distributed proofreaders principles of freedom by terence macswiney late lord mayor of cork 1921 [illustration: terence macswiney (late lord mayor of cork)] [illustration] to the soldiers of freedom in every land preface it was my intention to publish these articles in book form as soon as possible. i had them typed for the purpose. i had no time for revision save to insert in the typed copy words or lines omitted from the original printed matter. i also made an occasional verbal alteration in the original. one article, however, that on "intellectual freedom," though written in the series in the place in which it now stands, was not printed with them. it is now published for the first time. religion i wish to make a note on the article under this heading to avoid a possible misconception amongst people outside ireland. in ireland there is no religious dissension, but there is religious insincerity. english politicians, to serve the end of dividing ireland, have worked on the religious feelings of the north, suggesting the danger of catholic ascendancy. there is not now, and there never was, any such danger, but our enemies, by raising the cry, sowed discord in the north, with the aim of destroying irish unity. it should be borne in mind that when the republican standard was first raised in the field in ireland, in the rising of 1798, catholics and protestants in the north were united in the cause. belfast was the first home of republicanism in ireland. this is the truth of the matter. the present-day cleavage is an unnatural thing created by ireland's enemies to hold her in subjection and will disappear entirely with political freedom. it has had, however, in our day, one unhappy effect, only for a time fortunately, and this is disappearing. i refer to the rise of hibernianism. the english ruling faction having, for their own political designs, corrupted the orangemen with power and flattery, enabled them to establish an ascendancy not only over ulster, but indirectly by their vote over the south. this becoming intolerable, some sincere but misguided catholics in the north joined the organisation known as the ancient order of hibernians. this was, in effect, a sort of catholic freemasonry to counter the orange freemasonry, but like orangeism, it was a political and not a religious weapon. further, as a political weapon, it extended all through ireland during the last years of the irish parliamentary movement. in cork, for example, it completely controlled the city life for some years, but the rapid rise of the republican movement brought about the equally rapid fall of hibernianism. at the present moment it has as little influence in the public life of cork as sir edward carson himself. the great bulk of its one-time members have joined the republican movement. this demonstrates clearly that anything in the nature of a sectarian movement is essentially repugnant to the irish people. as i have pointed out, the hibernian order, when created, became at once a political weapon, but ireland has discarded that, and other such weapons, for those with which she is carving out the destinies of the republic. for a time, however, hibernianism created an unnatural atmosphere of sectarian rivalry in ireland. that has now happily passed away. at the time, however, of the writing of the article on religion it was at its height, and this fact coloured the writing of the article. on re-reading it and considering the publication of the present work i was inclined to suppress it, but decided that it ought to be included because it bears directly on the evil of materialism in religious bodies, which is a matter of grave concern to every religious community in the world. t. macs. contents chapter i. the basis of freedom ii. separation iii. moral force iv. brothers and enemies v. the secret of strength vi. principle in action vii. loyalty viii. womanhood ix. the frontier x. literature and freedom--the propagandist playwright xi. literature and freedom--art for art's sake xii. religion xiii. intellectual freedom xiv. militarism xv. the empire xvi. resistance in arms--foreword xvii. resistance in arms--the true meaning of law xviii. resistance in arms--objections xix. the bearna baoghail--conclusion +principles of freedom+ chapter i the basis of freedom i why should we fight for freedom? is it not strange, that it has become necessary to ask and answer this question? we have fought our fight for centuries, and contending parties still continue the struggle, but the real significance of the struggle and its true motive force are hardly at all understood, and there is a curious but logical result. men technically on the same side are separated by differences wide and deep, both of ideal and plan of action; while, conversely, men technically opposed have perhaps more in common than we realise in a sense deeper than we understand. ii this is the question i would discuss. i find in practice everywhere in ireland--it is worse out of ireland--the doctrine, "the end justifies the means." one party will denounce another for the use of discreditable tactics, but it will have no hesitation in using such itself if it can thereby snatch a discreditable victory. so, clear speaking is needed: a fight that is not clean-handed will make victory more disgraceful than any defeat. i make the point here because we stand for separation from the british empire, and because i have heard it argued that we ought, if we could, make a foreign alliance to crush english power here, even if our foreign allies were engaged in crushing freedom elsewhere. when such a question can be proposed it should be answered, though the time is not ripe to test it. if ireland were to win freedom by helping directly or indirectly to crush another people she would earn the execration she has herself poured out on tyranny for ages. i have come to see it is possible for ireland to win her independence by base methods. it is imperative, therefore, that we should declare ourselves and know where we stand. and i stand by this principle: no physical victory can compensate for spiritual surrender. whatever side denies that is not my side. what, then, is the true basis to our claim to freedom? there are two points of view. the first we have when fresh from school, still in our teens, ready to tilt against everyone and everything, delighting in saying smart things--and able sometimes to say them--talking much and boldly of freedom, but satisfied if the thing sounds bravely. there is the later point of view. we are no longer boys; we have come to review the situation, and take a definite stand in life. we have had years of experience, keen struggles, not a little bitterness, and we are steadied. we feel a heart-beat for deeper things. it is no longer sufficient that they sound bravely; they must ring true. the schoolboy's dream is more of a roman triumph--tramping armies, shouting multitudes, waving banners--all good enough in their way. but the dream of men is for something beyond all this show. if it were not, it could hardly claim a sacrifice. iii a spiritual necessity makes the true significance of our claim to freedom: the material aspect is only a secondary consideration. a man facing life is gifted with certain powers of soul and body. it is of vital importance to himself and the community that he be given a full opportunity to develop his powers, and to fill his place worthily. in a free state he is in the natural environment for full self-development. in an enslaved state it is the reverse. when one country holds another in subjection that other suffers materially and morally. it suffers materially, being a prey for plunder. it suffers morally because of the corrupt influences the bigger nation sets at work to maintain its ascendancy. because of this moral corruption national subjection should be resisted, as a state fostering vice; and as in the case of vice, when we understand it we have no option but to fight. with it we can make no terms. it is the duty of the rightful power to develop the best in its subjects: it is the practice of the usurping power to develop the basest. our history affords many examples. when our rulers visit ireland they bestow favours and titles on the supporters of their regime--but it is always seen that the greatest favours and highest titles are not for the honest adherent of their power--but for him who has betrayed the national cause that he entered public life to support. observe the men who might be respected are passed over for him who ought to be despised. in the corrupt politician there was surely a better nature. a free state would have encouraged and developed it. the usurping state titled him for the use of his baser instincts. such allurement must mean demoralisation. we are none of us angels, and under the best of circumstances find it hard to do worthy things; when all the temptation is to do unworthy things we are demoralised. most of us, happily, will not give ourselves over to the evil influence, but we lose faith in the ideal. we are apathetic. we have powers and let them lie fallow. our minds should be restless for noble and beautiful things; they are hopeless in a land everywhere confined and wasted. in the destruction of spirit entailed lies the deeper significance of our claim to freedom. iv it is a spiritual appeal, then, that primarily moves us. we are urged to action by a beautiful ideal. the motive force must be likewise true and beautiful. it is love of country that inspires us; not hate of the enemy and desire for full satisfaction for the past. pause awhile. we are all irritated now and then by some mawkish interpretation of our motive force that makes it seem a weakly thing, invoked to help us in evading difficulties instead of conquering them. love in any genuine form is strong, vital and warm-blooded. let it not be confused with any flabby substitute. take a parallel case. should we, because of the mawkishness of a "princess novelette," deride the beautiful dream that keeps ages wondering and joyous, that is occasionally caught up in the words of genius, as when shelley sings: "i arise from dreams of thee"? when foolish people make a sacred thing seem silly, let us at least be sane. the man who cries out for the sacred thing but voices a universal need. to exist, the healthy mind must have beautiful things--the rapture of a song, the music of running water, the glory of the sunset and its dreams, and the deeper dreams of the dawn. it is nothing but love of country that rouses us to make our land full-blooded and beautiful where now she is pallid and wasted. this, too, has its deeper significance. v if we want full revenge for the past the best way to get it is to remain as we are. as we are, ireland is a menace to england. we need not debate this--she herself admits it by her continued efforts to pacify us in her own stupid way. would she not ignore us if it were quite safe so to do? on the other hand, if we succeed in our efforts to separate from her, the benefit to england will be second only to our own. this might strike us strangely, but 'tis true, not the less true because the english people could hardly understand or appreciate it now. the military defence of ireland is almost farcical. a free ireland could make it a reality--could make it strong against invasion. this would secure england from attack on our side. no one is, i take it, so foolish as to suppose, being free, we would enter quarrels not our own. we should remain neutral. our common sense would so dictate, our sense of right would so demand. the freedom of a nation carries with it the responsibility that it be no menace to the freedom of another nation. the freedom of all makes for the security of all. if there are tyrannies on earth one nation cannot set things right, but it is still bound so to order its own affairs as to be consistent with universal freedom and friendship. and, again, strange as it may seem, separation from england will alone make for final friendship with england. for no one is so foolish as to wish to be for ever at war with england. it is unthinkable. now the most beautiful motive for freedom is vindicated. our liberty stands to benefit the enemy instead of injuring him. if we want to injure him, we should remain as we are--a menace to him. the opportunity will come, but it would hardly make us happy. this but makes clear a need of the human race. freedom rightly considered is not a mere setting-up of a number of independent units. it makes for harmony among nations and good fellowship on earth. vi i have written carefully that no one may escape the conclusion. it is clear and exacting, but in the issue it is beautiful. we fight for freedom--not for the vanity of the world, not to have a fine conceit of ourselves, not to be as bad--or if we prefer to put it so, as big as our neighbours. the inspiration is drawn from a deeper element of our being. we stifle for self-development individually and as a nation. if we don't go forward we must go down. it is a matter of life and death; it is out soul's salvation. if the whole nation stand for it, we are happy; we shall be grandly victorious. if only a few are faithful found they must be the more steadfast for being but a few. they stand for an individual right that is inalienable. a majority has no right to annul it, and no power to destroy it. tyrannies may persecute, slay, or banish those who defend it; the thing is indestructible. it does not need legions to protect it nor genius to proclaim it, though the poets have always glorified it, and the legions will ultimately acknowledge it. one man alone may vindicate it, and because that one man has never failed it has never died. not, indeed, that ireland has ever been reduced to a single loyal son. she never will be. we have not survived the centuries to be conquered now. but the profound significance of the struggle, of its deep spiritual appeal, of the imperative need for a motive force as lofty and beautiful, of the consciousness that worthy winning of freedom is a labour for human brotherhood; the significance of it all is seen in the obligation it imposes on everyone to be true, the majority notwithstanding. he is called to a grave charge who is called to resist the majority. but he will resist, knowing his victory will lead them to a dearer dream than they had ever known. he will fight for that ideal in obscurity, little heeded--in the open, misunderstood; in humble places, still undaunted; in high places, seizing every vantage point, never crushed, never silent, never despairing, cheering a few comrades with hope for the morrow. and should these few sink in the struggle the greatness of the ideal is proven in the last hour; as they fall their country awakens to their dream, and he who inspired and sustained them is justified; justified against the whole race, he who once stood alone against them. in the hour he falls he is the saviour of his race. chapter ii separation. i when we plead for separation from the british empire as the only basis on which our country can have full development, and on which we can have final peace with england, we find in opponents a variety of attitudes, but one attitude invariably absent--a readiness to discuss the question fairly and refute it, if this can be done. one man will take it superficially and heatedly, assuming it to be, according to his party, a censure on mr. redmond or mr. o'brien. another will take it superficially, but, as he thinks, philosophically, and will dismiss it with a smile. with the followers of mr. redmond or mr. o'brien we can hardly argue at present, but we should not lose heart on their account, for these men move _en masse_. one day the consciousness of the country will be electrified with a great deed or a great sacrifice and the multitude will break from lethargy or prejudice and march with a shout for freedom in a true, a brave, and a beautiful sense. we must work and prepare for that hour. then there is our philosophical friend. i expect him to hear my arguments. when i am done, he may not agree with me on all points; he may not agree with me on any point; but if he come with me, i promise him one thing: this question can no longer be dismissed with a smile. ii our friend's attitude is explained in part by our never having attempted to show that a separatist policy is great and wise. we have held it as a right, have fought for it, have made sacrifices for it, and vowed to have it at any cost; but we have not found for it a definite place in a philosophy of life. superficial though he be, our friend has indicated a need: we must take the question philosophically--but in the great and true sense. it is a truism of philosophy and science that the world is a harmonious whole, and that with the increase of knowledge, laws can be discovered to explain the order and the unity of the universe. accordingly, if we are to justify our own position as separatists, we must show that it will harmonise, unify and develop our national life, that it will restore us to a place among the nations, enable us to fulfil a national destiny, a destiny which, through all our struggles, we ever believe is great, and waiting for us. that must be accepted if we are to get at the truth of the matter. a great doctrine that dominates our lives, that lays down a rigid course of action, that involves self-denial, hard struggles, endurance for years, and possibly death before the goal is reached--any such doctrine must be capable of having its truth demonstrated by the discovery of principles that govern and justify it. otherwise we cannot yield it our allegiance. let us to the examination, then; we shall find it soul-stirring and inspiring. we must be prepared, however, to abandon many deeply-rooted prejudices; if we are unwilling, we must abandon the truth. but we will find courage in moving forward, and will triumph in the end, by keeping in mind at all times that the end of freedom is to realise the salvation and happiness of all peoples, to make the world, and not any selfish corner of it, a more beautiful dwelling-place for men. treated in this light, the question becomes for all earnest men great and arresting. our friend, who may have smiled, will discuss it readily now. yet he may not be convinced; he may point his finger over the wasted land and contrast its weakness with its opponents' strength, and conclude: "your philosophy is beautiful, but only a dream." he is at least impressed; that is a point gained; and we may induce him to come further and further till he adopts the great principle we defend. iii his difficulty now is the common error that a man's work for his country should be based on the assumption that it should bear full effect in his own time. this is most certainly false; for a man's life is counted by years, a nation's by centuries, and as work for the nation should be directed to bringing her to full maturity in the coming time, a man must be prepared to labour for an end that may be realised only in another generation. consider how he disposes his plans for his individual life. his boyhood and youth are directed that his manhood and prime may be the golden age of life, full-blooded and strong-minded, with clear vision and great purpose and high hope, all justified by some definite achievement. a man's prime is great as his earlier years have been well directed and concentrated. in the early years the ground is prepared and the seed sown for the splendid period of full development. so it is