reflections upon some passages in a book, entitled reflections upon the conduct of human life. with reference to the study of learning and knowledge. by edmund elys. elys, edmund, ca. 1634-ca. 1707. 1690 approx. 6 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 3 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2003-01 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a39370 wing e690 estc r214816 99826883 99826883 31292 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a39370) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 31292) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 1776:13) reflections upon some passages in a book, entitled reflections upon the conduct of human life. with reference to the study of learning and knowledge. by edmund elys. elys, edmund, ca. 1634-ca. 1707. 4 p. s.n., [london : 1690?] caption title. imprint form wing. begins on signature b. a reply to: norris, john. reflections upon the conduct of human life, with reference to the study of learning and knowledge. reproduction of the original in the bodleian library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng norris, john, 1657-1711. -reflections upon the couduct of human life, with reference to the study of learning and knowledge. society of friends -apologetic works -early works to 1800. knowledge, theory of (religion) -early works to 1800. sermons, english -17th century. 2002-06 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2002-06 aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images 2002-08 judith siefring sampled and proofread 2002-08 judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited 2002-10 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion reflections upon some passages , in a book , entitled reflections upon the conduct of human life . with reference to the study of learning and knowledge . by edmvnd elys . reflection 1. sect. 4. perhaps we shall be found to be as much out in the conduct of our vnderstandings , as in that of our wills. answ. there is no irregularity in the vnderstanding , but what proceeds from the irregularity of the will. sect. 10. true knowledge ( whatever it be ) must be suppos'd to be a thing of uncommon difficulty , and the study of it a work fit only for sublimer wits ; the more elevated , and awakned part of mankind . answ. purity of heart , is that which doth principally conduce to the attainment of true knowledge . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . sophocles . the soul that 's truly just , and kind ; truth , hid from subtle wits , shall find . sect. 37. a thing may deserve to be known , not as perfecting the vnderstanding ; but meerly as touching upon our interest . answ. no man can have any true , or real interest , but what has some reference to the enjoyment of the sovereign good : therefore any thing that deserves to be known because it touches upon our interest ; deserves to be known as perfecting the understanding : the perfection of the understanding consisting in the apprehension of the truth , for the satisfaction of the will , in the possession of the true good. i agree with this ingenious author in that he says , no truth is perfective of the understanding , but only necessary truth . by necessary truth i understand the divine essence , and all those effects of infinite wisdom , power , and goodness , which it is our duty to contemplate . reflection 2. sect. 10. if now it be further demanded how this may be done ; ( viz. to apply our selves to the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to consult the ideal world ) i answer that there are three ways of doing it , and i can think of no more : the first is by attention ; the second by purity of heart , and life ; and the third by prayer . i do not charge these words with falshood , but the reader will fall into an error , if he conceit that he may apply himself to the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by any other attention of the mind , but what proceeds from such a temper , or disposition of will , which implies an aversion from any other speculation , but what may be vseful unto him , in doing the will of god. this holy disposition of the will , is the only true purity of heart , and the exercising of it is an effectual prayer , a worshiping of god in spirit , and in truth . these words sect. 29. are most perfectly agreeable to my conceptions : we ought to prosecute learning and knowledge , no further than as 't is conducieve to the great ends of piety , and virtue . and consequently whenever we study to any other purpose , or in any other degree than this ; we are unaccountably , impertinently , i may add , sinfully employ'd . but , then , say i , it must be consider'd , that no sinful exercise or employment of our intellective faculties , can ever tend to the improvement of the brightness of the vnderstanding , or intellectual perfection . nothing can properly be call'd wisdom , but the practical vnderstanding of true goodness . such expressions as i find in the 27 and 28 sections , seem to come short of that accuracy which is requisite for a christian philosopher , that has the confidence to pass so severe a censure upon our academical education , and learning . certainly rectitude of will is a greater ornament and perfection , than brightness of understanding ; and to be good is more divine than to be wise and knowing . the question is , whether we ought to be more solicitous for that intellectual perfection , which we cant have here , and shall have hereafter , or for that moral perfection , which we may have here , and cannot hereafter . a lover of this present world is a fool and an ignorant wretch : they that love the lord jesus in sincerity , are the only wise and knowing men. 't is one and the same thing to be good , or to partake of the divine nature , and to be wise and knowing . i think it my duty to declare to the world , that it seems to me , that this author deals most incuriously with the people call'd quakers in speaking so contemptuously of their notion of the light within . i pray god that he , and i , and they , and all those that profess themselves to be followers of jesus christ , may have our hearts duly affected with the sense of these sacred words , proverbs 4. 18 , 19. the path of the just is as the shining light , that shineth more and more unto the perfect day . the way of the wicked is as darkness : they know not at what they stumble . iohn 1. 9. this was the true light , which lighteth every man that cometh into the world . iohn 8. 12. then spake jesus again unto them , saying , i am the light of the world : he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness , but shall have the light of life . iohn 14. 6. jesus saith unto him , i am the way , and the truth , and the life : no man cometh unto the father , but by me . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . finis . second remarks upon an essay concerning humane understanding in a letter address'd to the author, being a vindication of the first remarks against the answer of mr. lock, at the end of his reply to the lord bishop of worcester. burnet, thomas, 1635?-1715. 1697 approx. 40 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 17 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2003-01 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a30485 wing b5946 estc r20232 12259067 ocm 12259067 57739 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a30485) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 57739) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 175:3) second remarks upon an essay concerning humane understanding in a letter address'd to the author, being a vindication of the first remarks against the answer of mr. lock, at the end of his reply to the lord bishop of worcester. burnet, thomas, 1635?-1715. [2], 30 p. printed for m. wotton ..., london : 1697. attributed to t. burnet. cf. bm. reproduction of original in yale university library. marginal notes. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng locke, john, 1632-1704. -essay concerning human understanding. burnet, thomas, 1635?-1715. -remarks upon an essay concerning human understanding. locke, john, 1632-1704. -mr. locke's reply to the ... bishop of worcester's answer to his letter concerning ... mr. locke's essay of human understanding. knowledge, theory of -early works to 1800. 2002-06 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2002-07 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2002-08 john latta sampled and proofread 2002-08 john latta text and markup reviewed and edited 2002-10 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion second remarks upon an essay concerning humane understanding , in a letter address'd to the author . being a vindication of the first remarks , against the answer of mr. lock , at the end of his reply to the lord bishop of worcester . london , printed for m. wotton , at the three daggers in fleet-street . 1697. the occasional paper will be continu'd next term. second remarks upon an essay concerning humane understanding , in a letter address'd to the author . sir , at the end of your reply to the lord bishop of worcester , i have met with your answer , as you are pleas'd to call it , to my short remarks upon your essay , and am very much surpriz'd to find it writ in such an angry style , and with such undeserved and ill-grounded reflections . i writ to you with civility and respect , and i dare appeal to any gentleman , if there be any thing unbecoming or provoking in the style or expressions of my letter . if you made a false surmise to your self , that a storm was coming , as you phrase it , and a design hatching to run down your book ; as there is no storm , i 'm sure , in my letter , but every line calm and peaceable , so i protest i never heard of any such design , never had communication with any , about the confuting or opposing your book : and as to these two short papers of remarks , 't is more than i know if any person in the world ( besides my self ) knows me to be the writer of them . so far was i from designing any thing by them but my own satisfaction , and to know the true state of your principles , that i might the better judge of their truth , and of their consequences . and whereas you say , if it was for my own information , what need of putting my doubts in print ? i thought that the best way , that your answer might give satisfaction to others ( as well as to me ) who probably might have the same or like scruples . and as to your self , i thought i had done you a kindness , by giving you an opportunity of explaining or vindicating some of your principles , which were likely , i thought , to fall under the censure of inquisitive persons . then , as to the crime of concealing my name , which is another thing objected , i think , of all men i know , mr. lock had the least reason to make that criminal , he , who hath writ so many books without putting his name to them , and some in confutation of the principles of other men. turpe est censori , cùm — but you have invented a strange reason for my concealing my name , with a black accusation contain'd in it , in these words : i cannot much blame him in another respect , for concealing his name . for , i think , any one who appears amongst christians , may be well asham'd of his name , when be raises such a doubt as this , viz. whether an infinitely powerful and wise being , be veracious or no ? unless falshood be in such reputation with this gentleman , that he concludes lying to be no mark of weakness and folly. this insinuation is the more inexcusable , because to bring it in , you have misrepresented and perverted the sense of the author . the question there is not , whether god be veracious ? but , whether , according to your principles , he can be prov'd to be so ? the reflection which falls upon your principles onely , you would have thrown upon god , and very unjustly suppose that the remarker calls in question the divine veracity , whereas he onely calls in question the truth of your principles : which , i think , is a very different thing from the divine veracity . in the pages you cite , the remarker says , veracity , according to his principles , may be prov'd to belong to the divine nature , as being a perfection ; but tells you at the same time , that you make no use of that argument , nor vouchsafe to give us any account or idea of perfection , tho' you do of many other terms and notions of less importance . you may see by this , that falshood and lying ( as your gross words are ) are not in reputation with this gentleman , seeing he looks upon them as imperfections inconsistent with the divine nature . now let every impartial reader judge , whether there is less of the christian in the first objection , or in the pretended answer ; and whether of these two persons hath more reason to be ashamed . you add in the same place , that you have more than once spoke of the goodness of god , another evidence of his veracity . be it so ; but where have you prov'd the divine goodness ? or how can it be prov'd , from your principles ? the question is not , as i told you before , whether god be good and veracious , &c. nor whether you think so , ( for i do not enter into your thoughts ) but onely , whether you have prov'd these attributes , or laid down any principles by which they may be prov'd . next , you proceed to what concerns the mathematical demonstration of morality : where i desired to know how it could be founded on your principles . in answer to this , you tell me , my judgment does not seem of that consequence , that any one should be in haste to gratifie my impatience . sir , i did not presume to desire to know the full systems of your morality , but the basis up on which you would build it : and you having declar'd more than once , that from grounds and principles laid down in your book , morality might be mathematically demonstrated , i thought it would give no offence to enquire which ground or principle you pitcht upon for your foundation . i thought , i say , that would have given no offence , especially seeing i was willing to suppose , that 't was not the deficiency of your principles , but my own short-sightedness , that made me at a loss . but however , if this enquiry , how modestly soever propos'd , be look'd upon by you as presumptuous , i beg your pardon , if that will satisfie at present ; and we shall have occasion hereafter to speak more at large concerning the grounds of morality ; where , tho' you be so reserv'd in declaring yours , i shall not be so in declaring mine . after this , you make a remark upon what i had said concerning the knowledge of our duty , and concerning the grounds of the divine law : and you express it in these words ; and since he thinks the illiterate part of mankind ( which is the greatest ) must have a more compendious way to know their duty , than by long deductions , ( you should have said , long and obscure deductions , if you had truly taken the words of the author ) he may do well to consider , whether it were for their sakes he publish'd this question , viz. what is the reason and ground of the divine law ? i suppose this is mentioned as containing something inconsistent or incongruous ; but i see no such thing in the words cited . may not the illiterate part of mankind know their duty by natural conscience , and the revealed law of god , and yet that divine law have a reason or ground ? i can see no interfering in this , nor any incongruity . but this is a gentle reprimand or ( intended ) reflexion upon me , in comparison of the next , which flies as high as the imputation of malice and ignorance ; in these words : a man that insinuates , as he does , as if i held , that the distinction of vertue and vice was to be picked up by our eyes , our ears , or our nostrils , shews so much ignorance , or so much malice , that he deserves no other answer but pity . malice and ignorance ! these are such vulgar topicks of railing amongst angry and ill-bred writers , that methinks it should be below the genius of a gentleman and a philosopher , to make use of them . do you find these hard words in the writing you criticize ? i know that is no rule to you ; but however , the world will consider these things ( whether you will or no ) to judge of the temper of a person , who treats another at this rate , that us'd him with respect , and in civil language . but let us consider the matter it self . you call this an insinuation of mine , not a thing directly exprest ; and you have reason for this diminution of it : but this also will make it more difficult to find out the particular passage you understand here . the first passage in the paragraph to which i suppose you refer , is this : your general principle of picking up all our knowledge from our five senses , i confess , does not sit easily in my thoughts , tho' you join reflexion to help us . now if this be the sentence you mean , surely you ought not to have omitted reflexion , and to have charg'd this only upon the five senses , which you see i do not . there is another sentence in the same paragraph , which possibly you may refer to ; and 't is this : as to morality , we think the great foundation of it is , the distinction of good and evil , vertue and vice , turpis & honesti , as they are usually call'd : and i do not find that my eyes , ears , nostrils , or any other outward sense , make any distinction of these things , as they do of sounds , colours , scents , and other outward objects ; nor from any idea taken in from them or from their reports , am i conscious that i do or can conclude , that there is such a distinction in the nature of things . in these two passages i though i had taken in enough to comprehend your sensation and reflexion , which you make the principles of all our knowledge , natural or moral , and consequently of the distinction of good and evil , vertue and vice. but we shall see further into this matter , and into your sense , when you have further explain'd your moral notions , and let us see what you make vertue and vice , good and evil to be , according to your way . but i must not forget to speak a few words to the charge it self , malice and ignorance . malice is against a person : now god knows , i never had either malice or envy against your person : and whosoever reads that paper of remarks , i believe , will think so ; for 't is writ in a courteous style , and with favourable expressions to you , from first to last . as to the imputation of ignorance , i am not so much concern'd to clear my self in that point . if it be my ignorance in general that you pity , i acknowledge your kindness , and own your pity well plac't : but if it be my ignorance of your principles that you pity , as it seems to be , that may be a weakness in me , i confess , but i hope no mortal sin , nor any thing that requires much pity . but however , if you pity my ignorance of your principles , and yet will not instruct me in them , nor help me when i beg your charity , that pity is but a mock-pity , and deserves no thanks . now we come to the last head of inquiries you are pleas'd to take notice of , the immortality of the soul. and for a proof of this , you refer me ( whether ludicrously and sarcastically , or no , you best know ) to the lord bishop of worcester's arguments , taken from your principles . then you add , but if that will not serve his turn , i will tell him a principle of mine that will clear it to him ; and that is , the revelation of life and immortality by jesus christ through the gospel . i write it immortality , for so i know it was intended ; tho' , by an unlucky slip of the press , 't is printed there immorality . the revelation of the gospel is no doubt an happy confirmation of the immortality of the soul ; but we are speaking of proofs to be made by the light of nature , and particularly by the principles of humane understanding , as you have represented them . and before you make use of revelation in this point , you should resolve the other point objected to you , viz. how you can prove the truth of revealed religion , according to your principles . sir , i have now done with your answer , as you call it ; but i can find neither answer nor explication in it to those doubts i proposed . you may have some particular reasons for that , which you best know : but i know no good reason you can have for writing in such a snappish and peevish way . if you affect the character of a captious disputant , i do not envy it you , i think you have taken the ready way to gain it , by your way of writing , both here and elsewhere . if you have been so treated by other pens , as to make you angry and out of humour , you ought not to take your revenge , or ease your spleen upon an inoffensive pen : and you will be less pitied , when roughly handled by others , if you treat them rudely that treated you civilly . there is nothing , i 'm sure , in my words or expressions that could offend you : it must be in the sense , by touching , it may be , upon some tender parts of your essay , that would not bear pressing without giving pain . if you concluded ' with your self , that the writer of those remarks was some mean contemptible thing , with whom you were not bound to observe the measures of common civility ; yet methinks , even in that case , it had been better to have wholly neglected a person of whom you had such an idea , than to have given an answer without giving any satisfaction to his doubts , or any vindication of your principles . as to the storm you speak of , preparing against you , i know nothing of it , as i told you before ; yet i can blame none that desire such principles of humane understanding as may give them proofs and security against such a system as this , cogitant matter , a mortal soul , a manichean god ( or a god without moral attributes , ) and an arbitrary law of good and evil. how far your principles are concern'd in these things , or lead to scepticism in these and other material points , is left to your consideration . this however i know , the ready way to prevent any such storm , is to give such a plain explication of your principles , without art or chicane , as may cure and remove any fears of this nature . after all , notwithstanding this imperfect and angry answer , i will not be discourag'd from solliciting once more a further explication of your principles upon the three grand points , the immortality of the soul , natural religion , and reveal'd religion . and whereas you seem to say , those that do not like your principles , or think them false or defective , let them find out better : we cannot tell how good or how bad , how full or defective your principles are , till we know the true state of them , and their consequences , in reference to moral things : and for that reason we desire a further explanation of them upon those heads . i am apt to believe , many of your readers , if not the generality , do not so far understand your principles , as to see what consequences they draw after them ; and possibly you did not reflect upon it your self . your readers may easily be amus'd in a multitude of names and notions , and signs of notions : they 're led into a wood of idea's ( simple and complex , and complex-collective ; absolute , relative , real , or phantastical , &c. ) and there they are lost ; pleasantly indeed , amongst lights and shades , and many pretty landskips ; but they know not where they are , nor see to the end of the wood. you know what philosophers ( ancient or modern ) your principles are said to imitate ; but i do not desire to make use of names , one way or other , but to argue every thing fairly and upon the square , as far as reason will go . and let those that are unconcern'd and impartial , judge what is fairly objected , what fairly answer'd , and what not . but if in these things , which concern religion and morality , you will give us no further light or answer , i may reasonably conclude , that i have not mistaken your sense , and that i have truly calculated the elevation of those principles . wherein , notwithstanding , i shall be always willing and desirous to be set right , if i have committed any errour . but let us proceed to the matters under debate . as to the immortality of the soul , in your answer to the lord bishop of worcester , you acknowledge the deficiency or limitation of your principles as to the proof of its immateriality : but however , you do not freely tell us , what you make the soul to be . you say indeed , 't is a thinking substance ; but so you say matter may be made , for any thing you know . then the soul may be mortal , for any thing you know , or any thing we know , by your principles . do you think the soul to be a permanent substance , distinct from the body ? or a modification or power of the body ? or life onely ? or a certain influence from without , acting in matter so and so qualified , or in such and such systems ? which dispositions or systems , when they come to be dissolved or destroy'd , that power ceases to act there ; either perishing , as a flame when the fewel is spent ; or returning to its fountain , whatsoever it was . this notion seems to me to suit best to the general air of your discourse about the soul , and with several particular passages relating to it . as when you make cogitation in us to be like motion in matter , which receives its motion from external impression . and when you speak about the sleep of the soul , or the suspension of cogitation when we sleep ; the body not being then receptive of the thinking influence . you say , the soul hath no extension , nor , at certain fits , any cogitation : what can the soul be then , but a certain power acting in the body , when the body is prepar'd for the exercise of it , and ceasing to act when the body is indisposed ? but whether that be a superiour divine power , distinct from matter , as a vis movens ; or a power fastned , i know not how , to the body , or upon such and such systems of matter : whether , i say , of these two suppositions better agrees with your doctrine , i cannot certainly tell ; but either of them destroys the immortality of the soul , upon the dissolution of the body . furthermore , this seems to be the supposition you go upon , when you question , whether a man waking and sleeping ( without thoughts ) be the same man. if there be still , sleeping or waking , the same soul , the same permanent substance , i see no room for that question or doubt which you make ; and your making of it , would induce one to believe , that it is a difficulty that arises to you particularly , and upon that principle , that the soul of man is not a permanent and distinct substance , but an extrinsick or intrinsick power , that acts or is suspended according to the disposition or indispositions of the body . accordingly , i do not see by your discourse , how st. peter , suppose , at the resurrection , will be the same man , unless he have the same body , or the same organization of parts ; tho' his soul be the same , with the same dispositions and habits : nor how our saviour , now in heaven , is the same man that was crucified at jerusalem ; or that he that was crucified at jerusalem , is the same man that will come again to judge the quick and the dead . but i do not love to walk in the dark , and therefore i refer these things to your further explication , if you so please . your doctrine of the soul seems to me obscure and ambiguous : men write , i think , to be understood ; and i hope i may , without offence , use the same sentence to you , which you have used to others , si monvis intelligi , debes negligi . however if you please to let us into the secret , if there be a secret , i shall make no other use of it than to give it a fair and free examination . i proceed now to another difficulty in your doctrine of the soul , which i mentioned formerly . you think the soul , when we are asleep , is without any thoughts or perceptions . i am still at a loss , i confess , how to frame any idea of a thoughtless , senseless , lifeless soul. this carcase of a soul i cannot understand : if it neither have cogitation , nor extension , as you suppose , what being or manner of being it hath , i am not able to comprehend . it must be a substance , and a particular finite substance , and yet without any mode . if you say you have no idea of it , why then do you affirm or introduce a new and unintelligible state of the soul , whereof neither you , nor others , can have any conception ? however , you ought to tell us , how you bring the soul out of this unintelligible state. what cause can you assign able to produce the first thought at the end of this sleep and silence , in a total ecclipse and intermission of thinking ? upon your supposition , that all our thoughts perish in sound sleep ; and all cogitation is extinct , we seem to have a new soul every morning . if a flame be extinct , the same cannot return , but a new one may be made . if a body cease to move , and come to perfect rest , the motion it had cannot be restord , but a new motion may be produc'd . if all cogitation be extinct , all our ideas are extinct , so far as they are cogitations , and seated in the soul : so we must have them new imprest ; we are , as it were , new born , and begin the world again . if you say , the ideas remain in the soul , in that state of silence and insensibility , and need only a new excitation ; why then , say i , may not infants have innate ideas ( which you so much oppose ) that want only objects and occasions to excite and actuate them , with a fit disposition of the brain ? sir , i am sorry my apprehension should be so slow , or your doctrine about the soul so shaded and cover'd , that i cannot , without further light , come to know your meaning ; or , which i most desire , see how it is consistent with reason and nature . to gratifie your readers with a clearer explanation of your principles in this particular , seems to be a debt due to them , which i shall take however as an obligation : but if you be otherwise minded , for reasons best known to your self , i shall use no further entreaty or importunity . another head wherein i desir'd your further explication , was in reference to reveal'd religion ; that we may see what ground we can have upon your principles for the certainty of it . if we cannot in your way be assur'd of the immortality of the soul by the light of nature , or by revelation , you leave us no certain way to know it . now if you do not make that revelation certain in it self , it cannot make us certain of any thing . you seem therefore the more oblig'd to give good proof of the certainty of reveal'd religion , by how much you make the assurance of our immortality to depend upon its testimony . i told you formerly , why i thought your principles would not reach to the proof of a certainty in reveal'd religion ; namely , because they do not prove , nor give us grounds whereupon we may prove the moral attributes of god ; upon which , and not upon infinite power and knowledge only , depends the satisfaction and assurance we have of the truth of a revelation . the divine veracity is the particular attribute upon which it mainly depends ; and that we think may be prov'd from the divine perfection : but you have given us no idea of perfection , unless you resolve it into power ; whereof indeed you have given a large account , but that will not reach and decide the case in question . however , i will wait your pleasure and leisure , to see if you are minded to give us any more instruction in this particular . the truth is , there is a passage in your late reply to the bishop of worcester , ( p. 95 , 96. ) which would incline one to believe , that you think there is no certainty in reveal'd religion , seeing you do not allow the certainty of faith , but look upon that expression as jargon , or next to nonsense . to talk of the certainty of faith , say you , seems all one to me , as to talk of the knowledge of believing : a way of speaking not easie to me to understand . faith , methinks , must either be certain or uncertain ; and if you refuse the one , you must take the other . but this , i suppose , with what follows there , will fall under the examination and censure of a better pen : i will therefore insist no more upon it . i proceed now to the third head , that of natural religion and morality . this you think is demonstrable from your principles , mathematically demonstrable . this indeed would be an happy performance , and of great use to mankind . but , i cannot discern from what sure foundation , or in what method you can make out this demonstration . if you make natural religion and morality to depend upon future rewards and punishments , as i think you do , then they must depend upon the immortality of the soul ; and if they depend upon that , and that be only probable by the light of nature , then neither can the other by the light of nature be mathematically demonstrable . i should argue thus , if morality stands upon future punishments and rewards , and future punishments and rewards stand upon the immortality of the soul , and the immortality of the soul be only probable , then morality cannot be mathematically demonstrable . this is something like your indian comparison . if the earth stand upon an elephant , and the elephant upon a tortoise , then what supports the tortoise ? thus far we are clear ; there ought not , i 'm sure , be more in the conclusion , than was in the premises . you allow , i think , a law of nature , with or without revelation ; a natural conscience to distinguish good and evil , virtue and vice. this is generally understood by morality and natural religion . and this morality , if i understand you aright , is what you say is demonstrable by your principles . but if you use that word morality in another sense than what is generally understood by it in common conversation , or by ancient and modern authors , you ( who blame others so often for an uncertain use of words ) ought to fix and declare your peculiar signification of that word , that we may know your meaning . if by morality you understand the practical precepts of the christian religion , who doubts but that morality may be known clearly and evidently ? we have no need of your mathematical demonstration in that case , if you mean onely that you can prove morality from scripture . besides , if that were required , you must first give us a demonstration of the veracity of the revealer from your principles , before you can demonstrate morality in this sense . but if you understand natural morality , as others do ; we think , and say , you cannot give , by your principles , a demonstration of it . after all , whatsoever you understand by morality , you seem to ground your demonstration upon future punishments and rewards , and upon the arbitrary . will of the law giver : and i do not think these the first grounds of good and evil , vertue and vice. i do not think they are constituted by punishments and rewards , nor by the will of god onely , if you take that will for an arbitrury power : and i 'll give my reasons for it . if things were so , there would be no fixt notion of holiness , and god might be the author of sin : i mean , of what we call sin , and judge sin , and for which sinners are punisht . but in reality ( according to this principle ) there is nothing sin to this almighty being , nor any fixt notion of holiness . for if his will be the original rule of good and evil , and that will go by no rule , there is no rule of sin to him : all things are indifferent , till he declare this or that to be sin , according to his pleasure ; nor is there any rule of sin to us , but that revealed pleasure . this consequence , i believe , will be granted , admitting the supposition . but you will say , it may be , after god hath declar'd such and such things to be sin , they are so , and he cannot be the author of them . and why not , i pray ? i desire to know , what binds him to his word ? to this order or declaration he hath made ? it must be something antecedent to his will , and , in that respect , superiour : which if you allow , we have all we desire , an original standard for sin and holiness ; namely , the divine nature and essential perfections : a law from which the divine will can never deviate ; nor we , without sin , ever transgrefs . then , on the other hand , as to holiness , what definition or idea can you give us of it , according to this principle ? is holiness onely a due care and concern for our interest and happiness , present and future ? that 's a good thing , and very necessary ; but 't is rather prudence or wisdom , than holiness , in the proper sense of the word . suppose then you say , holiness is a conformity to the will of god : that also is very true ; for the divine will is never contrary to the divine nature : but this is not the original notion of intrinsick holiness , into which 't is ultimately resolv'd ; this is not the archetype . intrinsick holiness is a conformity to the divine nature , according to our capacities ; being like to god , and partakers of his perfections , pure as he is pure , so far as the measures of humanity will permit . this , i think , is clear in reason , and i m sure 't is confirm'd by good authorities ; that of revelation , and also that of the best esteem'd philosophers that have writ about morality . and furthermore , how can we know ( antecedently to revelation ) what the will of god is , or what he hath appointed to be good or evil , sin or holiness ? i say , how can you know this , if you do not know it from the immutable nature of god , and the immutable differences of good and evil ? and there will be the same difficulty to know or ascertain future punishments and rewards , without , or with a revelation : for tho' you have a revelation , if there be no immovable rules of good and evil , just and unjust ; nor any fixt rule of right betwixt god and his creatures , you can never be assur'd of performance , whatsoever is promis'd or threatned . there may be a reveal'd and a secret will , for any thing you know : and we may follow one , and the other be finally executed , according to a secret intention ; which will lay a ground for an incurable scepticism . but i have noted before , how these principles , upon another account , render the whole future state uncertain , and therefore prosecute it no further at present . i think you should tell us also , what is the love of god ( the fountain of vertue and piety ) according to your principles ; and how it is distinguish'd from self love : which , in your way , it seems to be in the last resolution of it . we love god ; but why ? not for his sake , but for our own sake ; because he will reward our love and obedience . without this motive , you seem to leave no argument to love him , or vertue , or piety : we may fear and admire an eternal , almighty , all knowing being : but if he have no other attributes , as i do not find you have prov'd any more , you lay no foundation for the love of god , nor for the love of vertue and piety . those verses express my sense in this particular : oderunt peccare mali , formidine poenae : oderunt peccare boni , virtutis amore . but your principles turn the latter verse another way ; oderunt peccare boni , mercedis amore . how , pray you , upon these principles , do you preserve the distinction ( that good old distinction , which it may be you despise ) of bonum utile & honestum ? in your way , either the parts are coincident , or bonum utile is superior to bonum honestum . 't is an open and free saying of tully's , but was always thought to have good sense in it , perspicuum est , nisi aequitas , fides , justitia , proficiscantur à naturâ , & si omnia haec ad utilitatem referantur , virum bonum non posse reperiri . many , you know , of our best authors in morality have spoken things to the same sense . in like manner , the distinction of positive laws , and natural or moral laws , seems to be confounded , if you make both to depend upon the arbitrary will of god. at least , these things need a further explication , if , according to this new way , you make them both to have the same ground and measure . give me leave to add one consideration more : as the reasons of good and evil , so likewise of true and false , seem to be unstable and unsettled , according to these principles . for , if the difference of true and false be immutable , or not determin'd by the arbitrary will of god , i see no reason why we should not make the same judgment as to the difference of good and evil ; or why moral truths should not be as fixt and unalterable as any other . let us take a proposition in mathematicks , and another in morality : suppose , in the former , that which is often made use of , that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones : and in morals , that it is a wicked thing for a man maliciously to kill his friend , or his father , or any innocent person . the truth of this seems to me as clear , eternal , and unalterable , as the other . there is a rectitude and obliquity in actions , as well as in lines , a congruity or incongruity . 't is true , moral cases are commonly more complex , and so not so easily stated ; but in those that are simple and general , or clearly stated , propositions about them are as certain as other truths . in every moral action or moral case there is a right and a wrong , as much as every number is even or odd , or every line straight or crooked . and the relations of moral things seem to me as necessary , as the relations of figures and numbers . i am also apt to believe , that the differences of good and evil , just and unjust , turpis & honesti , would be as sensible to us ( in nature pure ) as physical or mathematical differences ; as smeet and sowr , straight and crooked ; if interest , appetities , passions , and lusts did not deprave our taste and judgments in those intellectual things . which prejudices and brutish inclinations take no place , you know , in physical or mathematical speculations . sir , if you please to let us know your grounds of morality ( mathematically demonstrable ) as plainly as i have done mine , 't is all that i desire as to this particular . and in all other things , i think , 't is enough to express our thoughts clearly , with our reasons for them . more is not needful amongst persons that have no other design than to find out truth , by comparing the opinions of others with their own , and weighing the reasons on both sides . for a man to attend to his own thoughts and conceptions , and the best light he hath ; not to speak by roat , and blindly follow either new or receiv'd opinions , is so far commendable . but whether his principles and conclusions are just , and proportionate to the nature of things , is a further question , and must be left to time and trial. every man would be willing to know the sense of the authors that he reads , the state of their principles with their consequences ( especially as to moral things ) that he might make a sure judgment of them . i am sensible that when men have a different set of ideas and first principles , they may be easily mistaken in judging of one anothers meaning , or in drawing consequences from one anothers principles : but that , methinks , ought to give no offence ; but rather to be gently rectified ( without ill language ) by the authors themselves , who best know their own mind . and as i find that you say you are often at a loss in understanding the lord bishop of worcester's remarks upon some of your notions , so i hope you will not think it strange if i am sometimes at a loss also how to understand your writings ; which , we may reasonably presume , are not more clear , either as to sense or words . you tell me in your answer , that i pretend to have writ that letter to be inform'd : and so i did ; but withal gave you some reasons for my doubts . will you not allow a learner to desire his master to explain himself , when he does not understand his dictates ? and also to propose objections , when his teacher's sense seems to him contrary to reason ? we are taught by your self , not to give up our assent to the authority of others , without good evidence ; and you make it one great cause of errour , to relie blindly upon the opinions of others . i hope therefore i have obey'd your precepts in this , as i am ready to do in all other things that are reasonable . i can truly and sincerly say , that i do not write out of any spirit of opposition , nor for any by-ends whatsoever ; but for my own instruction and satisfaction , and for the discovery of truth in those great points . when i doubt of your sense , if you please to direct me ; and when i make objections , if you please to answer them , i have my design ; and desire onely that the merits of the cause may be spoken to on either hand , without course language , and personal reflexions , which , i think , is your own advice . * in your conclusion you tell me again of my fault , in not setting my name to my paper , in these hard , words ; to conclude , were there nothing else in it , i should not think it fit to trouble my self about the questions of a man , which he himself does not think wortby owning . to which i answer , tho' in some cases i think the sense is more impartially consider'd ( without favour or prejudice ) when the author is unknown ; yet if that will satisfie you , do you put your name to all the books and pamphlets you have writ , and i will put my name to this ; how unusual soever it is to put a name to such small papers . sir , your humble servant . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a30485-e160 answ. p. 3. pag. 4. remarks , p. 5 pag. 4. pag. 5. pag. 5 , 6. pag. 74 , 75. effay , p. 44. pag. 68 . fect . 10. p. 44 , 45. & lib. 2. c. 27. pag. 180. sect . 6. pag. 272. p. 17. sect . 5 , 6. p. 192. sect . 5. p. 86. sect . 19. p. 197. sect . 2. de fin . bon. & mal. c. 18 . pag. 2. essay , p. 405. sect . 17. * no bodies notions , i think , are the better or truer , for ill-manners joined with them ; and i conclude , your lordship , who so well knows the different cast of mens heads , and of the opinions that possess them , will not think it ill manners in any one , if his notions differ from your lordship's , and that he owns that difference , and explains the grounds of it as well as be can : i have always thought , that truth and knowledge , by the ill and over-eager management of controversies , lose a great deal of the advantages they might receive from the variety of conceptions there is in mens understandings . could the heats , and passions , and ill language be left out of them , they would afford great improvements to those who could separate them from by-interests and personal prejudices . answer to the bishop of worcester , p. 222. philosophicall fancies. written by the right honourable, the lady newcastle. newcastle, margaret cavendish, duchess of, 1624?-1674. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a53057 of text r202988 in the english short title catalog (wing n865). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 124 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 60 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a53057 wing n865 estc r202988 99863099 99863099 115281 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a53057) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 115281) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; 189:e1474[1]) philosophicall fancies. written by the right honourable, the lady newcastle. newcastle, margaret cavendish, duchess of, 1624?-1674. [24], 94, [2] p. printed by tho: roycroft, for j. martin, and j. allestrye, at the bell in st. pauls church-yard, london : 1653. partly in verse. the last leaf is blank. annotation on thomason copy: "may. 21.". reproduction of the original in the british library. eng conduct of life -early works to 1800. mind and body -early works to 1800. knowledge, theory of -early works to 1800. good and evil -early works to 1800. virtue -early works to 1800. a53057 r202988 (wing n865). civilwar no philosophicall fancies. written by the right honourable, the lady newcastle. newcastle, margaret cavendish, duchess of 1653 18822 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a this text has no known defects that were recorded as gap elements at the time of transcription. 2000-00 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2001-00 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2001-00 tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread 2001-00 tcp staff (michigan) text and markup reviewed and edited 2001-11 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion philosophicall fancies . written by the right honourable , the lady newcastle . london , printed by tho : roycroft , for j. martin , and j. allestrye , at the bell in st. pauls church-yard , 1653. a dedication to fame . to thee , great fame , i dedicate this peece . though i am no philosopher of greece ; yet do not thou my workes of thoughts despise , because they came not from the ancient , wise . nor do not think , great fame , that they had all the strange opinions , wich we learning call . for nature's unconfin'd , and gives about her severall fancies , without leave , no doubt . shee 's infinite , and can no limits take , but by her art , as good a brain may make . although shee 's not so bountifull to me , yet pray accept of this epitome . an epistle to time . swift , ever-moving time , i write to thee , to crave thy pardon , if ill spent thou be . but i did chuse this way , thinking it best : for by my writing i do none molest . i injure none , nor yet disturb their way , i slander none , nor any one betray . if i do wast thee in a musing thought , yet i take paines , my braines constantly wrought . for in three weeks begun , and finisht all these philosophicall fancies , which i call . if thou thinkst much , that i should spend thee so , to write of that , i can but guesse , not know ; i le tell thee time , thou mayst bee worser spent , in wanton waies , which some call merriment . let me tell thee , this better pleaseth me , then if i spent thee in fine pageantry . a request to time . time , prethee be content , and let me write ; i le use thee better then the carpet knight , or amorous ladies , which doe dance , and play , casting their modesty , and fame away . i humbly cast mine eyes downe to the ground , or shut them close , while i a fancy found . and in a melancholy posture sit , with musing thoughts , till i more fancies get . besides , deare time , nature doth not me give such store of health , to hope i old shall live . then let me give my youth the most content , which is to write , and send it to the print . if any like my fancies when they 'r read , my time 's rewarded , though my body's dead . if they do not , my son'e will lye at rest , because my life did think , what 's harmlesse , best . an epistle to my braine . i wonder , braine , thou art so dull , when there was not a day , but wit past , through the yeare . for seven yeares 't is , since i have married bin ; which time , my braine might be a magazine , to store up wise discourse , naturally sent , in fluent words , which free , and easie went . if thou art not with wit inrich'd thereby , then uselesse is the art of memory . but thou , poor braine , hard ftozen art with cold , words seales , of wit , will neither print , nor hold . an epistle to a troubled fancy . fancies in sleep are visions , dreames we call , rais'd in the braine to sport themselves withall . sometimes they take delight to fright the minde , taking strange shapes , not like to natures kinde . after the soule they hunt , and run about , as from the body they would thrust it out . but if they are in humour kind , and good , in pleasing shapes before the minde they stood . an epistle to contemplation . i contemplating by a fires side , in winter cold , my thoughts would hunting ride . and after fancies they do run a race , if lose them not , they have a pleasant chase . if they do catch the hare , or kill the deere , they dresse them strait in verse , and make good cheere . an epistle to my musefull thoughts . thoughts , trouble not the soule with falling out , siding in factions , with feare , hope and doubt . but with the muses dance in measur'd feet , taking out all the fancies as you meet . some fancies are like wilde , and toyish girles , and some are sober , grave ; others are churles . let those that sober , sad , a pavin measure , corantoes are the lighter fancies pleasure . let churlish fancies dance with crabbed feet , in numbers odd , not even , smooth , nor sweet . another to the thoughts . my thoughts lye close imprison'd in the minde , unlesse through strange opinions passage finde . but when they finde a way , they run so fast , no reason can perswade to stay their hast . then they strait seek a credit for to win , perswading all they meet to follow them : and with their rhetoricke hope they to grow strong , striving to get beleife , as they go on . if contradiction chance to stop their way , they strait flye out , and oft times run away . and seldome they do back return again , to rally , or to muster in the brain . but the weak braine is forc'd more thoughts to raise , striving to get a victory of praise . reason , and the thoughts . thoughts , run not in such strange phantastick waies , nor take such paines to get a vulgar praise . the world will scorne , and say , you are all fooles , because you are not taught in common schooles . the world will think you mad , because you run not the same track , that former times have done . turn foolish thoughts , walke in a beaten path , or else the world ridiculously will laugh . reason forbeare , our study not molest , for wee do goe those waies that please us best . nature doth give us liberty to run , without a check , more swift far then the sun . but if we jar , and sometimes disagree , by thy disputes , we run unevenly . but prethee reason trouble us no more , for if you prate , wee 'l thrust you out of doore . to sir charles cavendish , my noble brother-in-law . sir , to forget to divulge your noble favours to me , in any of my works , were to murther gratitvde ; which i will never be guilty of : and though i am your slave , being manacl'd with chaines of obligation , yet my chaines feele softer then silke , and my bondage is pleasanter then freedome ; because i am bound to your selfe , who are a person so full of generosity , as you delight in bounty , and take pleasure to relieve the necessitated condition of your friends ; and what is freely given , is comfortably receiv'd , and a satisfaction to the minde . for , should a bountifull hand be joyn'd to repining thoughts , it would be like a gilded statue made of rotten wood . but your minde is the mint of virtues , which makes them currant coyne ; which i will never clip with a silent tongue , nor change with an unthankfull heart ; but locke it up with the key of admiration , in the chest of affection . i shall not feare to be turn'd out of your favour , though my deserts make me not worthy to dwell therein ; because you are so constant to charity , and so compassionate to misery ; so adverse to covetousnesse , so arm'd against mis-fortunes , so valiant in friendship , so victorious in naturall affections , as you are the conquerour of all merit . and may you ride in triumph on fame round the vniverse , untill the expiring thereof . thus doth your humble servant joy in your love , proud of your favour , glorie in your fame , and will die in your service . m. n. to the reader . noble readers , if this worke is not so well wrought , but that you may finde some false stitches ; i must let you understand it was huddl'd up in such hast , ( out of a desire to have it joyned to my booke of poems ) as i took not so much time , as to consider throughly ; for i writ it in lesse then three weekes ; and yet for all my hast , it came a weeke too short of the presse . besides my desire ( to have those works printed in england , which i wrote in england , before i leave england ) perswaded me to send it to the presse , without a further inlargement . but i imagine my readers will say , that there is enough , unless it were better . i can only say , i wish it were so good , as to give satisfaction : howsoever i pleased my selfe in the study of it . the table . of matter , and motion , page 1. of the forme , and the minde , 2. of eternall matter , 3. of infinite matter , 4. there is no proportion in nature , ib. of one kinde of matter , 5. of infinite knowledge , ib. there is no judge in nature , ib. of perfection , 6. of inequalities , ib. of unities , 8. of thin , and thick matter , ib. of vacuum , 9. the unity of nature , ib of division , 10 the order of nature , ib. of war , and no absolute power , 11. of power , ib. similizing the spirits , or innate motion , of operation , 13. of natural , or sensitive war . 14. of annihilation , ib. of life , 15. of change , 20. of youth , and growth , 21. of increasing , 22. of decay , 23. of dead , and death , 24. of locall shapes , 25. this visible motions in animals , vegetables , and minerals , 26. of the working of the severall motions of nature , 27. of the minde , 30. of their severall dances , and figures , 31. the sympathy , and antipathy of spirits , 33. the sympathy of sensitive , and rationall spirits in one figure , 36. the sympathy of the rationall , and sensitive spirits , to the figure they make , and inhabit , 37. of pleasure , and paine , 38. of the minde , ib. of thinking , or the minde , and thoughts , 41. of the motions of the spirits , 42. of the creation of the animall figure . 45. of the gathering of the spirits , 47. the moving of innate matter , 49. of matter , motion , and knowledge , or understanding , 52. of the animall figure , 54. what an animall is , 55. of sense , and reason , exercis'd in their different shapes , 56. of the dispersing of the rationall spirits , 63. of the senses , 64. of motion that makes light , 65. of opticks , ib. of the flowing of the spirits , 66. of motion , and matter , 67. of the braine , 68. of darknesse , ib. of the sun , 69. of the clouds , ib. of the motion of the planets , 70. of the motion of the sea , ib. i speak not here of deiaticall infinites , but of grosse infinites , such , as philosophers call chaos . of matter and motion . there is no first matter , nor first motion ; for matter and motion are infinite , and being infinite , must consequently be eternall ; and though but one matter , yet there is no such thing , as the whole matter , that is , as one should say , all . and though there is but one kinde of matter , yet there are infinite degrees of matter , as thinner and thicker , softer and harder , weightier and lighter ; and as there is but one matter , so there is but one motion , yet there are infinite degrees of motion , as swifter and slower ; and infinite changes of motion : and although there is but one matter , yet there are infinite of parts in that matter , and so infinites of figures : if infinite figures , infinite sizes ; if infinite sizes , infinite degrees of higness , and infinite degrees of smalnesse , infinite thicknesse , infinite thinnesse , infinite lightnesse , infinite weightinesse ; if infinite degrees of motion , infinite degrees of strengths ; if infinite degrees of strengths , infinite degrees of power , and infinite degrees of knowledge , and infinite degrees of sense . of the form , and the minde . as i sayd , there is but one matter , thinner and thicker , which is the forme , and the minde , that is , matter moving , or matter moved ; likewise there is but one motion , though slower or swifter moving severall wayes ; but the slower or weaker motions are no lesse motion , then the stronger or swifter . so matter that is thinnest or thickest , softest or hardest , yet it is but one matter ; for if it were divided by degrees , untill it came to an atome , that atome would still be the same matter , as well as the greatest bulk . but we cannot say smallest , or biggest , thickest or thinnest , softest or hardest in infinite . eternall matter . that matter which was solid , and weighty from all eternity , may be so eternally ; and what was spungie , and light from all eternity , may be so eternally ; and what had innate motion from eternity , may be so eternally ; and what was dull without innate motion from eternity , may be so eternally : for if the degrees could change , then there might be all thin , and no thicke , or all thicke , and no thin , all hard , no soft , and fluid , or all fluid , and no solidity . for though contracting and dilating may bring and joyne parts together , or separate parts asunder , yet those parts shall not be any other wayes , then by nature they were . of infinite matter . infinite matter cannot have exact forme , or figure , because it hath no limits : but being divided by motion into severall parts , those parts may have perfect figures , so long as those figures last ; yet these parts cannot be taken from the infinite body . and though parts may be divided in the body infinite , and joyned severall wayes , yet infinite can neither be added , nor diminished ; yet division is as infinite , as the matter divided . no proportion in nature . in nature there is no such thing , as number , or quantity ; for number , & quantity have only reference to division : neither is there any such thing as time in eternity ; for time hath no reference but to the present , if there be any such thing as present . of one kinde of matter . although there may be infinite degrees of matter , yet the nature , and kind of matter is finite : for infinite of severall kindes of matter would make a confusion . of infinite knowledge . there can be no absolute knowledge , if infinite degrees of knowledge ; nor no absolute power , if there be infinite degrees of strength : nor present , if infinite degrees of motion . no judge in nature . no intreaty , nor petition can perswade nature , nor any bribes an corrupt , or alter the course of nature . justly there can be no complaints made against nature , nor to nature . nature can give no redresse . there are no appeales can be made , nor causes determined , because nature is infinite , and eternall : for infinite cannot be confined , or prescribed , setled , or altered , rul'd , or dispos'd , because the effects are as infinite as the causes : and what is infinite , hath no absolute power : for what is absolute , is finite . finite cannot tel how infinite doth flow , nor how infinite matter moveth to and fro . for infinite of knowledge cannot guess of infinite of matter , more , or lesse : nor infinite of causes cannot finde the infinite effects of every kinde . of perfection . in infinite can no perfection be , for why ? perfection is in unity ? in infinite no union can combine , for that has neither number , point , nor line ; though infinite can have no figure , yet not lye all confu'sd in heaps together . of inequalities . if infinites have infinite degrees , and none a like to make equalities . as if a haire be cut with curious arts , innumerable , but unequall parts , and that not any part alike shall be , how shall we joyn , to make them well agree ? if every one is like it selfe alone , there cannot be , unlesse three equal ones . if one , and one make two ; and two , and two make foure , yet there must be two equall ones to make two , and two equall twos to make foure . and as two and one make three , yet there must be two equall ones joyned to a single one , to make three , or three equall single ones to joyn in three . the like is in weight , and measure , in motion and strength . of unities . in infinite if infinite degrees , then those degrees may meet in unities . and if one man should have the strength of foure , then foure to equal him will be no more . as if one line should be in four parts cut , shall equall the same lino together put ; so two and one , though odd , is three ; yet three and three shall equall be . like those that equall spaces backwards go , to those that 's forward , equalls them we know . like buckets in a well , if empty be , as one descends , the other ascends , we see so motions , though they 'r crosse , may well agree , as oft in musick make a harmony . there is no vacuity . in nature if degrees may equall be , all may be full , and no vacuity . as boxes small , & smaller may containe , so bigger , and bigger must there be again . infinite may run contracting , & dilating , still , still , by degrees without a separating . of thin , and thick matter . thus may thin matter into solid run , and by its motion , make thick matter turne . in severall wayes , and fashions , as it will , although dull matter of it selfe lye still : t is not , that solid matter moves in thin , for that is dull , but thin which moves therein . like marrow in the bones , or bloud in veines . or thinner matter which the bloud containes . like heat in fire , the effect is strait to burne , so matter thin makes solid matter run . of vacuum . if infinite inequallity doth run , then must there be in infinite vacuum . for what 's unequall , cannot joyned be so close , but there will be vacuity . the unity of nature . nature tends to unity , being but of a kinde of matter : but the degrees of this matter being thinner , and thicker , softer , and harder , weightier , and lighter , makes it , as it were , of different kinde , when t is but different degrees : like severall extractions , as it were out of one and the same thing ; and when it comes to such an extract , it turnes to spirits , that is , to have an innate motion . of division . the severall degrees of matter cause division by different motion , making severall figures , erecting , and dissolving them , according as their matter moves , this makes motion , and figure alwayes to be in war , but not the matter ; for it is the severall effects that disagree , but not the causes : for the eternall matter is allwayes in peace , as being not subject to change ; but motion , and figure , being subject to change , strive for superiority : which can never be , because subject to change . the order of nature . the reason , that there is not a confusion in nature , but an orderly course therein , is , the eternall matter is allwayes one , and the same : for though there are infinite degrees , yet the nature of that matter never alters . but all variety is made according to the severall degrees , & the severall degrees do palliate , and in some sense make an equality in infinite ; so as it is not the severall degrees of matter , that strive against each other , but severall motions drive them against one another . of war , and no absolute power . the reason , that all things make war upon one another , is , the severall (†) degrees of matter , the contradiction of motion , and the degrees , and the advantage of the shapes of (†) figures alwayes striving . of power . there is no absolute power , because power is infinite , and the infinitenesse hinders the absolutenesse : for if there were an absolute power , there would be no dispute ; but because there is no absolute power , there would be no dispute ; but because there is no absolute power , therefore there are disputes , and will be eternally : for the severall degrees of matter , motion , and figure strive for superiority , making faction by (†) sympathy , and fraction , by (†) antipathy . similizing the spirits , or innate matter . the spirits , or essences in nature are like quick-silver : for say it be fluid , it will part into little sphaericall bodyes , running about , though it be nere so small a quantity : and though they are sphaericall , yet those figures they make by severall , and subtle motion , may differ variously , and infinitely . this innate matter is a kind of god , or gods to the dull part of matter , having power to forme it , as it please : and why may not every degree of innate matter be , as severall gods , and so a stronger motion be a god to the weaker , and so have an infinite , and eternall government ? as we will compare motions to officers , or magistrates . the constable rules the parish , the mayor the constable , the king the mayor , and some higher power the king : thus infinite powers rule eternity . or againe thus , the constable rules the hundred , the mayor rules the city , the king the kingdome , and caesar the world . thus may dull matter over others rule , according as 't is † shap'd by motions tool . so innate matter governs by degree , according as the stronger motions be . of operation . all things in the world have an operative power ; which operation is made by sympatheticall motions , and antipatheticall motions , in severall figures . for the assisting operation is caused by one , the destructive operation by another ; like poyson , and cordialls , the one kills , the other cures : but operations are as infinite , as motions . naturall , or sensitive war . all naturall war is caused either by a sympatheticall motion , or an antipatheticall motion . for naturall warre , and peace proceed from selfe-preservation , which belongs only to the figure ; for nothing is annihilated in nature , but the particular prints , or severall shapes that motion makes of matter ; which motion in every figure strives to maintaine what they have created : for when some figures destroy others , it is for the maintenance or security of themselves : and when the destruction is , for food , it is sympatheticall motion , which makes a particular appetite , or nourishment from some creatures to others ; but an antipatheticall motion , that makes the destruction . of annihilation . there can be no annihilation in nature : not particular motions , and figures , because the matter , remaines hat was the cause of those motions and figures . as for particular figures , although every part is separated that made such a figure , yet it is not annihilated ; because those parts remaine that made it . so as it is not impossible but the same particular figures may be erected by the same motions , that joynd those parts , and in the matter may repeat the same motion eternally so by succession : and the same matter in a figure may be erected , and dispersed eternally . thus the dispersing of the matter into particular figures by an alteration of motion , we call death ; and the joyning of parts to create a figure , we call life . death is a separation , life is a contraction . of life . life is the extract , or spirit of common matter : ( † ) this extract is agile , being alwayes in motion ; for the thinnesse of this matter causes the subtelty of the quality , or property which quality , or property is to work upon all dull matter . this essence , or life , which are spirits of sense , move of themselves : for the dull part of matter moves not , but as it is moved thereby . their common motions are foure . atractive . retentive . digestive . expulsive . atractive is that which we call growth , or youth . retentive , is that we call strength . digestive is that we call health , that is an equall distribution of parts to parts , and agreeing of those sprits . expulsive is that which we call death , or decay . the attractive spirits gather , and draw the materialls together . the digestive spirits do cut and carve out every thing . the retentive do fit , and lay them in their proper places . the expulsive do pull down , and scatter them about . those spirits most commonly move according to the matter they worke on . for in spungy and in porous light matter , their motion is quick ; in solid , and weighty , their motion is slower . for the solid parts are not onely dull , and immoveable in themselves , but they hinder and * obstruct those spirits of sense , and though they cut and peirce through all , yet it is with more labour , and slower motion ; for their motions change according to the quantity and quality of that matter they meet with ; for that which is porous and spungy , the figures that they forme that matter in , are sooner made , and suddenlier destroyed , then that which is more combustible . this is the reason mineralls last longer then vegetables and animals , because that matter is both tougher and harder to worke on , then vegetables and animals are . these sensitive spirits we may similize to severall workmen , being alwayes busily imployed , removing , lifting , carrying , driving , drawing , digging , and the like . and although these spirits are of substance thinner then dull matter , yet they are stronger by reason of their subtlety , and motion , which motion gives them power : for they are of an acute quality , being the vitrioll , as it were , of nature , cut and divide all that opposeth their way . now these spirits although they be infinite , yet we cannot thinke them so grosse an infinite , as combustible matter , yet those thinner infinites may cut , and carve the thicker infinites all into severall figures : like as aqua-fort is will eate into the hardest iron , and divide it into small parts . as i have sayd before , the spirits of life worke according as the matter is , for every thing is shap'd according to the solidity of the matter ; like as a man which builds a house , makes the beames of the house of such wood , which is tough , and strong , because he knows otherwise it will breake , by reason of the great weight they are to bear ; but to make laths he takes his wood and cuts it thin , that the nayls may easier passe through , so joyning and fitting severall forts to proper uses to build his house . or like a cooke when he 's to raise a pye , must take stiffe dough ; for otherwise it will not onely fall before it be finished , but it cannot be raised , and to make the lids to cover his pye , hee must use a softer paste , otherwise it will not rowle thinn ; thus a stiffe paste is not fit for a lid , nor a thinner paste for to raise a pye ; it may make a cake , or so . so the spirits of life must make figures , as the matter is fit , and proper thereto , for the figure of man or the like ; the spirits of life take the solid and hard matter for the * bones : the glutinous matter for the sinews , nerves , muscles . and the like ; and the oyly matter for flesh , fat , marrow . so the fluid for blood , and such like matter . and the spirits themselves do give this dull matter , motion , not onely in the building of the figure , but to make the figure move when it is built . now the spirits of life , or lively spirits do not onely move dull and in moving matter , but makes that matter to move , and worke upon others ; for some kinde of figures shall make † another to resemble it selfe , though not just be as it selfe is made , but as the shadow like the substance ; for it workes as a hand that is guided by another , and not of its owne strength : that is the reason , arts have not so much persection as nature . the copy is not so lively as the originall ; for the spirits of life move , and work of their own strength , and the dull matter by the strength of the spirits . of change . the change of motion in severall figures makes all change and difference in the world , and their severall properties and effects thereto . and that which we call death , or corruption , is not * an absence of life , but an expulsive motion which doth annihilate those figures , that erecting motion hath made . so death is an annihilation of the print , not of the mould of figures ; for the moulds of those figures of mankinde , beast , or plant , of all kinds whatsoever , shall never be annihilated so long as motion and matter last , which may alwayes be ; for the mould of all figures is in the power of motion , and the substance of matter . of youth , or growth . thus spirits of sense work according to the substance of the matter : for if the matter be porous and light , they form those figures quicker , and dissolve them suddenly : but if their matter be solid and hard , they worke slower , which makes some figures longer ere they come to perfection , and not so easily undone . and if their strength be too weake for the matter they worke upon , as wanting helpe , then the figure is imperfect , and mishapen , as we say . this is the reason animals & vegetables , which are young , have not so great strength as when they are full growne ; because there are fewer spirits , and the materialls are loose and unsetled , not knockt close : but by degrees more spirits gather together , which helpe to forward their worke , bring in materialls by food , setling them by nourishment , carrying out by evacuations that matter that is unusefull , and that rubbish and chips , as i may say , which would hinder their motion . if they bring in unusefull matter , their figure increases not , as we say , thrives not . and if they carry out the principall materials , the figure decayes , and falls downe . but those parts of matter which are not spirits , do not carry that part of matter which is spirit , but the spirits carry the dull matter . thus the spirits , the innated matter , move in dull matter , and dull matter moveth by the spirits ; and if the matter be fine , and not grosse , which they build withall , and their motion be regular , then the figure is beautifull and well proportioned . of increasing . the reason that the corruption of one figure is the cause of making of another of the same kinde , is , not onely , that it is of such a tempered matter that can onely make such a kinde of figure ; but that the spirits make figures according to their strength : so that the spirits that are in the seed , when they have undone the figure they are in , by a generall expulsion , which we call corruption , they begin to create againe another figure of the same kinde , if no greater power hinder it . for the matter that is proper , to make such like figures , is fitted , or temper'd to their strengths . so as the temper of the matter , and the strength of the spirits , are the erectors of those figures eternally . and the reason , that from one seed , lesse , or more numbers are increased and raisd , is , that though few begin the work , more will come to their help ; and as their numbers are increased , their figures are more , or lesse , weaker , or stronger . of decay . when spirits of life have created a figure , and brought it to perfection ; if they did not pull it down again they would be idle having no work to do ; and idlenesse is against the nature of life , being a perpetuall mption . for as soon as a figure is perfected , the spirits generally move to an expulsive motion . this is the reason , that age hath not that strength as full-growth : but like an old house falling down by degrees , shed their haires or leaves , instead of tiles , the windowes broke downe , and stopped with rubbish . so eyes in animals grow hollow and dimme . and when the foundation of a house is loose , every little wind shakes it . so when the nerves being slack , and the muscles untyed , and the joynts unhing'd , the whole body is weak , and tottering , which we call palsies : which palsies , as the wind , shakes . the blood , as the springe dries up , rheumes as raine fals down , and vapours , as dust , flye up . of dead , and death . dead is , where there is a generall alteration of such motion , as is proper to such figures . but death is an annihilation of that print , or figure , by an expulsive motion : and as that figure dissolves , the spirits disperse about , carrying their severall burthens to the making of other figures . like as a house that is ruin'd by time , or spoyled by accident ; the severall materials are imployed to other uses ; sometimes to the building of an house again . but a house is longer a building then a pulling down , by reason of the cutting , carving , laying , carrying , placing , and fitting every part to make them joyn together ; so all the works of nature are sooner dissolv'd then created . of locall shapes . some shapes have power over others , but t is not alwaies in the size , or bulck of the figure , but in the manner of their formes that gives advantage , or disadvantage . a little mouse will run through the snowt of a great elephant : a little flye will sting a great figure to death ; a worm will wind through a thick body ; the lions force lies in his clawes , the horses in his hoofe , the dogs in his teeth , the bulls in his hornes , and mans in his armes , and hands ; birdes in their bills , and talons : and the manner of their shapes gives them severall properties , or faculties . as the shape of a bird causes them to flye , a worm to creep , the shape of a beast to run , the shape of fish to swim ; yet some flye swifter , and higher then others , as their wings are made : so some run nimbler then others , according as their limbs are made ; and some swim glider then others , according as their fins are made . but man surpasses the shape of all other creatures ; because he hath a part , as it were , of every shape . but the same motion , and the same matter , without the shape , could not give such externall properties ; since all internall properties are wrought out of dull matter . so as it is their shapes , joyned with such motions proper thereunto , that give strength , & agilenesse . but the internall qualities may be alike in every figure ; because rationall spirits worke not upon dull matter , but figures themselves . the visible motion in animals , vegetables , and minerals . the externall motions of animals are , running , turning , winding , tumbling , leaping , jumping , shoving , throwing , darting , climbing , creeping , drawing , heaving , lifting , carrying , holding , or staying , piercing , digging flying , swimming , diving . the internall motion , is , contriving , directing , examining , comparing , or judging , contemplating , or reasoning , approving , or disapproving , resolving . from whence arise all the passions , and severall dispositions . these , and the like , are the visible , internall motions in animals . the internall motions of vegetables , and minerals , are in operation ; as , contracting , dilating ; which is attractive , retentive , digestive , expulsive . the vegetables externall motion , is , increasing , decreasing , that is enlarging , or lasting ; although there may be matter not moving , yet there is no matter , which is not moved . of the working of severall motions of nature . motions do work according as they finde matter , that 's fit , and proper for each kinde . sensitive spirits work not all one way , but as the matter is , they cut , carve , lay . joyning together matter , solid light , and build , & form some figures streight upright ; or make them bending , and so jutting out : and some are large , and strong , and big about . and some are thick , and hard , and close unite ; others are flat , and low , and loose , and light . but when they meet with matter , fine , and thin , then they do weave , as spiders when they spin : all that is woven is soft , smooth , thin things , as flowry vegetables , & animall skins . observe the graine of every thing , you le see , like inter-woven threads lye evenly . and like to diaper , & damask wrought , in severall workes , that for our table 's bought . or like to carpets which the persian made , or sattin smooth , which is the florence trade . some matter they ingrave , like ring , and seale , which is the stamp of natures common-weale . t is natures armes , where she doth print on all her works , as coyne that 's in the mint . some severall sorts they joyn together glu'd . as matter solid , with some that 's fluid . like to the earthly ball , where some are mixt of severall sorts , although not fixt . for though the figure of the earth may last longer then others ; yet at last may waste . and so the sun , and moon , and planets all , like other figures , at the last may fall . the matter 's still the same , but motion may alter it into figures every way : yet keepe the property , to make such kind of figures fit , which motion out can find . thus may the figures change , if motion hurles that matter of her waies , for other worlds . of the minde . there is a degree of stronger spirits then the sensitive spirits , as it were the essence of spirits ; as the spirit of spirits : this is the minde , or soule of animalls . for as the sensitive spirits are a weak knowledge , so this is a stronger knowledge . as to similize them , i may say , there is as much difference betwixt them , as aqua fortis , to ordinary vitrioll . these rationall spirits , as i may call them , worke not upon dull matter , as the sensitive spirits do ; but only move in measure , and number , which make figures ; which figures are thoughts , as memory , understanding , imaginations , or fancy , and remembrance , and will . thus these spirits moving in measure , casting , and placing themselves into figures make a consort , and harmony by numbers . where the greater quantity , or numbers , are together of those rationall spirits , the more variety of figure is made by their severall motion , they dance severall dances according to their company . of their severall dances , or figures . what object soever is presented unto them by the senses , they straite dance themselves into that figure ; this is memory . and when they dance the same figure without the helpe of the outward object , this is remembrance when they dance figures of their owne invention , ( as i may say ) then that is imagination or fancie . understanding is when they dance perfectly ( as i may say ) not to misse the least part of those figures that are brought through the senses . will is to choose a dance , that is to move as they please , and not as they are perswaded by the sensitive spirits . but when their motion and measures be not regular , or their quantity or numbers sufficient to make the figures perfect , then is the minde weak and infirme , ( as i may say ) they dance out of time and measure . but where the greatest number of these , or quantity of these essences are met , and joyn'd in the most regular motion , there is the clearest understanding , the deepest judgement , the perfectest knowledge , the finest fancies , the more imagination , the stronger memory , the obstinatest will . but sometimes their motions may be regular ; but society is so small , so as they cannot change into so many severall figures : then we say he hath a weak minde , or a poor soule . but be their quantity or numbers few or great , yet if they move confusedly , and out of order , wee say the minde is distracted . and the reason the minde , or soule is improveable , or decayable , is , that the quantity or numbers are increaseable , or decreaseable , and their motions regular , and irregular . a feaver in the body is the same motion amongst the sensitive spirits , as madnesse is in the minde amongst the rationall spirits . so lkewise paine in the body is like those motions , that make griefe in the minde . so pleasure in the body is the like motions , as make delight , and joy in the minde , all convulsive motions in the body , are like the motions that cause feare in the minde . all expulsive motions amongst the rational spirits , are a dispersing their society ; as expulsity in the body , is the dispersing of dull matter by the sensitive spirits . all drugs have an opposite motion to the matter they work on , working by an expulsive motion ; and if they move strongly , having great quantity of spirits gathered together in a little dul matter , they do not only cast out superfluous matter , but pul down the very materials of a figure . but al cordials have a sympatheticall motion to the matter they meet , giving strength by their help to those spirits they finde tired : ( as one may say ) that it is to be over-power'd by opposite motions in dull matter . the sympathy , and antipathy of spirits . pleasure , and delight , discontent , and sorrow , which is love , and hate , is like light , and darknesse ; the one is a quick , equall , and free motion ; the other is a slow , irregular , and obstructed motion . when there is the like motion of rationall spirits in opposite figures , then there is a like understanding , and disposition . just as when there is the like motion in the sensitive spirits , then there is the like constitution of body . so when there is the like quantity laid in the same symmetry , then the figures agree in the same proportions , and lineaments of figures . the reason , that the rationall spirits in one figure , are delighted with the outward forme of another figure , is , that the motions of those sensitive spirits which move in that figure agree with the motion of the rationall spirits in the other . this is love of beauty ; and when the sensitive motions alter in the figure of the body , and the beauty decaies , then the motion of the rationall spirits alter , and the love , or goodliking ceases . if the motion of the rationall spirits are crosse to the motion of the sensitive spirits , in opposite figures , then it is dislike . so if the motion be just crosse , and contrary , of the rationall spirits in opposite figures , it is hate ; but if they agree , it is love . but these sympathies , which are made only by a likenesse of motions without an intermixture , last not longe ; because those spirits are at a distance , changing their motion without the knowledge , or consent of either side . but the way that the rationall spirits intermix , is , through the organs of the body , especially the eyes , and eares , which are the common doors , which let the spirits out , and in . for the vocall , and verbal motion from the mouth , carry the spirits through the eares down to the heart , where love , and hate is lodged . and the spirits from the eyes issue out in beames , and raies ; as from the sun , which heat , or scorch † the heart , which either raise a fruitful crop of love , making the ground fertile , or dries it so much , as makes it insipid , that nothing of good will grow there , unlesse stinking weeds of hate : but if the ground be fertile , although every crop is not so rich , as some , yet it never growes barren , unlesse they take out the strength with too much kindness ; as the old proverb , they kill with too much kindnesse ; which murther is seldome committed . but the rationall spirits † are apt to take surfet , as wel as sensitive spirits , which makes love , and good-will , so often to be ill rewarded , neglected , and disdain'd . the sympathy of sensitive , and rationall spirits in one figure . there is a stronge sympathy , and agreement , or affection ( as i may say ) betwixt the rationall spirits , and the sensitive spirits joyned in one figure : like fellow-labourers that assist one another , to help to finish their work . for when they disagree , as the rationall spirits will move one way sometimes , and the sensitive spirits another ; that is , when reason strives to abate the appetite of the senses ; yet it is by a loving direction , rather to admonish them by a gentle contrary motion for them to imitate , and follow in the like motions ; yet it is , as they alwayes agree at last ; like the father , and the son . for though the father rules by command , and the son obeies through obedience , yet the father out of love to his son , as willing to please him , submits to his delight , although (†) it is against his liking . so the rationall spirits oftimes agree with the motions of the sensitive spirits , although they would rather move another way . the sympathy of the rationall and sensitive spirits , to the figure they make , and inhabit . all the externall motion in a figure , is , by the sensitive spirits ; and all the internall , by the rationall spirits : and when the rationall , and sensitive spirits , disagree in opposite figures , by contrary motion , they oft war upon one another ; which to defend , the sensitive spirits , and rationall spirits , use all their force , and power in either figure ; to defend , or to assault , to succour , or to destroy , through an aversion made by contrary motions in each other . now the rationall spirits do not only choose the materialls for their defence , or assault , but do direct the sensitive spirits in the management thereof ; and according to the strength of the spirits of either side , the victory is gain'd , or lost . if the body be weak , there is lesse sensitive spirit , if the direction be not advantageous , there is lesse rationall spirit . but many times the alacrity of the rationall and sensitive spirits , made by moving in a regular motion , overcomes the greater numbers , being in a disorder'd motion . thus what is lost by scarcity , is regain'd by conformity and unity . of pleasure , and paine . all evacuations have an expulsive motion ; if the expulsive motion is regular , t is pleasure , if irregular , t is paine . indeed , all irregular , and crosse motion , is paine ; all regular motion is pleasure , and delight , being a harmony of motion , or a discord of motion . of the minde . imagine the rationall essence , or spirits , like little sphericall bodies of quick-silver several ways (†) placing themselves in several figures , sometimes moving in measure , and in order , and sometimes out of order : this quick-silver to be the minde , and their severall postures made by motion , the passions , and affections ; or all that is moving in a minde , to expresse those severall motions , is onely to be done by guesse , not by knowledge , as some few i will guesseat . love is , when they move in equall number , and even measure . hate is an opposite motion : feare is , when those small bodies tumble on a heap together without order . anger is , when they move without measure , and in no uniforme figure . inconstancy is , when they move swistly severall wayes . constancy is a circular motion . doubt , and suspition , and jealousie , are , when those small bodies move with odd numbers . hope is when those small bodies move like wilde geese , one after another . admiration is , when those sphericall bodies gather close together , knitting so , as to make such a circular figure ; and one is to stand for a center or point in the midst . humility is a creeping motion . joy is a hopping , skipping motion . ambition is a lofty motion , as to move upwards , or * higher then other motions . coveting , or ambition is like a flying motion , moving in severall figures like that which they covet for ; if they covet for fame , they put themselves into such figures , as letters do , that expresse words , which words are such praises as they would have , or such figures as they would have statues cutt , or pictures drawne : but all their motion which they make , is according to those figures with which they sympathize and agree : besides , their motion and figures are like the sound of musick ; though the notes differ , the cords agree to make a harmony : so several symmetries make a perfect figure , severall figures make a just number , and severall quantities or proportions make a just weight , and severall lines make an even measure : thus equall may be made out of divisions eternally , and infinitely . and because the figures and motions of the infinite spirits which they move , and make , are infinite , i cannot give a finall description : besides , their motion is so subtle , curious , and intricate , as they are past finding out . some naturall motions work so curious fine , none can perceive , unlesse an eye divine . of thinking , or the minde , and thoughts . one may think , and yet not of any particular thing ; that is , one may have sense , and not thoughts : for thoughts are when the minde takes a particular notice of some outward object , or inward idea ; but thinking is only a sense without any particular notice . as for example ; those that are in a great feare , and are amazed , the minde is in confus'd sense , without any particular thoughts : but when the minde is out of that amaze , it fixes it selfe on particulars , and then have thoughts of past danger ; but the minde can have no particular thought of the amaze ; for the minde cannot call to minde that which was not . likewise when we are asleep , the mind is not out of the body , nor the motion that makes the sense of the minde ceast , which is thinking ; but the motion that makes the thoughts therein work upon particulars . thus the minde may bee without thoughts , but thoughts cannot be without the minde : yet thoughts go out of the minde very oft , that is , such a motion to such a thing is ceast ; and when that motion is made again , it returns . thus thinking is the minde , and thoughts the effect thereof : thinking is an equall motion without a figure , or as when we feele heat , and see no fire . of the motions of the spirits . if it be , as probably it is , that all sensitive spirits live in dull matter ; so rationall spirits live in sensitive spirits , according to the shape of those figures that the sensitive spirits form them . the rationall spirits by moving severall waies , may make severall kindes of knowledge , and according to the motions of the sensitive spirits in their severall figures they make , though the spirits may be the same , yet their severall motions may be unknown to each other . like as a point , that writes upon a table-book , which when the letter that was writ thereon , is rub'd out , the table is as plain , as if there was never any letter thereon ; but though the letters are out , yet the table-book , and pen remaine . so although this motion is gone , the spirit , and matter remaine ; but if those spirits make other kindes of motions , like other kindes of letters , or language , those motions understand not the first , nor the first understands not them , being as severall languages . even so it may be in a sound ; for that kind of knowledge the figure had in the sound , which is an alteration of the motion of the rationall spirits , caus'd by an alteration of the motion of the sensitive spirits in dull matter : and by these disorderly motions , other motions are ru'bd out of the table-book , which is the matter that was moved . but if the same kind of letters be writ in the same place again ; that is , when the spirits move in the same motion , then the same knowledge is in that figure , as it was before ; the other kind of knowledge , which was made by other kind of motion , is rub'd out ; which severall knowledge is no more known to each other , then severall languages by unlearned men . and as language is still language , though not understood , so knowledge is still knowledge , although not generall ; but if they be that , we call dead , then those letters that were rubbed out , were never writ again ; which is , the same knowledge never returnes into the same figure . thus the spirits of knowledge , or the knowledge of spirits , which is their severall motions , may be ignorant , and unacquainted with each other : that is , that some motion may not know how other motions move , not only in several spirits , but in one and the same spirit ; no more then every effect can know their cause : and motion is but the effect of the spirits , which spirits are a thin , subtle matter : for there would be no motion if there were no matter ; for nothing can move : but there may be matter without selfe-motion , but not selfe-motion without matter . matter prime knowes not what effects shall be , or how their severall motions will agree . because † t is infinite , and so doth move eternally , in which nothing can prove . for infinite doth not in compasse lye , nor hath eternall lines to measure by . knowledge is there none , to comprehend that which hath no beginning , nor no end . perfect knowledge comprises all can be , but nothing can comprise eternity . destiny , and fates , or what the like we call , in infinites they no power have at all . nature hath generosity enough to give all figures case , whilst in that form they live . but motion which innated matter is by running crosse , each severall paines it gives . of the creation of the animall figure . the reason , † that the sensitive spirits , when they begin to create an animal figure , the figure that is created feels it not , untill the modell be finished , that is , it cannot have an animall motion , untill it hath an animall figure ; for it is the shape which gives it locall motion : and after the fabrick is built , they begin to furnish it with † strength , and inlarge it with growth , and the rationall spirit which inhabits it , chooseth his room , which is the head ; and although some rationall spirits were from the first creating it , yet had not such motions , as when created : besides , at first they have not so much company , as to make so much change , as to take parts , like instruments of musick , which cannot make so much division upon few strings as upon more . the next , the figure being weak , their motions cannot be strong ; besides , before the figure is inlarged by growth , they want room to move in . this is the reason , that new-borne animalls seeme to have no knowledge , especially man ; because the spirits do neither move so strong , nor have such variety of change , for want of company to make a consort . yet some animalls have more knowledge then others , by reason of their strength , as all beasts know their dams , and run to their dugs , and know how to suck as soone as they are borne ; and birds and children , and the like weak creatures , such do not . but the spirits of sense give them strength , and the spirits of reason do direct them to their food , (†) & the spirits of sense give them taste , and appetite , and the spirits of reason choose their meat : for all animall creatures are not of one dyet , for that which will nourish one , will destroy another . the gathering of spirits . if the rationall spirits should enter into a figure newly created , altogether , and not by degrees , a childe ( for example ) would have as much understanding and knowledge in the womb , or when it is new-borne , as when it is inlarged and fully grown . but we finde by experience there are severall sorts and degrees of knowledge and understanding , by the recourse of spirits : which is the reason , some figures have greater proportion of understanding and knowledge , and sooner then others ; yet it is increased by degrees , according as rationall spirits increase . like as children , they must get strength before they can go . so learning and experience increase rationall spirits , as food the sensitive : but experience and learning is not alwayes tyed to the eare ; for every organ and pore of the body is as severall doores to let them in and out : for the rationall spirits living with the sensitive spirits , come in , and go out with them , but not in equall proportion , but sometimes more , sometimes fewer : this makes understanding more perfect in health then in sicknesse , and in our middle age , more then in the latter age : for in age and sicknesse there is more carryed out , then brought in . this is the reason , children have not such understanding , but their reason increaseth with their yeares . but the rationall spirits may be similized † to a company of good fellows , which have pointed a meeting ; and the company coming from severall places , makes their time the longer ere their numbers are compleated , though many a braine is disappointed ; but in some figures the rooms are not commodious to move in , made in their creation , for want of helpe : those are changelings , innocents , or naturall fooles . the rationall spirits seem most to delight in spungy , soft , and liquid matter ; as in the blood , brain , nerves , and in vegetables ; as not only being neerest to their own nature , but having more room to move in . this makes the rationall spirits to choose the head in animals , for their chiefe room to dance their figures in : (†) for the head is the biggest place that hath the spungy materialls ; thus as soon as a figure is created , those rationall spirits choose a room . the moving of innate matter . though motion makes knowledge , yet the spirits give motion : for those spirits , or essences , are the guiders , governours , directers ; the motions are but their instruments , the spirits are the cause , motion but an effect therefrom : for that thin matter which is spirits , can alter the motion , but motion cannot alter the matter , or nature of those essences , or spirits ; so as the same spirits may be in a body , but not one and the same knowledge , because not the same motion , that made that knowledge . as for example ; how many severall touches belong to the body ? for every part of the body hath a severall touch , which is a severall knowledge belonging to every severall part ; for every severall part doth not know , and feele every severall touch . for when the head akes , the heele feels it not , but only the rationall spirits which are free from the incumbrance of dull matter , they are agile , and quick to take notice of every particular touch , in , or on every part of the figure . the like motions of a paine in the body . the like motion of the rationall spirits , we call a griefe in the mind ; for touch in the body , is a thought in the mind ; and to prove it is the like motion of the rationall spirits to the sensitive , which makes the knowledge of it , is , that when the rationall spirits are busily moved with some fantasmes , if any thing touches the body , it is not known to the rationall spirits , because the rationall spirits move not in such a motion , as to make a thought in the head , of the touch in the heele , which makes the thoughts to be as senselesse of that touch , as any other part of the body , that hath not such paines made by such motions . and shall we say , there is no sense in the heele , because no knowledge of it in the head ? we may as well say , that when an object stands just before an eye that is blind , either by a contrary motion of the thoughts inward , by some deep contemplation , or otherwise : we may as well say there is no outward object , because the rationall spirits take no notice of that object ; t is not , that the stronger motion stops the lesse , or the swifter , the flower ; for then the motions of the planets would stop one anothers course . some will say , what sense hath man , or any other animall when they are dead ? it may be answered , that the figure , which is a body , may have sense , but not the animall ; for that we call an animall , is such a temper'd matter joyn'd in such a figure , moving with such kind of motions ; but when those motions do generally alter , that are proper to an animall , although the matter , and figure remain , yet it is no longer an animall , because those motions that help it to make an animall are ceas'd : so as the animall can have no more knowledge of what kind of sense the figure hath , ( because it is no more an animall ) then an animall , what sense dust hath . and that is the reason , that when any part is dead in an animall , if that those motions that belonged to the animall , are ceas'd in that part , which alter it from being a part of the animall , and knowes no more what sense it hath , then if a living man should carry a dead man upon his shoulders , what sense the dead man feels , whether any , or no . of matter , motion , and knowledge or understanding . whatsoever hath an innate motion , hath knowledge ; and what matter soever hath this innate motion , is knowing : but according to the severall motions , are severall knowledges made ; for knowledge lives in motion , as motion lives in matter : for though the kind of matter never alters , yet the manner of motions alters in that matter : and as motions alter , so knowledge differs , which makes the severall motions in severall figures , to give severall knowledge . and where there is a likenesse of motion , there is a likenesse of knowledge : as the appetite of sensitive spirits , and the desire of rationall spirits are alike motions in severall degrees of matter . and the touch in the heel , or any part of the body else , is the like motion , as the thought thereof in the head ; the one is the motion of the sensitive spirits , the other in the rationall spirits , as touch from the sensitive spirits : for thought is only a strong touch , & touch a weake thought . so sense is a weak knowledge , and knowledge a strong sense , made by the degrees of the spirits : for animall spirits are stronger ( as i sayd before ) being of an higher extract ( as i may say ) in the chymistry of nature , which makes the different degrees in knowledge , by the difference in strengths and finenesse , or subtlety of matter . of the animall figure . whatsoever hath motion hath sensitive spirits ; and what is there on earth that is not wrought , or made into figures , and then undone again by these spirits ? so that all matter is moving , or moved , by the movers ; if so , all things have sense , because all things have of these spirits in them ; and if sensitive spirits , why not rationall spirits ? for there is as much infinite of every severall degree of matter , as if there were but one matter : for there is no quantity in infinite ; for infinite is a continued thing . if so , who knowes , but vegetables and mineralls may have some of those rationall spirits , which is a minde or soule in them , as well as man ? onely they want that figure ( with such kinde of motion proper thereunto ) to expresse knowledge that way . for had vegetables and mineralls the same shape , made by such motions , as the sensitive spirits create ; then there might be wooden men , and iron beasts ; for though marks do not come in the same way , yet the same marks may come in , and be made by the same motion ; for the spirits are so subtle , as they can passe and repasse through the solidest matter . thus there may be as many severall and various motions in vegetables and mineralls , as in animals ; and as many internall figures made by the rationall spirits ; onely they want the animall , to expresse it the animall way . and if their knowledge be not the same knowledge , but different from the knowledge of animalls , by reason of their different figures , made by other kinde of motion on other tempered matter , yet it is knowledge . for shall we say , a man doth not know , because hee doth not know what another man knows , or some higher power ? what an animall is . an animall is that which wee call sensitive spirit ; that is , a figure that hath locall motion ; that is , such a kinde of figure with such kinde of motions proper thereunto . but when there is a generall alteration of those motions in it , then it is no more that we call animall ; because the locall motion is altered ; yet we cannot knowingly say , it is not a sensitive creature , so long as the figure lasts : besides when the figure is dissolved , yet every scattered part may have sense , as long as any kinde of motion is in it ; and whatsoever hath an innate motion , hath sense , either increasing or decreasing motion ; but the sense is as different as the motions therein , because those properties belonging to such a figure are altered by other motions . of sense and reason exercised in their different shapes . if every thing hath sense and reason , then there might be beasts , and birds , and fish , and men : as vegetables and minerals , had they the animall shape to expresse that way ; and vegetables & minerals may know , as man , though like to trees and stones they grow . then corall trouts may through the water glide , and pearled menows swim on either side ; and mermayds , which in the sea delight , might all be made of watry lillies white ; set on salt watry billows as they flow , which like green banks appeare thereon to grow . and marriners i th' midst their shipp might stand , in stead of mast , hold sayles in either hand . on mountaine tops the golden fleece might feed , some hundred yeares their ewes bring forth their breed . large deere of oake might through the forrest run , leaves on their heads might keepe them from the sun ; in stead of shedding hornes , their leaves might fall , and acornes to increase a wood of fawnes withall . then might a squerrill for a nut be crackt , if nature had that matter so compact : and the small sprouts which on the husk do grow , might be the taile , and make a brushing show . then might the diamonds which on rocks oft lye , be all like to some little sparkling flye . then might a leaden hare , if swiftly run , melt from that shape , and so a (†) pig become . and dogs of copper-mouths sound like a bell ; so when they kill a hare , ring out his knell . hard iron men shall have no cause to feare to catch a fall , when they a hunting were . nor in the wars should have no use of armes , nor fear'd to fight ; they could receive no harmes . for if a bullet on their breasts should hit , fall on their back , but strait-waies up may get . or if a bullet on their head do light . may make them totter , but not kill them quite . and stars be like the birds with twinckling wing , when in the aire they flye , like larks might sing . and as they flye , like wandring planets shew , their tailes may like to blazing comets grow . when they on trees do rest themselves from flight , appeare like fixed stars in clouds of night . thus may the sun be like a woman faire , and the bright beames be as her flowing haire . and from her eyes may cast a silver light , and when she sleeps , the world be as dark night . or women may of alabaster be , and so as smooth as polisht ivory . or , as cleer christall , where heartes may be shown , and all their falsehoods to the world be known . or else be made of rose , and lillies white , both faire , and sweet , to give the soule delight . or else bee made like tulips fresh in may , by nature drest , cloath'd severall colours gay . thus every yeare there may young virgins spring , but wither , and decay , as soon agen . while they are fresh , upon their breast might set great swarmes of bees , from thence sweet honey get . or , on their lips , for gilly-flowers , flies drawing delicious sweet that therein lies . thus every maid , like severall flowres shew , not in their shape , but like in substance grow . then teares which from oppressed hearts do rise , may gather into clouds within the eyes : from whence those teares , like showres of raine may flow upon the bancks of cheeks , where roses grow . after those showres of raine , so sweet may smell , perfuming all the aire , that neer them dwell . but when the sun of joy , and mirth doth rise , darting forth pleasing beames from loving eyes . then may the buds of modesty unfold , with full blown confidence the sun behold . but griefe as frost them nips , and withering dye , in their owne (†) podds intombed lye . thus virgin cherry trees , where blossomes blow , so red ripe cherries on their lips may grow . or women plumtrees at each fingers end , may ripe plummes hang , and make their joynts to bend . men sicomores , which on their breast may write their amorous verses , which their thoughts indite . mens stretched arms may be like spreading vines , where grapes may grow , soe drinke of their own wine . to plant large orchards , need no paines nor care , for every one their sweet fresh fruit may beare . then silver grasse may in the meadowes grow , which nothing but a sithe of fire can mow . the wïnd , which from the north a journey takes , may strike those silver strings , and musick make . thus may another world , though matter still the same , by changing shapes , change humours , properties , and name . thus colossus , a statue wonderous great , when it did fall , might strait get on his feet . where ships , which through his leggs did swim , he might have blow'd their sailes , or else have drown'd them quite . the golden calfe that israel joy'd to see , might run away from their idolatry . the basan bul of brasse might be , when roare , his mettl'd throat might make his voice sownd more . the hil , which mahomet did call , might come at the first word , or else away might run . thus pompey's statue might rejoyce to see , when kill'd was caesar , his great enemy . the wooden-horse that did great troy betray , have told what 's in him , and then run away . achilles armes against ulisses plead , and not let wit against true valour speed . of the dispersing of the rationall spirits . some think , that the rationall spirits flye out of animals , ( or that animall we call man ) like a swarm of bees , when they like not their hives , finding some inconvenience , seek about for another habitation : or leave the body , like rats , when they finde the house rotten , and ready to fall ; or scar'd away like birds from their nest. but where should this swarm , or troop , or flight , or essences go , unlesse they think this thin matter is an essence , evaporates to nothing ? as i have said before , the difference of rationall spirits , and sensitive spirits , is , that the sensitive spirits make figures out of dull matter : the rationall spirits put themselves into figure , placing themselves with number , and measure ; this is the reason when animals dye , the externall forme of that animall may be perfect , and the internall motion of the spirits quite alter'd ; yet not absent , nor dispersd , untill the annihilating of the externall figure : thus it is not the matter that alters , but the motion and forme . some figures are stronger built then others , which makes them last longer : for some , their building is so weak , as they fall as soon as finished ; like houses that are built with stone , or timber , although it might be a stone-house , or timber-house , yet it may be built not of such a sort of stone , or such a sort of timber . of the senses . the pores of the skin receive touch , as the eye light , the eare sound , the nose scent , the tongue tast . thus the spirits passe , and repasse by the holes , they peirce through the dull matter , carrying their severall burthens out , & in , yet it is neither the burthen , nor the passage that makes the different sense , but the different motion ; † for if the motion that comes through the pores of the skin , were as the motions that come from the eye , eare , nose , mouth , then the body might receive sound , light , scent , tast , all over as it doth touch . of motion that makes light . if the same motion that is made in the head did move in the heele , there would appeare a light to the sense of that part of the figure ; unlesse they will make such matter as the braine to be infinite , and onely in the head of an animall . opticks . there may be such motion in the braine , as to make light , although the sun never came there to give the first motion : for two opposite motions may give a light by reflection , unlesse the sun , and the eye have a particular motion from all eternity : as we say an eternal monopoler of such a kind of motion as makes light . of the flowing of the spirits . the spirit 's like to ants , in heapes they lye , the hill they make , is the round ball , the eye . from thence they run to fetch each object in , the braine receives , and stores up all they bring . and in the eares , like hives , as bees they swarm , buzzing , and humming , as in summers warm . and when they flye abroad , they take much paine , to bring in fine conceits into the braine . of which , as wax , they make their severall cells , in workes of poetry , which wit still fills : and on the tongue , they sit as flowres sweet , sucking their honey from delicious meat . then to the nose , like birds they flye , there pick up sweet perfumes , in stead of spices stick . of which within the braine they build a nest , to which delight , or else to take their rest . but in the porous skin , they spread as sheep , and feeding cattell which in meadowes keep . of motion , and matter . why may not vegetables have light , sound , taste , touch , as well as animals , if the same kind of motion moves the same kind of matter in them ? for who knowes , but the sappe in vegetables may be of the same substance , and degree of the braine : and why may not all the senses be inherent in a figure , if the same motion moves the same matter within the figure , as such motion without the figure ? of the braine . the braine in animals is like clouds , which are sometimes swell'd full with vapour , and sometimes rarified with heat , and mov'd by the sensitive spirits to severall objects , as the cloudes are mov'd by the wind to severall places . the winds seem to be all spirits , because they are so agile , and quick . of darknesse . to prove that darknesse hath particular motions which make it , as well as motion makes light , is , that when some have used to have a light by them while they sleep , will , as soon as the light goeth out , awake ; for it darknesse had no motion , it would not strike upon the optick nerve . but as an equall motion makes light , and a perturb'd motion makes colour , which is between light , & darknesse : so darknesse is an opposite motion to those motions that make light ; for though light is an equall motion , yet it is such a kind , or sort of motion . of the sun . why may not the sun be of an higher extract then the rationall spirits , and be like glasse , which is a high extract in chymistry , and so become a (†) shining body ? if so , sure it hath a great knowledge ; for the sun seemes to be composed of purer spirits , without the mixture of dull matter ; for the motion is quick , and subtle , as wee may finde by the effect of the light , and heat . of the cloudes . the cloudes seem to be of such spungy , and porous matter , as the raine , and aire , like the sensitive spirits that form , and move it , and the sun the rationall spirit to give them knowledge : and as moist vapours from the stomack rise , and gathering in the braine , flow through the eyes ; so do the clouds send forth , as from the braine , the vapours which do rise in showres . of the motion of the planets . the earth , sun , moon , the rest of planets all are mov'd by that , we vitall spirits call . and like to animals , some move more slow , and other some by quicker motion go . and as some creatures by their shapes do flye , some swim , some run , some creep , some riseth high . so planets by their shapes about do wind , all being made , like circles , round we find . the motion of the sea . the sea 's more quick , then fresher waters are , the reason is , more vitall spirits are there . and as the planets move still round about , so seas do ebb , & flow , both in , & out . as arrowes flye up , far as strength them lend , and then for want of strength do back descend . so do the seas in ebbes-run back againe , for want of strength , their length for to maintaine . but why they ebb , and flow , at certain times , is like the lungs that draw , and breath out wind . just so do seas draw back , and then do flow , as constant as the lungs do to and fro : alwaies in motion , never lying still , the empty place they leave , turn back to fill . we may as well inquire of nature , why animals breath in such a space of time , as the seas ebb , and flow in such a space of time . i could have inlarged my booke with the fancies of the severall motions , which makes the several effects of the sun , planets , or the suns ( i may say ) as the fixed stars : and whether they have not cast knowledge , and understanding by their various , and quicke , and subtle motions ; and whether they do not order and dispose other creatures , by the power of their supreamer motions . what motions make civil wars , and whether the aire causes it , or not ? whether the stars , and planets work not upon the disposition of severall creatures , and of severall effects , joyning as one way ? what motion makes the aire pestilent , and how it comes to change into severall diseases ? and whether diseases are just alike , and whether they differ as the faces of men do ? why some figures are apt to some diseases , and others not ? and why some kinde of drugs , or cordialls , will worke on some diseases , and not on others ? and why some drugs have strong effects upon some humours , and not upon others ? and why physicke should purge , and how some cordials will rectifie the disorderly motion in a distemper'd figure ? why some ground will beare some sorts of seeds , and not others ? why same food will nourish some figures , and destroy others ? how naturall affection is bred in the wombe . what makes a naturall aversion from some creatures to others , and what causes an unnaturalnsse to their owne kind and breed ? what motion makes thunder , lightning , vvinde , earthquakes , cold , ice , snow , haile , rain , what motions makes drought , heat . why the sun should give light , and not the other planets . what motions make fire , aire , water , earth . what manner of motions make sense . why some have haire , some wool , some feathers , some scales , and some onely skin . and why some vegetables beare some leaves , some none , some fruit , some none . and what motion makes particular taste , scent , colour , touch ; and why all do touch , not taste alike : and whether they be inherent , or not ; and how they may be inherent in every figure proper thereto , and yet another figure receive them in another sense : and how it comes , that some figures have more of some sense , then others , and what makes the society of every kinde of figure , and what makes the war with others , and amongst themselves : and how such degrees of matter with such kinde of motions , make the difference in vegetables , minerals , and animals ; and why such shapes must of necessity have such properties , and why some shapes have power over other shapes ; and why some shapes have power over some motions , and some motions over some shapes , and some motions over other motions , and what the severall effects are of severall shapes , and severall motions . what makes that which is fulsome , and nauceous , pleasant , and savory ; whether they are inherent , or not , whether they are in the contained , or the containing ; or whether a sympathy or likenesse from both , and so of all the senses ; whether the outward motition cause the sense , or the inward motion ; or whether the inward motion moves to the inward matter , or with the outward matter , and inward matter , agreeing in the like motions . and what the reason may bee , to make some creatures agree in some element , and not in others : as what 's the reason a beast , or a man , or fowles , cannot live in the water , or fish live long out of the water . and whether there may not bee a sympathy naturally betwixt some beasts , to other , although of a different figure , more then to others , by some secret , and obscure motions ; and whether the severall dispositions of men , may not have a naturall likeuesse , or sympathy to the severall dispositions , and natures of beasts . what causes the severall sorts of creatures to keep in particular societies , as in commonwealths , flocks , heards , droves , flights , covies , broods , eyes , swarmes , sholes , and of their particular enmity from some sorts to others , and their affections , love to others , their factions , side-takings , and disagreeings in their owne society , their craft and policies of selfe-love , and preservation , and their tender love and assistance to their young . what makes superstition : and many more . but fancy , which is the effect of motion , is as infinite as motion ; which made me despaire of a finall conclusion of my booke ; which makes my booke imperfect , and my fancies unsettled : but that which i have writ , will give my readers so much light , as to guesse what my fancies would have beene at . a dialogue between the body , and the minde . i write , and write , and 't may be never read ; my bookes , and i , all in a grave lye dead . no memory will build a monument , nor offer praise unto the soules content . but howsoever , soule , lye still at rest , to make thy fame to live , have done the best . for all the wit that nature to me gave , i set it forth , for to adorne thy grave . but if the ruines of oblivion come , t is not my fault , for what i can , is done . for all the life that nature to me lends about thy worke , and in thy service spends . but if thou thinkst , i take not paines , pray speake , before we part , my body is but weak . soule . braine thou hast done thy best , yet thou mightst go to the grave learned , their subtle tricks to know : and aske them , how such fame they do beget , when they do write , but of anothers wit . for they have little of their owne , but what they have from others braines , and fancies got . body . o soule ! i shall not need to take such paines , the labour will be more then all the gaines : for why ! the world doth cosen and so cheat , by railing at those authors wits they get ; muffling & hiding of their authors face , by some strange language , or by some disgrace . their wit into an anagram they make , that anagram for their owne wit they take . and here , & there they do a fancy steale , and so of strangers make a common-weale . tell to the world they are true natives bred , when they were borne all in another head . and with translating wit they march along , with understanding praise they grow so strong , that they do rule , by conquering fames great court : from whence they send out all their false report . this is the way my soule that they do use , by different language do the world abuse . therefore lye still thou troubled restless spirit , seek not for fame , unlesse thou hast a merit . soule . body , when thou art gone , then i dye too , unlesse some great act in thy life thou do : but prethee be not thou so wondrous nice , to set my fame at a great merits price . body . alas , what can i do to make thee live , unlesse some wise instructions thou canst give ? can you direct me to some noble act , wherein vain-glory makes no false compact ? can you direct me which way i shall take , those that are in distress , happy to make ? soule . no , that 's unpossible , unlesse all hearts could be divided into equall parts . body . then prethee be content , seek thou no more ; t is fortune makes the world to worship , and adore . a request to my friends . when i am dead , and buried lye within a grave ; if friends passe by , let them not turn away their sight , because they would forget me quite : but on my grave a teare let fall , and me unto remembrance call . then may my ashes rise , that teare to meet , receive it in my urne like balsome sweet . o you that are my dearest friends , do not , when i am dead , lye in the grave forgot , but let me in your mind , as one thought be ; so shall i live still in your memory . if you had dyed , my heart still should have been a room to keep , and hang your picture in . my thoughts should copies pencill every day , teares be the oyle , for colours on to lay . my lips shall mixe thy severall colour'd praise , by words compounded , various severall waies . innocent white , and azure truth agree , with modest red , purple in grain to bee . and many more , which rhetorick still can place , shadowes of griefe , to give a lively grace . an elegy . her corps was borne to church on gray goose wing , her sheet was paper white to lap her in . and cotten dyed with inke , her covering black , with letters for her scutcheons print in that . fancies bound up with verse , a garland made , and at the head , upon her hearse was laid . and numbers ten did beare her to the grave , the muses nine a monument her gave . i heare that my first booke was thought to be none of mine owne fancies ; onely , i owne it with my name . if any thinke my booke so well writ , as that i had not the wit to do it , truely i am glad , for my wits sake , if i have any that is thought so well of ; although mistrust lies betwixt me , and it ; and if it be so little wit in it , as they mistrust it was not mine ; i am glad they thinke me to have so much , as i could not write so foolish . and truely for any friend of mine , as i have none so cowardly , that dare not defend their honour , so i have none so foolish , as to be affear'd , or asham'd to owne their owne writings . and truely i am so honest , as not to steale anothers work , and give it my owne name : nor so vaine-glorious , as to straine to build up a fame upon the ground of another mans wit . but be it bad , or good , it is my owne , unlesse in printing t is a changeling grown . which sure i have no reason for to doubt , it hath the same mark , when i put it out . but be it faire , or brown , or black , or wilde , i still must own it , 'cause it is my childe . and should my neighbours say , t is a dull block , t is honestly begot , of harmlesse stock . by motion in my braine t was form'd , and bred , by my industrious study it was fed . and by my busie pen was cloathd , though plain the garments be , yet are they without stain . but be it nere so plain , not rich , and gay , phantasticall t is drest , the world will say . the world thinks all is fine , that 's in the fashion , though it be old , if fashion'd with translation . they nere consider what becomes them best , but think all fooles , that are not courtly drest . o nature , nature , why dost thou create so many fooles , and so few wife didst make ? good nature , move their braine another way , and then as beasts as beasts , perchance they may . lord how the world delight to tell a lye ! as if they thought they sav'd a soule thereby . more lyes they tell , then they will prayers say , and run about to vent them every way . some bragging lyes , and then he tells how free the ladies were , when he 's in company . or else what such a lord did say to him , and so what answer he return'd to them . or any action which great fame hath won , then he saies streight , t was by his counsell done . when any wit , that comes abroad in print , then he sayes strait he had a finger in 't : how he did rectifie , and mend the same , or else he wrote it all , or gav 't a name . thus in the world thousands of lyes are told , which none , but fooles , their words for truth will hold . but in the world there are more fooles then wise , which makes them passe for truth , when all are lyes . j begun a booke about three yeares since , which i intend to name the worlds ollio , and when i come into flaunders where those papers are , i will , if god give me live , and health , finish it , and send it forth in print . i imagine all those that have read my former books , wil say , that i have writ enough , unless they were better : but say what you will , it pleaseth me , and since my delights are harmlesse , i will satisfie my humour . for had my braine as many fancies in 't , to fill the world , would put them all in print . no matter whether they be well exprest , my will is done , and that please woman best . a farewell to the muses . farewell my muse , thou gentle harmlesse spirit , that us'd to haunt me in the dead of night . and on my pillow , where my head i laid , thou sit'st close by , and with my fancies play'd : sometimes upon my eyes you dancing skip , making a vision of some fine land-skip . thus with your sportings , kept me oft awake , not with your noise , for nere a word you spake : but with your faiery dancing , circling winde , upon a hill of thoughts within my minde . when t was your sport to blow out every light , then i did rest , and sleep out all the night . great god , from thee all infinites do flow , and by thy power from thence effects do grow . thou order'dst all degrees of matter , just , as t is thy will , and pleasure , move it must . and by thy knowledge orderd'st all the best ; for in thy knowledge doth thy wisdome rest . and wisdome cannot order things amisse , for where disorder is , no wisdome is . besides , great god , thy wil is just , for why , thy will still on thy wisdome doth rely . o pardon lord , for what i here now speak , upon a guesse , my knowledge is but weak , but thou hast made such creatures , as man-kind , and giv'st them something , which we call a minde ; alwaies in motion , never quiet lyes , untill the figure of his body dies . his severall thoughts , which severall motions are , do raise up love , hopes , joyes , doubts , and feare . as love doth raise up hope , so feare doth doubt , which makes him seek to finde the great god out . selfe-love doth make him seek to finde , if he came from , or shaell last to eternity . but motion being slow , makes knowledge weake , and then his thoughts 'gainst ignorance doth beat . as fluid waters 'gainst hard rocks do flow , break their soft streames , and so they backward go . just so do thoughts , and then they backward slide unto the place where first they did abide . and there in gentle murmurs do complaine , that all their care , and labour is in vain . but since none knowes the great creator , must man seek no more , but in his goodnesse trust . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a53057e-140 reason . thoughts . notes for div a53057e-6090 i mean of forme , dull matter . some think there was a chaos , a confused heap . the readers may take either opinion . severall motions , and severall figures . (†) not the matter , but the degrees (†) not the bigness of figures , but the manner of shapes : which makes some shapes to have the advantage over others much bigger , as a mouse will kill an elephant . (†) which is in likenesse . (†) unlikenesse . one shape hath power over another ; one minde knowes more then another . either by growth , or sense , or reason . for when matter comes to such a degree it quickens , that it begins to move , & motion is life . * i meane when i say obstruct , that it either turnes their motion another way , or makes them move slower . * i do not say that bones are the solid'st matter in nature . † as the figure of man. * all motion is life . i mean the figure of dul matter as a plentifull crop , or a great brood . these degrees are visible to us . dancing is a measur'd motion . † scorching is , when the motion is too quick . † that is , when there come so many spirits , as they disagree , pressing upon one another . (†) those degrees that are neerest , have the greatest sympathy . (†) like chess-men , table-men nine-pins , or the like . * i say higher , for expressions sake . † nothing can bee made or known absolute out of infinite and eternall . † though it may have other motions , yet not the animall motion . † the figure might bee without an animall motion , but an animall motion cannot bee untill there is an animall figure (†) which food is when such materialls are not proper for such a figure . † the greater the number is , the more variety of motion is made , which makes figures in the braine . (†) in animall shapes . (†) a pig of lead . (†) the huske . † to prove that it is the several motion , is , that wee shall have the same sense in our sleep , either to move pleasure , or feele paine . (†) like glass . an exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute being an answer to the vanity of dogmatizing / by thomas white. white, thomas, 1593-1676. 1665 approx. 131 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 45 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2005-03 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a65786 wing w1824 estc r11142 12929269 ocm 12929269 95611 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a65786) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 95611) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 991:19) an exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute being an answer to the vanity of dogmatizing / by thomas white. white, thomas, 1593-1676. [8], 80 p. printed for john williams ..., london : 1665. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng glanvill, joseph, 1636-1680. -scepsis scientifica. philosophy, english -17th century. knowledge, theory of -early works to 1800. 2004-10 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2004-10 aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images 2004-11 judith siefring sampled and proofread 2004-11 judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited 2005-01 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion an exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute : being an answer to the vanity of dogmatizing . by thomas white . — sciri hoc sciat alter . london , printed for john williams at the crown and globe in s. pauls church-yard ▪ 1665. to the young witts of both universities . though i doubt not of more powerful and seasonabler provision against that destructive contagion of pyrronism , which , not long since , has begun to take fresh heart : yet , hearing no news of any publick cauterization apply'd to that tumour of glanvil's , which has rag'd now full two years ; methought this silence of my betters turn'd the task upon my weakness , if not to avert , at least to open & expose to be torn in pieces by eloquenter pens the injustice of that calumny impos'd on the whole profession of philosophers . reflect then o flourishing englands fertilest hope ! the joy and crown of your mother , whose beholding you with pleasure swells her silent breast ! reflect , i say , and seriously ruminate what you strain to live and grow to ; what persons you hope and covet to become hereafter : whether wise and skilful to govern christian life and manners : or a crew of rhetoricians , pleasantly tattling unknown and uncertain things ; and betraying those under your tuition into all precipices that fall in their way : for , for such blind ones , and leaders of the blind , he sets you out to the world , who inculcates to your england the vanity of dogmatizing or promising truths . i am not angry with the man , who , with a great deal of wit and an unfordable stream of eloquence ( which will ripen with his years ) prosecutes what he proposes to himself , and takes for a truth ; not without some savour of modesty : for , neither does he derogote from faith the power of teaching its tenets , nor disclaim all hope of attaining science hereafter through a laborious amassment of experiments . but , he points to acertain person ( whom he owns his master ) that , giving us the heads of some books he had written , thus concludes the second , here it is where the chief foundations of pyrronism are laid ; and that mainly establisht , that nothing is known . well , indeed , may the future despair , if the pains of so may ages have brought it but to this , that there 's nothing known . have , then , the so many magnificent structures of your colledges been devis'd , only to delude the people with a deal of pretty talk , not a jot advancive of reason ? have so many prodigious wits of your ancesters been sent abroad over all the christian world , but to sell smoak and bubbles for jewels & pearls ? have you yourselves the patience to be till'd on through so many years exercises , only to the like emptiness ? scorn and hate that so foul a reproach should be cast on the fame of all past ages , and present industry . but , what , at length , has enveigled into these conceits that great interpreter of epicurus , a man never to my hearing , mis-spoken of , either for wit , or life and manners ? since i 'm utterly a stranger to his privy-councils , i 'le tell you what his book seems to offer . there are two sciences contested about : physick and metaphysick ( between which that of the soul and morals take their places ) . the first , content with few experiments , surprises truth by vertue of demonstration , and fixes it by that force which alone is inerrable , viz. the power of our spiritual intellect . this eye alone pierces into the strength of contradiction ; and is onlily certain and necessary , as far as it scapes ore-shadowing by the senses : but , it is not overlavish too , in making use of them ; and advances in growth by reflecting on it self its inmost eye . physick is more florid , and with a vernal look , as it were , sooth's our spirit inclin'd to body . 't is more abundant in experiments , and meer historical almost , unless assisted and forc'd into rules by this its companion . that many court this gay one , no wonder , and slight her elder sister as 't were but dry leaves ; whereas , yet , on her 't is the gallant depends , nor without her help and principles borrow'd from her , is able scarce to demonstrate any thing and advance by causes connectedly . the ignorance of this necessity has bin the ruin of this author , and many great mens endeavours ; nay , and will be , 'till the utter despair of getting forward teach first a retreat back again to settle principles . another rubb is the unbridled impudence of very many moderns , who loudly crack of aristotle and metaphysick , as oft as there falls occasion of setting themselves out . they fill the book-sellers shops with mighty tomes : they counterfeit the highest knowledge by pompous skirmishes in their own schools ; and by wonderful promises enkindle the native ardour of science . by these arts they heap on themselves the honours and fruits due to science ; they flourish gayly and are propos'd to be ador'd in the chairs . mean while , look but into the matter , and those vast mountains bring forth this solution of questions , perhaps i , perhaps no. histories are related of what the antients , what the moderns have thought of any propos'd thesis ; petty reasons for the i or no are shot out at random , as it were , from bands of slingers or archers : so their pages get bredth , their tomes bulk : but , when they come to give judgment , out comes an edict to this purpose , all the opinions are probable , but , this last seems to me the more probable . what could be look'd for more silly from midas's ears ? what blind tiresias could not as truly give verdict of colours , perhaps 't is white , perhaps not ? what wonder now is it , if that ingenious person derided such solemn trifles ? and imagining these men , because none contradicted it , entertainers of aristotle and his secrets , wholy neglected and contemn'd them . you , then , o yong branches , growing up into wine to rejoyce the hearts of men ! remembring that vertue 's the mean hedg'd in by both extreams , neither disclaim and detest aristotle , nor superstitiously adore and embrace him . those things he has demonstrated , though but few and seeming contemptible , yet receive . 't is the nature of principles to appear vulgar and despicable ; but there 's not a step can be made in sciences without them . the foundations of edifices lye buryed under ground , yet 't is they sustain the magnificent and towring fabrick . they that slight aristotle's grounds must of necessity , being always in quest of principles , ever fall short of science . yet , far worse than these are they who feign and profess themselves aristotelians , and are ignorants the while in the method of demonstrating , & neglect what he prescribes : circumventers of parents , spiriters of youth ; whom , enveigled with a shew of philosophy , they betray to vanity and prattle : worst enemies of the commonwealth ; to which owing youth adorn'd with science & vertue , they pay it foolishly-confident , sophisticate , and fitted by their education to ill and good alike . for you , let aristotle be your master , of few things indeed ; but those such as fructifie into thousands , viz. the whole race of separated substances , the things necessary to be fore-known to physical contemplation , and judgment , in fine , of experiments . you have now the pleas of both sides : 't is your part to call aside into council with you that candour and sollicitude which so weighty an affair deserves . the most earnest coveter of your sollid knowledge thomas white . the table . first plea. there is demonstration and science , page 1 second plea. the scepticks alledge nothing sollid , page 11 third plea. t is imprudent to deny the existence of science , p. 17 fourth plea refells the preliminary objection , page 24 fifth plea refells our ignorance of the soul and sensation , p. 30 sixth plea displaies the pastick vertue , continuity , adhesion of parts , and the mysteries of rolling , page 42 seventh plea inquires after the causes of our modern shortness in science , page 51 eight plea wards off from aristotle the calumny of special impiety , page 55 ninth plea wipes off the aspersions on aristotle's doctrine and terms , page 60 tenth plea maintains certain definitions and arguings , p. 65 eleventh plea refutes some topicks babbled against science , p. 71 an exclusion of scepticism and scepticks from all title to dispute . first plea. there is demonstration and science . 1. scepticism , born of old by an unlucky miscarriage of nature , for her own credit , carryed off the tongues of the eloquent where it had long been fostred , and buryed by the steddiness of christian faith ; this monster snatcht from the teeth of worms and insects , peter gassendus , a man of a most piercing sagacity , of neat and copious eloquence , a most pleasing behaviour and wonderful diligence , by a kind of magick has endeavoured to restore again to life . he , a person ( which is the strangest of all ) most tenacious of catholick faith , and never suspected guilty of mischievous tenets : whereas , yet , this scepticism is the mother of infinite errors , and all heresies , and that very seducing philosophy and vain fallacy which the saints , warn'd by the apostles , have taught us to beware of . heard , this man , otherwise eminent in his paradoxical exercitation against the aristotelians , has dar'd to expose , not vail'd , as before , and wandring like a quean in the dark , but bold-fac'd and painted , to the multitude and market place . by his example , the author of the vanity of dogmatizing has produc'd her amongst us beauteously trick'd-up in english : he , too , a great master of wit and eloquence . nor indeed are vast mischiefs to be dreaded from vulgar heads . this is the occasion of my undertaking ; and this my design ( if heaven vouchsafe to enlighten and guide my pen ) to force back into her grave this carcass that would be rivalling science , and deliver her up a feast to her former worthy commoners . come on then , let 's untie the knot of the question . 3. since , then , 't is of science we are to speak , its genius would in some measure be look'd into . nature her self , therefore , teaches us , that man is an animal endued with reason , to fit him for governing his action , and reason is allowed to be that whereby what before was unknown is rendred known : dayly experience also convinces that our action consists for the most part in such things as are subject to an infinite and insuperable mutability and variation : whence it comes to pass , that that vertue which is immediate to action cannot properly be called science ( since 't is not infallible , and the effect of demonstrative discourse ) but a power of conjecturing aptly ; and uses commonly to be term'd prudence , either properly or derivatively ; properly , if it be concerning the thing to be done , as to its right proceeding from reason ; analogically , if of the action or thing to be done , as it regards some other inferior faculty subservient to the dominion of reason . now prudence depends on two previous powers , art and inference or experiment . art , though it ows its birth to experience , yet is sustained by universall and unfailing rules : but , it self understands not the necessary and indefectible efficacy of its rule ; but is content with the testimony of ever-corresponding effects . inference , or experience for the most part is true , but necessitates not assent , because not universal . 4. setting this therefore aside , 't is clear the decrees of art , since she is veracious , have necessitating and necessarily connected principles , which force the effect of art to be not possibly otherwise than as art teaches 't will succeed . whence follows , that the subject matter of science and art is the same ; and every art has a proper science due to it self , if the nature of man would stretch to attain it . but , the same warning we gave before concerning prudence , must be repeated concerning science . for , as he who behaves himself prudently in any artifice , is not therefore esteem'd and stil'd a prudent man ; but only he who rightly tempers his action in as much as 't is humane : so , neither is he , with propriety , to be called a knowing man , who skills the demonstration of duelling , or versifying ; but he that has the demonstration of those things which are principles for governing our life , in as much as 't is humane : the chief whereof is that which has merited the term of theology , or metaphysicks : the next is ethicks : then physicks , or natural science ; whether , because all corporeal natures , or the world , is proposed to the disputation of men ; or because , next metaphysical contemplation , nothing so much advances our desired beatitude as physicks . nor yet are mathematicks to be excluded ; both because quantity , their subject , is the vesture of those bodies which physicks speculate through ; as also , because the rules , and as it were , the demonstrableness of natural things at every step depends on them . out of all which 't is clear , that in nothing equivocation more lewdly cheats man-kind , than in this term of knowing , or learned men . for , if masters in sciences , analogically so called , are not really worthy this name : how much further off meriting so noble a title are those , whose ambition streins no higher than , like parrats , to repeat others sentiments ? and how manifestly pernicious are they that have the confidence to apply such learning to the government of humane life ; and vent poison , or at best , smoak , under the reverend name of science ? 5. it follows , that such science 't is we propose to our selves as is beneficial to humane life . and concerning this , three things offer themselves to our enquiry . whether there be at all any certainty attainable , at least of one proposition or one reasonment , which we call a sylogism ? at this hangs the next , whether at least , any habit , or series of more truths traced with certainty ( such as generally are esteem'd those which arithmeticians and geometricians profess ) may be acquired by humane industry ? the last question , by most ( at least in practise ) disputed ( whate're in words they pretend ) is limited to physicks and metaphysicks ; whether about the objects of these any beneficial multitude of truths may be spun out connectedly ; as the masters in mathematicks seem already to have done ? and herein consists the usefulness of my discourse ; and the desparation or difficulty of this conclusion compels me to clear the former ; which of themselves by their own evidence had stood unscrupled , had not the step , and almost necessary consequence they afford to the third , terrified those who feel such difficulty to yield this last . 6. to work , then ; let us fix the first step , and assert , as invincibly known , and unshakable by any art of the scepticks , that what is is , or that what terminates and specifies an identical proposition as its object is self-evident : as if we should say , that peter is peter , wood is wood , a stone is a stone ; and whatever others carry as open-fac'd an evidence . the scepticks i imagine , will laugh at this axiom as foolish : because identical propositions use to be excluded from the rank of scientifical ones , and the sciences themselves ; as nothing at all advancing the understanding . but , by this their very laugh they 'l yield us the victory ; as confessing evidence in these , however they be useless : and therefore that wherever the same necessity shall intervene , there cannot want evidence . one thing in this position occurs a little cloudy , obscuring it through a mist caus'd by the shadow of that most acute person , renatus des cartes ; who , severely prying to descry the very first thing falling under knowlege , beat it up at length to this , that the first thing every one knows , is , that himself thinks . but , the difference of our opinions , i conceive , has sprung from hence , that , whereas science may be consider'd both in its generation and in its subsistence ; he has taken the former method , i the later . for , really , if we examine by what degrees science is born in us , we see , the first thing that happens is to have a passion made in us by bodies ; and the first evident thing that strikes us is that we think . but , if , looking upon science now existing ▪ and as it s t were at rest in us , we enquire what 't is that fasten truth to our minds , so that we cannot doubt or , as were , waver about it : nothing will appear more simply or originally manifest then that what is is , wherein , in a manner , is formally included that what is so is , that , whilst it is , it cannot not-be ; which , indeed , is , that the understander is certain that the thing is , or has a fixedness concerning the truth which is in him . 7. it being determin'd that an identical proposition is evident , 't is equally determin'd that propositions term'd self-known are evident : for , if they be look'd into , t will be clearly seen , that a self-known proposition is in some sort composed of an identical proposition and another otherwise evident , or taken for evident . for , there are two sorts of self-known propositions ; one wherein the generical notion is predicated of a species ; another wherein the species are predicated divisively of the genus . take these for examples : a man is an animal : the sense is , a rational animal is a sort , or one of the animals : the evidence of the proposition consists in this , that the word animal signifies , as it were formally in predication , to be one of the animals ; and the word rational denotes that whereby a man is one of the animals . wherefore in this proposition , a man is an animal ; these two propositions shrowd themselves , one of the animals is one of the animals ; and that other , that rational is a determiner of animality : now this later is not affirmed , but taken for granted , either from sense as it were , or some other way supposed to be known and past doubt ; and in force of the former identification , t is concluded that a man is an animal . in like manner when 't is said , number is either even or odd , bulk is either finite or infinite ; and whatever predicates , contradictorily oppos'd , are predicated divisively of a subject ; two propositions lye in them ; one an identical one , for example , that even and not-even are all , or comprise all the kinds of number ; and another otherwise known , viz. that such a number , for example , ten , is a certain number . this later is known as it were by sense ; or suppos'd , not affirm'd : the former is equivalent to this all number is all number ; and one of all the numbers , for example ; ten , is affirm'd to be one of the even or odd , because , by force of the contradiction between even and not-even , even and odd must of necessity comprise all numbers , or even and odd and all number be the same . 8. the same force of identity is also clear in a sylogism : for example , when in the first mood , or barbara , two self-known propositions are taken and another truth , unknown before , is concluded out of them . as , when t is argu'd that every man is a living creature , because every man is an animal , and every animal is a living creature : there 's made an identification of man and living creature ; or rather it is discovered by the double identification of animal with the superior and inferior . the force therefore of the sylogism whereby it fixes the mind in this identity , tha● man is a living creature , lies in nothing but this , tha● through the former two identifications it rests fixed as to the premisses . plain therefore t is , that the light of an identical proposition shews it self both in self-known propositions , and in those which are concluded by sylogisms : and , which follows , either that the truth of an identical proposition is not evident , or else that self-known propositions , and such as are concluded by a legitimate sylogism are evident and most certain : and , that it cannot be doubted , so many truths are palpably certain as can be reacht by a legitimate deduction of sylogisms . since , therefore , he cannot be esteem'd other than a mad sot that should deny the evidence of an identical proposition ; he cannot be reputed rational who should at all reject propositions self-known , or collected by legitimate discourse . 9. be this , therefore , a demonstration a priori , as they term it , of this truth , that there is some certainty or science ; that , since t is undenyable that what is is , or , an identical proposition is true , and every proposition , whether self-known or sylogistically-concluded , has no other necessity than what shews it self in an identical one ; there can be no doubt of these , unless identical ones , too , be called in question . for , since , in a self-known proposition , t is evident , that the thing signified by one term is that which is signified by the other : and in a sylogistically-concluded proposition , it likewise appears , that because a is b , and b is c , a too is c ; or that , unless a be c , a will not be a ; for 't is not a unless it be b , nor b unless it be c : 't is evident that whatever is evinced by a legitimate sylogism , has the same necessity as an identical proposition . since therefore 't were meer perversness , and such as cannot fall into humane nature , to doubt whether an identical proposition be true ; t is absolutely manifest that whatever is concluded by ligitimate discourse out of self-known propositions is engrafted , beyond any danger of ambiguity ; or , that there is science of all such like : and therefore that there is some science , and that , indeed , of many truths . now , that which either in a self-known or in a demonstrated proposition , is assum'd beyond identical ones is not capable either of truth or falshood ; but , in a manner , is taken by way of snpposition ; as if 't were said , if he be a man ; if it be an animal : i say , for as much as man or animal are the subjects of the propositions or premisses . second plea. the scepticks alledge nothing sollid . 1. now , to the scepticks , or scepticism it self . what says the sceptick ? though , says he , nothing be certain , yet many things appear true to us ; and , out of such appearance we proceed to operation . thou entanglest thy self , sceptick ! for , how , whilst , in common , it most clearly appears to thee that nothing is true ; yet assertest thou , in particular , that this appears to thee true ? can these two stand together ; it appears that none of those things proposed us are true ; and at the same time , it appears that some of them are true ? besides , if any thing appears true , 't is because it deceives us with the face and similitude of certain or true , ( which two , as to us , speak the same thing ; for , we say , that is certain which we know to be true , or which is true to us ) : but , 't is clear , we cannot affirm any thing to be like another , if we know not that other : if therefore , there be amongst us no certainty , or nothing known to be true ; nothing can ever be or appear like certainty amongst men. 't is , therefore , stark folly to joyn these two togther , there is nothing certain , or ther 's no certainty ; and yet some things appear certain . 2. for all that , the sceptick will stand to it , that at least this appearance is enough for humane action : since all action is singular , that is , in infinite circumstances upon which demonstration has no force , but only prudence , or the power of conjecturing which is to be prefer'd before other . notwithstanding , if the action be truly humane , that is , purely and thoroughly govern'd by reason , this sceptical appearance is not enough for it . for , first , since prudence is an intellectual vertue , it cannot be indifferent to truth and falsity ; but always tenacious of truth . in action , therefore , govern'd by prudence two things fall under consideration ; that which is most conspicuous and spy'd by every one is , whether the action be like to attain its immediate and next end , to which 't is destin'd : and this for the most part is uncertain ; but withall , in this consists not the primary effect of prudence , but a certain faculty of guessing , which they call sagacity . the other thing , wherein especially prudence plays its part , is whether this action be to be done here and so : for which it suffices that two things be certain ; one , that the actor is led by no passion ; the other , that he has used pains , or disquisition enough ; which depends on the former ; since that will not fall short , unless some passion makes the actor precipitate . but , as far as the soul proves deficient in these two , so much , too , she deviates from the rule of prudence . now , these two may be very clear to an experienced person . farther , this tenet , again , of the scepticks fails of sufficiency for action in the very first root of acting , viz. whether any thing be to be done , or whether action be wholly to be suspended : for , in vain the understanding tugs at it , what action to perform ; unless it be first evident that something is to be acted : they therefore , who profess not so much as this is known , that something sometimes is to be done , cannot be mov'd to action out of pure understanding . nor can it be reply'd that it appears to the sceptick he is to act : for , since appearing is common to true and false ; nay , since 't is known that false is oft-times more probable and apparent , than true ; 't is plain that neither probability in general , nor the greater probability can have any force at all to cause assent . but , if one has not assented to this universal proposition , something is to be done ; 't is plain that , as to pure reason , he has no principle of acting : and , if he has any other principle besides , reason , the action , as far as it springs from that , is not rational . it must therefore be concluded that all action of the scepticks is utterly not-humane , but only brutal ; as rising purely from sense and imagination : or , rather worse than brutal ; in as much as they force reason to submit to and serve sense . 3. but , that which highlyest crosses this sect is , that professors of science much undervallue themselves , if they vouchsafe to dispute with them or endure to hear them babble . for , since in all humanenature , no sect is to be found more addicted to prattle , and more greedy of that vanity which follows tinckling cymbals : at what a distance will they be from their beatitude , if among the adorers of science they be not allow'd to vent their trifles ? let us , therefore , fairly weigh this , whether they are to be admitted among the professors of learning . scientifical persons , then , are either masters or disciples ; that is , such as have already attain'd the habit of science , or such as endeavour after it , or are seekers of truth . since , therefore , t is plain , the scepticks profess not themselves possessors of the science ; it remains they are to be reckoned among the seekers ; wherefore , since this contradicts it self , that one should seek what he thinks is no where , or at least , which dispairs possible to be found ; in vain they declare themselves candidates or seekers after sciences . add to this , that , since they neither admit self-known propositions , nor any legitimate consequence of discourse ; they have no way or method of seeking , or any trace from which to commence their search : but , if they admit any of these two , they cannot but acknowledge something certain . 4. it ought , therefore , be objected , at the very begining , to such contemners of sciences ; what attempt you ? what 's your aim ? how have you the confidence to attaque any one that 's truly a man ? for , whence shall what you say derive any appearance ? is it not just to press on you to prove first whatever you assume ; and this without ever coming to an end ? you therefore , will never be able to assume any thing that can prove our tenets false or uncertain . again , will you use any other form of discourse then sylogistical ? but , this you deny to be evident and certain . you , therefore , come but to deride , sillily to play the rooks , and chatter figments like poetical magpies . you i reply , perhaps , you dispute ad hominem ( as they term it ) , and shew , out of those things which our selves have accepted , that what we teach thereupon has no certainty . what 's your meaning ? if indeed you endeavoured this in any one tenet , it might be allow'd you to try what you were able to do : but , if universally you assert us unable to make good consequences , you call us beasts and deserve not the hearing . and , you your selves , how will you evince any one consequence to be ill ? will you tell us how it ought to be , to be good , you i say that grant none to be evident ? ' again , why will ours be false , and yours good ? but , if you affirm your own not good neither ; what madness possesses you , that you cannot suffer us to rest even in our error ; when you neither can nor strive to exempt us from erring ? t is sweeter , sure , to believe one-self in the light , then to know one-self in darkness and all light hopeless . 5. in fine , to what purpose do we amass arguments against those , who , as far as in them lies , have put off humane nature , and made themselves beasts ? for , if to reason be to advance our selves , out of certain and known things , to things before unknown and uncertain ; and nothing be certain : neither is any reasoning possible ; nor consequently any power of reasoning ; or animal endowed with it . but , if nothing be certain , nothing , too , will be true , since that is certain which we see to be true ; that is , truth had , our truth true to us , true by which we are true . for , clear it is , that our nature is covetous of truth in it self ; that , when we or our understanding is true , being impregnated with this truth , it may be made operative , and master of all things without it ; or , that it may pursue useful things , fear such as are to be fear'd contemn things contemptible , and reject all manner of counterfeit scare-crows . he frustrates , therefore , the whole bent of nature , that denies there 's any certainty ; and utterly evacuates , as nature her self , so also her most vehement desire and aim . what need i mention humane conversation , but especially negotiation ? for , if there can be nothing certain in humane matters , why do we instruct infants and boys ? why strive we to perswade youth into those things which seem true to us ? for , if there be no certainty acquirable , t is to be judg'd wholly indifferent what every youth does , or whither he tends : especially , since not so much as this is certain , that one thing is more probable than another ; and far less , that what now is more probable will be so when the boy comes to choose it . third plea. t is imprudent to deny the existence of sciences . 1. let us raise our style , and enlarge it to entire habits . can it be believed , that men of excellent wits should be so fond as to deny those things that humane life is full of ; and without which there 's no living , at least commodiously ? i mean arts. let 's consider what part of our action or life is exempt from their service : what arts go to the providing us food , cloaths , houses , delights ? our minds are cultivated with liberal ones : the fields , mountains , seas are mastred by arts. to conclude , what is there that falls under mans use , wherein some kind of art is not exercised ? art , therefore , what is it , but a rule which commonly fails not ? this , then ( if mens souls but own themselves ) is certain , that art , for the most part , fails not . what if i should say , that it never fails ? but either the artificer is unskilfull , or else , through laziness or knavery follows not the prescription of the art , as oft as any error happens . but , be it so , that art sometimes fails ; at least , the whole course of our actions is grounded on this that , commonly it fails not : wherefore since what never fails is certain , art , which in most cases never fails , in most cases is certain ; and whoever denies this , either out of ignorance or stomack , opposes himself to very nature and the order of things . this is , therefore , a throughly-attested truth , that there are intire and complete habits of certainties : since , both of the several arts , in common , t is certain that for the most part they attain their effect ; and the same is as evident of the several members and joints in each art in particular . 2. the next place mathematicks challenge , which have gain'd the true name of science : first , arithmetick and geometry , each of so large an extension , that they make up many entire habits ; and if they be acknowledg'd for sciences , they leave no room for opposing others , upon pretence of the abundance of their doctrines , or the largeness of their subject . such , again is the steddiness of attestatition to these sciences , of so many ages , so many eminent wits , by shewing and perpetuating so many effects , beyond the estimation of humane prudence ; that there can be no doubt but they winch against nature it self that calumniate these sciences . let 's behold the multiplicity of sylogisms ; the derivation of far distant truths by intermediate propositions , immediate to one another ; and how many principles or fore-known truths are sometimes made use of towards the search of some one : and we shall see these sciences will not sustain themselvs alone , but extend their power to others also ; and perswade , nay , evince , that there 's nothing but may be demonstrated , if there want not industry . 3. yet i am not ignorant what uses to be urg'd against these sciences , especially against geometry : which though in other works i have sometimes repell'd , yet here too , as in their properest place , they are again to be repeated ; chiefly because the scepticks no where , in my judgment deserve more applause . for , plain it is , though nothing be farther from the meaning of the geometricians than what the scepticks lay to their charge ; yet nothing appears clearer in the terms they use , than what they mean not : providence so ordering it , that those things which best guard themselves by their own evidence should be most infesed with prejudices ; to warn us , in more obscure points , not to desert evidence , though we be hard put to 't with weighty , perhaps , but obscure argments . for , what 's more manifest than that geometricians require a streight line to be drawn from one point to another ? that they dispute , whole volumes full , conconcerning lines and superficies ? that they demand a line to be drawn out in infinitum ? that a circle be made ? an equilateral triangle ? and a thousand such like : that none of all which , yet , can exist in the world , 't is either certain , or , at least , so ambiguous that it ought not to be presum'd without demonstration ; whereas the geometricians neither attempt nor promise any such thing . 4. notwithstanding in all these , t is no hard matter to satisfie an attentive reader . for , i ask , whether or why t is not lawful for a mathematitian to speak universally of his object , in the same manner as both the learned and unlearned talk of theirs ? he may then speak of the body proposed to him , as t is long , not treating at all about it , as t is broad ; since for a body to be broad is nothing else , but to be long according to two dimensions . in like manner , since a body to be deep signifies it to be long according to three dimensions ; what an envious part 't is not to allow the same to be considered as broad , abstracting from the third dimonsion ? these things being clear to the utmost pitch of evidence ; and so that we cannot speak otherwise according to nature ; let 's see wherein lyes the fault of the geometricians . you urge that they assert there is a line in being , that is , longitude without latitude ; i deny it : you prove it , alledging they mark a line with letters , saying the line a. b. i demand , to what purpose serves this marking ? is it for any thing but to notifie the longitude of the body they measure ? if that be all , then the sense which serves the mathematicians turn in the word is , that the body propos'd , according to longitude , is equivalent to the distance between a and b. and , if he assumes any more , it must of necessity be something impertinent to his discourse , which geometricians , of all men , are farthest from . 5. the very same may be said for their manner of speaking concerning a superficies . but , for points , the solution is more evident : for , in stead of this word the point a , or the point b , put the word end or term , and there will remain no shadow of difficulty . for , who can doubt but that a body , as long , is terminated : and therefore can forbid an end or term to be assign'd it ? for the rest , 't will easily appear the like discourse serves : for , when he demands a line to be produc'd in infinitum , the clear sense of the geometrician is to have it drawn out as far as is necessary for his work ; which never does or can happen to require it actually infinite . not an infinite , therefore , but an indefinite line the geometrician asks ; that he may use any as big a part of it as he needs . in like manner , if he demands a circle or streight line to be made ; 't were fond to think he expects them scor'd out mathematically on paper or sand : since the demonstration he intends is universal and exists in the understanding only , not in paper . it suffices therefore , that the accurateness of the circle or line be in his mind , to which the paper yields a phantasm ; a weak one , indeed , but fit enough to delineate the rigorous form in his mind . some , too , will not allow a line can be cut just in the middle . nor do i deny this to be petty work of geometry : but , neither do i expect the scepticks should be able to prove this impossible : and therefore , against a perfect demonstration , such as euclid's is , to listen to slight-babling reasons were to trifle , not philosophize . 6. is not this hugely remarkable , or rather to be admir'd ? that those things which advance geometry , above other sciences , in a great measure are false ; taken for granted in order to use , but not credited for science : for , mathematick is not certainer or more evident than other sciences ; but easier and more adapted to fancy , not understanding . for , if in geometry we were still to use strick terms , and always to repeat this body , as long , abstracting from its latitude , or , as broad , abstracting from its depth , the whole discipline , losing that inveiglement of clearness by which it tills on the reader , would be but tedious work . now , because we may use the names of points , lines , and superficies , as they were things ; and , according to this gross apprehension , make visible figures : geometrical truths strike almost our very corporeal eyes . whether as much may be done in other sciences , at least as to some part , is not yet clear ; but , from the way of algebra , it may be conjectur'd not utterly out of the reach of humane industry . 7. this , at least , may passe for evident , from the manner we have expressed of the geometricalcontemplation : that the geometricians use to draw their consequences and positions , not from the sounds of their words , but the notions in their minds . but , herein kind nature has been indulgent to those disciplines ; that they are excus'd from any necessity to resolve the equivocation of their terms : but having once explain'd them , they may , without any rub , proceed , whence we see that if at any time , they are put to explicate their words , geometry grows even as troublesom as metaphysick : as appears in that question bandy'd concerning an angle of contact ; because they reflect not that an angle speaks a quantum , whereas yet they confess it cannot exist without a space . plain then 't is rendred that the first task in the other sciences is , to make the question clear between the opposite parties , not only in term , but also in meaning : and that this is the main fault of the weak managers of other sciences , that they stick obstinately at using the words in a fore-received sense , and that no clear one ; nor can be bronght to an agreement about their explication . 8. it must be concluded , that , in physick also and metaphysick , there 's a capacity of infinite demonstrations , if industry be not wanting . for , who is so senselesse as pertinaciously to deny , that a formal sylogism may be made ev'n about the subjects of these sciences , or , when made , is of force ? it must , therefore , be said , either that the discoursers in these disciplines cannot comprehend their own meaning , and declare what they feel in their mind when they pronounce such words : or else , that they may reduce them into a sylogism and breed science . plain too , it is , that , in that part of physick , which is truly call'd such , viz. that which treats of sensible qualities , not so subject to obscurity through the equivocalnesse of the terms , demonstration will cost lesse pains : in metaphysicks 't will prove harder , because the commoner the words are , the more they are subject to equivocation . but , on the other side , because , the commoner the things treated are , the simpler are their notions , and consequently , more evident the connexion of the terms : demonstrations in metaphysicks must needs be most evident and secure , and such as deserve the evidence of all other sciences should depend on them . fourth plea refells the preliminary objections . 1. now we must give ear to the complaints , ( shall i call them ? ) or rather reproaches of the scepticks : though themselves are no slight causes of those ills which they object to the lovers of dogmatizing ; who , whilst they even acknowledge it the entire work of a man , and one minding his businesse too , to dilate the bounds of any science ; themselves , pursuing mean studies and the applause of a smooth-tongue , strive , under pretence of impossibility , to avert from that heroick thought the scientifically-dispos'd genius of others . yet , would they do even this but solidly , i should think it pardonable : but , if they fall not on this neither in a legitimate way ; how are they not to be exploded ? now , perhaps , the defects of mis-seekers may be more ; but i le content my self with the proposal of three . let the first be of those who seek things incapable of truth ; or who , of that which has no being at all , enquire how it is or may be made : as if one should require a triangle , equal to an assign'd circle , to be inscrib'd in it . let the second be of those , who complain that those things are unknown , which , though true in themselves , are yet , either , absolutely , or at least as yet , out of the reach of human power : as if one should be angry that the wars or government of the planetary common-wealths ( supposing those globes planted with rational creatures ) are unknown to us . for , 't is fondness to quarrel at our ignorance of such things , for reaching the knowledge whereof nature has afforded us no ladder of accidents . the last defect is of such as lament those things are unknown , which , by honest industry , may be searcht out , and will , if the ardour of inquisition grow ripe . for , 't is ignorance and importunity to allow no time for encrease of sciences . amongst these i reckon not those self-tormentors , who fret that those things are unknown , which are publickly known to others , but unknown to them ; because , upon some extrinsecal prejudice , they neglect inquiring into what others have said : which race of men is , at this day , most frequent among the courters of science ; but withall most insufferable : for , what can be viler than to shut the eyes against things most manifest to the understanding ; upon the calumnies of such as profess they know not these things which others constantly affirm are most evidently comprehended ? 2. let now the complaints themselves speak , viz. those with which the contemner of advancing dogmatically has stuft his 3 , 4 , 5 , and 6 chapters : but , first le ts examine those things which he indulgingly reproaches . they are the two , as it were , acknowledged ultra's of philosophers , viz. the causes of the seas ebbing and flowing , and of the wonders of the load-stone . i le endeavour to look into them severally . and , as to the first , though that may well be reckoned among the things whose accidents are not-yet-enough comprehended by us ; and therefore i might justly exact that they , who think it incomprehensible , should take care to have the phoenomena's clear'd , and teach us , by just calculations of seamen , what dayes , in the several regions , the sea ebbs and flows happen : otherwise , i may deservedly lay the blame on industry , and excuse philosophy : yet i will not proceed so rigorously with a courteous adversary ; but argue , that these things may be convinced concerning this vicissitude of the sea : that the motion is caus'd by an extrinsecal mover : that that is no other than the winde : that what rules the windes is but various aspects of the sun and moon to the divers climates of the earth . which , if they be true , if evident from the phoenomena's ; what remains , but that the phoenomena's be more acurately traced ; and the ignorance of particulars laid to the charge of industry , not of art : and so philosophy scape scot-free ? 3. le ts run over our proposals one by one . the first is that the seas motion is from something extrinsecal , or without it . this is demonstrated by aristotle in his books of physicks ; as they who have studyed him know : the dialogues , too , de mundo have made this some part of their pains ; and , if a proper place for it occurs in this treatise , i shall not be loath of my labour to explicate the same again : here this proposition is to be assum'd , not prov'd . that the author of this motion is the winde comprehends more than one thing , viz. that the winde is a sufficient stirrer of the sea ; and that it , in particular , concurs to this motion call'd the flux . as to the first part , ( not to mention how many deluges or overflowings of the sea have infested the coasts by the windes help ) , we need not travel beyond the thames ; in which , almost every winter , the flood happens , sometimes more than once in a day , to be beaten back or pour in more abundantly than ordinary , to the overflowing the streets in the subburbs of london , that , again , the winde causes this course of the tydes , besides the necessity which the perpetual west-winde , flowing from the atlantick sea to the east-indies , carries with it ; the six-months strong currents , which take their turns constantly backward and forward between africa and america , conformable to the windes always keeping the vicissitude there , are a manifest testimony . add to these , that , through the whole coast of china , certain tempests , with most vehement rains and overflowings of rivers , are daily expected at the new and full moons ; whence the variation of the fluxes at the same just periods is encreased . now , that the windes and rains and rising of storms depend from the sun and moon is so notorious that 't is past contest . these things , then being clear ; the causes of ebbing and flowing cannot be obscure : though the certain compasses they fetch be unknown , because the observations of them are not-yet exactly calculated . 4. nor is the magnetical philosophy less evident , if we 'l have but patience to look into 't by piece-male . for , it cannot be doubted , from the sudden turning of iron-tools fit for the purpose , and other bodies apt for magnetical direction ; but that power of direction , which we call magnetical , is attaind by a flux of unperceivable atoms deriv'd from one body into another : and as little , that because a perpendicular or horizontally-sidelong position of the magnetical body is apt to beget in it that vertue ; the primarily magnetical body is the earth we tread on , or at least the crust of it next us . nor , again , is it questionable , from the perpetual motion of corruption and generation of this magnetical vertue in those bodies ; but there is a certain perpetual flux of atoms upwards and downwards , as also between the equator and the poles ; whereby this vertue is infus'd and fed . neither , again , will any stick at it , that the magnetical body , if it be set at full liberty , must be carry'd according to the flux of the like atoms ; as that which swims in a river follows the violence of the stream : and consequently , the declination , too , or variation of the needle point out the channel of the earth's atoms , which are proper to it . all which if we solidly remark , and pursue with a steddy discourse ; i see not what great mistery lies in this magnetical vertue and operation , beyond possibility of bringing clearly to light . these secrets , therefore , of nature were , heretofore , like the head of nilus , undiscover'd ; but now , themselves attest not the defect but proficiency of science . these then thus touch'd on , let us fall to the objections themselves . fifth plea refells our ignorance of the soul and sensation . 1. in the third chapter , therefore , of his most eloquent discourse , he objects our ignorance of that thing we ought to be best acquainted with , viz. our own souls . concerning which , what a kind of thing 't is in this our earthly habitation , he neither teaches nor enquires at all , as far as i can discern ; only that it is , he asserts , may be most clearly gathered from its effects ; but , to ask what it is , he saies is like the mistake of infants , that look behind the glass for the body whose superficies they saw painted on its foreside . and , in my judgment , he had said rarely , had he stopt here : but in his following questions , he shews his deficiency even in this . for , he asks farther , whence the soul comes ? and how t is united to the body ? he is therefore most manifestly detected , to think that the soul , lying hid in the body , is of it self a certain substance , which may directly be made , come , and be joined to another thing : whence he terms it subsistence , which doubtless denotes a thing and substance . now , that this is a most important error in philosophy none can doubt , that 's able to discern the opposition of one and many . for , t is plain , that either a man is not a thing ; or else that his soul and body are not two things ; if one thing cannot at once be many , nor many one . nor am i scar'd with the distinction ( which the boys that gabble philosophy have always ready in their budget ) of a perfect and imperfect thing : which saies just nothing , unless imperfect signifie to which somewhat is wanting to make it a thing ; which suppos'd , an imperfect thing is not a thing , and the distinction vanishes . otherwise , the same cannot be one thing and more things : wherefore either a man is not a thing , but a pair of things consisting of an intelligence and a beast ; or his soul and body are not two things . 2. when , therefore , he asks , whence comes the soul ? it must be answered with a question , whether he doubts whence the man comes ? for , if whilst the man lives , there be but one only thing which is call'd the man , 't is he alone can have come ; and he beats the wind that enquires whence the soul comes ? nor am i shaken with the authority of our fore-fathers , though never so reverend : i mean not of those who profess themselvs unable to grapple with the question ; for these deliver the candle into the hands of posterity , advising them to pursue on the same race , that it may be seen whether any thing purer occur to them than to themselves , ready to patronize whoever shall clear the truth . but their opposition i resist , who clamor 't is the faith of all churches that rational souls are fram'd by god. for , now i 'm accustom'd to it , to distinguish between what 's due to the sincerity of faith , and what to scholastical subtilty . if i attribute the making of man , as he 's intellectual , to the singular power and operation of god , i have submitted my self to the keys of the churches doctrine , and subscrib'd to the tradition of the saints . but , whether that action , which is the generation of man , consists of two actual parts , or be but one alone , by more notions equivalent to more really-distinct actions , is a purely speculative question belonging to the schools . and so it must be said that one thing , a man , equivalent to a beast and an intelligence , is brought into existence , by one action , equivalent to two , the generation of an animal and the creation of an intelligence . 3. by this truth we are led to the evident solution of the two following knots ; the econd being how the body and soul are united ? which , 't is plain , is herein faulty , that it supposes two things to be united existing either before the compound , or not destroyd but ty'd together in it : which is clearly false , not only out of the ' fore-declared truth , but also out the definition of a part. for , parts are call'd such , whereof , by a motion , call'd composition , one thing is made ; or into which , what was one is resolv'd by division , or destruction of the unity . now , unity , not union , is the form of what is one : and , in that which is one , to seek for the colligation or cement , is to seek by what the same is made the same . the same error runs through the following difficulty , which laments that 't is unknown how the soul moves the body : which is utterly knock'd on the head , by denying the soul moves the body . for , true it is , that one animated member moves another ; but not , that any substance , which is a pure soul , moves immediately any member in which the soul is not . i appeal to other animals , in which there 's frankly denied to be a soul independent of the body : and i desire to have shewn me what motion there is in man , which is not in them . i confess freely , that one member , the brain especially , moves the rest after another manner in man , than in other animals ; and this by reason of the difference in their souls : but first it ought to be made evident by experiments , that a humane soul , without the help of the body , or some member acting together with it , moves another member ; before we are to enquire into the manner how this either is or can be done . 4. the last darkness which he bemoans in this chapter lyes in our ignorance of that motion , whereby the spirits are deriv'd out of the brain into the fit nerves for the animal's natural action . and , if indeed the objection brandish an argument common to all animals , i should soon quit the field : for i confess my self not so skilful in anatomy , that i can lay before the eyes , why , from the motion of anger boyling in the heart , the spirits should start into those muscles , by whose streining the animal is carry'd towards its adversaries ; and , from the motion of fear , spirits flow into the opposite muscles , by which the animal flies fromwards them ; whereas they , in a manner , add strength to and enforce both alike . yet , i make no question at all but , by force of the brain 's motion , caus'd by the motion of the heart , it comes to pass that the entrance into one sort of channels are shut , others opn'd , and that thence comes this admirable and as-yet-not-sufficiently-seen-through direction of the spirits . but , the authors seems to make mans case proper to himself ; alledging will , and perhaps election , to be , as it were , the first author of this direction . still , therefore , he slips into the same error . for , first , he should demonstrate some act of the will , without some either precedent or concomitant motion of the heart , ( which , when t is violent , we call passion ; when we endeavour at any thing , desire or flight , or some other such like we stile it ) : but , if there be no such , then the cause of this direction is purely mechanical , as he calls it , and not any certain inexplicable power . now , that there cannot possibly be any such exempt act of the will , 't is clear enough to them who allow ther 's no knowledge without a beat of phansies : for , phansies cannot chuse but both be stird themselves and stir others , by the usual ways of nature . by motions , therefore , deriv'd from the heart , whether in man or in animals , all motions , whether natural or free , universally are perform'd : and , by consequence , are subject to the contemplation and scrutiny of philosophy and acurate mechanicks . 5. the fourth chapter objects that the natures of sensation and memory are inexplicable . as to the former , first he acknowledges the substance of sensation is seated in the brain alone : then he inclines to des cartes's fantastical conjecture , shall i call it , or deviation from the manifest footsteps of nature ; about motion's being brought down from the heav'ns to our eyes , through the continuedness of a very thin ether : but , because he esteems aristotle's conceits , too , not incredible , i may be excus'd from that speculation . at length , therefore , he falls again into the old error , enquiring how corporeal things can have any force upon a naked spirit ? he supposes therefore , the soul in the body to be a kind of thing , not the form or affection of the thing , man ; and so , is upon the same false haunt again , nor needs repeating former discourses to beat him off it . but , left he should say nothing new , he objects that , by sense alone ; there 's no discerning the quantities , distances , figures and colours of things . i wonder , i must confess , at these objections from a curious and ingenious man ; things so clearly explain'd & demonstrated in opticks . who is so ignorant , that he knows not that bigger things , at the same distance , strike the eye in a more obtuse angle and stronglier ? who knows not that figure , if plain , as objected to the eye , is nothing else but quantity more spacious or contracted this or that way ? but , if it be a solid one and participate of the third dimension , it borrows its variety from distance . again , that distance is nothing else , but a certain magnitude spread between the eye and the object ; which if it be past judging of , neither can the eye attest the distance . lastly , that colour is nothing else , but the confused figuration of a superficies , according to its parts undistinguisht to sense . whence it remains clear , that the eye needs no other geometry for all these , than what is necessary to judge of a magnitude from the variety of an angle . 6. his next pains is about memory . to shew the explication of that impossible , he commemorates and rejects four waies of resolving it . i must take another path than any of those . first , i must weaken this consequence , that if any thing about memory has not hitherto been explicated , we must therefore make account it never will be , or that 't is impossible to be explicated . we must be aware too , that alwaies some things will be unknown ; either because their trivialness merits not the pains of learning them ; or in that at length the bulk of things known will be grown so great , that more will be burthensome to the understanding . now , to complain of such like is to have forgot human shortness . what , therefore , seems my task in this queston is , to bring into play those things which are already establisht and evident about memory ; and , for those that are unknown to make an estimate whether , some time or other , they too will come or merit to be known . first , then 't is evident , we must distinguish what is memory and what remembrance . for , memory is only a conserving of the impressions made by the objects , whereby the animal is rendred able to use them when he lists or needs . but , remembrance is a certain motion whereby that power of using the impressions is reduc'd into act and use. concerning memory , therefore , a reason is to be given both of its station or rest , and of the causes or manner of its motion : and of both , if i be not mistaken , nature and experience offer evident footsteps , for tracing them . 7. in the first place , that all things that move the sense have certain minute particles of their body shorn off ; as to the touch , tast and smell , is too notorious to abide contest . he that denyes the same force to the light , returning from the things to our eyes , must deny , too , that the sun extracts exhalations from the earth and sea : there being no other diversity in the operations , but that the one is greater and stronger , the other weaker and less . now that these atoms get up to the brain , by the waftage of the spirits , ( that is , a certain liquid and most subtil substance ) can scarce be denied by one never so pievish , that 's but put in minde how waters and oyles are impregnated . these atoms , therefore , must of necessity strike , not without some violence , upon that part of the brain , whose being-struck causes perception . again , that a stream or any thing liquid dasht against a resister should not leap back again is most clearly repugnant , both to experience and reason . and , that a substance any thing viscuous , in a viscuous vessel besides ( such as those are about the brain ) being repuls'd , should not stick to any thing solid is equally impossible : as also , that a notable part of that stream should not cling together , is against the nature of gluyness . the walls therefore , of the empty and hollow places of the brain must of necessity be all hang'd and furnisht with little threads . conclude we , then , that through all the senses , except hearing , the animal is enabled , by atoms constantly sticking in it , to make use again of the impressions made by objects . in fine , since sound is made by a collision of the air ; 't is evident by anatomy , that it drives the hammer of the ear to beat upon the anvil , by which beat 't is not to be believ'd but certain particles must fly off and strike the fancy : the orderly storing up ▪ therefore , of these is apt to constitute the memory of sounds . the structure , then , of memory ( if i am not mistaken ) is rationally enough declared . 8. i cannot see why the like track may not carry us to the explaining of the symptoms of remembrance too ; or why their solution should be desparate . for , there 's nothing clearer than that the fore-explicated motion of the atoms is set on work by a wind , as it were . for , that passion is a certain ebullition of spirits reeking out of the heart , t is visible even to the eies , in anger , and love , and bashfulness . if we make inquisition what effect these motions have on the fancy , we experience , that those objects occur to the mind , tumultuously and all on a heap , as it were , which solicite these passions ; so hastily and in a huddle , that they prevent mature weighing . it appears , therefore , that the atoms , rouz'd from their places by such like vapours , fly about the cognoscitive part , in a kind of confused tumble . if then , there are certain winds and blasts , which we call motions of the appetitive faculty : is it not plain , that the cavities of the brain will be brusht , as it were , and the images sticking to the wals be moved to the place destin'd for attaining their effect ? and that these atoms are carried neither meerly by chance , nor yet in a certain order , is evident by this ; that , upon inquisition , the things we seek for do not suddenly and perfectly occur ; which were a sign of election ; and yet manifestly , such abundance of them suit to our purpose , that t is clear , they could not run thus without any industry at all . as , therefore , when we treated of directing the spirits into the nerves , we allowed the several passions each their waies into certain parts of the brain : so , here , t is also manifest , the same passions have the places and series of some certain atoms , in a manner more obvious to them , than others . 9. but our new admirer of nature is perplext , how this multitude of objects , swimming in the cavities of the brain , should possibly be , without entangling and confounding one another : and by what art they shift out of one anothers way , so as to be able to keep humane knowledge distinct . and here , i must confess , i had need crave the help of a machine : for , really , we have no candle , nor spectacles enabling us to look into the subtile paths by which the atoms avoid and slip by , to escape ruining one another by shocking . but , in exchange , i ask how many sun-beams ( which philosophy now questions not to be bodies ) pierce streight to our eies , through the vast continuity of air , and so many little bodies flying up and down in it ? there 's no body , if we credit experience and reason , without its steams , and a sphere of vapours derived from it : how do these steams find free paths to run in and attain such wonderful effects ? the magnetical , sympathetical , and smell-producing streams , have not their courses broken , or ends intercepted by one another . they that have not the confidence to deny these , why are they loath to allow the same may happen in the wide passages of the brain ? but you 'l reply , that to multiply a difficulty is not to salve it ; but to profess the rest of nature inscrutable , when t is our task to clear this particular . well then , thus i cut the very knot asunder : in currents of greater atoms , where t is easier to make experiment , t is plain , that many are confounded , many lost ; yet , out of the very nature of multitude , that some are preserved entire , and those enough to serve nature's turn . so it passes even in the brain : whatever object enters requires time for affecting the sense ; which , if it be too short , the object is lost almost before it be perceiv'd ; if long , it roots in the knowledge by the multiplicity of the images , and the frequent sight of the same object does as much ; nay , that knowledge often repeated , works the same effect , is evident beyond dispute . this being so , we must conclude , that such is the art of nature as , for things to be remembred , there shall not want that abundance of images , which is necessary and sufficient to force their way through the crowd of all others they meet . 10. 't is plain that , in this answer , i have prefer'd the digbaean method before the rest : because that , as neer as is possible , traces nature step by step . i concern not my self in the rest ; as studying philosophy , out of a design to build , not destroy . only , i 'd remember the ingenious author that he mis-imposes the third opinion ( which relishes nothing of philosophy ) upon aristotle ( who taught the digbaean way ) ; deceiv'd by the counterfeit stilers of themselves aristotelians , whereas they are nothingless . in this same chapter , the author seems sollicitous about the will 's following the understanding : but , because , he disputes nothing on 't , neither will i ; only , hint that the will , as spiritual , signifies not any thing else , but the very understanding perfect , or ripe for action to follow out of it . that mystery of whence comes ill , i deny not , has bin brought down , by the contests of the ancients , even to our ears ; nor question i but 't will last as long as the bold and ignorant shall endure : but , as the author mis-insinuates , i doubt not that st. augustine himself has most clearly convinc'd it ; nor can it any longer be troublesome to any , but those who either know not , or neglect his doctrine . sixth plea displaies the pastick vertue , continuity , adhesion of parts , and the mysteries of rolling . 1 ▪ in his fifth chapter he falls upon the obscurity of the formation of natural bodies , especeially living ones : yet , not so smartly but that what he says may , with ease enough be repuls'd . i say , then , that there are two methods , by which the formation of living creatures may be rendred intelligible ; without any farther difficulty than what may , without a miracle , be refunded into the wisdome of our maker . conceive the first , thus : let 's say the seed of a plant or animal conteins invisible parts of all the animals members : these , le ts say , supply'd with moisture , encrease , with some slight mutation , whereof the reason may be easily rendred ( for example , that some parts dryer and harder , others are more throughly water'd and grow soft ) ; and what great matter will be apprehended in the formation of living things ? the other method is , that , observing the progress in chymicks , which must of necessity hold the very same in nature if self , we 'd see that things concocted with a gentle fire result into three more remarkable parts : a kind of thin and , as it were , fiery one , though condensablein to the species of water ; another oily and answerable to air ; a third expressing the nature of salt and , as it were , hardned water ; with all which ther 's mingled and lyes at the bottom a fourth , that 's dry and of an earthy quality , however they call it . the same we ought to expect from nature ; since the acting of heat upon moisture is the end of both fornaces . this laid for a ground , suppose , in a proper vessel , a drop of prepared liquor , so kept warm and preserv'd that it may be encreas'd , too ; is it not plain that , by the very action , some parts will become dryer , others more subtil and liquid ? and that the dryer will grow into different figures ? especially into certain hollow vessels ; if , by the beats of the boyling moisture , they be extended and thrust out in length ? and that all of them will cling together , where they begin first to divide ? and see you not now the figure of the animal and its respectively homogeneous parts form'd ? and that their connexion and variety , and its other heterogeneous parts follow the variety of either the fire or liquor . 2. he that shall comprehend these things well , will not lament that the plastick vertue is an empty name and a word without a thing . but , if he be ingenious and conveniently at leisure , he 'l either , in spring time close-observe the breeding plants in gardens or the fields ; or at home pluck up seeds buried in pots , just while they are taking life ; and daily rake into the bowels of berries and seeds : and i dare promise him so manifestly connected steps of advance , that , after many experiments , he shall fore-tel , meerly out of what he sees the day before , what will be the next days issue . those things which appear wonderful confusedly in the whole , taken asunder discover and fairly offer themselves to view . if one observe the spreading of figures or colours , he shall find the principles of these founded in the nature of juice ; the reasons of those chalk'd out by some manner of their production : for both fruits and even slips are , by art , variable into any kind of forms . much more the figures of different salts or concret juices spring , not from any intrinsecal nature , but from their usual generation and the diffidulty or facilness of their place and motions . nor let any be scar'd by the talk of artists , that admire and amplifie those things whose causes they understand not : or of our authour , amaz'd at the constancy of natural operations ; why our hens should never be colour'd like peacocks-tails or parrats . for , in different regions , great varieties spring from the diversity of food and air : and , for what is out of our reach about these things , we must be beholden to time . 3. in the same chapter he raises two other questions , which he thinks absolutely inexplicable : to me , on the other side , they seem to have scarce any difficulty in them . the later in him is concerning the composition of bulk or continuum : a question both debated by the antients and desperate to the modern's . the former , though the later in nature , is concerning the sticking together of parts , or , why one body is more divisible , another less . the former question supposes another , whether there be parts actually in a continuum , whereof the affirmative side , though they wrangle in words , yet is commonly taken by the modern's , as it were a self-or-sensibly-known truth ; but , by the whole school of the antient peripateticks and that of the thomists following them , hist out , as demonstratively convicted . the issue of the matter is that , about the composition of bulk , the moderns , after a world of laborious trifling , confess philosophy at a stand : the peripateticks deride them as groping in the dark . for , if there be no parts til they are made by division ; they are manifestly out of their wits that seek how those should be united which are-not at all ? the arguments of those that assert actual parts cite even sense ; concerning which ther 's nothing certainer than that it cannot discern any part in a bulk ; since the term of each part is invisible , whereas sence requires a notable quantity to judge of . their other arguments commonly assume our manner of speaking , and end in logical trifles , how we ought to speak , not what the thing it self has really in it . now , this no-very-difficult contest being decided , all the controversie concerning the composition of bulk is over . 4. about the other question there 's even as wise work . the followers of democritus strive to resolve it into hooks and corner'd hold-fasts : not seeing , that nothing can be imagin'd so one , or an atom , as that it self is not compos'd of many parts , concerning which it must be ask'd how they come to stick so fast together ? but , this difficulty they , at least , slip over , asserting that these in minutest bodies , by force of nature , resist whatever divisive power , not so the compounds of them : that is , the greatest and invincible coherence of parts they carelesly ascribe to the force and quality of nature , and are narrowly inquisitive about a less . the first resolution , therefore , 't is plain , is refunded into nature it self , and the division of body or bulk into rare and dense , or having more and less of quantity in equality of bulk . which differences most demonstrably dividing the notion of quantitative and constituting more species of it in things ; there remains no greater difficulty in the adhesion of the parts of the same continuum , than whether there be any such thing or not : for , if there be any , by its very being a continuum , of necessicity it must be whereof parts may be made , not wherein parts are ; else ( as we have press'd above ) the same thing would be one and many , divided and not-divided , in the same notion . therefore 't is that substance , from its very quantity , whence it has its refolvableness into parts , has also its easier or harder resolvableness , which they call its parts more or less sticking to one another . but , as soon as ever the speculation is strein'd up to intellectual notions , these naturalists's stomack turns : as if philosophy enjoyn'd us not to know our own thoughts , and made it unlawful to understand what we speak . 5. his sixth chapter is all dedicated to the motion of wheels ; nor , if we believe an author that wants for no wit , is it any ways solvable . but , before he attaques that fatal difficulty , he objects a certain previous one to us , which the antients object to aristotle ; but he , i confess , in a clearer form . for , he considers a wheel mov'd about its center , and plainly concludes that no part of it moves ; but the whole is mov'd , and the several parts together change place . but , what inconvenience this conclusion drags along with it , i am utterly ignorant : for , though he strives to reduce at large , that one part first quits the place before another is in it ; yet evidently the words , not the thing , breeds all the contest : for , what hinders that , altogether and at-once , both the quitter should first not-be and the succeeder first be in the same place ? another solution might be given , did the argument exact it : but , as i said , the quarrel is about the words and manner of speaking , not the thing . the author subjoyns a second difficulty , how , in a wheel turn'd about , the parts nearer the center , in the same time , come to run over so little a space ; whereas they are connected with the remoter , which fetch so large a compass ? and , after he has acknowledged it to arise from hence , because they are not carry'd alike swiftly ; he infers that , if the swiftness of the motions be unequal , the straight line drawn from the center to the circumference must be crook'd : whereas 't is most evident , the right line would be crook'd , if the nearer and distanter parts from the center were carry'd with equal velocity . 6. at length the author loftily enters upon his boasted experiment , professing before hand , hee 'l stop the mouth of the boldest obstinancy . thus he proposes it . let one axle-tree have three wheels on it , one at each end , both alike , and a third in the middle far less . let the bigger rest upon the floor , the lesse● upon some table . let them all be drawn in a progressive motion , till , having fetch'd a full compass , they mark the floor and the table with the very same points , in which , at first , they rested on them . the three scor'd lines will be found equal ; whereas the middle one is scor'd out by the contact of a circle far less than the other two , yet 't is as long as them : which , with no likely-hood , can be deny'd impossible ; since , 't is clear , things that touch , as far as they do so , are , necessarily equal . this is the knot ; this the evident repugnancy . but , alas ! let 's observe that motion is call'd in to help tye the knot the harder ; and that the motion is of two kinds , a right and a circular , compounding a third progressive motion of the wheel . observe we farther , that the right ( or streight ) motion of the three wheels is equal ; and that the circular motion of the great wheels is equal to the right motion ; but the circular motion of the middle little wheel is less than the right motion : and , which follows , that the greater wheels are mov'd with the same celerity according to both motions ; but the lesser is mov'd stronglyer in the right , than in the circular . now , the compounded motion is not that which is scor'd upon the floor or table , which , 't is clear , is a simple and purely right one ; but a certain crooked motion in the air , making , with the scored motion , a certain area ( whose quantity , torricellus has demonstrated ) : as is manifest beyond dispute to whoever but takes any one point of the circle or wheel ; and withall , that the progressive motion of the bigger wheels is greater than that of the lesser wheel . these things thus explicated , there appears nothing in this objection more intricate , than in this simple proposition , that of two bodies , which are carryed according to one line with equal velocity , one may , at the same time , be carried swiftlyer than the other , according to another line : which is so evident , that any one , that 's a mathematician , cannot doubt of it . 7. yet still galilaeus presses closer that , in the circumvolution , the several points of the lesser circle or wheel are just fitted , in an immediate succession , to the several points of the space in which 't is carried : and , therefore , that it cannot be understood how the right can be longer than the crooked . but , that which deceived galilaeus was his not having discussed aristotle himself , but bin overcredulous to his modern interpreters , or rather corrupters . for , aristotle has taught us that a moveable , in actual motion , alwaies possesses a bigger ( and not-equal ) place to it self ; which is most evident : for , since no part of motion can be but in time ; and , in every part of time , the thing moved quits some place and gets some new ; 't is plain , there cannot be found any so little motion , wherein the body moved , has not possessed both the place in which it had rested , and some part of a new one . this supposed , though the moveable were conceived indivisible ; yet certain it would be that , in whatever determinate part of time , or by however little a part of motion , it would score out not a space equal to it self , but some line ; and , in the conditions of our present dispute every point of the lesser wheel will draw a line proportionate to a part of the circle of the greater wheel . and , since really there are no either instants in time , or indivisibles in motion , or points in a circular line : 't is evident , this argument has no force ; but in vertue of that false apprehension which we have convinced in the ' fore-alledged defence of geometry . seventh plea inquires after the causes of our modern shortness in science . 1. in some of the following chapters he , exquisitely enough , searches into the causes of errors and human ignorance : yet , me-thinks , i could suggest two which he has over-slipt . one is the laziness or rather vanity of this age : for , whoever has got himself but talk enough to weave a learned story amongst the ignorant or half-learned , such as understandings unaccostomed to sciences are apt to be dazled with : partly out of irksomness to pursue harder things , partly out of confidence of his own wit , he slights descending into those mines whence our ancestors have dig'd out science ; and to take those pains himself which alone wisdom regards and follows . let this author be my witness ; who , about the end of his former chapter , complains of the obscurity of our speculations concerning motion , gravity , light , colours , sight , sound ; all which the digbaean philosophy makes as clear as day : whence also ( though there they are more copiously and clearly explicated ) we have borrowed our discourses of the load-stone , the derivation of the spirits into the members , the memory and remembrance , the formation of living creatures , and whatever almost we have alledged for solving the proposed difficulties : the very dictates of nature leading us the way . such like philosophers , therefore , read the eminent and highly elaborate works of others , as if they were romances invented for pleasure , or as spectators behold a comedy : what on the sudden takes them they commend ; if any thing more knotty than ordinary occurs , they either out of laziness let it pass unregarded , or break some bitter jest on 't . 2. another cause of ignorance , wav'd by our author , appears to me to be a certain special error in the nature of demonstration . for , they feign to themselvs a certain idea of demonstration , which should not only have this force on the vnderstanding , to render the truth propos'd evident ; but , so , besides , that no objection can with any likelihood be oppos'd against it . which is as much as if they should require this demonstration to clear whatever follows out of , or any way relates to it ; or , that one demonstration should be a kind of entire science . for , otherwise , how is it possible but opposition may be rais'd against this , out of things not-yet seen-through and conjoin'd with this truth ? an understanding then , adapted to sciences , out of very principles and what it already knows , is secure of a deduced truth : nor fears any thing can be infer'd opposite to the truth it knows ; whatever pains it may cost to get out of streights . for , it knows , that those things are certain , which the vnderstanding , out of a steddy sight that a thing is a thing , or that the same is the same , has fixt to and in it self : and patiently waits till the distinction between the entanglements shew it self , and the confusion vanish . 3. in that these contemners of sciences endeavour not at fixing any thing in themselves by a severe contemplation of truth : as soon as any truth pretends but to evidence , as if they were incapable of owning it , they quit their station , and betake themselves to enquiring whether any one has oppos'd that same : and if they find impugners , they assume it for most evident , that such a truth is not evident . for , say they , were it evident , 't would be so to all ; 't would convince every understanding . but , they may just as well say , the sun is not visible , because t is not seen by them who turn their backs on 't , or keep their eies shut . for , as in corporeal sight , some corporeal motion is necessary , by which the ball of the eye may be set against the object : no less to see and fix in the mind this very evidence , that the same cannot be and not-be at once , a certain application , and as it were , opening of the mind is required ; even to conceive and give birth to the very evidentest evidence . and , for want of this , so many of the ancients and moderns have not own'd , but corrupted , the evidence of that very first and most notorious principle . whence they can never attain that scientifical method which shines so clear in arithmetick and geometry , but are wholly entangled in logical and equivocal trifles ; and fill babbling volumes with fopperies . let these lusty compilers of tomes shew the world but one leaf , or one page deduc'd , or , at least , attempted in a geometrical method ; and then , let them complain there 's no science , or that it lies hid in an unfathomable well : now the sordid sluggards , only mettlesome at repaoaches , conceit a lion in the way , and stir not a foot , so much as to behold the very way . eighth plea wards off from aristotle the calumny of special impiety . 1. and now i seem at an end of the task set me : did not the same persons strein , as enviously as possible , to defame aristotle , with all manner of contumelies ; that the ignominy of that one man may make way for them to tear science it self out of the hands of the learned , and throw it into the dirt of probability . for , he alone , of all the ancients , has left any monument of demonstration in metaphysicks and physicks . the academicks , where they leave the peripateticks , were orators , not philosophers . for , socrates himself was meerly a disputer and a doubter . plato and aristotle divided his school . plato propos'd to himself , with his wholy-divine wit and purest eloquence , to set out probability , and make himself admir'd for speaking specious things concerning the principles necessary to human life . aristotle very concisely hunting after truth by experiments , and marrying with the inspection of nature , the power of deducing consequences , design'd to shew the world science in physicks and metaphysicks worthy to vye with geometry : and , therefore , as long as a popular form of common-wealth nourisht the power of orators , he was less esteem'd . for , those famous persons affected to manage science after the manner of civil causes , without a solid and firm judgment . the orators at length , wearing out of credit , the authority of aristotle grew stronger ; and has been deriv'd from the romans to the arabians ; from them , to our schools : the italians first ( to our knowledge ) re-calling into the west , the science of the arabians , which the wars long since had chas'd away . 2. 't is highly unjust , and a sign of a cavilling spirit , to pry into his life , whose doctine you go about to impugn : for , these oratorial preventions of the reader argue the writer has no mind a candid judgment should be given of the truth ; but lyes in wait to distort justice by stirring the affections . wherefore , hissing out those things which are tattled against aristotles manners , let 's trace what 's objected against his doctrine . peter gassendus , then , in his third exercitation , objects it as certain , that 't is aristotles opinion , in his book of metaphysicks , that god is an animal : whereas , on the contrary , in the 8. book of his physicks , chap. 6 and 10. he so expresly makes god a substance immaterial , indivisible , immoveable either by himself or by accident ; that impudence it self cannot be able to deny god , in his opinion , not-an animal . he adds , that god is ty'd to the out-most superficies of the highest heaven , which is extream-heedlesly said in the peripatetical way : whether you construe without heaven , in imaginary spaces ( whereas aristotle most expresly attests there are no such ) ; or an indivisible adherent to heaven ; whereas , both the first mover must necessarily be said to be in that which is first moveable or moved ; and , t is well known , that , in aristotle's way , the superficies is mov'd only through the motion of the body whose it is ; as also , the superficies ( as we have said above ) is a certain being divided , or term , or no-farther of a body , and not any entity in which god may be placed . 3. the next accusation argues god bound up to the laws of fate and necessity . but , here , the calumniator is clearly in an error . for , there are two kinds of fate ; one a stoical ; their 's who assert that whatever things are , exist in force of contradiction , since , of necessity , every thing must either be or not-be ; and this fate aristotle rejects : the other fate is a course of causes . since , therefore , 't is evident and agreed by all , in the peripatetical way , that god is the first-being , and by consequence , the cause of the whole series of the rest ; most clear it is that , in aristotle's school , he is not subject to fate , but himself the fate of all other things ; which is the most wise tenet of the saints , and the marrow of christian doctrine . like this is the other , that he is subject to necessity . for , the term , necessity , is ambiguous : for , as t is attributed to animals contradistinctly from liberty , so it takes away perfect knowledge ; which no peripatetick ever deny'd to god , to whom aristotles doctrine forces the very top of knowledge to be attributed . there 's another necessity springing from prefect knowledge ; to which nothing lying undiscovered , one perfect in knowledge , and , consequently , god , can take but one way . but , this necessity implying the determination of an understander to particulars , out of common principles , manifestly speaks election or liberty actuated . 4. he is farther calumniated to have taught that god knows not despicable and petty things ; and , the 12. of his metaphysicks is cited , where this is not found but by way of doubting : but , his best interpreters conclude , out of other texts , that aristotle attributes the knowledge even of these too , to god. this crimination , therefore , argues an ill will , drawing the words of that excellent person to the worst sense . yet , at least , he makes the world increated . but this may easily be deny'd . he asserted it , indeed , not-generated , or , impossible to have begun by motion and the force of natural causes ; which is most consonant to christian faith : but , as to the creation of the world , he has not a word on 't : yet , 't is one thing not to have acknowledg'd it , or reacht so high ; another , to deny ; amongst modest men that babble not incertainties . yet , i confess , he thought the world it self eternal : but , in his very error , he shewed himself the chief of heathen philosophers . for , whereas , they all with one consent declared , that nothing is made of nothing , 't was inconsequent for the world to have begun by motion , which could not exist without time ; and no begining of time , either out of its own essence , or by the action of moving causes , could appear . t is plain , therefore , that this error of aristotle's argues his excellency above the rest , who by chance , and not by science light on the truth . 5. the last calumny about his tenets concerns the immortality of the soul , which gassendus saies , aristotle in many places denies : but as disfavourably as before ; since , his best interpreters attest that he acknowledged it ; and plutarch records him to have written concerning the soul , upon eudemus's death ; out of whom is cited that famous story of a dead man's soul begging revenge of his friend . whence is evidenc'd that those interpreters err , who , out of aristotle's principles , endeavour to conclude the soul not immortal , and that this was aristotle's own sence . it hits strangely in fine , that the author , otherwise very ingenious , should judge this a fit objection , that aristotle denyed the resurrection of the dead : which , t is most certain , the light of faith first discover'd to mortals ; though , after its acceptation on that account , its conformity also to the progress of nature might be discern'd . this farther , that he concludes , saying , that aristotle speaks many things wholly disagreeable to our h. orthodox faith : as if plato and the rest of the philosophers had tendred the world none but tenets agreeable to faith : which is by so much an unworthier part of gassendus , in that he himself in his preface , promises he 'l shew that , t is by faith alone , any thing comes to our knowledge of god and the intelligences ; and that all arguments about these things , drawn from the light of nature , are vain . a worthy epiphonema , indeed , to close up his sixth book , design'd against metaphysick , or the supreme science . ninth plea wipes off the aspersions on aristotle's doctrine and terms . 1. i must now return from gassendus to the author of the vanity of dogmatizing ; since he has selected the strongest mediums : justly preferring them before that numerable rabble which gassendus has heap'd together , even to cloying ; out of love to reproaching , rather than science . our english academick , then , first by way of preface , as it were , seems to decline that envy , which the honourable train of aristotle's followers would be apt to procure him ; applying that sentence of seneca's , the multitude is an argument of the worst : so prone we are to err , even in the plainest things . for , t is evident , the vulgar , in some things , follow men of excellence , as it were , their captains ; in other things are govern'd , or rather hurried by their own judgment . the former method is that of nature it self , that many ignorants may , by the vertue and authority of a few , be carried to good : but , that the vulgar should judge of things themselvs know not , and by a tumultuary consent , precipitate the counsels of the prudent ; this is opposite to the laws of nature and reason . here now enquire whence aristotle has got an authority with the vulgar ? and t will clearly appear he has been made the coripheus of philosophers by the sway of the very princes of scholastical theology : to whom if you compare the judgments of orators or criticks , they 'l dwindle away to nothing . the fathers themselves ( those great persons pardon me if i say so ) are of another different trade ; nor have fallen upon any philosophical explication of faith , otherwise than as forc'd to it by the importunity of hereticks . 2. the author subjoins , that in the opinion of the wise , peripeteticism is a mass of terms that signifie nothing . but this author knew not that his own terms are so equivocal , that themselves speak nothing . for , who has sufficiently fifted this , who , or by whose judgment they are called wise , that have pronounced this of the peripateticks ? if we consult aristotles works themselves , or his ancient emulators , t is clearer than the sun , none ever of the philosophers so industriously , and by distributing so many of his terms into obvious sences , took care for the clearness of his dictates , and eluded the entanglement of equivocations . t is manifest then , the wise men had little skill in aristotle . they have mistaken , therefore , for aristotelians some apes cloaking themselves with aristotle's name , and expose other mens tenets for peripatetical ones : and ( which he seems not to know ) in very truth pyrronians . for , whoever , in mighty volumes and questions piled one on another , teaches nothing else , but , that one part , indeed , is more likely , but either side is defensible ; in such a world of twattle saies no more , than had he pass'd sentence in one word , that nothing is clear . this calumny , therefore , touches his own friends , not aristotle . 3. then , he prosecutes his plea against the peripateticks by certain doubts ; which either are not , or seem not , clear to him , in spight of reason . the notion of materia prima , which asserts it to have neither quiddity , nor quantity , nor quality , he contests is a description of nothing . ' strange , that men be so humorsome ! are there , perhaps , in all nature more usual words than being and power ? who is so sottish , that he speaks not thus of a piece of brass or marble assign'd for the purpose , that it is not-yet , but may or will be a statue of mercury ? do they not , peradventure , understand themselves that speak thus ; or , when they say , it may be , or has an aptitude to be a mercury , do they say the brass or marble is nothing , or , is nothing of mercury ? how , then , besides mercury , or the form of mercury , is there not a certain power or aptitude to be mercury , which neither is mercury actually , nor yet a notion of no-thing or no-thing ? or if , in respect of the figure which constitutes mercury , there is some aptitude which neither is that , nor yet a notion of nothing ; why may we not affirm the same of a quantum or bulk , and say , a boy is not yet big , but may be big ? for he that asserts this does he not , at the same time , deny bigness ; and yet clearly he names an aptitude to bigness ? nor , perhaps , is there any difference in respect to entity ; for we scruple not to say that tallow or oile may be flame , and yet that they are not yet flame : the tallow , therefore , or oil neither are the thing , flame , which they may be , nor so big as they will be when they are flame , nor so hot ; and yet they may be flame , they may be greater , they may be hotter : and there is in them a certain power , which neither has quiddity , quantity , nor quality ; since they are refer'd to all these , and are in a present state of privation in respect to them . now whoever professes this unintelligible , directly condemns mankind for a company of fools , that know not what they say in their vulgarest speech and commerces : and , he that denies matter it self destroys that solemn maxim of philosophy , that nature makes nothing of nothing . 4. there are two other terms which trouble our sceptick , form and being educ'd out of the power of matter . as for the first , 't is strangely odd , that too much speculation should so render ingenious men no better than the most stupid . can any man be born such a bruit , as not to own that one thing is distinct from another ? or , if it be distinct , can he assert t is distinguish'd by nothing ? does the difficulty lie here , that this , by which t is distinguish'd should be called a form ? what a strange unreasonableness is this , not to let me call that a form , which i see distinguish one from the other ? may not i say of two brazen statues , that they agree in brass , and are distinguisht by their figures ? or , if there be a third of marble , shall i be chid for saying , the brazen ones are distinguisht from the marble one , in that this is of stone , those other of mettal ? as , therefore , before , i distinguisht power and being in substance , quantity , and quality ; i may , now , in the same , find grounds for the denominations of form and subject in each of them . 5. as to the later term , being educ'd out of power , let the ingenious man reflect whether that which , out of some dark hole , softly and by degrees comes forth n●o open view , is improperly said to be educ'd or brought out . again , let him remember ( if he have ever seen a peece of marble form'd by a statuary ) how , at first it cannot be imagin'd what the artist means to form : after a little pains , there appears a confus'd resemblance of a humane creature ; then , whether it be a man or woman ; and at length , what man it is . behold , how a man , which was potentially in the marble , and confused in the dark , as it were , is by little and little educ'd by art out of that confusion into clear light , and the marble is palpable and expresly made a caesar. philosophers consider as much in nature ; whether you observe the seeds of living things , or the community of the elements to be mixt into a compound , or the abstraction of matter from the elements , whence this phrase to be educ'd out of the power of matter signifies matter out of its aptitude to many , to be determin'd , by the operation of nature or art to one certain thing ; through a motion from confusion to distinctness : and not to be , as it were , infus'd , with a dependance from the subject , as this anti-peripatetick fancies out of i know not what dreamers . for , there are none of these triflles extant in aristotle . tenth plea maintains certain definitions and arguings . 1. next they shoot at two of aristotle's definitions , either of them most exact , and as clear as can be , to those that understand any thing in his way . the first is the definition of light , in these words , light is the act of a prespicuous thing : which seems obscure to this race of people , because the use of the word act is fram'd by philosophers , and not taken from tully , or found in calipine . let them know , therefore , that act is deriv'd from agere , to do , or agi , to be done , or the participle actum , done ; and us'd by philosophers for that , by which what was intended by the agent at the end of his action is term'd or demonstrated donc . in greek , perhaps , 't is more elegantly call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as it were , the operation of the causes , taking the operation , not for the flux of the action , but , for that which remains introduced by the operation , which is such a flux . but , because our language affords not a proper word correspondent to the term , act ; our sterling philosopher is all in choller against aristotle . for , if he had put but ordinary words , instead of terms of art , saying , light is a certain perfection of a body , that has this in its nature , to let coloured things appear through it , making them de facto appear through it ; as we experience objects are seen through illuminated air , which are not seen through it darkened : what had he found worth making such a wide mouth over ? now because he has spoken most neatly and briefly , poor aristotle smarts for it . 2. the other definition has the same fault . the definition is this , motion is the act of a thing in power , as in power . for , since a thing is said to be in power , to that it may be brought to by motion ; for example ; one that 's sick , to health ; wood , to firing , or to be fire : t is plain , that motion is that perfection , or act with which the subject is affected whilst 't is yet in power , or , till the sick person be in health , or the wood be fire ; as in power , or in that state by which it may attain the intended perfection . behold here a most clear and learned definition , and subject to no other reproach than a certain umbrage , from a ridiculous story concerning the greek term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which i believe fram'd by the philosopher to express his intention emphatically . the story 's this ; that a critick , i know not who , went to one ciccus , esteem'd a magician ( i imagine , because he wrote of magick ) to enquire of the devil what was the meaning of that word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in aristotle ; and return'd as wise as he went , and mock'd at by the oracle . that it may appear then what a dunce devil our philosophers have consulted ; lte them take notice that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a word made up of three , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , with the addition of a foeminine termination , which is proper for signifying abstractions : and so signifies the manner the subject of motion is found in at the end of the action ; which is the very same thing with the term act , as t is explicated above . 3. in his seventeenth chapter there is a new calumny forg'd against aristotle ; the more unworthily , in that he ; above the rest , has endeavour'd at clearness . his philosophy is accus'd to be litigious , and through the wavering use of his terms , confused and obscure . this accusation is found guilty of a double ignorance : one , of what aristotle's use is ; for he 's the carefullest that ever writ , to distinguish and form the significations of his terms : the other is , that he takes scepticks for peripateticks . and , that the scepticks endeavours are the vainest that can be , i easily grant ; that they little trouble themselves about fixing the use of their words , to be left more at liberty to sell any trifles they list for vanity or profits sake ; that they are petty orators , or rather janglers , not philosophers ; that they take upon them the name of aristotelians , to corrupt youth and draw disciples after them . i deny not that these are to be shun'd like the plaigue , by all pursuers of science ; nor is any thing of sollidity to be expected from them : this one thing puts me out of patience , that persons , otherwise ingenious and desirous of knowledge , should be averted by these cheats , not only from true science , but from all hope of ever gaining any , in the things most necessary to human life . 4. they back their feigned plea against the philosopher out of his own words and actions . their first crack is upon that saying of his , that his books of physicks were so publisht , that they were not made publick . the sense whereof was , that the matter or subject handled in them is so abstracted , that , without the assistance of an experienc'd master , they could not be understood by those unus'd to his way ; which we see hold to this day : for , scarce any one comprehends those books , unless aided by the old commentators . whence our moderns , for the most part , are quite besides the cushion as to aristotles meaning ; though he himself has spoken , as clearly as possible the brevity he prefixt to himself could bear . the next calumny is grosser and more luckless ; that those things which he has collected , to furnish logical disputants , and perfect the act of disputing previously to giving judgment , should be applyed to his method of demonstrating , and to his practice not in disputing but defining . for , as , in plays , 't is a commendation to entangle the story , that it may come off at last with greater admiration : so , 't is the task of the inquirer to confound the question , with proposing difficulties before it , that the demonstrator may clearly vnidicate it , and , as it were , dispelling the clouds , restore it to light. 5. this plea requir'd instances out of that work of his . the author presses three : upon gassendus's credit , i believe , or some other slight lookers into it ; for , in the book it self there 's nothing to be seen : the first runs thus . he proves the world to be perfect , because it consists of bodies ; that bodies are perfect , because they consist of a triple dimension ; that a triple dimensions is , therefore , perfect , because consisting of three ; and that three is perfect , because two we call both , and never say all till we come to three . look into his first book de coelo , chap. 1. you shall find these last words make no part of the demonstration , but are additional only : and that the demonstration , it self is this ; because the world consists of bodies , the perfection of the world is to be perfect in the notion of body . now , the perfection of body lies in this , that it be spread every way upon three prependiculars , as the geometricians demonstrate . and thus are both the several bodies , and the world ; but in a divers manner ; for the several bodies are terminated each to others ; whence , though they are spread according to all the lines , yet not to the whole , or utmost extent of them . but , because there is no space beyond or without the world ( as 't is demonstrated in the fourth of his physicks ) , the world is spread according to all and the whole lines , or , perfectly every way ; and by consequence , must be said perfect in the notion of body , and , so , absolutely . 6. the second instance is , that aristotle asserts , were there more worlds , the moon would fall down upon the earth . this consequence the arguer thinks sprung from such a fancy as theirs , that fear the antipodes should drop into heaven . but , he reflects not how great pains the philosopher took to establish the center of the world in the earth : which granted , this consequence would depend not from fancy but reason , as himself seems to confess . 7. the third instance , too ( drawn out of lib. 2. cap. 5. de coelo . is utterly perverted . for , aristotle teaches not , that the heav'ns are , therefore , carry'd towards the west , because the west is the nobler , ( as the argument makes it ) ; but , that the west is the nobler , because the heav'ns are carry'd towards it . now , there 's this difference betwixt the two ; that in the former method , 't is assum'd without proof , that the west is the nobler ; in the later , it follows out of those things which aristotle had concluded ; viz. that there 's nothing accidental in eternal things ; and , by consequence , that the motion towards the west is natural to the heav'ns ; and natural motion is to the more honourable : whence it clearly follows , that the west is nobler than the east . it follows , i say ; for , if the principles were true , 't were a noble demonstration . eleventh plea refutes some topicks babbled against science . 1. about the end of the chapter he expresses indignation , that the learned so employ all their pains upon logick , physick , and metaphysick ; that the sciences , usefuller to human life , viz. concerning the heav'ns , meteors , fossils , and animals , but especially politicks and oeconomicks , are much neglected . nor can i deny that these are neglected in the schools : but , what 's guilty on 't , but the scepticism that reigns there ? for , if the sciences were taught in aristotle's method , there would be room enough for all ; nor would nature be taunted with the usual calumny , that mans life is too short for the arts : but , the necessary ones once known , there would advance still a surplusage of leisure , to take abundantly , in any of these sciences , that delight which human curiosity should be drawn to . but , they are the scepticks that envy this happiness to men ; confounding all things with endless contests ; especially those common truths which aristotle has demonstrated : such as are formal divisibility , that what ever is mov'd is mov'd by another , that a continuum or bulk is divisible in infinitum , that there 's no vacuum : and such like ; without the owning whereof before hand , 't is in vain to make experiments for acquiring science : since , they will all come at length to be resolv'd into these principles ; or else there will be ever a straining after science unproffitably , without any principles at all . 2. in his eighteenth chapter , he reproves the peripatetical doctrine as insufficient to solve phaenomena's . but , this he does out of error or spleen : for , if he takes the doctrine of our modern philosophical apes to be aristotle's own , he 's strangely in an error ; but , if he denyes aristotle to have taken pains to solve problem's , he 'l be shewn guilty of injustice by all his books of natural philosophy , those especially which usually follow his eight books . which of the moderns has more happily unbowel'd nature than digby , who at every turn is mindful of aristotle , and candidly accepts his dictates ? the adversary urges that the systeme of heaven is mis-contriv'd by aristotle . open the accusation , you 'l find the sum and very knot of it to be , that aristotle had not an optick table : else supposing those phaenomenas of the sun , which enlightened aristotle's age , his discourse , in his books de coelo , merits all admiration . that the intelligences are the movers of the heav'n is christian doctrine . that there is a certain fire swimming upon our air is nothing else but cartes's ether , or a kind of rarer element enbracing the convex of our sky . if aristotle has err'd in a very few things ; why , yet , so much anger ? shall we not allow philosophy its growing time ? if , yet , he may be said to err , and not rather ingeniously , and ingeniously to propose , who professes he conjectures , not demonstrates ; as aristotle does in his books de coelo . 3. his ninteenth chapter inveighs against aristotle's doctrine as unfruitful and barren ; but , weakly and falsely . weakly , because all the inventions he speaks of belong to artificers and handy-craft-men ; not philosophers , whose office 't is to make use of experiments for science , not to make them . falsly , because aristotle's way of doctrine being about common notions , without which there 's no comprehending particulars ; nothing is truly invented without it . i , but they are generals that are found in aristotle . it must be reply'd , that he and his disciples deserve thanks for devulging them , and fixing a step to climb thence farther and higher . but , ( if my divination fails me not ) i see , were aristotle's principles pluck'd up , philosophy unable to give an account of ordinary effects . i 'm sure , the philosophy which admits vacuities is reducible to no rules for acting : and cartes's vortices , i shrewdly suspect no way serviceable to invention . concerning his tenets , which savour of impiety , we have spoken before . for his contradictions , the places are not cited : but , whoever is skill'd in aristotle knows , he uses to draw examples out of others books and vulgar sayings ; and that nothing is to be esteemed his own , which falls not into the course of his doctrine . whence , 't is no hard matter to find contrary opinions in his works : but , those things alone are to be ascribed to him , which either are asserted in their proper places , or brought by him for confirmation of his known tenets . 4. the twentieth chapter renders manifest the eminence of peripateticism above all other methods , by its very impugnation of it . for , it assumes , it cannot be known that one thing is cause of another , otherwise than because they are found together : which we deny not to be an occasion of suspecting , but no argument of causality ; for , if nothing else be clear , 't will be still-unknown , which of the too is the cause , which effect . but , the peripateticks conclude not a. to be the cause of b. till , defining both , they find , out of their very definitions , that a cannot be , but it must follow out of its intrinsecals that b is . for example , a peripaterick collects that fire is the cause of heat ; because heat is nothing else but atoms flowing from fire : and on the other side , he knows that fire cannot exist , but it must send out such particles . cartes's paradox , of light and the sun , is just as if we should expect the skyes falling to catch larks . that wonderfully ingenious man is so coelestial , that he has not so much as sand to found his structures on . peripateticks chuse rather to collect a few certainties , acknowledging a multitude of uncertainties , than , grasping at all , to hold nothing . sure i am , none more largely pretends demonstration , than des cartes : so that , nothing is more unseemly than for his adorers to profess scepticism . 5. not a jot stronger , to establish the impossibility of science , is the argument from the variety of opinions amongst those that are call'd philosopers . for first , it must be evident that they are philosophers : before their judgements deserve esteem in philosophical matters . do they profess to demonstrate ? do they model their books in euclid's method ? do they interweave definitions with self-known truths ? and admit no other for proof ? all which may be observ'd in aristotle and his antient interpreters , though not express'd in euclids form . these things if they do , either they are not rational , or all will be of the same mind ; as geometricians are . if they neglect these , 't is not a pin matter for their judgments in philosophy . our author tells a story of the power of fancy , which i doubt is imperfect : for , it seems , he would have one man be able to order anothers thoughts without ever acting by his senses or fancy : since , he relates , that one compel'd others , absent from him , to think and speak what he pleas'd . for , though i allow men to have a very large power over animals , by the help of their fancies ; for example , to tame or enrage them , by means of sounds or shewing them figures ; perhaps , too , to strike them sick or cure them , and such like : yet , that the fancy should be mov'd to those things , which move it not by any sense , 't is hard to believe . for all that , i do not altogether deny the motion made upon the sense to be every way like , and univocal to that which is in the mind ; and , when it happens , to be deriv'd rather from the vehemencie of the affection , than the pure motion of the fancies impressing it . 6. in this twenty first chapter , he divines of future science ; particularly , of some not-yet discovered manners of acting at distance : which i 'le rather await , than discuss or hope for . about the end of the chapter , he assumes , that nothing can be known , unless it be resolv'd into the first causes . whence , he should have seen clearly that the first causes , and metaphysicks , which treats of them , is most known of all to nature , or next to our first knowledges : and that naturalists strive in vain , who negotiate much about the particulars of nature ; and comprehend nothing through their ignorance of metaphysick . take for example the stir about vacuum ; which metaphysicks declare as impossible , as for no-thing to be a thing : about the spring of rarity and density ; which the metaphysician most palpably demonstrates is out of , or , extrinsecal to the things that are rare and dense , and many such like ; whose truth those that essay by experiments , but without the light of metaphysick , shall find an endless work on 't . metaphysical principles must be taken from aristotle , not des cartes , though a person of most eminent wit. for , aristotle , by contemplation , form'd into method those things which he found engrafted in nature : des cartes , in his physical principles ( as if he meant to prescribe the creator an idea ) designs in the air and in the concave of the moon , as they say , what himself thought was to be done , according to art. from which kind of fabrick there 's no benefit to be hoped for by the reader . 7. the next chapter is sick of that error , which aristotle has very often detected and confuted ; viz. that nothing is known unless it be perfectly known : for example , that we know not god is , unlesse we see him , that any man cannot make use , and be sure of that cartes's first-known thing or object of knowledge , i think , therefore i am , unlesse he comprehends the all things of that i ; so , as to know the nature of his matter and form , the number of his elements and members , and the causes and motion by which he was begotten , and in short , whatever is connected with him . which is clearly to professe , he knows not the question in hand : for , none of the dogmatizers either arrogates to himself or hopes for so perfect a knowledge . 't is a piece of the same heedlesnesse , not to know that all that see a white wall have the same apprehension of whiteness , though their several sensations vary the degree and perfection of it . whence , our author had done more prudently to have sat down in silence , and pardon'd the affecters of science their error ; than , by meerly topical and delusory reasons , to have averted minds , born to excellent things , from the first desire of nature , and gathering fruit , at least , in some degree ; according to that of the moral poet , though you of glycons mighty lims despair , do not to keep away the gout forbear . 8. for all that , our academick makes no scruple , in general , to lay all kind of mischief to those that proceed dogmatically , such art ( as the philosophers says ) it requires to find a mean. first he asserts this method is the daughter of ignorance ? who would have look'd for this brand from a sceptick ? you that profess your selves to know nothing , do you object ignorance to others ? quis tulerit gracchos de seditione querentes ? next , he calls it the inmate of untam'd affections : upon what title ? for , if there be any science , that will the peaceful temples keep well fortifi'd , built by the sages doctrine . — you that profess you know not whether there be any or no ; how rashly do you affirm it to dwell alwayes with untam'd affections ? since , if there be none , it dwells no where . the third inconvenience of dogmatizing is , that it stirs men up to controversies . the rising sun seems to me guilty of the very same crime , in disturbin the slug-a-beds , and summoning every one to their work : for , such a kind of falt it is , to inculcate truth to those that live in ignorance and error . a fourth crime is , that one who adheres to any science , lays ignorance to the charge of those that know not his demonstration . i cannot deny it ; for , 't is the nature and title of light to reproach those things , as dark , which admit not its beams . but , herein the demonstrators are modester than the scepticks , that , at least , they except some , and speak well of nature ; whom , with all her children , the scepticks condemn to the dungeon of darknesse for ever . 9. like this is the next , that the confidence of science in error bars the gates against the liberty to get possession of truth . how blindly does the sceptick dispute these things ? who freely owns that truth is no where , which men might have the liberty to get possession of . he concludes at last , the dogmatizer has a petty and enthrall'd soul. so strangely things are nick-nam'd that are unknown ! for , t is science's part to dilate the soul , and render it capable of great things : and this the pleasure of one that knows , to look down on scepticks as all in a tumult below , and lucret. see them at a loss at every turn , and breathless hunting out the way of life . which to make ones life and task is the miserablest of all things , and an utter casting off rationality ; and the whole felicity humanity affords . these things , as they are all most true , and scarce deniable , even by a sceptick , to follow out of the possibility of demonstration , that is , if there be any rational nature , yet i would not have them so asserted , as to patronize palliated scepticks , who admit , indeed , that there is such a thing as some both physical and metaphysical science , in common ; but neither tend to it by any legitimate method , nor own any thing , in particular , demonstrated : and yet , by the press of the herd , in a society , thrusting one another on , and by loads of scriblers , they most absurdly fly at and arrogate to themselves the highest degree of doctorship , and the top of sciences and name of wisdom . the father of nature grant mankind may at length be eas'd of this yoak ; which galls the necks of the sons of adam : and , that the studious of truth may understand it alike dangerous to think every thing and nothing is demonstrated . finis . academia scientiarum, or, the academy of sciences being a short and easie introduction to the knowledge of the liberal arts and sciences, with the names of those famous authors that have written on every particular science : in english and latine / by d. abercromby ... abercromby, david, d. 1701 or 2. 1687 approx. 176 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 110 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2005-12 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a26553 wing a77 estc r6380 11966133 ocm 11966133 51707 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a26553) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 51707) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 46:4) academia scientiarum, or, the academy of sciences being a short and easie introduction to the knowledge of the liberal arts and sciences, with the names of those famous authors that have written on every particular science : in english and latine / by d. abercromby ... abercromby, david, d. 1701 or 2. [24], 179, [12] p. printed by h.c. for j. taylor, l. meredith, t. bennet, r. wilde ..., london : 1687. english and latin on opposite pages. first ed. cf. wing. reproduction of original in british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng knowledge, theory of. philosophy -early works to 1800. science -early works to 1800. intellectual life. 2005-02 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2005-03 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2005-04 jonathan blaney sampled and proofread 2005-04 jonathan blaney text and markup reviewed and edited 2005-10 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion licens'd , feb. 23. 1687. r. midgley . academia scientiarum : or the academy of sciences . being a short and easie introduction to the knowledge of the liberal arts and sciences . with the names of those famous authors that have written on every particular science . in english and latine . by d. abercromby , m. d. london , printed by h. c. for j. taylor , l. meredith , t. bennet , r. wilde , booksellers in st. paul's church-yard , amen-corner , and ludgate-hill , 1687. to alex. campbell , of calder the younger , eldest son to sir hugh campbell , knight baronet , and baron of calder . sir , being of a temper quite contrary to the flatering genius of this age , i shall not follow the example of most writers of dedicatory epistles , and try your patience with long encomiums either of yourself , or of your family , since the histories , and publick records of the kingdom of scotland , have given the publick so clear , and so full an account of its antiquity ; as likewise of the vertue , generosity , great atchievements , and unshaken loyalty of your illustrious ancestors yet i hope i shall not offend your modesty , if i say , 't is the general opinion of all your acquaintances , both at home and abroad , that as you follow in your greener years so closely their footsteps through the temple of vertue , to that of honour and glory , so you may perhaps , impove ( if possible ) to a higher pitch , those very great and heroick qualities they first excell'd in . may not i then b● allowed to say , without the least suspicio● of flattery , that you are not only th● la●ful successor of the most ancient , mo● noble , and loyal family of the thai● of calder , and of their estate and for ▪ tune , but also , that you are already possess'd of these good and great endowments both of body and mind , which made them capable of the great employments they were intrusted with , and enabled them on all occasions to render the kings of scotland and great britain such signal services , as can never be forgotten . but not intending a panegyrick , which i know would be uneasie to you , who hates the least appearance of flattery , i shall not insist on this subject ; i must only tell you , that this small treatise , since 't is the academy of sciences , could not but claim a peculiar right to your patronage , since you have given so singular and convincing proofs of your being thoroughly acquainted with the subject it treats of ; for having seen by a lucky chance , before i had any acquaintance with yourself , your very learned and accurate book , i found it to contain in short , almost all kind of useful learning , the systems both of the new and old philosophy , the choicest flowers of rhetorick ; as likewise evident marks of a not ordinary piety and loyalty , especially when you conclude the whole with your father's , as well as your own dutiful asserting and declaring for his sacred majesty , who now reigns , ( then duke , ) his undoubted right of succession , in expressions full of affection and zeal to his person and service , and that at a time when loyalty and duty of subjects to the royal family , were not only seasonable , but seem'd to be necessary ; and you being hardly past the sixteenth year of your age , i could not but be surprised , instead of promising buds , to find so early fruits both of vertue and loyalty . while this directed me whither i should send this small present , it rais'd my thoughts in revising of it with a paulo majora canamus , to reform it so as to make it suitable to your character , and give it the better pretence to your acceptance . only i hope , that as travellers find some pleasure when settled at home , to review in a small map , those vast and pleasant countries they have visited abroad , so it may perhaps , prove some diversion in your spare hours , to consider now and then those very many arts and sciences , which both at home and abroad you have practised , and so successfull studied in larger volumes . though i treat nothing a fond , as the french speak , or thoroughly and to the bottom , yet besides some not despicable hints of the material principles of most arts and sciences , i do point every where at the famed authors , and greatest masters of every art and science , that they may supply you with what my design'd brevity , and the scope of this treatise , would not allow me to enlarge upon ; and so this not unpleasant method , whatever you think of the performance , may perhaps reconcile you to my design , of adding , though but little , to your greater improvements , while at the same time i shew to the world with what zeal i am , sir , your truly affectionate friend , and humble servant , d. abercromby . nobilissimo , clarissimoque domino . d. alex. campbell , a calder juniori , d. hugonis campbell , equitis baronetti , & baronis calderae , filio natu maximo . nobilissime domine , cum proclivem adeo in adulationem hujus saeculi genium omnino oderim praeter orum fere omnium morem qui mecaeati suo opusculum quodpiam inscri●nt , neque in tuas ipsius , neque in familiae tuae laudes multis excurram , cum praesertim historia ipsa publicaque regni scotiae instrumenta , non antiquissima solum ejusdem stemmata , sed & virtutem , fortitudinem , ingentia sacta , inconcussamque semper in reges nostros illustrium majorum tuorum fidem nec semel , nec paucis divulgarint . nihil tamen , spero , proferam quod prae modestia aegrius ferre debeas , si dixero cum omnibus sive britannis , sive exteris quibus non de facie tantum notus es , eorum te vestigia quamvis adhuc tantum aerate florentem per templum virtutis ad templum honoris & gloriae , tam presso pede insequi , ut quibus illi aliquando dotibus claruere , has rerum a te gerendarum splendore illustriores forte aliquando fore , nec immerito , nec solus conjiciam . quidni igitur hoc loco absque ulla adulationis suspicione liceat mihi profiteri te non modo conspicuum antiquissimae , nobilissimae , fidissimaeque regibus nostris familiae , ac thannorum calderae , opumque , quibus potiuuntur , legitimum haeredem , sed videri etiam donatum a natura iis sive corporis sive animi ornamentis , quae ipsis ad sublimia quaeque regni munera additum aperuerunt , quibus ii recte administrandis insignia regibus tum scotiae , tum magniae britanniae obsequia nulla proinde oblivione delenda pro re nata praestitere . sed cum nullam hic panegyrim mihi proposuerim , utpote quae tibi vel levissimam adulationis speciem refugienti ingrata foret , huic argumento pluribus non immorabor ; hic tantum dicam tractulum hunc , cum academia scientiarum sit , vel eo nomine tuo deberi patrocinio quod illius argumentum intime te , penitusque nosse indiciis haud obscuris non ita pridem demonstraveris , cum enim propitio mihi casu in librum a te sane perquam docte eleganterque conscriptum prius quam mihi notus fores , incidissem statim eo paucis , compendioque animadverti contineri non veteris modo novaeque philosophiae systemata , sed & omnem fere utilorem & alicujus momenti doctrinam , flosculosque etiam eloquentiae selectiores , nec non conspicua pietatis in deum , fideique in regem ubique indicia , ibi praesertim ubi sub finem operis , tuo ipsius patrisque tui nomine , regis nunc regantis ( tum ducis eboracensis ) certissimum avitum ad diadema jus , spirantibus ubique tuum in ipsum amorem verbis pro officio declaras , eoque tempore quo debitae regiae familiae fidei , obedientiaeque declaratio non opportuna tantum , sed & necessaria omnino videbatur ; cumque annum jam sextum supra decimum vix implevisses non potui non mirari maturos adeo tuo in hortulo solidae virtutis fructus , e quo teneriores tantum adhuc flosculi habita aetatis ratione expectari poterant . dam haec me impellerent ut tuo tractatulum hunc nomini inscriberem novam mihi provinciam imposuerunt ut eum scilicet ad limam denuo revocarem , quo jam tuo dignior aspectu quantumvis tibi semper impar , faciliorem ad te aditum inveniret . illud tantum sperare mihi liceat , ut qui longinquas regiones peragrarunt , domum reduces non absque voluptate aliqua exigua eas in mappa revisunt , ita futurum tibi negotiis magis seriis libero non injucundum contemplari varias illas scientias artesque quas tanto successu grandioribuse voluminibus conquisitas , domi ●orisque foeliciter exercuisti . caeterum licet nihil hic penitius attingam , praeter non contemnenda artium plerarumque , ac scientiarum principia , celebriores ubique authores indico , ut ea tibi pluribus subministrent , quae paucis tantum proposita mihi brevitas ipseque tractatuli hujusce scopus a me exigebant ; hac itaque non injucunda scribendi methodo , quicquid de opere ipso censeas , forte fiet ut & concilium meum probes , & propositam mihi metam ; eo enim hoc opusculo collimavi , ut quidpiam quamvis modicum praeclaris animi tui ornamentis adderem , dum interim palam profiteor quam non ficte haberi velim tibi , tuoque ubi res feret , obsequio addictissimus . david abercromby . the preface . because of the shortness of humane life , and the little leisure of most men to read large volumes , an accurate and easie method for attaining to a general , and yet in some measure , sufficient knowledge of most arts and sciences , has been long wish'd for , but never , for ought i know , undertaken , or at least , so compendiously , and so usefully performed , by any perhaps , either at home or abroad . for , 1. i have set down in these papers , a part of what i judg'd most material in every science ; as likewise fittest for every common capacity , that so this treatise may prove of a more general use . 2. i have called it the academy of sciences , because here , as in an academy , you may learn most of the noblest arts and sciences , especially if you peruse often what is offered to you in these few sheets : but if you desire to know more , though perhaps most gentlemen will think this enough , i have supplied you with good authors , who will give you a further , instruction , if you are at leisuure to consult them . 3. the virtuosi are concern'd in this treatise , because it contains an abridgment of what they have already learn'd , together with the names of the famed authors that have treated of the subject ; which is no inconsiderable advantage , the learned as well others , being sometimes at a loss when they write books , what authors treat of this or that subject ; wherein by having this treatise at hand , they may be soon satisfied . i have written it both in english and latine , to gratifie such as understand but one of the said tongues . 4. for methods sake , in the order of the sciences set down here , i have followed the alphabet as far as conveniently i could , beginning with those whose first letter of their names is a , and then with those whose first letter is b , &c. which engag'd me to keep the greek and latine names , as the most known , and the fittest for this purpose . i need not now tell you , that this treatise is of singular use to all sorts of persons , of what condition soever , and not to scholars only , but likewise to masters , who have here in a few lines , what they may teach such as are committed to their trust ; yea , the very ladies themselves , by the perusal of this treatise , and a little help , may be furnish'd with such a variety of knowledge , as may supply their not being bred in universities . praefatio . cum per humanae vitae brevitatem , otiumque ingentia evolvere volumina plerisque hominum non liceat , accuratam , facilemque methodum qua generalem quis , & tamen quae aliquatenus sufficiat , artium praecipuarum scientiarumque notitiam assequeretur , diu multumque plurimi exoptarunt , quam tamen indigenarum nemo , quod sciam , aut etiam alienigenarum scribendam adhuc suscepit , aut eo saltem , quo hic tradita est , compendio , fructuque forte hactenus conscripsit : primo enim quicquid praecipui quavis in scientia momenti , & quicquid communem ad captum magis appositum judicavi , idcirco adduxi in medium ut eo pluribus tractatulus hic usui foret . 2. academiam scientiarum inscripsi ; hic enim velut in academia artes plerasque , scientiasque nobiliores discere poteris si praesertim saepius relegas quae breve hoc scriptum tibi proponit : at si penitius omnia , pluraque scire volueris , quamquam nobilium plerique sat multa haec forte existimaturi sint , probatos tibi suggessi authores , qui te plura docebunt si quidem per otium eos consulere tibi liceat . 3. jam eos quoque qui ingenuis artibus ingenium excoluere opusculum hoc spectat , utpote eorum compendium quae jam didicere , complexum , celebriorumque propofito super argumento nomina authorum : quod non exiguae quid utilitatis est cum etiam docti aliquando , perinde atque alii nesciant , dum libros scribunt , quis de hac , illave re egerit ; quod seposito hujuscemodi ad usum hoc libello cito discent . caeterum tum anglico eum , tum latino idiomate eo consilio scripsi , ut ●is inservirem qui alteram linguarum ●llarum non intelligerent . 4. methodi gratia in serie scientiarum hic exhibita , alphabeti ordinem , quantum commode potui secutus sum , initio ab iis ducto quarum homina littera a , tum ab iis quarum homina littera b inchoat , &c. unde factum est ut voces graecas & latinas , utpote maxime notas , huncque in scopum magis idoneas retinuerim . frustra jam hic subjungerem tractatulum hunc summe utilem fore omni hominum generi , aetati , conditioni , neque discipulis tantum , sed & magistris quae hic perpaucis habent quae suae commissos curae docere queant : quin etiam ipsae faeminae hujus tractatuli lectione exiguaque docentis opera eam cognitionis varietatem compare sibi poterunt , quae educationis , qua carent , academicae , supplementum quoddam videri possit . some books printed for , and sold by john taylor , at the ship in st. paul's church-yard . a free enquiry into the vulgarly receiv'd notion of nature , made in an essay , address'd to a friend . in english and latine , for the benefit of forreiners . by r. b. fellow of the royal society . the declimations of quintilian , being and exercitation or praxis upon his twelve books , concerning the institution of an orator . translated ( from the oxford theater edition ) into english , by a learned and ingenious hand , with the approbation of several eminent schoolmasters in the city of london . the happy ascetick , or the best exercise ; with a letter to a person of quality , concerning the lives of the primitive christians . by anthony horneck , d. d. preacher at the savoy . the academy of sciences . academia scientiarum . section i. algebra . algebra , or the analytical doctrine , is the art of finding an unknown magnitude , taking it as if it were known , and finding the equality between it and the given magnitudes : it implieth then a dissolving of what is suppos'd to be compounded , which is meant by the greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or resolution : this name may upon this account be given to the common operations of arithmetick ; as for instance , to what we call substraction , division , extraction of roots , &c. for substraction is nothing else but a dissolution or resolution of what is suppos'd to be compounded , or made up by addition ; and division a resolution of what is suppos'd to be made up by multiplication ; as likewise extraction of the square root , is a resolution of what is supposed to be made up by squaring : but such resolutions being easie , are not called algebra , for the resolution of things , whereof the composition is more intricate , is more properly understood by this harsh word . the arabs call it algibr walmokabala , from the first of these two words we call it algebra , which taken together , imply the art of restitution and resolution . lucas de burgo , the most ancient european algebrist , calls it the rule of restauration and opposition . and indeed , this is its chief work ; a quantity unknown , which they commonly call root , is supposed by additions , substractions , multiplications , divisions , and other like operations , to be so chang'd , as to be made equal to a known quantity compared with it , or set over against it ; which comparing is commonly called equation , and by resolving such an equation , the root so changed , transformed or luxated , is in a manner put into joynt again , and its true value made known , for the word giabara , from which the word algebra is derived , does signifie , to restore or set a broken bone or joynt . theo says , that algebra was invented by plato ; however the chief writers of algebra are those whose names i have set down here , to gratifie such as would learn this noble art. lucas pacciolus , or lucas of burgo , a minorita fryer , wrote an italian treatise of algebra , in venice , 1494. a little after the invention of the art of printing ; there he mentions pisanus , and several others that had written on the same subject before him , but their works are not extant . harriot , oughtred , descartes , huddenius , gelleus , billius , and lately the fam'd dr. wallis has written a large volume on this subject . sectio prima . algebra . algebra sive doctrina analytica est ars inveniendi magnitudinem incognitam eam accipiendo quasi cognita foret , inveniendoque aequalitatem eam inter , datasque magnitudines . sonat itaque resolutionem ejus quod compositum supponitur , hicque graecae vocis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sensus est : hoc proinde nomen tribui poterit communibus arithmeticae operationibus , puta substractioni , divisioni , extractioni radicum quadratarum , &c. substractio enim nihil aliud est quam resolutio ejus quod ex additione supponitur emersisse , compositi , divisio quid ? nisi resolutio ejus quod ex multiplicatione supponitur emersisse , compositi , extractioque radicis quadratae nil aliud est quam resolutio ejus quod ex quadratione supponitur emersisse , compositi : sed hujuscemodi resolutiones utpote faciliores algebrae nomine intelligendae non veniunt , difficilium enim compositionum resolutio barbara hac voce , & magis proprie intelligitur . arabibus dicitur algiabr walmokabala , a priore voce nos algebram dici mus , geminae eae voces simul sumptae artem restitutionis , ac resolutionis sonant . lucas burgensis antiquissimus inter europaeos algebrista algebram restaurationis & oppositionis regulam vocat . et reipsa praecipuum hoc ejus opus est , quantitas adhuc incognita quam vulgo radicem dicunt , quibusdam additionibus , subductionibus , multiplicationibus , divisionibus , aliisque ●d genus operationibus ita supponitur mutata , ut tandem aequalis fiat quantitati notae eidem comparatae , aut e regione ejusdem collocatae , quae comparatio aequatio dici solet : hujus autem aequationis resolutione radix hunc in modum mutata , aut quasi luxata , priori rursus , ut ita dicam , situi restituitur , verusque ejus valor innotescit , vox enim giabara unde algiabr desumitur , fracti ossis restaurationem sonat . inventam asserit a platone algebram theo ; ut ut sit praecipui algebrae scriptores hi sunt quorum nomina hic appono in eorum gratiam qui nobilem hanc artem discere voluerint . lucas pacciolus , aut burgensis , italicum de algebra tractatum scripsit venetiis anno nonagesimo quarto supra millesimum quadringentesimum ●aulo post inventam typographiam ; ●bi commemorat pisanum , aliosque ●on paucos qui de eodem argumento ●rius scripserant , at eorum opera jam ●on extant . harriotus , oughtredus , cartesius , huddenius , gelleus , billius , ●c nuperrime celeberrimus vallisius ●oc super argumento amplum volu●en edidit . sect. ii. arithmetick . arithmetick is the art of numbering ; 't is either practical or speculative ; the speculative arithmetick contains some general truths relating to numbers : as for instance , unity is the beginning of every number ; a number is a multitude compounded of unites . an even part of a number is that which by multiplication produceth that number . as 2 is an even part of 10 , because 2 multiplied by 5 , give 10. an uneven part of a number is that which by multiplication produceth not that number . thus 3 is an uneven part of 10 , because however multiplied , it shall never produce this number 10. the proportion of numbers is either according to their excess , defect , or equality , for that thing has some proportion to another that is either less , greater , or equal . a perfect number is that which is equal to all its even parts : the first perfect number is 6 , for all its even parts are 1 , 2 , 3 , which together give 6. the next perfect number is 28 , for all its even parts are 1 , 2 , 4 , 7 , 14 , which by addition give 28. these ensuing notions likewise may be referr'd to the speculative part of arithmetick , to multiply one number by another , as 4 by 2 , is to take the multiplicand 4 as many times as the unity may be taken in the multiplicator 2 , and so 4 being multiplied by 2 , the product must be 8. to divide one number by another ; as for instance , 8 by 2 , is to find out how many times 2 are contained in 8. a plain number is the product of two numbers multiplied the one by the other ; 12 then is a plain number , because it is the product of 6 multiplied by 2. a solid number is the product of three numbers multiplied , such is 24 , because 't is the product of those three numbers multiplied 2 , 3 , 4 , for multiplying 2 by 3 i have 6 , and 6 by 4 i have 24. a square number is the product of two equal numbers muitiplied by one another , or of the same number multiplied by itself . 4 is a square number , as being the product of 2 multiplied by 2 , and 2 is called the square root . a cube is the product of three equal numbers , or of the same number thrice taken ; for if you multiply 2 by 2 , you have 4 ; and if you multiply 4 by ● again , you have 8 , and 8 is called th● cube root . that part of arithmetick that relate● to the practice , contains , first addition , which is the gathering of man● numbers into one sum ; as if i add ● to 6 , the whole is 8. secondly substraction , as if i take 4 from 6 , ther● remains 2 ▪ thirdly , multiplication as if i enquire how many are four time● six , and i find 24. fourthly , division , as if i enquire how many times ● are contained in 24 , and i find the● to be contain'd four times in 24. fifthly , the fractions . sixthly , th● decimal fractions , invented to supply broken numbers , very troublesome to practitioners . seventhly , the extraction of roots , cubic and square ▪ eighthly , the four rules of proportion , of society , alligation , falshood , the doctrine of progressions . we may reckon the ensuing authors among the best arithmeticians . simon stevinius invented the decimal fractions ; neper supplies troublesome and intricate divisions by his rabdologick plates , and his logarithms ; and tacquet has given us both the theory , and the practice of arithmetick ; euclid in the 7 , 8 , 9 , and 10 of his elements of geometry ; jordanus , nemorantius , francis maurolycus , barlaamon , &c. sectio secunda . arithmetica . arithmetica est ars numerandi ; est autem practica aut speculativa ; haec manifeste vera quaedam , & generalia de numeris pronunciata complectitur : cujuscemodi ea sunt quae sequuntur . omnis numeri principium est unitas ; numerus est multitudo ex unitatibus composita . pars aliquota numeriea est quae numerum metitur . ita numerus hic 2 est pars ●iquota numeri hujus 10 , quinquies ●im 2 sunt 10. pars aliquanta numeri est ea quae ●umerum non metitur . ita numerus ●ic 3 est pars aliquanta numeri hujus ●o ; ter enim sumptus dat 9 , & qua●er dat 12. proportio numerorum est nume●orum consideratio juxta excessum , defectum aut aequalitatem : illud ●nim ad aliud proportionem habet , quod aut minus , aut majus , aut aequale est . perfectus numerus dicitur qui omnibus suis partibus paribus aequalis est . primus perfectus est 6 , illius enim omnes partes pares seu aliquotae sunt 1 , 2 , 3 , quae simul additae dant 6. secundus est 28 ; nam illius omnes partes aliquotae seu pares sunt 1 , 2 , 4 , 7 , 14 , quae simul additae 28 producunt . subsequentes pariter notiones ad arithmeticam speculativam referri poterunt . unum numerum per alium ●ultiplicare seu in alium ducere ut 4 ●n 2 est toties sumere multiplicandum ● quoties sumi potest in multiplicatore ● unitas : quare si 4 ducas in 2 , summa ●utura est 8. unum numerum divi●ere per alium ut 8 per 2 nihil aliud est quam invenire quoties 2 conti●eantur in 8. numerus planus a duo●us numeris in se invicem ductis producitur , 12 igitur est numerus planus quia producitur a numero 6 in 2 ducto . solidus numerus a tribus numeris multiplicatis oritur : ejusmodi est 24 , ex tribus enim hisce numeris multiplicatis emergit 2 , 3 , 4 ; si enim 2 duco in 3 habeo 6 , & si duxero 6 in 4 , ha●eo 24. numerus quadratus producitur a duobus aequalibus numeris inse invicem ductis , cujusmodi est 4 : oritur enim a numero 2 in 2 ducto , qui radix quadrata dicitur . cubus oritur ex multiplicatione trium numerorum aequalium , aut ejusdem numeri ter assumpti ita 8 cubus primus ex multiplicatione numeri 2 ter assumpti , producitur , si enim 2 ducas in 2 habes 4 , & si 4 rursus ducas in 2 habes 8 , & 2 radix cubica dicitur . pars illa arithmeticae quae spectat praxim complectitur primo additionem quae est plurium numerorum in unam summam collectio , ut si addam 2 huic numero 6 summa integra futura est 8. secundo , substractionem ut si 4. subduco e numero 6 , supersunt 2. tertio , multiplicationem , ut si inquiram quot constituant quater 6 , comperiam 24. quarto , divisionem ut si inquiram quoties 6 contineantur in 24 comperioque in 24 quater contineri . quinto , fractiones . sexto , fractiones decimales ad supplementum fractionum practicis permolestarum excogitatas . septimo , extractionem radicum cubicarum , ac quadratarum . octavo , regulas proportionum , societatis : alligationis , falsi , & doctrinam progressionum . annumerare possumus sequentes authores primis arithmeticis . simo●em stevinium fractionum decemalium ●nventorem ; neperum scotum qui divisionis molestiam laminis suis rabdologicis , & logarithmis omnem sustu●it ; tacquetum qui arithmeticae , & theoriam , & praxim tradidit ; eucli●em 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , elementorum , jor●anum , nemorantium , franciscum maurolicum , & barlaamontium , &c. sect. iii. judiciary astrology . judiciary astrology is that science , by the help of which men pretend to judge of things to come , and more especially of mens good and bad fortunes . the judiciary astrologers do ascribe considerable vertues to the different conjunctions amd aspects of the stars . they distinguish five kinds of mutual aspects among the planets : the first is called a sextile , when one planet is distant from another the sixth part of the circuit of the heavens , that is to say , 60 degrees . the second is called a quartile , when the distance is but the fourth part of the circle or 90 degrees . the third is called a trine , when the distance is but the third part of the circle , or 120 degrees . the fourth is called an opposition , when the two planets are in the two opposite points of the circle , and distant from one another 180 degrees . the fifth is called a conjunction , when the two planets are in the same sign of the zodiack . astrologers divide the heavens into twelve equal parts , which they call houses ; they say that every planet has eight dignities , viz. house , exaltation , triplicity , term , chariot or throne , person , joy , face . they say the stars were not only made to give light : hence 't is they take the station , direction and retrogradation ( as they speak ) of a planet to be a certain reeling , or spinning of fates and fortunes : they distinguish all the constellations into so many triangles or trigones : the first is the fiery trigone , comprehending aries , leo , sagittarius ; the second is the earthly , comprehending those ensuing constellations , taurus , virgo , capricornus ; the third is the aerial , comprehending gemini , libra , aquarius ; the fourth trigone is the watery , comprehending cancer , scorpius , pisces . if you desire to know more particularly the principles of this science , you may consult these following authors . vannius , butler , cardan , gadbury , albottazen , haly , julius firmicus , johannes jovianus pontanus , pezelius , &c. secttio tertia . astrologia judiciaria . astrologia judiciaria ea est scientia cujus ope de rebus futuris homines pronunciant , ac praesertim de faelici aut infaelici cujusque fato . astrologi judiciarii insignes ascribunt virtutes diversis conjunctionibus , aspectibusque planetarum . quinos distinguunt aspectus planetarum . primus dicitur sextilis cum distat planeta unus ab alio sexta parte circuli , hoc est 60 gradibus . secundus vocatur quadratus cum distant invicem quarta parte ejusdem circuli , hoc est 90 gradibus . tertius dicitur trigonus quando tertia tantum parte , seu 120 gradibus . quar●us oppositionis cum uterque planeta sibi oppositi sunt , disjunctique 180 gradibus . quintus est conjunctionis cum duo planetae sunt in eodem signo zodiaci . universum coeli ambitum secant astrologi in duodenas partes aequales , quas vocant domos seu domicilia . octonas planetarum dignitates numerant , quae sunt domus , exaltatio , trigonus , terminus , carpentum , persona , gaudium , facies . stellas dicunt non creatas tantum ad orbem illuminandum : unde aiunt stationem , directionem & retrocessum planetae esse nescio quam fatorum revolutionem , ac quasi netionem : constellationes omnes distinguunt tot in triangula seu trigona : primum trigonum igneum dicitur , complectiturque arietem , leonem , sagittarium ; secundum terrestre appellatur , continetque taurum , virginem , capricornum ; tertium aerium est complexum geminos , libram , aquarium ; quartum appellatione aqueum , continet cancrum , scorpium , pisces . si propius hujus scientiae principia intueri volueris , consulere poteris hos sequentes authores , vannium , butlerium , cardanum , gadburium , justinum , philippum melanctonum , origanum , ptolomaeum , albohazen , haly , julium firmicum , johannem jovianum pontanum , pezelium , &c. sect ▪ iv. astronomy . astronomy gives us an account of the motions of coelestial bodies , of of their distance , order , bulk , &c. the babylonians will have belus to have been the inventor of it , the aegyptians mercury , the moors atlas and hercules , the grecians jupiter , orpheus and atreus , the scythes prometheus . we may divide it into two parts , the one spherical , and the other we may call systematical the spherical is that part of astronomy which treateth of the sphere , whether artificial or natural ; the artificial sphere is made up of ten circles , whereof six are great ones , because they divide the whole sphere into two equal parts , such we reckon the horizon , the meridian , the equator , the two colures , and the zodiack . the little circles are those that divide the sphere into two unequal parts , as the two tropicks , and the two polar circles : every circle is divided into sixty parts , which they call first minutes ; and each minute likewise into sixty parts , which we call second minutes . the natural sphere , or the coelestial globe , besides the foregoing circles , offers to our view divers constellations : the antients reckon'd eight and forty , comprehending in this number all the stars to be seen in greece , and all the known parts of the world ; 12 of those constellations are contain'd in the zodiack , 21 are to be seen toward the north , and 15 towards the south ; but of late there are twelve other constellations discovered towards the south . the systematical astronomy , which others call the theorical , is that part which by the help of some engines and orbs , offers to our view those coelestial motions which are not so obvious to every common understanding . this part of . astronomy comprehends several hypotheses , as that of anaxagoras and democritus , who allowed a free motion to the stars , but of no first mover , or primum mobile : neither did they admit any second motion towards ihe east , but a simple motion only towards the west ; so in their opinion , those stars only could be said to move toward the east , that moved more slowly towards the west . there is another hypothesis that considers the stars as tied to solid spheres ; and who hold this hypothesis , hold likewise the earth to rest in the centre of the world. copernicus allows motion to the earth ; he fixeth the sun in the centre of the world , though it turns round about its own axis within seven and twenty days , as 't is manifest by the motion of its spots . 1. in this system , the orb of the sixed stars is immoveable . 2. mercury turns round the sun in almost three months . 3. venus in four months and a half , and the earth itself in twelve months , and round the earth the moon tarneth every month . 4. mars's revolution round the sun is ended in almost two years , as jupiter's in twelve years , and saturn's in thirty . tycobrahe orders his system thus : first the firmament , or the sphere of the fixed stars , the earth being the centre of the world ; then the orbs of saturn , jupiter and mars ; venus and mercury turn round the sun , and the moon round the earth . the old system was ordered thus : the earth was the centre of the world , above it were plac'd the planets and heavens in this order ; the moon , mercury , venus , the sun , mars , jupiter , saturn , the two chrystalline heavens , and the primum mobile . authors . ptolomy , aratus , eudoxus , calippe , tycobrahe , gassendy , de billy , courcier , de sacrobosco , fracastorius , galilaeus . sectio quarta . astronomia . astronomia describit corporum coelestium motum , distantiam , ordinem , magnitudinem , &c. illius inventorem babylonii volunt esse belum , aegyptii mercurium , mauri atlantem & herculem , graeci jovem , orpheum & atreum , scythae prometheum . eam dividere possumus geminas in partes , alteram sphaericam , alteram appellare possumus systematicam . sphaerica est ea pars astronomiae quae agit de sphaera , sive arte facta , sive naturali : sphaera arte facta constat 10 circulis quorum 6 sunt majores quia dividunt sphaeram in duas partes aequales ; cujusmodi numeramus horizontem & meridianum aequatorem , colurosque duos aequinoctii , & solstitii , & zodiacum . minores circuli sunt ii qui sphaeram in duas partes inaequales dividunt : cujusmodi sunt duo tropici , totidemque polares : quivis circulus dividitur in gradus 360 , & quivis gradus in 60 particulas , quas prima minuta vocant ; & minutum primum in sexaginta partes quas secunda minuta dicimus . sphaera naturalis , seu globus coelestis praeter commemoratos circulos aspicientibus exhibet varias constellationes : antiqui octo supra quadraginta constellationes numerabant : quo numero comprehendebant omnes stellas in graecia conspicuas , atque in omnibus cognitis tum mundi partibus : 12 constellationes continebat zodiacus , 21 apparent ad boream , 15 ad austrum , versus hanc partem duodecim nuper aliae detectae sunt . astronomia systematica quam alii theoricam vocant est ea astronomiae pars quae aspectui nostro exhibet ope quarundam machinarum orbiumque eos coelestes motus qui omnibus non aeque obvii sunt . haec astronomiae pars varias complectitur hypotheses cujusmodi est hypothesis anaxagorae ac democriti , qui motum astris liberum assignabant sed nullum admittebant primum mobile ; neque ulla proinde solidis sphaeris alligabant sydera : nec ullum secundum in ortum concedebant motum , sed simplicem tantum in occasum : ita juxta eorum sententiam ea tantum sydera moveri dicuntur in ortum , quae lentius moventur in occasum : alia quaedam est hypothesis quae sydera , ut solidis alligata sphaeris intuetur ; quique hanc hypothesim tenent terram in centro mundi quietam volunt . copernicus motum terrae attribuit ; solem constituit in centro mundi immotum , licet proprium circa axem moveatur spatio viginti septem dierum ut patet e motu ejusdem macularum in hoc systemate . 1. orbis fixarum immotus est . 2. mercurius spatio fere trium mensium circa solem vertitur . 3. venus intra quatuor menses , & semissem , terraque ipsa duodecim mensibus , circaque terram quolibet mense gyrat luna . 4. martis periodus circa solem absolvitur duobus fere annis , ut jovis duodecim , saturnique spatio triginta annorum . suum tycobrahe systema ita constituit . firmamentum , seu coelum fixarum primo loco statuit : mundi centrum terra est ; fixarum coelo succedit coelum saturni , tum jovis , & martis , venus & mercurius circa solem gyrant luna circa terram movetur . antiquum systema ita se habebat : terra mundi centrum occupabat ; supra illam erant aqua , aer , & ignis , succedebant planetae coelique hoc ordine , luna , mercurius , venus , sol , mars , jupiter , saturnus , firmamentum , duo coeli chrystallini primum mobile . authores . ptolomaeus , aratus , eudoxus , calippus , tycobrahe , gassendus , billius , courcierius , de sacrobosco , fracastorius , galilaeus . sect. v. military architecture . architectonica militaris , or military architecture , is the art of fortifying . this art teacheth us how to encline towards the angles of a poligone , that is , a figure of many angles , certaines lines upon which the fortress is to be built in such a manner , that the enemy by whatever side he makes his approach , may be beat back by the lesser number . every point of the circumference of the fortress must be defended by some other part of the same . according to the holland method of fortifying , the angle of the bastion , or the flanqued , and defended angle exceeds always by 15 degrees the half of the angle of the polygone ; upon this account 't is that the angle of the bastion is never streight , or of 90 degrees , unless in a place defended by 12 bastions ; but in places defended by more than 12 , it is always streight . according to tht french method , if the polygone be a triangle , the angle of the bastion contains 45 degrees ; if it be a pentagone , or of five angles , it contains 78 degrees ; if the polygone have more than five sides , the angle of the bastion is streight , or is open 90 deg . authors . errard of barleduc , samuel marolois , adam fritach , stevin in italian , de lorini , del cavallero francisco tensimi , del cavallero alessandro barone , de groote , herigone . sectio quinta . architectonica militaris . architectonica militaris est ars muniendi , ars autem muniendi docet qui inclinare debeamus ad angulos polygoni hoc est figurae variis terminatae angulis lineas quasdam super quibus propugnaculum aedificandum est , ita ut hostis quacumque parte invadat , minoribus viribus repelli possit . omne punctum in procinctu munimenti debet defendi ab alia parte . juxta methodum muniendi hollandicam angulus propugnaculi , aut defensus excedit semper quindecim gradibus semissem polygoni , quamobrem angulus propugnaculi nunquam est rectus nisi locus duodecim propugnaculis defenditur , quoties autem locus pluribus , quam duodecim propugnaculis munitur , rectus semper est . juxta gallicam muniendi methodum si munitum polygonum triangulum fuerit , angulus polygoni est graduum 46 , si pentagonum fuerit , angulus propugnaculi est gradibus 78 ; si polygonum constet pluribus quam quinque lateribus , angulus propugnaculi est rectus , aut 90 graduum . authores . errardus barneto-duceus , samuel marolois , adamus fritachius , stevinius italice , de lorini , franciscus tensimi , herigonius , &c. sect. vi. the military art. the military art of the greeks and the romans was on several accounts different from that of this age. of old an ordinary grecian army did contain 28672 , among whom we reckon not those that were upon the elephants , who were sometimes in greater numbers , sometimes in lesser . this army was divided into horse and foot : the foot was divided again into oplites and psiles , the oplites were those that wore a heavy armour , the psiles were slightly arm'd . the number of the oplites was always double of the number of the psiles , and the psiles double of the number of the cavalry . all the oplites of the phalange were put in one battalion , whereof the front contained 256 men , and the wing 16. of all the psiles of the phalange , the grecians made two battalions , each having 128 men on a breast , and 8 in the slanks ; all the cavalry of the phalange was divided into 16 squar'd turmes or troops , whereof each did contain 64 men . in a grecian army made up of four phalanges , there were four battalions of oplites , 8 of psiles , and 64 troops of horse . in a roman legion there were four different sorts of men , not only as to age , riches , warlick science , but likewise on the account of their arms , and way of fighting ; for of the younger and poorer sort ( as polybius assures us ) they made their velites ; those that were somewhat above them upon the account of their age and riches , were halbardeers , or hasteries ; such as were richer , and in the full vigour of their age , were princes ; and the oldest and most experimented , were the triaries . the number of the soldiers of every one of those different sorts , was different in different times , according as the legion was less or more numerous . when the legion did amount to 4200 , as it did in polybius his time , there were 600 triaries in the legion , and 1200 of every one of the three other sorts , to wit , of princes , hastaries , and velites . when the legion was more numerous , those three different sorts were likewise encreased , the triaries only excepted , who were always the same number . in the militia of this age , there is no such repartition observed , the armies being not always divided into parts made up of the samo numbers ; for some regiments have 10 companies , others 15 , others 20 , &c. likewise the compapanies have not always the same number , some being a hundred men strong , others one hundred and twenty , others one hundred and fifty , &c. in this age an army is drawn up in battel , or three lines , and the french divide sometimes every line into several little bodies ; the turks give sometimes to their army the figure of a cer●sont . the camp , especially if the enemy be near , ought to be in some place where there is a great abundance of water , and provisions : and if the army is to make a long stay , 't is to be observed if the air be good . ye are not to encamp near a hill , which being taken by the enemy , might incommode your camp. authors . polybius , stevin , herigone . sectio secta . ars bellica . ars bellica , seu militaris tum graecorum , tum romanorum varie discrepabat ab hodierna recentiorum . communis graecorum exercitus numerabat 28672 , quibus non annumeramus qui elephantis insidebant qui non eundem semper numerum conflabant , sed interdum majorem , minorem interdum . hic exercitus dividebatur in equites , peditesque , pedites rursus in oplitas & psilos , oplitae erant gravis armaturae milites , psili levis armaturae . numerus oplitarum duplus erat numeri psilorum , & psili equitum numerum geminabant . omnes oplitae unius phalangis uno colligebantur in agmine cujus frons constabat 256 , & ala 16. ex omnibus psilis phalangis constituebant graeci duo agmina , a fronte stabant viginti octo supra centum , a latere octo . omnes equites phalangis distribuebantur in turmas quadratas sedecim , quarum quaelibet quatuor supra sexaginta milites continebat . in exercitu graeco ex quadruplici phalange conflato quatuor erant agmina oplitarum , octo psilorum , & sexaginta quatuor turmae equitum . romana legio quatuor complectebatur hominum genera diversa non aetate tantum , divitiis , scientiaque bellica , sed & armis , modoque pugnandi : ex junioribus enim , pauperioribusque , ut testatur polybius seligebantur velites , ex proximis hastarii , ex aetate florentibus principes , senioresque , & magis experti seligebantur in triarios . numerus militum ex quibus diversi illi ordines constabant diversis temporibus diversus erat ; prout legio magis , minusque numerosa erat . cum legio constabat ducentis supra quatuor millia , ut temporibus polybii constabat ; sexcenti erant triarii in legione , ducenti supra mille in quovis ordinum reliquorum , scilicet principum , hastariorum , & velitum : at numerosiore jam legione tres varii ordines numerosiores omnes reddebantur , exceptis tantum modo triariis quorum numerus idem semper erat . in militia hujus saeculi nulla hujusmodi distributio observatur , cum exercitus non dividatur in partes eodem semper numero constantes : quaedam enim legiones constant 10 cohortibus quaedam 15 , quaedam 20 , paucioribus aut pluribus ; cohortes pariter non semper eodem constant numero : quaedam enim constant 100 militibus , aliae 120 , aliae 150 &c. hoc saeculo exercitus pugnaturus in tres ordines distribuitur ; galli unumquemque ordinem in varia agmina quandoque distribuunt , turcae exercitum interdum ordinant in formam lunae crescentis . castra , maxime si in propinquo fuerit hostis debent figi in loco tuto ubi magna adsit aquarum copia , commeatusque , & si diuturnior esse debeat exercitus mora , videndum an aura illic salubris sit . cavendum autem imprimis ne castra prope montem statuantur , qui ab hoste occupatus exercitui noxius esse posset . authores . polybius , stevinius , heregonius . sect. vii . cosmography . cosmography is a description of the world , and its chief parts .. the world is the highest heaven , and whatever it contains , it is divided into the sublunary region , and the coelestial : the sublunary region is obnoxious to divers changes , and is contained in the concave surface of the orb of the moon : it contains the four elements , the earth , the water , the air , the fire . the semi-diametre of the earth contains about 3436 italian miles . the ordinary depth of the sea is 500 geometrical paces . the surface of the earth is almost equal to the surface of the sea , and somewhat higher , because we see that rivers from their first rise to the sea go always downwards . the divines think that the earth was entirely round , and surrounded with waters on all sides , but after god had commanded the waters to retreat , so many hills were made as there are concavities to receive the seas . the coelestial region is that part of the world which is extended from the concave surface of the heaven of the moon , to the convex surface of the highest heaven ; which space comprehends the heavens of all the stars . astronomers distinguish three sorts of spheres ; the first is streight , when the equator maketh streight angles with the horizon ; the second is oblique , when the intersection of the horizon and equator makes oblique angles ; the third is the parallel sphere , when the equator and the horizon are joyned together . astronomers conceive ten points , and ten chief circles in the concave superficies of the first mobile : the points are the two poles of the world , the two poles of the zodiack , the two equinoctial , and two solsticial points , zenith and nadir . the circles are the horizon , meridian , equator , zodiack , the colures of the equinox , and the colures of the solstice . the cancer and capricorne , the arctick and antarctick circles ; by zenith and nadir we understand two points , the first directly answering to our heads , and the second to our feet . astronomers fancy divers motions in the heavens : the primum mobile turns round with it all the other orbs in 24 hours . they allow to the other heavens under the first mobile a motion of libration from the north to the south , and from the south to the north. the eclipse of the moon is a real privation of its light , by the interposition of the earth between it and the sun. the eclipse of the sun is not a real privation of light , because the sun eclips'd , is only hid from our eyes by the interposition of the moon . all the eclipses of the moon are universal , or seen by all such as see the moon ; all the eclipses of the sun are particular ones , or not seen by every one that sees the sun. there are five zones , one torrid , two temperate , and two cold ones . the torrid zone is comprehended between the two tropicks ; its breadth is 47 degrees , if we reckon according to the common calcul 23 ½ on each side of the equator ; the two temperate zones are contain'd between the tropicks and the polar circles , whereof one is south , and the other north ; the breadth of both is 43 degrees . the cold zones are contain'd within the polar circles , distant from the poles of the world 23 degrees ½ . authors . peter aerte his world , in five vol. herigone , garcy , adrianus metius . sectio septima . cosmographia . cosmographia est descriptio mundi , praecipuarumque ejusdem partium . mundus est caelum altissimum , & quicquid eo comprehenditur , dividitur in regionem sublunarem , & coelestem , regio sublunaris variis est obnoxia mutationibus , contineturque concava caeli lunaris superficie , quatuor complectitur elementa , terram , aquam , aerem , ignem . semi-diameter terrae quadringenta fere & triginta sex supra tria millia , milliaria ilalica complectitur . communis marium altitudo est passuum geometricorum quingentorum . superficies terrae est fere aequalis superficiei maris , atque aliquanto altior , quia animadvertimus flumina ab ipsa origine ad mare descendere , seu deorsum tendere . putant theologi terram initio rotundam fuisse , atque aquis undique circumcinctam : sed postquam deus aquas recedere jussisset , tot erupere montes , quot sunt concavitates aquis marinis recipiendis idoneae . regio coelestis est ea pars mundi quae porrigitur a superficie concava coeli lunaris ad superficiem convexam altissimi coeli , quod spatium coelos omnium stellarum comprehendit . astronomi triplicem sphaeram distinguunt prima est sphaera recta quando aequator rectos cum horizonte angulos constituit ; secunda est obliqua cum intersectio aequatoris , & horizontis constituit obliquos , tertia est parallela cum aequator , & horizon sibi congruunt , aut conjunguntur . astronomi in concava primi mobilis superficie concipiunt 10 puncta , totidemque primarios circulos : puncta sunt duo mundi poli , duo poli zodiaci , duo puncta aequinoctialia , duo puncta solsticialia , zenith & nadir . circuli sunt horizon , meridianus , aequator , zodiacus , colurus aequinoctiorum , colurus solstitiorum , tropicus cancri , & capricorni , duoque polares : his vocibus zenith & nadir intelligimus duo puncta ex diametro opposita , alterum , scilicet zenith vertici nostro imminens , alterum nempe nadir , pedibus oppositum . astronomi varios concipiunt in coelis motus . primum mobile reliquos secum coelos 24 horarum spatio circumducit : reliquis sub primo mobili coelis addunt motum librationis a septentrione in austrum & ab austro in septentrionem . eclipsis lunae est vera luminis privatio interjectu terrae lunam inter & solem : eclipsis solis non est realis privatio luminis . sol enim deficiens tegitur tantum ab oculis nostris interpositu lunae . omnes eclipses lunae sunt universales aut conspicuae omnibus corpus lunare eo tempore intuentibus ; omnes eclipses solis sunt particulares , aut non conspicuae omnibus qui solem ipsum intueri possunt . quinque sunt zonae , una torrida , duae temperatae , duaeque frigidae , torrida zona comprehenditur duobus tropicis : ipsius latitudo est vulgari calculo 47 graduum ; nempe 23 ½ cis , ●ltraque aequatorem ; duae temperatae comprehenduntur tropicis , & polari●us circulis quorum alter meridiona●is alter borealis est , utriusque latitudo est graduum 43 ; frigidae zonae comprehenduntur polaribus circulis dissi●is a mundi polis grad . 23 ½ . authores . petrus de aerte , seu mundus ipsius ● voluminibus , herigonius , garcaeus , adrianus metius . sect. viii . catoptrick . catoptrick is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a looking-glass , because it treats of the rays , as being reflected by polish'd bodies . this science demonstrates these following propositions . 1. if a ray falling upon a glass , make equal angles , 't is reflected into itself . 2. rays reflected from plain and convex glasses , do neither come together , nor are equi-distant . 3. heights and depths seem to be overturned in convex glasses . 4. in convex glasses , what is on the left hand , appears to be on the right ; and what is on the right hand , appears to be on the left . 5. if the eye were in the centre of ● concave-glass , it would see nothing but itself . authors . euclid and peter herigone have written on this subject . sectio octava . catoptrica . catoptrica derivatur a graeca voce 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quod speculum sonat , quia agit de radio ut reflexo a laevigatis corporibus , sequentes propositiones demonstrat . 1. si radius in qualecumque speculum cadens aequales facit angulos ipse in seipsum reflectitur . 2. radii a planis , convexisque speculis reflexi neque mutuo concurrent , neque erunt paralleli . 3. altitudines & profunditates in convexis speculis inversae apparent . 4. in speculis convexis sinistra videntur dextra , & dextra sinistra . 5. si oculus ponatur in centro speculi concavi seipsum tantum cernet . authores . euclides , & petrus herigonius hoc super argumento scripserunt . sect. ix . chymistry . chymistry is the art of analysing , or resolving bodies by the operation of the fire into their compounding principles . the chymists do generally affirm mercury , salt , and sulphur to be the compounding principles of all compounded things ; which doctrine is learnedly and solidly confuted by the english philosopher , i mean the famous robert boyle in his sceptical chymist . yet it cannot be denied but that it is useful and necessary likewise to mankind , upon the account of those many excellent medicines it prepares to the great advantage of physicians , and ease of their patients , whereof these ensuing are some of the most considerable . 1. aurum fulminans , or thundering gold ; a very good sudorifick ; it may be taken in the measles from 2 grains to 6 in any convenient electuary ; it stops vomiting , and is a hindrance to the activity of mercury , or quick-silver . 2. vitriolus lunae taken inwardly , is prevalent against the dropsie , and the head-ach , of what sort soever ; you may take it from 2 grains to 6 in any specifick water ; it is likewise a moderate purger . 3. sal jovis , is a great drier . 4. magisterium bismuth , softeneth the skin , and is good against scabs and itch , if you mix a drachm of it with 4 ounces of water , because it is a great destroyer of salts and acids , two general causes of most distempers . 5. sal saturni taken inwardly , prevaileth against the squinancy , the overflowing of the flowers , piles , dysentery ; you may take it from 2 grains to 4 in plantain-water . 6. oleum saturni cleanseth and drieth up ulcers . 7. spiritus ardens saturni resisteth powerfully putrefaction ; it is beneficial to such as are troubled with too much melancholy . you may take it from 8 to 16 drops , in any convenient liquor , a fortnight together . 8. crocus aperitivus martis has a a peculiar vertue against all distempers occasioned by obstructions ▪ you may take it from 2 grains to 2 scruples in lozenges or pills . 9. crocus martis astringens is of a peculiar vertue against the glitting of the yard , the overflowing of the monthly flowers and piles ; you may take it from 15 grains to a drachm in lozenges or pills . 10. mars diaphoreticus cures effectually the most melancholy distempers , as likewise quartan-agues ; you may take it from 10 to 20 grains in pills , or any convenient liquor . 11. sublimatum corrosivum eats up superfluous flesh , and drieth up ulcers . 12. sublimatum dulce , or aquila alba , is very good against all venereal distempers ; 't is a great deobstruent , and killer of worms ; it may be taken in pills from 6 grains to 30 : 't is a mild purger . 13. praecipitatum rubrum drieth up wounds , and consumeth superfluous or proud flesh . 14. turbith minerale , or the yellow praecipitate , is a strong purger , and worketh both upwards and downwards ; 't is good against venereal distempers ; you may take it in pills from 2 gr . to 6. 15. crudum antimonium is a sudorifick , but if you boyl it in any acid liquor , it will provoke you to vomit . 16. regulus antimonii purgeth upwards and downwards , if mixed with any cathartick or purger . 17. vitrum antimonii is the strongest vomitory that is made of antimony . 18. antimonium diaphoreticum resisteth powerfully poison , and is likewise good against contagious distempers , and against the measlles . 19. flores antimonii provoke to vomit ; and rubri flores antimonii as yet more ; you may take them both from 2 gr . to 14 , taking every quarter of an hour a spoonful of broth wherein you have boyl'd a competent quantity of the cream of tartar. 20. sulphur antimonii is prevalent against the distempers of the breast ; you may take 6 grains of it in any appropriated liquor . authors . paracelsus , beguinus , helmontius , and the deservedly renowned robert boyle , &c. sectio nona . chymica . chymica est ars reducendi corpora vi ignis in ea ex quibus constant principia . fatentur chymicorum plerique , asseruntque mercurium , sal , sulphur , esse tria ut loquuntur , prima , seu constituentia omnium rerum compositarum principia : quam doctrinam erudite more suo , ingenioseque ac solidis argumentis confutat philosophus britannicus celeberrimus merito boylius in chymico suo sceptico . nemo tamen inficias ierit chymiam & utilem esse generi humano , & necessariam ob tot generosa quae parat medicamenta non mediocri medicorum emolumento , magnoque commissorum ipsis aegrorum levamine : quae hic subjunguntur , quaedam sunt ●e praecipuis . 1. aurum fulminans sudores provocat ; adhiberi potest adversus morbillos , minima dosis sit gr . 2 maxima gr . 6 sistit vomitum , obstatque activitati mercurii . 2. vitriolus lunae interius sumptus praevalet contra hydropem , & quemcumque capitis dolorem : dosis minima gr . 2 maxima 6 in quacumque aqua specifica ; leniter quoque purgat . 3. sal jovis valde desiccat . 4. magisterium bismuth , emollit carnem , valetque contra scabiem & pruriginem si illius drachmam quatuor unciis aquae commisceas , quia salia , & acida , geminas plerumque morborum causas destruit . 5. sal saturni , si sumatur interius praevalet contra anginam , immoderatum menstruorum fluxum , haemorrhoides , dysenteriam ; dosis minima gr . 2 , summa 4 , in aqua plantaginis . 6. oleum saturni purgat , exsiccatque ulcera . 7. spiritus ardens saturni potenter resistit putrefactioni ; nimia melancholia dejectis prodest : dosis 6 , 8 aut 16 guttae in quovis conveniente liquore per quatuordecim dies . 8. crocus aperitivus martis peculiari virtute pollet adversus morbos ab obstructionibus ortos : dosis minima gr . 2 summa scrupuli duo in trapeziis , aut pilulis . 9. crocus martis astringens peculiariter valet contra stillicidium penis , nimium menstruorum fluxum , & hoemorrhoides ; dosis ima gr . 15 , summa , drachma in trapeziis , aut pilulis . 10. mars diaphoreticus reipsa curat plerosque morbos a melancholia ortos , atque febres etiam quartanas ; dosis 10 aut 20 gr . in pilulis , aut conveniente quopiam liquore . 11. sublimatum corrosivum exedit superfluam carnem , exsiccatque ulcera . 12. sublimatum dulce , aut aquila alba pollet adversus omnem veneream intemperiem : insigniter deobstruit , vermiumque excidium est ; si in pilulis sumitur ; minima dosis gr . 6 summa gr . 30 ; leniter purgat . 13. praecipitatum rubrum exsiccat vulnera , consumitque superfluam carnem . turbith menerale , aut praecipitatum flavum valide purgat superne & inferne , valet adversus morbos venereos ; dosis ima in pilulis gr . 2. summa gr . 6. 15. crudum antimonium est sudorificum , sed si illud in acido quopiam liquore concoquas , vomitum provocabit . regulus antimonii cathartico cuipiam immixtus superne , inferneque purgat . 17. nihil ex antimonio fit , quod po●entius vitro antimonii vomitum ex●itet . 18. antimonium diaphoreticum re●istit potenter veneno , valetque contra morbos contagiosos , & morbillos . 19. flores antimonii vomitum pro●ocant fortiusque , adhuc , rubri flores antimonii ; amborum dosis ima gr . 2 ●umma 15 , sume interim quovis qua●rante horae cochleare jusculi in quo ●remoris tartari sufficiens mensura ●octa fuerit . 20. sulphur antimonii pollet adversus omnes pectoris morbos ; dosis ●r . 6 in quovis idoneo liquore . authores . paracelsus , helmontius , beguinus , meritoque celeberrimus ubique boy●ius . sect. x. dioptrick . dioptrick is that part of astrology that searcheth out by instruments the distance of the sun , moon , and other planets . if you take it more generally , its chief end is to shew the apparent changes of our sight , and of visible objects look'd into through prospective glasses . it treats of the broken or refracted rays of light , and this is its chief principle : when a ray passeth through a thin middle into a thicker , it breaks in the superficies of the thicker towards the perpendicular line ; and when it passeth through a thick middle , or medium , to a thinner it deviates from the perpendicular line , which this obvious experiment demonstrates . lay an image , or any other visible object , in the bottom of a vessel , and then go back till it vanish out of your sight ; now if you fill this vessel with water , it shall presently be visible again , because the ray coming from your eye , breaks downwards in the superficies of the water , as the same going streight up to the superficies of the water deviates from the perpendicular , because of the thinner air towards the eye , which renders the object visible again . this science treats likewise of convex and concave glasses , as they may work some change in the sight , and may help it . it gives ▪ an account of those whom aristotle calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , who see remote things distinctly , and nearer objects confusedly ; and why those whom we call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , see both the remote and nearer objects confusedly . it teacheth likewise amongst other things , 1. that those whom we call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 see distinctly some things that are represented by convex glasses in a streight situation . 2. that they see not distinctly through a convex glass any of those objects that are overturn'd . 3. it sheweth the influence of glasses applied one to another upon our sight . authors . kepler , maurolycus , euclide , &c. have written of this curious science . sectio decima . dioptrica . dioptrica ea astrologiae pars est quae instrumentis quibusdam distantiam solis & lunae , aliorumque planetarum indagat . eam in genere si spectes , praecipuus ejusdem scopus est indicare apparentes visus mutationes , objectorumque per vitra optica ut microscopia , megaloscopia inspectorum , agit de radio fracto ; hocque primarium hujus scientiae principium est : cum radius lucis progreditur a tenuiore medio ad dentius , frangitur versus perpendicularem in superficie spissioris ; cumque progreditur a medio spissiore ad tenuius , deviat a perpendiculari . quod obvio hoc experimento manifestum fit : imaginem aut quodvis aliud conspicuum objectum infundo vasis cujuspiam colloca : tum recede donec objectum non amplius appareat : jam si vas hoc aqua impleas , oculis se mox imago oggeret : quia radius lucis ab oculo ad fundum vasis porrectus frangitur deorsum in superficie aquae versus perpendicularem , ut idem ad superficiem ascendens ob tenuiorem aerem deviat a perpendiculari versus oculum , unde fit ut objectum rursus conspiciendum se praebeat . insuper haec scientia agit de convexis concavisque vitris , quatenus visum aut variare , aut juvare possunt . redditque pariter rationem cur ii quos aristoteles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vocat , remota distincte videant , propinqua confuse ; & cur ii quos 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicimus tum remota , tum propinqua objecta confuse videant . inter alia pariter docet , 1. eos quos 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicimus , quaedam videre distincte quae a vitris convexis recto in situ exhibentur . 2. minime eos videre distincte per vitra convexa ullùm eorum objectorum quae eversa sunt . 3. ostendit vitrorum sibi invicem junctorum in visum nostrum operationem . authores . keplerus , maurolycus , euclides , &c. de curiosa hac scientia scripsere . sect. xi . moral philosophy . ethica is that art which directs us how to act always conformably to right reason : it s chief principle is this , do as you would be done by . it teacheth us that god is our last end , because he only is bonum sufficiens , the sufficient good , nothing else being able to content us . it teacheth likewise that we can never love any thing but under the shew and appearance of good , whereof it offereth three sorts , honour profit and pleasure . god alone is our objective beatitude or happiness , ( as they speak in the schools , ) our formal beatitude is that operation of the mind by which we possess god , which is the intuitive vision or contemplation of god. this art sheweth that the internal principles of humane actions are either natural , as powers ; or acquired , as habits : that the understanding moves the will to act , and the will our understanding ; that a habit being generated by the repetition of acts , giveth the soul not the real power of acting , but only enables it to act more easily . authors . aristotle , seneca , plato , cicero , &c. sectio undecima . ethica seu moralis philosophia . haec ea est ars quae nos ad agendum in omnibus conformiter rectae rationi dirigit : primarium ipsius principium hoc est , quod tibi vis fieri , & alteri feceris . docet deum esse ultimum nostrum finem quia ille solus est bonum sufficiens , cum nihil aliud beatos nos efficere queat : docet pariter nihil nos amare posse nisi sub specie boni , cujus triplex genus proponit jucundum , utile honestum . beatitudo nostra objectiva , ut loquuntur scholae , solus deus est , formalis nostra beatitudo est ea mentis operatio qua deum possidemus , intuitiva scilicet dei visio . hic habitus docet principia interna actionum humanarum , aut esse nobis congenita , cujusmodi sunt potentiae ; aut acquisita , cujusmodi sunt habitus ; docet intellectum movere voluntatem ad agendum , & vice versa ; habitum actuum repititione productum , animae tribuere non ipsam quidem agendi facultatem , seu potentiam , sed majorem quamdam facilitatem . authores . aristoteles , seneca , plato , cicero , &c. sect. xii . geography . geography is the description of the earth , and its chief parts .. because geographers talk much of the longitude and latitude of a place , 't is of some use to know what is meant by these two words . the longitude then of a place , or its distance from the east , is an arch of the equator intercepted between the semicircle of the first meridian , and the meridian of the place , according to the order of the signs . the latitude of a place , or its distance from the equinoctial line , is the arch of the meridian , intercepted between the equator and the place proposed , being always equal to the elevation of the pole , which is the arch of the meridian intercepted between the conspicuous pole and the horizon , because the latitude of a place , as likwise the height of the pole , together with the arch of the meridian intercepted between the pole & the zenith , are equal to the fourth part of the meridian or the quadrant . the whole world is now divided into four parts , europe , asia , africa , and america : europe is bounded towards the north by the hyperborean sea , towards the west by the atlantick sea , and the herculean by the streights of gibraltar and by the ocean ; towards the east by the egean sea , the hellespont , propontis , bosphorus thracius , the streights of caffa , the meotide lake , the river tanais , &c. till you come to a little town called ●uria , from whence 't is bounded by a white line till you come to the white sea. the chief parts of europe are germany , spain , france , great britain , switzerland , the low countries , ireland , denmarck , norway , swedeland , poland , italy , croatia , sclavonia , dalmatia , albania , grecia , thracia , bulgaria , servia , bosnia , russia , hungaria , transylvania . asia is bounded towards the north by the scythian sea , towards the east by the sea called eoum , towards the south by the indian sea or the red sea , towards the west by the arabick sreights and the interne sea. africa is joyn'd to asia by an isthme , or a narrow piece of ground dividing two seas : 't is bounded by several seas , towards the east by the red sea , towards the south by the ethiopian sea , towards the west by the atlantick sea , towards the north by the interne sea. the chief parts of africa we reckon to be those following , barbary biledulgeride , sarra , the countrey of the negroes , egypt , ethiopia both superior and inferior , the kingdom of the abyssins . america was wholly unknown to the antients till about the year 1492 , it was discovered by christopher columbus , a genoese , in the name of ferdinand king of castile . 't is called america from americus vespucius , a florentine , who the first after columbus , in the year 1497 , under the auspices of the king of portugal , discover'd that part of it that lyes beyond the equinoctial line . america is divided into two parts , the one norrhern , and the other southern , or the peruane america ; they are both divided by an isthme . the northern america is called the mexican , from its chief city mexico . we know only those countreys that lye near the shore , as canada , the land of labrador , the adjacent islands , new france or norimbegra , virginia or apalchen , florida , new spain , new grenade , california , quivira , ananian , jucatan , guatimala , hondura , nicaragna . in the southern america you have castile , the golden peru , chili , chica , the countrey of the pantagons , brasilia , caribana , guiiana , biquiri or the countrey of the amazons , paguan , picoram , moxos , uram , charchas . authors . ptolomy , the great atlas , the english atlas , ortelius , strabo , solinus , pomponius mela , philipp cluvier , &c. sectio duodecima . geographia . geographia est descriptio terrae praecipuarumque ejus partium . quia geographi multum loquuntur de longitudine ac latitudine loci , utile fuerit scire quid reipsa sint . longitudo itaque loci , aut ipsius distantia ab ortu , est arcus aequatoris inter semicirculum primi meridiani , & meridianum loci secundum ordinem signorum interceptus . latitudo loci aut ejusdem distantia a linea aequinoctiali est arcus meridiani interceptus aequatorem inter , & locum propositum , estque semper aequalis elevationi poli , quae est arcus meridiani horizontem inter , & conspicuum polum interceptus , quod tam latitudo loci , quam elevatio poli cum arcu meridiani inter polum & zenith intercepto , aequent quadrantem meridiani . totus terrarum orbis nunc dividitur in quatuor partes , europam , asiam , africam , americam : europa terminos habet a septentrione mare hyperboreum , aut septentrionale , ab occidente mare atlanticum , fretum herculeum , & oceanum , ob ortu mare aegaeum , hellespontum , propontidem bosphorum thracium , bosphorum cimmerium , lacum maeotim , tanais fluenta usque ad oppidum tuia , inde lineam rectam ad sinum usque granduicum , seu mare album . praecipuae europae partes sunt , germania , hispania , gallia , magna britannia , helvetia , belgium , dania , suedia , polonia , italia , croatia , sclavonia , dalmatia , albania , graecia , thracia , bulgaria , servia , bosnia , russia , hungaria , transylvania . asia terminatur versus septentrionem mari scythico , versus ortum mari eoo , versus meridiem mari indico , aut rubro , versus occidentem sinu arabico & mari interno . africa isthmo jungitur asiae , terminos habet varias circum maria , ab ortu mare rubrum , a meridie aethiopicum , ab occasu atlanticum , a septentrione internum . praecipuas africae partes sequentes numeramus , barbariam , biledulgeridem , sarram , regionem nigritarum , aegyptum aethiopiam utramque superiorem & inferiorem , regnum abyssinorum . america antiquis prorsus incognita fuit , donec sub annum quadringentesimum nonagesimum secundum supra millesinum detecta fuit a christophoro columbo genuensi nomine ferdinandi regis castiliae . america dicitur ab americo vespucio florentino qui primus post columbum anno 1497. sub auspiciis regis lusitaniae eam partem continentis detexit quae ultra lineam aequinoctialem jacet . america dividitur duas in partes alteram septentrionalem , meridionalem alteram aut peruanam ; utraque isthmo dividitur , septentrionalis america vocatur mexicana a praecipua ejusdem civitate mexico ▪ regiones tantum littoribus adjacentes novimus , nempe canadam , terram laboratoris , atque insulas adjacentes , novam franciam sive norimbregram , virginiam sive apalchen , floridam , novam hispaniam , novam granatam , californiam , quiviram , ananian , jucatan , guatimalam , honduram , nicaragnem . in meridionali america sunt castilio aurea , peruvia , chili , regio pentagonum , brasilia , caribana , guiiana , biquiri , paguam , picoram , moxos , uram , charchas . authores . ptolomaeus , magnus atlas , ortelius , strabo , solinus , pomponius mela , philippus cluverius . sect. xiii . geometry . this science teacheth us how to measure the earth , and to set limits to every mans lands ; 't is entirely contain'd in the fifteen books of euclid's elements : the first thirteen are acknowledg'd by all to be undoubtedly of this author ; the two last are ascrib'd by some to hipsicles of alexandria . euclid's elements may be divided into four parts ; the first part , contain'd in the first six books , treats of plains ; the second , consisting of the three other following books searcheth into the properties of numbers ; the third part of euclid's elements , consisting of the tenth book only , treats of commensurable and incommensurable lines ; and lastly , the fourth part comprehending the remaining books , treats of solids , or bodies . the first part of euclid's elements is again threefold ; the first four books treat of plains absolutely considered , of their equality and inequality ; the fifth treats of the proportion of magnitudes in general ; the sixth sheweth the proportion of plain figures . geometry may be divided into these three subordinate parts , altimetry , planimetry , and stereometry ; altimetry is the art of measuring streight lines , planimetry is the art of measuring surfaces , stereometry is the art of measuring solids or bodies . a line is measured by a line of a known magnitude , and a superficies or surface by a square of a known magnitude , and solids are measured by a cube of a known bulk . authors . euclid , hero mechanicus ▪ fournierius , malapertius , maginus , clavius , nicolaus tartalea in italian , adrianus metius , samuel marolois , simon stevin , and daniel sant bech . sectio decima tertia . geometria . haec scientia docet nos qui terram metiamur , atque unius cujusque praediis limites praescribamus : integra continetur quindecim libris elementorum euclidis : priores tredecim sine ulla controversia euclidi ascribuntur ab omnibus , posteriores vero duo , a quibusdam hypsicli alexandrino tribuuntur . elementa euclidis dividi possunt in quatuor partes ; quorum prima pars sex prioribus libris contenta , agit de planis ; secunda , quae ex tribus sequentibus conflatur , affectiones numerorum examinat ; tertia pars elementorum euclidis , quae solo libro decimo constat , de lineis commensurabilibus , ac incommensurabilibus agit ; quarta denique pars , quam residui libri constituunt de solidis , aut corporibus disserit . prima pars elementorum euclidis rursus triplex est ; priores enim qua●uor libri agunt de planis absolute spectatis , de eorum aequalitate , aut inaequalitate ; quintus disserit de proportionibus magnitudinum in genere ; sextus planarum figurarum proportiones exponit . geometria dividi potest in has tres partes subordinatas , in altimetriam , planimetriam , & stereometriam ; altimetria est ars dimetiendi lineas rectas , planimetria est ars dimetiendi superficies , stereometria est ars dimetiendi solida , sive corpora . lineas metiuntur lineae notae magnitudinis , superficiem metitur quadratum mensurae notae , solidaque metitur cubus notae molis . authores . euclides , hero mechanicus , fournierius , malapertius , maginus , clavius , nicolaus tartalea italice , adrianus metius , samuel marolois , simon stevinius , daniel sant bechius . sect. xiv . the art of dialling . gnomonica is the art of dialling , or of making sun-dials . of sun-dials there are two sorts , some are pendulums , and others are fix'd ones . the pendulums are those that being hung up , or held up , shew the hours by the height of the sun , as the astrolabe , the cylinder , the quadrants , the astronomical rings , and others of the same kind . the fixed-dials require a certain situation , to shew the hours by the motion of the sun from east to west , and upon this account they are more exact than the pendulums . the centre of the dial , is that point of the plane of the dial in which the axis of the world is cut by the plane . the perpendicular style is a streight line drawn from the centre of the earth to the plane of the dial : the centre then of the world , or of the earth in a dial , is the top of the style , which is perpendicular to the plain of the dial. the pole of the plane of the dial , is the pole of a great circle equi-distant from the plane of the dial. in all astronomical dials , that part of the style which by its shadow sheweth the hour , must be in the axis or axle-tree of the world. the italians reckon 24 hours , beginning from the setting of the sun ; the babylonians reckon as many from the rising of the sun , to the going down of the same ; but in the old dials , the hours of the day , and of the night , are reckon'd separately , viz. 12 from the rising of the sun , till the going down of the same ; and as many from the setting of the sun , till the rising of the same . authors . maurolycus , ptolomaeus , kircherus , &c. sectio decima quarta . gnomonica . gnomonica est ars construendi horologia solaria . horologia solaria dividuntur in pendula , & fixa : pendula sunt ea quae appensa , aut manu suspensa , horas indicant ope altitudinis solaris : cujusmodi sunt astrolabium , cylindrus , quadrans , annuli astronomici , aliaque ejusdem generis . horologia stabilia , seu fixa , requirunt situm quemdam ut ostendant horas ope motus solis ab ortu in occasum , ideoque accuratiora sunt pendulis . centrum horologii est punctum plani horologii , in quo axis mundi secatura plano . stylus perpendicularis est recta a centro terrae ad planum horologii ducta , unde centrum mundi , sive terrae in horologio est vertex styli plano horologii normalis . polus plani horologii , est polus magni circuli paralleli plano horologii . in omni horologio astronomico ea pars styli quae umbra horam ostendit , debet esse in axe mundi . itali numerant horas 24 initio ducto ab occasu solis ; babylonii numerant totidem initio ducto ab ortu solis ; sed in antiquis horologiis horae diei , noctisque separatim enumerantur , duodecim scilicet enumerantur ab ortu solis ad occasum , totidemque ab occasu ad ortum . authores . maurolycus , ptolomaeus , kircherus , &c. sect. xv. grammar . grammar is the art of writing and speaking well ; it treats of words and the construction of words . this art considereth two things in words , the letters , and the syllables ; as likewise two sorts of letters for some sound alone , and are called vowels , as a , e , i , o , u , ; others sound not alone , but together with some other letter , and they are called upon this account consonants , as these following , b , c , d g k , p , q , t , which letters are called mutes , as f , l , m , n , r , s , x , z are called half vowels . a syllable that has a full sound is made up either of a vowel and a consonant , or of vowels and consonants . in words , grammar considereth their accent or tone , whether acute , or grave , or mean ; their derivation and etymology , their composition and simplicity ; their numbers ; if the word be a noun , plural , singular ; their cases , nominative , genitive , dative , accusative , vocative , ablative : if the word be a verb , it considereth the tenses , as present , imperfect , perfect , future or to come . it teacheth the art of construing words one with another , as the adjective with the substantive , in order to make a congruous speech ; either continued or interrupted : it distinguisheth the sentences by three notes , which we commonly call comma , semicolon , colon , or as the latins speak , punctum . the first is a short pause of respiration , which we express thus ( , ) the second is a longer pause , which we express thus ( ; ) the third is a full pause , and finisheth the sense , which we mark thus ( . ) chief authors . alvares and despauter . sectio decima quinta . grammatica . grammatica est ars recte loquendi , scribendique ; agit de vocibus , vocumque constructione . duo contemplatur in vocibus literas & syllabas , ut pariter duo genera literarum quaedam enim solitarie sonant , & vocales dicuntur , ut a e , i , o , u , ; quaedam solitarie non sonant , sed simul cum alia quapiam litera , & propterea consonantes dicuntur , cujusmodi sunt hae literae oppositae b , c , d , g , p , q , t , quae literae dicuntur mutae , ut f , l , m , n , r , s , x , z dicuntur semivocales . syllaba quae integrum habet sonum , constat vel unica vocali , vel vocali addita consonante , vel vocalibus simul & consonantibus . in vocibus grammatica considerat accentum , seu tonum , sive acutum , sive gravem , sive medium , earum derivationem , originem , atque etymologiam , compositionem , simplicitatem , numeros , si quaestio de nomine sit , singularem , pluralem ; casus , nominativum , genitivum , dativum , accusativum , vocativum , ablativum ; si quaestio de verbo sit , considerat tempora , ut praesens , imper●ectum , praeteritum , futurum . docet qui voces simul construere debeamus , ut adjectivum cum substantivo , ut fiat oratio congrua , continua , aut interrupta ; distinguit sententias tribus hisce notis , quas designamus appellationibus hisce comma , semicolon , colon , aut ut latini loquuntur , punctum . prima nota indicat brevem a respirando cessationem , quam exprimimus hunc in modum ( , ) secunda est diuturnior cessatio quam exprimimus hunc in modum ( ; ) postrema est plena cessatio , sensumque absolvit , quam ita notamus ( . ) authores primae notae . alvares , despauterius , &c. section xvi . hydrography . hydrography is a description of the waters , especially the seas . the sea is the general collection of waters , 't is divided into the ocean and mediterranean sea : the ocean is that sea which surrounds the whole earth , 't is divided into the great ocean , gulfs and streights . the ocean hath four different names , from the four opposite points of the world , from the east , 't is called the eastern sea ; from the south , the southern ; from the north , the northern ; 't is divided into three vast seas , indian , or red sea ; the atlantick sea , so called from atlas , a hill in mauritania ; and the pacifick sea. the indian sea reacheth from the islands of sumatra and java to the promontory of good hope , its chief gulfs are the ganget●ck gulf , or the gulf of bengala , whose longitude is 120 deg . latitude 16 deg . the persick gulf , or elcatif sea , whose longitude is 76 deg . latitude 26 ; the arabick gulph , or the red sea , commonly called mar di meca , whose longitude is 70 deg . latitude 20 ; the barbarick gulf , whose longitude is 70 deg . latitude 4. these are the chief islands of the ocean , lerne , or madagascar , or the island of st. laurence , longit . 75 deg . lat 20. discuriada , or zocotara , longit . 48 deg . lat . 11. the maldives , longit . 105. lat . 5. nanigeris , commonly called zeilan , longit . 113. lat . 6. taprobana , sumatra , longit . 130. lat 0. java the great , longit . 140. lat . 10. we reckon among the chief islands of the atlantick sea , albion , or great britain , longit . 22. lat . 52. ireland , longit . 13. lat . 54. hesperides , or the islands of the cap vert , longit . 353. lat . 17. cuba , longit . 295. lat . 22. jamaica , 298. lat . 18. the pacifick , or southern sea , lies between asia , america , and the magellanick gulf ; its chief islands are japan , longit . 170. lat . 36. the molucs , longit . 157. lat . 1. salomon's islands , longit . 195. lat . 10. authors . herigone , ortelius , pomponius mela , joachim , vadiam , fournier . sectio decima sexta . hydrographia . hydrographia est descriptio aquarum , maxime marium . mare est generalis aquarum collectio , dividitur in oceanum , & mare mediterraneum : oceanus est mare quod universam terram ambit , dividitur in vastum , sinuosum , & fretum . oceanus quatuor sortitur appellationes a quatuor cardinalibus mundi partibus , ab oriente eous dicitur , ab occidente occiduus , a meridie australis , a septentrione septentrionalis ; dividitur in tria vasta maria indicum , sive rubrum , atlanticum a● atlante mauritaniae monte sic dictum , & in pacificum . oceanus indicus porrigitur ab insulis sumatra , & java usque ad caput bonae spei : ejus praecipui sinus sunt gangeticus , sive bengalensis , cujus longitudo 120 graduum , latitudo 16 graduum . sinus persicus , cujus longit . 76 graduum , latitudo 20 graduum . sinus arabicus , aut mare rubrum , vulgo mar di meca , cujus longit . 70. lat . 20. sinus barbaricus , sive mare asperum , cujus longit . 70. lat . 4. primariae oceani insulae sunt lerne , aut madagascar , seu insula sancti laurentii , cujus long . 75. lat . 20. discuriada aut zocotara , cujus long . 48. lat . 11. maldiviae , longit . 105. lat . 5. nanigeris , vulgo zeilan , cujus longit . 113. lat . 6. taprobana , sumatra , longit . 130. lat . 0. java major , longit . 140. lat . 10. praecipuae insulae maris atlantici sunt albion , sive magna britannia , ●ujus longit . 22. lat 52. hibernia , ●ujus longit . 13. lat . 54. hesperides , ●ut insulae promontorii viridis , longit . ●arum insularum 353. lat . 17. cuba , ●ujus longit . 295. lat . 22. jamaica , ●ujus longit . 298. lat . 18. mare pacificum , sive meridionale ●cet inter asiam , americamque , & ●retum magellanicum ; praecipuae ejus ●nsulae sunt japonia , cujus longit . 170. ●t . 36. molucae , longit . 157. lat . 1. ●nsulae salomonis longit . 195. lat . 10. authores . herigonius , ortelius , pomponius me● , joachimus , vadiamus , fournierius . sect. xvii . logick . logick is the art of disputing wel● the three operations of the min● make up its whole object , which are apprehension , judgement or affirmation and illation . it teacheth , that the truth of any of those three operations consist● in their confirmity to their objects : s● this compounded apprehension , go● almighty , is true , because i apprehen● god to be , what he really is , that i● almighty ; you may easily apply this t● the other two operations . it s two chief principles are these dictum de omni , and dictum de nullo : the first signifieth , that whatever 〈◊〉 generally affirmed of any thing , m●… likewise be affirm'd of whatever is contain'd under that thing , as if i s●… every animal is a living creature , th●… it follows , that a bird is a living cre●tur● ▪ the second signifieth , that what ever is generally denied of any thing is denied likewise of whatever is contain'd under that thing ; as if i say no animal is a stone , then i may , an cught likewise to say , no bird is stone , no man is a stone , &c. logick teacheth the art of making syllogism , which consisteth of three propositions , whereof the first two being granted , the conclusion must necessarily b● granted , because it was already implicitely admitted by him , who admitted of the premises : as 't is evident in this syllogism , every man is a living creature , peter is a man , ergo , peter is a living creature . logick is natural to all mankind , because 't is nothing else but the use of our reasoning faculty . artificial logick is made up of some rules and precepts that help our reasoning faculty . authors . aristotle , arriaga , ruvius , guilminot , &c. sectio decima septima . logica . logica est ars recte disserendi : ipsius objectum sunt tres mentis ●perationes ; apprehensio , judicium ●ut affirmatio , & illatio . docet ●eritatem illarum operationum in ea●um cum ipsis objectis conformitate esse positam ; ut composita haec apprehensio , deus omnipotens , est vera , ●uia apprehendo deum , ut reipsa est omnipotentem : quod reliquis operationibus applicari facile potest . duo praecipua logicae principia sunt ista , dictum de omni , & dictum ●e nullo : prius significat quicquid generaliter affirmatur de re quapiam , affirmari idem posse de omnibus sub eadem contentis , ut si dicam , omne animal est vivens , licebit dicere omnis volucris est vivens . posterius ●nnuit , quicquid generaliter negatur de quapiam re , negari posse idem de omnibus eadem comprehensis ; ut si dicam , nullum animal est lapis ; licebit etiam dicere , nulla volucris est lapis ; nullus homo est lapis , &c. logica docet artem conficiendi syllogismi , qui constat tribus propositionibus : quarum duae primae si semel admittantur , tertia necessario admitti debet , quia jam tacite admissa est ab eo qui duas primas admisit , ut patet in hoc syllogismo , omnis homo est animal , petrus est homo , ergo , petrus est animal . logica congenita est humano generi , cum nihil aliud sit quam facultatis nostrae rationalis exercitium . artificialis logica sunt praecepta quaedam hanc facultatem juvantia . authores . aristoteles , arriaga , ruvius , guilminotius , &c. sect. xviii . metaphysick . this science considers beings , as abstracted from all matter ; and is so called , because it treats of things somewhat besides , above , or beyond nature . it considereth two things in a being , 1. it s essence , which seems to have a real being , though it does not exist , as a rose in the midst of winter . 2. it s existence , which is actually in being , or by which a thing is actually in being , as the existence of a rose is that by which it now is . it considereth three properties of every being , its unity , goodness , and truth ; unity is that by which a thing is one , and not many . truth or verity , is the conformity of any thing to its real or consistent principles , as true gold consists in its conformity to the principles of this metal . the metaphysical goodness of things , is that essential perfection which is agreeable to them . this science treats likewise of powers , acts , principles , and causes , and proves , in opposition to aristotle , and other ancient philosophers , that the world was not eternal . authors . aristotle , vasques , suares , valentia , &c. sectio decima octava . metaphysica . haec scientia considerat entia , ut abstracta ab omni materia , nomenque hoc trahit inde quod agat de rebus aliquatenus praeter , vel supra , aut ultra naturam . duo in ente contemplatur , 1. essentiam , quae videtur esse verum ens licet non existat , ut rosa media hyeme . 2. existentiam quae actu in rerum natura est , aut vi cujus aliquid actu existit , ut existentia rosae est id vi cujus rosa nunc existit . contemplatur tres in quovis ente proprietates , unitatem , bonitatem , veritatem : unitas est id vi cujus quidpiam est unum , & non multa . veritas est conformitas unius cujusque rei cum principiis veris , & constituentibus , ut veritas auri , aut aurum verum est ejusdem conformitas cum constituentibus hujusce metalli principiis . metaphysica bonitas rerum est essentialis illa perfectio quae rebus congruit . haec scientia agit pariter de potentiis , actibus , principiis , causis , contraque aristotelem , aliosque antiquos philosophos , probat mundum non fuisse aeternum . authores . aristoteles , vasques , suares , valentia , &c. sect. xix . musick . musick is a science which teacheth us what belongs to the theory and practice of harmony . melody is that which has a certain order compounded of sounds and intervals . this science treats of these seven ensuing things , of sounds , of intervals , of genders , of constitutions or systems , of tunes , of changes , of the making of melody . the sound is a gentle falling of the voice upon the note . the interval is comprehended under two sounds , the one sharper than the other . authors . guido aretine , in the year 1028 , invented these six syllables , ut , re , mi , fal , sol , la , of which mi , fa , or fa , mi , imply a half tune , and the others following one another signifie a greater or lesser tune ; euclid , ptolomy , aristoxenus , faber stapulensis , boetius , john kepler , salinas , zarlins , and vincentius galilaeus in italian . sectio decima nona . musica . musica est scientia quae theoriam praximque harmoniae docet . concentus est id quod certum habet ordinem ex sonis & intervallis compositum . haec scientia de septem hisce sequentibus agit , de sonis , de intervallis , de generibus , de constitutionibus , de tonis , de mutatione , de melopaeia . sonus est concinnus vocis casus ad unam extensionem : intervallum est id quod continetur duobus sonis acumine , & gravitate differentibus . authores . guido aretinus , anno salutis 1028 , invenit has sex syllabas , ut , re , mi , fa , sol , la , quarum mi , fa , vel fa , mi , dimidium tonum significant , ac sequentes sese invicem aliae tonum absque discrimine majorem aut minorem ; euclides , ptolomaeus , aristoxenus , faber stapulensis , boetius , joannes keplerus , salinas , zarlinus , vincentius galilaeus italice . sect. xx. the mechanicks . this science considereth the quantity of moving forces , and of duration of the time in which the motion is performed . the gravity of a body , is a certain capacity of falling downwards ; the center of gravity , is that place or point from which if we conceive the body to be suspended , whatever situation you may give it , it shall retain the same . the center of magnitude , and of gravity , are not always the same , as 't is evident in a bowl half lead , half wood. the pendula diameter of gravity , or the handle , is a streight line drawn through the center of gravity perpendicularly to the horizon . no weight can rest , unless the pendula diameter of gravity , or handle , pass through the place upon which it leans , or from which the weight is suspended . in all planes , the center of the figure , is likewise the center of gravity . this art teacheth in general , how to find out the ponderousness of every thing , and how to move things with little strength . we must not forget in this place a sort of mecbanism , the knowledge whereof is of great concern for the good of mankind ; i mean that of trusses , and instruments fit for restoring by degrees , any part of the body to its natural place and situation . the burst peritonaeum sometimes gives way to the intestines , at other times to the caul . and not seldom , to both , to get out of their natural place , into the groins , or the scrotum , there causing a rupture , called enterocele , or hernia intestinalis ; if the bowels come out , an epiplocele , or hernia omentalis ; if the omentum or caul be out . the peritonaeum is made up of two strong , but soft membranes , which do so contain whatsoever is included in the belly , that , when sound , nothing can fall out . in women , the os pubis is its utmost limit . in men , its outermost membrane reacheth further , and constitutes the first proper coat of the testicles . in the groin , it comprehends the seminal vessels , as in a sheath , called processus , which being stretched or inlarged , or coming to burst , is the immediate cause of the lately mentioned ruptures . we must not nevertheless imagine , that the peritonaeum cannot be distended , and burst in other places , and therein to cause a rupture . the causes which make the peritonaeum to burst or dilate , are falling , leaping , beating , bearing of heavy burthens , strong vomitings or coughing , obstipation of the belly , winds pent in , and vehement motions of the body . but i can do no greater service to the publick , than to inform the world of two of the best artists i know of in this kind , both living together in black fryers , in london , i mean the famed robert smith , a scotch gentleman , and his son-in-law , thomas jewel , who give daily succesful proofs of their skill in this kind of mechanism , their trusses of what kind soever being so light , so easie , and so fitted to all the motions of the body , that they are not at all troublesome . they likewise cure effectually any deformity in humane bodies , occasioned by the preternatural bending outwards , inwards , or downwards , of any part thereof , and by such ingenuously contrived engines , as force nature gently into its first place and situation . authors . aristotle , henry monenthole , joseph blancan , guid ubald , stevin , hero , robert vulturius , cedren , john baptista porta , joseph boillot , ranelli , barbette , brown , &c. sectio vigesima . mechanica . mechanica est scientia quae quantitates virium moventium , & temporum in quibus fit motus considerat . gravitas corporis est quaedam potentia ad descensum . centrum gravitatis est punctum ex quo vel sola cogitatione suspensum corpus , quemcumque situm dederis retinet . centrum gravitatis , & centrum magnitudinis non sunt semper idem , ut patet in sphaera plumbo ▪ lignea . pendula gravitatis diameter , aut ansa est linea recta ducta per centrum gravitatis acta horizonti perpendicularis . nullum pondus quiescere potest nisi pendula gravitatis diameter , aut ansa transeat per locum cui innititur , aut e quo suspenditur corpus . in omni plano figurae centrum , centrum quoque gravitatis est . haec ars docet in genere modum reperiendae ponderationis , rerumque exiguis viribus movendarum methodum . non est praetermittendum hoc loco aliud genus mechanismi cujus notitia non parum humano generi profuerit ; de mechanismo loquor , fasciarum , instrumentorumque , aut machinarum quibus paulatim quaevis corporis pars ad debitum a natura situm reducatur . rupto peritonaeo interdum intestina , omentum interdum , saepe & intestina , & omentum loco naturali excidunt in inguina , aut scrotum , ibique hernia producitur , dicta enterocele , aut intestinalis , si prolabantur intestina , vel epiplocele , aut hernia omentalis si omentum excidat . peritonaeum gemina valida quidem sed molli constat membrana , quae ita concludit quicquid imo ventre comprehenditur , ut cum sanum corpus est nihil procidere possit . peritonaeum in mulieribus osse pubis terminatur : in viris tunica exterior ulterius procedit , ac testiculorum involucrum primum proprium constituit . in inguine vasa seminalia comprehendit , instar vaginae , processus dictae : processus hic laxatus , dilatatus aut ruptus est immediata herniarum mox commemoratarum causa : non est tamen existimandum peritonaeum non posse distendi , rumpique etiam aliis in locis ibique herniam producere . causae peritonaei rupti , aut dilatati hae fere sunt , lapsus , saltatio , percussio , gravium onerum gestatio , vomitus violentior , aut tussis , constipatio ventris , flatus reclusi , vehementiorque omnis corporis motus . sed nihil forte utilius rei publicae praestitero , quam si hic nominatim indica vero duos peritissimos quos quidem norim hujusmodi mechanismi artifices simul conviventes londini in ea regione urbis quae black fryers , dicitur ; sunt autem ii celebris robertus smith scotus , ejusque gener thomas jewel , qui quotidiana magnoque successu suae hoc in genere mechanismi peritiae experimenta exhibent : ipsorum enim fasciae cujuscumque generis , sive contra hernias intestinales , sive omentales , sive umbilicales , sive ventosas , aut contra aquosas , adeo leves sunt , gestatuque faciles , omnique corporis motui ita obsecundant , ut nihil omnino molestiae gestantibus secum afferant . reipsa quoque praenominati tollunt quamcumque humanorum corporum deformitatem a praeternaturali partis cujuspiam extrorsum , introrsum , aut deorsum distentione ortam , instrumentisque ac machinis ingenii ejusmodi quibus natura suaviter ad pristinum situm reducatur . authores . aristoteles , henricus monentholus , josephus blancanus , guidus ubaldus ' stevinus , hero , robertus vulturius , cedrenus , joannes baptista porta , josephus boillotus , augustus ranelli , paulus barbettus , johannes brownius , &c. sect. xxi . medica : or the art of conserving and curing humane bodies . hermes trismegistus , a fam'd physician in egypt , invented this necessary art : 't is either empirical , that is , grounded upon meer experience ; or dogmatical , that is , grounded both upon reason and experience : hippocrates and galenus were the chief masters of the dogmatical part . this art is either speculative or practical ; the former considereth , 1. the nature , and the outward causes of distempers , as the six things that are called not natural , because they are not the constituent parts of our bodies , such we reckon the air , meat , drink , sleep , watching , motion and rest , what we throw off , and what we retain , excreta & retenta ; our passions , plethora , or fulness , cacochymy , or an ill habit of our bloud . 2. it searcheth into the internal causes of our distempers , as wind , worms , acids . the practical part of this noble and useful art relates to the method of curing , which is either performed by alteration or evacuation . whether this evacuation be wrought by bleeding , vomiting , stool , urine , sweat , or insenble transpiration ; and upon this account , its true object is the whole materia medica , or whatever may be subservient to the physician 's intention in either of the three kingdoms , i mean , animal , vegitative , and mineral . the whole materia medica may be reduc'd to the ensuing heads . 1. the attenuating remedies , as elicampe roots , wormwood leaves , camomile flowers , the hot seeds , juniper , and lawrel berries , old tallow , and grease , especially that of a wolf , and of a bear , most oyls , as of bitter almonds , walnuts , &c. the plaisters of betony , diachylon , oxycroceum , &c. 2. the softening , as marsh mallow roots , briony roots , &c. 3. such as dissolve clots , as the roots of round birthwort . 4. the deterging , as the roots of gentian , and birthwort . 5 the epicerasticks , that by a moderate moisture take off the sharpness of the humour , as mallow , and marsh-mallow roots . 6. alexipharmaca , that resist venome , as angelica root . 7. the thickening , as the roots of bugloss and plantain . 8. the cathartick , which either purge the bile , as cassia , manna , tamarinds , &c. or the phlegm , as carthamy , wild saffron , agarick , turbith , jalep , or the melancholy , as sena oake-fern , or the watery humours , as dwarf elder , elder-seed , bark , juice , mechoaca . 9. the vomitory , whether milder ones , as sarabacca leaves bruised in dill water , or stronger ones , as the spirit of tobacco , the infusion of tobacco , crocus metallorum , &c. 10. diureticks , as radish roots , parseley roots , &c. 11. the sudorificks , as harts horn , diascordium , angelica roots , &c. 12. the repelling remedies , as the sloe-tree roots , tormentil roots , &c. 13. the emplasticks that stop the passages of the body , as lilly roots , wild comphry roots , &c. 14. the absorbing remedies , which by a great faculty of drying , consume the moisture , as all cenders , vineger , brine , &c. 15. the blistering , which raise blisters , as the cantharides , mustard , garlick , water-cresses . 16. the suppurating , that generate matter , as marsh-mallow roots , white lilly roots . 17. the vulnerary , as tormentil roots , the roots of both comphreys . 18. the sarcoticks , that remove whatever may hinder the breeding of flesh , as the roots of birthwort , tragacanth , dragons bloud , sarcocolla , &c. 19. the epuloticks , that generate a callus , or scarr , as dragons bloud , myrtle leaves . 20. the anodines , as marsh-mallows , and lilly roots . 21. the narcoticks , which take away all feeling , as oyl of palm , laurel , turpentine , opium , &c. 22. the hypnoticks , that cause sleep , as requies nicolai , diascordium , laudanum opiatum , &c. 23. such as stop bleeding , as corals , the bolus , seal'd earth . 24. the cephalicks , as the roots of birthwort , betony leaves , galanga . 25. the errhina , that purge the brains and the breast , by bringing down the superfluous pituite lying about the meninges , as the juice of betony , the powder of white and black hellebore . 26. the ophthalmicks for the eyes , as eye-bright , and celadine water , and also their juices . 27. otica , that ease the pains of the ears , as laurel leaves , leeks , radishes . 28. the cardiacks , as the roots of zodoaria , great leopards bane , thistle , and balm water . 29. the bechick , that render the humours contained in the lungs and the breast , fit to be thrown up , as the syrup of ground ▪ ivy. 30. the aromaticks , as roots of cyperus . 31. splenica , such as cure the spleen , as the powder of style , valerian roots . 32 , the nephritcks , that help the reins , as marsh-mallow roots , sal prunella , &c. 33. the lithontripticks , that break the stone , as elecampane roots , galanga , &c. 34. the hystericks , that cure hysterical fits , as purslain seed , the seed of agnus castus , the trochisques of myrrh , &c. 35. the arthriticks , that prevail against the gout , as elecampane roots , night-shade , plaintain , marsh-mallow leaves . authors . hippocrates , galen , trallian , actuarius , cornelius celsus , avicenna , sennertus , riverius , macasius , regius , willis , barbette , harvey the inventor of the circulation of the bloud . sectio vigesima prima . medica : sive ars conservandi & restaurandi humani corporis . hermes trismegistus celebris apud aegyptios medicus necessariae hujusce artis inventor dicitur : est autem aut empirica , hoc est quae mera experientia , aut dogmatica , quae ratione & experientia nititur : medicinae dogmaticae praecipui magistri extitere hippocrates & galenus . est aut speculativa aut practica ; prior considerat , 1. naturam , causasque externas morborum , ut sex res dictas non naturales quia non sunt partes corporis humani constituentes , cujusmodi censemus aerem , cibum , potum , somnum , vigilias , motum , & quietem , excreta , & retenta , animi pathemata , plethoram , sive plenitudinem , cacochymiam , sive pravum sanguinis habitum . 2. scrutatur internas morborum causas , puta flatus , vermes , acidum . practica pars nobilis hujus , utilisque artis methodum medendi spectat , quae posita est in evacuatione , & alteratione , quocumque demum modo evacuatio contingat , sive venae sectione , sive vomitu , dejectione , sudore , urina , aut insensibili transpiratione ; quocirca verum ipsius objectum est tota materia medica , aut quicquid in regno animali , vegetabili , & minerali , medici scopo inservire poterit . porro totam materiam medicam ad sequentia capita reducere fere possumus . 1. attenuantia , ut radices aenulae campanae , folia absinthii , flores camomillae , semina calida , baccae juniperi , lauri , axungiae vetustiores maxime vulpina , & ursina , olea pleraque , ut amygdalarum amararum , nucum , &c. emplastra de betonica , diachylon , oxycroceum , &c. 2. emollientia , ut radices altheae , bryoniae . 3. grumos dissolventia , ut radices aristolochiae rotundae . 4. detergentia , ut radices gentianae , aristolochiae . 5. epicerastica quae moderata humidate acrimoniam humorum obtundunt , ut radices malvae , & altheae . 6. alexipharmaca quae resistunt veneno , ut radix angelicae . 7. condensantia , ut radices buglossae , & plantaginis . 8. cathartica que vel purgant bilem , ut cassia , manna , tamarindi , &c. vel phlegma , ut carthamus , crocus sylvestris , turbith , jalap , vel melancholiam , ut sena , polypodium quercinum , vel humores aquosos , ut sambuci , & ebuli semen , cortex , succus , mechoaca . 9. vomitoria , sive mitiora , ut asari folia , aut validiora , ut spiritus nicotianae , infusio nicotianae , crocus metallorum . , &c. 10. diuretica . ut radices raphani , apii . 11. sudorifica , ut cornu cervi , diascordium , radices angelicae . 12. repellentia , ut radices pruni sylvestris , tormentillae , &c. 13. emplastica quae corporis meatus obstruunt , ut radices symphiti , & liliorum . 14. absorbentia , quae valida exsiccandi vi absumunt humorem , ut omnes cineres , acetum , muria . 15. vesicatoria , quae vesicas excitant , ut cantharides , sinapi , allium , nasturtium . 16. suppurantia , a quibus pus generatur , ut radices althaeae , liliorum alborum , &c. 17. vulneraria , ut radices tormentillae , consolidae utriusque . 18. sarcotica , quae removent quicquid carnis generationem prohibet , ut radices aristolochiae , tragacantha , sanguis draconis , sarcocolla . 19. epulotica , quae callum generant , aut cicatricem , ut sanguis draconis , folia myrthi . 20. anodina , ut radices althaeae , radices liliorum . 21. narcotica , quae omnem sensum tollunt , ut oleum palmae , lauri , terebinthinae , &c. 22. hypnotica , quae somnos conciliant , ut requies nicolai , diascordium , laudanum opiatum , &c. 23. sanguinem sistentia , ut coralliae , bolus , terra sigillata , &c. 24. cephalica , ut radices aristolochiae , galangae , folia betonicae . 25. errhina , quae cerebum purgant & thoracem , educta superflua circa meninges pituita , ut succus betonicae pulvis albi & nigri hellebori . 26. ophthalmica , ut aquae & succi euphrasiae , & chelidoniae . 27. otica , quae levant aurium dolorem , ut folia lauri , radices porri , raphani . 28. cardiaca , ut radices zedoariae , doronici , aquae cardui benedicti , & melissae . 29. bechica , quae humores in thorace , & pulmone conclusos ad faciliorem tussiendo ejectionem disponunt , ut sirupus & succus hederae terrestris . 30. aromatica , ut sirupi absinthii , & betonicae . 31. splenica , ut pulvis ex chalybe , radices valerianae . 32. nephritica , ut radices althaeae , sal prunellae . 33. lithontriptica , quae calculum frangunt , ut radices aenulae campanae , galangae . 34. hysterica , ut semen agni casti , portulacae , trochisci de myrrha . 35. arthritica , quae valent adversus podagram , & chiragram , ut radices aenulae campanae , folia solani , plantaginis , althaeae . authores . hippocrates , galenus , trallianus , actuarius , cornelius celsus , avicenna , sennertus , riverius , macasius , regius , willisius , barbetius , harveius circulationis sanguinis inventor , &c. sect. xxii . the art of sailing . ars nautica , or histiodromica , is that art which teacheth how to direct a ship through the seas , to the propos'd harbour . this art requireth the knowledge of the mariners compass , and the lead , of the sea-coasts , capes , rocks , promontories , harbours , of the distances of one place from another , of the ebbing and flowing of the sea , of the latitude and longitude of every place . it requireth likewise the knowledge of several instruments fit to take the latitude of a place , as of the cross-staff , of the quadrant , of the nocturnal , of the plane scale , of gunter's scale , &c. the mariners compass is a round plane , whose circumference is divided into 32 equal parts , by streight lines , called rhombs , passing through the center . the height of the pole , of so great benefit to sailers , is found out thus : observe first the height of the sun at noon-day , with an astrolabe , or some other instrument of that kind ; then take the declination of the sun , from the height , if the sun declines from the equator towards the northern pole ; or add the declination of the sun , to the observed height , if the sun declines towards the southern pole ; the remaining number , or the sum made up by addition , gives you the height of the equator , whose complement to 90 degrees ( as they speak ) is always the height of the pole. thus if the height of the equator above our horizon be 60 deg . the height of the pole is 30 deg . because 30 added to 60 , make up 90 ; and if the pole be elevated but 10 deg . the height of the equator is 80 , because this number is the complement of that . if their could be an hour glass , or ● clock , so contriv'd , as to fall but very little short of the measure of time ▪ with the help of this clock , to the great advantage of sailers , the differences of the longitudes might be found after this manner : when the ship sets off , let the clock shew the hour in the place from whence you sail'd , without discontinuing : if then we would know the longitude of the place in which we now are , let us , by observation of the sun , find the hour in that place we chance to be in ; which if it be the same pointed at by the clock , or shewn by the glass , 't is certain we are in the same meridian we were in at our first setting out ; but if we find by observation , more hours than the clock pointeth at , we have made a progress towards the east ; if we find fewer hours , we are gone towards the west ; and the differences of the longitudes may easily be known , if the differences of the hours be converted into degrees , and minutes of degrees . authors . seller , everard , wright , &c. sectio vigesima secunda . ars nautica . ars nautica , sive histiodromica ea est quae docet qui dirigi debeat navis per maria ad propositum portum . haec ars requirit notitiam pyxidis nauticae , & bolidis , orae maritimae , promontoriorum , rupium , portuum distantiarum inter loca , aestuum maritimorum , latitudinis & longitudinis cujusque loci , instrumentorum pariter variorum ad investigandam syderum altitudinem , ut baculi decussati , quadrantis , nocturnalis , scalarum planarum , scalarum gunteri , &c. pyxis nautica est planum rotundum , cujus circumferentia in 32 partes aequales dividitur rectis lineis per centrum transeuntibus quae rhombi dicuntur . altitudo poli navigantibus adeo utilis sic invenitur : observa primo meridianam solis altitudinem ope astrolabii , aut alterius cujuspiam instrumenti , tum substrahe declinationem solis ex altitudine jam inventa solis , ope instrumenti , si declinatio solis versus polum conspicuum sit , aut adde declinationem solis observatae altitudini si sol declinaverit versus polum meridionalem , residuum aut summa futura est altitudo aequatoris , cujus complementum est semper altitudo poli : itaque si altitudo aequatoris supra horizontem nostrum sit graduum sexaginta , altitudi poli futura est graduum triginta : quia si addas 30 ipsis 60 , summa futura est 90 ; & si polus 10 tantum supra horizontem gradibus extet , aequator supra eundem extabit 80 , quia hic numerus est complementum illius . si posset construi clepsydra , aut horologium quod ab accurata mensura temporis parum aberraret : illius ope inveniri possent hoc modo longitudinum differentiae : aptetur horologium ita ut dum solvit navis ostendat horas loci unde discedimus , deinde inter navigandum nunquam cesset : cumque libuerit scire longitudinem loci in quo sumus , ex observatione coelesti inquiratur illius loci hora , quae si omnino convenerit cum hora quam horologium indicat , certum erit nos esse sub eo unde discessimus meridiano , si vero plures horas observatione invenimus , quam horologium indicet , progressi sumus versus ortum , si pauciores defleximus versus occidentem , dignosceturque differentia longitudinum , si reducantur differentiae horarum in gradus , & minuta graduum . authores . sellerius , everardus , wrightius , &c. sect. xxiii . opticks . the opticks , or optica , gives us an account of various appearances of objects . this science treats of the streight ray , as the catoptrick of the reflected , and the dioptrick of the refracted or broken ray. these following definitions belong to the opticks . the proper objects of sense , are those that can be known but by one sense ; and the common objects , such as may be known by more than one sense . light and colour , are the proper objects of our sight ; the light , upon its own account ; and the colour , by the help of light. these following things , are the common objects of our senses , bulk , figure , place , situation , distance , continuity , discontinuity , motion , and rest. the visuel rays , are the streight lines , by which the frame of the visible object is in a manner carried to the eye . we may reckon among the chief principles of this science , these following . the visible object radiates from all its least parts , to all the least parts of the medium , to which one may draw a streight line . that is seen , and that only , from which to the eye the visuel ray may be eztended . the more bodies there appear between the eye and the object , the more remote the objects appear to be . the convergent rays , are those that departing from the object , come together : such are , the rays of diverse parts of the object , which cut one another in the chrystalline humor . the divergent rays , departing from the object towards the eye , recede from one another : the rays of every point of the object , are divergent , till they come to the chrystalline humour , beyond which they come together again towards the retina . we may reckon these following propositoins amongst the most considerable of the opticks . no visible object is seen at first altogether , and perfectly . magnitudes being in the same streight line , the remoter seem to be the lesser . parallel intervals seem to be nearer one another , the farther they are from the eye . rectangle magnitudes being seen at a distance , seem to be round . equal magnitudes being under the eye , those that are farthest from the eye , seem to be highest . authors . you may reckon amongst the best masters of the opticks , euclid , aquilonius , scheiner , vitellio , alhazane , herigone , &c. sectio vigesima tertia . optica . optica variae objectorum apparentiae causas demonstrat . agit de radio recto , ut catoptrica de reflexo , & dioptrica de refracto . ad opticam spectant sequentes definitiones . propria objecta sunt ea quae ab uno tantum sensu percipi possunt . communia sunt ea quae a pluribus sensibus percipiuntur . lumen & color sunt propria visus nostri objecta , lumen quidem ratione sui , color ope lucis . communia visus objecta sunt ea quae sequuntur , quantitas , figura , locus , situs , distantia , continuitas , discontinuitas , motus , & quies . radii visorii rectae lineae sunt , quibus forma aspectabilis objecti ad visum porrigitur . inter praecipua hujus scientiae principia sequentia numerare licet . visibile radiat e quolibet sui puncto ad quodlibet punctum medii ad quod recta duci potest . id omne & solum videtur a quo ad oculum radius opticus extendi potest . quo plura corpora oculum inter , & objectum apparent , eo remotius existimatur objectum . convergentes radii sunt ii qui recedendo ab objecto simul coeunt . ejusmodi sunt radii variorum punctorum objecti qui se mutuo in humore chrystallino secant . divergentes radii progrediendo ab objecto versus oculum recedunt a se invicem donec ad humorem chrystallinum pervenerint ultra quem versus retinam coeunt . annumerare possumus praecipuis opticae ; propositiones sequentes . nullum visibile objectum simul totum , & perfecte videtur . magnitudinum in eadem recta quae remotiores videntur , minores apparent . parallela intervalla eo magis ad se invicem accedere videntur quo sunt remotoria ab oculo . rectangulae magnitudines procul visae apparent rotundae . aequalium magnitudinum sub oculo quae remotiores , videntur altiores . authores . inter praecipuos opticae doctores censere possumus euclidem , aquilonium , alhazenum , scheinerum , vitellionem herigonium , &c. sect. xxiv . perspective . perspective representeth every object seen in some diaphane , or transparent medium , through which the visual rays are terminated or bounded on the object ; and generally what ▪ is seen through something , as through the air , water , clouds , glass , and the like , may be said to be seen in perspective . the chief contents of this science , may be referred to these following heads . the ray is a streight line drawn from the eye to the glass perpendicularly . that point is called primary , on which falls a perpendicular line drawn from the eye to the glass . the projection of a line , is not a crooked line . the object being a point , there is but one visual ray drawn from the object to the center of the eye , and this ray is called the axis , or centrical , as being the most vivid , and the strongest of all . if the object be a streight line , the visual rays make a triangle . if the object be a surface , plane or spherical , the visual rays represent a pyramide . ichonography is the pourtraiture of the platform or plane upon which we would raise any thing . orthography is the pourtraiture of the fore part of the object . scenography representeth the object wholly elevated and perfect , with all its dimensions and umbrages on all sides . the horizontal line in perspective , is taken from the height of our eye : this is the chief piece of the picture , and which ought to be the rule of the dimensions and height of the figure . the point of perspective , or sight , is made by the centrical ray above the horizon . authors . amongst the chief writers of perspective , you have roger bacon , john baptist porta , stevin , marole , john cousin , daniel barbaro , vignola , serlio , du cereau , salomon de caus , guidus ubaldus , niceronius , &c. sectio vigesima quarta . perspectiva . perspectiva quodlibet objectum exhibet conspectum permedium quodpiam diaphanum , per quod radii visorii transeuntes terminantur ad objectum , & generaliter loquendo quicquid per aliud quidpiam videtur , ut per aerem , per aquam , per nubes , per vitrum , & quaecumque alia sunt ejusmodi , dici possunt videri in perspectiva . quae praecipui momenti haec scientia continet ad sequentia capita reduci queunt . radius primarius est recta ab oculo in vitrum ad angulos rectos ducta . primarium punctum dicitur id in quod cadit perpendicularis ab oculo in vitrum ducta . projectio lineae non est linea curva . cum objectum est punctum unicus tantum est radius visorius ab objecto ad centrum oculi ductus , hicque radius dicitur axis , aut radius centricus , estque omnium vivacissimus , ac fortissimus . si objectum recta sit linea , radii visiorii conflant triangulum . si objectum sit superficies plana , aut sphaerica , radii visiorii conficiunt pyramidem . ichonographia est delineatio plani super quod erigere quidpiam volumus . orthographia est delineatio anterio●is objecti partis . scenographia exhibet objectum omnino elevatum , perfectumque una cum omnibus ejusdem dimensionibus , um●risque undique . linea horizontalis in perspectiva ●ucitur ab altitudine oculi : haec prae●pui in pictura momenti est , regu●que esse debet dimensionum , altitu●numque figurae . punctum perspectivae , aut visus fit ●entrico supra horizontem radio . authores . inter praecipuos perspectivae scriptores hi censentur rogerius bacco , johannes baptista porta , stevinius , marolus , johannes cousinus , daniel barbaro , vignola , serlio , du cereau , salomon de caus , guidus ubaldus , niceronius , &c. sect. xxv . poetry . poetry is the art of making verse and poems : in order to this , 〈…〉 teacheth the quantity of syllables , whether they be short or long , doubtful 〈…〉 common , i mean , either short or long 〈…〉 pleasure . it teacheth what feet every verse compounded of , that feet are made syllables of different quantities , as spondee consists of two long syllables ; for instance , doctos , and pyrrichius ; of two short , as rota ; a dactyle consists of one long , and two short , as pectora . a poem implieth a fiction : upon this account , verses that contain no fiction , are not strictly considered ▪ a poem ; and he that gives a meer matter of fact , without any ingenious fiction adapted to the subject , is rather styl'd a versificator , than a poet. verses are either denominated from their inventors , as sapphick verses , from the greek poetress sappho , the first inventress ; as pindarick , from pindarus , or from the feet whereof they consist ; as iambick , from the iambick● of which they are compos'd , or from th● matter they express ; as heroick , from the praises of great men ; as elegiack from sad narratives , or from the number of feet , as hexameter , and pent● meter , the first having six , and the othe● five . the scansion of a verse , is the measuring of a verse by its feet . the cesure is the making of a short syllable long at the end of a foot . authors . aristotle , horace , alvares , despauter , waller , cowley , dryden , & . sectio vigesima quinta . poetica . poetica est ars pangendorum carminum quem in scopum docet quantitatem syllabarum an scilicet sint longae , breves , dubiae , aut communes , hoc est pro arbitrio , breves aut longae . docet ex quibus pedibus quilibet versus constet , pedesque constare ex syllabis variae quantitatis , spondaeum puta , duabus longis , ut doctos , pyrrichium ; ex duabus brevibus , ut rota ; dactylum ex una longa & duabus brevibus , ut pectora . poema fictionem necessario requirit : quare versus nullam fictionem complexi stricte loquendo poema dici nequeunt : qui rem absque ingenioso ullo commento , ut reipsa contigit , carmine describit , versificator potius quam poeta dicendus est . versus denominantur aut ab inventoribus , ut sapphici versus a puella graeca quae sappho dicebatur , prima inventrice , ut pindarici a pindaro ; aut a pedibus ex quibus constant , ut iambici ab iambis , ex quibus fiunt ; aut a materia quam exprimunt , ut heroici a laudibus heroum , elegiaci a maestis narrationibus ; aut a numero pedum , ut hexameter , & pentameter a numero pedum sex , & quinque . scansio versus est ejusdem ope pedum dimensio . caesuta est productio syllabae brevis sub finem pedis . authores . aristoteles , horatius , alvares , despauterius , &c. sect. xxvi . philosophy . philosophy , if we take it generally , is the love of wisdom ; if more particularly , the knowledge of natural bodies , or of the natural causes of things : the aristotelian philosophy acknowledgeth three principles of every thing , matter , form , and privation ; for we can conceive nothing to be generated without these three ; for if i conceive the generation of fire in wood , i must of necessity apprehend the wood as the matter , as likewise the privation of the fire in the wood , and also the form of fire taking place of that of wood. this philosophy resolveth all difficulties relating to bodies , by matter , privation , and form , occult qualities , and such like pretences to humane ignorance : so every mixt , according to aristotles principle , is compounded of matter and form : this matter , the peripateticks call the subject of all forms ; and this form , the act of matter ; and both together , the two compounding principles of all compounded things aristotles followers teach , that nature is such an enemy to a vacuum , that to shun it , she forceth heavy things upwards , and light things downwards . the new philosophy holds but two simple principles of all things , matter , and motion ; that , as the material cause ; this , as the efficient . the formal cause of things , which school-men call a substantial or accidental form , being nothing else , according to the modern philosophers , but a certain texture of the compounding particles ; and by the variety of textures every where obvious , or by the various modifications of matter , they give us a rational account of all the differences we observe among corporeal beings . authors of the school philosophy . aristotle , and all his commentators , as averroes , alexander aphrodisaeus , &c. authors of the new philosophy . descartes , verulam , the honourable robert boyle , who in not a few things , has out-done them both , and is deservedly styl'd abroad , the english philosopher ; he being indeed , the honour of his nation , as well as of his family . sectio vigesima sexta . philosophia . philosophia si latius sumatur , amorem sapientiae sonat , si propius & specialius , est corporum naturalium , aut naturalium causarum cognitio . philosophia aristotelica agnoscit tria rerum dum generantur principia , materiam , formam , & privationem . nihil enim generari concipimus nisi haec tria concipiamus : si enim concipio generationem ignis in ligno , necessario concipio lignum , ut materiam , & privationem pariter ipsius in ligno , formamque ignis formae ligni succedentem . haec philosophia omnes fere difficultates ad corpora spectantes ope materiae , privationis , & formae resolvit , atque occultarum qualitatum beneficio , aliisque humanae ignorantiae velamentis ; unumquodque igitur mixtum juxta aristotelica principia componitur ex materia , & forma : hanc materiam vocant peripatetici subjectum omnium formarum , & hanc formam actum materiae , componentiaque duo principia si simul sumantur , omnium rerum compositarum . aristotelis sectatores docent naturam vacuo adeo esse inimicam , ut illius vitandi gratia gravia sursum cogat , & levia deorsum . nova philosophia duo admittit simplicia omnium rerum principia materiam , & motum , illam ceu causam materialem hanc ut efficientem . formalis enim rerum causa , quam scholastici formam substantialem vocant , aut accidentalem , nihil aliud est juxta philosophos recentiores , quam textura quaedam partium componentium . hacque contextus varietate ubique obvia , aut variis materiae modificationibus , rationalem , facilem , obviamque nobis reddunt rationem omnium quae observamus , corporea inter entia discriminum . authores philosophiae scholasticae . aristoteles ejusque commentatores , ut averroes , alexander aphrodisaeus , &c. authores novae philosophiae . gassendus , cartesius , verulamius , illustrissimus robertus boylius , qui in multis his omnibus palmam praeripuit , meritoque philosophus britannicus cognominatur ; est que reipsa nationis suae , & nobilissimae familiae ornamentum & decus . sect. xxvii . rhetorick . rhetorick is the art of speaking well ; the duty of a rhetorician , is to speak pertinently to the subject , in order to perswade , and his chief scope must be to perswade by his discourse . rhetorick consists of four parts , invention , disposition , elocution , and pronounciation : invention is the contriving of an argument fit to perswade , and those arguments are always taken from some of these ensuing heads . 1. from the definition , when we declare what the thing is . 2. from the division , when we distribute a thing into all its parts . 3. from the etymology , when we shew its origine and signification . 4. from the species , when we frame an argument from that particular kind of thing the subject we treat of , belongs to . 5. from the genus , when we bring some proof from that general thing the subject we treat of , is contain'd under . 6. from the similitude . 7. from the dissimilitude . 8. from contraries . 9. from opposites , that can never concur together . 10. from comparison . 11. from the four causes , efficient , material , formal , and final . 12. from the antecedents and consequents of a thing . disposition is the orderly placing of the things invented : this orderly placing consists of five things ; exordium , by which the speaker prepares the minds of his auditors , to what he is to say . proposition , when the orator declares what he intends to make out . narration , when he relates the matter of fact , with all its circumstances . confirmation , when he proves his proposition . peroration , when the orator endeavours to move the affections of the hearers , by a fit elocution . elocution , made up of tropes , as they speak in the schools , by which words change their signification ; and of figures , which are an elegant , and not vulgar manner of speaking , is the ornament of speech . pronunciation relates to the voice , and the gesture ; by the first , we please the ear ; by the second , the sight . these forementioned things ( necessary to the compleating of an orator ) being seldom found together in any eminency , gave occasion to cicero to say , that we scarce find a good orator in a whole age. authors . aristole , cicero , suarez . sectio vigesima septima . rhetorica . rhetorica est ars bene dicendi ; officium rhetoris est loqui apposite ad scopum hoc est ad persuadendum ; praecipuus enim ipsius scopus est persuadere dictione . rhetorica quatuor constat partibus , inventione , dispositione , elocutione , pronunciatione : inventio est excogitatio argumenti ad persuadendum idonei ; haec autem argumenta ducuntur semper ab aliquo sequentium capitum . 1. a definitione , cum declaramus quid res sint . 2. a divisione , cum rem distribuimus in omnes partes . 3 , ab etymologia , cum indicamus ejusdem originem & significationem . 4. a specie , cum argumentum quodpiam ducimus a particulari illa rerum specie , ad quam res , de qua agimus spectat . 5. a genere , cum probationem de sumimus a generali illa re , sub qua id quod sub litem cadit , continetur . 6. a similitudine . 7. a dissimilitudine . 8. a contrario . 9. ab oppositis , quae nunquam concurrere queunt . 10. a comparatione . 11. a quatuor causis , efficiente , materiali , formali , & finali . 12. ab antecedentibus & consequentibus . dispositio est ordinata rerum inventarum collocatio : haec ordinata collocatio his quinque constat , exordio , quo parat orator auditorum animos ad ea quae dicturus est . propositione , cum orator quid probaturus sit exponit . narratione , cum materiam facti omnibus vestitam appendicibus enarrat . confirmatione , cum propositionem suam probat . peroratione , qua conatur orator auditorum animos apta elocutione movere . elocutio , composita ex tropis , quibus voces ad alienam significationem traducuntur , & figuris quae sunt elegantes , & non vulgares loquendi formulae , est totius orationis ornamentum . pronunciatio spectat vocem , & gestum , ista recreamus aurem , hac oculum : praememorata haec quae in perfecto oratore requirimus cum vix uspiam simul summo in gradu concurrant , impulerunt ciceronem ut dicere● vix singulis aetatibus singulos tolerabiles oratores extisse . authores . aristoteles , cicero , suares . sect. xxviii . the doctrine of the sphere . sphaerica is a science which treats of the sphere , whether artificial or natural . the sphere is a solid figure comprehended under one surface , to which all the streight lines drawn from one of those points that are within the figure , are equal one to another . the center of the sphere , is the forementioned point . the axis of the sphere , is a streight line drawn through the center , and terminated on each side in the surface of the sphere ; about which the sphere turneth round . the poles of the sphere , are the two extreme points of the axis . this science demonstrates these following propositions . 1. the sphere toucheth but in one point the plane by which it is not cut . 2. in the sphere , great circles cut one another into equal parts ; and if they divide one another into equal parts , they are great circles . 3. in the sphere , the pole of a great circle is distant from the circumference of the same circle , a full quadrant , or a fourth part of the great circle . 4. in the sphere , parallel circles are about the same poles ; and circles that are about the same poles , are parallel . 5. in the sphere , there are no more than two circles , both equal-distant and equal . this science teacheth how to find the center , and the pole of any sphere , and sheweth likewise all the properties of the circles of the sphere . authors . theodosius , maurolycus , sacrobosco , clavius , mestlinus , blancanus . sectio vigesima octava . sphaerica . sphaerica est scientia quae agit de sphaera , sive arte facta , sive naturali . sphaerica est figura solida comprehensa una superficie , ad quam ab uno eorum punctorum quae intra figuram sunt , omnes rectae lineae ductae sunt aequales inter se. centrum sphaerae est punctum praememoratum . axis sphaerae est recta per centrum ducta & utrimque terminata in superficie sphaerae circa quam volvitur sphaera . poli sphaerae , sunt duo extrema puncta axis . haec scientia sequentes propositiones demonstrat . 1. sphaera planum a quo non secatur , non tangit in pluribus punctis uno . 2. in sphaera , maximi circuli sese mutuo bifariam secant , & qui sese mutuo bifariam secant , sunt maximi . 3. in sphaera , polus maximi circuli abest a circumferentia ejusdem circuli quadrante maximi circuli . 4. in sphaera , paralleli circuli circa eosdem polos sunt , & qui circa eosdem polos in sphaera sunt , sunt paralleli . 5. in sphaera non sunt plures circuli aequales , & paralleli quam duo . haec scientia praeterea docet qui centrum , polumque cujuscumque sphaerae invenire possimus , indicatque pariter proprietates circulorum sphaerae . authores . theodosius , maurolycus , sacrobosco , clavius , mestlinus , blancanus . sect. xxix . divinity . theology , or divity , is wholly directed to the glory of god , and salvation of mankind . the speculative part of it , proposeth to us things that we are to believe , as whatever concerns gods attributes and perfections , the immortality of our souls , and whatever is contain'd in the apostolick creed . the practical part , proposeth to us things that we are to do , viz. whatever is contain'd in the decalogue . the immediate object of divinity , as it relates to christians , we reckon whatever concerns christ , directly , or indirectly ; as in general , the old and new testament . and in particular , the prophecies relating to his coming , his miracles , his doctrine , and the conversion of the world by his apostles : if then , a man knew no other divinity , but that which gives an account of gods attributes , he is not upon this account a christian divine , but a philosopher , or deist . christian divinity , besides the aforesaid things , teacheth all kind of vertues , as charity , humility , patience , chastity , adoration , prayer to , and praise of god , faith , obedience , repentance , &c. it will have us moreover to pardon and love our very enemies ; which no other religion commands : it offers to us the fundamental points of christian religion , christs godhead , passion , death , resurrection , &c. and ( as i was saying ) whatever is contained in the creed . authors . the master of sentences , thomas aquinas , scotus , hammond , lightfoot , and several other doctors of the church of england . sectio vigesima nona . theologia . thologia ad dei gloriam , salutemque animarum tota dirigitur . speculativa pars proponit nobis credenda , ut quae spectant ad attributa divina , immortalitatem animae , quaeque in symbolo apostolorum continentur . pars practica facienda nobis proponit , quaecumque scilicet decalogus nobis exhibet . theologia prout spectat christianos , immediatum habet objectum quicquid refertur ad christum directe , aut indirecte ut in genere tum antiquum , tum novum testamentum ; & magis speciatim prophetias ad ipsius adventum spectantes , miracula , doctrinam , hominumque ab apostolis conversionem : quocirca si nullum quis aliam noverit theologiam quam quae divinorum attributorum reddit rationem non hoc nomine christianus theologus , sed philosophus potius , aut deista merus dici debet . theologia christiana praeter superius commemorata docet omnia virtutum genera , humilitatem , patientiam , castitatem , adorationem , orationem , laudem dei , fidem , obedientiam , paenitentiam , &c. vult insuper nos non tantum remittere injuriam , sed & diligere inimicos : quod nulla nisi christiana religio injungit . proponit nobis religionis christianae fundamenta , christi deitatem , passionem , mortem , resurrectionem , &c. atque ut superius dicebam quicquid in symbolo continetur . authores . majister sententiarum , thomas aquinas , johannes duns scotus a patria , hamm●ndius , lightfootius , aliique quam plurimi ecclesiae anglicanae doctores . sect. xxx . spherical trigonometry . spherical trigonometry teacheth us to measure spherical triangles , that is triangles in the surface of the sphere , made by the arches of great circles . those sides of a spherical triangle are of the same kind that both exceed , or both fall short of 90 degrees ; but they are of a different sort , if the one exceed , and the other fall short of 90 degrees . this science demonstrates these following propositions . 1. in all spherical triangles , any side whatsoever , is less than a semi-circle . 2. in all spherical triangles , any two sides , howsoever they be consider'd , are greater than the third . 3. of a spherical triangle equilateral , if each side be a quadrant , or of 90 deg . all the angles are streight ; and if each side be less than the quadrant , all the angles are obtuse . 4. in all spherical triangles , when the angles are all acute , all the arches are less than the quadrant . 5. in all spherical triangles , the three angles are greater than two streight angles , and lesser than six . authors . kepler , afraganius , julius higinus , garcaeus , robert hues , adrianus metius . sectio trigesima . trigonometria sphaerica . trigonometria sphaerica docet nos modum dimetiendi triangula sphaerica , hoc est triangula ex tribus arcubus maximorum circulorum , in superficie sphaerae composita . latera ea trianguli sphaerici ejusdem sunt affectionis quae simul excedunt , aut deficiunt a quadrante , aut nonaginta gradibus , sed non sunt ejusdem generis si unum latus excedat , & alterum sit infra nonaginta gradus . haec scientia sequentes hasce propositiones demonstrat . 1. in omni triangulo sphaerico quodvis latus quomodocumque sumptum est minus semi-circulo . 2. in omni triangulo sphaerico duo latera reliquo sunt majora quomodocumque sumpta . 3. omne triangulum sphaericum aequilaterum , si singula latera sunt quadrantes , habet singulos angulos rectos , si vero quadrante minora , ob , tusos . 4. in omni triangulo sphaerico cujus omnes anguli sunt acuti arcus singuli quadrante minores sunt 5. omnis trianguli sphaerici tres anguli duobus quidem rectis sunt majores , sex vero rectis minores . authores . keplerus , afraganius , julius higinus , garcaeus , robertus hues , adrianus metius . sect. xxxi . the rectiline trigonometry . the rectiline trigonometry teacheth us how to measure triangles made of streight lines . a streight line , is the shortest way between two extremes . between two extremes , there can be but one streight line . two streight lines can not cut one another , but in one point . an angle is measured by degrees , so a streight angle is an angle of 90 degrees , an acute angle is an angle of fewer than 90 , as an obtuse angle contains more than 90 degrees . a line falling even down upon another line , without inclining either to the one side , or to the other , is called a perpendicular line , and makes two streight angles . parallel lines , are those that are equidistant one from another . this science demonstrates this proposition , of great use in mathematicks , that the three angles of all rectiline triangles , are equal to two streight ones . all the angles of a triangle , may be acute , but there can be but one streight , or obtuse . if one of the three angles of a triangle be streight , the two others are equal to a streight angle . who knows the degrees of two angles , knows the degrees of the third , because all three make up 180 degrees . all the angles of a triangle being equal , all the sides are likewise equal . authors . euclid , clavius , arnauld ; malapertius , fournier , &c. sectio trigesima prima . trigonometria rectilinea . trigonometria rectilinea docet qui triangula ex rectis lineis composita metiri oporteat . linea recta est brevissima duo inter extrema via . duo inter extrema unica tantum duci potest recta . duae rectae nequeunt se invicem nisi in puncto secare . angulum metiuntur gradus , angulus rectus est angulus 90 graduum , acutus angulus graduum pauciorum , angulus obtusus plures nonaginta gradibus gradus continet . linea in aliam utrimque incidens ex aequo perpendicularis dicitur , duosque utrimque rectos angulos constituit . lineae parallelae , sunt lineae aequo a se invicem intervallo dissitae . haec scientia non exiguae mathematicis in disciplinis utilitatis hanc propositionem demonstrat , omnis trianguli rectilinei tres anguli duobus rectis sunt aequales . omnes anguli trianguli rectilinei possunt esse acuti , sed unus tantum rectus esse potest , aut obtusus . si unus trium angulorum trianguli sit rectus , duo reliqui recto aequales sunt . qui novit duorum angulorum gradus tertii anguli gradus novit , simul enim tres anguli conficiunt numerum 180. quoties omnes anguli trianguli sunt aequales , omnia latera quoque aequalia sunt . authores . euclides , cicero , clavius , arnauld , malapertius , fournierius , &c. an appendix , pointing at some of the chief authors of this , and the foregoing ages . by authors , here are meant , those that are really such , and the first inventors of any useful piece of knowledge . reader , thou mayest rest satisfied with this very short and imperfect account of some of the chief new inventions , either of this , or of the past ages , since i design , at more leisure , to write a larger treatise of this subject , as likewise to set down the particular times every thing was printed in , that so the unjust dealing both of domestick and foreign transcribers , who have so often stolen the greatest , or ( at least ) the best part of their writings from the honourable robert boyle , hook , descartes , gassendi , and others , may to their confusion , be discovered ; and to the great encouragement of all ingenious men , who shall the more willingly venture abroad their notions , and new contrivances , in what kind soever , if they ▪ are once secured from usurping authors . i shall begin with the deservedly famous robert boyle , though i may dispatch in one word , what relates to this noble author , if i say , as truly i may , that whatever he has publish'd , is in every respect new , both as to the subject it self , the arguments he proposeth , and the particular method : but because the curious reader will not be satisfied with this general account , i come to particulars , but shall speak but of a very few things , as designing , at greater conveniency , a more accurate history of this great author's new contrivances , whether notions , engines , or experiments . as likewise whatever the natives of this island have invented towards the promoting of useful learning . the famous air-pump was invented by the honourable robert boyle : he giveth a full account of it , in his discourse of physico mechanical experiments ; by the help whereof , he proves the elastick power and spring of the air , and several other wonderful phaenomena's relating to the nature , spring , expansion , pressure , weight of the air , &c. he contrived the experiment concerning the different parts and redintegration of salt-peter ; whence he concludes , that motion , figure , and disposition of parts , may suffice to produce all secondary affections of bodies , and so banisheth the substantial forms and qualities of the schools . but because i design a larger account in another treatise of this noble author's new inventions , i shall only tell you here , that his physiological and experimental essays , his sceptical chymist , his usefulness of experimental philosophy , his history of cold , his experimental history of colours , his hydrostatical paradoxes , his origine of forms and qualities , his free enquiry into the receiv'd notion of nature , his reconciliableness of specifick remedies to the new philosophy , his history of humane bloud , his discourse of final causes , not yet published ; as likewise all his other treatises contain as many new notions and exepriments almost as lines . i shall not forget in this place , what that very learned and ingenious gentleman , sir robert gordon , of gordistoun , has lately invented ; i mean , his famous water-pump , a piece of mechanism , far beyond the contrivances of all foregoing ages , in this kind , as i shall easily make out by the following account of this useful engine . this new pump draweth twice as much water as any other ; it is wrought with half the force , and costs half the price , and takes up but half the room . the experiment , performed at deptford the twenty second of march , in presence of my lord dartmouth , and the commissioners of the navy ; appointed to give account of it to the king , was as follows . in a sixth-rate frigat , this new pump did fill the gaged cistern of two tuns , in one minute and forty five seconds ; and the shippump did the same in six minutes and some more , each pump being wrought by four men . in a fourth-rate frigat , this pump being wrought by twelve men , did fill the cistern in thirty one seconds ; and the ship-pump , being wrought by six men , fill'd it in four minutes and some more . the chief authors of new discoveries in anatomy , we reckon to be these following : fabricius ab aqua pendente discover'd the valve of the veins , as the valve at the entrance of the great gut colon was found out by bauhinus ; the milky veins of the mesentery , by asellius ; the receptacle of the chyle , hy pequet ; the ductus virsungianus , by george virsung , of padua ; the lymphatick vessels , by dr. joliffe , bartholin , and olaus rudbeck ; the internal ductus salivaris in the maxillary glandule , by dr. wharton , and dr. glisson ; the glandules under the tongue , nose and palate ; the vessels in the nameless glandules of the eye ; the tear glandule , by nicolas steno ; a new artery , called arteria bronchialis , by frederick rusch ; the circulation of the bloud , by dr. harvey , though some , upon no very good grounds , ascribe it to paulus venetus , and others to prosper alpinus , and andreas caesalpinus . the act of making salt water fresh , was lately invented in england , whereof the deservedly famous r. boyle gave a very rational account , in a letter written upon this subject . arithmetick was either invented , or much promoted by pythagoras , by euclid , not the euclid that was contemporary to plato , and hearer of socrates , but the famed mathematician of that name , who was after aristotle , and at ninety years distance from the former ; by diaphantus , psellus , apuleius , cardan , gemma frisius , clavius , &c. neper invented the logarithms , by the help whereof we perform all the operations of arithmetick by addition and substraction . he invented likewise an easie , certain and compendious way of accounting by sticks , called rabdology , as also computation by neper's bones . the telescope was invented by james metius , of amsterdam , though commonly ascribed to galile , who indeed , improved it . torricellius found the barometer , whereby we weigh the air itself . printing , according to polidore vergile , was found by john cuttemberg , of ments , in germany , though others give the honour to one fust , of the same city ; and some , to lawrence , a burgher of harlem . the chineses knew this art before the europeans . flavius goia , of amalphis , in the kingdom of naples , is thought to be the inventor of the mariners-compass , three hundred years since . finis . appendix , quosdam e praecipuis hujus , superiorumque saeculorum authoribus indicans . hic nomine authorum intelliguntur ii , qui reipsa ejusmodi sunt , hoc est primi utilis cujuscumque scientiae , seu cognitionis inventores . aequi bonique consulet lector brevem hanc imperfectamque descriptionem eorum , quae sive hoc , sive praeterita saecula invenerunt ; cum enim per otium licebit , statui ampliorem hoc super argumento conscribere tractatum , ipsumque denotare tempus quo quidlibet e prelo in lucem prodiit , eo consilio ut transcriptores tum domestici , tum extranei qui toties ties illustrissimo boylio , hookio , cartesio , aliisque maximam aut praecipuam saltem lucubrationum suarum partem surripuere meritas ipso detecti furti pudore luant paenas : quo fiet ut ingeniosi quique quaecumque de novo excogitant , facilius in lucem emissuri sint si tutos se ab authoribus aliena usurpantibus noverint . initium ducam a roberto boylio jure merito jam ubique celeberrimo , quamvis quae hic nobilem hunc authorem spectant verbo absolvere queam , si dixero ut vere possum , quicquid ab ipso in lucem editum est esse omnino novum , sive argumentum ipsum spectes , sive rationes ab ipso propositas , sive denique peculiarem ipsius methodum : sed quia his in genere dictis lectoris curiositati factum satis non fuerit , propius quaedam attingam paucissima tantum commemoraturus , ut qui per otium accuratiorem scribere decreverim historiam tum eorum quae magnus hic author primus adinvenit puta notionem machinarum , experiment orum , &c. tum eorum quae indigenae hujus insulae ad utilium scientiarum propagationem excogitarunt . celeberrima antlia aeria ab illustrissimo roberto boylio excogitata fuit : plenam ejusdem descriptionem tradit ibi ubi de experimentis physico-mechanicis ; illius ope elasticam aeris virtutem , atque elaterem probat , variaque alia , quae merito miremur , phaenomena ad naturam , elaterem , expansionem , pressionem , gravitatemque aeris spectantia . primus ille author experimenti est de diversis partibus , & redintegratione salispetrae , unde concludit motu , figura , partiumque dispositione secundarias omnium corporum affectiones produci posse , proscribitque proinde substantiales scholarum formas , & qualitates . sed quia fusius alibi scribere statui de iis quae nobilis hic author primus invenit , hic tantum suggeram , physiologicis ipsius tent aminibus , atque experimentalibus , chymico sceptico , utilitate experimentalis philosophiae , historia frigoris , experimentali historia colorum , hydrostaticis paradoxis , origine formarum & qualitatum , libera in receptam naturae notionem disquisitione , concordia remediorum specificorum & novae philosophiae , historia humani sanguinis , dissertatione de causis finalibus , nondum edita ; variisque aliis ejusdem operibus , tot novas contineri notiones , experimentaque fere quot versus . non praetermittam hoc loco quod doctissimus , ingeniosissim usque rob. gordonius , a gordistoun eques , nuper● adinvenit ; notissimam scilicet jam ubique hauriendis aquis antliam , mechanismi quoddam genus , quod superiorum aetatum hoc in genere arte facta longe exsuperet , ut sequente utilis hujusce machinae descriptione facile demonstrabo . nova haec antlia duplo plus quavis alia aquarum trahit ; & dimidiis tantum viribus dimidioque solum constat pretio , & dimidium tantum modo implet locum . experimentum hoc deptfordii vigesimo secundo martii coram comite darmouthensi commissariisque classis regiae , ad rem ut reipsa erat regi referendam constitutis ita se habebat . imposita nova haec antlia navi bellicae sexti ordinis mensuratam duorum doliorum cisternam minuto uno , secundis quinque supra quadraginta implevit : notaque navis antlia idem sex minutis & aliqua parte septimi praestitit , utramque autem quatuor tantum operarii agebant . navi bellicae quarti ordinis imposita coopera●tibus interim duodecim operario cist●ruam secundis triginta , & uno implevit , navisque antlia ope sex nautarum cand●●● quatuor minutis , & aliqua parte quinti implevit . praecipuos rerum anatomicarum detectores sequentes numeramus , vid. fabricium ab aqua pendente , qui detexit valvulas venarum , ut valvula , sub introitum magni intestini quod colon dicunt inventa fuit a bauhino ; venae lacteae mesenterii ab asellio , receptaculum chyli a pequeto , ductus virsungianus a georgio virsung paduensi ; lymphatica vasa a doctore joliffeo , bartholino , & olao rudbeckio , internus ductus salivaris in glandula maxillari a doctore whartono , & doctore glissonio , glandulae sub lingua , naso , palato , vasa sub innominata glandula oculi , glandula lacrymalis a nicolao stenone ; nova arteria bronchialis dicta a frederico ruschio , circulatio sanguinis ab harvaeo ; quamvis alii quidam non sat probabiliter eam ascribant paulo veneto , ut nonnulli prospero alpino , & etiam andreae caesalpino . ars aquae salsae dulcorandae inventa nuper in anglia est , de qua celeberrimus merito boylius conformia omnino rationi in epistola quadam hoc super argumento scripsit . arithmeticam aut invenerunt , aut multum promoverunt sequentes authores , pythagoras , euclides , non is qui coaevus fuit pl●toni , auditorque socratis , sed celeberrimus mathematicus hujus nominis qui post aristotelem floruit , annis post priorem nonaginta ; diaephantus , psellius , apuleius , cardan●s , gemma frisius , clavius , &c. neperus invenit logarithmos quorum ope omnia arithmeticae praescripta exequimur sola additione , & substractione . invenit pariter facilem , certam , brevemque numerandi methodum ope baculorum , quam rabdologiam dicunt , aut computationem per ossa neperi . telescopium inventum fuit a jacobo metio , amstelodamensi licet vulgo galilaeo tribuatur , qui quidem perfectius illud multo reddidit . torricellius invenit barometrum quo instrumento aerem ipsum metimur . ars typographica teste polydoro vergilio inventa fuit a johanne cuttembergio , moguntiano , licet quidam hunc honorem tribuant cuidam fustio ex eadem civitate , & nonnulli laurentio civi harlemensi . sinenses hanc artem prius aeuropaeis noverant . flavius goia , ab amalphi , in regno neapolitano creditur jam trecentis abhinc annis pyxidem nauticam invenisse . finis . scepsis scientifica, or, confest ignorance, the way to science in an essay of the vanity of dogmatizing, and confident opinion : with a reply to the exceptions of the learned thomas albius / by joseph glanvill ... glanvill, joseph, 1636-1680. 1665 approx. 196 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 51 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2009-03 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a70185 wing g828_pt2 estc r13862 11839211 ocm 11839211 49777 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a70185) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 49777) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 70:14, 31:5) scepsis scientifica, or, confest ignorance, the way to science in an essay of the vanity of dogmatizing, and confident opinion : with a reply to the exceptions of the learned thomas albius / by joseph glanvill ... glanvill, joseph, 1636-1680. 2 v. printed by e. cotes, for henry eversden ..., london : 1665. vol. 2 has special t.p.: scire/i tuum nihil est, or, the authors defence of the vanity of dogmatizing, against the exceptions of the learned tho. albius in his late sciri ... london : printed by e.c. for h. eversden, 1665. first ed. published under title: the way of dogmatizing. copy at reel 31:5 (g827) is volume 1; copy at reel 70:14 (g828) is volume 2. "a letter to a friend concerning aristotle": v. 2, p. 77-92. reproduction of original in library of congress (v. 1) and british library (v. 2) created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng white, thomas, 1593-1676. philosophy -early works to 1800. knowledge, theory of -early works to 1800. 2007-08 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2007-08 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2008-02 john pas sampled and proofread 2008-02 john pas text and markup reviewed and edited 2008-09 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion scire / i tuum nihil est : or , the authors defence of the vanity of dogmatizing ; against the exceptions of the learned tho. albius in his late sciri . no doubt but ye are the men , and wisdom shall dye with you ! job . london , printed by e. c. for henry eversden at the grey-hound in st. pauls-church-yard , 1665. the authors apology for his style . it may perhaps seem to some incongruous , that my reply is not written in the language of the objections ; and i should have thought so too , had the objections spoke the language of my discourse . but since my assailant takes the liberty to recede from my style , i know no reason obligeth me to humour his . and 't is less improper for a book to differ in fashion from another that opposeth it ; than from that of which 't is a part and vindication . and this answer were sufficient for the seeming impropriety : but yet i have reasons more considerable to excuse it . i must confess then , that by that time sciri was extant , i was grown so indifferent to those matters , that i had much ado to perswade my self to a review of what i had written ; and could have ben content to have left it without any other vindication , then what it could it self obtain from the good nature and ingenuity , of impartial perusers . and in this coldness of humor had without doubt deserved it , but that my bookseller importun'd me for another edition : which request of his having consented to , i saw my self under a necessity of decorum to return something on an occasion , in which silence perhaps might have been ill-manners to an ingenious and learned adversary . but though the constraint of these circumstances overcame my aversness to writing any more on a subject , with which i thought i had done for ever ; yet could it not prevail against the humour i had of troubling my self no more then needs in a business , to which i was driven , rather then inclined or perswaded . so that after i had resolv'd an answer ; it had been more difficult to have drawn my self to put it into any other drss , then what is most easie and familiar . which yet was not the effect only of the indisposition and laziness of my humour ; but a dictate of my discretion . for the truth is , i foresaw the occasion would not engage me in any thing , that i could think worthy of the universal language ; except i should have written a discourse , and not an answer . besides which , had i used another style i must have been more diffuse in reiterating what i had said in the opposed essay ; otherwise those that understood not english , had been uncapable of my justification ; and my self , and those that do , nauseated by the repetition . these then were the chief reasons of my continuing the language i began with ; which i confess i was the more easily perswaded by , because there are late great examples of like practice , whose fashions 't is no discredit to imitate . and to all i might add , that i love not that my discourse should wear linsy-woolsy . sciri , a. sive sceptices & scepticorum à jure disputationis exclusio . remarques on the title . g. i should never have thought my self concern'd in a book , that wears such a title ; but that i found my name in the first page made an ungrateful adjunct : and the opposing a discourse i had publish't , profest the occasion , and mark it aim'd at . how unjust 't is to suggest that i am a sceptick , is i think clear enough from what i have said already , and shall make more fully appear in the process . and how little kindness i have for the disputing way of procedure , i have publiquely declared . how proper then that part of the title is in this application , any one may pass an easie judgement . but to what purpose old cato stands there , with that instructive oracle in his mouth , which i remember ever since i cap't verses , contra verbosos : i was posed to conjecture . especially since the insignificant prattle , and endless garrulity of the philosophy of the schools , which this gentleman seems to vindicate , is none of the least offences to those whom , whither they will or no , he will have be scepticks . in consideration of this , and some such other misapplyed appellations , i thought that this learned man had an other notion of sceptick then was usual ; and casting mine eye over his late purgation , presented to the cardinals of the inquisition , i found that his scepticks were some of the modern voluminous ●●sputing peripateticks , whom in that part of my discourse where i deal with the aristotelian philosophy , i bestow a particular reflection on . these it seems by the solicitation of their complaints against his writings had obtain'd a general condemnation of them from the pope and consistory of cardinals ; whom therefore in his appeal to the said cardinals he accuseth of ignorance , corruption of the aristotelian doctrines , and tendency to heresie and atheism . and that these are the scepticks of our philosopher , appears also from several passages both of the praeface and body of the discourse i am rejoyning to . but then upon what account the celebrated gassendus and the author of the vanity of dogmatizing should be comprised under a common name with these , with whom they have so little confederacy either in doctrin or design ; i cannot yet find the least ground for conjecture . a. junioribus academicis . etsi non dubitem validioribus & magis opportunis auxiliis obviam itum esse exitiali illi pyrrhonicae contagio , quod nova audere non ita pridem occaepit ; tamen , quia nil publici cauterii adactum ad ulous glanvillanum jam biennio integro aestuofum audiveram , visum est filentibus potioribus ad meam infirmitatem devolutum esse onus , iniquitatem indisciplinatae illius calumniae universo philosophantium choro impositae , si non avertere , certe aperire , & plumis disertioribus lacerandam exponere . — page 1. upon the supposal then that i am a sceptick , the learned g. gentleman invades my harmless and peaceable essay as a deadly pyrrhonical contagion , and an enemy to science . but with what ingenuity i am charg'd , with what i have so frequently disclaim'd , i appeal to the professions of the discourse it self to evidence : which whether they are arguments of a sceptical aim and temper , let the dogmatist judge between us . and though my apology for philosophy may perhaps be defective in point of judgement and argument , for the clearing of what i undertook to vindicate ; yet both the design and menage of it , one would think , should have secured me from suspicion of endeavouring to discourage philosophical enquiries , by introducing a despair of science . for on the contrary , one of my chief designs was , to remove that sloath and laziness which in these later ages hath cramp't endeavour , and made men content to sit down with their slender acquists , as certainties and demonstrations which are scarce probabilities . i desire it may be taken notice of once for all then , that i have nought to do with that shuffling sect , that love to doubt eternally , and to question all things . my profession is freedom of enquiry , and i own no more scepticism then what is concluded in the motto which the royal society have now adopted for theirs , nullius in verba . so that there was no need of so solemn a warning to the universities against my innocent discourse ; whose greatest fault is , that 'tas been so unhappy as to be mistaken . for the ulcus glanvillanum ( as my learned assailant is pleased to call it ) contains none of the supposed venome . nor will it inspire any but supine and passive tempers with any other spirit then that of more diligent research , and careful pursuits of nature . i am not therefore concern'd in the question our author propounds to his junior academicks to this purpose : whether they would be severely wise for the conduct of their manners and religion , or enticingly rhetorical , pleading for ignorance and uncertainty , and whistling their dependants into apparent precipices ? since one of the greatest quarrels i have against confident opinion , is , that it renders the dogmatist conceited , not wise . and is so far from being serviceable to good manners , that it mischievously corrupts them , sowring mens spirits with envy , ill nature , and moroseness ; and mingling their religion with schism , bitrer zeal , and sedition : and these are worse precipices then a modest and reserv'd belief can betray men into . to what follows within this period , i 'le say no more , then that there 's a medium between being blind and infallible . and vanitas dogmatizandi , is not well explained by vera pollicendi . a. viro non irascor , qui magno ingenio & eloquentiae cum annis maturandae flumine non vadando , — pag. 3. g. in this clause the learned gentleman acknowledgeth my confession of certainty in faith , and hopes of science from experiment ; neither of which can consist with a criminal and dangerous scepticism : which yet he seems not willing to have me free from , adding , that i point at one , as the ground of my expectation , whom this learned man will have believed a favourer of the pyrrhonian nihil sciri : the person aim'd at in this reflection , i conceive , is des-cartes ; though i confess , i remember not that sentence mention'd in his writings ; for after the proposal of what might be expected from experiment and the progress of enquiry , i adde , that those that are acquainted with the fecundity of the cartesian principles will dispair of nothing . and if that great man , possibly one of the greatest that ever was , must be believed a sceptick , who would not ambitiously affect the title ? and to give the pyrrhonians one of the noblest and happiest wits that hath shone upon the world , is to yield a greater advantage to their cause , then would be done by a thousand profest assertions of it so that had i been guilty of such a concession , i might thence more reasonably have been judged a favourer of the scepticks , then by any thing i have writ against the dogmatists . for i am apt to think , that mankind is like to reap more advantage from the ignorance of des cartes , then perhaps from the greatest part of the science was before him , and i cannot forbear pronouncing him the phosphoros of that clear and useful light , that begins to spring in plentifully upon an awakened world . so that though the following expostulations are proper and seasonable in reference to our authors peripatetical scepticks , yet are they most improper and injurious , if they have any aspect on des-cartes , or those that endeavour to promote that free and useful way of philosophizing which he hath insisted in . but i add no more on this occasion , because 't is possible i have mistaken the person intended by my assailant . however , if the reflection be not directed to him , 't is to the excellent gassendus , who is presently after introduced , under the title of the great interpreter of epicurus ; who hath as little reason to be suspected of criminal scepticism , as the other . it is well known that these great men were inquirers , and it becomes not such to be swearers , nor is it therefore reasonable to conclude them scepticks . a. aliud offendiculum est complurium modernorum effraenis impudentia , qui aristotelem — pag. 7. g. i am glad to find my learned assailant justifying all my censures of the modern aristotelians ; only he accuseth them of one fault which i seldom find among them , viz. modesty in proposing their opinions ; which our authour inveighs against as a criminal diffidence . but for my part i think the greatest number of that spirit can plead not guilty to the accusation . and for those of them that are less assured in their sentiments , i should not reckon it among their crimes , to be wary and sparing of assent in notions so lubricous and uncertain , as are those they deal in . though i confess , to keep such voluminous ado about acknowledg'd uncertainties , is a very reprehensible vanity . and doubtless the unprofitable toyes of these later peripateticks , have offended many against that philosophy . but whether most of them are not the genuine derivations of the hypothesis they claim to , may without difficulty be determin'd by any that will consider the natural flatulency of that aery scheam of notions . and i think they have no great reason to pretend to ingenuity or judgement , that accuse aristotle for the faults of his sectators . but from this last period of sence , i desire chiefly it may be noted , that our learned author pleads not for the modern aristotelianism , which yet obtains in most of the schools of christendom : all the advantage i shall make of which at present is to question , whether the reseuing men from an over fond value of such small wares , and the preventing the expence of time and pains upon such solemn trifles , as our philosopher deservedly calls them , be like to be a prejudice to their persuits of more useful knowledge , and the furtherance of science ? vos modo novi palmites surgentes in vinum quod a. laetificet corda hominum , memores quod — pag. 9. though i confess i have not so great a value for the g. aristotelian learning , as some others ; yet i am none of those , that would disswade junior academicks from the study of that philosophy . especially , i think aristotles logick and rhetorick are to be acknowledg'd ; though , i am not of the opinion of averroes that he was the inventer of either . and doubtless that reverence and observance is due to the statutes of those universities that recommend this author ; yea and the antiquity of that philosophy ( though it be far from being the antientest ) will commend it to the students of universal learning . besides , i would have nothing avoided or condemn'd till it be understood : and were i more an enemy to that philosophy then my assailant can suppose i am , yet should i not disswade the learning it ; since primus sapientiae gradus , est falsa intelligere . only , i think , 't would be very injurious to knowledge , if aristotle should ingross men , and should his placits be all receiv'd as the dictates of universal reason . there are other hypotheseis more antient , and possiby more useful , that deserve to be enquired into . and 't is an enlargement and enobling the minds of men to acquaint them with the various scheams in which things have been represented . my design was not then to discourage any from inquiring into the aristotelian doctrines , especially as they are in their original : but to prevent mens sitting down for ever on his composures , and making his placits the infallible measures of truth and nature . let aristotle be studied then , but not adored . let him have the first of our time , but not all ; the advantage of prepossession is great , which yet free philosophers i presume will grant him ; only let pythagoras , democritus , plato , and the more antient chaldaean wisdom , have their turns to be inquired into , and let the great and illustrious moderns have theirs . 't is an unaccountable vanity , to spend all our time in raking into the scraps and imperfct remains of former ages , and to neglect the knowledge and clearer notices of our own , which ( my lord bacon makes the third , but reckoning in the aegyptian ) is the fourth , and perhaps greatest enquiry of learning . for many have gone to and fro , and science is increased . methinks 't is pity that so many improveable wits as frequent the universities , should be hindred from enquiry ; and tyed up to the writings of a single authour , from the knowledge of the sentiments of the philosophick world , and studying the more instructive volumn of the universe . doubtless , since the dayes of aristotle , the face of things is alter'd , and new phaenomena are disclosed , which his hypotheseis will no more suit , then the coats of children will a body that is at full and advanced stature . besides , the greatest spirits of our dayes , proceed in another way of enquiry , which , if there were nothing in 't but the fashion of the learning of the age , it were however fit to be known by those that lay any claim to ingenuity , and have leisure for such researches . and it seems to me an unpardonable kind of sloath , ( especially in youth that useth to be busie and inquisitive ) to be contentedly ignorant of those great theories that make such noise in the age they live in ; and to spend all their time in that which will signifie little without the walls of a colledge . for the wiser world is of a differing opinion from our philosopher in the assertion of this paragraph , viz. that no progress can be made in sciences without the aristotelian grounds ; and i think will hardly be brought to believe , that those that have quitted those foundations must be alwayes to seek for principles , and necessarily come short of science . for to think that the principles of any man should be the only and infallible measures of things , seems a fond overvaluing credulity that hath nothing to warrant it . and he that phancies that all succeeding mankind cannot light upon principles as happy and likely , as those of aristotle , but must eternally despair of science , if they proceed in any other way , then he hath prescribed them ; hath no pretence for so bold a judgment of possibilities . actio prima . scepsin infaelici naturae aborsu antiquitùs natam , a. & ipsiusmet pudore è linguis disertorum ubi diu habitaverat elatam , & fidei christianae constantiâ tumulatam , à vermium & insectorum epulis raptam , magicâ quadam operâ vivis restituere conatus est petrus gassendus , acerrimae vir sagacitatis , nitidae eloquentiae , copiosae facundiae , suavissimorum morum , & diligentiae admirandae . idem ( quod his omnibus majus est ) catholicae fidei tenacissimus , & nusquam pravorum áogmatum suspectus , cùm tamen haec sceptica infinitorum errorum & omnium haereseôn mater sit , & illa ipsa seductrix philosophia , & inanis fallacia , quam cavendam apostoli monitu docuêre sancti . hanc vir ille , caetera magnus , in exercitatione suâ paradoxâ adversus aristotelaeòs , non ut priùs tectam & scortorum more in tenebris vagantem , sed effronti vultu & fucatâ formâ turbis & foro ostentare ausus est . 