with the nation: we must prepare the ground and sow the seed for the rich ripeness of maturity; and bearing in mind that the maturity of the nation will come, not in one generation but after many generations, we must be prepared to work in the knowledge that we prepare for a future that only other generations will enjoy. it does not mean that we shall work in loneliness, cheered by no vision of the promised land; we may even reach the promised land in our time, though we cannot explore all its great wonders: that will be the delight of ages. but some will never survive to celebrate the great victory that will establish our independence; yet they shall not go without reward; for to them will come a vision of soul of the future triumph, an exaltation of soul in the consciousness of labouring for that future, an exultation of soul in the knowledge that once its purpose is grasped, no tyranny can destroy it, that the destiny of our country is assured, and her dominion will endure for ever. let any argument be raised against one such pioneer--he knows this in his heart, and it makes him indomitable, and it is he who is proven to be wise in the end. he judges the past clearly, and through the crust of things he discerns the truth in his own time, and puts his work in true relation to the great experience of life, and he is justified; for ultimately his work opens out, matures, and bears fruit a hundredfold. it may not be in a day, but when his hand falls dead, his glory becomes quickly manifest. he has lived a beautiful life, and has left a beautiful field; he has sacrificed the hour to give service for all time; he has entered the company of the great, and with them he will be remembered for ever. he is the practical man in the true sense. but there is the other self-styled practical man, who thinks all this proceeding foolish, and cries out for the expedient of the hour. has he ever realised the promise of his proposals? no, he is the most inefficient person who has ever walked the earth. but for a saving consideration let him go contemplate the wasted efforts of the opportunist in every generation, and the broken projects scattered through the desert-places of history. iv still one will look out on the grim things of the hour, and hypnotised by the hour will cry: "see the strength of the british empire, see our wasted state; your hope is vain." let him consider this clear truth: peoples endure; empires perish. where are now the empires of antiquity? and the empires of to-day have the seed of dissolution in them. but the peoples that saw the old empires rise and hold sway are represented now in their posterity; the tyrannies they knew are dead and done with. the peoples endured; the empires perished; and the nations of the earth of this day will survive in posterity when the empires that now contend for mastery are gathered into the dust, with all dead, bad things. we shall endure; and the measure of our faith will be the measure of our achievement and of the greatness of our future place. v is it not the dream of earnest men of all parties to have an end to our long war, a peace final and honourable, wherein the soul of the country can rest, revive and express itself; wherein poetry, music and art will pour out in uninterrupted joy, the joy of deliverance, flashing in splendour and superabundant in volume, evidence of long suppression? this is the dream of us all. but who can hope for this final peace while any part of our independence is denied? for, while we are connected in any shape with the british empire the connection implies some dependence; this cannot be gainsaid; and who is so foolish as to expect that there will be no collision with the british parliament, while there is this connection implying dependence on the british empire? if such a one exists he goes against all experience and all history. on either side of the connection will be two interests--the english interest and the irish interest, and they will be always at variance. consider how parties within a single state are at variance, conservatives and radicals, in any country in europe. the proposals of one are always insidious, dangerous or reactionary, as the case may be, in the eyes of the other; and in no case will the parties agree; they will at times even charge each other with treachery; there is never peace. it is the rule of party war. who, then, can hope for peace where into the strife is imported a race difference, where the division is not of party but of people? that is in truth the vain hope. and be it borne in mind the race difference is not due to our predominating gaelic stock, but to the separate countries and to distinct households in the human race. if we were all of english extraction the difference would still exist. there is the historic case of the american states; it is easy to understand. when a man's children come of age, they set up establishments for themselves, and live independently; they are always bound by affection to the parent-home; but if the father try to interfere in the house of a son, and govern it in any detail, there will be strife. it is hardly necessary to labour the point. if all the people in this country were of english extraction and england were to claim on that account that there should be a connection with her, and that it should dominate the people here, there would be strife; and it could have but one end--separation. we would, of whatever extraction, have lived in natural neighbourliness with england, but she chose to trap and harass us, and it will take long generations of goodwill to wipe out some memories. again, and yet again, let there be no confusion of thought as to this final peace; it will never come while there is any formal link of dependence. the spirit of our manhood will always flame up to resent and resist that link. separation and equality may restore ties of friendship; nothing else can: for individual development and general goodwill is the lesson of human life. we can be good neighbours, but most dangerous enemies, and in the coming time our hereditary foe cannot afford to have us on her flank. the present is promising; the future is developing for us: we shall reach the goal. let us see to it that we shall be found worthy. vi that we be found worthy; let this be borne in mind. for it is true that here only is our great danger. if with our freedom to win, our country to open up, our future to develop, we learn no lesson from the mistakes of nations and live no better life than the great powers, we shall have missed a golden opportunity, and shall be one of the failures of history. so far, on superficial judgment, we have been accounted a failure; though the simple maintenance of our fight for centuries has been in itself a splendid triumph. but then only would we have failed in the great sense, when we had got our field and wasted it, as the nations around us waste theirs to-day. we led europe once; let us lead again with a beautiful realisation of freedom; and let us beware of the delusion that is abroad, that we seek nothing more than to be free of restraint, as england, france and germany are to-day; let us beware of the delusion that if we can scramble through anyhow to freedom we can then begin to live worthily, but that in the interval we cannot be too particular. that is the grim shadow that darkens our path, that falls between us and a beautiful human life, and may drive us to that tiger-like existence that makes havoc through the world to-day. let us beware. i do not say we must settle now all disputes, such as capital, labour, and others, but that everyone should realise a duty to be high-minded and honourable in action; to regard his fellow not as a man to be circumvented, but as a brother to be sympathised with and uplifted. neither kingdom, republic, nor commune can regenerate us; it is in the beautiful mind and a great ideal we shall find the charter of our freedom; and this is the philosophy that it is most essential to preach. we must not ignore it now, for how we work to-day will decide how we shall live to-morrow; and if we are not scrupulous in our struggle, we shall not be pure in our future state, i know there are many who are not indifferent to high-minded action, but who live in dread of an exacting code of life, fearing it will harass our movements and make success impossible. let us correct this mistake with the reflection that the time is shaping for us. the power of our country is strengthening; the grip of the enemy is slackening; every extension of local government is a step nearer to independent government; the people are not satisfied with an instalment; their capacity for further power is developed, and they are equipped with weapons to win it. even in our time have we made great advance. let one fact alone make this evident. less than twenty years ago the irish language was despised; to-day the movement to restore it is strong enough to have it made compulsory in the national university. can anyone doubt from this sign of the times alone that the hour points to freedom, and we are on the road to victory? that we shall win our freedom i have no doubt; that we shall use it well i am not so certain, for see how sadly misused it is abroad through the world to-day. that should be our final consideration, and we should make this a resolution--our future history shall be more glorious than that of any contemporary state. we shall look for prosperity, no doubt, but let our enthusiasm be for beautiful living; we shall build up our strength, yet not for conquest, but as a pledge of brotherhood and a defence for the weaker ones of the earth; we shall take pride in our institutions, not only as guaranteeing the stability of the state, but as securing the happiness of the citizens, and we shall lead europe again as we led it of old. we shall rouse the world from a wicked dream of material greed, of tyrannical power, of corrupt and callous politics to the wonder of a regenerated spirit, a new and beautiful dream; and we shall establish our state in a true freedom that will endure for ever. chapter iii moral force i one of the great difficulties in discussing any question of importance in ireland is that words have been twisted from their original and true significance, and if we are to have any effective discussion, we must first make clear the meaning of our terms. love of country is quoted to tolerate every insidious error of weakness, but if it has any meaning it should make men strong-souled and resolute in every crisis. men working for the extension of local government toast "ireland a nation," and extol home rule as independence; but while there is any restraint on us by a neighbouring power, acknowledged superior, there is dependence to that extent. straightway, those who fight for independence shift their ground and plead for absolute independence, but there is no such thing as qualified independence; and when we abandon the simple name to men of half-measures, we prejudice our cause and confuse the issue. then there is the irreconcilable--how is he regarded in the common cry? always an impossible, wild, foolish person, and we frequently resent the name and try to explain his reasonableness instead of exulting in his strength, for the true irreconcilable is the simple lover of the truth. among men fighting for freedom some start up in their plea for liberty, pointing to the prosperity of england, france, and germany, and when we debate the means by which they won their power, we find our friends draw no distinction between true freedom and licentious living; but it would be better to be crushed under the wheels of great powers than to prosper by their example. and so, through every discussion we must make clear the meaning of our terms. there is one i would treat particularly now. of all the terms glibly flung about in every debate not one has been so confused as moral force. ii since the time of o'connell the cry moral force has been used persistently to cover up the weakness of every politician who was afraid or unwilling to fight for the whole rights of his country, and confusion has been the consequence. i am not going here to raise old debates over o'connell's memory, who, when all is said, was a great man and a patriot. let those of us who read with burning eyes of the shameless fiasco of clontarf recall for full judgment the o'connell of earlier years, when his unwearied heart was fighting the uphill fight of the pioneer. but a great need now is to challenge his later influence, which is overshadowing us to our undoing. for we find men of this time who lack moral courage fighting in the name of moral force, while those who are pre-eminent as men of moral fibre are dismissed with a smile--physical-force men. to make clear the confusion we need only to distinguish moral force from moral weakness. there is the distinction. call it what we will, moral courage, moral strength, moral force; we all recognise that great virtue of mind and heart that keeps a man unconquerable above every power of brute strength. i call it moral force, which is a good name, and i make the definition: a man of moral force is he who, seeing a thing to be right and essential and claiming his allegiance, stands for it as for the truth, unheeding any consequence. it is not that he is a wild person, utterly reckless of all mad possibilities, filled with a madder hope, and indifferent to any havoc that may ensue. no, but it is a first principle of his, that a true thing is a good thing, and from a good thing rightly pursued can follow no bad consequence. and he faces every possible development with conscience at rest--it may be with trepidation for his own courage in some great ordeal, but for the nobility of the cause and the beauty of the result that must ensue, always with serene faith. and soon the trepidation for himself passes, for a great cause always makes great men, and many who set out in hesitation die heroes. this it is that explains the strange and wonderful buoyancy of men, standing for great ideals, so little understood of others of weaker mould. the soldier of freedom knows he is forward in the battle of truth, he knows his victory will make for a world beautiful, that if he must inflict or endure pain, it is for the regeneration of those who suffer, the emancipation of those in chains, the exaltation of those who die, and the security and happiness of generations yet unborn. for the strength that will support a man through every phase of this struggle a strong and courageous mind is the primary need--in a word, moral force. a man who will be brave only if tramping with a legion will fail in courage if called to stand in the breach alone. and it must be clear to all that till ireland can again summon her banded armies there will be abundant need for men who will stand the single test. 'tis the bravest test, the noblest test, and 'tis the test that offers the surest and greatest victory. for one armed man cannot resist a multitude, nor one army conquer countless legions; but not all the armies of all the empires of earth can crush the spirit of one true man. and that one man will prevail. iii but so much have we felt the need of resisting every slavish tendency that found refuge under the name of moral force, that those of us who would vindicate our manhood cried wildly out again for the physical test; and we cried it long and repeatedly the more we smarted under the meanness of retrograde times. but the time is again inspiring, and the air must now be cleared. we have set up for the final test of the man of unconquerable spirit that test which is the first and last argument of tyranny--recourse to brute strength. we have surrounded with fictitious glory the carnage of the battlefields; we have shouted of wading through our enemies' blood, as if bloody fields were beautiful; we have been contemptuous of peace, as if every war were exhilarating; but, "war is hell," said a famous general in the field. this, of course, is exaggeration, but there is a grim element of truth in the warning that must be kept in mind at all times. if one among us still would resent being asked to forego what he thinks a rightful need of vengeance, let him look into himself. let him consider his feelings on the death of some notorious traitor or criminal; not satisfaction, but awe, is the uppermost feeling in his heart. death sobers us all. but away from death this may be unconvincing; and one may still shout of the glory of floating the ship of freedom in the blood of the enemy. i give him pause. he may still correct his philosophy in view of the horror of a street accident or the brutality of a prize-fight. iv but war must be faced and blood must be shed, not gleefully, but as a terrible necessity, because there are moral horrors worse than any physical horror, because freedom is indispensable for a soul erect, and freedom must be had at any cost of suffering; the soul is greater than the body. this is the justification of war. if hesitating to undertake it means the overthrow of liberty possessed, or the lying passive in slavery already accomplished, then it is the duty of every man to fight if he is standing, or revolt if he is down. and he must make no peace till freedom is assured, for the moral plague that eats up a people whose independence is lost is more calamitous than any physical rending of limb from limb. the body is a passing phase; the spirit is immortal; and the degradation of that immortal part of man is the great tragedy of life. consider all the mean things and debasing tendencies that wither up a people in a state of slavery. there are the bribes of those in power to maintain their ascendancy, the barter of every principle by time-servers; the corruption of public life and the apathy of private life; the hard struggle of those of high ideals, the conflict with all ignoble practices, the wearing down of patience, and in the end the quiet abandoning of the flag once bravely flourished; then the increased numbers of the apathetic and the general gloom, depression, and despair--everywhere a land decaying. viciousness, meanness, cowardice, intolerance, every bad thing arises like a weed in the night and blights the land where freedom is dead; and the aspect of that land and the soul of that people become spectacles of disgust, revolting and terrible, terrible for the high things degraded and the great destinies imperilled. it would be less terrible if an earthquake split the land in two, and sank it into the ocean. to avert the moral plague of slavery men fly to arms, notwithstanding the physical consequence, and those who set more count by the physical consequences cannot by that avert them, for the moral disease is followed by physical wreck--if delayed still inevitable. so, physical force is justified, not _per se_, but as an expression of moral force; where it is unsupported by the higher principle it is evil incarnate. the true antithesis is not between moral force and physical force, but between moral force and moral weakness. that is the fundamental distinction being ignored on all sides. when the time demands and the occasion offers, it is imperative to have recourse to arms, but in that terrible crisis we must preserve our balance. if we leap forward for our enemies' blood, glorifying brute force, we set up the standard of the tyrant and heap up infamy for ourselves; on the other hand, if we hesitate to take the stern action demanded, we fail in strength of soul, and let slip