2. illius exemplo , apud nos linguâ vernaculâ eandem exornatam produxit vanitatis dogmatizandi author ; ipse quoque & ingenio pollens & eloquio . neque enim à vulgaribus mentibus timenda sunt grandia infortunia . haec mei laboris est occasio ; propositum verò , si lumen caelitùs affluat & vires calamo ministret , hanc cadaveream scientiae aemulam in sua sepulcreta compellere , & inominatis dentibus rodendam tradere . agedum igitur , quaesiti nodum evolvamus . g. the scepticism which the constancy of christianity lay'd in it's grave , i dare say the illustrious gassendus would never have redeemed from thence . the scepticism which consists in freedome of inquiry , that noble pen recommended , and adorned ; but did not restore : for campanella and the great verulam were before him ; yet , avicenna and others of his spirit among the antient peripateticks , were free philosophers . but what that scepticism should be , that is consistent with so sharpe a wit , so neat and copious an eloquence , such sweet manners , and admirable diligence , such firmness and fledfastness in the faith , and so unsuspected an orthodoxie , as are ascribed , and deservedly , to that great person : and yet be the source of infinite errorus and heresies , that seducing philosophy and vain deceit , against which we have the caveat of an apostle ; is beyond the reach of my conjecture . and i am the more confounded when i am told , that this mother of heresie , this vain deceit , is nothing but an endeavour to lessen the imposing authority of a vain-glorious heathen , whom some excellent persons , both fathers and philosophers , have accused , as one impious in manners , and worse in doctrine and belief . a suppressor of the more antient and more valuable wisdom : and one , that from a proud and insolent tassus contemned , and continually quarrel'd with his betters : yea , and who grew so far into this humour and contradiction that he would frequently unsay and contradict his own assertions . one , whose credit grew up in the night of barbarism and ignorance ; and whose principles are repugnant , many of them , to the nature of things , and the fundamentals of faith : i say , that an attempt to redeem the free ▪ born spirits of men , from an unworthy vassallage to so stigmatiz'd an authority , should be to this learned man so criminal and dangerous a business , is , i confess , to me , occasion of some surprise and wonder and if this be the faulty scepticism gassendus , and the author of the vanity of dogmatizing , are accused of ; let those that have a mind to pass their censure , make the worst they can of the imputation . that gassendus was no sceptick in the old and common notion , is apparent from the voluminous pains he hath taken in the building up a body of philosophy upon the principles of democritus and epicurus ; and if he was not so fond of the principles he undertook to illustrate , as to boast their certainty ; proposing them not in a confident and assertive form , but as probabilities and hypotheseis : i see no reason why his modesty should be made his crime , and be so severely animadverted on . nor doth the author of the impugned essay yet see any cause to be ashamed of having followed his example in an affair so innocent ; to say no more on 't . and he cannot yet decern how that discourse could yield an occasion to this learned man of opposing scepticism , which he may lay in the dust without concernment to the vanity of dogmatizing , or it's author : who is no otherwise interested in the paragraphs that follow for the asserting science , and opposition of the scepticks , but only to wish our author his desired success in the undertaking . i am not therefore concerned to take notice of any thing further , till the second section of the fourth action . for though possibly in the intermediate discourse , some things are said , which are not so cogent , and othersome which might appear obnoxious to one that would be quarrelsome ; yet because i wish well to the design , and attend not an assault , but defence , i shall pass all that without any other remarque ; but ; that if this learned gentleman had thought gassendus and my self scepticks in good earnest , his proof which must suppose the certainty of some principles , had been precarious ; or , if not , needless . a. actio quarta . sect. 2. ipsae jam loquantur querelae , illae nempe quibus quatuor a tertio capitula , cumulavit — pag. 51. g. it seems the learned gentleman had a desire to make an occasion to solve the motion of the sea , and magnetick attractions ; since in my discourse i gave him none , having only mention'd them as things i would not insist on , and confest them better accounted for then less acknowledg'd mysteries . whether the reason of these darke phaenomena be well assigned by this philosopher ; i 'le not put my self upon the occasion of inquiring . that they are the certain and infallible causes , i suppose this learned man's modesty will not permit him to affirm ; and if they are but confest probabilities , here 's no opposition to the scepticism of the author ; which allowes ingenious and hopeful conjecture in resolving the appearances of nature : though he fears , few accounts will amount to certainties and demonstrations . so that though for mine own part i acquiesce in the cartesian solution of these magnalia , as an hypothesis that may content one , that is not restlesly and unreasonably inquisitive : yet even in that , when i would look deep , i descern objections which perhaps will very difficulty be satisfied : and which speak those ingenious offers to be but attempts , no absolute performances . and if this acute philosopher think the impulse of the external winds a sufficient cause of the flux and reflux ; i shall not go about to disturbe him in his satisfactions . that will ease one man's mind , that will leave an others restless . only i cannot well apprehend how so constant and regular an effect as the motion of the sea , should depend upon so uncertain and proverbially inconstant a cause as the winds are . or , if there were no difficulty in that , yet the learned author may please to consider , that this is but the next cause of the phaenomenon , the cause of which , perhaps , is more hardly assigneable then the other . and the nature and original of the winds , is , it may be , as abstruse a theory as any in philosophy . for in assigning causes , in the second or third , commonly we are lost and non-plust , which is no inconsiderable evidence of humane ignorance and deficiency . actio quinta . sect. i. a. tertio itaque eloquentissimae dissertationis capite objicit ignorantiam illius rei quae notissima — pag. 57. my learned assailant is now descended to the difficulties g. i propounded , and judge not yet satisfactorily accounted for ; concerning which i affirm not , that they are doubts that cannot possibly be unriddled ; for this were to discourage , and not to awaken inquiry : but that they have not yet been sufficiently explain'd , or explicable by any yet extant hypothesis ; a sad argument of intellectual deficience , that after so much talk and indeavour after science , the whole world should yet be to seek in matters they have the greatest advantages of being acquainted with . i am not therefore an enemy to any essayes can be made towards the explication of the difficulties proposed ; but should heartily embrace any hopeful offers for the clearing of those mysterious theories . so that if this learned man propose any thing that may be probable ; though it come not near the title of certainty or science : i have so great a kindness for ingenuity , and such a desire for the quieting my anxious and inquiring mind , that i shall give it an entertainment not like the usual ones of angry disputants , who cannot endure any thing that proceeds from an antagonist ; but such a one as may evidence , that truth is welcome to me , though it comes in a way of opposition to the petty interest of mine opinions . to the business then , if to suppose the soul a distinct substance from the body and extrinsically advenient , be a great error in philosophy , almost all the world hath hitherto been mistaken : so that if this gentlemans opinion be true , he hath confirm'd the scepticism i endeavor to promote . but if we enquire into the philosophy of the soul , as high as any accounts are given of it , we shall find it's distinction from the body to have been the current belief of all the wiser ages . for , ( 1. ) the highest times of whose doctrines we have any history , believed it's praeexistence , and therefore certainly asserted it's diversity and substantial distinction from the body it informs . of which briefly . we have praeexistence among the chaldean oracles , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and afterwards more clearly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and psellus in his exposition of the chaldean theology , tells us , that according to their doctrine souls descended hither ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and again zoroaster , speaking of souls , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . besides which ( 2. ) trismegistus is express in the assertion of the same doctrine ; of which a testimony or two perhaps will not be impertinent . in his minerva mundi , he brings in god threatning those he had placed in an happy condition of life and enjoyment , with bonds and imprisonment in case of disobedience . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and they transgressing , he adds , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and in another place , assignes this for the cause of their incarceration ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ( 3. ) it was also the opinion of the ancient jews , that souls were first created together , and resided in a place they call golph , a coelestial region . ad therefore 't is said in the mishna , non aderit filius david priusquam exhaustae fuerint universae animae quae sunt in golph . so that they believed all generations on earth to be supplyed from that promptuary and element of soules in heaven ; whence they supposed them to descend by the north-pole , and to ascend by the south . hence the saying of the cabbalists , magnus aquilo scaturigo animarum . and probably that other omne malum nobis ex aquilone . from which tradition 't is likely also homer had this notion , — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ( 4. ) what was the opinion of pythagoras , plato , and the greatest of the greek philosophers in this particular , is notoriously known to all men that know any thing of these matters . and i need no testimonies in so clear a business . it appears then from the allegations i have produced , that the most valuable wisdom of the antient world asserted a doctrine which necessarily inferres and supposeth their opinion of the souls being a distinct substance from the body . which also ( 2 ) must be supposed by all that believe it 's natural immortality . for separability is the greatest argument of real distinction ; especially that , which the schools call mutual . now the souls immortality is a truth that hath had an unanimous reception from the better and wiser world . the aegyptians , chaldaeans , assyrians , indians , jews , greeks , and universally all that ever had a name for wisdom among the antients , believed it . and what hath been the apprehension of latter ages , i need inform no body that is capable of judging in such inquiries . a councel of the church of rome it self hath determin'd it , and recommended it's proof and demonstration to all christian philosophers . but what need of more ? 't is the belief of sir k. digby , and our authors own . and how real separability can consist with identity and indistinction , i know no possibility of apprehending . for that a thing can be separated from it self , can never be believed by any , but those that make a religion of absurdities . ( 3. ) the sacred and mosaical philosophy supposeth the like real distinction ; of which the expression of god's breathing into adams nostrils the breath of life , is sufficient evidence . yea , and all the arguments that are alledg'd to prove it's immediate creation , do strongly conclude it an other substance from the body . yea ( 4 ) aristotle himself affirmes it ; for saith he , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . elsewhere , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and yet more clearly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and once more , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . other testimonies i could bring to like purpose , but these are sufficient to evince that if aristotle be consistent with himself , he believed the real distinction i contend for ; and his peripateticks i 'me sure unanimously affirm it . to all which if i can add sir k. digby's opinion , i shall bid fair for our authors assent to my conclusion , that 't was aristotle's , and the truth . ( 5 ) then , that noble and celebrated friend of our authors , affirmes in his immortality [ that the soul is a substance , and a substance besides the body . ] yea , almost all that discourse of his leans upon that supposal . yea ( 6 ) our philosopher himself in his peripatetical institutions , affirms as much as ever i supposed . for he saith that [ 't is most evident that the mind is something of an other kind from quantity and matter , that 't is noble and wholy opposite to the nature of quantity , that 't is a substantial principle of man , and no mode or determination of divisibility , and that there is nothing common to body and spirit . ] besides which , in the fifth book of the same institutions , he discourses of the souls separation from the body , and asserts it to be evident , that it perisheth not with it ; because it hath actions that belong not to a body , but hath of it self the vertue of a being . and that it's power of existence is not taken away when the body fails , the soul being apart from and besides it . and that matter is not necessary to the souls existence . many other expressions there are in that discourse to like purpose , which seem to speak the souls real distinction from the body in as great variety of phrase as diversity and distinction can be spoken . so that how such passages consist with the doctrine of it's identity with the body , i confess i am not metaphysical enough to comprehend . and i believe very few else can perceive the consistency besides this philosopher ; whose metaphysicks of whole and part , have yet been entertain'd by none that i know of ; and therefore though this should be acknowledged a good account , yet 't is an argument of the weakness of humane understanding that it hath not yet comprehended it . i think by this time 't is clear then , that the supposition of my procedure , the souls distinction from the body , is not peccant ; except all the world , both antient and modern , hath been mistaken , and our author also : which if it be granted , 't is an instance of what i plead for . if not , my supposition is good , and the emergent doubt unanswer'd . and if our learned author yet thinks it plain , that either man is no being , or that the soul and body are not two , i must acknowledge such palams to be the dogmatizing i suppose . and i am willing to put it upon the issue , whether it be so to any body else but this philosopher . but ( 2 ) besides all this , it seems to me very clear from the nature of the things themselves abstracting from authority ; that the soul is a substance distinct from the body . for i think , ( 1 ) 't is strongly concluded by the common arguments that prove it immaterial ; for perception , perception of spirituals , universals and other abstracts from sense , as mathematical lines , points , superficies , congenit notions , logical , metaphysical , and moral ▪ self-reflection , freedom , indifferency and universality of action : these , i say , are properties not at all competible to body or matter , though of never so pure a mixture . nor is it conceiveable how any of these should arise from modificaiions of quantity being of a diverse kind from all the phaenomena of motion but ( 2 ) if the soul be not a distinct substance from the body , 't is then a certain disposition and modification of it ; which this gentteman in the 10 lesson of his institutions seems to intimate , saying , [ that since the soul is a certain affection — which is introduced and expell'd by corporeal action — ] he thence inferrs some thing that is not to our purpose to relate . and if so ▪ since all diversities in matter arise from motion and position of parts , every different preception will require a different order and position of the parts of the matter perceiving , which must be obtained by motion . i demand then , when we pass from one conception to another , is the motion , the cause of this diversity , meerly casual ; or directed by some act of knowledge ? the former , i suppose , no man in his wits will affirm ; since then all our conceptions will be non-sense and confusion ; chance being the cause of nothing that is orderly and regular . if therefore there be a knowledge in us that directs the motions that form every distinct conception : i demand concerning that knowledge , whether it be in like manner directed by some other , or is it the effect of meer casual motions ? if the former , we must run up in infinitum in our inquiry : and the latter admits the alledged absurdities . there is no way then of defending the assertion of the souls being matter , or any modification of it : but by affirming with master hobbs a certain connexion between all our thoughts , and a necessary fate in all things : which who ever affirmes , will find difficulties enough in his assertion to bring him to mine , that there 's a vanity in dogmatizing , and confidence is unreasonable . but of this i have had occasion to discourse more in an other treatise , and i shall not repeat what i have there written , or what others have said on the subject . especially since perhaps this learned gentleman will not think himself concern'd in the proof of this conclusion , he having in his writings asserted it . but whether he have not unsaid it again in this , i appeal to any equal decerner . and that the soul should be a substance of another kind from matter , that hath nothing common with it ; a substance separable from all body , to which matter is not necessary , and actually in the other state divided from it : ( all which and more to like purpose our author hath in some of his books affirmed ; ) and yet not be a distinct substance , but really the same with the body to which it is united ; which he asserts in this ; i say ▪ how these so opposite affirmations can be reconciled , i have either not wit , or not charity enough to help me to imagine . i know this authors doctrine is , that there are no parts before separation and division , and therefore no real distinction . but whether things in their natures so divers as body and spirit , which almost in nothing , even according to this philosophy , communicate ; are not essentially divided , though not locally distant , i am willing to leave to the readers judgment . and i would fain know whereupon the separability of the soul and body is founded , if not upon the real distinction of their natures : so that though this notion may be less obnoxious when it relates only to substances of the same kind , and quality ; yet when it concerns those that are so essentially distinct , as body and spirit , it seems most strangely lyable . yea though it should be supposed a truth , yet it must be acknowledged unconceiveable ; which sufficeth to satisfie my conclusion . a. neque me terret distinctio ( quae pueris philosophiam garrientibus in sacco parata est ) entis perfecti & imperfecti — pag. 58. the distinction of the schools of a being perfect and g. imperfect , is not i think so childish and impertinent as our author would have believed . for though ens imperfectum in the metaphysical sence , be non-sence and a contradiction ; yet in genere physico , as they speak , 't is no absurdity : since a being may want some circumstances of natural compleatness and perfection ; and yet be metaphysically compleat and perfect : so that to affirm the soul an imperfect being nakedly in it self , is to say no more , then that 't was made with a natural aptitude , and congruity to a body by union with which 't is perfected and compleated , being then furnish't with the requisites of its nature ; which in like manner may be said of a body in humane form , viz. that 't is defective and incompleat till it be furnished with the principle of humane actions , for which it was designed . so that there 's no absurdity in affirming , that a thing may be one in a physiological and natural sense ; and two in a metaphysical ; and so out philosopher's inference is no sequel . a. 2. quando itaque petit , unde anima veniat ? reponendum est , an dubitet unde homo veniat ? — pag. 59. g. the foundation of our learned authors answers to the proposed difficulties being overthrown ; and it being made secure enough , that the soul is a distinct substance from the body ; 't is a pertinent and material enquiry to ask , whence the soul is ? and if our philosopher will call this the man according to the maxim , let the question be proposed in his own phrase , and there 's no danger of an absurdity . a. neque majorum quamtumvis reverendorum me quatit authoritas ; non dico illorum qui — pag. 59. g. it seems the learned gentleman would fain reconcile the authority of the church asserting the souls creation to his main conclusion , that 't is no distinct substance from the body ; and to his inference thereupon , that 't is improper and impertinent , to inquire whence it came . but whether what is said be a clear salve or a shuffle , let it be determin'd by any equal judgment . for either by homo quatenus intellectivus , our author means something that is the same with the body ; or really distinct and diverse . if the former , he hath not satisfied the authority of the church , which affirms , the soul as a distinct substance , to be the immediate subject of creation ; founded upon that clear distinction in the inspired writings [ the body to the dust , and the soul to god that gave it . ] but if he mean the latter , he hath not provided for his own assertion and hypothesis . besides ( 2. ) if man as intellective be created , then either he means the whole man , or only that by which he 's intellective ; the former is against all sense and experience . and the latter overthrows all our author's answers , with the proposition upon which they are erected . for if there be some thing in man which is the subject of divine power and action ; and some other thing that is the subject of natural production and generation ; it seems to me apparent that these must be two things really distinguish't . for the same thing cannot be created and naturally produced . for creation supposeth the production of the whole ex nihilo , both sui & subjecti ( as the schools phrase it ) without the co-operation of any thing with the divine superlative power : whereas all generation , according to truth and the same hypothesis , at least supposeth one of them , and is perform'd by natural agents . and i think the case is plain enough when 't is brought to this , whether the same thing can be produced of something and nothing , with created assistance , and without it ? since the actions then are so infinitely diverse , i think i shall not be reprehensibly dogmatical , in affirming the terms distinct . what the gentleman says more , seems to be involv'd , and looks like a designed evasion . and if [ one action produceth a man , a creature equivalent to a beast and angel ] i demand , whether this one action be divine or natural , from god or the generant ? if the former , every man is as immediately created as the first . and the latter quite excludes crea ion , and supposeth god no otherwise to act in giving being to our souls , then in each common production . 't is necessary therefore that the terms produced be distinct , when the actions whereby they are produced are so vastly diverse ; and that the soul have an origination different from the formation of the body , of which 't is more pertinent to inquire , then easie to return an answer . 3. ex hâc veritate derivamur ad sequentes duos a. nodos patentissimè solvendos . — pag. 60. in this and the following paragraphs our author supposeth g. his doctrin of the identity of the soul and body for an answer ; and i think after what hath been said , i have as good reason to suppose mine of the diversity for a reply . but how the definition of a part enervates my enquiry , i cannot imagine , since if [ parts are , out of which by composition are made one ] and the body and soul be supposed parts of the man ( which may well enough be allowed upon the account of what hath been said ) i see not but why we may inquire , how these parts , whose natures are so different , can be compounded and united . a. currit idem error in sequenti difficultate , quae luget nesciri quomodo anima moveat corpus , — pag. 61. g. whether my supposal be an error , we have seen already ; if it be not , our philosophers answer is so . and whither the implyed assertion that the soul moves not the body be not one , i appeal to any man , that understands he hath any claim to such a being . for though many of our actions , and possibly more then are suspected , may be allowed to be meer mechanick motions ; yet the experience of all the world attests , that our wills determine and excite not a few of our corporeal motions . what else means the distinction of the schools of actions imperate and elicit ? and how is it that we can speak and move at pleasure , and in spight of all corporeal impulse , desist from external action ! and if man be a meer mechanicks engine , farewel free-will , virtue , vice , laws , religion , rewards and punishments . a clock were as capable of these , according to our philosopher's hypothesis , as an humane automaton . a. vere enim unum membrum animatum movet aliud , sed non aliqua substantia quae sit pura anima — pag. 61. ▪ t is true , one animate member moves another , but the g. motion must somewhere begin . and though those which are purely corporeal in us are excited by material agents ; yet others we find , which derive from an higher principle , viz. a free and unconstrained will. and it seem strange to me that men should be so much in love with their private speculations , as for their sakes to confront their own , and all the worlds experience . what follows , no body that i know , affirms , viz. [ that a substance which is a pure soul moves a member wherein there is none ] . but to what concerns other animals , the learned author knows , that the platonists assign them souls independent on their bodies ; and the peripateticks , substantial forms distinct from matter , which are the source and principle of their actions . so that according to either of these hypotheseis , the question may as pertinently be proposed concerning their kind , as our own , and will be as difficultly answered . indeed the excellent monsieur des-cartes , and his followers that affirm , all bruit actions to be mechanical , are not concern'd in the inquiry . and if this be the belief of our philosopher , i 'le not indeavour to disturb his hypothesis . only this i 'le add to our purpose , that though we suppose the actions of beasts to be fatal and material , yet there 's no reason to infer the same of ours , since we feel it otherwise . and 't is no very reasonable method of arguing , to conclude from an opinion of things we can but conjecture , to the denyal of things we certainly feel , and know . so that though , as our author insinuates , there may perhaps be no kind of corporeal actions in our selves , which are not in bruits ; yet 't is not therefore necessary to inferr , that they proceed from a like principle in both : much less that we should conclude , that none of our own actions are begun by a principle distinct from the body and immaterial ; because we believe that theirs are not so . on the other side methinks the argument will be stronger to inferr , that because we feel a substance distinct from matter to be the cause of some of our motions ; that therefore there may likely be an incorporeal substance that is the principle and spring of some of theirs : and 't is better to conclude from certainty to conjecture , then from conjecture against certainty . a. 4. ultimae , quas in hoc capitulo plangit , tenebrae collocatae sunt in ignorantiâ illius motus , — pag. 62. g. the difficulties about the direction of the spirits concern not only man , but all other animals , supposing them to do any thing by a principle of knowledge and animadversion . or , though we judge all their actions m chanical , yet the account will be more difficultly rendred that way , then by supposing them to act by an animadversive principle . for how such an infinite variety of motions should be regularly menaged , and conducted in such a wilderness of passages and distinct avennues by meer blind impellents and material conveyances , i have not the least shadow of conjecture . and though des-cartes hath made the best attempts in this kind of any hath yet appear'd in the theory , yet there are mechanical difficulties in the way of his solutions , which perhaps will never be well satisfied . but our philosopher confesseth here the defect of his anatomy ; and though he thinks himself secure of the general cause , yet the particular direction he acknowledges wonderful , and not yet sufficiently discover'd . verùm author casum proprium homini constituere videtur , a. ostentans voluntatem & fortassis — pag. 63. to prove that the will is not alwayes moved by some g. precedent passion , and consequently that the soul is the immediate principle of some of our actions , i make this double offer : ( 1. ) 't is clear from experience , that , though many of our volitions are motions from the passion , yet some of our determinations are from the understanding and immaterial faculties . and sometimes we set our wills to determine in things that are purely indifferent , to make tryal of our liberty ; when we find not the least provocation or incitement to the action from any emotion of the body . and indeed to suppose every action of the will to depend upon a previous appetite or passion , is to destroy our liberty , and to inferr a stoical fatality with all the dangerous consequences of that doctrine ▪ ( 2. ) our author's proof that there is no dispassionate volition , is an insinuation , that there is no knowledge without an impulse from the phantasms ; a conclusion which may be easily disproved , by those highly abstract speculations which the mind of man sometimes entertains it self with , when it puts off all the cloathing of the imagination , and raiseth it self to a temper for those noble enquiries about god and immaterials : and if there be no intellect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as aristotle speaks , for ought i know , we lose one of our chiefest arguments for our immortality : besides which , i suppose our learned author will not think it for his credit , to be told , that he is in the very rode of the hobbian hypothesis ; which will clearly enough appear , if we consider these his assertions ; [ that the soul is no distinct substance from the body , that it contributes nothing towards its motion ; that our wills are moved by precedent or present passion , which doubtless is excited by something that is not in our power ; that all our intellections are from phantasms , and consequently , nothing else but elevated sense , and that all both natural and free actions are performed by motions deriv'd from the heart ] i say , who ever considers , how these symbolize , yea , and are one with the main principles of that irreligious philosophy , must without an excess of charity , suppose our philosopher to have shaken hands with the leviathan . briefly then , 't is confest , that the mechanical way of conveyance and direction of the spirits in animal performances is yet undiscover'd , and that the channels and particular passages of mechanical motions ( which all ours are supposed to be ) is yet occult and manifest . and though this gentleman affirms , the heart to be the fountain of animate operations , yet 't is but an unapproved presumption ; and the greatest master of mechanicks that ever was , the illustrious des-cartes has deriv'd all these motions from the brain , in which he 's follow'd by the greatest part of profoundest speculators ; so that it seems we are not certain of the first spring of the motions we enquire of ; much less can we certainly determin the minutes and particularities of direction : and if any of our actions are deriv'd from our souls , which our author seems unwilling to hear of , though i think i have made it sufficiently evident , the difficulties i urg'd upon that supposal have not had the least offer towards solution . a. 5. caput quartum sensationis & memoriae inexplicabiles esse naturas objicit . — pag. 64. i am no further concern'd in the beginning of this section , g. then to mind this learned gentleman how different his apprehension of des-cartes his hypothesis of the manner of sense , is , from that of his ingenuous and applauded friend sir k. digby ; who calls not his opinion a fanstatical conjecture , but thus prefaces to the recital of his hypothesis . [ monsieur des-cartes , ( who by his great and heroick attempts , and by shewing mankind how to steer and husband theit reason to the best advantage , hath left us no excuse of being ignorant of any thing that is worth the knowing ) explicating the nature of sense — and then goes on to declare his opinion of this matter , which he concludes with this character ; of a colour very diverse from our author 's [ this then is the sum of monsieur des-cartes's opinion , which he hath very finely exprest with all the advantages that opposite examples , significant words and clear method , can give unto a witty discourse ; which yet , is but a part of the commendations he deserveth , for what he hath done on this particular : he is over and above all this , the first i ever met with who hath published any conceptions of this nature , whereby to make the operations of sense intelligible , certainly , this praise will ever belong unto him that he hath given the first hint of speaking groundedly , and to the purpose upon this subject ; and whosoever shall carry it any further ( as what important mystery was ever born and perfected at one ? ) must acknowledge to have deriv'd his light from him . ] this is the censure that excellent person gives of des-cartes , and his opinion , which his dear friend our author , hath with so much severity reflected on . and the learned knight professeth himself of des-cartes's mind in all the other circumstances of this hypothesis , except the subject of this motion . so that i wonder that our philosopher should so far forget himself , as to put such a slurre upon the judgment of his admired friend , by speaking so contemptuously of a notion that learned man had so much , and so deservedly , applauded . what follows is already answer'd . a. sed nè nihil novi dicat , calumniatur sensu solo non posse agnosci quantitates rerum , distantias , — pag. 65. g. our author in this period , wonders at my assertion , and i wonder as much at his wonder ; which is not occasioned by any affirmation of mine , but by a mistake of his own : for my doubt ( as plain as i could express it ) is , how , since there is nothing in the brain , the seat of sense , to represent external objects but motion , ( for which i have the suffrage of his noble friend , whose method he professeth to follow ) how , i say , we should by that know figures , distances , magnitudes , and colours , things of another kind from motion ; which therefore cannot represent them , but by some knowledge in the soul , which we are not aware of ; and how the scant and narrow images in the brain should notifie the vastest objects , in their large dimensions , without some secret inference and geometry in the soul , is unconceiveable : but what this knowledge is , we know not . this is the sense of the difficulty propos'd , which , how it is explicated by the optical demonstrations the gentleman talks of , the opticks of my understanding cannot discover . for the rest i dare venture it without an answer . 6. proximus in memoriam labor expenditur . illius a. explanationem ut impossibilem declaret , — pag. 66. 7. imprimis , decîdi à moventibus sensum quasdam exuvias & corporis delibamenta , quoad tactum , — pag 68. i take not upon me to determin of possibilities ; and therefore g. from the present ignorance of the nature of memory i infer not , that it will never be explained hereafter : only i affirm , that no hypothesis extant hath yet made it manifest ; which is sufficient for my conclusion of the present narrowness of our knowledge , though not of my assailants of the impossibility of enlarging it . but our philosopher thinketh the nature of memory sufficiently explained already , and the account he gives is that of sir k. digby , which was one of the four that i examin'd in the discourse impugn'd . this is the hypothesis which our author hath adopted , and undertook the defence of ; with what success , we shall discover when we have examin'd the answer he makes to my impugnations . which after a large recital of the hypothesis he descends to in the ninth section . 9. attamen , perturbat novum naturae miratorem a. multitudo objectorum cavis cerebri — pag. 72. the difficulty i urg'd against the digbaean account of g. the memory , was , that 't is inconceiveable how those active particles , which are the images and representations of things remembred , should keep their distinct and orderly situations without confusion or dissipation in a substance wherein there is continual motion ? to which the learned gentleman returns ; that 't is as conceivable as how the rays of light should come in a direct line to the eye ; or how the atomical effluvia that continually flow from all bodies , especially the magnetical and sympathetick , should find their way to the place they tend to . to this i rejoyn briefly , ( 1 ) what the gentleman himself suggests , were answer sufficient , that the multiplying of difficulty doth not solve it : for supposing the direction of the corpuscles of light , and those mention'd effluvia , to be of a difficult apprehension , as the continuance and regularity of those images in the brain : yet this only argues another defect in our knowledge , and so is a new evidence of the truth of my general conclusion . but ( 2 ) the proposed instances are far more accountable then this before us . for , as to what concerns the light , supposing with des cartes ( as is most probable ) that the action of light consists in nothing but the conamen of the aethereal matter , receding from the centre of its motion : the direct tendency of it to the eye , is no difficulty worth considering , but as clear as the light it self the subject of the enquiry ; or , if the rays be atomical streams , and effluxes of the sun , there is no more difficulty in this hypothesis neither , then in the direct spouting of water out of a pipe ; yea no more , then in the beating of the waves against the sides of a ship , when it swims in the ocean . for there 's an whole sea of atomes which derive from the fountain illuminant , whose course can no more be diverted , by those little bodies that swim up and down in the air ; then that of the ocean can by those sands , pebles , fishes , and rocks , that are mingled with the waters . and as for the other instances of corporeal emissions , it would require to be prov'd that they perform all those feats that are ascrib'd to them : whereas perhaps it is more likely , that those strange operations are not mechanical but magical , being effected by the continuity of the great spirit of nature , which runs through all things : or however , to suppose this act of the memory to be as clear as magnetisme and sympathies , will be no great advantage to the belief of its certain intelligibility . at ego ipsum sic nodum scindo . in majoribus ubi facilior a. est experiendi facultas , palàm est multa — pag. 73. that what our author has answer'd in this period , g. should resolve the difficulty , is to me as great a wonder , as the mystery we are discoursing of . and if the knot be cut , 't is certainly by some occult and sympathetick instrument , for the gross of his answer comes not near it . the difficulty was ; how the images of such an infinite of objects , as we remember , should be kept distinct without confusion , be brought forth when we have occasion , and remanded back again into their own cells when they have done the errant they were sent for . to which our author saith no more , but to this purpose ( if i understand him ) that if the object stays not on the sense , it makes not impression enough to be remembred , but if it be repeated there , it leaves plenty enough of those images behind it to confirm and strengthen the knowledge of the object : in which radicated knowledge , if the memory consist , there would be no need of reserving those atomes in the brain , or calling them forth upon occasion , as the hypothesis supposeth ; or , if there be , the difficulty is untouched . besides all which , i might adde , that if these material images are a sufficient account of the memory , how will our remembrance of distances , magnitudes , relations , words , metaphysical notions , and those of immaterials , which leave no such idola , in the brain , be accounted for ? let this gentleman tell me how — et erit mihi magnus — a. 10. palàm est me in hâc responsione digbaeanam methodum caeteris praetulisse . ipsius enim — pag. 74. g. if i am mistaken in the opinion of aristotle in this matter , ( 1. ) i err with the great body of his commentators and followers ; yea , and all the schools in christendom , who unanimously concurr in the assignment of the doctrine of intentional species to their master aristotle ; so that if all the peripateticks hitherto have been so grossly out in imposing an opinion he never taught upon their ador'd philosopher , for ought i know , there is no such thing as the aristotelean philosophy in the universities of europe : for the taking in , or denying these intentional species will make material and mighty alterations in the whole frame of the hypothesis ; and i see not how the denial of them is consistent with the aristotelean doctrine of qualities and forms . but ( 2. ) if aristotle taught the digbaean philosophy , as our author sayes , he taught the atomical , which is notoriously known to have been the way of democritus and epicurus , which aristotle frequently and professedly opposeth . that democritus taught the atomical hypothesis , we have the affirmative of aristotle to justifie , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( speaking of leucippus and democritus ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and neerer to our purpose , that these solved the way of sensation , by material images , we have from plutarch ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . this hypothesis aristotle endeavours to confute ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sayes he , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . aristotle then thought the doctrine of sensation by corporeal images absurd in democritus and epicurus ; and therefore certainly would not himself affirm it ; as he must do on the supposal of his having taught the same hypothesis with sir k. digby about the memory , which is exactly the same with that of these sages : for that learned knight affirms , sensation to be perform'd [ by driving of solid material bodies , exceeding little ones , that come from the objects themselves , ( they are his own words ) against that part of the brain where knowledge resideth , which same bodies rebounding thence into certain cells of the brain , perform the offices of the memory ] as he has largely discourst upon the subject . sir k. digby then proceeds in the corpuscularian method which aristotle opposeth , and particularly in the business of sensation ; and consequently cannot be of his belief in his hypothesis of the memory , which the learned knight gives account of by the same material idola , which aristotle laught at . and doubtless the memory is excited to action by the like instruments as are the external senses , consonantly to that of plato in his phaedo , speaking of the senses , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and aristotle himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . i think 't is clear then that aristotle's doctrine of the memory is not the same with sir k. digby's . and if i have been out in intitling the opinion of intentional species to aristotle , my mistake is the more venial , because the whole army of his most devoted sectators are deceived with me . but our author is more reprehensible in his mistake , if it be one ; because he 's alone in his opinion . and an error hath by so much the more of guilt , as it hath of singularity and self-assurance . but whether this were aristotle's doctrine or not , i think 't is not very material , since i make this none of the charges against him . if it be not his , 't is the general opinion of his schools ; and i have proved it an insufficient account of the faculty we are discoursing of . actio sexta . a. 1. capite quinto formationis corporum naturalium , viventium praesertim , obscuritatem intentat : — pag. 76. g. two methods it seems our philosopher proposeth , for the giving an account of the formation of animals ; neither of which seems to me a sufficient solution of the doubt attempted . for first , he that supposeth all the vastly differing parts of a worm or insect to be actually contain'd , though in myriate and indivisible proportions , in a drop of dew out of which they are sometimes generated , believes gratis , without any ground of his supposal ; and therefore will be very bold to assert this the certain account of the phaenomenon . ( 2. ) if the seed contain , though invisibly , all the parts of the animal ; then either in the same site , and position , that they are found in in the compleated body ; or they lie there in a confused huddle and mixture ; the former , is contrary to all experience , which assures us , that the immediate matter of all generations is a certain fluid , and , as far as can be discern'd , an homogeneous substance . now fluidity consisting in the motion of the parts of the fluid body , as is testified by experience and the best philosophy , the seminal parts can be of no setled form or consistence . and if the second be supposed , which doubtless is the truth , the difficulty under debate will be unanswer'd , ( viz. ) how such an infinite of distinct parts should be brought into their regular and orderly positions without the guidance and conduct of some knowing agent ; to fly to a first cause is unphilosophical ; and he that pretends a second , let him shew it . and fortuitously it cannot be : for chance is the cause of no constant and regular effect ; and to suppose an undirected motion to shuffle these fluid parts into the wonderful and exact form of an animal , or any other regular body ; is as likely , as that the divided letters of an alphabet should be accidentally jumbled into an elegant and polite discourse ; which when once i see effected , i 'le believe , that there wants nothing to the formation of the world and all bodies therein , but matter and motion . some intelligent principle then must be suppos'd to guide these elementary parts into their orderly situations . but what that is , who is 't will determine ? ( 2. ) the second account also is too general , and flies very wide of my particular enquiry . for my quaery is concerning the principle of the conduct of the parts of the various matter in those rare and methodical composures ; and our philosopher's answer concerns only the gross and material parts of the composition . and therefore little can be collected from the chymical processes he speaks of , for our purpose ; and the elementary solutions mention'd , signifie nothing towards the accounting for the unerring exactness we find in animal formations . for all these being suppos'd , the matter is in the same circumstances of difficulty as before ; and this gentleman's solution seems to me to signifie no more , then if a man should answer to one that that desires an account of the art and method of the motions of a watch , or any other ingenious automaton ; that they are perform'd by steel , iron , brass , or silver , wherein the matter indeed of the work is declar'd , but not the artifice . and in the case before us , i inquire of the principle of direction of those intricate and methodical motions , and am answer'd with an account of the gross and material ingredients . nor is what follows of any whit more avail to the solution pretended ; for let the matter resolve into parts dry , subtle , and liquid ▪ let the dryer dispose themselves into divers figures , and constitute what vessels our philosopher is pleas'd to fancy ; yet how from hence forward the infinite variety of the parts of an animal will result , will require something more to help us to conjecture . a. 2. haec qui mente comprehenderit , non plorabit plasticam vanum nomen esse & vocem sine re . — pag. 78. g. though by a close and recondite search into the seminalities of plants , and vegetables , the future processes may be judg'd , as our philosopher assures us ; yet this only argues , that the grown parts were all contain'd pack't up in their seeds and berries ; so that in the growth and progress nature did only display and unfold , what before was in the minute proportions more closely laid together ; supposing which , the main doubt still remains unsatisfied , viz. how these smaller seminal parts were so order'd , and framed ? and this brachygraphy of nature cannot be thought less difficult then it 's text. and , secondly , what relates to animals we have seen already ; for 't is not likely , that the formed parts were ever actually contain'd in the seed , out of which they were produced . neque quemquam terreant artificum dicta , admirantium a. ea quorum causas non intelligunt , — pag. 79. i might well wonder at the specifical uniformity of things , if g. unguided matter were the only principle of their formation , against which hypothesis this doubt was raised ; and the variation from the kind which happens in some regions , would not be so observable , as an identity in any . 3. eodem capitulo duas alias quaestiones movet quas a. absolutè inexplicabiles putat ; mihi contra — pag. 80. if the doubts i propose of the union of the parts , and composition g. of quantity , contain scarce any difficulty at all ; our philosopher is more lucky in his enquiries , then others that have dealt in those theories ; most men confessing the perplexity of the mention'd phaenomena , especially of the latter . and the vast diversity of philosophers about it , testifies , that the speculation of them is not of so facile an explication . and 't is strange that the ancients should keep such ado about an easie probleme , and the moderns despair of a solution , so pretendedly obvious . i will not differ with the learned gentleman about the order of the questions , and grant , that they both suppose actual parts in quantity ; which because our author denies , & makes this the foundation of his answer to these , and some of my former propos'd difficulties , i must be fain to prove it ; which i attempt ( 1. ) by giving some evidence of my affirmative , and ( 2. ) by shewing the weakness and insufficiency of the grounds of the contrary assertion . for the first then , that there are actual parts in quantity , i evince it by these considerations . ( 1. ) the formal nature of quantity is extension in the notion of aristotle's schools ; and divisibility in the philosophy of sir kenelm digby , and our authour ; both which suppose parts , and parts actual : for to be extended , in the school phrase , is to have partes extrapartes ; and if the extension be actual , the parts must be so : for it is not conceiveable how a thing can be extended , but by parts which are really distinct one from another , though not separate : which seems to me so evident , that nothing can be spoken plainer ; and i appeal in this matter to the common sense of all men . nor can a thing be divided , except we suppose the parts praeexistent in the divisible : for divisibility is founded upon real distinction , and 't is impossible to divide what is one without diversity . ( 2. ) except there are parts in quantity before division , there are none at all : for after they are divided they are no parts , but have a compleatness and integrality of their own , especially if the subject were homogeneous . ( 3. ) except there are parts actually in quantity , contradictions may be verified de eodem , with all the other circumstances , which the metaphysicks teach impossible . for the same body may be black and white , cold and hot , seen and not seen , and partake of all other most contrary qualities . which contradictions , and inconsistences cannot be accommodated in the same subject , without supposal of the contended-for diversity . nor will the answer , which sir k. digby has provided for such objections help the hypothesis , viz. [ that it is not one part of the thing that shews it self , and another that doth not , one that is hot , and another cold , &c. but it is the same thing , shewing it self according to one possibility of division , and not another . ] for first , these distinct possibilities are founded upon distinct actualities , which are the parts i would have acknowledged . and such a capacity of receiving things so different , cannot be in the same subject , without the supposal of parts actually distinct and divers . ( 2. ) the subjects of these contrary qualities are things actual : whereas possibilities are but metaphysical notions . and these subjects are distinct , or contradictions will be reconcil'd de eodem ; from which the inference seems necessary , that quantity hath parts , and parts actual , and distinct possibilities will not salve the business . and ( 3. ) why must the common speech of all mankinde be alter'd , and what all the world cals parts , be call'd possibilities of division ? which yet if our philosopher will needs name so , they being acknowledg'd distinct , and prov'd actual , or at least founded immediately upon things that are so ; my question will as well proceed this way as in the common one , viz. how the things that answer to these distinct possibilities are united , and of what compounded ? there is another answer which i find in our authors peripatetical institutions , the sum of which is , [ that the contradictions have only a notional repugnance in the subject as 't is in our understandings : and since the parts have a distinct being in our understanding , from thence 't is that they are capable to sustain contradictions ] which answer , if i understand , i have reason to wonder at : for certainly the subject sustains the contradictories as it is in re . and , i never heard of a notion black or white , but in a metaphor ; 't is the real substance is the subject of these contrarieties ; which were impossible , if it had not divers realities answering to the qualities so denominating . and therefore 't is not the understanding that makes the divers subjects of these accidents , as our author suggests : but there being such is the ground that we so apprehend them . i hope i need say no more then to establish the supposal of the difficulty under consideration , that there are parts actually in quantity : only i am obliged by my proposed method to add further , ( 2. ) that the grounds of the excellent sir k. digby , and our author , on which they built their asserted paradox , seem to me very insufficient to sustain so great a weight as leans upon them . the reasons are ( 1. ) quantity is divisibility . ( 2. ) divisibility is capacity of division . ( 3 ) what is only capable of division , is not actually divided . ( 4. ) quantity is not actually divided , and therefore hath no parts actually , to which in short , ( 1. ) that quantity is divisibility , is presumed ; but extension is before it , in nature , and our conception , and is the received notion , though perhaps impenetrability is the truest . however ( 2. ) even this supposeth parts , and those actual : for division is but solution of union . and union supposeth parts to be united . ( 3. ) what is only capable of division in a physiological and mechanical lense ; may , yea and ought , to be divided in a metaphysical . that is , they ought to be divers in their being , before they can be separate and distinct in their material bulk and quantity . for separability must presuppose diversity . ( 4. ) though quantity be not actually divided in one sense , 't is in another : every part having a distinct place and being of its own , though it doth not yet enjoy it separately and apart from others . but ( 2. ) it is pleaded against actual parts in quantity , that if we admit them , we cannot stop till we come down to indivisibles ; of which to suppose quantity composed , is said to be absurd and impossible . in return to which , i grant the inference , and have acknowledged the hypothesis of indivisibles to be full of seeming inconsistencies ; as is the other also : and therefore reckon both among the unconceiveables ; of which there can be no greater argument then their having driven so great and sagacious wits upon such an assertion , ( to which out of reverence to these celebrated persons , i shall not affix an epithete ) against the evidence of our senses , and the apprehension of all the world : that there are no parts in quantity . but ( 2. ) 't is no good method of reasoning , to deny what is plain and obvious , because we cannot conceive what is abstruse and difficult . and i think the assertor cannot answer it to his severer faculties , who affirms , there are no parts actually in quantity , against all his senses and the universal suffrage of mankinde ; because he cannot untie the difficulties that emerge from the supposal , that bodies are compounded of indivisibles ; a nice and in tricate theory . yea how will our author answer for the assertion to his master aristotle ? who saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . argumenta asserentium partes actu vel sensum a. citant , de quo nihil certius est quàm — pag. 81. i believe the assertors of actual parts may well appeal g. to the senses , notwithstanding what our author , and the learned knight have alledg'd to invalidate their evidence . for what though the sense discovers not the distinct term of the hand or finger ; can it not therefore discern them to be distant and distinguish't from the foot and toes ? and is not this enough to ground the belief of their diversity ? cannot we distinguish the motions of our parts ; though we know not their first springs and exact beginnings ? or discern a difference between the apple and the twig it grows on ; except we could see the point where one begins and the other endeth ? and whether an hypothesis is like to stand , that is put to such poor shifts to defend it self against the grossest of our faculties , i leave to be conjectured ? the supposition then of my doubts , being thus asserted and prov'd , we see yet but small hope to expect their solution . or , if this be an aenswer , t' is an evidence of our intellectual weakness , that all the world hath all this while been confounded about a plain problem upon a false supposal . the answer to my other difficulty about the union of the parts of quantity , is grounded also upon the presumption that there are actually none ; which i think i have sufficiently disprov'd . a. 5. caput sextum totum motui rotarum dedicatum est , neque si credimus authori de cujus — pag. 83. g. i conclude not only that no part can move , but the whole must ; but also that in the circular motion of a wheel , it seems that the motion of every part must be praerequired to it self , which i think is clear enough in the inference , though the proposition inferred , be impossible and absurd . and what inconvenience there is in this conclusion , that all the parts change their place at once , i have made sufficiently evident , in the place where the difficulty is urged . i confess in our authors hypothesis that there are actually no parts in bodies , the doubt is none ; and the whole matter will pass into words and air : but supposing that in quantity there are distinct realities , i think 't will be hard to dis-incumber this trite phaenomenon from the perplexities i mention'd . a. subjungit author secundam difficultatem , quomodo in rotâ circumvolutâ viciniores centro partes — pag. 84. g. i say again , however we find it in the event , while yet we consider the remote parts , moving swifter then the central ones , in the speculative notion , 't is hard to conceive , but that the line drawn from the centre to the circumference , should be inflected ; since one point of the line rests while the other moves , which in the theory seems to argue a disunion , and consequently an incurvation . so that though it be true in the experiment and event , yea and while we look upon the reason of the thing , in one position ; that the line would be made crooked , were it not for the unequal velocity of the parts ; yet it appears as clear to reason , in another posture , that this inequality should inferre it . for if b move swifter then a. a rests some instant while b is in motion . there 's no motion , but where there 's change of place , viz. of that place , in respect of which the body is said to move : the place in respect of which the body is said to move , is the next superficies that is considered as quiescen ' . and consequently it seems if b move any instant , in which a doth not : it is proportionably to its motion remov'd from that of a to which it was adjacent , and by consequence one would expect it should be disjoyn'd , or inflected . 6. jactatum tandem experimentum capite alto ingreditur a. author ille , prefatus audentisseme — pag. 85. since the publishing my discourse ; i have met an ingenious g. account , among some excellent geometricians of this probleme , which perhaps may satisfie the difficulty . the account briefly is , that in volutation the whole circumference moves by a motion both progressive and circular : but the centre by the progressive only . and consequently by how much the nearer the parts are to the centre the more they have of the progressive motion , and the less of circulation . so that the little wheel in our experiment draws , and hath so much more progression then the greater , as makes amends for it's defect of parts . which solution i 'le acknowledge perfect , if two things answer experiment , which i have not yet had occasion to make tryal of ; viz. ( 1. ) supposing both wheels to be denticulated , the little wheel will with it's teeth describe lines ; and the great one with it's make points . and ( 2. ) the disproportion being augmented , suppose to an hundred to one , the drawing of the lesser wheel will be exceeding palpable , and discoverable by the dullest sense . i say , if these circumstances answer experiment ; this difficulty is for ought i know well accounted for . and i need add no more to this confession : for our authors answer is either materially the same with this , or much less to purpose . actio septima . a. 1. in sequentibus aliquot capitulis satis exquisitè investigat causas errorum & ignorantiae — pag. 90. g. that the present age abounds with pratling ignorance , and vain shews of science falsly so called , will not be denyed by one , who hath directed some indeavours against them . and did i not deeply apprehend how much bold affirmers , and lazy inquisitors have prejudiced the advance of true and substantial knowledge , i had never engaged against dogmatizing and peripatetick philosophy . i wonder therefore that my learned assailant should object my omission of these causes of ignorance , which had the greatest interest in drawing from me the discourse he opposeth ; in which , i have largely insisted on those reasons of the defect of knowledge , viz. the depth of truth , the praecipitancy of mens understandings , and aversness to deep search , and close engagement of their mindes . besides which , i have professedly attacqued the disputing way of inquiry , and the verbal emptiness of the philosophy of the schools ; which how guilty it is of laying a foundation for sloath and loquacity , is particularly made appear in the discourse i directed against it . and while the schools of learning are under the regency of that kind of spirit , i fear little is to be expected from philosophy but bold talk ; and endless disputes and quarrels . for what else can be the fruit of a philosophy made up of occult qualities , sympathies , entelechia's , elements , celestial influences , and abundance other hard words and lazy generalities , but an arrest of all ingenious and practical indeavour ; and a wilderness of opinions instead of certainty and science ? but thanks be to providence , the world begins to emerge from this state of things , and to imploy it self in more deep and concerning disquisitions ; the issue of which , we hope , will be a philosophy fruitful in works , not in words , and such as may accommodate the use of life , both natural and moral . testis mihi esto author qui sub finem prioris capitis a. conqueritur de obscuritate speculationum , — pag 90. how justly the author is made an instance and witness g. of that , which , in the very discourse , by which only , i suppose , he is known to our philosopher , he hath so earnestly witnest against , which his spirit is so averse unto , which gave the occasion of the dispute between us ; i say , with what justice i am made an instance of that i have so professedly opposed , let it be judg'd by any , that is not unreasonably partial . 't is true , i complain of the obscurity of motion , gravity , light , colours , vision , and sounds ; and yet am not ignorant of the accounts sir k. digby , and other philosophers both antient and modern , have given of these phaenomena . my mind is anxious in speculation , and hath engag'd me to look as far , as my capacity could reach , into these theories ; i could never content my self with superficial put ▪ offs ; nor am i apt immediately to dispair , if i find not present satisfaction in my first enquiries . i have with my best diligence examined the most hopeful accounts are extant of these appearances , and yet must profess , that though the first sight of their respective solutions is pleasant and encouraging , and seems to promise my mind a requiem ; yet the longer i view the most likely of these hypotheses , the more liable and obnoxious i apprehend them . like pictures they will not bear to be look't upon , but at a distance , and when i come neer , i easily detect their imperfections . so that deep search discovers more ignorance , then it cures ; and confidence of science seems to be built upon a slight and superficial view of things ; as aristotle himself hath somewhere observed , and every one else may , that will but take notice , that young talking sophisters use to be far more assured of their assertions , then the deepest and most exercis'd philosophers . i 'le not disparage the account given by the learned sir k. digby of the mention'd phaenomena ; they are to be acknowledg'd pretty , and ingenious : but yet i cannot think , that 't is an argument of shallowness and impatience in enquiry , not fully to acquiesce in his hypotheses as infallible solutions . i suppose , that ingenious philosopher's own modesty and justice will not suffer him to own such a fondness for his notions , which i know he proposeth , but as likely and convenient supposals . i confess the most satisfaction . i any where meet with , is in the accounts of des-cartes , to whom sir k. digby himself bears this testimony , [ that he hath shown the world the way to science , ] and yet that great man , the excellence of whose philosophick genius and performances , the most improv'd spirits acknowledge , propounds his principles but in the modest way of hypotheses , and pretends not to have explain'd things as they are , but as they may be . and i believe our author will not reckon , him among the slight and talkative philosophers ; which is so far from being true , that such as love only to skim things , and have not the patience to keep their minds to a deep and close attention , cannot with any face as much as pretend acquaintance with his principles ; the comprehension of which , will require the most severe meditation , and fix't engagement of the mind , of any philosophy that is intelligible . not , that this excellent person affects obscurity either in matter , style , or method , being indeed very perspicuous in all of them : but because , his way is unusual , and his principles so coherent and closely pack't together , that the letting fall any link of connexion , will spoil the dependance , and hinder the understanding of the sequel . but i return from this excursion . if all then must be accounted impatient and shallow philosophers , who acquiesce not in the digbaean hypotheses ; all the learned cartesians , platonists , the whole stock of the ingenious recent philosophers ; yea and all , that follow not the way of sir k. digby , must unavoidably fall under the shame of these appellatives ; and perhaps that great person himself , who i dare say thinks not the light his philosophy hath afforded these perplexing speculations , to be so clear , as to admit of no shadow or obscurity . what ever haste therefore those discover , that will not be fully contented with the principles in which our philosopher is so well satisfied , i am confident that a little reflection will inform him , that he hath betrayed some , in his censure . a. 2. altera ab authore nostro neglecta ignorantiae causa mihi apparet esse quidam specialis — pag. 91. g. if any are so weak to affirm nothing can be demonstrated , against which any thing is , or can be objected ; let them answer for their assertion , i am not to account for the mistakes of others : and if there are those who will not admit of certainty or evidence in a conclusion that any hath made a doubt of , as our author intimates in the following paragraph , i have as little to answer for their scepticism and incredulity . for i never expect to see the world agree in any thing ; and therefore i assent where i see cause , and proportion the degree of my belief to that i have of evidence , without expecting the hopeless encouragement of a universal suffrage . though i confess , where deep and enquiring spirits differ , i judge i have reason to be cautious , and to suspect uncertainty . our author concludes with a reprehension of those endless talkers , the modern peripateticks , and their voluminous trifles , in which i dissent not from him : but pass from them to their master aristotle , whom our philosopher undertakes to vindicate from my reflections ; with what success , will be the subject of our next enquiry . actio octava . 1. et jam defunctus labore imperato videor , nisi a. summâ cum invidiâ aristotelem omnibus — pag. 95. our author in this paragraph is of a very different g. apprehension from all other aristotelians , if we 'l believe patritius , who saith , tritum vero jam est ac emnium aristotelicorum assensu comprobatum , nullam esse in aristotelicis libris scientificam demonstrationem . our philosopher then denies all science among the other antients , and the rest of the aristotelians allow none in aristotle . and if either be true , or both , 't is an evidence against dogmatizing , and fond doating upon authorities . but this action is professedly directed against gassendus ; some few of whose charges against aristotle our author indeavours to defeat and disable ; which should he succeed in according to his desires , yet the far greater , and perhaps the more formidable number stands unanswer'd . briefly then ( 1. ) he excepts at gassendus's animadverting on aristotle's manners , which he insinuates , to be more like a crafty orator , then a close and severe philosopher . to which in behalf of that excellent neoterick , it may be rejoyn'd , that if aristotle were vicious and immoral , there is much the less reason why we should revere his authority : for truth and vertue use to dwell together ; and the fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom . vice drowns the noble idea's of the soul , and fills the mind with those foul steams of the body , which are prejudicial to deep and worthy enquiries ; so that with all good men and true philosophers 't will not a little detract from the credit of aristotle's intellectuals , if his morals are acknowledg'd , or can be prov'd obnoxious . whither the charge be just or not , our philosopher makes no enquiry , which seems a tacite confession of the truth of the accusation ; and then i think he hath no reason to object the impropriety . after this remark he descends ( 2. ) to some particular instances of gassendus's charge , to as many of which , as i am concern'd in , i make this brief rejoynder : ( 1. ) then aristotle expresly makes god an animal in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . if he sayes otherwise elsewhere , 't is only an argument of the inconsistency of aristotle , not of the injustice of gassendus . ( 2. ) that god acts by necessity , aristotle clearly enough insinuates in that conclusion of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which is testimony sufficient of the truth of my charge ; if gassendus accused him of more , 't is like he was able to make it good . ( 3. ) that aristotle made the world eternal , our author allows me . but that hereby he prov'd himself the chief of all the ethnick philosophers , i cannot grant him so easily . for ( 1. ) aristotle was not the first in this assertion , but had it from ocellus lucanus ; from whom also he transcrib'd the arguments he made use of to enforce it : which yet ( 2. ) are not such , as do so highly commend his philosophy , and faculty of arguing . he proves the world eternal then , because the heavens are so ; the assertion of which he attempts by five arguments : ( viz. ) ( 1. ) from the etymology of aether , viz. ab 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ( 2. ) from the silence of history of any change or alteration they have undergone . ( 3. ) from the opinion of the antients . ( 4. ) from the freedom of the heavens from contrarieties . and ( 5. ) from the eternity of the caelestial motions , which he proves with the eternity of time by reasons borrow'd from ocellus , who was the author of the main argument . now whoever affirms that such arguings as these set aristotle so much above all the more antient philosophers , expresses more fondness towards him , then justice to his betters . nor can the comparative excellency of his wit be any more reasonably concluded from his allowing the natural inference of that acknowledg'd principle , ex nihilo nihil ; which doubtless the antients never meant in the general notion ; but in a sense which restrain'd it to natural productions ; else their assertion of the worlds beginning had been nonsense and a contradiction . ( 4. ) the learned gentleman admires that we should charge aristotle with the denyal of the resurrection of the dead ; which though he acknowledges truly to be alledg'd ; yet he thinks it unreasonably objected , since he supposes this doctrine only to be discoverable by supernatural light and revelation . to which briefly , ( 1. ) though the resurrection in the particular circumstances , in which christianity hath cloathed it , be not known by our unassisted faculties : yet that the soul shall live , and live united to a body in the other state , i think deducible from the meer principles of nature : for the philosophy of the soul informs us , that it uses matter in its highest operations , which is fair ground of conjecture , that it is alwayes united to some body . besides which , it may be argued from the analogy of nature , which useth not in other things , to leap from one extream unto another ; and therefore 't is not likely that the soul should pass immediately , from the state of so deep an immersion into the gross matter , to a condition of pure and absolute immateriality . to which may be further added , that , even according to the principles of aristotle , there can be no knowledge without sense , nor sense without corporeal motion , which cannot well be perceiv'd by a being that is perfectly disjoyn'd from matter . thus the principles of meer reason suggest , that the soul is joyn'd to another body after its discharge from the present . and ( 2. ) others of the greek philosophers , by the meer conduct of their natural light , believ'd it . the academicks generally assign'd bodies to those in the other state , and such as were suitable to the regions of the world they resided in ; and therefore plato calls some of them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and to others of more inferior conditon he attributes aerial bodies ; yea , generally the greeks appointed corporeal punishments for the wicked in their acheron , and cocytus , as theocritus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and virgil , — aliis sub gurgite vasto infectum eluitur scelus , aut exuritur igni . but the business is so well known that it needs no testimony ; and from hence 't is sufficiently evident , that they believ'd the corporeal state of the soul after its separation from this terrestrial body : so that aristotle's assertion herein , is contrary both to the nature of the thing ; and the belief of most of his contemporaries ; nay , and the most venerable wisdom that was before him . and indeed , what he taught of the soul , is at the best uncertain , he using the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for the mind one while , and then for the phancy ; applying it now to angels , and at another time to brutes ; so that none of his sectators could ever tell what was his opinion about it . actio nona . 1. a gassendo ad authorem vanitatis dogmatizandi a. reducenda est oratio , postquam ipse — pag. 104. i think still that the many are very incompetent judges g. of worth either in men or things , admiring trash , and slighting excellence ; and 't is my lord bacon's observation , which signifies much more with me ; then all our learned author has said in this paragraph , viz. [ i hat the lowest vertues are the subjects of the peoples praise ; the middle ones of their admiration ; but the highest they have no sense at all of ; ] which saying holds not only in morals , but in all things else which the vulgar use to judge in : for they regard nothing , but what is like themselves , that is , mean and trivial ; which is the reason of that other observation of the same great philosopher ; that time , like a river bears up what is light and chaffy , while the things that are more weighty and considerable , are lost at the bottom . 2. subjicit author noster sapientium arbitrio peripateticam a. esse vocum nihil significantium — pag. 105. the excellent lord verulam is one of the wise men that g. hath reprov'd the arbritrariness of aristotle's words , particularly in his instauratio magna , where he saith , [ i cannot a little marvel at the philosopher aristotle , that did proceed in such a spirit of difference and contradiction to all antiquity , not only to frame new words of science at pleasure , but to confound and extinguish all antient wisdom ] and his affected obscurity , patricius sayes , all the greeks confessed ; yea themistius one of his great sectators sayes of him , se , veluti sepiam a●ramento suo sese occuluisse . and simplicius another , writes thus in his prolegomena to the praedicaments : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , besides which clear testimony the author of the censure prefixt to aristotle's works cited by gassendus after great praises of him , adds , ingenium viri tectum & callidum & metu●ns reprehensionis , quod inhibebat eum , ne proferret interdum aperiò , quae sentiret ; indè tam multa per ejus opera obscura & ambigua . and again the forementioned themistius , cum plerèque omnia aristotelis scripta quasi de composito caligine quadam offusa oppletaque habeantur : like unto which is that , which simplicius sayes of him : in acroamaticis datâ operâ obscurus esse voluit . we see then who the wise men are , that have accused the obscurity of the aristotelean processes . and that he was not so clear from aequivocatiens as our author suggests ; i 'le give but a double instance ( 1. ) of his applying the foremention'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to beasts and angels , to the imagination and abstracted intellect . and ( 2. ) his calling god , the quintessence , form , the soul , and motion , by the common appellative of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to all which might be added , that 't is an argument that the aristotelean method was not so clear and cautious , as our author would have it believed ; since his commentators have been infinitely divided about his meaning : and our author himself complains , that those of the latter schools have quite receded from his genuine doctrine , which either accuses their ignorance , or his obscurity . it appears then , that the wise men i mention to have accused aristotle's ambiguities and aequivocations were those that understood the aristotelean doctrines , being some of them his most genuine and ancient interpreters ; and not those who are so little acquainted with the matters of this philosophy , as to charge aristotle with the faults of , i know not what , apish peripateticks , and pyrrhonians . 3. prosequitur deinde actionem in peripateticos per a. dubia quaedam , quae illi clara non sunt , — pag. 107. in this paragraph i can understand nothing proved , but g. that a thing is possible to be before it is ; which possibility our author will have to be neither quid , nor quale , nor quantum : though not absolutely nothing . and if this learned gentleman take this posse of a thing for aristotle's materia prima , he mistakes the metaphysical , for the physical matter : or , if hereby he would only insinuate , that the first mater may be something , though neither quid , quale , nor quantum ; the instance is too short for his conclusion , since the posse of a thing before it is , is no real beeing , but an extrinsecal denomination , and a mode of our conception . 4. duae aliae voces molestae sunt sceptico nostro . hae a. sunt forma , & educi de potentiâ materiei ▪ — pag. 109. i call the aristotelean form an empty word , because i g. believe there 's nothing real that answers it ; all bodies are sufficiently distinguish'd by figure and position of parts , and i see no necessity to introduce such an arbitrary being ; however , if our author pleases , let him call that by which things are distinguish'd , their form : but if with aristotle he will make this a substantial principle of things ; i must be excused in a dissent to which my reason inforces me . and if his hypothesis be , that forms are accidents , ( as it seems , he supposes , by the instances alledged ) he recedes from his master aristotle , who expresly makes his form a substance . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a. 5. quoad posteriorem vocem , seu educi de potentiâ , videat vir ingeniosus an illud quod — pag. 110. g. that which was brought out of the dark , was in it . and caesar adds nothing to the marble , but the figure ; which is but a mode of matter , and answers not our case . but forms are not supposed praeexistent in the matter from whence they were educed ; and are substances really distinguisht from it : which i have prov'd from aristotle , and 't is the sense of his commentators , though it seems 't is not our authors . i inquire then , are these substantial forms produced of something , or of nothing ? an aristotelian will not allow the latter ; for this were against the maxime , ex nihilo nihil , and a creation . he affirms it produced of something then , and this something is potentia materia . i enquire further therefore , whether any thing of the form did actually praeexist in this power of the matter , or not ? if so , all possible forms reside in the subjects out of which they are educed , which is not consonant to their hypothesis . if not , the latter part of the disjunction is confest ; to avoid the shame of which , they fly to subjective dependence : and this is the potentia materiae , they talk of ; from which follow the absurdities i inferred . and this is the philosophy of the schools ; and this the peripateticism i charge : if our author saith , it is not according to aristotle's doctrine , let him dispute it out with aristotle's followers ; i charge it not on him , but on his schooles , in which all the world can justifie me . actio decima . 1. proximè sagittant duas aristotelis definitiones , a. utramque exactissimam & quicquam in — pag. 112. let 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie as our author would have it , g. viz. that which remains of an action , and is introduced by it . but i enquire then , ( 1. ) whether this interpretation be not arbitrary ? i 'me sure the word in this sense is so . ( 2. ) light is then something that remains of an operation : and this explication notably helps the perspicuity of the definition , which is as good a one as that was lately given of a thought in a university sermon , viz. a repentine prosiliency jumping into being . and if our author's description be all contain'd in actus perspicui ▪ i shall need no more proof of aristotle's obscurity in this ▪ instance . 2. idem est reliquae definitionis vitium . est autem a. ipsa definitio , motus est actus entis — pag. 113. g. if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the definition of motion signifie the mode , whereby the subject is affected in the end of action , according to our author ; with what congruity doth aristotle then apply it to the soul ? except he thought it a mode of matter , and then our philosopher had no reason to suppose he believed its immortality ; but whatever he concluded of this , he affirm'd it to be a substance , as in that passage , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and galen of him , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a. 3. nova calumnia capite decimo septimo instruitur adversus aristotelem , tantò indigniùs — pag. 115. g. that aristotle was not so careful in distinguishing the signification of words , as is pretended , we have evinced already : and it appears clearly enough from the last instance ; in which things are coupled together by a common appellative that agree in nothing . and for the other mistake this period chargeth me with , i answer ; that if i take the scepticks for peripateticks , i hope our philosopher will henceforward absolve me from the so often objected scepticism . for according to our author my peripateticks are scepticks , and he knows how much friendship i have for those . but whether they are scepticks or not , they are aristotle's followers , if he have any in the schools of christendom ; and i leave them to justifie the title they have assumed . it sufficeth for me , that the genuine aristotelian method is a way of obscurity and dispute ; for which , besides the instances i have given , i have alledged the clear testimonies of his acknowledg'd sectators . and if the modern peripateticks can prove themselves aristotelians , we have a charge of sufficient aggravation from our author against them also . for thus he censures them under the name of scepticks [ scepticorum conatus esse vanissimos facile agnosco , illos parum de vocum usu sollicitos esse quo liberum sit iis quaslibet nugas vanitatis aut alterius lucri causa divendere , oratorculos vel magis rabulas , non philosophos esse , aristotelicorum nomen assumere ut corrumpant juventutem , & discipulos post sese abducant ; hos omnibus scientiae sectatoribus veluti pestem vitandos non inficior , neque quicquam ab iis solidi expectandum esse . ] 4. confirmant fictam adversus philosophum actionem a. ex ipsis philosophi dictis & gestis . — pag. 116. it seems it was not only the abstractedness of the matter , g. that rendred aristotle's physiology so difficult of comprehension , since our author confesseth that scarce any understand it , but who are assisted by the commentaries of the ancients . and certainly all the moderns had never receded so far from his sense , if his expressions had not been obscure and involved , as well as his matter difficult . and for that which the learned gentleman calls a more grievous and unhappy calumny : he confesseth it to be aristotle's instruction to perfect his scholars in the method of disputing , which is all i charge him with ; and i think ambiguity and obstinate garrulity in controversies , which the philosopher seems to advise them to , is a way of disputation that will not much commend the practisers , or instructor . a. 5. merebatur haec actio instantias ex opere . premit author tres ( ex fide credo gassendi — pag. 117. g. that i have done aristotle no wrong in the first instance alledged , will appear to any one that will take the pains to peruse the first chapter of his first de celo . for attempting there the proof of the perfection of bodies in order to the evincing that of the world , he doth it thus : the magnitude that is one way divisible , is a line ; two , is a superficies ; and what may three ways be divided , is a body . besides which there is no other magnitude , for this reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which he proves by a saying of the pythagoreans , and this reason in nature ( if it be one ) viz. because the beginning , end , and middle , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which also is confirmed by that i quoted from him : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and concludes , wherefore since all and perfect , differ not as to their form , body will be the only perfect magnitude , and that for the reason i assign'd from him , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . this is the genuine tenour of aristotle's argument , and our authors sense and interpretation seems to me , ( as i suppose 't will to any one else , who considerately compares it with the text ) forraign , arbitrary , and unnatural . as to the second instance , the learned gentleman hath mistaken the words of my charge . for if he pleaseth to look again into my book , he will find , that i object no such consequence to aristotle , as , that if there were more worlds then one , the moon would fall to the earth . but on the contrary , that the earth would fall to that other world. so that our authors justification of aristotle's argument , viz. that he fixt the centre of the world in the earth , is a strange one , and concludes the quite contrary to what aristotle would inferre . and why the moon should fall , upon the suppositions , that the earth is the centre , and that there are other worlds , ( as our author suggests ) rather then as things are at present , i cannot conjecture . my third instance of aristotle's trifling , and inconsequent arguings , was ; that he inferrs the heavens to move towards the west , because they move towards the more honourable , and before is more honourable then after . which is clearly his consequence in the 5. chapter of his second de coelo : for thus he argues , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nature doth alwayes what is best . now saith he , as the motion which is upwards is more excellent then that which is downward , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; so in like manner is that which is forward more excellent then that which is backward . thence he concludes this the reason why the heavens move antrorsum . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . so that this seems the substance of the inference ; the heavens move by a motion that is natural , nature doth what is best , before is better then behind , and consequently that way the heavens move . the weakness of which argumentation consists in supposing , that those variable respects of before , and after , are realities in nature , which is a poor vulgar conceit , arising from the meere prejudice of misapplyed sensations , and very unbecomming a philosopher . and that this was the supposal of aristotle's argument , is confirmed by the margin of pacius's edition , in which he hath given this account of the contents of this period , coelum movetur ad anteriorem partem , quia hujusmodi motus est praestantior quam motus ad partem posteriorem . yea , when our author himself saith in the account he gives of the argument , motum naturalem esse ad honorabilius , unde clare sequitur occidentem esse nobiliorem oriente , he hath given me all i have contended for . actio undecima . a. indignatur sub finem capituli , quod doctorum opera ita in logicam , physicam , & metaphysicam — pag. 123. g. our author confesseth the schools neglect of the profitable doctrines of the heavens , meteors , minerals , and animals . but his scepticism , viz. the present peripateticism , is the cause . and this is that which i charge in the place animadverted on . so that i accuse not aristotle here ; but by name the modern retainers to the stagyrite : but whether the notionality and obscurity of the aristotelian method it self do not give occasion to the endless babble of those reprehended scepticks , i have already past my conjecture . a. 2. capite decimo octavo arguit doctrinam peripateticam , quasi ad phaenomena salvanda — pag. 124. g. i am not yet convinced , but that the aristotelian philosophy is insufficient for the solution of the phaenomena ; and yet question not aristotle's endeavours in that kind , but his success , upon what accounts my discourse declareth . i acknowledge the ingenuity of sir kenelm digbye's hypotheseis : but cannot yet understand that to have been aristotle's method . and i think our author is one of the first that asserts aristotle to have taught the corpuscularian and atomical philosophy ; for all the world hath hitherto taken his , to be the way of qualities and forms : yea aristotle mentions the atomical hypothesis of democritus in a way of dissent and profest opposition ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which last passage is the main substance of the corpuscularian philosophy . and elsewhere he recites the same hypothesis from leucippus and democritus , to the same purpose ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . urget adversarius systema coeli ab aristotele sequiùs a. esse constitutum . aperi accusationem . — pag. 125. i cannot see but that aristotle without optick instruments , g. the defect of which our author thinks excuseth his astronomy , might have discovered the motion of the earth , and fluidity of the heavens , as well as the more antient wisdom that believ'd them . he recites the former as the opinion of the pythagoreans , but could not overcome the prejudice of sense against it . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and in another place hath a profest redargution of this pythagorean opinion . as for the hypothesis of the fluidity of the heavens , 't is said in the jewish gemara , non orbes sed in coelo liquido moveri sidera , vetustissima haebreorum sententia est . and if aristotle had own'd a wit so much more excellent then others of the antients , as our author somewhere intimates , i see not why he might not have received these theories , as well as some of those , to whom optick tubes were as much strangers as to the contriver of the orbs. that the christian doctrine teacheth the motion of the heavens by intelligencies ▪ i cannot yet comprehend . and our author cannot think it so evident as to be believed without proof . our air according to the best computations can be made of the weight of the astmosphear , reacheth not much above 50 miles upwards ; and the thin element there , is nothing to the sphear of fire supposed under the concave of the moon . a. 3. caput decimum nonum exagitat aristotelis doctrinam quasi infaecundam & sterilem . — pag. 126. g. if it belong not to philosophers to make experiments ; the noble lord bacon , des cartes , our illustrious royal society , and all experimental philosophers , have been needlesly imployed , and out of the way in their inquiries . and if we must use no experiments but those that are made by ordinary mechanicks without design of science , we shall never make any great progress into the knowledg of the magnalia ; which are not known by the common methods of action . he that will erect a lasting and stately fabrick , must have stones digged from the quarries , and not expect that the high-wayes should furnish him . what these common aristotelian principles are , without which no account can be given of natural effects , our author would do well to tell us . some principles indeed are necessary , and without them nothing can be inquired or determin'd : but such are common to all philosophers , and not peculiarly aristotle's . those that admit vacuities , think there can be no action without them ; holding it impossible there should be motion in absolute pleno ; and we have but our author 's bare assertion against their arguments . the cartesian vortices will serve to account for the phaenomena , and teach a way of theory not unserviceable to experiment . and for the salvo of aristotle's credit in those contradictory passages we meet in his writings ; viz. that they are the sayings of others , it seems to me an arbitrary shift and evasion : since we find them in his discourses without mention of any such matter . and if it be confest his custom to insert forrein doctrines and sayings into his works , without any intimation to distinguish them from his own ; who then can know when aristotle speaks himself , or when he speaks the words and sense of others ? 4. caput vicesimum manifestam reddit eminentiam a. peripatetices supra reliquas methodos — pag. 127. in that chapter i impugn not aristotle's philosophy , but g. had concluded my reflections in the former . causalities are first found out by concomitancy , as i intimated . and our experience of the dependence of one , and independence of the other shews which is the effect , and which the cause . definitions cannot discover causalities , for they are formed after the causality is known . so that in our authors instance , a man cannot know heat to be the atoms of fire , till the concomitancy be known , and the efficiency first presumed . the question is then , how heat is known to be the effect of fire ? our author answers by it's definition . but how came it to be so defined ? the answer must be , by the concomitancy and dependence ; for there 's nothing else assignable . but who is our authors peripatetick that concludes heat to be the atomes of fire ? and who that adorer of des-cartes that professeth scepticism ? a. 5. nihilo validius est argumentum à varietate opinionum philosophantium ad impossibilitatem — pag. ●●9 . g. i urge no such argument as the variety of philosophers opinions against the possibility of science , but from the notion of the dogmatists ; that demonstration supposeth certainty , as aristotle himself affirms , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and certainty , impossibility of being otherwise ; as aristotle proceeds , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; i say , from hence i inferre 't is scarce modest to conclude any thing so a demonstration , and consequently , science in their notion ; the reason of my inference is fully declared in my discourse , the least view of which will be evidence enough of the wideness of this answer . sub finem capitis assumit nihil sciri posse nisi in primas a. causas resolvatur . unde diluxisse — pag. 131. when i affirm nothing can be known but by a resolution of things into their first causes , i mean the mechanical , not metaphysical : for i am of opinion with the excellent lord verulam ; that natural theory hath been very much hindered , and corrupted by metaphysical admixtures ; and this is a considerable fault of aristotle and his sectators . some general notices indeed are necessary to direct us in particular researches , but then they must be such as are concluded from induction in particulars ; and perhaps the instances our philosopher alledges to shew the necessity of metaphysicks to physiology will be better determin'd and accounted for in the way of experiment , then notion ; and i think our author 's metaphysical argument against a vacuum , ( the exploding of which he thinks so necessary for the establishment of a grounded philosophy ) i think , i say , his argument is a sophism , whose greatest force lies in the scarcity of words and defect in language : for this is the sum of the presumed demonstration . a vacuum is imaginary space ; imaginary space is nothing real , and those bodies are together , that have nothing between them : if the middle of which propositions be denyed , the argument comes to nothing ; and it may without absurdity be affirmed , that though space have not the nature of any of the beings that are in our praedicaments , yet 't is something real and not meerly imaginary : for the notion of space strikes so close to our minds , that we cannot conceive , but that 't is infinite and eternal , viz. is every where , and has been alwayes ; and therefore has a kind of being , that is no arbitrary figment ; though such a one , for the expressing of which our words are defective : we see then , how this pretended metaphysical impossibility may be answered ; for though supposing a vacuum there be nihil corporis between the bodies distant , yet is there aliquid spatii , which is sufficient to avoid the contradiction ; so that there may be a vacuum , notwithstanding our author's metaphysicks : yea , that aristotle himself asserted it , though i know he has opposed it also , is affirmed by aetius in these words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and there seems a strong necessity that there should be one , since it looks like an impossibility that there should be motion in pleno , or at least that any thing should be moved , but that all the world must be moved with it ; which i alledge only to shew , that metaphysicks may both ways be urged almost for any thing , and that all matters of notion are double-handed . and if we must determine nothing in physiology till metaphysicks have concluded it ; for ought i know we shall be at an eternal loss , and never fix on any thing . and by this method of mingling metaphysicks with natural philosophy , we shall fill plain theories with infinite intricacy and dispute . indeed , the impatient mind of man , as my lord bacon observes , is too apt to fly to general conclusions ; and more averse to the way of experiment and induction , which he thought the only method for the establishing of a solid and grounded theory : in which there is none has more happily succeeded then the philosopher des-cartes , whose philosophy is not a prescribed form how things should be made , as our author injuriously suggests , but professes it self only an hypothesis how they may be , and how by such principles the phaenomena may be salved : and the mechanicks of des-cartes are much more likely methods for the expounding nature , then the metaphysicks of aristotle ; which his own sectators have confest a meer rhapsody and confused ramble of they knew not what : yea , and 't is doubtful whither they are not the spurious issue of some more modern author , since diogenes laertius , who uses to give a full and faithful catalogue of the writings of philosophers , hath omitted this out of the works of aristotle , and philoponus affirms that book written by pasicrates rhodius . and if so , aristotle will lose the credit of demonstration in metaphysicks , with which our author hath invested him . 7. sequens capitulum laborat illo errore quem aristoteles a. saepius & detexit & confutavit : — pag 132. imperfect knowledge , according to the notion of the dogmatists , g. is not science , but opinion . scire , our author knows , is per causas scire ; and the conditions of those causes are that they be true , immediate , and necessary ; this is perfect knowledge , this is the science the dogmatist pretends to ; and to this according to his own maxime , every thing that is must contribute , as my discourse declareth . nor do our philosophers instances weaken my conclusion ; for they relate to another kind of knowledge , viz. that of the existence , not of the nature of things ; which latter is that which i am treating of ; and the knowledge of the being of a thing , as is its object , is a simple act , and consequently , to this , a single evidence is sufficient : but the comprehension of the nature , like the thing it self , is complex , and requires the knowledge of the things of which 't is constituted . what is added within this paragraph about two persons , seeing the same object in the same circumstances of sentiment , is our author 's bare assertion , against my proof of the contrary : and the last period is built upon the fore ▪ mentioned mistake of my design and intentions . a. 8. attamen academicus noster non dubitat generatim dogmaticè procedentibus affingere quaevis — pag. 134. g. the learned gentleman is now discended to my moral considerations against confident opinion : his reflections on the two first of which are built upon the supposal of my being a sceptick , which charge i think i 've sufficiently disabled . the truth of my third accusation is confest , but the guilt , not acknowledged ; since that which excites men to endless bawlings , and altercations ; schisms , heresies , and rebellions , by the vehemencies of dispute , is it seems with our author no more noxious and criminal , then the sun that stirrs men up to their work in the morning , by the importunity of it's beams . to the fourth absurdity of dogmatizing , our philosopher also gives a kind reception ; and it seems can be content with a confidence that accuseth all the world of ignorance . but whether be the more modest , the dogmatist that chargeth all that are not of his mind as ignorants ; or the sceptick that involves himself also in the common reproach , let them dispute it out when they will , i have nothing to do with their quarrel . in the last i 'me agreed with our author in the truth of his assertion , that science inlargeth mens mindes ; but cannot acknowledge the pertinency . for he could scarce have named things more opposite then confidence and science . science indeed inlargeth : but there 's a knowledge that only puffeth up . and i 'me of solomon's opinion , that 't is the fool that rageth and is confident . our author concludes as he began , in the supposition that i am a sceptick , and in this i 'me certain he is mistaken ; and will be dogmatical in affirming , that i am none . thus have i concluded my reply with a brevity , that shews i am not fond of an occasion of disputing ; and a carelesness , that will witness the little delight i have in matters that are not of very material speculation . the truth is , i dropt these reflections with such a dulness and inactivity of humor : that when my pen had traced one period , it was indifferent whether it began another . and i remember not an heat in the whole performance . for i felt no concernment to defend a discourse , which perhaps i had less kindness for then one , who hath professedly opposed it . not to mention the other reasons of my coldness and indifference in this action . and though i have still a quick resentment of the vanity of confiding in opinions , and possibly could with an humor brisk enough have reassailed the spirit of proud and unreasonable presumption ; yet i hitherto see no necessity of adding more to what i have said on the subject : and the reflections that engaged my pen , have made me but few new occasions . so that looking on my impugned discourse as too inconsiderable for a subject of publick vindication , and meeting but little opportunity for general and discursive notion in that which opposed it ; i was , i profess , sometimes more inclined to have throwne away these sheets among the rubbish of my papers , then to permit them thus to shew themselves to the publique . but my civility to this learned man obliged me to some answer , and whatever i apprehend of it otherwise , my laziness or my judgement made me think this sufficient for that service . what others will judge of it i am ignorant and careless , and am sufficiently satisfied with this , that i think it pertinent , and that i have finish't it . finis . a letter to a friend concerning aristotle . sir , i am very sensible how bold and adventurous a thing it is , for men of private condition to oppose what custom and great names have render'd venerable . and though i am still of opinion ▪ that a lazie acquiescence in the discoveries of any single author , how great and august soever , be a disadvantage to the encrease of knowledge ; yet i think it not wise in every man that hath only a naked reason to assist him , to confront such celebrated authorities . upon which account i acknowledge some juvenile heat and praecipitancy in those reflections your friendship has animadverted on . which , besides the pardon young pens may expect from those who are not unreasonably severe , hath a claim to your candour upon other considerations , which i intend this paper shall acquaint you with . in order to which , i suppose i need not tell you , that 't was no enmity to the learning of the universities , which with all duty i acknowledge , that drew my pen upon the sage their constitutions have made textuary . you know me too well , to think i designed any thing against the appointments and purposes of our pious ancestors in those venerable nurseries of piety and learning . i too well apprehend the danger of such innovations in an age so prone to fancies and dissettlements . in which nothing howsoever worthy and sacred , has been able to defend it self against the rude hands of proud , because successeful violence guilded with the plunder'd titles of reformation and religion . i 'le assure you then , though i had been so fond and unwise to engage in a design so unlikely in the undertaker ; i should never have been so disingenious and undutiful as to form a project so inconvenient and hazardous in the event , as to discourage young students from a method of studies the constitutions of the place they live in have enjoyn'd them : which indeed , considering the circumstances wherein things stand , 't is in a manner necessary they should be vers'd in ; since that philosophy is wrought into the current theology of europe : which therefore would not be comprehended without an insight into those hypotheses . nor can a man make a reasonable choice of his principles , except he have some knowledge of all that offer themselves candidates for his favour : and a wise man's belief is not chance , but election ; besides which , it enlarges and ennobles the minds of men to furnish them with variety of conception , and takes them off from doating on the beloved conclusions of their private and narrow principles . i blame not therefore the use of aristotle in the universities among the junior students , though i cannot approve the streightness and sloath of elder dijudicants , from whom more generous temper might be expected , then to sit down in a contented despair of any further progress into science , than has been made by their idolized sophy ; and depriving themselves and all this world of their liberty in philosophy by a sacramental adherence to an heathen authority . and i confess , 't was this pedantry and boyishness of humor that drew from me those reflections i directed against aristotle . which perhaps you 'le think not so censurable an action when you consider , ( 1. ) that whatever fondness these latter ages have express'd towards him , the pious fathers of the first and purest times of christianity , own'd for him no such regard and veneration ; but frequently reprehended him with a keen and impartial severity . and if we may believe the learned and industrious patricius [ multos ê patribus habuit oppugnatores , celebratorem neminem . ] clemens alex. epiphanius , and nazianzen accuse him of impiety against god and religion ; lactantius of contradiction and inconsistency ; justin martyr professedly wrote a book against him ; s. basil reprehends his ethicks ; and origen set's epicurus before him . theodoret accuses him for denying providence below the moon . and 't is notoriously known that platonism was the philosophy of the first christian centuries when aristotle was not much regarded . yea as the excellent gassendus has observ'd , in the flourishing times of rome and athens , the academicks and stoicks ; and laertius sayes in his , the epicureans , were the only valued sects of philosophers , while the peripateticks were but little accounted of . yea cicero , pliny , quintilian that had otherwise the greatest esteem of aristotle , prefer'd plato before him . and i find ( 2. ) not that aristotle had such an excess of respect and worship , till after barbarism had overrun rome and athens . for when the empire began to emerge from that black night of ignorance which had with it's rude conquerours invaded it ; averroes and some others of the arabian interpreters chanced to light upon the remains of this philosopher , which they translated into the language of the moors , and as 't is usual for men to dignifie what they have bestowed pains upon , especially if it be rare and new ; these first interpreters would not fail to celebrate the author , that they might reconcile credit to their writings upon him , and recommend their own elucubrations . and therefore aristotle shall be the prime of philosophers , that they may be next him . insomuch that his redeemer averroes arriv'd to that vanity in commendation as to affirm , that aristotle invented logick , divinity and physiology ; never spoke any thing without strong reason , and that there was nothing defective or superfluous in his writings , but all things in the most full and perfect order ; and that no errour had been found in his composures : which commendations coming down to the latines , with the books they celebrated , and they having no other philosopher , but aristotle , nor interpreter , but his idolater averroes , greedily swallowed both the books and the character together , making sacred text of the writings of the author , and axioms of the commendations of the interpreter . for the mighty cry of the first admirers , assisted by the ignorance of those times , and the natural temper that is in men to revere the first author that pleases them , bore down others to an assent to those applauses ; and being at last by the schoolmen mingled with divinity , and by others adopted into other faculties , grew in a manner sacred and universal . aristotle became an oracle , his placits were enacted laws , and his dixit an unquestionable argument ; and thus was the reasoning world despoil'd of that freedom which is the priviledge of humane nature , and subjected to a forreign authority , that could lay no reasonable claim to their respect or observance . so that the esteem of the aristotelean philosophy having been so small in the best and wisest times , and having sprung up to this bulk by accidental occasions in the latter and less cultivated ages , i cannot yet think it so piacular to question the dueness of those superlative praises are bestowed upon him in these , wherein mankind seems awaken'd to enquire into the world of things , not of words , and is resolv'd no longer to court names , but nature . and you 'le see less reason for your displeasure against that engagement of mine , when i shall have told you thirdly , that 't is very doubtful whether those writings that go under his name , are aristotle's or not . for besides that the antient greek interpreters have alwayes made this quaery in the beginning of their expositions , whether the books they were about to expound were aristotle 's ; besides this suspicion i say , several very learned men have professedly undertook to prove the uncertainty of all his writings , among whom are picus , patricius , and gassendus , and from these author's i 'le give you a brief account of this matter . ( first ) then theophrastus , aristotle's scholar , wrote several things that had the same title with those we presume are his : and who then can tell whether they were wrote by aristotle , or theophrastus ? to say aristotle's works are discoverable by their style , is to presume the question , that some are known to be his : which being supposed , the enquirer may notwithstanding be deceived in his judgment , since learned men in the same age are often delighted with the same mode of writing , especially the scholars of any great author use to imitate the way and method of their masters ; yea and diversity of age and matter make's them sometimes differ more in their styles from themselves , than others do from them . at least ( secondly ) theophrastus had great advantages of adding , altering , and mingling aristotle's works as he pleased : he himself putting forth few books while he lived , but leaving them in the hands of this his great scholar and sectator . and 't is the observation of strabo and plutarch that the first peripateticks had few or none of aristotle's writings among them ; upon which account impostures and forgeries might be more securely practiced . besides which , ( thirdly ) theophrastus himself did not publish these writings , but left them in the hands of neleus , as is testified by plutarch and athenaeus . now this neleus of two copies which he kept of aristotle's writings , sold one to ptolomy for the famous library at alexandria ; the other he kept himself and left with his posterity ; who , as strabo testifies , diligent search being made by the attalick kings after books to furnish the library at pergamus , hid them in a pit underground about 160. years till they were almost spoil'd with moths and rotteness , and after sold them to apellicon tejus an athenian , who got them transcribed and supplyed in those places in which they had been impair'd by their concealment , but as strabo says arbitrarily , and at a venture ; insomuch that the transcripts were full of errour and incurable defects . at length sylla taking athens , this library of apellicon , in which were the writings of aristotle , was transported to rome , as is testified by plutarch , and there fell into the hands of tyrannio grammaticus under whom they contracted new and worse errors . from him they pass to andronicus rhodius who distributed them into the order we now find them in , adding and altering as he pleased . after him , picus says the contending peripateticks still mended what they understood not ; and every man as he fancyed . all which circumstances are more than suspicions of much forgery and corruption in aristotle's composures . yea , if that be true which marius nizolius asserts , and largely endeavours to prove , that most of the books of aristotle that are extant are but epitomes and compendiums drawn up by nicomachus of his father's writings , 't will be another evidence against their authority . to which i add ( 4. ) what has been observed by the forecited learned men , that diogenes laertius , who lived when most of the antient authors might be seen , who was very industrious in the search of antiquities , and who perused above two hundred authors in order to the compiling of his history , forty of which had professedly wrote the lives of philosophers ; yet this diogenes hath omitted all we have now extant of aristotle's works except nine , viz. duo de plantis , physiogn . categoriae , de interpret . mechan . contra xenophanem ; contra gorgiam & zenonem . yea and patricius gives sufficient reason why all these but the four last should be suspected also . now why so many forged pieces were ascribed to aristotle , three reasons are given by ammonius . viz. ( 1. ) because there were several others of his name ( diogenes laertius sayes eight ) by reason of which 't was an easie matter to shelter the mean and contemptible products of others under his name and authority . ( 2. ) because several of his disciples wrote books on the same subjects , and with the same titles with their master . ( 3. ) there being great rewards propos'd by ptolomy to those that brought in any considerable author 's to his library , several out of a covetous design to enrich themselves by the forgery , inscribed other writings by the name of this philosopher , to render them more currant and vendible . so that there were 40. books of analyticks ascribed to aristotle in ptolomy's library , when as he wrote but four ; and two de categoriis , when he wrote but one . it appears then that the books of aristotle are of very uncertain and suspicious authority . yea , and though his writings were never so unsuspect and certain in the main , yet no man can be assur'd in particular what is aristotle's in them and what not , they having met with such hard usage as we mention'd . yea , the books themselves give notorious evidence of those abuses in the confusions , inversions , contradictions , tautologies , defects , abruptness , and other gross imperfections they abound with . upon the account of which gassendus sayes , he thought aristotle a greater man than to be the author of such mean and obnoxious writings . but however , whether these are genuine or not , they contain the aristotelianism of the present peripatetick schools , and if those works are none of his , there 's less reason why we should fall down before the εφη of an uncertain authority . besides which , i must confess fourthly , that the reverence i have to the more antient sages , which aristotle frequently traduced , and unworthily abused , animated me to more severity against him , than upon another occasion had perhaps been so pardonable and becoming . and that aristotle dealt so invidiously with the philosophers were before him , will not need much proof to one , that is but indifferently acquainted with his writings . the great lord bacon hath particularly charged him with this unworthiness in his excellent advancement of learning , wherein he says , that [ aristotle as though he had been of the race of the ottomans , thought he could not reign , except the first thing he did , he kill'd all his brethren . ] and elsewhere in the same discourse [ i cannot a little marvel at the philosopher aristotle , that proceeded in such a spirit of difference and contradiction to all antiquity , undertaking not only to frame new words of science at pleasure , but to confound and extinguish all the antient wisdom , insomuch that he never names any antient author , but to confute or reprove him ] consonant whereunto are the observations of patricius that he carpes at the antients by name in more than 250 places , and without name in more than 1000. he reprehends 46 philosophers of worth , besides poets and rhetoricians , and most of all spent his spleen upon his excellent and venerable master plato , whom in above 60 places by name he hath contradicted . and as plato opposed all the sophisters , and but two philosophers , viz. anaxagoras and heraclitus ; so aristotle that he might be opposite to him in , this also , oppos'd all the philosophers , and but two sophisters viz. protagoras and gorgias . yea , and not only assaulted them with his arguments , but persecuted them by his reproaches , calling the philosophy of empedocles , and all the antients stuttering ; xenocrates , and melissus , rusticks ; anaxagoras , simple and inconsiderate ; yea , and all of them in an heap , as patricius testifies , gross ignorants , fools and madmen . how fit then think you is it that the world should now be obliged to so tender and awful a respect to the libeller of the most venerable sages , as that it should be a crime next heresie to endeavour , though never so modestly , to weaken his textuary and usurp'd authority ? and how just think you is your charge of my reflections as a piece of irreverence to antiquity ? when my veneration of the greater antiquity extorted from me those strictures against the proud antagonist of all the ancient and more valuable wisdom ? of whose unworthy and disingenuous usage of the elder philosophers , i 'le present you among many with some particular instances , that most easily offer themselves to my pen and memory . briefly then , he accuses zeno for making god a body , because he call'd him a sphear in a metaphor . he sayes of parmenides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he made hot and cold principles , and yet in two long chapters falls upon him as making all things one . these two principles of parmenides aristotle interprets of fire and earth , when 't is clear enough that the philosophers meant light and darkness . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . he says of parmenides and melissus , that they denyed all generation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and yet in another place , having it seems forgot this charge , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . he accused empedocles for constituting the soul of elements , for which he took occasion from that verse of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when as the elements he means are not corporeal , as aristotle would suggest to force an absurdity on that philosopher , but intellectual ones , as simplicius one of his own interpreters expounds empedocles . he blasphemes anaxagoras's mind in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and yet after gives excellent attributes to that mind of anaxagoras . he accuses the pythagoreans of making numbers the principles of things ; when as 't is evident that numbers were intended by pythagoras , but as symbolical representations of them , which serv'd him but for the same purposes the hieroglyphicks did the aegyptians , from whom that sage had his method of philosophy ; as philoponus himself confessingly affirms , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ but of all the philosophers he quarrel'd with , there was none he pursued with so much gall and animosity , as his incomparable master plato , whom he not only insolently opposed and ingratefully thrust out of his school while he lived , but with a severe pen persecuted his very ashes , and followed him with injuries beyond the grave . and all for no other reason , but because that venerable old man reproved his evil life , and preferr'd the better deserving speucippus , xenocrates , and amyclas before him . the particular instances of those ungrateful abuses are too numerous to be insisted on ; therefore i shall only pitch my observation on plato's doctrine of idea's which aristotle in all his books inveigh's against , and hath render'd ridiculous among his credulous sectators . concerning which you may please to take notice , that this opinion was not originally plato's , though aristotle charge him as the author , but was the doctrine of the pythagoreans , aegyptians and chaldaeans . we have it in timaeus locrus the pythagorean , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and before him trismegistus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . but originally this doctrine of idea's was chaldaean , for which i offer you the ensuing testimonies which will also clear the antient sense and nature of those idea's . we have them then in the oracles of zoroaster , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and these idea's , by which we may understand their natures , he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . briefly then , the chaldaeans by their idea's understood the forms of things as they were in their archetypa mente , which answers to the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the christian trinity . they called them also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as they were in this primaeval mind . in the soul of the world they call'd them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in nature , they were seeds ; and in matter , forms . thus therefore ; in the seeds of all things there is heat ; in that , spirit ; in this , nature which depends on the universal soul , and that on god , in whom 't is jynx or idea . this was the chaldaean notion of idea's , and this was the platonical ; which how unlike it is the chimaera of universal abstract notions , aristotle and his peripateticks falsly affix upon the divine philosopher , is of easie apprehension . so that aristotle in his impugnation of the platonical idea's , fights against notions of his own creating , and no assertions of his venerable master . and i must confess the reverence i have for that excellent sage and his philosophy , lessens my esteem of aristotle , and his . which i cannot without some regret behold so sacred in christendom , while the incomparable prince of philosophers with his divine theories seems to be neglected and forgotten ; especially since this latter is so consonant in his dogmata to the principles of christianity , and the other so opposite to most the articles of our belief in his . of which patricius has presented the world with a large catalogue of instances , and i 'le offer you a few of them . plato affirms god to be one ; aristotle make's one first mover , but 56 other gods movers of the orbs. plato own 's god under the notion of the father ; which aristotle no where acknowledges . plato , that god is the supreme wisdom ; aristotle , that he is ignorant of particulars . plato , that god is omnipotent ; aristotle , that he can do nothing , but move the heavens . plato , that god made the world ; aristotle , that the world is uncreated , and eternal . plato , that god made the world of nothing ; aristotle , that of nothing is made nothing . plato that god is free from all body ; aristotle , that he 's tyed to the first orb. plato , that providence is over all things ; aristotle , that 't is confin'd to the heavens . plato , that god governs the universe ; aristotle , not god , but nature , chance , and fortune . plato , that god created the soul ; aristotle , that 't is the act of the body . plato , that the happiness of a man is in his likeness to god ; aristotle , that a man is happy in the goods of fortune . plato , there will come one that shall teach us to pray , a prophecy of our saviour . aristotle , prayers are in vain , because god knows not particulars . plato , that after death good men shall enjoy god. aristotle , no pleasure after this life . plato , the souls of the wicked shall be punish't after death ; aristotle , they shall perish with the body , and suffer nothing . plato , the dead shall rise . aristotle , à privatione ad habitum . plato that the soul and body of the wicked shall be punish't in hell. aristotle knew no such matter . these are some instances among many , of the divine temper of the platonical philosophy , and the impiety of the aristotelian ; for a further account of which i referre you to the fore-mentioned learned author . so that i doubt not , but when you have duly consider'd the matter , you 'l judge those reflections the effects of a laudable zeal for antiquity , and what is more sacred , truth . to which i adde ( 5. ) that the aristotelian was not the antient philosophy , but the corpuscularian and atomical , which to the great hinderance of science lay long buryed in neglect and oblivion , but hath in these latter ages been again restored to the light and it 's deserv'd repute and value . and that the atomical hypothesis was the first and most antient , of which there is any memory in physiology , is notoriously known to all , that know the age of democritus ; who was one of those four sages that brought the learning of the aegyptians among the grecians ; orpheus bringing in theology ; thales the mathematicks ; our democritus , natural philosophy ; and pythagoras all three , with the moral . now the learning of the aegyptians came from the chaldaeans , and was convey'd to them , as some learned men affirm , by abraham , who was of kin to zoroaster the great chaldaean legislatour and philosopher ; which zoroaster lived 290 years after the flood , and as pliny saith , was the schollar of azonaces , whom antiquáries affirm to have been of the schoole of sem and heber . the atomical philosophy then coming from the aegyptians to the grecians , and from the chaldaeans to them ; is without doubt of the most venerable antiquity ; and the aristotelian a very novelty in compare with that grey hypothesis : at the best , a degeneracy and corruption of the most antient wisdom . yea , and 't is the complaint of several learned men , which whoever knows any thing of aristotles sectators will justifie , that the modern peripateticks have as farr receded from his sense , as from the truth of things . for it hath been the fashion of his interpreters both greeks , latins , and arabians , to form whole doctrines from catches and scraps of sentences , without attending to the analogy and main scope of his writings . from which method of interpretation hath proceeded a spurious medly of nice , spinose and useless notions , that is but little of kin to aristotle or nature . so that whatever of genuine aristotelian is in those works that bare his name ; there 's little of aristotle in his schools . and 't is no indignity to antiquity or the stagyrite , to oppose the corruption and abuse of both . and to endeavour to restore the antients to their just estimation , which hath been usurp't from them by a modern and spurious learning . and though i grudge not aristotles esteem while it is not prejudicial to the respect we owe his betters ; yet i regret that excessive and undue veneration which fondly sets him so much above all the more valuable antients . and i 'le propose it to your judgment ( 6. ) whether 't was likely that aristotle was so farr beyond other philosophers in his intellectuals , as these latter ages have presumed , when he came so farr short of most of them in his morals ? i believe there 's a near connection between truth and goodness , and there 's a taste in the soul whereby it relisheth truth , as the palate meats ; which sence and gusto vice depraves and vi●iates . so that though witt may make the vicious , cunning sophisters , and subtile atheists , yet i doubt seldom the best and most exercised philosophers . now what the ancients have related of aristotle's manners , i 'le present you in an instance or two , and dismiss this displeasing subject . suidas then accuseth him of sodomy with hermias , aeschriones , palephatus , and abydenus ; st. jerome of drunkenness : lycus and aristocles , two of his own disciples , charge him with avarice : aelian of cavelling , loquacity , scoffing , and ingratitude ; of which last , there are two notorious instances in his usage of alexander and plato . how he used his venerable master , i have already noted . and what return he made to the kindnesses of his glorious schollar , you may see in these few words from arrian , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and to sum up much in one , timaeus the historian in suidas gives this account of him , that he was forward , impudent , saucy , unwise , indocile , and hatefully glutinous , or in the words of suidas , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . but to conclude these ungrateful remarques , plutarch makes him a traytor to alexander ; and eusebius to his countrey . and being at last banisht for his impiety , he made himself away by poyson , according to the testimony of laertius . thus then you see an ill character of aristotle's manners from disinteressed authorities ; on consideration of which , 't is to me matter of some wonder , that the memory of the vitious should be so blessed , and his authority so irreproveable . unto all which may be added . ( lastly ) that there is less reason that aristotle should be valued beyond all others that have had a name for wisdom , if we consider , that he borrowed almost all he writ from the more antient philosophers , though he had not the ingenuity and gratitude to acknowledge it : particularly from architas and ocellus , transcribing them word for word in many places , especially the latter ; and yet never as much as mention'd him in all his writings . and i think you ascribe more to aristotle then is his due when you call him the inventour of sciences ; for we owe that honour to others of the antients ; particularly to zeno the invention of logick , and of rhetorick to empedocles , according to his own testimony in laertius , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( speaking of zeno ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . perictione a pythagorean woman writ metaphysicks ▪ before aristotle . stobaeus in his morals hath a fragment of her book de sapientia , of which she declares the subject in these words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . besides whom plato , parmenides , xenophanes , pythagoras , the aegyptians , trismegistus , and before all , the chaldeans writ of this science , long before aristotle was extant . and , democritus brought natural philosophy , as did pythagoras the moral , from the aegyptians , before the stagyritè was an infant . and for the mathematicks , they were studied in aegypt , before he was born in greece , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is his own confession . thus then you see sir , we are not so much beholden to aristotle , as most men have presumed . and perhaps by this time you may be convinc't that we have no reason so passionately to revere his authority . but whither you are , or not , i am not much concerned , being willing to leave all men to the liberty of their own sentiments . it sufficeth for my purpose , that i have given you some of the grounds of my dissatisfactions in aristotle and his hypotheseis . if you are convinced , at the bar of your judgment , i am justified ; if you are not , your dissent i presume is rational , and when i have seen your reasons , i shall either be more disposed to your apprehensions , or be more confirm'd in the justice and reasonableness of mine own . to which i 'le add no more , but my desires of your pardon of this voluminous trouble , and acceptance of the affectionate regards of sir , your humble servant j. g. finis . reflections upon the conduct of human life with reference to the study of learning and knowledge : in a letter to the excellent lady, the lady masham / by john norris ... ; to which is annex'd a visitation sermon, by the same author. norris, john, 1657-1711. 1690 approx. 198 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 102 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2003-01 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a52433 wing n1267 wing n1270_partial estc r15880 12951607 ocm 12951607 95935 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a52433) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 95935) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 363:14) reflections upon the conduct of human life with reference to the study of learning and knowledge : in a letter to the excellent lady, the lady masham / by john norris ... ; to which is annex'd a visitation sermon, by the same author. norris, john, 1657-1711. masham, damaris, lady, 1658-1708. norris, john, 1657-1711. sermon preach'd in the abby church of bath ... july 30, 1689. [7], 196, [3] p. printed for s. manship ..., london : 1690. "a sermon preach'd in the abby church of bath" has special t.p., with imprint: london, 1690. advertisement: [3] p. at end. reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. marginal notes. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng church of england -sermons. knowledge, theory of (religion) -early works to 1800. sermons, english -17th century. 2002-06 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2002-08 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2002-09 john latta sampled and proofread 2002-09 john latta text and markup reviewed and edited 2002-10 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion licens'd , november 1. 1689. reflections upon the conduct of human life : with reference to the study of learning and knowledge . in a letter to the excellent lady , the lady masham . by iohn norris , m. a. rector of newton st. loe , in somersetshire , near bath ; and late fellow of all souls college in oxford . to which is annex'd , a visitation sermon , by the same author . london , printed for s. manship , at the black bull in cornhil . m dc xc . madam , the affliction your ladyship is under for the loss of your sight is so great , and your complaints upon that occasion so just , that i can neither blame you for the one , nor excuse my self from pittying you for the other . and indeed since you have been so unhappy as to be deprived of the use of your eyes , i think i owe your ladyship so much compassion , that i cannot better employ mine , than in writing you such a consolation , as the opportunity of my new retirement , with the serious reflections i have lately made in it , will suggest . and that i believe will be such , as is more peculiarly adapted to the circumstance of your trouble , which tho occasion'd by a common accident , yet , i find , proceeds upon an uncommon principle . for tho 't is to be presumed that , notwithstanding your great contempt of the world , it must be a considerable part of your affliction to lose the sight of some delectable objects in it , since the wisest of men ( from whom your ladyship cannot much dissent ) after a censure of vanity past upon all things under heaven , is yet forc'd to confess that truly the light is sweet , and a pleasant thing it is for the eyes to behold the sun ; yet i perceive the chief reason why your ladyship is so concern'd for the loss of your sight , is because you are thereby deprived of conversation with your books , and consequently retarded in your earnest pursuit after learning and knowledge . 't is upon this hinge i know that the main weight of your sorrow turns , and therefore you will not want a specific proper for your malady , if you should chance to be convinced that our learning is generally misplaced , and that such an importunate pursuit after learning and knowledge is no way agreeable to the present station and condition of man. for certainly you will no longer lament the loss of your eyes , for disabling you from doing that , which perhaps would not be adviseable for you to do , if you had them again . if therefore you once come to be convinc'd of this , one main ground of your discontent is removed ; and that you may , is the design of the following reflections . the first reflection . wherein the general conduct of human life is tax'd , for placing learning and knowledge , in such things as are little or nothing perfective of the understanding . i. being naturally more than ordinarily disposed to thoughtfulness , and from the circumstances of my present solitude and retirement further invited to it ; i began one day to fall into a deep meditation upon the conduct of my own , and of humane life . what reflections i made upon my own , are too peculiarly calculated for my proper circumstances , to be of any general use , and therefore i shall not trouble you with them . but as for those past upon the conduct of humane life , i think they are of too general use , and withal of too weighty consequence , not to be communicated . these therefore i shall think worth while to draw up into a little more orderly form than wherein they were first conceived , and present to your ladyships consideration . ii. first then i consider that the conduct of human life must be to the end of human life , which is the same with the end of man , which is happiness . this conduct therefore must be and and necessarily is , in gross to happiness . but now whereas there are two faculties or powers of man , by the right ordering of which this happiness is to be attain'd , vnderstanding and will , therefore more immediately and distinctly , this conduct of human life is in order to the government and exercise of these two faculties , the due regulation of which is the immediate end , to which human life is to be conducted . there is therefore a double conduct of human life , intellectual and moral . iii. as to the moral conduct of human life , i do not intend at present to spend any reflections upon it . not because 't is unexceptionable , but because 't is too obnoxious , the general impertinence and irregularity of it being too open and exposed , to need any . and besides 't is a butt , that has been shot at so often , ever since preaching and writing has been in the world , that 't is now so thick-set with holes , that there is scarce room left to fasten a new arrow in it . 2. the undue and irregular method of prosecuting what is really perfective of it . 3. the too importunate and over-earnest pursuit after knowledge in general . these are the three cardinal irregularities , i have observ'd in the intellectual conduct of human life , and upon each of these i shall bestow a reflection . vii . the business of this first reflection shall be to tax the general conduct of human life , for placing learning and knowledge , in such things as are little or nothing perfective of the understanding . this i confess to be a charge of more than ordinary severity and boldness ; because it fastens an imputation of folly upon the learned order ( for with them only is my present concern ) and not only so , but also in that very thing wherein they think their wisdom and intellectual accomplishment consists , and upon which they value themselves above the rest of mankind . to question their conduct in any thing else , would be but a trivial charge , and such as they would not only readily pardon , but acknowledge ; it being a common thing with learned men not only to own , but studiously to affect ignorance in things besides their profession , as in secular business , the common affairs of life , the mysteries of trades and the like . but to censure them as defective in that one thing they pretend to , to make that their blind-side where they think they see clearest ; to maintain that they are not only not really wise and knowing , but that generally they don't so much as know what true knowledge is , and that they generally place it in such things as contribute little or nothing to the perfection of that , whereby they really excel the brutes , and would be thought to excel the common sort of men ; this is so high , and so disobliging a charge , that i fear those who from the force of what shall be here urg'd , may be convinc'd of the truth of it , will hardly forgive the boldness of it . viii . but as high a charge as it is , i question not but that it may be , and will be here made good . and that it may appear to be true , we will first of all by way of address or preparation , consider what antecedent grounds of probability there are , that men should generally place learning and knowledge in such things as are little or nothing perfective of the rational part ; and then in the second place we will proceed directly to prove that they do so . ix . as to the first , your ladyship cannot be so little acquainted either with hidden springs , or outward workings of humane nature , as not to have observ'd that however strong and uuiversal is the desire of knowledge , yet men are generally more in love with the fame and reputation of it , than with the thing it self . there are indeed here and there a few humble retired souls that are otherwise disposed , and like your ladyship are so far from loving the fame and credit of knowledge before knowledge it self , that they don't love it at all , but are content to court wisdom privately , and enjoy their own light in the dark . for it may be they consider that be their attainments what they will , fame is a thing of infinite uncertainty and contingency , that it depends more upon the humours of men , or some more secret unaccountable fate , than upon real excellency and merit , that some have the luck to be popular and cry'd up for nothing , when in the mean while others that are really and highly deserving can scarce keep their heads above contempt ; that the world is seldom just to true merit , and that nothing is weigh'd in a falser ballance than real excellency , whether moral or intellectual ; and that there is little reason to expect it should ever be otherwise as long as envy and ignorance hold the scales . then again it may be they consider with themselves , that suppose true worth were secure of reputation , yet what a poor slender good is it ! for what is it to be talk'd of , or pointed at ? should a man be never so popular the antipodes will never hear of him , or if they do , what is he the better for what is said of him there ? and should his fame , like the sun , travael round the whole globe , besides that he is but master of a point when he has all , he can enjoy no more of it but just what he hears , which is inconsiderable . and yet as inconsiderable as it is , 't is like to be his whole portion . for as for posthumous glory , it comes too late to be any thing valuable . he will either not be sensible of it , or despise it . for certainly it must needs be mightily beneath the improvements of a separate state to put any value upon the injudicious praises of poor mortals here below . or suppose that a deceas'd spirit could take any delight in reflecting upon the fame he has left behind him , yet 't is to be considered that the fashion of this world passes away , that those in whose praises he outlives himself , must also shortly dye , and that then his fame will have a funeral , as well as himself . these perhaps , or such like considerations , may prevail with your ladyship and a few more thinking persons , to have but a very cold and indifferent regard for the reputation of learning and knowledge : but as for the generality of mankind it must be own'd that they are fond of it to a strange degree , and are more concern'd to be accounted wise and learned , than really to be so . otherwise i question whether our libraries would be so full as they are . x. but now , tho the generality of men be so passionately and keenly set upon the fame of being learned and knowing , yet ( so little hath nature design'd to gratify this ambitious humour ) there are but a very few that have either a genius and inclination for learning it self , or a capacity of attaining to it . not an inclination , because there is a great variety in the speculative , as well as moral inclinations of men , one being naturally disposed to this sort of study , and another to that , whereas true knowledge whatever it be ( which shall be consider'd in its due place ) is of one determinate kind or nature in general , and consequently must require a certain peculiar frame and disposition of mind . not a capacity , because the generality of men are known to have but indifferent intellectuals , suited to the exigencies of common life , when as true knowledge ( what ever it be ) must be supposed to be a thing of uncommon difficulty , and the study of it a work fit only for sublimer wits , the more elevated and awaken'd part of mankind . xi . now put these two things together , that almost all men would fain be thought learned and knowing , and that there is but here and there one that is naturally made and fitted for true knowledge , and then consider what is like to be the result of this complication . why , the latter few may succeed well in the search of what they were naturally qualified for , and having attain'd to a competency of true knowledge , such as is perfective of the understanding , they find themselves under no temptation to place it in any thing else , or to bring into credit any other sort of knowledge . because having arrived so far , they are either wise enough to undervalue the fame of being learned , or else despair not of attaining it by their proficiency in true knowledge . here therefore they take up their rest . xii . but now what shall we do with the others ? are they to be perswaded that they are not of a make for the study and attainment of learning ? you 'll find it tough work to convince them of that . but suppose it possible that they could be made sensible that they are not like to commence very learned and knowing , yet all the world shall never be able to perswade them to lay aside that natural itch of being so accounted . but you 'll say , tho this inclination be too natural and inbred to be quite laid aside , yet there 's hopes it may be govern'd . no nor that neither . they must put in for the prize , and 't is in vain to disswade them from it . but they must despair of ever winning it in a fair way , being supposed not able to reach the tree of knowledge . true. they have therefore but one way left , and that is , to turn the tables , and cry up something or other for learning which they are capable of . no matter whether it deserve that name , that is , whether it be really perfective of the rational part or no , 't is enough if they can reach it . for those that can't compass true riches , and yet will have the name and credit of it , are put upon the necessity of coyning and counterfeiting . xiii . and truly this supposition seems to me so very reasonable , that were experience altogether silent in the case , and were i utterly unacquainted with the state of learning in the world , yet if i had a draught given me of human nature , and were told how much the ambition of being esteem'd as learned and knowing exceeds both the desire and the ability to be so , and were then ask'd what i thought would be the intellectual conduct of human life , i should without any further enquiry conclude that in all probability men would generally place learning and knowledge in such things as signifie little or nothing to the perfection of the understanding . xiv . but from grounds of probability that they should do so , let us proceed to prove directly that they do so . now in this charge there is something supposed , and something asserted . the supposition is that there are some things , the knowledge of which is little or nothing perfective of the understanding . the assertion is , that learning is generally placed in the knowledge of such things . the proof of the supposition will ingage my pen upon the discussion of a very gurious and weighty question , wherein the perfection of the understanding does consist , or what it is that is perfective of the understanding ? which when we have duly fix'd and stated , we shall then have a certain measure to go by in the proof of the assertion . xv. to the question then i answer , that the perfection of the understanding , as that of the will , is either formal or objective . the formal perfection of the understanding , as that of the will , is no other than its exercise or operation , which is thinking and perception , as that of the other is willing and chusing . according to the vulgar maxim , that the perfection of every thing is its operation , which must be understood only of the formal perfection . the objective perfection of the understanding is truth , as that of the will is good. the result of these two perfections joyn'd together , is what in the understanding we call knowledge , and what in the will we call vertue . xvi . our concern is not at present with the formal , but with the objective perfection of the understanding . this we have said in general to be truth , as that of the will is good. and thus far there is neither difficulty , nor controversie . all therefore that further remains to be here considerd , is , what truth that is which is the objective perfection of the understanding , or , what truth that is , in the knowledge of which the perfection of the understanding does consist , xvii . now since there is so great a proportion and correspondence between the understanding and the will , and the perfection of each , the first entrance we shall make upon the resolution of this question shall be to consider , what good that is which is the objective perfection of the will , or , what good that is in the desiring and embracing of which the perfection of the will does consist . which being determin'd , will afford at least a fair ground and occasion , tho not an infallible measure for the determination of the other . xviii . here then 't will be necessary to premise a consideration of the kinds of good . the most general distribution of which i conceive to be into these two , necessary and contingent good . by necessary good i understand that which cannot but be good , that which is always and immutably good . and this comprizes under it the good of the end which is desireable for it self , commonly called pleasant good . and the good of the means , which has an immutable connexion with it , and is desirable for the other , commonly call'd profitable good. by contingent good i understand that which may , or may not be good , and is good , whenever it is so , only upon a positive account , because enjoyn'd by the will of a competent authority . this can never be the good of the end , or a self-desirable good ; nor can it be such a good of the means as has a natural and immutable connexion with it ; but is always an arbitrary and mutable means . xix . this being briefly premised , i shall venture to assert that that good which is the objective perfection of the will is necessary good. either that which is self-desirable , as god the universal , or any other particular pleasant good . or else that which has an immutable connexion with it , as moral good . as for contingent good , that is no otherwise perfective of the will , than in the force and vertue of the necessary good . for obedience to a positive law is no otherwise a vertue , than as 't is included in some general natural law , whereof 't is a contingent instance . which is also the ground commonly assign'd by casuists , why human laws oblige in conscience . according to that of aquinas , lex humana obligat in conscientia , quatenus participat legem aeternam & naturalem . an human law obliges in conscience as much as it partakes of the eternal and natural law. that is , as far as it is founded , or relies upon the immutable will of god and the dictate of natural reason . xx. this is too plain to need much proof , though not so plain but that it may be demonstrated . if then a reason be demanded why the objective perfection of the will is only necessary , not contingent good , 't will be sufficient to say , that that only is perfective of the will , which naturally , and of it self , makes it happy , and wherein she can acquiesce with satisfaction and delight . but this is only necessary good , that which is essentially , intrinsically , and immutably good , either as the end , or as having a natural connexion with it , either of which involves happiness . as for contingent good , that is supposed to be of it self indifferent as to happiness , and tho by positive ordination it may be made a condition of it , yet still it contributes to it only as an arbitrary means , which has no inward goodness in it self , and whose whole moral excellency is deriv'd from some general law of reason , whereof 't is an instance by accident , and in vertue whereof it obliges . thus moses's striking the rock , had nothing morally good or perfective of the will in it , but only as 't was an instance of that general law of obeying the divine will in all things . nor did the vertue of moses consist , properly and strictly speaking , in striking the rock , but in obeying god by striking the rock . xxi . by this it appears what good that is , in the desiring and embracing of which the moral perfection of the will does properly and ultimately consist . that it is necessary , not contingent good . whence we may take instruction how to state the perfection of the understanding , which we shall do by following the same common measure . first then be it here also premised , that as in relation to the will , all good is either necessary or contingent , so in relation to the understanding , all truth is either necessary or contingent . for besides the immediateness of the opposition , which is contradictory , i further consider , that that must be the adaequate division of truth which is of being , truth being a property of being , and such a one , as tho formally and abstractly different ( for the subject must never be included in the precise reason of the property ) is yet materially , and concretely the same with it . but now necessary and contingent is the adequate division of being , therefore also of truth . xxii . by necessary truth i understand that which cannot but be true , that which is always and immutably true. such is god among simple truths , who is immutably what he is , and all the divine ideas which ( as i have elsewhere abundantly explain'd it ) are the very essence of god , as variously imitable or participable , thus or thus . such also among complex truths are all propositions of eternal truth , whether absolute or hypothetical , with all their regular inferences and conclusions , which ( as i have also elsewhere shewn ) are nothing else but the divine ideas themselves as they respect each other according to their several immutable habitudes and combinations . xxiii . by contingent truth i understand that which may or may not be true , that whose truth depends not upon the essence of god. ( that ground and pillar of all necessary truth ) but only upon his meer will and free pleasure , either decreeing or permitting . such among simple truths are all created beings , the whole ectypal world , and all things in it , which tho made according to the eternal and immutable patterns of the divine ideas or archetypal world , yet in themselves are temporary and mutable . such also among complex truths are all those propositions the terms of which have no essential or immutable connexion with each other , but are so and so combined and related , meerly by the decree or permission of him , who is the author of whatever is besides himself . xxiv . under the first order of truths are comprehended all those things which are the matter of those arts and sciences which are built upon stable and immoveable foundations , which depend not upon the system of the present world , but were antecedent to it , and might have been study'd before 't was made , and according to which the world it self was made , such as theology , metaphysics , morality , geometry , &c. together with all those unchangeable rules and measures of reason and consequence which are to be used about them all , which is the subject of that art or science we call logic. under the second order are comprehended all matters of fact , all temporary events , all natural or artificial effects , &c. which are the matter of all arbitrary and mutable sciences ; as history , chronology , knowledge of tongues , &c. which began with this mundan system , and stand or fall with it . xxv . now as that good which is primely and properly perfective of the will is necessary good , so following the same proportion i shall not doubt to assert , that that truth which is primely and properly perfective of the understanding is also necessary truth . and as contingent good is no otherwise perfective of the will , than in the force and vertue of the necessary good ( as was above explain'd ) so likewise contingent truth , is no otherwise perfective of the understanding than in the force and vertue of necessary truth , that is , of the divine ideas wherein 't is contain'd . as for example , when i speculate some particular artificial triangle which is a contingent simple truth , it is no otherwise perfective of my understanding than as it is beheld in its necessary and immutable nature , or ( which is all one ) in the divine idea . and thus again when i form a proposition concerning this triangle , by ascribing to it some property or other , which is a contingent complex truth , this again is no otherwise perfective of my understanding than as it belongs to , and is beheld in the nature of a triangle in common , which is necessary and immutable , being no other than an idea , or a determinate mode of the divine omniformity . so that at length the perfection of the understanding is resolv'd into the knowledge of necessary truth , which is its only objective perfection ; that which is contingent being no way perfective of it , but only in vertue of the other . xxvi . i am ( madam ) very sensible how strange and paradoxical this way of philosophizing will seem to those who are either unaddicted to meditation in general , or not conversant in theories of this kind , and therefore for their sakes , rather than for any inevidence of the argument , i will give some proof and confirmation of it , which i will so order , that it shall be an explanation at the same time . i will therefore first shew that 't is so , and secondly , how and why 't is so . that it is so i prove thus : first , i suppose that god was once when there was nothing besides god. again , i suppose that as the being of god did go before all other being in order of time , so in order of nature it was antecedent even to the will of creating , putting , or permitting any thing . again , i suppose that there was therefore then no other truth but necessary truth , that is , the divine ideas with their several habitudes and complications . i suppose again , that therefore god must be consider'd as knowing then only these necessary truths . and yet i suppose again , that god was as perfect then as he is now ; and consequently , that the divine vnderstanding was as perfect then as now , the nature of god requiring not only that he should be absolutely perfect , but that he should be so in himself . whence i infer , that therefore the whole perfection of the divine understanding is to be resolv'd into the sole knowledge of necessary truths , and that the knowledge of contingent truth gives no perfection to it , any otherwise than as 't is beheld in that which is necessary , as was said before . xxvii . from this process of reasoning , i presume 't is sufficiently evident , that the objective perfection of the divine vnderstanding is only necessary truth , which i take in the first place to be a strong ground of presumption , that the perfection of human vnderstanding does also consist in the same . but to make it further plain that it does so , i suppose again , that nothing were to exist but only god , and one intelligent being ; and that this intelligent being had the full and perfect fruition of god. upon this supposition i enquire , whether this intelligent being would be perfectly happy or no ? without all question he would , as enjoying an all-sufficient good. well , if so , then he must be perfectly happy in his vnderstanding . and yet 't is most certain , that he could then have the knowledge of very little more than necessary truth ; for all that he could possibly know besides , would be only that he himself did exist , and that he knew these necessary truths , and that he was happy in the knowledge of them , and the like . and lest the knowledge of such contingencies should be thought any accumulation to his happiness , we will carry our hypothesis a little further , by supposing that this intelligent being were not to attend to any of his own perfections , or to any of those few contingent truths resulting from them , but were only to contemplate god and the divine ideas ; and then i demand whether his understanding would be sufficiently perfected or no ? 't is necessary to answer in the affirmative , whence 't is also as necessary to conclude , that the only objective perfection of our understanding is necessary truth . xxviii . this i think sufficient to prove that 't is so . i shall now briefly explain the mode of it , by shewing how and why 't is so ; and i account for it after this manner . necessary truth is the same with the divine ideas ; and accordingly plato , i remember , calls science a participation of ideas , and the divine ideas are the very essence of god , as 't is variously imitable according to its omniformity : necessary truth therefore is no other than the essence of god , the very substance of the divinity . more particularly , it is the same with the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the second person in the holy triad , who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as philo speaks , the archetypal seal , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the intellectual world , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the archetypal paradigme , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the idea of ideas . whom also the scripture represents as the wisdom of his father , and as the light of the world , and who inlightens every man that comes into it , not only efficiently ( as 't is vulgarly understood ) but also formally , he himself being the truth , and the light , in which we see all things . xxix . these things ( madam ) i only hint to you , referring you for further satisfaction to your deservedly admired monsieur malebranche in his de la recherche de la verité , and to a treatise of mine call'd reason and religion ; where i have purposely treated of the divine ideas , and of our seeing all things in them : in which however whatever is deficient shall be supplied in another latin treatise of a larger compass , now under my hands , and which i shall communicate to the world e're long ( if god please to continue my life and health ) under the title of theoria mundi idealis , sive metaphysica platonica . xxx . however , lest i should be thought to proceed upon a precarious ground , i will here give you one short and evident demonstration that necessary truth is the very essence of god , and then advance . that god is the cause of whatever is besides himself , or that whatever is , is either god or the effect of god , is a clear and acknowledg'd principle . upon which i thus argue : necessary truth is either god , or the effect of god. but it is not the effect of god , therefore it is no other than god himself . xxxi . that it is not the effect of god , is evident from the many absurdities that would follow upon that supposition . for first , god would be then a necessary agent ; for if necessary truth be an effect , 't is a necessary effect , and a necessary effect must have a necessary cause . again , god would not only be a necessary agent , but also ( which is worse ) an vnintelligent agent . the consequence is unavoidable , for if truth be the effect of god , then antecedently to the effecting of it , there was no truth , and consequently no knowledge . again , if necessary truth be the effect of god , then the perfection of the divine understanding must be supposed to depend upon something that is not god ; nay , upon something created by god. 't will follow again , that god has made something which he cannot destroy . and lastly , to add no more , if necessary truth be the effect of god , then there will be something necessary , immutable , and eternal , &c. besides god. the consequences are all plain , and so are the absurdities . the last of which appeared so great to the excellent monsieur poiret , a stiff opposer of your beloved malebranche , and of the ideal philosophy , that he urges this as one argument against the very being of necessary truth , because then there would be something necessary besides god , not considering that this necessary truth is really one and the same with god himself . and this alone puts by the force of his argument against the being of necessary truth , which however is sufficiently conclusive to the purpose we now aim at , that necessary truth is not the effect of god. for if it were , then his absurdity would come in , and there would be something necessary besides god. since then necessary truth is not the effect of god , it remains by vertue of the premised disjunction , that it must be no other than the very substance and essence of the deity . xxxii . i further consider , that the essence of god is intimately and immediately united to the mind of man ; this is plain from scripture , which tells us that in god is our life , our motion , and our being . and from philosophy , which assures us , that what pervades all things , must needs be immediately united with every thing . and for this , you have the authority of your excellent malebranche , who therefore calls god the place of spirits , as space is the place of bodies . xxxiii . now upon these two suppositions , that necessary truth is the same with god himself , and that the essence of god is immediately united to the mind of man , 't is easie to conceive how and why necessary truth should be the objective perfection of our understanding ; since to make an object perfective of the faculty , nothing else is requisite , than that it be its proper good , and that it be intimately present to it . and this will also sufficiently give us to understand that contingent truth cannot be the objective perfection of the mind ; first , because that is a created being , whereas god alone is our proper good. and secondly , because 't is without us , and cannot be immediately united to our minds , without which condition , were it never so perfective otherwise , it could contribute nothing to the perfection of our understandings . xxxiv . and thus have i given a full resolution to that curious and important question which the proof of my supposition ingaged me upon , and which is to be the measure of what follows in this reflection . it is plain from hence , that there are some things the knowledge whereof is little or nothing perfective of the understanding . for as i have shewn , 't is not contingent but necessary truth , wherein the perfection of the understanding does consist . whence it follows that true learning ought to be placed in the knowledge of necessary truth , in the comprehension of those arts and sciences whose foundations are not arbitrary , but stable and immutable , and in understanding the eternal and unchangeable laws and measures of reason and consequence . he therefore is the truly learned and knowing man , who has furnish'd his mind with bright and clear ideas , lodg'd them orderly and regularly in his head , and settled the relations and consequences of one to another . he that is able to think clearly and distinctly ( for so much a man knows , as he distinctly understands , and no more ) to judge truly and solidly , and to reason dependently and consequentially . in short , he that sees most of the divine ideas , is most familiarly conversant in the intelligible world , and has the largest and the clearest view of the field of truth . this i hold to be learning , and intellectual perfection , and besides what arguments i have alledged in behalf of this hypothesis ; it is further confirmed by the authority of plato , when he makes the happiness or perfection of man ( for 't is all one ) to consist in the contemplation of ideas . xxxv . but notwithstanding the unquestionable certainty of the premises , this is not that measure which the generality of the world has thought fit to proceed by . learning is generally placed in the knowledge of contingent , not of necessary truth . for your ladyship very well knows that the world does not esteem him a learned man whose learning has clear'd his understanding , who is arrived to clearness and distinctness of conception , and is a thorough master of notion and discourse . no , 't will cost great pains , great labour of mind , and anxiety of thinking to arrive to this pitch . nor will all the pains in the world do , unless a man be naturally made for it , unless he be of a notional complexion , and has had his head cast in a metaphysical mould . whereupon this attainment is like to be the lot of a very few . this therefore must not be learning , but something else must , that lies more within common reach , tho of no real moment to the perfection of the understanding . such ( as i have shewn ) are contingent truths , and yet learning is generally placed in the knowledge of these . xxxvi . for first , 't is reckon'd a notable point of learning to understand variety of languages . this alone gives a man a title to learning without one grain of sense ; and on the other side , let a man be an angel for notion and discourse , yet unless he can express the same thoughts in variety of words , he may go for a rational , but will by no means be esteem'd a learned man. and this brings to my mind a passage which i met with not long since in london , where being in company with an ingenious french man , i ask't him of what repute m. malebranche was with the learned in france ? he told me , that he was look'd upon as a great master of notion and speculation , but as a man of no great learning . i ask'd him , why ? because , said he , he understands but few languages . how much that excellent authors talent may lie that way i am not concern'd . but whatever it be , the most learned of them all must give me leave to say , that i would rather be master of a quarter of his sense , than of all the languages that may be form'd out of the alphabet . but is it not a strange thing that so much stress should be laid upon such a triflle ? for what am i the better for being able to tell what 't is a clock in several languages ? what does this signifie to the perfection of my understanding ? words are purely in order to thought and sense , and therefore are of no further value than as they serve as helps either to learn , or to communicate the other . to affect them therefore for themselves , is to turn the means into the end , than which nothing is more absurd . and yet this vain peice of pedantry has prevail'd all the world over , and with some to that degree , that they have confounded ideas with words , and have made all science to terminate in the latter . thus the philosophers of the nominal way , and particularly mr. hobbs who makes reason to be nothing else but sequela nominum , a well order'd train of words . never certainly was there a grosser peice of idolatry , nor a plainer argument of the great degeneracy of mankind . and tho all the multipliers of tongues are not comprehended under this latter charge , yet it may concern them to consider , how great a folly it must needs be , to place learning in that , which is one of the greatest curses upon earth , and which shall utterly cease in heaven . xxxvii . again , it passes for an extraordinary part of learning to understand history , that is , in other words , to know what a company of silly creatures , call'd men , have been doing for almost this 6000 years . now what is my understanding the perfecter for knowing this ? i deny not but that there are some matters of fact , as the more remarkable turns of ecclesiastical history , together with the greater revolutions of the civil world , that may be of moment to be known , not that the knowledge of them as such is learning , or perfective of the understanding , but because by discovering to us the conduct of divine providence they supply us with occasions of adoring and glorifying the wisdom and goodness of god. i am not therefore against the knowing these things , but only i would not have men think themselves the wiser or more learned for such knowledge . for 't is one thing to say that a thing deserves to be known , and another to say that 't is learning or wisdom to know it . for a thing may deserve to be known , not as perfecting the understanding , but meerly as touching upon our interest . i grant therefore that it may be of consequence to know some historical passages , if we are any way concerned in them , and so it may to know the clock has struck one , if i have appointed an assignation at that time ; but sure the bare naked theory of the clock's having struck one , can add but little to the stock of my intellectual perfection . the most trivial matter of fact in the world is worth knowing , if i have any concern depending upon it ; and the greatest without that is utterly insignificant . so that 't is not from the perfecting of our vnderstanding , but from the relation they have to our interest , that these things deserve to be known . xxxviii . this is sufficiently plain from the measure we have premised , by which no truth is perfective of the understanding but only necessary truth . but to address my self more convincingly to the great magnifiers of history , i shall only desire their answer to this one question . suppose such and such matters of fact , on the knowledge of which they found their title to learning , and perhaps , glory more in the knowing them , than the actors themselves did in the doing them . suppose , i say , such matters of fact had never been done ; suppose fabius had never weather'd out hannibal by delays ; nor cyrus took babylon by draining the river into the ditches , what loss or diminution would this have been to the perfection of their understandings ? they cannot say it would have been any . and why then should the knowing them now they are done , be reckon'd as an intellectual improvement ? and yet we find that 't is so , and that men study these things not only for their use ( for that i allow ) but for their meer theory , placing learning in such history , which has nothing to commend it but only that it tells you such and such things were done . of this impertinent sort is the greatest part of the roman and grecian history , which ( had not the world voted it for learning ) would no more concern a man to know , than that a bird has dropt a feather upon the pyrenoean mountains . xxxix . again , it goes for a notable piece of learning to understand chronology , to be able to adjust the intervals and distances of time , to know when such an action was done , when such a famous man flourish'd , and who and who were contemporary , and the like . now i deny not , but that while men live in this world , they may be concern'd to have some acquaintance with these things , by reason of some interest or other that depends upon it . it may therefore , i say , for some purposes , be convenient to know that . for instance , there is a twofold aera ( or date ) of the victory at actium , the one reckon'd from the fight at the promontory of actium , according to the account of dio and xiphilinus ; the other from the taking of alexandria , and the death of cleopatra , according to ptolemy , iosephus , eusebius , and censorinus . but however , concerning this may be , with respect to its usefulness , yet certainly as to any intellectual perfection that accrues by it , it must needs be a very unedifying stuffage of mind ; and yet 't is counted a great accomplishment and enrichment of it . xl. another thing there is which passes for wonderful learning , which i cannot well reduce either to necessary or contingent truth , for indeed it does not belong to truth at all , and that is our sophistical way of disputation . and indeed it may well be call'd so , for as 't is generally manag'd , 't is nothing but meer quibbling and jesting , not arguing but punning . for suppose the question be , whether he that has faith shall be saved ? no says the opponent , if the damn'd have faith , then not every one that has faith shall be saved ; but the damn'd have faith. therefore , &c here 't is plain that the word faith , tho it has something in common in both propositions , yet according to the intire idea signifies one thing in one proposition , and another in another . and why then is not the whole proceedure to be rejected as idle and impertinent ? as for downright fallacy and equivocation where there is a manifest ambiguity ( as between dog and dog , one signifying a celestial sign , and the other a terrestial animal ) this is every where despised and laught at as unbecoming both the acumen and the gravity of a disputant . and we think we have sufficiently discharged our hands of such an argument , by crying out that these are four terms in the syllogism . but now i would fain know whether it be not the same to all real purposes in the foremention'd instance , which is after the common way of our scholastic disputation ? is not faith and faith there , as much an ambiguity as dog and dog here ? for my part i can perceive but this only difference , that dog and dog have nothing in common but the name , whereas faith and faith have some generical part wherein they agree . but what does this mend the matter ? for tho there be some generical agreement , yet take 'em according to their whole ideas , that is , take the generical part with its contracting difference , and 't is plain that they signifie two different things , and consequently that there is really as great an ambiguity here as there . and this we plainly confess when we come to distinguish . for what is a distinction but a pointing out of an ambiguity ? what is it else but to say , that such a thing is true in this sense , but not in that , true in that sense wherein the point of the question is not concern'd , but not in that wherein it is . no ? why then , notwithstanding the generical agreement the procedure is as fallacious and impertinent as when the question being about star-dog , the opposition is about land-dog . and yet ( such is the inconsistency of human judgment ) the one is counted trifling , and the other serious arguing . whereas indeed no arguing can be so , but where the terms of the question are first defined ( as is done in geometry ) and then always used according to the first stated sense . all disputing any otherwise than so , must necessarily be nothing else but meer punning , only much worse than what is in common use , because 't is punning when a man pretends to be serious . and yet this is made a considerable part of our academical education and learning . and to this i add this further remark , that 't is reckon'd a notable excellence to be able to spin out an argument to a great length , and he is counted the best arguer that can thus pun longest . whereas indeed did a man speak to the purpose , brevity would be his greatest excellence . xli . there are many other things which the unaccountable humour of the world has turn'd up for learning , which ignorance will never be the better for , and which wisdom does not need . thus 't is counted learning to have tumbled over a multitude of books , especially if great ones , and old ones , and obscure ones , but most of all , if manuscripts ; the recovery of one of which is reckon'd so much added to the commonwealth of learning , as they call it . a well-read man signifies the very same as a learned man in most mens dictionaries , and by well-read they dont mean one that has read well , that has clear'd and improv'd his understanding by his reading , but only one that has read a great deal , tho perhaps he has puzzled and confounded his notions by doing so . thus again it goes for learning , to be acquainted with mens opinions , especially of the ancients , to know what this or that philosopher held , what this or that author says , tho perhaps he says nothing but what is either absurd , or obviously true. thus for instance , what can be more absurd than that fancy of empedocles , that there are two semi-circles compassing betwixt them the earth , one whereof was composed of fire , the other of air , and that the former made the day , and the latter night ? and yet to know this is learning . and what again is more obviously true , than that grave doctrine of aristotle , that privation must go before the introduction of the form in all generation ? and yet 't is learning to know that he taught thus , tho it be a thing so plain , and so near the surface , that a child can't miss of it . to know the thing is nothing , because so plain and easie , but to know that aristotle held it , that 's the learning . nay , to instance in a matter of greater difficulty , tho i know very well , and am able to demonstrate the grounds of the atomical philosophy , or the motion of the earth , or the circulation of the blood , yet i shall not be admitted into the order of the learned , unless i am able to tell that moscus the phoenician invented the first , and that democritus and leucippus afterwards improved it , and that the two latter owe their discovery to copernicus and harvey . so much more learned an atchievement is it to know opinions than things ; and accordingly , those are reckon'd the most learned authors , who have given the greatest specimens of this kind of knowledge . thus is picus mirandula more admired for the examination he has made of the doctrine of the pagans , than any of them were for what they deliver'd ; and plutarch has got more credit from the history he gives of their opinions , in the 2d tome of his works , than from any of his rational and moral discourses . and were he not accounted learned for the former , i question whether the latter ( tho far more excellent than they are ) would ever have given him that title . xlii . now ( madam ) what an hard and unreasonable imposition is this , that tho i am able to think and write never so much like an angel my self , yet i must not be accounted a man of learning , unless i can tell what every whimsical writer has said before me ! and how hard will this fall upon those , whose lot is to breathe in the last ages of the world , who must be accountable for all the whims and extravagancies of so many centuries ? and yet this is made so great a part of learning , that the learning of most men lies in books rather than in things ; and among authors , where one writes upon things , there are twenty that writes upon books . nay , some have carried this odd humour on so far , that 't is thought learning to know the very titles of books , and their several editions , with the time and place , when and where they were printed . and i have met with several my self , that have valued themselves not a little upon this mechanical faculty , tho they knew no more of what was in them , than they do of what is written in the rolls of destiny . xliii . from this placing of learning in the knowledge of books , proceeds that ridiculous vanity of multiplying quotations , which is also reckon'd another piece of learning , tho they are used so unseasonably and impertinently , that there can be no other end in them , but only to shew that the author has read such a book . and yet 't is no such convincing evidence of that neither , it being neither new nor difficult , for a man that 's resolv'd upon it , to quote such authors as he never read nor saw. and were it not too odious , as well as obvious a truth , i could name to your ladiship , some of those author-mongers , who yet pass for men of shrewd learning , and vast reading . xliv . these , and many other such things ( for 't were endless to reckon up all ) are by the majority of the world voted for learning , and in these we spend our education , our study , and our time , tho they are all of them contingent truths , that are not perfective of the understanding ( nothing being so but only necessary truths , or the divine ideas , the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the word and wisdom of the father ) and also most of them impertinent and unconcerning ones . so that in short , the charge of this reflection amounts to thus much , that learning is generally placed in the knowledge of such things , which neither the intellectual perfection , nor any other interest of man is concern'd to know . the end of the first reflection . the second reflection . wherein the general conduct of human life is tax'd , for using undue and irregular methods , in prosecuting what is really perfective of the vnderstanding . i. in the preceding reflection , the intellectual conduct of human life was censured for the general misplacing of learning , for placing it in such things as are not perfective of the understanding . in the present reflection supposing it to be free from that fault , we shall consider it as chargeable with another , namely , with an undue and irregular method of prosecuting what is really perfective of it . the first was an errour about the end ; this second is an errour about the means , which are the two hinges upon which all prudence , and all imprudence turns . ii. that the truth of this charge may appear , we must here also propose a measure , whereby we may proceed , as we did in the former reflection . and as there we took upon us to determine what that is which is objectively perfective of the vnderstanding , so we must here consider what is the right method of prosecuting what is so . which being stated will be a measure to us in this , as the other was in the former reflection . iii. i design not here a just and particular treatise concerning the method of study or inquiry after truth , this province being already professedly undertaken , and excellently adorn'd by two as great masters of thinking as ever were , or are like to be in the world , cartesius and malebranche , of both which your ladyship is so much a mistress , that a further undertaking of this kind would be as needless to your better information , as to the argument it self , after the management of it under such excellent hands . however something i must say , it being impossible to shew that wrong methods are used in this grand inquest , but by predefining which is the right . this therefore i shall do , but briefly only , and in general . iv. since therefore that truth which is perfective of the understanding is necessary truth , and since this necessary truth is the same with the divine ideas ( both which being already proved , are here supposed ) following the thred of the same hypothesis , i find it necessary to affirm , that the right and indeed only method of enquiry after that truth which is perfective of the understanding is by consulting the ideal world , where only it is , or the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , who says of himself that he is not only the truth , but also the way . v. here i suppose two things , first that this divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or ideal world is intimately united with , and presential to the mind . secondly that we see and understand all things in him , that he is our light and our wisdom , the light by which we see , and the light which we see , that he is the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the inward word and substantial conception of our minds , as he is of the father , and that in this sense he inlightens every man that comes into the world. this i need not prove now , because i have done it professedly elsewhere , only i shall pass one necessary remark upon the manner of our being inlighten'd by the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , who may be said to inlighten us in a double respect , either fundamentally and potentially by putting us into a capacity of illumination , by his intimate union and presence with us , or else effectually and actually , when we attend to his divine light , which is always present to us , tho we are not so to it . in the former sense he inlightens every man , in the latter only those who duly consult him and attend to him . vi. for i consider , that the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is an inlighteness in the same proportion as he is a redeemer . now he redeems us either by putting us in a salvable and reconcilable state , which is a redemption vniversal incondionate and antecedent , or by actually reconciling and saving us , which depends upon , and is consequent to certain conditions , and is conferr'd only upon those who are qualify'd accordingly . and as his redemption is double , so is his illumination . he inlightens either by putting us in a state or possibility of illumination by being intimately present with us , and surrounding us with his divine ideal light , which is a benefit common to all , or by actually informing our understandings when we apply our selves with due attention to his all-diffused light , which is ever present to us , and to the whole creation , and shineth even in the darkness , tho the darkness comprehend it not . vii . and i was not a little glad to find the grounds of this distinction in the writings of that elevated heathen , hierocles , which i shall give you in the words of my own translation . this bright heathen commenting upon that mystical prayer of pythagoras , o father jupiter , either free all from their manifold evils , or else discover to all what daemon they use , moves this question , since they that know god and themselves are free from mortal passions ; why then are not all freed , since all are sufficiently assisted with the opportunities of this knowledge ? to which he first gives this general answer , because the greatest part of men embrace evil of their own accord , since they neither see nor hear neighbouring good . then a little after he is more particular in his account . since therefore ( says he ) that any thing may be shewn to any one , 't is necessary that the actions of two persons concur ( for how can you shew what you have a mind should be shewn , to a blind man , although you offer it to him a thousand times , or how can you shew to one that sees , if you offer nothing to his sight ) both these must be present , some good proposed by him that shews , and an eye capable of seeing in him to whom it is to be shewn ; so that from a visible object , and a faculty of seeing , may result a manifestation . this being so , let us suppose that all would be freed from evil , if their maker did shew to all the knowledge of his own nature , and what daemon they themselves use . but we find that all are not deliver'd from evil , it follows therefore that he does not make this discovery to all , but to those only who of their own accord endeavour to free themselves from evil , and voluntarily fix their eye upon what is shewn by the intention of contemplation . and again a little after , thus every illumination of god by the concurrence of our vision , becomes a discovery . viii . in all which process , this refined heathen supposes that god is ready on his part to inlighten all men ; nay , that he does inlighten them all so far as to put them in the way , and within the possibility of illumination , which then becomes actual and effectual when they yield due attention to the divine light. he does not indeed descend to so much nicety and particularity as to ascribe this illumination to the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or ideal world , but only to god in general , nor does he determine whether god does inlighten us only efficiently , by infusing acts or habits of knowledge ( as is more vulgarly held , than understood , and indeed is no way intelligible ) or formally by being himself the very formal light of our minds , and the immediate object of our knowledge . this i say he does not determine , nor do i cite him to this purpose , having sufficiently explain'd and establisht this theory elsewhere , but only to shew his concurrence with me in this distinction of the double illumination of god. ix . these supposals being premised , first , that that truth which is perfective of the understanding is necessary truth ; then secondly , that this necessary truth is the same with the divine ideas ; then thirdly , that the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or ideal world , is intimately united with , and praesential to the mind ; then fourthly , that we see and understand all things in him , and that 't is he that is our inlightner ; and that lastly , tho he inlightens all fundamentally and potentially , yet this illumination is not reduced to act , and made effectual , but by the intervening of some condition on our parts , which is duly to consult and apply our selves to him . from these premises the same conclusion which we touch't on before , necessarily and evidently follows , that the right and only method of enquiry after that truth which is perfective of the understanding , is to consult the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or ideal world. for this is the region of truth , and here are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge . this is that great and universal oracle lodged in every man's breast , whereof the antient vrim and thummim was an expressive type or emblem . this is reason , this is conscience , this is truth , this is that light within so darkly talk'd of , by some who have by their aukward , untoward , and vnprincipled way of representing it , discredited one of the noblest theorys in the world. but the thing in it self rightly understood is true , and if any shall yet call it quakerism , or euthusiasm , i shall only make this reply at present , that 't is such quakerism as makes a good part of st. iohn's gospel , and of st. austin's works . but to return , this i say is that divine oracle which we all may , and must consult , if we would inrich our minds with truth , that truth which is perfective of the understanding . and this is the true method of being truly wise . and this is no other method , than what is advised us by this divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the substantial wisdom of god. blessed is the man that heareth me , watching daily at my gates , waiting at the posts of my doors . and again says the same substantial wisdom , who so is simple , let him turn in hither . and again , i am the light of the world , he that follows me , or ( as the word more properly signifies ) he that consorts or keeps company with me , walketh not in darkness . this therefore is via intelligentiae , the way and method of true knowledge , to apply our selves to the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to consult the ideal world. x. thus in general . if now it be further demanded how this is to be done , i answer that there are three ways of doing it , and i can think of no more . the first is by attention . the second is by purity of heart and life . and the third is by prayer . upon each of which i shall bestow some few remarks , such as may rather give hints than full entertainment to your thoughts , because i know your ladyship loves to have something left to work out by your self in your own private meditations . which consideration has made me all along use less prolixity than the quaintness and weightiness of my argument would otherwise justify . xi . the first method assign'd is attention , or application of mind to the intelligible world , the world of truth . this is the same with thinking or speculating , which if intelligibly accounted for , will be found to be nothing else but the conversion of the mind to the ideal world , or omniformity of the divine essence ; which as it is the first , so is it also the directest and most compendicus method of science . for this is to go directly to the spring-head , to the lucid fountain of good , 't is to take hold of essential truth nakedly as it is in it self ( as a very contemplative person expresses it ) 't is to fix the eye of the mind upon the intellectual sun , upon him who is substantial truth , and the light of the world. which must needs be the most ready way to be inlightned . for the more heedfully we attend to the ideal world , the more we shall see and discover of it ; and not only so , but also more clearly distinguish what we do discover . for so a man that casts a short careless glance upon the galaxy , sees only a confused whiteness arising from the numerous mixture of little splendors , but when the same person fixes his eye with steadiness and delay of application , he begins to discern something more distinctly , a new star ever and anon arises under his inspection , not discover'd before , and still the longer and harder he looks , the more he discerns , till at length he has discover'd as much as he can well atttend to at once , and has satiated his faculty with the brightness and multitude of light. the application is as obvious , as the figure is pertinent , and therefore i shall only remark this one thing more upon this part , that this was the method of the first inventors of arts and sciences , who made their way into the coasts of learning by meer dint of thinking ; and further , that this is the very method that has been used by the greatest improvers of them ever since , such as bacon , boyle , descartes , galileus , harvey , mersennus , digby , malebranche , poiret , and ( whom i name with particular honour and reverence ) our excellent friend dr. more . all these must be allow'd , and i think are to be great improvers of learning , and that 't was by this method they did it . and i dare prophesie , that if ever any extraordinary advancement be for the future made in the world , 't will be done by thinking . xii . this as to thinking in general . but now as to the order of thinking , if your ladiship can be supposed to need any instruction about it , i cannot recommend you to a better tutor than your friend m. malebranche , in his second part of his sixth book of inquiry after truth , where he purposely describes the method of thinking , which you may remember he reduces to these few following laws . xiii . the first law is , that evidence be maintain'd in our reasonings . from this principle depends this general law concerning the matter of our studies , that we ought not to reason but only of those things whereof we have clear ideas , and by necessary consequence , that we ought always to begin with the most simple and easie things , and also to dwell long upon them , before we advance to the inquisition of things more complex and difficult . xiv . upon the same general principle , depend the laws concerning the manner whereby we are to proceed in the solution of questions . the first of which laws is this , that the state of the question to be solved is to be most distinctly conceived . besides , the ideas of the terms ought to be distinct that they may be compared with one another , and that the relations which are sought for may be known . xv. but when the relations of things to one another cannot be known by immediately comparing them , then the second law is , that we should employ our thoughts to find out one or more middle ideas , which we may use as a common measure to know by their help the relations that are between those things . and withal he advises that we should study to have those ideas clear and distinct , proportionably to the accuracy and numerousness of those relations which we endeavour to deprehend . xvi . but when the questions are difficult and require a long examination , then the third law is , that from the matter in hand all those things should be removed whose examination is not necessary to the discovery of the sought for truth . because the capacity of the mind is not to be without reason divided , but all its force is to be imploy'd about those things from which it may perceive light. and all those things which can be removed , and which being remov'd , the question remains intire ; they are the things that do not belong to the question . xvii . when the question is included within a few terms , then the fourth rule is , that the matter of our meditation is to be divided by parts , and those parts to be handled singly according to their natural order , by beginning with the more simple , that is , with those which include fewest relations . and that we should not pass on to the more complex , till the more simple be distinctly known , and render'd familiar . xviii . when by meditation these things become familiar to us , then the fifth rule is , that the ideas of all these are to be contracted , and disposed in the imagination , or to be written down in paper , that they may no longer fill the capacity of the mind . this rule , tho always useful , yet he makes it necessary only in the most difficult questions , which require a great capacity of mind . and he says withal , that the use of this and the following rules , is not to be accurately known but only in algebra . xix . when the ideas of all things necessary to be consider'd , are clear , familiar , contract , and orderly digested in the imagination , or exprest in paper ; then the sixth law is , that all things are to be compared or collated according to the laws of combination , alternately among one another , either by the sole intuition of the mind , or by the motion of the imagination , joyn'd with the intuition of the mind , or by the calculation of the pen joyn'd with the attention of the mind and of the imagination . xx. if none of all those relations which result from all those collations , be that which is sought after , then again from all those relations those are to be removed which are of no use to the solution of the question : and the others are to be made familiar , to be contracted , and to be orderly disposed in the imagination , or express'd in paper , and to be compared with each other , according to the laws of combination . and then we are to see whether the compound relation which is sought for be any one of all those compound relations which result from those new comparisons . xxi . if none of those found relatitions include the solution of the question , then again from all those relations , the unserviceable are to be cast away , the other are to be made familiar , &c. and by proceeding in this manner , the truth or relation sought for , be it never so complex , will at last be found , provided we are able sufficiently to extend the capacity of our mind , by contracting ideas , and that in all our operations we always attend to the end and scope which is to be arriv'd at . for in every step of this intellectual progress , we ought to have our eye perpetually fix'd upon the state of the question . to all which he adds one caution more , that we should beware lest we should sit down contented with a false light or appearance , and so be deceived . and that therefore our collations in order to the finding out the truth we look after , be so often repeated , till we can no longer with hold our assent without being secretly chid and reprehended by a certain master answering from within to our questions , that is to our labour , application of mind , and desire of heart . by which master within this admirable theorist can mean nothing else but the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or ideal world , that universal oracle of mankind , and of all the intelligent creation . this is a short view of those laws which the excellent m. malebranche has given concerning the method of thinking . and i believe if an angel had been ingaged in the undertaking , he could not have given better . they are all natural , clear , distinct , easie , and depending ; few enough not to burthen or distract the mind , and yet many enough to inform it . and therefore i shall not be guilty of so much presumption and impertinence as to prescribe any other , thinking it sufficient to consider and practice these . and so much for the first way of consulting the ideal world , which is by thinking . xxiii . the second way is by purity of heart and life . this i confess has a more immediate and special influence upon the knowledge of spiritual and moral truths , according to that of our saviour , if any man will do his will , he shall know of the doctrine , &c. and that of his prime apostle , the animal man perceiveth not the things of god , &c. but its efficacy is not confined here , but has a larger sphere of activity , and serves to the discovery even of all ideal or necessary truth . for as viciousness not only proceeds from ignorance , but also causes it , by besotting and clouding the understanding , so purity of heart and life not only proceeds from light and knowledge , but also produces it , and helps the soul to see more clearly and distinctly . hence the pythagoric and platonic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the method of purification and purgation so much talk'd of by perphyry , iamblichus , plotinus , and particularly by hierocles in his introduction to his noble comment , where he has these words , as a blear eye cannot behold a very bright object till it be purged , so a soul not yet clarify'd and refined by vertue is not qualify'd to gaze upon the beauty of truth . and the same method is no less recommended in scripture . wisdom will not enter into a polluted spirit , says the wise man. and says the angel to daniel , many shall be purify'd and made white , and none of the wicked shall understand , but the wise shall understand . and says the psalmist , i am wiser than the aged because i keep thy commandments . and to this purpose also is that of our lord to be understood , he that follows me , that is , that lives after my example , walketh not in darkness . the purity of his heart will be a light to his understanding . xxiv . but to represent his more distinctly , there are two ways whereby purity of heart serves to the acquirement of knowledge . by natural efficacy , and by the divine grace and benediction . and first it does it by natural efficacy , either by clarifying the medium , or by assisting the faculty . the former i conceive and represent after this manner . i suppose in the first place that the soul sees through a medium ; secondly , that this medium is our terrestrical vehicle ; thirdly , that the grosness of this medium hinders the vision of the soul. all which i ground upon those words of the apostle , now we see through a glass , darkly . xxv . this supposed , it follows that whatsoever clarifys this medium does also help the vision of the soul. and this purity does , especially that more eminent part of it which consists in chastity and temperance . for first it composes the passions , especially that of lust , by that the animal spirits , and by that the blood. for the motion of the passions ferments the spirits , and the fermentation of the spirits agitates the blood , and by agitation raises all the feculent and drossy parts of it ; and makes it like a troubled fountain , thick and muddy . and this i take to be one true reason why men in any passion can't reason so clearly as when they are in more quiet and silence of spirit . but now by purity of heart all this disturbance is allay'd and composed , the passions are becalm'd , the spirits fix'd , the fountain of the blood clears up , and so all the inner part of that glass the apostle speaks of , becomes more bright and pellucid , more apt to transmit the rays of the ideal light , and consequently we see more clearly through it . tho it be still but darkly in comparison of what we shall do hereafter . xxvi . but this is not all ; this purity does also clarifie the outward part of the glass too . first by consequence , because the finer the spirits and blood are , the finer will be the threds of the outward veil also . then more directly , because temperance does refine and subtilize the texture of the body , diminishes from its bulk and grossness , and unloads the soul of a good part of that burthen which not only presses down her aspirations , but also hinders her sight : and besides , it refines the the inner part too , by bringing in fresh supplies of fine spirits . this was that temperance which made the faces of daniel , hananiah , mishael and azariah look clear and fair , and which made them wise too , gave a quick and delicate air to their countenances , and let in the light of the ideal world upon their souls . this was that philosophical temperance of the pythagoreans , which ( to use the words of dr. more commenting upon that place ) is the mother of that wisdom which makes the face to shine , and nourishes the luciform vehicle of the soul. xxvii . and as this purity does clarify the medium , so does it also assist the faculty . and this it does by the same general way whereby it clarifies the medium , that is , by composing the passions . for the passions not only trouble and thicken the medium ( as was noted and explain'd before ) but al●o divide and disperse the faculty . for the more things a man desires , the more things he will be engaged to think upon , and the more things he thinks upon at once , the more languid and confuse will his conception be . but now this purity by composing the passions , contracts the desires , and by contracting the desires , it contracts also by consequence the thoughts , and by this the man is reduced to a greater vnity , simplicity , and recollection of mind , and having but few thoughts to divide him , he is the better inabled to think clearly and distinctly . xxviii . and thus have i given a clear and distinct account how purity of heart serves to the acquirement of knowledge by a natural efficacy . this it does also secondly by the divine grace and benediction . purity of heart is that heavenly lure which invites not only the holy spirit , but also the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to come and dwell in the soul , and to inrich it with his ideal communications . this we may be assured of from his own mouth , he that loveth me , shall be lov'd of my father , and i will love him , and manifest my self to him . and again , if a man love me , my father will love him , and we will come unto him , and make our abode with him . the pure , chaste and good soul shall not only be loved by the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but be also of his council and privacy . for this is the spouse of the word eternal , who first assumed innocent nature , and then assumes innocent persons , the first by a natural , the second by a mystic union . this is the beloved disciple who has the priviledge to lean upon the bosom of his lord , and to be admitted to his more secret communications . and therefore says the psalmist , the secret of the lord is with them that fear him , and he will shew them his covenant . and says our lord himself , blessed are the pure in heart , for they shall see god. and concerning the four children that refused to defile themselves with the portion of the kings meat , it is said , that god gave them knowledge , and skill in all learning and wisdom ; and that daniel had understanding in all visions and dreams . for they were not only pure and temperate but religiously so , in obedience to the law of their god , the god of israel . which the said god rewarded with knowledge and skill in all learning and wisdom in them all , but in daniel peculiarly , with a faculty of interpreting aenigmatical dreams and visions ; as the learned dr. more observes in his excellent comment upon that place . xxix . the third and last way of consulting the ideal world is by prayer . this is a method which the scripture also advises us to : if any of you lack wisdom , let him ask of god , that giveth to all men liberally , and upbraideth not , and it shall be given him . and this we know was the method whereby the wisest of men attain'd his unparallel'd wisdom . for as wisdom was his choice , so the method of his seeking and gaining , it was by prayer . and 't is further observable that he address'd himself to the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or ideal world in particular , as you may see in that solemn prayer of his recorded in the book of wisdom , give me wisdom that sitteth by thy throne , &c. which i commend to your ladyships perusal at leisure . xxx . and thus ( madam ) have i defined and by scripture and reason proved , what is the right method of prosecuting that truth which is perfective of the understanding . this in general i have shewn to consist in consulting the ideal world ; the manner of doing which i have also shewn to be , first , by thinking , the order of which is also defined , secondly , by purity of heart and life , and lastly by prayer . this i take to be via intelligentiae , the way and method of wisdom , whose house i think is now built , tho not upon seven , yet upon three substantial pillars , and i should be glad if any one would be so kind as to shew me the weakness of the ground upon which they stand . xxxi . and now ( madam ) i think i i need not use many words to shew that as learning is generally placed in such things as are not perfective of the understanding , so that what is so is generally prosecuted by undue methods . for 't is but to compare the methods in common use with that which we have premised and demonstrated , and you will immediately perceive the falseness and irregularity of them . for first , whereas the first and general method of wisdom and knowledge is by consulting the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or ideal world , the world of light , that light which inlightens every man that comes into this world , the generality of students don 't so much as dream of this , nor make any such application , but apply themselves altogether to the ectypal world , to the world of darkness and obscurity . so verifying that complaint of god by the prophet , my people have forsaken me the fountain of living waters , and have digg'd to themselves broken cisterns , that will hold no water . xxxii . then again , whereas another more particular method is by attention and thinking , this is generally so little regarded , that no sort of men think so little for the most part as they that are ingaged in the profess study of learning and knowledge . this they don't reckon as any part of study , nor as any progress in the stage of learning , but only as a graver way of being idle . 't is then only they study when they are hanging their heads over an old musty folio , and are making huge common-places , and stuffing their memories with grey sentences , and venerable sayings : and thus they spend their time and their ink , and having scambl'd through a company of books ( most of which perhaps were written to as little purpose , as they are read ) they think themselves learned men , and the world is too often of their opinion , tho they have not made themselves masters of any sense or notion , nor are able to demonstrate one single truth upon solid principles , and in a consequential process . xxxiii . and this is the method not only of those who misplace learning , but also of the most of those that place it aright . for even those that place it in ideal truths do not generally think for it , but read for it , seek it not in their souls , but in books . and this methinks i can never sufficiently wonder at . indeed as for those that place learning not in being able to frame clear and distinct conceptions of ones own , but in knowing the opinions of others , 't is no wonder that they take this method , for tho it be not a means to the end they should propose , yet , t is a means to the end which they do propose . but the wonder is how those that place learning as they should , in the clear conception of ideal truths , should think to find this meerly by tumbling over books . xxxiv . i deny not but that reading is one way of knowing ( otherwise i should not be at the pains to write this to your ladyship ) but then , t is only by accident that it is so , as it gives hints and occasions for thinking . and therefore thinking is the only thing to be regarded even in reading ( for reading as such is nothing ) and then we read to most purpose , when we are thereby most enabled to think . so that thinking is the end of reading , as understanding is the end of thinking . we ought therefore to read only in order to thinking . and yet this method is generally so much inverted , that the main stress is laid upon reading . nothing but read , read , as long as eyes and spectacles will hold , not regarding whether the head be clear , so that it be full . xxxv . as to the particular order in thinking proposed by m. malebranche , i refer your ladyship to the same excellent author to shew you how much it is transgress'd . which he does at large , and to wonderful satisfaction , shewing first that the school-philosophers do not observe that general law concerning the matter of study , which is the cause of a great many errors in their physiology . then shewing that the second part of the general law is not observed by the common philosophers , and what extraordinary advances cartesius made in learning by the exact observation of it . then he proceeds to explain the principles of aristotle's philosophy , where he shews that he never observed the second branch of the general law , and reflects upon those errors of his philosophy occasioned by his not doing so . but for a fuller account in these things i refer you to the author himself . xxxvi . then again , whereas purity of heart and life is another method of arriving to the light and knowledge of ideal truth , your ladyship cannot but know , and 't is a sad as well as a true observation , that this is not only neglected among that part of mankind that sit down contentedly in ignorance , and aspire to no greater stock of knowledge than what they brought with them into the world , but also among the generality of those few that addict themselves to the cultivation and improvement of their minds . nay these in proportion to their number seem more guilty of this neglect than the other , and nothing so common as to see men of curious and inquisitive tempers and of famed learning , who yet are very corrupt in the moral state of their minds , and live very ill lives . whence some have taken occasion to represent learning , as an enemy to religion , and have cry'd up ignorance as the mother of devotion . and tho the conclusion of these men be notoriously weak and absurd , yet it must be confest that the ground upon which they build it , is too true . men famed for learning , are oftentimes as infamous for living , and many that study hard to furnish their heads , are yet very negligent in purifying their hearts , not considering that there is a moral , as well as a natural communication between one and the other , and that they are concern'd to be pure in heart and life not only upon the common account , in order to a happy state hereafter , but also in pursuance of their own particular way and end here . xxxvii . then again lastly , whereas another method of wisdom is prayer , i do not find that the generality of students do at all apply themselves to this method . pray indeed ( 't is to be hoped ) they do for other things , which they think lye more out of their reach , but as for learning and knowledge , they think they can compass this well enough by their own proper industry , and the help of good books , without being beholden to the assistance of heaven . and this , tho they do place learning in the knowledge of necessary truth . which procedure of theirs i cannot resolve into any other principle , ( i mean as to those that act by any ) but the meer want of knowing or considering that this necessary truth is really the same with god himself . for did they attentively consider that god is truth , and that so much as they possess of truth , so much they have of god , 't is not to be imagined they should be so indifferent in using prayer , or any of the other preceding methods of consulting god for his own light. the end of the second reflection . the third reflection . wherein the general conduct of human life is tax'd with a too importunate , and over-earnest pursuit after knowledge in general . i. having pass'd over the two first stages of the intellectual conduct of human life , that of the end , and that of the means ; and reflected upon the irregularities of each , by shewing how both are generally mistaken and misplaced ; i am now arrived to the third and last , which consists not in the choice of the object , or of the method to it ( that belonging to the two former ) but in the degree of affection wherewith they are prosecuted . which part of our intellectual conduct , as it is equally capable of being faulty , so i shall here make it my business to shew that it is actually as faulty and irregular , if not more than either of the two former . and the fault that i tax it with , is , a too importunate and over-earnest pursuit after knowledge in general . ii. the charge of this reflection is of a larger compass and extent than either of the two preceding , those being directed against such as either misplace the object , or else mistake the method of learning and knowledge ; but this takes in both together , and others also not concerned in either of the former . for not only those that err in the placing of learning , or in the method to it , but also those who are right in both , come under the censure of the present reflection , they all agree in this , in being too importunate and vehement in the pursuit of knowledge . iii. now in the making out the truth of this charge , we must here also according to the method observ'd in the two former reflections , first lay down a common measure of proceeding , by stating the due bounds of our present affection to , and search after knowledge , or , how far it becomes man to imploy himself in the prosecution of learning and knowledge ? the due stating of which question will be a certain direction to us in the determination of this , whether our general inquest after knowledge be immoderate or no. now for the determination of the first it will be necessary to draw up the true state or hypothesis of man according to the posture wherein he now stands . which i shall do distinctly in these following considerations . iv. first i consider , that the utmost pitch of knowledge man by his utmost endeavours can arrive to in this world is very inconsiderable . god indeed has given us reason enough to distinguish us from the brute part of the creation , and we may improve it so far as to distinguish our selves from one another , and so one man may deserve to be call'd learned and knowing in comparison of another that is either naturally more ignorant , or more unimproved ; but absolutely speaking , the most that any or all of us either know or can know here is of little or no consideration . what we know of god is but little , for as the apostle says , we see through a glass , darkly ; what we know of our selves perhaps is less , and what we know of the world about us is not much . we have seen but a few of gods works , as the wise man observes , and we understand yet fewer . there are almost an infinite number of things which we never so much as thought of , and of most things we conceive very darkly and uncertainly , and there is not one thing from the greatest to the least , which we do or can understand thoroughly . those that apply their whole study to any one thing , can never come to the end of that one thing , for not only every science but every particular of it has its unmeasurable depths and recesses ; and 't is confess'd by a great inquirer into the nature of antimony ( as 't is related by the honourable mr. boyle ) that 't is impossible for one man to understand throughly that one single mineral only . and if a man i cannot understand all of so little , how little must he understand of all ! suppose further , that all the knowledge of the learned were put together , 't would weigh but light , for what one art or science is there that is brought to any tolerable perfection ? and if the common stock be so little , how small a pittance is it that must fall to every particular man's share ! and where is that man who after all his poring and studying , is able to answer all the questions , i will not say which god put to iob , but which may be askt him by the next idiot he meets ? v. 