the dogs of war to every extreme of weakness and wildness, to create depravity and horror that will ultimately destroy us. a true soldier of freedom will not hesitate to strike vigorously and strike home, knowing that on his resolution will depend the restoration and defence of liberty. but he will always remember that restraint is the great attribute that separates man from beast, that retaliation is the vicious resource of the tyrant and the slave; that magnanimity is the splendour of manhood; and he will remember that he strikes not at his enemy's life, but at his misdeed, that in destroying the misdeed, he makes not only for his own freedom, but even for his enemy's regeneration. this may be for most of us perhaps too great a dream. but for him who reads into the heart of the question and for the true shaping of his course it will stand; he will never forget, even in the thickest fight, that the enemy of to-day and yesterday may be the genuine comrade of to-morrow. v if it is imperative that we should fix unalterably our guiding principles before we are plunged unprepared into the fight, it is even more urgent we should clear the mind to the truth now, for we have fallen into the dangerous habit of deferring important questions on the plea that the time is not ripe. in a word, we lack moral strength; and so, that virtue that is to safeguard us in time of war is the great virtue that will redeem us in time of servility. it need not be further laboured that in a state enslaved every mean thing flourishes. the admission of it makes clear that in such a state it is more important that every evil be resisted. in a normal condition of liberty many temporary evils may arise; yet they are not dangerous--in the glow of a people's freedom they waste and die as disease dies in the sunlight. but where independence is suppressed and a people degenerate, a little evil is in an atmosphere to grow, and it grows and expands; and evils multiply and destroy. that is why men of high spirit working to regenerate a fallen people must be more insistent to watch every little defect and weak tendency that in a braver time would leave the soul unruffled. that is why every difficulty, once it becomes evident, is ripe for settlement. to evade the issue is to invite disaster. resolution alone will save us in our many dangers. but a plea for policy will be raised to evade a particular and urgent question: "people won't unite on it"; that's one cry. "ignorant people will be led astray"; that's another cry. there is always some excuse ready for evasion. the difficulty is, that every party likes some part of the truth; no party likes it all; but we must have it all, every line of it. we want no popular editions and no philosophic selections--the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. this must be the rule for everything concerning which a man has a public duty and ought to have a public opinion. there is a dangerous tendency gaining ground of slurring over vital things because the settlement of them involves great difficulty, and may involve great danger; but whatever the issue is we must face it. it is a step forward to bring men together on points of agreement, but men come thus together not without a certain amount of suspicion. in a fight for freedom that latent suspicion would become a mastering fear to seize and destroy us. we must allay it now. we must lead men to discuss points of difference with respect, forbearance, and courage, to find a consistent way of life for all that will inspire confidence in all. at present we inspire confidence in no one; it would be fatal to hide the fact. this is a necessary step to bringing matters to a head. we cannot hope to succeed all at once, but we must keep the great aim in view. there will be objections on all sides; from the _blasã©_ man of the world, concerned only for his comfort, the mean man of business concerned only for his profits, the man of policy always looking for a middle way, a certain type of religious pessimist who always spies danger in every proposal, and many others. we need not consider the comfort of the first nor the selfishness of the second; but the third and fourth require a word. the man of policy offers me his judgment instead of a clear consideration of the truth. 'tis he who says: "you and i can discuss certain things privately. we are educated; we understand. ignorant people can't understand, and you only make mischief in supposing it. it's not wise." to him i reply: "you are afraid to speak the whole truth; i am afraid to hide it. you are filled with the danger to ignorant people of having out everything; i am filled with the danger to _you_ of suppressing anything. i do not propose to you that you can with the whole truth make ignorant people profound, but i say you must have the whole truth out for your own salvation." here is the danger: we see life within certain limitations, and cannot see the possibly infinite significance of something we would put by. it is of grave importance that we see it rightly, and in the difficulties of the case our only safe course is to take the evidence life offers without prejudice and without fear, and write it down. when the matter is grave, let it be taken with all the mature deliberation and care its gravity demands, but once the evidence is clearly seen, let us for our salvation write it down. for any man to set his petty judgment above the need for setting down the truth is madness; and i refuse to do it. there is our religious pessimist to consider. to him i say i take religion more seriously. i take it not to evade the problems of life, but to solve them. when i tell him to have no fear, this is not my indifference to the issue, but a tribute to the faith that is in me. let us be careful to do the right thing; then fear is inconsistent with faith. nor can i understand the other attitude. two thousand years after the preaching of the sermon on the mount we are to go about whispering to one another what is wise. vi to conclude: now, and in every phase of the coming struggle, the strong mind is a greater need than the strong hand. we must be passionate, but the mind must guide and govern our passion. in the aberrations of the weak mind decrying resistance, let us not lose our balance and defy brute strength. at a later stage we must consider the ethics of resistance to the civil power; the significance of what is written now will be more apparent then. let the cultivation of a brave, high spirit be our great task; it will make of each man's soul an unassailable fortress. armies may fail, but it resists for ever. the body it informs may be crushed; the spirit in passing breathes on other souls, and other hearts are fired to action, and the fight goes on to victory. to the man whose mind is true and resolute ultimate victory is assured. no sophistry can sap his resistance; no weakness can tempt him to savage reprisals. he will neither abandon his heritage nor poison his nature. and in every crisis he is steadfast, in every issue justified. rejoice, then good comrades; our souls are still our own. through the coldness and depression of the time there has lightened a flash of the old fire; the old enthusiasm, warm and passionate, is again stirring us; we are forward to uphold our country's right, to fight for her liberty, and to justify our own generation. we shall conquer. let the enemy count his dreadnoughts and number off his legions--where are now the legions of rome and carthage? and the spirit of freedom they challenged is alive and animating the young nations to-day. hold we our heads high, then, and we shall bear our flag bravely through every fight. persistent, consistent, straightforward and fearless, so shall we discipline the soul to great deeds, and make it indomitable. in the indomitable soul lies the assurance of our ultimate victory. chapter iv brothers and enemies i our enemies are brothers from whom we are estranged. here is the fundamental truth that explains and justifies our hope of re-establishing a real patriotism among all parties in ireland, and a final peace with our ancient enemy of england. it is the view of prejudice that makes of the various sections of our people hopelessly hostile divisions, and raises up a barrier of hate between ireland and england that can never be surmounted. if ireland is to be regenerated, we must have internal unity; if the world is to be regenerated, we must have world-wide unity--not of government, but of brotherhood. to this great end every individual, every nation has a duty; and that the end may not be missed we must continually turn for the correction of our philosophy to reflecting on the common origin of the human race, on the beauty of the world that is the heritage of all, our common hopes and fears, and in the greatest sense the mutual interests of the peoples of the earth. if, unheeding this, any people make their part of the earth ugly with acts of tyranny and baseness, they threaten the security of all; if unconscious of it, a people always high-spirited are plunged into war with a neighbour, now a foe, and yet fight, as their nature compels them, bravely and magnanimously, they but drive their enemy back to the field of a purer life, and, perhaps, to the realisation of a more beautiful existence, a dream to which his stagnant soul steeped in ugliness could never rise. ii on the road to freedom every alliance will be sternly tried. internal friendship will not be made in a day, nor external friendship for many a day, and there will be how many temptations to hold it all a delusion and scatter the few still standing loyally to the flag. we must understand, then, the bond that holds us together on the line of march, and in the teeth of every opposition. nothing but a genuine bond of brotherhood can so unite men, but we hardly seem to realise its truth. when a deep and ardent patriotism requires men of different creeds to come together frankly and in a spirit of comradeship, and when the most earnest of all the creeds do so, others who are colder and less earnest regard this union as a somewhat suspicious alliance; and, if they join in, do so reluctantly. others come not at all; these think our friends labour in a delusion, that it needs but an occasion to start an old fear and drive them apart, to attack one another with ancient bitterness fired with fresh venom. we must combat that idea. let us consider the attitude to one another of three units of the band, who represent the best of the company and should be typical of the whole; one who is a catholic, one who is a protestant, and one who may happen to be neither. the complete philosophy of any one of the three may not be accepted by the other two; the horizon of his hopes may be more or less distant, but that complete philosophy stretches beyond the limit of the sphere, within which they are drawn together to mutual understanding and comradeship, moved by a common hope, a brave purpose and a beautiful dream. the significance of their work may be deeper for one than for another, the origin of the dream and its ultimate aim may be points not held in common; but the beautiful tangible thing that they all now fight for, the purer public and private life, the more honourable dealings between men, the higher ideals for the community and the nation, the grander forbearance, courage and freedom, in all these they are at one. the instinctive recognition of an attack on the ideal is alive and vigilant in all three. the sympathy that binds them is ardent, deep and enduring. observe them come together. note the warm hand grasp, the drawn face of one, a hard-worker; of another, the eye anxious for a brother hard pressed; of the third, the eye glistening for the ideal triumphant; of all the intimate confidence, the mutual encouragement and self-sacrifice, never a note of despair, but always the exultation of the great fight, and the promise of a great victory. this is a finer company than a mere casual alliance; yet it makes the uninspired pause, wondering and questioning. these men are earnest men of different creeds; still they are as intimately bound to one another as if they knelt at the one altar. in the narrow view the creeds should be at one another's throats; here they are marching shoulder to shoulder. how is this? and the one whose creed is the most exacting could, perhaps, give the best reply. he would reply that within the sphere in which they work together the true thing that unites them can be done only the one right way; that instinctively seizing this right way they come together; that this is the line of advance to wider and deeper things that are his inspiration and his life; that if a comrade is roused to action by the nearer task, and labours bravely and rightly for it, he is on the road to widening vistas in his dream that now he may not see. that is what he would say whose vision of life is the widest. all objectors he may not satisfy. that what is life to him may leave his comrade cold is a difficulty; but against the difficulty stand the depth and reality of their comradeship, proven by mutual sacrifice, endurance, and faith, and he never doubts that their bond union will sometime prove to have a wise and beautiful meaning in the annals of god. iii but the men of different creeds who stand firmly and loyally together are a minority. we are faced with the great difficulty of uniting as a whole north and south; and we are faced with the grim fact that many whom we desire to unite are angrily repudiating a like desire, that many are sarcastically noting this, that many are coldly refusing to believe; while through it all the most bitter are emphasising enmity and glorifying it. all these unbelievers keep insisting north and south are natural enemies and must so remain. the situation is further embittered by acts of enmity being practised by both sides to the extreme provocation of the faithful few. their forbearance will be sorely tried, and this is the final test of men. by those who cling to prejudice and abandon self-restraint, extol enmity, and always proceed to the further step--the plea to wipe the enemy out: the counter plea for forbearance is always scorned as the enervating gospel of weakness and despair. though we like to call ourselves christian, we have no desire for--nay even make a jest of--that outstanding christian virtue; yet men not held by christian dogma have joyously surrendered to the sublimity of that divine idea. hear shelley speak: "what nation has the example of the desolation of attica by mardonius and xerxes, or the extinction of the persian empire by alexander of macedon restrained from outrage? was not the pretext for this latter system of spoliation derived immediately from the former? had revenge in this instance any other effect than to increase, instead of diminishing, the mass of malice and evil already existing in the world? the emptiness and folly of retaliation are apparent from every example which can be brought forward." shelley writes much further on retaliation, which he denounces as "futile superstition." simple violence repels every high and generous thinker. hear one other, mazzini: "what we have to do is not to establish a new order of things by violence. an order of things so established is always tyrannical even when it is better than the old." let us bear this in mind when there is an act of aggression on either side of the boyne. there will not be wanting on the other side a cry for retaliation and "a lesson." we shall receive every provocation to give up and acknowledge ancient bitterness, but then is the time to stand firm, then we shall need to practise the divine forbearance that is the secret of strength. iv but with only a minority standing to the flag we cry out for some hope of final success. men will not fight without result for ever; they ask for some sign of progress, some gleam of the light of victory. happily, searching the skies, our eyes can have their reward. we shall, no doubt, see, outstanding, dark evidence of old animosity; we shall hear fierce war-cries and see raging crowds, but the crowds are less numerous, and the wrath has lost its sting. men who raged twenty years ago rage now, but their fury is less real; and young men growing up around them, quite indifferent to the ideal, are also indifferent to the counter cries: they are passive, unimpressed by either side. rightly approached, they may understand and feel the glow of a fine enthusiasm; they are numbered by prejudice, they will become warm, active and daring under an inspiring appeal. remember, and have done with despair. think how you and i found our path step by step of the way: political life was full of conventions that suited our fathers' time, but have faded in the light of our day. we found these conventions unreal and put them by. this was no reflection on our fathers; what they fought for truly is our heritage, and we pay them a tribute in offering it in turn our loyalty inspired by their devotion. but their errors we must rectify; what they left undone we must take up and fulfil. that is the task of every generation, to take up the uncompleted work of the former one, and hand on to their successors an achievement and a heritage. youth recognises this instinctively, and every generation will take a step in advance of its predecessor, putting by its prejudices and developing its truth. every individual may know this from his own experience, and from it he knows that those who are now voicing old bitter cries are ageing, and will soon pass and leave no successors. not that prejudice will die for ever. each new day will have its own, but that which is now dividing and hampering us will pass. let the memory of its bitterness be an incentive to checking new animosities and keeping the future safe; but in the present let us grasp and keep in our mind that the barrier that sundered our nation must crumble, if only we have faith and persist, undeterred by old bitter cries, for they are dying cries, undepressed by millions apathetic, for it is the great recurring sign of the ideal, that one hour its light will flash through quivering multitudes, and millions will have vision and rouse to regenerate the land. v happily, it is nothing new to plead for brotherhood among irishmen now; unhappily, it is not so generally admitted, nor even recognised, that the same reason that exists for restoring friendly relations among irishmen, exists for the re-establishing of friendship with any outsider--england or another--with whom now or in the future we may be at war. friendliness between neighbours is one of the natural things of life. in the case of individuals how beautifully it shows between two dwellers in the same street or townland. they rejoice together in prosperity; give mutual aid in adversity; in the ordinary daily round work together in a spirit of comradeship; at all times they find a bond of unity in their mutual interests. consider, then, the sundering of their friendship by some act of evil on either side. the old friendship is turned to hate. now the proximity that gave intimate pleasure to their comradeship gives as keen an edge to their enmity; they meet one another, cross one another, harass one another at every point. the bitterness that is such a poison to life must be revolting to their best instincts; deep in their hearts must be a yearning for the casting out of hate and the return of old comradeship. still the estranged brothers are at daggers drawn. sometimes