't were an endless undertaking to represent at large the little that we know , or are capable of knowing . nor do i design to turn a second agrippa , and entertain your ladyship with a long harangue about the vanity of humane sciences , only give me leave to touch upon two notorious instances of our ignorance , and in that very science which is pretended to be at the very vertical point of improvement . 't is concerning the the maximum and the minimum naturale , the greatest and the least thing in nature . as to the first , the question is whether the extension of the universe be finite or infinite ? if you say 't is positively infinite , besides the difficulty of conceiving how any thing can be so extended , 't will follow that god himself cannot add the least further dimension to it . if you say 't is finite , suppose your self in the utmost extremities of it , and try whether it be possible for you to dis-imagin further extension . then as to the second , the question is whether every , even the least assignable part of matter be infinitely divisible or no ? if you say yes , then 't will unavoidably follow that the least atom will have as many parts as the whole world. if you say no , then you must say that matter may be divided so long till at last you come to a part that does not contain more other parts , if so , then i enquire has this uncontaining part figure , or has it not ? if not , then 't is infinite , figure being only the termination of quantity . but if it has , then it has more other parts above , below and of each side , and consequently may again be divided , contrary to what you suppos'd . so that you see here are desperate difficulties on both sides , say what you will you are equally baffled , and yet 't is most certain that one only can be true , they being two opposite parts of a contradiction , but which is so , is beyond the capacity of humane understanding to determine . vi. the like difficulties we meet with when we inquire concerning time , whether it be infinitely divisible , or only into moments ? and so again in the business of motion , whether there be any such thing as the extream degree of swiftness and slowness , or no ? neither of which can be defined without manifest absurdity . but 't is superfluous , as well as endless , to display the particulars of our ignorance , tho indeed when all accompts are cast up , that will be found to be our best knowledge . this only in general , our life is so short , our progress in learning so slow , and learning in it self so long and tedious , and what we do or can know so very little , that the patrons of scepticism had much more reason to conclude from the disability of our facculties and the slightness of our attainments , than from the uncertainty and instability of truth , that there is no knowledge . vii . secondly , i consider , that as we can here know but little , so even that very little which we do , serves more to our trouble and disquiet , than to our pleasure and satisfaction . and here comes in that experimental reflection of the wise man , in much wisdom is much grief , and he that increases knowledge , increases sorrow . this proposition is not true , absolutely consider'd , knowledge being the perfection of human nature , the image of god , and the principal ingredient of our future happiness ; but only with relation to the present state and posture of man. and in this respect it is abundantly true . first , because the more we know , the more we shall discover of our ignorance , ( that being the chiefest thing we learn by our study ) which we shall find to be of an infinitely larger sphere than our knowledge , and consequently shall be more troubled for what we do not know , than pleas'd with what we do . secondly , because the prospect of what yet further remains to be known will inflame our thirst after it . for wisdom says of her self , they that eat of me shall yet be hungry , and they that drink of me shall yet be thirsty . which tho it be a great commendation of wisdom , and an argument of her inexhaustible excellence , yet 't is withal a great instrument of punishment to those who can attain to so little of it , as cannot satisfie that thirst which it has inflamed . thirdly , because the more a man improves his thinking faculty , the more apt he will be to be disgusted and offended with the follies of society ; as the most delicate touch is the soonest put to pain . there being a thousand impertinencies that will strike very disagreeably upon a discerning mind which won't so much as affect a grosser understanding . viii . but the principal ground of this assertion , and which , did not the quickness of your ladyship's apprenhension oblige me to brevity , i could be voluminous upon , is this . 't is most certain that man is now placed in the midst of vanities and unsatisfying objects , and and that his true good is not within his reach , and consequently whatever pleasure he takes in those things that are , is purely owing to his ignorance of their vanity . well , if so , then vae sapienti , woe be to the wise man. this is not a place to be wise in . there is nothing here solid enough to endure the test of wisdom . the wise man cannot find a paradice here , tho the fool can . the more he knows the more he discovers the vanity of all pretended enjoyments , and the more he does this , the more he streightens and retrenches his delights , and the more he does this , the more he retires and withdraws himself from all worldly diversions , and this sets him the more a thinking and musing , and this again presents to his mind a fresh and more lively conviction of the worlds vanity , and this makes him again retrench his delights , and so on in this returning circle , till at length he finds nothing but his bare wisdom to delight in . and a little more thinking makes him see the vanity of that too . and now all 's gone . to dispatch this part in one word , this is the fruit of being wise , to be able to taste nothing that 's present , nor to flatter ones self with the prospect of what is to come , which is a state of horrible privation and sterility . this is the thorough wise mans lot , and every advance in wisdom is a step towards this condition so true is it , that he who increases wisdom , increases sorrow , while in the mean time the fool laughs , and is merry . ix . thirdly , i consider , that if our knowledge could yield us more satisfaction than it occasions trouble , yet our life is so short , and so incumber'd , that we can make but little of the enjoyment , so little , that 't is not answerable to the meer labour we undergo in acquiring it . all the morning of our days is spent in the preliminaries of learning , in learning words and terms of art , wherein there is nothing but toil and drudgery , and before we can taste any of the fruits of the tree of knowledge , before we can relish what is intellectual and rational in it , our sun is got into the meridian , and then it presently begins to decline and our learning with it ; our light , our strength , and our time make haste to consume , nothing increases now but the shadows , that is our ignorance and darkness of mind , and while we consider and look about us , the sun sets , and all is concluded in the darkness and shadow of death . but oftentimes the sun is intercepted by a cloud long before it setts , and we live backward again , grow weak and childish , silly and forgetful , and unlearn faster than we learnt ; or if it chance to shine bright to the last , then we improve too much , and grow too wise for our selves , and reject the greatest part of what we learnt before , as idle and insignificant . so that we are under a necessity of unlearning in a short time most of what we have so dearly learnt , either through forgetfulness , or improvement of iudgment . fourthly , i consider , that there is no necessity of our being so wonderfully learned and knowing here . 't is neither necessary as injoin'd by god , nor as a means to any considerable end. we can be good , and we can be happy without it . and as to the interest of communities and public societies , 't is civil prudence and honesty , and not learning which makes them happy . and lest any advantage in our after state should be alledged for its necessity , this makes it more unnecessary than any consideration besides . for tho we are never so unlearned now , provided we know enough to do our duty , and live well , we shall in a short time arrive to such a degree of knowledge as is requisite to our supream perfection , to which our present learning cannot add , and from which our present ignorance will not diminish . i do not say this will be immediately upon our discharge from the body , there being some reasonable controversie about that , ( which would be too great a digression at present to pursue ) tho 't is most certain that even then there must needs be great inlargements of understanding ; however 't is most unquestionable that this our intellectual accomplishment can be no further off than our enjoyment of the beatific vision . we shall then commence instantaneously wise and learned , and be fully possess'd of the tree of knowledge , as well as of the tree of life . for then that glass through which we now see darkly shall be laid aside , and there shall be no other but the speculum deitatis , the glass of the divinty , which is no other than the ideal world , which shall be now more intimately united to us , and more clearly display'd before us . and tho even now there shall be degrees of knowledge according to the various participiation of the ideal light , yet the variety of this dispensation shall not proceed by the degree of our knowledge in this life , but by some other measure . for , xi . fifthly , i consider , that tho there is no necessity of our being so very learned and knowing , yet there is an absolute necessity of our being good and vertuous . this is necessary both ways , as commanded by god , and as a means to our final perfection . and besides 't is necessary now , there being no other opportunity for it . if we don't know here , we may know hereafter , and shall infalliably do so if we are but good here ; but if we be not good here , we shall neither be good , happy , nor knowing hereafter . the main opportunity for knowledge is after this life , but the only opportunity for being good is now. and if we take care to improve this , we are sufficiently secure of the other , and of whatever else appertains to the perfection of our natures . but if this be neglected all is lost . this therefore is indispensably necessary , and 't is the only thing that is so , and 't is necessary now , necessary not only to our happiness in general , but also to that of our intellectual part in particular . for , xii . sixthly , and lastly i consider , that thus stands the case between god and man. first , man is supposed to be made in a state of innocence and perfection , in perfect favour and communion with god , his true good , and in a capacity so to continue . from this excellent state he is supposed to fall , and by his fall so to disable himself that he cannot by his own strength repent and live well , and so to provoke god , that tho he could and did repent , yet he would not be pardon'd and accepted , without satisfaction made to divine justice . this satisfaction man is supposed not able to make , nor any other creature for him . whereupon god in great mercy and pitty is supposed to ordain a mediator , his own son , god and man , between himself and his laps'd creature , who by the sacrifice of himself should effect two things , answerable to the double necessity of man , first make repentance available , which otherwise would not have been so ; and secondly merit grace for him that he might be able to repent . and this is what we are to understand by the restoration or redemption of man , which thus far is vniversal and inconditionate . xiii . but still notwithstanding all that this mediator has done for him , man is supposed only so far restored , as to be put in a pardonable and reconcilable state ( for as for our being actually and immediately reconciled by the death of christ , that 's a silly , fond , antinomian conceit , and no way consistent with the great mystery of godliness ) i say man is yet only in a capacity or possibility of pardon and reconciliation , which is then , and then only reduced to act , when he actually performs the conditions of reconciliation , when he believes , repents and leads a good life , with which he may , and without which he shall not be pardon'd and saved , notwithstanding that christ has dy'd for him . the design of whose death was not to make a good life unnecessary , but only to render it efficacious and available , not to procure a priviledge of being saved without it ( as some fancy ) but that we might be saved with it . if this qualification be wanting , we shall be so far from being any thing advantaged from the redemption purchas'd by our mediator , that we shall be accountable for it , to the great aggravation both of our guilt and misery . it therefore highly concerns man to improve with all diligence this short and only opportunity of making his great fortune , to adorn his mind with all moral and religious perfections , and his life with all good actions , since with this he may be happy in all his capacities , and without it he shall not only fall into a state of unutterable misery , but be also accountable for the possibility he had of escaping it , for neglecting so great salvation , so great an opportunity of being saved . xiv . these things being premised concerning the present hypothesis or state of man , first , that he can there know but very little , secondly , that even that little knowledge which he can attain to serves more to his trouble than satisfaction , and so is not only vanity , but also vexation of spirit . thirdly , that supposing it as pleasant as may be , yet such is the shortness and incumbrance of his life , that the enjoyment of it is not answerable to the labour of acquiring it . fourthly , that there is no necessity of such a deal of learning and knowledge , either as to this world , or to the next , and that e're long he shall have his fill of knowledge in the beatifick vision of the ideal world , one glance whereof shall instruct him more , than an eternal poring upon all the books in this , and undistinguish the greatest doctor from the most ignorant peasant . fifthly , that there is an absolute necessity of his being good and vertuous , this being the condition not only of his happiness in general , but also of the accomplishment of his vnderstanding in particular . and that now is the only opportunity for it . sixthly , and lastly , that the attainment of happiness and intellectual perfection upon this condition was the purchase of his saviours death , who has also merited grace for his assistance in the performance of it . which if he neglect , he shall not only miss of happiness , but be also answerable for so great and so dear an opportunity of gaining it ; from these premises 't will i think follow with no less than mathematical evidence . xv. first , that learning and knowledge is not the thing for which god design'd man in this station , nor consequently the end or reason of his bestowing upon him those intellectual and rational powers which he has . for had this been the end and design of god he would have made it more possible for him , and withal more his interest and concern , to attain it . secondly , 't will follow that the end for which god intended man here , and the reason why he made him a rational creature , was that he might live vertuously and well , so serve him here , that he might be rewarded with happiness and perfect knowledge hereafter ; having furnish'd him with intellectual abilities sufficient for this , tho not for the other . thirdly and lastly , 't will follow that the principal care and concern of man both because of his own interest , and out of compliance with the designs of god , ought to be to live a good and regular life , to accomplish the moral part of his nature , to subdue his passions , to rectifie his love , to study purity of heart and life , in one word , to perfect holiness in the fear of god , and ( which is what we have been hitherto inquiring after ) that he ought to busy himself in the study of learning and knowledge no further , than as 't is conducive to the interest of religion and vertue . xvi . this therefore is the measure to be observ'd in our prosecution of learning and knowledge . we are to study only that we may be good , and consequently ought to prosecute such knowledge only as has an aptness to make us so , that which the apostle calls the truth , which is after godliness . for that 's the only business we have to do in this world. whatever knowledge we prosecute besides this , or further than 't is conducive to this end , tho it be absolutely consider'd , never so excellent and perfective of our rational part , yet with respect to the present posture and station of man , 't is a culpable curiosity , and an unaccountable vanity , and only a more solemn and laborious way of being idle and impertinent . xvii . and this will be found ( if well examin'd ) to be nothing different from the censure of the wise preacher . and i gave my heart to to know wisdom , says he , and i perceiv'd that this also is vanity and vexation of sptrit . not that he now first applied himself to the study of wisdom . no , he had been inspired with that before , and and by the help of it had discover'd the vanity of all other things . but that wisdom which saw through all other things , did not as yet perceive the vanity of it self . he therefore now gave his heart to know wisdom , that is , to reflect upon it , and consider whether this might be excepted from his general censure , and struck out of the scroll of vanities . and upon deep reflection he found that it could not , and that even this also was as much a vanity as any of the rest . now this proposition of solomon's cannot be understood absolutely ( knowledge being an undoubted perfection of human nature ) but only with respect to the present posture of man in this world. neither can it be understood of all kind of knowledge even in this life , some kind of knowledge being necessary to qualifie him for happiness in the next . it must therefore necessarily be understood of all that knowledge which contributes not to that great end. so that from these two necessary limitations the sense of solomon's proposition ( if it have any ) must be this ; that to man in this present juncture all knowledge that does not contribute to the interest of his after-state , is downright vanity and vexation of spirit . xviii . for , to what purpose should we study so much , considering that after all we are able to know so little , considering that even that little is enough to trouble and disquiet us , considering that our life is as much too short for the enjoying what knowledge we have , as for compassing what we would have , and withal considering that there lies no manner of obligation or necessity upon us to do thus . but ( which is what i would most of all inculcate ) to what purpose imaginable should we be so busy , and vehement in the pursuit of learning , of any learning , but what is of use to the moral conduct of our life , considering these two things , first , that 't is but to stay a little while and we shall have all that knowledge gratis , from the communications of the ideal world , which we so unsuccessfully drudge for here , to the neglect of more important and concerning exercises . and secondly , considering that there is such an absolute necessity of being good , and of living well , and that this short uncertain life is the only time for it , which if neglected , this great work must lie undone for ever ? upon the former consideration this studious , bookish humour is like laying out a great sum of money to purchase an estate which after one weak , dropping life will of course fall into hand . and i am sure he would be reckon'd fool or mad that should do so . and upon the latter , 't is as if a man that was riding post upon business of life and death , should as he passes through a wood , stand still to listen to the singing of a nightingale , and so forget the main and only business of his journey . xix . 't is most certain that the two cases here supposed , are as great instances of folly and impertinence as can well be conceiv'd , and yet ( however it comes to pass that we are not sensible of it ) 't is certain that they are very applicable to the intellectual conduct of human life as 't is generally managed . and tho we are all ready enough to call such men fools as shall do as in the two mention'd instances is supposed , yet 't is most certain that we do the very same or worse , that we are too much concern'd in the application of the parable , and that of most of us it may be truly said , thou art the man. xx. for i demand , what difference is there between him that now labours and toils for learning and knowledge , which in a little time he shall be easily and fully possest of , and him that dearly buys an estate which would otherwise come to him after a short interval ? what difference is there , but only this , that he that buys the estate , tho he might have spared his money , yet however he gets what he laid out his money for ; his expence indeed was needless , but not in vain . whereas he that drudges in the pursuit of knowledge , not only toils for that which in a short time he shall have with ease , and in abundance , but which after all he can't compass in any considerable measure , and so undergoes a vain as well as unnecessary labour . and is therefore the greater fool. xxi . again i demand , what difference is there between him who when he is imploy'd upon business of life and death shall alight from his horse , and stand idling to hear a nightingale singing in the wood , and him who having an eternity of happiness to secure by the right ordering of his life and manners , and having only this point of time to do it in , shall yet turn vertuoso , and set up for learning and curiosity . 't is true indeed the nightingale sings well , and 't were worth while to stand still and hear him , were i disingaged from more concerning affairs , but not certainly when i am upon life and death . and so learning and knowledge are excellent things , and such as would deserve my study , and my time , had i any to spare , and were more at leisure , but not certainly when i have so great an interest as that of my final state dependi●g upon the good use of it . my business now , is not to be learned , but to be good . xxii . for is my life so long , am i so over-stock'd with time , or is my depending interest so little , or is it so easily secured , that i can find leisure for unnecessary curiosities ? is this conduct agreeable to the present station and posture of man , whose entrance into this world , and whose whole stay in it , is purely in order to another state ? or would any one imagin this to be the condition of man by such a conduct ! shall a prisoner who has but a few days allow'd him to make a preparation for his trial , spend that little opportunity in cutting and carving , and such like mechanical contrivances ? or would any one imagin such a man to be in such a condition , near a doubtful trial of life and death , whom coming into a prison he finds so imploy'd ? and yet is there any thing more absurd and impertinent in this , than in the present supposition , than to have a man who has so great a concern upon his hands as the preparing for eternity , all busy and taken up with quadrants , and telescopes , furnaces , syphons and air-pumps ? xxiii . when we would expose any signal impertinence , we commonly illustrate it by the example of archimedes , who was busy in making mathematical figures on the sands of syracuse while the city was taking by marcellus , and so though there were particular orders given for his safety , lost his life by his unseasonable study . now i confess there was impertinence and absurdity enough in this instance to consign it over to posterity . but had archimedes been a christian , or otherwise assured of the great concerns of another world , i should have said , that the main of his impertinence did not lie here , in being mathematically imploy'd when the enemy was taking the city , but in laying out his thoughts and time upon such an insignificant unconcerning study , while he had no less a concern upon him than the securing his eternal interest . which must be done now or never . nothing certainly is an impertinence , if this be not , to hunt after learning and knowledge in such a juncture as this . xxiv . sure i am , and your ladyship too very well knows , that many other proceedings in the conduct of life are condemn'd of vanity and impertinence upon the very same grounds , tho not half so inconsistent with the character of man , nor so disagreeable to his present posture in this world , for is not the world full of invectives , and have not the pens of moral writers been all along imploy'd against those that apply themselves to secular acquirements , spend their short and uncertain lives , which ought to be imploy'd in the pursuit of an infinitely higher interest , in gaping up and down after honours and preferments , in long and frequent attendances at court , in raising families , getting estates and the like ? these things i say and such like are condemn'd and censured not only upon the stock of their particular viciousness , as crimes of ambition or covetousness respectively , but for what they have in common , as they are mispendings of time , and unconcerning excentrical imployments . xxv . but now i would fain know , whether any of these misconducts of life be more expensive of our time , more remote and alien from the main business of it , more unrelating to our grand concern , and consequently more impertinent , than to be busily imploy'd in the niceties and curiosities of learning : and whether a man that loiters away six weeks in court-attendances for a place of honour , be not every whit as accountably imploy'd with respect to the end of man in the other world , and his business in this , as he that shall spend so much time in the solution of a mathematical question , as m. descrates i remember confesses of himself in one of his epistles . and why then the prosecution of learning should be the only thing excepted from the vanities and impertinencies of life i have not head enough to understand . xxvi . and yet so it is . all other excentrical unconcerning occupations are cried down meerly for being so , as not according with the present character and state of man. this alone is not contented with the reputation of innocence , but stands for positive merit and excellence , for praise and commendation . to say a man is a lover of knowledge , and a diligent inquirer after truth , is almost as great an encomium as you can give him , and the time spent in the study , tho in the search of unedifying truth , is reckon'd almost as laudably bestow'd as that in the chapel , and ( so inconsistent with its self is human judgment ) 't is learning only that is allow'd not only to divide , but to devour the greatest part of our short life , and is the only thing that with credit and public allowance stands in competition with religion and the study of vertue . nay , by the most is preferr'd before it , who would rather be counted learned , than pious . xxvii . but is not this a strenge and unreasonable competition ? it must indeed be confess'd that the perfection of man is double , of the intellectual as well as of the moral part , and that knowledge is a very divine excellence . but certainly rectitude of will is a greater ornament and perfection than brightness of vnderstanding , and to be good is more divine than to be wise and knowing , that being the principal , perhaps only difference between an angel and a devil . and tho solomon's choice be universally applauded , yet i think that of mary is to be preferr'd before it , and ( to use the expression of the excellent monsieur poiret ) that 't is better like an infant without much reasoning to love much , than like the devil to reason much without love. xxviii . but suppose knowledge were a much diviner excellence than 't is , suppose it were more perfective of , and ornamental to human nature than the habit and practice of vertue , yet still this competition would be utterly against reason . for 't is to be consider'd ( as i have already suggested ) that the former we can't have now in any measure , and shall have it hereafter without measure , but the latter we may have now ( for we may love much tho we can't know much ) and cannot have it hereafter . now the question is , whether we ought to be more solicitious for that intellectual perfection which we can't have here , and shall have hereafter , or for that moral perfection which we may have here , and cannot hereafter ? and i think we need not consult an oracle , or conjure up a spirit to be resolv'd of this question . xxix . and this one solitary consideration ( much more in conjunction with the other parts of the human character ) i take to be sufficient to justifie the truth of what measure we have prescribed to our intellectual conduct , that we ought to prosecute learning and knowledge no further than as 't is conducive to the great ends of piety and vertue . and consequently that when ever we study to any other purpose , or in any other degree than this , we are unaccountably impertinently , i may add sinfully imploy'd . for this is the whole of man , to fear god and keep his commandments , the whole of man in this station , and consequently this ought to be the only scope of all his studys and endeavours . xxx . and accordingly 't is observable that the scripture whenever it makes mention of wisdom with any mark of commendation , it always means by it either the very practice of religion and vertue , or such knowledge at least , that has a near and strong influence upon it ; thereby implying that that is the only wisdom which becomes the study of man. remarkable above the rest to this purpose is the 28th chapter of iob , where having run through several instances of natural knowledge , at length says he , but where shall wisdom be found ? and where is the place of understanding ? as much as to say that in none of the other things mention'd did consist the wisdom of man. then it follows , man knoweth not the price thereof , neither is it found in the land of the living , the depth saith , it is not in me , and the sea saith it is not in me . not in the depths of learning , nor in the recesses of speculation , seeing it is hid from the eyes of all living , and kept close from the fowls of the air , from men of high and towring notions , and sublime theories . destruction and death say , we have heard the fame thereof with our ears . as much as to say , that after this life , and then only , unless perhaps about the hour of death , men begin to have a true sense and lively savoury relish of this wisdom . but in the mean time , god understandeth the way thereof , and he knoweth the place thereof . and unto man he said , behold the fear of the lord that is wisdom , and to depart from evil , that is understanding . to man he said . had it been to another creature , suppose an angel , in a state of security and confirmation , he would perhaps have recommended for wisdom the study of nature , and the curiosities of philosophy , but having to do with man , a probationary and unfixt creature , that shall be either happy or miserable according as he demeans himself in this short time of trial , the only wisdom he advises to such a creature in such a station , is to look well to his moral conduct , to study religion and good life . xxxi . and now ( madam ) since we are upon scripture-authority ( for indeed so little has this matter been consider'd , that i have scarce any other to follow ) will your ladyship give me leave in further confirmation of the measure propos'd , to commend to your consideration two great scripture-examples , both of men eminently wise , and of a learned education . the men i instance in are moses and st. paul. the latter of which professedly declares that he determin'd to know nothing , but iesus christ and him crucify'd , that is , nothing but what concerns either the faith or the practice of christianity . and the former complaining of the gross ignorance of the people committed to his charge , and desiring they would become wiser , breaks out into this passionate wish , o that they were wise , that they understood this , that they would consider their latter end. xxxii . moses had been bred a scholar , as well as a courtier , and was well instructed in all the secrets of the aegyptian philosophy , which was then the best in the world. besides , he was himself a wise man , a man that besides the advantages of pharaoh's court , had the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 himself for his tutor , and convers'd personally with his maker , and therefore must needs be supposed to know what was true wisdom . but now this he does not make to consist either in the accomplishments of courtly education , or in the deep mysteries of philosophy , but in the consideration of our latter end. he wishes that his people were wise , and to this end he does not wish that they were as well-bred as he , or as learned as he , but only that they understood this , this one thing , that they would consider their latter end. which he makes the summary and abstract of all wisdom . much like that of plato , when he defines philosophy to be , the theory of death . xxxiii . and here , if your ladyship will dispence with a short digression , a digression from the immediate thred of my discourse , tho not from the general design of it , i would upon this occasion briefly represent to you what an excellent part of wisdom it is for man seriously to consider his latter end . to make this distinctly appear , i shall proceed upon these two grounds : first , that the consideration of death is the most proper exercise that a wise man can be employ'd about . and secondly , that this is the most compendious way of making him wise that is not so . xxxiv . and first , it is the most proper exercise that a wise man can employ himself about . for wisdom consists in a due estimation of things ; and then things are duly estimated , when they are measured and rated , first as they are absolutely in themselves ; and secondly , as they stand in relation to us . if they are great and extraordinary then they deserve to be consider'd for their own sakes ; and if they nearly relate to us , then they deserve to be consider'd for ours . and upon both these accounts , death and its consequences are highly deserving a wise mans thoughts and reflections . xxxv . for first , they are great and extraordinary transactions , barely as in themselves consider'd , and as such would deservedly ingage the most attentive consideration , even of a stander by , of any other indifferent being , suppose an angel , that can be no otherwise concerned in it , than as t is a great event , a noble scene of providence , a matter of wonder and curiosity . i say upon this single account death with its consequences is as fit a subject for the contemplation of a wise man as auy in nature . xxxvi . or if there be within the sphere of nature things of a greater and more bulky appearance , yet certainly there is nothing wherein man is so nearly concern'd , so highly interessed as in death . since upon the manner of this depends his eternal happiness or ruin. there is therefore nothing that so much deserves to be consider'd by him . whether therefore we regard the absolute greatness of the thing , or its relative greatness with respect to us , as we are interessed and concerned in it , but especially if we weigh both , the consideration of death is as proper an exercise as a wise man can be imploy'd about . xxxvii . and as 't is so fit an imployment for him that is wise already , so secondly is it the most compendious way of making him wise , truly wise , that is not so . for all wisdom is in order to happiness , and to be truly wise , is to be wise unto salvation . whatever knowledge contributes not to this , is quite beside the mark , and is as the apostle calls it , science falsly so called . the knowledge itself is vain , and the study of it is impertinent . xxxviii . now the only way to happiness is a good life , and consequently all wisdom being in order to happiness , that 's the only wisdom that serves to the promoting of good life , according to that of iob before cited , and to man he said , behold the fear of the lord that is wisdom , and to depart from evil is understanding . that therefore is the most compendious way of making a man wise , that soonest makes him good , and reduces his mind to a moral regularity . and nothing does this so soon and so well as the serious and habitual consideration of death . and therefore says the wise man , remember death and corruption , and keep the commandments . the shortest compendium of holy living that ever was given . as if he had said , many are the precepts and admonitions left us by wise and good men , for the moral conduct of life , but would you have a short and infallible directory of living well ? why , remember death and corruption ; do but remember this , and forget all other rules if you will , and your duty if you can . xxxix . and what is here remarked by one wise man is consented to by all . hence those common practises among the antients of placing sepulchres in their gardens , and of using that celebrated motto , memento mori . hence also that modern as well as antient custom of putting emblems of mortality in churches , and other public places , by all which t is implied that the consideration of death , is the greatest security of a good life . as indeed it must be upon this general ground , because it does that at a blow , which other considerations do by parts , and gives an entire defeat to the three great enemies of our salvation at once . it sets us above the temptations of the world the flesh , and the devib . for how can the world captivate him , who considers he is but a stranger in it , and that he must shortly leave it ! how can the flesh insnare him who has his sepulchre always in his eye , and reflects upon the cold lodging he shall have there ! and how can the devil prevail upon him , who remembers always he must dye , and then enter upon an unchangeable state of happiness or misery , according as he has either resisted or yeilded to his temptations ! of so vast consequence is the constant thinking upon death above all other things that fall within the compass even of useful and practical meditation , and so great reason had moses for placing the wisdom of man in the consideration of his latter end. xl. but to return ( if being still in pursuit of my general design , i may well be said to be out of the way ) i now perswade my self that from the character i have drawn of man and his present circumstances , together with those reflections built upon it , and interwoven with it , and lastly from divine authority , the measure we have given is so well establish'd , that if your ladyship be not yet , you ought to be convinc'd that however naturally desirous we may be of knowledge , yet that this appetite is to be govern'd as well as those that are sensual ; that we ought to indulge it only so far as may tend to the moralizing our souls , and the conducting our lives , and the fitting us for that happiness which god has promised not to the learned , but to the good. and that if it be gratify'd to any other purpose , or in any other measure than this , our curiosity is impertinent , our study immoderate , and the tree of knowledge still a forbidden plant. xli . and now ( madam ) having fix'd and stated the measure of our present affection to , and inquiry after learning and knowledge , which i think is establish'd upon irrefutable principles , i may leave it to your ladyship to consider how much 't is observ'd in the general conduct of our studies . t is plain that 't is not observ'd at all . for these two things are too notorious to need any more for their proof than only to look abroad into the world. first , that very little of that which is generally made the subject of study has any manner of tendency to living well here , or happily hereafter . and secondly , that these very studies which have no religious or moral influence upon life , do yet devour the greatest part of it . the best and most of our time is devoted to dry-learning , this we make the course of our study , the rest is only by the by , and 't is well if what is devotional , practical or divinely-relishing , can find us at leisure upon a broken piece of a sunday or holiday . but the main current of our life runs in studies of another nature , that don't so much as glance one kind aspect upon good living , 't is well if some of them dont hinder it . i am sure st. austin thought so , and makes it part of his penitentials . and yet to these our youth is dedicated , in these we imploy our riper years ; nor do we see the vanity and impertinence of it in old age. and then when we dye , this very thing makes one great part of our funeral elegy , that we were so diligent and indefatigable in our studies , and so inquisitive in the search of knowledge , perhaps that we procured an early interment by it , when according to the principles before laid down , we were as impertinently imploy'd all the while , as if we had been so long picking straws in bedlam . i say as impertinently , tho perhaps not so innocently . the sum of all comes to this : the measure of prosecuting learning and knowledge is their usefullness to good life . consequently all prosecution of it beyond or beside this end is impertinent and immoderate . this has been fully proved by evident principles . but now of this sort is the general prosecution of learning and knowledge , as is plain by appealing to the general conduct of study . the conclusion therefore unovoidably follows . that the intellectual conduct of human life is justly chargeable with an immoderate and impertinent pursuit of knowledge . which was the proposition to be made out , and i am sorry to see it so well proved . the end of the third reflection . the conclusion . and now ( madam ) having finish'd my threefold reflection upon the intellectual conduct of human life , i have a double application to make , one to your ladyship , and another to my self . that to your ladyship is this , that you would consider to what a narrow compass , by vertue of the preceding discourses , these three things are reduced , which before use to take up so large a room , viz. learning it self , the method of learning , and the desire and prosecution of learning . the first of which is comprized within the limits of necessary truth , the second within those of thinking , purity and prayer ; the third within its usefulness to the furtherance of good life . these indeed are great retrenchments , but i think such as are just and necessary to the regulation of our intellectual conduct , which i am glad to find so compendious and disincumber'd , that being a mark of no small probability to confirm me in the truth of it , as the rightest line is also always the shortest . and since both learning it self , its method , and limits of prosecution are all so reduced , i would further commend to your ladyships consideration , whether from this great abridgment you can forbear deducing these two corollaries , first , that this bookish humour which every where so prevails , is one of the spiritual dyscrasys , or moral diseases of mankind , one of the most malignant reliques of original depravation . it carrying in it the very stamp and signature of adam's transgression , which owed its birth to curiosity , and inordinate desire of knowledge . secondly , that those who have eyes , may in a great measure spare them , and that those who have not , should not , upon the account of learning , much lament the want of them which is what particularly concerns your ladyship's case , and is now address'd to your private considerarion . now as to my own particular concern , the result of what i have written is this . i am so inwardly and throughly convinc'd of the certainty of those principles , i have here lay'd down , that i think i am not only under a particular obligation , but almost under a necessity of conducting my studies according to the measures proposed . the last of which has left such a strong influence , such a deep impression upon me , that i think i shall now follow the advice of the heathen ( m. antonius as i remember ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , rid my self of the thirst after books , and study nothing but what serves to the advancement of piety and good life . i have now spent about thirteen years in the most celebrated university in the world , and , according to the ordinary measures , perhaps not amiss , having accomplish'd my self in a competent degree both with such learning as the academical standard requires , and with whatever else my own private genius inclined me to . but truly i cannot say that i have order'd my studies in that theatre of learning , so much to my own satisfaction , as to my reputation with others . to be free with you , i must declare , that when i reflect upon my past intellectual conduct , i am as little satisfy'd with it as i am with that of my morals , and that i think i have nigh as much to answer for the former , as i have for the latter , being very conscious that the greatest part of it has been imploy'd in vnconcerning curiosities , , such as derive no moral influence upon the soul that contemplates them . but i have now ( if i sufficiently understand my self ) a very different taste and apprehension of things , and intend to spend my uncertain remainder of time in studying only such things as make for the moral improvement of my mind , and the regulation of my life , not being able to give an account upon any rational and consistent principles , why i should study any thing else . more particularly i think i shall cheifly apply my self to the reading of such books as are rather perswasive , than instructive , such as are sapid , pathetic and divinely-relishing , such as warm , kindle and inlarge the interiour , and awaken the divine sense of the soul , as considering with my self that i have now , after so much reading and speculation , more need of heat than of light. tho if i were for more light still , i think this would prove the best method of illumination , and that when all 's done , the love of god is the best light of the soul. for i consider with the excellent cardinal bona , that a man may have knowledge without love. but he that loves , altho he wants sciences humanely acquired , yet he will know more than human wisdom can teach him , because he has that master within who teaches man knowledge . purity of heart and life being one of the methods of consulting the ideal world , as was shewn in the second part. and now ( madam ) i cannot well presage how your ladyship will relish this renunciation of all studies meerly curious , from one whom you apprehended ( perhaps upon too just grounds ) to have been so naturally disposed to them , and so deeply ingaged in them . perhaps you 'll say i am already countrify'd since i left the vniversity . how far that metamorphosis may seize upon me , i can't yet tell , if solitude and retirement be enough to bring it , i am i confess in great danger , being now got into a little corner of the world , where i must be more company to my self than i have been ever yet . but the best on 't is , i have not been so great a stranger to my own company all along , as to fear any great alteration by it now . nor do i think the management of the present undertaking a sign of any such change . whether i should have had the same thoughts in the vniversity or no , i can't say , i rather believe they are owing to my country-retirement ( as i hinted in the beginning ) but however that be , sure i am they were entertain'd upon the deepest and severest consideration , and i believe are so well grounded , that the more your ladyship considers , the more you will be convinc'd both of the truth of what i have discours'd , and of the reasonableness of what i design ; which is to devote my self wholly to the accomplishment of my moral part , and of my intellectual , only so far as is subservient to the other . and now ( madam ) having bid farewel to all unconcerning studies , all the dry and unsavoury parts of learning , 't is high time to take my leave of your ladyship too ; which i do with this hope , that one great ground of your trouble for the misfortune of your eyes is by the foregoing considerations removed : and with this assurance , that if these discourses be too weak to bring you over to my present opinion , they will however prove strong enough to work you into a better , which is to believe , that i still continue in all reality , your ladyships most faithful friend and servant , iohn norris . newton st. loe , sept. 2. 1689. a sermon preach'd in the abby church of bath , before the right reverend father in god , thomas , lord bishop of bath and wells : at his visitation held there iuly 30. 1689. by iohn norris , m. a. rector of newton st. loe , near bath , and late fellow of all-souls college in oxford . london , printed in the year 1690. john 21. v. 15. so when they had dined , iesus saith to simon peter , simon son of ionas , lovest thou me more than these ? he saith unto him , yea lord ; thou knowest that i love thee . he saith unto him , feed my lambs . the words consist of three considerable parts . first , of a question put by our lord to st. peter . secondly , of st. peter's answer . thirdly , of a command by way of inference from it . the question was whether st. peter loved him beyond the rest of his disciples then present . this demand of our lord was not so high as were st. peter's former professions and pretensions . this warm and zealous apostle had always profess'd a more than ordinary adhesion to his lord and master , and pretended to as great a supremacy of love , as his successours do of knowledge and iurisdiction . he seem'd to be among the apostles what the seraphim are among the angels , to out-shine and out-burn not this or that vulgar disciple only , but the whole apostolical order in zeal , courage , and flames of divine love. for no less can that eminent profession of his import , tho all men should be offended because of thee , yet will i never be offended . but not having made good his high pretensions , our lord now puts the question to him in terms more moderate than those wherein he had before voluntarily boasted of his own fidelity ; and whereas he had before made shew of a superlative love beyond all the disciples , our lord only asks him this modest question , lovest thou me more than these ? the good apostle having now partly from the late experiment of his own frailty , and partly from the manner of our lords question , learnt more humility and modesty , returns such an answer as was short not only of his former professions , but even of the question too . he does not reply , lord thou knowest that i love thee more than these . no , he dares not venture any more so much as to determine any thing concerning the measure of his love , but is contented barely to aver the truth , and sincerity of it . and for this he fears not to appeal at last to the divine omniscience , lord thou knowest all things , thou knowest that i love thee . our lord takes the answer , and does not at all question the truth and sincerity of it , only he gives him a test whereby it might be tried and justified , both before god , himself and the world , by subjoining this illative command , feed my lambs , as it is in the text , or as in the two following verses , feed my sheep . this whole intercourse between our lord and st. peter , may i conceive , as to the full stress and scope of it , fitly be reduced to this short hypothetical sceme of speech , if thou lovest me , feed my sheep . like that of our saviour , upon another occasion to his disciples in common , if ye love me keep my commandments . this under a shorter view takes in the full force of the words , and i shall accordingly discourse upon them , as if they had stood in this posture . hence then i shall take occasion to consider these three things , as naturally arising from the words , and as no less pertinent to our present concern . first the great love of our lord christ to his church , which he here calls his lambs , and his sheep , which he here commands st. peter as he loved him to feed , and which lastly he would not absolutely and finally commit to his charge , till after three distinct inquiries whether he truly loved him . secondly , i shall consider the command here given , and shew the great obligation that lies upon all spiritual pastors and guides of souls to feed this flock of christ which is so dearly beloved by him . thirdly , i shall consider the connexion and dependence that is between the practice of this command and the love of christ. if thou lovst me feed my sheep . lastly , i shall close all with an earnest exhortation to the conscientious practice of the duty enjoyned . the first thing i shall consider is the great love of christ to his church . and certainly if there be any secret in religion fit for angels to contemplate , and too high for them to comprehend ; if there be any love that has breadth and length , and depth , and heighth , if there be any love that passes knowledge , if there be any love that is stronger than death , and dearer than life , if there be any , lastly , that is truly wonderful , and that passes love not only of women , but of the whole creation , 't is this love of our lord to his church . we have no line long enough to fathom so vast a depth , nor can mortality furnish us with ideas to conceive , or with words to utter so deep a mystery . if there be any words that can reach it , they must be such as st. paul heard in his rapture , strange words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 words that cannot be pronounced by an human tongue , and that would be meer barbarism to a mortal capacity . but however , that we may take some measure of that which really has none , and be able to frame some notion of this love of christ , which as the apostle tells us passes knowledge , we will exhibit a prospect of it in a double light ; first , in those verbal representations which the scripture gives of it , and secondly , in those real and actual proofs whereby christ himself has exprest this his most excellent , and otherwise incredible love. as to the first , the scripture we know is full of great things , and those set forth with as great and magnificent expressions . the rhetoric and stile of scripture runs incomparably high , beyond that of any other writings in whatever it treats of . but there are three things more especially , in the description of which the holy spirit seems to labour , and be at a stand for expression . and these are the glories of heaven , the miseries of hell , and the love of christ to his church . these the scripture represents under all the variety of symbols , figures and images that can be supplied either from the intellectual or material world ; that so what is wanting in each single representation , might be made up from the multitude and combination of them , that if one should miss , another might strike us , to make if possible some impression of so strange and so concerning truths upon the minds of men. but the last of these , as 't is most wonderful and mysterious ( it being a greater wonder that god should love man , than that either there should be so much happiness in the enjoyment of god , or so much misery in the loss of him ) so is it more frequently inculcated , and more strongly represented . so frequently inculcated is it , that were it not for the mystery of the thing , and that there is no tautology in love , the scripture would seem chargeable with vain repetitions . every page almost in holy writ breathes forth this mystery of divine love , and besides that , there is one whole book particularly imploy'd in the representation of it , by all the flowers and delicacies of the most exalted poetry ; it may be said of the whole sacred volumn that 't is but one continued expression of love from christ to his church , one larger canticles . and as 't is thus frequently inculcated , so is it no less strongly represented . 't is represented by that which is the most proper effect , and the last end and accomplishment of all love , by vnion . for there are three most admirable unions proposed to our faith in the christian religion . the unity of essence in the trinity , the unity of person in jesus christ , and the union that is between christ and his church . the first of these is an example and prefiguration as it were to the second , and the second to the third . for we cannot better represent the union of christ with his church , than by the hypostatic vnion , or the union of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with human nature . for first , as in this mystery the plurality of nature is consistent with the unity of person , so does love effect the same miracle in the union between christ and his church . for here also we meet with a new theanthropy , a strange composition of god and man , two vastly different substances , which without confusion of either natures or properties , make up one and the same body . for if christ be head of the church , he is also one body with it . and so st. austin , totus christus secundam ecclesiam & caput & corpus est . again , as in the mystery of the hypostatic union there is a communication of idioms or properties whereby what primarily and abstractly belongs to one , may secondarily and concretely be attributed to the other , as that god is man , and man is god , so has love introduced the like communication between christ and his church , which may be said to be happy and glorified in christ , as he is said to suffer in his church . again , as in the mystery of the hypostatic union the word uniting it self to human nature adorn'd and exalted it , not only by the priviledge of so sacred a confederacy , but also with many distinct graces and excellencies , whereby it was necessarily tho not forcibly determin'd to love the divinity , and highly fitted to be loved by it , so is it also in this union between christ and his church . he has not only innobled her by so sacred an alliance , but is ever conferring upon her his gifts and graces , and will never cease to do so , till at length he present her to himself a glorious church , without spot or blemish , and make her in some measure worthy of so great a love , and so intimate an vnion . for 't is observable , that in scripture jesus christ is set out as the author and dispencer of all grace , to him is ascribed the work of the second as well as of the first creation , from his fulness we all receive , and the apostle says expresly , that to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of christ. but not to pursue this metaphysical parallel any further , let us return to consider this union , as 't is represented in holy scripture . now there are but two sorts of union in the world , natural and moral . and the holy spirit has made choice of the closest of each , whereby to figure out to us the union between christ and his church . the closest of natural unions is that between the head and the body ; and the closest of all moral unions is that between the husband and the wife . and both these are by the holy spirit applied to this mystery . thus is christ oftentimes call'd the head of the church , and the church the body of christ. thus again is he stiled the bridegroom , and the church honour'd with the name of his spouse . and because this latter figure carries in it more of sensible endearment , therefore is it of more frequent use , and withal of more antient date . for besides that adam first open'd this mystery , and by his miraculous marriage typified to us that of christ with his church , which came out of the wounded side of our lord , as eve was taken out of adam's , the prophets have also given our lord the title of bridegroom in the old testament . the 45th psalm is a plain spiritual epithalamium , and so is the whole book of canticles , and the holy baptist , in whom both types and prophesie expire , calls him expresly by the name of bridegroom . strange miracle of humility and love ! that ever god should come down to seek a spouse upon earth ! was it not enough , o blessed jesu , that thou wast one with the father and holy spirit , in the eternal trinity ? was it not enough that thou hadst made thy self one with our mortal flesh by assuming our nature , but that thou must yet heap mystery upon mystery , and as if thou wert not yet near enough allied to us , must also make thy self one with thy church ? but such is thy love to man as not to be contented with one single union with him ? and so great thy condescention as if thou need'st a partner , to compleat thy happiness , and as if it were no more good for the second , than 't was for the first adam to be alone . these are the two principal figures under which the scripture pictures out to us the love of christ to his church , and his union with it . not that they rise up to the heighth of the mystery , but because they come the nearest of any to it . for indeed they fall vastly short , and give but a faint shadowy resemblance of what they are intended to represent . and therefore as we have hitherto represented the dearness between christ and his church , by that between the head and the members , and the husband and wife , so we may , and with better reason invert the order , and propose the former as an example and measure for both the latter . and 't is observable that st. paul does so ; for says he , husbands love your wives , even as christ loved the church . and again , no man ever yet hated his own flesh , but nourishes and cherishes it even as the lord the church . where you see the love of christ to his church is not , as before , set out by that of married persons , and that of a man to his own flesh , but these are set out and illustrated by the other . so great and transcending all love , yea even all knowledge , is this love of christ to his church . but 't will appear yet greater , if we take a prospect of it in the second light , namely in those real and actual proofs whereby christ himself has exprest this his most excellent and otherwise incredible love. and certainly they are such as never were , will , or can be given by any other lover . for ( to make the prospect as short as maybe ) was it not an amazing instance of love for the great and ever blessed god , who could neither be advantaged by our happiness , nor damaged by our misery , to come down and assume our nature in its meanest circumstances , to live a needy and contemptible life , and dye a painful aud execrable death , and all this to reconcile a rebel , to restore an apostate ? indeed the work of man's redemption , if we deeply consider the whole method and contrivance of it , is such an heroic instance of love , and so much exceeding that of his creation , that 't is well man was created and redeem'd by the same good being , since otherwise his obligations to his redeemer being so much greater than those to his creator , he would be very much divided and distracted in his returns of love and gratitude . but let us reflect a little upon the life , before we further consider the death of our redeemer . it was one constant argument , one continued miracle of love. he lived as one purely devoted to the good of mankind . all his thoughts , all his words , all his actions were love , his whole business was to glorify his father , and ( which was his greatest glory ) to express his love to man , which tho at all times exceeding wonderful , yet toward the evening of his life it thicken'd and grew stronger , like motion within the neighbourhood of the center , and as then he prayed , so he loved yet more earnestly . for 't was then that he wept over condemn'd ierusalem , and bedew'd with tears the grave of lazarus . 't was then that with desire he desired to eat the passover with his disciples , instituted a perpetual monument of love , his holy supper , and left another of humility by condescending to wash their feet . 't was then that he comforted his disciples with the variety of the heavenly mansions , with a declaration that he himself was the way , the truth and the life , with an assurance that their prayers in his name should be effectual , with a promise of the holy spirit , and with a legacy of his own peace , to compensate for the tribulation they should meet with in the world. 't was then , lastly , that he recommended the state of his apostles , together with his own glorification , in one and the same solemn prayer to his father , that he would preserve them in unity and truth , and at length glorify them with the whole body of true believers with himself in heaven . and all this at a time when one would have thought his own concern should have been his only meditation , and fear his only passion , for now was he within view of his amazing sufferings , and the shade was just ready to point at the dreadful hour , and yet even now his love was truly stronger than death , and the care of his disciples prevailed over the horrors of his approaching agony . which he further shewed by giving up himself to a cruel and shameful death , for the life and salvation of the world. a death ( to say no more of it ) of such strange sorrow and anguish , that the very prospect of it put him into a sweat of blood , and the induring it made him complain of being deserted of his father . and then that his redemption might prove effectual , after his resurrection he gives commission to his disciples to go and publish it with its conditions throughout the world , and orders them all , as he does here st. peter , to feed his sheep . and lest the the benefit of his death should be again frustrated for want of power to perform the conditions , presently after his ascension he sent down the spirit of consolation upon his apostles , and does continually confer grace upon , and make intercession for his church . so tenderly affected was he toward this his spouse , that even the felicities of heaven could not make him forget her , as he further shew'd by complaining in behalf of his church , when from the midst of his glory he said , saul , saul , why persecutest thou me ? which words shew him as much concern'd for the wounds given to his mystical , as for those he felt in his natural body . and now since the love of our lord to his church is so exceeding great , it certainly concerns all christians , especially those whom he has intrusted with the care of his church to be alike minded . which leads me in the second place to consider the command here given , and to shew the great obligation that lies upon all spiritual pastors , to feed this flock of christ which is so nearly beloved by him . feed my sheep , says our lord to st. peter , and in him to all the pastors of the christian church , who are equally concerned both in the command and in the duty . and that they are so is , already sufficiently concluded from what has been discoursed concerning the great love of christ to his church . to make you therefore more sensible of this duty i need only propose to your meditation , how affectionately our lord loves his church , and how dear her interests are to him , that out of this his abundant love , he has set apart a distinct order of men on this very purpose , to promote and further her in the way of salvation , that he has intrusted the care of her in their hands , and has made them his vicegerents and trustees ; that 't is a charge worthy their greatest care , for which there needs no other argument than that 't is committed to them , by him who knows the worth . of souls ; that he strictly commands them , as they have any love or regard for him , to feed his sheep ; that 't was the very last command that he gave them , when he was just leaving the world , and upon the very confines of glorification , and that lastly as this is the greatest trust that was ever by god reposed in men , so there will be the severest account taken of it at the last day , at the great visitation of the bishop of souls . this is enough , if duely weighed , to shew the obligation of this command , and to conclude this part , were it not necessary to add something concerning the manner of discharging it . feed my sheep is the command given by christ to the pastors of his church , and we have seen the obligation of it : but how are they to feed them ? i answer , first by prayer for their respective charges both in public and in private . this is the first thing belonging to the pastoral office , and accordingly with this st. paul begins his admonition to his son timothy . i exhort therefore that first of all , supplications , prayers , intercessions and giving thanks be made for all men. secondly by preaching , with private instruction and admonition as occasion shall serve and require . and here their first care should be to preach nothing but what is true. secondly , to confine their discourses to vseful truths , such as tend to the promotion of good life , that which the apostle calls the truth which is after godliness . thirdly , to deliver only plain truths . for there are many truths which are highly useful and have a very practical aspect when they are once understood , which are not so easie and obvious to be so . these therefore ought as much to be waved as those which are not useful , because tho useful , simply speaking , yet respectively they are not . and upon these two latter accounts we should not trouble our unlearned auditories , either with thorny questions and knotty controversies which in themselves have no practical use , or with more refined theories and school niceties , which to them are as useless and unpractical as the other . to feed them with the former would be to give them stones instead of bread ; and to feed them with the latter would be like placing a man in the region of pure ether ; why , he can't breath in it , and will starve by reason of the over-fineness of his diet. nor is it enough that the truths we preach be vseful and plain , unless in the fourth place they be deliver'd in a plain and intelligible manner . for what signifies it that the things are in themselves plain , if we make them obscure in our expressing them ; we are all ready enough to laugh at the poor frier for going about to preach the gospel to beasts and trees , and are not they alike ridiculous that order discourses so as not to be understood by those that hear them ? don't these also preach to beasts and trees ? we ought therefore to consult the capacity of our hearers , and consider to whom , as well as what we speak . and to this plainness of expression we would do well to join some degrees of warmth and concernedness . and this i rather recommend because there are some that affect a cold , dead , careless and heartless way of delivery . but certainly this has as little decorum in it as it has of devotion . for since the things we speak are supposed not only to be truths , but concerning and important truths , what can be more absurd than to see a man deliver a sermon as drily and indifferently , as one would read a mathematical lecture ? 't is said of iohn the baptist , that he was a burning , as well as a shining light. and truly we have need of such in this cold frozen age. plain sermons , preach'd with warmth and affection do more than the best , coldly deliver'd . you know the story in eusebius of the heathen philosopher coming into the council of nice , who was baffled into christianity by the meer warmth and heartiness wherewith the good old man address'd him . he could have resisted his arguments , but not the spirit and zeal wherewith he spake . and this is all i shall think proper to remark to you upon the preaching part . the next way whereby the pastors of the church are to feed the sheep of christ , is by duely administring to them the holy sacrament , which is their true spiritual food , the manna that must sustain them in this wilderness . this is the most proper way of feeding them , for the body of christ is meat indeed , and his blood is drink indeed . there remains yet one way more of feeding the flock of christ , without which the rest will signifie but little , and that is by a good example . among the other properties of a good shepherd , our saviour reckons this as one , that he goes before his sheep , and leads them by his steps , as well as with his voice . there ought to be a connexion between hear and do , but much more between preach and do. and he that is not careful of this , as he cannot expect to do much good to others , so he will certainly condemn himself . to be short ( for i hope i need not inlarge , speaking to wise men ) a good preacher who is an ill liver is such a monster as cannot be match'd in all affrica . and for his state hereafter , i may leave it to be consider'd how great a condemnation awaits him , whom not only the book of god , and of conscience , but even his own sermons shall judge at the last day . these are the several ways of discharging this precept , feed my sheep ; to which however i think it necessary to add one thing more , and that is that we feed them our selves , and not by proxy , or deputation . for out lord does not say to st. peter , do thou get some body to feed my sheep , but do thou feed them thy self . for however st. peter's shadow might do cures upon the body , it must be his person that must do good upon the souls of his charge . to speak out plainly what i intend , non-residency is one of the greatest scandals of the reform'd , yea of the christian religion , contrary to all reason and justice , as well as primitive practice . and whoever are guilty of it , plainly shew that they are lovers of ease , honour or profit more than lovers of christ. for certainly he that loves christ as he ought will not think himself too good to feed his sheep . which leads me in the third and last place to consider the connexion and dependance that is between the practice of this command and the love of christ. now this i briefly make out upon a double ground . the first ground is , because the love of christ will naturally ingage us to love whatever he loves , and consequently since his church is so exceeding dear to him , 't will ingage us to love his church , and if to love it , then consequently to be diligent in feeding it , that being the most proper instance of shewing our love to it . the second ground is , because the person of jesus christ consisting of a double nature , god and man , the love of him must include the love of his humanity ; as well as of his divinity . if therefore we love christ , we love the human nature as well as the divine , and if so , then we love man as man , consequently all men , and if we love all men , we shall desire and endeavour their salvation , and accordingly take care to feed them with the bread of life . upon these two grounds it plainly appears that there is a strong connexion between the loving of christ , and the feeding of his sheep , and that such pastors as do not well discharge the latter , have no right of pretending to the former . this is the test whereby both st. peter's and every spiritual pastor's affection to our lord must be tried , if you love me , feed my sheep . let me therefore exhort you all , as you love our lord jesus christ , and as you desire to be loved and approv'd of by him , to a sincere and conscientious discharge of your pastoral duty , to take heed unto your selves and to all the flock over which the holy ghost has made you overseers , to feed the church of god , which he has purchased with his own blood. let me beseech you to consider what you are , and what you should be . what you are by your character and profession , and what you should be in the exercise of it , and therefore to take heed to your selves , to your doctrine , and above all to your publick life and conversation . for certainly it cannot be an ordinary measure of religion that will serve our turn , who are concern'd not only to be good , but exemplary , and must live well for others as well as for our selves , what therefore is perfection in others , will be but strict duty in us . the devotion of our ordinary days , ought to exceed that of their festivals , and we should live in as much warmth of religion as they dye . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in all things shewing thy self a pattern of good works , that 's our rule , we ought to be patterns and examples of a holy and refined conversation . let your lamps therefore be always trimm'd , and your lights always burning , and that with such brightness , as to shame those that will not be allured by the glory of the flame . and that you may the better do all this , let me desire you all frequently and seriously to meditate upon the excellent example of the great and good shepherd christ jesus , whose life was wholly imploy'd , and at last laid down for the good of his sheep . i pray you ( my reverend brethren ) consider this and all that has been said , that so when this great shepherd shall return to visit his flock , you may all give up the same account to him , that he did to his father , those that thou gavest me i have kept , and none of them is lost . amen . finis . books printed for sam. manship , at the black-bull , in cornhil . odes . satyrs , and epistles of horace , done into english ; the second edition . lives of the most famous english poets , or the honour of parnassus , in a brief essay of the works and writings of above two hundred of them , from the time of k. william the conqueror , to the reign of the late k. iames the second , in octav. reason and religion , or the grounds and measures of devotion , considered from the nature of god and the nature of man , in several contemplations , with exercises of devotion , applied to every contemplation ; by iohn norris , m. a. and fellow of all-souls-college in oxford . octavo , price 2 s. the theory and regulation of love , a moral essay in two parts , to which is added letters philosophical and moral , between the author and doctor more , by i. noris , m. a. and fellow of all-souls-college in oxford . 2 s. a cap of gray-hairs , for a green head , or the fathers counsel to his son an apprentice in london : containing wholesome instructions for the managements of a man's whole life : the fourth edition in twelves . 1 s. the injured lovers , or the ambitious father a tragedy ; acted by their majesties servants , at the theatre royal : by w. mountfort . a comedy . the comical revenge , or love in a tub ; as it is now acted at their majesties theatre : by sir geo. ethenege . the gallant hermaphrodite , an amorous novel , translated from the french , of the sieur de chouigny . price 1 s. the marrow of divinity , or the chief grounds of protestant religion , briefly explained in a form of catechising ; by way of question and answer , by william ames , d. d. price 3. d. finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a52433-e280 eccles. 11.7 . notes for div a52433-e530 exod. 17.6 . vid. reason and religion . pag. 82. vid. the same treatise . pag. 203. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. 3. cogitationes rationales de deo p. 296. de la recherche de la verite p. 208. 1 cor. 13.8 . notes for div a52433-e7740 vide , reason and religion . joh. 1.5 . p. 144. p. 146. p. 148 , reason and religion . colos. 2.3 . prov. 8.34 . c. 9.4 . joh. 8.12 . tauler sermon , 3. pasch. p. 412. joh. 7.17 . 1 cor. ● . 14 . 1 wisd. 4. dan. 12.10 . psal. 119. joh. 8.12 . 1 cor. 13.12 . dan. 1.15 joh. 14.2 . v. 23. psal. 25.13 . dan. 1.17 . pag. 5. jam. 1.5 . 1 king. 3.9 . notes for div a52433-e12910 eccl. 43. nat. hist. p. 13. job . 38. eccles. 1.18 . colos. 3.10 . cogitat . ration . de deo. p. 62● . eccles. 12.13 . v. 12. v. 13. v. 14. v. 21. v. 22. v. 23. v. 28. 1 cor. 2. deut. 32.29 . confess . lib. c. 1.16 . notes for div a52433-e19770 via compendii ad deum . p. 172. notes for div a52433-e21120 mat. 26.33 . ephes. 3.19 . ephes. 5.27 . ephes. 4.7 . ephes. 5.25 . ver. 29. luke . 22.44 . jo. 17. 1 tim. 2.1 . 1 titus . john 5.35 . john 10.4 act. 20.28 . tit. 2.7 . john 17.12 . the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. locke's second letter wherein his notion of ideas is prov'd to be inconsistent with itself, and with the articles of the christian faith. stillingfleet, edward, 1635-1699. 1698 approx. 237 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 93 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2003-01 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a61523 wing s5558 estc r3400 12185882 ocm 12185882 55785 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a61523) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 55785) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 879:8) the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. locke's second letter wherein his notion of ideas is prov'd to be inconsistent with itself, and with the articles of the christian faith. stillingfleet, edward, 1635-1699. 178, [7] p. printed by j.h. for henry mortlock ..., london : 1698. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng locke, john, 1632-1704. -essay concerning human understanding. knowledge, theory of. 2002-09 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2002-10 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2002-11 judith siefring sampled and proofread 2002-11 judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited 2002-12 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. locke's second letter ; wherein his notion of ideas is prov'd to be inconsistent with it self , and with the articles of the christian faith . london , printed by i. h. for henry mortlock at the phoenix in st. paul's church-yard , mdcxcviii . the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. locke's second letter , &c. sir , i was not a little surpriz'd at the length of your second letter , considering the shortness of the answer contained in it : but it put me in mind of the springs of modená mention'd by ramazzini , which rise up with such a plenty of water upon opening a passage , that the undertaker is afraid of being overwhelm'd by it . i see how dangerous it is to give occasion to a person of such a fruitfull invention to write ; for letters become books , and small books will soon rise to great volumes , if no way be found to give a check to such an ebullition of thoughts , as some men find within themselves . i was apt to think the best way were , to let nature spend it self ; and although those who write out of their own thoughts do it with as much ease and pleasure as a spider spins his web ; yet the world soon grows weary of controversies , especially when they are about personal matters : which made me wonder that one who understands the world so well , should spend above fifty pages of a letter in renewing and enlarging a complaint wholly concerning himself . suppose i had born a little too hard upon you in joyning your words and anothers intentions together ; had it not been an easie and effectual way of clearing your self , to have declared to the world , that you owned the doctrine of the trinity , as it hath been received in the christian church , and is by ours in the creeds and articles of religion ? this had stopt the mouths of the clamorous , and had removed the suspicions of the doubtfull , and would have given full satisfaction to all reasonable men. but when you so carefully avoid doing this , all other arts and evasions do but leave the matter more suspicious among the most intelligent and impartial readers . this i mention , not that you need be afraid of the inquisition , or that i intend to charge you with heresie in denying the trinity ; but my present design is to shew , that your mind is so intangled and set fast by your notion of ideas , that you know not what to make of the doctrines of the trinity and incarnation ; because you can have no idea of one nature and three persons , nor of two natures and one person ; as will fully appear afterwards . and therefore , out of regard to publick service , in order to the preventing a growing mischief , i shall endeavour to lay open the ill consequences of your way of ideas with respect to the articles of the christian faith. but i shall wave all unnecessary repetitions , and come immediately to the matter of your complaint as it is renewed in this second letter , which i shall briefly answer , before i proceed to that which i chiefly design . your complaint , you say , was , that you were brought into a controversie wherein you had never meddled , nor knew how you came to be concerned in . i told you , it was because the person who opposed the mysteries of christianity went upon your grounds , and made use of your words ; although i declared withall , that they were used to other purposes than you intended them ; and i confess'd , that the reason why i quoted your words so much , was , because i found your notion as to certainty by ideas , was the main foundation on which the author of christianity not mysterious went ; and that he had nothing that look'd like reason , if that principle were removed ; which made me so much endeavour to shew , that it would not hold , and so i supposed the reason why i so often mention'd your words , was no longer a riddle to you . these passages you set down in your second letter ; but you say , all this seems to you to do nothing towards the clearing of this matter . whether it doth or not , i am content to leave it to any indifferent reader ; and there it must rest at last , although you should write volumes about it . but for what cause do you continue so unsatisfied ? you tell us , it is , that the author mentioned , went upon this ground , that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty , but that is not your notion as to certainty by ideas ; which is , that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , such as we have , whether they be in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct or no : and you say , that you have no notions of certainty more than this one . this is no more than what you had said before in your former letter , and i took particular notice of it , and gave three several answers to it , which i shall here lay together and defend , because you seem to think i had not answered it . ( 1. ) that those who offer at clear and distinct ideas bid much fairer for certainty than you do ( according to this answer ) and speak more agreeably to your original grounds of certainty . for it is a very wonderfull thing in point of reason , for you to pretend to certainty by ideas , and not allow those ideas to be clear and distinct ? you say , the certainty lies in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas : how can i clearly perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas , if i have not clear and distinct ideas ? for how is it possible for a man's mind to know whether they agree or disagree , if there be some parts of those ideas , we have only general and confused ideas of ? and therefore i had great reason to say , that if certainty be placed in ideas we must have clear and distinct ideas . you may as well say , a man may be certain of the agreement and disagreement of colours in a confused or uncertain light. for so much as the idea fails of clearness and distinctness , so much it fails of that evidence which it is necessary to judge by . where-ever there is obscurity , confusion or imperfection in the ideas , there must be so much uncertainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of them . and to pretend to certainty by ideas without pretending to clear and distinct ideas , is to judge without evidence , and to determine a thing to be certainly true , when we cannot know whether it be so or not ; for how can you be sure that your ideas agree with the reality of things ( wherein you place the certainty of knowledge ) if there be no such ideas of those things , that you can perceive their true nature , and their difference from all others ? for therein you will not deny that the notion of clear and distinct ideas consists . but you say more than once or twice , or ten times , that i blame those who place certainty in clear and distinct ideas , but you do it not , and yet i bring you in among them ; which is the thing you so much complain of . i will give you a full answer to this complaint . i do not deny , but the first occasion of my charge was the supposition that clear and distinct ideas were necessary in order to any certainty in our minds , and that the only way to attain this certainty was by comparing these ideas together : but to prove this , your words were produced , and your principles of certainty laid down , and none else ; and i could not imagine that you could place certainty in the agreement or disagreement of ideas , and yet not suppose those ideas to be clear and distinct . but finding your self joyned in such company which you did not desire to be seen in , you rather chose to distinguish your self from them , by denying clear and distinct ideas to be necessary to certainty . but it must be here observed , that our debate about certainty by ideas is not about any other certainty , but about certainty of knowledge with regard to some proposition , whose ideas are to be compared as to their agreement and disagreement . for your words are , certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas as expressed in any proposition . this we usually call knowing or being certain of the truth of any proposition . so that a proposition whose ideas are to be compared as to their agreement or disagreement , is the proper object of this certainty . and therefore this certainty is to be distinguished , 1. from a certainty by sense ; or that by which we come to know the existence of external objects . for you say , that the knowledge of the existence of any other thing we can have only by sensation . for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with any idea a man hath in his memory ; no particular man can know the existence of any other being , but only when by actual operating upon him it makes it self perceived by him . but that this is quite another certainty from that of ideas , appears from these following words of yours ; for the having the idea of any thing in our mind , no more proves the existence of that thing than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world , or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history . therefore this is a very different certainty from that of ideas . 2. from a certainty by reason ; when from the existence of some things evident to sense , we inferr the existence of another thing not evident to sense : as to take your own words in your former letter . as to the existence of bodily substances , i know by my senses , that something extended , solid and figur'd does exist ; for my senses are the utmost evidence and certainty i have of the existence of extended , solid , figured things . these modes being then known to exist by our senses , the existence of them ( which i cannot conceive can subsist without something to support them ) makes me see the connection of those ideas with a support , or as it is called , subject of inhesion , and so consequently the connection of that support , which cannot be nothing , with existence . granting all this , yet it by no means proves that we can have a certainty in the way of ideas , where the ideas themselves by which we have the certainty are obscure and confused ; but that supposing the ideas we have by our senses to be true , we may from them inferr the existence of something of which we have only an obscure and confused idea ; which is the case of bodily substances . of which i grant you may come to a certain knowledge , but not a certainty by ideas , but by a consequence of reason deduced from the ideas we have by our senses . and this can never prove that we may have a certainty by ideas , where the ideas themselves are not clear and distinct : for there is a great difference between having a certainty by reason , of a thing whose idea is confused and obscure , and having that certainty by obscure and confused ideas . for in this case the idea of substance is obscure : but the way of certainty is by a clear deduction of reason from the ideas we have by our senses . 3. from a certainty by remembrance ; by which i mean the remaining impression on the mind of an original certainty by demonstration . as to use your own instance ; a man hath found by mathematical evidence , that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles ; the perception of this at the time of the demonstration was clear and distinct ; but afterwards , the method of demonstration may have slipt out of his mind , yet he retains a certainty of the thing by virtue of that demonstration ; but this is not a clear perception , as you would have it , where the ideas are confused ; but it is an obscure remembrance of the grounds of that certainty which he once had ; and hath never seen any reason since , why he should call it in question . these things then being put out of the question , which belong not to it ; the question truly stated is , whether we can attain to any certainty of knowledge as to the truth of a proposition in the way of ideas , where the ideas themselves by which we come to that certainty be not clear and distinct ? another thing to be observed is , that des cartes who first started this way of certainty by ideas , thought it a ridiculous thing in any to pretend to it , unless their ideas were clear and distinct . he saith , that when we assent without clear perception , we are either deceived , or fall into truth by chance , but we do often err when we think we have clear perception , and have not . but to a certain iudgment , it is necessary that our perception be not only clear but distinct : that is , when the thing not only lies open to our view , but we see it on all sides , and so can distinguish it from all other things . you agree with him in placing certainty in ideas , but you differ from him in that which alone made his opinion reasonable , viz. that these ideas be clear and distinct . if it were possible for us to come to clear and distinct ideas of the things we pretend to be certain of , it were a just pretence to certainty in that way ; but since we cannot come at them , we must be content with such measures of knowledge as we are capable of . but for you to talk so much of certainty by ideas , and yet to allow obscurity and imperfection in those ideas , is like a purblind man who would pretend to judge exactly of the differences of colours in the twilight , because another pretended to do it at noon-day : or like one , who would undertake to shew certainly the agreement or disagreement of two men at a distance from him , in their habit , features , and stature , and yet at the same time confess that he could not clearly distinguish one from the other . so that if i did think you spake more consistently to your hypothesis , than you say now that you did , i hope you will forgive me that wrong , if at least it be a wrong to you ; for after all , there are several passages in your essay , which suppose clear ideas necessary to certainty . for in one place you say , that the mind not being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know . what is this but to make clear ideas necessary to certainty ? in another , yet more plainly , that which is requisite to make our knowledge certain is the clearness of our ideas . in a third place you say ; for it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas ; where they are either imperfect , confused or obscure , we cannot expect to have certain , perfect or clear knowledge . in a fourth ; but obscure and confused ideas can never produce any clear and certain knowledge , because as far as any ideas are confused or obscure , the mind can never perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree . what can be more express ? and yet you have complained of me in near twenty places of your second letter for charging this upon you . by this the world will judge of the justice of your complaints , and the consistency of your notion of ideas . ( 2. ) i answer'd , that it is very possible the authour of christianity not mysterious , might mistake or misapply your notions , but there is too much reason to believe he thought them the same , and we have no reason to be sorry that he hath given you this occasion for the explaining your meaning , and for the vindication of your self in the matters you apprehend he had charged you with . here you enter upon a fresh complaint , and say ▪ this can be no reason why you should be joyned with a man that had misapplied your notions ; and that no man hath so much mistaken and misapplied your notions as my self , and therefore you ought rather to be joyned with me . but is this fair and ingenuous dealing , to represent this matter so , as if i had joined you together , because he had misunderstood and misapplied your notions ? can you think me a man of so little sense to make that the reason of it ? no , sir , it was because he assigned no other grounds but yours , and that in your own words , however now you would divert the meaning of them another way . and although i was willing to allow you all reasonable occasions for your own vindication , as appears by my words ; yet i was sensible enough , that you had given too just an occasion to apply them in that manner , as appears by the next page . but because these words follow some i had quoted out of your postscript , you fall into a nice piece of criticism about them , which , you say , in grammatical construction , must refer to the words of the postscript ; but any one that reads without a design to cavil , would easily interpret them of your words and notions about which the debate was ; and not of the postscript which comes in but as a parenthesis . this looks like chicaning in controversie ; which no man , who knows his cause is good , ever falls into . but if , you say , by an unintelligible new way of construction the word them be applied to any passages in your book : what then ? why then , whoever they are , you intend to complain of them too . but the words just before tell you who they are , viz. the enemies of the christian faith. and is this all that you intend , only to complain of them for making you a party in the controversie against the trinity ? but whether you have not made your self too much a party in it , will appear , before we have done . i had with great kindness , as i thought , taken notice of a passage in your postscript : in which i was glad to find that in general , you owned the mysteries of the christian faith , and the scripture to be the foundation and rule of it : from whence i inferr'd , that i could not believe you intended to give any advantage to the enemies of the christian faith. this passage , you say , you were surprized to find in a paragraph design'd to give you satisfaction . there are some persons i find very hard to be satisfied . for i speak of my satisfaction in this passage , and that i was glad you agreed so far with me , although you could not come up in all things to what i could wish . but what reason have you to express so much dissatisfaction at these words ? you call it an extraordinary sort of complement ; and that they seem to intimate as though i took you for a heathen before . how like a cavilling exception is this ? do not we know that in the debate about the mysteries of faith our adversaries are no heathens ; but they deny any mysteries : i was glad to find that you owned them ; and resolved your faith into the scripture as the foundation of it . did not this look more like a good opinion of you as to these matters , than any inclination to suspect you for a heathen ? but you say , it must not be taken for granted , that those who do not write or appear in print in controversies of religion do not own the christian faith , and the scriptures as the rule of it . i was far enough from any such apprehension ; but the case is quite otherwise , with those who are not sparing of writing about articles of faith , and among them take great care to avoid some which have been always esteem'd fundamental articles by the christian church . and i think it was no want of humanity or christian charity in me , that i was so glad to find you own the mysteries of the christian faith in general : which shews at least , that you cannot object against any articles of faith , because they contain something mysterious in them . but i said , that in all things your answer doth not come fully up to what i could wish . and i think i gave sufficient proof of it , as to your idea of substance , the nature of ideas , the materiality of the soul , the disparaging some arguments to prove the existence of god , the tendency of your principles ; and the ground of certainty , &c. which are put off to another letter , except the last , which is therefore now to be examin'd . ( 3. ) the third answer i gave was , that your own grounds of certainty , tend to scepticism ; and that in an age wherein the mysteries of faith are too much exposed by the promoters of scepticism and infidelity , it is a thing of dangerous consequence to start such new methods of certainty , as are apt to leave men's minds more doubtfull than before . these words , you say , contain a farther accusation of your book , which shall be consider'd in its due place . but this is the proper place of considering it . for i said , that hereby you have given too just occasion to the enemies of the christian faith , to make use of your words and notions , as was evidently proved from your own concessions . and if this be so , however i was willing to have had you explained your self to the general satisfaction ; yet since you decline it , i do insist upon it , that you cannot clear your self from laying that foundation , which the author of christianity not mysterious built upon . for your ground of certainty is the agreement or disagreement of the ideas , as expressed in any proposition . which are your own words . from hence i urged , that let the proposition come to us any way , either by humane or divine authority , if our certainty depend upon this , we can be no more certain , than we have clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas contained in it . and from hence the author of christianity not mysterious thought he had reason to reject all mysteries of faith which are contained in propositions , upon your grounds of certainty . by this it evidently appears , that although i was willing to allow you all fair ways of interpreting your own sense ; yet i by no means thought that your words were wholly misunderstood or misapplied by that author : but rather that he saw into the true consequence of them , as they lie in you book . and what answer do you give to this ? not a word in the proper place for it . but afterwards ( for i would omit nothing that may seem to help your cause ) you offer something towards an answer . for there you distinguish the certainty of faith , and the certainty of knowledge , and you humbly conceive the certainty of faith , if i think fit to call it so , hath nothing to do with the certainty of knowledge ; and to talk of the certainty of faith seems all one to you as to talk of the knowledge of believing , a way of speaking not easie for you to understand . so that if i shake never so much the certainty of knowledge , it doth not at all concern the assurance of faith , that is quite distinct from it , neither stands nor falls with knowledge . faith stands by it self and upon grounds of its own , nor can be removed from them and placed on those of knowledge . their grounds are so far from being the same , or having any thing , that when it is brought to certainty , faith is destroyed , 't is knowledge then and faith no longer . so that , whether you are , or are not mistaken in the placing certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , faith still stands upon its own basis , which is not at all alter'd by it ; and every article of that hath just the same unmoved foundation , and the very same credibility that it had before . this is the substance of what you say about this matter , and is the most considerable passage in your book towards clearing this matter . but i was aware of this , as appears by these words ; is faith an unreasonable act ? is it not an assent to a proposition ? then , if all certainty in acts of reason be derived from the perceiving the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in it ; either there can be no certainty in the reasonable act of faith , or the grounds of certainty must be laid some other way . but this is a matter of too great weight and consequence to be easily past over , because the main strength of your defence lies in it , and therefore i shall more strictly examine what you say ; and set this point of the certainty of faith in as good a light as i can , and shew the inconsistency of your notion of ideas , with the articles of the christian faith. to talk of the certainty of faith , say you , seems all one to you as to talk of the knowledge of believing ; a way of speaking not easie for you to understand . but how comes the certainty of faith to become so hard a point with you ? have not all mankind , who have talked of matters of faith , allow'd a certainty of faith as well as a certainty of knowledge , although upon different grounds ? in your former letter you told us , that if we knew the original of words , we should be much helped to the ideas they were first applied to and made to stand for . now what is there in the original of the word certainty which makes it uncapable of being applied to faith ? i had thought that our word was taken from the latin ; and that among the romans it was opposed to doubting , nil tam certum quam quod de dubio certum . and therefore where the mind upon examination of the grounds of assent saw no reason for doubting , it might properly be said to be certain : if it sees no cause to doubt from the evidence of the thing it self , or the clear deduction of consequences , that is certainty of knowledge ; but where it sees no reason to doubt from the authority of him that speaks , that is certainty of believing ; and the greater the authority of him that speaks , the less reason there is to doubt , and therefore the greater certainty of faith. and this i think is very easie to be understood , and so have the generality of mankind thought to this day . but it seems our old words must not now pass in the current sense ; but then it is fit they be called in , and new stampt , that we may have none but new milled words to talk with ; but in common justice , a competent time ought to be allow'd for it , that none be surprized ; and in the mean time they ought to pass in their current sense ; and that is all the favour i desire in this matter . but i am utterly against any private mints of words ; and think those persons assume too much authority to themselves , who will not suffer common words to pass in their general acceptation ; but will set such bounds and limits to the sense of them , as suit best with their own speculations . but is not this all one as to talk of the knowledge of believing ? for what reason ? knowledge and faith are too distinct things , the one relates to evidence , and the other to testimony ; but certainty is common to them both , unless you think it impossible to be certain upon any testimony whatsoever . you tell us in your postscript ( which i hope may be brought hither without offence ) that it is a shame among christians to raise such a doubt of this , whether an infinitely powerfull and wise being be veracious or no. then i suppose the veracity of god is a certain and undoubted principle ; and if there be sufficient means to assure us of divine revelation ( as i doubt not but you yield there are ) what should hinder one , that believes upon such grounds as are sufficient to convince him , from attaining to a certainty of faith ? but you take certainty as belonging only to knowledge . so do the papists , as belonging only to infallibility , and say there can be no certainty of faith , where there is not an infallible proponent ; but neither you nor they are to impose upon the understandings of mankind , who know how to distinguish the grounds of certainty both from knowledge and infallibility . you allow such a thing as assurance of faith ; and why not certainty as well as assurance ? i know no reason , but that you have appropriated certainty to the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas in any proposition ; and now you find this will not hold as to articles of faith ; and therefore you will allow no certainty of faith ; which i think is not for the advantage of your cause . but you go on and tell us , that if this way of certainty by ideas doth not hold , yet it cannot affect matters of faith which stand immoveable upon other grounds ; faith in your own words stands still upon its own basis ; and every article of it has just the same unmoved foundation , and the very same credibility that it had before . this will appear to be an extraordinary answer , when we have throughly examin'd it . here we see faith is taken not with respect to the general grounds of certainty , but to the particular articles of faith , i. e. the propositions contained in that revelation which we embrace on the account of its divine authority ; now these propositions are of several kinds . 1. some that are more clearly expressed therein , but such as might be attained to by the light of reason without revelation . and such are the fundamental principles of natural religion , viz. the being of god and providence , and the rewards and punishments of a future state. these mankind may attain to a certainty in , without revelation , or else there can be no such thing as natural religion in the world ; but these things are more fully and plainly revealed in the scriptures . let us now suppose a person by natural reason to attain to a certainty , as to the being of god and immortality of the soul ; and he proceeds upon your general grounds of certainty , from the agreement or disagreement of ideas ; and so from the ideas of god and the soul , he is made certain of those two points before mention'd . but let us again suppose that such a person upon a farther examination of your method of proceeding finds , that the way of ideas in these cases will not do ; for no idea proves the existence of the thing without it self , no more than the picture of a man proves his being , or the visions of a dream make a true history , ( which are your own expressions . ) and for the soul he cannot be certain , but that matter may think , ( as you affirm ) and then what becomes of the soul's immateriality ( and consequently immortality ) from its operations ? but for all this , say you , his assurance of faith remains firm on its own basis. now i appeal to any man of sense , whether the finding the uncertainty of his own principles which he went upon in point of reason , doth not weaken the credibility of these fundamental articles when they are consider'd purely as matters of faith ? for before , there was a natural credibility in them on the account of reason ; but by going on wrong grounds of certainty , all that is lost ; and instead of being certain he is more doubtfull than ever . and if the evidence of faith falls so much short of that of reason , it must needs have less effect upon mens minds , when the subserviency of reason is taken away ; as it must be when the grounds of certainty by reason are vanished . is it at all probable , that he who finds his reason deceive him in such fundamental points should have his faith stand firm and unmoveable on the account of revelation ? for in matters of revelation , there must be some antecedent principles supposed before we can believe any thing on the account of it . and the first is , that there is a god ; but this was the very thing he found himself at a loss in by his way of certainty by ideas ; and how can his faith stand firm as to divine revelation , when he is made uncertain by his own way , whether there be a god or no ? besides , to suppose divine revelation , we must be certain that there is a principle above matter and motion in the world ; but here we find , that upon the principles of certainty by ideas he cannot be certain of this ; because he doth not know but matter may think ; and consequently , all revelation may be nothing but the effects of an exalted fancy , or the heats of a disordered imagination , as spinoza affirmed . again , before there can be any such thing as assurance of faith upon divine revelation , there must be a certainty as to sense and tradition ; for there can be no revelation pretended now without immediate inspiration ; and the basis of our faith is a revelation contained in an ancient book , whereof the parts were delivered at distant times , but conveyed down to us by an universal tradition . but now , what if your grounds of certainty can give us no assurance as to these things ? i do not mean , that they cannot demonstrate matters of fact , which it were most unreasonable to expect ; but that these grounds of certainty make all things uncertain ; for i think i have proved , that this way of ideas cannot give a satisfactory account as to the existence of the plainest objects of sense ; because reason cannot perceive the connexion between the objects and the ideas . how then can we arrive to any certainty in perceiving those objects by their ideas ? and i was in the right , when i said this way tended to scepticism ; and i do not think that consistent with the assurance of faith. but this is an imputation you take very ill , and say , that i have brought no argument for it , but only that my great prejudice against this way of certainty is , that it leads to scepticism . ( sceptism is the new mill'd word . ) this is very strange , when that expression is only the introduction to the arguments from p. 125 to 132 , to which no answer at all is given . and so i leave it . there are other propositions or articles of faith which wholly depend on the sense of words contained in the scripture , and we are to enquire , whether the assurance of faith , as you call it , be consistent with the overthrowing your grounds of certainty ; i. e. whether those who embrace the articles of faith in the way of ideas , can retain their certainty of those articles when these ideas are quitted . and this alone will be a plain demonstration in the case , that the certainty of faith cannot stand with such men , if this way of certainty by ideas be destroyed . and by this which i am now to make out , let any one judge how true your words are like to prove , when you say , let the grounds of knowledge or certainty be resolved into what they please , it touches not your faith ; the foundation of that stands as sure as before , and cannot be at all shaken by it . of this we shall judge by some important articles of christian faith according to your ideas . the first shall be that of the resurrection of the dead . the reason of believing the resurrection of the same body upon your grounds is from the idea of identity ; which i take to be this from your own words . 1. that the identity of living creatures depends not on a mass of the same particles , but on something else ; for in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity ; for which you instance in the growth of an oak and a horse . 2. that the identity of a man consists in nothing but a participation of the same continued life by constantly fleeting particles of matter , in succession vitally united to the same organized body . 3. that personal identity , i. e. the sameness of a rational being lies in self-consciousness , and in that alone , whether it be annexed only to one individual substance , or can be continued in a succession of several substances . 4. that those who place thought in a purely material , animal constitution , void of spirit , do place personal identity in something else that identity of substance , as animal identity is preserved in identity of life and not of substance . 5. that it matters not to this point of being the same self , whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances . 6. that in this personal identity of self-consciousness is founded all the right and iustice of reward and punishment , happiness and misery , being that for which every one is concerned for himself , not mattering what becomes of any substance not joined to , or affected with that consciousness . 7. that the sentence at the day of iudgment will be justified by the consciousness all persons shall have that they themselves in what bodies soever they appear , or what substances soever that consciousness adheres to , are the same that committed those actions and deserve that punishment for them . this i suppose to be a true and just account of your sense of this matter ; and so the article of the resurrection is resolved into your idea of personal identity . and the question between us now is , whether your certainty of this matter from your idea have no influence on the belief of this article of faith ? for the main of your defence lies upon this point , whether your method of certainty by ideas , doth at all shake , or in the least concern the assurance of faith ? which you absolutely deny , and affirm , that faith stands upon its own basis , and is not at all altered by your method of certainty ; and every article of that has just the same unmoved foundation , and the very same credibility that it had before . now i take this article of the resurrection of the dead to be an article of faith , and we are to consider , whether if your method of certainty by ideas do hold in this matter , it continues as firm , and in the same credibility it had before ? i shall not urge you with the sense of our own or other christian churches in this point of the sameness of the body in the resurrection of the dead , but i shall continue my self to the scripture as the foundation and rule of our faith ; and the main point is , whether according to that , it be not necessary for the same substance which was united to the body to be raised up at the last day ? i do not say the same individual particles of matter which were united at the point of death ; for there must be a great alteration in them in a lingring disease , as if a fat man falls into a consumption : i do not say , the same particles which the sinner had at the very time of commission of his sins ; for then a long sinner must have a vast body , considering the continual spending of particles by perspiration ; but that which i suppose is implyed in it is , that it must be the same material substance which was vitally united to the soul here . you mention the hypothesis of those , who place thought in a purely material animal constitution void of spirit : but you agree , that the more probable opinion is , that this consciousness is annexed to the affection of one individual immaterial substance . it is very well that it is allowed to be the more probable opinion ; but it seems without any certainty as to the truth of it . for you have told us , what the effect of probability is , viz. that it is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition true or false rather than the contrary ; and that it is conversant about things whereof we have no certainty , but only some inducements to receive it for true . thence i cannot but observe , that we have no certainty upon your grounds , that self-consciousness depends upon an individual immaterial substance , and consequently that a material substance may , according to your principles , have self-consciousness in it ; at least , that you are not certain of the contrary . now i pray consider , whether this doth not a little affect the whole article of the resurrection ? for , if it may be only a material substance in us that thinks , then this substance , which consists in the life of an organiz'd body , must cease by death ; for how can that , which consisted in life , be preserved afterwards ? and if the personal identity consists in a self-consciousness depending on such a substance as cannot be preserved without an organiz'd body , then there is no subsistence of it separate from the body , and the resurrection must be giving a new life . to whom ? to a material substance which wholly lost its personal identity by death . so that here can be no personal identity at all ; unless you say the very same life which was long since at an end can be reproduced . which i suppose you will not assert . but let us take the more probable opinion ; which i think certain , viz. that self-consciousness depends upon an immaterial principle in us ; and then the question is , how far the scripture determines the sameness of the body at the resurrection , i. e. of that material substance , which was vitally united with that immaterial substance in this life . the doctrine delivered by our saviour is , that all that are in the graves shall hear his voice ; and shall come forth ; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life , and they that have done evil to the resurrection of damnation . what is the meaning of all that are in their graves ? doth this relate to any other substance than that which was united to the soul in life ? can a different substance be said to be in the graves and to come out of them ? is it not material , as you say , whether the present self be made up of the same or other substances ? if it be not so to your idea of identity , it is as to the sense of our saviour's words : unless you can make it out , that a substance which never was in the grave may come out of it . but it may be said , that if these words be taken strictly they confine the resurrection to those particles of matter only which were in the grave ; if not , then they may extend to another substance . i answer , that by comparing this with other places we find that the words are to be understood of the substance of that body to which the soul was united ; and not to those individual particles . so st. paul , for we must all appear before the iudgment seat of christ , that every one may receive the things done in his body , according to that he hath done , whether it be good or bad . can these words be understood of any other material substance , but that body in which these things were done ? how could it be said , if any other substance be joyned to the soul at the resurrection , as its body , that they were the things done in or by the body ? curcellaeus his copy reads it , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; the complutensian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and several of the fathers so took it ; either way , it must relate to that which was the real body in which the person lived and acted , whether good or evil. and st. paul's dispute about the manner of raising the body might soon have been ended , if there were no necessity of the same body . if there be no resurrection of the dead , then is not christ raised . it seems then , other bodies are to be raised as his was ; and can there be any doubt whether his body were the same material substance which was united to his soul before ? and the apostle lays so much weight upon it , that he saith , if christ be not raised your faith is vain ; doth he mean , if there were not the same personal identity , as to the soul of christ and the matter united to it after the resurrection ? that cannot be his meaning , for then there would have been no necessity of christs own body being raised ; which he asserts and proves by undoubted witnesses . were they witnesses only of some material substance then united to his soul ? he saith , he was seen of five hundred brethren at once . what he was this ? it was christ that died . yes , the person of christ ; but personal identity doth not require the same substance , but the same consciousness ; and so if christ were conscious to himself in another substance , there was no necessity of the same body . and so truly from the seeing the person of christ they could not prove it was the same individual body . but thomas said , except i shall see in his hands the print of the nails , and put my finger into the print of the nails , and thrust my hand into his side , i will not believe . the doing whereof convinced him it was the same individual body ; but there will be no such proof at the great day . and there is no reason there should , since the resurrection of christ was a sufficient proof of god's power to raise the dead , and the dissimilitude of circumstances can be no argument against it , since the power and wisdom of god are concerned in it . but the apostle insists upon the resurrection of christ , not meerly as an argument of the possibility of ours , but of the certainty of it ; because he rose as the first fruits ; christ the first fruits , afterwards they that are christs at his coming . st. paul was aware of the objections in mens minds about the resurrection of the same body ; and it is of great consequence as to this article , to shew upon what grounds he proceeds . but some man will say , how are the dead raised up , and with what body do they come ? first he shews , that the seminal parts of plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary providence of god in the manner of their vegetation . they sow bare grain of wheat , or of some other grain , but god giveth it a body , as it hath pleased him , and to every seed his own body . here is an identity of the material substance supposed ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that proper body which belongs to it ; every seed having that body in little , which is afterwards so much inlarged ; and in grain the seed is corrupted before its germination ; but it hath its proper organical parts , which make it the same body with that which it grows up to . for although grain be not divided into lobes as other seeds are , yet it hath been found , by the most accurate observations , that upon separating the membranes these seminal parts are discerned in them ; which afterwards grow up to that body which we call corn. st. paul indeed saith , that we sow not that body that shall be ; but he speaks not of the identity but the perfection of it . and although there be such a difference from the grain it self , when it comes up to be perfect corn with root , stalk , blade and ear , that it may be said to outward appearance not to be the same body , yet with regard to the seminal and organical parts , it is as much the same as a man grown up is the same with the embryo in the womb. and although many arguments may be used to prove , that a man is not the same , because life which depends upon the course of the blood and the manner of respiration and nutrition is so different in both states , yet that man would be thought ridiculous that should seriously affirm , that it was not the same man. and you grant , that the variation of great parcels of matter in plants , alters not the identity : and that the organization of the parts in one coherent body partaking of one common life makes the identity of a plant ; so that in things capable of any sort of life , the identity is consistent with a continued succession of parts ; and so the wheat grown up is the same body with the grain that was sown . and thus the alteration of the parts of the body at the resurrection is consistent with its identity , if its organization and life be the same ; and this is a real identity of the body which depends not upon consciousness . from whence it follows , that to make the same body , no more is required but restoring life to the organized parts of it . and you grant likewise , that the identity of the same man consists in a participation of the same continued life by constantly fleeting particles of matter in succession vitally united to the same organized body . so that there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the body , if life were continued ; and if by divine power life be restored to that material substance which was before united , by a re-union of the soul to it , there is no reason to deny the identity of the body . not from the consciousness of the soul , but from that life which is the result of the union of soul and body . but st. paul still supposes that it must be that material substance to which the soul was before united . for saith he , it is sown in corruption , it is raised in incorruption : it is sown in dishonour , it is raised in glory ; it is sown in weakness , it is raised in power ; it is sown a natural body , it is raised a spiritual body . can such a material substance which was never united to the body be said to be sown in corruption , and weakness , and dishonour ? either therefore he must speak of the same body , or his meaning cannot be comprehended . for what doth all this relate to a conscious principle ? the apostle speaks plainly of that body which was once quickened and afterwards falls to corruption ; and is to be restored with more noble qualities . for this corruptible must put on incorruption , and this mortal must put on immortality . i do not see how he could more expressly affirm the identity of this corruptible body , with that after the resurrection , and that without any respect to the principle of self-consciousness ; and so if the scripture be the sole foundation of our faith , this is an article of it , and so it hath been always understood by the christian church . and your idea of personal identity is inconsistent with it ; for it makes the same body which was here united to the soul not to be necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection , but any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body . the dispute is not , how far personal identity in it self may consist in the very same material substance ; for we allow the notion of personal identity to belong to the same man under several changes of matter ; but whether it doth not depend upon a vital vnion between the soul and body and the life which is consequent upon it ; and therefore in the resurrection the same material substance must be reunited ; or else it cannot be called a resurrection , but a renovation ; i. e. it may be a new life , but not a raising the body from the dead . 2. the next articles of faith which your notion of ideas is inconsistent with , are no less than those of the trinity , and of the incarnation of our saviour . the former by the first article of our church is expressed by three persons in the vnity of the divine nature : the latter is said art. 2. to be by the vnion of the divine and humane nature in one person . let us now see whether your ideas of nature and person can consist with these . but before i come to that i must endeavour to set this matter right , as to the dispute about the notion of nature and person , which you have endeavour'd with all your art , to perplex and confound , and have brought in several interlocutors to make it look more like an entertainment . of which afterwards : the original question was , whether we could come to any certainty about the distinction of nature and person in the way of ideas ; and my business was to prove that we could not , because we had no simple ideas by sensation or reflection , without which you affirm that our vnderstanding seems to you not to have the least glimmering of ideas : and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways . these are your own words . and then i undertook to shew , that it was not possible for us to have any simple ideas of nature and person by sensation or reflection : and that whether we consider'd nature as taken for essential properties , or for that substance wherein that property lies : whether we consider it in distinct individuals or abstractly ; still my design was to shew that in your way of ideas , you could come to no certainty about them . and as to person i shew'd , that the distinction of individuals is not founded meerly on what occurs to our senses , but upon a different manner of subsistence , which is in one individual , and is not communicable to another . and as to this i said , that we may find within our selves an intelligent substance by inward perception ; but whether that make a person or not , must be understood some other way ; for if the meer intelligent substance make a person , then there cannot be the union of two such natures , but there must be two persons . which is repugnant to the article of the incarnation of our saviour . that this was the true state of the question will appear to any one that will vouchsafe to look into it . but what said you in your first letter in answer to it ? as to nature you say , that it is a collection of several ideas combined into one complex , abstract idea , which when they are found united in any individual existing , though joyned in that existence with several other ideas , that individual or particular being is truly said to have the nature of a man , or the nature of a man to be in him ; forasmuch as these simple ideas are found united in him , which answer the ●omplex , abstract idea , to which the specifick name is given by any one : which abstract specifick idea , he keeps the same when he applies the specifick name standing for it to distinct individuals . and as to person , in the way of ideas , you say , that the word person in it self signifies nothing , and so no idea belonging to it , nothing can be said to be the true idea of it . but as soon as the common vse of any language has appropriated it to any idea , then that is the true idea of a person , and so of nature . against this i objected in my answer to that letter , that if these terms really signifie nothing in themselves , but are only abstract and complex ideas , which the common use of language hath appropriated to be the signs of two ideas ; then it is plain that they are only notions of the mind , as all abstracted and complex ideas are ; and so one nature and three persons can be no more . to this you answer in your second letter , that your notion of the terms nature and person is , that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another , nor in themselves signifie any thing at all , but have the signification which they have barely by imposition . whoever imagined that words signifie any otherwise than by imposition ? but the question is , whether these be meer words and names , or not ? or whether there be not a real foundation in things for such a distinction between nature and person ? of which i gave this evident proof , that if it were not the same nature in different individuals , every individual must make a different kind . and what answer do you give to this plain reason ? nothing particular that i can find . but in the general you say , that all that you can find that i except against in your notion of nature and person is nothing but this , viz. that these are two sounds which in themselves signifie nothing . and is this all indeed ? did not i tell you in these words , ( which i am forced to repeat on this occasion , although i am very unwilling to fill pages with repetitions . ) the question now between us comes to this , whether the common nature or essence of things lies only in an abstract idea , or a general name , and the real essence consists only in particular beings from which that nature is abstracted ? the question is not whether in forming the notion of common nature , the mind doth not abstract from the circumstances of particular beings ; but it is whether there be not an antecedent foundation in the nature of things , upon which we form this abstract idea ? for if there be , then it cannot be called an universal name only ; or a meer sign of an idea , which we have formed from putting many simple ideas together , which name belongs to all of such a sort , as have those simple ideas united together . in these words , which you cannot deny to be in the place mention'd , i thought i had stated the case fairly between us . and why do you not return an answer to them ? but instead of that you only mention another passage more liable to cavilling , where i say , that upon your notions of nature and person , i do not see how it is possible to defend the doctrine of the trinity . for if these terms really signifie nothing in themselves , but are only abstract and complex ideas , which the common use of language hath appropriated to be the sign of two ideas ; then it is plain that they are only notions of the mind , as all abstract and complex ideas are ; and so one nature and three persons can be no more . upon this you charge me with affirming that of you which you never said , viz. that these terms are only abstract or complex ideas : but your words are , taking therefore nature and person for the sign of two ideas they are put to stand for : and by enumerating all the simple ideas , that are contained in the complex idea , that each of them is made to stand for , we shall immediately see the whole difference that is between them . these are your own words . now from thence it appears , that nature and person are terms which are the signs of two ideas by your own confession : but you never made these , or any other terms to be ideas : and you should be ashamed of such iargon . but have not you said in your essay , that it is a very common practice for names to be made use of instead of the ideas themselves , especially if the ideas be very complex . nature and person you grant to be complex ideas ; and these terms you confess are appropriated to be the signs of two ideas : therefore here is an ambiguity in the use of these words , for they are complex ideas themselves , and they are made the signs of them ; and so the words of the sentence are capable of both those senses . for it is true , according to you , that these terms , nature and person , really signifie nothing in themselves , but are only complex and abstract ideas ; and those terms are appropriated to be the signs of two ideas . so that nature and person are both ideas themselves , and those terms are the signs of two ideas : and the sense had not been liable to exception , if and had been inserted ; for if these terms really signifie nothing in themselves , but are only abstract and complex ideas ; and which the common use had appropriated to be the signs of two ideas , &c. but whether this be properly expressed or not , according to your sense of ideas , the weight of the controversie depends not at all upon it ; but whether nature and person can be any other but abstract ideas , according to your own plain expressions ; and if they are so , they are no more than notions of the mind , and then the consequence must hold , that one nature and three persons can be no more . upon which i said , i did not see how it was possible to defend the doctrine of the trinity , ( and i now add of the incarnation ) which was the thing i undertook to make out . but you very freely say , whether i rightly deduce from it this consequence , viz. and so one nature and three persons can be no more ; is what you neither know not are concerned to examin . which i think is an expression could hardly drop from a person , who did know how to declare his belief of three persons in the vnity of the divine nature . but you pretend these are none of your notions of nature and person , nor indeed any thing you can understand . but it is plain , that this consequence follows from your own notions of nature and person ; as they are set down expresly by your self in the former letter . you tell me , i made this inference a little in haste ! whether a man write in haste or not , the world will judge by what appears , and not by what he or any other saith . and i think it will appear , that i did not make this inference in haste , but from a deliberate consideration of your notion of the ideas of nature and person . but by those terms signifying nothing in themselves , you say , that you meant , that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another , nor in themselves signifie any thing at all , but have the signification which they have barely by imposition . and was this truly all that you meant by it ? and do you think that peter , and iames , and iohn signifie any thing by nature ? are not all words made significative by imposition ? but is there no difference in the signification of words as they stand for signs of things ? if they be words for particular substances , then you grant , that there is something really existing which is meant by those words ; but if they relate only to the conceptions of the mind , then they signifie them and no more . and the question is , which of these two you meant by those words nature and person ? and you plainly affirm both of them to be complex ideas , which are made only by an act of the mind , and therefore your meaning can be no otherwise understood . you presume , that upon more leisurely thoughts , both my self and the rest of mankind will concur with you . i never affected singularity , and am ready to comply with the rest of mankind in any reasonable thing . but you say , that this notion of nature and person , that they are two words that signifie only by imposition , is what will hold in the common sense of mankind . no doubt of it : but i must again and again tell you , that is not the point in question , but whether they are only abstract and complex ideas , which have no other being but in the mind . and to this you answer not a word . i do not in the least think as you suggest , that it is necessary to the defense of the trinity , that these two articulate sounds should have natural significations , and that unless they are used in those significations , it were impossible to defend the doctrine of the trinity . but i do affirm , that those who make nature and person to be only abstract and complex ideas ; can neither defend nor reasonably believe it . and this is making no extraordinary supposition necessary to the belief or defence of it ; but only that which in the common sense of mankind is necessary to it . for , if you have expressed your own mind in your former letter ; that must guide us in your notion of nature and person , where you undertook to explain them . for if nature and person be abstract , and complex ideas , as you say , and such are only acts of the mind , i do not see how it is possible for you to reconcile these notions with the articles of the trinity and incarnation . i do not go about to accuse you of denying these doctrines ; i hope you do not . but i impute all this hesitancy , and doubting only to your notions of ideas ; which you had been so long forming in your mind , that as it often happens in such cases , one darling favourite notion proves too hard for some points of far greater consequence , when they are found inconsistent with it . and because you had first fixed your notion of ideas , and taken much pains about them , you thought all other things were to be entertained as they appear'd consistent with them . but you could not but find , that the articles of three persons , and one nature ; and two natures , and one person , were not reconcileable with your ideas of nature and person ; which is that they are complex ideas , which depend upon the act of the mind ; for this were to make the two natures in christ to be only two complex ideas . for if nature , as you say , be a collection of several ideas combined into one complex , abstract idea ; then two natures can be nothing else but two such collections , or two abstracted and complex ideas . it may be said , that when you make nature an abstracted and complex idea , you speak of a specifick idea , but the humane nature in christ was a particular substance , and this you assert to be a real thing , and not to depend on the act of the mind . but this doth not clear the matter . for in your former letter you said , that all the ideas we have of particular distinct substances , are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas : which in corporeal substances are sensible qualities , in incorporeal are operations of the mind . the utmost then which the idea of humane nature in christ comes to is , that there were in him the sensible qualities and intellectual operations of a man , with an unknown substance to support them : which belongs not to the simple ideas , but is supposed by them . this is all i can make of your way of ideas : and so the incarnation of christ is the assuming the sensible qualities , and intellectual operations of a man , to which a substratum doth belong : but is no part of the simple ideas . so that we can have no idea at all of the humane nature of christ ; but only an inference , that since those are but accidents , there must be a substratum to support them ; and consequently there was a particular substance in him made up of mind and body . but if this had come in the way of ideas , yet it cannot make out the humane nature of christ. for if it were in him no otherwise than in other men , then the mystery of the incarnation is quite gone , and christ is to be consider'd but like other men ; which doth not answer to what the scripture saith of the word 's being made flesh , and that god was manifest in the flesh. there must be therefore something beyond the meer humane nature in him ; and either it must be only some divine operation upon , and with it , and that is no substance ; or if it be a substance , it must either cohabit with it , or else be united to it . if it only co-habits , then there are two persons dwelling together in one body , and the actions of one cannot be attributed to the other ; if there be a real union between them , so as the acts belong to one person ; then there must be such a manner of existence in the humane nature of christ , which is different from it in other persons . for in all others , the acts belong to the humane person ; but if it were so in christ , then the divine acts of christ must flow from the humane nature as the principle of them ; which is to confound the divine and humane nature , and operations together ; if they come from the divine person , then the humane nature must have another kind of subsistence , than it hath in others , or else there must be two persons ; and person being as you say , a forensick term , there must be two different capacities of rewards and punishments ; which is so absurd an opinion as i think no one will assert . if there be then but one person and two natures , how can you possibly reconcile this to your way of ideas ? person , say you , in it self signifies nothing ; but as soon as the common use of any language has appropriated it to any idea , then that is the true idea of a person , i. e. men may call a person what they please , for there is nothing but common use required to it : they may call a horse , or a tree , or a stone a person if they think fit ; but since the common use of language hath appropriated it to an intelligent being , that is , a person . and so you tell us , that person stands for a thinking intelligent being that hath reason and reflection , and can consider it self as it self , the same thinking being in different times and place . how comes person to stand for this and nothing else ? from whence comes self-consciousness in different times and places to make up this idea of a person ? whether it be true or false , i am not now to enquire , but how it comes into this idea of a person ? hath the common use of our language appropriated it to this sense ? if not , this seems to be a meer arbitrary idea ; and may as well be denied as affirmed . and what a fine pass are we come to in the way of ideas , if a meer arbitrary idea must be taken into the only true method of certainty ? but of that afterwards . we now proceed in the way of ideas as you give it us . but if this be the true idea of a person , then there can be no union of two natures in one person : for if an intelligent conscious being be the idea of a person ; and the divine and human nature be intelligent conscious beings , then the doctrine of the union of two natures and one person is quite sunk , for here must be two persons in this way of ideas . again , if this be the idea of a person , then where there are three persons , there must be three distinct intelligent beings ; and so there cannot be three persons in the same individual essence . and thus both these doctrines of the trinity and incarnation are past recovery gone , if this way of ideas hold . so great a difference there is , between forming ideas first , and then judging of revelation by them ; and the believing of revelation on its proper grounds , and interpreting the sense of it by the due measures of reason . you may pretend what you please , that you hold the assurance of faith , and the certainty by ideas to go upon very different grounds ; but when a proposition is offered you out of scripture to be believed , and you doubt about the sense of it , is not recourse to be made to your ideas ? as , in the present case , whether there can be three persons in one nature , or two natures and one person ; what resolution can you come to upon your principles , but in the way of ideas ? you may possibly say , that where ideas are clear and distinct , there you are to judge of revelation by them ; and this is what you assert in your essay , that in propositions whose certainty is built on clear and perfect ideas and evident deductions of reason , there no proposition can be received for divine revelation which contradicts them ; from hence you conclude it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once . and yet there is a person who hath lately told the world , that there is one certain secret way how by divine power , the same body , but not the same person , may be in very distant places at once ; but he is advised to keep it up as a secret ; which was good friendly advice : but till it be discovered there is no judging of it . here i observe , that you require clear and distinct ideas ; and yet we find , if a man's word may be taken , these clear and distinct ideas do not prove the thing impossible . but what is to be said when the ideas are not clear and distinct ? you say , your method of certainty is by the agreement or disagreement of ideas , where they are not in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct . and this is your secret about certainty ; which i think had been better kept up too : for i pray , in the case now before us , are your ideas of nature and person clear and distinct or not ? if they are , then it is plain from your own doctrine , that if revelation be pretended , you are to reject it . how then comes the certainty of faith to be preserved firm and immoveable , although the grounds of certainty be disputed ? but suppose they are not clear and distinct ? what is to be done in a matter of revelation contrary to your ideas ? are you to submit to the revelation or not ? whatever god hath revealed is most certainly true , no doubt can be made of it . this is the proper object of faith ; but whether it be a divine revelation or no , you say , reason must judge . yes , reason proceeding upon clear and distinct ideas . but suppose you have ideas sufficient for certainty in your way , but not clear and distinct ; what is to be done then ? in things that are above reason , you say , when they are revealed , they are proper matters of faith. what is here being above reason ? either above the discovery of reason ▪ as the fall of angels , the resurrection of the body , &c. and about these , you say , reason hath nothing to do . ( what not if there be an idea of identity as to the body ? ) or such as are above the comprehension of reason when discovered . and they are either such as we have no natural ideas of ; and then you grant , that they are pure matters of faith ; or they are such , as you have certain ideas of , but not clear and distinct . now here lies the pinching difficulty , as to your way of ideas . you say indeed , that revelation must carry it against meer probabilities to the contrary ; because the mind not being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know , but is only probably convinced of , is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony , which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive . i pray observe your own words , you here positively say , that the mind not being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know : so that it is plain here , that you place certainty only in evident knowledge , or in clear and distinct ideas ; and yet your great complaint of me was , that i charged this upon you , and now i find it in your own words ( which i observed before . ) but let us allow you all you desire , viz. that there may be certainty by ideas , where they are not clear and distinct : and let us now suppose that you are to judge of a proposition delivered as a matter of faith , where you have a certainty by reason from your ideas , such as they are : can you assent to this as a matter of faith , when you are already certain by your ideas of the contrary ? how is this possible ? can you believe that to be true , which you are certain is not true ? suppose it be that there are two natures in one person ; the question is , whether you can assent to this as a matter of faith ? if you had said , there had been only probabilities on the other side , i grant that you then say , revelation is to prevail ; but when you say you have certainty by ideas to the contrary , i do not see how it is possible for you to assent to a matter of faith as true , when you are certain from your ideas that it is not true : for how can you believe against certainty ? the evidence is not so great as when the ideas are clear and distinct , but the bar against assent is as strong ; because the mind is actually determined by certainty . and so your notion of certainty by ideas must overthrow the credibility of a matter of faith in all such propositions which are offered to be believed on the account of divine revelation . i shall now summ up the force of what i have said about this matter . your answer is , that your method of certainty by ideas , shakes not at all , nor in the least concerns the assurance of faith ▪ against this i have pleaded . ( 1. ) that your method of certainty shakes the belief of revelation in general . ( 2. ) that it shakes the belief of particular propositions or articles of faith , which depend upon the sense of words contained in scripture . because you do not say , that we are to believe all that we find there expressed ; but in case we have any clear and distinct ideas which limit the sense another way than the words seem to carry it , we are to judge that to be the true sense . but in case our ideas are not clear and distinct , yet you affirm as your proper doctrine , that we may come to certainty by ideas , although not in all respects perfectly clear and distinct . from whence i infer , that where you have attained to a certainty by your imperfect ideas , you must judge of a matter of faith , by those ideas , and consequently , if the union of two natures and one person , or three persons in one nature be repugnant to your ideas ( as i have shewed that they are ) you must by virtue of your own principles reject these from being matters of faith. and thus i hope i have proved what i undertook , viz. that your notion of certainty by ideas is inconsistent with these articles of the christian faith. but you have this comfort left , that you are not the first person who hath run himself into insuperable difficulties as to matters of faith , by this way of ideas . for des cartes himself did so in a remarkable manner : he was a person of a great reach and capacity , and spent many thoughts in laying the foundations of certainty from ideas , both as to incorporeal and corporeal substances ; and yet was miserably foiled as to both of them . his demonstrations from his ideas in his metaphysical meditations , did not meet with the entertainment he promised himself from the inquisitive part of mankind ; for his objective reality from his idea gave no satisfaction ; and his other argument was thought to have no force , unless it were taken off from the idea and placed upon the necessity of existence in the nature of the thing . as to corporeal substances , his fundamental mistake was in a wrong idea of matter , which he made to be the same with extension ; and upon this he built his systeme of nature . but against this first false step many things were objected by his adversaries , as may be seen by the late disputes in france about his principles ; they objected , that his notion or idea of matter made it necessary , and impossible for god to annihilate it ; and his defenders are driven to such shifts as to god's will and power , that an indifferent person might thereby see how dangerous it is to take up with ideas as to the ground of certainty , although neither himself nor his followers pretend to place it in any thing but clear and distinct ideas . but when they came to reconcile their ideas with matters of faith , they were so plunged , that they could see no way to get through their difficulties . for as monsieur huet observes , although des cartes professes great submission to divine revelation , yet when it came to the trial , he judged his opinions could not be repugnant to it , because he was certain of the truth of them ; which shews , that he judged of revelation by his rules of certainty , and whatever he pretended , he did not take his measures of truth from revelation . a late defender of des cartes in answer to this , produces the words used by him in his principles , wherein he owns , that in case of divine revelation if god declares any thing concerning himself or others which exceed our capacity , as the mysteries of the trinity and incarnation , he would not refuse to believe them , although he could not clearly understand them . this monsieur huet denies not , viz. that he made such a general profession of submission to revelation and owning the mysteries of faith ; but , saith he , when it comes to particular points , then ideas are to be the standard by which we are to judge of revelation . monsieur regis in his reply saith , that matters of faith and philosophical truths are of different kinds ; and that there can be no contrariety but between things of the same kind . which makes him run into that great absurdity , that although in a philosophical sense god cannot do things repugnant to reason , yet in the way of faith he may ; and all this to preserve the certainty by ideas , when nothing can be more repugnant to all kinds of certainty than such a supposition . but another great admirer of des cartes , thinks this way unreasonable ; but des cartes , he saith , hath shewn the right method of certainty by clear and distinct ideas , and therefore he calls it no less than a divine certainty ; and he adds , that truth cannot be contrary to it self ; and he laughs at the distinction of philosophical and theological truths ; or the two ways of certainty by knowledge and faith : for , truth is always one and the same , and changes not its countenance : and if truth be an agreement of words with things , how can the same words agree in one book and differ in another ? for the same god is the author of truth where-ever it is : and therefore he calls it , a most absurd opinion of those who say , that god who is immutable should teach that as truth in philosophy , which is false in divinity . but i return to you . you seem to be not a little concerned , that i say , that as you have stated your notion of ideas it may be of dangerous consequence to that article of the christian faith which i had endeavoured to defend . such an accusation , you say , brought into any court in england , would be thought to shew a great inclination to have the accused be suspected rather than any evidence of being guilty of any thing ; and so would immediately be dismissed without hearing any plea to it . but you must give me leave to say , that you have quite mistaken my design , which was not to accuse you , but to shew my own dissatisfaction , as to the way you had taken to clear your self . i hoped you would have said so much for your own vindication , as would have satisfied the world , that your notion of ideas was far from any tendency that way to which it was carried by him who made use of your expressions : but , instead of that you explained it in such a manner as made it far more suspicious that he had not perverted your meaning . and that made me to say , that as you had stated it , it may be of dangerous consequence . it may be , say you , this is no evidence , but only an inclination to accuse you . so far from it , that it shewed an inclination to favour you , when i only said it may be ; for now you see , that i think it is of such dangerous consequence , and i must think so till you have cleared it better . but the notion of ideas as you have stated it , relates to your whole book : why should you carry it farther than i intended it ? the stating of it i mentioned was in your first letter ; where you told us what you meant by nature and person . but you have found out two particulars wherein it may be of dangerous consequence , first in making so much use of the word ideas , and your placing certainty in ideas . as to the term of ideas , i have no objection to the use of the word it self ; provided it be used in a common sense , and no weight be laid upon it more than it can bear ; for i am for no new affected terms which are apt to carry mens minds out of the way ; they are like ignes fatui , which seem to give light , but lead those that follow them into bogs : like fontanges , which seem to set peoples heads that wear them higher , but their understandings are just what they were before . i always dislik'd the stoical improvements by new words , or giving new senses to old ones . but i told you , i should never have mention'd this way of ideas , but for the ill use i found made of them : and you might have enjoy'd the satisfaction you had in them long enough , unless i had found them imploy'd in doing mischief . which , as you humbly conceive amounts to thus much and no more ; that i fear ideas ; i. e. the term ideas may some time or other be of dangerous consequence . can you possibly think this was my meaning ? i know of no antipathy i have to the term ideas ; nor do i understand any mischief that lies in the bare use of the term. if it gives you any satisfaction i pray make what use you please of it , so you do not set it up in your way of ideas for a new method of certainty ; nor weaken mens belief as to matters of faith by it . these were my prejudices against your ideas , and they are increased by your defences ; for i can find nothing that hath any force to remove them . you tell me , my quarrel must be with the term ideas as of dangerous consequence : but why so ? it was the way of certainty by ideas which i insisted upon , and the new terms as imploy'd to that purpose . i confess , i say , the world had been strangely amuzed with ideas of late , and we have been told , what strange things might be done by the help of ideas , i. e. as to matter of certainty . but you tell me more than once , that i own , that these come only to be common notions of things , which i have no aversion from . this is a way of turning things upon me , which i could not expect from you. for those words are brought in by me on this occasion , you had said , that you see no such opposition , but that ideas and sound reason may stand together , i. e. reason rightly managing those ideas , so as to produce evidence by them . upon this , i used these words . but what need all this great noise about ideas and certainty ; true and real certainty by ideas , if after all it comes only to this , that our ideas only represent such things , from whence we bring arguments to prove the truth of things ? but the world hath been strangely amused , &c. judge now how fair and ingenuous this answer is . that which i bring in as a consequence of your assertion , you make to be my own sense as to your notion of ideas : when i all along distinguish the way of reason , by deducing one thing from another , from your way of certainty , in the agreement and disagreement of ideas ; and i therefore mention it as an argument of your own departing from your beloved notion of ideas . i never said any thing against reason rightly managing ideas , so as to produce evidence by them . i was glad you came so far towards my own apprehension as to the use of ideas , and i declare soon after that if you mean no more by your certainty from ideas , but a certainty from reason , i was not so unreasonable a man to disagree with you . and yet you spend many pages to justifie your use of the term ideas : which is all lost upon me . for in short , it is not your way of ideas , but your way of certainty by ideas , which i was unsatisfied about , and am so much the more by the method you have taken to defend your self . and this was the thing i found fault with , as you could not but see ; but you found it much easier to run into a long discourse , to no purpose , about the use of the word ideas . how far your use of the term is new i will not dispute with you ; be it new or old the thing you do pretend to by your ideas is that which i disliked , and am forced to do so still ; for you give me no manner of satisfaction about it , as will appear by the examination of what you say , about the new method of certainty , which is the matter in question : you desire to know whether there be any other or older method of certainty ? that is not the point , but whether yours be any at all ? which i deny . if there be no older , you say , the world is obliged to you for this new one : very true , if it were what it pretends . but you tell me , i ought to set the world right in a thing of that great concernment , and to overthrow yours , and thereby prevent the dangerous consequence of your unseasonable starting this new method of certainty . i did never pretend to inform the world of new methods , and therefore am not bound to go any farther than to that i found fault with , which was your new method ; and although i thought i had said enough before , to shew how far it was from what it pretended ; yet because you call me to it in such a manner , i shall endeavour more freely to represent to you the vnsatisfactoriness and inconsistency of it . for it is still to me a strange thing , that you should talk so much of a new method of certainty by ideas ; and yet allow , as you do , such a want of ideas , so much imperfection in them , and such a want of connexion between our ideas , and the things themselves . one would think , that he that owned these things rather design'd to prove there could be no certainty by ideas . and when i had objected these things in the conclusion of my former answer , you do not deny them ; and all the return you make is , that it is better to have some way of certainty ( though it will not lead us to it in every thing ) than no way at all . as though the dispute between us had been , whether any certainty be not better than none . no doubt any true certainty is desirable , but it is , as i have often said , of ill consequence to set up such a method of certainty , as if it hold , will overthrow our faith , and if it doth not , must deceive all those that follow it . and it is the certainty of faith which i defend against your pretended certainty of knowledge . but to let you see what ground i had to be unsatisfied with it , i shall now wave all the instances of ideas i insisted on before , as to substances and sensible qualities ; and i shall single out one remarkable idea , by which the uncertainty of your way of ideas will be fully discover'd . and that is the idea of space ; upon which a famous systeme of natural philosophy hath been built , and as upon a clear and distinct idea ; and yet you will by no means allow it to be so ; and think you have a clear idea to the contrary ; although those who will not allow it to be true cannot deny it to be consistent with it self , and that the ideas in it have an agreement with one another . as to space , you say , that we have it both by sight and touch , which inform us of the distance between bodies : which in several respects may be called distance , capacity and extension ; and so extension , you say , is an idea belonging to body only , but space may , as is evident , be consider'd without it . but here now arises a great difficulty to me in the way of certainty by ideas : viz. that some very thinking men in this way of ideas , have look'd on the idea of space , and extended matter to be the same ; for say they , it appears to us from clear ideas , that body and extension are the same thing , and therefore if there be extension in space there must be body . but , you say , those that do so , either change the signification of words , and so render it a doubtfull idea , or they confound very different ideas with one another , and so can never come to certainty by the agreement or disagreement of ideas . but you conclude , that the clear and distinct idea of simple space distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from body . here we see you pretend to a clear and distinct idea . but it falls out very unluckily for the way of ideas , that the first starter of this way of certainty is as positive , that the idea of space and extended body are the same . so that here we have clear and distinct ideas both ways . and is not this an admirable method of certainty , when in one of the plainest ideas which depend upon our senses , the greatest defenders of ideas differ so fundamentally . what can other men hope for in this way of ideas , if such men can agree no better in one of the most evident to our senses ? but then we must consider , who hath the better reason ? this is not certainty by ideas , but by reason upon them , which is another thing : let us go to reason . is that reason built only on some intermediate idea , which makes it clear ? i find intermediate ideas on both sides , and urged with equal assurance . des cartes saith , that from extension we rightly conclude a body to be a substance ; because it is a repugnancy that there should be an extension of nothing ; and therefore , if there be extension in space there must be body . and he proves it from the idea of body ; for , if we cast off all such things as are not necessary to body , as hardness , colour , gravity , heat , and cold , and all other qualities , we shall find nothing to remain but extension , and therefore nothing but extension is in the idea of body , which being likewise in space the idea of body and space are the same . but say you on the other side , i appeal to every man 's own thoughts , whether the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity , as it is from the idea of a scarlet colour . 't is true , that solidity cannot exist without extension ; but this hinders not but they are distinct ideas . one appeals to thoughts , and the other to reason : had des cartes no thoughts ? yet his reason convinced him , that whatever thoughts he had , he must be perswaded by reason , which was the true idea . you say , that is a clear and distinct idea that a man's thoughts dictate to him to be so . no , saith des cartes , that only is the true idea , which a man comes to by the exercise of his reason ; and he look'd upon those others as meer ideas of imagination , and not rational ideas . so that here we have another work to do , and that no easie one , which is to distinguish the ideas of imagination from those of reason : and what way have you laid down to prevent so great a mistake ? of what rules have you to judge , how far imagination is to be allowed in the matter of ideas ? for in all objects of sense the impression is made upon the imagination ; which is the seat of ideas , that come in by sensation . now here lies a very considerable difficulty , how far reason is to judge of these ideas or imagination ? for if all our simple ideas of things without us come in by sensation , then one would think those ideas are to be allow'd which come in that way ; and so the impressions of fancy are to be the standard and rule of certainty , which i think you will not affirm . but what rule then have you when , and where , and how far , you are to correct the erroneous ideas of imagination ? i cannot deny but you were sensible of the difficulty from the ideas of imagination , and thus you propose it . to what purpose is all this stir ? knowledge , say you , is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas , but who knows what those ideas may be ? is there any thing so extravagant as the imagination of men's brains ? where is the head that hath no chimaera's in it ? or if there be a sober and wise man , what difference will there be by your rules between his knowledge , and that of the most extravagant fancy in the world : they both have their ideas , and perceive their agreement and disagreement one with another . let us now consider the answer you give to it , and by that we shall better judge of your way of certainty . your general answer is , that if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in our fancies , our assurance would go no farther than that of dreams , or the visions of a heated fancy . but our knowledge is real , only so far , as there is a conformity between our ideas , and the reality of things . all this is undoubtedly true . but you say , how shall the mind , when it perceives nothing but its own ideas , know that they agree with things themselves ? there indeed lies the difficulty , but how do you remove it ? there are two sorts of ideas , you say , we may be sure , agree with things . and these are worth the knowing . 1. the first are simple ideas , which since the mind can by no means make to it self , must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural way . and producing therein those perceptions which by the wisdom and will of our maker they are adapted to . from whence it follows , that simple ideas are not fictions of our minds . all that can be proved from hence is no more , but that the objects of our senses do make those impressions upon them , that from them we may be certain there are such things without us , which produce those impressions . and this is all you mean when you say , that you are certain these ideas are no fictions of our brains . but let us apply this to the present case . our senses truly inform us of a distance between bodies ; and so far we are certain of an idea of space , but the question about the idea of space goes farther ; viz. whether the idea of space imply something or nothing ? how can nothing be extended ? if it be something extended it must be body ; and so space and body are the same . and so your simple ideas give no manner of satisfaction in this matter . 2. all our complex ideas , except those of substances , you say , being archetypes of the mind 's own making , not referr'd to the existence of any thing , cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge ; for that which is not designed to represent any thing but it self , can never be capable of a wrong representation , nor mislead us from the true apprehension of any thing by its dislikeness to it . where are we now ? what in the way to certainty still ? methinks it seems to be too intricate and winding to be that plain way . what is meant by these archetypes in the mind which cannot deceive us ? i confess here are such things said in order to certainty , which are above my understanding , if taken with respect to things ; as how we cannot but be infallibly certain , that all the knowledge we attain concerning these ideas is real , and reaches things themselves , and yet they are archetypes of the mind 's own making , not intended to be the copies of any thing , nor referr'd to the existence of any thing . how can the certainty by these ideas reach the things themselves , if they are archetypes of the mind , not referr'd to the existence of any thing ? but i suppose all this is meant of mathematical truths , and so reaches not the case , which is concerning the certainty of our knowledge of things that really exist . 3. you say , there is another sort of complex ideas , which being referr'd to archetypes without us may differ from them , and so our knowledge about them may come short of being real . now these were the things we desired to be made certain in ; and to find out such rules as would make our knowledge real . but for all that i can see , the hopes of any criterion is quite lost , as to the point in question : how shall the mind when it perceives nothing but its own ideas , know that they agree with the things themselves ? for upon these grounds we can have no certainty as to simple ideas , but only as to the power of making impressions on our senses ; but as to complex ideas as of substances , our knowledge about them may come short of being real , i. e. we cannot arrive to certainty about them in the way of ideas ; because , they may differ from the archetypes without us . and you confess , that our ideas are not very exact copies , and yet are the subjects of real , ( as far as we have any ) knowledge of them ; which will not be found to reach very far . but to make it real concerning substances , the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things . and if our complex ideas may deceive us as to the things from whence they are supposed to be taken , what an account of certainty in the way of ideas is here ? and yet you conclude this chapter in that triumphant manner ; i think i have shewn wherein it is that certainty , real certainty consists , which whatever it was to others was to me heretofore one of those desiderata's , which i found great want of : and for all that i can see may do so still . for here is nothing said to distinguish the strong impressions of fancy from the appearances of things , from that certainty of knowledge which comes from the things themselves . for , a confident opiniator will talk with greater assurance of the agreement and disagreement of things with his ideas ; than a man of far greater judgment and more modesty . and you have given us no rules to make a difference between opinion and rational certainty ; especially when the ideas of fancy are found to agree with one another . but i shall go a step farther to shew , that the agreement of ideas is no ground of certainty , and that from a supposition relating to the present case . we have seen how possible it is for an ingenious person skilled in the phaenomena of nature to contrive such an hypothesis , that one part may agree with another , so as that no discernible inconsistency may be found in it , and yet all this may be built on such a foundation , as cannot be consistent with your certainty by ideas ; nay , such as you are certain cannot be true . the hypothesis , i mean , is that of des cartes ; for allowing him his laws of motion , and his three elements , the phaenomena of nature , or the ideas of it agree with one another , and yet all this is built upon space being the same with body ; and consequently , that there can be no vacuum : upon which his laws of motion , and his solution of the phaenomena is all built . and therefore , when a learned man of our own objected that to him , and thought it of no great consequence to his philosophy ; he replied with some smartness , that he was mistaken , for he took it for one of the most certain principles of his philosophy . what certainty then can there be in ideas , when so absurd a principle as that shall be look'd on by so great a man , as so certain a thing in the way of ideas , as to build his whole system of natural philosophy upon it ? and his followers to this day stifly defend it , who are otherwise ingenious men. nothing now remains to be answer'd in your second letter , but what relates to the defence of what i had said in my book concerning nature and person . for i cannot but observe , that instead of clearing some pressing difficulties in my answer to your former letter , you run back to my book , and begin a new critique upon that part of it ; and take in the help of some ingenious persons of your acquaintance , to whom i must shew so much civility as to take notice of their objections . which i shall the rather do , because the doctrine of the trinity is expressed in the first article of our religion by one nature and three persons , and so it hath been understood by the christian church long before . and it is the sense of the christian church which i am bound to defend , and no particular opinions of my own . you tell me , that there hath not been one of your acquaintance who owned that he understood my meaning ; but confessed that the farther he look'd into what i had said , the more he was at a loss about nature and person . but i hope i am not to answer for other men's want of understanding in these matters : which requires greater application of mind , than most men are willing to allow themselves about them . but i am to judge no otherwise of their sense and capacity , than as you have represented them . one said i began with giving two significations of the word nature ; one of them , as it stood for properties ; and this he understood ; but the other wherein nature was taken for the thing it self , wherein those properties were , he said he did not understand . but he said he was not very well acquainted with greek , and aristotle was brought to explain and settle the sense of nature . but why did not this gentleman in the first place consider what it was i undertook to shew , which was , that we had an idea of nature , which came not in by our senses ; and in the very next words i said , that nature and substance are of an equal extent ; and so , that which is the subject of powers and properties is the nature , whether it be meant of bodily or spiritual substances . and although by sensation and reflection we know the powers and properties of things ; yet it is by reason we are satisfied there must be such a nature or substance , because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves . methinks if the gentleman were so much at a loss as you represent him , you should have helped him out by your relative ideas : for hard things go down much better with some men's minds in the way of ideas , ( which is a sort of gilding the pills ) and i doubt not but you could have satisfied him , that the understanding may by virtue of a relative idea be very well satisfied of the being of nature , as well as substance , when i declared that i took them to be of equal extent ; as they were the subject of powers and properties . but he saith , that this he understood not , because nature extended to things that were not substances . did i not say , that nature was sometimes taken only for properties , but that there must be another sense proved , because there must be a subject wherein these properties are , and in that respect , i said , that nature and substance were of equal extent . but he doth not understand the deduction ; aristotle takes nature for a corporeal substance , therefore nature and substance are of an equal extent . what a hard fate doth that man lie under , that falls into the hands of a severe critick ! he must have a care of his but , and for , and them , and it ; for the least ambiguity in any of these will fill up pages in an answer , and make a book look considerable for the bulk of it . and what must a man do , who is to answer to all such objections about the use of particles ? but let any indifferent reader judge , how i am used in this place . my words are sometimes nature is taken for the thing it self in which those properties are ; and so aristotle took nature for a corporeal substance , which had the principles of motion in it self ; but nature and substance are of an equal extent . doth not any man of common sense see , that i oppose this to aristotle's sense of nature for a corporeal substance ? he confines it to that only ; i say , that it is of equal extent with substance whether bodily or spiritual : and those very words follow after . if you had really such a conversation with a gentleman , i am sorry for him ; and i think you did not deal so like a gentleman by him , to expose him thus to the world. but i perceive he is a philosopher too ; for he proves , that aristotle 's notion of nature for a corporeal substance will not hold . did i ever say that it would ? i am far enough from thinking , that a corporeal substance hath a principle of motion from it self ; but might not i mention aristotle's taking nature for a substance , although i presently add , his sense was too short and narrow , because nature and substance were of equal extent ? but did not his notion of nature imply that it was a principle of motion in it self ? whatever aristotle thought , the notion of nature doth not depend upon a principle of motion from it self ; but it was considered , not as in it self as the cause , but in it self as the subject . and that philosophical gentleman might be pleased to consider , that aristotle did not make motion to arise from matter , but asserted it to come from a first mover , and said , that those philosophers talked like men not well in their wits , who attributed motion to matter of it self ; as i could easily prove , if it were needful . and methinks you should not have been such a stranger to aristotle , to let your acquaintance run into such blunders , and then to print them for them . but the gentleman is farther plunged and knows not how to get out . he cannot for his life understand nature to be substance and substance to be nature ? where lies the difficulty ? is the repugnancy , in the words , or in the sense ? not in the words or sense either in greek or latin. for the greek , ( if i may have leave to mention that language in this case ) those who have been very well acquainted with the force of words therein , have made nature of the same importance with substance . so hesychius renders it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , substance ; but i shall not bring the testimony of criticks but of philosophers . and aristotle may be allowed to understand his own language , he saith positively , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; every substance is called nature , and the reason he gives for it is , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because nature is a substance . it may be said , that aristotle said this , because he took nature for such a substance as had the power of motion in it self ; i do not deny , but he look'd on that as the proper acception of nature ; but from hence it follows , that whatever substance had such a principle of motion in it self was truly and properly nature ; not as exclusive of a superiour principle of motion , but as having an internal self-moving principle . and herein aristotle differed from some modern philosophers , who make all motion to come from the impulse of another body , and to be a meer mode of matter continued from one body to another . i confess aristotle was of another opinion from those gentlemen , and look'd on motion as an effect of an inward principle ; and not meerly of an external impulse : but whether aristotle were mistaken herein is not the question ; and it is possible he was not ; however , it plainly appears , that substance with a power of motion in it self , and nature , had the same sense ; and none of those who have been the most severe criticks upon aristotle have disputed , that i remember , against this sense of nature in him . one of them finds this fault , that it was but a repetition of what he had said in his physicks ; where he doth likewise treat of the sense of nature . and there he takes it for such a substance which hath the principle of motion and rest within it self and by it self ; which he opposes to artificial things , as a bed or a garment . and as much as this definition hath been run down by some men , if we set aside some affected obscurity in his philosophical writings , there is no such absurdity in it ; when he explains himself not to understand it of meer local motion , or change of place , but of all alterations incident to bodies . so that nature in his sense , was a substance endued with a principle of life and action . and all those things which did partake of nature in this sense , he said , were substances ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for nature is always a subject and in a subject ; i. e. the substance it self is nature , and that which is in it is according to nature . and this sense of aristotle plutarch relies upon , as the true notion of nature which he saith is the principle of motion and rest ; because the beginning and ending of things depend upon it : but plutarch by no means approves of those mens opinion who made nature to be an original self-moving principle ; for , saith he , matter of it self cannot move without an efficient cause , no more than any metal can frame it self into a particular form without an artificer . from whence we see that aristotle's notion of nature was very consistent with an efficient cause of nature . but your gentleman saith , that to those who admit not matter and motion to be eternal , no nature in that sense will be left , since nature is said to be a corporeal substance which hath the principles of motion in it self , and such a sort of corporeal substance those men have no notion of at all , and consequently none of nature , which is such a corporeal substance . but if aristotle did not suppose matter to move it self , without an efficient cause , ( as certainly he did not ) then all this falls to the ground , and his notion of nature for a substantial principle of life and action may remain good . but it may be said , that this was one of his singular notions , and that no other philosophers took it so . which is so far from being true , that a great enemy of aristotle's confesses , that the name of nature among the writers before him extended to all kinds of beings , and not only to individual but to specifick natures . aristotle's fault lay in applying nature only to corporeal substances ; and whatever was above them he look'd on as above nature ; but the pythagoreans and platonists took nature to extend to spiritual as well as bodily substances . which appears by timaeus locrus his book of nature ; in the beginning whereof he divides things into two kinds , intellectual and corporeal ; and the former , whose nature was more excellent , he derives immediately from the best principle , viz. god himself . but to make this plainer , we are to consider , that there were four opinions , among the old philosophers about nature . some held nature to be the same with matter , and attributed the beginning of all things to that alone ; such were the followers of anaximander and democritus . others rejected this doctrine as absurd and impious , and held a divine being above matter , which gave the beginning to motion and framed the world , and they asserted spiritual as well as corporeal natures , and these were the followers of pythagoras and anaxagoras . others asserted the beginning of motion and of the world from a first cause ; but confined the sense of nature to the course of things established in this visible world by an universal providence at first . and this was the notion of aristotle and his followers to the time of strato who attributed all to meer nature . lastly , there were some who made nature to be the first principle which formed all things ; which sometimes they called god , and sometimes nature , as is obvious in all the writings of the stoicks ; vis illum naturam vocare ? non peccabis ; saith seneca : and in another place , quid aliud est natura , quam deus & divina ratio ? and again , nec deus sine naturâ est , nec natura sine deo , sed idem est utrumque , which he elsewhere calls , incorporalis ratio ingentium operum artifex . with which balbus in cicero agrees , when he defines nature from zeno , to be an intelligent fire that produces all things . for what he calls ignem artificiosum ad gignendum , &c. laertius calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and it is called in cicero , natura artifex , consultrix & provida , &c. which can agree to nothing but a spiritual substance ; and when he explains what nature is , he saith , that epicurus called all by the name of nature ; and divided it into matter and vacuity and the accidents of both : but we ( saith he of the stoicks ) by nature understand no inanimate things which have no principle within to unite them , as earth and stones ; but a living substance , as an animal , in which is no chance , but order and contrivance . and so plato said , that nature ordered all things with reason and vnderstanding . by which he understood the divide being . if we come lower down among the philosophers , we shall find nature taken for a principle of life . so sextus empiricus distinguishes the union of matter in stones and wood from that which is in plants , and this he calls nature , which is the lowest degree of it ; for afterwards , he speaks of rational and intellectual natures , and places god in the head of them . antoninus distinguishes nature in plants from a heap of the particles of matter in wood and stone . but in another place he distinguishes that which is meer nature in man , viz. what he hath in common with plants , from the nature of an animal in him ; and that again from the nature of a rational creature in him . here indeed he speaks of the properties of those natures ; but he still supposes , that where they are separate , they are founded in distinct substances . so that i hope , if the philosophers of old , of all kinds did understand the sense of nature and substance , the gentleman may not continue in such a peremptory humour of saying , that for his life he cannot understand nature to be substance , nor substance to be nature . for they all agreed in this , however they differed in their opinions of nature . but i have something farther to add concerning the sense of the christian church in this matter ; which i think is by no means to be despised . it is observed by damascen , that some of the philosophers made this difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; that the former was taken for simple essence , but the latter for essence with a specifical difference ; but that the christian writers took both of them for that which was common to more than one , as an angel , a man , a horse , &c. so st. chrysostom calls angels 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and theodoret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , st. basil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; but they all agree , that incorporeal and invisible substances are real natures . and the reason damascen gives is , that they have both the same original ( and you know that it is a good way to find out the true idea ) for as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , both which are the same . so that if real existence belong to substance , and nature hath its name from thence too , then substance and nature must be of the same importance . and this notion of nature they do not take up meerly from the etymology of the word , but from the sense of it in scripture ; as when st. paul saith , they worshipped those which by nature are no gods ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as the alexandrian copy hath it more clearly ; i. e. which are not really and substantially gods. they had the names of gods , and the divine properties were attributed to them ; but because they had not the divine essence , they are said not to be gods by nature . and what sense would this gentleman make of the apostle's words , who cannot for his life understand that nature is the same with substance ? he must understand this only of the properties which belong to god. but these properties must be somewhere , and so a substance must be supposed as the subject of them ; and what reason can there be to exclude that which is the subject of those properties ? for there must be a divine being , as well as properties ; and that being must have essential properties belonging to it ; and what imaginable reason can there be , why that should not be called the divine nature ? and if it be , then substance and nature are the same . i might easily pursue this farther , but i design to bring things into as little a compass as i can . but it may be there is something in our own language which hinders nature from being taken for a substance ; and for this i appeal to a late ingenious and honourable person and philosopher of our own ; i mean mr. boyle , who hath written a philosophical enquiry into the notion of nature ; and he tells us of the various acceptations of it . ( 1. ) for the author of nature . ( 2. ) for the essence of a thing . ( 3. ) for what comes to men by birth ; as a man is noble by nature . ( 4. ) for an internal principle of motion : as that a stone is carried downwards by nature . ( 5. ) for the established course of things ; as that nature makes the night to succeed the day . ( 6. ) for an aggregate of powers belonging to a living body ; as that nature is strong or weak . ( 7. ) for the system of the universe ; as when we say of a chimaera , there is no such thing in nature . ( 8. ) for a semi-deity ; which is the notion he opposes . but we may observe , that he allows god and all the real beings of the vniverse to have nature belonging to them ; and he saith , the word essence is of great affinity to it , if not of an adequate import . but the real essence of a thing is a substance ; and therefore nature and substance are of the like importance . the next thing fit to be considered is , how far your certainty by ideas and the certainty by reason differ from each other . the occasion of this debate stands thus . i had said in my book , that i granted , that by sensation and reflection we come to know the powers and properties of things ; but our reason is satisfied , that there must be something beyond these , because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves . so that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason and not to meer ideas . in answer to this you said , that you can find no opposition between ideas and reason ; but ideas are the objects of the vnderstanding , and vnderstanding is one of the faculties imployed about them . to which i replied , no doubt of it . but you might easily see , that by reason i understood principles of reason , allow'd by mankind ; which i think are very different from ideas . but i perceive reason in this sense is a thing you have no idea of , or one as obscure as that of substance . if there be any thing which seems too sharp and reflecting in the manner of expression , i do not go about to defend it ; but the worst of it is , that your idea of reason is as obscure as that of substance . and whether there were not a just occasion for it , the reader must judge when the faculty was put for the principles of reason . could any man judge otherwise , but that you had a very obscure idea of reason , who could mistake the vnderstanding for it ? but reason , you say , taken for the faculty is as different from ideas in your apprehension . but what is that to the point in dispute , whether the notion of nature be to be taken from ideas or from reason ? you say , the vnderstanding is imploy'd about them . and what then ? i shewed that the nature of things belongs to reason and not to bare ideas ; because ideas come in by sensation and reflection ; by which we come to know the powers and properties of things ; but we cannot come to know the notion of nature as the subject of them , but by this reason that we are convinced they cannot subsist of themselves . and is this no more than to say , the vnderstanding is imployed about ideas ? but now you answer farther , that if reason be taken for the faculty or the principles of reason allowed by mankind , reason and ideas may consist together . this leads me to the examination of that which may be of some use , viz. to shew the difference of your method of certainty by ideas , and the method of certainty by reason . and the way of certainty by reason lies in two things ; 1. the certainty of principles . 2. the certainty of deductions . as to the former , the gentleman your defender in your book saith , that in your essay , in more places than one , you have spoken , and that pretty largely of self-evident propositions and maxims ; so that if i have ever read them , i cannot doubt , but you have ideas of those common principles of reason . what ideas you have of them must appear from your book . and i do there find a chapter of self-evident propositions and maxims ; which i cannot but think extraordinary for the design of it ; which is thus summed up in the conclusion , viz. that it was to shew , that these maxims , as they are of little use where we have clear and distinct ideas , so they are of dangerous use , where our ideas are not clear and distinct . and is not this a fair way to convince me that your way of ideas is very consistent with the certainty of reason ; when the way of reason hath been always supposed to proceed upon general principles ; and you assert them to be vseless and dangerous . your first design you say is to prove , that the consideration of these general maxims can add nothing to the evidence or certainty of knowledge ; which overthrows all that which hath been accounted science and demonstration , and must lay the foundation of scepticism . because our true grounds of certainty depend upon some general principle of reason . to make this plain , i shall put a case grounded upon your words , which are , that you have discoursed with very rational men , who have actually denied that they are men. these words , i. s. understands as spoken of themselves , and charges them with very ill consequences ; but i think they are capable of another meaning : however , let us put the case that men did in earnest question , whether they were men or not ; and then i do not see , if you set aside general maxims , how you can convince them that they are men. for , the way i look on as most apt to prevail upon such extraordinary sceptical men , is by general maxims and principles of reason . as in the first place , that nothing can have no properties ; which i take to be the fundamental principle of certainty , as to real beings . for , all our inward perceptions are only of some acts or properties , as of thinking , doubting , reasoning , &c. and if a man proceeds so far as to question every thing , in order to the discovering the true ground of certainty , he cannot be satisfied with finding out only some modes of being ; but that which he aims at is , satisfaction as to his real existence . but this wholly depends upon the truth and certainty of this fundamental maxim ; that nothing can have no operations ; and therefore , whatever thinks , or doubts , or reasons , must certainly be . and since by another fundamental maxim , it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be ; he cannot entertain any possible doubt of his own existence . it may be said , that this reaches only to bare existence , and not to the being men. i answer , that for the certainty as to that , there are other general maxims of necessary use ; as , that all different sorts of beings are distinguished by essential properties ; that the essential properties of a man are to reason , discourse , &c. that these properties cannot subsist by themselves without a real substance : and therefore , where these properties are found , those who have them must be real and substantial men. you may possibly say , that these maxims are useless , because you affirm that nothing can be more evident to us , than our own existence ; and that we have an internal infallible perception that we are . but i answer , that these maxims do not at all appear to be useless , because the certainty we enquire after is a certainty of reason , and not of bare perception . and if it be a certainty of reason , some ground of reason must be assigned for it : but all that the perception reaches to , are those acts mention'd by you . i think , i reason , i feel pleasure and pain : but the question goes farther as to the subject of those acts , and the nature of that subject , whether it be a man or not . now here lies the main difficulty , whether without the help of these principles you can prove to any that doubt , that they are men ? and i shall now shew , that in your way of ideas you cannot . for , ( 1 ) you suppose that we must have a clear distinct idea of that which we are certain of in the way of ideas . ( 2 ) you deny that we have any such clear and distinct idea of man. 1. you suppose , that we must have a clear and distinct idea of that we are certain of . for in your chapter of maxims , you say , that every one knows the ideas that he has , and that distinctly and unconfusedly one from another . which always being so ( i pray mark that , and judge whether you do not make clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty ) he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind , that it is there , and is that idea it is , and that two distinct ideas when they are in his mind are there , and are not one and the same idea : from whence you infer the necessity of certainty , when the ideas are clear and distinct . this is so plain and clear , that i wonder how you came to forget it , and to think that i did you wrong when i charged you with holding clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty . but of that in the beginning of this discourse . 2. but let us now examine your idea of man , whether that be clear and distinct or not ; and if not , then according to your principles very rational men cannot be certain that they are men. for if they have no way of certainty but by ideas , and you allow no clear and distinct idea of man , then they can come to no certainty ; and i hope you will not deny them to be very rational men , if they follow the way of ideas . first , you shew , that there can be no demonstration in the way of principles what man is . secondly , that there are very different ideas of man , some , you say , make the idea of a man without a soul ; as children do . others add laughter and rational discourse , and these may demonstrate by general principles that ideots and infants are no men by this maxim , that it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be ; and you have discoursed with very rational men , who have actually denied that they are men. others take in the idea of body in general , and the powers of language and reason , and leave out shape ; and so a man may be a four-footed creature , or in whatever body or shape he found speech and reason joined , that was a man. but where is the clear and distinct idea of a man all this while ? we can have no certainty by principles , you say , and you offer none in the way of ideas ; for the ideas are very confused , imperfect and repugnant to each other ; and so in this new method of certainty by ideas , we cannot be so much as certain that we are men. but is it possible to suppose , that a rational man should talk of certainty by ideas , and not be able to fix the idea of a man ? one would have thought this had been only an omission in this place out of pure zeal against principles ; but certainly in other places this idea of a man must be made clear and distinct . so far from it , that in other places , you industriously set your self to disprove the common idea of a man. it could not possibly be , say you , that the abstract idea to which the name man is given , should be different in several men , if it were of natures making ; and that to one it should be animal rationale ; to another animal implume bipes latis unguibus . from whence it is plain , that you allow no clear and distinct idea of man ; and you endeavour to expose the sacred definition , as you call it , of animal rationale ; which was never exposed by any man without cause . but you conclude , that we are far from knowing certainly what man is ; though perhaps it will be judged great ignorance to doubt about it . and yet you think you may say , that the certain boundaries of that species are so far from being determined , and the precise number of simple ideas , which make that nominal essence so far from being setled and perfectly known , that very material doubts may still arise about it . so that i begin to think i. s. was in the right , when he made you say , that you had discoursed with very rational men who denied themselves to be men. but this is a little too hard to deny themselves to be men. if it had been only , who doubted whether they were men or not ; you could not deny them to be very rational men , because they went upon your grounds , that we can have no certainty either by principles , or by any clear and distinct ideas , what a man is . thus i have shew'd how inconsistent your way of ideas is with true certainty ; and of what use and necessity these general principles of reason are . i now come to the certainty of reason in making deductions . and here i shall briefly lay down the grounds of certainty , which the ancient philosophers went upon , and then compare your way of ideas with them . aristotle observes , that socrates first brought in definitions and inductions in order to certainty ; and went no farther . plato allowed no certainty , but only opinion , as to external objects ; but he said ▪ that certainty depended upon abstract and separate ideas , which were always the same . this he took , ( as i observed in my former letter ) from the pythagoreans , only changing numbers into ideas . for by numbers , they understood first principles , not gross and material ; but immaterial and eternal , as iamblichus saith ; and therefore moderatus gaditanus , one of the most understanding men among them saith , the pythagoreans brought in numbers , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for a more decent way of instruction , following the practice of geometricians , who make use of figures to represent things to the mind ; and therefore their doctrine of numbers was the philosophy of principles , or the general grounds of certainty ; but this was so abstruse and so little understood , that it soon lost its reputation , as porphyry observes , or was mixed with plantonism ; and therefore photinus joins the pythagorean and platonick principles together . but aristotle was a great enemy to these abstracted speculations , and therefore set himself so much on all occasions against ideas and numbers , especially in his metaphysicks . but instead thereof , he endeavour'd to bring down certainty to material things , and to real beings . in order to this , he saw it necessary to avoid confusion , by explaining doubtfull terms , and by ranking things under several heads , which he called categories ; wherein all things are reduced to substance , and accidents belonging to them ; to which he joins some general discourses about the right apprehension of things simply consider'd . but it is observable , that in all the categories from archytas the pythagorean downwards , ( who first placed them in that order , ) substance was first ranked , as the most proper idea of the mind , and all accidents or modes were consider'd with respect to that . and the french cartesians in their logick , place substance as the first object of their ideas : and do not leave us a relative idea , to be supposed only , because accidents cannot subsist without a subject . then follows the way of understanding the truth and falshood of propositions ; after which , he pursues the way of reasoning , or inferring one thing from another , which he calls syllogizing , wherein he professes to go upon this common principle of reason , that what things do agree in a third must agree among themselves . but being not content with the ordinary dialectical way , which proceeded upon the concessions of the party , he attempted to bring in true demonstration . to which he supposes general axioms necessary , and definitions , and postulata : and he distinguishes between a necessary conclusion , and a demonstration ; for the former may arise from the manner of reasoning ; but a demonstration supposes a necessary cause , and that the propositions are such as that the conclusion necessarily follows from them . so that demonstration according to him must be of an inseparable property , and by the most immediate and necessary cause . how far aristotle's notion of demonstration can be applied to physical matters is not my business to enquire ; it being only to shew what his method of certainty was . but besides aristotle , the stoicks took upon them to lay down the true method of certainty ; and they went another way to work about it , viz. ( 1. ) by finding out the criterion of truth and falshood . ( 2. ) by examining the consequences and deductions of reason . as to things which had some degree of evidence to sense or reason , they made the criterion necessary , but for those which had not , but must be proved , the examination of that proof was necessary in order to certainty . the criterion was agreed to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the measure whereby we are to judge of things . but as in the use of balances for weight , there must be one to hold them , and the balances themselves , and the position of them ; and as in the judging of a line , whether straight or crooked , there must be the artificer , the rule and the application of it ; so in judging of truth and falshood , there must be the faculty of understanding as the artificer , sense and reason as the rule ; and the inward ideas of the mind , which answer'd to the position of the balances , or the application of the rule . now that which they placed their notion of certainty in , was that inward and comprehensive idea , which was called by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . if it were a weak assent , they called it opinion ; for they made the assent voluntary , notwithstanding the criterion ; but if it were a firm and immoveable assent , that they called knowledge and certainty . but besides these comprehensive ideas they did allow of common notions , which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or anticipations : of which arrian speaks ; and simplicius saith , they are those wherein all are agreed , and are planted in us by right reason , and confirmed by time and observation . as to the other part , they took great pains about the true signification of words , the rank and order of things , the nature and kind of propositions , and the difference of signs , whereof some were monitory , and others demonstrative . and the proving a thing uncertain , by something granted to be certain , was that which they called demonstration . according to the principles of the eleatick school , the most simple and natural way of reasoning was supposed to be by drawing consequences upon suppositions , and the way the stoicks took to judge of reasoning , was by judging what approached nearest to the first principles of reasoning ; such as that every thing we talk about either must be or not be ; and in such disjunct propositions , one part or other must be taken , and then a train of consequences follows . and plutarch , no friend to the stoicks , thinks this faculty of drawing consequences , lays the best foundation for demonstration . for the principle of it , he saith , is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the connex way of reasoning ; that is as simplicius explains it , when two things are so joyned together as antecedent and consequent , that by position of the antecedent , the consequent follows , and by taking away the consequent , the antecedent is removed . thus i have , in as few words , as i could , laid together those old methods of certainty , which have obtained greatest reputation in the world. but your way of certainty by ideas is so wholly new , that here we have no general principles ; no criterion , no antecedents and consequents ; no syllogistical methods of demonstration ; and yet we are told of a better way of certainty to be attained , meerly by the help of ideas . but how comes there to be such a way of certainty by ideas , and yet the ideas themselves are so uncertain and obscure ? i confess , that the more i look into it , the farther it appears to be from a way of certainty to me . for in your chapter of the improvement of knowledge , you have these words ; for it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas , where they are imperfect , confused or obscure , we cannot expect to have certain , perfect , or clear knowledge . and yet how often do you confess , that our ideas are imperfect , confused , and obscure ? how then is it possible to attain to any certainty by them ? and notwithstanding these plain words , you assert it over and over in your second letter , as appears in the beginning , that you do not place certainty in clear and distinct ideas , ( as i observed in the beginning . ) how can these things consist ? can certainty be had with imperfect and obscure ideas , and yet no certainty be had by them ? i cannot blame you for finding fault with common principles of reason , if both parts of a contradiction may be true : but i forbear . however i cannot but join other words of yours to shew how resolved you were to be inconsistent with your self : but obscure and confused ideas can never produce any clear or distinct knowledge ; because as far as any ideas are confused or obscure , so far the mind can never perceive clearly , whether thy agree or disagree . and yet in the same place , you say , that our knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas , its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity of that perception , and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas themselves . how is it possible for us to have a clear perception of the agreement of ideas , if the ideas themselves be not clear and distinct ? if the mind can never perceive clearly , the agreement or disagreement of obscure and confused ideas , how can its knowledge lie in the perception of that which is not to be perceived ? this is a thing which i cannot make consistent . but besides , i have another charge upon your way of certainty , viz. that you have no criterion to distinguish false and doubtfull ideas from true and certain ; how then can any man be secure that he is not imposed upon in this way of ideas ? the academicks went too far in the way to scepticism , but they differ'd from the scepticks in two things . 1. they asserted , that there was no absolute certainty to be had , which the scepticks would not . 2. they held a far greater probability in some things than others , and that men were bound to follow the greatest probability in what concern'd their own welfare : but the scepticks said , that they would do as others did , or follow inclination , and the laws of their country , but they held no opinion in their minds , as they said . the academicks went much upon ideas , or representations of things to their minds , but they did not proceed upon every idea , but they examin'd and weighed all the circumstances belonging to it , before they allow'd it to prevail upon them to give an assent as to a greater probability . carneades , one of the subtilest of them , as appears by sextus empiricus , distinguished a three-fold idea . 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a probable idea ; which the academicks called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for , said he , neither that which appears false of it self ; nor that which is true , but doth not appear so , can perswade a man's mind . and of those things which do appear to be true , some have a very slender appearance , others have a mighty strong one , and therein he placed his criterion . 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , an undistracted idea ; i. e. when no circumstances disturb or shake the first impression , so as to make us question the truth of it ; which sextus empiricus calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a concurrence of ideas and none disagreeing , and yet he would not allow this to be a ground of certainty but only of probability . 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a well examin'd idea , by the best reason a man hath and the greatest application of mind . and this was the foundation of the highest probability a man's mind could reach to . now to apply this to your case ; you tell us of a way of certainty by ideas , and never offer any such method for examining them , as the academicks required for their probability . as for instance , your first idea which you go upon , is that of solidity , which , you say , of all others seems the most intimately connected with and essential to body : and therefore must be of great moment . solidity , you say , consists in repletion and resistence ; and by this idea of solidity the extension of body , you say , is distinguished from that of space ; so that of pure space and solidity you have clear and distinct ideas . now here in the way of certainty i have two questions to ask . 1. how this idea comes to be clear and distinct to you , when others who go in the same way of ideas have quite another idea of it , and think they have as plain and distinct an idea that the extension of space and body are the same ? now , what criterion is there to come to any certainty in this matter ? i see none so much as offer'd , but only that they seem to you to be clear and distinct , but to others the contrary . so that here we are at a loss as to any certainty in the way of ideas . and the blind man who fansied the idea of scarlet to be like the sound of a trumpet , could hardly be convinced of his error in the way of ideas . this you mention to shew the different ideas men may fall into ; which i think is enough to shew that they have no way to certainty in themselves , if it be possible for men , even for philosophical and rational men , to fall into such contrary ideas about the same thing ; and both sides think their ideas clear and distinct . 2. but i have another question to propose ; viz. whether by this idea of solidity we may come to know what it is ? this is a very reasonable question in the way of certainty , which is to lead us to the certain knowledge of things . i pray therefore tell me from your idea , what it is , and wherein it consists ? the question you suppose might be very well asked ; and you give a most satisfactory answer to it . if any ask me what this solidity is , i send him to his senses to inform him . i had thought by the design of your book you would have sent him to his ideas for certainty ; and are we sent back again from our ideas to our senses ? what do these ideas signifie then ? but you say farther ; that if this be not a sufficient explication of solidity , you promise to tell him what it is , when he tells you , what thinking is , or explains to you what extension and motion are . are we not now in the true way of certainty ; when such things as these are given over , of which we have the clearest evidence by sensation and reflection ? for here you make it as impossible to come to certain , clear and distinct notions of these things , as to discourse into a blind man the ideas of light and colours . is not this a rare way of certainty ? thus i have shewed that you have no security against false and uncertain ideas , no criterion to judge them by ; no light into the nature of things by them , as will farther appear by what you say of the ideas of sensible qualities . to discover , say you , the nature of our ideas the better , and to discourse of them intelligibly , it will be convenient to distinguish them , as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds ; and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us : that so we may not think ( as perhaps is usually done ) that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject : most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us , than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas , which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us . now here again our ideas deceive us , in the way of certainty . we desire to know something of the nature of those objects of which we have the ideas in our minds , because these we are told , will bring us to a certainty of knowledge . of what ? of what we feel ? no certainly , but of that which causes these inward perceptions . can we then by these ideas know the nature of things without us ? no , you say we cannot ; for most of those of sensation are no more the likeness of something without us , than names are for things which they stand for . so that these ideas are really nothing but names , if they be not representations of things ; and if they be not , how can we understand things by them ; and if we cannot , what certainty is attainable by them ? but i will do you no wrong ; and therefore i must consider what you say about demonstration : for it cannot be denied that you own the thing , although you deny it to be ex proecognitis & proeconcessis , and say , it is a mistake that they are supposed to be the foundations of all our knowledge and reasonings . we must therefore examine your way of demonstration without principles . certainty , you say , depends so wholly on intuition , that in demonstrative knowledge , this intuition is necessary in all the connexion of the intermediate ideas , without which we cannot attain knowledge or certainty . by intuition you mean self-evidence . for you say , in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining , but perceives the truth as the eye doth light only by being directed towards it . for hence you must suppose self evidence to be in the ideas of your mind ; and that every intermediate idea which you take to demonstrate any thing by , must have a self-evident connexion with the other idea : which is such a way of demonstration , as the old philosophers never thought of . for upon this ground every demonstration carries its own light with it ; and can no more be questioned , than whether two and two make four ; and i would be glad to see any demonstration ( not about figures and numbers ) of this kind , which i think is not to be expected in the way of ideas . but because in this lies the chief point as to a way of certainty by ideas , i shall more carefully examine the grounds you proceed upon , and shew them to be very insufficient for the purpose you intend them . your principal ground is from mathematical demonstrations , and your examples are brought from them . but his is quite a different case from yours . for you grant , that those ideas on which mathematical demonstrations proceed , are wholly in the mind , and do not relate to the existence of things ; but our debate goes upon a certainty of the knowledge of things as really existing ; so that , although we should grant all that you say , about the intuition of ideas in mathematical demonstrations , yet it comes not at all to your business , unless you can prove that we have as clear and distinct ideas of beings , as we have of numbers and figures . and yet herein you are not consistent with your self ; for you design to prove demonstrations without general principles ; and yet every one knows , that general principles are supposed in mathematicks , and that person would be thought ridiculous , who should go about to prove , that general principles are of little , or of dangerous use in mathematical demonstrations . and so in morality , which you place among the sciences capable of demonstration ; you confess , that the way of demonstration therein is from principles , as those of the mathematicks , by necessary consequences . this is a very intelligible way of demonstration : but how then comes it to pass , that in the way of certainty by ideas as to other points of knowledge , you deny general maxims to be the foundation we are to proceed upon ? and the method you lay down , is this , that ideas of particular things are first in the mind , which are first received and distinguished , and so knowledge got by them ; but general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind , which carry difficulty with them ; but that it is true of our particular distinct ideas , that they are all known by their native evidence , are wholly independent , receive no light , nor are capable of proof one from another ; much less the more particular from the more general , or the more simple from the more compounded , the more simple and less abstract being the most familiar , and the easier and earlier apprehended . but which ever be the clearest ideas , the evidence and certainty of all such propositions is in this , that a man sees the same idea to be the same idea , and infallibly perceives two different ideas to be two different ideas . for when a man has in his vnderstanding the ideas of one and of two , the idea of yellow and of blue , he cannot but certainly know , that this idea of one is the idea of one , and not the idea of two ; and that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow , and not of blue . for a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind , which he has distinct ; that would be to have them confused and distinct at the same time , which is a contradiction : and to have none distinct is to have no use of our faculties , to have no knowledge at all . and therefore , what idea soever is affirmed of it self ; or whatsoever two entire distinct ideas are denied one of another , the mind cannot but assent to such a proposition , as infallibly true , assoon as it understands the terms without hesitation , or need of proof , or regarding those made in more general terms , and called maxims . these are your own words , which i have set down at large , that you may not complain that i misrepresent your sense . and if i understand the force of them , you take off the way of demonstration from general principles and consequences deduced from them , and place it in the self-evidence of ideas . but that it is impossible to come to a demonstration about real beings , in this way of intuition of ideas , i shall now make appear from your self , which will farther discover the inconsistency of your notion of ideas . and the reasons i go upon are these ; 1. that you confess , that some of the most obvious ideas are far from being self-evident . 2. that there may be contradictory opinions about some ideas , which you account most clear and distinct . 3. that granting the ideas to be true , there is no self-evidence of the connexion of them , which is necessary to make a demonstration . 1. that some of the most obvious ideas , are far from being self-evident by your own confession . among these you cannot deny those of matter and motion , of time and duration , and of light , to be very considerable . but i shall prove from your self , that we can have no intuition of these things , which are so obvious to us ; and consequently can have no self-evident ideas of them . as to the idea of matter : that you tell us , consists in a solid substance every where the same ; and a body is a solid extended figured substance . now there are two things concerning matter , which i would be glad to come to a certain knowledge of . and those are , 1. the manner of cohesion of the parts of matter , concerning which you have these words . for since no body is no farther , nor otherwise extended , than by the vnion and cohesion of its solid parts , we shall very ill comprehend the extension of body , without understanding , wherein consists the vnion and cohesion of its parts , which seems to me as incomprehensible as the manner of thinking , and how it is performed . i would have any one intelligibly explain to me , how the parts of gold or brass ( that but now in fusion were as loose from one another , as the particles of water , or the sands of an hour-glass ) come in a few moments to be so united , and adhere so strongly one to another , that the utmost force of men's arms cannot separate them . a considering man will i suppose be here at a loss , to satisfie his own or another man's vnderstanding . and can you then imagine that we have intuition into the idea of matter ? or that it is possible to come to a demonstration about it by the help of any intervening idea ? the idea of solidity , or firm cohesion of parts cannot be said to come from the idea of matter it self , for then there could be no such thing as fluid matter . whence then comes the distinction between these ideas of solid and fluid matter ? that there is such a cohesion of the solid parts of matter is evident : now what other ideas do you compare and connect with this to make it evident , how this solidity and matter came to have this agreement with each other ? is it by the density or compactedness of the matter in a little compass ? but that is as hard to give an account of ; viz. how some parts of matter come to take up so much less room , and to stick closer than others . is it by bare rest of the parts ? but how comes the resistance of solid bodies to come only from rest ? is it from the pressure of the ambient air ? no you say , that in truth the pressure of an ambient fluid how great soever , can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter . so that we are not to look for any thing like a demonstration of the cohesion of the parts of matter . 2. and as little are we to expect it , as to the divisibility of it ; which was the other thing i hoped to find demonstrated in the way of ideas . for you tell us , that the notion of body is cumbred with some difficulties which are very hard , and perhaps impossible to be explained , or understood by us . and among these you particularly instance in the divisibility of matter ; which you say , whether we grant or deny it to be in infinitum , it involves us in consequences , impossible to be explicated or made consistent . consequences that carry greater difficulty , and more apparent absurdity than any thing can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance . so that i think it is vain to expect a demonstration in the way of ideas as to this matter . the next is that of motion . concerning which you tell us , that the definition of the schools is exquisite iargon : that of the atomists is but putting one synonymous word for another ; viz. that motion is a passage from one place to another : for passage may as well be defined a motion from one place to another . and the cartesian definition , that it is the successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body to those of another , will not prove a much better definition of motion when well examin'd . and what is there so evident as motion ? so that if our ideas fail us in so plain a case , what help can we hope from them in things more abstruse and remote from our senses ? as to time and duration , you say , that the answer of a great man ( to one who asked what time was , si non rogas , intelligo , which amounts to this , the more i set my self to consider it , the less i understand it ) might perhaps perswade one , that time , which reveals all other things , is it self not to be discover'd . this shews , that there is no self-evident idea of time. but here you offer to furnish us with as clear and distinct ideas , as of many other which are thought much less obscure . however , then it is plain , that we have not the knowledge by intuition , but by rational deduction . for you proceed from the idea of succession , to that of duration ; by observing a distance in the parts of succession ; and then from observing periodical motions , we get ideas of the measures of duration , as minutes , hours , days , years , &c. from hence we proceed to imagine duration not yet come ; and such to which we can always add ; from which comes the idea of eternity : and by considering any part of duration with periodical measures , we come to the idea of what we call time in general . so that the idea of time in general is so far from being known by intuition , that many steps are to be taken in order to it ; and some such as one would hardly have thought of . as how the idea of succession should arise from a train of ideas in our minds : you say it is , because we have no perception of duration , but by considering the train of ideas , that take their turns in our vnderstandings . what think you of those people that fail'd not in reckoning the succession of time right for many years together by knots , and notches on sticks , and figures , without ever so much as thinking of ideas , or any thing like them ? but besides , such arbitrary measures of time , what need any recourse to ideas , when the returns of days and months and years by the planetary motions , are so easie and so universal ? if a man hath no perception of duration when he sleeps , yet the time runs on , and nights have as much their share in succession as days have . and although , you say , it seems very clear to you , that men derive their ideas of duration from their reflection on the train of the ideas they observe to succeed one another , yet i think the contrary so clear , that men may have a clear idea of succession without it , that i rather wonder how you came to think of this way . but it is sufficient to my purpose , that you could never know this idea of time by self-evidence . the last i shall mention is light , and one would think , if any idea be self-evident , it should be that . but let us see what you say about it ; you explode the peripatetick definition of it as unintelligible ; and the cartesian you allow to be but little better . for when they make it to be a number of little globules striking briskly on the bottom of the eye , you say , to a man that understands it not before , these words would make the idea of light no more known to him , than if one should tell him , that light was nothing but a company of little tennis-balls , which fairies all day long strook with rackets against some men's foreheads while they pass by others . and is this a self-evident idea of light ? thus we have seen what account your self have given of these self-evident ideas , which are the ground work of demonstration . 2. but suppose an idea happen to be thought by some to be clear and distinct , and others should think the contrary to be so , what hopes of demonstration by clear and distinct ideas then ? as suppose a man entertain des cartes his idea of space , as the same with body , or extended matter , which he affirms to be clear and distinct ; the consequence from hence is , as your self confess , that he may from thence demonstrate that there can be no vacuum : but again , let us suppose another to have a clear and distinct idea of space from body , this man , you say , may demonstrate as easily that there may be a vacuum , or space without a body , as des cartes demonstrated the contrary . say you so ? what! demonstrations on both sides , and in the way of ideas too ? this is extraordinary indeed . but if we may be allow'd the use of common principles , we may be sure , that both parts of a contradiction cannot be true , and therefore there must be a fundamental mistake some where . you say , it is in wrong application of that general maxim , what is , is . but there is no fault in the principle , which is the true meaning of the other ; that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be , which undoubtedly holds true ; but it is in supposing the reality of the thing to be according to what you call a clear and distinct idea . so that the general principles of reason stand firm and good ; but your self-evidence of clear and distinct ideas is such a principle , we see , as serves for demonstrations of both parts of a contradiction . 3. but granting the ideas to be true , yet when their connexion is not self-evident , then an intermediate idea must complete the demonstration . but how doth it appear that this middle idea is self-evidently connected with them ? for you say , if that intermediate idea be not known by intuition , that must need a proof ; and so there can be no demonstration . which i am very apt to believe in this way of ideas ; unless these ideas get more light by being put between two others . this will best appear by a remarkable instance already mention'd , viz. in the ideas of space and body ; the question supposed is , whether they be the same or not ; some we see affirm it , and others deny it . so that here we must use an intermediate idea , and that is of motion , and we are to consider whether this hath a self-evident connexion , with the other ideas ? the motion of bodies , you say , that are in our view and neighbourhood , seems to you plainly to evince a vacuum . but how ? is it by intuition or self-evidence ? no , you do not pretend to it . but by reason : because there must be a void space equal to the bulk of that body , which moves within the bounds of such a superficies . and if there be a space without body there must be a vacuum . but gassendus attempted to prove motion impossible , if there were no vacuum : for every body must go into the place of another , and so in insinitum ; which he said was ridiculous and impossible . the cartesians answer'd , that the motion was circular . gassendus urged , that still it was impossible : for suppose a the first body , and x the last ; a cannot move , unless x can be moved : but x cannot move , because the place is filled with a. the cartesians say , this proves nothing , because in the same instant , that x goes into the places of a , that gives way . ioh. bapt. morinus ( professor of the mathematicks at paris , at the same time with gassendus ) answers to gassendus his argument , that the separation of two bodies and succession are at the same time ; and so there can be no vacuum . bernier defends gassendus his argument , and saith , that no motion can begin without a vacuum ; but other philosophers and mathematicians as stifly deny it . and is it possible to imagine , that there should be a self-evident connexion of ideas in this case ? but what hath reason now to do in this way of intuition ? yes , say you , reason is to discover the agreement or disagreement of ideas . but this is nothing but an imploying the faculty of reason in such a manner : and so in the beginning of your chapter of reason , you tell us , that it is sometimes taken for true and clear principles , and sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those principles ; but you take it for a saculty in man. but why , in a chapter of reason , are the other two senses neglected ? we might have expected here full satisfaction as to the principles of reason as distinct from the faculty , but you wholly avoid it ; and only shew how it is used in finding out the certain connexion of ideas in demonstration ; and the probable connexion in other things . so that the difference lies between us , as to this matter of reason , in these two things . ( 1. ) you affirm , that general principles and maxims of reason are of little , or no vse ; i say that they are of very great use , and the only proper foundations of certainty . ( 2. ) you say , that demonstration is by way of intuition of ideas , and that reason is only the faculty imploy'd in discovering and comparing ideas with themselves , or with others intervening ; and that this is the only way of certainty . i affirm , and have proved , that there can be no demonstration by intuition of ideas ; but that all the certainty we can attain to , is from general principles of reason , and necessary deductions made from them . but before i conclude this discourse , i must observe that you prove that demonstration must be by intuition , in an extraordinary manner , from the sense of the word . for you say , it is called demonstration , it being shewn to the vnderstanding , and the mind made see , that it is so . i have told you formerly , how very uncertain a way of arguing it is , which is taken from the original signification of words ; and if it would hold in this case , it would be most proper for ocular demonstrations , or by the finger . but in the philosophical sense of the word , demonstration was never taken for intuition , or the knowing of a thing by its self-evidence . but you assert the necessity of intuitive knowledge , in every step of a demonstration . whereas , aristotle saith , things that are self-evident cannot be demonstrated ; and that it is weakness and folly not to know what things are capable of demonstration , and what not . it seems there were some philosophers , who would have first principles demonstrated ; this , saith aristotle cannot be done without running in infinitum , which is absurd . whence it is plain , that demonstration was supposed to lie in some antecedent proof ; and where any thing was self-evident it was absurd to look for it : so that the way of intuition and demonstration , were thought inconsistent . for what a man sees by its own light , he needs no proof of . but you say , that in a demonstration the intervenient ideas are called proofs ; and where by the help of these the agreement or disagreement is plainly perceived , that is demonstration : and that in every step there is an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea , which it uses as a proof ; for , if it were not so , that would need a proof . so that according to your method of demonstration , that which is used as a proof must need no proof , but must be known by immediate intuition . of which kind of demonstration , i would fain see any one instance in the knowledge of things , and not in abstracted and mathematical demonstrations . for it may be , it hath been the occasion of some great mistakes in the philosophy of this age , that ingenious and mathematical men have labour'd so much to accommodate the principles of that science to the nature of material things ; of which we have a remarkable instance in the system of des cartes . and supposing we could come to a certainty about the nature and tendency of bodies here within our reach , ( i mean with respect to the earth ) i do not know , how far the greatest mathematician can proceed in making demonstrations as to the nature and tendency of those bodies which are so much out of our reach , as the heavenly bodies are , both in themselves and with respect to one another . for , if the phaenomena depend upon a force given them by the great and wise creator , how can we know in what manner or degree that force is given to bodies at such a wonderfull distance from us , as the fixed stars are ? for , if god can alter the laws of motion in another system , as it is not denied ; how can we be mathematically certain , that the laws of motion in bodies , so much above us , are the very same that we find them here ? i do not by any means take off from the laudable endeavours of those who have gone about to reduce natural speculations to mathematical certainty : but i mention it to shew , that it is a very easie way for thinking men to deceive themselves , in talking so much of demonstrative certainty about natural things , when all their instances are brought from mathematical demonstrations . aristotle , whom i cannot despise so much as some do ( i do not say for want of reading him ) hath a discourse on purpose in the beginning of his books of animals , in what way natural things are to be handled ; and he saith , there are two ways . 1. by way of science . 2. by way of instruction , which must be suitable to the nature of the things . so that in natural history he saith , there must be certain bounds set for enquiry , without proceeding to strict demonstration . and , saith he , the manner of demonstration as to natural things , is different from what it is in speculative or mathematical things . in another place he laments the want of experiments as to natural history , ( although he made far more than any before him , and was better able to do it by the plentifull assistance of philip and alexander , while he lived at court ) and he looks on that as the best way of satisfying our reason about such things ; and our reasons , saith he , are then good , when they agree with the phaenomena . and he was so far from thinking he had made demonstrations in physicks , that in one place he saith , that in things not evident to sense , he thought it sufficient to shew the possibility of it ; and therefore he ought not to be run down for his modesty ; however his physical notions fall far short of demonstrations . in his morals , he saith , all principles must be suitable to the nature of the science ; for it would be absurd for a man to go about to prove the three angles of a triangle , equal to two right angles ; and take this for his principle , that the soul is immortal . for the proof must be proper and connected with it . and from hence he excludes plato's idea , from being a principle in morals . in his eudemia , the way of proceeding in morals , he saith , is by reasons , testimonies , and examples ; and he looks on it as great want of iudgment for men not to consider what reasons are proper for every science . so that according to him , morality is not uncapable of demonstration ; so it be upon moral principles : for that he lays down in the beginning of his ethicks , and afterwards that the same exactness is not to be required in all sorts of reasoning : but that it ought to be suitable to the matter it is about . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . if therefore the principles in morality be clear and proper , and the deductions be plain and natural , i do not see , but that it is as capable of demonstration as any other science ; if men were as willing to be convinced in morals , as they are in mathematicks . and therein i fully agree with you : but the way of demonstration by ideas will not do , either there or any where else . i mean by this intuitive knowledge in every step of the demonstration : when the intervening ideas are far from being capable of this intuitive certainty . and as to your argument from the notation of the word , it is certain , that after the philosophical use of it , it signified no more among some philosophers , than the conclusion of an argument ; whereby we are brought from something we did perceive , to somethiug we did not . not by way of intuition , but by a deduction of reason . and plato makes use of the word demonstration in his phoedrus , for such a reason which wise men would believe , and others would not . but there could be no intuitive certainty in such a demonstration . i have been longer a clearing this matter than i thought i should have been ; but it is the main point as to certainty by ideas , and what remains will admit of an easier dispatch . i now return to the difference between nature and person ; and i shall only single out what is material and pertinent ; and now leave the interlocutory gentlemen to maintain their conversation by themselves . i had said in my vindication , that nature may be consider'd two ways . ( 1. ) as it is in distinct individuals . ( 2. ) abstractly without respect to individual persons . ( 1. ) as it is in distinct individuals , as the nature of a man is equally in peter , iames and iohn , and this is the common nature with a particular subsistence belonging to each of them . for the nature of man , as in peter , is distinct from the same nature , as it is in iames and iohn ; otherwise they would be but one person , as well as have the same nature . which to my understanding is plain and clear reason . and if so , then here we have an identity of nature , and a distinction of persons in the same nature . but to this you object these three things : ( 1. ) that you cannot put together one and the same , and distinct ; and consequently there is no foundation for the distinction of nature and person . ( 2. ) that what i say about common nature , and particular subsistence and individuals , is wholly unintelligible to you and your friends . ( 3. ) that to speak truly and precisely of this matter , as in reality it is , there is no such thing as one common nature in several individuals ; for all that is truth in them is particular , and can be nothing but particular . but the meaning is , that every particular individual man or horse , &c. has such a nature or constitution as agrees , and is conformable to that idea which that general name stands for . this is the substance of what i can gather out of your discourse in several pages , but as to the general reflections i pass them over , having no other design , but to set truth in as good a light as i can . and if i have the misfortune not to be understood , i cannot help it ; i wish it were in my power to help other men's capacities as well as to help my own . but you say , the notionists and ideists , ( as they are called ) seem to have their apprehensive faculties very differently turned ? i do not think , that there is any different turn in their faculties ; but there may be a very wrong turn in the method of reasoning in those , who go in this way of ideas , from what there is in those who pursue the general principles of reason , and from thence draw particular conclusions . if any man takes it for granted , that your way of ideas is the only way to certainty ( and he must take it for granted , if he will believe it ) then i cannot see how he can apprehend one and the same common nature in different persons or individuals , because all his ideas are taken from particulars ; and therefore a common nature is no more but one common name ; and every individual is consider'd as ranked under those names . but herein lies the fundamental mistake , that you presume that we are not to judge of things by the general principles of reason , but by particular ideas . for if men set aside this new way of judging only by these ideas ; things would appear in another light to them : but i find it is to very little purpose to argue with such men , who are resolved to stick to this way of ideas ; for they can apprehend nothing but just in their own way . and let us say what we will , it is jargon , and unintelligible to them ; although very rational men have said the same things that we do , and have been thought by the rest of mankind to have spoken intelligibly . but now it seems nothing is intelligible , but what suits with this new way of ideas , however repugnant it be to the common principles of reason ; which must be the standard to mankind , whatever becomes of this way of ideas . and therefore in this debate , i shall proceed upon these principles of reason , which have been receiv'd among mankind ; and from them i hope to make it appear , that the difference of nature and person is not imaginary and fictitious , but grounded upon the real nature of things . the principles of reason , which i go upon are these ; 1. that nothing hath no properties . 2. that all properties being only modes or accidents must have a real subject to subsist in . 3. that properties essentially different , must subsist in different essences . 4. that where there is an agreement in essential properties and a difference in individual , there must be both an identity and diversity in several respects . now upon these principles i build my assertion , that there is one real and common nature or essence in mankind , and a difference of persons in the several individuals . for , that there are such essential properties in mankind which are not in brutes , i suppose you will not deny . now these essential properties must subsist somewhere ; for nothing can have no properties , and these properties cannot subsist ( where individuals are multiplied ) in any one individual : for that is to exclude all the rest from the essential properties which belong to them ; and if they have them in common , there must be some common subject wherein they subsist , and that can be nothing but the common essence of mankind . for the essence of brutes or plants have them not ; and therefore these essences must be really different from one another . but because individuals of the same kind , have something to distinguish , as well as to unite them , therefore there must be a different subsistence in every individual : and so one and the same , and yet distinct , may very easily and intelligibly consist together . but you say , i have not told you what nature is ; i think my discourse sufficiently shew'd it , if you had a mind to understand it ; for you could not but see that i meant the subject of the essential properties , whether you call it nature , substance , or essence . your objection about nature and substance being of equal extent , i hope , i have sufficiently removed in the foregoing discourse . you tell me , that it is more than you know , that the nature of a man is equal in peter , james and john. i am sorry for it . for i thought you had ideas of particular substances . but they may be drills or horses for any thing you know . i am again sorry , that you know particular men no better ; but that for ought you know , they may be drills or horses . but you know a horse that was called peter , and you do not know but the master of the same team might call other of his horses , james and john. suppose all this . and could you not in the way of ideas distinguish them from those of your acquaintance who had the same names ? i confess , this tempts me to think that ideists ( as you call them ) have a particular turn of their understandings about these matters . for i cannot but think , that those who were not very rational men , might understand the difference between men and horses ; without being told , that although horses might be called by their names ; yet that these were real men , and their constitution and nature was conformable to that idea , which the general name man stands for . but this is no more than to say , that he that has the nature of a man is a man , or what has the nature of a drill is a drill ; and what has the nature of a horse is a horse ; whether it be called peter , or not called peter . if this were really the discourse of your friends in private conversation , you have been very obliging to them to publish it to the world : for mankind are not so stupid , as not to know a man from a horse or a drill , but only by the specifick name of man. you may have a horse called peter if you please , and another iames , and a third iohn ; but for all that , there is no one that hath the understanding of a man , but will be able without your specifick names to tell the difference of your horse peter from your man peter ; and call them by what names you please the difference will not depend upon them , but upon the essential properties which belong to them ; and so it will be owned by all that have not this new turn of their vnderstandings . but i plainly see , that a new notion when it hath got deep into a man's head doth give a strange turn to his understanding ; so that he cannot see that , which every one else can , that hath not the same tincture upon his mind . and i remember an observation of yours , how dangerous it is to a man's reason to fix his fancy long upon one sort of thoughts . these ideas are a very odd sort of spectacles to our understandings , if they make them see and understand less , than people of very , ordinary capacities do . for even the man who had the horse with the name peter , and might have others by the names of james and john , would not a little wonder at a grave philosopher that should seriously say to him ; you see , friend , that your horses have the names of men , how do you know but that they are men ? know , saith the country-man , i hope you are wiser than to ask me such a question ? or what do you take me for , if i cannot tell the difference of men from horses whatever names they have . do not tell me of your specifick names , and conformity to your ideas , i know well enough the difference between my horse peter and my man peter without such gibberish . my man peter and i can sit and chop logick together , about our country affairs , and he can write and read , and he is a very sharp fellow at a bargain ; but my horse peter can do none of these things , and i never could find any thing like reason in him , and do you think i do not know the difference between a man and a beast ? i pursue this no farther lest the country-man should be too rude to the gentlemen , with whom you had this learned conversation , about the difference of men , and horses , and drills . but you or your friend , or both , are very hard set again about a common nature with a particular subsistence proper to each person . for such is your misfortune , you say , that for your life you cannot find it out . this is a hard case ; before , for your life you could not understand nature and substance to be the same ; and now again , for your life you cannot find out this . where lies the monstrous difficulty of it ? you say , you repeated , and this twenty times to your self ; and your weak vnderstanding always rejolts . at what ? my words are , nature may be considered , as it is in distinct individuals , as the nature of man is equally in peter , iames and iohn . and this is the common nature with a particular subsistence proper to each of them . you say , that the nature of man in peter is the nature of a man , if peter be supposed to be a man , but if it be the name of a horse , your knowledge vanishes . cannot you , for your life , know the difference between a man and a horse , by their essential properties , whatever their names be ? if so , there is a greater turn of mens vnderstandings , than i imagined . but again say you , let it be impossible to give that name to a horse ( who ever said or thought so ? ) yet you cannot understand these words , the common nature of a man is in peter ; for whatsoever is in peter exists in peter ; and whatever exists in peter is particular ; but the common nature of man is the general nature of man , or else you understand not what is meant by common nature ; and it confounds your vnderstanding to make a general a particular . to this i answer , that the common nature of man may be taken two ways . in the way of ideas , and in the way of reason . in your way of ideas it is not at all to be wondered at , that you cannot understand such a common nature , as i spake of , which subsists in several persons , because you say , you can have no ideas of real substances but such as are particular ; all others are only abstract ideas , and made only by the act of the mind . but i say , that in the way of reason you may come to a better understanding of this matter . which is by considering the nature of beings , and the causes of the differences amongst the several kinds of them . i had told you before , in my answer to your first letter , that we are to consider beings as god hath ordered them in their several sorts and ranks , and that he hath distinguished them by essential properties from each other , as appears by mankind , and brutes , and plants : and that although the individuals of the several kinds agree in essential properties , yet there is a real difference between them in several accidents that belong to them , as to time , place , qualities , relations , &c. now that wherein they agree is the common nature ; and that wherein they differ , is the particular subsistence . and if this be so hard to be understood , why was it not answered here in the proper place for it ? is not that a real nature that is the subject of real properties ? is not that nature really in all those who have the same essential properties ? and therefore the common nature of man must exist in peter , because he is a man , and so in iames and iohn : and yet every one of these is so distinguished from the other , that we may justly say he hath a particular subsistence with that common nature . and this is no making a general a particular ; but distinguishing one from the other , which is a distinction so easie and necessary , that i cannot but wonder at those who say , that for their lives they cannot find it out . i had said , for the nature of man as in peter , is distinct from that same nature , as it is in iames and iohn , otherwise they would be but one person as well as one nature . and what reply is made to this ? you cannot understand what this is a proof of . it is plain that i meant it of a particular subsistence ; and if you cannot for your life understand such easie things , how can i for my life help it ? read the words over again which are before them , and join them together . and this is the common nature with a particular subsistence proper to each of them ; for the nature of man as in peter is distinct from that same nature as it is in iames and iohn . but i am really ashamed to be put to explain such things ; i hope ideas do not give another turn to common sense . but you say , that otherwise they could not be three persons , is to prove it by a proposition unintelligible to you , because you do not yet apprehend what a person is . of that in its proper place . these words of mine follow , and this distinction of persons in them , is discerned both by our senses as to their different accidents , and by our reason because they have a separate existence , not coming into it at once and in the same manner . and is this unintelligible too ? you say , it will hold as well for three physical atoms , which are three distinct individuals , and have three distinct natures in them , as certainly as three distinct men. but are three atoms as much three persons as three men ? but you cannot discern the distinction by our senses as to their accidents , nor by your reason as to separate existence , because god might create them at once . therefore we cannot distinguish three humane persons that way ? in this reasoning in the way of ideas ? or in any way ? suppose we put the common nature of an animal for the common nature of man. what follows ? therefore three animals are three distinct persons , as well as three men ? i thought there was some cause for your disliking the common principles and methods of reasoning . i am forced to give but short touches at such things , which i cannot answer more largely , without being thought to make marks of distinction . come we now therefore to the second sense of nature , as it is taken abstractly without respect to individual persons ; and then i said , it makes an entire notion of it self . for however the same nature may be in different individuals , yet the nature in it self remains one and the same ; which appears from this evident reason , that otherwise every individual must make a different kind . is this to be understood any better ? no. an entire notion of it self is an expression never met with before . an entire idea of it self had been very plain and easie ; but this is not to talk with men in their own dialect . but if we put it so , the difficulty remains . what difficulty ? it then makes no more an entire notion than the nature of peter . is it not the same nature considered as common to all individuals , distinct from that nature as in peter ? i wish among all the ways of inlarging knowledge , you could think of some new way of conveying notions into mens minds , for i find your way of ideas will never do it . for you cannot be brought one step beyond the first cast of ideas . and you will not allow , that which i give for an evident reason , to prove any thing towards clear apprehensions of one common nature . but if nature be one and the same in different individuals , then there must be one common nature , which makes an entire notion of it self : if it be not one and the same , then every individual must make a distinct kind ? can any thing be more evident ? but you give one common answer ; i understand not any thing that is meant in this whole paragraph , as to the right apprehension of one common nature . and so i am very well content to leave it to the reader 's understanding . and now i come at last to the idea of a person . and here i am glad to find something you do understand : which is great news . this , say you , i understand very well , that supposing peter , james and john to be all three men , and man being a name for one kind of animals , they are all of the same kind . do you mean that they have the same common essence , or have only the same common name ? if you mean the former , there must be a common nature ; if only the latter , that cannot make them of the same kind . for kind signifies nothing but a meer name without it . if it be asked you , whether men and drills be of the same kind or not ? could you give no other answer , but that the specifick name man stands for one sort , and the specifick name drill for the other ; and therefore they are not of the same kind ? are those names arbitrary , or are they founded on real and distinct properties ? if they be arbitrary , they have no other difference , but what a dictionary gives them . if they are founded on real and distinct properties , then there must be a real difference of kinds founded in nature ; which is as much as i desire . but to go on . you understand too very well , that peter is not james , and james is not john , but that there is a difference in these individuals . you understand also , that they may be distinguished from each other by our senses , as to different features and distance of place , &c. but what follows , you say , you do not understand , viz. that supposing there were no such external difference , yet there is a difference between them as individuals of the same nature . for all that this comes to , as far as you can understand , is that the ground of the distinction between several individuals in the same common nature is that they are several individuals in the same common nature . you understand , it seems , that they are several individuals , that peter is not james , and james is not john ; and the question is , what this distinction is founded upon ? whether upon our observing the difference of features , distance of place , &c. or on some antecedent ground ? i affirm , that there is a ground of the distinction of individuals antecedent to such accidental differences as are liable to our observation by our senses . and the ground i go upon is this , that the true reason of identity in man is the vital union of soul and body : and since every man hath a different soul united to different particles of matter , there must be a real distinction between them , without any respect to what is accidental to them . for , if peter have a soul and body different from iames , and iames from iohn , they must have different principles of individuation , without any respect to features or place , &c. you say , you cannot suppose a contradiction , viz. that there is no difference of place between them . but that is not the point , whether when we consider them with respect to place , there can be such a thing as identity of place to two different bodies ? but whether we cannot consider two several individuals of mankind without particular regard to place ? which i say , we may , and for this reason ; because relation to place , is an external difference , but the real distinction of individuals doth not relate to any accident of the body ; because the individual consists of the union of soul and body ; and you cannot judge of the existence of the soul by the place of the body . you say , that when we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time , we are sure ( be it what it will ) that it is that very thing , and not another which at that time exists in another place , how like and undistinguishing soever it may be in all other respects . and in this consists identity . but i think the identity of man depends neither upon the notion of place for his body ; nor upon the soul consider'd by it self , but upon both these , as actually united and making one person . which to me seems so clear and intelligible , that i can imagine no objection against it . i am certain , you produce none . my next words are , and here lies the true idea of a person , which arises from that manner of subsistence , which is in one individual , and is not communicable to another . in your answer to this , i pass over the trifling exceptions , about the dissyllable person , and the true idea and signification of the articulate sound ; and about here and herein , &c. being resolved to keep to what appears material . and the only thing of that kind is , that according to my sense of person , it will as well agree to bucephalus as to alexander ; and the difference will be as great , between bucephalus and podargus , as between alexander and hector , all being several individuals in the same common nature : but for your part you cannot understand that bucephalus and podargus are persons in the true signification of the word person in the english tongue . and whoever desired you should ? for i expresly say , that a person is a compleat intelligent substance , with a peculiar manner of subsistence . and again , for a person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another intelligent substance in the same nature . so that it is impossible to apply my notion of person to any irrational creatures , although they be bucephalus and podargus : and i think a man must strain hard to make such objections , so directly against that idea of a person which i set down . and it is very easie to understand the difference between a distinction of individuals as such , and of intelligent individuals , and that manner of subsistence in them , which makes them distinct persons . but you say , that i affirm , that an individual intelligent substance is rather supposed to the making of a person , than the proper definition of it ; and yet afterwards i make it to be the definition of a person , that it is a compleat intelligent substance . to this i answer , that in the former place i give an account of the reason of personality , which i say lies in the manner of subsistence , and not in the intelligent individual substance ; which is rather supposed to the making of a person : for that which critically distinguishes the person is the reason of personality ; but when we come to give a common definition of it , there is no such necessity of insisting upon the reason of the difference , but upon the common acception of it person . and upon that account i call it a complete intelligent substance , because , although the soul be so in it self ; yet we take person with relation to soul and body united together . and so the identity of person must take in both , not only here , but at the resurrection . and thus i have gone through all that i could find , that seem'd material in the dialogue between you and your friends as to this subject , and i assure you , i have omitted nothing which i apprehended had any appearance of difficulty in it . and i find not the least reason to be unsatisfied in the account i had given of the difference of nature and person : but i still think that it doth tend very much to the right apprehension of the doctrine of the trinity ; as i hope doth farther appear by the foregoing discourse . and now to come to a conclusion of this whole debate . ( for i intend not to draw this saw any longer : having done as much as i think sitting for my self to do . ) i saw no necessity of writing again for my own vindication as to your first charge , which i was contended to leave to the reader 's judgment . but in the conclusion of my former answer , i had said , that as you had stated your notion of ideas , it may be of dangerous consequence to that article of the christian faith , which i endeavour'd to defend . this you call a new charge against your book ; and you complain , that i do not specifie the particulars , wherein i apprehend it may be of such dangerous consequence ; and you blame me for this saying , without shewing that it is so : and that all the reason i give is , that it is made use of by ill men to do mischief : that when i say , it may be , it shews only an inclination to accuse , and proves nothing : that danger may be apprehended where no danger is ; that if any thing must be laid aside , because it may be ill used , you do not know what will be innocent enough to be kept : and lastly , that the imputation of a tendency to scepticism , and to the overthrowing any article of the christian faith are no small charge ; and that you cannot see any argument i have brought , that your notion of ideas tends to scepticism . these things laid together , made me think it necessary to do that which i was unwilling 〈◊〉 do , till you had driven me to it ; which was to shew , the reasons i had , why i look'd on your notion of ideas , and of certainty by them , as inconsistent with it self , and with some important articles of the christian faith. what i have now done , i thought it my duty to do , not with respect to my self , but to some of the mysteries of our faith ; which i do not charge you with opposing , but with laying such foundations as do tend to the overthrow of them ; of which we have had too much experience already ; and may have more , if your way of certainty by ideas should obtain . which i cannot think it will among such as are capable , and willing , to judge impartially . i have now done with this matter : and as some may think it the first part of wisdom not to begin in such disputes ( and i am of their mind if they did not touch the christian faith ) so they cannot but judge it the next ( as i do ) to know when to make an end. i am , sir , your faithfull friend , and servant , ed. wigorn. sept. 22. 1697. finis . errata . page 22. line 16. after thing , insert common . p. 103 margin , r. p. 253. p. 115. l. 14. r. plotinus . p. 130. l. 26. r. this . p. 175. l. 11. blot out it . books written by the right reverend father in god , edw. l. bishop of worcester , and sold by h. mortlock at the phoenix in st. paul's church-yuard . a rational account of the grounds of the protestant religion ; being a vindication of the lord archbishop of canterbury's relation of a conference , &c. from the pretended answer of t. c. 2d . edit . fol. origines britannicae , or the antiquities of the british churches , with a preface concerning some pretended antiquities relating to britain , in vindication of the bishop of st. asaph . folio . irenicum , a weapon-slave for the churches wounds . quarto . origines sacrae , or a rational account of the grounds of christian faith , as to the truth and divine authority of the script ▪ and the matters therein contained . 4 to . a discourse concerning the idolatry practised in the church of rome , and the hazard of salvation in the communion of it . octavo . an answer to several late treatises occasioned by a book entituled , a discourse concerning the idolatry practised in the church of rome , and the hazard of salvation in the communion of it ; part i. octavo . a second discourse in vindication of the protestant grounds of faith , against the pretence of infallibility in the roman church , in answer to the guide in controversie , by r h protestancy without principles , and reason and religion ; or the certain rule of faith , by e w. with a particular enquiry into the miracles of the roman church octavo . an answer to mr. cressy's epistle apologetical to a person of honour , touching his vindication of dr ▪ stillingfleet . octavo . a defence of the discourse concerning the idolatry practised in the church of rome , in answer to a book entituled , catholicks no idolaters : octavo . several conferences between a roman priest ▪ a fanatick chaplain , and a divine of the church of england ; being a full answer to the late dialogues of t g octavo . a discourse concerning bonds of resignation of benefices in point of law and conscience , in octavo . a discourse concerning the illegality of the ecclesiastical commission , in answer to the vindication and defence of it : wherein the true notion of the legal supremacy is cleared ; and an account is given of the nature , original and mischief of the dispensing power . the unreasonableness of separation , or an impartial account of the history , nature and pleas of the present separation from the communion of the ch. of england . quarto the grand question concerning the bishops right to vote in parliament in cases capital stated and argued , from the parliament-rolls and the history of former times ; with an enquiry into their peerage , and the three estates in parliament . octavo . a discourse concerning the doctrine of christ's satisfaction ; or the true reasons of his sufferings ; with an answer to the socinian objections . to which is added , a sermon concerning the mysteries of the christian faith , preached april 7. 1691. with a preface concerning the true state of the controversie about christ's satisfaction . the second edition . 8 vo . twelve sermons preached upon several occasions vol. i. octavo . ten sermons preached upon several occasions . vol ii. octavo . a third volume will be shortly published . a discourse in vindication of the doctrine of the trinity : with an answer to the late socinian objections against it , from scripture , antiquity and reason and a preface concerning the different explications of the trinity , and the tendency of the present socinian controversie . the second edition , octavo . the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. lock 's letter concerning some passages relating to his essay of humane understanding , mentioned in the late discourse in vindication of the trinity . with a postscript in answer to some reflections made on that treatise in a late socinian pamphlet . the bishop of worcester's charge to the clergy of his diocess in his primary visitation begun at worcester , september 11. 1690. 4 to . the effigies of the right reverend father in god , edward lord bishop of worcester , engraven on a copper-plate by robert white . price 6 d. the rule of faith : or an answer to the treatise of mr. i. s. entituled , sure-footing , &c. by iohn tillotson , d. d. to which is adjoyned , a reply to mr. i. s's third appendix , &c. by edward stillingfleet d. d. a letter to mr. g. giving a true account of a late conference at the d. of p's . a second letter to mr. g. in answer to two letters lately published concerning the conference at the d. of p s. veteres vindicati : in an expostulary letter to mr. sclater of putney , upon his consensus veterum , &c. wherein the absurdity of his method , and the weakness of his reasons are shewn ; his false aspersions upon the church of england are wiped off , and her faith concerning the eucharist proved to be that of the primitive church : together with animadversions on dean boileu's french translation of , and remarks upon bertram . an answer to the compiler of nubes testium : wherein is shewn , that antiquity ( in relation to the points in controversie set down by him ) did not for the first five hundred years believe , teach and practice as the church of rome doth at present believe , teach and practice ; together with a vindication of veteres vindicati from the late weak and disingenuous attempts of the author of transubstantiation defended , by the author of the answer to mr. sclater of putney . a letter to father lewis sabran jesuit , in answer to his letter to a peer of the church of england ; wherein the postscript to the answer to the nubes testium is vindicated , and father sabran's mistakes farther discoverd . a second letter to father lewis sabran jesuit , in answer to his reply . a vindication of the principles of the author of the answer to the compiler of nubes testium in answer to a late pretended letter from a dissenter to the divines of the church of england . a discourse concerning the nature and grounds of the certainty of faith , in answer to i. s. his catholick letters . the council of trent examin'd and disprov'd by catholick tradition , in the main points in controversie between us and the church of rome ▪ with a particular account of the times and occasions of introducing them . part. i. to which a preface is prefixed concerning the true sense of the council of trent , and the notion of transubstantiation . an historical examination of the authority of general councils , shewing the false dealing that hath been used in the publishing of them ; and the difference amongst the papists themselves about their number . the second edition corrected . 4 to . the folly and unreasonableness of atheism demonstrated from the advantage and pleasure of a religious life : the faculties of human souls : the structure of animate bodies , and the origine and frame of the world ; in eight sermons : preached at the lecture , founded by the honourable robert boyle , esq in the first year , 1692. by richard bentley , d. d. chaplain in ordinary , and library-keeper to his majesty . of revelation , and the messias : a sermon preached at the publick commencement at cambridge , july the 5th . 1696. by richard bentley , d. d. chaplain in ordinary , and library-keeper to his majesty . the restoring of fallen brethren ; containing the substance of two sermons on gal vi. 1 , 2 preached at the performance of publick penance , by certain criminals , on the lord's day , usually called mid-lent-sunday , 1696. in the parish church of old-swinford in worcester-shire : by simon ford , d. d and rector there ; with a preface , by the right reverend father in god , edward lord bishop of worcester . the new-years-gift complete , in six parts , composed of prayers and meditations for every day in the week , with devotions for the sacrament , lent , and other occasions . the first part may be had by it self books written by the late reverend anthony horneck , d. d. preacher at the savoy . the great law of consideration ; or a discourse , wherein the nature , usefulness , and absolute necessity of consideration , in order to a truly serious , and religious life , is laid open , in 8 vo . the happy ascetick ; or the best exercise ; together with prayers suitable to each exercise : to which is added , a letter to a person of quality , concerning the holy lives of the primitive christians , in 8 vo . delight and judgment represented , in a discourse , concerning the great day of judgment ; and its power to damp and embitter sensual delights , sports , and recreations , in 8 vo . the exercise of prayer ; or , a help to devotion : containing prayers and devotions for several occasions . the antiquities of nottingham-shire , extracted out of records , original evidences , leiger-books , and other manuscripts , and authentick authorities ; beautified with maps , prospects , and portraictures : by robert thoroton dr. of physick , folio . some school-books sold by henry mortlok , at the phoenix in st. paul's church-yard . horatius , interpretatione & notis illustravit ludovicus des-prez , in usum delphini . huic editioni accessere vita horatii cum dacerii chronologia horatiana , & praefatio de satyra romana , 8vo . l. annaeus florus , in usum delphini , 8vo . leusdeni compendium graecum novi testamenti , in 8vo . quinta editio . janua linguarum trilinguis , sive johannis amos comenii janua linguarum , 8vo . graecae grammatices rudimenta in usum scholae westmonasteriensis busby's apolodorus , in usum scholae westmonast . nomenclatura brevis reformata , in usum scholae westmonasteriensis . an english introduction to the latin tongue , for the use of the lower forms in westminster school . graeca epigrammata , in usum scholae west . martialis epigram . in usum scholae west . juneval in usum scholae westmonasteriensis . a general examination of the common greek grammar , according to dr. busby's method , chiefly intended for grounding young beginners in the greek tongue , in the free-school in newark upon trent . a short exposition of the catechism of the church of england , with the church catechism it self , and order of confirmation in english and latin , the latin revised and much amended , by edw. boughen , d.d. fitted for the use of schools . an explanation of the additional rules for the genders of nouns in the oxford grammar , by way of question and answer : by iohn twells master of the free-school in newark , very proper to be bound up with the oxford grammar . with variety of other school-books . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a61523-e120 2d . letter ▪ p. 2. answ. to first letter , p. 46. 2 d. letter , p. 48. p. 49. p. 50. first letter , p. 57. p. 80. letter ii. ● . ● , 9 , 10.12 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 23 , 38 , 39 , 41 , 47 , 50 , 56 , 61 , 107 , 114. essay , b. 4. ch . 6. sect. 3. first letter , p. 57. b. 4. ch . 11. sect. 1. letter p. 57. b. 4. ch . 2. sect. 15. princip . l. 1. n. 44 , &c. b. 4. ch . 18. sect. 8. b. 4. ch . 4. sect. 8. b. 4. ch . 12. sect. 14. b. 4. ch . 2. sect. 15. answ. to let 1. p. 36. let. 2. p. 36. answer to letter 1. p. 37. letter 2. p. 45. p. ●6 ▪ p. 41. p. 43 , 44. p. 4● . answer to letter 1. p. 38. letter 2. p. 46. letter 2 p. 95. answer to letter 1. p 83. postscript p. 3. p. 96. p. 131. p. 131. lett. ii. p. 170. 2. essay , b. 2. ch . 27. n. 3. n. 6. n. 9. n. 11. n. 16. n. 18. n. 26. letter 2. p. 96. n. 25. essay , e. 4. ch . 15. sect. 1. sect. 4. john 5.28 , 29. 2 cor. 5.10 . 1 cor. 15.16 . 17. 6. 4. john 20.25 . 1 cor. 15.20 , 23. 35. 36 , 37 , 38. sect. 4. sect. 6. 42. 43. 44. 53 , 5● . essay b. 2. c. 1. sect. 5. vindication of the trinity , p. 252. &c. p. 260. letter 1. p. 165. p. 216 answer to letter 1 ▪ p. 103. letter 2. p. 109. p. 100. answer to letter 1. p. 107. p. 103. letter 2. p. 112. letter 1. p. 27. essay b. 4. c. 6. sect. 1. letter 2. p. 113. p. 109. p. 109. p. 110. p. 111. p. 112. letter 1. p. 32. essay l. 2. ch . 27. sect. 26. letter 1. p. 216. essay , l. 2. ch . 27. sect. 9. essay , b. 4. ch . 18. sect. 5. evangel . medici art. 14. p. 170. ch. 18. sect. 10. sect. 8. censur . philos. cartes . c. 8. sect. 3. n. 4. philosophia scripturae interpres , c. 5. n. 56. c. 8. p. 58. p. 60. p. 63. p. 65 , 79. from p. 63. to p. 73. p. 87. p. 88. p. 171 , 172. essay , b. 2. ch . 13. sect. 2. sect. 12. sect. 14. princip . p. 11. n. 16. essay , l. 2. ch . 13. sect. 12. b. 4. ch . 4. sect. 1. sect. 2 , sect. 4 ▪ sect. 5. sect. 11. sect. 12. des cartes epist. ● 1. ep. 87 , 88. p. ●17 p. 118. p. 120. p. 119. p. 121. arist. metaph . l. 5. c. 4. p. rami schol. metaph l. 9. c. 4. physic. ausc. l. 2. c. 1. plut. de plac. phil. l. 1. c. 1. c. 3. letter ii. p. 119. fr. patrit . discuss . peripat . t. ii. l. 2. p. 207. nat quaest. l. 2. c. 45. de benef . l. 4. c. 7 , 8. de cons. ad helv. c. 8. cic. de nat. l. 2. plato in phileb . sext. empir . l. 8. c. 2. p. 324. anton. l. 6. sect . 14. l. 10. sect. 2. damasc. dial. c. 32. chrysost. hom. 22. in gen. theod. in gen. qu. 2. basil. in hex . or. 1. gal. 4.8 . mr. boyle of the notion of nature , p. 27. p. 35. discourse of the trinity , p. 25. p. 124. ibid. book 4 ch 7. sect. ●● . sect. 4. book 4. ch . 7. sect. 17. solid philos. asserted preface , sect. 16. reflex . 19. p. 378. book 4. ch . 9. sect. 3. book 4. ch . 7. sect. 4. book 4 ▪ ch . 7. sect. 16. sect. 17. sect. 18. book 3. ch . 6. sect. 26. sect. 17 ▪ aristot. metaph . l. 5. answer to the first lett. p. 32. iambl . in nicom . p. 5. porph vit . pythag. metaphys . l. 7. c. 15 , 16. l. 12 ▪ c. 4 , 5. arrian . l. 1. c. 22. l. 3. c 26. simplic . in epict . c. 33. plut. de ei delph . simplic . in epict. c. 58. essay , b. 4. ch . 12. sect. 14. book 4. ch . 2. sect. 15. sext. empiric . advers . mathem . l. 7. essay , b. 2. ch . 4. sect. 5. sect. 6. book ii. ch . 8. sect. 7. b. iv. ch 2. sect. 8. sect. 12. b. iv. ch . 3. sect. 18. ch. 7. sect. 10. sect. 9. sect. 10. book 3. ch . 10. sect. 15. book 2. ch . 23. sect. 24. sect. 25. book 2. ch . 23. sect. 24. ch. 23. sect. 31. book 3. ch . 4. sect. 8. sect. 9. book 2. ch . 14. sect. 2. sect. 32. sect. 4. book 3. ch . 4. sect. 10. book 4. ch . 7. sect. 12. book 4. ch . 2. sect. 7. essay , b. 2. ch . 13. sect. 22. joh. bapt. morini dissert . de atomis & vacuo , p. 14. bernier favilla ridiculi muris , p. 99. sect. 2. ch. 17. sect. ●● sect. 2. essay , b. 4. ch . 2. sect. 3. sect. 7 , 8. aristot. metaph . l. 4. c. 4. sect. 3. sect. 7. arist. de part. anim. l. 1. c. 1. ●● gen. a●●●● l. 3. c. 10. de meteor . l. 1. c. 7. moral . magn. l. 1. c. 1. eudem . l 1. c. 6. ethic ad nicom l. 1. c. 1 , 7. l. 2. c. 2. itaque argumenti conclusio quae est graecè 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ità definitur ; ratio quae ex rebus perceptis ad id quod non percipiebatur adducit . cicero in lucullo , c. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , plato in phaedro . v. dialect . ciceron . adam bu●sii , l. 6. c. 10. p. 127. p. 131 , 132.134.138 , &c. p. 154. p. 144. p. 131. p. 132. p. 133. b. ii. ch 11. sect. 13. p. 114. p. 121. p. 135. answ to lett. l. p. 110. p. 137. p. 138. p. 140. p. 141. p. 144. p. 146. p. 147. p. 149. p. 152. p. 149. essay , b. 2. ch . 27. sect. 1. p. 155. p. 156. p. 159. p. 57. 59. 84. 85. 57. 84 85. 17● . 171. aggravation of sinne and sinning against knowledge. mercie. delivered in severall sermons upon divers occasions. by tho: goodvvin b.d. goodwin, thomas, 1600-1680. 1637 approx. 237 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 75 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2009-03 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a01894 stc 12033 estc s103262 99839019 99839019 3413 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a01894) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 3413) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1475-1640 ; 1068:10) aggravation of sinne and sinning against knowledge. mercie. delivered in severall sermons upon divers occasions. by tho: goodvvin b.d. goodwin, thomas, 1600-1680. [8], 91, [1]; [4], 42, [2] p. printed by m. flesher for iohn rothwell, and are to be sold at his shop at the signe of the sun in pauls churchyard, london : m dc xxxvii. [1637] the words "sinne: and sinning" and "knowledge. mercie." are bracketed together on title page. with an additional title page: aggravation of sinne. by tho: goodwin b.d. .. "aggravations of sinning against knovvledge" has separate dated title page; pagination and register are continuous. "aggravation of sinning against mercie" has separate pagination, register, and title page with imprint ".. printed by m.f. for r. dawlman ..". with a final imprimatur leaf. a variant of the edition with r. dawlman's name in the imprint on the general title page. reproduction of the original in the british library. closely trimmed with some loss of running title. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng sermons, english -17th century. sin, mortal -early works to 1800. knowledge, theory of (religion) -early works to 1800. 2007-09 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2007-11 aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images 2008-02 elspeth healey sampled and proofread 2008-02 elspeth healey text and markup reviewed and edited 2008-09 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion aggravation of sinne : and sinning against knowledge . mercie . delivered in severall sermons upon divers occasions . by tho : goodvvin b. d. london , printed by m. flesher for iohn rothwell , and are to be sold at his shop at the signe of the sun in pauls churchyard . mdcxxxvii . aggravation of sinne . by tho : goodwin b. d. london , printed by m. f. for iohn rothwell , and are to be sold at the sun in pauls church-yard . m dc xxxvii . a table of the contents of the aggravation of sin . the subject is the sinfulnesse of sin . page 2. the mischievous effects of the evill of sin . ibid. 1. it hath debased the soule . ibid. 2. it defiles the soule 1. in an instant . 2. totally . 3. eternally . 3 3. it robs the soule of the image of god. 4 4. it robs a man of god himselfe . 5 5. it was the first founder of hell . 6 the essence of sin is the cause of all these evills . ibid. sin an evill that contains all the evils in the world . 7 1. it is the cause of sorrowes , and diseases , and all evills . ibid. 2. there is some peculiar mischief in sin , not found in other evils , as appears in divers instances . 8 quest . what transcendencie of evill is in the essence of sin , that makes it above all other evill . 10 answ . it is contrary to god and all that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1. it is contrary to his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being . ibid. being . ibid. 2. it is contrary to all his attributes which are his name , is to himselfe , and what ever is his . ibid. 1. to his lawes and ordinances . 2. to his favourites . 3. to his image in mans owne breast . 11 sinfulness of sin aggravated from the person suffering , being god and man. 12 the least sin virtually more or lesse containes all sin in the nature of it , proved . ibid. every sin inclines our nature more to sin . 13 sin containes not onely all other evils in it , but also all of its owne kind . ibid. sinne a perfect evill . ibid. reasons why sin is the chiefest evill . 1. because it is simply to be avoided for its selfe . 2. because there can be no worse punishment than it selfe 3. because it cannot have a worse epithete given it than it selfe . 14 use . wonder at the abounding nature of sin . 15 examine our owne estates . ibid. quest . when a mans sins may be said to be his own ? answ . 1. then he commits sin out of his owne . 2. then he hates it not , but loves it . 3. then he nourisheth it , & cherisheth it . 4. then he provides for it . 5. then he lives in sin . 17 use 2. consider , the punishment of sin is out of measure fearfull . 18 it containes all miseries in it . 19 what the damned speake of sinne in hell . ibid. use 3. onely iesus christ can conquer sin . 21 christs righteousnesse abounds sins sinfulnesse . 22 come to god through christ , and take him to be our lord and king. 23 sinne and christ cannot stand together . ibid. we will not take christ while sin appears sinfull to us . ibid. imprimatur ; tho : weekes . r. p. ep o : lond. cap. domest . aggravation of sinne . rom . 7. 13. was that then which is good made death unto mee ? god forbid . but sinne , that it might appeare sin , working death in mee by that which is good : that sinne by the commandement might become exceeding sinfull . wee finde our apostle in the 9. verse to have been alive , but struck upon the sudden dead , by an apparition presented to him in the glasse of the law , of the sinfulnesse of sinne . sin revived , sayes the 9. verse , appeared to be sinne , sayes the 13. verse , lookes but like it selfe , above measure sinfull : and hee falls downe dead at the very sight of it : i dyed , sayes he in the 9. it wrought death in me , sayes the 13. that is , an apprehension of death and hell , as due to that estate i was then in . but yet as the life of sinne was the death of paul , so this death of his was but a preparation to a new life , i through the law and dead to the law , that i might live to god , gal. 2. 19. and here hee likewise speakes of gods worke upon him at his first conversion ; for then it was that hee relates how sinne became in his esteeme , so above measure sinfull . the subject then to be insisted on is the sinfulnesse of sinne , a subject therefore as necessary as any other , because if ever we be saved , sinne must first appeare to us all , as it did here to him , above measure sinfull . and first , because all knowledge begins at the effects which are obvious to sense , and interpreters of the nature of things , therefore wee will begin this demonstration of the evill of sin , from the mischievous effects it hath filled the world withall , it having done nothing but wrought mischiefe since it came into the world , and all the mischiefe that hath beene done , it alone hath done , but especially towards the poore soule of man , the miserable subject of it . which first it hath debased the soule of man , the noblest creature under heaven , and highest allyed , made to be a companion fit for god himselfe , but sinne hath stript it of its first native excellency , as it did reuben , gen. 49. 41. debased the soule more worth than all the world , as christ himselfe saith , that onely went to the price of it : yet sinne hath made it a drudge and slave to every creature it was made to rule : therefore the prodigall as a type is said to serve swine , and feed on huskes , so as every vanity masters it . therefore we find in scripture , that men are said to be servants to wine , tit. 2. 3. servants to riches , and divers lusts , &c. and hence it is that shame attends upon it , rom. 6. 21. now shame ariseth out of an apprehension of some excellencie debased : and by how much the excellencie is greater , by so much is the shame the greater , and therefore unutterable confusion will one day befall sinners : because sinne is the debasement of an unvaluable excellencie . secondly , it not onely debaseth it , but defiles it also ; and indeed there was nothing else that could defile it , mat. 15. 20. for the soule is a most pure beame , bearing the image of the father of lights : as farre surpassing the sinne in purenesse , as the sunne doth a clod of earth ; and yet all the dirt in the world cannot defile the sunne ; all the clouds that seeke to muffle it , it scatters them all : but sinne hath defiled the soule , yea , one sinne , the least defiles it , in an instant , totally , eternally . first , one sinne did it in the fall of adam , rom. 5. 17. one offence polluted him , and all the world . now suppose you should see one drop of darknesse seazing on the sunne , and putting out that light and eye of heaven , and to loosen it out of the orbe it moves in , and cause it to drop downe a lump of darknesse , you would say it were a strange darknesse : this sinne did then in the soule , to which yet the sunne is but as a taper . secondly , it defiles it thus in an instant . take the most glorious angell in heaven , and let one of the least sinnes seaze upon his heart , he would in an instant fall downe from heaven , stript of all his glory , the ugliest creature that ever was beheld : you would count that the strongest of all poysons , that would poyson in an instant ; as nero boiled a poison to that height , that it killed germanicus as soone as he received it ; now such an one is sinne . thirdly , sinne defiles it totally : it rests not in one member onely , but beginning at the understanding , eates into the will and affections ; soaks through all . those diseases we account strongest , which seaze not on a joynt or a member onely , but strikes rottennesse through the whole body . fourthly , it defiles eternally , it being aterna macula , a staine which no nitre or sope , or any creature can wash out , ier. 2. 21. there was once let in a deluge of water , and the world was all overflow'd with it ; it washed away sinners indeed , but not one sinne . and the world shall be a fire again at the latter day , and all that fire , and these flames in hell that follow , shall not purge out one sinne . thirdly , it hath robbed the soule of the image of god , deprived us of the glory of god , rom. 3. 23. the image of gods holinesse , which is his beauty and ours : wee were beautifull and all glorious once within , which though but an accident , is more worth than all mens soules devoid of it , it being a likenesse unto god , a divine nature , without which no man shall see god. though man in innocency had all perfections united in him via eminentiae , that are to be found in other creatures , yet this was more worth than all : for all the rest made him not like to god , as this did ; without which all paradise could not make adam happy ; which when he had lost , he was left naked , though those his other perfections remained with him ; which is profitable for all things , as the apostle sayes . the least dramme of which , the whole world emballanced with , would be found too light ; without which the glorious angels would be damned devills , the saints in heaven damned ghosts , this it hath robbed man of . fourthly , it hath robbed man even of god himselfe : your sinnes separate ( sayes god ) betwixt you and me : and therefore they are said to live without god in the world : and in robbing a man of god , it robs him of all things ; for all things are ours , but so farre as god is ours ; of god whose face makes heaven , he is all in all , his loving kindnesse is better than life , and containeth beauty , honours , riches , all : yea they are but a drop to him . but its mischiefe hath not staid here , but as the leprosie of the lepers in the old law , sometimes infected their houses , garments ; so it hath hurld confusion over all the world , brought a vanitie on the creature , rom. 8. 23. and a curse : and had not christ undertooke the shattered condition of the world to uphold it , it had fallen about adams cares . and though the old walls and ruinous palace of the world stands to this day , yet the beauty , the glosse , and glory of the hangings is soyled and marred with many imperfections cast upon every creature . but as the house of the leper was to be pulled downe , and traitors houses use to be made jakes : so the world ( if christ had not stept in ) had shrunke into its first nothing : and you will say , that is a strong carrion that retaines not onely infection in it selfe , but infects all the aire about : so this , that not the soule the subject of it onely , but all the world . lastly , it was the first founder of hell , and laid the first corner stone thereof : sinne alone brought in and filled that bottomlesse gulfe with all the fire , and brimstone , and treasures of wrath , which shall never be burnt and consumed . and this crucified and pierced christ himselfe , poured on him his fathers wrath , the enduring of which for sinne , was such , as that all the angels in heaven had crackt and sunke under it . but yet this estimate is but taken from the effects of it , the essence of it which is the cause of all these evills , must needs have much more mischiefe in it . shall i speak the least evill i can say of it ? it conteins all evills als● in it : therefore iames 1. 23. the apostle calls it filthinesse , and abundance of superfluitie , or excrement as it were , of naughtinesse . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . as if so transcendent , that if all evills were to have an excrement , a scumme , a superfluitie , sinne is it , as being the abstracted quintessence of all evill . an evill , which in the nature and essence of it virtually , and eminently , containes all evills of what kinde soever that are in the world ; insomuch as in the scriptures you shall finde that all the evills in the world , serve but to answer for it , and to give names to it . hence sinne it is called poyson , and sinners serpents : sinne is called a vomit , sinners dogs : sinne the stench of graves , and they rotten sepulchres : sinne mire , sinners sowes : and sinne darknesse , blindnesse , shame , nakednesse , folly , madnesse , death , whatsoever is filthy , defective , infective , painfull . now as the holy ghost sayes of nabal , as is his name , so is he ; so may wee say of sinne : for if adam gave names to all things , according to their nature , much more god , who calls things as they are . surely god would not slander sinne , though it be his onely enemie . and besides , there is reason for this , for it is the cause of all evills . god sowed nothing but good seed in the world ; he beheld , and saw all things were very good . it is sinne hath sowne the tares : all those evills that have come up , sorrowes and diseases , both unto men and beasts . now whatsoever is in the effect , is via eminentiae in the cause . surely therefore it is to the soule of man ( the miserable vessell and subject of it ) all that , which poyson , death , and sicknesse is unto the other creatures , and to the body ; and in that , it is all these to the soule , it is therefore more than all these to it : for corruptio optimi pessima : by how much the soule exceeds all other creatures , by so much must sinne , which is the corruption , poyson , death , and sicknesse of it , exceed all other evills . but yet this is the least ill that can be said of it . there is 2. some further transcendent peculiar mischiefe in it , that is not to be found in all other evills , as will appeare in many instances . for first , all other evills god proclaimes himselfe the author of , and ownes them all ; though sinne be the meritorious cause of all , yet god the efficient and disposing cause . there is no evill in the city but i have done it . he onely disclaimeth this , iam. 1. 13. as a bastard of some others breeding , for he is the father of lights , ver . 17. secondly , the utmost extremity of the evill of punishment god the sonne under-went , had a cup mingled him of his father , more bitter than if all the evils in the world had beene strained in , and he dranke it off heartily to the bottome ; but not a drop of sinne , though sweetned with the offer of all the world , would goe downe with him . thirdly , other evils the saints have chosen and imbraced as good , and refused the greatest good things the world had , as evill , when they came in competition with sinne . so moses those rather to suffer , much rather than to enjoy the pleasures of sinne , heb. 11. from 24. to 28. so chrysostome , when eudoxia the empresse threatned him : goe tell her , sayes he , nil nisi peccatum timeo , i feare nothing but sinne . fourthly , take the devill himselfe , whom you all conceive to be more full of mischiefe than all the evills in the world , called therefore in the abstract spirituall wickednesse , eph. 6. 12. yet it was but sinne that first spoiled him , and it is sinne possesseth the very devils : he was a glorious angell , till he was acquainted with it : and could there be a separation made betweene him and sinne , he would be againe of as good , sweet , and amiable a nature , as any creature in earth or heaven . fiftly , though other things are evill , yet nothing makes the creature accursed but sinne : as all good things in the world doe not make a man a blessed man , so nor all the evills accursed . god sayes not , blessed are the honorable , and the rich , nor that accursed are the poore : but cursed is the man that continues not in all things , gal. 3. 10. a curse to the least sinne ; and on the contrary , blessed is the man whose iniquities are forgiven , &c. rom. 4. 7. sixtly , god hates nothing but sinne . were all evills swept downe into one man , god hates him not simply for them , not because thou art poore and disgraced , but onely because sinfull . it is sin he hates , rev. 2. 15. isa . 27. 11. yea it alone : and whereas other attributes are diversely communicated in their effects to severall things : as his love and goodnesse , himselfe , his sonne , his children , have all a share in : yet all the hatred ( which is as large as his love ) is solely poured out upon , and wholly , and limited onely unto sinne . all the question will be what transcendencie of evill is in the essence of it , that makes it above all other evills , and hated , and it onely by god , christ , the saints , &c. more than any other evill . why ? it is enmity with god , rom. 8. 7. abstracts we know speake essences : the meaning is , it is as directly contrary to god , as any thing could be : for contrary it is to god , and all that is his . as 1. contrary to his essence , to his existence , and being god : for it makes men hate him , rom. 1. 30. and as he that hateth his brother is a murtherer , 1 ioh. 3. 15. so hee that hateth god may be said to be a murtherer of him , and wisheth that he were not . peccutum est dei-cidium . 2. contrary it is to all his attributes which are his name : men are jealous of their names : gods name is himselfe ; as 1. it makes a man slight gods goodnesse , and to seeke happinesse in the creature , as if hee were able to be happy without him . and 2. it deposeth his soveraignty , and sets up other gods before his face . 3. it contemns his truth , power , and justice . and 4. turnes his grace into wantonnesse . and as to himselfe , so to what ever is his , or deare to him . besides , a king hath 3. things in an especiall manner deare to him : his lawes , his favour it es , his image stampt upon his coine : and so hath god. first , his lawes and ordinances : god never gave law , but it hath beene broken by sinne ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the definition of it , the transgression of the law , 1 ioh. 3. 4. yea it is called destroying the law , psal . 119. 126. and know , that gods law , the least tittle of it , is more deare to him , than all the world . for ere the least tittle of it shall be broken , heaven and earth shall passe . the least sinne therefore , which is a breach of the least law , is worse than the destruction of the world : and for his worship , ( as envying god should have any , ) it turns his ordinances into sinne . secondly , for his favourites : god hath but a few poore ones ; upon whom because god hath set his love , sinne hath set its hatred . lastly , for his image even in a mans owne breast : the law of the members fights against the law of the mind , and endevoureth to expell it , though a man should be damned for it . gal. 5. 17. the flesh ( namely sinne ) lusteth against the spirit , for they are contraries . contrary indeed ; for me thinkes though it hates that image in others , that yet it should spare it in a mans selfe , out of self-love ; but yet , though a man should be damned , if this image be expelled , it yet laboureth to doe this ; so deadly is that hatred , a man hates himselfe , as holy , so farre as he is sinfull . it abounds now so high , as our thoughts can follow it no farther : divines say , it aspires unto infinity , the object against whom it is thus contrary unto , being god , who is infinite , they tell us , that objectively , sinne it selfe is infinite . sure i am , the worth of the object or party offended , aggravates the offence : an ill word against the king is high treason , not the greatest indignity to another man. sure i also am , that god was so offended with it , as , though he loves his sonne as himselfe , yet he ( though without sinne ) being but made sinne by imputation , yet god spared him not : and because the creatures could not strike a stroake hard enough , he himselfe was pleased to bruise him , esay 53. 16. he spared not his owne sonne , rom. 8. 32. his love might have overcome him , to have passed by it to his sonne ; at least a word of his mouth might have pacified him : yet so great was his hatred of it , and offence at it , as he powred the vialls of his wrath on him : neither would entreaty serve , for though he cryed with strong cryes it should passe from him , god would not , till he had out-wrastled it . and as the person offended , aggravates the offence , as before , so also the person suffering , being god and man , argues the abounding sinfulnesse of it . for , for what crime did you ever hear a king was put to death ? their persons being esteemed in worth above all crime , as civill . christ was the king of kings . and yet there is one consideration more to make the measure of its iniquity fully full , and to abound to flowing over , and that is this , that the least sinne virtually more or lesse containes all sinne in the nature of it ( i meane not that all are equall , therefore i adde more or lesse ) and i prove it thus : because adam by one offence contracted the staine of all , no sooner did one sinne seaze upon his heart , but he had all sinnes in him . and so every sinne in us by a miraculous multiplication inclines our nature more to every sinne than it was before : it makes the pollution of nature of a deeper dye ; not onely to that species of sinne , whereof it is the proper individuall act , but to all else : as bring one candle into a roome , the light spreads all over ; and then another , the light is all over more increased : so it is in sinne ; for the least cuts the soule off from god , and then it is ready to goe a whoring after every vanity that will entice it , or entertaine it . and this shewes the fulnesse of the evill of it , in that it containes not onely all other evills in the world in it , but also all of its owne kinde . as you would count that a strange poyson , the least drop of which containes the force of all poyson in it : that a strange disease , the least infection whereof brought the body subject to all diseases : yet such an one is sinne , the least making the soule more prone and subject to all . and now you see it is a perfect evill ; and though indeed it cannot be said to be the chiefest in that full sense wherein god is said to be the chiefest good ; because if it were as bad as god is good , how could he pardon it , subdue it , bring it to nothing as he doth ? and then how could it have addition to it , one sin being more sinfull than another ? ezek. 8. 15. iohn 19. 11. but yet it hath some analogie of being the chiefest evill , as god the chiefest good . for 1. as god is the chiefest good , who therefore is to be loved for himselfe , and other things but for his sake ; so also in sin the chiefest evill , because it is simply to be avoided for its selfe ; but other evills become good , yea desirable when compared with it . secondly , as god is the chiefest good , because he is the greatest happinesse to himselfe ; so sin , the greatest evill to it selfe : for there can be no worse punishment of it , than its selfe ; therefore when god would give a man over , as an enemie he meanes never to deale withall more , he gives him up to sinne . and thirdly , it is so evill , as it cannot have a worse epithete given it , than it selfe ; and therefore the apostle , when he would spek his worst of it , and wind up his expression hightest , usque ad hyperbolem , calls it by its own name , sinfull sinne , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , rom. 7. 13. that as in god being the greatest good , quicquid est in deo est deus ipse , therefore his attributes and names are but himselfe , idem praedicatur de seipso : so it is with sinne , quicquid est in peccato , peccatum est , &c. he can call it no worse than by its owne name , sinfull sinne . use . and what have i beene speaking of all this while ? why ? but of one sinne in the generall nature of it . there is not a man here , but hath millions of them ; as many as the sands upon the sea shore ; yea , as there would be atomes , were all the world pounded to dust , it exceeds in number also ; and therefore ere we goe any further , let all our thoughts break off here in wonderment at the abounding of sinne , above all things else ; for other things , if they be great , they are but a few ; if many , they are but small : the world , t is a big one indeed , but yet there is but one ; the sands , though innumerable , yet they are but small ; your sinfulnesse exceeds in ●oth . and next , let all our thoughts be wound up to the most deepe and intense consideration of our estates ; for if one sin abounds thus , what tongue can expresse , or heart can conceive their misery , who to use the apostles phrase , 1 cor. 15. are yet in their sinnes ? that is , stand bound to god in their owne single bond onely , to answer for all their sinnes themselves ; and cannot , in the estate wherein yet they stand of impenitencie and unbeleefe , plead the benefit of christs death , to take off and ease them of the guilt of one sinne , but , all their sinnes are yet all their owne , which to a man in christ they are not ; for his owne bonds are cancelled , and given in , and christ entred into bonds for him , and all his sins translated upon him . now for a proper character of their estate , and sutable to this expression : first then a mans sinnes may be said to be still his owne : when he committeth sinne , out of his owne , that is the full frame and inclination of his heart . thus the devill is said to sinne , ioh. 8. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out of his owne ; the whole frame of his spirit is in it ; which a man in christ cannot be so fully said to doe , for hee hath a new creature in him that sinneth not , 1 ioh. 3. 1 , 9. that can say even when he sins , it is not i , but sinne . and secondly , then sinne is a mans owne , when he hates it not , but loves it : the world loves his owne , saith christ , ioh. 15. 29. and so doth a wicked man his sinne , more than any good ; which is davids character , psal . 52. 3. and thirdly , what is a mans owne , he nourisheth and cherisheth ; therefore eph. 5. 19. no man hates his owne flesh , but loveth it , and cherisheth it : so doe men their sinnes , when they are their owne . those great and rich oppressors , iam. 5. 5. are said to nourish their hearts in wantonnes , and in pleasure , as in a day of slaughter ; as living upon the creame of sinning , and having such plenty , they pick out none but the sweetest bits to nourish their hearts withall . 4. so what a man provides for , that is his own ; so sayes the apostle , a man that provides not for his owne , is worse , &c. when therefore men make provision for the flesh , as the phrase is , rom. 13. 14. have their caterers and contrivers of their lusts , and whose chiefest care is every morning , what pleasures of sinne they have that day to be enjoyed , it is a signe that their sins are their owne . in a word , when men live in sinne , 't is the expression used , 1 tim. 5. 6. she that lives in pleasure , is dead while she lives . when the revenewes of the comfort of mens lives come in , from the pleasures of sinne , and that supplies them with all those necessaries that belong to life ; as when 't is their element they drink in like water ; their meat , they eate the bread of wickednesse , prov. 1. 7. and it goes downe , and troubleth them not ; their sleepe also , they cannot sleepe till they have done or contrived some mischiefe , ver . 16. their apparell , as when violence and oppression covers them as a garment , and pride compasseth them as a chaine , psal . 73. their recreation also , it is a pastime for a foole to doe wickedly , he makes sport and brags of it , prov. 10. 23. yea their health , being sick and discontented , when their lusts are not satisfied , as ahab was for naboths vineyard ; amnon grew leane , when hee could not enjoy his paramore . all these , as they live in their sins here , and so are dead whilest they live , and so are miserable , making the greatest evill their chiefest good ; so when they come to die ( as we all must doe one day ) and how soone , and how suddenly we know not ; wee carry our soules , our precious soules , as precious water in a brittle glasse , soone cracked , and then we are spilt like water , which none can gather up againe ; or but as a candle in a paper lanthorne ; in clay walls , full of cranyes , often but a little cold comes in , and blowes the candle out ; ) and then , without a through change of heart before , wrought from all sinne , to all godlinesse , they will die in their sinnes . and all , and the utmost of all miseries is spoken in that one word : and therefore christ , when he would summe up all miseries in one expression , tells the pharisees they should die in their sins , iohn 8. 28. vse 2. and let us consider further , that if sin be thus above measure sinfull , that hell that followeth death , is then likewise above measure fearful . and so it is intimated to be a punishment without measure , ier. 30. 11. compared with isa . 27. punish them as i punish thee ( sayes god to his owne ) but i will punish thee in measure . and indeed , sinne being committed against god the king of kings , it can never be punished enough . but as the killing of a king , is amongst men a crime so hainous , that no tortures can exceed the desert of it : we use to say , all torments are too little , any death too good for such a crime . now peccatum est dei 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as i said before , a destroying god as much as in us lies : and therefore none but god himselfe can give it a full punishment : therefore it is called a falling into gods hands , heb. 10. 31. which , as he sayes there , is fearfull . for if his breath blowes us to destruction , iob 4. 9. for we are but dust heaps ; yea , his nod , he nods to destruction , psal . 80. 16. then what is the weight of his hands , even of those hands , which span the heavens , and hold the earth in the hollow of them ? and if god take it into his hands to punish , he will be sure to doe unto the full . sinne is mans worke , and punishment is gods , and god will shew himselfe as perfect in his worke , as man in his . if sinne be malum catholicum , as hath been said , that containes all evils in it ; then the punishment god will inflict shall be malum catholicum also , containing in it all miseries ; it is a cup full of mixture , so called psal . 75. 8. as into which god hath strained the quintessence of all miseries , and the wicked of the earth must drink the dregges of it , though it be eternity unto the bottome . and if one sin deserves a hell , a punishment above measure , what will millions of millions doe ? and we reade that every sinne shall receive a just recompence , heb. 2. 3. oh let us then take heed of dying in our sinnes , and therefore of living in them ; for we shall lie in prison till we have paid the very utmost farthing . and therefore if all this that i have said of it wil not engender answerable apprehensions of it in you , ( this being but painting the toad , which you can look upon and handle without affrightment ) i wish that if without danger you could but lay your eares to hell , that standing as it were behind the skreene , you might heare sinne spoken of in its owne dialect by the oldest sonnes of perdition there , to heare what cain sayes of murthering his brother abel ; what saul of his persecuting david , and the priests of iehovah ; what balaam and achitophel say of their cursed counsels and policies ; what ahab sayes of his oppression of naboth ; what iudas of treason ; and heare what expressions they have , with what horrors , yellings , groanes , distractions , the least sin is there spoken of . if god should take any mans soule here , and as he rapt his , into the third heavens , where he saw grace in its fullest brightnesse ; so carry any ones soule into those chambers of death , as solomon calls them , and leading him through all , from chamber to chamber , shew him the visions of darknesse , and hee there heare all those bedlames cry out , one of this sinne , another of that , and see sinne as it lookes in hell ! but there is one aggravation more of the evill and misery sinne brings upon men , i have not spoken of yet , that it blinds their eyes , and hardens their hearts , that they doe not see , nor lament their misery , till they be in hell ; and then it is too late . vse 3. but what , doth sin so exceed in sinfulnesse , and is the venome of it boyled up to such a height of mischiefe , that there should be no name in heaven and earth able to grapple with it , and destroy it ? is there no antidote , no balme in gilead more soveraigne , than it is deadly ? surely yes , god would never have suffered so potent and malicious an enemy to have set foot in his dominions , but that he knew how to conquer it , and that not by punishing of it onely in hell , but by destroying it : onely it is too potent for all the creatures to encounter with . this victory is alone reserved for christ , it can die by no other hand , that he may have the glory of it ; which therefore is the top of his glory , as mediator , and his highest title , the memory of which he beares written in his name jesus , for he shall save his people from their sinnes , mat. 1. 21. and therefore the apostle paul , his chiefest herauld , proclaimes this victory with a world of solemnity and triumph , 1 cor. 15. 36. oh death , where is thy sting ? oh grave , where is thy victory ? the sting of death is sinne , the strength of sinne is the law : but thankes be to god that gives us the victory through our lord iesus christ : which yet again addes to the demonstration of the sinfulnesse of it : for the strength of sinne was such , that like goliah it would have defied the whole host of heaven and earth . it was not possible the blood of bulls and goats should take away sinne , heb. 10. 4. nor would the riches of the world , or the blood of men have beene a sufficient ransome : will the lord be pleased with rivers of oyle ? shall i give my first borne for my transgression ? no , sayes he , there is no proportion , for thy first borne is but the fruit of thy body , and sinne is the sinne of thy soule , mich. 6. 7. it must cost more to redeeme a soule than so , psal . 49. 9. no , couldest thou bring rivers of teares , in stead of rivers of oyle ; which if any thing , were like to pacifie god , yet are they but the excrements of thy braines ; but sinne is the sinne of thy heart : yea all the righteousnesse that we could ever do , cannot make amends for one sinne : for suppose it perfect , when as yet it is but dung . mal. 2. 3. and a menstruom cloath , yet thou owest it already as thou art a creature ; and one debt cannot pay another . if then we should goe a begging to all the angels , who never sinned , let them lay all their stock together , it would begger them all to pay for one sinne : no , it is not the merit of angels will doe it ; for sinne is the transgression , the destruction of the law , psal . 109. 1. and the least 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is more worth than heaven , and all that is therein . onely , though it be thus unconquerably sinfull by all created powers , it hath not gone beyond the price that christ hath paid for it ; the apostle compares to this very purpose , sinne and christs righteousnesse together , rom. 5. 15 , 20. 't is true , sayes hee , that sinne abounds , and that one sinne , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and instanceth in adams sinne , which staineth all mens natures to the end of the world ; yet sayes he , the gift of righteousnesse by christ abounds much more ; abounds to flowing over , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sayes the apostle , 1 tim. 1. 14. as the sea doth above mote-hills , malach. 7. 14. though therefore it would undoe all the angels , yet christs riches are unsearchable , eph. 3. 8. hee hath such riches of merit , as are able to pay all thy debts the very first day of thy mariage with him , though thou hadst beene a sinner millions of yeares , afore the creation to this day : and when that is done , there is enough left to purchase thee more grace and glory than all the angels have in heaven . in a word , he is able to save to the utmost , all that come to god by him , heb. 7. 5. let their sins be what they will. but then wee must come to him , and to god by him , and take him as our lord , and king , and head , and husband , as he is freely tendered , we must be made one with him , and have our hearts divorced from all our sinnes for ever . and why not now ? doe we yet look for another christ ? and to allude to us , as naomi said to ruth , is there yet any more sonnes in my wombe , that they may be your husbands ? so say i , hath god any more such sonnes ? or is not this christ good enough ? or are we afraid of being happy too soon , in being married to him ? but yet if we will have christ indeed ( without whom we are undone ) how shall we thou continue in sinne , which is thus above measure sinfull ? no not in one . the apostle speaks there in the language of impossibility and inconsistencie . christ , and the raigne of one sinne , they cannot stand together . and indeed , wee will not so much as take christ , untill first wee have seene more or lesse this vission here , and sinne appear to us , as to him , above measure sinfull : naturally we slight it and make a mock of , and account it precisenesse to stick and make conscience of it : but if once sinne thus appeares to any but in its owne colours , that man will looke upon the least sinne then , as upon hell it selfe ; and like a man affrighted , feare in all his wayes , lest he should meet with sinne , and starts at the very appearance of it ; he weepes if sinne doe but see him , and hee doe but see it in himselfe and others ; and cryes out as ioseph did , how shall i doe this , and sinne ? and then a man will make out for christ , as a condemned man for life , as a man that can no longer live , oh give me christ , or else i die ; and then if upon this christ appeares to him , and manifests himselfe , as his promise is to thē that seek him , ioh. 14. 21. his heart thereupon will much more detest and loathe it : he saw it evill afore , out then it comes to have a new tincture added , which makes it infinitely more sinfull in his eyes ; for he then lookes upon every sinne as guilty of christs bloud , as dyed with it , though covered by it ; the grace of god appearing , teacheth us to deny all ungodlinesse and worldly lusts . the love of christ constraines him . thinkes he , shall i live in that for which christ died ? shall that be my life , which was his death ? did he that never knew sinne , undergoe the torment for it , and shall i be so unkinde as to enjoy the pleasure of it ? no , but as david when hee was very thirstie , and had water of the well of bethleem brought him , with the hazard of mens lives , powred it on the ground ; for sayes hee , it is the blood of these men : so sayes he , even when the cup of pleasures is at his very lips , it cost the blood of christ , and so pours it upon the ground . and as the love of christ constraines him , so the power of christ doth change him . kings may pardon traytors , but they cannot change their hearts ; but christ pardons none , hee doth not make new creatures , and all old things passe away , because he makes them friends , favourites to live with , and delight in ; and if men put on christ , and have learned him , as the truth is in iesus , they put off as concerning the former conversation the old man , with the deceitfull lusts ; and he ceaseth from sinne , that is , from the course of any knowne sin : they are the apostles owne words , which shall judge us ; and if we should expect salvation from him upon any other termes , we are deceived ; for christ is author of salvation to them onely that obey him , heb. 5. 9. aggravations of sinning against knowledge . by tho : goodwin b. d. london , printed by m. f. for iohn rothwell , 〈…〉 be sold at the sun in pauls church 〈…〉 m dc xxxvii . contents of aggravation of sinning against knowledge . doct. to sinne against knowledge is the highest aggravation of sinning . page 34 1. demonstrations of the point , by comparing it with other kinds of sinning . 36 how much sins against knowledge doe transcend sins of ignorance . 37 1. in sins of ignorance there may be a supposition , if he had known it , he would not have done it : but not so in these . ibid. 2. the vast difference between them appears in the repentance god accepts for each : a generall repentance for the one , not so for the other . 39 3. some kinds of sinning against knowledge exclude from mercy , which done ignorantly , leave a capacity of it . 40 4. sinning against knowledge is the highest , but that of sinning against the holy ghost . 41 6. reasons . 1. because knowledge is the greatest mercy . 42 2. knowledge is the immediate guide of men in all their waies : a man sins against his guide . 43 that knowledge is so proved , in that an erroneous conscience binds . 45 3. reason : knowledge layeth a further obligation to obedience . ibid. lawes come in force when promulged . 46 4. there is the more contempt cast on the law . 47 5. in sins against knowledge the will of the sinner closeth more with sin , as sin . ibid. 6. in sinning against knowledge , a man condemnes himselfe . 48 three things handled concerning sins against knowledge . ibid. 1. what it is to sin against knowledg explained . 49 1. distinction , to sinne with knowledge and against knowledge doe differ . ibid. a regenerate man guilty of more sins knowne than another . ibid. yet not of more sins against knowledge . 50 2. distinction . men sin against knowledge either objectively or circumstantially only . 51 1. what it is to sinne directly against knowledge . ibid. 2. what to sinne against knowledge circumstantially onely . ibid. this distinction explained out of this chap. ibid. sinnes directly against knowledge reduced to two heads . 52 1. in regard of our selves 5. wayes . ibid. 1. when we abuse knowledg to help us to sin . ib. 3. wayes . 1. to plot and contrive sin . 2. to colour sins committed by lyes . 3. to colour sins by pretence of religion , and use their knowledg of religion to plead for and justifie their sin . ibid. 2. when men neglect to get knowledge that might preserve them from sinning . 53 3. when men refuse knowledge that they may sin more freely . 55 4. is to hate the light , and to endevour to extinguish it . 55 5. when men hold opinions ag : their consciences . 57 2. men sin directly against knowledge it selfe in respect of others . 58 1. by concealing knowledge . ibid. 2. men indevor to suppresse knowledg in others . ib. 3. when men go about to make others sin against their consciences . 59 2. generall branch . sins committed collaterally or circumstantially against knowledge . 60 it is done 1. either in particular acts of sinning , or 2. in continuing in an estate of sinning against knowledge . ibid. particular instances being infinite . 61 a distinction is given concerning them . ibid. 1. some sins more transient . ibid. 2. some more permanent and continued , untill recalled , though but once committed . ibid. which are of all other most dangerous to commit , when against knowledge . 62 2. going on in a sinfull estate against knowledge . ibid. three sorts of men thus sin : 1. such as for worldly ends forbear to professe christ and his wayes , which they know to be such . 63 2. those that defer repentance . 65 3. apostate professors goe on in an estate of sinning against knowledge . ibid. application . 67 2. head : rules whereby to estimate sins against knowledge . 68 of two sorts : before sinning , or in sinning . 69 1. before sinning , 3. rules . 1. the more a man considers the issues and consequents of a sin . ibid. 2. the more consultation , and debates before . 70 3. the more testimonies and warnings against a sin . 71 2. rules to measure the sinfulnesse of such acts in sinning , 3. 73 1. the lesse passion or temptation to a sinne against knowledge . ibid. 2. the more inward regreet , and sorow , & reluctancy , the stronger is the knowledg , & so more against it . 75 3. the more hardnesse of heart in committing a sin known to be a sin , the greater the sin , as it is a sin against knowledge . 76 3. head : aggravations drawn from the kind of that knowledge we sin against , which are five . 77 the more strong the knowledg , the greater the sin . 78 1. to sin against the inbred light of nature . ibid. 2. to sin against the light of education . 80 3. the more real & experimental light men sin against . 82 4. the more shining the light is in the conscience , joyned with a taste , the greater the sin . 83 5. to sin against professed knowledge . 85 how great an ingagement and motive it is to men of knowledg to turn to god , and to take heed of sinning . 87 1. such an one cannot sin so cheap as others : their sins are more castly and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. and will have lesse pleasure in sinning . ibid. 2. such are given up to greater hardnesse of heart . 88 3. such god gives up to the worst & grossest of sins . ibid. 4. at death , knowledge sinned against , gives up to more horror and dispaire . 89 5. in hell it increaseth torment . 90 finis . aggravations of sinning against knowledge . rom . 1. 21. because that when they knew god , they glorified him not as god , neither were thankfull , but became vaine in their imaginations , and their foolish heart was darkned . there are two generall aggravations the apostle insists on , in these two chapters , of the gentiles sinfulnesse : first their unthankfulnesse , ver . 21. in despising the riches of gods goodnesse , chap. 2. 4. secondly , of rebellion , in sinning against knowledge : that when they knew him , they glorified him not as god. and of all other hee inculcateth this of sinning against knowledge , as the greatest : for bringing in a long , large , and particular indictment of many severall sinnes , idolatry , ver . 23. unnaturall uncleannesse , ver . 26. &c. and all kinds of unrighteousnesse , ver . 29. hee doth both in the beginning , and end of the bill , bring in this aggravation , that they sinned against knowledge in all these . so ver . 18. he begins the indictment and promulgation of gods wrath above all for this , that they with-held the truth in unrighteousnesse ; which was as much as all that unrighteousnesse committed , barely in it selfe considered : and then again in the end , when hee comes to pronounce sentence , he comes in with this , after all particulars had beene reckoned up , who knowing the judgement of god against those which doe such things , yet doe them . so that this doctrine is cleare from hence , that to sinne against knowledge , either in omitting good duties which we know we ought to performe , or committing of sinnes we know wee ought not to doe , is the highest aggravation of sinfulnesse . i put both in both sinnes of omission and commission : for so the particular sinnes the gentiles are taxed for here , are of both sorts ; as not glorifying , or worshipping god , as well as turning his glory into a lye , &c. to omit prayer , when your consciences tell you , you ought to doe it : to omit holy discourse , examining the heart , when you know you ought to doe them , are as well sinnes against knowledge , as to tell a lie against your knowledge , or as to steale and forsweare , or murder , or be drunke , &c. now when i say , it is an aggravation to these sinnes , my meaning is this : that take any sinne thou thinkest most grosse , and view it barely in the act of it , put the act nakedly in the one scale , be it a sinne of uncleannesse , or drunkennesse ; and then put this circumstance which was added to it in the other scale , that before and when thou diddest it , thou knewest it to be a sinne , this alone weighs as much , yea more than the sinne it selfe doth : that as it is said of herod , that he added this to all his other sinnes , that he cast iohn in prison , who told him of his herodias , and so is made as much as all his former sinnes : so is this brought in here , that in and unto all their unrighteousnesse , this was added , they with-held the truth , the light of their consciences ( which is as a prophet from god ) they did imprison in unrighteousnesse , ver . 18. and therefore when daniel would convince balshazzar of his deservednesse to lose his kingdome , and that he was not able to hold weight in the ballance , dan. 5. 22. what puts he into the other scale against him to weigh him up , and to shew he was too light , ver . 21 , 22 ? he tells him how his father knew the god of heaven , and how that his knowledge cost him seven yeares the learning among wild beasts , and thou ( sayes he ) his sonne knewest all this , and yet didst not humble thy selfe . here is the aggravation weighs downe all : he knew the god of heaven against whom he sinned , and that judgement on his father for his pride ; and then withall he tels him , that this god , in whose hands is thy breath , and all thy wayes , thou hast not glorified . i name this place among many others , because it is parallel with this in the text . i le name no more , but give reasons and demonstrations for it . first , demonstrations . the greatnesse of this kind of sinning might many wayes be made appeare ; we will demonstrate it onely by comparing it with other kinds of sinning . to sinne , though out of simple ignorance , when that ignorance is but the causa sine qua non of sinning , that is , so as if a man had knowne it a sinne , he had not done it , doth not yet make the fact not to be a sinne , though it lesseneth it . for luke 12. 48. he that did not know his masters will , was beaten , when the thing committed was worthy of stripes , though he did not know so much , because the thing deserves it . and the reason is , because the law being once promulged , as 1. to adam it was , and put into his heart , as the common ark of mankinde ; though the tables be lost , yet our ignorance doth not make the law of none effect . for the law of nature for ever binds , that is , all that was written in adams heart , because it was thereby then published in him , and to him for us . but positive lawes , as i may call them , as to beleeve in christ , &c. anew delivered , bind not , but where they are publisht . iosiah rent his clothes , when the booke of the law was found , because the ordinances were not kept , although they had not knowne the law of many yeares ; yet because they ought to have knowne it , therefore for all their ignorance , he feared wrath would come upon all israel . so also lev. 5. 17. sinnes of ignorance were to be sacrificed for : yet however , it lesseneth the sin , therefore he shall be beaten with few stripes . and sure , if ignorance lesseneth them , knowledge aggravates ; for contrariorum eadem est ratio : therefore he that knowes , shall be beaten with many stripes . yea such difference is there , that god is said to wink at sins of ignorance . acts 17. 30. the time of this ignorance god winks at . whiles they had no knowledge , god tooke no notice : yea and he abates something for such sinnes , because the creature hath a cloake , hath something to say for its selfe ; ( as christ sayes , iohn 15. 22. ) but when against knowledge , they have no cloak . yea farther , christ makes a sinne of ignorance to be no sinne , in comparison : so there , if i had not spoken and done those workes never man did , they had had [ no sinne . ] ( that is ) none in comparison , but now they have no cloak , no shelter to award the stripes , or plea to abate of them . and that you may see the ground of this vast difference betweene sinnes of ignorance , and against knowledge , consider first , that if a man sin ( suppose the act the same ) out of ignorance meerly , there may be a supposition , that if hee had knowne it , he would not have done it ; and that as soone as he doth know it , he would or might repent of it . so 1 cor. 2. 8. if they had knowne , they had not crucified the lord of glory . the like sayes christ of tyre , sidon , and gomorrha , that if the same things had beene done in them , they would have repented . but now when a man knowes it afore , and also considers it in the very committing it , and yet doth it , then there is no roome for such a supposition , and lesse hope . for what is it that should reduce this man to repentance ? is it not his knowledge ? now if that had no power to keepe him from his sinne , then it may be judged , that it will not be of force to bring him to repentance for it ; for by sinning the heart is made more hard , and the knowledge and the authority of it weakned and lessened , as all power is , when contemned and resisted , rom. 1. 21. their foolish heart becomes darker . aristotle himselfe hath a touch of this notion in the third of his ethicks , that if a man sinne out of ignorance , when he knowes it , he repents of it ; if out of passion , when the passion is over , he is sorry for what he hath done : but when a man sinnes deliberately , and out of knowledge , it is a signe he is fixed and set in mischiefe ; and therefore it is counted wickednesse and malice . and hence it is , that those that have beene enlightned with the highest kind of light , but that of saving grace , heb. 6. 4 , 5. and heb. 10. if they sinne wilfully after such a knowledge of the truth , god lookes on them , as those that will never repent . and therefore likewise the schoole gives this as the reason why the devills sinne obstinately , and cannot repent , because of their full knowledge they sinne with ; they know all in the full latitude that it may be knowne , and yet goe on . secondly , the vast difference that in gods account is put betweene sinnes of knowledge , and of ignorance , will appeare by the different respect and regard that god hath to them , in the repentance he requires and accepts for them ; and that both in the acts of repentance , and also in the state of grace and repentance , upon which god accepts a man , or for want of which he rejecteth him . first , when a man comes to performe the acts of repentance , and to humble himselfe for sinne , and to turne from it , god exacteth not , that sins of ignorance should particularly be repented of . but if they be repented of but in the general , & in the lumpe , be they never so great , god accepts it . this is intimated psal . 19. 12. who can understand his errour ? cleanse me from my secret sinnes : that was confession enough . but sinnes of knowledge must be particularly repented of , and confessed , and that againe and againe , as david was forced to doe for his murder and adultery , or a man shall never have pardon . yea farther , greater difference will appeare , in regard of the state of grace and repentance : for a man may lye in a sinne he doth not know to be a sinne , and yet be in the state of grace , as the patriarchs in poligamie , and in divorcing their wives : but to lye in a sinne of knowledge , is not compatible with grace : but unlesse a man maintaineth a constant fight against it , hateth it , confesseth it , forsaketh it , hee cannot have mercy . this cannot stand with uprightnesse of heart . a friend may keepe correspondencie with one , hee suspects not to be an enemy unto his friend , and be true to his friendship notwithstanding : but if hee knowes him to be an enemie , he must break utterly with the one , if he leanes to the other . thirdly , yet farther in the third place , so vast is the difference , that some kind of sins committed out of and against knowledge , utterly exclude from mercy for time to come ; which done out of ignorance , remained capable of , and might have obtained it ; as persecuting the saints , blaspheming christ , &c. pauls will was as much in those acts themselves , and as hearty as those that sin against the holy ghost : for he was made against the church , and in these sins , as himselfe sayes , not sinning willingly herein onely , but being carried on with fury , as hot and as forward as the pharisees that sinned that sinne : onely sayes hee , 1 tim. 1. 13. i did it ignorantly , therefore i obtained mercie . though it was ignorantly done , yet there was need of mercie : but yet in that he did it but ignorantly , there was a capacity and place for mercie , which otherwise had not beene . but thus to sin after a man hath received the knowledge of the truth , shuts a man out from mercie , heb. 10. and there is no more sacrifice for sinne , for such sins ; i say , such sins as these , thus directly against the gospell , when committed with knowledge . for sins against the law , though against knowledge , there was an atonement , as appeares levit. 6. from the 1. verse to the 8. where hee instanceth in forswearing : but to persecute the saints , and christs truth , with malice , after knowledge of it , there is no more sacrifice : not that simply the sin is so great in the act it selfe of persecution , for paul did it out of ignorance ; but because it is out of knowledge : so vast a difference doth knowledge and ignorance put betweene the guilt of the same sinne . and therefore indeed , to conclude this in the last place , this is the highest step of the ladder , next to turning off : the very highest but that of sinning against the holy ghost : which must needs argue it the highest aggravation of sinning , when it ascends so high , when it brings a man to the brinck , and next to falling into the bottomlesse pit , irrecoverably . and therefore to sinne presumptuously ( which is all one ) and to sinne against knowledge , ( as appears numb . 15. 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30. it being there opposed to sinning out of ignorance , ( such a sinne as david did , of whom it is said , 2 sam. 12. 9. that he despised the word of the lord : which phrase also is used to expresse sinnes of presumption , ver . 31. of that 15. of numbers ) to sinne , i say , presumptuously , is the highest step : so in davids account , psal . 19. 12 , 13. for first he prayes , lord keepe me from secret sinnes , ( which he maketh sinnes of ignorance ) and then next he prayes against presumptuous sinnes , ( which , as the opposition shewes , are sinnes against knowledge : ) for ( sayes he ) if they get dominion over me , i shall not be free from [ that great offence . ] that is , that unpardonable sinne , which shall never be forgiven : so as these are neerest it of any other : yet not so , as that every one that fals into such a sinne commits it , but he is nigh to it , at the next step to it . for to commit that sinne , but two things are required ; light in the mind , and malice in the heart : not malice alone , unlesse there be light ; for then that apostle had sinned it : so as knowledge is the parent of it , it is after receiving the knowledge of the truth , heb. 10. 27 , 28. these are the demonstrations of it , the reasons are first , because knowledge of god and his wayes , is the greatest mercie , next to saving grace : hee hath not dealt [ so ] with every nation . wherein ? in giving the knowledge of his wayes : and as it is thus , so to a nation , so to a man ; and therefore christ speaking of the gift of knowledge , and giving the reason why it so greatly condemneth , luke 12. 48. sayes , for to whom [ much ] is given , much is required . as if hee had said , to know his masters will , that is the great talent of all other . there is a [ much ] in that . thus it was in the heathens esteeme also : they acknowledged their foolish wisdome in morall and naturall philosophie , their greatest excellencie : and therefore plato thank'd god for three things ; that he was a man , an athenian , and a philosopher . and rom. 1. 22. the apostle mentions it as that excellencie they did professe . and soloman , of all vanities sayes this is the best vanity , and that it exceeds folly , as light doth darknesse , eccles . 2. but surely much more is the knowledge of the law , and of god , as we have it revealed to us ; this must needs be much more excellent . and so the jewes esteemed theirs ; as in this second chapter of the romanes , the apostle shewes also of them , that they made their boast of the law , and their forme of knowledge of it , and approving the things that are excellent . and what doe the two great books of the creatures , and the word , and all meanes else serve for , but to increase knowledge ? if therefore all tend to this , this is then the greatest mercie of all the rest . for secondly , god hath appointed knowledge as the immediate guide of men in all their wayes , to bring them to salvation and repentance , for to that it leads them . it is that same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as the philosopher call'd it : and therefore the law , rom. 7. 1 , 2. is compared to an husband , ( so farre as it is written in , or revealed in the heart ) that as an husband is the guide of the wife in her youth , so is the law to the heart . and whereas beasts are ruled by a bit and bridle , god hee rules men by knowledge . and therefore if men be wicked , notwithstanding this light , they must needs sinne highly , seeing there is no other curbe for them , as they are men , but this : if he will deale with them as men , this is the onely way ; and therefore if that will not doe it , it is supposed nothing will. it is knowledge makes men capable of sin , which beasts are not ; therefore the more knowledge , ( if men be wicked withall ) the more sinne must necessarily be reckoned to them : so as god doth not simply looke what mens actions and affections are , but chiefly what their knowledge is , and accordingly judgeth men more or lesse wicked . i may illustrate this by that comparison , which i may allude unto : that as in kingdomes , god measures out the wickednesse thereof , and so his punishments accordingly , principally , by the guides , the governors thereof , what they are , and what they doe ; as in the 5. of ieremie , the 4. verse it appeares ; where first god lookes upon the poore people , but , he excuseth them , these are foolish , and know not the way of the lord : and therefore god would have beene moved to spare the kingdome , notwithstanding their sins . but from them at the 5. verse he goes to view the rules , i will get me to the great men , for these have knowne the way of the lord : and when he saw that these had broken the bands , then , how shall i pardon thee for this ? so is it in his judgement towards a particular man : when god lookes downe upon a man , and sees him in his courses exceeding loose , and wicked , hee lookes first upon those rude affections in him , which are uncleane , profane , debaucht , greedy of all wickednesse ; ay but sayes he , these are foolish of themselves , but i will looke upon his understanding , and upon the superiour faculties , which are the guides of these affections , and see what they dictate to these unruly affections , to restraine them : and when he findes that the guides themselves are enlightned , and have knowne the way of the lord , and that the will and the affections , though informed with much knowledge , yet break all bands , then how shall i pardon thee ? thee , who art a knowing drunkard , and a knowing unclean person , &c. so as thus to sin , aggravates and maketh sin out of measure sinfull . now that knowledge and reason is a mans guide , will further appeare by this : that even erroneous knowledge doth put an obligation , a bond , and a tye upon a man : which can be in no other respect , but because knowledge is appointed to be a mans guide . thus if a man thinkes a thing ( which is in it selfe common and indifferent ) to be a sinne , and forbidden , ( as rom. 14. 4. ) although the law forbids it not , yet to him it is uncleane , though in christ it is not uncleane , that is , by the law of christ . for , this his knowledge and judgement of the thing hath to him the force of a law : for it propounds it to him as a law , and as from god ; which reason of his , god hath appointed as his immediate guide : and the will is to follow nothing that is evill , which is represented to it , as evill ; this is the law of meere nature in all conditions ; therefore if a man should doe an action which is in it self good , if he thought it to be evill , he should sinne , and so è contra , for he goes against the dictate of nature . so that erroneous knowledge , though against the law , is a law to me , though not per se , yet per accidens . now therefore if to go against a false light of conscience be yet a sinne , though it proves that the commandement allowes the thing was done , and was for it , then to go against the true light of the law , how sinfull is it ? againe , thirdly , the knowledge of the law binds the person so much the more to obedience , by how much the more he knowes it : so as though it would be a sinne , when he knowes not the law to transgresse it , yet when he knowes it , it is a greater sinne . 't is true indeed , that conscience and the law , when they meet , make up but one law , not two distinct laws : and therefore in sinning against knowledge , though a man doth not commit two distinct sinnes , yet the knowledge of it doth adde a further degree of sinfulnesse to it : as a cloath is the same cloath when it is white , that it was when it is dyed with a scarlet dye ; yet then it hath a dye , a tincture given it , which is more worth than the cloath : and so when you sinne , not knowing the law , the sin is the same for substance , it would be if you had known it ; yet that knowledge dyes it , makes it a scarlet sinne , as esay speaks , farre greater and deeper in demerit than the sinne it selfe : and the ground of this is , because lawes then come to be in force , when they are promulged , and made known : so as the more they are promulged and knowne , the more is the force of their binding , and so the greater guilt . therefore deut. 11. 12. 3. 8. god straitens the cords more , the binding force of the law more upon those jewes consciences , to whom he at the first personally with majesty had promulgated it , than upon their children , though upon theirs also . now if all gods lawes , being made knowne to adam , binde us , and are in force , and this when we know them not ; then if we do know them , or might know them , they binde much more : and still the more clearely wee know them , the obligation increaseth , and the guilt insuing with it : and the rather , because now when wee come to know them , they are anew promulged , in a way of a peculiar mercie ; wee having defaced the knowledge of them in our fall . fourthly , when the law , being knowne , is broken , there is the more contempt cast upon the law , and the law-giver also ; and so a higher degree of sinning . and therefore numbers 15. 30. he that sinnes out of knowledge , is said to reproach the lord , and to despise the word . and therefore saul sinning against knowledge , samuel calleth it rebellion : and though it were but in a small thing , yet he parallels it with witchcraft . so also iob 24. 13. they are said to rebell , when they sinne against light ; because rebellion is added to disobedience : for knowledge is an officer set to see the law executed , and fulfilled ; and makes god present to the conscience . therefore rom. 2. 14. it is called a witnesse ; and therefore in sinning against knowledge , men are said to sinne before the face of the lord himselfe ; now what a great contempt is that ? therefore also psal . 50. the hypocrite sinning against knowledge , is said to cast the law of god behind his back : so as there is a contempt in this sinning , which is in no other . fiftly , the more knowledge a man sinneth against , the more the will of the sinner is discovered to be for sinne , as sinne . now voluntarium est regula & mensur a actionum moralium : willingnesse in sinning , is the standard and measure of sinnes . the lesse will , the lesse sinne : so much is cut off , the lesse the will closeth with it ; at least wise so much is added , by how much the will is more in it : and therefore the highest degree of sinning is exprest to us by sinning willingly , and this after knowledge , heb. 10. now though an ignorant man commits the act as willingly , as when paul persecuted the church , yet he commits it not considered as sinne , till he hath the knowledge of it : but then when it is discovered to be sinne , and the more clearely it is so discovered , the will may be said to joyn with it as sinne . therefore the apostle sayes , to him that knowes to doe well , and doth it not , to him it is sinne . iames 4. 17. because by his knowledge the thing is represented as sinne ; and so he closeth with it the more , under that notion and apprehension . sixtly , in sinning against knowledge , a man condemns himselfe ; but when out of ignorance meerely , the law onely doth condemne him . so rom. 2. 1. a man having knowledge in that wherein hee judgeth another , he condemneth himselfe . so rom. 14. now as self-murder is the highest degree of murder , and an aggravation of it ; so self-condemning must needs be reckoned . god tooke it as a great advantage over him that hid his talent , that out of thine owne mouth i will condemne thee , thou wicked servant . the doctrine being thus proved , first , i will explaine , what it is to sin against knowledge . secondly , i will give the aggravations of it . thirdly , i will give rules to measure sinnes of knowledge by , and the greatnesse of them in any act . lastly , the use of all . for the first , what it is to sinne against knowledge . first , to explaine it , i premise these distinctions . the first distinction . that it is one thing to sinne with knowledge , another thing against knowledge . there are many sinnes doe passe from a man with his knowledge , which yet are not against knowledge . this is to be observed for the removall of a scruple which may arise in some that are godly , who else may be wounded with this doctrine through a mistake . a regenerate man is , and must needs be supposed guilty of more knowne sinnes , than an unregenerate man : and yet he commits fewer against knowledge , than he . first , i say , hee is guilty of more knowne sinnes : for he takes notice of every sinfull disposition that is stirring in him , every by-end , every contrariety unto holinesse , deadnesse to duty , reluctancie to spirituall duties : and when regenerated , beginneth to see and know more evill by himselfe , than ever he did before : he fees as the apostle sayes of himselfe , rom. 7. 10. all concupiscence : and the holier a man is , the more he discernes and knowes his sins : so sayes the apostle , rom. 7. 18. i know that in me dwels no good thing . and ver . 21. i finde when i would doe good , evill is present with me . and 23. i see another law . all these , he sayes , he perceived and found daily in himselfe : and the more holy that he grew , the more he saw them . for the purer and clearer the light of gods spirit shines in a man , the more sinnes he knowes : he will see lusts steaming up , flying in his heart , like moates in the sun , or sparkes out of a furnace , which else he had not seene : the clearer the sun-beame is which is let into the heart , the more thou wilt see them . but yet in the second place , i adde , that neverthelesse he sinnes lesse against knowledge : for then wee are properly said to sinne against knowledge , when wee doe take the fulfilling of a lust , or the performance of an outward action , a dutie , or the like , into deliberation and consideration , and consider motives against the sinne , or to the dutie , and yet commit that sinne , yeeld to it , and nourish that lust , and omit that dutie : here now we sinne not onely with knowledge , but against knowledge : because knowledge stept in , and opposed us in it , comes to interrupt and prevent us : but now in those failings in dutie , and stirring of lusts in the regenerate afore mentioned , the case is otherwise : they are committed indeed with knowledge , but not against it : for it is not in the power of knowledge to prevent them ; for motus primo primi non cadunt sub libertatem ; but yet though such sinnes will arise againe and againe , yet sayes a good heart , they must not think to passe uncontrouled and unseene : therefore let not poore soules mistake me , as if i moant , throughout this discourse , of all sins which are knowne to be sinnes , but i meane such sinnes as are committed against knowledge : that is , when knowledge comes and examines a sinne , in or before the committing of it , brings it to the law , contests against it , condemnes it , and yet a man approveth it , and consenteth to it ; when a dutie and a sinne are brought before knowledge , as barrabas and christ afore pilate , and thy knowledge doth againe and againe tell thee such a sinne is a great sinne , and ought to be crucified , and yet thou cryest , let it goe ; and so for the duty , it tels thee again and againe it ought to be submitted unto , and yet thou omittest it , and committest the sin , choosest barrabas rather than christ , these are sinnes against knowledge : now such sins against knowledg break a mans peace , and the more consideration before had , the more the peace is broken . the second distinction is , that men sinne against knowledg , either directly , or collaterally : objectively , or circumstantially . first directly : when knowledge it selfe is the thing men abuse , or fight against , becommeth the object , the terminus , the butt and mark shot at ; this is to sin directly against knowledge it selfe . the second way , collaterally , is , when knowledge is but a circumstance in our sinnes : so as the pleasure of some sinne ( we know to be a sin ) is the thing aimed at ; & that our knowledge steps but in between to hinder us in it , and we commit it notwithstanding , though we doe know it ; here knowledge is indeed sinned against , yet but collaterally , and as a stander by , but as a circumstance onely , shot at per accidens , concomitanter , and by the by , as one that steps in to part a fray is smitten , for labouring to hinder them in their sin , as the sodomi●es quarrelled with lot : they are both found in this chapter , and therefore come fitly within the compasse of this discourse . first , this collaterall kinde of sinning against knowledge is mentioned in the 21. verse , where he saies , they knew god , yet they glorified him not : there knowledge is made but a circumstance of their sinning ; they sinned against it but collaterally . but then that other kind of sinning directly against knowledge , is mentioned ver . 28. they liked not to retaine god in their knowledge : that is , they hated this knowledge it selfe , so as now they did not onely love sin , they knew to be sin , but also they loved not the knowledge of it ; so that because both are thus clearly instanced in , wee will speake of both more largely . now sinnes directly against knowledge it selfe are many : i will reduce the chiefe heads of them into two branches : first , in regard of our selves . secondly , in regard of others . first , in regard of our selves , five wayes we may thus sin against knowledge it selfe . first , when we abuse knowledge to helpe us to sinne : as first , to plot and contrive a sin , as iudas plotted to betray his master , if hee could conveniently ; so the text sayes , mark 14. 11. hee would doe it wisely : and thus those that came to intrap christ with most cunning questions , did sinne , and those who plot against the just , as psal . 37. 12. so secondly , when men use their wisedoms to tell a cunning lye , to cover a sin ; as plato sayes , men of knowledge , sunt ad mendacia potentiores & sapientiores : whereas fooles , though they would lye , yet often tell truth ere they are aware . but also thirdly , when they abuse morall knowledge , which yet , as aristotle sayes , is least apt to be ( i am sure should least be ) abused , so as to make a shew of good pretences to cover their sins , and dissemble them ; not onely by finding out some cunning artificiall colour , as david did in the matter of vriah — chance of warre ( sayes he ) falls to all alike : but when men are so impudently hypocriticall , as to make use of religious pretexts , ( as the devill sometimes doth ) as saul , who pretends to samuel , i have done the will of the lord : and when samuel told him of the cattell , oh , sayes he , they are for a sacrifice ; when god had expresly commanded to kill them all . but this shift shifted him out of his kingdome , samuel pronounceth him a rebell in it , rebellion is sinne against knowledge , therefore he knew it . thus also iezabel coloured over the stoning of naboth with a solemne fast . so iudas fisheth for money with a charitable pretence , this might have beene sold , and given to the poore . in sins against knowledge , usually the mind indevours to find out a colour , and that provokes god more than the sinne , because we goe about to mock him . we see men cannot endure a shift , much lesse the all-knowing god , not to be mocked : and we see it is hard to convince such an one . david was faine to be brought to the rack , ere he would confesse , when he had a shift ; and men doe seeke such shifts onely in case of sinning against conscience : for else there were no need , they would be sure to plead ignorance , as abimelech did . secondly , when men neglect the getting and obtaining of knowledge , which knowledge might keep & hinder them frō sinning , and might make them expert in duties . this is as much as to sin against knowledge , although the sins be committed out of ignorance : yet that ignorance being through their owne default , it comes all to one : when it may be said of men , as the apostle doth of the hebrewes , chap. 5. 12. that for the time they have had to learn , they might have beene teachers ; they had yet need be taught againe the first principles ▪ if a man had an apprentice , who through negligence and want of heeding , and observing what hee daily sees and heares about his trade , might have got for his time much knowledge in his trade , whereby he might have saved his master much , which hee now hath lost him ; and rid and perfected much worke , hee daily spoiles him ; such carelesse blockish ignorance it is just for his master to correct him for , and to charge on him all that waste and losse , because he might have knowne how to have done better . and therefore even they who thought ignorance in it selfe no sin ( wherein they erred ) yet the neglect of knowledge upon this very ground , they thought a great sinne , and that it would be so farre from excusing sinnes , as that it would aggravate them . so here we see these gentiles shall not onely be reckoned with for the actuall knowledge , they had attained to , and sinned against ; but also for what they might have had , and have picked out of the creatures . for so the apostle brings in this here in the 20. verse , that the power of god being cleerly seen in the creatures , they neglecting to spell and reade it , so much knowledg as they might have got , god will reckon to them , and aggravate their sins by . thirdly , which is yet much worse , when men refuse knowledge , that they may sinne the more freely ; and doe stop the eare , lest they should be charmed : as when men are loath , and afraid , and dare not reade such a booke as discovers , or might discover that truth to them , the submission to which would prejudice them , and this to the end that they may plead ignorance of their sinne . thus also those that assent not to truth when it comes in strongly upon them , but seek to evade it . but 1 cor. 14. 38. when the apostle had cleerely discovered the truth in those things controverted , so as who ever was spirituall , or not fully blind , might see , and would acknowledge the truth : then he shuts up his discourse about them , ver . 27. if any be ignorant , let him be ignorant : for it is wilfull , it is affected ; hee speakes it , as elsewhere , revel . last , it is said , he that is unjust , let him be unjust still : that is , hee that will be unjust , and refuseth to turne , let him goe on . this is a great sinne , for god , you see , gives such a man over : one that is but neglectfull , or dull of capacity , god will take paines with him , to teach him , and beare with him , as christ did with his disciples : but if he be wilfully ignorant , he lets him die in his ignorance , and yet will reckon with him , as if all his sinnes had beene committed against knowledge , because hee refused to know . the fourth is to hate the light , and to endevour to extinguish it . this is yet much worse , when men hate the word , and the ministers of it , the examples of gods people , and the light they carry with them ( they shining as lights in a crooked generation , phil. 2. 15. and yet they hate these , as theeves doe a torch in the night , and fly against the light , as batts doe , and as the iewes did , iohn 3. 20. ) this christ sayes is the great condemning sinne of all others . so these gentiles put socrates to death for reproving them . and thus men sinne also , when they labour to extinguish the light in their owne consciences , and like not to retaine god in their knowledge , verse 28. but would studie the art of forgetfulnesse : when men have put the candle out , and drawne the curtaines , that they may sinne , and sleepe in sin more freely and securely . thus those also sin in a higher measure , who have had a cleare conviction , that they ought to be thus strict , and ought to sanctifie the lords day , and pray privately , but now have lost this light , and think they need not be so strict : when men continue not in what they were once assured of , as the apostle speaks , 2 tim. 3. 14. these sinne against their knowledge , and are the worst of such sinners : and this estate aristotle himselfe makes statum maligni , the state of a wicked one , namely , when the sparkes of light are extinguisht or hated . for when any mans light is lost and turned into darknesse by sinning , then , as christ sayes , how great is that darknesse ? when good lawes are not onely not enacted and embraced , but repealed also , ( it is aristotles similitude , to distinguish an incontinent person , and a wicked man ) this is an high kind of sinning : so of these gentiles it is said , their foolish heart was darkned ; they had extinguisht some of that light god gave them . as some drink away their wits , so some sin away their consciences ; and thus by degrees , they first sinne away the light of the word they had , as they in iude , who were religious once , and then they quench even that little sparke of nature that is left . also verse 10. corrupting themselves in what they know naturally . fiftly , men sinne against knowledge yet worse , when they hold opinion against their knowledge . so many are said to doe , in 1 tim. 4. 2. he foretels they should speake lyes in hypocrisie , and invent lyes that should have a pretence of holinesse ; which they know to be a lye , or else they should not be said to speake lyes in hypocrisie ; but they doe it to maintaine their honour and greatnesse , which must downe , if their doctrine prove false : and though many are given up to beleeve their lyes , 2 thes . 2. 11. as a punishment of their not loving the truth ; yet others of them shall know they are lies , and yet vent them for truths . thus when men fashion their opinion to the times and wayes of preferment , and their dependances on great ones , or to maintaine and uphold a faction , or out of pride , having broached an error , maintaine it , though the pulling out that one tile doth untile all the house . these are the two causes given of perverting the truth , 1 tim. 6. 4 , 5. namely , pride and covetousnesse , and supposing gaine godlinesse , and so fashioning their religion accordingly : when men are knights of the post , that will write or speak any thing , whereby they may get gaine and preferment . secondly , men sin against knowledge in regard of others . first , by concealing it : the apostle indeed sayes in a certaine case , hast thou knowledge ? keepe it to thy selfe . he speakes it of opinions , or practices about things indifferent , which might scandalize the weake ; but if thou hast knowledge , which may edifie thy brother , thou oughtest to communicate it . socrates , knowing there was but one god , said , in his apologie for his life , that if they would give him life , upon condition to keep that truth to himselfe , and not to teach it to others , hee would not accept life upon such a condition : and i remember he expresseth his resolution in words very nigh the same words the apostles used , acts 4. 20. whether it be better to obey god than men , judge you : and , we cannot but teach the things wee have heard and seene , sayes christ : for knowledge is a thing will boyle within a man forvent , and cannot be imprisoned : it is light , and the end why light was made , was to be set up to give light . and christ argues from an apparent absurdity to put a light under a bushell , which may give light to all the house ; hast thou knowledge of god and of his wayes , thou canst not but speake ( if withall thou hast but a good heart ) to all in the familie , to thy wife in thy bosome , &c. god took it for granted , that abraham would teach his children what he should know from him : the same disposition is in all the children of abraham . secondly , when men endeavour to suppresse knowledge . as the pharisees , they kept the keyes of it in their hands , and would not open the treasures of it themselves , nor let others doe it neither . so they ( acts 4. 16. ) could not deny but a great miracle was done by the apostles ( say themselves ) but that it spread no further , let us threaten them , and charge them , that they speake no more in his name . and this they did against their consciences by their owne profession , we cannot deny it : as if they had said , if wee could we would , but it was too manifest it was the truth . so when masters keep their servants from the meanes of knowledge , they are thus guilty . thirdly , when wee would make others sinne against their consciences . the pharises , when the blind man would not say as they said , they cast him out ; they would have had him say that christ was a sinner , when through the small light he had , hee judged it evident enough , that a sinner should not doe such a miracle , as was never done since the world began . and so iezabel made the judges , and witnesses sinne against conscience in accusing naboth : and so some of the gentiles , that would hold correspondencie with the jewes , would have constrained the galathians to be circumcised , gal. 6. 12. those that knew that circumcision was to be abolisht , yet they would perswade them to it by a clubb argument , drawn from avoiding persecution , not from evidence of the truth , or by reasons that might convince them , and their consciences : therfore he sayes , they constrained thē . the perswaders might indeed glory , as having their cause and side strengthened , but they wanne little credit to their cause by it ; for as the perswaders arguments were suited to flesh , so the others yeelding was out of flesh , and so they glory in your flesh and weaknesse , sayes he ; as the papists urged cranmer , not by arguments , but threats and promises to recant ; this is the greatest cruelty in the world , to have a man murder himselfe , stab his conscience . to offend a weak conscience is a sinne , if but passively , when thou dost something before his face , which his conscience is against : but if thou makest him wound his own conscience , and to doe an act himselfe , which his owne conscience is against , it is much worse : as if thou beest a master , and hast a servant who pleadeth conscience , that hee cannot lye for thy advantage in thy shop , or who will not doe unlawfull businesses on the sabbath day , and pleads conscience , wilt thou smite him and whip him ? god will smite thee , thou whited wall . how darest thou smite him , and so cause him to doe that for which god will whip him worser ? shew mercy to those under you , enforme their consciences , wring them not , you may hap to break the wards if you doe . now for sinnes committed collaterally , or per modum circumstantia ( that i may so expresse it ) against knowledge , they are done either when particular acts of sinne are committed , and duties omitted , against light and knowledge ; and so the saints may and doe often sinne against knowledge . or , secondly , in regard of a knowne estate of sinne , and impenitencie persisted in ; when men continue , and goe on in such a state against conviction of conscience , that such is their estates . for the first , because particular acts of sin committed against knowledge are infinite , and there will be no end of instancing in particulars , therefore i will not insist : onely in briefe this distinction concerning such acts may be observed , and the observation of it may be usefull : that some acts of sinnes against knowledge , are meerely transient : that is , are done and ended at once . and though the guilt of them is eternall , yet the extent of the act is finished with the committing it , and reacheth no further : as a vaine oath , breach of the sabbath , &c. which acts cannot be repealed , though they may be repented of . but others there are , which though the act may be but once outwardly and professedly done , yet have an habituall and continued permanency , life , & subsistence given it , such as that untill a man doth recall them , hee may be said continually to renew those acts , and every day to be guilty of them , and to maintaine it , and so habitually to cōmit them . as it is with laws , which though made but once , are yet continued acts of the state , whilest they stand in force unrepealed : so is it in some sins . for instance , when a man doth take goods from his neighbour unjustly , the act indeed is done but once : but till hee restores them , he may be said to steale them ; every day , every houre , he continues to doe it habitually ; so a man having subscribed to falshood , or recanted the truth publiquely , the act , though done but once , yet untill a retractation be some wayes made , hee continues that act , and so is daily anew guilty of it . so if a man should marry one , whom it is unlawfull for him to marry , ( as herod did ) though that sinfull act of espousals , whereby they entred into it , was soon dispatcht ; yet , till a divorce , he lives in a continuall sin . and such acts ( of this latter sort i meane ) against knowledge are most dangerous to commit ; because to continue thus in them , though but once committed , hazards a mans estate ; and therefore men find , when they come to repent , the greatest snare , and trouble , and difficulty in such kind of sins ; to extricate themselves out of them by a meet and true repentance . but as concerning the first branch of this distinction , namely , of particular acts committed against knowledge ; besides this last distinction briefly touched ; i will anon give you severall aggravations and rules whereby to measure the sinfulnesse that is in such acts so committed : but in the meane time the second branch of this former distinction must be insisted upon , and therefore i will bring in these aggravations and rules which concerne particular acts , as distinct heads , after i have briefly spoken to this other , which is , that secondly , those sinne against knowledge , who goe on in an estate of sin and impenitencie , which they know to be damnable : as pharaoh , exod. 9. 27. who confest that the and his people were wicked , and yet hardned himselfe in sinne most dangerously : and yet three sorts of men may apparently be convinced thus to sin . first , those that keep out , and with-draw themselves from professing christ and his wayes , and the feare of his name , out of shame or feare of man , or losse of preferment , or the like worldly ends , when yet they are convinced that they are gods wayes , and ought to be professed by them . i doe not say , that all , who doe not come in to professe christ , and that doe not joyne themselves with his people , that they goe on against knowledge ; for many are ignorant , and mistaken about them : but when men are convinced of the truth , and necessity of professing and confessing of it even unto salvation , ( as the apostle speaks , rom. 10 ) and yet out of fear , or shame , keep still on the other side , drawing in their hornes all together . these goe on in an estate of impenitencie against knowledg ; for put all these together , and it must needs appeare to be so : as first , when they are convinced that this is the truth , and that salvation and the power of religion is onely to be found in such wayes and men : and secondly , that these are to be practiced and professed , and yet thirdly , out of shame , &c. keepe still a loofe off , and goe on a contrary way ; these must needs know , that they goe on in an estate of impenitencie against knowledge . this was the case of many of the pharises , who therefore sinned highly : they beleeved , and were convinced , that christ was the messiah ; and so then to be confest , and followed , and to be cleaved unto : and then also they must needs know , that his followers onely were the children of god : yet ioh. 12. 42. it is said , though they thus beleeved on him , yet they durst not confesse him for feare of the iewes , and of the pharises , and of being put out of the synagogues . at the latter day , christ shall not need to sever such from the rest , as hee will doe the sheepe from the goats ; for they willingly remaine all their dayes amongst them , whom they know to be goats , and refuse the company , and fould , and food , and marks of the sheep ; which they know to be such : they may apologize , and make fair with the saints , that their hearts are with them , but they will be rankt at the day of judgement , as here they ranked themselves , with the workers of iniquity . of these doth the psalmist speake , those that turne aside by their crooked wayes , them shall the lord leave with the workers of iniquity . those also thus sinne , and are to be joyned with these , who know the tearms and condition of salvation , and how they must part with all for christ , and yet will not come to the price ; such doe goe desperately on against knowledge in a bad estate , and doe judge themselves unworthy of eternall life . thus the young man in the gospell , he was told , that he was to sell all , and that was the condition , and hee knew heaven was worth it , and was convinced of the truth herein , that thus he ought to doe , for he went away sorrowfull : now if he had not knowne that he went away without happinesse , he needed not have beene sorrowfull at all ; but he knew the bargaine of salvation was not struck up , and likewise what it stuck at , and yet still rested in his former condition , and chose rather to enjoy his many possessions : this man now went on in his state against knowledge . secondly , as also those who upon the same or like ground defer their repentance , these go on in a bad estate , and must needs know they doe so ; for in that they promise to repent hereafter , and take up purposes to doe it , when they have gone on a little while longer , to adde drunkennesse to thirst , they doe thereby professe that there is a work of grace , which they must attaine to , ere they can be in the state of grace : for they would not promise so much hereafter , but that they know not how , without such a work , they should be saved . whilest therefore such shall rest without present endevouring after it , so long they are judged in themselves to be in a bad estate at present . when men know the curses due to their present estate , and yet say as hee , deut. 29. 19. i will goe on in the way of my heart , and shall have peace afterward . this man sinnes most highly , and therefore gods wrath smoakes against that man , and he sayes of him , that he will not be mercifull to him , in that place . thirdly , sunk and broken professors , such cannot but goe on in a bad estate against knowledge , when either men are falne from the practice and profession of what is good , which once they thought necessarie to salvation ; or when they continue to hold forth their profession in hypocrisie . those that have escaped the pollutions of the world , through the knowledge of iesus christ , but are returned to their vomit againe , some of these are ingenious , and acknowledge both themselves faln , & their present estate most miserable , and yet goe on in it ; and such are to be pittyed , but yet are in a most dangerous condition . saul when he was fallen away , yet had this ingenuity a while left , hee desired samuel to pray to his god for him , and told david , that he was more righteous than he ; yet still went on in his courses , and in the end ( as some have thought ) sinned against the holy ghost . but others there are , who though they be fallen from all the inward , powerfull and secret performance of duties they once did practice , and from all conscience of sinning , yet retain their profession which they know to be but an out-side : these of all others goe on against knowledge : and rev. 22. 15. they are said to make a lye ; not onely to tell a lye in words , but to make a lye in deeds . now a lye is a sin of all others most against knowledge , and indeed against a double knowledge , both facti and juris : & so is this . 1. that they professe themselves to be that they know they are not . 2. that they will not endevour after that state they know they ought to get into , if ever saved . this is the condition of many , who being convinced of the power of religion , have launched forth into a profession , and hoyst up saile , but now the tyde is fallen , the spirit withdrawne , the conscience of sinne extinguisht in them ; yet for their credit sake still beare their sails up as high as ever : even as many merchants doe , who are sunk in their estates , still beare a faire shew , yea will seeme richer than ordinary , by purchasing lands , &c. such a professor was iudas , hee began seriously , and thought to have gone to heaven , and was earnest in good duties at first : as they also , 2 pet. 2. 18. they really , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , escaped the pollutions of the world , through the knowledge of christ : but in the end iudas became a grosse hypocrite , one that pretended the poore , when he loved the bag ; and on the sudden betrayed his master , when yet the disciples knew it not , suspected iudas as little as themselves ; and the end of those also , in that fore-named place , is said to be worse than their beginning . now because such sinne so highly against knowledge , therefore their punishment is made the regula of all other wicked mens ; as when it is said , that other sinners shall have their portion with hypocrites : as the wicked angels punishment is made the measure of mens : goe ye cursed into the fire prepared for the devill and his angels : so among men , such grosse hypocrites , their punishment is made the rule , and so the chiefe of all kind of torments , which sinners of the sonnes of men shall undergoe . now let mee speake a word to all such as thus go on in a state of impenitencie against knowledge : this is a high kinde of sinning , and of all the most desperate , and doth argue more hardnesse of heart , and despising the riches of gods goodnesse . for if , as in the rom. 2. 4. to go on in sinne , when a man [ knowes not , ] that is , considers not that gods mercy leads him to repentance , is made the signe and effect of a very hard heart , treasuring up wrath , then much more , when thou knowest and considerest thou art in an impenitent condition , and hast many motions leading thee to repentance , is thy heart then to be accounted hard ? when a man commits a particular act against knowledge , he haply and usually still thinks his estate may be good , and that he shall not lose god utterly , or hazard the losse of him ; onely his spirit , being at present empty of communion with him , he steales out to some stolne pleasure : but when a man knowes his estate bad , and that he is without god in the world , and yet goes on , he doth hereby cast away the lord , and professeth he cares not for him , or that communion which is to be had by him , as esau did his birth-right . david , though he despised the lord , yet hee did not cast away the lord , as saul did : for saul ventured utterly to lose him , knowing his estate naught . david , when hee sinned , thought gods eternall favour would still continue , though for the present he might lose the sense of it . but when a man goes on in a state of sinning , he ventures the losse of gods eternall love , and slights it , and knowes he doth so : when a man knowes that he is condemned already , as being impenitent , and that all his eternall estate lyes upon the non-payment of such duties of repentance , &c. and that the guilt of all his sinnes will come in upon him , and that an execution is out , and yet goes on , this is more than to commit one act against knowledge , whereby he thinks he brings upon himself but the guilt of that one sinne ; and upon the committing of which , he thinks not the morgage of all lyes , though it deserves it ; herein men shew themselves more desperate . in the next place , i come to those rules , whereby you may measure and estimate sinning against knowledge , in any particular act of sinning ; and they are either before the sinne , or in sinning : three of either , which i make a second head , to explaine this doctrine by . first , before . the first rule is , the more thou knewest , and didst consider the issues and consequents of that sinne thou didst commit , the more thou sinnest against conscience in it : when as in rom. 1. ult . thou knowing ( sayes the apostle ) that those that commit such things , are worthy of death : that is , thou considerest that hell and damnation is the issue and desert of it , and yet committest it ; yea and this when haply hell fire at present flasheth in thy face , and yet thou goest on to doe it , in this case men are said to choose death , and to love it , prov. 3. 36. when a man considers , that the way to the whorehouse are the wayes to death ( as solomon speaks ) so when thou a professor considerest with thy selfe before , this sinne will prove scandalous , and undoe me , disable me for service , cast mee out of the hearts of good men , and yet dost it . thus that foolish king was told againe and againe , ier. 38. 17 , 18 , 19. that if he would yeeld to the king of babel , he should save his life , and city , and kingdome , and live there still ; but if hee would not , he should not escape : but as ieremie told him , verse 23. thou shalt cause this city to be burnt with fire , yet he would not hearken : this is the word of the lord ( sayes ieremie , ) and he knew it to be so ; and yet being a weake prince , led by his nobles , he would not follow his counsell : and thus iudas fully knew the issue : christ had said againe and againe , woe be to him by whom the sonne of man is betrayed , and yet went on to doe it . the second rule is , the more consultations , debates , and motives against it , did runne through thee before thou didst it , so much the greater and more hainous . how often did mercy come in , and tell thee , that if thou lookest for any hope or part in it , thou shouldest not doe such an evill ? how often came that in , shall i doe this , and sinne against god ? did any scripture come in to testifie against thee in the nick ? did god send in the remembrance of such a mercie past , to perswade thee ; or some mercies to come , which thou dependest upon him for ? that which made spira's sinne so great , was such debates as these before : and this made darius sinne , in casting daniel into the lions den , so great ; he debated it with himselfe , dan. 6. 14. he was sore displeased with himselfe , and laboured to the going downe of the sunne to deliver him ; he considered that he was as his right hand in all the affaires of his kingdome , and a man entrapped meerely for his conscience , and that to put him to death was to sacrifice him to their malice ; he knew him to be holy , and wise , worth all the men that sought after his life , and yet yeelded ; these considerations troubled him afore , and also after ; insomuch as he could not sleep for them , ver . 18. now because that every such consultation should set an impression upon the heart , and countermand the motions of sin , when therefore thou dost it , maugre all such debates and motives to the contrary , this is much against knowledg , and very heynous . therefore the pharises , luke 7. 30. are said to have rejected the counsell of god , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in or against themselves : the words will beare either : in themselves , because they knew it , and tooke it into consideration , and yet rejected it : and against themselves , because it was their destruction . the third rule is , that the more confirmations any man hath had of the knowledge of that which he sinneth in , and testimonies against it , the greater sinne against knowledge it is : when a man hath had a cloud of witnesses in his observation against a particular sinne , and yet doth it , and goes on in it , it is the more fearfull . to goe on against that one witnesse , the bare light and grudging of naturall conscience onely , is not so much ; but when it is further confirmed , and backed by the word written , which a man hath read , and with testimonies , out of which a man meets with such places , wherein againe and againe in reading of it , such a practice is condemned , and observes it ; and then also heares it reproved in sermons , and of all sinnes else , heares in private conference that sinne spoken against also ; yea hath in his eye many examples of others sinning in the like kinde , which have beene punished , yea haply himselfe also ; yet to sin against all these is exceeding hainous . sometimes god orders things so , as a sinne is made a great sinne , by such forewarnings ; so he contrived circumstances that iudas sinned a great sinne ; for iudas knew before that christ was the saviour of the world ; he knew it by all the miracles he had seene , as also by his gracious words and converse ; and he professed as much in following of him ; and he had the written word against it , thou shalt not murder the innocent . but yet further , god to aggravate his sinne to the highest , orders it so , that christ should tell him of it when he was to goe about it , pronounceth a woe to him , iohn 22. 22. that it had beene good for that man that he had never beene borne . mar. 14. 21. and the disciples they were sorrowfull at christs speech , when hee suspected one of them ; and shewed an abomination and detestation of such a fact , there was a jurie of eleven men , yea witnesses against it ; yea and iudas against himselfe , he asked if it were he ; yea and christ gave him a sop , and told him , thou hast said it , and doe what thou doest quickly : which even then might argue to his conscience , that he was god , and searched and knew his heart , and yet hee went out and did it immediately . how did hee sinne against the haire , as wee speak , and how did all these circumstances aggravate his sin ? but yet a more cleare evidence of this is that instance of pilate , whom god many wayes would have stopt in his sinne of condemning christ , who examining him before the pharises , he could finde no fault with him , as concerning those things whereof they accused him , luke 23. 14. and yet to allay their malice , unjustly scourged him , verse 16. and further , when he sent him to herod , as being willing to rid his owne hands of him , herod also found nothing worthy of death in him , verse 15. which was another witnesse might have confirmed him concerning christs innocencie . yea yet further , that the fact might be more aggravated , a most notorious murtherers life must be put into the scale with christs , and either the one or the other condemned : and when the people yet chose barrabas , why ( sayes pilate ) what evill hath he done ? ver . 22. then he distinctly knew and considered , that he was delivered up through envie : yea and when hee was upon the bench , and ready to pronounce sentence , as it were , god admonisht him by his owne wife , mat. 27. 19. whom god himselfe had admonished in a dreame , she sending him word shee had suffered many things by reason of him that night , and therefore have nothing ( sayes shee ) to doe with that just man : yea he himselfe , when he condemns him , washeth his hands . and thus it falls out in many sinfull businesses which men are about , that god often and many severall wayes would knock them off , and stops them in their way , as hee did balaam ; reproves them , as he did him by a dumbe asse , 2 pet. 2. 16. so there by some silent passage of providence , and not onely so , but by his spirit also standing in their way , with the threatnings ready drawne and brandisht against them , as the angell did with a drawne sword against balaam , and yet they goe on ; this is fearfull . there are 3. rules also , whereby the sinfulnesse of sin , as it is against knowledge , may be measured , from what may be observed in the act : as first , the lesse passion , or inward violence or temptation to a sinne committed against knowledg , the greater sinne against knowledge it is argued to be : for then the knowledge is the clearer , passion or temptation being as a mist . but then to sinne , when a man is not in passion , is to stumble at noon-day . for as drunkennesse takes away reason , so doth passion ( which is a short drunkennesse ) cloud and mist a mans knowledge . and so aristotle compares the knowledge of an incontinent person , to the knowledge of one that is drunk . when peter denied his master , though hee had warning of it before , and so it was against knowledge , and it was by lying , and swearing , and forswearing , which are sinnes of all other most directly against knowledge , yet he was taken unexpectedly ; and when that which might stir up feare to the utmost in him , was in his view ; for hee was then in the judgement hall , where his master , just before his face , was arraigned for his life , and he thought he might also have presently been brought to the barre with him , if he had beene discovered to have been his disciple ; so as his passion being up , his soule was distempered , reason had little time to recover it selfe ; and therefore though it was against knowledge , yet the lesse against knowledge , because knowledge had laesam operationem , it had not its perfect worke upon his heart : but now iudas , in betraying his master , had not onely warning before , but was not tempted to it , but went of himselfe , and made the offer to the pharisees , sought how conveniently to doe it , plotted to doe it , had his wits about him , had time to think of it , and therefore it was ( besides the hainousnesse of the act ) more also against knowledge , and so the greater . so david when he went to slay nabal , was in hot blood , in a passion ; but when hee plotted to kill vriah , he was in cold blood : he was drunke when he lay with bathsheba , but sober when hee made vriah drunke : hee went quietly and sedately on in it . and therefore we find david blamed onely in the matter of vriah , not so much for that of bathsheba . secondly , the more sorrow , renisus , or reluctancie , and regreeting of mind there is against a sinne , 't is a sign that the knowledge of it is the stronger , and quicker against it , and so the sinne the more against knowledge : for that gaine-saying and displeasure of the minde against it , ariseth from the strength and violent beating of the pulse of conscience , and opposition of it against the sinne , it springs from the greater and deeper apprehension of the evill of the sinne in the action , which is then in doing ; and though that reluctancie be a better signe of the estate of the person , than if there were none at all ; as there is not in those who are past feeling , & commit sin with greedinesse ; whose estate is therefore worse , and more uncapable of repentance , yet the fact it self is argued to be the more hainous , for it argues it to be against strong , active , stirring knowledge . this argued herods sinne to be much against knowledge ( as indeed it was ) mark 6. 26. the text sayes , he was exceeding sorrowfull : now that he could not have beene , unlesse he had exceedingly apprehended what a great sinne it was to behead iohn , who , he knew , was a just and an holy man , ver . 20. and who was one that had a great place in his estimation , for he observed him , and was wrought much upon by his ministerie , and he knew that he did but sacrifice him to the malice of a wicked woman ; and in this case the sinne is also hereby made so much the greater , in that conscience doth stir up a contrary violent passion in the heart against the temptation , and therefore yet to doe it , when there is such a bank cast up that might resist it , yet then to break all downe , such a sin wasts the conscience much . thirdly , on the contrary , the more hardnesse of heart there is , and want of tendernesse , in committing that sinne , which a man knowes to be a sinne , it is argued thereby to be the greater sinne against knowledge ; not onely the greater sinne , but the greater sinne against knowledge . for hardnesse of heart in sinning , is an effect of having formerly sinned much against knowledge before . for as the light of the sun hardneth clay , so the beames of knowledge and conscience , lighting upon mens hearts , use to harden them , and doe make them in the end past feeling . and therefore in 1 tim. 4. 2. sinning against knowledge is made the cause of a seared conscience , they speak lyes in hypocrisie : and therefore knowingly that they are lyes , and such lyes as damne others as well as themselves , which who beleeve are damned , 2 thes . 2. 11 , 12. and if so , no wonder if it followes , having their consciences seared with an hot iron . it is not a cold iron will seare their consciences , and make them insensible , but an hot iron , a burning and a shining light , which once having had place in their consciences , and being rejected , they begin to be hardned and seared . for knowledge makes sinnes and the apprehensions of them , familiar to a man , and so lesse terrible and frightfull in the end , as beares and lyons doe become to their keepers , through custome . iudas had a hard heart , when he came to betray his master , surely his conscience had smitten him at first more for nimming out of the bag , than it did now for this of murder . he could never have had such a hard heart , had he not had much knowledge : was it not a hard heart , that when he was challenged to his face , hee could set a brazen face on it , and did aske as well as the rest , is it i ? when also christ cursed him to his face , who should doe it , and the disciples all abhorr'd it : had not iudas lived under such blessed and glorious meanes , and sinned long against knowledge , all this would have startled him , and have staggered in his purpose : but he goes on as if it were nothing , though when he had done it , his conscience was then opened too late ; when a man formerly hath beene troubled with a small sinne , more than now with a grosse lye , which he can digest better than once the other : or , when before , if he omitted praying , it troubled him , now he can goe a weeke without , and is not sensible of it , it is a signe that his knowledge hath hardned him . thus having given such rules , whereby you may estimate the sinfulnesse of particular acts , i will now proceed to other wayes , aggravations taken from the kind of knowledge a man sins against , to sin against what kind of knowledge is most hainous and dangerous ; and these are five , drawn from the severall qualifications of that knowledge , and the light which men sinne against . for the greater , or the more strong & efficacious the light and knowledge is , the greater is the sinne of knowledge thou committest ; and this i make a third generall head to explaine this doctrine by . all these five rules being applicable and common both to particular acts against knowledge , and also lying in an estate of impenitencie against knowledge , and all other particulars which have beene mentioned . first then , to sinne against the inbred light of nature , that is , in such sinnes , as though thou hadst wanted the light of the word in , thou wouldst have knowne to be such : this is a high kind of sinning . such the apostle speaks of , iude 10. what things they know naturally , in these they corrupt themselves , as bruit beasts , putting as it were no difference of actions , no more than beasts , no not in what nature teacheth them , and therefore therein are as beasts : for it is the light of nature puts the first difference betweene men and beasts ; and in such kinde of sinnes the apostle instanceth in this first chapter , as namely , that of unnaturall uncleannesse , in three particulars : as 1. self-uncleannesse , ver . 24. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , alone by themselves : so beza and theophilact understand it , which he makes there the first degree of unnaturall uncleannesse , which is therefore unnaturall , because thou destroyest that which nature gave thee for propagation , quod perdis homo est . then 2. the uncleane love of boyes , men burning in lust with men , ver . 27. be it discovered in what dalliance it will , though not arising to an act of sodomie , doing that which is unseemely , ver . 27. which hee therefore sayes , is the perverting the use and intent of nature , and so is a sin against nature , leaving the naturall use of women . my brethren , i am ashamed to speak of such things as are done in secret . these kind of sinnes , by the apostles ranking them , are in a further degree of unnaturalnesse , than any other , because they are made the punishments of other sinnes , which yet were against the light of nature also : namely , not glorifying god when they knew him : yet that being a sinne , the light of nature was not so clear in comparison of these , therefore these are made the punishments of the other , as being more against nature . so for men to be disobedient to parents , stubborne to them , and without naturall affection , as the apostle sayes , ver . 30 , 31. this is against nature , even the instinct of it . so unthankfulnesse , and requiting evill for good , is against a common principle in mens mindes . doe not the gentiles doe good to those that do good to them ? your hearts use to rise against such an one out of common humanity ; or if you see one cruell and unmercifull , which is another reckoned up , ver . 31. there being usually principles of pitty in all mens natures , by nature ; therefore for one man to prey upon , and tyrannize over another , as fishes doe over the small ones , as habakkuk complaineth , this is against nature ; which teacheth you to doe as you would be done to . so covenant-breakers , and lying , and forswearing , mentioned ver . 30. inventers of evill , and truce-breakers , are sins against nature , and natural light ; lying is against a double light , both morall ; both juris , which tels us such a thing ought not to be done ; and facti , whilest we affirm a thing that is not , the knowledge of the contrary ariseth up in us against , though there were no law forbade it ; therefore of all sins else , the devills lusts are expressed by two ; lying , which is a sinne in the understanding , and malice in the will , iohn 8. 44. secondly , to sin against that light which thou didst suck in , when thou wert young , to sin against the light of thy education , this is an aggravation , and a great one . there is a catechisme of a blessed mother bathsheba , which shee taught solomon when a child , put in among the records of sacred writ , prov. 31. wherein she counsels him betimes , not to give his strength to women ; she foretold him of that sinne : and because it is incident to kings most , they having all pleasures at command , she tells him particularly , it destroyes kings : and so also not to drink wine , was another instruction there he was forewarned of : this aggravated solomons fault the more ; for reade the 2. chapter of ecclesiastes , and we shall finde there , that hee was most guilty in the inordinate love of these two ; but hee had not beene brought up so , his good mother had not thus instructed him . and thus also when god would aggravate his owne peoples sin unto them , he recalls them to their education in their youth in the wildernesse . so ierem. 2. 2. goe and cry to them , iremember the kindnesse and towardlinesse of thy youth : he puts them in mind of their education by moses their tutor , and their forwardnesse then . and so hos . 12. when he was a child , i loved him ; and then god had their first fruits , ver . 3. this he brings to aggravate their back-sliding , ver . 5. therefore the apostle urgeth it as a strong argument to timothie , to goe on to persevere in grace and goodnesse , that he had knowne the scriptures from a child : and therefore for him to fall , would be more hainous . the reason is , because the light then infused , it is the first , a virgin light , as i may call it , which god in much mercy vouchsafed to pre-possesse the minde with , before it should be deflowred and defiled with corrupt principles from the world ; and did put it there to keep the mind chaste and pure : and this also then , when the minde was most soft and tender , and so fitter to receive the deeper impression from it . and hence ordinarily the light suckt in then , seasons men ever after , whether it be for good , or for evill ; it fore-stalls , and pre-judgeth a man against other principles : and though a man comes to have more acquired knowledge and reasons after put into him when he is come to perfect age , yet the small light of his education , if it were to the contrary , doth bias him , and keeps him fixt , and bent that way . so we see it is in opinions about religion : the light then entertained , can never be disputed out : so in mens wayes and actions , traine up a child in his way , and he will not depart from it . prov. 22. 6. to sin therefore against it , and to put out the beames of it , or defile it , and to weare out the impressions of it , how wicked is it , and what a wretch art thou to do so ? many of you young schollers have had a good bathsheba that instructed you , not to poure out your strength to drinke or women , but to pray privately , and to feare god , and love him ; and when you come hither , you have good tutors also , who teach you to pray ; ministers , who instill blessed truths into you , from which , one would think , you should never depart ; yet you doe . think how grievous this is ; for if it is made an excuse for many a man in sinning , that it answers but his education ; that he never knew or saw better , as you say of many papists ; then must it needs on the contrary , be an aggravation of sinfulnesse . and as it was timothies commendation , that hee knew the scriptures from a child , so it will be thy condemnation , that thou knewest better from a child , and yet rebellest against thy light . thirdly , the more reall and experimentall the light is , men sinne against , still the more sinne ; as when they have learnt it from examples of godly men , whom they have lived amongst , or the observations of gods dealings with themselves or others , and not onely from the word notionally . to sinne against such light , this addes a further degree ; not onely to sinne against the bare light of nature , but also further , when nature hath besides lighted her torch at the scripture , and then when beyond all this , the reall examples and observations made of gods dealings with a mans selfe and others , shall confirme all this , this makes a mans sinfulnesse much more grievous ; for as exempla efficacius docent quàm praecepta , so the knowledge got by experiments of mercies or judgements , is of more force and evidence . knowledge learnt by experience , is the most efficacious . therefore christ himselfe , who knew all things already , yet learnt ( in the schoole of experience ) by what he suffered . a little of some knowledge distill'd out of a mans owne observation , is most precious , every drop of it ; therefore the apostle urgeth it on timothie , 2 tim. 3. 14. continue in the things thou hast learned , and beene assured of , knowing of whom thou hast learned them . there is a two-fold motive , and both emphaticall ; first , he was assured in himselfe ; and secondly , that which strengthned that assurance , and was a meanes to worke it , was the example of the holy apostle , and of his owne parents , knowing of whom thou hast learned it : and so ver . 10. the apostle againe urgeth his owne example , thou hast fully knowne my doctrine and manner of life ; and then also brings to his mind the education of those his godly parents , who instructed him . hence also , esay 26. 10. it is made an aggravation , that in the land of uprightnesse men deale unjustly . thus light drawn from the observation of gods judgements upon others , it much aggravates : it is laid to belshazzars charge , dan. 5. 22. thou knewest all this , how god dealt with thy father nebuchadonezer . so some of you come here , and live in a religious society , and see sometimes one , sometimes another of thy colleagues turn to christ , yea haply chamber fellow converted from his evill courses , and yet thou goest on , this is sinning against a great light . fourthly , the more vigorous , strong , powerfull the light is that is in thee , and more stirring in thy heart , and joyned with a taste , the greater the sins committed against it are to be accounted . the more thou hast tasted the bitternesse of sinne , and gods wrath , and hast beene stung with it as with a cockatrice , the more thou hast tasted gods goodnesse in prayer , and in the ordinances , the more of such a knowledge , and yet sinnest the worse . in the 5. of iohn , 35. christ aggravates the iewes unbeleefe in himselfe , and their present hardnesse , that iohn was to them , not only a shining , but also a burning light ; that is , they had such knowledge engendred by his ministery , as wrought joy and heat , as well as light ; therefore it is added , they rejoyced therein for a season . and thus their fall , heb. 6. is aggravated , that it was such a light as had tasting with it . for to explaine this , you must know , that between ordinary notionall light , or that assenting to spirituall truths which is common with men , from traditionall knowledge living in the church , that between it and true saving light , or the light of life , there is a middle kind of light , which is more than the common conviction men have , and lesse than saving light : it is a light which leaves also some impression on the affections , makes them feele the powers of heaven and hell , and be affected with them . now the more of such light against a sinne , be it drunkennesse , or uncleannesse , or oppression , and yet fallest to it againe , the worse . for this is a further degree added to knowledg , and not common to all wicked men . and therefore as those iewes , who had not onely common meanes of knowledge , but miracles also , and yet beleeved not , iohn 12. 17. shall be more condemned ; so those who have such tasting knowledg set on by the holy ghost ( which is as much as if a miracle were wrought , for it is above nature , a supernaturall worke of the spirit . ) and therefore to sinne against such light , and such onely , is that which makes a man in the next degree of fitnesse to sin against the holy ghost . fiftly , to sin against professed knowledge , is an aggravation also , and an heavy one . to sin against a mans owne principles which he teacheth others , or reproves or censureth in others . titus 1. last , those that professe they know god , and yet deny him , these are most abominable of all others : for these are lyars , and so sinne against knowledge as lyars doe , in the 1 iohn 2. 4. such an one is called a lyar in a double respect , both in that he sayes hee hath that knowledge he hath not , it not being true ; and because also he denyes that in deed , which he affirmes in word , this is scandalous sinning . so rom. 2. 24. the iewes beasting of the law , and of having the forme of knowledge in their braines , caused the gentiles to blaspheme , when they saw they lived cleane contrary thereunto : and therefore a brother that walkes inordinately , was to be delivered to satan , to learne what it was to blaspheme , 1 tim. 2. 20. that is , to learne to know how evill and bitter a thing it is , by the torments of an evill conscience , to live in such a course , as made god and his wayes evill spoken of , as it befell david when he thus sinned . yea 2 cor. 5. 10 , 11. though they might keep company with a heathen , because hee was ignorant , and professed not the knowledge of god ; yet if a brother , one that professed , and so was to walke by the same rules , did sinne against those principles he professed , then keepe him not company : thus did saul sinne . all the religion he had and pretended to in his latter dayes , was persecuting witches : yet in the end he went against this his principle ; hee went to a witch in his great extremitie at last . and thus god will deale with all that are hollow , and sinne secretly against knowledge in the end . hee suffers them to goe against their most professed principles . these are aggravations in generall , applicable both to any act of sinning , or going on in a known state of sinning . use . now the use of all that hath been spoken , what is it , but to move all those that have knowledge , to take heed , more heed of sinning than other men ? and those of them that remaine in their naturall estate , to turne speedily and effectually unto god ? for if sinning against knowledge be so great an aggravation of sinning , then of all engagements to repentance , knowledge is the greatest . first , thou who hast knowledge , canst not sin so cheap as another , who is ignorant : therefore if thou wilt be wicked , thy wickednesse will cost thee ten times more than it would another . places of much knowledge , and plentifull in the meanes of grace , are dear places to live in sin in . to be drunk , and uncleane , after enlightning , and the motions of the spirit , and powerfull sermons , is more than twentie times afore ; thou mightest have committed ten to one , and beene damned lesse . this is condemnation ( sayes christ ) that light came into the world . neither canst thou haue so much pleasure in thy sin as an ignorant person ; for the conscience puts forth a sting in the act , when thou hast knowledge , and does subject thee to bondage and the fear of death . when a man knows how dearely he must pay for it , there is an expectation of judgement embittereth all . therefore the gentiles sinned with more pleasure than we . therefore eph. 4. 18 , 19. the apostle speaking of them , sayes , that through their ignorance , and darknesse , and want of feeling , they committed sin with greedinesse , and so with more pleasure ; they not having knowledge or hearts sensible of the evils that attend upon their courses . secondly , thou wilt in sinning against knowledg be given up to greater hardnesse . if the light that is in thee be darknesse ( sayes christ ) how great is that darknesse ? therefore the more light a man hath , and yet goes on in works of darknesse , the more darknesse that man will be left unto , even to a reprobate mind in the end . thirdly , it will procure thee to be given up to the worst of sins , more than another man ; for god when he leaves men , makes one sin the punishment of another , & reserves the worst for sinners against knowledge . these gentiles , when they knew god , they worshipped him not , god gave them up to the worst of sinnes , whereof they were capable , as unnaturall uncleannesse , &c. but these are not sinnes great enough for thee , that art a sinner of the christians ; to be given up to drunkennesse , or adultery , &c. otherwise than to discover thy rottennesse , these are too small sins ; but thou shalt be given up to inward profanenesse of heart , ( as esau was , having been brought up in a good family ) so as not to neglect holy duties onely , but to despise them ; to despise the good word of god and his saints , and to hate godlinesse and the appearance of it ; thou shalt be given up to contemne god and his judgements , to trample under foot the blood of the covenant , or else unto devilish opinions ; those other are too small to be punishments of thy sinne : for stil the end of such an one must be seven times worse than the beginning , as christ sayes it shall ; if thou wert a drunkard , a swearer , or an uncleane person before , and thy knowledge wrought some alteration in thee , thou shalt not haply be so now at thy fal , but seven times worse ; profane , injurious to saints , a blasphemer , or derider of gods wayes and ordinances . fourthly , when thou commost to lay hold on mercy at death , thy knowledge will give thee up to more despaire , than another man. knowledge , though when it is but newly revealed , it is an help ; yet not made use of , turns against the soul , to wound it , and to work despaire ; and this both because we have sinned against the meanes that should have saved us , as also because such as sinne against knowledge , sin with more presumption ; and the more presumption in thy life , the more despaire thou art apt to fall into at death . therefore esay 59. 11 , 12. what brought such trouble , and roarings like beares upon these jewes ? and that when salvation was looked for , that yet it was so far off from them , in their apprehensions ? our iniquities ( say they ) testifie to our face , and we know them . now then sins testifie to our face , when our conscience tooke notice of them , even to our faces , when we were committing them ; and then also the same sins themselves will againe testifie to our faces , when we have recourse for the pardon of them . therefore thou wilt lye roaring on thy death bed , and that thou knowest them , will come as an argument , that thou shalt not have mercie . as ignorance is a plea for mercie , i did it ignorantly , therefore i obtained mercie ; so i did it knowingly , will come in as a bar and a plea against thee , therefore i shall not have mercie . fiftly , both here and in hell , it is the greatest executioner and tormenter . in this sense it may be said , qui auget scientiam , auget dolorem : he that increaseth knowledge , increaseth sorrow , as solomon speaks : for knowledge enlargeth our apprehension of our guilt , and that brings more feare and torment . have they no knowledge , who eate up my people ? yes , there is their feare ( sayes david . ) therefore heb. 10. 28. after sinning after knowledge , there remaines not onely a more fearfull punishment , but a more fearfull expectation in the parties consciences . and this is the worme in hell , that gnawes for ever . light breeds these wormes . but then you will say , it is best for us to be ignorant , and to keep our selves so . i answer , no : for to refuse knowledge will damn as much as abusing it . this you may see in prov. 1. 23. ye fooles ( sayes wisedome ) you that hate knowledge , turne , and i will poure my spirit upon you , and make known my words to you . well , ver . 24. they refused , and would none of his reproof : therefore sayes god , i will laugh at your calamitie : that is , i will have no pitty , but instead of pitty , god will laugh at you ; and when your feare comes , i will not answer , because ye hated knowledge , ver . 29. so as this is as bad . there remaines therefore no middle way of refuge , to extricate thy selfe at , and avoid all this , no remedy but turning unto god : otherwise thou canst not but be more miserable than other men ; yea and this must be done speedily also : for thou having knowledge , god is quicker in denying thee grace , and in giving thee up to a reprobate mind , than another man , who is ignorant . he will wait upon another that knows not his will & waies , twenty , thirty , forty yeares , as he did upon the children of the israelites that were borne in the wildernesse , and had not seene his wonders in egypt , and at the red sea : but those that had , he soone sware against many of them , that they should never enter into his rest . christ comes as a swift witnesse against those to whom the gospell is preached , mal. 3. 5. he makes quick dispatch of the treaty of grace with them . therefore few that have knowledge are converted when they are old , or that lived long under the meanes . and therefore you that have knowledge , are engaged to repent , and to turn to god , and to bring your hearts to your knowledge , and that speedily also , or else your damnation will not only be more intolerable than others , but the sentence of it passe out more quickly against you . therefore as christ sayes , ioh. 12. 36. whilst you have the light , walk in it : for that day of grace , which is very clear and bright , is usually a short one . and though men may live many naturall dayes after , and enjoy the common light of the sunne , yet the day of grace , and of gracious excitements to repent , may be but a short one . finis . aggravation of sinning against mercie : by exaggerating the riches of common mercies men sinne against . by tho : goodwin b. d. london , printed by m. f. for r. dawlman , at the brazen serpent in pauls church-yard . mcd xxxvii . the table . the first generall head. what goodnesse , or bounty , patience , and long suffering are in god. page 3. bounty in god described . ibid. 1. he must be a giver . 4 2. what he gives must be his owne . ibid. 3. he must give largely . 5 4. he must give all he gives freely . 6 5. he looks for no recompence for time to come . 7 patience is a further thing than mercy . 8 1. though we injure god , and he be sensible of it , yet he is patient . ibid. 2. he vouchsafeth that time he forbeares them in to repent . 9 3. he waits that men would come in and repent . ib. lastly , long suffering is but patience lengthned out farther . ibid. the second generall head. riches of this goodnesse spent on us . 10 1. they are riches in themselves . ibid. 2. all the world spend on these riches . 11 3. the time he hath forborne men . 12 4. the expensive prodigality of sinners in all ages . ibid. patience is precious . 13 1. in regard of what those manifestations of his goodnesse cost . 13 2. in regard of the usefulnesse . 14 the third generall head. all this patience is used as meanes to bring men to repentance . 16 1. all this goodnesse witnesseth a gracious hand in all these . ib. 2. our owne conscience beares witnesse of offending a good god. 17 3. a common principle will witness against us when we returne evill for good . ibid. an vse of expostulation with sinfull and impenitent men , and considerations drawn from . 18 1. their creation out of nothing . 19 2. their being made men . 20 3. having all the members of a man. 21 4. preparing the world for them . 22 5. suffering them to live a long time in it . 23 6. giving them space to repent in . 25 7. living upon his cost and charges . 28 8. filling up their yeers and time with goodnes . 31 as riches , credit , friends , comfort in them all . aggravations of sinning against mercie . rom . 2. 4 , 5. or despisest thou the riches of his goodnesse , and forbearance , and long suffering , not knowing that the goodnesse of god leadeth thee to repentance ? but after thy hardnesse and impenitent heart , treasurest up unto thy selfe wrath against the day of wrath , and revelation of the righteous judgement of god ? this is the last & most weighty aggravation which the apostle puts into the measure of the gentiles sinfulnesse ( which in the former chapter he had , verse 29. pronounced full before ) to make it fuller yet : their sinning against mercies , and despising the riches of gods goodnesse , patience , and forbearance , the hatefull evill and iniquity whereof , can be better no way set off and illustrated unto mens consciences , than by a display of the riches of that goodnesse which mea sinne against . my purpose therefore is to unlock and carry you into that more common treasury of outward mercies , and leade you through the severall roomes thereof , all which doe continually leade you unto repentance : that then reflecting upon our ungratefull waste , and abuse of so many mercies in sinning , thereby our sins , every sinne , the least , may yet appeare more sinfull unto us , who are lesse than the least of all those mercies . know then , that besides that peculiar treasure of unsearchable riches of grace laid up in christ ( the offer of which neglected and despised , addes yet to all that sinfulnesse , a guilt as farre exceeding all that which shall be spoken of , as heaven exceeds the earth ) there is another untold mine of riches the earth is full of , as the psalmist tells us , and the apostle here , which these gentiles onely heard of , and which we partake of all as much as they . as there are riches of grace offered to you which can never be exhausted ; so there are riches of patience spent upon you , which you will have spent out in the end ; the expence of which , cast up , will alone amount to an immense treasure , both of guilt in you , and of wrath in god , as these words informe us . to helpe you in this account , i will 1. in generall , shew what goodnesse , or bounty , patience , and long suffering are in god. 2. that there are riches of these spent upon all the sons of men . 3. that these all leade men to repentance . and then 4. i will expostulate with you , and aggravate your sinfulnesse , in going on to despise all these by unrepentance , as the apostle here doth . first , in that god is said here to be good , or bountifull : 2. patient , or forbearing : 3. long-suffering , they seeme to note out three degrees of his common mercies unto men . first , he is a good , or a bountifull god : for so , as goodnesse is here used , i exegetically expound it : for though it be true , that goodnesse and bounty may differ ; yet when riches of goodnesse are said to be communicated , it imports the same , and is all one with bounty ; and such is god. and all those noble and royall qualifications and properties which concurre to make one truely good , and bountifull , doe meet and abound in him , in all those good things which he doth bestow ; and are found truly in none but in him : so that it may be truly said , that there is none good but god , as christ sayes of him . now bounty , in the generall , which is in god , may be thus described : it is a free , willing , and a large giving of what is meerly his own , looking for no recompense againe . to explaine this , that you may see , that all these conditions are required to true goodnesse , and all of them to be found in god onely . 1. he that is bountifull , he must be a giver , and bestower of good things : and all he bestows , it must be by way of gift , not by way of recompence unto , or by desert from the party hee bestowes all on : therefore christ sayes , luke 6. 33. that to doe good to those who have done , or doe good to us , is not thank-worthy , nor is it bounty . but god is therefore truely good , because hee simply , meerely , and absolutely gives away all which he bestowes : for hee was not , nor can any way become beholden to any of his creatures ; nor had formerly received any thing from them , which might move him hereunto : so rom. 11. 35. who hath first given him , that hee may recompence him againe ? nay untill he gave us a being , we were not capable of so much as receiving any good thing from him . 2. he who is truly termed good , or bountifull , all that he gives away must be his owne ; and so all which god bestowes , it is his owne . so psal . 24. 1. the earth is the lords . the ground wee tread on , the place wee dwell in ; hee is our landlord . but is that all ? for the house may be the landlords , when the furniture is the tenants : therefore he further addes , and the fulnesse of it is his also : that is , all the things that fill the world , all the furniture , and provision of it both ; all the moveables . ( so psal . 50. 11 , 12. ) the cattell and the fowles upon a thousand hills are mine , sayes hee ; and also all the standing goods , the corne and oile ( which you set and plant ) are mine , hos . 2. 9. yea and the psalmist in the same 24. psalme , adds further , that they who dwell therein are his also : not the house and furniture onely , but the inhabitants themselves . and this , by the most sure , and most soveraigne title that can be , better than that of purchase , or inheritance , of and from another : for he hath made them ; all is thine , because all comes of thee , sayes the same david , 1 chron. 29. 11 , 12. and all things are not onely [ of him ] but [ through him ] rom. 11. 36. that is , they cannot stand nor subsist without him . even kings , ( the greatest and most bountifull of men ) their bounty is but as that of the clouds , which though they showre down plentifully , yet they first received all from the earth below them . 3. he must give largely , it is not bounty else . now god is therefore said to be rich in goodnesse , because he is abundant in it . so we finde it , comparing psal . 33. 5. with psal . 104. 24. in which it is said , that the earth is full of his goodnesse , and his riches ; which we may judge of , by what he sayes in the 27. verse of that 104. psalme , of what an house he keepes , and what multitudes he feeds : all these ( saith the psalmist ) wait on thee , that thou mayest give them meat , and thou openest thy hand , and they are filled with good . king ahasuerus , to shew his bounty , made a feast to his chiefe subjects , but it was but for halfe a yeare , and not to all : some few halfe yeeres more would well nigh have beggard him ; but god doth thus continually . the greatest and most bountifull of men , when they would expresse the largest of their bounty , speake but of giving halfe of their kingdomes , ( so herod , and he did but talk so too ) but god bestowes whole worlds , and kingdomes , as daniel speakes , dan. 4. 35. and gives them to whom he please . 4. he that is bountifull , must give all he gives freely , and willingly . which , though i put together , yet may imply two distinct things : as first , that he that gives , must be a free agent in it , who is at his choice , whether he would give any thing away or no. the sunne doth much good to the world , it affords a large light , and even halfe the world at once is full of its glory : yea and all this light is its owne , not borrowed , as that of the moone and starres is ; yet this sunne cannot be called good or bountifull , because it sends forth this light necessarily , and naturally ; and cannot choose but doe so ; nor can it draw in its beames . but god is a free giver , he was at his choice , whether he would have made the world or no ; and can yet when hee pleaseth , with-draw his spirit and face , and then they all perish , psal . 104. 29. secondly , it must be willing by also : that is , no way constrained , nor by extraction wrung from him , who is to be called bountifull . a willing mind in matter of bounty , is more accepted than the thing , 2 cor. 8. 