the evil done is so great and the bitterness so keen that the old spirit can apparently never be restored; but while there is any hope whatever the true heart will keep it alive deep down, for it must be cherished and kept in mind if the whole beauty of life is to be renewed and preserved for ever. it is so with nations as with individuals. once this is recognised we must be on guard against a new error, which is an old error in new form, the taking of means for end. the end of general peace is to give all nations freedom in essentials, to realise the deeper purpose, possibilities, fulness and beauty of life; it is not to have a peace at any price, peace with a certain surrender, the meaner peace that is akin to slavery. no, its message is to guard one nation from excess that has plunged another into evil, to leave the way open to a final peace, not base but honourable; it is to preserve the divine balance of the soul. it may be further urged that we are engaged in a great fight; that to try to rouse in men the more generous instincts will but weaken their hands by removing a certain driving bitterness that gives strength to their fight. whatever it removes it will not be their strength. in a war admittedly between brothers, a civil war, where different conceptions of duty force men asunder, father is up against son, and brother against brother; yet they are not weakened in their contest by ties of blood and the deeper-lying harmony of things that in happier times prevail to the exclusion of bitterness and hate. when, therefore, you teach a man his enemy is in a deep sense his brother, you do not draw him from the fight, but you give him a new conception of the goal to win and with a great dream inspire him to persevere and reach the goal. vi if, then, beyond individual and national freedom there is this great dream still to be striven for, let us not decry it as something too sublime for earth. it must be our guiding star to lead us rightly as far as we may go. we can travel rightly that part of the road we now tread on only by shaping it true to the great end that ought to inspire us all. we shall have many temptations to swerve aside, but the power of mind that keeps our position clear and firm will react against every destroying influence. in the first stage of the fight for internal unity, when blind bigotry is furiously insisting that we but plan an insidious scheme for the oppression of a minority, our firmness will save us till our conception of the end grow on that minority and convince all of our earnestness. then the dream will inspire them, the flag will claim them, and the first stage in the fight will be won. when internal unity is accomplished, we are within reach of freedom. yes, but cries an objector, "why plead for friendship with england, who will have peace only on condition of her supremacy?" and an answer is needed. if it takes two to make a fight, it also most certainly takes two to make a peace, unless one accepts the position of serf and surrenders. but this we do not fear; we can compel our freedom and we are confident of victory. there is still the step to friendship. many will be baffled by the difficulty, that while we must keep alive our generous instincts, we must be stern and resolute in the fight; while we desire peace we must prosecute war; while we long for comradeship we must be breaking up dangerous alliances: literary, political, trades and social unions formed with england while she is asserting her supremacy must be broken up till they can be reformed on a basis of independence, equality and universal freedom. while we are prosecuting these vigorous measures it may not seem the way to final friendship; but we must persist; independence is first indispensable. here again, however, while insisting among our own ranks on our conception of the end, it will grow on the mind of the enemy. they may put it by at first as a delusion or a snare, but one intimate moment will come when it will light up for them, and a new era is begun. in such a moment is evil abandoned, hate buried and friendship reborn. there is one honest fear that our independence would threaten their security: it will yet be replaced by the conviction that there is a surer safeguard in our freedom than in our suppression; the light will break through the clouds of suspicion and a star of stars will glorify the earth. for this end our enemy must have an ideal as high as our own; if thus an objector, he is right. but if in the gross materialism and greed of empire that is now the ruling passion with the enemy there is apparently little hope of a transformation that will make them spiritual, high-minded and generous, we must not abandon our ideal: while the meanness and tyranny of contemporary england stand forward against our argument and leave our reasoning cold, we can find a more subtle appeal in spirit, such an appeal as comes to us in a play of shakespeare's, a song of shelley's, or a picture of turner's. from the heart of the enemy genius cries, bearing witness to our common humanity, and the yearning for such high comradeship is alive, and the dream survives to light us on the forward path. we must travel that path rightly. we can so travel whatever the enemy's mind. more difficult it will be, but it can be done. that is the great significance and justification of nationalism: it is the unanswerable argument to cosmopolitanism. if the greatness and beauty of life that ought to be the dream of all nations is denied by all but one, that one may keep alive the dream within her own frontier till its fascination will arrest and inspire the world. if this ultimate dream is still floating far off, in its pursuit there is for us achievement on achievement, and each brave thing done is in itself a beauty and a joy for ever. for the good fighter there is always fine recompense; a clear mind, warm blood, quick imagination, grasp of life and joy in action, and at the end of day always an eminence won. yes, and from the height of that eminence will come ringing down to the last doubter a last word: we may reach the mountaintops in aspiring to the stars. chapter v the secret of strength i to win our freedom we must be strong. but what is the secret of strength? it is fundamental to the whole question to understand this rightly, and, once grasped, make it the mainstay of individual existence, which is the foundation of national life. so much has the bodily power of over-riding minorities been made the criterion of absolute power, that to make clear the truth requires patience, insight, and a little mental study. but the end is a great end. it is to reconnoitre the most important battlefield, to discover the dispositions of the enemy, to measure our own resources and forge our strength link by link till we put on the armour of invincibility. ii we have to grasp a distinction, knowledge of which is essential to discerning true strength. it can be clearly seen in the contrast between two certain fighting forces; first, a well-organised army, capably led, marching forward full of hope and buoyancy; second, a remnant of that army after disaster, a mere handful, not swept like their comrades in panic, but with souls set to fight a forlorn hope. let us study the two: in the contrast we shall learn the secret. the courage of the well-organised army is not of so fine a quality as that nerving the few to fight to the last gasp. consider first the army. what is its value as a force? its discipline, its consolidation, the absolute obedience of its units to its officers, with the resulting unity of the whole; added to this is the sense of security in numbers, buoyancy of marching in a compact body, confidence in capable chiefs--all these factors go to the making of the courage and strength of the army. it is because their combination makes for the reliability of the force that discipline is so much valued and enforced, even to the point of death. let us keep this in our mind, that their strength lies in their numbers, concentration, unity, reliance on one another and on their chiefs. a sudden disaster overtakes that army--the death of a great general, the miscarriage of some plan, a surprise attack, any of the chances of war, and the strength of the army is pierced, the discipline shaken, the sense of security gone. there is an instinctive movement to retreat; the habit of discipline keeps it orderly at first; the fear grows; all precaution and restraint are thrown aside--the retreat is a rout, the army a rabble, the end debacle. external discipline in giving them its strength left them without individual resource; internal discipline was ignored. when their combined strength was gone there was individual helplessness and panic. consider, now, a remnant of that army, the members of which have the courage of the finer quality, individually resolute and set on resistance, clearly seeing at once all the possible consequences of their action, yet with that higher quality of soul accepting them without hesitation, pledging all human hopes for one last great hope of snatching victory from defeat, or, if not to save a lost battle, to check an advancing host, rally flying forces, and redeem a campaign. this is the heroic quality. in a crisis, the mind possessed of it does not wait for instructions or to reason a conclusion. it sees definite things, and swift as thought decides. there are flying legions, a flag down, a conquering army, and flight or death--to all eyes these are apparent; but to a brave company between that flight and death there is a gleam of hope, of victory, and for that forlorn hope flight is put by with the acceptance of death in the alternative if they fail. that is the quality to redeem us. because it is witnessed so often in our history we are going to win; not for our prowess in more fortunate war on an even field or with the flowing tide, not for many victories in many lands, but for the sacred places in this our brave land that are memorable for fights that registered the land unconquerable. why a last stand and a sacrifice are more inspiring than a great victory is one of the hidden things; but the truth stands: for thinking of them our spirits re-kindle, our courage re-awakens, and we stiffen our backs for another battle. iii we have, then, to develop individual patience, courage, and resolution. once this is borne in mind our work begins. in places there is a dangerous idea that sometime in the future we may be called on to strike a blow for freedom, but in the meantime there is little to do but watch and wait. this is a fatal error; we have to forge our strength in the interval. there is a further mistake that our national work is something apart, that social, business, religious and other concerns have no relation to it, and consequently we set apart a few hours of our leisure for national work, and go about our day as if no nation existed. but the middle of the day has a natural connection with the beginning of the day and the end of the day, and in whatever sphere a man finds himself, his acts must be in relation to and consistent with every other sphere. he will be the best patriot and the best soldier who is the best friend and the best citizen. one cannot be an honest man in one sphere and a rascal in another; and since a citizen to fulfil his duty to his country must be honourable and zealous, he must develop the underlying virtues in private life. he must strengthen the individual character, and to do this he must deal with many things seemingly remote and inconsequential from a national point of view. everything that crosses a man's path in his day's round of little or great moment requires of him an attitude towards it, and the conscious or unconscious shaping of his attitude is determining how he will proceed in other spheres not now in view. suppose the case of a man in business or social life. he has to work with others in a day's routine or fill up with them hours of leisure they enjoy together. consider to what accompaniment the work is often done and with what manner of conversation the leisure is often filled. in a day's routine, where men work together, harmonious relations are necessary; yet what bickerings, contentions, animosities fill many a day over points never worth a thought. you will see two men squabble like cats for the veriest trifle, and then go through days like children, without a word. you will see something similar in social life among men and women equally--petty jealousies, personalities, slanderings, mean little stories of no great consequence in themselves, except in the converse sense of showing how small and contemptible everything and everyone concerned is. a keen eye notes with some depression the absence from both spheres of a fine manliness, a generous conception of things, a large outlook, that prevents a squabble with a smile, and because of a consciousness of the need for determination in a great fight for a principle, holds in true contempt the trivialities of an hour. for in all the mean little bickerings of life there is involved not a principle, but a petty pride. one has to note these things and decide a line of action. in the abstract the right course seems quite natural and easy, but in fact it is not so. a man finds another act towards him with unconscious impudence or arrogance, and at once flies into a rage; there is a fierce wrangle, and at the end he finds no purpose served, for nothing was at stake. he has lost his temper for nothing. in his heat he may tell you "he wouldn't let so-and-so do so-and-so," but on the same principle he should hold a street-argument with every fish-wife who might call him a name. he may tell you "he will make so-and-so respect him," but he offends his own self-respect if he cannot consider some things beneath him. one must have a sense of proportion and not elevate every little act of impudence into a challenge of life to be fought over as for life and death. it may be corrected with a little humour or a little disdain, but always with sympathy for the narrow mind whose view of life cannot reach beyond these petty things. yet, to repeat, it is not easy. an irritable temper will be on fire before reason can check it; the process of correction will prove uncomfortable--the reasons will be there, but the feelings in revolt. still, little by little, it is brought under, and in the end the nasty little irritability is killed just like a troublesome nerve; and, by and by, what once provoked a fierce rage becomes a subject for humorous reflection. let no one fear we kill the nerve for the great battle of life; this we but strengthen and make constant. every act of personal discipline is contributing to a subconscious reservoir whence our nobler energies are supplied for ever. and so, little things lead to great; and in an office wrangle or a social squabble there is need for developing those very qualities of judgment, courage, and patience which equip a man for the trials of the battlefield or the ruling of the state. iv we have considered the individual in business and social life. let us now follow him into a political assembly. we find the same conditions prevail. again, men fight bitterly but most frequently for nothing worth a fight; and again those rightly judging the situation must resolve not to be tempted into a wrangle even if their restraint be called by another name. what in a political assembly is often the first thing to note? we begin by the assumption, "this is a practical body of men," the words invariably used to cover the putting by of some great principle that we ought all endorse and uphold. but, first, by one of the many specious reasons now approved, we put the principle by, and before long we are at one another's throats about things involving no principle. it is not necessary to particularise. note any meeting for the same general conditions: a chairman, indecisive, explaining rules of order which he lacks the grit to apply; members ignoring the chair and talking at one another; others calling to order or talking out of time or away from the point; one unconsciously showing the futility of the whole business by asking occasionally what is before the chair, or what the purpose of the meeting. this picture is familiar to us all, and curiously we seem to take it always as the particular freak of a particular time or locality; but it is nothing of the kind. it is the natural and logical result of putting by principle and trying to live away from it. yet, that is what we are doing every day. it means we lack collectively the courage to pursue a thing to its logical conclusion and fight for the truth realised. if we are to be otherwise as a body, it will only be by personal discipline training for the wider and greater field. we must get a proper conception of the great cause we stand for, its magnitude and majesty, and that to be worthy of its service we must have a standard above reproach, have an end of petty proposals and underhand doings, be of brave front, resolute heart, and honourable intent. we must all understand this each in his own mind and shape his actions, each to be found faithful in the test. in fine, if in private life there is need for developing the great virtues requisite for public service, even more is it necessary in public life to develop the courage, patience and wisdom of the soldier and the statesman. v a concrete case will give a clearer grasp of the issue than any abstract reasoning. our history, recent and remote, affords many examples of the abandoning by our public men of a principle, to defend which they entered public life; and our action on such an occasion is invariably the same--to regard the delinquent as simply a traitor, to load him with invective and scorn and brand him for ever. we never see it is not innate wickedness in the man, but a weakness against which he has been untrained and undisciplined, and which leaves him helpless in the first crisis. ireland has recently been incensed by the action of some of her mayors and lord mayors in connection with the english coronation festival; the feeling has been acute in the metropolis. certain things are obvious, but how many see what is below the surface? let me suggest a case and a series of circumstances; the more pointed the case, the more interesting. i will suppose a particular mayor is an old fenian: let us see how for him a web is finely woven, and in the end how securely he is netted. first a mayor is a magistrate, and must take the judicial oath, but the old fenian has taken an oath of allegiance to ireland--clash number one. it is not simply a question of yes or no; there are attendant circumstances. around a public man in place circulates a swarm of interested people, needy friends, meddling politicians, "supporters" generally. the chief magistrate will have influence on the bench which they all wish to invoke now and then, and they all wish to see him there. they don't approve of any principle that stands in the way. they group themselves together as his "supporters," and claiming to have put him into public life, they act as if they had acquired a lease of his soul. not what he knows to be right, but what they believe to be useful, must be done; and before the first day is done the first fight must be made. however, the old fenian has enough of the spirit of old times to come safe through the first round. but the second is close on his heels: dublin castle has been attentive. the mayor, as chief magistrate, has privileges on which