12. now of god it is said , dan. 4. 22. that he gives the kingdomes of the world to whom he will , and none swayes him , or can stay his hand , ver . 35. yea hee gives all away with delight . so psal . 104. 31. having spoken of feeding every living thing , and of other the like works of his goodnesse , throughout that psalme , hee concludes with this , god rejoyceth in all his workes : that is , doth all the good he doth to his creatures with delight ; it doth him good ( as it were ) to see the poore creatures feed . last of all , looking for no recompence for the time to come . this is another requisite in bounty . sayes christ , luke 6. 34. if you give to receive againe , as sinners doe , this is not thank-worthy : but ver . 35. so doth not your heavenly father : for ( sayes he ) doe good , and hope for nothing againe , so shall you be like your father , and then you shall shew your selves true children of the [ most high. ] in which word , he insinuates a reason why god gives all thus : because he is so great , and so high a god , as nothing wee doe can reach him ; as david speaks , psal . 16. 2. my goodnesse extends not unto thee : he is too high to receive any benefit by what we doe . and even that thankfulnesse he exacts , he requires it but as an acknowledgement of our duty , and for our good , deut. 10. 12. and so much for the first , namely , what goodnesse and bounty is : and how god is truely good , and he onely so . but this attribute of his , and the effects of it , he exerciseth towards all our fellow creatures , and did to adam in paradise . but now to us ward ( as the apostle speaks ) namely the sons of men , now fallen , hee extendeth and manifests a further riches , namely , of patience and long-suffering , which the devills partake not of , the good angels and other creatures : that sinned not , are uncapable of . for as christ sayes , luke 6. 35. in what he bestowes on us , he is kind to such , as are evill and unthankfull . mercy is more than goodnesse , for mercy alwaies doth respect misery : and because all the creatures are subject to a misery , rom. 8. 20 , 21 , 22. of bondage and vanity , therefore his tender mercies are over all his workes . but yet patience is a further thing than mercy , ( as mercy is than goodnesse ) being exercised , not towards miserable creatures onely , but towards sinners , and includes in it more three things further towards them . 1. not only that those persons he doth good unto do offend , and injure him ; but that himself also is exceeding sensible of all those wrongs , and moved by them , and also provoked to wrath thereby ; it is not patience else . so in the 2. of pet. 3. 9. it is not slacknesse ( sayes he there : ) god is not slack : that is , he sits not in heaven as one of the idol gods , that regarded not what acts were kept here below ; or took not to heart mens carriages towards him ; but is long-suffering , or patient ; that is , he apprehends himselfe wronged , is fully sensible of it ; is angry with the wicked every day , psal . 7. 11. he hath much adoe to forbear , even when he doth forbeare , and letteth them alone ; he exerciseth an attribute , a vertue towards them , namely , patience , in keeping in of his anger ; which is as to keepe fire in ones bosome . but secondly , this is not all ; he doth not simply forbeare , and restraine his anger , but vouchsafeth that time he forbeares them in , that they might repent in it ; and his mercies , as meanes leading to repentance . so it followes in that 2 pet. 3. 9. but god is long suffering to us-ward , and his long suffering hath this in it , not willing that any should perish , but come unto repentance . so also revel . 2. 21. it is called space to repent . and all the blessings he vouchsafeth , he gives them as means and guides to leade them on to repentance , as here . and mat. 18. 29. have patience with me , and i will pay thee all . that is , give me a longer day and space to pay the debt in , and be willing to accept it when i bring it , and let me lye out of prison , that i may be enabled to pay it . thirdly , there is yet a further thing in his patience , namely , a waiting , and expectation that men would come in , and repent . so luke 13. 17. these three yeeres have i [ come seeking ] fruit , but have found none : there was an expectation , a longing , a desire it would bring forth fruit , oh when shall it once be , sayes god , ier. 13. last ? in the last place , that other attribute of long suffering , which is the third , is but as a further degree of patience ; but patience lengthened out farther , that is , when god hath beene thus patient , hath forborne and waited for their comming in , and that not for three yeeres , but haply thirty , forty yeeres , and still they turne not ; his patience then begins ( as we would think ) to be ( as it were ) worne out , and his anger begins to arise , as if he could forbeare no longer ; ( as it was towards that tree , why cumbereth it the ground ? cut it downe ) yet hee goes on to spare a man another yeere , and many more yeares still after that ; and endureth with much long suffering ( as rom. 9. 22. ) the vessels of wrath , endures to wonderment , above measure , beyond all expectation , all patience , as it were ; this is long suffering . the second generall head is , that there are [ riches ] of this his goodnesse , &c. expended on us . it is a rich goodnesse , patience and long suffering : rich in themselves , in regard of their abundance , as they came from him : and rich also in regard of their precious usefulnesse unto us , as they may be improved by us . first , in themselves they are rich : if wee consider what is expended , all that while , hee layes out , not simply his power to sustain and uphold all things , and to maintaine us freely : so to doe is nothing to him . for whilst he doth but so , nothing goes out of purse , or is detracted from him ; ( as i may so speak ) he feeles not the expence either of power , providence , &c. all this cost him but words : for he upholds all , creates all by the word of his power , hebr. 1. and thus to maintaine the angels , and to have maintained all mankinde before they fell , had beene no more . but ( my brethren ) when now he maintains us sinners , not simply power goes forth from him , but his glory is expended , and taken from him , and for the while wasted , detracted from ; he loseth , at present , every day infinitely by us , and he is sensible of it ; every sinne takes glory from him , robs him , as he himselfe complaines : that he who made the world , upholds it , ( keeps it together , as the hoops doe the barrell , it would fall to pieces else , to nothing ; in whom all live , as fishes in the sea , yea upon whom all live ) that he should live unknown , unthought of , unserved ; yea disgraced , dishonoured in the world , and have this world lost to him , as it were ; and sinne , the devill , wicked men , to have all the glory from him , to be exalted , to carry the whole world afore them : this spends upon him , he had need of riches to doe this . secondly , consider the multitude of sinners , that thus spend , and live upon these riches , no lesse than all the world : hee had need of multitudes of patience in him : he forbeares not one , but all and every one . we looke upon one man , and seeing him very wicked , wee wonder god cuts him not off ; we wonder at our selves , that god did not cut us off before this , when once our eyes are opened : nay then cast your eyes over all the world , and stand amazed at gods forbearance towards it . take the richest man that ever was , to have millions of men in his debt , it would undoe him soone . all the world are in gods debt , and run still in debt every day more and more , and yet he breaks not , nay breaks not them . nay thirdly , to manifest this abundance yet more , consider not onely the multitude hee forbeares , but the time he hath done it : to forbeare much , and to forbeare it long : he hath forborne , and beene out of purse from the beginning of the world , since men were upon the face of the earth , five thousand yeeres and a halfe already ; and how long it is yet to the day of judgement , wee know not : and yet ye see , he is as patient , and as bountifull now in the latter dayes of the world , as he was at the first . did that greatest convert that ever was , that had not lived past thirty yeeres in his sinfull estate ( for he was young when he held the stoners clothes that stoned stephen ) and yet was the chiefest of sinners , did he yet ( as himselfe sayes ) thinke himselfe a patterne of long suffering , 1 tim. 1. 16. though it a great matter god should forbeare so long ? what is the whole world then ? if he , being but one small poore vessell , was so richly laden with the riches of gods patience , how is this great bark of the world then fraught , that hath gone over so vast a gulfe of time ? how much of these his riches have been laden in it ? and then fourthly , adde to this the expensive prodigality of all these sinners in all ages ; every sinner spends something , and how lavish are men of oathes ? all the thoughts of mens hearts from their youth up , they are evill , and onely evill , and continually : and how much then hath every man spent him ? every sin is a debt . in the second place , this is a rich goodnesse and patience in regard of the preciousnesse and usefulnesse . first , precious , in regard of what all these manifestations of his goodnesse and forbearance cost , even the blood of his sonne , who as a lord hath bought and purchased all wicked men ; their lives , and their reprivall , all that time that here they live ; and all the blessings and dispensations of goodnesse , which here they do enjoy . christs mediation so far prevailes with god for all the world , that it puts a stop to the present proceedings of justice , which otherwise had said of all , that day thou sinnest , thou dyest . so that as christ may be called the wisdome and the power of god ; so also the patience and the long suffering of god. for , for his sake , and through his meanes , it is exercised : god would not shew a drop of mercy , but for his sonne . which , i take , strongly and clearly intimated , in that dealing of his , with the jewes , ( exod. 23. 20. compared with exod. 33. 2 , 3 , 4 , &c. immediately after god had given the law , ( by the rules and threatnings whereof , god the father in his government was to proceed ) and after they had transgressed it , he there declares , that he could not goe with them : rested thee , and told thee , this world was no place for thee , for hell is onely our owne place , acts 1. 25. thou shoulest have beene executed the first day . and is not so much time of ease from punishment infinite mercy ? cast but your thoughts upon the angels that fell , that have been in hell from the first moment of their sinning , doe but thinke with your selves , what they would give to have so much time , cut out of that eternity , they are to run through , & to have it set apart for ease , and to be void of torment ; if the rich man in hell , made it such a great suit , and counted it so great a favour to have but one drop of water ( which could but for a little while ( scarce more than a moment ) have cooled and eased , not his whole body , but the tip of his tongue only ) how much more would he have thought it mercy , to have lived so many yeares againe as he had done free from torment ? what is it then for thee , to live so many yeares free from the falling of the least drop of that wrath , whereof the full vialls should have been poured out many yeares agoe ? the same law was out against us , which was out against the angels ; that day thou eatest , thou shalt dye the death : what put the difference ? the apostle tells us , his long suffering to us ward : not to them : for in chap. 2. 4. he had told us that hee spared not the angels which fell , but posted , and threw them into hell , as soone as they had sinned . sixtly , but further , in the 6. place ; is this all ? hath it beene barely a time of ease given thee , a time of reprivall ? no , it hath beene more , space to repent , and so to obtaine thy pardon in , rev. 2. 21. and as it hath beene more than ease of torment unto thee , so also consider it hath beene more than slacknesse in him that hath afforded it to thee , as the apostle there doth tell us . it is not that he hath tooke no notice of thy offending him , but he is sensible of every idle thought , of every oath , vaine word , and as the scripture tels us , he is pained at the very heart , in so much as he repents that ever he made thee ; he is angry with thee every day thou risest , every time hee lookes on thee , when ever he meets thee going into the taverne to be drunk , the whorehouse to be uncleane , when he meets thee reeling in the streets , he hath much adoe to forbeare killing thee , as he had to forbeare moses when he met him in the inne : he is ready to have a blow at thee , and it should not need be any great stroake , or fetching his arme about ; if he did but blow on thee , thou wert consumed . to suffer thee to live , doth therefore cost him much riches of patience ; but to cut thee off , need cost him nothing : hee can doe that with ease . but further , all is joyned with a willingnesse that thou shouldst repent , and not perish , as that place tells thee . it were much mercy for a traytor to be reprived , to have a lease of his life for twenty yeeres , though there were no hope nor meanes of obtaining his finall pardon after that time spent , and this also , though moneth , a yeere ? what others , who have laine gasping , would have given a world for time againe , ( as i have heard one crying day and night ( call time againe ) or if not then , oh what in hell : the third thing i am to shew , is , that all this goodnesse , patience , and forbearance , is afforded towards you as a meanes , and helpes to bring you to repentance . acts 17. 26 , 27 , 28. god ( sayes the apostle there ) hath allotted to men , both their times to live in , and also their places of abode and habitations , all richly furnished with blessings to uphold their lives & beings . and to what end are both these thus afforded ? that they might seek the lord , if by groping after him ( even as men in the darke ) they might haply finde him . but men being in the darke , and destitute of guides to bring thē unto god , may yet be as far of finding him as ever . therefore adde but the words of my text , to what the apostle sayes there , and we see , that this goodnesse of god takes us by the hand , and leads us to repentance ; to turne from sinne unto god , and so to finde him . and thus lead are you unto god , by the help of three severall guides , which each after other sweetly leade you , and point you out to this . first , all this goodnesse beares witnesse to your hearts of a gracious hand that extends it self in all these ; therefore in that 17. of the acts , he subjoynes , god is not far off any of us . that there is a good god bestowes all things on you , is a thought lyes at next doore of all his blessings , not far off . yea they all ( sayes the apostle to the same gentiles , acts 14. 16. ) doe beare witnesse of him , ( though they went on in their owne wayes ) yet ( sayes he there ) god left not himselfe without witnesse ; that is , an impression on their hearts that his good hand bestowed all on them , when he filled their hearts with foode and gladnesse . secondly , his goodnesse having brought thus god to mens thoughts , then your owne consciences take you , and leade you downe into your selves , and beare witnesse , that you by walking in your owne wayes , doe nothing but provoke and offend this good god. so rom. 2. 15. and then thirdly , there is an indelible principle common to all men to love those who love them ; which after the two former have brought you hitherto , point , you to repentance , as the conclusion . [ shall we goe on to sinne against this good , so good ? returne evill for good ? ] is not this a naturall necessary consequent out of all these , to say as they , let us therefore feare the lord , who giveth us the early and the latter raine , as it is ier. 5. 26 , 27 ? and though men are said not to know this , in the text , yet the meaning is , they doe not throughly and effectually consider thus much , so as thereby to be brought to repentance , yet however there is such a witnesse of all this in all mens hearts , and thus are they led on unto repentance , would they see their way and follow their guide . the use shall be an use of expostulation ( as here the apostle carryes it ) with men sinfull and impenitent , for going on to sinne against all this mercy ; together with an aggravation of their sinfulnesse hereby . men , if young , doe usually take the advantage of this their precious time , ( which out of so much long suffering is vouchsafed them ) and of all those precious opportunities , and blessings they enjoy , to improve them onely , in reaping and gathering in to themselves the pleasures of sinne ; making the time of youth their harvest of sinning , and yet thinke to escape by repenting , afterwards : and then when old , after they have already enjoyed a long and a faire sunshine day to turne to god in , and to have sowne much seed to the spirit , the comfort whereof they might now have reaped ; yet as they have altogether neglected so to doe all their youth , so they goe on to doe so still , whilst they see they have any day left , be it never so neare the setting ; and doe choose rather desperately to venture their estate in the world to come , upon the riches of his mercy pardoning , ( though without all care and endeavour to change their hearts or lives ) upon the experience they have had of the riches of his mercy forbearing them in this world , thinking to finde him the same in both . with all such , let me reason a little , and from the riches of gods goodnesse , patience , &c. spent upon them , at once expostulate with them , for their impenitency , and aggravate to them their sinfulnesse , and also , if possible , prevail with them to goe on to despise it thus no longer . and if there be any principle of common ingenuity , any sparke ( i doe not say of grace , but of goodnesse of nature ) left unextinguisht , me thinkes it should affect you , and doe some good on youere i have done . and to that end , consider a little , and compare together gods loving kindnesses towards you , and your unkind dealings towards him . to begin at the very beginning of thy being : how much riches of goodnesse were there laid and buried in thy foundation ? when the first corner stone was laid , when thou wert made a man , ( besides the cost which hath beene spent upon this building since ) and , cursed as thou art , even that very foundation was laid in bloody iniquities , in which thou wert conceived ; and the very materialls of soule and body , thou consistest of , being tempered with sinne , like the stone in the wall , and beame out of the timber , cry out every moment to god against thee , as edom did , rase it , rase it , even to the very ground . consider how but the other day thou were meere nothing , and when an infinite number that never were nor shall be , were in as great a possibility of being as thou , ( for when he made this world , he could have laid it aside wholly , and created millions of otherworlds ) yet he chose thee to have a roome in this , but one world , ( for he means to make no more ) and this world could have stood without thee , and did before thou wert , and shall doe when thou art gone : yet he called thee forth out of nothing , and by his almighty power , bade thee stand forth when there was no need of thee . i say he chose thee to have a being : for as there is an election of things that are to salvation , so out of things that were not unto being . and wretch that thou art , if thou repentest not , thou destroyest what god hath made , and hadst better have kept nothing still , and never have peept out , or else to skulk into thy first nothing againe , for thou art lost , better never to have beene borne . secondly , consider yet more goodnesse . thou mightest have beene admitted into the lowest forme of creatures , have beene a worme , a flea , a flye , which we men fillip and crush to death at pleasure : but to be made a man , created one of the states , barons , lords of the world the first houre , admitted into the highest order , crowned a king in the wombe , as david sayes of man , psal . 8. 5. made a little lower than the angels , but crowned with glory and honour ; made to have dominion over all the works of his hands . the one halfe of thee is more worth than a whole world , [ thy soule ] as christ sayes , that went to the price of soules ; upon which god hath bestowed an eternity of being , and made it the picture of his face , his image , when other creatures do weare but his footsteps . and thy body the other peece , and indeed but the case , the sheath , ( as daniels phrase and the chaldee hath it , dan. 7. 15. ) of thee , what a curious workmanship is it ? wonderfully and fearfully made , as david sayes , psalm . 139. 15. curiously wrought in the lower parts of the earth : so there he calls the womb ; because as curious workmen , when they have some choice piece in hand , perfect it in private , and then bring it forth to light for men to gaze at : so god out of a teare , a drop , he hath limmed out the epitome of the whole world ; the index of all the creatures . sunne , moone , starres , are to be found in thee . and yet wretch as thou art , thou art withall the epitome of hell , and broughtest into the world with thee , the seeds and principles of all the villanies , that have beene acted in the world , and if thou repentest not , thou hadst better have beene a toad , or serpent , the hatefullest of creatures ; and wouldst change thy condition with them one day . thirdly , being a man , hast thou all thy members that belong unto a man ? it is because hee wrote them all in his booke , psal . 139. 16. if he had left out an eye in his common-place booke , thou hadst wanted it ; is not that a mercy ? aske the blinde . if thou hadst wanted those windows to looke out at , thy body would have beene a dungeon , the world a prison . if a tongue ( which is thy glory ) or an eare , thou hadst lived among men , as a beast among men . and yet when god gave thee all these , what did he but put weapons into an enemies hand ? for hast thou not used all these , as weapons of unrighteousnesse ? insomuch as the tongue , but one member , is called a world of iniquity by the apostle ; and if thou repentest not , thou hadst better ( as christ sayes ) have entred into the world without an eye , an care , a tongue , than with these goe for ever into hell . fourthly , when thou wert taken out of the wombe , ( where thou didst remaine , but whilest thou wert a framing ) what a stately palace hath he brought thee into , [ the world ] which thou findest prepared , and ready furnisht with all things for thy maintenance , as canaan was to the children of israel ; a stately house thou buildest not , trees thou plantedst not , a rich canopy spangled , spread as a curtaine over thy head ; he sets up a taper for thee to work by [ the sun ] till thou art weary , psal . 104. 23. and then it goes down without thy bidding , for it knows its going downe , ver . 19. and then he drawes a curtain over halfe the world , that men may goe to rest , thou causest darknesse , and it is night , ver . 20. an house this world is , so curiously contrived , that to every roome of it , even to every poore village , springs doe comes as pipes to finde thee water . so psal . 104. 10 , 11. the pavement of which house thou treadest on , brings forth thy food , ver . 14. bread for strength , wine to cheere thy heart , oyle to make thy face to shine , ver . 15. which three are there synecdochically put for all things needfull to strength , ornament , and delight . the very chambers of that house ( as david calls them ) drop fatnesse , and water the earth , ver . 13. hee wheeles the heavens about , and so spins out time for thee , every moment of which time brings forth some blessing or other , and no one is barren . therefore psal . 65. 11. the yeere is said to be crowned with goodnesse : a diadem of goodnesse encircles it round : and yet thou hast filled this world thou thus art brought into , with nothing but rebellions , as hee hath done with blessings , and hast piled up sins to heaven ; and thou hast pressed all these armies of blessings thou findest the world filled with , to fight against their maker , under the devills banner , whom thy wickednesse sets up as the god of this world . and as the yeere is crowned with goodnesse , so thy yeeres with wickednesse , and no moment is barren ; but all thy imaginations are evill continually . yea thou hast sinned against heaven and earth , and subjected the whole creation unto vanity , laden the earth , and filled it so with wickednesse , that it groanes , the axeltree of it is even ready to crack under thee , and the ground thou treadest on to spue thee out . fiftly , since thou camest into the world , what a long time hath god suffered thee to live in it ? hee hath not spared thee three yeares onely , ( as he did the figtree ) but thirty , forty . and when thou first madest bold to thrust forth thy trayterous head into the world , death ( which thy sin brought into the world with it ) might have arrested but for one treason , and though all that time of his reprivall he carryes and behaves himselfe never so obediently . but unto thee , this time hath beene more than a longer day of life , and putting off the execution ( which for the guilt of that first rebellion should have been acted on thee in the womb ) it hath beene time to repent in : and yet hath not this time of thy reprivall made thee so much the more rebellious ? and hast not thou spent all this time in making up the measure of thine iniquity full ? and hath it beene will ingnesse onely in god that thou shouldest not perish ? yea more , joyned with waiting also , when it should once be , thinking the time long , as longing and desiring that thou wouldst repent , that he might pardon thee . thus ierem. 13. last , god expresseth himselfe , when shall it once be ? yea and consider how many dayes of payment have been set , and how many promises made , and broken all by thee , and yet still hee walteth unto wonderment . thou receiuedst presse money at thy baptisme , when thou didst promise to forsake the devill and all his workes , and to begin to serve him , when thou shouldst begin to discerne betweene good and evill . but no sooner did the light of knowledge dawne in thy heart , but thou beganst to fight against him ; and thy first thoughts to this day have beene onely and continually evill . and then ( haply ) in thy younger yeares , before thou hadst tasted of the pleasures of sinne , he gave thee an inkling , by meanes of thy education , of his goodnesse towards thee , and of that happinesse to be liad in him , and thou hadst the first offer of him , ere thy tender yeares were poysoned by the world ; and he hath dealt with thee againe and againe , both by his word and spirit ; not waited onely , but wooed thee , and hath beene a suiter to thy heart long : and i appeale to your hearts , how many promises you have made him , of turning from all your rebellions to him , after such a sermon , which was brought powerfully home : in such a sicknesse , and in such a strait , thy conscience knowes full well : and still god hath made tryall of thee , and given thee longer day ; and though thou hast broke with him againe and againe , yet he hath forborne thee againe and againe , and hath waited this twenty , thirty , forty , fifty , sixty years , when thou shouldest come in , and be as good as thy word , and still thou hast failed him . and yet behold and wonder , and stand confounded at the riches of his long suffering , that after so many yeares expence , and promises broken by thee , expectations failed in him , and many mockeries of him , after all this he is yet willing to accept of the remainder , if thou wouldst spend the rest of the time , left thee in the flesh , according to his will , as the apostle speaks , 1 pet. 4. 3. even to lose principall , use , and all , for what is past , and requires but the same composition was propounded the first day ; yea and not onely so , but with promise to become a debtor unto thee , to bestow further riches on thee than ever yet thou sawest , or art able to conceive : yea and all this , when he could have his penyworths out of thee another way , and lose not one farthing by thee , but by punishing thee in hell , recover all to the utmost . neither , seventhly , hath it beene barely and simply an act of patience and forbearance , though joyned with this willingnesse , thou shouldst not perish ; or meerely a permissive act of suffering thee to live . but god shewes forth yet more riches of goodnesse joyned with this long suffering ; in him ye live , and move , and have your being ; and dost thou live in him onely ? nay thou livest on him also , upon his cost and charges ; i have hung upon thee ( sayes david ) from my mothers wombe . and consider what thy life is , that of so small a bottome , he should spin out so long a thred ! had hee not drawne it out of his owne power , as the spider doth her web out of her owne bowels , it had beene at an end the second minute ; to maintaine that radicall moisture , that oyle that feeds the lampe , and light of thy life , that radicale balsamum , this is as great a miracle as the maintaining the oyle in the cruze of the poore famished widow . and further yet ; hath he maintained thee onely ? nay more , hath he not defended thee , tooke thy part , protected thee , tooke thee under his wing , as the hen doth her chickens , to shelter thee from those many dangers thy life hath been exposed unto ? otherwise , how many wayes , ere this , hadst thou been snatcht away out of the land of the living ? is thy case , the case of the figtree onely , which before we mentioned , that when god cryed , cut it downe , another cryed , spare it ? but there have beene many have cryed , cut thee downe , and god hath cryed , spare thee : there is never a minute , but the devills would have had a blow at thy life , as he longed to have had at iohs . that thou , a poore lump of flesh , shouldst walke through , and in the midst of such an host of fierce and cruell enemies , whose hearts are swelled with malice at thee , and god should say to them all , concerning thee , as he did to laban concerning iacob , touch not this man. and yet if thou wert not liable to their malice and power , yet consider how many dangers and casualties , besides , thou hast beene kept in , and from ; as falls , drowning , killing many wayes ; how often have the arrows of death come whisking by thee , took away those next thee , ( haply of thy kindred , brother , sister , yoke-fellow , of the same house , family with thy selfe ) and yet have missed thee ? and if we look no farther than these dayes of mortality we have lived in ; two great plagues in this kingdome , how have the most of us all here survived , and now the third is increasing and growing upon us ? to have our lives in such deare yeares of time , when to have our life for a prey is mercy enough , as ieremy told baruch ! that these arrows should flye round about us , over our heads , and misse us ! that gods arrests should seize upon men , walking , talking with us , and spare us ! how often , many other wayes , hath thy neck been upon the block , and the axe held over , and yet hath fallen besides ! to goe no farther than thy own body , the humours thereof , if god should not restraine them , would overflow and drowne it , as the waters would the earth , if god should not say to them , stay your proud waves . and when in a sicknesse they have been let out , yet god hath kept a sluce , that so much should break forth , and no more , which should purge , and wash the body , and make it more healthfull , as the overflowing of nilus doth . and when then thy body hath been brought low and weake , and like a crazy rotten ship in a storme , taking in water on all sides , so that all the physitians in the world could not have stopt those leakes ; yet hee hath rebuked wind and sea , hath careened , mended thee , and launched thee into the world againe , as whole , as sound , and strong as ever ; and god hath said , as iob. 33. that thou shouldst not dye . in a word , if thou consider but what thy life is , and the dangers it is subject to , thou wilt acknowledge it as great a wonder to preserve it , as to see a glasse , that hath beene in continuall use , gone through many hands , and hath had many knocks , and falls , to be kept for forty , fifty , sixty yeeres whole and unbroken : god hath carryed thy life in his hand , as it were a candle in a paper lanthorn in a strong windy night , and kept it from being extinct , when as wee often see in many , that a little cold comes but in at a little cranny , and blowes their candle out , as iob speaks . and eightly , how have these yeeres and hours of thy time been filled up with goodnesse ? and with how many comforts ? for a traytor to live , though but upon bread and water all his dayes , what favour is it ? and so hadst thou lived all this time , never so miserably , though all thy dayes thou hadst eaten thy bread in darknesse , and hadst had much sorrow with thy sicknesse , ( as solomon speaks . ) some there are , who , as iob speaks , iob 21. 15. dye in the bitternesse of their soules , and never eate with pleasure , scarce seeing a good day ; and if this had beene thy case , yet this is infinite mercy . even whatsoever is on this side hell , is mercy . lam. 3. 22. say they in the worst estate the church was ever on earth , it is thy [ mercies , ] not mercy onely , but multitude of mercies are shewne us , that we are not consumed , because his mercies are renewed every morning . if at the brink of hell , and not in , it is mercy . but hath he not all this while filled thy heart with food and gladnesse , as the apostle speaks , acts 14. 17 ? it were infinite to goe over the particular kinds of common comforts , which god vouchsafes men here : not halfe the riches of his goodnesse is yet told : it would require an age to make an inventory of them . hast a house in the world to hide thy head in , and keepe thee from the injuries of the weather ? ( which was more than christ had ) god he is thy landlord , ( though it may be thou payest him no rent ; ) he it is that builds the house , psal . 127. 1. hast a bed to lye upon ? he makes it , especially in thy sicknesse , psal . 41. 3. hast thou sleepe ( which is the nurse of nature , the parenthesis of all thy cares and griefes , ) he rocks thee asleep every night ; and as he gives thee a house , so hee gives thee rest , psal . 127. 2. it is god keeps off those gnatts of distracting cares , and griefes , and thoughts , and terrors of conscience , would buzze about a man , and keepe one continually waking . and when thou sleepest , is thy sleepe pleasant to thee ? god makes it so , ier. 31. 26. hast thou cloathes to cover thy nakednesse ? reade old iacobs indentures , gen. 28. 20. and thou shalt see by them whose finding they are at ; if thou wilt give mer rayment , that is one of his conditions mentioned . yea , doe thy cloathes keepe thee warme ? even this is attributed to him , iob 37. 17. he fills thee , feeds thee , spreads thy table , serves thee , fills thy cup , as david describes his goodnesse , psal . 23. 5. and gives thee thy meat in due season ; and hath not failed thee a meales meat , but thou hast had it at thy appointed time , as iob speaks . and hast thou health ? which is the salt to all these blessings , ( without which thou wouldst say , thou hadst no pleasure in them ) he is the god of thy health , and keeps off diseases . exod. 15. 26. i will put none of those diseases on thee ; i am the lord who healeth thee ; that is , preserve thee from them which else would seize on thee . and these mercies hee vouchsafeth unto you that are the poorest , and loades you with these and the like benefits every day . but hast thou riches added to these , and abundance ? the blessing of god maketh rich , prov. 10. 22. though thou hadst them by birth , yet hee made those friends , and parents of thine , but feoffees in trust for thee : they were no more , it was god who bequeathed them , eccl. 2. last . or whether thou hast got them since by thine owne industry , it is hee gives thee power to get wealth , deut. 8. 18. prov. 12. 24. and out of a small estate maketh men great , iob 8. 7. it is hee by his providence hath stopt the secret issues and draynes of expence , at which other mens estates runne out ; hath stopt that hole in the bottome of the bag , as the prophet speaks . and with these riches hath he given thee a heart to use them . this , as it is a farther mercy , eccles . 5. 19. and chap. 6. 2. so also from him , as it is noted there . or hast thou credit ( which is better than riches ? so sayes solomon , prov. 22. 1. ) it is god who gives it , not thy wisedome , parts , or worth : eccles . 9. 11. favour is not alwaies to men of skill : that is , not acceptation of what they doe , without a farther blessing from god. therefore besides the gift of wisdome , he gave a further promise of honour also unto solomon , 2 chron. 1. 11. it is god who fashions mens opinions . the apostle prayes to god his service might be accepted of the saints , though no service was like to be more acceptable , for it was the gathering and bringing in of almes and reliefe to them . it is he rules mens tongues , bids men blesse , as well as he bade shimei curse : and he hath kept thee from such grosse sinnes , which , as flyes , would have putrifyed the oyntment of thy good name , who also conceales those thou hast committed , and hides thee from the strife of tongues , iob 5. 21. hast thou friends , or doe any love thee ? ( wherein much of the comfort of our lives consists , and therefore david sayes of ionathan , 2 sam. 1. 26. thou wert pleasant to me ) it is god who gives favour in mens eyes : so hee did ioseph , gen. 39. 21. if any man or creature doth thee a kindnesse , he toucheth their hearts , ( as it is said of the men who clave to saul ) and visits for thee ; he made the aegyptians beyond all reason the israelites friends , gave them favour in their eyes , as the text tells us . and hence , gen. 33. 10. iacob sayes , he saw the face of god , in reconciled esaus face ; for gods favour appeared in his looke . he put you into your callings , ranks , and stations , gives you all your skill , successe in them ; the meanest of trades , to sow , and plough , and thresh , they are from the lord , who is wonderfull in working , ( esay 28. from the 23. to the end ) even as well as the skill of the most curious ingraver , limbner , or embroyderer ( as of bezaleel ) the scripture sayes , god was his master , taught him . hast thou enlarged parts and gifts for higher imployments ? it is not thy birth , or age hath acquired them unto thee : iob 32. 8 , 9. great men are not alwaies wise , therefore it goes not by birth ; nor have the aged alwaies understanding , it goes not onely by experience ; but it is the inspiration of the almighty . and hast a calling answerable to thy parts , to be a scholler , and have thy minde enriched and ennobled with the best and choisest jewell the world hath , wisdome and knowledge ; whereby the minde is elevated as much above other mens , as they are above beasts ? god hath beene thy great tutor , the mind of man is gods candle , and hee maketh wiser than a mans teachers , as he did moses in egyptian learning , daniel , david . to conclude , hast thou comfort in all these ? in riches , learning , credit , wife , children , meat , drink , &c. hee puts in all the sugar , delight and pleasure that especially depends on him ; even to fashion the heart to all these . as ayre lights not without the sunne , nor wood heats not without fire ; so neither doth thy condition comfort thee without god. and therefore acts 14. 17. it is said , he filled their hearts , as with food , so , with gladnesse . and besides all these , consider the many peculiar passages and turnings of his providence towards thee for thy good ; the working of things together , ever and anon to doe thee a good turne ; the packing and plotting all for thee , better than thou couldst have plotted for thy selfe ; as thy reliefe in many streights , successe in many businesses ; he workes all our works in us and for us , as esay speaks , esay 26. hath he not taken such speciall care and providence of thee , as if hee had regarded no man else in the world ? and now when thou hast considered all , bethinke thy selfe withall a little of thy dealings towards him : what have beene the effects and fruits of all this goodnesse ? hold up thy head man , looke god in the face . it is well yet , that shame begins to cover thee . how hath that his patience and long suffering , vouchsafing thee space to repent , wrought with thee ? how nigh to repentance hath it brought thee ? such is the perversenesse of mans nature , as solomon tells us , eccles . 8. 11. that because sentence against an evill worke is not presently executed , therefore the hearts of the sonnes of men are fully set to doe evill : because god defers punishing , they defer repenting ; thou thinkest to spend the most precious of thy time and strength in sinning , and give god the dreggs , the bottome , the last sands , thy dotage , which thy very selfe and friends are weary of , and all these blessings and comforts which god hath vouchsafed thee , how hast thou used them against him ? this oyle which should have beene fuell to thy thankfulnesse , hath encreased the fire of thy lusts , and thy lusts have consumed them all , iames 4. the riches hee hath given , thou hast made idols of , and sacrificed thy dearest , morning , daily thoughts and affections unto , as god complaines , ezek. 16. from the 15. and so on : [ his meat ] ( as at the 29. ver . he calls it ) thou sacrificedst to thy belly , which thou hast made thy god ; thy strength to women ; the wealth hee hath given you , you have made use of , but to live at a high rate of sinning , and to procure the sweetest bits , the daintiest and most costly sinnes ; the edge of that sword of power god hath put into thy hand , thou hast turned against him and his , haply both his children and ministers ; so that god , by giving thee all these , hath but made thee more able to offend him , and hath strengthned an enemy , and by sparing thee thus long , hath but made thee more bold to doe it ; all his mercyes have but fortifyed thy heart against him ; doe ye requite the lord thus , ye foolish people and unkind ? as moses expostulates the case , deut. 32. 6. as christ said to the jewes , for which of all my good workes doe yee stone me ? so say i to you , for which of all his mercies is it , ye sinne against him ? what , to fight against him with his owne weapons ? to betray all he gives you into the devills , his enemies hands ? what iniquity did you ever finde in him , thus to deale ? god will one day thus expostulate his cause with you , and heape coales of fire upon all your heads , ( if that you turne not ) because you have rendred him evill for good : and all these mercies thus abused , will be as so many coales to make hell fire the hotter . and to reason this point yet further with you out of the text , and what arguments it will afford to work upon you . consider , first , what it is thou doest ; whilest thus thou goest on , thou art a despiser of the riches of his goodnesse : that which is opposite to goodnesse , must needs be transcendently evill . what , art thou evill , because god is good ? and so much the more evill , by how much the more he is good , surely there must needs be an unexhausted treasure of wickednesse in thee , which will also cause in the end a treasure of wrath in him ; what and sinne against mercy , patience , long suffering , added to goodnesse ? of all attributes , as the richest to the most glorious ; for it is that he glories in : in the abusing of which , therefore he thinkes himselfe most debased : of all attributes the tenderest : what , kick against his bowels ? so are his mercies called : canst hit him no where else but there ? to despise a mans wisdome , power , learning , is not so much as to despise his love ; what canst thou imagine will become of thee , when thou commest to dye ? what is it thou wilt then come to plead and cry for ? o mercy , mercy ; why wretch that thou art , it is mercy thou hast sinned against . riches of mercy and patience abused ; turnes into fury . i may allude to that speech , 1 sam. 2. 25. if a man sinne against his brother , the iudge shall judge him ; but if against god , who shall plead for him ? so hadst thou sinned against any other attribute , mercy might have pleaded for thee ; but if against mercy it selfe , who shall ? well , if thou goest on thus to doe so still , thou hast a hard heart ; it argues the greatest hardnesse of all other ; that is the second . you use not ( however it comes to passe ) to deale thus with the worst of men , sinner like to your selves ; but to them that love you , you tender love againe , luke 6. 33. and will you deale so with god ? is it a small thing to weary men , but you must weary god also ? sayes esay , 7. 13. hee thought it infinitely lesse to abuse men than god ; but you carry your selves as men , to men , but as devills towards god ; herein ye have not the hearts of men in you ; not principles of common humanity , whereby ye differ from beasts ; the cords of love are called the cords of a man , hos . 11. 6. the spirit of man breakes , melts under kindnesse ; beasts indeed yee use to prick with goades , but the cords of a man are the cords of love ; no principle being more deepely engraven in mens hearts , than this , to doe good to those who doe good to you , mat. 5. 46. nay , would ye had herein yet the hearts of beasts ; the oxe knowes his owner , the asse his masters cribb , but my people have rebelled against mee . a sinne so much against nature , that he calls upon those creatures , who have no more than meere nature in them , viz. the heavens to stand astonisht at it . but as nature elevated by grace , riseth higher than it self ; so being poysoned with sinne , it is cast below it selfe , sins against it self , and the principles which are begotten in and with it selfe ; if it were not so , how were it possible thou shouldst hate him , who never did thee hurt ? and goe on to wound him , who weepeth overthee ? and despise that in him most , which seekes to save thee ? and load him with sins ? amos 2. 13. who loades thee daily with his mercies , psal . 68. 19. there is a third consideration the text suggests , to shew the fearfulnesse of thy sin in this respect ; and that is , that thou goest on every minute sinning and in impenitency , by despising his goodnesse , to treasure up wrath against the day of wrath ; to sin against mercy , of all other encreaseth wrath ; thou must pay treasures , for treasures spent . as thou lavishly spendest riches of mercy , so god will recover riches of glory out of thee : god will not lose by thee , but will reckon with thee in wrath for every offer of patience spent ; for every sand of long suffering that runs out , hee drops in a drop of wrath into his vialls , and it will prove a treasure , such a treasure as shall bring in an eternall revenue of glory unto god , of all his glory lost , and riches spent , with advantage ; such a treasure , as will aske an eternity of time to be spent upon thee , and yet be never emptied or made lesse ; and the longer thou goest on , the greater heap it will swell unto . and dost thou know and consider how fast this treasure fills , and how much the longer thou goest on to adde to it , still the more thou addest , still the last yeere more than all the yeeres before ? every minutes impenitency adding to this heape and summe , as new figures added in a summe use to doe ; the first is but one , the second makes it ten , the third an hundred , the fourth a thousand , and what a summe will this grow to ? ay but thou wilt say , tush , i am in prosperity , in health , wealth , and ease , and to day shall be as to morrow , and much more abundant . esay 56. 12. well , but fourthly , consider out of the text , that there will come a day at last , the morrow whereof will be a day of wrath : it is treasuring up now , but is not brought forth till the day of wrath , till which day thou mayest goe on and prosper , as iob giving us the reason why wicked men prosper here , sayes , chap. 21. they are reserved to the day of wraths , in the plurall , because treasures are laid up against then ; thou art yet spared , because thy sins are not yet full , and that treasure is not full , as the sins of the amorites were not ; and all this thy present prosperity fits thee but for hell . so rom. 9. 22. they are said to be vessells fitted for destruction , by long suffering . and so nahum tells us , they are but as stubble laid out in the sunne a drying , till it be fully dry , nahum 1. 10. that it may burne the better ; and like grapes that are let to hang in the sunshine till they be ripe , revel . 15. 16. and so thou for the winepresse of gods wrath . but thy senselesse heart may hap to say , i see no such thing , and these are but threats , i thinke so ; therefore it is said in the text , that it is a treasure ; which , as treasures use to be , is hid till that day comes , & then revealed , as the words have it . for though thou seest not this day a comming , yet god who sits in heaven , sees thy day a comming , as david sayes , psal . 37. 13. who is therefore said to see it , because himselfe sees it not ; and it is a comming faster than thou art aware of it , 2 pet. 2. 3. damnation slumbereth not , though thou dreamest not of it ; lingreth not : as an hue and cry , it is sent out , and is on its course , and will in the end overtake thee , and that when thou least thinkest of it , as a theefe in the night , when thou art asleepe , yet dreamest not of it , 2 thes . 5. when thou art least prepared for it , as in the old world , when they were eating and drinking : as god watcheth when his child is at the best and ripest , and then takes him ; so he will watch thee to take thee for thy neglect , at thy worst , and give thee haply no time to prepare ; they goe downe to hell in a moment , psal . 73 9. finis . imprimatur ; tho : weekes . r. p. ep o : lond. cap. domest . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a01894-e1150 gen. 2. heb. 1. 2. rom. 1. 2 sam. 14. 14. isa . 40. rom. 6. 1 pet. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes for div a01894-e5810 doct. to sin against knowledge is the highest aggravation of sinning . demonstratiōs of the point , by comparing it vvith other kinds of sinning . how much sinnes against knowledge doe transcend sins of ignorance . in sins of ignorance there may be a supposition , if he had known it , he would not have done it : but not so in these . the vast difference between them , appears in the repentance god accepts for each . a generall repentance for the one , not so for the other . some kinds of sinning against knowledge exclude frō mercy , which done ignorantly leave a capacity of it . sinning against knowledge is the highest to sinning against the holy ghost . secondly , reasons , which are 6. 1. because knowledge is the greatest 〈◊〉 . 2. reason . knowledge is the immediate guide of men in all their wayes : a man sins against his guide . that knowledge is so , proved , in that an erroneous conscience bindeth . knowledg layeth a further obligation as obedience . lawes come in force when promulged . there is the more contempt cast upon the law. in sins again●… knowledge , 〈◊〉 will of the sinner closeth more with sin as sin . in sinning against knowledge a man condemns himselfe . ● . things handled concerning sins against knowledge . 1. what it is 〈◊〉 sinne gainst knowledge , explained . 1. distinction to sinne with knowledge and against knowledge doe differ . a regenerate man guilty of more sinnes known , than another . yet not of more sinnes against knowledge . 2. distinction . men sin against knowledge , either objectively , or circumstantially onely . what it is to sin directly against knowledge . what to sinne against knowledg circumstantially onely . this distinction explained out of this chapter . sins directly against knowledg reduced to two heads . 1. in regard of ourselves five wayes . when we abuse knowledge to help us to sin , 3. wayes . 1. to plot and contrive sinne . 2. to colour sins committed by lyes . 3. to colour sins by pretence of religion , and use their knowledg of religion to plead for , and instifie their sin● . when men neglect to get knowledge that might preserve them from sinning , &c. when men refuse knowledge that they may sin more freely . is to hate the light , and to endevour to extinguish it . when men hold opinions against their consciences . 2. men sin directly against knowledge it selfe in respect of others , by concealing knowledge . men endevour to suppresse knowledge in others . when men go about to make others sinne against their consciences . iohn 9. 2. generall branch : sins committed collaterally or circumstantially against knowledge . it is done , 1. either in particular acts of sinning , or 2. in continuing in an estate of sinning against knowledge . particular instances being infinite . a distinction is given concening them . 1. some sinne more transient 2. some more permanent and continued , until recalld , though but once committed . which are of 〈◊〉 other most ●angerous to ●ommit , when against knowledge . 2. going on in a sinfull estate against knowledge . three sorts of men thus sin : such as for worldly end forbear to professe christ a●… his waies , whi●●… they know to be such . psal . 125. ult . those that defer repentance . apostate professors goe on in an estate of sinning against knowledge . application . 2. head : rules whereby to estimate sinnes against knowledge . of two sorts before sinning or in sinning 1 before sinning , 3. rules . 1. the more a man consider the issues and consequents o● a sinne . rule , the more consultations and de●●tes before . 3. rule , the more testimonies and warnings against sinne . 2. rules to measure the sinfulnesse of such acts in sinning , 3. the lesse passion or temptation to a sin against knowledge . the more inward regreet , and sorrow , and reluctancy , the stronger is the knowledge , and so more against it . the more hardnesse of heart in committing a sinne knowne to be a sin , the greater the sin , as it is a sin against knowledge . 3. head. aggravations drawne from the kind● of that knowledge we sinne against , which are five . the more ●…ong the knowledge , the ●●eater the sin . to sin against the inbred light of nature . hab. 1. 14. to sin against the light of education . the more reall and experimentall light men sin against . the more shining the light is in the conscience joyned with a taste , the greater the sin . to sin against professed knowledge . how great an engagement & motive it is to men of knowledge to turne to god , and to take heed of sinning . such an one cannot sin so cheap as others : their sins are more costly and chargeable , and will have lesse pleasure in sinning . such are given up to greater hardnesse of heart . such god gives up to the worst and grossest of sins . at death , knowledg sinned against , gives up to more horror and despaire . hell it ineaseth torent . notes for div a01894-e15950 ephes . 2. 7. psal . 104. 24. luke 6. 33. rom. 11. 35. psal . 24. 1. psal . 50. 11 , 12. 1 chron. 29. psal . 104. 29. luke 6. 34. psal . 16. 2. luke 6. 35. psal . 7. 11. revel . 2. 21. mat. 18. 29. luke 13. 17. heb. 1. iohn 1. 10. 1 tim. 1. 16. 2 pet. 3. 1. acts 1. 25. 2 pet. 3. 9. gen. 6. acts 17. 26 , 27 , 28. acts 14. 16. luke 6. ier. 5. 26 , 27. hab. 2. 10 , 11. psal . 137. 7. psal . 8. 5. psal . 139. 15. eccl. 12. 2. rom. 6. psal . 104. 23. psal . 104. 10 , 11. psal . 65. 11. 1 pet. 4. 3. iob 33. eccles . 5. 17. iob 21. 25. lamen . 3. 22. acts 14. 17. psal . 41. 3. psal . 127. 2. ier. 31. 26. gen. 28. 20. iob 37. 17. exod. 15. 26. psal . 68. 19. deut. 8. 18. prov. 22. 1. iob 5. 21. 2 sam. 1. 26. gen. 33. 10. iob 32. 8 , 9. acts 14. 17. eccles . 8. 11. deut. 32. 6. 1 sam. 2. 25. esay 7. 13. hos . 11. 6. mat. 5. 46. esay 1. amos 2. 13. psal . 68. 19. 2 pet. 2. 3. 2 thes . 5. the vanity of dogmatizing, or, confidence in opinions manifested in a discourse of the shortness and uncertainty of our knowledge, and its causes : with some reflexions on peripateticism, and an apology for philosophy / by jos. glanvill ... scepsis scientifica glanvill, joseph, 1636-1680. 1661 approx. 314 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 145 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2003-01 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a42833 wing g834 estc r3090 12267851 ocm 12267851 58119 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a42833) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 58119) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 186:2) the vanity of dogmatizing, or, confidence in opinions manifested in a discourse of the shortness and uncertainty of our knowledge, and its causes : with some reflexions on peripateticism, and an apology for philosophy / by jos. glanvill ... scepsis scientifica glanvill, joseph, 1636-1680. [33], 250, [6] p. printed by e.c. for henry eversden ..., london : 1661. published also as: scepsis scientifica, or, confest ignorance the way to science. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng philosophy -early works to 1800. knowledge, theory of -early works to 1800. 2002-08 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2002-09 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2002-10 emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread 2002-10 emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited 2002-12 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the vanity of dogmatizing : or confidence in opinions . manifested in a discourse of the shortness and vncertainty of our knowledge , and its causes ; with some reflexions on peripateticism ; and an apology for philosophy . by ios . glanvill , m. a. london , printed by e. c. for henry eversden at the grey-hound in st. pauls-church-yard . 1661. to the reverend my ever honored friend , mr. ioseph mynard , b. d. sir , i dare not approach so much knowledge , as you are owner of , but in the dress of an humble ignorance . the lesser sporades must vail their light in the presence of the monarch luminary ; and to appear before you , with any confidence of science , were an unpardonable piece of dogmatizing . therefore whatever be thought of the discourse it self , it cannot be censur'd in this application ; and though the pedant may be angry with me , for shaking his indear'd opinions ; yet he cannot but approve of this appeal to one , whose very name would reduce a sceptick . if you give your vote against dogmatizing : 't is time for the opinionative world , to lay down their proud pretensions : and if such known accomplishments acknowledge ignorance ; confidence will be out of countenance ; and the sciolist will write on his most presumed certainty ; this is also vanity . whatever in this discourse is less consonant to your severer apprehensions , i begge it may be the object of your charity , and candor . i betake my self to the protection of your ingenuity , from the pursuits of your judicious censure . and were there not a benign warmth , as well as light attended you , 't were a bold venture to come within your beams . could i divine wherein you differ from me ; i should be strongly induced to note that with a deleatur ; and revenge the presumption , by differing from my present self . if any thing seem to you to savour too much of the pyrrhonian : i hope you 'l consider , that scepticism is less reprehensible in enquiring years , and no crime in a juvenile exercitation . but i have no design against science : my indeavour is to promote it . confidence in uncertainties , is the greatest enemy to what is certain ; and were i a sceptick , i 'de plead for dogmatizing : for the way to bring men to stick to nothing , is confidently to perswade them to swallow all things . the treatise in your hands is a fortuitous , undesigned abortive ; and an aequivocal effect of a very diverse intention : for having writ a discourse , which formerly i let you know of , of the soul's immortality : i design'd a preface to it , as a corrective of enthusiasm , in a vindication of the use of reason in matters of religion : and my considerations on that subject , which i thought a sheet would have comprised , grew so voluminous , as to fill fourteen : which , being too much for a preface ; i was advised to print apart . and therefore reassuming my pen , to annex some additional inlargements to the beginning ; where i had been most curt and sparing : my thoughts ran out into this discourse , which now beggs your patronage : while the two former were remanded into the obscurity of my private papers : the latter being rendred less necessary by his majesties much desired , and seasonable arrival ; and the former by the maturer undertakings of the accomplisht dr. h. more . i have no apologie to make for my lapses , but what would need a new one . to say they are the errata's of one that hath not by some years reach't his fourth , climacterical , would excuse indeed the poverty of my judgement , but criminate the boldness of this address . nor can i avoid this latter imputation , but by being more criminal : and to shun this respectful presumption , i must do violence to my gratitude . since therefore your obligations have made my fault , my duty ; i hope the same goodness , that gave birth to my crime , will remit it . hereby you 'l further indear your other favours : and make me as much an admirer of your vertues , as i am a debtor to your civilities : which since i cannot do them right in an acknowledgement ; i 'le acknowledge , by signifying that the greatness of them hath disabled me from doing so : an impotence , which a little charity will render venial ; since it speaks your self its author . these your indearments will necessitate me to a self-contradiction ; and i must profess my self dogmatical in this , that i am , sir , your most obliged and affectionate servant jos. glanvill . cecill house in the strand , march 1. 1660. the preface . reader , to complain in print of the multitude of books , seems to me a self-accusing vanity , whilest the querulous reprehenders add to the cause of complaint , and transgress themselves in that , which they seem to wish amended . 't is true , the births of the press are numerous , nor is there less variety in the humors , and phancies of perusers , and while the number of the one , exceeds not the diversity of the other , some will not think that too much , which others judge superfluous . the genius of one approves , what another disregardeth . and were nothing to pass the press , but what were suited to the universal gusto ; farewel typography were i to be judge , and no other to be gratified , i think i should silence whole libraries of authors and reduce the world of books into a fardle : whereas were another to sit censor , it may be all those i had spared , would be condemn'd to darkness , and obtain no exemption from those ruines , and were all to be supprest , which some think unworthy light ; no more would be left , then were before moses , and trismegistus . therefore , i seek no applause from the disgrace of others , nor will i huckster-like discredit any mans ware , to recommend mine own . i am not angry that there are so many books already , ( bating only the anomalies of impiety and irreligion ) nor will i plead the necessity of publishing mine from feigned importunities . those that are taken up with others , are at their liberty to avoid the divertisement of its perusal : and those , to whom 't is not importunate will not expect an apology for its publication . what quarter the world will give it , is above my conjecture . if it be but indifferently dealt with , i am not disappointed . to print , is to run the gantlet , and to expose ones self to the tongue strapado . if the more generous spirits favour me , let pedants do their worst : there 's no smart in their censure , yea , their very approbation is a scandal . for the design of this discourse , the title speaks it . it is levied against dogmatizing , and attempts upon a daring enemy , confidence in opinions . the knowledge i teach , is ignorance : and methinks the theory of our own natures , should be enough to learn it us . we came into the world , and we know not how ; we live in 't in a self-nescience , and go hence again and are as ignorant of our recess . we grow , we live , we move at first in a microcosm , and can give no more scientifical account , of the state of our three quarters confinement , then if we had never been extant in the greater world , but had expir'd in an abortion ; we are inlarg'd from the prison of the womb , we live , we grow , and give being to our like : we see , we hear , and outward objects affect our other senses : we understand , we will , we imagine , and remember : and yet know no more of the immediate reasons of most of these common functions , then those little embryo anchorites : we breath , we talk , we move , while we are ignorant of the manner of these vital performances . the dogmatist knows not how he moves his finger ; nor by what art or method he turns his tongue in his vocal expressions . new parts are added to our substance , to supply our continual decayings , and as we dye we are born daily ; nor can we give a certain account , how the aliment is so prepared for nutrition , or by what mechanism it is so regularly distributed ; the turning of it into chyle , by the stomachs heat , is a general , and unsatisfying solution . we love , we hate , we joy , we grieve : passions annoy us , and our minds are disturb'd by those corporal aestuations . nor yet can we tell how these should reach our unbodyed selves , or how the soul should be affected by these heterogeneous agitations . we lay us down , to sleep away our diurnal cares ; night shuts up the senses windows , the mind contracts into the brains centre . we live in death , and lye as in the grave . now we know nothing , nor can our waking thoughts inform us , who is morpheus , and what that leaden key , that locks us up within our senseless cels : there 's a difficulty that pincheth , nor will it easily be resolved . the soul is awake , and solicited by external motions , for some of them reach the perceptive region in the most silent repose , and obscurity of night . what is 't then that prevents our sensations ; or if we do perceive , how is 't , that we know it not ? but we dream , see visions , converse with chimaera's , the one half of our lives is a romance , a fiction . we retain a catch of those pretty stories , and our awakened imagination smiles in the recollection . nor yet can our most severe inquiries finde what did so abuse us , or shew the nature , and manner of these nocturnal illusions : when we puzzle our selves in the disquisition , we do but dream , and every hypothesis is a phancy . our most industrious conceits are but like their object , and as uncertain as those of midnight . thus when some dayes , and nights have gone over us , the stroak of fate concludes the number of our pulses ; we take our leave of the sun and moon , and bid mortality adieu . the vital flame is extinct , the soul retires into another world , and the body to dwell with dust . nor doth the last scene yield us any more satisfaction in our autography ; for we are as ignorant how the soul leaves the light , as how it first came into it ; we know as little how the union is dissolved , that is , the chain of the so differing subsistencies , that compound us , as how it first commenced . this then is the creature that so pretends to knowledge , and that makes such a noise , and bustle for opinions . the instruction of delphos may shame such confidents into modesty ; and till we have learn't that honest adviso , though from hell , γνωθι σεαυτον confidence is arrogance , and dogmatizing unreasonable presuming . i doubt not but the opinionative resolver , thinks all these easie knowables , and the theories here accounted mysteries , are to him revelations . but let him suspend that conclusion till he hath weigh'd the considerations hereof , which the discourse it self will present him with ; and if he can untie those knots , he is able to teach all humanity , and will do well to oblige mankinde by his informations . i had thought here to have shut up my preface , being sensible of the taedium of long praeliminaries . but lest the ingenious stumble at my threshold , and take offence at the seemingly disproportionate excess , which i ascribe to adam's senses : i 'le subjoyn a word to prevent the scruple . first then , for those that go the way of the allegorie , and assert pre-existence ; i 'm secure enough from their dissatisfaction . for , that the aetherial adam could easily sense the most tender touches upon his passive vehicle , and so had a clear and full perception of objects , which we since plung'd into the grosser hyle are not at all , or but a little aware of ; can be no doubt in their hypothesis . nor can there as great a difference be supposed between the senses of eighty , and those of twenty , between the opticks of the blind bat and perspicacious eagle , as there was between those pure un-eclipsed sensations , and these of our now-embodyed , muddied sensitive . now that the prae-existent adam could so advantageously form his vehicle , as to receive better information from the most distant objects , than we by the most helpful telescopes ; will be no difficult admission to the friends of the allegory . so that what may seem a meer hyperbolical , and fanciful display to the sons of the letter ; to the allegorists will be but a defective representation of literal realities . and i cannot be obnoxious to their censure , but for my coming short in the description . but i am like more dangerously to be beset by them that go the way of the plain : and 't will be thought somewhat hard , to verifie my hypothesis of the literal adam . indeed , there is difficulty in the mechanical defence ; and dioptrical impugnations are somewhat formidable . for unless the constitution of adam's organs was diverse from ours , and from those of his fallen self ; it will to some seem impossible , that he should command distant objects by natural , as we do by artificial advantages . since those removed bodies of sun and stars ( in which i instance ) could form but minute angles in adam's retina , and such as were vastly different from those they form in ours assisted by a telescope . so that granting adam's eye had no greater diametrical wideness of the pupil , no greater distance from the cornea to the retiformis , and no more filaments of the optick nerves of which the tunica retina is woven , than we : the unmeasurable odds of sensitive perfections which i assign him ; will be conceiv'd mechanically impossible . these difficulties may seem irresistibly pressing , and incapable of a satisfactory solution . but i propound it to the consideration of the ingenious objectors , whether these supposed organical defects might not have been supplyed in our unfallen protoplast by the vast perfections of his animadversive , and some other advantageous circumstances : so that though it be granted , that an object at the distance of the stars could not form in the eye of adam any angles , as wide as those it forms by the help of a tube ; yet i think my hypothesis may stand unshaken . for suppose two eyes of an equal and like figure , in the same distance from an object ; so that it forms equal angles in both : it may come to pass by other reasons , that one of these eyes shall see this object bigger then the other : yea , if the difference of the reasons on both sides be so much greater , one eye shall see it clearly , and the other not at all : for let one of these eyes be placed in an old body , or in a body deprived quite , or in a great measure of those spirits which are allowed the instruments of sight , or of the due egress and regress of them , in their natural courses and channels ; and let the other have a body of a clean contrary quality ; or let the soul that actuates one of the said eyes , be indued with an higher faculty of animadversion ( i mean with a greater degree of the animadversive ability ) than the soul hath , that actuates the other . in either of these cases , the fore-mention'd difformity of vision , will fall out in the same uniform case of dioptrical advantages . for a little angle made in the eye , will make as discernible an impression to a soul of a greater animadversive power , and assisted by more and meeter instruments of sight ; as a greater angle can make to a soul of a less power , and destitute of those other instruments , which are as necessary to sight as those dioptrical conveniencies . so that grant that the object set at the same distance made angles in the eye of adam , no wider than those it formes in ours ; yet that which we discern not , might have been seen by him , having more and better spirits , and being endued with a stronger animadversive , according to mine hypothesis . for there is the same proportion between a great power , and a little help , or a little angle ; which is between a small power , and a great help , or a great angle . if all this satisfie not , i begg from the ingenious the favour of this consideration : that some grains must be allow'd to a rhetorical display , which will not bear the rigour of a critical severity . but whether this mine hypothesis stand or fall , my discourse is not at all concerned . and i am not so fond of my conjectures , but that i can lay them down at the feet of a convictive opposition . to the learned author , of the eloquent and ingenious vanity of dogmatizing . poets are but libe'lers , i implore no muse ; parnassian praise is an abuse . call up the spirit of philosophy : your worth 's disgrac't by poetry . summon des-cartes , plato , socrates : let this great triad speak your praise . other encomiasts that attempt , set-forth their own defects , and not your worth . as if a chamber-light should dare essay , to gloss the beauty of the day . he that thinks fully to describe it , dreams : you 're only seen by your own beams ▪ and only eagle-eyes can bear that light ; your strength and lustre blindes weak sight . let pedants quarrel with th' light that detects their belov'd vanities and defects . and let the bat , assoon as day 's begun , commence a suit against the sun. let reprehended dogmatizers stamp ; and the scorch't moore curse heavens lamp : while nobler souls , that understand what 's writ , are debtors to your strength and wit. you have remov'd the old antipathy 'tween rhetorick , and philosophy : and in your book have cloath'd socratick sense , in demosthenian eloquence . yo 've smooth'd the satyr , and the wanton have reform'd and made rhetorick grave . and since your pen hath thus oblig'd them both , 't is fit they club t' express your worth . h. darsy , esq to his worthy friend mr. ioseph glanvill ; upon the vanity of dogmatizing in philosophy , displayed in his ingenious book . no controversies do me please , unless they do contend for peace : nor scarce a demonstration , but such as yours ; which proves , there 's none . doubful i liv'd , and doubtful die : thus αυτος gave ε'φη the lye ; and with his own more aged criticks , expung'd his youthful analyticks . to make my shrift , that certain i am only of uncertainty ; is no less glorious , then due , after the stagirite and you : i am absolved , if the hand of great apollo's priest may stand . you have made ignorance a boast : pride hath its ancient channel lost ; like arethusa , only found by those , that follow 't under ground ▪ title your book , the works of man ; the index of the vatican : call it arts encyclopaedy ; the universal pansophy ; the state of all the questions , since peter lumbard , solv'd at once ; ignorance in a learned dress , which volumes teach , but not profess ; the learning which all ages knew , being epitomiz'd by you . you teach us doubting ; and no more do libraries turn'd o're and o're : take up the folio , that comes next , 't will prove a comment on your text ; and the quotation would be good , if bodley in your margin stood . a. borfet , m. a. to his ingenious friend the author , on his vanity of dogmatizing . let vaunting knowledge now strike sail , and unto modest ign'rance vail . our firmest science ( when all 's done ) is nought but bold opinion . he that hath conquer'd every art th' encyclopaedy all by heart ; is but some few conjectures better than he that cannot read a letter . if any certainty there be , 't is this , that there 's no certaintie . reason's a draught that do's display , and cast its aspects ev'ry way . it do's acknowledge no back parts , 't is fac'd like ianus : and regard's opposite sides ; what one frowns on , t'other face sweetly smiles upon . then may the sciolist hereby correct his metoposcopy . let him , e're censure reason , found and view her lineaments all round . and since that science he has none , let him with you his nescience owne . weakness acknowledged is best : and imperfection when confest . meek and unboasting ignorance , is but a single impotence : but when 't is clad in high profession , 't is then a double imperfection . a silly ape struttingly drest , would but appear the greater jest . but your example teacheth us to become less ridiculous . he that would learn , but what you show , the narrow bounds of what men know : and would but take a serious view , of the foundations with you : he 'd scarce his confidence adventure , on bottomes which are so unsure . in disquisitions first gust it would be shipwrackt , sunk , and lost . p. h. reader , that the author may not be accountable for more faults , then his own ; he desires thee to correct , or at least to take notice of these typographical mistakes : some of which are less considerable , but others , if unobserv'd , may disturb the sense , and render the meaning less obvious : thou art therefore requested to exercise thine ingenuity , in pardoning the printer ; and thy justice , in doing right to the author . errata . page . line . read . 20. 5. unite . 22. 2. apprehenders . 24. 9. spirits . 25. 7. spontaneous . 27. 7. principles and. 28. 27. motions . 29. 21. conceive it . 41. 10. considerations . 42. 11. composition . 60. 6. makes . 67. 16. and our . 70. 12. of reason . 99. 25. mad , that . 102. 5. be what . 103. 26. of . 113. 9. cousenage . 129. 20. the world . 140. 1. the best . books newly published . a perfect history of the civil warrs of great brittain and ireland , by an impartial pen , in folio . britannia baconica , or the natural rarities of england , scotland and wales , as they are to be found in every shire , in octavo . the vanity of dogmatizing ; or , confidence in opinions . chap. i. a display of the perfections of innocence , with a conjecture at the manner of adams knowledge , viz. that it was by the large extent of his senses ; founded upon the supposition of the perfection of his faculties , and induc'd from two philosophick principles . our misery is not of yesterday , but as antient as the first criminal , and the ignorance we are involved in , almost coaeval with the humane nature ; not that we were made so by our god , but our selves ; we were his creatures , sin and misery were ours . to make way for what follows , we will go to the root of our antient happiness , and now ruines , that we may discover both what the man was , and what the sinner is . the eternal wisdome having made that creature whose crown it was to be like his maker , enrich't him with those ennoblements which were worthy him that gave them , and made no less for the benefit of their receiver , then the glory of their author . and as the primogenial light , which at first was difused over the face of the unfashion'd chaos , was afterwards by divine appointment gathered into the sun and stars , and other lucid bodies , which shine with an underived lustre : so those scatter'd perfections which are divided among the several cantons of created beings , were as it were constellated and summ'd up in this epitome of the greater world , man. his then blisful injoyments anticipated the aspires to be like gods ; being in a condition not to be added to , as much as in desire ; and the unlikeness of it to our now miserable , because apostate , state , makes it almost as impossible to be conceiv'd , as to be regain'd . a condition which was envied by creatures that nature had plac't a sphaere above us , and such as differ'd not much from glory , and blessed immortality , but in perpetuity and duration . for since the most despicable and disregarded pieces of decay'd nature , are so curiously wrought , and adorned with such eminent signatures of divine wisdome , as speak it their author , and that after a curse brought upon a disorder'd universe ; what think we was done unto him whom the king delighted to honour ? and what was the portion of he●●ens favorite , when omniscience it self sat in councel to furnish him with all those accomplishments which his specifick capacity could contain ? which questionless were as much above the hyperbolies that fond poetry bestowes upon its admired objects , as their flatter'd beauties are really below them . the most refined glories of subcoelestial excellencies are but more faint resemblances of these . for all the powers and faculties of this copy of the divinity , this meddal of god , were as perfect as beauty and harmony in idea . the soul was not clogg'd by the inactivity of its masse , as ours ; nor hindered in its actings , by the distemperature of indisposed organs . passions kept their place , as servants of the higher powers , and durst not arrogate the throne , as now : no countermands came hence , to repeal the decretals of the regal faculties ; that batrachomyomachia of one passion against an other , and both against reason , was yet unborn . man was never at odds with himself , till he was at odds with the commands of his maker . there was no jarring or disharmony in the faculties , till sin untun'd them . he could no sooner say to one power go , but it went , nor to another do this , but it did it . even the senses , the souls windows , were without any spot or opacity ; to liken them to the purest crystal , were to debase them by the comparison ; for their acumen and strength depending on the delicacy and apt disposure of the organs and spirits , by which outward motions are conveyed to the judgement-seat of the soul : those of innocence must needs infinitely more transcend ours , then the senses of sprightful youth doth them of frozen decrepit age . adam needed no spectacles . the acuteness of his natural opticks ( if conjecture may have credit ) shew'd him much of the coelestial magnificence and bravery without a galilaeo's tube : and 't is most probable that his naked eyes could reach near as much of the upper world , as we with all the advantages of art . it may be 't was as absurd even in the judgement of his senses , that the sun and stars should be so very much , less then this globe , as the contrary seems in ours ; and 't is not unlikely that he had as clear a perception of the earths motion , as we think we have of its quiescence . thus the accuracy of his knowledge of natural effects , might probably arise from his sensible perception of their causes . what the experiences of many ages will scarce afford us at this distance from perfection , his quicker senses could teach in a moment . and whereas we patch up a piece of philosophy from a few industriously gather'd , and yet scarce well observ'd or digested experiments , his knowledge was compleatly built , upon the certain , extemporary notice of his comprehensive , unerring faculties . his sight could inform him whether the loadstone doth attract by atomical effluviums ; which may gain the more credit by the consideration of what some affirm ; that by the help of microscopes they have beheld the subtile streams issuing from the beloved minerall . it may be he saw the motion of the bloud and spirits through the transparent skin , as we do the workings of those little industrious animals through a hive of glasse . the mysterious influence of the moon , and its causality on the seas motion , was no question in his philosophy , no more then a clocks motion is in ours , where our senses may inform us of its cause . sympathies and antipathies were to him no occult qualities . causes are hid in night and obscurity from us , which were all sun to him . now to shew the reasonableness of this hypothesis , i 'le suppose what i think few will deny ; that god adorn'd that creature which was a transcript of himself , with all the perfections its capacity could bear . and that this great extent of the senses horizon was a perfection easily competible to sinless humanity , will appear by the improvement of the two following principles . first , as far as the operation of nature reacheth , it works by corporeal instruments . if the coelestial lights influence our earth , and advance the production of minerals in their hidden beds , it is done by material communications . and if there be any virtue proceeding from the pole , to direct the motion of the enamour'd steel ( however unobserv'd those secret influences may be ) they work not but by corporal application . secondly , sense is made by motion , caus'd by bodily impression on the organ , and continued to the brain , and centre of perception . hence it is manifest that all bodies are in themselves sensible , in as much as they can impress this motion , which is the immediate cause of sensation : and therefore , as in the former principle , the most distant efficients working by a corporeal causality , if it be not perceiv'd , the non-perception must arise from the dulness and imperfection of the faculty , and not any defect in the object . so then , is it probable that the tenuous matter the instrument of remoter agents , should be able to move , and change the particles of the indisposed clay or steel , and yet not move the ductile easie senses of perfected man ? indeed we perceive not such subtile insinuations , because their action is overcome by the strokes of stronger impressors , and we are so limited in our perceptions , that we can only attend to the more vigorous impulse : but this is an imperfection incident to our degraded natures , which infinite wisdom easily prevented in his innocent master-piece : upon such considerations , to me it appears to be most reasonable , that the circumference of our protoplast's senses , should be the same with that of natures activity : unless we will derogate from his perfections , and so reflect a disparagement on him that made us . and i am the more perswaded of the concinnity of this notion , when i consider the uncouth harshness either of the way of actuall concreated knowledge , or of infant growing faculties ; neither of which methinks seem to be much favour'd by our severer reasons . thus i have given a brief account of what might have been spun into volumes ; a full description of such perfections cannot be given but by him that hath them ; an attainment which we shall never reach , till mortality be swallowed up of life . chap. ii. our decay and ruins by the fall , descanted on . of the now scantness of our knowledge : with a censure of the schoolmen , and peripatetick dogmatists . but 't is a miserable thing to have been happy : and a self-contracted wretchedness , is a double one . had felicity alwayes been a stranger to humanity , our now misery had been none ; and had not our selves been the authors of our ruines , less . we might have been made unhappy , but since we are miserable , we chose it . he that gave them , might have taken from us our extern injoyments , but none could have robb'd us of innocence but our selves . that we are below the angels of god , is no misery , 't is the lot of our natures ; but that we have made our selves like the beasts that perish , is so with a witness , because the fruit of our sin . while man knew no sin , he was ignorant of nothing else , that it imported humanity to know : but when he had sinned , the same trangression that opened his eyes to see his own shame , shut them against most things else , but it , and his newly purchased misery . with the nakedness of his body , he saw that of his soul ; and the blindness , and disaray of his faculties , which his former innocence was a stranger to : and that that shew'd them him , made them . whether our purer intellectuals , or only our impetuous affections , were the prime authors of the anomie , i dispute not : sin is as latent in its first cause , as visible in its effects ; and 't is the mercy of heaven that hath made it easier to know the cure , then the rise of our distempers . this is certain , that our masculine powers are deeply sharers of the consequential mischiefs , and though eve were the first in the disobedience , yet was adam a joint partaker of the curse . we are not now like the creatures we were made , and have not only lost our makers image , but our own : and do not much more transcend the creatures , which god and nature have plac't at our feet , then we come short of our antient selves ; a proud affecting to be like gods , hath made us unlike men. for whereas our ennobled understandings could once take the wings of the morning , to visit the world above us , and had a glorious display of the highest form of created excellencies , it now lies groveling in this lower region , muffled up in mists , and darkness : the curse of the serpent is fallen upon degenerated humanity , that it should go on its belly , and lick the dust . and as in the cartesian hypothesis , the planets sometimes lose their light , by the fixing of the impurer scum ; so our impaired intellectuals , which were once as pure light and flame in regard of their vigour and activity , are now darkned by those grosser spots , which our disobedience hath contracted . and our now overshadow'd souls ( to whose beauties stars were foils ) may be exactly emblem'd , by those crusted globes , whose influential emissions are intercepted , by the interposal of the benighting element , while the purer essence is imprison'd within the narrow compasse of a centre . for these once glorious lights , which did freely shed abroad their harmeless beams , and wanton'd in a larger circumference , are now pent up in a few first principles ( the naked essentials of our faculties ) within the straight confines of a prison . and whereas knowledge dwelt in our undepraved natures , as light in the sun , in as great plenty , as purity ; it is now hidden in us like sparks in a flint , both in scarcity , and obscurity . for considering the shortness of our intellectual sight , the deceptibility and impositions of our senses , the tumultuary disorders of our passions , the prejudices of our infant educations , and infinite such like ( of which an after oecasion will befriend us , with a more full and particular recital ) i say , by reason of these , we may conclude of the science of the most of men , truly so called , that it may be truss'd up in the same room with the iliads , yea it may be all the certainty of those high pretenders to it , the voluminous schoolmen , and peripatetical dictators , ( bating what they have of first principles and the word of god ) may be circumscrib'd by as small a circle , as the creed , when brachygraphy had confin'd it within the compass of a penny . and methinks the disputes of those assuming confidents , are like the controversie of those in plato's den , who having never seen but the shadow of an horse trajected against a wall , eagerly contended , whether its neighing proceeded from the appearing mane , or tail , which they saw moving through the agitation of the substance , playing in the winde : so these in the darker cels of their imagin'd principles , violently differ about the shadowes and exuviae of beings , words , and notions , while for the most part they ignore the substantial realities ; and like children make babies , for their phancies to play with , while their useless subtilties afford but little intertain to the nobler faculties . but many of the most accomplish't wits of all ages , whose modesty would not allow them to boast of more then they were owners of , have resolv'd their knowledge into socrates his summe total , and after all their pains in quest of science , have sat down in a profest nescience . it is the shallow unimprov'd intellects that are the confident pretenders to certainty ; as if contrary to the adage , science had no friend but ignorance . and though when they speak in the general of the weakness of our understandings , and the scantness of our knowledge , their discourse may even justifie scepticism it self ; yet in their particular opinions are as assertive and dogmatical , as if they were omniscient . to such , as a curbe to confidence , and an evidence of humane infirmities even in the noblest parts of man , i shall give the following instances of our intellectual blindness : not that i intend to poze them with those common aenigma's of magnetism , fluxes , refluxes and the like , these are resolv'd into a confest ignorance , and i shall not persue them to their old asylum : and yet it may be there is more knowable in these , then in lesse acknowledg'd mysteries : but i 'le not move beyond our selves , and the most ordinary and trivial phaenomena in nature , in which we shall finde enough to shame confidence , and unplume dogmatizing . chap. iii. instances of our ignorance propounded , ( 1 ) of things within our selves . the nature of the soul , and its origine , glanc'd at and past by ; ( 1 ) it 's union with the body is unconceivable : so ( 2 ) is its moving the body , consider'd either in the way of sir k. digby , des-cartes , or dr. h. more , and the platonists . ( 3 ) the manner of direction of the spirits , as unexplicable . in the prosecution of our intendment wee 'll first instance in some things in the generall , which concern the soul in this state of terrestriall union ; and then speak more particularly to some faculties within us , a scientificall account of which mortality is unacquainted with . secondly we intend to note some mysteries , which relate to matter and body . and thirdly to shew the unintelligible intricacy of some ordinary appearances . § 1. it 's a great question with some what the soul is . and unlesse their phancies may have a sight and sensible palpation of that more clarified subsistence , they will prefer infidelity , it self to an unimaginable idea . i 'le onely mind such , that the soul is seen , as other things , in the mirrour of its effects , and attributes : but , if like children they 'll run behind the glass to see its naked face , their expectation will meet with nothing but vacuity & emptiness . and though a pure intellectual eye may have a sight of it in reflex discoveries ; yet , if we affect a grosser touch , like ixiō we shal embrace a cloud . § 2. and it hath been no less a trouble to the world to determine whence it came , then what it is . whether it were made by an immediate creation , or seminall traduction , hath been a ball of contention to the most learned ages : and yet after all the bandying attempts of resolution it is as much a question as ever , and it may be will be so till it be concluded by immortality . some ingenious ones think the difficulties , which are urged by each side against the other , to be pregnant proofs of the falshood of both ; and substitute an hypothesis , which for probability is supposed to have the advantage of either . but i shall not stir in the waters , which have been already mudded by so many contentious enquiries . the great st. austin , and others of the gray heads of reverend antiquity have been content to sit down here in a profest neutrality : and i 'le not industiously endeavour to urge men to a confession of what they freely acknowledge ; but shall note difficulties which are not so usually observ'd , but as insoluble as these . § 3. it is the saying of divine plato , that man is natures horizon ; dividing betwixt the upper hemisphere of immateriall intellects , and this lower of corporeity : and that we are a compound of beings distant in extreams , is as clear as noon . but how the purer spirit is united to this clod , is a knot too hard for fallen humanity to unty . what cement should unite heaven and earth , light and darkness , natures of so divers a make , of such disagreeing attributes , which have almost nothing , but being , in common ; this is a riddle , which must be left to the coming of elias . how should a thought be united to a marble-statue , or a sun-beam to a lump of clay ! the freezing of the words in the air in the northern climes , is as conceivable , as this strange union . that this active spark , this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ as the stoicks call it ] should be confined to a prison it can so easily pervade , is of less facill apprehension , then that the light should be pent up in a box of crystall , and kept from accompanying its source to the lower world : and to hang weights on the wings of the winde seems far more intelligible . in the unions , which we understand , the extreams are reconciled by interceding participations of natures , which have somewhat of either . but body and spirit stand at such a distance in their essentiall compositions , that to suppose an uniter of a middle constitution , that should partake of some of the qualities of both , is unwarranted by any of our faculties , yea most absonous to our reasons ; since there is not any the least affinity betwixt length , breadth and thickness , and apprehension , judgement and discourse : the former of which are the most immediate results [ if not essentials ] of matter , the latter of spirit . § 4. secondly , we can as little give an account , how the soul moves the body . that , that should give motion to an unwieldy bulk , which it self hath neither bulk nor motion ; is of as difficil an apprehension , as any mystery in nature . for though conceiving it under some phancied appearance , and pinning on it materiall affections , the doubt doth not so sensibly touch us ; since under such conceptions we have the advantage of our senses to befriend us with parallels , and gross appre●henders may not think it any more strange , then that a bullet should be moved by the rarified fire , or the clouds carryed before the invisible winds : yet if we defaecate the notion from materiality , and abstract quantity , locality and all kind of corporeity from it , and represent it to our thoughts either under the notion of the ingenious sir k. digby as a pure mind and knowledge , or as the admir'd des-cartes expresses it , une chose qui pense , as a thinking substance ; it will be as hard to apprehend , as that an empty wish should remove mountains : a supposition which if realized , would relieve sisyphus . nor yet doth the ingenious hypothesis of the most excellent cantabrigian philosopher , of the souls being an extended penetrable substance , relieve us ; since , how that which penetrates all bodies without the least jog or obstruction , should impress a motion on any , is by his own confession alike inconceivable . neither will its moving the body by a vehicle of spirits , avail us ; since they are bodies too , though of a purer mould . and to credit the unintelligibility both of this union and motion , we need no more then to consider , that when we would conceiue any thing which is not obvious to our senses , we have recourse to our memories the store-house of past observations : and turning over the treasure that is there , seek for something of like kind , which hath formerly come within the notice of our outward or inward senses . so that we cannot conceive any thing , which comes not within the verge of our senses ; but either by like experiments which we have made , or at least by some remoter hints which we receive from them . and where such are wanting , i cannot apprehend how the thing can be conceived . if any think otherwise , let them carefully examine their thoughts : and , if they finde a determinate intellection of any modes of being , which were never in the least hinted to them by their externall or internall senses ; i 'le beleeve that such can realize chimaera's . but now in the cases before us there are not the least footsteps , either of such an union , or motion , in the whole circumference of sensible nature : and we cannot apprehend any thing beyond the evidence of our faculties . § 5. thirdly , how the soul directs the spirits for the motion of the body according to the several animal exigents ; is as perplex in the theory , as either of the former . for the meatus , or passages , through which those subtill emissaries are conveyed to the respective members , being so almost infinite , and each of them drawn through so many meanders , cross turnings , and divers roades , wherein other spirits are continually a journeying ; it is wonderfull , that they should exactly perform their regular destinations without losing their way in such a wilderness : neither can the wit of man tell how they are directed . for that they are carried by the manuduction of a rule , is evident from the constant steddyness and regularity of their motion into the parts , where their supplies are expected : but , what that regulating efficiency should be , and how managed ; is not easily determin'd . that it is performed by meer mechanisme , constant experience confutes ; which assureth us , that our sponta●●eous motions are under the imperium of our will. at least the first determination of the spirits into such or such passages , is from the soul , what ever we hold of the after conveyances ; of which likewise i think , that all the philosophy in the world cannot make it out to be purely mechanicall . but yet though we gain this , that the soule is the principle of direction , the difficulty is as formidable as ever . for unless we allow it a kinde of inward sight of the anatomicall frame of its owne body of every vein , muscle , and artery ; of the exact site , and position of them , with their severall windings , and secret chanels : it is as unconceivable how it should be the directrix of such intricate motions , as that a blind man should manage a game at chess . but this is a kinde of knowledge , that we are not in the least aware of : yea many times we are so far from an attention to the inward direction of the spirits , that our employ'd mindes observe not any method in the outward performance ; even when 't is manag'd by variety of interchangeable motions , in which a steady direction is difficult , and a miscariage easy . thus an artist will play a lesson on an instrument without minding a stroke ; and our tongues will run divisions in a tune not missing a note , even when our thoughts are totally engaged elsewhere : which effects are to be attributed to some secret art of the soul , which to us is utterly occult , and without the ken of our intellects . chap. iv. ( 4 ) we can give no account of the manner of sensation : nor ( 5 ) of the nature of the memory . it is consider'd according to the philosophy of des-cartes , sir k. digby , aristotle and mr. hobbs , and all ineffectuall . some other unexplicables mention'd . § 6. but besides those abstrusities , that lie more deep , and are of a more mysterious alloy ; we are at a loss for a scientificall account even of our senses , the most knowable of our facultyes . our eyes , that see other things , see not themselves : and those princip●●●● foundations of knowledge are themselvs unknown . that the soul is the sole percipient , which alone hath animadversion and sense properly so called , and that the body is only the receiver and conveyer of corporeall impressions , is as certain , as philosophy can make it . aristotle himself teacheth so much in that maxime of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and plato credits this position with his suffrage ; affirming , that 't is the soul that hath life and sense , but the body neither . but this is so largly prosecuted by that wonder of men , the great des-cartes , and is a truth that shines so clear in the eyes of all considering men ; that to goe about industriously to prove it , were to light a candle to seek the sun : we 'll therefore suppose it , as that which needs not amuse us ; but yet , what are the instruments of sensible perceptions and particular conveyers of outward motions to the seat of sense , is difficult : and how the pure mind can receive information from that , which is not in the least like it self , and but little resembling what it represents ; i think inexplicable . whether sensation be made by corporall emissions and materiall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or by motions imprest on the aethereall matter , and carryed by the continuity thereof to the common sense ; i 'le not revive into a dispute : the ingenuity of the latter hath already given it almost an absolute victory over its rivall . but suppose which we will , there are doubts not to be solv'd by either . for how the soule by mutation made in matter a substance of another kind , should be excited to action ; and how bodily alterations and motions should concern it , which is subject to neither ; is a difficulty which confidence may triumph over sooner , then conquer . for body connot act on any thing but by motion ; motion cannot be received but by quantative dimension ; the soul is astranger to such gross substantiality , and hath nothing of quantity , but what it is cloathed with by our deceived phancies ; and therefore how can we conceive under a passsive subjection to material impressions ? and yet the importunity of pain , and unavoydableness of sensations strongly perswade , that we are so . some say , that the soul indeed is not passive under the materiall phantasms ; but doth only intuitively view them by the necessity of her nature , and so observes other things in these there representatives . but how is it , and by what art doth the soul read that such an image or stroke in matter [ whether that of her vehicle , or of the brain , the case is the same ] signifies such an object ? did we learn such an alphabet in our embryo-state ? and how comes it to pass , that we are not aware of any such congenite apprehensions ? we know what we know ; but do we know any more ? that by diversity of motions we should spell out figures , distances , magnitudes , colours , things not resembled by them ; we must attribute to some secret deduction . but what this deduction should be , or by what mediums this knowledge is advanc'd ; is as dark , as ignorance it self . one , that hath not the knowledge of letters , may see the figures ; but comprehends not the meaning included in them : an infant may hear the sounds , and see the motion of the lips ; but hath no conception conveyed by them , not knowing what they are intended to signify . so our souls , though they might have perceived the motions and images themselves by simple sense ; yet without some implicit inference it seems inconceivable , how by that means they should apprehend their archetypes . moreover images and motions are in the brain in a very inconsiderable latitude of space ; and yet they represent the greatest magnitudes . the image of an hemisphere of the upper globe cannot be of a wider circumference , then a wall-nut : and how can such petty impressions notifie such vastly expanded objects , but through some kind of scientifical method , and geometry in the principle ? without this it is not conceivable how distances should be perceiv'd , but all objects would appear in a cluster , and lie in as narrow a room as their images take up in our scanter craniums . nor will the philosophy of the most ingenious des-cartes help us out : for that striking upon divers filaments of the brain cannot well be supposed to represent their respective distances , except some such kind of inference be allotted us in our faculties ; the concession of which will only steed us as a refuge for ignorance , where we shall meet , what we would seem to shun . § . 7. the memory is a faculty whose nature is as obscure , and hath as much of riddle in it as any of the former ; it seems to be an organical power , because bodily distempers often marr its idea's , and cause a total oblivion : but what instruments the soul useth in her review of past impressions , is a question which may drive enquiry to despair . there are four principal hypotheses by which a resolution hath been attempted . the first that i 'le mention , is that of the incomparable des-cartes , who gives this account : the glandula pinealis , by him made the seat of common sense , doth by its motion impel the spirits into divers parts of the brain ; till it find those wherein are some tracks of the object we would remember ; which consists in this , viz. that the pores of the brain , through the which the spirits before took their course , are more easily opened to the spirits which demand re-entrance ; so that finding those pores , they make their way through them sooner then through others : whence there ariseth a special motion in the glandula , which signifies this to be the object we would remember . a second is , that of the ingenious sir k. digby , a summary of which is , that things are reserved in the memory by some corporeal exuviae and material images ; which having impinged on the common sense , rebound thence into some vacant cells of the brain , where they keep their ranks and postures in the same order that they entred , till they are again stirr'd up ; and then they slide through the fancy , as when they were first presented . these are the endeavours of those two grand sages , then whom it may be the sun never saw a more learned pair . and yet as a sad evidence of the infirmities of laps'd humanity : these great sophi fail here of their wonted success in unridling nature . and i think favour it self can say no more of either hypothesis , then that they are ingenious attempts . nor do i speak this to derogate from the grandeur of their wits us'd to victory : i should rather confer what i could to the erecting of such trophies to them , as might eternize their memories . and their coming short here , i think not to be from defect of their personal abilities , but specifick constitution ; and the doubt they leave us in , proceeds from hence , that they were no more then men . i shall consider what is mentioned from them apart , before i come to the other two : and what i am here about to produce , is not to argue either of these positions of falseness ; but of unconceiveableness . in the general , what hath been urg'd under the former head , stands in full force against both these , and them that follow . but to the first ; if memory be made by the easie motion of the spirits through the opened passages , according to what hath been noted from des-cartes ; whence have we a distinct remembrance of such diversity of objects , whose images without doubt pass through the same apertures ? and how should we recall the distances of bodies which lye in a line ? or , is it not likely , that the impell'd spirits might light upon other pores accommodated to their purpose through the motion of other bodies through them ? yea , in such a pervious substance as the brain , they might finde an easie either entrance , or exit , almost every where ; and therefore to shake every grain of corn through the same holes of a sieve in repeated winnowings , is as easie to be performed as this to be conckived . besides , it 's difficult to apprehend , but that these avennues should in a very short time be stopped up by the pressure of other parts of the matter , through its natural gravity , or other alterations made in the brain : and the opening of other vicine passages might quickly obliterate any tracks of these : as the making of one hole in the yeelding mud , defaces the print of another near it ; at least the accession of enlargement , which was derived from such transitions , would be as soon lost , as made . but for the second , how is it imaginable , that those active particles , which have no cement to unite them , nothing to keep them in the order they were set , yea , which are ever and anon justled by the occursion of other bodies , whereof there is an infinite store in this repository , should so orderly keep their cells without any alteration of their site or posture , which at first was allotted them ? and how is it conceivable , but that carelesly turning over the idea's of our mind to recover something we would remember , we should put all the other images into a disorderly floating , and so raise a little chaos of confusion , where nature requires the exactest order . according to this account , i cannot see , but that our memories would be more confused then our mid-night compositions : for is it likely , that the divided atomes which presented themselves together , should keep the same ranks in such a variety of tumultuary agitations , as happen in that liquid medium ? an heap of ants on an hillock will more easily be kept to an uniformity in motion ; and the little bodies which are incessantly playing up and down the air in their careless postures , are as capable of regularity as these . much more m●ght be added , but i intend only a touch . but a third way , that hath been attempted , is that of aristotle , which says , that objects are conserved in the memory by certain intentional species , beings , which have nothing of matter in their essential constitution , but yet have a necessary subjective dependence on it , whence they are called material . to this briefly . besides that these species are made a medium between body and spirit , and therefore partake of no more of being , then what the charity of our imaginations affords them ; and that the supposition infers a creative energie in the object their producent , which philosophy allows not to creature-efficients : i say , beside these , it is quite against their nature to subsist , but in the presence and under the actual influence of their cause ; as being produc'd by an emanative causality , the effects whereof dye in the removal of their origine . but this superannuated conceit deserves no more of our remembrance , then it contributes to the apprehension of it . and therefore i pass on to the last . which is that of mr. hobbs , that memory is nothing else but the knowledge of decaying sense , which is made by the reaction of one body against another ; or , as he expresses it in his humane nature , a missing of parts in an object . the foundation of this principle [ as of many of its fellows ] is totally evers't by the most ingenious commentator upon immaterial beings , dr. h. more in his book of immortality . i shall therefore leave that cause in the hands of that most learned undertaker , and only observe two things to my present purpose . ( 1 ) . neither the brain , nor spirits , nor any other material substance within the head can for any considerable space of time conserve motion . the former is of such a clammy consistence , that it can no more retain it then a quagmire : and the spirits for their liquidity are more uncapable then the fluid medium , which is the conveyer of sounds , to persevere in the continued repetition of vocal airs . and if there were any other substance within us , as fitly temper'd to preserve motion , as the author of the opinion could desire : yet ( 2. ) which will equally press against either of the former , this motion would be quickly deadned even to an utter cessation , by counter-motions ; and we should not remember any thing , but till the next impression . much less can this principle give an account , how such an abundance of motions should orderly succeed one another , as things do in our memories : and to remember a soug or tune , it will be required , that our souls be an harmony more then in a metaphor● continually running over in a silent whisper those musical accents which our retentive faculty is preserver of . which could we suppose in a single instance ; yet a multitude of musical consonancies would be as impossible , as to play a thousand tunes on a lute at once . one motion would cross and destroy another ; all would be clashing and discord : and the musicians soul would be the most disharmonious : for according to the tenour of this opinion , our memories will be stored with infinite variety of divers , yea contrary motions , which must needs interfere , thwart , and obstruct on another : and there would be nothing within us , but ataxy and disorder . § . 8. much more might be added of the difficulties , which occurr touching the understanding , phancy , will , and affections . but the controversies hereabout , are so hotly manag'd by the divided schools , and so voluminously every where handled ; that it will be thought better to say nothing of them , then a little . the sole difficulties about the will , its nature , and sequency to the understanding , &c. have almost quite baffled inquiry , and shewn us little else , but that our understandings are as blind as it is . and the grand question depending hereon , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; i think will not be ended , but by the final abolition of its object . they , that would lose their knowledge here , let them diligently inquire after it . search will discover that ignorance , which is as invincible , as its cause . these controversies , like some rivers , the further they run , the more they are hid . and i think a less account is given of them now , then some centuries past ; when they were a subject of debate to the pious fathers . chap. v. how our bodies are form'd unexplicable . the plastick signifies nothing ; the formation of plants , and animals unknown , in their principle . mechanisme solves it not . a new way propounded , which also fails of satisfaction . ( 2. ) no account is yet given how the parts of matter are united . some considerations on des-cartes his hypothesis , it fails of solution . ( 3. ) the question is unanswerable , whether matter be compounded of divisibles , or indivisibles . therefore we 'l pass on to the next , the consideration of our bodies , which though we see , and feel , and continually converse with ; yet its constitution , and inward frame is an america , a yet undiscovered region . the saying of the kingly prophet , i am wonderfully made , may well be understood of that admiration , which is the daughter of ignorance . and with reverence it may be applyed , that in seeing we see , and understand not . three things i 'le subjoyn concerning this sensible matter , the other part of our compositoin . § . 1. that our bodies are made according to the most curious artifice , and orderly contrivance , cannot be denyed even by them , who are least beholden to nature . the elegance of this composure , sav'd the great aesculapius , galen , from a profest atheism . and i cannot think that the branded epicurus , lucretius , and their fellows were in earnest , when they resolv'd this composition into a fortuitous range of atoms . to suppose a watch , or any other the most curious automaton by the blind hits of chance , to perform diversity of orderly motions , to indicate the hour , day of the moneth , tides , age of the moon , and the like , with an unparallel'd exactness , and all without the regulation of art , this were the more pardonable absurdity . and that this admirable engine of our bodies , whose functions are carryed on by such a multitude of parts , and motions , which neither interfere , nor impede one another in their operations ; but by an harmonious sympathy promote the perfection and good of the whole : that this should be an undesign'd effect , is an assertion , that is more then melancholies hyperbole . i say therefore , that if we do but consider this fabrick with minds unpossest of an affected madness ; we will easily grant , that it was some skilful archeus who delineated those comely proportions , and hath exprest such exactly geometrical elegancies in its compositions . but what this hidden architect should be , and by what instruments and art this frame is erected ; is as unknown to us , as our embryo-thoughts . the plastick faculty is a fine word : but what it is , how it works , and whose it is , we cannot learn ; no , not by a return into the womb ; neither will the platonick principles unriddle the doubt : for though the soul be supposed to be the bodies maker , and the builder of its own house ; yet by what kind of knowledge , method , or means , is as unknown : and that we should have a knowledge which we know not of , is an assertion , which some say , hath no commission from our faculties . the great des-cartes will allow it to be no better , then a downright absurdity . but yet should we suppose it , it would be evidence enough of what we aim at . nor is the composition of our bodies the only wonder : we are as much non-plust by the most contemptible worm , and plant , we tread on . how is a drop of dew organiz'd into an insect , or a lump of clay into animal perfections ? how are the glories of the field spun , and by what pencil are they limn'd in their unaffected bravery ? by whose direction is the nutriment so regularly distributed unto the respective parts , and how are they kept to their specifick uniformities ? if we attempt mechanical solutions , we shall never give an account , why the wood-cock doth not sometimes borrow colours of the mag-pye , why the lilly doth not exchange with the daysie , or why it is not sometime painted with a blush of the rose ? can unguided matter keep it self to such exact conformities , as not in the least spot to vary from the species ? that divers limners at a distance without either copy , or designe , should draw the same picture to an undistinguishable exactness , both in form , colour , and features ; this is more conceivable , then that matter , which is so diversified both in quantity , quality , motion , site , and infinite other circumstances , should frame it self so absolutely according to the idea of its kind . and though the fury of that apelles , who threw his pencil in a desperate rage upon the picture he had essayed to draw , once casually effected those lively representations , which his art could not describe ; yet 't is not likely , that one of a thousand such praecipitancies should be crowned with so an unexpected an issue . for though blind matter might reach some elegancies in individual effects ; yet specifick conformities can be no unadvised productions , but in greatest likelyhood , are regulated by the immediate efficiency of some knowing agent : which whether it be seminal forms , according to the platonical principles , or what ever else we please to suppose ; the manner of its working is to us unknown ▪ or if these effects are meerly mechanical ; yet to learn the method of such operations may be , and hath indeed been ingeniously attempted ; but i think cannot be performed to the satisfaction of severer examination . that all bodies both animal , vegetable , and inanimate , are form'd out of such particles of matter , which by reason of their figures , will not cohaere or lie together , but in such an order as is necessary to such a specifical formation , and that therein they naturally of themselves concurre , and reside , is a pretty conceit , and there are experiments that credit it . if after a decoction of hearbs in a winter-night , we expose the liquor to the frigid air ; we may observe in the morning under a crust of ice , the perfect appearance both in figure , and colour , of the plants that were taken from it . but if we break the aqueous crystal , those pretty images dis-appear and are presently dissolved . now these airy vegetables are presumed to have been made , by the reliques of these plantal emissions whose avolation was prevented by the condensed inclosure . and therefore playing up and down for a while within their liquid prison , they at last settle together in their natural order , and the atomes of each part finding out their proper place , at length rest in their methodical situation , till by breaking the ice they are disturbed , and those counterfeit compositions are scatter'd into their first indivisibles . this hypothesis may yet seem to receive further confirmation , from the artificial resurrection of plants from their ashes , which chymists are so well acquainted with : and besides , that salt dissolved upon fixation returns to its affected cubes , the regular figures of minerals , as the hexagonal of crystal , the hemi-sphaerical of the fairy-stone , the stellar figure of the stone asteria , and such like , seem to look with probability upon this way of formation . and i must needs say 't is handsomly conjectur'd . but yet what those figures are , that should be thus mechanically adapted , to fall so unerringly into regular compositions , is beyond our faculties to conceive , or determine . and how those heterogeneous atomes ( for such their figures are supposed ) should by themselves hit so exactly into their proper residence in the midst of such tumultuary motions , cross thwartings , and arietations of other particles , especially when for one way of hitting right , there are thousands of missing ; there 's no hypothesis yet extant can resolve us . and yet had heaven afforded that miracle of men , the illustrious des-cartes a longer day on earth , we might have expected the utmost of what ingenuity could perform herein : but his immature fate hath unhappily disappointed us ; and prevented the most desirable complement of his not to be equall'd philosophy . § . 2. ( 2. ) it 's no less difficult to give an account , how the parts of the matter of our bodies are united : for though superficial enquirers may easily satisfie themselves by answering , that it is done by muscles , nerves , and other like strings and ligaments , which nature hath destin'd to that office ; yet , if we seek for an account how the parts of these do cohere , we shall find the cause to be as latent , as the effect of easie discovery . nothing with any shew of success hath yet appeared on the philosophick stage , but the opinion of des-cartes ; that the parts of matter are united by rest. neither can i conceive , how any thing can be substituted in its room , more congruous to reason ; since rest is most opposite to motion , the immediate cause of disunion . but yet i cannot see , how this can satisfie , touching the almost indissolvible coherence of some bodies , and the fragility and solubility of others : for if the union of the parts consist only in rest ; it would seem that a bagg of dust would be of as firm a consistence as that of marble or adamant : a bar of iron will be as easily broken as a tobacco-pipe ; and bajazets cage had been but a sorry prison . the aegyptian pyramids would have been sooner lost , then the names of them that built them ; and as easily blown away , as those inverst ones of smoke . if it be pretended for a difference , that the parts of solid bodies are held together by hooks , and angulous involutions ; i say , this comes not home : for the coherence of the parts of these hooks [ as hath been noted ] will be of as difficult a conception , as the former : and we must either suppose an infinite of them holding together on one another ; or at last come to parts , that are united by a meer juxta-position : yea , could we suppose the former , yet the coherence of these , would be like the hanging together of an infinite such of dust : which hypothesis would spoil the proverb , and a rope of sand , should be no more a phrase for labour in vain : for unless there be something , upon which all the rest may depend for their cohesion ; the hanging of one by another , will signifie no more then the mutual dependence of causes and effects in an infinite series , without a first : the admission of which , atheism would applaud . but yet to do the master of mechanicks right ; somewhat of more validity in the behalf of this hypothesis may be assign'd : which is , that the closeness and compactness of the parts resting together , doth much confer to the strength of the union : for every thing continues in the condition , wherein it is , except something more powerful alter it : and therefore the parts , that rest close together , must continue in the same relation to each other , till some other body by motion disjoyn them . now then , the more parts there are pen't together , the more able they will be for resistence ; and what hath less compactness , and by consequence fewer parts , according to the laws of motion will not be able to effect any alteration in it . according to what is here presented , what is most dense , and least porous , will be most coherent , and least discerpible . and if this help not , i cannot apprehend what can give an account of the former instances . and yet even this is confuted by experience ; since the most porous , spongy bodies are oft-times the most tough in consistence . 't is easier to break a tube of glass or crystal , then of elm or ash : and yet as the parts of the former are more , so they are more at rest ; since the liquid juyce , which is diffused through the parts of the wood , is in a continual agitation , which in des-cartes his philosophy is the cause of fluidity ; and a proportion'd humidity conferr's much to union [ sir k. digby makes it the cement it self ] ; a dry stick will be easily broken , when a green one will maintain a strong resistence : and yet in the moist substance there is less rest , then in what is , dryer and more fragill . much more might be added : but i 'le content my self with what 's mentioned ; and , notwithstanding what hath been said , i judge this account of that most miraculous wit to be the most ingenuous and rational , that hath or [ it may be ] can be given . i shall not therefore conclude it false ; though i think the emergent difficulties , which are its attendants , unanswerable : which is proof enough of the weakness of our now reasons , which are driven to such straights and puzzles even in things which are most obvious , and have so much the advantage of our faculties . § . 3. the composition of bodies , whether it be of divisibles or indivisibles , is a question which must be rank'd with the indissolvibles : for though it hath been attempted by the most illustrious wits of all philosophick ages ; yet they have done little else , but shewn their own divisions to be almost as infinite , as some suppose those of their subject . and notwithstanding all their shifts , subtilties , newly invented words and modes , sly subterfuges , and studyed evasions ; yet the product of all their endeavours , is but as the birth of the labouring mountains , wind and emptiness . do what they can ; actual infinite extension every where , equality of all bodies , impossibility of motion , and a world more of the most palpable absurdities will press the assertors of infinite divisibility . neither can it be avoided , but that all motions would be equal in velocity , the lines drawn from side to side in a pyramid , may have more parts then the basis , all bodies would be swallow'd up in a point , and endless more inconsistences , will be as necessarily consequential to the opinion of indivisibles . but intending only to instance in difficulties , which are not so much taken notice of ; i shall refer the reader , that would see more of this , to oviedo , pontius , ariaga , carelton , and other iesuites : whose management of this subject with equal force on either side , is a strong presumption of what we drive at . chap. vi. difficulties about the motion of a wheel , which admit of no solution . besides the already mention'd difficulties , even the most ordinary trivial occurrents , if we contemplate them in the theory , will as much puzzle us , as any of the former . under this head i 'le add three rhings touching the motion of a wheel , and conclude this . § . 1. and first , if we abstractly consider it , it seems impossible that a wheel should move : i mean not the progressive , but that motion which is meerly on its own centre . and were it not for the information of experience , it 's most likely that philosophy had long ago concluded it impossible : for let 's suppose the wheel to be divided according to the alphabet . now in motion there is a change of place , and in the motion of a wheel there is a succession of one part to another in the same place ; so that it seems unconceivable that a. should move until b. hath left its place : for a. cannot move , but it must acquire some place or other . it can acquire none but what was b's , which we suppose to be most immediate to it . the same space cannot contain them both . and therefore b. must leave its place , before a. can have it ; yea , and the nature of succession requires it . but now b. cannot move , but into the place of c ; and c. must be out , before b. can come in : so that the motion of c. will be pre-required likewise to the motion of a ; & so onward till it comes to z. upon the same accounts z. will not be able to move , till a. moves , being the part next to it : neither will a. be able to move [ as hath been shown ] till z. hath . and so the motion of every part will be pre-requir'd to it self . neither can one evade , by saying , that all the parts move at once . for ( 1. ) we cannot conceive in a succession but that something should be first , and that motion should begin somewhere . ( 2. ) if the parts may all change places with one another at the same time without any respect of priority , and posteriority to each others motion : why then may not a company of bullets closely crowded together in a box , as well move together by a like mutual and simultaneous exchange ? doubtless the reason of this ineptitude to motion in this position is , that they cannot give way one to another , and motion can no where begin because of the plenitude . the case is just the same in the instance before us ; and therefore we need go no further for an evidence of its inconceivableness . but yet to give it one touch more according to the peripatetick niceness , which says , that one part enters in the same instant that the other goes out : i 'le add this in brief : in the instant that b. leaves its place , it 's in it , or not : if so ; then a. cannot be in it in the same instant without quantative penetration . if not ; then it cannot be said to leave it in that instant , but to have left it before . these difficulties , which pinch so in this obvious experiment , stand in their full force against all motion on the hypothesis of absolute plenitude . nor yet have the defenders hereof need to take notice of them , because they equally press a most sensible truth . neither is it fair , that the opposite opinion of interspers'd vacuities should be rejected as absurd upon the account of some inextricable perplexities which attend it . therefore let them both have fair play ; and which soever doth with most ease and congruity solve the phaenomena , that shall have my vote for the most philosophick hypothesis . § . 2. it 's a difficulty no less desperate then the former , that the parts vicine to the centre , which it may be pass not over the hundredth part of space which those do of the extreme circumference , should describe their narrower circle but in equal time with those other , that trace so great a round . if they move but in the same degree of velocity ; here is then an equality in time and motion , and yet a vast inequality in the acquired space . a thing which seems flatly impossible : for is it conceivable , that of two bodies setting forth together , and continuing their motion in the same swiftness , the one should so far out-go its fellow , as to move ten mile an hour , while the other moves but a furlong ? if so , 't will be no wonder , that the race is not to the swift , and the furthest way about may well be the nearest way home . there is but one way that can be attempted to untie this knot ; which is , by saying , that the remoter and more out-side parts move more swiftly then the central ones . but this likewise is as unconceivable as what it would avoid : for suppose a right line drawn from the centre to the circumference , and it cannot be apprehended , but that the line should be inflected , if some parts of it move faster then others . i say if we do abstractedly from experience contemplate it in the theory , it is hard to conceive , but that one part moving , while the other rests , or at least moves slower ( which is as rest to a swifter motion ) should change its distance from it , and the respect , which it had to it ; which one would think should cause an incurvation in the line . § . 3. i 'le add only this one , which is an experiment that may for ever silence the most daring confidence . let there be two wheels fixt on the same axel in diameter ten inches a piece . between them let there be a little wheel , of two inches diameter , fixed on the same axel . let them be moved together on a plane , the great ones on the ground suppose , and the little one on a table [ for because of its parvitude it cannot reach to the same floor with them ] and you 'l find that the little wheel will move over the same space in equal time with equal circulations , with the great ones , and describe as long a line . now this seems bigg of repugnancies , though sense it self suffragate to its truth : for since every part of the greater wheels makes a proportionable part of the line , as do the parts of the little one , and the parts of those so much exceeding in multitude the parts of this : it will seem necessary that the line made by the greater wheels should have as many parts more then the line made by the less , as the wheels themselves have in circumference , and so the line would be as much longer as the wheels are bigger : so that one of these absurdities is unavoidable , either that more parts of the greater wheels go to the making one part of their lines , which will inferr a quantitative penetration ; or that the little wheel hath as many parts as the great ones , though five times in diameter exceeded by them , since the lines they describe are of equal length ; or the less wheel's line will have fewer parts then the others , though of equal extent with them , since it can have no more parts then the less circle , nor they fewer then the greater . but these are all such repugnancies , as that melancholy it self would scarse own them . and therefore we may well enter this among the unconceivables . should i have enlarged on this subject to the taking in of all things that claim a share in 't , it may be few things would have been left unspoken to , but the creed . philosophy would not have engross'd our pen , but we must have been forced to anger the intelligences of higher orbs. but intending only a glance at this rugged theam , i shall forbear to insist more on it , though the consideration of the mysteries of motion , gravity , light , colours , vision , sound , and infinite such like [ things obvious , yet unknown ] might have been plentiful subject . i come now to trace some of the causes of our ignorance and intellectual weakness : and among so many it 's almost as great a wonder as any of the former ; that we can say , we know . chap. vii . mens backwardness to acknowledge their own ignorance and error , though ready to find them in others . the ( i ) cause of the shortness of our knowledge , viz. the depth of verity discours't of , as of its admixtion in mens opinions with falsehood , and the connexion of truths , and their mutual dependence : a second reason of the shortness of our knowledge , viz. because we can perceive nothing but by proportion to our senses . the disease of our intellectuals is too great , not to be its own diagnostick : and they that feel it not , are not less sick , but stupidly so . the weakness of humane understanding , all will confess : yet the confidence of most in their own reasonings , practically disowns it : and 't is easier to perswade them it from others lapses then their own ; so that while all complain of our ignorance and error , every one exempts himself . it is acknowledged by all , while every one denies it . if the foregoing part of this discourse , have not universally concluded our weakness : i have one item more of my own . if knowledge can be found in the particulars mention'd ; i must lose that , which i thought i had , that there is none . but however , though some should pick a quarrel with the instances i alleadged ; yet the conclusion must be owned in others . and therefore beside the general reason i gave of our intellectual disabilities , the fall ; it will be worth our labour to descend to a more particular account : since it is a good degree of knowledge to be acquainted with the causes of our ignorance . and what we have to say under this head , will be comprehensive both of the causes of that , and ( which are the effects thereof ) of our misapprehensions and errours . § . 1. and first , one cause of the little we know may be , that knowledge lies deep , and is therefore difficult ; and so not the acquist of every careless inquirer . democritus his well hath a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and truth floats not . the useless froth swims on the surface ; but the pearl lies cover'd with a mass of waters . verisimilitude and opinion are an easie purchase ; and these counterfeits are all the vulgars treasure : but true knowledge is as dear in acquisition , as rare in possession . truth , like a point or line , requires an acuteness and intention to its discovery ; while verisimility , like the expanded superficies , is an obvious sensible on either hand , and affords a large and easie field for loose enquiry . and 't is the more difficult to find out verity , because it is in such inconsiderable proportions scattered in a mass of opinionative uncertainty ; like the silver in hiero's crown of gold : and it is no easie piece of chymistry to reduce them to their unmixed selves . the elements are no where pure in these lower regions ; and if there is any free from the admixtion of another , sure 't is above the concave of the moon : neither can any boast of a knowledge , which is depurate from the defilement of a contrary , within this atmosphear of flesh ; it dwels no where in unblended proportions , on this side the empyreum . all opinions have their truth , and all have what is not so ; and to say all are true and none , is no absurdity . so that to crown our selfs with sparks , which are almost lost in such a world of heterogeneous natures , is as difficult as desirable . besides , truth is never alone ; to know one will require the knowledge of many . they hang together in a chain of mutual dependence ; you cannot draw one link without many others . such an harmony cannot commence from a single string ; diversity of strokes makes it . the beauty of a face is not known by the eye , or nose ; it consists in a symmetry , and 't is the comparative faculty which votes it : thus is truth relative , and little considerable can be attain'd by catches . the painter cannot transcribe a face upon a transient view ; it requires the information of a fixt and observant eye : and before we can reach an exact sight of truth 's uniform perfections , this fleeting transitory our life , is gone . thus we see the face of truth , but as we do one anothers , when we walk the streets , in a careless pass-by : and the most diligent observers , view but the back-side o' th' hangings ; the right one is o' th' other side the grave : so that our knowledge is but like those broken ends , at best a most confused adumbration . nature , that was veil'd to aristotle , hath not yet uncover'd , in almost two thousand years . what he sought on the other side of euripus , we must not look for on this side immortality . in easie disquisitions we are often left to the uncertainty of a guess : yea after we have triumph'd in a supposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; a new-sprung difficulty marrs our ovations , and exposeth us to the torment of a disappointment : so that even the great master of dogmatists himself concludes the scene with an anxius vixi , dubius morior . § . 2. another reason of our ignorance and the narrowness of our apprehensions may arise hence ; that we cannot perceive the manner of any of natures operations , but by proportion to our senses , and a return to material phantasms . a blind man cannot conceive colours , but either as some audible , gustable , odoriferous , or tactile qualities ; and when he would imagine them , he hath questionless recourse to some of these , in an account of which his other senses befriend him . thus more perfect apprehenders misconceive immaterials : our imaginations paint souls and angels in as dissimilar a resemblance . thus had there not been any night , shadow , or opacity ; we should never have had any determinate conceit of darkness ; that would have been as inconceiveable to us , as its contrary is to him that never saw it . but now our senses being scant and limited , and natures operations subtil and various ; they must needs transcend , and out-run our faculties . they are only natures grosser wayes of working , which are sensible ; her finer threads are out of the reach of our feeble percipient , yea questionless she hath many hidden energies , no wayes imitated in her obvious peices : and therefore it is no wonder that we are so often at a loss ; an infirmity beyond prevention , except we could step by step follow the tracks and methods of infinite wisdom , which cannot be done but by him that owns it . chap. viii . a third reason of our ignorance and error , viz. the impostures and deceits of our senses . the way to rectifie these mis-informations propounded . des-cartes his method the only way to science . the difficulty of exact performance . § . 3. another reason is the imposture and fallacy of our senses , which impose not only on common heads , who scarce at all live to the higher principle ; but even more refined mercuries , who have the advantages of an improved reason to disabuse them , are yet frequently captivated to these deceiving prepossessions : appealing to a judicature both uncommissioned and unjust ; and when the clearest truth is to be tryed by such judges , its innocence will not secure it from the condemning award of that unintelligent tribunal : for since we live the life of brutes , before we grow into man ; and our understandings in this their non-age , being almost meerly passive to sensible impressions , receiving all things in an uncontroverted and promiscuous admission : it cannot be , that our knowledge should be other , then an heap of mis-conception and error , and conceits as impertinent as the toys we delight in . all this while , we have no more ●o reason , then the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ as plotinus cals it ] amounts to . and besides this our easie submission to the sophistications of sense , and inability to prevent the miscarriages of our iunior reasons ; that which strikes the great stroke toward our after-deceptions , is the pertinacious adherence of many of these first impressions to our graduate understandings . that which is early received , if in any considerable strength of impress , as it were grows into our tender natures , and is therefore of difficult remove . thus a fright in minority , or an antipathy then contracted , is not worn out but with its subject . and it may be more then a story , that nero derived much of his cruelty from the nurse that suckled him . now though our coming judgments do in part undeceive us , and rectifie the grosser errors which our unwary sensitive hath engaged us in ; yet others are so flesht in us , that they maintain their interest upon the deceptibility of our decayed natures , and are cherish't there , as the legitimate issues of our reasonable faculties . indeed sense it self detects its more palpable deceits , by a counter-evidence ; and the more ordinary impostures seldom out-live the first experiments . if our sight represent a staff as crooked in the water ; the same faculty rectifies both it , and us , in the thinner element . and if a square tower seem round at a distance ; the eye , which mistook in the circumstance of its figure , at that remove , corrects the mistake in a due approach : yea , and befriends those who have learn'd to make the advantage of its informations , in more remote and difficil discoveries . and though his sense occasion the careless rustick to judge the sun no bigger then a cheese-fat ; yet sense too by a frugal improvement of its evidence , grounds the astronomers knowledge , that it 's bigger then this globe of earth and water . which it doth not only by the advantageous assistance of a tube , but by less industrious experiments , shewing in what degrees distance minorates the object . but yet in inifinite other cases , wherein sense can afford none , or but very little help to dis-intangle us ; our first deceptions lose no ground , but rather improve in our riper years : so that we are not weaned from our child-hood , till we return to our second infancy ; and even our gray heads out-grow not those errors , which we have learn't before the alphabet . thus our reasons being inoculated on sense , will retain a rellish of the stock they grow upon : and if we would endeavour after an unmixed knowledge ; we must unlive our former lives , and ( inverting the practise of penelope ) undo in the day of our more advanc'd understandings , what we had spun in the night of our infant-ignorance . he that would rebuild a decayed structure , must first pluck down the former ruines . a fabrick , though high and beautiful , if founded on rubbish , is easily made the triumph of the winds : and the most pompous seeming knowledge , that 's built on the unexamin'd prejudices of sense , stands not , but till the storm arise ; the next strong encounter discovers its weakness , in a shameful overthrow . and now since a great part of our scientifical treasure is most likely to be adulterate , though all bears the image and superscription of verity ; the only way to know what is sophisticate , and what is not so , is to bring all to the examen of the touchstone : for the prepossessions of sense having ( as is shewen ) so mingled themselves with our genuine truths , and being as plausible to appearance as they ; we cannot gain a true assurance of any , but by suspending our assent from all , till the deserts of each , discover'd by a strict enquiry , claim it . upon this account i think the method of the most excellent des-cartes not unworthy its author ; and ( since dogmatical ignorance will call it so ) a scepticism , that 's the only way to science . but yet this is so difficult in the impartial and exact performance , that it may be well reckon'd among the bare possibilities , which never commence into a futurity : it requiring such a free , sedate , and intent minde , as it may be is no where found but among the platonical idea's . do what we can , prejudices will creep in , and hinder our intellectual perfection : and though by this means we may get some comfortable allay to our distempers ; yet can it not perfectly cure us of a disease , that sticks as close to us as our natures . chap. ix . two instances of sensitive deception . ( 1 ) of the quiescence of the earth . sense is the great inducement to its belief ; its testimony deserves no credit in this case , though it do move , sense would present it as immoveable . the sun to sense is as much devoid of motion as the earth . four cases in which motion is insensible , viz. ( 1 ) if it be very swift . ( 2 ) if it be steddy and regular . ( 3 ) if very slow . ( 4 ) if the sentient partake of it . applyed to the earths motion . the unweildiness of its bulk is no argument of its immobility . now before i leave this , i shall take the opportunity , which this head offers , to endeavour the detection of some grand prejudices of sense , in two instances ; the free debate of which i conceive to be of great importance , though hitherto for the most part obstructed , by the peremptory conclusion of sense , which yet i shall declare to have no suffrage in the case of either : and the pleasantness and concernment of the theories , if it be one , i hope will attone the digression . § . 2. first , it is generally opinion'd , that the earth rests as the worlds centre , while the heavens are the subject of the universal motions ; and , as immoveable as the earth , is grown into the credit of being proverbial . so that for a man to go about to counter-argue this common belief , is as fruitless as to whistle against the windes . i shall not undertake to maintain the paradox , that stands diameter to this almost catholick opinion . it s assertion would be entertained with the hoot of the rabble : the very mention of it as possible , is among the most ridiculous ; and they are likely most severely to judge it , who least understand the cause . but yet the patronage of as great wits , as it may be e're saw the sun , such as pythagoras , des-cartes , copernicus , galilaeo , more , kepler , &c. hath gain'd it a more favourable censure with the learned world ; and advanc'd it far above either vain , or contemptible . and if it be a mistake , it 's only so : there 's no heresie in such an harmless aberration ; at the worst , with the ingenuous ; the probability of it will render it a lapse of easie pardon . now whether the earth move or rest , i undertake not to determine . my work is to prove , that the common inducement to the belief of its quiescence , the testimony of sense , is weak and frivolous : to the end , that if upon an unprejudiced tryal , it be found more consonant to the astronomical phaenomena ; its motion may be admitted , notwithstanding the seeming contrary evidence of unconcerned senses . and i think what follows will evince , that this is no so absurd an hypothesis , as vulgar philosophers account it ; but that , though it move , its motion must needs be as insensible , as if it were quiescent : and the assertion of it would then be as uncouth and harsh to the sons of sense , that is , to the generality of mankind , as now it is . that there is a motion , which makes the vicissitudes of day and night , and constitutes the successive seasons of the annual circle ; sense may assure us , or at least the comparative judgement of an higher faculty , made upon its immediate evidence : but whether the sun , or earth , be the common movent , cannot be determin'd but by a farther appeal . if we will take the literal evidence of our eyes ; the aethereal coal moves no more then this inferior clod doth : for where ever in the firmament we see it , it 's represented to us , as fixt in that part of the enlightened hemisphear . and though an after-account discover , that it hath changed its site and respect to this our globe ; yet whether that were caused by its translation from us , or ours from it , sense leaves us in an ignoramus : so that if we are resolved to stand to its verdict , it must be by as great a miracle if the sun ever move , as it was that it once rested , or what ever else was the subject of that supernal change . and if upon a meer sensible account we will deny motion to the earth ; upon the same inducement we must deny it the sun ; and the heavens will lose their first moveable . but to draw up closer to our main design , we may the better conceive that , though the earth move , yet its motion must needs be insensible ; if we consider that in four cases motion strikes not the sense . 1. the velocity of motion prevents the sense of 't . thus a bullet passeth by us , and out-runs the nimblest opticks ; and the fly of a jack in its swiftest rounds , gives the eye no notice of its circulations . the reason is , for that there is no sense without some stay of the object on the faculty : for in sense there are two considerables : the motion made on the brain ; and the souls act consequent thereupon , which we call animadversion : and in this latter consists the formality of sensitive perception . now though possibly the aethereal matter might convey the stroke and motion made on it quite to the brain , before the pass of the object ; yet the soul being taken up with other attendances , perceives not , till engaged to it by iterated impressions , except the first impulse be very strong and violent . thus in the clearest night we cannot see some of the smaller stars , upon the first cast of the eye to their celestial residence : yet a more intent view discovers them ; though very likely their motion reach't the brain , assoon as the more noted impress of their fellows . thus upon a slight turn of our sight , we omit many particularities in nearer objects , which a more fixed look presents us with . and thus the swiftest motions , though they knock at the dore ; yet they are gone before the soul can come , to take an account of their errand . 2. if regularity and steddiness accompany velocity ; the motion then leaves not the least track in the sensitive . thus a french top , the common recreation of school-boys , thrown from a cord which was wound about it , will stand as it were fixt on the floor it lighted ; and yet continue in its repeated gyrations , while the sense discovers not the least footsteps of that praecipitate rotation . the reason is much what the same with the former : for that meeting no joggs , or counter-motions to interrupt it , the return of the parts is so quick , that the mind cannot take notice of their succession to each other : for before it can fix to the observation of any one , its object is gone : whereas , were there any considerable thwart in the motion ; it would be a kind of stop or arrest , by the benefit of which the soul might have a glance of the fugitive transient . but i pass these ; they concern not our present enquiry . 3. if the motion be very slow , we perceive it not . thus vegetables spring up from their mother earth ; and we can no more discern their accretive motion , then we can their most hidden cause . thus the sly shadow steals away on times account-book the dyal ; and the quickest eye can tell no more , but that it 's gone . if a reason of this be demanded ; i conceive it may be to some satisfaction return'd , that 't is because motion cannot be perceived without the perception of its terms , viz. the parts of space which it immediately left , and those which it next acquires . now the space left and acquir'd in every sensible moment in such slow progressions , is so inconsiderable , that it cannot possibly move the sense ; ( which by reason either of its constitutional dulness , or the importunity of stronger impressions , cannot take notice of such parvitudes ) and therefore neither can the motion depending thereon , be a●y more observable , then it is . 4. if the sentient be carryed passibus aequis with the body , whose motion it would observe ; [ supposing the former condition , that it be regular and steddy ] in this case especially the remove is insensible , at least in its proper subject . thus , while in a ship , we perceive it not to move : but our sense transfers its motion to the neighbouring shores , as the poet , littus campique recedunt . and i question not , but if any were born and bred under deck , and had no other information but what his sense affords ; he would without the least doubt or scruple , opinion , that the house he dwelt in , was as stable and fixt as ours . to express the reason according to the philosophy of des-cartes , i suppose it thus : motion is not perceived , but by the successive strikings of the object upon divers filaments of the brain ; which diversifie the representation of its site and distance . but now when the motion of the object is common with it , to our selves ; it retains the same relation to our sense , as if we both rested : for striking still on the same strings of the brain , it varies not its site or distance from us ; and therefore we cannot possibly sense its motion : nor yet upon the same account our own ; least of all , when we are carryed without any conamen and endeavour of ours , which in our particular progressions betrayes them to our notice . now then the earths motion ( if we suppose it to have any ) having the joynt concurrence of the two last , to render it insensible ; i think we shall need no more proof to conclude the necessity of its being so . for though the third seems not to belong to the present case , since the supposed motion will be near a thousand miles an hour under the equinoctial line ; yet it will seem to have no velocity to the sense any more then the received motion of the sun , and for the same reason . because the distant points in the celestial expanse [ from a various and successive respect to which the length , and consequently the swiftness of this motion must be calculated ] appear to the eye in so small a degree of elongation from one another , as bears no proportion to what is real . for since the margin of the visible horizon in the heavenly globe is parallel with that in the earthly , accounted but 120 miles diameter ; sense must needs measure the azimuths , or vertical circles , by triplication of the same diameter of 120. so that there will be no more proportion betwixt the sensible and real celerity of the terrestrial motion , then there is between the visible and rational dimension of the celestial hemisphear ; which is none at all . but if sensitive prejudice will yet confidently maintain the impossibility of the hypothesis , from the supposed unwieldiness of its massy bulk , grounded on our experience of the ineptitude of great and heavy bodies to motion : i say this is a meer imposture of our senses , the fallacy of which we may avoid , by considering ; that the earth may as easily move , notwithstanding this pretended indisposition of its magnitude , as those much vaster orbs of sun and stars . he that made it , could as well give motion to the whole , as to the parts ; the constant agitation of which is discover'd in natural productions : and to both as well as rest to either : neither will it need the assistance of an intelligence to perpetuate the begun rotation : since according to the indispensable law of nature [ that every thing should continue in the state wherein it is , except something more powerful hinder it ] it must persevere in motion , unless obstructed by a miracle . neither can gravity , which makes great bodies hard of remove , be any hinderance to the earths motion : since even the peripatetick maxime , nihil gravitat in suo loco , will exempt it from this indisposing quality ; which is nothing but the tendency of its parts , which are ravish't from it , to their desired centre . and the french philosophy will inform us , that the earth as well as other bodies is indifferent in it self to rest , or its contrary . i have done with this instance , and my brevity in the following shall make some amends for my prolixity in this . he that would be inform'd in this subject of the earths mobility , may find it largely and ingeniously discuss'd , in galilaeo's systema cosmicum . chap. x. another instance of the deceptions of our senses : which is of translating the idea of our passions to things without us . properly and formally heat is not in the fire , but is an expression of our sentiment . yet in propriety of speech the senses themselves are never deceived , but only administer an occasion of deceit to the understanding : prov'd by reason , and the authority of st. austin . secondly the best philosophy [ the deserved title of the cartesian ] derives all sensitive perception from motion , and corporal impress ; some account of which we have above given . not that the formality of it consists in material reaction , as master hobbs affirms , totally excluding any immaterial concurrence : but that the representations of objects to the soul , the only animadversive principle , are conveyed by motions made upon the immediate instruments of sense . so that the diversity of our sensations ariseth from the diversity of the motion or figure of the object ; which in a different manner affect the brain , whence the soul hath its immediate intelligence of the quality of what is presented . thus the different effects , which fire and water have on us , which we call heat and cold , result from the so differing configuration and agitation of their particles : and not from , i know not what chimerical beings , supposed to inhere in the objects , their cause , and thence to be propagated by many petty imaginary productions to the seat of sense . so that what we term heat and cold , and other qualities , are not properly according to philosophical rigour in the bodies , their efficients : but are rather names expressing our passions ; and therefore not strictly attributable to any thing without us , but by extrinsick denomination , as vision to the wall. this i conceive to be an hypothesis , well worthy a rational belief : and yet is it so abhorrent from the vulgar , that they would assoon believe anaxagoras , that snow is black , as him that should affirm , it is not white ; and if any should in earnest assert , that the fire is not formally hot , it would be thought that the heat of his brain had fitted him for anticyra , and that his head were so to madness : for it is conceiv'd to be as certain , as our faculties can make it , that the same qualities , which we resent within us , are in the object , their source . and yet this confidence is grounded on no better foundation , then a delusory prejudice , and the vote of misapplyed sensations , which have no warrant to determine either one or other . i may indeed conclude , that i am formally hot or cold ; i feel it . but whether these qualities are formally , or only eminently in their producent ; is beyond the knowledge of the sensitive . even the peripatetick philosophy will teach us , that heat is not in the body of the sun , but only vertually , and as in its cause ; though it be the fountain and great distributour of warmth to the neather creation : and yet none urge the evidence of sense to disprove it : neither can it with any more justice be alledged against this hypothesis . for if it be so as des-cartes would have it ; yet sense would constantly present it to us , as now. we should finde heat as infallible an attendant upon fire , and the increase thereof by the same degrees in our approach to the fountain calefacient , and the same excess within the visible substance , as now ; which yet i think to be the chief inducements to the adverse belief : for fire ( i retain the instance , which yet may be applyed to other cases ) being constant in its specifical motions in those smaller derivations of it , which are its instruments of action , and therefore in the same manner striking the sentient , though gradually varying according to the proportions of more or less quantity or agitation , &c. will not fail to produce the same effect in us , which we call heat , when ever we are within the orb of its activity . and the heat must needs be augmented by proximity , and most of all within the flame , because of the more violent motion of the particles there , which therefore begets in us a stronger sense . now if this motive energie , the instrument of this active element , must be called heat ; let it be so , i contend not . i know not how otherwise to call it : to impose names is part of the peoples charter , and i fight not with words . only i would not that the idea of our passions should be apply'd to any thing without us , when it hath its subject no where but in our selves . this is the grand deceit , which my design is to detect , and if possible , to rectifie . thus we have seen two notorious instances of sensitive deception , which justifie the charge of petron. arbiter . fallunt nos oculi , vagique sensus oppressâ ratione mentiuntur . and yet to speak properly , and to do our senses right , simply they are not deceived , but only administer an occasion to our forward understandings to deceive themselves : and so though they are some way accessory to our delusion ; yet the more principal faculties are the capital offenders . thus if the senses represent the earth as fixt and immoveable ; they give us the truth of their sentiments : to sense it is so , and it would be deceit to present it otherwise . for [ as we have shewn ] though it do move in it self ; it rests to us , who are carry'd with it . and it must needs be to sense unalterably quiescent , in that our rotation with it , prevents the variety of successive impress ; which only renders motion sensible . and so if we erroneously attribute our particular incommunicable sensations to things , which do no more resemble them then the effect doth its aequivocal cause ; our senses are not in fault , but our precipitate judgements . we feel such , or such a sentiment within us , and herein is no cheat or misprison : 't is truly so , and our sense concludes nothing of its rise or origine . but if hence our understandings falsly deduct , that there is the same quality in the external impressor ; 't is , it is criminal , our sense is innocent . when the ear tingles , we really hear a sound : if we judge it without us , it 's the fallacy of our iudgments . the apparitions of our frighted phancies are real sensibles : but if we translate them without the compass of our brains , and apprehend them as external objects ; it 's the unwary rashness of our understanding deludes us . and if our disaffected palates resent nought but bitterness from our choicest viands , we truly tast the unpleasing quality , though falsly conceive it in that , which is no more then the occasion of its production . if any find fault with the novelty of the notion ; the learned st. austin stands ready to confute the charge : and they , who revere antiquity , will derive satisfaction from so venerable a suffrage . he tells us , si quis remum frangi in aquâ opinatur , & , cùm aufertur , integrari ; non malum habet internuncium , sed malus est iudex . and onward to this purpose , the sense could not otherwise perceive it in the water , neither ought it : for since the water is one thing , and the air another ; 't is requisite and necessary , that the sense should be as different as the medium : wherefore the eye sees aright ; if there be a mistake , 't is the judgement 's the deceiver . elsewhere he saith , that our eyes mis-inform us not , but faithfully transmit their resentment to the mind . and against the scepticks , that it 's a piece of injustice to complain of our senses , and to exact from them an account , which is beyond the sphear of their notice : and resolutely determines , quicquid possuut videre oculi , verum vident . so that what we have said of the senses deceptions , is rigidly to be charg'd only on our careless understandings , misleading us through the ill management of sensible informations . but because such are commonly known by the name of the senses deceipts ( somewhat the more justifiably in that they administer the occasion ) i have thought good to retain the usual way of speaking , though somewhat varying from the manner of apprehending . chap. xi . a fourth reason of our ignorance and error , viz. the fallacy of our imaginations ; an account of the nature of that faculty ; instances of its deceptions ; spirits are not in a place ; intellection , volition , decrees , &c. cannot properly be ascrib'd to god. it is not reason that opposeth faith , but phancy : the interest which imagination hath in many of our opinions , in that it impresses a perswasion wiihout evidence . fourthly , we erre and come short of science , because we are so frequently mislead by the evil conduct of our imaginations ; whose irregular strength and importunity doth almost perpetually abuse us . now to make a full and clear discovery of our phancies deceptions ; 't will be requisite to look into the nature of that mysterious faculty . in which survey we must trace the soul in the wayes of her intellectual actions ; whereby we may come to the distinct knowledge of what is meant by imagination , in contradistinction to some other powers . but first premising , that the souls nature ( at least as far as concerns our inquiry ) consists in intelligibility : and secondly , that when we speak of powers and faculties of the soul , we intend not to assert with the schools , their real distinction from it , or each other , but only a modal diversity . therefore i shall distribute intellectual operations according to the known triple division , though with some difference of representation . the first is simple apprehension , which denotes no more , then the souls naked intellection of an object , without either composition or deduction . the foundation of this act , as to materials , is sensitive perception . now our simple apprehension of corporal objects , if present , we call sense ; if absent , we properly name it imagination . thus when we would conceive a triangle , man , horse , or any other sensible ; we figure it in our phancies , and stir up there its sensible idea . but in our notion of spirituals , we , as much as we can , denudate them of all material phantasmes ; and thus they become the object of our intellects , properly so called . now all this while the soul is , as it were , silent ; and in a more passive way of reception . but the second act advanceth propositions from simple intellections : and hereby we have the knowledge of the distinctions or identities of objective representations . now here , as in the former , where the objects are purely material ; the judgment is made by the imagination : if otherwise , we refer it to the understanding . there is yet a third act , which is a connecting of propositions and deducing of conclusions from them : and this the schools call discourse ; and we shall not miscall it , if we name it , reason . now this , as it supposeth the two former , so is it grounded on certain congenite propositions ; which i conceive to be the very essentials of rationality . such are , quodlibet est , vel non est ; impossibile est idem esse , & non esse ; non entis nulla sunt praedicata , & c. not that every one hath naturally a formal and explicit notion of these principles : for the vulgar use them , without knowledge of them , under any such express consideration ; but yet there was never any born to reason without them . if any ask , how the soul came by those foundation propositions : i return , as quantity did by longum , latum , & profundum ; they being the essential annexes , or rather constitutives of it , as reasonable . now then , when the conclusion is deduc'd from the unerring dictates of our faculties ; we say the inference is rational : but when from mis-apprehended , or ill-compounded phantasmes ; we ascribe it to the imagination . so we see , there is a triple operation of the phancy as well as intellect ; and these powers are only circumstantially different . in this method we intend a distinct , though short account , how the imagination deceives us . first then , the imagination , which is of simple perception , doth never of it self and directly mislead us ; as is at large declared in our former discourse of sense . yet is it the almost fatal means of our deception , through the unwarrantable compositions , divisions , and applications , which it occasions the second act to make of the simple images . hence we may derive the visions , voyces , revelations of the enthusiast : the strong idea's of which , being conjur'd up into the imagination by the heat of the melancholized brain , are judged exterior realties ; when as they are but motions within the cranium . hence story is full of the wonders , it works upon hypochondriacal imaginants ; to whom the grossest absurdities are infallible certainties , and free reason an impostour . that groom , that conceited himself an emperour , thought all as irrational as disloyal , that did not acknowledge him : and he , that supposed himself made of glass ; thought them all mad , that dis-believed him . but we pity , or laugh at those fatuous extravagants ; while yet our selves have a considerable dose of what makes them so : and more sober heads have a set of misconceits , which are as absurd to an unpassionated reason , as those to our unabused senses . and , as the greatest counter-evidence to those distemper'd phancies is none : so in the more ordinary deceits , in which our imaginations insensibly engage us , we give but little credit to the uncorrupted suggestions of the faculty , that should disabuse us . that the soul and angels are devoid of quantitative dimensions , hath the suffrage of the most ; and that they have nothing to do with grosser locality , is as generally opinion'd : but who is it , that retains not a great part of the imposture , by allowing them a definitive ubi , which is still but imagination ? he that said , a thousand might dance on the point of a needle , spake but grossly ; and we may as well suppose them to have wings , as a proper ubi . we say , spirits are where they operate : but strictly to be in a place , or ubi , is a material attribute , and incompatible with so depurate a nature . we ask not , in what place a thought is , nor are we solicitous for the ubi of vertue , or any other immaterial accident . relations , ubications , duration , the vulgar philosophy admits into the list of something ; and yet to enquire in what place they are , were a soloecism . so that , if to be and to be in a place be not reciprocal ; i know not why spirits may not be exempted , having as much to plead from the purity of their nature , as any thing but one , within the circle of being . and yet imagination stands so strongly against the notion , that it cannot look for the favour of a very diffusive entertainment . but we are more dangerously deceiv'd , when judging the infinite essence by our narrow selves ; we ascribe intellections , volitions , decrees , purposes , and such like immanent actions to that nature , which hath nothing in common with us , as being infinitely above us . now to use these as hypotheseis , as himself in his word , is pleas'd to low himself to our capacities , is allowable : but a strict and rigorous imputation is derogatory to him , and arrogant in us . to say , that god doth eminently contain all those effects in his glorious simple essence , that the creature can produce or act by such a faculty , power , or affection ; is to affirm him to be ● what he is , infinite . thus , to conceive that he can do all those things in the most perfect manner , which we do upon understanding , willing , and decreeing ; is an apprehension suteable to his idea : but to fix on him the formality of faculties , or affections ; is the imposture of our phancies , and contradictory to his divinity . 't is this deception misleads the contending world ; and is the author of most of that darkness and confusion , that is upon the face of the quinquarticular debates . now then , we being thus obnoxious to fallacy in our apprehensions and judgements , and so often imposed upon by these deceptions ; our inferences and deductions must needs be as unwarrantable , as our simple and compound thoughts are deceitful . thus the reason of the far greatest part of mankind , is but an aggregate of mistaken phantasms ; and in things not sensible a constant delusion . yea the highest and most improved parts of rationality , are frequently caught in the entanglements of a tenacious imagination ; and submit to its obstinate , but delusory dictamens . thus we are involv'd in inextricable perplexities about the divine nature , and attributes ; and in our reasonings about those sublimities are puzled with contradictions , which are but the toyings of our phancies , no absurdities to our more defaecate faculties . what work do our imaginations make with eternity and immensity ? and how are we gravell'd by their cutting dilemma's ? i 'm confident many have thus imagin'd themselves out of their religion ; and run a ground on that more desperate absurdity , atheism . to say , reason opposeth faith , is to scandalize both : 't is imagination is the rebel ; reason contradicts its impious suggestions . nor is our reason any more accountable for the errours of our opinions ; then our holiness for the vitiosity of our lives : and we may as well say , that the sun is the cause of the shadow , which is the effect of the intercepting opacity , as either . reason and faith are at perfect unisons : the disharmony is in the phancy . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is a saying of plato's ; and well worthy a christian subscription , reason being the image of the creators wisdom copyed out in the creature . though indeed , as 't is now in the subject , 't is but an amassment of imaginary conceptions , praejudices , ungrounded opinions , and infinite impostures ; and 't is no wonder , if these are at odds with the principles of our belief : but all this is but apish sophistry ; and to give it a name so divine and excellent , is abusive and unjust . there is yet another as deplorable a deceit of our imaginations , as any : which is , its impressing a strong perswasion of the truth of an opinion , where there is no evidence to support it . and if it be such , as we never heard question'd or contradicted ; 't is then held as indubitate , as first principles . thus the most of mankind is led by opinionative impulse ; and imagination is praedominant . hence we have an ungrounded credulity cry'd up for faith ; and the more vigorous impressions of phancy , for the spirits motions . these are the grand delusions of our age , and the highest evidence of the imaginations deceptions . this is the spirit , that works in the children of phancy ; and we need not seek to remoter resolutions . but the excellent dr. h. more hath follow'd enthusiastick effects to their proper origine , and prevented our endeavours of attempting it . his discourse of enthusiasm compleatly makes good the title ; and 't is as well a victory , as a triumph . chap. xii . a fifth reason , the praecipitancy of our understandings ; the reason of it . the most close ingagement of our minds requisite to the finding of truth ; the difficulties of the performance of it . two instances of our praecipitating ; as the concluding thing impossible , which to nature are not so ; and the joyning causes with irrelative effects . § . 5. again another account of the shortness of our reasons and easiness of deception , is , the forwardness of our understandings assent , to slightly examin'd conclusions , contracting many times a firm and obstinate belief from weak inducements ; and that not only in such things , as immediately concern the sense , but in almost every thing that falls within the scope of our enquiry . for the declarement of this , we are to observe , that every being uncessantly aspires to its own perfection , and is restless till it obtain it ; as is the trembling needle , till it find it s beloved north. now the perfection of a faculty is union with its object , to which its respective actions are directed , as the scope and term of its endeavours . thus our understanding being perfected by truth , with all the impatience , which accompanies strong desire , breaths after its enjoyment . but now the good and perfection of being , which every thing reacheth at , must be known , and that in the particular instances thereof ; or else 't is not attain'd : and if it be mistaken , that being courts deceit and its own delusion . now this knowledge of their good , was at first as natural to all things , as the desire on 't : otherwise this innate propension would have been as much a torment and misery to those things that are capable of it , as a needless impertinency to all others . but nature shoots not at rovers . even inanimates , though they know not their perfection themselves , yet are they not carryed on by a blind unguided impetus : but that which directs them , knows it . the next orders of being have some sight of it themselves : and man most perfectly had it , before the touch of the apple . so then beside this general propensity to truth , the understanding must know what is so , before it can entertain it with assent . the former we possess ( it may be ) as entirely as when nature gave it us : but of the latter little , but the capacity : and herein have we made our selves of all creatures the most miserable . and now such a multitude , such an infinite of uncertain opinions , bare probabilities , specious falshoods , spreading themselves before us , and solliciting our belief ; and we being thus greedy of truth , and yet so unable to discern it : it cannot be , that we should reach it any otherwise , then by the most close meditation and engagement of our minds ; by which we must endeavour to estrange our assent from every thing , which is not clearly , and distinctly evidenc't to our faculties . but now , this is so difficult ; and as hath been intimated , so almost infeasable ; that it may well drive modesty to despair of science . for though possibly assiduity in the most fixed cogitation be no trouble or pain to immaterializ'd spirits ; yet is it more , then our embodyed souls can bear without lassitude or distemper . for in this terrestrial state there are few things transacted , even in our intellectual part , but through the help and furtherance of corporal instruments ; which by more then ordinary usage lose their edge and fitness for action , and so grow inept for their respective destinations . upon this account our senses are dull'd and spent by any extraordinary intention ; and our very eyes will ake , if long fixt upon any difficultly discerned object . now though meditation be to be reckoned among the most abstracted operations of our minds ; yet can it not be performed without a considerable proportion of spirits to assist in the action , though indeed such as are furnish't out of the bodies purer store . this i think to be hence evidenc't ; in that fixed seriousness herein , heats the brain in some to distraction , causeth an aking and diziness in founder heads , hinders the works of nature in its lower and animal functions , takes away or lessens pain in distemper'd parts , and seldom leaves any but under a weary some dullness , and inactivity ; which i think to be arguments of sufficient validity to justifie our assent to this , that the spirits are imploy'd in our most intense cogitations , yea in such , whose objects are most elevated above material . now the managing and carrying on of this work by the spirits instrumental co-efficiency requires , that they be kept together without distraction or dissipation ; that so they may be ready to receive and execute the orders and commissions of the commanding faculty . if either of these happen , all miscarries : as do the works of nature , when they want that heat , which is requisite for their intended perfection . and therefore , for the prevention of such inconveniences in meditation , we choose recess and solitude . but now if we consider the volatile nature of those officious assistants , and the several causes which occur continually , even from the meer mechanism of our bodies to scatter and disorder them , besides the excursions of our roving phancies ( which cannot be kept to a close attendance ) ; it will be found very hard to retain them in any long service , but do what we can , they 'l get loose from the minds regimen . so that it 's no easie matter to bring the body to be what it was intended for , the souls servant ; and to confine the imagination , of as facil a performance , as the goteham's design of hedging in the cuckow . and though some constitutions are genially disposited to this mental seriousness ; yet they can scarce say , nos numeri sumus : yea in the most advantag'd tempers , this disposition is but comparative ; when as the most of men labour under disadvantages , which nothing can rid them of , but that which loosens them from this mass of flesh . thus the boyling bloud of youth , fiercely agitating the fluid air , hinders that serenity and fixed stayedness , which is necessary to so severe an intentness : and the frigidity of decrepite age is as much its enemy , not only through penury of spirits , but by reason of its clogging them with its dulling moisture . and even in the temperate zone of our life , there are few bodies at such an aequipoiz of humours ; but that the prevalency of some one indisposeth the spirits for a work so difficult and serious : for temperamentum ad pondus , may well be reckon'd among the three philosophical unattainables . besides , the bustle of business , the avocations of our senses , and external pleasures , and the noyse and din of a clamorous world are impediments not to be master'd by feeble endeavours . and to speak the full of my sentiments , i think never man could boast it , without the precincts of paradise ; but he , that came to gain us a better eden then we lost . so then , to direct all this to our end , the mind of man being thus naturally amorous of , and impatient for truth , and yet averse to , and almost incapacitated for , that diligent and painful search , which is necessary to its discovery ; it must needs take up short , of what is really so , and please it self in the possession of imaginary appearances , which offering themselves to its embraces in the borrowed attire of that , which the enamour'd intellect is in pursuit of , our impatient minds entertain these counterfeits , without the least suspicion of their cousenage . for as the will , having lost its true and substantial good , now courts the shadow , and greedily catches at the vain shews of superficial bliss : so our no less degenerate understandings having suffered as sad a divorce from their dearest object , are as forward to defile themselves with every meretricious semblance , that the variety of opinion presents them with . thus we see the inconsiderate vulgar , prostrating their assent to every shallow appearance : and those , who are beholden to prometheus for a finer mould , are not furnisht with so much truth as otherwise they might be owners of , did not this precipitancy of concluding prevent them : as 't is said of the industrious chymist , that by catching at it too soon , he lost the long expected treasure of the philosophical elixir . i 'le illustrate this head by a double instance , and close it . 1. hence it is , that we conclude many things within the list of impossibilities , which yet are easie feasables . for by an unadvised transiliency leaping from the effect to its remotest cause , we observe not the connexion through the interposal of more immediate causalities ; which yet at last bring the extreams together without a miracle . and hereupon we hastily conclude that impossible , which we see not in the proximate capacity of its efficient . hence , that a single hair should root up an oak ( which the mathematicks teach us to be possible ) will be thought fit to be number'd with the story of the brazen-head , or that other of the wishing hat. the relation of archimedes's lifting up the ships of marcellus , among many finds but little more credit , then that of the gyants shouldering mountains : and his other exploits sound no better to common ears , then those of amadis de gaule , and the knight of the sun. and yet mathematicians know , that by multiplying of mechanical advantages , any power may conquer any resistance , and the great syracusian wit wanted but tools , and a place to stand on , to remove the earth . so the brag of the ottoman , that he would throw malta into the sea , might be performed at an easier rate , then by the shovels of his ianizaries . and from this last noted head , ariseth that other of joyning causes with irrelative effects , which either refer not at all unto them , or in a remoter capacity . hence the indian conceiv'd so grossly of the letter , that discover'd his theft ; and that other , who thought the watch an animal . from hence grew the impostures of charms , and amulets , and other insignificant ceremonies ; which to this day impose upon common belief , as they did of old upon the barbarism of the incultivate heathen . thus effects unusual , whose causes run under ground , and are more remote from ordinary discernment , are noted in the book of vulgar opinion , with digitus dei , or daemonis ; though they owe no other dependence to the first , then what is common to the whole syntax of beings , nor yet any more to the second , then what is given it by the imagination of those unqualifi'd judges . thus every unwonted meteor is portentous ; and the appearance of any unobserved star , some divine prognostick . antiquity thought thunder the immediate voyce of iupiter , and impleaded them of impiety , that referr'd it to natural causalities . neither can there happen a storm , at this remove from antique ignorance , but the multitude will have the devil in 't . chap. xiii . the sixth reason discours't of , viz. the interest which our affections have in our dijudications . the cause why our affections mislead us ; several branches of this mention'd ; and the first , viz constitutional inclination largely insisted on . again we owe much of our errour and intellectual scarcity to the interest in , and power which our affections have over , our so easily seducible understandings . and 't is a truth well worthy the pen , from which it dropt ; periit iudicium , ubi res transiit in affectum . that iove himself cannot be wise and in love ; may be understood in a larger sense , then antiquity meant it . affection bribes the judgement to the most notorious inequality ; and we cannot expect an equitable award , where the judge is made a party : so that , that understanding only is capable of giving a just decision , which is , as aristotle saith of the law , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : but where the will , or passion hath the casting voyce , the case of truth is desperate . and yet this is the miserable disorder , into which we are laps'd : the lower powers are gotten uppermost ; and we see like men on our heads , as plato observ'd of old , that on the right hand , which indeed is on the left . the woman in us , still prosecutes a deceit , like that begun in the garden : and our understandings are wedded to an eve , as fatal as the mother of our miseries . and while all things are judg'd according to their suitableness , or disagreement to the gusto of the fond feminine ; we shall be as far from the tree of knowledge , as from that , which is guarded by the cherubin . the deceiver soon found this soft place of adam's ; and innocency it self did not secure him from this way of seduction . the first deception enter'd in at this postern , and hath ever since kept it open for the entry of legion : so that we scarse see any thing now but through our passions , the most blind , and sophisticate things about us . thus the monsters which story relates to have their eyes in their breasts , are pictures of us in our invisible selves . our love of one opinion induceth us to embrace it ; and our hate of another , doth more then fit us , for its rejection : and , that love is blind , is extensible beyond the object of poetry . when once the affections are engag'd , there 's but a short step to the understanding : and , facilè credimus quod volumus , is a truth , that needs not plead authority to credit it . the reason , i conceive , is this : love as it were uniting the object to the soul , gives it a kind of identity with us ; so that the beloved idea is but our selves in another name : and when self is at the bar , the sentence is not like to be impartial : for every man is naturally a narcissus , and each passion in us , no other but self-love sweetned by milder epithets . we can love nothing , but what is agreeable to us ; and our desire of what is so , hath its first inducement from within us : yea , we love nothing but what hath some resemblance within our selves ; and whatever we applaud as good or excellent , is but self in a transcript , and è contrà . thus , to reach the highest of our amours , and to speak all at once : we love our friends , because they are our image ; and we love our god , because we are his . so then , the beloved opinion being thus wedded to the intellect ; the case of our espoused self becomes our own : and when we weigh our selves , iustice doth not use to hold the ballance . besides , all things being double-handed , and having the appearances both of truth , and falshood ; where our affections have engaged us , we attend only to the former , which we see through a magnifying medium : while looking on the latter , through the wrong end of the perspective , which scants their dimensions , we neglect and contemn them . yea , and as in corrupt judicial proceedings , the fore-stalled understanding passes a peremptory sentence upon the single hearing of one party ; and so comes under the poets censure of him , qui statuit aliquid parte inauditâ alterâ . but to give a more particular account of this gullery ; our affections engage us as by our love to our selves , so by our love to others . of the former we have the observable instances of natural disposition , custom and education , interest , and our proper invention : of the latter in that homage , which is payd to antiquity , and authority . i take them up in order . 1. congruity of opinions , whether true or false , to our natural constitution , is one great incentive to their belief , and reception : and in a sense too the complexion of the mind , as well as manners , follows the temperament of the body . thus some men are genially disposited to some opinions , and naturally as averse to others . some things we are inclined to love , and we know not why : others we disesteem , and upon no better account then the poet did sabidius , hoc tantùm possum dicere , non amo te . some faces at first sight we admire and dote on : others , in our impartial apprehensions no less deserving our esteem , we can behold without resentment ; and it may be with an invincible disregard . i question not , but intellectual representations are received by us , with as an unequal a fate upon a bare temperamental relish or disgust : and i believe the understanding hath its idiosyncrasies , as well as other faculties . some men are made to superstition , others to frantick enthusiasm ; the former by the cold of a timorous heart , the latter by the heat of a temerarious brain : and there are natures , as fatally averse to either . and the opinions , which are suited to their respective tempers , will be sure to find their welcome , and to grow without manure . your dull phlegmatick souls are taken with the dulness of sensible doctrines : and the more mercurial geniuses calculated to what is more refined , and intellectual . thus opinions have their climes and national diversities : and as some regions have their proper vices , not so generally found in others ; so have they their mental depravities , which are drawn in with the common air of the countrey . and i take this for one of the most considerable causes of the diversity of laws , customes , religions , natural and moral doctrines , which is to be found in the divided regions of the inhabited earth . and therefore i wonder not at the idolatry of the iews of old , or of the several parts of the world to this day , nor at the sensual expectations of the mussel-men , nor at the fopperies of the superstitious romanists , nor the ridiculous devotions of the deluded indians : since that the most senseless conceits and fooleries cannot miss of harbor , where affection , grown upon the stock of a depraved constitution , hath endeared them . and if we do but more nearly look into our faculties , beginning our survey from the lowest dregs of sense , even those which have a nearer commerce with matter , and so by steps ascend to our more spiritualiz'd selves : we shall throughout discover how constitutional partiality sways us . thus to one palate that is sweet , desirable , and delicious , which to another is odious and distastful ; or more compendiously in the proverb , one mans meat is anothers poyson . thus what to one is a most grateful odour , to another is noxious and displeasant ; 't were a misery to some to lye stretch't on a bed of roses : and in the sense of life ; that 's a welcome touch to one , which is disagreeing to another . and yet to rise a little higher to the nobler pair ; the musical airs , which one entertains with most delightful transports , to another are importune : and the objects , which one can't see without an extasie , another is no more mov'd at , than a statue . if we pass further , the phancies of men are so immediately diversify'd by the individual crasis , that every man is in this a phoenix ; and owns something , wherein none are like him : and these are as many , as humane nature hath singulars . now the phancies of the most , like the index of a clock , are moved but by the inward springs and wheels of the corporal machine ; which even on the most sublimate intellectuals is dangerously influential . and yet this sits at the helm of the worlds belief ; and vulgar reason is no better then a more refined imagination . so then the senses , phancy , and what we call reason it self , being thus influenc'd by the bodies temperament , and little better then indications of it ; it cannot be otherwise , but that this love of our selves should strongly incline us in our most abstracted dijudications . chap. xiv . a second thing whereby our affections ingage us in error , is the prejudice of custom and education . a third , interest . the fourth , love to our own productions . 2. another genuine derivation of this selfish fondness , by reason of which we miscarry of science , is the almost insuperable prejudice of custom , and education : by which our minds are encumber'd , and the most are held in a fatal ignorance . now could a man be composed to such an advantage of constitution , that it should not at all adulterate the images of his mind ; yet this second nature would alter the crasis of the uuderstanding , and render it as obnoxious to aberrances , as now . and though in the former regard , the soul were a pure 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; yet custom and education will so blot and scrible on 't , as almost to incapacitate it for after-impressions . thus we judge all things by our anticipations ; and condemn or applaud them , as they agree or differ from our education-prepossessions . one countrey laughs at the laws , customs , and opinions of another , as absurd and ridiculous ; and the other is as charitable to them , in its conceit of theirs . this confirms the most sottish idolaters in their accustomed adorations , beyond the conviction of any thing , but dooms-day . the impressions of a barbarous education are stronger in them , then nature ; when in their cruel worships they launce themselves with knifes , and expose their harmless infants to the flames as a sacrifice to their idols . and 't is on this account , that there 's no religion so irrational , but can boast its martyrs . this is it , which befriends the talmud and alcoran ; and did they not owe their credit more to it , then to any rational inducement , we might expect their ashes : whereas education hath so rooted these mis-believers in their ungrounded faith , that they may assoon be pluck't from themselves , as from their obstinate adherencies ; and to convert a turk , or iew , may be well a phrase for an attempt impossible . we look for it only from him , to whom our impossibles are none . and 't is to be feared , that christianity it self by most , that have espoused it , is not held by any better tenure . the best account that many can give of their belief , is , that they were bred in it ; which indeed is no better , then that which we call , the womans reason . and thousands of them , whom their profession , and our charity styles christians , are driven to their religion by custom and education , as the indians are to baptism ; that is , like a drove of cattle to the water . and had our stars determin'd our nativities among the enemies of the cross , and theirs under a christian horoscope ; in all likelyhood antichristianism had not been the object of our aversion , nor christianity of theirs : but we should have exchang'd the scene of our belief with that of our abode and breeding . there is nothing so monstrous , to which education cannot form our ductile minority ; it can lick us into shapes beyond the monstrosities of those of affrica . and as king iames would say of parliaments ; it can do any thing , but make a man a woman . for our initial age is like the melted wax to the prepared seal , capable of any impression from the documents of our teachers . the half-moon or cross , are indifferent to its reception ; and we may with equal facility write on this rasa tabula , turk , or christian. we came into the world like the unformed cub ; 't is education is our plastick : we are baptized into our opinions by our juvenile nurture , and our growing years confirm those unexamined principles . for our first task is to learn the creed of our countrey ; and our next to maintain it . we seldom examine our receptions , more then children their catechisms ; for implicit faith is a vertue , where orthodoxie is the object . some will not be at the trouble of a tryal : others are scar'd from attempting it . if we do , 't is not by a sun-beam or ray of universal light ; but by a flame that 's kindled by our affections , and fed by the fewel of our anticipations . and thus like the hermite , we think the sun shines no where , but in our cell ; and all the world to be in darkness but our selves . we judge truth to be circumscrib'd by the confines of our belief , and the doctrines we were brought up in : and with as ill manners , as those of china , repute all the rest of world , monoculous . so that what some astrologers say of our fortunes and the passages of our lives ; may by the allowance of a metaphor be said of our opinions : that they are written in our stars , being to the most as fatal as those involuntary occurrences , and as little in their power as the placits of destiny . we are bound to our countreys opinions , as to its laws : and an accustomed assent is tantamount to an infallible conclusion . he that offers to dissent , shall be out-law'd in his reputation : and the fear of guilty cain , shall be fulfilled on him , who ever meets him shall slay him . thus custom and education hath seal'd the canon ; and he that adds or takes away from the book of orthodox belief , shall be more then in danger of an anathema : and the inquisition is not confined to the jurisdiction of the triple-crown . so we preposterously invert the precept ; holding fast what hath the vote of our antedating apprehensions , we try all things by these our partial prolepses . he that dares do otherwise , is a rebel to orthodoxy ; and exposeth his credit to sequestration . thus custom conciliates our esteem to things , no otherwise deserving it : what is in fashion , is handsom and pleasant ; though never so uncouth to an unconcern'd beholder . their antick deckings with feathers is as comely in the account of those barbarous nations , which use them ; as the ornaments of lace , and ribband , are in ours . and the plucking off the shooe is to the iapanners as decent a salutation ; as the uncovering of the head is to us , and their abhorred neighbours . on the other hand we start and boggle at what is unusual : and like the fox in the fable at his first view of the lyon , we cannot endure the sight of the bug-bear , novelty . hence some innocent truths have been affix'd with the reproach of heresie : into which , because contrary to the inur'd belief , the violent rejecters would not endure a patient inspection : but as children frighted in the dark , who run away with an out-cry from the monsters of their own imaginations framing ; and will not stay for the information of a better discovery : so they looking on them through their unadvised fears , and uncharitable suspicions ; command their understandings to a praecipitate flight , figuring their phancies to shapes monstrous and horrible , through which they make them the objects of their aversion . hence there is no truth , but its adversaries have made it an ugly vizard ; by which it 's exposed to the hate and disesteem of superficial examiners : and an opprobrious title with vulgar believers is as good as an argument . 't is but writing the name , that customary receptions have discredited , under the opinions we dislike ; and all other refutation is superfluous . thus shallow apprehenders are frighted from many sober verities ; like the king of arabs , who ran away from the smoaking mince-py , apprehending some dangerous plot in the harmless steam . so then , while we thus mistake the infusions of education , for the principles of universal nature ; we must needs fail of a scientifical theory . and therefore the two nations differing about the antiquity of their language , made appeal to an undecisive experiment ; when they agreed upon the tryal of a child brought up among the wild inhabitants of the desert . the language it spake , had no reason to be accounted the most ancient and natural : and the lucky determination for the phrygians by its pronouncing the word beck , which signified bread in the dialect of that countrey , they owed not to nature , but the goat-herd ; from which the exposed infant , by accompanying that sort of animals , had learnt it . 3. again , interest , is another thing , by the magnetisme of which our affections are almost irresistibly attracted . it is the pole , to which we turn , and our sympathizing judgements seldom decline from the direction of this impregnant . where interest hath engaged us ; like hannibal , we 'l find a way to veritie , or make it . any thing is a truth , to one whose interest it is , to have it so . and therefore self-designers are seldom disappointed , for want of the speciousness of a cause to warrrant them ; in the belief of which , they do oft as really impose upon themselves , as industriously endeavour it upon others . with what an infinite of law-suits , controversies , and litigious cases doth the world abound ? and yet every man is confident of the truth and goodness of his own . and as mr. hobbs observes , the reason that mathematical demonstrations are uncontroverted , is ; because interest hath no place in those unquestionable verities : when as , did the advantage , of any stand against them , euclids elements would not pass with a nemine contradicente . sir h. blunt tells us , that temporal expectations bring in droves to the mahumetan faith ; and we know the same holds thousands in the romish . the eagles will be , where the carcase is ; and that shall have the faith of most , which is best able to pay them for 't . an advantageous cause never wanted proselytes . i confess , i cannot believe that all the learned romanists profess against their conscience ; but rather , that their interest brings their consciences to their profession : and self-advantage can as easily incline some , to believe a falshood , as profess it . a good will , help'd by a good wit can find truth any where : and , what the chymists brag of their elixir , it can transmute any metal into gold ; in the hand of a skilful artificer , in spight of the adage , ex quolibet ligno mercurius . though yet i think , that every religion hath its bare nominals : and that pope was one with a witness , whose saying it was , quantum nobis lucri peperit illa fabula de christo ! 4. besides , fourthly , self-love engageth us for any thing , that is a minerva of our own . we love the issues of our brains , no less then those of our bodies : and fondness of our own begotten notions , though illegitimate , obligeth us to maintain them . we hugge intellectual deformities , if they bear our names ; and will hardly by perswaded they are so , when our selves are their authors . if their dam may be judge , the young apes are the most beautiful things in nature ; and if we might determine it , our proper conceptions would be all voted axioms . thus then the affections wear the breeches : and the female rules , while our understanding governs us , as the story saith themistocles did athens . so that to give the sum of all , most of the contests of the litigious world pretending for truth , are but the bandyings of one mans affections against anothers : in which , though their reasons may be foil'd , yet their passions lose no ground , but rather improve by the antiperistasis of an opposition . chap. xv. 5. our affections are engaged by our reverence to antiquity and authority . this hath been a great hinderer of theorical improvements ; and it hath been an advantage to the mathematicks , and mechanicks arts , that it hath no place in them . our mistake of antiquity . the unreasonableness of that kind of pedantick adoration . hence the vanity of affecting impertinent quotations . the pedantry on 't is derided ; the little improvement of science through its successive derivations , and whence that hath hapned . another thing , that engageth our affections to unwarrantable conclusions , and is therefore fatal to science ; is our doting on antiquity , and the opinions of our fathers . we look with a superstitious reverence upon the accounts of praeterlapsed ages : and with a supercilious severity , on the more deserving products of our own . a vanity , which hath possess'd all times as well as ours ; and the golden age was never present . for as in statick experiment , an inconsiderable weight by vertue of its distance from the centre of the ballance , will preponderate much greater magnitudes ; so the most slight and chaffy opinion , if at a great remove from the present age , contracts such an esteem and veneration , that it out-weighs what is infinitly more ponderous and rational , of a modern date . and thus , in another sense , we realize what archimedes had only in hypothesis ; weighing a single grain against the globe of earth . we reverence gray-headed doctrines ; though feeble , decrepit , and within a step of dust : and on this account maintain opinions , which have nothing but our charity to uphold them . while the beauty of a truth , as of a picture , is not acknowledg'd but at a distance ; and that wisdom is nothing worth , which is not fetcht from afar : wherein yet we oft deceive our selves , as did that mariner , who mistaking them for precious stones , brought home his ship fraught with common pebbles from the remotest indies . thus our eyes , like the preposterous animal's , are behind us ; and our intellectual motions retrograde . we adhere to the determinations of our fathers , as if their opinions were entail'd on us as their lands ; or ( as some conceive ) part of the parents soul were portion'd out to his off-spring , and the conceptions of our minds were ex traduce . the sages of old live again in us ; and in opinions there is a metempsychosis . we are our re-animated ancestours , and antedate their resurrection . and thus , while every age is but another shew of the former ; 't is no wonder , that science hath not out-grown the dwarfishness of its pristine stature , and that the intellectual world is such a microcosm . for while we account of some admired authours , as the seths pillars , on which all knowledge is engraven ; and spend that time and study in defence of their placits , which with more advantage to science might have been employ'd upon the books of the more ancient , and universal author : 't is not to be admired , that knowledge hath receiv'd so little improvement from the endeavours of many pretending promoters , through the continued series of so many successive ages . for while we are slaves to the dictates of our progenitours ; our discoveries , like water , will not run higher then the fountains , from which they own their derivation . and while we think it so piaculous , to go beyond the ancients ; we must necessarily come short of genuine antiquity , truth ; unless we suppose them to have reach'd perfection of knowledge in spight of their aknowledgements of ignorance . now if we enquire the reason , why the mathematicks , and mechanick arts , have so much got the start in growth of other sciences : we shall find it probably resolv'd into this , as one considerable cause : that their progress hath not been retarded by that reverential aw of former discoveries , which hath been so great an hinderance to theorical improvements . 't was never an heresie to out-limn apelles ; nor criminal to out-work the obelisks . galilaeus without a crime out-saw all antiquity ; and was not afraid to believe his eyes , in spight of the opticks of ptolomy and aristotle . 't is no discredit to that ingenious perspicill , that antiquity ne're saw in 't : nor are we shy of assent to those celestial informations , because they were hid from ages . we believe the verticity of the needle , without a certificate from the dayes of old : and confine not our selves to the sole conduct of the stars , for fear of being wiser then our fathers . had authority prevail'd here , the earths fourth part had to us been none , and hercules his pillars had still been the worlds seneca's prophesie had yet been an unfulfill'd prediction , and one moiety of our globes , an empty hemisphear . in a sense , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is wholesom instruction ; and becoming the vote of a synod : but yet , in common acceptation , it 's an enemy to verity , which can plead the antiquity of above six thousand ; and bears date from before the chaos . for , as the noble lord verulam hath noted , we have a mistaken apprehension of antiquity ; calling that so , which in truth is the worlds nonage . antiquitas seculi est juventus mundi . so that in such appeals , we fetch our knowledge from the cradle ; which though it be nearest to innocence , it is so too to the fatal ruines which follow'd it . upon a true account , the present age is the worlds grandaevity ; and if we must to antiquity , let multitude of days speak . now for us to supersede further disquisition , upon the infant acquirements of those juvenile endeavours , is foolishly to neglect the nobler advantages we are owners of , and in a sense to disappoint the expectations of him that gave them . yet thus we prevent our selves of science ; and our knowledge , though its age write thousands , is still in its swadlings . for like school-boys , we give over assoon as we have learn't as far as our masters can teach us : and had not the undertakings of some glorious heroes prevented ; plato's year might have found us , where the days of aristotle left us . for my part , i think it no such arrogance , as our pedants account it ; that almost two thousand years elapsed since , should weigh with the sixty three of the stagirite . if we owe it to him , that we know so much ; 't is long of his pedantick adorers that we know so little more . i can see no ground , why his reason should be textuary to ours ; or that god , or nature , ever intended him an universal headship . it was another , in whom were hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge : his reason only is the yea and amen ; who is the alpha and omega , the christian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 't was this vain idolizing of authors , which gave birth to that silly vanity of impertinent citations ; and inducing authority in things neither requiring , nor deserving it . that saying was much more observable , that men have beards , and women none ; because quoted from beza : and that other , pax res bona est ; because brought in with a , said st. austin . but these ridiculous fooleries , to your more generous discerners , signifie nothing but the pedantry of the affected sciolist . 't is an inglorious acquist to have our heads or volumes laden , as were cardinal campeius his mules , with old and useless luggage : and yet the magnificence of many high pretenders to science , if laid open by a true discovery , would amount to no more then the old boots and shooes , of that proud , and exposed embassadour . methinks 't is a pitiful piece of knowledge , that can be learnt from an index ; and a poor ambition to be rich in the inventory of anothers treasure . to boast a memory ( the most that these pedants can aim at ) is but an humble ostentation . and of all the faculties , in which some brutes out-vie us , i least envy them an excellence in that ; desiring rather to be a fountain , then a hogs-head . 't is better to own a judgment , though but with a curta supellex of coherent notions ; then a memory , like a sepulchre , furnished with a load of broken and discarnate bones . authorities alone with me make no number , unless evidence of reason stand before them : for all the cyphers of arithmetick , are no better then a single nothing . and yet this rank folly of affecting such impertinencies , hath overgrown our times ; and those that are candidates for the repute of scholars , take this way to compass it . when as multiplicity of reading , the best it can signifie , doth but speak them to have taken pains for it : and this alone is but the dry , and barren part of learning , and hath little reason to denominate . a number of receits at the best can but make an emperick . but again , to what is more perpendicular to our discourse , if we impartially look into the remains of antique ages ; we shall finde but little to justifie so groundless a tyranny , as antiquity hath impos'd on the enslaved world . for if we drive the current of science as high , as history can lead us ; we shall finde , that through its several successive derivations it hath still lain under such disadvantages , as have rendred any considerable accession unfeasable . and though it hath oft chang'd its channel , by its remove from one nation to another ; yet hath it been little more alter'd , then a river in its passage through differing regions , viz. in name and method . for the succeeding times still subscribing to , and copying out those , who went before them , with little more then verbal diversity ; science hath still been the same pityful thing , though in a various livery . now if we look upon it , either in the hand of the superstitious egyptian , fabulous and disputing graecian , or as garrulous roman : what hath it been , but only a pretty toy in an hieroglyphick ; a very slender something in a fable ; or an old nothing in a disputation ? and though those former days have not wanted brave wits , that have gallantly attempted , and made essays worthy immortality ; yet by reason either of the unqualified capacities of the multitude , ( who dote on things slight and trivial , neglecting what is more rare and excellent ) or the clamorous assaults of envious and more popular opposers , they have submitted to fate , and are almost lost in oblivion . and therefore , as that great man , the lord bacon hath observ'd , time as a river , hath brought down to us what is more light and superficial ; while things more solid and substantial have been immersed . thus the aristotelian philosophy hath prevailed ; while the more excellent hypotheses of democritus and epicurus have long lain buryed under neglect aud obloquy : and for ought i know might have slept for ever , had not the ingenuity of this age recall'd them from their urne . but it is somewhat collateral to my scope , as well as disproportion'd to my abilities , to fall upon particular instances of the defects and errours of the philosophy of the ancients . the foremention'd noble advancer of learning , whose name and parts might give credit to any undertaking ; hath handsomly perform'd it , in his ingenious novum organum . and yet , because it may conferr towards the discovery of how little our adherence to antiquity befriends truth , and the encrease of knowledge ; as also how groundless are the dogmatists high pretensions to science : i shall adventure some considerations on the peripatetick philosophy ; which hath had the luck to survive all others , and to build a fame on their ruines . chap. xvi . reflexions on the peripatetick philosophy . the generality of its reception , no argument of its deserts ; the first charge against that philosophy ; that it is meerly verbal . a censure of the peripatetick iesuites . materia prima in that philosophy signifies nothing . a parallel drawn between it and imaginary space : this latter pleads more for its reality . their form also is a meer word , and potentia materia insignificant . an essay to detect peripatetick verbosity , by translating some definitions . that aristotles philosophy hath been entertain'd by the most ; hath deceiv'd the credulous into a conceit , that it 's best : and its intrinsick worth hath been concluded from the grandure of its retinue . but seneca's determination , argumentum pessimi turba est , is more deserving our credit : and the fewest , that is the wisest , have always stood contradictory to that ground of belief ; vulgar applause by severer wisdom being held a scandal . if the numerousness of a train must carry it ; vertue may go follow astraea , and vice only will be worth the courting . the philosopher deservedly suspected himself of vanity , when cryed up by the multitude : and discreet apprehenders will not think the better of that philosophy , which hath the common cry to vouch it . he that writ counter to the astrologer in his almanack , did with more truth foretell the weather : and he that shall write , foul , in the place of the vulgars , fair ; passes the juster censure . those in the fable , who were wet with the showre of folly , hooted at the wise men that escap'd it , and pointed at their actions as ridiculous ; because unlike their own , that were truly so . if the major vote may cast it , wisdom and folly must exchange names ; and the way to the one will be by the other . nor is it the rabble only , which are such perverse discerners ; we are now a sphear above them : i mean the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of pretended philosophers , who judge as odly in their way , as the rascality in theirs : and many a profest retainer to philosophy , is but an ignoramus a in suit of second notions . 't is such , that most revere the reliques of the adored sophy ; and , as artemesia did those of mausolus , passionately drink his ashes . whether the remains of the stagirite deserve such veneration , we 'll make a brief enquiry . 1. that the aristotelian philosophy is an huddle of words and terms insignificant , hath been the censure of the wisest : and that both its basis and superstructure are chimaerical ; cannot be unobserv'd by them , that know it , and are free to judge it . 't is a philosophy , that makes most accurate inspections into the creatures of the brain ; and gives the exactest topography of the extramundane spaces . like our late politicians , it makes discoveries , and their objects too ; and deals in beings , that are nothing beholden to the primitive fiat . thus the same undivided essence , from the several circumstances of its being and operations , is here multiplied into legion , and emprov'd to a number of smaller entities ; and these again into as many modes and insignificant formalities . what a number of words here have nothing answering them ? and as many are imposed at random . to wrest names from their known meaning to senses most alien , and to darken speech by words without knowledge ; are none of the most inconsiderable faults of this philosophy : to reckon them in their particular instances , would puzzle archimedes . now hence the genuine idea's of the mind are adulterate ; and the things themselves lost in a crowd of names , and intentional nothings . thus these verbosities do emasculate the understanding ; and render it slight and frivolous , as its objects . me thinks , the late voluminous iesuites , those laplanders of peripateticism , do but subtilly trifle : and their philosophick undertakings are much like his , who spent his time in darting cumming-seeds through the eye of a needle . one would think they were impregnated , as are the mares in cappadocia ; they are big of words : their tedious volumes have the tympany , and bring forth the wind . to me , a cursus philosophicus , is but an impertinency in folio ; and the studying of them a laborious idleness . 't is here , that things are crumbled into notional atomes ; and the substance evaporated into an imaginary aether . the intellect , that can feed on this air , is a chamaelion ; and a meer inflated skin . from this stock grew school-divinity , which is but peripateticism in a theological livery . a school-man is the ghost of the stagirite , in a body of condensed air : and thomas but aristotle sainted . but to make good our charge against the philosophy of the schools , by a more close surveying it . that its principles are steril , unsatisfying verbosities ; cannot escape the notice of the most shallow inquirer . to begin at the bottom ; their materia prima is a meer chimaera . if we can fix a determinate conceit of nothing ; that 's the idea on 't : and , nec quid , nec quale , nec quantum , is as as apposite a definition of nothing , as can be . if we would conceive this imaginary matter : we must deny all things of it , that we can conceive , and what remains is the thing we look for . and should we allow it all , which its assertors assign it , viz. quantity interminate ; 't is still but an empty extended capacity , and therefore at the best , but like that space , which we imagine was before the beginning of time , and will be after the universal flames . 't is easie to draw a parallelism between that ancient , and this more modern nothing ; and in all things to make good its resemblance to that commentitious inanity . the peripatetick matter is a pure unactuated power : and this conceited vacuum a meer receptibility . matter is suppos'd indeterminate : and space is so . the pretended first matter is capable of all forms : and the imaginary space is receptive of any body . the matter can be actuated at once but by a single informant : and space is replenisht by one corporal inexistence . matter cannot naturally subsist uninform'd : and nature avoids vacuity in space . the matter is ingenerate , and beyond corruption : and the space was before , and will be after either . the matter in all things is but one : and the space most uniform . thus the foundation-principle of peripateticism runs but parallel to an acknowledg'd nothing : and their agreement in essential characters makes rather an identity , then a parity ; but that imaginary space hath more to plead for its reality , then the matter hath , and herein only are they dissimilar . for that hath no dependence on the bodies which possess it ; but was before them , and will survive them : whereas this essentially relies on the form , and cannot subsist without it . which yet , me thinks , is little better then an absurdity : that the cause should be an eleemosynary for its subsistence to its effect , and a nature posterior to , and dependent on it self . this dependentia a posteriori , though in a diverse way of causality , my reason could never away with : yea , one of their own , oviedo a spanish jesuite , hath effectually impugn'd it . so then there 's nothing real , answering this imaginary proteus ; and materia prima hath as much of being , as mons aureus . but to take a step further , their form is as obnoxious ; and as dry a word , as the formention'd nominal . i 'le not spend time in an industrious confutation : the subject is dry , and i long to be out on 't ; with a note on its imaginary origine , i 'le leave it . it 's source is as obscure , as nile's ; and potentia materiae is a pitiful figment . did it suppose any thing of the form to pre-exist in the matter , as the seminal of its being ; 't were tolerable sense to say it were educed from it . but by educing the affirmers only mean a producing in it , with a subjective dependence on its recipient : a very fine signification of eduction ; which answers not the question whence 't is derived , but into what it is received . the question is of the terminus à quo , and the answer of the subject . so that all that can be made of this power of the matter , is meerly a receptive capacity : and we may as well affirm , that the world was educ'd out of the power of the imaginary space ; and give that as a sufficient account of its original . and in this language , to grow rich were to educe money out of the power of the pocket . to make a full discovery of the jejune emptiness of these philosophick principles , were a task as easie for an ordinary undertaker ; as it would be tedious to an ingenious reader . gassendus hath excellently perform'd it , and , i am confident , to the conviction of those , whom nobler principles have not yet emancipated from that degenerous slavery . i shall not attempt a work that hath been finished by such an apelles . only to give an hint more of this verbal emptiness ; a short view of a definition or two will be current evidence : which , though in greek or latine they amuse us , yet a vernacular translation unmasks them ; and if we make them speak english , the cheat is transparent . light is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith that philosophy : in english , the act of a perspicuous body . sure aristotle here transgrest his topicks : and if this definition be clearer , and more known then the thing defin'd ; midnight may vye for conspicuity with noon . is not light more known then this insignificant energie ? and what 's a diaphanous body , but the lights medium , the air ? so that light is the act of the air : which definition spoils the riddle ; and makes it no wonder , a man should see by night as well as by day . thus is light darkned by an illustration ; and the sun it self is wrap'd up in obscuring clouds : as if light were best seen by darkness , as light inaccessible is known by ignorance . if lux be umbra dei ; this definition is umbra lucis . the infant , that was last enlarged from its maternal cels ; knows more what light is , then this definition teacheth . again , that motion is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. is as insignificant as the former . by the most favourable interpretation of that unintelligible entelechy ; it is but an act of a being in power , as it is in power : the construing of which to any real meaning , is beyond the criticisms of a mother tongue ; except it describes our modern acts of parliaments . sure that definition is not very conspicuous , whose genus pos'd the devil . the philosopher , that prov'd motion by walking , did in that action better define it : and that puzled candidate , who being ask'd what a circle was , decrib'd it by the rotation of his hand ; gave an account more satisfying . in some things we must indeed give an allowance for words of art : but in defining obvious appearances , we are to use what is most plain and easie ; that the mind be not misled by amphibologies , or ill conceived notions , into fallacious deductions . to give an account of all the insignificancies of this philosophy , would be almost to transcribe it ; a task that i should never engage in , though i ow'd no account for my idle hours . 't will need a pardon from the ingenious for the minutes already spent , though in a confutation . chap. xvii . 2. peripatetick philosophy is litigious ; it hath no setled constant signification of words ; the inconveniences hereof . aristotle intended the cherishing controversies : prov'd by his own double testimony . some of his impertinent arguings derided . disputes retard , and are injurious to knowledge . peripateticks are most exercised in the controversal parts of philosophy , and know little of the practical and experimental . a touch at school-divinity . that this philosophy is litigious , the very spawn of disputations and controversies as undecisive as needless ; is the natural result of the former : storms are the products of vapours . for where words are imposed arbitrariously , having no stated real meaning ; or else distorted from their common use , and known significations : the mind must needs be led into confusion and misprision ; and so things plain and easie in their naked natures , made full of intricacy and disputable uncertainty . for we cannot conclude with assurance , but from clearly apprehended premises ; and these cannot be so conceiv'd , but by a distinct comprehension of the words out of which they are elemented . so that , where they are unfixt or ambiguous ; our propositions must be so , and our deductions can be no better . one reason therefore of the uncontroverted certainty of mathematical science is ; because 't is built upon clear and settled significations of names , which admit of no ambiguity or insignificant obscurity . but in the aristotelian philosophy it's quite otherwise : words being here carelesly and abusively admitted , and as inconstantly retained ; it must needs come to pass , that they will be diversly apprehended by contenders , and so made the subject of controversies , there are endless both for use and number . and thus being at their first step out of the way to science , by mistaking in simple terms ; in the progress of their enquiries they must needs lose both themselves , and the truth , in a verbal labyrinth . and now the entangled disputants , as master hobs ingeniously observeth , like birds that came down the chimney ; betake them to the false light , seldom suspecting the way they enter'd : but attempting by vain , impertinent , and coincident distinctions , to escape the absurdity that pursues them : do but weary themselves with as little success , as the silly bird attempts the window . the mis-stated words are the original mistake ; and every other essay is a new one . now these canting contests , the usual entertainment of the peripatum , are not only the accidental vitiosities of the philosophers ; but the genuine issues of the philosophy it self . and aristotle seems purposely to intend the cherishing of controversal digladiations , by his own affectation of an intricate obscurity . himself acknowledg'd it , when he said ; his physicks were publish'd , and not so : and by that double advice in his topicks 't is as clear as light . in one place , he adviseth his sectatours in disputations to be ambiguous : and in another , to bring forth any thing that occurs , rather then give way to their adversary ; counsel very well becoming an enquirer after verity ! nor did he here advise them to any thing , but what he followeth himself , and exactly copies out in his practise . the multitudes of his lame , abrupt , equivocal , self-conttadicting expressions , will evidence it as to the first part : which who considers , may be satisfied in this ; that if aristotle found nature's face under covert of a veil , he hath not removed the old , but made her a new one . and for the latter , his frequent slightness in arguing doth abundantly make it good . to instance , he proves the world to be perfect , because it consists of bodies ; and that bodies are so , because they consist of a triple dimension ; and that a triple dimension is perfect , because three are all ; and that three are all , because when 't is but one or two , we can't say all , but when 't is three , we may : is not this an absolute demonstration ? we can say all at the number three : therefore the world is perfect . tobit went forth and his dog follow'd him ; therefore there 's a world in the moon , were an argument as apodictical . in another place he proves the world to be but one : for were there another , our earth would fall unto it . this is a pitiful deduction , from the meer prejudice of sense ; and not unlike theirs , who thought , if there were antipodes , they must needs [ as it 's said of erasmus ] in coelum descendere . as if , were there more worlds , each of them would not have its proper centre . elsewhere shewing , why the heavens move this way rather then another , he gives this for a reason : because they move to the more honourable ; and before is more honourable then after . this is like the gallant , who sent his man to buy an hat , that would turn up behind . as if , had the heavens moved the other way ; that term had not been then before , which is now the contrary . this inference is founded upon a very weak supposition , viz. that those alterable respects are realities in nature ; which will never be admitted by a considerate discerner . thus aristotle acted his own instructions ; and his obsequious sectators have super-erogated in observance . they have so disguised his philosophy by obscuring comments , that his revived self would not own it : and were he to act another part with mortals ; he 'd be but pitiful peripatetick , every sophister would out-talk him . now this disputing way of enquiry is so far from advancing science ; that 't is no inconsiderable retarder : for in scientifical discoveries many things must be consider'd , which the hurrey of a dispute indisposeth for ; and there is no way to truth , but by the most clear comprehension of simple notions , and as wary an accuracy in deductions . if the fountain be disturb'd , there 's no seeing to the bottom ; and here 's an exception to the proverb , 't is no good fishing for verity in troubled waters . one mistake of either simple apprehension , or connexion , makes an erroneous conclusion . so that the precipitancy of disputation , and the stir and noise of passions , that usually attend it ; must needs be prejudicial to verity : its calm insinuations can no more be heard in such a bustle , then a whisper among a croud of saylors in a storm . nor do the eager clamors of contending disputants , yeeld any more relief to eclipsed truth ; then did the sounding brass of old to the labouring moon . when it 's under question , 't were as good flip cross and pile , as to dispute for 't : and to play a game at chess for an opinion in philosophy [ as my self and an ingenious friend have sometime sported ] is as likely a way to determine . thus the peripatetick procedure is inept for philosophical solutions : the lot were as equitable a decision , as their empty loquacities . 't is these nugacious disputations , that have been the great hinderance to the more improveable parts of learning : and the modern retainers to the stagirite have spent their sweat and pains upon the most litigious parts of his philosophy ; while those , that find less play for the contending genius , are incultivate . thus logick , physicks , metaphysicks , are the burden of volumes , and the dayly entertainment of the disputing schools : while the more profitable doctrines of the heavens , meteors , minerals , animals ; as also the more practical ones of politicks , and oeconomicks , are scarce so much as glanc'd at . and the indisputable mathematicks , the only science heaven hath yet vouchsaf't humanity ; have but few votaries among the slaves of the stagirite . what , the late promoters of the aristotelian philosophy , have writ on all these so fertile subjects ; can scarce compare with the single disputes about materia prima . nor hath humane science monopoliz'd the damage , that hath sprung from this root of evils : theology hath been as deep a sharer . the volumes of the schoolmen , are deplorable evidence of peripatetick depravations : and luther's censure of that divinity , quam primum apparuit theologia scholastica , evanuit theologia crucis , is neither uncharitable , nor unjust . this hath mudded the fountain of certainty with notional and ethnick admixtions ; and platted the head of evangelical truth , as the iews did its author's , with a crown of thorns : here , the most obvious verity is subtiliz'd into niceties , and spun into a thread indiscernible by common opticks , but through the spectacles of the adored heathen . this hath robb'd the christian world of its unity and peace ; and made the church , the stage of everlasting contentions : and while aristotle is made the centre of truth , and unity , what hope of reconciling ? and yet most of these scholastick controversies are ultimately resolv'd into the subtilties of his philosophy : and me thinks an athenian should not be the best guide to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; nor an idolater to that god he neither knew nor owned . when i read the eager contests of these notional theologues , about things that are not ; i cannot but think of the pair of wise ones , that fought for the middle : and me thinks many of their controversies are such , as if we and our antipodes , should strive who were uppermost ; their title to truth is equal . he that divided his text into one part ; did but imitate the schoolmen in their coincident distinctions : and the best of their curiosities are but like paint on glass , which intercepts and dyes the light the more desirable splendor . i cannot look upon their elaborate trifles , but with a sad reflexion on the degenerate state of our lapsed intellects ; and as deep a resentment , of the mischiefs of this school-philosophy . chap. xviii . 3. it gives no account of the phaenomena ; those that are remoter , it attempts not . it speaks nothing pertinent in the most ordinary : it s circular , and general way of solution . it resolves all things into occult qualities . the absurdity of the aristotelian hypothesis of the heavens . the gallaxy is no meteor : the heavens are corruptible . comets are above the moon . the sphear of fire derided . aristotle convicted of several other false assertions . 3. the aristotelian hypotheses give a very dry and jejune account of nature's phaenomena . for as to its more mysterious reserves , peripatetick enquiry hath left them unattempted ; and the most forward notional dictators sit down here in a contented ignorance : and as if nothing more were knowable then is already discover'd , they put stop to all endeavours of their solution . qualities , that were occult to aristotle , must be so to us ; and we must not philosophize beyond sympathy and antipathy : whereas indeed the rarities of nature are in these recesses , and its most excellent operations cryptick to common discernment . modern ingenuity expects wonders from magnetick discoveries : and while we know but its more sensible ways of working ; we are but vulgar philosophers , and not likely to help the world to any considerable theories . till the fountains of the great deeps are broken up ; knowledge is not likely to cover the earth as the waters the sea. nor is the aristotelian philosophy guilty of this sloth and philosophick penury , only in remoter abstrusities : but in solving the most ordinary causalities , it is as defective and unsatisfying . even the most common productions are here resolv'd into celestial influences , elemental combinations , active and passive principles , and such generalities ; while the particular manner of them is as hidden as sympathies . and if we follow manifest qualities beyond the empty signification of their names ; we shall find them as occult , as those which are professedly so . that heavy bodies descend by gravity , is no better an account then we might expect from a rustick : and again , that gravity is a quality whereby an heavy body descends , is an impertinent circle , and teacheth nothing . the feigned central alliciency is but a word , and the manner of it still occult . that the fire burns by a quality called heat ; is an empty dry return to the question , and leaves us still ignorant of the immediate way of igneous solutions . the accounts that this philosophy gives by other qualities , are of the same gender with these : so that to say the loadstone draws iron by magnetick attraction , and that the sea moves by flux and reflux ; were as satisfying as these hypotheses , and the solution were as pertinent . in the qualities , this philosophy calls manifest , nothing is so but the effects . for the heat , we feel , is but the effect of the fire ; and the pressure , we are sensible of , but the effect of the descending body . and effects , whose causes are confessedly occult , are as much within the sphear of our senses ; and our eyes will inform us of the motion of the steel to its attrahent . thus peripatetick philosophy resolves all things into occult qualities ; and the dogmatists are the only scepticks . even to them , that pretend so much to science , the world is circumscrib'd with a gyges his ring ; and is intellectually invisible : and , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , will best become the mouth of a peripatetick . for by their way of disquisition there can no more be truly comprehended , then what 's known by every common ignorant : but ingenious inquiry will not be contented with such vulgar frigidities . but further , if we look into the aristotelian comments on the largest volumes of the universe : the works of the fourth day are there as confused and disorderly , as the chaos of the first : and more like that , which was before the light , then the compleatly finish'd , and gloriously disposed frame . what a romance is the story of those impossible concamerations , intersections , involutions , and feign'd rotations of solid orbs ? all substituted to salve the credit of a broken ill-contrived systeme . the belief of such disorders above , were an advantage to the oblique atheism of epicurus : and such irregularities in the celestial motions , would lend an argument to the apotheiosis of fortune . had the world been coagmented from that supposed fortuitous jumble ; this hypothesis had been tolerable . but could the doctrine of solid orbs , be accommodated to astronomical phaenomena ; yet to ascribe each sphear an intelligence to circumvolve it , were an unphilosophical desperate refuge : and to confine the blessed genii to a province , which was the hell of ixion , were to rob them of their felicities . that the galaxy is a meteor , was the account of aristotle : but the telescope hath autoptically confuted it : and he , who is not pyrrhonian to the disbelief of his senses , may see ; that it 's no exhalation from the earth , but an heap of smaller luminaries . that the heavens are void of corruption , is aristotles supposal : but the tube hath betray'd their impurity ; and neoterick astronomy hath found spots in the sun. the discoveries made in venus , and the moon , disprove the antique quintessence ; and evidence them of as course materials , as the globe we belong to . the perspicil , as well as the needle , hath enlarged the habitable world ; and that the moon is an earth , is no improbable conjecture . the inequality of its surface , mountanous protuberance , the nature of its maculae , and infinite other circumstances [ for which the world 's beholding to galilaeo ] are items not contemptible : hevelius hath graphically describ'd it : that comets are of nature terrestrial , is allowable : but that they are materiall'd of vapours , and never flamed beyond the moon ; were a concession unpardonable . that in cassiopaea was in the firmament , and another in our age above the sun. nor was there ever any as low as the highest point of the circumference , the stagyrite allows them . so that we need not be appal'd at blazing stars , and a comet is no more ground for astrological presages then a flaming chimney . the unparallel'd des-cartes hath unridled their dark physiology , and to wonder solv'd their motions . his philosophy gives them transcursions beyond the vortex we breath in ; and leads them through others , which are only known in an hypothesis . aristotle would have fainted before he had flown half so far , as that eagle-wit ; and have lighted on a hard name , or occult quality , to rest him . that there is a sphear of fire under the concave of the moon , is a dream : and this , may be , was the reason some imagin'd hell there , thinking those flames the ignis rotae . according to this hypothesis , the whole lunar world is a torrid zone ; and on a better account , then aristotle thought ours was , may be supposed inhabitable , except they are salamanders which dwell in those fiery regions . that the reflexion of the solar rays , is terminated in the clouds ; was the opinion of the graecian sage : but lunar observations have convicted it of falshood ; and that planet receives the dusky light , we discern in its sextile aspect , from the earth's benignity . that the rainbow never describes more then a semicircle , is no creditable assertion ; since experimental observations have confuted it . gassendus saw one at sun-setting , whose supreme arch almost reached our zenith ; while the horns stood in the oriental tropicks . and that noble wit reprehends the school-idol , for assigning fifty years at least between every lunar iris. that caucasus enjoys the sun-beams three parts of the nights vigils ; that danubius ariseth from the pyrenaean hills : that the earth is higher towards the north : are opinions truly charged on aristotle by the restorer of epicurus ; and all easily confutable falsities . to reckon all the aristotelian aberrances , and to give a full account of the lameness of his hypotheses , would swell this digression into a volume . the mention'd shall suffice us . chap. xix . aristotle's philosophy inept for new discoveries ; it hath been the author of no one invention : it 's founded on vulgarities , and therefore makes nothing known beyond them . the knowledge of natures out-side confers not to practical improvements . better hopes from the new philosophy . a fifth charge against aristotle's philosophy , it is in many things impious , and self-contradicting : instances of both propounded . the directing all this to the design of the discourse . a caution , viz. that nothing is here intended in favour of novelty in divinity ; the reason why we may imbrace what is new in philosophy , while we reject them in theologie . 4. the aristotelian philosophy is inept for new discoveries ; and therefore of no accommodation to the use of life . that all arts , and professions are capable of maturer improvements ; cannot be doubted by those , who know the least of any . and that there is an america of secrets , and unknown peru of nature , whose discovery would richly advance them , is more then conjecture . now while we either sayl by the land of gross aud vulgar doctrines , or direct our enquiries , by the cynosure of meer abstract notions ; we are not likely to reach the treasures on the other side the atlantick : the directing of the world the way to which , is the noble end of true philosohpy . that the aristotelian physiology cannot boast it self the proper author of any one invention ; is praegnant evidence of its infecundous deficiency : and 't would puzzle the schools to point at any considerable discovery , made by the direct , sole manuduction of peripatetick principles . most of our rarities have been found out by casual emergency ; and have been the works of time , and chance , rather then of philosophy . what aristotle hath of experimental knowledge in his books of animals , or elsewhere ; is not much transcending vulgar observation : and yet what he hath of this , was never learnt from his hypotheses ; but forcibly fetch'd in to suffrage to them . and 't is the observation of the noble st. alban ; that that philosophy is built on a few vulgar experiments : and if upon further enquiry , any were found to refragate , they were to be discharg'd by a distinction . now what is founded on , and made up but of vulgarities , cannot make known any thing beyond them . for nature is is set a going by the most subtil and hidden instruments ; which it may be have nothing obvious which resembles them . hence judging by visible appearances , we are discouraged by supposed impossibilities which to nature are none , but within her sphear of action . and therefore what shews only the outside , and sensible structure of nature ; is not likely to help us in finding out the magnalia . 't were next to impossible for one , who never saw the inward wheels and motions , to make a watch upon the bare view of the circle of hours , and index : and 't is as difficult to trace natural operations to any practical advantage , by the sight of the cortex of sensible appearances . he were a poor physitian , that had no more anatomy , then were to be gather'd from the physnomy . yea , the most common phaenomena can be neither known , nor improved , without insight into the more hidden frame . for nature works by an invisible hand in all things : and till peripateticism can shew us further , then those gross solutions of qualities and elements ; 't will never make us benefactors to the world , nor considerable discoverers . but its experienc'd sterility through so many hundred years , drives hope to desperation . we expect greater things from neoterick endeavours . the cartesian philosophy in this regard hath shewn the world the way to be happy . me thinks this age seems resolved to bequeath posterity somewhat to remember it : and the glorious undertakers , wherewith heaven hath blest our days , will leave the world better provided then they found it . and whereas in former times such generous free-spirited worthies were , as the rare newly observed stars , a single one the wonder of an age : in ours they are like the lights of the greater size that twinkle in the starry firmament : and this last century can glory in numerous constellations . should those heroes go on , as they have happily begun ; they 'll fill the world with wonders . and i doubt not but posterity will find many things , that are now but rumors , verified into practical realities . it may be some ages hence , a voyage to the southern unknown tracts , yea possibly the moon , will not be more strange then one to america . to them , that come after us , it may be as ordinary to buy a pair of wings to fly into remotest regions ; as now a pair of boots to ride a iourney . and to conferr at the distance of the indies by sympathetick conveyances , may be as usual to future times , as to us in a litterary correspondence . the restauration of gray hairs to iuvenility , and renewing the exhausted marrow , may at length be effected without a miracle : and the turning of the now comparatively desert world into a paradise , may not improbably be expected from late agriculture . now those , that judge by the narrowness of former principles , will smile at these paradoxical expectations : but questionless those great inventions , that have in these later ages altered the face of all things ; in their naked proposals , and meer suppositions , were to former times as ridiculous . to have talk'd of a new earth to have been discovered , had been a romance to antiquity : and to sayl without sight of stars or shoars by the guidance of a mineral , a story more absurd , then the flight of daedalus . that men should speak after their tongues were ashes , or communicate with each other in differing hemisphears , before the invention of letters ; could not but have been thought a fiction . antiquity would not have believed the almost incredible force of our canons ; and would as coldly have entertain'd the wonders of the telescope . in these we all condemn antique incredulity ; and 't is likely posterity will have as much cause to pity ours . but yet notwithstanding this straightness of shallow observers , there are a set of enlarged souls that are more judiciously credulous : and those , who are acquainted with the fecundity of cartesian principles , and the diligent and ingenuous endeavours of so many true philosophers ; will despair of nothing . 5. but again , the aristotelian philosophy is in some things impious , and inconsistent with divinity ; and in many more inconsistent with it self . that the resurrection is impossible ; that god understands not all things ; that the world was from eternity ; that there 's no substantial form , but moves some orb ; that the first mover moves by an eternal , immutable necessity ; that , if the world and motion were not from eternity , then god was idle ; were all the assertions of aristotle , which theology pronounceth impieties . which yet we need not strange at from one , of whom a father saith , nec deum coluit nec curavit : especially , if it be as philoponus affirms , that he philosophiz'd by command from the oracle . of the aristotelian contradictions , gassendus hath presented us with a catalogue : we 'll instance in a few of them . in one place he saith , the planets scintillation is not seen , because of their propinquity ; but that of the rising and setting sun is , because of its distance : and yet in another place he makes the sun nearer us , then they are . he saith , that the elements are not eternal , and seeks to prove it ; and yet he makes the world so , and the elements its parts . in his meteors he saith , no dew is produced in the wind ; and yet afterwards admits it under the south , and none under the north. in one place he defines a vapour humid and cold ; and in another humid and hot . he saith , the faculty of speaking is a sense ; and yet before he allow'd but five . in one place , that nature doth all things best ; and in another , that it makes more evil then good . and somewhere he contradicts himself within a line ; saying , that an immoveable mover hath no principle of motion . 't would be tedious to mention more ; and the qualiiy of a digression will not allow it . thus we have , as briefly as the subject would bear , animadverted on the so much admired philosophy of aristotle . the nobler spirits of the age , are disengaged from those detected vanities : and the now adorers of that philosophy are few , but such narrow souls , that know no other ; or if any of them look beyond the leaves of their master , yet they try other principles by a jury of his , and scan cartes with genus and species . from the former sort i may hope , they 'l pardon this attempt ; and for the latter , i value not their censure . thus then we may conclude upon the whole , that the stamp of authority can make leather as current as gold ; and that there 's nothing so contemptible , but antiquity can render it august , and excellent . but , because the fooleries of some affected novelists have discredited new discoveries , and render'd the very mention suspected of vanity at least ; and in points divine , of heresie : it will be necessary to add , that i intend not the former discourse , in favour of any new-broach'd conceit in divinity ; for i own no opinion there , which cannot plead the prescription of above sixteen hundred . there 's nothing i have more sadly resented , then the phrenetick whimsies with which our age abounds , and therefore am not likely to patron them . in theology , i put as great a difference between our new lights , and ancient truths ; as between the sun , and an unconcocted evanid meteor . though i confess , that in philosophy i 'm a seeker ; yet cannot believe , that a sceptick in philosophy must be one in divinity . gospel-light began in it zenith ; and , as some say the sun , was created in its meridian strength and lustre . but the beginnings of philosophy were in a crepusculous obscurity ; and it 's yet scarse past the dawn . divine truths were most pure in their source ; and time could not perfect what eternity began : our divinity , like the grand-father of humanity , was born in the fulness of time , and in the strength of its manly vigour : but philosophy and arts commenced embryo's , and are compleated by times gradual accomplishments . and therefore , what i cannot find in the leaves of former inquisitours : i seek in the modern attempts of nearer authors . i cannot receive aristotle's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in so extensive an interpretation , as some would enlarge it to : and that discouraging maxime , nil dictum quod non dictum prius , hath little room in my estimation . nor can i tye up my belief to the letter of solomon : except copernicus be in the right , there hath been something new under the sun ; i 'm sure , later times have seen novelties in the heavens above it . i do not think , that all science is tautology : the last ages have shewn us , what antiquity never saw ; no , not in a dream . chap. xx. it 's queried whether there be any science in the sense of the dogmatists : ( 1 ) we cannot know any thing to be the cause of another , but from its attending it ; and this way is not infallible ; declared by instances , especially from the philosophy of des-cartes . all things are mixt , and 't is difficult to assign each cause its distinct effect . ( 2 ) there 's no demonstration but where the contrary is impossible . we can scarce conclude so of any thing : instances of supposed impossibles which are none . a story of a scholar that turn'd gipsy ; and of the power of imagination . of one mans binding anothers thoughts ; and a conjecture at the maner of its performance . confidence of science is one great reason , we miss it : whereby presuming we have it every where , we seek it not where it is ; and therefore fall short of the object of our enquiry . now to give further check to dogmatical pretensions , and to discover the vanity of assuming ignorance ; we 'll make a short enquiry , whether there be any such thing as science in the sense of its assertours . in their notion then , it is the knowledge of things in their true , immediate , necessary causes : upon which i 'le advance the following observations . 1. all knowledge of causes is deductive : for we know none by simple intuition ; but through the mediation of its effects . now we cannot conclude , any thing to be the cause of another ; but from its continual accompanying it : for the causality it self is insensible . thus we gather fire to be the cause of heat , and the sun of day-light : because where ever fire is , we find there 's heat ; and where ever the sun is , light attends it , and è contrà . but now to argue from a concomitancy to a causality , is not infallibly conclusive : yea in this way lies notorious delusion . is 't not possible , and how know we the contrary , but , that something , which alway attends the grosser flame , may be the cause of heat ? and may not it , and its supposed cause , be only parallel effects ? suppose the fire had ne're appear'd , but had been still hid in smoke ; and that heat did alway proportionably encrease and diminish , with the greater or less quantity of that fuliginous exhalation : should we ever have doubted , that smoke was the cause on 't ? suppose we had never seen more sun , then in a cloudy day , and that the lesser lights had ne're shewn us their lucid substance ; let us suppose the day had alway broke with a wind , and had proportionably varyed , as that did : had not he been a notorious sceptick , that should question the causality ? but we need not be beholding to such remote suppositions : the french philosophy furnishes us with a better instance . for , according to the principles of the illustrious des-cartes , there would be light , though the sun and stars gave none ; and a great part of what we now enjoy , is independent on their beams . now if this seemingly prodigious paradox , can be reconcil'd to the least probability of conjecture , or may it be made but a tolerable supposal ; i presume , it may then win those that are of most difficil belief , readily to yeeld ; that causes in our account the most palpable , may possibly be but uninfluential attendants ; since that there is not an instance can be given , wherein we opinion a more certain efficiency . so then , according to the tenour of that concinnous hypothesis , light being caused by the conamen of the matter of the vortex , to recede from the centre of its motion : it is easily deducible , that were there none of that fluid aether , which makes the body of the sun in the centre of our world , or should it cease from action ; yet the conatus of the circling matter would not be considerably less , but according to the indispensable laws of motion , must press the organs of sense as now , though it may be not with so smart an impulse . thus we see , how there might be light before the luminaries ; and evening and morning before there was a sun. so then we cannot infallibly assure our selves of the truth of the causes , that most obviously occur ; and therefore the foundation of scientifical procedure , is too weak for so magnificent a superstructure . besides , that the world 's a mass of heterogeneous subsistencies , and every part thereof a coalition of distinguishable varieties ; we need not go far for evidence : and that all things are mixed , and causes blended by mutual involutions ; i presume , to the intelligent will be no difficult concession . now to profound to the bottom of these diversities , to assign each cause its distinct effects , and to limit them by their just and true proportions ; are necessary requisites of science : and he that hath compast them , may boast he hath out-done humanity . but for us to talk of knowledge , from those few indistinct representations , which are made to our grosser faculties , is a flatulent vanity . 2. we hold no demonstration in the notion of the dogmatist , but where the contrary is impossible : for necessary is that , which cannot be otherwise . now , whether the acquisitions of any on this side perfection , can make good the pretensions to so high strain'd an infallibility , will be worth a reflexion . and , me thinks , did we but compare the miserable scantness of our capacities , with the vast profundity of things ; both truth and modesty would teach us a dialect , more becoming short-sighted mortality . can nothing be otherwise , which we conceive impossible , to be so ? is our knowledge , and things , so adequately commensurate , as to justifie the affirming , that that cannot be , which we comprehend not ? our demonstrations are levyed upon principles of our own , not universal nature : and , as my lord bacon notes , we judge from the analogy of our selves , not the universe . now are not many things certain by the principles of one , which are impossible to the apprehensions of another ? thus some things our juvenile reasons tenaciously adhere to ; which yet our maturer judgements disallow of : many things to meer sensible discerners are impossible , which to the enlarged principles of more advanced intellects are easie verities : yea , that 's absurd in one philosophy , which is a worthy truth in another ; and that 's a demonstration to aristotle , which is none to des-cartes . that every fixt star is a sun ; and that they are as distant from each other , as we from some of them ; that the sun , which lights us , is in the centre of our world , and our earth a planet that wheels about it ; that this globe is a star , only crusted over with the grosser element , and that its centre is of the same nature with the sun ; that it may recover its light again , and shine amids the other luminaries ; that our sun may be swallow'd up of another , and become a planet : all these , if we judge by common principles or the rules of vulgar philosophy , are prodigious impossibilities , and their contradictories , as good as demonstrable : but yet to a reason inform'd by cartesianism ; these have their probability . thus , it may be , the grossest absurdities to the philosophies of europe , may be justifiable assertions to that of china : and 't is not unlikely , but what 's impossible to all humanity , may be possible in the metaphysicks , and physiologie of angels . now the best principles , excepting divine , and mathematical , are but hypotheses ; within the circle of which we may indeed conclude many things , with security from error : but yet the greatest certainty , advanc'd from supposal , is still but hypothetical . so that we may affirm , things are thus and thus , according to the principles we have espoused : but we strangely forget our selves , when we plead a necessity of their being so in nature , and an impossibility of their being otherwise . that one man should be able to bind the thoughts of another , and determine them to their particular objects ; will be reckon'd in the first rank of impossibles : yet by the power of advanc'd imagination it may very probably be effected ; and story abounds with instances . i 'le trouble the reader but with one ; and the hands from which i had it , make me secure of the truth on 't . there was very lately a lad in the university of oxford , who being of very pregnant and ready parts , and yet wanting the encouragement of preferment ; was by his poverty forc'd to leave his studies there , and to cast himself upon the wide world for a livelyhood . now , his necessities growing dayly on him , and wanting the help of friends to relieve him ; he was at last forced to joyn himself to a company of vagabond gypsies , whom occasionly he met with , and to follow their trade for a maintenance . among these extravagant people , by the insinuating subtilty of his carriage , he quickly got so much of their love , and esteem ; as that they discover'd to him their mystery : in the practice of which , by the pregnancy of his wit and parts he soon grew so good a proficient , as to be able to out-do his instructours . after he had been a pretty while well exercis'd in the trade ; there chanc'd to ride by a couple of scholars who had formerly bin of his acquaintance . the scholars had quickly spyed out their old friend , among the gypsies ; and their amazement to see him among such society , had well-nigh discover'd him : but by a sign he prevented their owning him before that crew : and taking one of them aside privately , desired him with his friend to go to an inn , not far distant thence , promising there to come to them . they accordingly went thither , and he follows : after their first salutations , his friends enquire how he came to lead so odd a life as that was , and to joyn himself with such a cheating beggerly company . the scholar-gypsy having given them an account of the necessity , which drove him to that kind of life ; told them , that the people he went with were not such impostours as they were taken for , but that they had a traditional kind of learning among them , and could do wonders by the power of imagination , and that himself had learnt much of their art , and improved it further then themselves could . and to evince the truth of what he told them , he said , he 'd remove into another room , leaving them to discourse together ; and upon his return tell them the sum of what they had talked of : which accordingly he perform'd , giving them a full account of what had pass'd between them in his absence . the scholars being amaz'd at so unexpected a discovery , earnestly desir'd him to unriddle the mystery . in which he gave them satisfaction , by telling them , that what he did was by the power of imagination , his phancy binding theirs ; and that himself had dictated to them the discourse , they held together , while he was from them : that there were warrantable wayes of heightening the imagination to that pitch , as to bind anothers ; and that when he had compass'd the whole secret , some parts of which he said he was yet ignorant of , he intended to leave their company , and give the world an account of what he had learned . now that this strange power of the imagination is no impossibility ; the wonderful signatures in the foetus caus'd by the imagination of the mother , is no contemptible item . the sympathies of laughing & gaping together , are resolv'd into this principle : and i see not why the phancy of one man may not determine the cogitation of another rightly qualified , as easily as his bodily motion . this influence seems to be no more unreasonable , then that of one string of a lute upon another ; when a stroak on it causeth a proportionable motion in the sympathizing consort , which is distant from it and not sensibly touched . now if this notion be strictly verifiable ; 't will yeeld us a good account how angels inject thoughts into our minds , and know our cogitations : and here we may see the source of some kinds of fascination . if we are prejudic'd against the speculation , because we cannot conceive the manner of so strange an operation ; we shall indeed receive no help from the common philosophy : but yet the hypothesis of a mundane soul , lately reviv'd by that incomparable platonist and cartesian , dr. h. more , will handsomly relieve us . or if any would rather have a mechanical account ; i think it may probably be made out some such way as follows . imagination is inward sense . to sense is required a motion of certain filaments of the brain ; and consequently in imagination there 's the like : they only differing in this , that the motion of the one proceeds immediately from external objects ; but that of the other hath its immediate rise within us . now then , when any part of the brain is strongly agitated ; that , which is next and most capable to receive the motive impress , must in like manner be moved . now we cannot conceive any thing more capable of motion , then the fluid matter , that 's interspers'd among all bodies , and contiguous to them . so then , the agitated parts of the brain begetting a motion in the proxime aether ; it is propagated through the liquid medium , as we see the motion is which is caus'd by a stone thrown into the water . now , when the thus moved matter meets with any thing like that , from which it received its primary impress ; it will proportionably move it , as it is in musical strings tuned unisons . and thus the motion being convey'd , from the brain of one man to the phancy of another ; it is there receiv'd from the instrument of conveyance , the subtil matter ; and the same kind of strings being moved , and much what after the same manner as in the first imaginant ; the soul is awaken'd to the same apprehensions , as were they that caus'd them . i pretend not to any exactness or infallibility in this account , fore-seeing many scruples that must be removed to make it perfect : 't is only an hint of the possibility of mechanically solving the phaenomenon ; though very likely it may require many other circumstances compleatly to make it out . but 't is not my business here to follow it : i leave it therefore to receive accomplishment from maturer inventions . chap. xxi . another instance of a supposed impossibility which may not be so . of conference at distance by impregnated needles . a way of secret conveyance by sympathized hands ; a relation to this purpose . of the magnetick cure of wounds . this discourse weakens not the certainty of truths mathematical or divine . mathematical science need not elate us , since by it we know but our own creatures , and are still ignorant of our makers . ( 3 ) we cannot know any thing in nature , without the knowledge of the first springs of natural motions , and these we are ignorant of . des-cartes his philosophy commended . but yet to advance another instance . that men should confer at very distant removes by an extemporary intercourse is a reputed impossibility , but yet there are some hints in natural operations that give us probability that 't is feasible , and may be compast without unwarrantable assistance from daemoniack correspondence . that a couple of needles equally toucht by the same magnet , being set in two dyals exactly proportion'd to each other , and circumscribed by the letters of the alphabet , may effect this magnale , hath considerable authorities to avouch it . the manner of it is thus represented . let the friends that would communicate take each a dyal : and having appointed a time for their sympathetick conference ; let one move his impregnate needle to any letter in the alphabet , and its affected fellow will precisely respect the same . so that would i know what my friend would acquaint me with ; 't is but observing the letters that are pointed at by my needle , and in their order transcribing them from their sympathized index , as its motion direct's : and i maybe assured that my friend described the same with his : and that the words on my paper , are of his inditing . now though there will be some ill contrivance in a circumstance of this invention , in that the thus impregnate needles will not move to , but avert from each other ( as ingenious dr. browne in his pseudodoxia epidemica hath observed : ) yet this cannot prejudice the main design of this way of secret conveyance : since 't is but reading counter to the magnetick informer ; and noting the letter which is most distant in the abecedarian circle from that which the needle turns to , and the case is not alter'd . now though this desirable effect possibly may not yet answer the expectation of inquisitive experiment ; yet 't is no despicable item , that by some other such way of magnetick efficiency , it may hereafter with success be attempted , when magical history shall be enlarged by riper inspections : and 't is not unlikely , but that present discoveries might be improved to the performance . there is besides this another way , which is said to have advanced the secret beyond speculation , and compleated it in practice . that some have conferr'd at distance by sympathized hands , and in a moment have thus transmitted their thoughts to each other , there are late specious relations do attest it : which say , that the hands of two friends being sympathized by a transferring of flesh from one into the other , and the place of the letters mutually agreed on ; the least prick in the hand of one , the other will be sensible of , and that in the same part of his own . and thus the distant friend by a new kind of chiromancy may read in his own hand what his correspondent had set down in his . for instance , would i in london acquaint my intimate in paris , that i am well : i would then prick that part where i had appointed the letter [ i : ] and doing so in another place to signifie that word was done , proceed to [ a , ] thence to [ m ] and so on , till i had finisht what i intended to make known . now that there have been some such practices , i have had a considerable relation , which i hold not impertinent to insert . a gentleman comes to a chirurgeon to have his arm cut off : the surgeon perceiving nothing that it ailed , was much startled at the motion ; thinking him either in jest , or besides himself . but by a more deliberate recollection , perceiving that he was both sober , and in earnest ; entreats him to know the reason of so strange a desire , since his arm to him seem'd perfectly sound : to which the gentleman replyes , that his hand was sympathiz'd , and his friend was dead , so that if not prevented by amputation , he said , it would rot away , as did that of his deceased correspondent . nor was this an unreasonable surmise ; but , if there be any such way of manual sympathizing , a very probable conjecture . for , that which was so sensibly affected with so inconsiderable a touch , in all likelyhood would be more immuted , by those greater alterations which are in cadaverous solutions . and no doubt , but that by the same reason it would have been corrupted , as some times warts are by the decay of buryed lard that was rubb'd upon them . now if these wayes of secret conveyance may be made out to be really practicable ; yea , if it be evincible , that they are as much as possibly so , it will be a warrantable presumption of the verity of the former instance : since t is as easily conceivable , that there should be communications between the phancies of men , as either the impregnate needles , or sympathized hands . and there is an instance yet behinde , which is more creditable than either , and gives probability to them all . that there is a magnetick way of curing wounds by anointing the weapon , and that the wound is affected in like manner as is the extravenate bloud by the sympathetick medicine , is for matter of fact put out of doubt by the noble sir k. digby , and the proof he gives in his ingenious discourse on the subject , is unexceptionable . for the reason of this wonder , he attempts it by mechanism , and endeavours to make it out by atomical aporrheas , which passing from the cruentate cloth or weapon to the wound , and being incorporated with the particles of the salve carry them in their embraces to the affected part : where the medicinal atomes entering together with the effluviums of the bloud , do by their subtle insinuation better effect the cure , then can be done by any grosser application . the particular way of their conveyance , and their regular direction is handsomly explicated by that learned knight , and recommended to the ingenious by most witty and becoming illustrations . it is out of my way here to enquire whether the anima mundi be not a better account , then any mechanical solutions . the former is more desperate , the later hath more of ingenuity , then solid satisfaction . it is enough for me that de facto there is such an entercourse between the magnetick unguent and the vulnerated body , and i need not be solicitous of the cause . these theories i presume will not be importunate to the ingenious : and therefore i have taken the liberty ( which the quality of an essay will well enough allow of ) to touch upon them , though seemingly collateral to my scope . and yet i think , they are but seemingly so , since they do pertinently illustrate my design , viz. that what seems impossible to us , may not be so in nature ; and therefore the dogmatist wants this to compleat his demonstration , that 't is impossible to be otherwise . now i intend not by any thing here to invalidate the certainty of truths either mathematical or divine . these are superstructed on principles that cannot fail us , except our faculties do constantly abuse us . our religious foundations are fastned at the pillars of the intellectual world , and the grand articles of our belief as demonstrable as geometry . nor will ever either the subtile attempts of the resolved atheist ; or the passionate hurricanoes of the phrentick enthusiast , any more be able to prevail against the reason our faith is built on , than the blustring windes to blow out the sun. and for mathematical sciences , he that doubts their certainty , hath need of a dose of hellebore . nor yet can the dogmatist make much of these concessions in favour of his pretended science ; for our discourse comes not within the circle of the former : and for the later , the knowledge we have of the mathematicks , hath no reason to elate us ; since by them we know but numbers , and figures , creatures of our own , and are yet ignorant of our maker's . ( 3. ) we cannot know any thing of nature but by an analysis of it to its true initial causes : and till we know the first springs of natural motions , we are still but ignorants . these are the alphabet of science , and nature cannot be read without them . now who dares pretend to have seen the prime motive causes , or to have had a view of nature , while she lay in her simple originals ? we know nothing but effects , and those but by our senses . nor can we judge of their causes , but by proportion to palpable causalities conceiving them like those within the sensible horizon . now 't is no doubt with the considerate , but that the rudiments of nature are very unlike the grosser appearances . thus in things obvious , there 's but little resemblance between the mucous sperm , and the compleated animal . the egge is not like the oviparous production : nor the corrupted muck like the creature that creeps from it . there 's but little similitude betwixt a terreous humidity , and plantal germinations ; nor do vegetable derivations ordinarily resemble their simple scminalities . so then , since there 's so much dissimilitude between cause and effect in the more palpable phaenomena , we can expect no less between them , and their invisible efficients . now had our senses never presented us with those obvious seminal principles of apparent generations , we should never have suspected that a plant or animal could have proceeded from such unlikely materials : much less , can we conceive or determine the uncompounded initials of natural productions , in the total silence of our senses . and though the grand secretary of nature , the miraculous des-cartes have here infinitely out-done all the philosophers went before him , in giving a particular and analytical account of the universal fabrick : yet he intends his principles but for hypotheses , and never pretends that things are really or necessarily , as he hath supposed them : but that they may be admitted pertinently to solve the phaenomena , and are convenient supposals for the use of life . nor can any further account be expected from humanity , but how things possibly may have been made consonantly to sensible nature : but infallibly to determine , how they truly were effected , is proper to him only that saw them in the chaos , and fashion'd them out of that confused mass . for to say , the principles of nature must needs be such as our philosophy makes them , is to set bounds to omnipotence , and to confine infinite power and wisdom to our shallow models . chap. xxii . ( 4 ) because of the mutual dependence and concatenation of causes , we cannot know any one without knowing all . particularly declared by instances . ( 5 ) all our science comes in at our senses ; their infallibility inquir'd into . the authors design in this last particular . ( 4 ) . according to the notion of the dogmatist , we know nothing , except we knew all things , and he that pretends to science affects an omniscience . for all things being linkt together by an uninterrupted chain of causes ; and every single motion owning a dependence on such a syndrome of prae-required motors : we can have no true knowledge of any , except we comprehended all , and could distinctly pry into the whole method of causal concatenations . thus we cannot know the cause of any one motion in a watch , unless we were acquainted with all its motive dependences , and had a distinctive comprehension of the whole mechanical frame . and would we know but the most contemptible plant that grows , almost all things that have a being must contribute to our knowledge : for , that to the perfect science of any thing it 's necessary to know all its causes ; is both reasonable in its self , and the sense of the dogmatist . so that , to the knowledge of the poorest simple , we must first know its efficient , the manner , and method of its efformation , and the nature of the plastick . to the comprehending of which , we must have a full prospect into the whole archidoxis of nature's secrets , and the immense profundities of occult philosophy : in which we know nothing till we compleatly ken all magnetick , and sympathetick energies , and their most hidden causes . and ( 2 ) if we contemplate a vegetable in its material principle , and look on it as made of earth ; we must have the true theory of the nature of that element , or we miserably fail of our scientifical aspirings , and while we can only say , 't is cold and dry , we are pitiful knowers . but now , to profound into the physicks of this heterogeneous masse , to discern the principles of its constitution , and to discover the reason of its diversities , are absolute requisites of the science we aim at . nor can we tolerably pretend to have those without the knowledge of minerals , the causes and manner of their concretions , and among the rest , the magnet , with its amazing properties . this directs us to the pole , and thence our disquisition is led to the whole systeme of the heavens : to the knowledge of which , we must know their motions , and the causes , and manner of their rotations , as also the reasons of all the planetary phaenomena , and of the comets , their nature , and the causes of all their irregular appearings . to these , the knowledge of the intricate doctrine of motion , the powers , proportions , and laws thereof , is requisite . and thus we are engaged in the objects of geometry and arithmetick , yea the whole mathematicks , must be contributary , and to them all nature payes a subsidy . besides , plants are partly material'd of water , with which they are furnisht either from subterranean fountains , or the clouds . now to have the true theory of the former , we must trace the nature of the sea , its origen ; and hereto its remarkable motions of flux and reflux . this again directs us to the moon , and the rest of the celestial faces . the moisture that comes from the clouds is drawn up in vapours : to the scientifical discernment of which , we must know the nature and manner of that action , their suspense in the middle region , the qualities of that place , and the causes and manner of their precipitating thence again : and so the reason of the sphaerical figure of the drops ; the causes of windes , hail , snow , thunder , lightning , with all other igneous appearances , with the whole physiology of meteors must be enquired into . and again ( 3 ) in our disquisition into the formal causes , the knowledge of the nature of colours , is necessary to compleat the science . to be inform'd of this , we must know what light is ; and light being effected by a motion on the organs of sense , 't will be a necessary requisite , to understand the nature of our sensitive faculties , and to them the essence of the soul , and other spiritual subsistences . the manner how it is materially united , and how it is aware of corporeal motion . the seat of sense , and the place where 't is principally affected : which cannot be known but by the anatomy of our parts , and the knowledge of their mechanical structure . and if further ( 4 ) we contemplate the end of this minute effect , its principal final cause , being the glory of its maker , leads us into divinity ; and for its subordinate , as 't is design'd for alimental sustenance to living creatures , and medicinal uses to man , we are conducted into zoography , and the whole body of physick . thus then , to the knowledge of the most contemptible effect in nature , 't is necessary to know the whole syntax of causes , and their particular circumstances , and modes of action . nay , we know nothing , till we know our selves , which are the summary of all the world without us , and the index of the creation . nor can we know our selves without the physiology of corporeal nature , and the metaphysicks of souls and angels . so then , every science borrows from all the rest ; and we cannot attain any single one , without the encyclopaedy . ( 5 ) the knowledge we have comes from our senses , and the dogmatist can go no higher for the original of his certainty . now let the sciolist tell me , why things must needs be so , as his individual senses represent them ? is he sure , that objects are not otherwise sensed by others , then they are by him ? and why must his sense be the infallible criterion ? it may be , what is white to us , is black to negroes , and our angels to them are fiends . diversity of constitution , or other circumstances varies the sensation , and to them of iava pepper is cold . and though we agree in a common name , yet it may be , i have the same representation from yellow , that another hath from green . thus two look upon an alabaster statue ; he call's it white , and i assent to the appellation : but how can i discover , that his inward sense on 't is the same that mine is ? it may be , alabaster is represented to him , as jet is to me , and yet it is white to us both . we accord in the name : but it 's beyond our knowledge , whether we do so in the conception answering it . yea , the contrary is not without its probability . for though the images , motions , or whatever else is the cause of sense , may be alike as from the object ; yet may the representations be varyed according to the nature and quality of the recipient . that 's one thing to us looking through a tube , which is another to our naked eyes . the same things seem otherwise through a green glass , then they do through a red . thus objects have a different appearance , when the eye is violently any way distorted , from that they have , when our organs are in their proper site and figure , and some extraordinary alterations in the brain duplicate that which is but a single object to our undistemper'd sentient . thus , that 's of one colour to us standing in one place , which hath a contrary aspect in another : as in those versatile representations in the neck of a dove , and folds of scarlet . and as great diversity might have been exemplified in the other senses , but for brevity i omit them . now then , since so many various circumstances concurre to every individual constitution , and every mans senses , differing as much from others in its figure , colour , site , and infinite other particularities in the organization , as any one mans can from it self , through diverse accidental variations : it cannot well be suppos'd otherwise , but that the conceptions convey'd by them must be as diverse . thus , one mans eyes are more protuberant , and swelling out ; anothers more sunk and depressed . one mans bright , and sparkling , and as it were swimming in a subtile , lucid moisture ; anothers more dull and heavy , and destitute of that spirituous humidity . the colour of mens eyes is various , nor is there less diversity in their quantitative proportions . and if we look further into the more inward constitution , there 's more variety in the internal configurations , than in the visible out-side . for let us consider the different qualities of the optick nerves , humors , tunicles , and spirits ; the divers figurings of the brain ; the strings , or filaments thereof ; their difference in tenuity and aptness for motion : and as many other circumstances , as there are individuals in humane nature ; all these are diversified according to the difference of each crasis , and are as unlike , as our faces . from these diversities in all likelyhood will arise as much difference in the manner of the reception of the images , and consequently as various sensations . so then , how objects are represented to my self ; i cannot be ignorant , being conscious to mine own cogitations ; but in what manner they are received , and what impresses they make upon the so differing organs of another , he only knows , that feels them . there is an obvious an easie objection , which i have sufficiently caveated against ; and with the considerate it will signifie no more then the inadvertency of the objectors . 't will be thought by slight discerners a ridiculous paradox , that all men should not conceive of the objects of sense alike ; since their agreement in the appellation seems so strong an argument of the identity of the sentiment . all , for instance , say , that snow is white , and that jet is black , is doubted by none . but yet 't is more then any man can determine , whether his conceit of what he cals white , be the same with anothers ; or whether , the notion he hath of one colour be not the same another hath of a very diverse one . so then , to direct all against the knowing ignorant , what he hath of sensible evidence , the very ground-work of his demonstration , is but the knowledge of his own resentment : but how the same things appear to others , they only know , that are conscious to them ; and how they are in themselves , only he that made them . thus have i in this last particular play'd with the dogmatist in a personated scepticism : and would not have the design of the whole discourse measur'd by the seeming tendency of this part on 't . the sciolist may here see , that what he counts of all things most absurd and irrational , hath yet considerable shew of probability to plead its cause , and it may be more then some of his presumed demonstrations . 't is irreprehensible in physitians to cure their patient of one disease , by casting him into another , less desperate . and i hope , i shall not deserve the frown of the ingenuous for my innocent intentions ; having in this only imitated the practice of bending a crooked stick as much the other way , to straighten it . and if by this verge to the other extream , i can bring the opinionative confident but half the way , viz. that discreet modest aequipoize of judgement , that becomes the sons of adam ; i have compast what i aim at . chap. xxiii . considerations against dogmatizing . ( 1 ) 't is the effect of ignorance . ( 2 ) it inhabits with untamed passions , and an ungovern'd spirit . ( 3 ) it is the great disturber of the world . ( 4 ) it is ill manners , and immodesty . ( 5 ) it holds men captive in error . ( 6 ) it betrayes a narrowness of spirit . i expect but little success of all this upon the dogmatist , his opinion'd assurance is paramont to argument , and 't is almost as easie to reason him out of a feaver , as out of this disease of the mind , i hope for better fruit from the more generous vertuoso's , to such i appeal against dogmatizing , in the following considerations ; that 's well spent upon impartial ingenuity , which is lost upon resolved prejudice . 1. opinionative confidence is the effect of ignorance , and were the sciolist perswaded so , i might spare my further reasons against it : 't is affectation of knowledge , that makes him confident he hath it , and his confidence is counter evidence to his pretensions to knowledge . he is the greatest ignorant , that knows not that he is so : for 't is a good degree of science , to be sensible that we want it . he that knows most of himself , knows least of his knowledge , and the exercised understanding is conscious of its disability . now he that is so , will not lean too assuredly on that , which hath so frequently deceived him , nor build the castle of his intellectual security , in the air of opinions . but for the shallow passive intellects , that were never ingag'd in a through search of verity , 't is such are the confidents that ingage their irrepealable assents to every slight appearance . thus meer sensible conceivers , make every thing they hold a sacrament , and the silly vulgar are sure of all things . there was no theoreme in the mathematicks more certain to archimedes , then the earth's immoveable quiescence seems to the multitude : nor then did the impossibility of antipodes , to antique ages . and if great philosophers doubt of many things , which popular dijudicants hold as certain as their creeds , i suppose ignorance it self will not say , it is because they are more ignorant . superficial pedants will swear their controversal uncertainties , while wiser heads stand in bivio . opinions are the rattles of immature intellects , but the advanced reasons have out-grown them . true knowledge is modest and wary , 't is ignorance that is so bold , and presuming . thus those that never travail'd without the horizon , that first terminated their infant aspects , will not be perswaded that the world hath any countrey better then their own : while they that have had a view of other regions , are not so confidently perswaded of the precedency of that , they were bred in , but speak more indifferently of the laws , manners , commodities , and customs of their native soil : so they that never peep 't beyond the common belief in which their easie understandings were at first indoctrinated , are indubitately assur'd of the truth , and comparative excellency of their receptions , while the larger souls , that have travail'd the divers climates of opinions , are more cautious in their resolves , and more sparing to determine . and let the most confirm'd dogmatist profound far into his indeared opinions , and i 'le warrant him 't will be an effectual cure of confidence . ( 2 ) confidence in opinions evermore dwells with untamed passions , and is maintain'd upon the depraved obstinacy of an ungovern'd spirit . he 's but a novice in the art of autocrasy , that cannot castigate his passions in reference to those presumptions , and will come as far short of wisdom as science : for the judgement being the hegemonical power , and director of action , if it be led by the over-bearings of passion , and stor'd with lubricous opinions in stead of clearly conceived truths , and be peremptorily resolved in them , the practice will be as irregular , as the conceptions erroneous . opinions hold the stirrup , while vice mounts into the saddle . ( 3 ) dogmatizing is the great disturber both of our selves and the world without us : for while we wed an opinion , we resolvedly ingage against every one , that opposeth it . thus every man , being in some of his opinionative apprehensions singular , must be at variance with all men . now every opposition of our espous'd opinions furrows the sea within us , and discomposeth the minds serenity . and what happiness is there in a storm of passions ? on this account the scepticks affected an indifferent aequipondious neutrality as the only means to their ataraxia , and freedom from passionate disturbances . nor were they altogether mistaken in the way , to their design'd felicity , but came short on 't , by going beyond it : for if there be a repose naturally attainable this side the stars , there is no way we can more hopefully seek it in . we can never be at rest , while our quiet can be taken from us by every thwarting our opinions : nor is that content an happiness , which every one can rob us of . there is no felicity , but in a fixed stability . nor can genuine constancy be built upon rowling foundations . 't is true staidness of mind , to look with an equal regard on all things , and this unmoved apathy in opinionative uncertainties , is a warrantable piece of stoicism . besides , this immodest obstinacy in opinions , hath made the world a babel ; and given birth to disorders , like those of the chaos . the primitive fight of elements doth fitly embleme that of opinions , and those proverbial contrarieties may be reconcil'd , as soon as peremptory contenders . that hence grow schisms , heresies , and anomalies beyond arithmetick , i could wish were of more difficult probation . 't were happy for a distemper'd church , if evidence were not so near us . 't is zeal for opinions that hath fill'd our hemisphear with smoke and darkness , and by a dear experience we know the fury of those flames it hath kindled . had not heaven prevented , they had turn'd our paradise into a desert , and made us the habitation of iim , and ohim . 't is lamentable that homo homini daemon , should be a proverb among the professors of the cross , and yet i fear it is as verifiable among them , as of those without the pale of visible christianity . i doubt we have lost s. iohn's sign of regeneration . by this we know that we are past from death , to life , that we love one another , is i fear , to few a sign of their spiritual resurrection . if our returning lord , shall scarse find faith on earth , where will he look for charity ? it is a stranger this side the region of love , and blessedness ; bitter zeal for opinions hath consum'd it . mutual agreement and indearments was the badge of primitive believers , but we may be known by the contrary criterion . the union of a sect within it self , is a pitiful charity : it 's no concord of christians , but a conspiracy against christ ; and they that love one another , for their opinionative concurrences , love for their own sakes , not their lords : not because they have his image , but because they bear one anothers . what a stir is there for mint , anise , and cummin controversies , while the great practical fundamentals are unstudyed , unobserved ? what eagerness in the prosecution of disciplinarian uncertainties , when the love of god and our neighbour , those evangelical unquestionables , want that fervent ardor ? 't is this hath consum'd the nutriment of the great and more necessary verities , and bred differences that are past any accommodation , but that of the last dayes decisions . the sight of that day will resolve us , and make us asham'd of our pety quarrels . thus opinions have rent the world asunder , and divided it almost into indivisibles . had heraclitus liv'd now , he had wept himself into marble , and democritus would have broke his spleen . who can speak of such fooleries without a satyr , to see aged infants so quarrel at put-pin , and the doating world grown child again ? how fond are men of a bundle of opinions , which are no better then a bagge of cherry-stones ? how do they scramble for their nuts , and apples , and how zealous for their pety victories ? methinks those grave contenders about opinionative trifles , look like aged socrates upon his boys hobby-horse , or like something more ludricous : since they make things their feria , which are scarse tolerable in their sportful intervals . ( 4 ) to be confident in opinions is ill manners , and immodesty ; and while we are peremptory in our perswasions , we accuse them all of ignorance and error that subscribe not our assertions . the dogmatist gives the lye to all dissenting apprehenders , and proclaims his judgement fittest , to be the intellectual standard . this is that spirit of immorality , that saith unto dissenters , stand off , i am more orthodox then thou art : a vanity more capital then error . he that affirms that things must needs be as he apprehends them , implies that none can be right till they submit to his opinions , and take him for their director . this is to invert the rule , and to account a mans self better then all men . ( 5 ) obstinacy in opinions holds the dogmatist in the chains of error , without hope of emancipation . while we are confident of all things , we are fatally deceiv'd in most . he that assures himself he never erres , will alwayes erre ; and his presumptions will render all attempts to inform him , ineffectual . we use not to seek further for what we think we are possest of ; and when falshood is without suspicion imbrac't in the stead of truth , and with confidence retained : verity will be rejected as a supposed error , and irreconcileably be hated , because it opposeth what is indeed so . ( 6 ) it betrays a poverty and narrowness of spirit , in the dogmatical assertors . there are a set of pedants that are born to slavery . but the generous soul preserves the liberty of his judgement , and will not pen it up in an opinionative dungeon ; with an equal respect he examins all things , and judgeth as impartially as rhadamanth : when as the pedant can hear nothing but in favour of the conceits he is amorous of ; and cannot see , but out of the grates of his prison . the determinations of the nobler spirit , are but temporary , and he holds them , but till better evidence repeal his former apprehensions . he won't defile his assent by prostituting it to every conjecture , or stuff his belief , with the luggage of uncertainties . the modesty of his expression renders him infallible ; and while he only saith he thinks so , he cannot be deceiv'd , or ever assert a falshood . but the wise monseur charron hath fully discourst of this universal liberty , and sav'd me the labour of inlarging . upon the review of my former considerations , i cannot quarrel with his motto : in a sense ie ne scay , is a justifiable scepticism , and not mis-becoming a candidate of wisdom . socrates in the judgement of the oracle knew more then all men , who in his own knew the least of any . chap. xxiv . an apology for philosophy . it is the glory of philosophy , that ignorance and phrensie are her enemies . now to vindicate this abused excellence from the mis-reports of stupid and enthusiastick ignorants , i 'le subjoyn this brief apology : lest those unintelligent maligners take an advantage from our discourse , to depretiate and detract from what hath been alway the object of their hate , because never of their knowledge , and capacities ; or , which is the greater mischief , lest this should discourage those enlarged souls , who aspire to the knowledge of god , and nature , which is the most venial ambition . if philosophy be uncertain , the former will confidently conclude it vain ; and the later may be in danger of pronouncing the same on their pains , who seek it ; if after all their labour they must reap the wind , meer opinion and conjecture . but there 's a part of philosophy , that owes no answer to the charge . the scepticks , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , must have the qualification of an exception ; and at least the mathematicks must be priviledg'd from the endictment . neither yet are we at so deplorable a loss , in the other parts of what we call science ; but that we may meet with what will content ingenuity , at this distance from perfection , though all things will not compleatly satisfie strict and rigid enquiry . philosophy indeed cannot immortalize us , or free us from the inseparable attendants on this state , ignorance , and error . but shall we malign it , because it entitles us not to an omniscience ? is it just to condemn the physitian , because hephestion dyed ? compleat knowledge is reserv'd to gratifie our glorified faculties . we are ignorant of some things from our specifical incapacity , as men ; of more from our contracted , as sinners : and 't is no fault in the spectacles , that the blind man sees not . shall we , like sullen children , because we have not what we would ; contemn what the benignity of heaven offers us ? do what we can , we shall be imperfect in all our attainments ; and shall we scornfully neglect what we may reach , because some things to mortality are denyed ? 't is madness to refuse the largesses of divine bounty on earth , because there is not an heaven in them . shall we not rejoyce at the gladsome approach of day , because it 's over-cast with a cloud , and follow'd by the obscurity of night ? all sublunary vouchsafements have their allay of a contrary ; and uncertainty , in another kind , is the annex of all things this side the sun. even crowns and diadems , the most splendid parts of terrene attains ; are akin to that , which to day is in the field , and to morrow is cut down , and wither'd : he that enjoy'd them , and knew their worth , excepted them not out of the charge of universal vanity . and yet the politician thinks they deserve his pains ; and is not discourag'd at the inconstancy of humane affairs , and the lubricity of his subject . he that looks perfection , must seek it above the empyreum ; it is reserv'd for glory . it 's that alone , which needs not the advantage of a foyl : defects seem as necessary to our now-happiness , as their opposites . the most refulgent colours are the result of light and shadows . venus was never the less beautiful for her mole . and 't is for the majesty of nature , like the persian kings , sometimes to cover , and not alway to prostrate her beauties to the naked view : yea , they contract a kind of splendour from the seemingly obscuring veil ; which adds to the enravishments of her transported admirers . he alone sees all things with an unshadowed comprehensive vision , who eminently is all : only the god of nature perfectly knows her ; and light without darkness is the incommunicable claim of him , that dwells in light inaccessible . 't is no disparagement to philosophy , that it cannot deifie us , or make good the impossible promise of the primitive deceiver . it is that , which she owns above her , that must perfectly remake us after the image of our maker . and yet those raised contemplations of god and nature , wherewith philosophy doth acquaint us ; enlarge and ennoble the spirit , and infinitely advance it above an ordinary level . the soul is alway like the objects of its delight and converse . a prince is as much above a peasant in spirit , as condition : and man as far transcends the beasts in largeness of desire , as dignity of nature and employment . while we only converse with earth , we are like it ; that is , unlike our selves : but when engag'd in more refin'd and intellectual entertainments ; we are somewhat more , then this narrow circumference of flesh speaks us . and , me thinks , those generous vertuoso's , who dwell in an higher region then other mortals ; should make a middle species between the platonical 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and common humanity . even our age in variety of glorious examples , can confute the conceit , that souls are equal : and the sole instances of those illustrious heroes , cartes , gassendus , galilaeo , tycho , harvey , more , digby ; will strike dead the opinion of the worlds decay , and conclude it , in its prime . and upon the review of these great sages , me-thinks , i could easily opinion ; that men may differ from men , as much as angels from unbodyed souls : and , it may be , more can be pleaded for such a metaphysical innovation , then can for a specifical diversity among our predicamental opposites . such as these , being in a great part freed from the entanglements of a drossie vehicle , are imploy'd like the spirits above ; in taking a survey of natures riches , and beginning those anthems to their maker , which eternity must consummate . this is one part of the life of souls . while we indulge to the sensitive or plantal life , our delights are common to us with the creatures below us : and 't is likely , they exceed us as much as in them , as in the senses their subjects ; and that 's a poor happiness for man to aim at , in which beasts are his superiours . but those mercurial souls , which were only lent the earth to shew the world their folly in admiring it ; possess delights , which as it were antedate immortality , and [ though at an humble distance ] resemble the joys above . the sun and stars , are not the worlds eyes , but these : the celestial argus cannot glory in such an universal view . these out-travel theirs , and their monarchs beams : skipping into vortexes beyond their light and influence ; and with an easie twinkle of an intellectual eye look into the centre , which is obscur'd from the upper luminaries . this is somewhat like the image of omnipresence : and what the hermetical philosophy saith of god , is in a sense verifiable of the thus ennobled soul , that its centre is every where , but it 's circumference no where . this is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and what plotinus calls so , the divine life , is somewhat more . those that live but to the lower concupiscible , and relish no delights but sensual ; it 's by the favour of a metaphor , that we call them men. as aristotle saith of brutes , they have but the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , only some shews and apish imitations of humane ; and have little more to justifie their title to rationality , then those mimick animals , the supposed posterity of cham : who , had they retain'd the priviledge of speech , which some of the fathers say they they own'd before the fall ; it may be they would plead their cause with them , and have laid strong claim to a parity . such , as these , are philosophies maligners , who computing the usefulness of all things , by what they bring to their barns , and treasures ; stick not to pronounce the most generous contemplations , needless unprofitable subtilties : and they might with as good reason say , that the light of their eyes was a superfluous provision of nature , because it fills not their bellies . thus the greatest part of miserable humanity is lost in earth : and , if man be an inversed plant ; these are inversed men , who forgetting that sursum , which nature writ in their foreheads , take their roots in this sordid element . but the philosophical soul is an inverted pyramid ; earth hath but a point of this aethereal cone . aquila non captat muscas , the royal eagle flyes not but at noble game ; and a young alexander will not play but with monarchs . he that hath been cradled in majesty , and used to crowns and scepters ; will not leave the throne to play with beggars at put-pin , or be fond of tops and cherry-stones : neither will a soul , that dwells with stars , dabble in this impurer mud ; or stoop to be a play-fellow and copartner in delights with the creatures , that have nought but animal . and though it be necessitated by its relation to flesh to a terrestrial converse ; yet 't is , like the sun , without contaminating its beams . for , though the body by a kind of magnetism be drawn down to this sediment of universal dreggs ; yet the thus impregnate spirit contracts a verticity to objects above the pole : and , like as in a falling torch , though the grosser materials hasten to their element ; yet the flame aspires , and , could it master the dulness of its load would carry it beyond the central activity of the terraqueous magnet . such souls justifie aristotles , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and in allayed sense that title , which the stoicks give it , of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . if we say , they are not in their bodies , but their bodies in them ; we have the authority of the divine plato to vouch us : and by the favour of an easie simile we may affirm them to be to the body , as the light of a candle to the gross , and faeculent snuff ; which , as it is not pent up in it , so neither doth it partake of its stench and and impurity . thus , as the roman oratour elegantly descants , erigimur , & latiores fieri videmur ; humana despicimus , contemplantesque supera & coelestia , haec nostra , ut exigua & minima , contemnimus . and yet there 's an higher degree , to which philosophy sublimes us . for , as it teacheth a generous contempt of what the grovelling desires of creeping mortals idolize and dote on ; so it raiseth us to love and admire an object , that is as much above terrestrial , as infinity can make it . if plutarch may have credit , the observation of natures harmony in the celestial motions was one of the first inducements to the belief of a god : and a greater then he affirms , that the visible things of the creation declare him , that made them . what knowledge we have of them , we have in a sense of their authour . his face cannot be beheld by creature-opticks , without the allay of a reflexion ; and nature is one of those mirrours , that represents him to us . and now the more we know of him , the more we love him , the more we are like him , the more we admire him . 't is here , that knowledge wonders ; and there 's an admiration , that 's not the daughter of ignorance . this indeed stupidly gazeth at the unwonted effect : but the philosophick passion truly admires and adores the supreme efficient . the wonders of the almighty are not seen , but by those that go down into the deep . the heavens declare their makers glory ; and philosophy theirs , which by a grateful rebound returns to its original source . the twinkling spangles , the ornaments of the upper world ; lose their beauty and magnificence ; while they are but the objects of our narrow'd senses : by them the half is not told us ; and vulgar spectators see them , but as a confused huddle of pety illuminants . but philosophy doth right to those immense sphears ; and advantagiously represents their glories , both in the vastness of their proportions , and regularity of their motions . if we would see the wonders of the globe we dwell in ; philosophy must reare us above it . the works of god speak forth his mighty praise : a speech not understood , but by those that know them . the most artful melody receives but little tribute of honour from the gazing beasts ; it requires skill to relish it . the most delicate musical accents of the indians , to us are but inarticulate hummings ; as questionless are ours to their otherwise tuned organs . ignorance of the notes and proportions , renders all harmony unaffecting . a gay puppet pleaseth children more , then the exactest piece of unaffected art : it requires some degrees of perfection , to admire what is truly perfect ; as it 's said to be an advance in oratory to relish cicero . indeed the unobservant multitude , may have some general confus'd apprehensions of a kind of beauty , that guilds the outside frame of the universe : but they are natures courser wares , that lye on the stall , expos'd to the transient view of every common eye ; her choicer riches are lock't up only for the sight of them , that will buy at the expence of sweat and oyl . yea , and the visible creation is far otherwise apprehended by the philosophical inquirer , then the unintelligent vulgar . thus the physitian looks with another eye on the medicinal hearb , then the grazing oxe , which swoops it in with the common grass : and the swine may see the pearl , which yet he values but with the ordinary muck ; it 's otherwise pris'd by the skilful ieweller . and from this last article , i think , i may conclude the charge , which hot-brain'd folly lays in against philosophy ; that it leads to irreligion , frivolous and vain . i dare say , next after the divine word , it 's one of the best friends to piety . neither is it any more justly accountable for the impious irregularities of some , that have payd an homage to its shrine ; then religion it self for the sinful extravagances both opinionative and practical of high pretenders to it . it is a vulgar conceit , that philosophy holds a confederacy with atheism it self ; but most injurious : for nothing can better antidote us against it ; and they may as well say , that physitians are the only murtherers . a philosophick atheist , is as good sense as a divine one : and i dare say the proverb , ubi tres medici , duo athei , is a scandal . i think the original of this conceit might be ; that the students of nature , conscious to her more cryptick ways of working , resolve many strange effects into the nearer efficiency of second causes ; which common ignorance and superstition attribute to the immediate causality of the first : thinking it to derogate from the divine power , that any thing which is above their apprehensions , should not be reckon'd above natures activity ; though it be but his instrument , and works nothing but as impower'd from him . hence they violently declaim against all , that will not acknowledge a miracle in every extraordinary effect , as setting nature in the throne of god ; and so it 's an easie step to say , they deny him . when as indeed , nature is but the chain of second causes ; and to suppose second causes without a first , is beneath the logick of gotham . neither can they [ who , to make their reproach of philosophy more authentick , alledge the authority of an apostle to conclude it vain ] upon any whit more reasonable terms make good their charge ; since this allegation stands in force but against its abuse , corrupt sophistry , or traditionary impositions , which lurk'd under the mask of so serious a name : at the worst , the text will never warrant an universal conclusion any more ; then that other , where the apostle speaks of silly women , ( who yet are the most rigid urgers of this ) can justly blot the sex with an unexceptionable note of infamy . now , what i have said here in this short apology for philosophy , is not so strictly verifiable of any that i know , as the cartesian . the entertainment of which among truly ingenuous unpossest spirits , renders an after-commendation superfluous and impertinent . it would require a wit like its authors , to do it right in an encomium . the strict rationality of the hypothesis in the main , and the critical coherence of its parts , i doubt not but will bear it down to posterity with a glory , that shall know no term , but the universal ruines . neither can the pedantry , or prejudice of the present age , any more obstruct its motion in that supreme sphear , wherein its desert hath plac'd it ; then can the howling wolves pluck cynthia from her orb ; who regardless of their noise , securely glides through the undisturbed aether . censure here will disparage it self , not it . he that accuseth the sun of darkness , shames his own blind eyes ; not its light . the barking of cynicks at that hero 's chariot-wheels , will not sully the glory of his triumphs . but i shall supersede this endless attempt : sun-beams best commend themselves . finis . the contents . chap. i. a display of the perfections of innocence ; with a conjecture at the manner of adams knowledge . page 1. chap. ii. our decay , and ruines by the fall , descanted on : of the now scantness of our knowledge . 10. chap. iii. instances of our ignorance ( 1 ) of things within our selves . the nature of the soul , and its origine glanc't at , and past by . ( 1 ) it 's union with the body is unconceiveable : so ( 2 ) is its moving the body consider'd either in the way of sir k. digby , des-cartes , or dr. h. more , and the platonists . ( 3 ) the manner of direction of the spirits as unexplicable . 17. chap. iv. ( 4 ) we can give no account of the manner of sensation : nor ( 5 ) of the nature of the memory . it is consider'd according to the philosophy of des-cartes , sir k. digby , aristotle , and mr. hobbs , and all in-effectual . some other unexplicables mention'd . 27. chap. v. ( 6 ) how our bodies are form'd , unexplicable . the plastick signifies nothing . the formation of plants , and animals unknown , in their principle . mechanism solves it not . a new way propounded , which also fails of satisfaction . ( 2 ) no account is yet given how the parts of matter are united . some considerations on des-cartes his hypothesis ; it fails of solution . ( 3 ) the question is unanswerable , whether matter be compounded of divisibles , or indivisibles . 41. chap. vi. difficulties about the motion of a wheel , which admit of no solution . 54. chap. vii . mens backwardness to acknowledge their own ignorance and errour , though ready to find them in others . the first cause of the shortness of our knowledge , viz. the depth of verity discourst of : as of its admixtion in mens opinions with falshood ; the connexion of truths . and their mutual dependence . a second reason of the shortness of our knowledge , viz. because we can perceive nothing but by proportion to our senses . 62. chap. viii . a third reason of our ignorance and errour , viz. the impostures and deceits of our senses . the way to rectifie these mis-informations propounded . des-cartes his method the only way to science . the difficulty of the exact performance . 69. chap. ix . two instances of sensitive deception . ( 1 ) of the quiescence of the earth . four cases in which motion is insensible , applyed to the earth's motion . 75. chap. x. another instance of the deceptions of our senses : which is of translating the idea of our passions to things without us . in propriety of speech our senses themselves are never deceived ; prov'd by reason , and the authority of st. austin . 87. chap. xi . a fourth reason of our ignorance and errour , viz. the fallacy of our imaginations . an account of the nature of that faculty ; instances of its deceptions . spirits are not in a place . intellection , volition , decrees , &c. cannot properly be ascrib'd to god. it is not reason that opposeth faith , but phancy . the interest which imagination hath in many of our opinions , in that it impresses a perswasion without evidence . 95. chap. xii . a fifth reason , the precipitancy of our understandings , the reason of it . the most close ingagements of our minds requisite to the finding of truth ; the difficulties of the performance of it . two instances of our precipitating . 106. chap. xiii . the sixth reason discourst of , viz. the interest which our affections have in our dijudications . the cause why our affections mislead us . several branches of this mention'd ; and the first , viz. constitutional inclination , largely insisted on . 113. chap. xiv . a second thing whereby our affections ingage us in errour , is the prejudice of custom and education . a third interest . ( 4 ) love to our own productions . 125. chap. xv. 5. our affections are ingag'd by our reverence to antiquity and authority ; our mistake of antiquity ; the unreasonableness of that kind of pedantick adoration . hence the vanity of affecting impertinent quotations : the pedantry on 't is derided . the little improvement of science through its successive derivations , and whence it hath hapned . 136. chap. xvi . reflexions on the peripatetick philosophy . the generality of its reception , no argument of its deserts ; the first charge against that philosophy . 148. chap. xvii . 2. peripatetick philosophy is litigious , it hath no setled constant signification of words ; the inconveniences hereof . aristotle intended the cherishing controversies , prov'd by his own double testimony . some of his impertinent arguings derided . disputes retard , and are injurious to knowledge . peripateticks are most exercised in the controversal parts of philosophy , and know little of the practical and experimental . a touch at school-divinity . 159. chap. xviii . 3. it gives no account of the phaenomena . those that are remoter it attempts not ; it speaks nothing pertinent in the most ordinary ; its circular , and general way of solution ; it resolves all things into occult qualities . the absurdity of aristotelian hypothesis of the heavens . the galaxy is no meteor . the heavens are corruptible . comets are above the moon . the sphear of fire derided . aristotle convicted of several other false assertions . 169. aristotle's philosophy inept for new discoveries . it hath been the author of no one invention : it 's founded on vulgarities , and therefore makes nothing known beyond them . the knowledge of natures out-side , conferrs not to practical improvements : better hopes from the new philosophy . a fifth charge against aristotle's philosophy , it is in many things impious , and self-contradicting ; instances of both propounded . the directing all this to the design of the discourse . a caution , viz. that nothing is here intended in favour of novelty in divinity . the reason why we may imbrace what is new in philosophy , while we reject novelties in theologie . 177 , 178. chap. xx. it 's quaeried whether there be any science in the sense of the dogmatist : ( 1 ) we cannot know any thing to be the cause of another , but from its attending it ; and this way is not infallible , declared by instances , especially from the philosophy of des-cartes . ( 2 ) there 's no demonstration but where the contrary is impossible . we can scarce conclude so of any thing . instances of supposed impossibles , which are none . a story of a scholar that turn'd gipsy ; and of the power of imagination : of one mans binding anothers thought , and a conjecture at the manner of its performance . 188 , 189. chap. xxi . another instance of a supposed impossibility which may not be so . of conference at distance by impregnated needles . away of secret conveyance by sympathized hands ; a relation to this purpose . of the magnetick cure of wounds . ( 3 ) we cannot know any thing in nature , without the knowledge of the first springs of natural motion , and these we are ignorant of . des-cartes his philosophy commend●d . 202 chap. xxii . ( 4 ) because of the mutual dependence and concatenation of causes , we cannot know any one without knowing all . particularly declared by instances . ( 5 ) all our science c●mes in at our senses , their infallibility inquired into . 213 chap. xxiii . considerations against dogmatizing , ( 1 ) 't is the effect of ignorance . ( 2 ) . it argues untamed passions . ( 3 ) it disturbs the world . ( 4 ) it is ill manners , and immodesty . ( 5 ) it holds men captive in errour . ( 6 ) it betrayes a narrowness of spirit . 224. chap. xxiv . an apology for philosophy . 235. finis . an abridgment of mr. locke's essay concerning humane [sic] understanding essay concerning human understanding locke, john, 1632-1704. 1696 approx. 374 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 165 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2005-10 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a48871 wing l2735 estc r23044 12238693 ocm 12238693 56724 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a48871) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 56724) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 606:7) an abridgment of mr. locke's essay concerning humane [sic] understanding essay concerning human understanding locke, john, 1632-1704. wynne, john, 1667-1743. [8], 310, [10] p. printed for a. and j. churchill ..., and edw. castle ..., london : 1696. advertisement: p. [10] at end. dedication signed: john wynne. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng knowledge, theory of. 2004-12 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2004-12 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2005-01 emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread 2005-01 emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited 2005-04 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion an abridgment of m r. locke's essay concerning humane understanding . london , printed for a. and j. churchill at the black swan in pater-noster-row , and edw. castle next scotland-yard-gate , near whiiehall , 1696. to the much esteemed mr. john locke . honoured sir , i send you this imperfect draught of your excellent essay concerning humane understanding , which i must confess , falls as much short of the perfection , as it does of the length of the original . nevertheless , as i lately intimated to you ( and you were pleased to think , that what i propos'd in reference to this design , would not be wholly lost labour ) i am not without hopes , that it may in this contracted form , prove in some measure serviceable to that noble end , which you have so successfully aimed at in it , viz. the advancement of real and useful knowledge . the inducement which moved me to think of abridging it , was a consideration purely extrinsical to the work it self ; and in effect no other than this ; that it would be better suited , to the ease and convenience of some sort of readers , when reduced into this narrow compass . in order to this , i thought the first book , which is employ'd in refuting the common opinion of innate notions and ideas , might be best spared in this abridgment ; especially , since the reader may be convinced by what he shall find here , that such a supposition is at least needless , in regard he may attain to all the knowledge he has , or finds himself capable of , without the help of any such innate ideas . besides this , i have retrench'd most of the larger explications ; and some useful hints , and instructive theories i have wholly omitted , not because they are less considerable in themselves ; but because they seemed not so necessary to be insisted on in this abridgment , considered as a previous instrument , and preparatory help , to guide and conduct the mind in its search after truth and knowledge . i did particularly pass by that accurate discourse , concerning the freedom and determination of the will contained in cap. 21. l. 2. because i found it too long to be inserted here at large , and too weighty and momentous to be but slightly and imperfectly represented . this i hope will prove no prejudice to the essay it self ; since none i presume will think it reasonable to form a judgment of the whole work , from this abridgment of it : and i perswade my self , that few readers will be content with this epitome , who can conveniently furnish themselves with the essay at large . however , i am apt to think , that this alone will serve to make the way to knowledge somewhat more plain and easie ; and afford such helps for the improvement of reason , as are perhaps in vain sought after in those books , which profess to teach the art of reasoning . but nevertheless , whether you shall think fit to let it come abroad , under the disadvantages that attend it in this form , i must leave you to judge . i shall only add , that i think my own pains abundantly recompenc'd by the agreeable , as well as instructive entertainment , which this nearer view , and closer inspection into your essay , afforded me : and i am not a little pleased , that it has given me this opportunity of expressing the just value and esteem i have for it , as well as the honour and respect i have for its author . i am honoured sir , your very humble and oblig'd servant , john wynne . oxon , ap. 17. 1695. errata . page 11 , line 2. r. for body . l. 4. r. to body . l. 13. r. to any . p. 12. l. 17. r. its stock . p. 23. l. 5. for esteem r. existence . p 30. l. 17. r. not the. p. 32. l. 16. r or jet ) p. 33. l. 11. r. vegetables many of them . p. 34. l. 11. r. receiv'd . p. 37. l. 4. r. occasions . p. 40. l. 17. universals . p. 41. l. 3. self . p. 42. l. 10. r. substances , thirdly . l. 26. beholder . theft . p. 43. l. 3. substances . p. 44. penult . dele the. p. 53. l. 18. r. than . p. 65. l. 12. r. observed , p. 70. l. 9. r. by the , p. 73. l. 15. r. complex one , p. 75. l. 14. r. disposition . p. 77. l. 2. r. ideas of . p. 78. l. 16. r. ideas . l. 19. r. idea . penult . r. capacities . p. 81. l. 12. r. one . is as . p. 84. l. 2. r. this notion . p. 90. l. 2. r. where . l. 19. dele they . p. 91. l. 17. r. united , l. 20. r. nourishment ; p. 92. l. 15. r. body , animal is . p. 94. l. 7. dele a. p. 96. l. 6. r. shall be . p. 110. l. 17. r. represent . p. 111. l. 22. r. because it agrees . l. 23. to be its . p. 113. l. 3. dele in l. 8. r. ideas . p. 132. l. 14. r. classing . p. 223. l. 5. r. pr●econcessis . p. 248. l. 17. r. then . p. 251. l. 23. dele are . p. 253. l. 2. dele out . p. 256. l. 23. r. one on another . p. 257. l. 6. r. veritates . p. 259. l. 24. r. an . p. 261. l. 23. r. very . p. 280. l. 6. r. capricie's . the introduction . 1. since it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings , and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them ; it is certainly a subject , even , for its nobleness , worth the enquiring into . 2. my purpose therefore is to enquire into the original , certainty , and extent of human knowledge ; together with the grounds and degrees of belief , opinion , and assent , which i shall do in the following method . 3. first , i shall enquire into the original of those ideas or notions , which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind ; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them . secondly , what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas ; and the certainty , evidence , and extent of it . thirdly , i shall make some enquiry into the nature and grounds of faith and opinion . 4. if by this enquiry into the nature of the understanding , i can discover the powers thereof , how far they reach , and where they fail us , it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in medling with things exceeding its comprehension , to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether , and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things , which upon examination are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities . we should not then perhaps be so forward , out of an affectation of universal knowledge , to perplex our selves with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited ; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions , or whereof ( as it has perhaps too often happened ) we have not any notions at all : but should learn to content our selves with what is attainable by us in this state. 5. for though the comprehension of our understanding comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things ; yet we shall have cause enough to magnifie the bountiful author of our being , for that portion and degree of knowledge , he has bestowed on us so far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our mansion . men have reason to be well satisfied with what god hath thought fit for them , since he has given them ( as st. peter says , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) whatsoever is necessary for the conveniencies of life , and information of virtue ; and has put within the reach of their discovery , the comfortable provision for this life , and the way that leads to a better . how short soever their knowledge may come of an universal , or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is , it yet secures their great concernments , that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their maker , and the sight of their own duties . men may find matter sufficient to busie their heads , and employ their hands with variety , delight and satisfaction ; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution , and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with , because they are not big enough to grasp every thing . we shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds , if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us ; for of that they are very capable : and it will be an unpardonable , as well as childish pelvishness , if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge , and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us , because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it . it will he no excuse to an idle and untoward servant , who would not attend his business by candle-light , to plead that he had not broad sun-shine . the candle that is set up in us , shines bright enough for all our purposes . the discoveries we can make with this , ought to satisfie us . and we shall the● use our understandings right , when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion , that they are suited to our faculties ; and upon those grounds , they are capable of being proposed to us ; and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration , and demand certainty , where probability only is to be had , and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments . if we will disbelive every thing , because we cannot certainly know all things ; we shall do much what as wiseiy as he who would not use his legs , but sit still and perish because he had no wings to fly. 6. when we know our own strength , we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success . and when we have well survey'd the powers of our own minds , we shall not be enclin'd either to sit still , and not set our thoughts on work at all , in despair of knowing any thing ; nor on the other side , question every thing , and disclaim all knowledge , because some things are not to be understood . our business here , is not to know all things but those things which concern our conduct . if we can find out those measures whereby a rational creature , put into that state which man is in , in this world , may and ought to govern his opinions and actions depending thereon , we need not be troubled that some other things scape our knowledge . 7. this was that which gave the first rise to this essay concerning the understanding . for i thought that the first step towards satisfying several enquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into , was , to take a survey of our understandings , examine our own powers , and see to what things they were adapted . till that was done , i suspected we began at the wrong end , and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and secure possession of truths that most concern'd us , whilst we let loose our thoughts in the vast ocean of being , as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings ; wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions , or that escaped its comprehension . thus men extending their enquiries beyond their capacities , and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing ; it is no wonder , that they raise questions , and multiply disputes , which never coming to any clear resolution , are proper only to continue and increase their doubts , and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism . whereas , were the capacities of our understandings well considered , the extent of our knowledge once discovered , and the horizon found , which sets bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things , between what is , and what is not comprehensible by us , men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avow'd ignorance of the one , and imploy their thoughts and discourse , with more advantage and satisfaction to the other . book ii. chap. i. of ideas in general , and their original . by the term idea , i mean whatever is the object of the understanding , when a man thinks ; or whatever it is which the mind can be employ'd about in thinking . i presume it will be easily granted me , that there are such ideas in mens minds : every one is conscious of them in himself ; and men's words and actions will satisfie him that they are in others . our first inquiry then shall be , how they come into the mind . it is an establish'd opinion amongst some men , that there are in the understanding certain innate principles , some primary notions , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) characters , as it were stamp'd upon the mind of man , which the soul receives in its very first being , and brings into the world with it . this opinion is accurately discuss'd , and refuted in the first book of this essay , to which i shall refer the reader , that desires satisfaction in this particular . it shall be sufficient here to shew , how men barely by the use of their natural faculties , may attain to all the knowledge they have , without the help of any innate impressions ; and may arrive at certainty without any such original notions or principles . for i imagine , any one will easily grant , that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom god hath given sight , and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects . i shall shew by what ways and degrees all other ideas come into the mind ; for which i shall appeal to every one 's own experience and observation . let us then suppose the mind to be , as we say white paper , void of all characters , without any ideas : how comes it to be furnished ? whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge ? to this i answer , in one word , from experience and observation . this , when employ'd about external sensible objects , we may call sensation : by this we have the ideas of bitter , sweet , yellow , hard , &c. which are commonly call'd sensible qualities , because convey'd into the mind by the senses . the same experience , when employ'd about the internal operations of the mind , perceiv'd , and reflected on by us , we may call reflection . hence we have the ideas of perception , thinking , doubting , willing , reasoning , &c. these two , viz. external material things , as the objects of sensation ▪ and the operations of our own minds , as the objects of reflection , are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings . the understanding seems not to have the least glimmering of ideas , which it doth not receive from one of these two sources . these , when we have taken a full survey of them , and their several modes and compositions , we shall find to contain out whole stock of ideas ; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways . 't is evident that children come by degrees to be furnish'd with ideas from the objects they are conversant with . they are so surrounded with bodies that perpetually and diversly affect them , that some ideas will ( whether they will or no ) be imprinted on their minds . light and colours , sounds and tangible qualities , do continually sollicite their proper senses , and force an entrance into the mind . 't is late commonly before children come to have ideas of the operations of their minds ; and some men have not any very clear or perfect ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives . because , tho' they pass there continually ; yet , like floating visions , they make not deep impressions enough to leave in the mind clear and lasting ideas , till the understanding turns inward upon its self , and reflects on its own operations , and makes them the objects of its own contemplation . when a man first perceives , then he may be said to have ideas ; having ideas , and perception , signifying the same thing . it is an opinion maintain'd by some , that the soul always thinks , and that it always has the actual perception of ideas , as long as it exists : and that actual thinking is an inseparable from the soul , as actual extension is from the body . but i cannot conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to think , than for the body always to move : the perception of ideas being ( as i conceive ) to the soul , what motion is to the body , not its essence , but one of its operations : and therefore , though thinking be never so much the proper action of the soul ; yet it is not necessary to suppose , that it should always think , always be in action . that perhaps is the priviledge of the infinite author and preserver of all things , who never slumbers nor sleeps ; but is not competent in any finite being . we know certainly by experience , that we sometimes think ; and thence draw this infallible consequence , that there is something in us that has a power to think , but whether that substance perpetually thinks or no , we can be no farther assured than experience informs us . i would be glad to learn from those men , who so confidently pronounce , that the human soul always thinks , how they come to know it : nay , how they come to know that they themselves think , when they themselves do not perceive it . the most that can be said of it , is , that 't is possible the soul may always think ; but not always retain it in memory : and i say , it is as possible the soul may not always think ; and much more probable that it should sometimes not think , than it should often think , and that a long while together , and not be conscious to it self the next moment after that it had thought . i see no reason therefore to believe , that the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on ; and as those are increas'd and retain'd , so it comes by exercise to improve its faculty of thinking , in the several parts of it ; as well as afterwards by compounding those ideas , and reflecting on its own operations , it increases in stock , as well as facility in remembring , imagining , reasoning , and other modes of thinking . chap. ii. of simple ideas . of ideas some are simple , others complex . a simple idea , is one uniform appearance or conception in the mind , which is not distinguishable into different ideas . such are sensible qualities , which though they are in the things themselves so united and blended , that there is no separation , no distance between them ; yet the ideas they produce in the mind , enter by the senses simple and unmix'd . thus , tho' the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax ; yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject , are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses . these simple ideas are suggested no other way than from the two ways above-mentioned , viz. sensation and reflexion . the mind being once stored with these simple ideas , has the power to repeat , compare , and unite them to an infinite variety : and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas . but the most enlarged understanding cannot frame one new simple idea ; nor by any force destroy them that are there . chap. iii. of ideas of one sense . ideas with reference to the different ways wherein they approach the mind , are of four sorts . first , there are some which come into our minds by one sense only . secondly , there are others convey'd into the mind by more senses than one . thirdly , others that are had from reflexion only . fourthly , there are some suggested to the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection . first , some enter into the mind only by one sense peculiarly adapted to receive them . thus colours , sounds , smells , &c. come in only by the eyes , ears , and nose . and if these organs are any of them so disorder'd as not to perform their functions , they have no postern to be admitted by ; no other way to bring themselves in view , and be perceiv'd by the understanding . it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense ; nor indeed is it possible ; there being a great many more than we have names for . chap. iv. of solidity . i shall here mention one which we receive by our touch , because it is one of the chief ingredients in many of our complex ideas ; and that is the idea of solidity : it arises from the resistance , one body makes to the entrance of another body into the place it possesses , till it has left it . there is no idea which we more constantly receive from sensation than this . in whatever posture we are , we feel somewhat that supports us , and hinders us from sinking downwards : and the bodies we daily handle , make us perceive that while they remain between them , they do by an unsurmountable force hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that press them . this idea is commonly called impenetrability . i conceive solidity is more proper to express it , because this carries something more of positive in it than impenetrability , which is negative , and is perhaps more a consequence of solidity , than solidity it self . this seems to be the most essential property of body , and that whereby we conceive it to fill space : the idea of which is , that where we imagine any space taken up by a solid substance , we conceive it so to possess it , that it excludes all other solid substances . this resistance is so great , that no force can surmount it . all the bodies in the world pressing a drop of water on all sides , will never be able to overcome the resistance it makes to their approaching one another , till it be removed out of their way . the idea of solidity is distinguished from that of pure space , in as much as this latter is neither capable of resistance , nor motion : 't is distinguished from hardness , in as much as hardness is a firm cohaesion of the solid parts of matter making up masses of a sensible bulk , so that the whole doth not easily change its figure . indeed , hard and soft , as commonly apprehended by us , are but relative to the constitutions of our bodies : that being called hard , which will put us to pain sooner than change its figure , by the pressure of any part of our bodies ; and that soft , which changes the situation of its parts upon an easie and unpainful touch. this difficulty of changing situation amongst the parts gives no more solidity to the hardest body , than to the softests nor is an adamant one jot more solid than water : he that shall fill a yielding soft body well with air or water , will quickly find its resistance . by this we may distinguish the idea of the extension of body , from the idea of the extension of space : that of body , is the cohaesion or continuity of solid , separable , and moveable parts ; that of space , the continuity of unsolid , inseparable , and immoveable parts . upon the solidity of bodies depends their mutual impulse , resistance , and protrusion : of pure space and solidity there are several ( among which i confess my self one ) who perswade themselves they have clear and distinct ideas : and that they can think on space without any thing in it that resists or is protruded by body , as well as on something that fills space , that can be protruded by the impulse of other bodies , or resist their motion ; the idea of the distance between the opposite parts of a concave surface , being equally clear without , as with the idea of any solid parts between . if any one ask what this solidity is , i send him to his senses to inform him : let him put a flint or foot-ball between his hands , and then endeavour to joyn them , and he will know . chap. v. of simple ideas of divers senses ▪ some ideas we get into the mind by more than one sense , as space , extension , figure , rest and motion . these are perceivable by the eyes or touch. chap. vi. of simple ideas of reflection . some are had from reflection , only : such are the ideas we have of the operations of our minds : of which the two principal are perception or thinking ; and volition or willing . the powers of producing these operations are call'd faculties , which are the understanding and will , the several modes of thinking , &c. belong to this head. chap. vii . of simple ideas of sensation and reflection . there are some simple ideas convey'd into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection ; such are pleasure , pain , power , existence , unity , succession . pleasure or delight , pain or uneasiness accompany almost every impression of our senses , and every . action or thought of the mind . by pleasure or pain we mean whatever delights or molests us , whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds ; or any thing operating on our bodies . satisfaction , delight , pleasure , happiness and uneasiness , trouble , torment , misery , &c. are but different degrees , the one of pleasure , the other of pain . the author of our beings having given us a power over several parts of our bodies , to move or keep them at rest as we think fit ; and also by their motion to move our selves and other contiguous bodies ; having also given a power to our minds in several instances , to chuse amongst its ideas which it will think on : to excite us to these actions of thinking and motion he has joyn'd to several thoughts and sensations a perception of delight : without this we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another motion to rest : in which state man however furnish'd with the faculties of understanding and will , would be a very idle unactive creature , and pass his time only in a lazy lethargick dream . pain has the same efficacy to set us on work that pleasure has ; since we are as ready to avoid that , as to pursue this . this is worth our consideration , that pain is often produc'd by the same objects and ideas that produce pleasure in us . this their near conjunction gives us new occasion of admiring the wisdom and goodness of our maker , who designing the preservation of our being , has annex'd pain to the application of many things to our bodies , to warn us of the harm they will do us , and as advices to withdraw us from them . but he not designing our preservation barely , but the preservation of every part and organ in its perfection , hath in many cases annexed pain to those very ideas which delight us . thus heat that is very agreeable to us in one degree , by a little greater increase of it , proves no ordinary torment : which is wisely ordered by nature , that when any object does by the vehemence of its operation disorder the instruments of sensation , whose structures cannot but be very delicate , we might by the pain be warn'd to withdraw before the organ be quite put out of order . that this is the end of pain , appears from this consideration ; that tho' great light is insufferable to the eyes ; yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them : because that causes no disorderly motion in that curious organ the eye . but excess of cold , as well as heat pains us ; because it is equally destructive to the temper which is necessary to the preservation of life . another reason why god hath annex'd several degrees of pleasure and pain to all the things that environ and affect us , and blended them together in all things that our thoughts and senses have to do with , is , that we finding imperfection and dissatisfaction , and want of compleat happiness in all the enjoyments of the creatures , might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of him with whom is fulness of joy , and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore . thô what is here said concerning pleasure and pain may not perhaps make those ideas clearer to us , than our own experience does , yet it may serve to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the sovereign disposer of all things , which is not unsuitable to the main end of these enquiries : the knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts , and the proper business of all understandings . 〈◊〉 and unity are two other ideas suggested by every object without , and every idea within : when ideas are in our minds , we consider them as being actually there , as well as we consider things to be actually without us ; which is , that they exist , or have existence : and whatever we consider as one thing , whether a real being , or idea , suggests the idea of unity . power is anothér idea deriv'd from these sources : for finding in our selves that we can think , and move several parts of our bodies at pleasure ; and observing the effects that natural bodies produce in one another ; by both these ways we get the idea of power . succession is another idea suggested by our senses , and by reflection on what passes in our minds . for if we look into our selves , we shall find our ideas always whilst we are awake , or have any thought , passing in train , one going and another coming without intermission . chap. viii . some farther considerations concerning simple ideas . whatsoever is able by affecting our senses , to cause any perception in the mind , doth thereby produce in the understanding a simple idea ; which whatsoever be the cause of it , is look'd upon as a real positive idea in the understanding . thus the ideas of heat and cold , light and darkness , motion and rest , &c. are equally positive in the mind , thô some of their causes may be meer privations . an enquiry into their causes concerns not the ideas as in the understanding ; but the nature of the things existing without us . thus a painter has distinct ideas of white and black , as well as the philosopher , who tells us what kind of particles , and how rang'd in the surface occasion'd those colours . that a privative cause may produce a positive idea , appears from shadows , which ( thô nothing but the absence of light ) are discernible ; and cause clear and positive ideas . the natural reason of which may be this , viz. that since sensation is produced only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits , variously agitated by external objects ; the abatement of any former motion must as necessarily produce a new sensation , as the increase and variation of it ; and thereby introduce a new idea . we have some negative names , which stand for no positive ideas : but consist wholly in negation of some certain ideas , as silence , invisible . these signify not any ideas in the mind , but their absence . it will be useful to distinguish ideas as they are perceptions in our minds , from what they are in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us : for we are not to think the former exact images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject . most of those of sensation being in the mind , no more the likeness of something existing without us , than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas , which yet upon hearing , they are apt to excite in us . whatsoever the mind perceives in it self , or is the immediate object of perception , thought or understanding , that i call an idea : and the power to produce any idea in our mind i call the quality of the subject wherein that power is : thus a snow-ball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white , cold and round , those powers as they are in the snow-ball i call qualities ; and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings i call them ideas : which ideas if i speak of sometimes , as in the things themselves , i would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which produce them in us . these qualities are of two sorts , first original or primary , such are solidity , extention , motion or rest , number and figure . these are inseparable from body , and such as it constantly keeps in all its changes and alterations : thus take a grain of wheat , divide it into two parts , each part has still solidity , extension , figure , mobility : divide it again , and it still retains the same qualities , and will do so still , thô you divide it on till the parts become insensible . the next thing to be consider'd , is , how bodies operate upon one another , and that is manifestly by impulse , and nothing else . for body cannot operate on what it does not touch : nor when it does touch , any other way than by motion . if so , then when external objects ( which are not united to our minds ) produce ideas in us ; 't is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal spirits to the brains , or seat of sensation . and since extension , figure , motion , &c. may be perceived at a distance by the sight , t is evident that some bodies must come from them to the eyes , and thereby convey to the brain some motion which produces those ideas we have in us . secondly , secondary qualities , such as colours , smells , tasts ; sounds , &c , which whatever reality we by mistake may attribute to them , are in truth nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us ; and depend on the qualities before-mentioned . the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them ; and their patterns really exist in bodies themselves : but the ideas produced in us by secundary qualities , have no resemblance of them at all , and what is sweet , blue , or warm in the idea , is but the certain bulk , figure , and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves , which we call so . thus we see that fire at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth , which at a nearer approach causes the sensation of pain . now what reason have we to say that the idea of warmth is actually in the fire , but that of pain not in the fire , which the same fire produces in us the same way . the bulk , number , figure , and motion of the parts of fire , are really in it , whether we perceive them or no ; and therefore may be call'd real qualities , because they really exist in that body . but light and heat are no more really in it , than sickness or pain : take away the sensation of them ; let not the eyes see light or colours , nor the ear hear sounds ; let the palate not taste , or the nose smell , and all colours , tasts , odours , and sounds , as they are such particular ideas vanish and cease ; and are reduced to their causes , ( that is ) bulk , motion , figure , &c. of parts . these secondary qualities are of two sorts , first immediately perceiveable , which by immediately operating on our bodies , produce several different ideas in us . secondly , mediately perceivable , which by operating on other bodies , change their primary qualities , so as to render them capable of producing ideas in us different from what they did before . these last are powers in bodies which proceed from the particular constitution of those primary and original qualities , to make such a change in the bulk , figure , texture , &c. of another body , as to make it operate on our senses different from what it did before ; as in fire to make lead fluid : these two last being nothing but powers relating to other bodies , and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities are yet otherwise thought of ; the former being esteemed real qualities ; but the later barely powers : the reason of this mistake seems to be this ; that our ideas of sensible qualities containing nothing in them of bulk , figure , &c. we cannot think them the effect of those primary qualities which appear not to our senses to operate in their productions , and with which they have not any apparent congruity , or conceivable connexion : nor can reason shew how bodies by their bulk , figure , &c. should produce in the mind the ideas of warm , yellow , &c. but in the other case when bodies operate upon one another , we plainly see that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it , and therefore we look upon it as the effect of power : but our senses not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us , and the quality of the object producing it , we imagine that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects and not in the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of the primary qualities , with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us , have no resemblance . this little exeursion into natural philosophy was necessary in our present enquiry to distinguish the primary and real qualities of bodies which are always in them , from those secundary and imputed qualities , which are but the powers of several combinations of those primary ones , when they operate without being distinctly discern'd ; whereby we learn to know what ideas are , and what are not resemblances of something really existing in the bodies we denominate from them . chap. ix . of perception . perception is the first idea we receive from reflection : it is by some called thinking in general : thô thinking in the propriety of the english tongue , signifies that sort of operation of the mind about its ideas , wherein the mind is active ; where it considers any thing with some degree of voluntary attention : for in bare perception the mind is for the most part only passive : and what it perceives it cannot avoid perceiving . what this is , we cannot otherwise know , than by reflecting on what passes in our minds when we see , feel , hear , &c. impressions made on the outward parts if they are not taken notice of within , cause no perception : as we see in those whose minds are intently busied in the contemplation of certain objects . a sufficient impulse there may be upon the organs of sensation : but if it reach not the observation of the mind , there follows no perception : so that wherever there is sense or perception , there some idea is actually produced and present in the understanding . we may observe that the ideas we receive from sensation , are often in grown people alter'd by the judgment without our taking notice of it . thus a globe of any uniform colour ( as of gold ) or jet , being set before our eyes , the idea thereby imprinted is of a flat circle variously shadowed . but being accustomed to perceive what kind of appearances convex bodies are wont to make in us ; the judgment alters the appearances into their causes ; and from that variety of shadow or colour , frames to it self the perception of a convex figure of one uniform colour . this in many cases by a settl'd habit is perform'd so readily , that we take that for the perception of our sensation , which is but an idea formed by the judgment : so that one serves only to excite the other , and is scarce taken notice of itself . as a man who reads and hears with attention , takes little notice of the characters or sounds , but of the ideas that are excited in him by them . thus habits come at last to produce actions in us , which often scape our observation . the faculty of perception seems to be that which puts the distinction between the animal kingdom , and the inferior parts of nature : since vegetables have some degrees of motion , and upon the different application of other bodies to them , do very briskly alter their figutes and motions , and thence have obtain'd the name of sensitive plants : which yet is , i suppose , but bare mechanism , and no otherwise produced , than the shortning of a rope by the affusion of water . but perception , i believe , is in some degree in all sorts of animals : thô i think we may from the make of an oister or cockle , reasonably conclude that it has not so many , nor so quick senses as a man , or several other animals . perception is also the first step and degree towards knowledge , and the inlet of all the materials of it : so that the fewer senses any man has , and the duller the impressions that are made by them are , the more remote he is from that knowledge which is to be found in other men. chap. x. of retention . the next faculty of the mind whereby it makes a farther progress towards knowledge , i call retention : which is the keeping of those ideas it has receiv'd . which is done two ways . first , by keeping the idea which is brought into the mind for some time actuactually in view , which is called contemplation . secondly , by reviving those ideas in our minds which have disappeared , and have been as it were , laid out of sight ; and this is memory , which is as it were , the store-house of our ideas , for the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view at once , it was necessary to have a repository to lay up those ideas which at another time it may have use of . but our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind which cease to be any thing , when there is no perception of them , this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory signifies no more but this , that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions it has once had , with this additional perception annex'd to them , that it has had them before . and it is by the assistance of this faculty , that we are said to have all those ideas in our understandings , which we can bring in sight , and make the object of our thoughts , without the help of those sensible qualities which first imprinted them there . attention and repetition help much to the fixing ideas in our memories : but those which make the deepest and most lasting impressions are those which are accompanied with pleasure and pain . ideas but once taken in and never again repeated are soon lost ; as those of colours in such as lost their sight when very young . the memory in some men is tenacious , even to a miracle : but yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas , even of those which are struck deepest ; and in minds the most retentive : so that if they be not sometimes renewed , the print wears out , and at last there remains nothing to be seen . those ideas that are often refresh'd by a frequent return of the objects or actions that produce them , fix themselves best in the memory , and remain longest there : such are the original qualities of bodies , viz. solidity , extension , figure , motion , &c. and those that almost constantly affect us , as heat and cold : and those that are the affections of all kinds of beings , as existence , duration , number : these and the like , are seldom quite lost while the mind retains any ideas at all . in memory the mind is oftentimes more than barely passive ; for it often sets it self on work to search some hidden ideas ; sometimes they start of their own accord : and sometimes turbulent and tempestuous passions tumble them out of their cells . the defects of the memory are two. first , that it loses the idea quite , and so far it produces perfect ignorance . secondly , that it moves slowly and retrieves not the ideas laid up in store quick enough to serve the mind upon occasions . this if it be to a great degree is stupidity . in the having ideas ready at hand on all occasions , consists what we call invention , fancy , and quickness of parts . this faculty other animals seem to have to a great degree as well as man , as appears by birds learning of tunes , and their endeavour to hit the notes right . for it seems impossible that they should endeavour to conform their voices ( as 't is plain they do ) to notes , whereof they have no ideas . chap. xi . of discerning , and other operations of the mind . another faculty of the mind is , that of discerning between its ideas : on this depends the evidence , and certainty of several even general propositions , which pass for innate truths : whereas indeed they depend on this clear discerning faculty of the mind , whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same or different . in being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another , where there is the least difference , consists in a great measure , that exactness of judgment and clearness of reason , which is to be observed in one man above another ; which is quite opposite to wit , which consists most in the assemblage of ideas , and putting those together with quickness and variety , which have the least resemblance , to form agreeable visions : whereas judgment separates carefully those ideas , wherein can be found the least difference to prevent error and delusion . to the well distinguishing our ideas , it chiefly contributes that they be clear and determinate , and when they are so , it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them , thô the senses should convey them from the same object differently on different occasions . the comparing of our ideas one with another in respect of extent , degree , time , place , or any other circumstances , is another operation of the mind about its ideas , which is the ground of relations . brutes seem not to have this faculty in any great degree . they have probably several ideas distinct enough ; but cannot compare them farther than some sensible circumstances annex'd to the objects themselves . the power of comparing general ideas , which we may observe in men , we may probably conjecture beasts have not at all . composition is another operation of the mind whereby it combines several of its simple ideas into complex ones : under which operation we may reckon that of enlarging , wherein we put several ideas together of the same kind , as several unites to make a dozen . in this also i suppose brutes come far short of man ; for tho' they take in and retain together several combinations of simple ideas , as possibly a dog does the shape , smell and voice of his master ; yet these are rather so many distinct marks , whereby he knows him , than one complex idea made out of those several simple ones . abstraction is another operation of the mind , whereby the mind forms general ideas from such as it receiv'd from particular objects , which it does by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances seperate from the circumstance of real existence , as time , place , &c. these become general representatives of all of the same kind , and their names applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas . thus the colour which i receive from chalk , snow , and milk , is made a representative of all of that kind ; and has a name given it ( whiteness ) which signifies the same quality , wherever to be found or imagin'd . and thus universally both ideas and terms are made . this puts the great difference between man and brutes : they seem to reason about particular objects , and ideas , but there appear no footsteps of abstraction in them , or of making general ideas . chap. xii . of complex ideas . in the reception of simple ideas the mind is only passive , having no power to frame any to its self , but as these simple ideas do exist in several combinations united together , so the mind may consider them as united , not only as they are really united in external objects , but as it self has joyned them . ideas thus made up of several ones put together , i call complex , as a man , army , beauty , gratitude , &c. by this faculty of repeating and joyning together its ideas , the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts . but it is still confin'd to those simple ideas which it received from the two sources of sensation and reflection . it can have no other ideas of sensible qualities , than what come from without by the senses , nor any other ideas of the operations of a thinking substance , than what it finds in it self , but having once got these simple ideas , it can by its own power put them together and make new complex ones , which it never received so united . complex ideas however compounded and decompounded , tho' their number be infinite , and their variety endless , may all be reduced under these three heads , first modes , secondly , substances , thirdly , relations . modes , i call such complex ideas which contain not the supposition of subsisting by themselves , but are consider'd as dependences on , and affections of substances , as triangle , gratitude , murder , &c. these modes are of two sorts , first simple , which are but the combinations of the same simple idea as a dozen , score , &c. which are but the ideas of so many distinct unites put together . secondly , mix'd , which are compounded of simple ideas of several kinds , as beauty , which consists in a certain composition of colour and figure , causing delight in the beholder . theft , which is the concealed change of the possession of any thing without the consent of the proprietor . these visibly contain a combination of several ideas , of several kinds . secondly substance , the ideas of substances are only such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves ; in which the confused idea of substance is always the chief . thus a combination of the ideas of a certain figure , with the powers of motion , thought , and reasoning joyn'd to substance , make the ordinary idea of man. these again are either of single substances , as man , stone , or of collective , or several put together , as army , heap : ideas of several substances thus put together , are as much each of them one single idea , as that of a man , or an unite . thirdly , relations which consist in the consideration and comparing one idea with another . of these several kinds we shall treat in their order . caap. xiii . of simple modes , and first of the simple modes of space . concerning simple modes we may observe that the modifications of any simple idea , are as perfectly different , and distinct ideas in the mind , as those of the greatest distance or contrariety ; thus two is as distinct from three , as blueness from heat . under this head i shall first consider the modes of space . space is a simple idea which we get both by our sight and touch. when we consider it barely in length between two bodies , 't is called distance , ; when in length , breadth , and thickness , it may be called capacity . when consider'd between the extremities of matter which fills the capacity of space with something solid , tangible and moveable , it is called extension , and thus extension will be an idea belonging to the body : but space may be conceived without it . each different distance is a different modification of space : and each idea of any different space is a simple mode of this idea . such are an inch , foot , yard , &c. which are the ideas of certain stated lengths , which men settle in their minds , for the use , and by the custom of measuring . when these ideas are made familiar to men's thoughts , they can in their minds repeat them as often as they will , without joyning to them the idea of body , and frame to themselves the ideas of feet , yards or fathoms beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies : and by adding these still one to another , enlarge their idea of space as much as they please . from this power of repeating any idea of distance , without being ever able to come to an end , we come by the idea of immensity . another modification of space is taken from the relation of the parts of the termination of capacity or extension amongst themselves : and this is what we call figure . this the touch discovers in sensible bodies , whose extremities come within our reach : and the eye takes both from bodies and colours , whose boundaries are within its view ; where observing how the extremities terminate either in straight lines , which meet at discernible angles ; or in crooked lines , wherein no angles can be perceiv'd : by considering these as they relate to one another in all parts of the extremities of any body or space , it has that idea we call figure : which affords to the mind infinite variety . another mode belonging to this head , is that of place . our idea of place is nothing but the relative position of any thing with reference to its distance from some fix'd , and certain points . whence we say , that a thing has or has not changed place , when its distance either is , or is not altered with respect to those bodies with which we have occasion to compare it . that this is so , we may easily gather from hence ; that we can have no idea of the place of the universe , tho' we can of all its parts . to say that the world is somewhere means no more than that it does exist . the word place is sometimes taken to signifie that space which any body takes up ; and so the universe may be conceived in a place . chap. xiv . of duration and its simple modes . there is another sort of distance , the idea of which we get from the fleeting , and perpetually perishing parts of succession which we call duration . the simple modes of it are any different lengths of it , whereof we have distinct ideas , as hours , days , years , &c. time and eternity . the idea of succession is got by reflecting on that train of ideas which constantly follow one another in our minds as long as we are awake . the distance between any parts of this succession is what we call duration : and the continuation of the existence of our selves , or any thing else commensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds , is what we call our own duration , or that of another thing co-existing with our thinking . that this is so , appears from hence , that we have no perception of succession or duration , when that succession of our ideas ceases , as in sleep : the moment that we sleep , and awake , how distant soever seems to be joyn'd and connected . and possibly it would be so to a waking man , could he fix upon one idea without variation , and the succession of others . and we see that they whose thoughts are very intent upon one thing , let slip out of their account a good part of that duration , : and think that time shorter than it is . but if a man during his sleep dream , and variety of ideas make themselves perceptible in his mind , one after another he hath then , during such dreaming , a sense of duration and of the length of it . a man having once got this idea of duration , can apply it to things which exist while he does not think : and thus we measure the time of our sleep , as well as that wherein we are awake . those who think we get the idea of succession from our observation of motion , by our senses , will be of our opinion , when they consider that motion produces in the mind an idea of succession , no otherwise than as it produces there a continu'd train of distinguishable ideas . a man that looks upon a body really moving perceives no motion , unless that motion produces a constant train of successive ideas . but wherever a man is , tho' all things be at rest about him , if he thinks , he will be conscious of succession without perceiving any motion . hence motions very slow are not perceived by us : because the change of distance is so slow , that it causes no new ideas in us , but after a long interval . the same happens in things that move very swift , which not affecting the sense with several distinguishable distances of their motion , cause not any train of ideas in our minds , and consequently are not perceived . thus any thing that moves round in a circle in less time than our ideas are wont to succeed one another in our minds , is not perceived to move , but seems to be a perfect entire circle of that matter which is in motion . such a part of duration as takes up the time of only one idea in our minds , wherein we perceive no succession , we call an instant . duration , as mark'd by certain periods and measures , is what we most properly call time : which we measure by the diurnal and annual revolutions of the sun , as being constant , regular , and universally observable by all mankind , and supposed equal to one another , it is not necessary that time should be measured by motion : any constant periodical appearance in seemingly equidistant spaces , may as well distinguish the intervals of time as what we make use of . for supposing the sun to be lighted , and then extinguish'd every day : and that in the space of an annual revolution , it should sensibly increase in brightness , and so decrease again ; such a regular appearance would serve to measure out the distances of duration , to all that could observe it , as well without , as with motion . the freezing of water , the blowing of a plant returning at equidistant periods in all the parts of the earth would serve for the same purpose . in effect , we find that a people of america counted their years by the coming and going away of birds at certain seasons . the mind having once got such a measure of time as the annual revolution of the sun , can easily apply it to duration wherein that measure it self did not exist : and the idea of duration equal to an annual revolution of the sun , is as easily applicable in our thoughts to duration where no sun , nor motion was , as the idea of a foot or yard to distances beyond the confines of the world. by the same means we come by the idea of eternity : for having got the ideas of certain lengths of duration , we can in our thoughts add them to one another as oft as we please , without ever coming to an end . chap. xv. of duration and expansion considered together . time is to duration as place is to space or expansion . they are so much of those boundless oceans of eternity and immensity as is set out , and distinguished from the rest ; and so are made use of to denote the position of finite real beings in respect one to another , in those infinite oceans of duration and space . each of these have a twofold acceptation . first , time in general is taken for so much of infinite duration as is coexistent with the universe , and measured out by the motions of its great bodies . thus it is used in the phrases before all time , when time shall be no more . place is likewise taken for that portion of infinite space possessed by the material world , tho' this might be more properly called extension . within these two are confined the particular time or duration , extension or place of all corporeal beings . secondly , time is sometimes applied to parts of that infinite duration that were not really measured out by real existence , but such as we upon occasion do suppose equal to certain lengths of measur'd time. as in the julian period which makes an excursion of seven hundred sixty four years beyond the creation . thus we may speak of place or distance in the great inane , wherein i can conceive a space equal to , or capable of receiving a body of any assigned dimensions . chap. xvi . of numbers . the complex ideas of number are form'd by adding several unites together . the simple modes of it are each several combination , as , two , three , &c. these are of all others most distinct , the nearest being as clearly different from each other as the most remote : two being as distinct from one , as two hundred . but it is hard to form distinct ideas of every the least excess in extension . hence demonstrations in numbers are more general in their use , and more determinate in their application than those of extension . simple modes of numbers , being in our minds but so many combinations of unites which have no variety , but more or less : names for each distinct combination , seem more necessary then in any other sort of ideas . for without a name or mark , to distinguish that precise collection , it will hardly be kept from being a heap of confusion . hence some americans have no distinct idea of any number beyond twenty : so that when they are discoursed with of greater numbers , they shew the hairs of their head. so that to reckon right two things are required . first , that the mind distinguish carefully two ideas which are different one from another , only by the addition or substraction of one unite . secondly , that it retain in memory the names or marks of the several combinations from an unite to that number ; and that in exact order , as they follow one another . in either of which if it fails , the whole business of numbring will be disturbed : and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude : but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attain'd to . chap. xvii . of infinity : the idea signified by the name infinity , is best examined , by considering to what infinity is by the mind attributed , and then how it frames it . finite and infinite then are look'd upon as the modes of quantity , and attributed primarily to things that have parts , and are capable of increase or diminution , by the addition or substraction of any the least part . such are the ideas of space , duration , and number . when we apply this idea to the supream being : we do it primarily in respect of his duration and ubiquity ; more figuratively when to his wisdom , power , goodness , and other attributes which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible : for when we call them infinite , we have no other idea of this infinity , but what carries with it some reflexion on the number , or the extent of the acts or objects of god's power and wisdom , which can never be supposed so great or so many , which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed , thô we multiply them in our thoughts , with the infinity of endless number . i do not pretend to say , how these attributes are in god , who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities : but this is our way of conceiving them , and these our ideas of their infinity . the next thing to be considered , is how we come by the idea of infinity . every one that has any idea of any stated lengths of space , as a foot , yard , &c. finds that he can repeat that idea , and joyn it to another , to a third , and so on without ever coming to an end of his additions : from this power of enlarging his idea of space , he takes the idea of infinite space or immensity . by the same power of repeating the idea of any length of duration we have in our minds , with all the endless addition of number , we come by the idea of eternity . if our idea of infinity be got by repeating without end our own ideas ; why do we not attribute it to other ideas , as well as those of space and duration ; since they may be as easily and as often repeated in our minds as the other ? yet no body ever thinks of infinite sweetness , whiteness , thô he can repeat the idea of sweet or white as frequently , as those of yard or day . i answer , that those ideas that have parts , and are capable of increase , by the addition of any parts , afford us by their repetition an idea of infinity ; because with the endless repetition there is continued an enlargement , of which there is no end : but it is not so in other ideas : for if to the perfectest idea i have of white , i add another of equal whiteness ; it enlarges not my idea at all . those ideas that consist not of parts , cannot be augmented to what proportion men please , or be stretch'd beyond what they have received by their senses ; but space , duration and number being capable of increase by repetition , leave in the mind an idea of an endless room for more ; and so those ideas alone lead the mind towards the thought of infinity . we are carefully to distinguish between the idea of the infinity of space , and the idea of a space infinite , the first is nothing but a supposed endless progression of the mind over any repeated idea of space . but to have actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite , is to suppose the mind already passed over all those repeated ideas of space , which an endless repetition can never totally represent to it ; which carries in it a plain contradiction . this will be plainer , if we consider infinity in numbers . the infinity of numbers , to the end of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach , easily appears to any one that reflects on it : but how clear soever this idea of the infinity of number be , there is nothing yet more evident , than the absurdity of the actual idea of infinite number . chap. xviii . of other simple modes . the mind has several distinct ideas of sliding , rolling , walking , creeping , &c. which are all but the different modifications of motion . swift and slow are two different ideas of motion , the measures whereof are made out of the distances of time and space put together . the like variety we have in sounds : every articulate word is a different modification of sound : as are also notes of different length put together , which make that complex idea called tune . the modes of colours might be also very various : some of which we take notice of , as the different degrees , or as they are termed shades of the same colour . but since we seldom make assemblages of colours , without taking in figure also , as in painting , &c. those which are taken notice of do most commonly belong to mixed modes , as beauty , rainbow , &c. all compounded tastes and smells are also modes made up of the simple ideas of those senses : but they being such as generally we have no names for , cannot be set down in writing , but must be left to the thoughts , and experience of the reader . chap. xix . of the modes of thinking . when the mind turns its view inwards upon its self , thinking is the first idea that occurs : wherein it observes a great variety of modifications ; and thereof frames to it self distinct ideas . thus the perception annex'd to any impression on the body made by an external object , is call'd sensation . when an idea recurs without the presence of the object , it is called remembrance . when sought after by the mind , and brought again in view , it is recollection . when held there long under attentive consideration , it is contemplation . when ideas float in the mind without regard or reflection , 't is called in french resvery , our language has scarce a name for it . when the ideas are taken notice of , and as it were registred in the memory , it is attention . when the mind fixes its view on any one idea , and considers it on all sides , it is intention and study . sleep without dreaming is rest from all these . and dreaming , is the perception of ideas in the mind , not suggested by any external objects , or known occasions ; nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding . of these various modes of thinking , the mind forms as distinct ideas , as it does of white and red , a square or a circle . chap. xx. of the modes of pleasure and pain . pleasure and pain are simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and reflection . there are thoughts of the mind , as well as sensations , accompanied with pleasure or pain . their causes are termed good or evil. for things are esteemed good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain . that we call good which is apt to cause or increase pleasure , or diminish pain in us : to procure or preserve the possession of any good , or absence of any evil : and on the contrary , that we call evil , which is apt to produce or increase any pain , or diminish any pleasure in us ; or else to procure us any evil , or deprive us of any good , by pleasure and pain i would be understood to mean of body or mind , as they are commonly distinguished ; thô in truth they are only different constitutions of the mind , sometimes occasion'd by disorder in the body , sometimes by thoughts of the mind . pleasure and pain , and their causes good and evil , are the hinges upon which our passions turn : by reflecting on the various modifications or tempers of mind , and the internal sensations which pleasure and pain , good and evil produce in us , we may thence form to our selves the ideas of our passions . thus by reflecting upon the thought we have of the delight , which any thing is apt to produce in us , we have an idea we call love : and on the contrary , the thought of the pain , which any thing present or absent produces in us , is what we call hatred . desire is that uneasiness which a man finds in himself , upon the absence of any thing , the present enjoyment of which carries the idea of delight with it . joy is a delight of the mind arising from the present or assur'd approaching possession of a good. sorrow is an uneasiness of the mind , upon the thought of a good lost , or the sense of a present evil. hope is a pleasure in the mind upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight . fear is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of a future evil , likely to befall us . anger is a discomposure of mind upon the receipt of injury , with a present purpose of revenge . despair is the thought of the unattainableness of any good. envy is an uneasiness of mind , caused by the consideration of a good we desire , obtained by one we think should not have had it before us . it is to be considered that in reference to the passions , the removal or lessening of a pain , is considered , and operates as a pleasure : and the loss or diminishing of a pleasure , as a pain . and farther , that the passions in most persons operate on the body , and cause various changes in it : but these being not always sensible , do not make a necessary part of the idea of each passion . besides these modes of pleasure and pain which result from the various considerations of good and evil , there are many others , i might have instanced in , as the pain of hunger and thirst , and the pleasure of eating and drinking ; and of musick , &c. but i rather chose to instance in the passions , as being of much more concernment to us . chap. xxi . of power . the mind being every day informed by the senses , of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without : reflecting also on what passes within it self , and observing a constant change of its ideas , sometimes by the impressions of outward objects upon the senses ; and sometimes by the determination of its own choice : and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been , that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things , by the same agents , and by the like ways , considers in one thing , the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed ; and in another , the possibility of making that change , and so comes by that idea which we call power . thus we say fire has a power to melt gold , and make it fluid ; and gold has a power to be melted . power thus considered is twofold , viz. . as able to make or able to receive any change : the one may be called active , the other passive power . of passive power all sensible things abundantly furnish us with ideas , whose sensible qualities and beings we find to be in a continual flux , and therefore with reason we look on them as liable still to the same change . nor have we of active power , fewer instances : since whatever change is observed : the mind must collect a power somewhere able to make that change . but yet if we will consider it attentively , bodies by our senses do not afford us , so clear and distinct an idea of active power , as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds . for all power relating to action , and there being but two sorts of action , viz. thinking and motion , let us consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers , which produce these actions . of thinki●g , body affords us no idea at all : it is only from reflection that we have that ; neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion . a body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move ; and when it isset in motion it self , that motion is rather a passion than an action in it . the idea of the beginning of motion we have only by reflection on what passes in our selves ; where we find by experience , that barely by willing it , we can move the parts of our bodies , which were before at rest. we find in our selves a power to begin or forbear , continue or end several actions of our minds , and motions of our bodies , barely by a thought or preference of the mind . this power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea , or the forbearing to consider it ; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest , and vice versa in any particular instance , is , that we call the will. the actual exercise of that power , is that which we call volition or willing : the forbearance or performance of that action , consequent to such order or command of the mind , is called voluntary : and whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the mind is called involuntary . the power of perception is that we call the understanding . perception which we make the act of the understanding is of three sorts . first , the perception of ideas in our minds , secondly , the perception of the signification of signs . thirdly , the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any distinct ideas . these powers of the mind , viz. of perceiving and preferring are usually called by another name ; and the ordinary way of speaking is that the understanding and will are two faculties of the mind . a word proper enough , if it be used so as not to breed any confusion in men's thoughts , by being supposed , ( as i suspect it has been ) to stand for some real beings in the soul that performed those actions of understanding and volition . from the consideration of the extent of the power of the mind , over the actions of the man , which every one finds in himself , arise the ideas of liberty and necessity : so far as a man has a power to think , or not to think ; to move , or not to move , according to the preference or direction of his own mind , so far is a man free. wherever any performance or forbearance , are not equally in a man's power ; wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind , there , he is not free , thô perhaps the action may be voluntary . so that the idea of liberty , is the idea of a power in any agent , to do or forbear any action according to the determination or thought of the mind , whereby either of them is preferred to the other ; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him , according to his volition , there he is not at liberty : that agent is under necessity . so that liberty cannot be where there is no thought , no volition , no will : but there may be thought , there may be will , there may be volition , where there is no liberty . thus a tennis-ball , whether in motion by the stroke of a racket , or lying still at rest , is not by any one taken to be a free agent ; because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think , and consequently not to have any volition or preference of motion to rest , or vice versâ . so a man striking himself or his friend by a convulsive motion of his arm , which it is not in his power by volition or the direction of his mind , to stop or forbear ; no body thinks he has in this liberty , every one pities him as acting by necessity , and constraint . again , suppose a man be carried whilst fast asleep into a room where is a person he longs to see , and be there locked fast in beyond his power to get out ; he awakes , and is glad to see himself in so desirable company , which he stays willingly in ; that is , prefers his staying to going away . is not this stay voluntary ? i think no body will doubt it , and yet being locked fast in , he is not at liberty to stay , he has not freedom to be gone . so that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition or preferring ; but to the person having the power of doing or forbearing to do , according as the mind shall chuse or direct . as it is in the motions of the body , so it is in the thoughts of our minds : where any one is such , that we have power to take it up , or lay it by according to the preference of the mind , there we are at liberty . a waking man is not at libetty to think or not to think , no more than he is at liberty , whether his body , shall touch any other or no : but whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another , is many times in his choice . and then he is in respect of his ideas , as much at liberty as he is in respect of bodies he rests on . he can at pleasure remove himself from one to another : but yet some ideas to the mind , like some motions to the body are such , as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid nor obtain their absence by their utmost effort it can use . thus a man on the rack , is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain , and entertain other contemplations . wherever thought is wholly wanting , or the power to act or forbear , according to the direction of thought , there necessity takes place . this in an agent capable of volition , when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to the preference of his mind , is called compulsion : when the hindring or stopping any action is contrary to his volition , it is called restraint . agents that have no thought , no volition at all , are in every thing necessary agents . and thus i have in a short draught given a view of our original ideas , from whence all the rest are derived , and of which they are made up . and which may be all reduc'd to these few primary and original ones , viz. extention , solidity , and mobility which by our senses we receive from body : thinking , and the power of moving , which by reflection we receive from our minds . existence , duration , number which belong both to the one , and to the other . by these i imagine might be explained the nature of colours , sounds , tasts smells , and all other ideas we have ; if we had but faculties acute enough to perceive the several modified extensions and motions of these minute bodies which produce those several sensations in us . chap. xxii . of mixed modes . mixed modes are combinations of simple ideas of different kinds , ( whereby they are distinguished from simple modes , which consist only of simple ideas of the same kind , put together by the mind ) as virtue , vice , a lie , &c. the mind being once furnished with simple ideas can put them together in several compositions , without examining whether they exist so together in nature : to form such ideas it suffices , if they are consistent : there are three ways whereby we get these complex ideas of mixed modes . first , by experience and observation of things themselves : thus by seeing two men wrestle , we get the idea of wrestling . secondly , by invention or voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds ; so he that first invented printing , had an idea of it first in his mind , before it ever existed . thirdly , by explaining the names of actions we never saw , or notions we cannot see ; and by enumerating all those ideas which go to the making them up . thus the mixed mode which the word lie stands for , is made up of these simple ideas : first , articulate sounds . secondly , certain ideas in the mind of the speaker . thirdly , words , the signs of these ideas . fourthly , those signs put together by affirmation or negation , otherwise than the ideas they stand for , are in the mind of the speaker . since languages are made , complex ideas are usually got by the explication of those terms that stand for them , for since they consist of simple ideas combined , they may by words standing for those simple ideas be represented to the mind of one who understands those words , thô that combination of simple ideas was never offer'd to his mind by the real existence of things . mixed modes have their unity from an act of the mind , combining those several simple ideas together , and considering them as one complex one : the mark of this union , is one name given to that combination . men seldom reckon any number of ideas to make one complex one : but such collections as there be names for . thus the killing of an old man , is as fit to be united into one complex idea , as that of a father : yet there being no name for it , it is not taken for a particular complex idea ; nor a distinct species of action , from that of killing any other man. those collections of ideas have names generally affixed , which are of frequent use in conversation : in which cases men endeavour to communicate their thoughts to one another with all possible dispatch . those others which they have seldom occasion to mention , they tie not together , nor give them names . this gives the reason , why there are words in every language , which cannot be rendred by any one single word of another . for the fashions and customs of one nation , make several combinations of ideas familiar in one , which another had never any occasion to make . such were , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among the greeks , proscriptio among the romans . this also occasions the constant change of languages ; because the change of custom and opinions , brings with it new combinations of ideas , which , to avoid long descriptions , have new names annexed to them , and so they become new species of complex modes . of all our simple ideas , those that have had most mixed modes made out of them are thinking ; and motion ; ( which comprehend in them all action ) and power , from whence these actions are conceived to flow . for actions being the great business of mankind , it is no wonder if the several modes of thinking , and motion should be taken notice of , the ideas of them observed , and laid up in memory , and have names assigned them . for without such complex ideas with names to them , men could not easily hold any communication about them . of this kind are the modes of actions distinguished by their causes , means , objects , ends , instruments , time , place , and other circumstances ; as also of the powers , sitted for those actions : thus boldness is the power to do or speak what we intend without fear or disorder : which power of doing any thing , when it has been acquired by the frequent doing the same thing , is that idea we call habit : when forward and ready upon every occasion to break into action , we call it dispositions . thus testiness , is a disposition or aptness to be angry . power being the source of all action , the substances wherein these powers are , whenthey exert this power , are called causes : and the substances thereupon produced , or the simple ideas introduced into any subject , effects . the efficacy whereby the new substance or idea is produced , is called , in the subject exerting that power , action ; in the subject wherein any simple idea is changed , or produced , passion : which efficacy in intellectual agents , we can i think , conceive to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing : in corporeal agents , nothing else but modifications of motion . whatever sort of action , besides these produces any effect ; i confess my self to have no notion , or idea of . and therefore many words which seem to express some action , signify nothing of the action , but barely the effect , with some circumstances of the subject wrought on , or cause operating . thus creation , annihilation , contain in them no idea of the action or manner , whereby they are produced , but barely of the cause , and the thing done . and when a country-man says the cold freezes water , thô the word freezing , seem to import some action , yet it truly signifies nothing but the effect , viz. that water that was before fluid , is become hard , and consistent , without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done . chap. xxiii . of our complex ideas or substances . the mind observing several simple ideas to go constantly together , which being presumed to belong to one thing , are called , when so united by one name ; and by mistake afterwards considered as one simple idea . we imagine not these simple ideas to subsist by themselves , but suppose some substratum , wherein they subsist , which we call substance , the idea of pure substance is nothing but the suppos'd , but unknown support of these qualities , which are capable of producing simple ideas in us . the ideas of particular substances are composed out of this obscure , and general idea of substance , together with such combinations of simple ideas , as are observed to exist together , and supposed to flow from the internal constitution , and unknown essence of that substance . thus we come by the ideas of man , horse , gold , &c. thus the sensible qualities of iron , or a diamond make the complex idea of those substances , which a smith or a jeweller commonly knows better , than a philosopher . the same happens concerning the operations of the mind viz. thinking , reasoning , &c. which we concluding not to subsist by themselves , nor apprehending how they can belong to body , or be produced by it ; we think them the actions of some other substance , which we call spirit : of whose substance or nature we have as clear a notion as of that of body ; the one being but the supposed substratum of the simple idea , we have from without ; as the other of those operations which we experiment in our selves within : so that the ideas of corporeal substance in matter , is as remote from our conceptions as that of spiritual substance . hence we may conclude that he has the perfectest idea of any particular substance , who has collected most of those simple ideas which do exist in it : among which we are to reckon its active powers , and passive capacities . tho' not strictly simple ideas . secondary qualities for the most part serve , to distinguish substances . for our senses fail us in the discovery of the bulk , figure , texture , &c. of the minute parts of bodies on which their real constitutions , and differences depend : and secondary qualities are nothing , but powers with relation to our senses . the ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal substances , are of three sorts . first , the ideas of primary qualities of things , which are discovered by our senses : such are bulk , figure , motion , &c. secondly , the sensible secondary qualities , which are nothing but powers to produce several ideas in us by our senses . thirdly , the aptness we consider in any substance to cause , or receive such alterations of primary qualities , as that the substance so altered , should produce in us different ideas , from what it did before : and they are called active and passive powers . all which , as far as we have any notice , or notion of them , terminate in simple ideas . had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies , it is not to be doubted , but they would produce quite different ideas in us ; as we find in viewing things with microscopes . such bodies as to our naked eyes are coloured and opaque , will through microscopes appear pellucid . bloud , to the naked eye appears all red ; but by a good microscope we see only some red globules swimming in a transparent liquor . the infinite wise author of our beings has fitted our organs , and faculties to the conveniences of life and the business we have to do here : we may by our sences know and distinguish things so far as to accommodate them to the exigencies of this life . we have also insight enough into their admirable contrivances , and wonderful effects to admire , and magnify the wisdom , power , and goodness of their author . such a knowledge as this which is suited to our present condition , we want not faculties to attain ; and we are fitted well enough with abilities to provide for the conveniencies of living . besides the complex ideas we have of material substances ; by the simple ideas t●●en from the operations of our own minds , which we experiment in our selves , as thinking , understanding , willing , knowing , &c. coexisting in the same substance , we are able to frame the complex idea of a spirit . and this idea of an immaterial substance , is as clear as that we have of a material . by joyning these with substance , of which we have no distinct idea , we have the idea of a spirit : and by putting together the ideas of coherent , solid parts , and power of being moved , joyned with substance , of which likewise we have no positive idea , we have the idea of matter . the one is so clear and distinct as the other . the substance of spirit is unknown to us ; and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us : two primary qualities or properties of body , viz. solid coherent parts , and impulse , we have distinct clear ideas of : so likewise have we , of two primary qualities or properties of spirit , thinking , and a power of action . we have also clear and distinct ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies , which are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts , and their motion . we have likewise the ideas of the several modes of thinking , viz. believing , doubting , hoping , fearing , &c. as also of willing and moving the body consequent to it . if this motion of spirit may have some difficulties in it , not easie to be explained , we have no more reason to deny or doubt of the existence of spirits , than we have , to deny or doubt of the existence of body : because the notion of body is cumbred with some difficulties very hard , and perhaps impossible to be explained . the divisibility in infinitum , for instance , of any finite extension involves us , whether we grant or deny it in consequences impossible to be explicated , or made consistent . we have therefore as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of spirit , as with our notion of body ; and the existence of the one , as well as the other . we have no other idea of the supream being , but a complex one of existence , power , knowledge , duration , pleasure , happiness , and of several other qualities , and powers which it is better to have than be without , with the addition of infinite to each of these . in which complex idea we may observe that there is no simple one , bating infinity , which is not also a part of our complex idea of other spirits : because in our ideas , as well of spirits as other things , we are restrained to those we receive from sensation and reflection . chap. xxiv . of collective ideas of substances . there are other ideas of substances which may be call'd collective , which are made up of many particular substances considered as united into one idea , as a troop , army , &c. which the mind makes by its power of composition . these collective ideas , are but the artificial draughts of the mind bringing things remote , and independent into one view , the better to contemplate and discourse of them united into one conception , and signified by one name . for there are no things so remote , which the mind cannot by this art of composition , bring into one idea as is visible in that signified by the name , universe . chap. xxv . of relation . there is another sett of ideas which the mind gets from the comparing of one thing with another . when the mind so considers one thing , that it does as it were bring it to , and set it by another , and carry its view from one to the other , this is relation or respect : and the denominations given to things intimating that respect , are what we call relatives . and the things so brought together related . thus when i call cajus , husband , or whiter , i intimate some other person , or thing in both cases , with which i compare him . any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation . where languages have failed to give correlative names , there the relation is not so easily taken notice of : as in concubine , which is a relative name , as well as wife . the ideas of relation may be the same , in those men who have far different ideas of the things that are related . thus those who have different ideas , of man , may agree in that of a father . there is no idea of any kind , which is not capable of an almost infinite number of considerations , in reference to other things : and therefore this makes no small part of men's words , and thoughts . thus one single man , may at once sustain the relations of father , brother , son , husband , friend , subject , general , european , englishman , islander , master , servant , bigger , less , &c. to an almost infinite number ; he being capable of as many relations , as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things in any manner of agreement , disagreement , or respect whatsoever . the ideas of relations are much clearer and more distinct , than of the things related ; because the knowledge of one simple idea , is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation : but to the knowing of any substantial being , an accurate collection of sundry ideas is necessary . chap. xxvi . of cause and effect and other relations . the ideas of cause and effect , we get from our observation of the vicissitude of things , while we perceive some qualities or substances begin to exist , and that they receive their existence from the due application and operation of other beings : that which produces , is the cause ; that which is produced , the effect . thus fluidity in wax is the effect of a certain degree of heat , which we observe to be constantly produced by the application of such heat . we distinguish the originals of things into two sorts . first when the thing is wholly made new , so that no part thereof did ever exist before , as when a new particle of matter , doth begin to exist which had b●fore no being ; 't is ca●led creation . secondly , when a thing is made up of particles which did all of them before exist , but the thing so constituted of pre-existing particles , which altogether make up such a collection of simple ideas , had not any existence before , as this man , this egg , this rose , &c. when produced in the ordinary course of nature , by an internal principle , but set on work by some external agent , and working by insensible ways which we perceive not ; 't is called generation . when the cause is extrinsical , and the effect introduced by a sensible separation or juxta-position of discernible parts , we call it making ; and such are all artificial things . when any simple idea is produced , which was not in that subject before , we call it alteration . the denominations of things taken from time , are for the most part only relations . thus when it is said that queen elizabeth lived sixty nine , and reigned forty five years , no more is meant , than , that the duration of her existence , was equal to sixty nine , and of her government to forty five annual revolutions of the sun : and so are all words answering , how long . young and old , and other words of time , that are thought to stand for positive ideas , are indeed relative ; and intimate a relation to a certain length of duration , whereof we have the idea in our minds . thus we call a man young , or old , that has lived little or much of that time that men usually attain to . this is evident from our application of these names to other things ; for a man is called young at twenty , but a horse old , &c. the sun and stars we call not old at all , because we know not what period god has set to that sort of beings . there are other ideas , that are truly relative , which we signify by names that are thought positive and absolute ; such as great and little , strong and weak . the things thus denominated are referred to some standards with which we compare them . thus we call an apple great , that is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to . and a man weak , that has not so much strength or power to move as men usually have , or those of his own size . chap. xxvii . of identity and diversity . another occasion the mind takes of comparing , is the very being of things : when considering a thing as existing at any certain time , or place , and comparing it with it self as existing at any other time , &c. we form the ideas of identity , and diversity . when we see any thing in any certain time and place , we are sure , it is that very thing ; and can be no other how like soever it may be in all other respects . we conceiving it impossible , that two things of the same kind should exist together in the same place , we conclude that whatever exists any where at the same time , excludes all of the same kind , and is there it self alone . when therefore we demand whether any thing be the same , or no , it refers always to something that existed such a time , in such a place , which it was certain at that instant was the same with it self , and no other . we have ideas of three sorts of substances , first , god : secondly , finite intelligence : thirdly , bodies . first , god being eternal , unalterable , and every where concerning his identity , there can be no doubt . secondly , finite spirits having had their determinate time and place of beginning to exist , the relation to that time and place will always determine to each its identity , as long as it exists . thirdly , the same will hold of every particle of matter to which no addition or substraction is made . these three exclude not one another out of the same place , yet each exclude those of the same kind , out of the same place . the identity and diversity of modes and relations are determined after the same manner , that substances are : only the actions of finite beings , as motion and thought , consisting in succession , they they cannot exist in different times , and places as permanent beings : for no motion or thought considered as at different times can be the same , each part thereof having a different beginning of existence . from whence it is plain , that existence it self is the principium individuationis , which determins a being to a particular time , and place incommunicable to two beings of the same kind . thus , suppose an atom existing in a determin'd time , and place ; it is evident that considered in any instant , it is the same with it self , and will be so , as long as its exstence continues . the same may be said of two , or more , or any number of particles , whilst they continue together . the mass will be the same however jumbled , but if one atom be taken away , it is not the same mass. in vegetables , the identity depends not on the same mass , and is not applied to the same thing . the reason of this is the difference between an animate body , and mass of matter ; this being only the cohesion of particles any how united . the other , such a disposition and organization of parts , as is sit to receive and distribute nourishment . so as to continue and frame the wood , bark , leaves , &c. of an oak , for instance , in which consists the vegetable life . that therefore which has such an organization of parts partaking of one common life , continues to be the same plant , thô that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant. the case is not so much different in brutes , but that any one may hence see what makes an animal , and continues it the same . the identity of the same man likewise consists in a participation of the same continued life , in succeeding particles of matter vitally united to the same organized body . to understand identity aright , we must consider what idea the word it is applied to , stands for . it being one thing to be the same substance , another the same man , and a third the same person . an animal , is a living organized body and the same animal , is the same continued life communicated to different particles of matter , united to that organized , living body ; our notion of man , is but of a particular sort of animal : should we see a creature of our own shape , thô it had no more reason than a parret , we should call it a man : or should we hear a parret discourse rationally , we should hardly call , or think it any thing but a parret . person stands for an intelligent being , that reasons and reflects , and can consider it self the same thing in different times and places ; which it doth by that consciousness that is inseparable from thinking . by this every one is to himself what he calls self , without considering whether that self be continued in the same , or divers substances . in this consists personal identity , or the sameness of a rational being : and so far as this consciousness extends backward to any past action , or thought , so far reaches the identity of that person . it is the same self now , it was then ; and it is by the same self , with this present one , that now reflects on it , that that action was done . self is that conscious thinking thing , whatever substance it matters not , which is conscious of pleasure or pain , capable of happiness or misery ; and so is concerned for it self , as far as that consciousness extends . that with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing , can joyn it self , makes the same person , and is one self with it ; and so attributes to its self , and owns all the actions of that thing , as its own , as far as that consciousness reaches . this personal identity , is the object of reward and punishment , being that by which every one is concerned for himself . if the consciousness went along with the little finger , when that was cut off it would be the same self , that was just before concerned for the whole body . if the same socrates , waking and sleeping , did not partake of the same consciousness , they would not be the same person : a socrates waking , could not be in justice accountable for what socrates sleeping did , no more than one twin , for what his brother twin did , because their outsides were so like , that they could not be distinguished . but suppose i wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life , beyond a possibility of retrieving them ; so that i shall never be conscious of them again : am i not again the same person that did those actions , thô i have now forgot them ? i answer , that we must here take notice what the word i is applied to , which in this case is the man only : and the same man being presumed to be the same person , i is easily here suppos'd to stand also for the same person . but if it be possible for the same man , to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times , it is past doubt the same man would , at different times , make different persons . which we see is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions , human laws not punishing the madman , for the sober man's actions , nor the sober man , for what the madman did ; thereby making them two persons . thus we say in english , such a one is not himself , or is besides himself , in which phrases it is insinuated , that self is changed , and the self same person is no longer in that man. but is not a man drunk or sober the same person ? why else is he punished for the same fact he commits when drunk , thô he be never afterwards conscious of it ? just as much the same person , as a man that walks , and does other things in his sleep , is the same person : and is as answerable for any mischief he shall do in it . human laws punish both , with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge : because in these cases , they cannot distinguish certainly what is real , and what is counterfeit : and so the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea. for thô punishment be annexed to personality , and personality to consciousness ; and the drunkard perhaps is not conscious of what he did : yet human judicatures justly punish him , because the fact is proved against ; but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him . but in the great day wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open , it may be reasonable to think no one should be made to answer , for what he knows nothing of ; but shall receive his doom , his own conscience accusing , or else excusing him . to conclude , whatever substance begins to exist , it must during its existence be the same : whatever compositions of substances begin to exist , during the union of those substances , the concrete must be the same . whatsoever mode begins to exist , during its existence it is the same : and so if the composition be of distinct substances , and different modes , the same rule holds . whence it appears that the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter , rather arises from the names ill used , than from any obscurity in the things themselves . for whatever makes the specifick idea , to which the name is applied , if that idea be steadily kept to , the distinction of any thing into the same , and divers , will easily be conceived , and there can arise no doubt concerning it . chap. xxviii . of other relations . all simple ideas , wherein are parts or degrees , afford an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein they are to one another in respect of those simple ideas . as whiter , sweeter , more , less , &c. these depending on the equality , and excess of the same simple idea , in several subjects may be called , proportional relations . another occasion of comparing things is taken from the circumstances of their origine , as father , son , brother , &c. these may be called natural relations . sometimes the foundation of considering things , is some act whereby any one comes by a moral right , power , or obligation to do something : such are general , captain , burgher ; these are instituted , and voluntary relations , and may be distinguished from the natural , in that they are alterable and separable from the persons to whom they sometimes belonged , thô neither of the substances so related be destroyed . but natural relations are not alterable , but are as lasting as their subjects . another relation is the conformity or disagreement of mens voluntary actions to a rule to which they are referred , and by which they are judged of : these may be called moral relations . it is this conformity or disagreement of our actions to some law ( whereby good or evil is drawn on us from the will and power of the law-maker , and is what we call reward or punishment ) that renders our actions morally good , or evil. of these moral rules or laws there seem to be three sorts with their different ensorcements . first , the divine law. secondly , civil law. thirdly , the law of opinion or reputation . by their relation to the first , our actions are either sins or duties : to the second , criminal or innocent : to the third vertues or vices . 1st . by the divine law , i mean that law which god has set to the actions of men , whether promulgated to them by the light of nature , or the voice of revelation . that god has given a law to mankind , seems undeniable , since he has , first , a right to do it , we are his creatures . secondly , goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to what is best . thirdly , power to enforce it by reward , and punishment of infinite weight , and duration . this is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude , and by which men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions : that is , whether as duties or sins they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the almighty . 2 ly . the civil law , is the rule set by the common-wealth , to the actions of those that belong to it . this law no body over-looks ; the rewards and punishments being ready at hand to enforce it , extending to the protecting or taking away of life , liberty , and estate of those who observe or disobey it . 3ly . the law of opinion or reputation . vertue and vice are names supposed every where , to stand for actions in their own nature , right and wrong . as far as they are really so applied , they so far are co-incident with the divine law. but it is visible that these names in the particular instances of their application , through the several nations and societies of men , are constantly attributed only to such actions as in each countrey and society , are in reputation or discredit . so that the measure of what is every where called and esteemed vertue and vice , is the approbation or dislike , praise or blame , which by a tacit consent establishes it self in the societies and tribes of men in the world ; whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them , according to the judgment , maxims or fashions of the place . that this is so , appears hence ; that tho' that passes for vertue in one place , which is elsewhere accounted vice ; yet every where vertue and praise , vice and blame go together ; vertue is every where that which is thought praise-worthy : and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publick esteem , is called vertue . these have so close an alliance , that they are often called by the same name . 