the castle now silently closes. there are private and veiled remonstrances by secret officials: "the mayor is acting illegally; he must not do so-and-so; such is the function of a magistrate; he has not taken the oath," etc. all this renewing the fight of the first day, for the castle, too, wants the mayor on the bench to brand him as its own and alienate him from the old flag. it puts on the pressure by suppressing his privileges, weakening his influence, and disappointing his "supporters." all this is silently done. still, the mayor holds fast, but he has not counted on this, and is beginning to be baffled and worried. meanwhile a sort of guerilla attack is being maintained: invitations arrive to garden parties at windsor, lesser functions nearer home, free passages to all the gay festivals, free admissions everywhere, the route indicated, and a gracious request for the presence of the mayor and mayoress. genuine business engagements now save the situation, and the invitations are put by, but our chief citizen is now bewildered. these social missiles are flying in all directions, always gracious and flattering, never challenging and rude--who can withstand them? still he is bewildered, but not yet caught. a new assault is made: the great health crusade battery is called up. here we must all unite, god's english and the wild irish, the fenian and the castleman, the labourer and the lord. surely, we are all against the microbes. there is a great demonstration, their excellencies attend--and the mayor presides. under the banner of the microbe he is caught. it is a great occasion, which their excellencies grace and improve. his excellency is affable with the mayor; her excellency is confidential and gracious with the mayoress--we might have been schoolchildren in the same townland we are so cordial. everything proceeds amid plaudits, and winds up in acclamation. their excellencies depart. great is the no-politics era--you can so quietly spike the guns of many an old politician--and keep him safe. the social amenities do this. their excellencies have gone, but they do not forget. there is a warm word of thanks for recent hospitality. perhaps the mayor has a daughter about to be married, or a son has died; it is remembered, and the cordial congratulation or gracious sympathy comes duly under the great seal. what surly man would resent sympathy? and so, the strength of the old warrior is sapped; the web is woven finely; in its secret net the castle has its man. you who have exercised yourselves in dublin recently over mayoral doings, note all this--not to the making light of any man's surrender, but to the true judging of the event, its deeper significance and danger. whoever fails must be called to account. when a man takes a position of trust, influence, and honour, and, whatever the difficulty, abandons a principle he should hold sacred, he must be held responsible. a battle is an ordeal, and we must be stern with friend and foe. but there is something more sinister than the weakness of the man: remember the net. vi the concrete case makes clear the principle in question. the man whom we have seen go down would have been safe if he had to fight no battle but one he could face with all his true friends, and in the open light of day. having to fight a secret battle was never even considered: threats direct or vague or subtle, blandishments, cajolery, graciousness, patronage, flattery, plausible generalities, attacks indirect and insidious--all coming without pause, secret, silent, tireless. he who is to be proof against this, and above threat or flattery, must have been disciplined with the discipline of a life that trains him for every emergency. you cannot take up such a character like a garment to suit the occasion: it must be developed in private and public by all those daily acts that declare a man's attitude, register his convictions, and form his mind. it gives its own reward at once, even in the day where nothing is apparently at stake; where men scramble furiously over the petty things of life; for he who sees these things at their proper value is unruffled. his composure in all the fury has its own value. but the mind that held him so, by the very act of dismissing something petty, gets a clearer conception of the great things of life; by intuition is at once awake to a hovering and fatal menace to individual or national existence, unseen of the common eye; and in that hour proves, to the confusion of the enemy, clear, vigorous and swift. let us, then, for this great end note what is the secret of strength. not alone to be ready to stand in with a host and march bravely to battle--the discipline that provides for this is great and valuable and must be always observed and practised. this gives, however, only the common courage of the crowd, and can only be trusted on an even field where the chances of war are equal. but when there is a struggle to restore freedom, where from the nature of the case the chances are uneven and the soldiers of liberty are at every disadvantage, then must we seek to adjust the balance by a finer courage and a more enduring strength. the mustering of legions will not suffice. the general reviewing this fine array who would rightly estimate the power he may command, must silently examine the units, to judge of this brave host how large a company can be formed to fight a forlorn hope. if this spirit is in reserve, he is armed against every emergency. if the chances are equal, he will have a splendid victory; if by any of the turns of war his legions are shaken and disaster threatened, there is always a certain rallying-ground where the host can re-form and the field be re-won, and the flag that has seen so many vicissitudes be set at last high and proudly in the light of freedom. chapter vi principle in action i our philosophy is valueless unless we bring it into life. with sufficient ingenuity we might frame theory after theory, and if they could not be put to the test of a work-a-day existence we but add another to the many dead theories that litter the history of philosophy. our principles are not to argue about, or write about, or hold meetings about, but primarily to give us a rule of life. to ignore this is to waste time and energy. to observe and follow it is to take from the clouds something that appeals to us, work it into life, by it interpret the problems to hand, make our choice between opposing standards, and maintain our fidelity to the true one against every opposition and through every fitful though terrible depression; so shall we startle people with its reality, and make for it a disciple or an opponent, but always at once convince the generation that there is a serious work in hand. ii if our philosophy is to be worked into life the first thing naturally is to review the situation. if we are to judge rightly, we must understand the present, draw from the past its lesson, and shape our plans for the future true to the principles that govern and inform every generation. let us survey the past, taking a sufficiently wide view between two points--say '98 and our own time--and we see certain definite conditions. great luminous years--'98, '03, '48, '67, rise up, witness to a great principle, readiness for sacrifice, unshaken belief in truth, valour and freedom, and a flag that will ultimately prevail. in these years the people had vision, the blood quickened, a living flame swept the land, scorching up hypocrisy, deceit, meanness, and lighting all brave hearts to high hope and achievement--for, the whimperers notwithstanding, it was always achievement to challenge the enemy and stagger his power, though yet his expulsion is delayed. between the glorious years of the living flame there intervened pallid times of depression, where every disease of soul and body crept into the open. true hearts lived, scattered here and there, believing still but disorganised and bewildered--the leaders were stricken down and in their place, obscuring the beauty of life, the grandeur of the past, and our future destiny, came time-servers, flatterers, hypocrites, open traffickers in honour and public decency, fastening their mean authority on the land. these are the two great resting-places in our historic survey: the generation of the living flame and the generation of despair; and it is for us to decide--for the decision rests with us--whether we shall in our time merely mark time or write another luminous chapter in the splendid history of our race. iii let us consider these two generations apart, to understand their distinctive features more clearly for our own guidance. take first the years of vision and the general effort to replant the old flag on our walls. with the first enthusiasts breathing the living flame abroad, the kindling hope, the widening fires, the deepening dream, there grows a consciousness of the greatness of the goal, of the general duty, of the individual responsibility for higher character, steadier work, and purer motive; and gradually meanness, trickeries, and treacheries are weeded out of the individual and national consciousness: there is a realisation of a time come to restore the nation's independence, and with passion and enthusiasm are fused a fine resolve and nerve. all the excited doings of the feverish or pallid years are put by as unworthy or futile. the great idea inspires a great fight; and that fight is made, and, notwithstanding any reverse, must be recorded great. whatever concourse of circumstances mar the dream and delay the victory, those brave years are as a torch in witness to the ideal, in justification of its soldiers and in promise of final success. iv let us examine now the deadening years that intervene between the great fights for freedom. we have known something of these times ourselves, have touched on them already, and need not further draw out the demoralising things that corrupt and dishearten us. but what we urgently require to study is the kind of effort--more often the absence of effort--made in such years by those who keep their belief in freedom and feel at times impelled in some way or other to action. they have followed a lost battle, and in the aftermath of defeat they are numbed into despair. they refuse to surrender to the forces of the hour, but they lack the fine faith and enthusiasm of the braver years that challenged these forces at every point and stood or fell by the issue. they lie apathetic till, moved by some particular meanness or treachery, they are roused to spasmodic anger, rush to act in some spasmodic way--generally futile, and then relapse into helplessness again. they lack the vision that inspires every moment, discerns a sure way, and heightens the spirit to battle without ceasing, which is characteristic of the great years. they tacitly accept that theirs is a useless generation, that the enemy is in the ascendant, that they cannot unseat him, and their action, where any is made, is but to show their attitude, never to convince opponents that the battle is again beginning, that this is a bid for freedom, that history will be called on to record their fight and pay tribute to their times. their action has never this great significance. when stung to fitful madness by the boastful votaries of power, their occasional frantic efforts are more as relief to their feelings than destructive to the tyranny in being. let us realise this to the full; and seeing the futility in other years of every pathetic makeshift to annoy or circumvent the enemy, put by futilities and do a great work to justify our time. v we have, then, to consider and decide our immediate attitude to life, where we stand. there are errors to remove. the first is the assumption that we are only required to acknowledge the flag in places, offer it allegiance at certain meetings at certain times that form but a small part of our existence; while we allow ourselves to be dispensed from fidelity to our principles when in other places, where other standards are either explicitly or tacitly recognised. that we must carry our flag everywhere; that there must be no dispensation: these are the cardinal points of our philosophy. life is a great battlefield, and any hour in the day a man's flag may be challenged and he must stand and justify it. an idea you hold as true is not to be professed only where it is proclaimed; it will whisper and you must be its prophet in strange places; it is insistent of all things--you must glory in it or deny it; there is no escaping it, and there is no middle way; wherever your path lies it will cross you and you must choose. beware lest on any plea you put it by. you cannot elect to do nothing; the concourse of circumstances would take you to some side; to do nothing is still to take a side. priest, poet, professor, public man, professional man, business man, tradesman--everyone will be called to answer; in every walk of life the true idea will find the false in conflict and the battle must be fought out there--the battle is lost when we satisfy ourselves with an academic debate in our spare moments. this is a debating club age, and a plea for an ideal is often wasted, taken as a mere point in an argument; but to walk among men fighting passionately for it as a thing believed in, is to make it real, to influence men never reached in other ways; it is to arrest attention, arouse interest and quicken the masses to advance. and wherever the appeal for the flag is calling us the snare of the enemy is in wait. our history so bristles with instances that a particular concrete case need not be cited. we know that priests will get more patronage if they discourage the national idea; that professors will get more emoluments and honours if they can ban it; that public men will receive places and titles if they betray it; that the professional man will be promised more aggrandisement, the business man more commerce, and the tradesman more traffic of his kind--if only he put by the flag. most treacherous and insidious the temptation will come to the man, young and able, everywhere. it will say, "you have ability; come into the light--only put that by; it keeps you obscure. and what purpose does it serve now? be practical; come." and you may weaken and yield and enter the light for the general applause, but the old idea will rankle deep down till smothered out, and you will stand in the splendour--a failure, miserable, hopeless, not apparent, indeed, but for all that, final. you may stand your ground, refuse the bribe, uphold the flag, and be rated a fool and a failure, but they who rate you so will not understand that you have won a battle greater than all the triumphs of empires; you will keep alive in your soul true light and enduring beauty; you will hear the music eternally in the heart of the high enthusiast and have vision of ultimate victory that has sustained all the world over the efforts of centuries, that uplifts the individual, consolidates the nation, and leads a wandering race from the desert into the promised land. vi if we are to justify ourselves in our time we must have done with dispensations. many honest men are astray on this point and think attitudes justifiable that are at the root of all our failures. what is the weakness? it is so simple to explain and so easy to understand that one must wonder how we have been ignoring it quietly and generally so long. a man, as we have seen, acknowledges his flag in certain places; in other places it is challenged and he pulls it down. he is dispensed. he believes in his heart, may even write an anonymous letter to the paper, will salute the flag again elsewhere, but he will not carry his flag through every fight and through every day. when a particular crisis arises, which involves our public boards, public men, and business men in action, that requires a decision for or against the nation, he will find it in his place in life not wise to be prominent on his own side, and he is silently absent from his meetings--he gives a subscription but excuses himself from attendance. he satisfies himself with private professions of faith and whispered encouragement to those who fill the gap--words that won't be heard at a distance--and, worst of all, he thinks, because some stake in life may be jeopardised by bolder action, he is justified. the answer is, simply he is not justified. nor should anyone who is prepared to take the risk himself take it on himself to absolve others--nor, least of all, openly preach a milder doctrine to lead others who are timid to the farther goal, believed in at heart. encourage them by all means to practise their principles as far as they go; never restrict yours, or you will find yourself saying things you can't altogether approve; and if you tell a man to do things you can't altogether approve, and keep on telling him, it wears into you, and a thing you once held in abhorrence you come to think of with indifference. you change insensibly. old friends rage at you, and because of it you rage at them--not knowing how you have changed. you dare not let what you believe lie in abeyance or say things inconsistent with it, else to-morrow you'll be puzzled to say what you believe. you will hardly say two things to fit each other. let us have no half policies. our policy must be full, clear, consistent, to satisfy the restless, inquiring minds; when we win all such over, the merely passive people will follow. it should be clear that no man can dispense himself or his fellow from a grave duty; but for all that we have been liberal with our dispensations, and it has left us in confusion and failure. on the understanding that we will be heroes to-morrow, we evade being men to-day. we think of some hazy hour in the future when we may get a call to great things; we realise not that the call is now, that the fight is afoot, that we must take the flag from its hidden resting-place and carry it boldly into life. so near a struggle may touch us with dread; but to dread provoking a fight is to endure without resistance all the consequences of a lost battle--a battle that might have been won. and if we are to be fit for the heroic to-morrow we must arise and be men to-day. vii at times we find ourselves on neutral ground. the exigencies of the struggle involve this; and unfortunately we have in our midst sincere men who do not believe in restoring ireland to her original independence. perhaps, from a tendency to lose our balance at times, it is well to have near by these men whose obvious sincerity may serve as a correcting influence. we have to make them one with us; in the meantime we meet them on neutral ground for some common purpose. yet, we must take our flag everywhere? yes, that is fundamental. what then of the places where men of diverging views meet; do we abjure the flag? by no means. the understanding here is not to force our views on others, but we must keep our principles clear in mind that no hostile view be forced on us. we must see to it that neutrality be observed. one of the pitfalls to be aware of is, that something which on our principles we should not recognise, is assumed as recognised by others because to attack it would be to violate neutrality. but if it may not be resisted, it may not be recognised; this is neutrality; it is to stand on equal terms. and since grave matters divide us--not directly concerned in our national struggle for freedom--let the dangerous idea be banished, that in entering on common ground we decry all opposing beliefs. for men who hold beliefs as vital it would not be creditable to either side to put them easily by. no, we do not ask them to forget themselves, but to respect one another--an entirely greater and more honourable principle. on neutral ground a man is not called on to abjure his flag; rather he and his flag are in sanctuary. viii when we find the national idea touches life at every point, we begin to realise how frequent the call is to defend it without warning. it is not that men directly raise the idea purposely to reject it, but that their habit of life, to which they expect all to conform, is unconsciously assuming that our ruling principle can have no place now or in the future. their assumption that the _status quo_ cannot be changed will be the cause of most collision at first; and we must be quietly ready with the counter-assumption, stand for the old idea and justify it. we must realise, too, that the number of people who have definite, strong, well-developed views against ours are comparatively small. this small number embraces the english government that commands forces, obeying it without reason, and influencing the general mass of people whose general attitude is indecision--adrift with the ruling force. it is this general mass of men we must permeate with the true idea, and give them more decision, more courage, more pride of race, and bring them to prove worthy of the race. they will begin to have confidence in the cause when they begin to see it vindicated amongst them day by day; and that vindication must be our duty. that duty will not be to seek; it will offer itself and we shall have our test. how? consider when men come together for any purpose where different views prevail and general things of no great moment form the subject of debate--suddenly, unconsciously or tentatively, one will raise some idea that may divide the company--say, acknowledging the english crown in ireland, putting by the claim for freedom, in the foolish hope of some material gain. there is much nonsense talked and confusion abroad on this head, and it is quite possible a man, believing in ireland's full claim, will find himself in a large company who ought to stand for ireland, yet who have lost a clear conception of her rights. but he will find that they have no clear conception the other way, either; they are confused and generally pliable; and so, when the challenging idea is introduced, if he is quick and clear with the vital points, he can tear the surface off the many nostrums of the hour and prove them mean, worthless, and degrading; and, doing so, he will be forming the minds about him. he must be ready; that is the great need. understand how a conversation is often turned by a chance word, and how governed by one man who has passionate, well-defined views, while others are cold and undecided. be that one man. you do not know where the circumstances of life will take you; your flag may be directly challenged to your face, and you must reveal yourself. these are things to avoid. be firm, rather than aggressive; but be always quietly prepared for the aggressive man; that is to inspire confidence in the timid. avoid vituperation as a disease, but have your facts clear and ready for friend or foe. whenever, and wherever least expected, a false idea comes wandering forth, put in at once a luminous word or two to clear the air, hearten friends and keep them steady. if you find yourself alone in the midst of opponents, who assume you are with them and expect your co-operation, you put them right with a word. this will arrest them; they will understand where you stand, and that you are ready; and they will generally yield you respect. but whether it involve a fight or not, thus do you declare your attitude. we may conveniently call it--putting up the flag. ix it is well to consider something of the opposition that confronts a man who tries to fill his life with a brave purpose. he will be told it is an illusion; he is a dreamer, a crank, or a fool. and it may serve a purpose to see if our critics are blinded by no illusion, to contrast our folly with their wisdom. here is one pushing by who will not be a fool, as he thinks--he's for the emigrant-ship. ask yourself if the people who go out from the remote places of ireland, quiet-spoken and ruddy-faced, and return after a few years loud-voiced and pallid, have found things exactly as their hope. they protest, yes; but their voice and colour belie them. take the other man who does not emigrate but who has his fling at home, who "knocks around" and tells you to do likewise and be no fool--mark him for your guidance. you will find his leisure is boisterous, but never gay. catch him between whiles off his guard and you will find the deadening lassitude of his life. this votary of pleasure has a burden to carry in whatever walk of life, high or low. on the higher plane he may have a more fastidious club or two, a more epicurean sense of enjoyment, more leisure and more luxury; but the type wherever found is the same. life is an utter burden to him; in his soul is no interest, no inspiration, no energy, and no hope. let him be no object of envy. here a friend pats you on the shoulder: "quite right; be neither an emigrant nor a waster; but be practical; have no illusions; deal with possibilities--who can say what is in the future? we must face these facts." our confident friend lacks a sense of humour. he would put your plan by for its bearing on the future, but he proposes one himself that the future must justify. he tells you circumstances will not be in your favour: he assumes them in his own. but we only claim that our principles will rule the future as they have ruled the past; for the circumstances no man can speak. he calls you a dreamer for your principles, but he can't show, now nor in history, that his exemplars were ever justified. we are all dreamers, then; but some have ugly dreams, while the dreams of others are beautiful worlds, star-lighted and full of music. x let the newborn enthusiast, just come eagerly to the flag, be warned of hours of depression that seize even the most earnest, the boldest and the strongest. our work is the work of men, subject to such vicissitudes as hover around all human enterprise; and every man enrolled must face hard struggles and dark hours. then the depression rushes down like a horrible, cold, dark mist that obscures every beautiful thing and every ray of hope. it may come from many causes: perhaps, a body not too robust, worn down by a tireless mind; perhaps, the memory of long years of effort, seemingly swallowed in oblivion and futility; perhaps contact with men on your own side whose presence there is a puzzle, who have no character and no conception of the grandeur of the cause, and whose mean, petty, underhand jealousies numb you--you who think anyone claiming so fine a flag as ours should be naturally brave, straightforward and generous; perhaps the seemingly overwhelming strength of the enemy, and the listlessness of thousands who would hail freedom with rapture, but who now stand aloof in despair--and along with all this and intensifying it, the voice of our self-complacent practical friend, who has but sarcasm for a high impulse, and for an immutable principle the latest expedient of the hour. through such an experience must the soldier of freedom live. but as surely as such an hour comes, there comes also a star to break the darkened sky; let those who feel the battle-weariness at times remember. when in places there may be but one or two to fight, it may seem of no avail; still let them be true and their numbers will be multiplied: love of truth is infectious. when progress is arrested, don't brood on what is, but on what was once achieved, what has since survived, and what we may yet achieve. if some have grown lax and temporise a little, with more firmness on your part mingle a little sympathy for them. it is harder to live a consistent life than die a brave death. most men of generous instincts would rouse all their courage to a supreme moment and die for the cause; but to rise to that supreme moment frequently and without warning is the burden of life for the cause; and it is because of its exhausting strain and exacting demands that so many men have failed. we must get men to realise that to live is as daring as to die. but confusion has been made in our time by the glib phrase: "you are not asked now to die for ireland, but to live for her," without insisting that the life shall aim at the ideal, the brave and the true. to slip apologetically through existence is not life. if such a mean philosophy went abroad, we would soon find the land a place of shivering creatures, without the capacity to live or the courage to die--calamity, surely. all these circumstances make for the hour of depression; and it may well be in such an hour, amid apathy and treachery, cold friends and active enemies, with worn-down frame and baffled mind, you, pleading for the old cause, may feel your voice is indeed a voice crying in the wilderness; and it may serve till the blood warms again and the imagination recover its glow, to think how a voice, that cried in the wilderness thousands of years ago, is potent and inspiring now, where the voice of the "practical" man sends no whisper across the waste of years. xi what, then, to conclude, must be our decision? to take our philosophy into life. when we do that generally, in a deep and significant sense our war of independence will have begun. let there be no deferring a duty to a more convenient future. it is as possible that an opening for freedom may be thrust on us, as that we shall be required to organise a formal war with the usual movements of armies; in our assumptions for the second, let us not be guilty of the fatal error of overlooking the first. as in other spheres, so in politics we have our conventions; and how little they may be proven has been lately seen, when england went through a war of debate,[footnote: debate over house of lords.] largely unreal, over her constitution and her liberties, even while foreign wars and complications were still being debated; and in the middle of it all, suddenly, from a local labour dispute, putting by all thought of the constitution, feeling as comparatively insignificant the fear of invasion, all england stood shuddering on the verge of frantic civil war;[footnote: the railway strike.] and all ireland, when the moment of possible freedom was given, when england might have been hardly able to save herself, much less to hold us--ireland, thinking and working in old grooves, lay helpless. let us draw the moral. we cannot tell what unsuspected development may spring on us from the future, but we can always be prepared by understanding that the vital hour is the hour at hand. let the brave choice now be made, and let the life around be governed by it; let every man stand to his colours and strike his flag to none; then shall we recover ground in all directions, and our time shall be recorded, not with the deadening but with the luminous years. in all the vicissitudes of the fight, let us not be distracted by the meanness of the mere time-server nor the treachery of the enemy, but be collected and cool; and remembering the many who are not with us from honest motives or unsuspected fears, live to show our belief beautiful and true and, in the eternal sense, practical. then shall those who are worth convincing be held, and our difference may reduce itself to what is possible; then will they come to realise that he who maintains a great faith unshaken will make more things possible than the opportunist of the hour; then will they understand how much more is possible than they had ever dared to dream: they will have a vision of the goal; and with that vision will be born a steady enthusiasm, a clear purpose, and a resolute soul. the regeneration of the land will be no longer a distant dream but a shaping reality; the living flame will sweep through all hearts again; and ireland will enter her last battle for freedom to emerge and reassume her place among the nations of the earth. chapter vii loyalty i to be loyal to his cause is the finest tribute that can be paid to any man. and since loyalty to the irish cause has been the great virtue of irishmen through all history, it is time to have some clear thinking as to who are the irish rebels and who the true men. when a stupid government, grasping our reverence for fidelity, tried to ban our heroes by calling them felons, it was natural we should rejoin by writing "the felons of our land" and heap ridicule on their purpose. but once this end was achieved we should have reverted to the normal attitude and written up as the true irish loyalists, brian the great, and shane the proud, the valiant owen roe and the peerless tone, mitchel and davis--irreconcilables all. when men revolt against an established evil it is their loyalty to the outraged truth we honour. we do not extol a rebel who rebels for rebellion's sake. let us be clear on this point, or when we shall have re-established our freedom after centuries of effort it shall be open to every knave and traitor to challenge our independence and plot to readmit the enemy. loyalty is the fine attribute of the fine nature; the word has been misused and maligned in ireland: let us restore it to its rightful honour by remembering it to be the virtue of our heroes of all time. in considering it from this view-point we shall find occasion to touch on delicate positions that have often baffled and worried us--the asserting of our rights while using the machinery of the government that denies them, the burning question of consistency, our attitude towards the political adventurer on one hand, and towards the honest man of half-measures on the other. loyalty involves all this. and it shows that the man who revolts to win freedom is the same as he who dies to defend it. he does not change his face and nature with the changing times. he is loyal always and most wonderfully lovable, because in the darkest times, when banned as wild, wicked and rebelly, he is loyal still as from the beginning, and will be to the end. yes, tone is the true irish loyalist, and every aider and abettor of the enemy a rebel to ireland and the irish race. ii when you insist on examining the question in the light of first principles your opportunist opponent at once feels the weakness of his position and always turns the point on your consistency. it is well, then, in advance to understand the relative value and importance of argument as argument in the statement of any case. a body of principles is primarily of value, not as affording a case that can be argued with ingenuity, but as enshrining one great principle that shines through and informs the rest, that illumines the mind of the individual, that warms, clarifies and invigorates--that, so to speak, puts the mind in focus, gets the facts of existence into perspective, and gives the individual everything in its right place and true proportion. it brings a man to the point where he does not dispute but believes. he has been wandering about cold and irresolute, tasting all philosophies, or none, and drinking deep despair. he does not understand the want in his soul while he has been looking for some panacea for its cure till the great light streams on him, and instead of receiving something he finds himself. that is it. there is a power of vision latent in us, clouded by error; the true philosophy dissipates the cloud and leaves the vision clear, wonderful and inspiring. he who acquired that vision is impervious to argument--it is not that he despises argument; on the contrary, he always uses it to its full strength. but he has had awakened within him something which the mere logician can never deduce, and that mysterious something is the explanation of his transformed life. he was a doubter, a falterer, a failure; he has become a believer, a fighter, a conqueror. you miss his significance completely when you take him for a theorist. the theorist propounds a view to which he must convert the world; the philosopher has a rule of life to immediately put into practice. his spirit flashes with a swiftness that can be encircled by no theory. it is his glory to have over and above a new penetrating argument in the mind--a new and wonderful vitality in the blood. the unbeliever, near by, still muddled by his cold theories, will argue and debate till his intellect is in a tangle. he fails to see that a man of intellectual agility might frame a theory and argue it out ably, and then suddenly turn over and with equal dexterity argue the other side. do we not have set debates with speakers appointed on each side? that is dialectic--a trick of the mind. but philosophy is the wine of the spirit. the capacity then to argue the point is not the justification of a philosophy. that justification must be found in the virtue of the philosophy that gives its believer vision and grasp of life as a whole, that warms and quickens his heart and makes him in spirit buoyant, beautiful, wise and daring. iii let us come now to that burning question of consistency. "very well, you won't acknowledge the english crown. why then use english coins and stamps? you don't recognise the parliament at westminster. why then recognise the county councils created by bill at westminster? why avail of all the local government machinery?"