't is true , vertue and vice. do in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong , which the laws of god have established ; because the observation of these laws visibly secures and advances the general good of mankind , and the neglect of them breeds mischief and confusion : and therefore men without renouncing all sense and reason , and their own interest , could not generally mistake in placing their commendation and blame on that side , that deserved it not . they who think not commendation and disgrace sufficient motives to engage men to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those with whom they converse , seem little skill'd in the history of mankind . the greatest part whereof govern themselves chiefly by this law of fashion . the penalties that attend the breach of god's laws are seldom seriously reflected on , and those that do reflect on them , entertain thoughts of future reconciliation . and for the punishment due from the laws of the common-wealth , men flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity : but no man escapes censure and dislike who offends against fashion ; nor is there one of ten thousand stiff and insensible enough , to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club. morality then is nothing but a relation to these laws or rules ; and these rules being nothing but a collection of several simple ideas ; the conformity thereto is but so ordering the action , that the simple ideas belonging to it , may correspond to those which the law requires . by which we see how moral beings , and notions are founded on , and terminated in the simple ideas of sensation and reflection . for example , let us consider the complex idea signified by the word murder . first from reflection , we have the ideas of willing , considering , purposing , malice , &c. also of life , perception , and self-motion . secondly from sensation , we have the ideas of man , and of some action whereby we put an end to that perception , and motion in the man , all which simple ideas , are comprehended in the word murder . this collection of simple ideas being found to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country i have been bred in , and to be held worthy of praise or blame , i call the action vertuous , or vicious . if i have the will of a supreme invisible , law-maker for my rule , then , as i suppose the action commanded or forbidden by god , i call it good or evil , sin or duty : if i compare it with the civil-law of my country , i call it lawful or unlawful , a crime or no crime . moral actions may be considered two ways , first , as they are in themselves a collection of simple ideas , in which sense they are positive absolute ideas . secondly , as good , or bad , or indifferent : in this respect they are relative , it being their conformity or disagreement with some rule , that makes them be so . we ought carefully to distinguish between the positive idea of the action , and the reference it has to a rule : both which are commonly comprehended under one name , which often occasions confusion , and misleads the judgment . it would be infinite to go over all sorts of relations ; i have here mentioned some of the most considerable , and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our ideas of relations , and wherein they are founded . chap. xxix . of clear obscure , distinct and confused ideas . having shewn the original of our ideas , and taken a view of their several sorts : i shall offer some few other considerations concerning them . the first , is that some are clear , others obscure : some distinct , and others confused . our simple ideas are clear , when they are such as the objects themselves from whence they were taken , did in a well-ordered sensation or perception present them . whilst the memory retains them thus , and can produce them so to the mind when it has occasion to consider them , they are clear ideas . our complex ideas are clear when the ideas that go to their composition are clear : and the number and order of those simple ideas , that are their ingredients , is determinate and certain . the cause of obscurity in simple ideas seems to be either dull organs , or slight impressions made by the objects , or a weakness in the memory , not able to retain them as received . a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other : and a confused , is such an one as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another from which it ought to be different . obscurity is opposed to clearness . confusion to distinctness . confusion is occasioned chiefly by the following defaults . first , when any complex idea ( for it is complex ideas that are most liable to confusion ) is made up of too small a number of simple ideas , and such as are common to other things : whereby the differences that make it deserve a different name , are left out . thus an idea of a leopard being conceived only as a spotted beast , is confused ; it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished from a panther , and other sorts of beasts that are spotted . secondly , when the ideas are so jumbled together in the complex one , that it is not easily discernible , whether it more belongs to the name given it , than to any other . we may conceive this confusion by a sort of pictures , usually shewn , wherein the colours mark out very odd and unusual figures , and have no discernible order in their position . this , when said to be the picture of a man or caesar , we reckon confused , because it is not discernible in that state , to belong more to the name man or caesar , than to the name baboon or pompey . but when a cylindrical mirrour rightly placed , hath reduced those irregular lines on the table , into their due order and proportion , then the eye presently sees that it is a man , or caesar : that is , that it belongs to those names , and is sufficiently distinguishable from a baboon or pompey ; that is , from the ideas signified by those names . thirdly , when any one of our ideas signified by a name is uncertain and undetermined . thus he that puts in , or leaves out an idea out of his complex one of church or idolatry , every time that he thinks of either , and holds not steady to any one precise combination of ideas , that makes it up , is said to have a confused idea of church or idolatry . confusion always concerns two ideas , and those most which most approach one another . to avoid confusion therefore we ought to examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with , or which it cannot easily be separated from ; and that will be found an idea belonging to another name , and so should be a different thing , from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct , and so keeps not that difference from that other idea which the different name imports . it is to be observed that our complex ideas may be very clear and distinct in one part , and very obscure and confused in another . thus in chiliaedrum , or body of a thousand sides , the idea of the figure may be confused , tho' that of the number be very distinct : we can discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of this complex idea which depends on the number thousand ; thô it is plain we have no precise idea of its figure , so as to distinguish it by that from one that has but nine hundred ninety nine sides . the not observing this , causes no small error in men's thoughts , and confusion in their discourses . chap. xxx . of real and fantastical ideas . our ideas in reference to things from whence they are taken , or which they may be supposed to represent , come under a threefold distinction , and are first either real or fantastical . secondly adequate or inadequate . thirdly true or false . by real ideas i mean such as have a foundation in nature ; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things , or with their archetypes . fantastical are such as have no foundation in nature , nor any conformity with that reality of being , to which they are referred as to their archetypes . by examining the several sorts of ideas we shall find , that first our simple ideas are all real ; not that they are images or representations of what does exist , but as they are the certain effects of powers in things without us , ordained by our maker , to produce in us such sensations : they are real ideas in us , whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves . their reality lies in the steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings . but whether they answer to those constitutions as to causes or patterns , it matters not : it suffices that they are constantly produced by them . complex ideas being arbitrary combinations of simple ideas put together , and united under one general name , in forming of which the mind uses its liberty ; we must enquire which of these are real , and which imaginary combinations , and to this i say , that , first , mixed modes and relations having no other reality , than what they have in the minds of men ; nothing else is required to make them real , but a possibility of existing conformable to them . these ideas being themselves archetypes , cannot differ from their archetypes , and so cannot be chimerical ; unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent ideas . those indeed that have names assigned them in any language , must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them , that they may not be thought fantastical . secondly , our complex ideas of substances being made , in reference to things existing without us , whose representations they are thought , are no farther real , than as they are such combinations of simple ideas , as are really united , and co-exist in things without us . those are fantastical which are made up of several ideas , that never were found united , as centaur , &c. chap. xxxi . of ideas adequate or inadequate . real ideas are either 1. adequate , which perfectly represents those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from , and which it makes them to stand for . secondly , inadequate , which are such as do but partially or incompleatly represent those archetypes to which they are referred : whence it appears . first , that all our simple ideas are adequate , for they being but the effects of certain powers in things fitted and ordained by god , to produce such sensations in us ; they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to such powers , and we are sure they agree to the reality of things . secondly , our complex ideas of modes being voluntary collections of simple ideas , which the mind puts together without reference to any real archetypes , cannot but be adequate ideas . they are referred to no other pattern , nor made by any original , but the good-liking and will of him that makes the combination . if indeed one would conform his idea , to that which is formed by another person , it may be wrong or inadequate , because they agree not to that which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern . in which respect only , any ideas of modes can be wrong , imperfect or inadequate . thirdly , our ideas of substances , have in the mind a double reference : first , they are sometimes referred to a supposed real essence , of each species of things . secondly , they are designed for representations in the mind of things that do exist , by ideas discoverable in them : in both which respects they are inadaequate . first , if the names of substances stand for things , as supposed to have certain real essences , whereby they are of this or that species , ( of which real essences men are wholly ignorant and know nothing ) it plainly follows that the ideas they have in their minds , being referr'd to real essences , as archetypes which are unknown , they must be so far from being adequate , that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all . our complex ideas of substances are , as has been shewn , nothing but certain collections of simple ideas that have been observed , or supposed constantly to exist together . but , such a complex idea cannot be the real essence of any substance : for then the properties we discover in it would be deducible from it , and their necessary connexion with it be known , as all the properties of a triangle depend on , and are deducible from the complex idea of three lines including a space : but it is certain that in our complex ideas of substances , are not contained in such ideas on which all the other qualities that are to be found in them depend . secondly , those that take their ideas of substances from their sensible qualities , cannot form adequate idaeas of them : because their qualities and powers are so various , that no man's complex idaea can contain them all . most of our simple idaeas , whereof our complex ones of substances do consist , are powers which being relations to other substances ; we cannot be sure we know all the powers , till we have tryed what changes they are fitted to give and receive from other substances , in their several ways of application : which being impossible to be tryed upon one body , much less upon all , it is impossible we should have adequate idaeas of any substance , made of a collection of all its properties . chap. xxxii . of true and false ideas . truth and falshood in propriety of speech belong only to propositions ; and when ideas are termed true or false , there is some secret or tacit proposition , which is the foundation of that denomination . our ideas being nothing but appearances or perceptions in the mind , can in strictness of speech no more be said to be true or false , than single names of things . the idea of centaur has no more falshood in it , when it appears in our minds , than the name centaur when it is pronounced or writ on paper . for truth or falshood lying always in some affirmation or negation , our ideas are not capable any of them , of being false , till the mind passes some judgment on them ; that is , affirms or denies something of them . in a metaphysical sense they may be said to be true , that is , to be really such as they exist ; tho' in things called true , even in that sense , there is perhaps a secret reference to our ideas , looked upon as the standards of that truth ; which amounts to a mental proposition . when the mind refers any of its ideas to any thing extraneous to it , they are then capable of being true or false : because in such a reference the mind makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing ; which supposition , as it is true or false , so the ideas themselves come to be denominated , this happens in these cases : first , when the mind supposes its idea , conformable to that in other mens minds , called by the same name , such as that of justice , vertue , &c. secondly , when the mind supposes any idea conformable to some real existence . thus that of a man is true , that of centaur false , the one having a conformity to what has really existed ; the other not . thirdly , when the mind refers any of its ideas to that real constitution , and essence of any thing whereon all its properties depend : and thus the greatest part , if not all our ideas of substances , are false . as to the first , when we judge of our ideas by their conformity to those of other men , they may be any of them false . but simple ideas are least liable to be so mistaken ; we seldom mistake green for blue , or bitter for sweet ; much less do we confound the names belonging to different senses , and call a colour by the name of a taste . complex ideas are much more liable to falshood in this particular : and those of mixed modes more than substances . because in substances their sensible qualities serve for the most part to distinguish them clearly : but in mixed modes we are more uncertain , and we may call that justice , which ought to be called by another name . the reason of this is , that the abstract ideas of mixed modes , being mens voluntary combinations of such a precise collection of simple ideas , we have nothing else to refer our ideas of mixed modes as standards to ; but the ideas of those who are thought to use names in their proper significations : and so as our ideas conform or differ from them , they pass for true or false . as to the second , when we refer our ideas to the real existence of things , none can be termed false , but our complex ideas of substances . for our simple ideas being nothing but perceptions in us answerable to certain powers in external objects , their truth consists in nothing but such appearances , as are produced in us suitable to those powers : neither do they become liable to the imputation of falshood , whether we judge these ideas to be in the things themselves , or no. for god having set them as marks of distinguishing things , that we may be able to discern one thing from another ; and thereby chuse them as we have occasion : it alters not the nature of our simple ideas , whether we think the idea of blue ( for instance ) to be in the violet it self , or in the mind only : and it is equally from that appearance to be denominated blue , whether it be that real colour , or only a peculiar texture in it , that causes in us that idea : since the name blue notes properly nothing but that mark of distinction , that is in a violet , discernible only by our eyes , whatever it consists in . neither would our simple ideas be false , if by the different structure of our organs it were so ordered , that the same object should produce in several mens minds different ideas . for this could never be known , since objects would operate constantly after the same manner . it is most probable nevertheless , that the ideas produced by objects in different mens minds , are very near and undiscernibly like . names of simple ideas may be mis-applied , as a man ignorant in the english tongue may call purple , scarlet : but this makes no falshood in the ideas . complex ideas of modes , cannot be false in reference to the essence of any thing really existing ; because they have no reference to any pattern existing , or made by nature . our complex ideas of substances , being all referr'd to patterns in things themselves , may be false . they are so , first , when looked upon as representations of the unknown essences of things . secondly , when they put together simple ideas which in the real existence of things , have no union : as in centaur . thirdly , when from any collection of simple ideas , that do always exist together , there is separated by a direct negation any one simple idea , which is constantly joyned with them . thus , if from extension , solidity , fixedness , malleableness , fusibility , &c. we remove the colour observed in gold. if this idea be only left out of the complex one of gold , it is to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect , rather than a false one : since , thô it contains not all the simple ideas , that are united in nature : yet it puts none together , but what do really exist together . upon the whole , i think that our ideas as they are considered by the mind , either in reference to the proper signification of their names , or in reference to the reality of things , may more proproperly be called right or wrong ideas , according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred . the ideas that are in mens minds simply considered , cannot be wrong , unless complex ideas , wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together . all other ideas are in themselves right , and the knowledge about them right , and true knowledge . but when we come to refer them to any patterns , or archetypes , then they are capable of being wrong , as far as they disagree with such archetypes . having thus given an account of the original sorts and extent of our ideas , which are the materials of our knowledge , before i proceed to shew what use the understanding makes of them , and what knowledge we have by them , i find it necessary , because of that close connexion between ideas , and words ; and that constant relation , which our abstract ideas and general words have one with another , to consider , first , the nature , use , and signification of language , which therefore must be the business of the next book . book iii. chap. i. of words or language in general . god having design'd man for a sociable creature , made him not only with an inclination , and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind : but furnished him also with language , which was to be the great instrument and common tye of society . man therefore had by nature his organs so fashioned , as to be fit to frame articulate sounds , which we call words . but besides articulate sounds ( which birds may be taught to imitate ) it was further necessary that he should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions , and make them stand as marks of the ideas of his mind , whereby they might be made known to others . but neither is it enough for the perfection of language , that sounds can be made . signs of ideas , unless these can be made use of , so as to comprehend several particular things : for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use , had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by . to remedy this inconvenience , language had yet a farther improvement in the use of general terms , whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences , which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the ideas they were made signs of . those names becoming general , which are made to stand for general ideas ; and those remaining particular , where the ideas they are used for are particular . there are other words which signify the want or absence of ideas , as ignorance , barrenness , &c. which relate to positive ideas , and signify their absence . it is observable that the words which stand for actions and notions , quite removed from sense , are borrowed from sensible ideas , v. g. to imagine , apprehend , comprehend , understand , adhere , conceive , instill , disgust , disturbance , tranquillity , &c. which are all taken from the operations of things sensible , and applied to modes of thinking . spirit in its primary signification is no more than breath ; angel a messenger . by which we may guess what kind of notions they were , and whence derived ; which filled the minds of the first beginners of languages , and how nature , even in the naming of things unawares suggested to men , the originals of all their knowledge : whilst to give names that might make known to others any operations they felt in themselves , or any other ideas , that came not under their senses , they were fain to borrow words from the ordinary and known ideas of sensation . the better to understand the use and force of language , as subservient to knowledge , it will be convenient to consider , first , to what it is that names in the use of language are immediately applyed . secondly , since all ( except proper names ) are general , and so stand not for this or that single thing , but for sorts and ranks : it will be necessary to consider what those sorts and kinds of things are ; wherein they consist , and how they come to be made . this shall be considered in the following chapters . chap ii. of the signification of words . man , thô he have great variety of thoughts , yet are they all within his own breast , invisible and hidden from others , nor can of themselves be made to appear . it was necessary therefore , for the comfort and advantage of society , that man should find out some external signs , whereby those invisible ideas might be made known to others . for which purpose nothing was so fit , either for plenty or quickness , as those articulate sounds he found himself able to make . hence words came to be made use of by men , as signs of their ideas : not upon the account of any natural connexion between articulate sounds , and certain ideas ; for then there would be but one language amongst all men : but by a voluntary imposition , whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea . the use then of words , is to be sensible marks of our ideas : and the ideas they stand for , are their proper and immediate signification . in which they stand for nothing more but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them . for when a man speaks to another , it is that he may be understood ; that is , that his sounds may make known his ideas to the hearer . words being voluntary signs cannot be imposed on things we know not : this would be to make them signs of nothing , sounds without significations . a man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things , or of conceptions in the mind of another , whereof he has none in his own . words in all mens mouths ( that speak with any meaning ) stand for the ideas which those that use them have : and which they would express by them . thus a child that takes notice of nothing more in the mettal he hears called gold , than the yellow colour , calls the same colour in a peacock's tail gold. another , that hath better observed , adds to shining yellow , great weight ; and then the sound gold stands , when he uses it , for a complex idea of a shining yellow , and very weighty substance . thô words signify properly nothing but the ideas in mens minds , yet they are in their thoughts secretly referred to two other things . first , they suppose their words to be marks of ideas , in the minds of other men with whom they communicate ; else they could not discourse intelligibly with one another : in this case men stand not to examine whether their ideas , and those of other men be the same ; they think it enough that they use the word in the common acceptation of that language . secondly , they suppose their words to stand also for the reality of things . words then being immediately the signs of mens ideas , whereby they express their thoughts and imaginations to others , there arises by constant use such a connexion between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for ; that the names heard almost as readily excite certain ideas , as if the objects themselves were present to the senses . and because we examine not precisely the signification of words , we often in attentive consideration set our thoughts more on words , than things : nay , some ( because we often learn words before we know the ideas they stand for ) speak several words no otherwise than parrots do , without any meaning at all . but so far as words are of use and signification , so far there is a constant connexion between the sound and idea ; and a designation that the one stand for the other ; without which application of them , they are nothing but insignificant noise . since then words signifie only mens peculiar ideas , and that by an arbitrary imposition , it follows that every man has an inviolable liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases . it is true , common use by a tacit consent appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages ; which so far limits the signification of each sound , that unless a man applies it to the same ideas , he cannot speak properly : and unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer , which he makes them stand for in speaking , he cannot speak intelligibly . but whatever be the consequence of any man's use of words , different either from their publick use , or that of the persons to whom he addresses them ; this is certain , their signification in his use of them is limited to his ideas , and they can be signs of nothing else . chap. iii. of general terms . all things that exist being particulars , it might be expected that words should be so too in their signification : but we find it quite contrary , for most of the words that make all languages are general terms . this is the effect of reason and necessity , for , first , it is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name , because it is impossible to have distinct ideas of every particular thing ; to retain its name , with its peculiar appropriation to that idea . secondly , it would be useless , unless all could be supposed to have these same ideas in their minds . for names applyed to particular things , whereof i alone have the ideas in my mind , could not be significant or intelligible to another , who is not acquainted with all those particular things which had fallen under my notice . thirdly , it would be of no great use for the improvement of knowledge , which thô founded in particular things , enlarges it self by general views ; to which , things reduced into sorts under general names , are properly subservient . in things where we have occasion to consider , and discourse of individuals , and particulars we use proper names : as in persons , countreys , cities , rivers , mountains , &c. thus we see that jockeys have particular names for their horses , because they often have occasion to mention this or that particular horse when he is out of sight . the next thing to be considered , is how general words come to be made . words become general by being made signs of general ideas : ideas become general by separating from them , the circumstances of time , place , or any other ideas that may determinate them to this or that particular existence . by this way of abstraction , they become capable of representing more individuals , than one : each of which having a conformity to that abstract idea , is of that sort . but it may not be amiss to trace our notions and names , from their beginning ; and observe by what degrees we proceed , and enlarge our ideas from our first infancy . it is evident that the first ideas children get , are only particular , as of the nurse or mother , and the names they give them are confined to these individuals . afterwards observing that there are a great many other things in the world , that resemble them in shape , and other qualities , they frame an idea which they find those many particulars do partake in ; to that they give with others the name man for example ; in this they make nothing new , but only leave out of the complex idea they had of peter , james , mary , &c. that which is peculiar to each , and retain only what is common to all . and thus they come to have a general name , and a general idea . by the same method they advance to more general names and notions . for observing several things that differ from their idea of man , and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name , to agree with man in some certain qualities , by retaining only those qualities , and uniting them into one idea , they have another more general idea , to which giving a name they make a term of a more comprehensive extension . thus by leaving out the shape , and some other properties signified by the name man , and retaining only a body with life , sense , and spontaneous motion ; we form the idea , signified by the name animal . by the same way the mind proceeds to body , substance , and at last to being , thing , and such universal terms which stand for any ideas whatsoever . hence we see that the whole mystery of genus and species , is nothing else but abstract ideas more or less comprehensive , with names annexed to them . this shews us the reason why in defining words , we make use of the genus : namely to save the labour of enumerating the several simple ideas , which the next general term stands for : general terms then belong not to the real existence of things ; they are inventions of the understanding , and concern only signs , either words or ideas . it must be considered in the next place , what kind of signification it is that general words have . it is evident that they do not barely signify one particular thing : for then they would not be general terms , but proper names : neither do they signify a plurality : for then man and men would signifie the same thing ; but that which they signifie , is a sort of things , and this they do , by being made a sign of an abstract idea in the mind , to which idea , as things existing are found to agree , so they come to be ranked under that name , or to be of that sort . the essences then of the sorts or species of things , are nothing but these abstract ideas . it is not denyed here that nature makes things alike , and so lays the foundation of this sorting and cleansing : but the sorts of species themselves are the workmanship of human understanding : so that every distinct abstract idea , is a distinct essence , and the names that stand for such distinct ideas , are the names of things essentially different thus oval , circle , rain and snow are essentially different . to make this clearer , it may not be amiss to consider the several significations of the word essence . first , it may be taken for the very being of any thing whereby it is , what it is ; thus the real internal , ( but unknown ) constitution in substances , may be called their essence . this is the proper signification of the word . secondly , in the schools the word essence has been almost wholly applyed to the artificial constitution of genus and species ; it is true , there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things : and it is past doubt there must be some real constitution , on which any collection of simple ideas , co-existing , must depend . but it being evident , that things are ranked into sorts , under names only as they agree to certain abstract ideas , to which we have annexed those names , the essence of each genus , or species , is nothing but the abstract idea , which the name stands for ; this the word essence imports in its most familiar use . these two sorts of essence may not unfitly be termed the one real , the other nominal . between the nominal essence and the name , there is so near a connexion , that the name of any sort of things , cannot be attributed to any particular being , but what has the essence whereby it answers that abstract idea , whereof that name is the sign . concerning the real essences of corporeal substances , there are two opinions . first , some using the word essence for they know not what . suppose a certain number of those essences , according to which , all natural things are made , and of which they equally partake , and do become of this or of that species . secondly . others look on all natural things to have a real , but unknown constitution of their insensible parts , from whence flow their sensible qualities , which serve us to distinguish them one from another ; and according to which we rank them into sorts , under common denominations . the former supposition seems irreconcilable with the frequent production of monsters , in all the species of animals : since it is impossible that two things partaking of the same real essence , should have different properties . but were there no other reason against it ; yet the supposition of essences which cannot be known , and yet the making them to be that which distinguisheth the species of things , is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any part of knowledge , that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by . we may farther observe that the nominal , and real essences of simple ideas and modes , are always the same : but in substances always quite different . thus a figure including a space between three lines , is the real as well as nominal essence of a triangle ; it being that foundation from which all its properties flow , and to which they are inseparably annexed ; but it is far otherwise in gold or any other sort of substance , it is the real constitution of its insensible parts , on which depend all those properties that are to be found in it ; which constitution since we know not , nor have any particular idea of , we can have no name that is the sign of it . but yet it is its colour , weight , fusibility , and fixedness , &c. which makes it to be gold , or gives it a right to that name ; which is therefore its nominal essence , since nothing can be called gold but what has a conformity to that abstract complex idea , to which that name is annexed . that essences are but abstract ideas , may farther appear by their being held ingenerable and incorruptible . this cannot be true of the real constitution of things . all things in nature ( save the author of it ) are liable to change : their real essences and constitutions are destroyed and perish : but as they are ideas established in the mind , they remain immutable . for whatever becomes of alexander or bucephalus , the ideas of man and horse remain the same . by these means the essence of a species rests safe and entire , without the existence of one individual of that kind . it is evident then that this doctrine of the immutability of essences is founded only on the relation established between abstract ideas and certain sounds : and will always be true , as long as the same name can have the same signification . chap. iv. of the names of simple ideas . words , thô they signifie nothing immediately , but the ideas in the mind of the speaker ; yet we shall find that the names of simple ideas , mixed modes , and natural substances have each of them something peculiar , and , first , the names of simple ideas and substances , with the abstract ideas in the mind , intimate some real existence , from which was derived their original pattern : but the names of mixed modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind . secondly , the names of simple ideas and modes signifie the real as well as nominal essences of their species : the names of substances signifie rarely , if ever any thing , but barely the nominal essences of those species . thirdly , the names of simple ideas are not capable of definitions ; those of complex ideas are : the reason of which i shall shew from the nature of our ideas , and the signification of words . it is agreed that a definition is nothing else but the shewing the meaning of one word , by several other , not synonymous terms . the meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for ; the meaning of any term is then shewed , or the word defined , when by other words the idea it is made the sign of , is as it were , represented or set before the view of another , and thus its signification ascertained . the names then of simple ideas are incapable of being defined , because the several terms of a definition signifying several ideas , they can altogether by no means represent an idea which has no composition at all , and therefore a definition , which is but the shewing of the meaning of one word , by several others not signifying each the same thing , can in the names of simple ideas have no place . the not observing this difference in our ideas , has occasioned those trisling definitions which are given us of those simple ideas : such as is that of motion , viz. the act of a being in power , as far forth as in power . the atomists who define motion to be a passage from one place to another , what do they more than put one synonymous word for another ? for what is passage other than a motion ? nor will the successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body to those of another , which the cartesians give us , prove a much better definition of motion when well examined . the act of perspicuous , as far forth as perspicuous , is another peripatetick definition of a simple idea , which it is certain can never make the meaning of the word light , which it pretends to define understood by a blind man , and when the cartesians tell us , that light is a great number of little globules striking briskly in the bottom of the eye ; these words would never make the idea the word light stands for , known to a man that understood it not before . simple ideas then can only be got by the impressions objects make on our minds , by the proper in-letts appointed to each sort . if they are not received this way , all the words in the world will never be able to produce in us the ideas they stand for . words being sounds , can produce in us no other simple ideas , but sounds , nor excite any in us , but by that voluntary connexion which they have with some ideas , which common use has made them signs of : and therefore he that has not before received into his mind by the proper in-lett the simple idea , which any word stands for , can never come to know the signification of that word , by any other words or sounds whatsoever . but in complex ideas which consist of several simple ones , the cause is quite otherwise ; for words standing for those several ideas that make up the composition , may imprint complex ideas in the mind , that never were there before , and so make their names be understood . in them definitions take place . thus the word rainbow , to one who knew all those colours , but yet had never seen that phaenomenon , might by enumerating the figure , largeness , position and order of the colours be so well defined , that it might be perfectly understood . the names of simple ideas , substances , and mixed modes have also this disserence ; that those of mixed modes stand for ideas perfectly ararbitrary : those of substances are not perfectly so , but refer to a pattern , thô with some latitude : and those of simple ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of things , and are not arbitrary at all . the names of simple modes , differ little from those of simple ideas . chap. v. of the names of mixed modes and relations . the names of mixed modes being general , stand for abstract ideas in the mind , as other general names do ; but they have something peculiar which may deserve our attention . and first , the ideas they stand for , or if you please the essences of the several species of mixed modes , are made by the understanding ; wherein they differ from those of simple ideas . secondly , they are made arbitrarily , without patterns , or reference to any real existence , wherein they differ from those of substances . the mind unites and retains certain collections , as so many distinct specifick ideas , whilst other combinations that as often in nature occur , and are as plainly suggested by outward things , pass neglected without particular names , or specifications . the mind in forming these complex ideas , makes no new idea , but only puts together those which it had before , wherein it does three things . first , it chuses a certain number . secondly , it gives them connexion , and makes them into one idea . thirdly , it ties them together by a name ; all this may be done before any one individual of that species of modes ever existed : as the ideas of sacrilege or adultery might be framed , before either of them was ever committed ; and we cannot doubt but law-makers have often made laws about species of actions , which were only the creatures of their own understanding . but thô mixed modes depend on the mind , and are made arbitrarily ; yet they are not made at random , and jumbled together without any reason at all , but are always made for the convenience of communication , which is the chief end of language , and therefore such combinations are only made as men have frequent occasion to mention . thus men having joyned to the idea of killing the idea of father and mother , and so made a distinct species from the killing a man's son or neighbour , because of the different heinousness of the crime , and the distinct punishment due to it , found it necessary to mention it by a distinct name , which is the end of making that distinct combination . in mixed modes it is the name that seems to preserve their essences , and to give them their lasting duration . the collection of ideas is made by the mind , but the name is as it were the knot which ties them fast together ; hence we seldom take any other for distinct species of mixed modes , but such as are set out by names . we must observe that the names of mixed modes always signify the real essences of their species , which being nothing but the abstract complex ideas , and not referred to the real existence of things ; there is no supposition of any thing more signified by any name of a mixed mode , but barely that complex idea the mind it self has formed : which when the mind has formed , is all it would express by it , and is that on which all the properties of the species depend , and from which alone they flow : and so in these the real and nominal essence is the same . this also shews the reason why the names of mixed modes are commonly , got , before the ideas they stand for are perfectly known : because there being no species of these ordinarily taken notice of , but such as have names , and those species being complex ideas made arbitrarily by the mind , it is convenient , if not necessary to know the names , before we learn the complex ideas ; unless a man will fill his head with a company of abstract complex ideas , which others having no names for , he has nothing to do with , but to lay by , and forget again . in the beginning of languages it was necessary to have the idea before one gave it the name ; and so it is still , where a new complex idea is to be made , and a name given it . in simple ideas and substances i grant it is otherwise ; which being such ideas as have real existence and union in nature , the ideas or names are got , one before the other , as it happens , what has been said here of mixed modes , is with very little difference applicable to relations also , which since every man himself may observe , i may spare my self the pains to enlarge on . chap. vi. of the names of substances . the common names of substances stand for sorts as well as other general terms ; that is , for such complex ideas , wherein several particular substances do , or might agree , by virtue of which they are capable to be comprehended in one common conception , and be signified by one name ; i say do or might agree , for thô there be but one sun existing , yet the idea of it being abstracted , is as much a sort , as if there were as many suns as there are stars . the measure and boundary of each sort whereby it is constituted that particular sort , and distinguished from others ; is what we call its essence : which is nothing but that abstract idea to which that name is annexed , so that every thing contained in that idea , is essential to that sort. this i call nominal essence , to distinguish it from that real constitution of substances , on which this nominal essence , and all the properties of that sort depend , and may be called its real essence : thus the nominal essence of gold is that complex idea the word gold stands for , let it be for instance a body , yellow , weighty , malleable , fusible , and fixed : but its real essence is the constitution of its insensible parts , on which those qualities , and all its other properties depend ; which is wholly unknown to us . that essence in the ordinary use of the word , relates to sorts , appears from hence , that if you take away , the abstract ideas by which we sort individuals , and rank them under common names , then the thought of any thing essential to any of them , instantly vanishes : we have no notion of the one without the other , which plainly shews their relation . no property is thought essential to any individual whatsoever , till the mind refers it to some sort or species of things , and then presently , according to the abstract idea of that sort , something is found essential ; so that essential or not essential , relates only to our abstract ideas , and the names annexed to them , which amounts to no more but this , that whatever particular thing has not in it those qualities contained in the abstract idea which any general term stands for , cannot be ranked under that species , nor be called by that name ; since that abstract idea is the very essence of that species . thus if the idea of body with some people be bare extension , or space , then solidity is not essential to body : if others make the idea , to which they give the name body , to be solidity and extension ; then solidity is essential also to body . that alone therefore is considered as essential , which makes a part of the complex idea the name of a sort stands for , without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort , nor be entituled to that name . substances are distinguished into sorts and species by their nominal essence ; for it is that alone , that the name which is the mark of the sort signifies : and the spicies of things to us are nothing but the ranking them under distinct names , according to the complex ideas in us , and not according to precise , distinct , real essences in them. we cannot rank and sort things by their real essences , because we know them not : our faculties carry us no farther in the knowledge of substances , than a collection of those sensible ideas we obobserve in them . but the internal constitution whereon their properties depend , is utterly unknown to us . this is evident when we come to examine but the stones we tread on , or the iron we daily handle : we soon find that we know not their make , and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in them ; and yet how infinitely these come short of the fine contrivances and unconceivable real essences of plants and animals , every one knows . the workmanship of the all-wise and powerful god in the great fabrick of the universe , and every part thereof farther exceeds the comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent man , than the best contrivance of the most ingenious man , doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational creatures . in vain therefore do we pretend to range things into sorts and dispose them into certain classes , under names by their real essences , that are so far from our discovery or comprehension . but thô the nominal essences of substances are made by the mind , they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes . to the making of any nominal essence , it is necessary . first , that the ideas whereof it consists , have such an union as to make but one idea , how compounded soever . secondly , that the particular ideas so united , be exactly the same , neither more or less : for if two abstract complex ideas differ , either in number or sorts of their component parts , they make two different , and not one and the same essence . in the first of these , the mind in making its complex ideas of substances , only follows nature , and puts none together which are not supposed to have an union in nature . for men observing certain qualities always joyned and existing together therein copy nature , and of ideas so united , make their complex ones of substances . secondly , thô the mind in making its complex ideas of substances , never puts any together that do not really , or are not supposed to co-exist : yet the number it combines depends upon the various care , industry or fancy of him that makes it . men generally content themselves with some few obvious qualities , and often leave out others as material and as firmly united as those that they take . in bodies organized and propagated by seeds , as vegetables and animals , the shape is that which to us is the leading quality and most characteristical part that determines the species : in most other bodies not propagated by seed , it is the colour we chiefly fix on , and are most led by . thus where we find the colour of gold , we are apt to imagine all the other qualities comprehended in our complex idea , to be there also . thô the nominal essences of substances are all supposed to be copied from nature ; yet they are all , or most of them very imperfect : and since the composition of those complex ideas is in several men very different , we may conclude that these boundaries of species are as men , and not as nature makes them ; if at least there are in nature any such prefixed bounds . it is true , that many particular substances are so made by nature , that they have an agreement and likeness one with another , and so afford a foundation of being ranked into sorts : but the sorting of things by us , being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms ; i cannot see how it can be properly said , that nature sets the boundaries of the species of things . but if it be so , our boundaries of species , are not exactly conformable to nature . if the first sorting of individuals depends on the mind of man , variously collecting the simple ideas , that make the nominal essence of the lowest species ; it is much more evident that the more comprehensive classes , called genera , do so . in forming more general ideas that may comprehend different sorts , the mind leaves out those qualities that distinguish them , and puts into its new collection only such ideas as are common to several sorts . thus by leaving out those qualities which are peculiar to , gold , silver , &c. and retaining a complex idea , made up of those that are common to each species , there is a new genus constituted , to which the name metal is annexed . so that in this whole business of genera and species , the genus or more comprehensive , is but a partial conception of what is in the species , and the species but a partial idea , of what is to be found in each individual . in all which there is no new thing made , but only more or less comprehensive signs , whereby we may be enabled to express in a few syllables great numbers of particular things , as they agree in more or less general conceptions , which we have framed to that purpose . if these abstract general idaeas be thought to be compleat , it can only be in respect of a certain established relation between them , and certain names , which are made use of to signify them , and not in respect of any thing existing as made by nature . this is adjusted to the true end of speech , which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our notions . this is the proper business of genus and species : and this men do without any consideration of real essences , and substantial forms , which come not within the reach of our knowledge , when we think of those things ; nor within the signification of our words , when we discourse with others . chap. vii . of particles . besides words which are the names of ideas in the mind , there are others made use of to signify the connexion that the mind gives to idaeas or propositions one with another , and to intimate some particular action of its own at that time relating to those ideas . this it does several ways : as is , is not , are marks of the mind affirming or denying : besides which , the mind does in declaring its sentiments to others connect not only the parts of propositions , but whole sentences one to another with their several relations , and dependencies to make a coherent discourse . the words signifying , that connexion the mind gives to several affirmations and negations , that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration , are called particles . and it is in the right use of these , that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good stile . to express the dependance of his thoughts and reasonings one upon another , a man must have words to shew what connexion , restriction , distinction , opposition , emphasis , &c. he gives to each respective part of his discourse . these cannot be understood rightly , without a clear view of the postures , stands , turns , limitations , exceptions and several other thoughts of the mind ; of these there are a great variety , much exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to express them by , for which reason it happens , that most of these particles have divers , and sometimes almost opposite significations . thus the particle but in english , has several very different significations , as , but to say no more : here it intimates a stop of the mind , in the course it was going , before it came to the end of it . i saw but two planets : here it shews that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed with a negation of all other ; you pray , but it is not that god would bring you to the true religion , but that he would confirm you in your own . the former of these intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be : the latter shews , that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before . all animals have sense , but a dog is an animal . here it signifies the connexion of the latter proposition with the former . to these ; divers other significations of this particle might be added , if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude . i intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs , the instances i have given in this one , may give occasion to reflect on their use and force in language , and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing , which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles , some whereof constantly , and others in certain constructions , have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them . chap. viii . of abstract and concrete terms . the mind as has been shewn , has a power to abstract its idea , whereby the sorts of things are distinguished : now each abstract idaea being distinct , so that the one can never be the other , the mind will by its intuitive knowledge perceive their difference ; and therefore in propositions , no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another : nor does the common use of language permit that any two abstract words or names of abstract ideas , should be affirmed one of another . all our affirmations are only in concrete , which is the affirming one abstract idea to be joyned to another : which abstract ideas in substances , may be of any sort , thô the most of them are of powers : in all the rest these are little else but relations . all our simple ideas have abstract as well as concrete names , as whitness white , sweetness sweet , &c. the like also holds in our ideas of modes and relations , as justice just , equality equal , &c. but as to our ideas of substances , we have very few abstract names at all . those few that the schools have forged , as animalitas , humanitas , &c. hold no proportion with the infinite number of names of substances , and could never get admittance into common use , or obtain the licence of publick approbation , which seems to intimate the confession of all mankind , that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances , since they have not names for such ideas . it was only the doctrine of substantial forms and the confidence of mistaken pretenders to a knowledge they had not , which first coin'd , and then introduced animalitas , humanitas , and the like : which yet went very little farther than their own schools , and could never get to be current amongst understanding men. chap. ix . of the imperfection of words . to examine the perfection or imperfection of words , it is necessary to consider their use , and end : which is twofold , first , to record our own thoughts ; secondly , to communicate our thoughts to others : the first is for the help of our own memories , whereby we do as it were talk to our selves : for this purpose any words may serve turn : words being arbitrary signs , we may use which we please for this purpose ; and there will be no imperfection in them , if we constantly use the same sign for the same idea . secondly , as to communication by words ; that too has a double use : first , their civil use , which is such a communication of thoughts and ideas by words , as may serve in common conversation and commerce , about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life . secondly , the philosophical use of words , by which i mean such an use of them , as may serve to convey the precise notions of things , and to express certain truths in general propositions , these two uses are very distinct , and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one , than in the other . the end of language in communication is to be understood ; that is , to excite by sounds in the hearer , the same idea which they stand for in the mind of the speaker . the doubtfulness and uncertainty of their signification , which is the imperfection we are here speaking of has its cause more in the ideas themselves than in any incapacity in the sounds to signifie them ; for in that regard they are all equally perfect . that then which makes the difference , is the difference of ideas they stand for , which must be learned and retained by those , who would discourse together intelligibly . now this is difficult in these cases . first , where the ideas they stand for are very complex : hence the names of mixed modes are liable to great uncertainty and obscurity in their signification . for here the idea being made up of many parts , it is not easy to form and retain it exactly ; of this sort chiefly are moral words , which have seldom in two different men , the same precise signification . secondly , where the ideas they stand for , have no certain connexion in nature , and therefore no settled standard to rectifie and adjust them by . this again is the case of the names of mixed modes , which are assemblages of ideas put together at pleasure . common use indeed regulates the meaning of words pretty well for common conversation : but it is not sufficient to adjust them to philosophical discourses ; there being scarce a name of any very complex idea , which in common use has not a great latitude ; and is not made the sign of far different ideas . the way of learning these names does not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification . for we may observe that children are taught the names of simple ideas , and substances , by having the things shewn them ; and then they repeat the name that stands for it ; as white , sweet , milk , sugar , ctc. but in mixed modes the sounds are learned first , and men are to learn afterwards their signification , by their own observation and industry , or the explication of others : which is the reason that these words are little more than bare sounds in the minds of most , because few are at the pains to settle their ideas , and notions precisely ; and those which are , make them the signs of ideas , different from what others understand by them , which is the occasion of most disputes . thirdly , where the signification of a word is referred to a standard which is not easily known : this is the case of the names of substances , which being supposed to stand for their real essences must needs be of uncertain application , because these essences are utterly unknown ; and it will be impossible to know what is , or is not antimony , v. g. when that word is to stand for the real essence of it ; whereof we have no idea at all . or suppose these names only stand for simple ideas , found to co-exist in substances , yet thus they will be liable to great uncerainty too : because these simple ideas being very numerous , men frame different ideas os the same subjects , by putting different ideas into their complex one , of such substances . several men observe several properties in the same substance , and none of them all ; who having but imperfect descriptions of things , can have but uncertain significations of words . fourthly , where the signification of the word , and the real essence of the thing , are not the same . which is still the case of substances ; from hence we may observe . first , that the names of simple ideas are least liable to mistakes : first , because the ideas they stand for , being each but one single perception , are easier got , and more clearly retained , than the more complex ones of substances and mixed modes . secondly , because they are not referr'd to any other essence , but barely that perception they immediately signify . secondly , names of simple modes are next to simple ideas least liable to doubt or uncertainty , especially those of figure and number , of which men have so clear and distinct ideas . thirdly , in mixed modes , when they are composed of a few and obvious ideas , their names are clear and distinct enough ; otherwise doubtful and uncertain . fourthly , the names of substances being annexed to ideas , that are neither the real essences , nor exact representations of things , are liable yet to greater imperfection , when we come to a philosophical use of them . chap x. of the abuse of words . beside the natural and unavoidable imperfections of languages , there are wilful faults and neglects , which men are often guilty of in their use of words . for , first , they use words without clear and distinct ideas , or , which is worse , signs without any thing signified ; such are for the most part introduced by sects of philosopy and religion , either out of an affectation of singularity , or to support some strange opinion ; or to cover the weakness of their hypothesis . these are commonly such as had no determinate collection of ideas annexed to them , when they were first invented ; or at least such , as if well examined , will be found inconsistent , and therefore may justly be called insignificant terms : instances of this kind may easily be had from the school-men and metaphysicians . others learn words which the propriety of language has affixed to very important ideas , and often upon occasion use them without any distinct meaning at all : whence their notions being unsteady and confused , their discourse must be filled with empty unintelligible noise and jargon , especially in moral matters where the words stand for arbitrary , and numerous collections of ideas , not regularly and permanently united in nature . secondly , another abuse is inconstancy in the use of words ; it is hard to find a discourse on any subject wherein the same words are not used sometimes for one collection of ideas , sometimes for another . the wilful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great folly , or greater dishonesty : and a man in his accompts with another , may with as much fairness make the characters of numbers , stand sometimes for one , and sometimes for another collection of unites ; as in his discourse , or reasoning , make the same words stand for different collections of simple ideas . thirdly , another is an affected obscurity , either by using old words in new significations , or by introducing new and ambiguous terms , without defining them , or putting them together , so as to confound their ordinary meaning . thô the peripatetick philosophy has been most eminent in this way , yet other sects have not been wholly clear of it . the admired art of disputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages , whilst it has been made use of , and fitted to perplex the signification of words , more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things : and he that will look into that sort of learned writings , will find the words there much more obscure , uncertain , and undetermined in their meaning , than they are in ordinary conversation . fourthly , another is the taking words for things : this , thô it in some degree concerns all names in general ; yet more particularly affects those of substances . thus in the peripatetick philosophy , substantial forms , abhorrence of vacuum , &c. are taken for something real . to this abuse those men are most subject , who confine their thoughts to any one system ; and give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis ; whereby they come to be perswaded , that the terms of that sect , are so suited to the nature of things , that they perfectly correspond with their real existence . fifthly , another is the setting them in the place of things , which they can by no means signify . we may observe that in the general names of substances , whereof the nominal essences are only known to us , when we affirm or deny any thing about them , we do most commonly tacitly suppose or intend they should stand for the real essence of a certain sort of substances . thus when a man says , gold is malleable , he would insinuate something more than this , what i call gold is malleable , ( thô truly it amounts to no more ) namely , that what has the real essence of gold is malleable , that is , that malleableness depends on , and is inseparable from the real essence of gold. but a man not knowing wherein that real essence consists the connexion in his mind of malleableness , is not truly with an essence he knows not , but with the sound gold he puts for it . it is true , the names of substances would be much more useful ; and propositions exprest by them much more certain , were the real essences of substances the ideas in our minds , which those words signified . and it is for want of those real essences that our words convey so little knowledge , or certainty in our discourses about them . but to suppose these names to stand for a thing , having the real essence on which the properties depend , is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words , that by a plain abuse it adds to it ; when we would make them stand for something , which not being in our complex ideas , the name we use can no way be the sign of it . in mixed modes , any idea of the complex one being left out , or changed , it is allowed to be another thing , that is , to be of another species , as is plain in chance-medley , man-slaughter , murder , &c. because the complex idea signified by that name , is the real as well as nominal essence ; and there is no secret reference of that name to any other essence , but that . but in substances it is not so ; for thô in that called gold , one puts in his complex idea , what another leaves out , and vice versâ , yet men do not usually think the species changed , because they refer the name in their minds to a real immutable essence of a thing existing , on which those properties depend : but this reference of the name to a thing we have not the idea of , is so far from helping us at all , that it only serves the more to involve us in difficulties . this reference is grounded on this supposition , namely , that the same precise internal constitution goes always with the same specifick name : in which are contained these two false suppositions . first , that there are certain precise essences , according to which , nature makes all particular things ; and by which they are distinguished into species . secondly , this tacitly insinuates as if we had ideas of these essences ; for why do we enquire , whether this or that thing have the real essence of that species man for instance , if we did not suppose it known , which yet is utterly false ; and therefore such applications of names as would make them stand for ideas we have not , must needs cause great disorder in discourse and reasonings about them ; and be a great inconvenience in our communication by words . sixthly , another more general , thô less observed , abuse of words , is , that men having by long and familiar use , annexed to them certain ideas , they are apt to imagine so near and necessary a connexion , between the names , and the significations they use them in , that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is ; as if it were past doubt , that in the use of these common received sounds , the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise ideas . and so likewise taking the words of others , as naturally standing for just , what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to , they never trouble themselves to explain their own , or understand anothers meaning : from whence commonly proceeds noise , and wrangling without improvement or information ; whilst men take words to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions , which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own ideas . thus life is a term , none more familiar : any one almost would take it for an affront , to be asked what he meant by it , and yet if it comes in question , whether such a thing has life , or not , it is easy to perceive , that a clear distinct settled idea , does not always accompany the use of so known a word . seventhly , figurative speech is also an abuse of language : for thô in discourses , where we seek rather pleasure and delight , than information and improvement , such ornaments as are borrowed from figurative speeches and allusions , can scarce pass for faults ; yet if we would speak of things as they are , we must allow , that all the art of rhetorick , besides order and clearness , all the artificial and figurative application of words , eloquence hath invented , are for nothing else , but to insinuate wrong ideas , move the passions , and thereby mislead the judgment , and so indeed are perfect cheat. and therefore however allowable , they may be in harangues and popular addresses ; they are certainly in all discourses that pretend to inform and instruct , wholly to be avoided ; and where truth and knowledge are concerned , cannot but be thought a great fault , either of the language or person that makes use of them . to conclude this consideration , the ends of language , in our discourse with others , are chiefly these three . first , to make our thoughts or ideas known to another ; this we fail in first , when we use names without clear and distinct ideas in our minds . secondly , when we apply received names to ideas , to which the common use of that language does not apply them . thirdly , when we apply them unsteadily , making them stand now for one , and by and by for another idea . secondly , to make known our thoughts with as much ease and quickness as is possible . this men fail in when they have complex ideas , without having distinct names for them , which may happen , either through the defect of a language , which has none , or the fault of that man who has not yet learned them . thirdly , to convey the knowledge of things : this cannot be done , but when our ideas agree to the reality of things . he that hath names without ideas , wants meaning in his words , and speaks only empty sounds : he that hath complex ideas , without names for them , wants dispatch in his expression . he that uses his words loosely and unsteadily , will either not be minded , or not understood . he that applies his names to ideas , different from their common use , wants propriety in his language , and speaks gibberish . and he that hath ideas of substances , disagreeing with the real existence of things , so far wants the materials of true knowledge in his understanding , and has instead thereof , chimaeras . language being the great conduit whereby men convey their discoveries , reasonings , and knowledge from one to another , he that makes an ill use of it , thô he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge which are in things themselves ; yet he does as much as in him lies , break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to the publick use , and advantage of mankind . he that uses words without any clear and steady meaning , what does he but lead himself and others into errors ? and he that designedly does it , ought to be looked on , as an enemy to truth and knowledge . if we look into books of controversy of any kind , we shall see that the effect of obscure , unsteady , and aequivocal terms , is nothing but noise and wrangling about sounds , without convincing or bettering a man's understanding . for if the idea be not agreed on between speaker and hearer , for which the words stand , the argument is not about things but names . it deserves to be considered , and carefully examined , whether the greatest part of the disputes in the world , are not meerly verbal , and about the signification of words ; and that , if the terms they are made in were defined and reduced in their significations , to the single ideas they stand for , those disputes would not end of themselves , and immediately vanish . chap. xi . of the remedies of the foregoing imperfections and abuses . to remedy the defects of speech above-mentioned , the following rules may be of use . first , a man should take care to use no word without a signification , no name without an idea for which he makes it stand . this rule will not seem needless to any one , who will take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such words , as instinct , sympathy , antipathy . &c. so made use of , as he might easily conclude , that those that used them , had no ideas in their minds , to which they applied them . secondly , those ideas , he annexes them to , should be clear and distinct , which in complex ideas is by knowing the particular ones , that make that composition ; of which , if any one be again complex , we must know also the precise collection that is united in each , and so till we come to simple ones . in substances the ideas must not only be distinct , but also conformable to things as they exist . thirdly , he must apply his words as near as may be to such ideas , as common use has annexed them to ; for words , especially of languages already framed , are no man's private possession , but the common measure of commerce and communication ; and therefore it is not for any one to change the stamp they are current in , nor alter the ideas they are affixed to ; or at least , when there is a necessity to do so , he is bound to give notice of it . and therefore , fourthly , when common use has left the signification of a word uncertain , and loose , or where it is to be used in a peculiar sense ; or where the term is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake , there it ought to be defined , and its signification ascertained . words standing for simple ideas being not defineable , their signification must be shewn either , first , by a synonymous word . secondly , by naming a subject , wherein that simple idea is to be found . thirdly , by presenting to the senses that subject , which may produce it in the mind , and make him actually have the idea that word stands for . mixed modes may be perfectly defined , by exactly enumerating those ideas that go to each composition . this ought more especially to be done in mixed modes belonging to morality : since definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known ; and yet a way whereby their precise meaning may be known certainly , and without leaving any room for any contest about it . for the explaining the signification of the names of substances , both the forementioned ways , viz. of shewing , and defining are requisite in many cases to be made use of ; their names are best defined by their leading qualities , which are mostly shape in animals , and vegetables : and colour in inanimate bodies ; and in some , both together . now these leading qualities are best made known by shewing , and can hardly be made known otherwise . the shape of a horse or cassowary will be but imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words : the sight of the animals doth it much better . and the idea of the particular colour of gold is not to be got by any description of it , but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about it . the like may be be said of those other simple ideas , peculiar in their kind to any substance , for which precise ideas there are no peculiar names . but because many of the simple ideas , which make up our specifick ideas of substances , are powers which lie not obvious to our sense in the things , as they ordinarily appear ; therefore in the signification of our names of substances , some part of the signification will be better made known , by enumerating those simple ideas , than in shewing the substance it self . for he that to the yellow shining colour of gold , got by sight , shall from my enumerating them have the ideas of great ductibility , fusibility , fixedness , and solubility in aqua regia will have a perfecter idea of gold , than he can have by seeing a piece of gold , and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious qualities . it were to be wished that words standing for things , which are known and distinguished by their outward shapes should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them . a vocabulary made after this fashion , would perhaps with more ease , and in less time teach the true signification of many terms , especially in languages of remote countreys , or ages ; and settle truer ideas in mens minds of several things , whereof we read the names in ancient authors , than all the large and laborious comments of learned criticks . naturalists that treat of plants and animals , have found the benefit of this way : and he that consults them will find that he has a clearer idea of apium and ibex from a little print , of that herb or beast , than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them : and so no doubt he would have of strigil , and sistrum , if instead of a curry-comb or cymbal , which are the english names dictionaries render them by , he could see stamped in the margin small pictures of these instruments , as they were in use amongst the ancients . fifthly , the last rule that i shall mention is , that in all discourses wherein one man pretends to instruct or convince another , he should use the same word , constantly in the same sense ; if this were done ( which no body can refuse , without great disingenuity ) many of the books extant might be spared ; many of the controversies in dispute , would be at an end ; several of those great volumes swollen with ambiguous words , now used in one sense , and by and by in another , would shrink into a very narrow compass : and many of the philosophers ( to mention no other ) as well as poets works , might be contained in a nutshell . book iv. chap. i. of knowledge in general . since the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings , has no other immediate object but its own ideas , which alone it does or can contemplate ; it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them . knowledge then seems to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement , or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas : where this perception is , there is knowledge ; and where it is not , there thô we fancy , guess , or believe , yet we always come short of knowledge . when we know that white is not black , what do we but perceive that these two ideas do not agree ? or that the three angles of a triangle , are equal to two rightones ; what do we more but perceive that equality to two right ones , does necessarily agree to , and is inseparable from the three angles of a triangle ? but to understand a little more distinctly , wherein this agreement or disagreement consists ; we may reduce it all to these four sorts ; first , identity or diversity ; secondly , relation ; thirdly , co-existence ; fourthly , real existence . 1. identity or diversity ; 't is the first act of the mind , to perceive its ideas ; and so far as it perceives them , to know each what it is , and thereby to perceive their difference , that is , the one not to be the other : by this the mind clearly perceives each idea to agree with it self , and to be what it is ; and all distinct ideas to disagree . this it does without any pains or deduction , by its natural power of perception and distinction . this is what men of art have reduced to those general rules , viz. what is is . and it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be . but no maxime can make a man know it clearer , that round is not square , than the bare perception of those two ideas , which the mind at first sight perceives to disagree . 2. the next sort of agreement or disagreement the mind perceives in any of its ideas may be called relative , and is nothing but the perception of the relation , between any two ideas of what kind soever : that is , their agreement or disagreement one with another in several ways the mind takes of comparing them . 3. the third sort of agreement or disagreement to be found in our ideas , is co-existence or non-coexistence in the same subject ; and this belongs particularly to substances . thus when we pronounce concerning gold , that it is fixed , it amounts to no more but this , that fixedness , or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed , is an idea that always accompanies that particular sort of yellowness , weight , fusibility , &c. which make our complex idea , signified by the word gold. 4. the fourth sort is that of actual and real existence agreeing to any idea . within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement , i suppose is contained all the knowledge we have , or are capable of . for all that we know or can affirm concerning any idea , is , that it is , or is not the same with some other : as that blue is not yellow . that it does , or does not co-exist with another in the same subject : as that iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions ; that it has that or this relation to some other ideas : as that two triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal : or that it has a real existence without the mind : as , that god is . there are several ways wherein the mind is possess'd of truth , each of which is called knowledge . first , there is actual knowledge , when the mind has a present view of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas , or of the relation they have one with another . secondly , a man is said to know any proposition , when having once evidently perceived the agreement or disagreement of the ideas , whereof it consists , and so lodged it in his memory , that whenever it comes to be reflected on again , the mind assents to it without doubt or hesitation , and is certain of the truth of it . and this may be called habitual knowledge : and thus a man may be said to know all those truths which are lodged in his memory , by a foregoing clear , and full perception . of this there are vulgarly speaking two degrees . the one is of such truths laid up in the memory , as whenever they occur to the mind , it actually perceives the relation , that is between those ideas . and this is in all those truths , where the ideas themselves , by an immediate view , discover their agreement or disagreement one with another . the other is of such truths , whereof the mind having been convinced , it retains the memory of the conviction , without the proofs . thus a man that remembers certainly , that he once perceived the demonstration , that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones , is commonly allowed to know it , because he cannot doubt of the truth of it . but yet having forgot the demonstration , he rather believes his memory , than knows the thing ; or rather it is something between opinion and knowledge : a sort of assurance , that exceeds bare belief , which relies on the testimony of another ; and yet comes short of perfect knowledge . chap. ii. of the degrees of our knowledge . all our knowlede consisting in the view the mind has of its own ideas , which is the utmost light , and greatest certainty we are capable of ; the different clearness of our knowledge , seems to lye in the different way of perception , the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas . when the mind perceives this agreement or disagreement , of two ideas , immediately by themselves , without the intervention of any other ; we may call it intuitive knowledge , in which cases the mind perceives the truth , as the eye does light , only by being directed towards it ; of this sort are , that white is not black , that three are more than two , and equal to one and two. this part of knowledge is irresistible , and like the bright sun-shine , forces it self immediately to be perceived as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way . it is on this intuition , that depends all the certainty and evidence of our other knowledge ; which certainty every one finds to be so great , that he cannot imagine , and therefore not require a greater . the next degree of knowledge is , where the mind perceives not this agreement or disagreement immediately , or by the juxta-position as it were of the ideas , because those ideas , concerning whose agreement or disagreement the enquiry is made , cannot by the mind be so put together , as to shew it . in this case the mind is sain to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches , by the intervention of other ideas : and this is that which we call reasoning : and thus if we would know the agreement or disagreement in bigness , between the three angles of a triangle , and two right angles ; we cannot by an immediate view , and comparing them do it ; because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once , and be compared with any other one , or two angles . and so of this , the mind has no immediate or intuitive knowledge . in this case the mind is fain to find out some other angles , to which the three angles of a triangle have equality , and finding those equal to two right ones , comes to know the equality of these three angles to two right ones . those intervening ideas , which serve to shew the agreement of any two others , are called proofs and where the agreement or disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived , it is called demonstration . a quickness in the mind to find those proofs , and to apply them right , is , i suppose , that which is called sagacity . this knowledge , thô it be certain , is not so clear and evident as intuitive knowledge . it requires pains and attention , and steady application of mind , to discover the agreement or disagreement of the ideas it considers , and there must be a progression by steps and degrees , before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty . before demonstration there was a doubt , which in intuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind , that has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable of distinct ideas , no more than it can be a doubt to the eye ( that can distinctly see white and black ) whether this ink and paper be all of a colour . now in every step that reason makes in demonstrative knowledge ; there is an intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea which it uses as a proof ; for if it were not so , that yet would need a proof ; since without the perception of such agreement or disagreement . there is no knowledge produced . by which it is evident , that every step in reasoning , that produces knowledge , has intuitive certainty ; which when the mind perceives , there is no more required but to remember it , to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideas concerning which we enquire , visible and certain . this intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step and progression of the demonstration , must also be exactly carried in the mind ; and a man must be sure that no part is left out : which because in long deductions , the memory cannot easily retain ; this knowledge becomes more imperfect than intuitive ; and men often embrace falshoods , for demonstrations . it has been generally taken for granted , that mathematicks alone are capable of demonstrative certainty . but to have such an agreement or disagreement as may be intuitively perceived , being as i imagine not the priviledge of the ideas of number , extension and figure alone ; it may possibly be the want of due method and application in us , and not of sufficient evidence in things , that demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other parts of knowledge . for in whatever ideas the mind can perceive the agreement or disagreement immediately , there it is capable of intuitive knowledge : and where it can perceive the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas , by an intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement they have with any intermediate ideas , there the mind is capable of demonstration , which is not limited to the ideas of figure , number , extension , or their modes . the reason why it has been generally supposed to belong to them only , is because in comparing their equality or excess , the modes of numbers have every the least difference , very clear and perceivable : and in extension , thô every the least excess is not so perceptible , yet the mind has found out ways to discover the just equality of two angels , extensions or figures : and both , that is , numbers and figures can be set down by visible and lasting marks . but in other simple ideas , whose modes and differences are made and counted by degrees , and not quantity , we have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their differences , as to perceive , or find ways to measure their just equality , or the least differences . for those other simple ideas being appearances or sensations produced in us , by the size , figure , motion , &c. of minute corpuseles singly insensible ; their different degrees also depend on the variation of some , or all of those causes , which since it cannot be observed by us in particles of matter , whereof each is too subtile to be perceived , it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simple ideas . thus for instance , not knowing what number of particles , nor what motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of whiteness ; we cannot demonstrate the certain equality of any two degrees of whiteness , because we have no certain standard to measure them by , nor means to distinguish every the least difference : the only help we have being from our senses , which in this point fail us . but where the difference is so great as to produce in the mind ideas clearly distinct ; there ideas of colours , as we see in different kinds , blue and red ( for instance ) are as capable of demonstration , as ideas of number and extension . what is here said of colours , i think holds true in all secondary qualities . these two then , intuition and demonstration , are the degrees of our knowledge , whatever comes short of one of these , is but faith or opinion , not knowledge , at least in all general truths . there is indeed another perception of the mind employed about the particular existence of finite beings , without us , which going beyond probability , but not reaching to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty , passes under the name of knowledge . nothing can be more certain , than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds : this is intuitive knowledge ; but whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us , corresponding to that idea , is that whereof some men think there may be a question made , because men may have such an idea in their minds , when no such thing exists , no such object affects their senses . but 't is evident that we are invincibly conscious to our selves of a different perception , when we look upon the sun in the day , and think on it by night ; when we actually taste wormwood , or smell a rose , or only think on that savour or odour : so that i think we may add to the two former sorts of knowledge , this also of the existence of particular external objects , by that perception and consciousness we have , of the actual entrance of ideas from them , and allow these three degrees of knowledge , viz. intuitive , demonstrative , and sensitive , but since our knowledge is founded on , and employed about our ideas only : will it follow thence that it must be con●ormable to our ideas , and that where our ideas are clear and distinct , obscure and confused , there our knowledge will be so too ? i answer , no : for our knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas ; its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity of that perception , and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas themselves . a man ( for instance ) that has a clear idea of the angles of a triangle , and of equality to two right ones , may yet have but an obscure perception of their agreement ; and so have but a very obscure knowledge of it . but obscure and confused ideas can never produce any clear or distinct knowledge : because , as far as any ideas are obscure or confused , so far the mind can never perceive clearly , whether they agree or disagree . chap. iii. of the extent of humane knowledge . from what has been said concerning knowledge , it follows that , first , we can have no knowledge farther than we have ideas . secondly , that we have no knowledge farther than we can have perception of that agreement or disagreement of our ideas , either by intuition , demonstration , or sensation . thirdly , we cannot have an intuitive knowledge that shall extend it self to all our ideas , and all that we would know about them ; because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another , by juxta-position , or an immediate comparison one with another . thus we cannot intuitively perceive the equality of two extensions , the difference of whose figures makes their parts uncapable of an exact and immediate application . fourthly , our rational knowledge can not reach to the whole extent of our ideas ; because between two different ideas we would examine , we cannot always find such proofs , as we can connect one to another , with an intuitive knowledge in all the parts of the deduction . fifthly , sensitive knowledge reaching no farther than the existence of things actually present to our senses , is yet much narrower than either of the former . sixthly , from all which it is evident , that the extent of our knowledge , comes not only short of the reality of things , but even of the extent of our own ideas . we have the ideas of a square , a circle and equality , and yet perhaps shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square . the affirmations or negations we make concerning the ideas we have , being reduced to the four sorts above-mentioned , viz. identity , co-existence , relation , and real existence ; i shall examine how far our knowledge extends in each of these . first , as to identity and diversity , our intuitive knowledge is as far extended as our ideas themselves ; and there can be no idea in the mind , which it does not presently by an intuitive knowledge , perceive to be what it is , and to be different from any other . secondly , as to the agreement or disagreement of our ideas in co-existence : in this our knowledge is very short , thô in this consists the greatest and most material part of our knowledge , concerning substances : for our ideas of substances being as i have shewed , nothing but certain collections of simple ideas , co-existing in one subject , ( our idea of flame for instance , is a body hot , luminous and moving upward . ) when we would know any thing farther concerning this or any other sort of substance , what do we but enquire what other qualities or powers these substances have or have not ? which is nothing else but to know , what other simple ideas do , or do not co-exist with those that make up that complex idea . the reason of this is , because the simple ideas which make up our complex ideas of substances , have no visible necessary connexion or inconsistence with other simple ideas , whose co-existence with them we would inform our selves about . these ideas being likewise for the most part secundary qualities , which depend upon the primary qualities of their minute or insensible parts , or on something yet more remote from our comprehension ; it is impossible we should know which have a necessary union , or inconsistency one with another , since we know not the root from whence they spring , or the size , figure , and texture of parts on which they depend , and from which they result . besides this , there is no discoverable connexion between any secundary qualitie , and those primary qualities that it depends on . we are so far from knowing what figure , size or motion produces , ( for instance ) a yellow colour , or sweet taste , or a sharp sound , that we can by no means conceive how any size , figure , or motion can possibly produce in us the idea of any colour , taste or sound whatsoever ; and there is no conceivable connexion between the one and the other . our knowledge therefore of co-existence reaches little farther than experience . some few indeed of the primary qualities have a necessary dependance , and visible connexion one with another : as figure necessarily supposes extension : receiving or communicating motion by impulse , supposes solidity . but qualities co-existent in any subject , without this dependance and connexion , cannot certainly be known to co-exist any farther , than experience by our senses informs us . thus , thô upon trial we find gold yellow , weighty , malleable , fusible and fixed , yet because none of these have any evident dependance , or necessary connexion with the other ; we cannot certainly know , that where any four of these are , the fifth will be there also , how highly probable soever it may be : but the highest degree of probability , amounts not to certainty ; without which there can be no true knowledge : for this co-existence can be no farther known , then it is perceived ; and it cannot be perceived , but either in particular subjects , by the observation of our senses ; or in general , by the necessary connexion of the ideas themselves . as to incompatibility , or repugnancy to co-existence , we may know that any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities , but one particular at once . one extension , one figure ; and so of sensible ideas peculiar to each sense : for whatever of each kind , is present in any subject , excludes all other of that sort ; for instance , one subject cannot have two smells , or two colours at the same time . as to powers of substances , which makes a great part of our enquiries about them , and is no inconsiderable branch of our knowledge : our knowledge as to these reaches little farther than experience ; because they consist in a texture and motion of parts , which we cannot by any means come to discover ; and i doubt whether with those faculties we have , we shall ever be able to carry our general knowledge much farther in this part . experience is that which in this part we must depend on ; and it were to be wished that it were improved : we find the advantages some mens generous pains , have this way brought to the stock of natural knowledge . and if others , especially the philosophers by fire who pretend to it , had been so wary in their observations , and sincere in their reports , as those who call themselves philosophers ought to have been : our acquaintance with the bodies here about us , and our insight into their powers and operations had been yet much greater . as to the third sort the agreement or disagreement of our ideas in any other relation : this is the largest field of knowledge , and it is hard to determine how far it may extend . this part depending on our sagacity in finding intermediate ideas , that may shew the habitudes and relations of ideas ; it is an hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such discoveries . they that are ignorant of algebra , cannot imagine the wonders in this kind , are to be done by it : and what farther improvements and helps , advantageous to other parts of knowledge , the sagacious mind of man may yet find out , it is not easy to determine . this at least i believe that the ideas of quantity , are not those alone that are capable of demonstration and knowledge : and that other , and perhaps more useful parts of contemplation , would afford us certainty , if vices , passions , and domineering interests , did not oppose or menace endeavours of this kind . the idea of a supream being , infinite in power , goodness , and wisdom , whose workmanship we are , and on whom we depend ; and the idea of our selves , as understanding rational creatures , would i suppose , if duly considered , afford such foundations of our duty , and rules of action , as might place morality among the sciences capable of demonstration : wherein i doubt not but from principles as incontestable as those of the mathematicks , by necessary consequences , the measure of right and wrong might be made out , to any one that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one , as he does to the other of these sciences . the relations of other modes may certainly be perceived as well as those of number , and extension . where there is no property , there is no injustice , is a proposition as certain as any demonstration in euclid : for the idea of property , being a right to any thing ; and the idea of injustice , being the invasion or violation of that right : it is evident that these ideas being thus established , and these names annexed to them , i can as certainly know this proposition to be true , as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones . again , no government allows absolute liberty . the idea of government being the establishment of society upon certain rules or laws , which require conformity to them ; and the idea of absolute liberty , being for any one to do whatever he pleases , i am as capable of being certain of the truth of this proposition , as of any in mathematicks . what has given the advantage to the ideas of quantity , and made them thought more capable of certainty and demonstration , is , first , that they can be represented by sensible marks , which have a nearer correspondence with them , than any words or sounds . diagrams drawn on paper , are copies of the ideas , and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their signification . but we have no sensible marks that resemble our moral ideas , and nothing but words to express them by ; which thô , when written , they remain the same ; yet the ideas they stand for , may change in the same man ; and it is very seldom that they are not different in different persons . secondly , moral ideas are commonly more complex than figures : whence these two inconveniencies follow : first , that their names are of more uncertain signification ; the precise collection of simple ideas they stand for , not being so easily agreed on , and so the sign that is used for them in communication always , and in thinking often , does not steadily carry with it the same idea . secondly , the mind cannot easily retain those precise combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary ; in the examination of the habitudes and correspondencies , agreements or disagreements of several of them one with another , especially where it is to be judged of by long deductions , and the intervention of several other complex ideas , to shew the agreement ' or disagreement of two remote ones . one part of these disadvantages in moral ideas , which has made them be thought not capable of demonstration , may in a good measure be remedied by definitions , setting down that collection of simple ideas which every term shall stand for , and then using the terms steadily and constantly for that precise collection . as to the fourth sort of knowledge , viz. of the real actual existence of things , we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence : a demonstrative knowledge , of the existence of god ; and a sensitive knowledge of the objects that present themselves to our senses . from what has been said we may discover the causes of our ignorance , which are chiefly these three ; first , want of ideas ; secondly , want of a discoverable connexion between the ideas we have . thirdly , want of tracing and examining our ideas . first , there are some things we are ignorant of for want of ideas . all the simple ideas we have , are confined to the observation of our senses , and the operations of our own minds , that we are conscious of in our selves . what other ideas it is possible other creatures may have , by the assistance of other senses and faculties more or perfecter than we have , or different from ours , it is not for us to determine ; but to say or think , there are no such , because we conceive nothing of them , is no better an argument , than if a blind man should be positive in it , that there was no such thing as sight and colours , because he had no manner of idea of any such thing . what faculties therefore other species of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of things , we know not . this we know , and certainly find , that we want other views of them , besides those we have to make discoveries of them more perfect . the intellectual and sensible world are in this perfectly alike , that the parts which we see of either of them , hold no proportion with that we see not , and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes , or our thoughts of either of them , is but a point , almost nothing , in comparison of the rest . another great cause of ignorance , is the want of ideas that we are capable of . this keeps us in ignorance of things we conceive capable of being known . bulk , figure and motion we have ideas of : yet not knowing what is the particular bulk , motion and figure of the greatest part of the bodies of the universe , we are ignorant of the several powers , efficacies , and ways of operation , whereby the effects we daily see , are produced . these are hid from us in some things , by being too remote , in others by being too minute . when we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the world , and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our ken , is but a small part of the immense universe ; we shall then discover an huge abyss of ignorance . what are the particular fabricks of the great masses of matter , which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal beings , how far they are extended , and what is their motion , and how continued , and what influence they have upon one another , are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts lose themselves in . if we confine our thoughts to this little canton , i mean this system of our sun , and the grosser masses of matter that visibly move about it ; what several sorts of vegetables , animals , and intellectual corporeal beings , infinitely different from those of our little spot of earth , may probably be in other planets , to the knowledge of which , even of their outward figures , and parts , we can no way attain , whilst we are confined to this earth , there being no natural means , either by sensation or reflection , to convey their certain ideas into our minds ? there are other bodies in the universe , no less concealed from us by their minuteness . these insensible corpuscles being the active parts of matter , and the great instruments of nature , on which depend all their secundary qualities and operations , our want of precise distinct ideas , and their primary qualities , keeps us in incurable ignorance of what we desire to know about them . did we know the mechanical affections of rhubarb or opium , we might as easily account for their operations of purging and causing sleep , as a watch-maker can for the motions of his watch. the dissolving of silver in aqua fortis , or gold in aqua regia , and not vice versâ , would be then perhaps no more difficult to know , than it is to a smith , to understand why the turning of one key , will open a lock , and not the turning of another . but whilst we are destitute of senses , acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies , and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections , we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and operations ; nor can we be assured about them any farther , than some few trials we make , are able to reach : but whether they will succeed again another time , we cannot be certain . this hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies : and our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact. and therefore i am apt to doubt , that how far soever humane industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things , yet scientifical will still be out of our reach ; because we want perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us , and most under our command . this at first sight shews us how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent , even of material beings : to which , if we add the consideration of that infinite number of spirits that may be , and probably are , which are yet more remote from our knowledge , whereof we have no cognizance : we shall find this cause of ignorance , conceal from us in an impenetrable obscurity , almost the whole intellectual world : a greater certainly , and more beautiful world than the material . for bating some very few ideas of spirit , we get from our own mind by reflection , and from thence the best we can collect , of the father of all spirits , the author of them , and us , and all things : we have no certain information , so much as of the existence of other spirits but by revelation : much less have we distinct ideas of their different natures , states , powers , and several constitutions , wherein they agree or differ one from another , and from us . and therefore in what concerns their different species , and properties , we are under an absolute ignorance . the second cause of ignorance is the want of discoverable connexion between those ideas we have ; where we want that , we are utterly incapable of universal and certain knowledge ; and are as in the former case , left only to observation and experiment . thus the mechanical affections of bodies , having no affinity at all with the ideas they produce in us ; we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our experience ; and can reason no otherwise about them , than as the effects or appointment of an infinitly wise agent , which perfectly surpass our comprehensions . the operation of our minds upon our bodies , is as unconceivable . how any thought should produce a motion in body , is as remote from the nature of our ideas , as how any body should produce any thought in the mind . that it is so , if experience did not convince us , the consideration of the things themselves , would never be able in the least to discover to us . in some of our ideas , there are certain relations , habitudes , and connexions , so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves , that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power whatsoever : in these only we are capable of certain and universal knowledge . thus the ideas of a right lined triangle , necessarily carries with it , an equality of its angles to two right ones . but the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter ; the production of sensation in us , of colours and sounds , &c. by impulse , and motion , being such wherein we can discover no natural connexion with any ideas we have , we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the wise architect . the things that we observe constantly to proceed regularly , we may conclude do act by a law set them ; but yet by a law that we know not ; whereby , thô causes work steadily , and effects constantly flow from them ; yet their connexions and dependencies being not discoverable in our ideas , we can have but an experimental knowledge of them . several effects come every day within the notice of our senses , of which we have so far sensitive knowledge . but the causes , manner and certainty of their production , we must for the foregoing reasons be content to be ignorant of . in these we can go no farther than particular experience informs us of matter of fact , and by analogy , guess what effects the like bodies are upon other tryals like to produce . but as to perfect science of natural bodies ( not to mention spiritual beings ) we are , i think , so far from being capable of any such thing , that i conclude it lost labour to seek after it . the third cause of ignorance is our want of tracing those ideas we have , or may have ; and finding out those intermediate ideas which may shew us what habitude of agreement or disagreement , they may have one with another : and thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths , for want of application in enquiring , examining , and by due ways comparing those ideas . hitherto we have examined the extent of our knowledge , in respect of the several sorts of beings that are . there is another extent of it , in respect of universality , which will also deserve to be considered ; and in this regard our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas . if the ideas are abstract , whose agreement or disagreement we perceive , our knowledge is universal . for what is known of such general ideas , will be true of every particular thing in which that essence , that is , that abstract idea is to be found : and what is once known of such ideas , will be perpetually , and for ever true . so that as to all general knowledge , we must search and find it only in our own minds : and it is only the examining of our own ideas , that furnishes us with the truths belonging to essences of things ( that is , to abstract ideas ) that are eternal , and are to be found out by the contemplation only of those essences ; as the existence of things is to be known only from experience . but i shall say more of this in the following chapters , where i shall speak of general , and rèal knowledge . chap. iv. of the reality of our knowledge . i doubt not but my reader by this time , may be apt to think that i have been all this while , only building a castle in the air : and be ready to object , if it be true , that all knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas , the visions of an enthusiast , and the reasonings of a sober man will be equally certain : it is no matter how things are , so a man observe but the agreement of his own imaginations , and talk conformably , it is all truth , all certainty , that an harpy is not a centaur , is by this way as certain knowledge , and as much truth , as that a square is not a circle . but of what use is all this knowledge of mens own imaginations , to a man that enquires after the reality of things ? to which i answer , that if our knowledge of our ideas should terminate in them , and reach no farther , where there is something farther intended ; our most serious thoughts would be of little more use , than the reveries of a crazy brain . but i hope before i have done , to make it evident , that this way of certainty by the knowledge of our own ideas , goes a little farther , than bare imagination : and that all the certainty of general truths a man has , lies in nothing else but this knowledge of our ideas . 't is evident that the mind knows not things immediately , but by the intervention of the ideas it has of them . our knowledge therefore is real , only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas , and the reality of things . but how shall we know when our ideas agree , with things themselves ? i answer , there be two sorts of ideas that , we may be assured agree with things : these are , first , simple ideas ; which since the mind can by no means make to it self , must be the effect of things operating upon the mind , in a natural way ; and producing therein those perceptions , which by the will of our maker , they are ordained and adapted to . hence it follows , that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies , but the natural and regular productions of things without us , really operating upon us ; which carry with them all the conformity our state requires , which is to represent things , under those appearances they are fitted to produce in us . thus the idea of whiteness , as it is in the mind , exactly answers that power which is in any body to produce it there . and this conformity between our simple ideas , and the existence of things , is sufficient for real knowledge . secondly , all our complex ideas , except those of substances , being archetypes , of the mind 's own making , and not referred to the existence of things as to their originals , cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge . for that which is not designed to represent any thing but it self , can never be capable of a wrong representation . here the ideas themselves are considered as archetypes , and things no otherwise regarded , than as they are conformable to them . thus the mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle or circle only , as they are ideas in his own mind , which possibly he never found existing mathematically , that is , precisely true : yet his knowledge is not only certain , but real ; because real things are no farther concern'd nor intended to be meant by any such propositions , than as things really agree to those archetypes in his mind . it is true of the idea of a triangle , that its three angles are equal to two right ones ; it is true also of a triangle , wherever it exists : what is true of those figures , that have barely an ideal existence in his mind , will hold true of them also , when they come to have a real existence in matter . hence it follows that moral knowledge , is as capable of real certainty as mathematicks . for certainty being nothing but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas , , and demonstration nothing , but the perception of such agreement by the intervention of other ideas ; our moral ideas as well as mathematical , being archetypes themselves , and so adequate or complete ideas all the agreement or disagreement we shall find in them , will produce real knowledge as well as in mathematical figures . that which is requisite to make our knowledge certain , is the clearness of our ideas ; and that which is required to make it real , is , that they answer their archetypes . but it will here be said , that if moral knowledge be placed in the contemplation of our own moral ideas ; and those be of our own making , what strange notions will there be of justice and temperance ? what confusion of vertues and vices , if every man may make what ideas of them he pleases ? i answer , no confusion , nor disorder at all , in the things themselves , nor the reasonings about them ; no more , than there would be a change in the properties of figures , and their relations one to another , if a man should make a triangle with four corners , or a trapezium with four right angles ; that is in plain english , change the names of the figures , and call that by one name , which is called ordinarily by another . the change of name will indeed at first disturb him , who knows not what idea , it stands for : but as soon as the figure is drawn , the consequences and demonstration are plain , and clear . just the same is it in moral knowledge : let a man have the idea of taking from others , without their consent , what they are justly possessed of , and call this justice , if he pleases : he that takes the name here , without the idea put to it , will be mistaken by joyning another idea of his own to that name ; but strip the idea of that name , or take it such as it is in the speakers mind ; and the same things will agree to it , as if you called it injustice . one thing we are to take notice of , that where god , or any other law-maker has defined any moral names , there they have made the essence of that species to which that name belongs : and there it is not safe to apply , or use them otherwise . but in other cases it is bare impropriety of speech , to apply them contrary to the common usage of the country they are used in . thirdly , but the complex ideas which we refer to archetypes without us , may differ from them , and so our knowledge about them may come short of being real : and thus are our ideas of substances . these must be taken from something , that does or has existed , and not be made up of ideas arbitrarily put together , without any real pattern . herein therefore is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances , that all our complex ideas of them must be such , and such only , as are made up of such simple ones , as have been discovered to co-exist in nature . wherever then we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas , there is certain knowledge ; and wherever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of things , there is certain real knowledge . chap v. of truth in general . truth in the proper import of the word , signifies the joyning or separating of signs ; as the things signified by them , do agree or disagree one with another . the joyning or separating of signs , is what we call propositions ; so that truth properly belongs only to propositions ; whereof there are two sorts , mental and verbal , as there are two sorts of signs commonly made use of , ideas and words . 't is difficult to treat of mental propositions without verbal : because in speaking of mental , we must make use of words , and then they become verbal . again , men commonly in their thoughts and reasonings , use words instead of ideas ; especially if the subject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas . if we have occasion to form mental propositions about white , black , circle , &c. we can , and often do , frame in our minds the ideas themselves , without reflecting on the names . but when we would consider , or make propositions about the more complex ideas , as of a man , vitriol , fortitude , glory , &c. we usually put the name for the idea ; because the idea these names stand for , being for the most part confused , imperfect , and undetermined ; we reflect on the names themselves , as being more clear , certain , and distinct , and readier to occur to our thoughts , than pure ideas : and so we make use of these words instead of the ideas themselves , even when we would meditate and reason within our selves , and make tacit mental propositions . we must then observe two sorts of propositions that we are capable of making . first , mental propositions , wherein the ideas in our understandings are put together , or separated by the mind , perceiving or judging of their agreement or disagreement . secondly , verbal propositions , which are words put together , or separated in affirmative or negative sentences : so that proposition consists , in joyning or separating signs : and truth consists , in putting together or separating these signs , according as the things they stand for , agree or disagree . truth as well as knowledge may well come under the distinction of verbal and real ; that being only verbal truth , wherein terms are joyned according to the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for , without regarding whether our ideas are such as really have or are capable of having an existence in nature . but then it is they contain real truth , when these signs are joyned , as our ideas agree ; and when our ideas are such as we know , are capable of having an existence in nature : which in substances we cannot know , but by knowing that such have existed . truth is the marking down in words , the agreement or disagreement of ideas , as it is . falshood is the marking down in words , the agreement or disagreement of ideas , otherwise than it is ; and so far as these ideas thus marked by sounds , agree to their archetypes , so far only is the truth real . the knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what ideas the words stand for , and the perception of the agreement or disagreement of those ideas , according as it is marked by those words . besides truth taken in the strict sense before-mentioned ; there are other sorts of truths , as first , moral truth , which is , speaking things according to the perswasion of our own minds . secondly , metaphysical truth , which is nothing but the real existence of things conformable to the ideas , to which we have annexed their names . these considerations of truth , either having been before taken notice of , or not being much to our present purpose ; it may suffice here only to have mentioned them . chap. vi. of universal propositions , their truth and certainty . the prevailing custom of using sounds , for ideas , even when men think and reason within their own breasts , makes the consideration of words and propositions so necessary a part of the treatise of knowledge , that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one , without explaining the other . and since general truths , which with reason are most sought after , can never be well made known , and are seldom apprehended , but as conceived and expressed in words ; it is not out of our way in the examination of our own knowledge to enquire into the truth and certainty of universal propositions . but it must be observed , that certainty is twofold , certainty of truth , and certainty of knowledge . certainty of truth is , when words are so put together in propositions , as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for ; as really it is . certainty of knowledge , is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas , as expressed in any propositions . this we usually call knowing , or being certain of the truth of any proposition . now because we cannot be certain of the truth of any general proposition , unless we know the precise bounds and extent of the species its terms stand for ; it is necessary we should know the essence of each species , which is that which constitutes and bounds it . this in all simple ideas , and modes is not hard to do : for in these the real and nominal essence be-being the same , there can be no doubt how far the species extends , or what things are comprehended under each term : which it is evident are all that have an exact conformity with the idea it stands for , and no other . but in substances , wherein a real essence , distinct from the nominal , is supposed to constitute , and bound the species , the extent of the general word is very uncertain ; because not knowing this real essence , we cannot know what is , or is not of that species , and consequently what may , or may not with certainty be affirmed of it . hence we may see that the names of substances , when made to stand for species , supposed to be constituted by real essences , which we know not , are not capable of conveying certainty to the understanding , of the truth of general propositions made up of such terms , we cannot be sure . for how can we besure that this or that quality is in gold , for instance , when we know not what is , or is not gold , that is , what has , or has not the real essence of gold , whereof we have no idea at all . on the other side , the names of substances when made use of for the complex ideas , men have in their minds ; thô they carry a clear and determinate signification with them , will not yet serve us to make many universal propositions , of whose truth we can be certain : because the simple ideas , out of which the complex are combined , carry not with them any discoverable connexion , or repugnancy , but with a very few other ideas . for instance , all gold is fixed , is a proposition we cannot be certain of how universally soever it be believed : for if we take the term gold , to stand for a real essence , it is evident we know not what particular substances are of that species , and so cannot with certainty affirm any thing universally of gold. but if we make the term gold stand for a species , determined by its nominal essence , be its complex idea what it will ; for instance , a body yellow , fusible , malleable , and very heavy ; no quality can with certainty be denyed or affirmed universally of it , but what has a discoverable connexion , or inconsistency with that nominal essence : fixedness , for instance , having no necessary connexion that we can discover with any simple idea that makes the complex one , or with the whole combination together : it is impossible that we should certainly know the truth of this proposition , all gold is fixed . but is not this an universal certain proposition , all gold is malleable ? i answer , it is so , if malleableness be a part of the complex idea , the word gold stands for : but then here is nothing affirmed of gold , but that , that sound stands for an idea , in which malleableness is contained . and such a sort of truth and certainty it is , to say , a centaur is four-footed . i imagine amongst all the secundary qualities of substances , and the powers relating to them , there cannot any two be named , whose necessary co-existence or repugnance to co-exist can be certainly known , unless in those of the same sense , which necessarily exclude one another . thus by the colour we cannot certainly know what smell , tast , &c. any body is of . 't is no wonder then that certainty is to be found but in very few general propositions concerning substances : our knowledge of their qualities and properties goes very seldom farther than our senses reach , or inform us . inquisitive and observing men may by strength of judgment , penetrate farther ; and on probabilities taken from wary observations , and hints well laid together , often guess right at what experience has not yet discovered to them : but this is but guessing still , it amounts only to opinion ; and has not that certainty , which is requisite to knowledge . to conclude , general propositions of what kind soever , are then only capable of certainty , when the terms used in them , stand for such ideas , whose agreement or disagreement , as there expressed , is capable to be discovered by us . and we are then certain of their truth or falshood , when we perceive the ideas they stand for , to agree or not agree , according as they are affirmed or denyed one of another ; whence we may take notice , that general certainty , is never to be found but in our ideas . chap. vii . of maxims . there are a sort of propositions , which under the name of maxims and axioms , have passed for principles of science : and because they are self-evident , have been supposed innate . it may be worth while to enquire into the reason of their evidence , and examine how far they influence our other knowledge . knowledge being but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by it self , without the intervention or help of any other , there our knowledge is self-evident : which being so , not only maxims , but an infinite number of other propositions partake equally with them in this self-evidence . for , in respect of identity and diversity , we may have as many self-evident propositions as we have distinct ideas . t is the first act of the mind , to know every one of its ideas by it self , and distinguish it from others . every one finds in himself , that he knows the ideas he has ; that he knows also when any one is in his understanding , and what it is ; and that when more than one are there , he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly , one from another ; so that all affirmations , or negations concerning them , are made without any possibility of doubt or uncertainty ; and must necessarily be assented to , as soon as understood : that is , as soon as we have in our minds the ideas clear and distinct , which the terms in the proposition stand for . thus a circle is a circle , blue is not red , are as self-evident propositions , as those general ones , what is , is , and 't is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be ; nor can the consideration of these axioms add any thing to the evidence , or certainty of our knowledge of them . as to the agreement or disagreement of co-existence , the mind has an immediate perception of this , but in very few . and therefore , in this sort we have very little intuitive knowledge : thô in some few propositions we have . two bodies cannot be in the same place i think is a self-evident proposition . the idea of fitting a place equal to the contents of its superficies , being annexed to our idea of body . as to the relations of modes , mathematicians have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality , as equals taken from equals , the remainder will be equal , &c. which however received for axioms , yet i think have not a clearer self-evidence than these , that one and one are equal to two , that if from the five fingers of one hand , you take two , and from the five fingers of the other hand two , the remaining numbers will be equal . these , and a thousand other such propositions may be found in numbers , which carry with them an equal , if not greater clearness , than those mathematical axioms . as to real existence , since that has no connexion with any other of our ideas , but that of our selves , and of a first being ; we have not so much as a demonstrative , much less a self-evident knowledge , concerning the real existence of other beings . in the next place let us consider what influence these maxims have upon the other parts of our knowledge . the rules established in the schools , that all reasonings are ex praecognitis & praeconceptis , seem to lay the foundation of all other knowledge in these maxims , and to suppose them to be praecognita ; whereby i think is meant two things : first , that these axioms are those truths that are first known to the mind : secondly , that upon them the other parts of our knowledge depend . first , that these axioms are not the truths first known to the mind , is evident from experience : for who knows not that a child perceives that a stranger is not its mother , long before he knows , that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be ? and how many truths are there about numbers , which the mind is perfectly acquainted with , and fully convinced of , before it ever thought on these general maxims ? of this the reason is plain ; for that which makes the mind assent to such propositions , being nothing but the perception it has of the agreement or disagreement of its ideas , according as it finds them affirmed or denied in words one of another ; and every idea being known to be what it is , and every two distinct ideas not to be the same , it must necessarily follow , that such self-evident truths must be first known , which consist of ideas , that are first in the mind ; and the ideas first in the mind , it is evident , are those of particular things ; from whence , by slow degrees the understanding proceeds to some few general ones , which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of sense , are settled in the mind , with general names to them . thus particular ideas are first received and distinguished , and so knowledge got about them , and next to them the less general or specifick , which are next to particular ones . secondly , from what has been said , it plainly follows , that these magnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other knowledge : for if there be a great many other truths , as self-evident as they , and a great many that we know before them , it is impossible that they should be the principles , from which we deduce all other truths . thus , that one and two are equal to three , is as evident , and easier known then that the whole is equal to all its parts . nor after the knowledge of this maxim , do we know that one and two are equal to three , better , or more certainly , than we did before . for if there be any odds in these ideas , the ideas of whole , and parts , are more obscure , or at least more difficult to be setled in the mind , than those of one , two and three . either therefore all knowledge does not depend on certain praecognita , or general maxims , called principles ; or else , such as these ( that one and one are two , that two and two are four , &c. ) and a great part of numeration will be so . to which if we add all the self-evident propositions that may be made about all our distinct ideas ; principles will be almost infinite , at least innumerable , which men arrive to the knowledge of , at different ages ; and a great many of those innate principles , they never come to know all their lives . but whether they come in view earlier or later , they are all known by their native evidence , and receive no light , nor are capable of any proof one from another ; much less the more particular , from the more general ; or the more simple from the more compounded : the more simple , and less abstract , being the most familiar , and the easier and earlier apprehended . these general maxims then , are only of use in disputes , to stop the mouths of wranglers ; but not of much use to the discovery of unknown truths ; or to help the mind forwards in its search after knowledge . several general maxims , are no more than bare verbal propositions ; and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names , one to another , as , the whole is equal to all its parts : what real truth does it teach us more , than what the signification of the word totum , or whole does of it self import ? but yet , mathematicians do not without reason place this , and some other such amongst their maxims ; that their scholars having in the entrance perfectly acquainted their thoughts with these propositions , made in such general terms , may have them ready to apply to all particular cases : not that if they be equally weighed , they are more clear and evident , than the particular instances they are brought to confirm , but that being more familiar to the mind , the very naming them is enough to satisfy the understanding . but this i say , is more from our custom of using them , than the different evidence of the things . so that if rightly consider'd , i think we may say , that where our ideas are clear and distinct , there is little , or no use at all of these maxims , to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them . he that cannot discern the truth , or falshood of such propositions , without the help of these and the like maxims , will not be helped by these maxims to do it . he that needs any proof to make him certain , and give his assent to this proposition , that two are equal to two , or that white is not black , will also have need of a proof to make him admit that , what is , is , or , that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be . and as these maxims are of little use , where we have clear and distinct ideas ; so they are of dangerous use , where our ideas are confused , and where we use words that are not annexed to clear and distinct ideas ; but to such as are of a loose and wandring signification , sometimes standing for one , and sometimes for another idea , from which follows mistake and error , which these maxims ( brought as proofs to establish propositions wherein the terms stand for confused and uncertain ideas ) do by their authority confirm and rivet . chap. viii . of trifling propositions . there are universal propositions , which thô they be certainly true , yet add no light to our understandings , bring no increase to our knowledge , such are , first , all purely identical propositions . these at first blush , appear to contain no instruction in them : for when we affirm the same term of it self , it shews us nothing but what we must certainly know before , whether such a proposition be either made by , or proposed to us . secondly , another sort of trifling propositions is , when a part of the complex idea is praedicated of the name of the whole ; a part of the definition , of the word defined , as ; lead is a metal , man an animal . these carry no information at all , to those who know the complex ideas , the names lead , and man stand for : indeed , to a man that knows the signification of the word metal , and not of the word lead , it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead , by saying it is a metal , than by enumerating the simple ideas one by one , which make up the complex idea of metal . alike trifling it is to predicate any one of the simple ideas of a complex one , of the name of the whole complex idea : as all gold is fusible ; for fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one , the sound gold stands for ; what can it be but playing with sounds , to affirm that of the name gold , which is comprehended in its received signification ? what instruction can it carry , to tell one that which he is supposed to know before ? for i am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me , or else he is to tell me . the general propositions that are made about substances , if they are certain , are for the most part but trifling . and if they are instructive , are uncertain ; and such as we have no knowledge of their real truth , how much soever constant observation and analogy may assist our judgments in guessing . hence it comes to pass , that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses , that amount yet to nothing . for names of substantial beings , as well as others , having setled significations affixed to them , may with great truth be joyned negatively and affirmatively in propositions , as their definitions make them fit to be so joyned ; and propositions consisting of such terms , may with the same clearness be deduced one from another , as those that convey the most real truths ; and all this without any knowledge of the nature or reality of things existing without us . thus he that has learnt the following words , with their ordinary acceptations annexed to them , viz. substance , man , animal form , soul , vegetative , sensitive , rational , may make several undoubted propositions about the soul , without any knowledge at all of what the soul really is . and of this sort a man may find an infinite number of propositions , reasonings and conclusions in books of metaphysicks , school-divinity , and some part of natural philosophy ; and after all , know as little of god , spirits , or bodies , as he did before he set out . thirdly , the worst sort of trifling , is , to use words loosely and uncertainly , which sets us yet farther from the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain to by them , or find in them . that which occasions this , is , that men may find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy , under the obscurity or perplexedness of their terms ; to which , perhaps , inadvertency and ill custom does in many men much contribute . to conclude , barely verbal propositions may be known by these following marks . first , all propositions , wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another , are barely about the signification of sounds . for since no abstract idea can be the same with any other , but it self ; when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term , it can signifie no more but this , that it may , or ought to be called by that name ; or that these two names signify the same idea . secondly , all propositions , wherein a part of the complex idea , which any term stands for , is predicated of that term , are only verbal : and thus all propositions wherein more comprehensive terms called genera , are affirmed of subordinate , or less comprehensive , called species , or individuals , are barely verbal . when by these two rules we examine the propositions that make up the discourses we ordnarily meet with , both in and out of books ; we shall , perhaps find , that a greater part of them , than is usually suspected , are purely about the signification of words , and contain nothing in them , but the use and application of these signs . chap. ix . of our knowledge of existence . hitherto we have only considered the essences of things , which being only abstract ideas , and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence , give us no knowledge of existence at all . we proceed now to enquire concerning our knowledge of the existence of things , and how we come by it . i say then that we have the knowledge of our own existence , by intuition ; of the existence of god , by demonstration ; and of other things , by sensation . as for our own existence , we perceive it so plainly , that it neither needs , nor is capable of any proof . i think , i reason ; i feel pleasure and pain ; can any of these be more evident to me , than my own existence ? if i doubt of all other things , that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence , and will not suffer me to doubt of that . if i know i doubt , i have as certain a perception of the thing doubting , as of that thought which i call doubt . experience then convinces us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence ; and an internal infallible perception that we are . in every act of sensation , reasoning or thinking , we are conscious to our selves of our own being , and in this matter come not short of the highest degree of certainty . chap x. of our knowledge of the existence of a god. tho' god has given us no innate ideas of himself , yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with , he hath not left himself without a witness , since we have sense , perception , and reason ; and cannot want a clear proof of him , as long as we carry our selves about us : nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point , since he has so plentifully provided us with means to discover , and know him , so far as is necessary to the end of our being , and the great concernment of our happiness . but thô this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers , yet it requires thought and attention : and the mind must apply it self to a regular deduction of it , from some part of our intuitiv knowledge ; or else we shall be as ignorant of this as of other propositions which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration . to shew therefore , that we are capable of knowing , that is , being certain , that there is a god , and how we may come by this certainty , i think we need go no farther than our selves , and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence . i think it is beyond question , that man has a clear perception of his own being : he knows certainly , that he exists , and that he is something . in the next place , man knows by an intuitive certainty , that bare nothing can no more produce any real being , than it can be equal to two right angles . if therefore we know there is some real being , it is an evident demonstration , that from eternity there has been something ; since what was not from eternity , had a beginning ; and what had a beginning , must be produced by something else next it is evident , that what has its being from another , must also have all that which is in , and belongs to its being from another too : all the powers it has must be owing to , and received from the same source . this eternal source then of all being must he also the source and original of all power ; and so this eternal being , must be also the most powerful . again , man finds in himself perception , and knowledge : we are certain then that there is not only some being , but some knowing , intelligent being in the world. there was a time then , when there was no knowing being , or else there has been a knowing being from eternity . if it be said , there was a time when that eternal being , had no knowledge ; i reply , that then it is impossible there should have ever been any knowledge . it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge , and operating blindly , and without any perception , should produce a knowing being , as it is impossible that a triangle should make it self three angles , bigger than two right ones . thus from the consideration of our selves , and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions , our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth , that there is an eternal , most powerful , and knowing being , which , whether any one will call god , it matters not . the thing is evident , and from this idea duly consider'd , will easily be deduced all those other attributes , we ought to ascribe to this eternal being . from what has been said , it is plain to me , we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a god , than of any thing our senses have not immediately discovered to us . nay , i presume i may say , that we more certainly know that there is a god , than that there is any thing else without us . when i say , we know , i mean , there is such a knowledge within our reach , which we cannot miss , if we will but apply our minds to that , as we do to several other enquiries . it being then unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude , that something has existed from eternity ; let us next see what kind of thing that must be : there are but two sorts of beings in the world , that man knows or conceives ; first , such as are purely material , without sense or perception , as the clippings of our beards , and parings of our nails . secondly , sensible perceiving beings ; such as we find our selves to be . these two sorts we shall hereofter call cogitative and incogitative beings ; which to our present purpose are better than material and immaterial . if then there must be something eternal , it is very obvious to reason , that it must necessarily be a cogitative being , because it is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent being , as that nothing should of it self produce matter . let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal , we shall find it in it self unable to produce any thing . let us suppose its parts firmly at rest together : if there were no other being in the world , must it not eternally remain so , a dead unactive lump ? is it possible to conceive it can add motion to it self , or produce any thing ? matter then by its own strength cannot produce in it self , so much as motion . the motion it has , must also be from eternity , or else added to matter by some other being , more powerful than matter . but let us suppose motion eternal too , yet matter , incogitative matter and motion could never produce thought : knowledge will still be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce , as matter is beyond the power of nothing to produce . divide matter into as minute parts as you will , vary the figure and motion of it , as much as you please , it will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk , than it did before this division . the minutest particles of matter , knock , impell , and resist one another , just as the greater do , and that is all they can do , so that if we will suppose nothing eternal , matter can never begin to be . if we suppose bare matter without motion eternal , motion can never begin to be . if we suppose only matter and motion eternal , thought can never begin to be : for it is impossible to conceive , that matter either with , or without motion , could have originally in and from it self , sense , perception , and knowledge , as is evident from hence , that the sense , perception and knowledge , must be a property eternally inseparable from matter , and every particle of it . since therefore whatsoever is the first eternal being , must necessarily be cogitative : and whatsoever is first of all things , must necessarily contain in it , and actually have , at least , all the perfections that can ever after exist , it necessarily follows , that the first eternal be●ng cannot be matter . if therefore it be evident that something necessarily must exist from eternity , it is also as evident that , that something must necessarily be a cogitative being . for it is as impossible that incogitative matter should produce a cogitative being , as that nothing , or the negation of all being should produce a positive being or matter . this discovery of the necessary existence of an eternal mind , does sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of god. for it will hence follow , that all other knowing beings , that have a beginning , must depend on him , and have no other ways of knowledge or extent of power , than what he gives them : and therefore if he made those , he made also the less excellent pieces of this universe , all inanimate bodies , whereby his omniscience , power and providence will be established ; and from thence all his other attributes necessarily follow . chap. xi . of our knowledge of the existence of other things . the knowledge of our own being we have by intuition : the existence of a god , reason clearly makes known to us , as has been shewn : the knowledge of the existence of any other thing , we can have only by sensation ; for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with any idea , a man hath in his memory ; nor of any other existence , but that of god , with the existence of any particular man ; no particular man can know the existence of any other being , but only , when by actual operating upon him , it makes it self be perceived by him . the having the idea of any thing in our mind , no more proves the existence of that thing , than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world , or the visions of a dream , make thereby a true history . it is therefore the actual receiving of ideas from without , that gives us notice of the existence of other things , and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us , which causes that idea in us , thô perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it ; for it takes not from the certainty of our senses , and the ideas we receive by them , that we know not the manner wherein they are produced . this notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us , thô it be not altogether so certain as intuition and demonstration , deserves the name of knowledge , if we perswade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right , concerning the existence of those objects , that affect them . but besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves , that they do not err in the information they give us of the existence of things without us , we have other concurrent reasons : as first , it is plain those perceptions are are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses , because those that want the organs of any sense ; never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds . this is too evident to be doubted , and therefore we cannot but be assured , that they come in by the organs of that sense , and no other way . secondly , because we find sometimes that we cannot avoid the having those ideas produced in our minds , as when my eyes are shut , i can at pleasure recall to my mind the ideas of light or the sun , which former sensations had lodged in my memory ; but if i turn my eyes towards the sun , i cannot avoid the ideas which the light or the sun , then produces in me : which shews a manifest difference between those ideas laid up in the memory , and such as force themselves upon us , and we cannot avoid having . and therefore it must needs be some exterior cause , whose efficacy i cannot resist , that produces those ideas in my mind , whether i will or no. besides , no man but perceives the difference in himself , between actually looking upon the sun , and contemplating the idea he has of it in his memory ; and therefore he hath certain knowledge , that they are not both memory or fancy ; but that actual seeing has a cause without . thirdly , add to this , that many ideas are produced in us without pain , which we afterwards remember without the least offence . thus the pain of heat or cold , when the idea of it is received in our minds , gives us no disturbance : which when felt was very troublesome ; and we remember the pain of hunger , thirst , head-ach , &c. without any pain at all ; which would either never disturb us , or else constantly do it , as often as we thought of it , were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds , and appearances entertaining our fancies , without the real existence of things affecting us from abroad . fourthly , our senses in many cases , bear witness to the truth of each others report , concerning the existence of sensible things without us : he that doubts when he sees a fire , whether it be real , may , if he please , feel it too ; and by the exquisite pain he will be convinced , that it is not a bare idea or phantom . if after all this , any one will be so sceptical , as to distrust his senses , and to question the existence of all things , or our knowledge of any thing ; let him consider that the certainty of things existing in rerum naturâ , when we have the testimony of our senses for it , is not only as great as our frame can attain to , but as our condition needs . for our faculties being not suited to the full extent of being , nor a clear comprehensive knowledge of all things , but to the preservation of us , in whom they are , and accommodated to the use of life ; they serve our purpose well enough , if they will but give give us certain notice of those things , that are convenient or inconvenient to us . for he that sees a candle burning , and has experimented the force of the flame , by putting his finger in it , will little doubt , that this is something existing without him , which does him harm , and puts him to pain , which is assurance enough ; when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by , than what is as certain as his actions themselves : so that this evidence is as great as we can desire , being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain , that is happiness or misery , beyond which we have no concernment , either of knowing , or being . in fine , when our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea , we are assured that there is something at that time really existing without us . but this knowledge extends only as far as the present testimony of our senses , employed about particular objects , that do then affect them , and no farther my seeing a man a minute since , is no certain argument of his present existence . as when our senses are actually employed about any object , we know that it does exist : so by our memory we may be assured , that heretofore things that affected our senses , have existed : and thus we have the knowledge of the past existence of several things ; whereof our senses having informed us , our memories still retain the ideas : and of this we are past all doubt , so long as we remember well . as to the existence of spirits , our having ideas of them , does not make us know , that any such things do exist without us ; or that there are any finite spirits ; or any other spiritual beings but the eternal god. we have ground from revelation , and several other reasons , to believe with assurance , that there are such creatures : but our senses not being able to discover them , we want the means of knowing their particular existence , for we can no more know that there are finite spirits really existing , by the idea we have of such beings , than by the ideas any one has of fairies or centaurs , he can come to know that things answering those ideas , do really exist . hence we may gather , that there are two sorts of propositions , one concerning the existence of any thing answerable to such an idea ; as that of an elephant , phenix , motion , or angel , viz. whether such a thing does any where exist : and this knowledge is only of particulars , and not to be had of any thing without us , but only of god , any other way than by our senses . another sort of propositions is , wherein is expressed the agreement or disagreement of our abstract ideas , and their dependence of another . and these may be universal and certain : so having the idea of god , and my self , of fear and obedience , i cannot but be sure that god is to be feared and obeyed by me ; and this proposition will be certain concerning man in general ; if i have made an abstract idea of such a species , whereof i am one particular . but such a proposition , how certain soever , proves not to me the existence of men in the world ; but will be true of all such creatures , whenever they do exist : which certainty of such general propositions , depends on the agreement or disagreement discoverable in those abstract ideas . in the former case , our knowledge is the consequence of the existence of things , producing ideas in our minds by our senses : in the later , the consequence of the ideas that are in our minds , and producing these general propositions , many whereof are called , eternae veritatis ; and all of them indeed are so , not from being written all , or any of them in the minds of all men , or that they were any of them propositions in any ones mind , till he having got the abstract ideas , joyned or separated them by affirmation or negation : but wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is , endowed with such faculties , and thereby furnished with such ideas , as we have ; we must conclude , he must needs , when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his ideas , know the truth of certain propositions , that will arise from the agreement or disagreement he will perceive in his own ideas . such propositions being once made about abstract ideas , so as to be true , they will whenever they can be supposed to be made again , at any time past , or to come by a mind having those ideas , alway actually be true . for names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same ideas ; and the same ideas having immutably the same habitudes one to another ; propositions concerning any abstract ideas , that are once true , must needs be eeternal verities . chap. xii . of the improvement of our knowledge . it being the received opinion amongst men of letters , that maxims are the foundations of all knowledge , and that sciences are each of them built upon certain proecognita , from whence the understanding was to take its rise , and by which it was to conduct it self in its inquiries in the matters belonging to that science , the beaten road of the schools has been to lay down in the beginning one or more general propositions , called principles , as foundations whereon to build the knowledge , was to be had of that subject . that which gave occasion to this way of proceeding , was , i suppose , the good success it seem'd to have in mathematicks , which of all other sciences , have the greatest certainty , clearness , and evidence in them . but if we consider it , we shall find that , the great advancement and certainty of real knowledge men arrived to in these sciences , was not owing to the influence of these principles , but to the clear distinct and compleat ideas their thoughts were employed about ; and the relation of equality and excess , so clear between some of them , that they had a intuitive knowledge ; and by that , a way to discover it in others : and this without the help of those maxims : for i ask , is it not possible for a lad to know that his whole body is bigger than his little finger , but by virtue of this axiom , the whole is bigger than the part ; nor be assured of it , till he has learned that maxim ? let any one consider from what has been elsewhere said , which is known first and clearest by most people , the particular instance , or the general rule ; and which it is that gives life and birth to the other . these general rules are but the comparing our more general and abstract ideas , which ideas are made by the mind , and have names given them , for the easier dispatch in its reasonings : but knowledge began in the mind , and was founded on particulars , thô afterwards perhaps no notice be taken thereof : it being natural for the mind , to lay up those general notions , and make the proper use of them , which is to disburthen the memory of the cumbersome load of particulars . the way to improve in knowledge , is not to swallow principles , with an implicite faith , and without examination , which would be apt to mislead men , instead of guiding them into truth ; but to get and fix in our minds , clear and complete ideas , as far as they are to be had , and annex to them proper , and constant names : and thus barely by considering our ideas , and comparing them together , observing their agreement or disagreement , their habitudes and relations , we shall get more true and clear knowledge by the conduct of this one rule , than by taking up principles , and thereby putting our minds into the disposal of others . we must therefore , if we will proceed as reason advises , adapt our methods of enquiry , to the nature of the ideas we examine , and the truth we search after . general and certain truths , are only founded in the habitudes and relations of abstract ideas . therefore a sagacious methodical application of our thoughts for the finding out these relations , is the only way to discover all that can with truth and certainty be put into general propositions . by what steps we are to proceed in these , is to be learned in the schools of the mathematicians , who from every plain and easie beginnings , by gentle degrees , and a continued chain of reasonings , proceed to the discovery and demonstration of truths , that appear at first sight beyond humane capacity . this , i think i may say , that if other ideas , that are real as well as nominal essences of their species , were pursued in the way familiar to mathematicians , they would carry our thoughts farther , and with greater evidence and clearness , than possibly we are apt to imagine . this gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture , which i suggest , chapter the third , viz. that morality is capable of demonstration , as well as mathematicks : for moral ideas being real essences , that have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another , so far as we can find their habitudes and relations , so far we shall be possessed of real and general truths . in our knowledge of substances , we are to proceed after a quite different method : the bare contemplation of their abstract ideas ( which are but nominal essences , will carry us but a very little way , in the search of truth and certainty . here experience must teach us what reason cannot : and it is by trying alone , that we can certainly know , what other qualities co-exist with those of our complex idea ; ( for instance ) whether that yellow heavy fusible body , i call gold , be malleable , or no , which experience ( however it prove in that particular body we examine ) makes us not certain that it is so in all , or any other yellow , heavy , fusible bodies , but that which we have tried ; because it is no consequence one way or the other from our complex idea : the necessity or inconsistence of malleability , hath no visible connexion with the combination of that colour , weight , and fusibility in any body . what i have here said of the nominal essence of gold , supposed to consist of a body of such a determinate colour , weight , and fusibility , will hold true , if other qualities be added to it . our reasonings from those ideas , will carry us but a little way in the certain discovery of the other properties , in those masses of matter wherein all those are to be found . as far as our experience reaches , we may have certain knowledge , and no farther . i deny not , but a man accustomed to rational and regular experiments , shall be able to see farther into the nature of bodies , and their unknown properties , than one that is a stranger to them . but this is but judgment , and opinion , not knowledge and certainty . this makes me suspect that natural philosophy is not capable of being made a science : from experiments and historical observations we may draw advantages of ease and health , and thereby increase our stock of conveniences for this life ; but beyond this , i fear our talents reach not ; nor are our faculties , as i guess , able to advance . from whence it is obvious to conclude , that since our faculties are not fitted to penetrate the real essences of bodies , but yet plainly to discover to us the being of a god , and the knowledge of our selves ; enough to give us a clear discovery of our duty , and great concernment ; it will become us as rational creatures , to employ our faculties , about what they are most adapted to , and follow the direction of nature , where it seems to point us out the way . for it is rational to conclude , that our proper employment lies in those enquiries , and that sort of knowledge which is most suited to our natural capacities , and carries in it our greatest interest , that is , the condition of our eternal state : and therefore it is , i think , that morality is the proper science and business of mankind in general ( who are both concerned and fitted to search out their summum bonum ) as several arts conversant about the several parts of nature , are the lot and private talent of particular men , for the common use of humane life , and their own particular subsistance in this world. the ways to enlarge our knowledge , as far as we are capable , seem to me to be these two : the first is to get and settle in our minds , as far as we can , clear , distinct , and constant ideas of those things we would consider and know . for it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas ; where they are either imperfect , confused or obscure , we cannot expect to have certain , perfect , or clear knowledge . the other is the art of finding out the intermediate ideas , which may shew us the agreement or repugnancy of other ideas , which cannot be immediately compared . that these two ( and not the relying on maxims , and drawing consequences from some general propositions ) are the right method of improving our knowledge , in the ideas of other modes , besides those of quantity , the consideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us . where first , we shall find that he that has not clear and perfect ideas of those angles or figures , of which he desires to know any thing , is utterly thereby incapable of any knowledge about them . suppose a man not to have an exact idea of a right angle , scalenum , or trapezium , and it is clear , that he will in vain seek any demonstration about them . and farther it is evident , that it was not the influence of maxims or principles , that hath led the masters of this science into those wonderful discoveries they have made . let a man of good parts know all the maxims of mathematicks never so well , and contemplate their extent and consequences as much as he pleases , he will by their assistance , i suppose , scarce ever come to know , that the square of the hypotenuse , in a right angl'd triangle , is equal to the squares of the two other sides . this , and other mathematical truths have been discovered by the thoughts , otherwise applied . the mind had other objects , other views before it , far different from those maxims which men well enough acquainted with those received axioms , but ignorant of their method , who first made these demonstrations , can never sufficiently admire . chap. xiii . some farther considerations concerning knowledge . our knowledge , as in other things , so in this , has a great conformity with our sight , that it is neither wholly necessary , nor wholly voluntary . men that have senses cannot chuse but receive some ideas by them ; and if they have memory , they cannot but retain some of them ; and if they have any distinguishing faculty , cannot but perceive the agreement or disagreement of some of them , one with another . as he that has eyes , if he will open them by day , cannot but see some objects , and perceive a difference in them , yet he may chuse whether he will turn his eyes towards an object , curiously survey it , and observe accurately all that is visible in it . but what he does see , he cannot see otherwise than he does : it depends not on his will , to see that black which appears yellow : just thus it is with our understanding ; all that is voluntary in our knowledge , is the employing or with-holding any of our faculties from this or that sort of objects ; and a more or less accurate survey of them : but they being employed , our will hath no power to determine the knowledge of the mind , one way or other . that is done only by the objects themselves , as far as they are clearly discovered . thus he that has got the ideas of numbers , and hath taken the pains to compare one , two and three , to six , cannot chuse but know that they are equal . he also that hath the idea of an intelligent , but weak and frail being , made by and depending on another , who is eternal , omnipotent , perfectly wise and good , will as certainly know that man is to honour , fear , and obey god , as that the sun shines when he sees it . but yet these truths , being never so certain , never so clear , he may be ignorant of either or both of them , who will not take the pains to employ his faculties as he should , to inform himself about them . chap. xiv . of judgment . the understanding faculties being given to man , not barely for speculation , but also for the conduct of his life ; a man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him , but what has the certainty of true knowledge : he that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him ; nor stir till he is infallibly assured of success in his business , will have little else to do , but sit still and perish . therefore as god has set some things in broad day-light , as he has given us some certain knowledge , thô limited to a few things , in comparison , probably as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of , to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state : so in the greatest part of our concernment , he has afforded us only the twilight , as i may so say , of probability , suitable to that state of mediocrity and probationership , he has been pleased to place us in here . the faculty which god has given man to enlighten him , next to certain knowledge is judgment , whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree , without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs . the mind exercises this judgment , sometimes out of necessity , where demonstrative proofs , and certain knowledge are not to be had ▪ and sometimes out of laziness , unskilfulness , or haste , even where they are to be had . this faculty of the mind when it is exercised immediately about things , is called judgment ; when about truths delivered in words , is most commonly called assent , or dissent . thus the mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falshood : first , knowledge , whereby it certainly perceives , and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas . secondly , judgment , which is the putting ideas together , or separating them from one another in the mind , when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived , but presumed to be so . and if it so unites or separates them , as in reality things are , it is right judgment . chap. xv. of probability . probability is nothing but the appearance of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas , by the intervention of proofs , whose connexion is not constant , and immutable ; or is not perceived to be so ; but is , or appears for the most part to be so , and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false , rather than the contrary . of probability there are degrees from the neighborhood of certainty and demonstration , quite down to improbability and unlikeliness , even to the confines of impossibility : and also degrees of assent from certain knowledge and what is next it , full assurance and confidence , quite down to conjecture doubt , distrust , and disbelief . that proposition then is probable , for which there are arguments or proofs to make it pass , or be received for true. the entertainment the mind gives to this sort of propositions , is called belief , assent or opinion . probability then being to supply the defect of our knowledge , is always conversant about a thing , whereof we have no certainty , but only some inducements to receive it for true . the grounds of it are in short these two following . first , the conformity of any thing with our own knowledge , experience or observation . secondly , the testimony of others , vouching their observation and experience . in the testimony of others , is to be considered ; first , the number ; secondly , the integrity ; thirdly , the skill of the witnesses ; fourthly , the design of the author , if it be a testimony cited out of a book ; fifthly , the consistency of the parts and circumstances of the relation ; sixthly , contrary testimonies . the mind before it rationally assents or dissents to any probable proposition , ought to examine all the grounds of probality , and see how they make , more or less , for or against it ; and upon a due balancing of the whole , reject or receive it , with a more or less firm assent , according to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability , on one side or the other . chap. xvi . of the degrees of assent . the grounds of probability laid down in the foregoing chapter , as they are the foundations on which our assent is built ; so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are , ( or ought ) to be regulated . only we are to take notice that no grounds of probability operate any farther on the mind , which searches after truth , and endeavours to judge right , than they appear ; at least in the first judgment , or search that the mind makes . it is indeed in many cases impossible , and in most very hard , even for those who have admirable memories , to retain all the proofs , which upon a due examination , made them embrace that side of the question . it suffices that they have once with care and fairness , sifted the matter as far as they could , and having once found on which side the probability appeared to them , they lay up the conclusion in their memories , as a truth they have discovered ; and for the future remain satisfied with the testimony of their memories , that this is the opinion , that by the proofs they have once seen of it , deserves such a degree of their assent as they assord it . it is unavoidable then that the memory be relied on in this case , and that men be perswaded of several opinions , whereof the proofs are not actually in their thoughts , nay , which perhaps they are not able actually to recall ; without this the greatest part of men , must be either scepticks , or change every moment , when any one offers them arguments , which for want of memory , they are not presently able to answer . it must be owned that men's sticking to past judgments , is often the cause of a great obstinacy in error and mistake . but the fault is not , that they relye on their memories , for what they have before well judged ; but because they judged , before they had well examined . who almost is there that hath the leisure , patience , and means to collect together , all the proofs concerning most of the opinions he has , so as safely to conclude that he has a clear and full view , and that there is no more to be alledged for his better information ? and yet we are forced , to determine our selves on one fide or other : the conduct of our lives , and the management of our great concerns , will not bear delay . for those depend for the most part , on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain knowledge , and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace one side or the other . the propositions we receive upon inducements of probability , are of two sorts : first , concerning some particular existence , or matter of fact , which falling under observation , is capable of humane testimony . secondly , concerning things which being beyond the discovery of our senses , are not capable of humane testimony . concerning the first of these , viz. particular matter of fa●t . first , where any particular thing , consonant to the constant observation of our selves , and others in the like case , comes attested with the concurrent reports of all that mention it , we receive it as easily , and build as firmly upon it , as if it were certain knowledge . thus , if all englishmen who have occasion to mention it , should report , that it froze in england last winter , or the like , i think a man would as little doubt of it , as that seven and four are eleven . the first and highest degree of probability then is , when the general consent of all men , in all ages , as far as can be known , concurs with a man 's own constant experience in the like cases , to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact , attested by fair witnesses : such are the stated constitutions and properties of bodies , and the regular proceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course of nature ; this we call an argument from the nature of things themselves . for what we and others always observe to be after the same manner , we conclude with reason , to be the effects of steddy and regular causes , thô they come not within the reach of our knowledge . as that fire warmed a man , or made lead fluid ; that iron sunk in water , swam in quick-silver . a relation affirming any such thing to have been , or a predication that it will happen again in the same manner , is received without doubt or hesitation : and our belief thus grounded , rises to assurance . secondly , the next degree of probability , is when by my own experience , and the agreement of all others that mention it : a thing is found to be for the most part so , and that the particular instance of it is attested by many and undoubted witnesses : thus history giving us such an account of men in all ages , and my own experience confirming it , that most men prefer their own private advantage , to the publick : if all historians that write of tiberius , say that he did so , it is extreamly probable : and in this case , our assent rises to a degree which we may call confidence . thirdly , in matters happening indifferently , as that a bird should fly this or that way : when any particular matter of fact comes attested by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses , there our assent is also unavoidable . thus , that there is in italy such a city as rome ; that about one thousand and seven hundred years ago , there lived such a man in it as julius caesar , &c. a man can as little doubt of this , and the like , as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance , whereof he himself is a witness . probability , on these grounds , carries so much evidence with it , that it leaves us as little liberty to believe or disbelieve , as demonstration does , whether we will know or be ignorant . but the difficulty is , when testimonies contradict common experience , and the reports of witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature , or with one another . here diligence , attention , and exactness is required to form a right judgment , and to proportion the assent to the evidence and probability of the thing , which rises and falls , according as the two foundations of credibility , favour , or contradict it . these are liable to such variety of contrary observations , circumstances , reports , tempers , designs , over sights , &c. of reporters , that it is impossible to reduce to precise rules , the various degrees wherein men give their assent . this in general may be said , that as the proofs upon due examination , shall to any one appear , in a greater or less degree , to preponderate on either side , so they are fitted to produce in the mind , such different entertainments , as are called belief , conjecture , guess , doubt , wavering , distrust , disbelief , &c. it is a rule generally approved , that any testimony the farther off it is removed from the original truth , the less force it has : and in traditional truths , each remove weakens the force of the proof . there is a rule quite contrary to this , advanced by some men , who look opinions to gain force by growing older : upon this ground , propositions evidently false or doubtful in their first beginning , come by an inverted rule of probability , to pass for authentick truths ; and those which deserved little credit from the mouths of their first relators , are thought to grow venerable by age , and are urged as undeniable . but certain it is , that no probability can rise above its first original . what has no other evidence than the single testimony of one witness , must stand or fall by his only testimony , thô afterwards cited by hundreds of others ; and is so far from receiving any strength thereby that it becomes the weaker . because passion , interest , inadvertency , mistake of his meaning , and a thousand odd reasons , or caprichois mens minds are acted by , may make one man quote another's words or meaning wrong . this is certain , that what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds , can never after come to be more valid in future ages , by being often repeated . the second sort of probability , is concerning things not falling under the reach of our senses , and therefore not capable of testimony : and such are , first , the existence , nature and operations of finite , immaterial beings without us , as spirits , angels , &c. or the existence of material beings , such as for their smallness or remoteness , our senses cannot take notice of : as whether there be any plants , animals , &c. in the planets , and other mansions of the vast universe . secondly , concerning the manner of operation in most parts of the works of nature , wherein , thô we see the sensible effects ; yet their causes are unknown , and we perceive not the ways , and manner how they are produced . we see animals are generated , nourished and move ; the loadstone draws iron , &c. but the causes that operate , and the manner they are produced in , we can only guess , and probably conjecture . in these matters analogy is the only help we have ; and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of probability . thus observing , that the bare rubbing of two bodies violently upon one another , produces heat , and very often fire ; we have reason to think that what we call heat and fire , consists , in a certain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning matter . this sort of probability , which is the best conduct of rational experiments , and the rise of hypotheses has also its use and influence . and a wary reasoning from analogy leads us often into the discovery of truths , and useful deductions , which would otherwise lie concealed . thô the common experience , and the ordinary course of things , have a mighty influence on the minds of men , to make them give or refuse credit , to any thing proposed to their belief ; yet there is one case wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent to a fair testimony given of it . for where such supernatural events are suitable to ends aimed at by him , who has the power to change the course of nature ; there under such circumstances they may be the fitter to procure belief , by how much the more they are beyond , or contrary to ordinary observation . this is the proper case of miracles , which well attested , do not only find credit themselves , but give it also to other truths . there are propositions that challenge the highest degree of our assent upon bare testimony , whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with common experience , and the ordinary course of things or no : the reason whereof is , because the testimony is of such an one , as cannot deceive nor be deceived ; and that is god himself . this carries with it certainty beyond doubt , evidence beyond exception . this is called by a peculiar name , revelation , and our assent to it , faith ; which has as much certainty in it , as our knowledge it self ; and we may as well doubt of our own being , as we can , whether any revelation from god be true. so that faith is a settled and sure principle of assent and assurance , and leaves no manner of room for doubt or hesitation ; only we must be sure , that it be a divine revelation , and that we understand it right ; else we shall expose our selves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm , and all the error of wrong principles , if we have faith and assurance , in what is not divine revelation . chap. xvii . of reason . the word reason in english , has different significations . sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles : sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those principles : sometimes for the cause , and particularly for the final cause ; but the consideration i shall have of it here , is , as it stands for a faculty , whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts ; and wherein it is evident , he much surpasses them . reason is necessary , both for the enlargement of our knowledge , and regulating our assent : for it hath to do both in knowledge and opinion , and is necessary and assisting to all our other intellectual faculties ; and indeed , contains two of them , viz. first , sagacity . whereby it finds intermediate ideas . secondly , illation , whereby it so orders and disposes of them , as to discover what connexion there is in each link of the chain , whereby the extremes are held together , and thereby , as it were , to draw into view the truth sought for ; which is that we call illation or inference : and consists in nothing , but the perception of the connexion there is between the ideas , in each step of the deduction , whereby the mind comes to see , either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas , as in demonstration , in which it arrives at knowledge : or their probable connexion , on which it gives or with-holds its assent , as in opinion . sense and intuition reach but a little way : the greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions , and intermediate ideas . in those cases where we must take propositions for true , without being certain of their being so , we have need to find out , examine , and compare the grounds of their probability : in both cases , the faculty which finds out the means , and rightly applies them to discover certainty in the one , and probability in the other , is that which we call reason . so that in reason we may consider these four degrees ; first , the discovering and finding out of proofs . secondly , the regular and methodical disposition of them , and laying them in such order , as their connexion may be plainly perceived . thirdly , the perceiving their connexion . fourthly , the making a right conclusion . there is one thing more which i shall desire to be considered concerning reason , and that is , whether syllogism , as is generally thought , be the proper instrument of it ; ant the usefullest way of exercising this faculty . the causes i have to doubt of it , are these . first , because syllogism serves our reason , but in one only of the fore-mentioned parts of it , and that is to shew the connexion of the proofs of any one instance , and no more : but in this it is of no great use , since the mind can perceive such connexion , where it really is ; as easily , nay , perhaps better without it . we may observe that there are many men that reason exceeding clear and rightly , who know not how to make a syllogism : and i believe scarce any one makes syllogisms in reasoning within himself . indeed , sometimes they may serve to discover a fallacy , hid in a rhetorical flourish ; or by stripping an absurdity of the cover of wit and good language , shew it in its naked deformity . but the mind is not taught to reason by these rules ; it has a native faculty to perceive the coherence or incoherence of its ideas , and can range them right , without any such perplexing repetitions : and i think every one will perceive in mathematical demonstrations , that the knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without syllogism . secondly , because thò syllogism serves to shew the force or fallacy of an argument made use of in the usual way of discoursing , by supplying the absent proposition , and so setting it before the view in a clear light ; yet it no less engages the mind in the perplexity of obscure and equivocal terms , wherewith this artificial way of reasoning , always abounds : it being adapted more to the attaining of victory in dispute , than the discovery or confirmation of truth in fair enquiries . but however it be in knowledge , i think it is of far less , or no use at all in probabilities : for the assent there being to be determined by the preponderancy , after a due weighing of all the proofs on both sides ; nothing is so unfit to assist the mind in that , as syllogism ; which running away with one assumed probability , pursues that till it has led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration . but let it help us ( as perhaps may be said ) in convincing men of their errors or mistakes ; yet still it fails our reason in that part , which if not its highest perfection , is yet certainly its hardest task ; and that which we must need its help in , and that is , the finding out of proofs , and making new discoveries . this way of reasoning , discovers no new proofs , but is the art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already . a man knows first , and then he is able to prove syllogistically ; so that syllogism comes after knowledge ; and then a man has little or no need of it . but it is chiefly by the finding out those ideas that shew the connexion of distant ones , that our stock of knowledge is increased ; and that useful arts and sciences are advanced . reason , thô of a very large extent fails us in several instances : as first , where our ideas fail . secondly , it is often at a loss , because of the obscurity , confusion , or imperfection of the ideas , it is employed about . thus having no perfect idea of the least extension of matter , nor of infinity , we are at a loss about the divisibility of matter . thirdly , our reason is often at a stand , because it perceives not those ideas which would serve to shew the certain or probable agreement or disagreement of any two other ideas . fourthly , our reason , is often engaged in absurdities and difficulties , by proceeding upon false principles , which being followed , lead men into contradictions to themselves , and inconsistancy in their own thoughts . fifthly , dubious words , and uncertain signs often puzzle mens reason , and bring them to a non-plus . in reasoning , men ordinarily use four sorts of arguments . the first , is to alledge the opinions of men , whose parts , learning , eminency , power , or some other cause , has gained a name , and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority . this may be called argumentum ad verecundiam . secondly , another way is , to require the adversary to admit what they alledge as a proof ; or to assign a better . this i call argumentum ad ignorantiam . a third way , is to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions . this is already known under the name of argumentum ad hominem . fourthly , the using of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability . this i call argumentum ad judicium . this alone of all the four , brings true instruction with it , and advances us in our way to knowledge . for first , it argues not another man's opinion to be right , because i , out of respect , or any other consideration , but that of conviction , will not contradict him . secondly , it proves not another man to be in the right way , nor that i ought to take the same with him , because i know not a better . thirdly , nor does it follow , that another man is in the right way , because he has shewn me that i am in the wrong . this may dispose me perhaps , for the reception of truth , but helps me not to it : that must come from proofs and arguments , and light arising from the nature of things themselves ; not from my shame facedness , ignorance or error . by what has been said of reason , we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of things , into those that are according to , above , and contrary to reason . according to reason , are such propositions , whose truth we can discover , by examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation and reflection , and by natural deduction find to be true , or probable . above reason are such propositions , whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles . contrary to reason , are such propositions as are inconsistent with , or irreconcilable to , our clear and distinct ideas . thus the existence of one god , is according to reason : the existence of more than one god , contrary to reason : the resurrection of the body after death , above reason . above reason , may be also taken in a double sense , viz. above probability , or above certainty . in that large sense also , contrary to reason , is , i suppose , sometimes taken . there is another use of the word reason , wherein it is opposed to faith ; which , thô authorized by common use , yet is it in it self , a very improper way of speaking : for faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind , which if it be regulated , as is our duty , cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reason ; and so cannot be opposite to it . he that believes without having any reason for believing , may be in love with his own fancies ; but neither seeks truth as he ought , nor pays the obedience due to his maker , who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him , to keep him out of mistake and error . but since reason and faith are by some men opposed , we will so consider them in the following chapter . chap xviii . of faith and reason , and their distinct provinces . reason , as contra-distinguished to faith , i take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths which the mind arrives at by deductions made from such ideas , which it has got by the use of its natural faculties , viz. by sensation or reflection . faith on the other side , is the assent to any proposition , upon the credit of the proposer , as coming immediately from god ; which we call revelation : concerning which we must observe . first , that no man inspired by god , can by any revelation communicate to others , any new simple ideas , which they had not before from sensation or reflection : because words , by their immediate operation on us , cannot cause other ideas , but of their natural sounds , and such as custom has annexed to them , which to us they have been wont to be signs of , but cannot introduce any new , and formerly unknown simple ideas . the same holds in all other signs , which cannot signify to us things , of which we have never before had any idea at all . for our simple ideas , we must depend wholly on our natural faculties , and can by no means receive them from traditional revelation ; i say traditional , in distinction to original revelation . by the one , i mean that impression which is made immediately by god on the mind of any man , to which we cannot set any bounds . and by the other , those impressions delivered over to others in words , and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to another . secondly , i say , that the same truths may be discovered by revelation , which are discoverable to us by reason ; but in such there is little need or use of revelation : god having furnished us with natural means to arrive at the knowledge of them : and truths discovered by our natural faculties , are more certain , than when conveyed to us by traditional revelation . for the knowledge we have , that this revelation came at first from god , can never be so sure as the knowledge we have from our own clear and distinct ideas . th●s also holds in matters of fact , know●●le by our senses : as the history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings , which had their orignal from revelation , and yet no bo●y , i think , will say he has as certain and clear knowledge of the flood , as noah that saw it , or that he himself would have had , had he then been alive and seen it . for he has no greater assurance , than that of his senses , that it is writ in the book , supposed to be writ by moses inspired . but he has not so great an assurance , that moses writ that book , as if he had seen moses write it ; so that the assurance of its being a revelation , is still less than our assurance of his senses . revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of reason . for since no evidence of our faculties , by which we receive such a revelation , can exceed , if equal , the certainty of our intuitive knowledge ; we can never receive for a truth any , that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge . the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree , that we can never assent to a proposition that affirms the same body to be in two distinct places at once ; however , it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation : since the evidence first , that we deceive not our selves in ascribing it to god. secondly . that we understand it right , can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge , whereby we discern it impossible , for the same body to be in two places at once . in propositions therefore , contrary to our distinct and clear ideas , it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. for faith can never convince us of any thing that contradicts out knowledge . because , thô faith be founded upon the testimony of god , who cannot lye , yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation , greater than our own knowledge . for if the mind of man can never have a clearer evidence of any thing to be a divine revelation , than it has of the principles of its own reason ; it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason , to give place to a proposition , whose revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have . in all things therefore where we have clear evidence from our ideas , and the principles of knowledge above-mentioned reason is the proper judge ; and revelation cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees ; nor can we be obliged , where we have the clear and evident sentence of reason , to quit it for the contrary opinion , under a pretence that it is matter of faith , which can have no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason . but , thirdly , there being many things , of which we have but imperfect notions , or none at all ; and other things , of whose past , present , or future existence , by the natural use of our faculties , we can have no knowledge at all : these being beyond the discovery of our faculties , and above reason , when revealed , become the proper matter of faith. thus , that part of the angels rebelled against god : that the bodies of men shall rise and live again , and the like , are purely matters of faith , with which reason has directly nothing to do . first then , whatever proposition is revealed , of whose truth our mind , by its natural faculties and notions cannot judge ; that is purely mater of faith , and above reason . secondly , all propositions , whereof the mind by its natural faculties , can come to determine and judge from natural acquired ideas , are matter of reason : but with this difference ; that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence , and so is perswaded of their truth only upon probable grounds : in such i say , an evident revelation ought to determine our assent , even against probability . because the mind , not being certain of the truth of that , it does not evidently know , is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony , which it is satisfied comes from one , who cannot err , and will not deceive . but yet it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation , and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered . thus far the dominion of faith reaches ; and that without any violence to reason , which is not injured or disturbed , but assisted and improved by new discoveries of truth , coming from the eternal fountain of all knowledge . whatever god hath revealed is certainly true ; no doubt can be made of it , this is the proper object of faith : but whether it be a divine revelation , or no , reason must judge ; which can never permit the mind , to reject a greater evidence , to embrace what is less evident , nor prefer less certainty to the greater . there can be no evidence , that any traditional revelation is of divine original , in the words we receive it , and the sense we understand it , so clear and so certain , as those of the principles of reason : and therefore , nothing that is contrary to the clear and self-evident dictates of reason , has a right to be urged or assented to , as a matter of faith , wherein reason has nothing to do . whatsoever is divine revelation , ought to over-rule all our opinions , prejudices and interests , and hath a right to be received with a full assent . such a submission as this , of our reason to faith , takes not away the land-marks of knowledge : this shakes not the foundations of reason , but leaves us that use of our faculties , for which they were given us . chap. xix . of wrong assent or error . error is a mistake of our judgment , giving assent to that which is not true . the reasons whereof may be reduced to these four ; first , want of proofs . secondly , want of ability to use them . thirdly , want of will to use them . fourthly , wrong measures of probability . first , want of proofs , by which i do not mean only the want of those proofs which are not to be had , but also of those proofs which are in being , or might be procured . the greatest part of mankind want the conveniencies , and opportunities of making experiments and observations themselves , or of collecting the testimonies of others , being enslaved to the necessity of their mean condition , whose lives are worn out only in the provisions for living . these men are by the constitution of humane affairs , unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those proofs , on which others build ; and which are necessary to establish those opinions . for having much to do to get the means of living , they are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious enquiries . it is true , that god has furnished men with faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take , if they will but seriously employ them that way , when their ordinary vocations allow them leisure . no man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living , as to have no spare time at all , to think on his soul , and inform himself in matters of religion , were men as intent on this , as they are on things of lower concernment . there are none so enslaved to the necessity of life , who might not find many vacancies , that might be husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge . secondly , want of ability to use them . there be many who cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads , nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs , and testimonies . these cannot discern that side on which the strongest proofs lie ; nor follow that which in it self is the most probable opinion . it is certain that there is a wide difference in mens understandings , apprehensions and reasonings , to a very great latitude , so that one may , without doing injury to mankind , affirm that there is a greater distance between some men and others in this respect , than between some men and some beasts ; but how this comes about , is a speculation , thô of great consequence ; yet not necessary to our present purpose . thirdly , for want of will to use them . some , thô they have opportunities and leisure enough , and want neither parts nor learning , nor other helps , are yet never the better for them , and never come to the knowledge of several truths that lie within their reach ; either upon the account of their hot pursuit of pleasure , constant drudgery in business , laziness and oscitancy in general , or a particular aversion for books and study : and some out of fear that an impartial inquiry would not favour those opinions , which best suit their prejudices , lives , designs , interests , &c. as many men forbear to cast up their accounts , who have reason to fear that their affairs are in no very good posture . how men , whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their understandings , can satisfie themselves with a lazy ignorance , i cannot tell : but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls , who lay out all their incomes in provisions for the body , and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge . i will not here mention how unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future state , and their concernment in it , which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes : nor shall i take notice what a shame it is to the greatest contem●ers of knowledge , to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know . but this , at least , is worth the consideration of those who call themselves gentlemen ; that however they may think credit , respect , and authority , the concomitants of their birth and fortune ; yet they will find all these still carried away from them by men of lower condition , who surpass them in knowledge . they who are blind , will always be led by those that see , or else fall into the ditch : and he is certainly the most subjected , the most enslaved , who is so in his understanding . fourthly , wrong measures of probability , which are , first , propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident , but doubtful and false , taken for principles . propositions looked on as principles , have so great an influence upon our opinions , that it is usually by them we judge of truth , and what is inconsistent with them , is so far from passing for probable with us , that it will not be allowed possible . the reverence born to these principles is so great , that the testimony , nor only of other men , but the evidence of our own senses are often rejected , when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these established rules . the great obstinacy that is to be found in men , firmly believing quite contrary opinions , thô many times equally absurd , in the various religions of mankind , are as evident a proof , as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional principles : so that men will disbelieve their own eyes , renounce the evidence of their senses , and give their own experience the lye , rather than admit of any thing disagreeing with these sacred tenents . secondly , received hypotheses . the difference between these and the former , is , that those who proceed by these , will admit of matter of fact , and agree with dissenters in that ; but differ in assigning of reasons , and explaining the manner of operation . these are not at that open defiance with their senses as the former ▪ they can endure to hearken to their information a little more patiently : but will by no means admit of their reports in the explanation of things ; nor be prevailed on by probabilities which would convince them , that things are not brought about just after the same manner , that they have decreed within themselves that they are . thirdly , predominant passions or inclinations : let never so much probability hang on one side of a covetous man's reasoning , and mon●y on the other , it is easie to foresee which will prevail . thô men cannot always openly gain-say , or resist the force of manifest probabilities , that make against them , yet yield they not to the argument . not but that it is the nature of the understanding , constantly to close with the more probable side ; but yet a man hath power to suspend , and restrain its enquiries , and not permit a full and satisfactory examination . until that be done there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent probabilities . first , that the arguments being brought in words , there may be a fallacy latent in them ; and the consequences being perhaps , many in train , may be some of them incoherent . there are few discourses so short and clear , to which men may not , with satisfaction enough to themselves raise this doubt , and from whose conviction they may not without reproach of disingenuity or unreasonableness set themselves free . secondly , manifest probabilities may be evaded upon this suggestion , that i know not yet all that may be said on the contrary side : and therefore , thô a man be beaten , it is not necessary he should yield , not knowing what forces there are in reserve behind . fourthly , authority , or the giving up our assent to the common received opinions , either of our friends or party , neighbourhood or country . how many men have no other ground for their tenents , than the supposed honesty or learning , or number of those of the same profession ? as if honest or bookish men could not err ; or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude . yet this with most men , serves the turn . all men are liable to error , and most men are in many points by passion or interest under temptation to it . this is certain , that there is not an opinion so absurd , which a man may not receive upon this ground . there is no error to be named , which has not had its professors . and a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in , if he thinks that he is in the right way , wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow ▪ but , notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errors and opinions , i must do mankind that right as to say , there are not so many men in errors and wrong opinions as is commonly supposed : not that i think they embrace the truth , but indeed , because , concerning those doctrines they keep such a stirr about , they have no thought , no opinion at all . for if any one should a little catechize the greatest part of the partisans of most of the sects in the world , he would not find concerning those matters they are so zealous for , that they have any opinions of their own . much less would he have reason to think , that they took them upon the examination of arguments , and appearance of probability . they are resolved to stick to a party , that education or interest has engaged them in ; and there , like the common soldiers of an army , shew their courage and warmth , as their leaders direct , without ever examining , or so much as knowing the cause they contend for . chap. xx. of the division of the sciences . all that can fall within the compass of humane understanding , being either , first , the nature of things ; their relations , and their manner of operation : or , secondly , that which man himself ought to do as a rational and voluntary agent , for the attainment of any end , especially happiness : or , thirdly , the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both of these are attained , and communicated : i think science may be properly divided into these three sorts . first , the knowledge of things , their constitutions , properties , and operations ; whether material or immaterial : this , in a litt●e more enlarged sense of the word , i call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or natural philosophy . the end of this is bare speculative truth , and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such , falls under this branch : whether it be god himself , angels , spirits , bodies , or any of their affections , as number , figure , &c. secondly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the skill of right applying our own powers and actions for the attainment of things , good and useful . the most considerable under this head , is ethicks , which is the seeking out those rules and measures of humane actions , which lead to happiness , and the means to practise them . the end of this is not bare speculation but right , and a conduct suitable thereto . thirdly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the doctrine of signs : the most usual being words , it is aptly enough termed logick : the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs , which the mind makes use of for the understanding of things , or conveying its knowledge to others . things are represented to the mind by ideas : and mens ideas are communicated to one another , by articulate sounds , or words . the consideration then of ideas and words , as the great instruments of knowledge makes no despicable part of their contemplation , who would take a view of humane knowledge in the whole extent of it . this seems to me the first and most general , as well as natural division , of the objects of our understanding . for a man can employ his thoughts about nothing , but either the contemplation of things themselves for the discovery of truth , or about the things in his own power , which are his actions , for the attainment of his own ends ; or the signs the mind makes use of , both in the one and the other , and the right ordering of them , for its clearer information . all which three , viz. things , as they are in themselves knowable : actions , as they depend on us in order to happiness , and the right use of signs , in order to knowledge , being toto coelo different , they seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual world wholly separate , and distinct one from another finis . the contents of the second book . the introduction . page 1 chap. i. of ideas in general , and their original . 7 chap. ii. of simple ideas . 13 chap. iii. of ideas of one sense . 14 chap. iv. of solidity . 15 chap. 5. of simple ideas of divers senses . 18 chap. 6. of simple ideas of reflection . 19 chap. 7. of simple ideas of sensation and reflection . 19 chap. 8. some farther considerations concerning simple ideas . 24 chap. 9. of perception . 31 chap. 10. of retention . 34 chap. 11. of discerning , and other operations of the mind . 37 chap. 12. of complex ideas . 41 chap. 13. of simple modes ; and first of the simple modes of space . 44 chap. 14. of duration , and its simple modes . 47 chap. 15. of duration and expansion considered together . 51 chap. 16. of numbers . 53 chap. 17. of infinity . 54 chap. 18. of other simple modes . 58 chap. 19. of the modes of thinking . 59 chap. 20. the modes of pleasure and pain . 61 chap. 21. of power . 64 chap. 22. of mixed modes . 71 chap. 23. of our complex ideas of substances . 77 chap. 24. of collective ideas of substances . 83 chap. 25. of relation . 84 chap. 26. of cause and effect , and other relations . 86 chap. 27. of identity and diversity . 89 chap. 28. of other relations . 97 chap. 29. of clear , obscure , distinct , and confused ideas . 104 chap. 30. of real and fantastical ideas . 108 chap. 31. of ideas adequate or inadequate . 110 chap. 32. of true and false ideas . 114 the contents of the third book chap. 1. of words or language in general page 121 chap. 2. of the signification of words . 124 chap. 3. of general terms . 128 chap. 4 of the names of simple ideas . 137 chap. 5. of the names of mixed modes and relations . 141 chap. 6. of the names of substances . 145 chap. 7. of particles . 153 chap. 8. of abstract and concrete terms . 156 chap. 9. of the imperfection of words . 158 chap. 10. of the abuse of words . 163 chap. 11. of the remedies of the foregoing imperfections and abuses . 174 the contents of the fourth book . chap. 1. of knowledge in general . page 180 chap. 2. of the degrees of our knowledge . 185 chap. 3. of the extent of humane knowledge . 194 chap. 4. of the reality of our knowledge . 213 chap. 5. of truth in general . 220 chap. 6. of universal propositions , their truth and certainty . 223 chap. 7. of maxims . 229 chap. 8. of trifling propositions 237 chap. 9. of our knowledge of existence . 241 chap. 10. of our knowledge of the existence of a god. 243 chap. 11. of our knowledge of the existence other things . 250 chap. 12. of the improvement of our knowledge . 258 chap. 13. some farther considerations concerning knowledge . 267 chap. 14. of judgment . 269 chap. 15. of probability . 271 chap. 16. of the degrees of assent . 273 chap. 17. of reason . 283 chap. 18. of faith and reason , and their distinct provinces . 292 chap. 19. of wrong assent or error . 299 chap. 20. of the division of the sciences . 308 books printed for , and sold by a. and j. churchill at the black swan in pater-noster-row . a view of universal history , from the creation , to the year of christ , 1695. by francis tallents , sometime fellow of magdalen colledge , cambridge . the whole graven in 16 copper-plates , each 15 inches deep , and 12 broad ; bound up into books , the sheets lined . price 16s . the general hist ▪ of the air. by r. boyl , esq 4to . a compleat journal of the votes , speeches , and debates , both of the house of lords and commons , throughout the whole reign of queen elizabeth . collected by sir simonds dewes , baronet , and published by paul bowes of the middle temple . esq the 2d . edit . fol. the works of the famous nith . machiavel , citizen and secretary of florence . written originally in italian , and from thence faithfully translated into eng. fol. mr. lock 's essay concerning humane understanding . the 3d edition with large additions . fol. — his thoughts of education . octav. two treatises of government ; the first , an answer to filmer's patriarcha . the later an essay concerning the true original , extent , and end of civil government . octav. the resurrection of the ( same ) body asserted from the tradition of the heathens , the ancient jews , and the primitive church . with an answer to the objections brought against it . by humphry hody d. d. considerations about lowering the interest , and raising the value of money . oct. 3d par. by mr. lock . two treatises of natural religion , octav. gentleman's religion , with the grounds and reasons of it . sermons preached by dr. r. leighton , late arch-bishop of glasgow . the second edi. oct the reasonableness of christianity , as delivered in the scriptures . octav. prince arthur , an heroick poem . in ten books , by r. blackmore , m. d. fellow of the colledge of physicians , london . fol.