--and so forth. the argument is a familiar one, and the answer is simple. though no guns are thundering now, ireland is virtually in a state of war. we are fighting to recover independence. the enemy has had to relax somewhat in the exigencies of the struggle and to concede all these positions of local government and enterprise now in question. we take these posts as places conceded in the fight and avail of them to strengthen, develop and uplift the country and prepare her to carry the last post. surely this is adequate. on a field of battle it is always to the credit of a general to capture an enemy's post and use it for the final victory. it is a sign of the battle's progress, and tells the distant watchers on the hills how the fight is faring and who is going to win. there would be consternation away from the field only if word should come that the soldiers had gone into the tents of the enemy, acknowledging him and accepting his flag. that is the point to question. there can be no defence for the occupying of any post conceded by the enemy. it may be held for or against ireland; any man accepting it and surrendering his flag to hold it stands condemned thereby. that is clear. yet it may be objected that such a clear choice is not put to most of those undertaking the local government of ireland, that few are conscious of such an issue and few governed by it. it is true. but for all that the machinery of local government is clearly under popular control, and as clearly worked for an immediate good, preparing for a greater end. men unaware of it are unconsciously working for the general development of the country and recovering her old power and influence. those conscious of the deeper issue enter every position to further that development and make the end obvious when the alien government--finding those powers conceded to sap further resistance are on the contrary used to conquer wider fields--endeavours to force the popular government back to the purposes of an old and failing tyranny. that is the nature of the struggle now. at periods the enemy tries to stem the movement, and then the fight becomes general and keen around a certain position. in our time there were the land leagues, the land war, fights for home rule, universities, irish; and these fights ended in land acts, local government acts, university acts, and the conceding of pride of place to the native language in university life. every position gained is a step forward; it is accepted as such, and so is justified. for anyone who grasps the serious purpose of recovering ireland's independence all along the line, the suggestion that we should abandon all machinery of local government and enterprise--because they are "government positions"--to men definitely attached to the alien garrison is so foolish as not to be even entertained. when our attitude is questioned let it be made clear. that is the final answer to the man who challenges our consistency: we are carrying the trenches of the enemy. iv even while dismissing a false idea of consistency we have to make clear another view still remote from the general mind. if we are to have an effective army of freedom we must enrol only men who have a clear conception of the goal, a readiness to yield full allegiance, and a determination to fight always so as to reflect honour on the flag. the importance of this will be felt only when we come to deal with concrete cases. while human nature is what it is we will have always on the outskirts of every movement a certain type of political adventurer who is ready to transfer his allegiance from one party to another according as he thinks the time serves. he has no principle but to be always with the ascendant party, and to succeed in that aim he is ready to court and betray every party in turn. as a result, he is a character well known to all. the honest man who has been following the wrong path, and after earnest inquiry comes to the flag, we readily distinguish. but it is fatal to any enterprise where the adventurer is enlisted and where his influence is allowed to dominate. it may seem strange that such men are given entry to great movements: the explanation is found in the desire of pioneers to make converts at once and convince the unconverted by the confidence of growing numbers. we ignore the danger to our growing strength when the adventurer comes along, loud in protest of his support--he is always affable and plausible, and is received as a "man of experience"; and in our anxiety for further strength we are apt to admit him without reserve. but we must make sure of our man. we must keep in mind that an alliance with the adventurer is more dangerous than his opposition; and we must remember the general public, typified by the man in the street whom we wish to convince, is quietly studying us, attracted perhaps by our principles and coming nearer to examine. if he knows nothing else, he knows the unprincipled man, and when he sees such in our ranks and councils he will not wait to argue or ask questions; he will go away and remain away. the extent to which men are ruled by the old adage, "show me your company and i'll tell you what you are," is more widespread than we think. moreover, consistency in a fine sense is involved in our decision. we fight for freedom, not for the hope of material profit or comfort, but because every fine instinct of manhood demands that man be free, and life beautiful and brave, and surely in such a splendid battle to have as allies mean, crafty profit-seekers would be amazing. let us be loyal in the deep sense, and let us not be afraid of being few at first. an earnest band is more effective than a discreditable multitude. that band will increase in numbers and strength till it becomes the nucleus of an army that will be invincible. v the fine sense of consistency that keeps us clear of the adventurer decides also our attitude to the well-meaning man of half-measures. he says separation from england is not possible now and suggests some alternative, if not home rule, grattan's parliament, or leaving it an open question. in the general view this seems sensible, and we are tempted to make an alliance based on such a ground; and the alliance is made. what ensues? men come together who believe in complete freedom, others who believe in partial freedom that may lead to complete freedom, and others who are satisfied with partial freedom as an end. before long the alliance ends in a deadlock. the man of the most far-reaching view knows that every immediate action taken must be consistent with the wider view and the farther goal, if that goal is to be attained; and he finds that his ultimate principle is frequently involved in some action proposed for the moment. when such a moment comes he must be loyal to his flag and to a principle that if not generally acknowledged is an abiding rule with him; but his allies refuse to be bound by a principle that is an unwritten law for him because the law is not written down for them. this is the root of the trouble. the friends, thinking to work together for some common purpose, find the unsettled issue intrudes, and a debate ensues that leads to angry words, recriminations, bad feeling and disruption. the alliance based on half measures has not fulfilled its own purpose, but it has sown suspicion between the honest men whom it brought together; that is no good result from the practical proposal. there is an inference: men who are conscious of a clear complete demand should form their own plans, equally full of care and resolution, and go ahead on their own account. but we hear a plaintive cry abroad: "oh, another split; that's irishmen all over--can never unite," etc. we will not turn aside for the plaintive people; but let it be understood there can be an independent co-operation, where of use, with those honest men who will not go the whole way. that independent co-operation can serve the full purpose of the binding alliance that has proved fatal. above all, let there be no charge of bad faith against the earnest man who chooses other ways than ours; it is altogether indefensible because we disagree with him to call his motives in question. often he is as earnest as we are; often has given longer and greater service, and only qualifies his own attitude in anxiety to meet others. to this we cannot assent, but to charge him with bad faith is flagrantly unjust and always calamitous. in getting rid of the deadlock we have too often fallen to furiously fighting with one another. let us bear this in mind, and concern ourselves more with the common enemy; but let not the hands of the men in the vanguard be tied by alien king, constitution, or parliament. all the conditions grow more definite and seem, perhaps, too exacting; remember the greatness of the enterprise. suppose in the building of a mighty edifice the architect at any point were careless or slurred over a difficulty, trusting to luck to bring it right, how the whole building would go awry, and what a mighty collapse would follow. let us stick to our colours and have no fear. when all these principles have been combined into one consistent whole, a light will flash over the land and the old spirit will be reborn; the mean will be purged of their meanness, the timid heartened with a fine courage, and the fearless will be justified: the land will be awake, militant, and marching to victory. vi this is, surely, the fine view of loyalty. let us write it on our banners and proclaim it to the world. it is consistent, _honourable_, fearless and immutable. what is said here to-day with enthusiasm, exactness and care, will stand without emendation or enlargement, if in a temporary reverse we are called to stand in the dock to-morrow; or if, finely purged in the battle of freedom, we come through our last fight with splendid triumph, our loyalty is there still, shining like a great sun, the same beautiful, unchanging thing that has lighted us through every struggle--perhaps now to guide us in framing a constitution and giving to a world, distracted by kings, presidents and theorists, a new polity for nations. a waverer, half-caught between the light, half fearful with an old fear, pleads: "this is too much--we are men, not angels." precisely, we are not angels; and because of our human weakness, our erring minds, our sudden passions, the most confident of us may at any moment find himself in the mud. what, then, will uplift him if he has been a waverer in principle as well as in fact? he is helpless, disgraced and undone. let him know in time we do not set up fine principles in a fine conceit that we can easily live up to them, but in the full consciousness that we cannot possibly live away from them. that is the bed-rock truth. when the man of finer faith by any slip comes to the earth, he has to uplift him a staff that never fails, and to guide him a principle that strengthens him for another fight, to go forth, in a sense alexander never dreamed of, to conquer new worlds. 'tis the faith that is in him, and the flag he serves, that make a man worthy; and the meanest may be with the highest if he be true and give good service. let us put by then the broken reed and the craft of little minds, and give us for our saving hope the banner of the angels and the loyalty of gods and men. chapter viii womanhood "and another said: i have married a wife and therefore i cannot come." yes, and we have been satisfied always to blame the wife, without noticing the man who is fond of his comfort first of all, who slips quietly away to enjoy a quiet smoke and a quiet glass in some quiet nook--always securing his escape by the readiest excuse. we are coming now to consider the aspect of the question that touches our sincere manhood; but let no one think we overlook that mean type of man who evades every call to duty on the comfortable plea: "i have married a wife." i when the mere man approaches the woman to study her, we can imagine the fair ones getting together and nudging one another in keen amusement as to what this seer is going to say. it is often sufficiently amusing when the clumsy male approaches her with self-satisfied air, thinking he has the secret of her mysterious being. i have no intention here of entering a rival search for the secret. but we can, perhaps, startle the gay ones from merriment to gravity by stating the simple fact that every man stands in some relationship to woman, either as son, brother, or husband; and if it be admitted that there is to be a fight to-morrow, then there are some things to be settled to-day. how is the woman training for to-morrow? how, then, will the man stand by that very binding relationship? will clinging arms hold him back or proud ones wave him on? will he have, in place of a comrade in the fight, a burden; or will the battle that has too often separated them but give them closer bonds of union and more intimate knowledge of the wonderful thing that is life? ii i wish to concentrate on one heroic example of irish womanhood that should serve as a model to this generation; and i do not mean to dwell on much that would require detailed examination. but some points should be indicated. for example, the awakening consciousness of our womanhood is troubling itself rightly over the woman's place in the community, is concentrating on the type delineated in "the doll's house," and is agitating for a more honourable and dignified place. we applaud the pioneers thus fighting for their honour and dignity: but let them not make the mistake of assuming the men are wholly responsible for "the doll's house," and the women would come out if they could. we have noticed the man who prefers his ease to any troubling duty: he has his mate in the woman who prefers to be wooed with trinkets, chocolates, and the theatre to a more beautiful way of life, that would give her a nobler place but more strenuous conditions. again, the man is not always the lord of the house. he is as often, if not more frequently, its slave. then there are the conventions of life. in place of a fine sense of courtesy prevailing between man and woman, which would recognise with the woman's finer sensibility a fine self-reliance, and with the man's greater strength a fine gentleness, we have a false code of manners, by which the woman is to be taken about, petted and treated generally as the useless being she often is; while the man becomes an effeminate creature that but cumbers the earth. fine courtesy and fine comradeship go together. but we have allowed a standard to gain recognition that is a danger alike to the dignity of our womanhood and the virility of our manhood. it is for us who are men to labour for a finer spirit in our manhood: we cannot throw the blame for any weakness over on external conditions. the woman is in the same position. she must understand that greater than the need of the suffrage is the more urgent need of making her fellow-woman spirited and self-reliant, ready rather to anticipate a danger than to evade it. when she is thus trained, not all the men of all the nations can deny her recognition and equality. iii for the battle of to-morrow then there is a preliminary fight to-day. the woman must come to this point, too. in life there is frequently so much meanness, a man is often called to acknowledge some degrading standard or fight for the very recognition of manhood, and the woman must stand in with him or help to pull him down. let her understand this and her duty is present and urgent. the man so often wavers on the verge of the right path, the woman often decides him. if she is nobler than he, as is frequently the case, she can lift him to her level; if she is meaner, as she often is, she as surely drags him down. when they are both equal in spirit and nobility of nature, how the world is filled with a glory that should assure us, if nothing else could, of the truth of the almighty god and a beautiful eternity to explain the origin and destiny of their wonderful existence. they are indispensable to each other: if they stand apart, neither can realise in its fulness the beauty and glory of life. let the man and woman see this, and let them know in the day that is at hand, how the challenge may come from some petty authority of the time that rules not by its integrity but by its favourites. we are cursed with such authority, and many a one drives about in luxury because he is obsequious to it: he prefers to be a parasite and to live in splendour than be a man and live in straits. he has what bernard shaw so aptly calls "the soul of a servant." if we are to prepare for a braver future, let us fight this evil thing; if we are to put by national servitude, let us begin by driving out individual obsequiousness. this is our training ground for to-morrow. let the woman realise this, and at least as many women as men will prefer privation with self-respect to comfort with contempt. let us, then, in the name of our common nature, ask those who have her training in hand, to teach the woman to despise the man of menial soul and to loathe the luxury that is his price. iv i wish to come to the heroic type of irish womanhood. when we need to hearten ourselves or others for a great enterprise, we instinctively turn to the examples of heroes and heroines who, in similar difficulties to ours, have entered the fight bravely, and issued heroically, leaving us a splendid heritage of fidelity and achievement. it is little to our credit that our heroes are so little known. it is less to our credit that our heroines are hardly known at all; and when we praise or sing of one our selection is not always the happiest. how often in the concert-hall or drawing-room do we get emotional when someone sings in tremulous tones, "she is far from the land." there is a feeling for poetry in our lives, a feeling that patriotism will not have it, a melting pity for the love that went to wreck, a sympathy for ourselves and everybody and everything--a relaxing of all the nerves in a wave of sentiment. this emotion is of the enervating order. there is no sweep of strong fire through the blood, no tightening grip on life, no set resolve to stand to the flag and see the battle through. it is well, then, a generation that has heard from a thousand platforms, in plaintive notes, of sarah curran and her love should turn to the braver and more beautiful model of her who was the wife of tone. v when we think of the qualities that are distinctive of the woman, we have in mind a finer gentleness, sensibility, sympathy and tenderness; and when we have these qualities intensified in any woman, and with them combined the endurance, courage and daring that are taken as the manly virtues, we have a woman of the heroic type. of such a type was the wife of tone. we can speak her praise without fear, for she was put to the test in every way, and in every way found marvellously true. for her devotion to, and encouragement of, her great husband in his great work, she would have won our high praise, even if, when he was stricken down and she was bereft of his wonderful love and buoyant spirits, she had proved forgetful of his work and the glory of his name. but she was bereft, and she was then found most marvellously true. her devotion to tone, while he was living and fighting, might be explained by the woman's passionate attachment to the man she loved. it is the woman's tenderness that is most evident in these early years, but there is shining evidence of the fortitude that showed her true nobility in the darker after-years. it was no ordinary love that bound them, and reading the record of their lives this stands out clear and beautiful. tone, whom we know as patient organiser, tenacious fighter, far-seeing thinker, indomitable spirit--a born leader of men--writes to his wife with the passionate simplicity of an enraptured child: "i doat upon you and the babes." and his letters end thus: "kiss the babies for me ten thousand times. god almighty for ever bless you, my dearest life and soul." (this from the "french atheist." i hope his traducers are heartily ashamed of themselves.) nor is it strange. when, in the beginning of his enterprise, he is in america, preparing to go to france on his great mission, he is troubled by the thought of his defenceless ones. in the crisis how does his wife act? does she wind clinging arms around him, telling him with tears, of their children and his early vows, and beseeching him to think of his love and forget his country? no; let the diary speak: "my wife especially, whose courage and whose zeal for my honour and interests were not in the least abated by all her past sufferings, supplicated me to let no consideration of her or our children stand for a moment in the way of my engagements to our friends and my duty to my country, adding that she would answer for our family during my absence, and that the same providence which had so often, as it were, miraculously preserved us, would, she was confident, not desert us now." it is the unmistakable accent of the woman. she is quivering as she sends him forth, but the spirit in her eyes would put a trembling man to shame--a spirit that her peerless husband matched but no man could surpass. her fortitude was to be more terribly tried in the terrible after-time, when the cause went down in disaster and tone had to answer with his life. no tribute could be so eloquent as the letter he wrote to her when the last moment had come and his doom was pronounced: "adieu, dearest love, i find it impossible to finish this letter. give my love to mary; and, above all, remember you are now the only parent of our dearest children, and that the best proof you can give of your affection for me will be to preserve yourself for their education. god almighty bless you all." that letter is like stephens' speech from the dock, eloquent for what is left unsaid. there is no wailing for her, least of all for himself, not that their devoted souls were not on the rack: "as no words can express what i feel for you and our children, i shall not attempt it; complaint of any kind would be beneath your courage and mine"--but their souls, that were destined to suffer, came sublimely through the ordeal. when tone left his children as a trust to his wife, he knew from the intimacy of their union what we learn from the after-event, how that trust might be placed and how faithfully it would be fulfilled. what a tribute from man to wife! how that trust was fulfilled is in evidence in every step of the following years. remembering tone's son who survived to write the memoirs was a child at his father's death, his simple tribute written in manhood is eloquent in the extreme: "i was brought up by my surviving parent in all the principles and in all the feelings of my father"--of itself it would suffice. but we can follow the years between and find moving evidence of the fulfilment of the trust. we see her devotion to her children and her proud care to preserve their independence and her own. she puts by patronage, having a higher title as the widow of a general of france; and she wins the respect of the great ones of france under the republic and the empire. lucien buonaparte, a year after tone's death, pleaded before the council of five hundred, in warm and eloquent praise: "if the services of tone were not sufficient of themselves to rouse your feelings, i might mention the independent spirit and firmness of that noble woman who, on the tomb of her husband and her brother, mingles with her sighs aspirations for the deliverance of ireland. i would attempt to give you an expression of that irish spirit which is blended in her countenance with the expression of her grief. such were those women of sparta, who, on the return of their countrymen from the battle, when with anxious looks they ran over the ranks and missed amongst them their sons, their husbands, and their brothers, exclaimed, 'he died for his country; he died for the republic.'" when the republic fell, and in the upheaval her rights were ignored, she went to the emperor napoleon in person and, recalling the services of tone, sought naturalization for her son to secure his career in the army; and to the wonder of all near by, the emperor heard her with marked respect and immediately granted her request. she sought only this for her surviving son. she had seen two children die--there was moving pathos in the daughter's death--and now she was standing by the last. never was child guarded more faithfully or sent more proudly on his path in life. one should read the memoirs to understand, and pause frequently to consider: how she promised her husband bravely in the beginning that she would answer for their children, and how, in what she afterwards styled the hyperbole of grief, she was called to fulfil to the letter, and was found faithful, with an unexampled strength and devotion; how she saw two children struck down by a fatal disease, and how she drew the surviving son back to health by her watchful care to send him on his college and military career with loving pride; how, when a minister of france, irritated at her putting by his patronage, roughly told her he could not "take the emperor by the collar to place mr. tone"--she went to the emperor in person, with dignity but without fear, and won his respect; how the suggestion of the mean-minded that her demand was a pecuniary one, drew from her the proud boast that in all her misfortunes she had never learned to hold out her hand; how through all her misfortunes we watch her with wonderful dignity, delicacy, courage, and devotion quick to see what her trust demanded and never failing to answer the call, till her task is done, and we see her on the morning when her son sets out on the path she had prepared, the same quivering woman, who had sent her husband with words of comfort to his duty, now, after all the years of trial, sending her son as proudly on his path. it is their first parting. let her own words speak: "hitherto i had not allowed myself even to feel that my william was my own and my only child; i considered only that tone's son was confided to me; but in that moment nature resumed her rights. i sat in a field: the road was long and white before me and no object on it but my child.... i could not think; but all i had ever suffered seemed before and around me at that moment, and i wished so intensely to close my eyes for ever, that i wondered it did not happen. the transitions of the mind are very extraordinary. as i sat in that state, unable to think of the necessity of returning home, a little lark rushed up from the grass beside me; it whirled over my head and hovered in the air singing such a beautiful, cheering, and, as it sounded to me, approving note, that it roused me. i felt in my heart as if tone had sent it to me. i returned to my solitary home." it is a picture to move us, to think of the devoted woman there in the sunshine, bent down in the grass, utterly alone, till the lark, sweeping heavenward in song, seems to give a message of gentle comfort from her husband's watching spirit. our emotion now is of no enervating order. we are proud of our land and her people; our nerves are firm and set; our hearts cry out for action; we are not weeping, but burning for the cause. how little we know of this heroic woman. we are in some ways familiar with tone, his high character, his genial open nature, his daring, his patience, his farsightedness, his judgment--in spirit tireless and indomitable: a man peerless among his fellows. but he had yet one compeer; there was one nature that matched his to depth and height of its greatness--that nature was a woman's, and the woman was wolfe tone's wife. vi it is well this heroic example of our womanhood should be before not only our womanhood but our manhood. it should show us all that patriotism does not destroy the finer feelings, but rather calls them forth and gives them wider play. we have been too used to thinking that the qualities of love and tenderness are no virtues for a soldier, that they will sap his resolution and destroy his work; but our movements fail always when they fail to be human. until we mature and the poetry in life is wakening, we are ready to act by a theory; but when nature asserts herself the hard theorist fails to hold us. let us remember and be human. we have been saying in effect, if not in so many words: "for ireland's sake, don't fall in love"--we might as well say: "for ireland's sake, don't let your blood circulate." it is impossible--even if it were possible it would be hateful. the man and woman have a great and beautiful destiny to fulfil together: to substitute for it an unnatural way of life that can claim neither the seclusion of the cloister nor the dominion of the world is neither beautiful nor great. we have cause for gratitude in the example before us. the woman can learn from it how she may equal the bravest man; and the man should learn to let his wife and children suffer rather than make of them willing slaves and cowards. for there are some earnest men who are ready to suffer themselves but cannot endure the suffering of those they love, and a mistaken family tenderness binds and drags them down. no one, surely, can hold it better to carefully put away every duty that may entail hardship on wife and child, for then the wife is, instead of a comrade, a burden, and the child becomes a degenerate creature, creeping between heaven and earth, afraid to hold his head erect, and unable to fulfil his duty to god or man. let no man be afraid that those he loves may be tried in the fire; but let him, to the best of his strength, show them how to stand the ordeal, and then trust to the greatness of the truth and the virtue of a loyal nature to bring each one forth in triumph, and he and they may have in the issue undreamed of recompense. for the battle that tries them will discover finer chords not yet touched in their intercourse; finer sympathies, susceptibilities, gentleness and strength; a deeper insight into life and a wider outlook on the world, making in fine a wonderful blend of wisdom, tenderness and courage that gives them to realise that life, with all its faults, struggles, and pain is still and for ever great and beautiful. chapter ix the frontier i our frontier is twofold, the language and the sea. for the majesty of our encircling waters we have no need to raise a plea, but to give god thanks for setting so certain a seal on our individual existence and giving us in the spreading horizon of the ocean some symbol of our illimitable destiny. for the language there is something still to be said; there are some ideas gaining currency that should be challenged--the cold denial of some that the unqualified name irish be given to the literature of irishman that is passionate with irish enthusiasm and loyalty to ireland, yet from the exigencies of the time had to be written in english; the view not only assumed but asserted by some of the gael that the gall may be recognised only if he take second place; the aloofness of many of the gall, not troubling to understand their rights and duties; the ignoring on both sides of the fine significance of the name irishman, of a spirit of patriotism and a deep-lying basis of authority and justice that will give stability to the state and secure its future against any upheaval that from the unrest of the time would seem to threaten the world. ii consider first the literature of irishmen in english. from the attitude commonly taken on the question of literary values, it is clear that the primary significance of expression in writing is often lost. what is said, and the purpose for which it is said, take precedence of the medium through which it is said. but from our national awakening to the significance of the medium so long ignored we have grown so excited that we frequently forget the greater significance of the thing. the utterance of the man is of first importance, and, where his utterance has weight, the vital need is to secure it through some medium, the medium becoming important when one more than another is found to have a wider and more intimate appeal; and then we do well to become insistent for a particular medium when it is in anxiety for full delivery of the writer's thought and a wide knowledge of its truth. but we are losing sight of this natural order of things. it is well, then, the unconvinced gall should hear why he should accept the irish language; not simply to defer to the gael, but to quicken the mind and defend the territory of what is now the common country of the gael and gall. davis caught up the great significance of the language when he said: "tis a surer barrier, and more important frontier, than fortress or river." the language is at once our frontier and our first fortress, and behind it all irishmen should stand, not because a particular branch of our people evolved it, but because it is the common heritage of all. one who has a knowledge of irish can easily get evidence of its quickening power on the irish mind. travel in an irish-speaking district and hail one of its old people in english, and you get in response a dull "good-day, sir." salute him in irish and you touch a secret spring. the dull eyes light up, the face is all animation, the body alert, and for a dull "good-day," you get warm benedictions, lively sallies, and after you, as you pass on your road, a flood of rich and racy irish comes pouring down the wind. that is the secret power of the language. it makes the old men proud of their youth and gives to the young quickened faculties, an awakened imagination and a world to conquer. this is no exaggeration. it is not always obvious, because we do not touch the secret spring nor wander near the magic. but the truth is there to find for him who cares to search. you discover behind the dullness of a provincial town a bright centre of interest, and when you study the circle you know that here is some wonderful thing: priests, doctors, lawyers, teachers, tradesmen, clerks--all drawn together, young and old, both sexes, all enthusiasts. sometimes a priest is teaching a smith, sometimes the smith is teaching the priest: for a moment at least we have unconsciously levelled barriers and there is jubilation in the natural life re-born. out of that quickened life and consciousness rises a vivid imagination with a rush of thought and a power of expression that gives the nation a new literature. that is the justification of the language. it awakens and draws to expression minds that would otherwise be blank. it is not that the revelation of davis is of less value than we think, but that through the medium of irish other revelations will be won that would otherwise be lost. again, in subtle ways we cannot wholly understand, it gives the irish mind a defence against every other mind, taking in comradeship whatever good the others have to offer, while retaining its own power and place. the irish mind can do itself justice only in irish. but still some ardent and faithful spirits broke through every difficulty of time and circumstance and found expression in english, and we have the treasures of davis, mitchel, and mangan; yet, the majority remained cold, and now, to quicken the mass, we turn to the old language. but this is not to decry what was won in other fields. in the widening future that beckons to us, we shall, if anything, give greater praise to these good fighters and enthusiasts, who in darker years, even with the language of the enemy, resisted his march and held the gap for ireland. iii on this ground the gael and gall stand on footing of equality. that is the point many on both sides miss and we need to emphasise it. some irishmen not of gaelic stock speak of irish as foreign to them, and would maintain english in the principal place now and in the future. we do well then to make clear to such a one that he is asked to adopt the language for ireland's sake as a nation and for his own sake as a citizen. if he wishes to serve her he must stand for the language; if he prefers english civilisation he should go back to england. there only can he develop on english lines. an irishman in ireland with an english mind is a queer contradiction, who can serve neither ireland nor england in any good sense, and both ireland and england disown him. so the irishman of other than gaelic ancestors should stand in with us, not accepting something disagreeable as inevitable, but claiming a right by birth and citizenship, joining the fine army of the nation for a brave adventurous future, full of fine possibility and guaranteed by a fine comradeship--owning a land not of flattery and favouritism, but of freedom and manhood. this saving ideal has been often obscured by our sundering class names. this is why we would substitute as common for all the fine name of irishman. iv but in asking all parties to accept the common name of irishman, we find a fear rather suggested than declared--that men may be asked in this name to put by something they hold as a great principle of life; that catholic, protestant and dissenter will all be asked to find agreement in a fourth alternative, in which they will not submit to one another but will all equally belie themselves. there is such a hidden fear, and we should have it out and dispose of it. the best men of all parties will have no truck with this and they are right. but on what ground, then, shall we find agreement, the recognition of which irish citizenship implies? on this, that the man of whatever sincere principles, religious or civic, counts among his great duties his duty as citizen; and he defends his creed because he believes it to be a safe guide to the fulfilling of all duties, this including. when, therefore, we ask him to stand in as irish citizen, it is not that he is to abandon in one iota his sincere principles, but that he is to give us proof of his sincerity. he tells us his creed requires him to be a good citizen: we give him a fine field in which he can be to us a fine example. v in further consideration of this we should put by the thought of finding a mere working agreement. there is a deep-lying basis of authority and justice to seek, which it should be our highest aim to discover. modern governments concede justice to those who can compel justice--even the democracy requires that you be strong enough to formulate a claim and sustain it; but this is the way of tyranny. a perfect government should seek, while careful to develop its stronger forces and keep them in perfect balance, to consider also the claims of those less powerful but not less true. a government that over-rides the weak because it is safe, is a tyranny, and tyranny is in seed in the democratic governments of our time. we must consider this well, for it is pressing and grave; and we must get men to come together as citizens to defend the rights as well of the unit which is unsupported as of the party that commands great power. so shall we give steadiness and fervour to our growing strength by balancing it with truth and justice: so shall we found a government that excesses cannot undermine nor tyranny destroy. vi we have to consider, in conclusion, the unrest in the world, the war of parties and classes, and the need of judging the tendencies of the time to set our steps aright. with the wars and rumours of wars that threaten the great nations from without and the wild upheavals that threaten them within, it would be foolish to hide from ourselves the drift of events. we must decide our attitude; and if it is too much to hope that we may keep clear of the upheavals, we should aim at strengthening ourselves against the coming crash. we cannot set the world right, but we can go a long way to setting things in our own land right, by making through a common patriotism a united people. what if we are held up occasionally by the cold cries shot at every high aim--"dreamer--utopia"; cry this in return: no vision of the dreamer can be more wild than the frantic make-shifts of the great powers to vie in armaments with one another or repress internal revolts. consider england in the late strike that paralysed her. it was only suspended by a step that merely deferred the struggle; the strife is again threatening. all the powers are so threatened and their efforts to defer the hour are equally feverish and fruitless; for the hour is pressing and may flash on the world when 'tis least prepared. let who will deride us, but let us prepare. we may not guide our steps with the certainty of prophets, nor hope by our beautiful schemes to make a perfect state; but we can only come near to perfection in the light of a perfect ideal, and however far below it we may remain, we can at least, under its inspiration, reach an existence rational and human: our justification for a brave effort lies in that the governments of this time are neither one nor the other. he who thinks ireland's struggle to express her own mind, to give utterance to her own tongue, to stand behind her own frontier, is but a sentiment will be surprised to find it leads him to this point. herein is the justification and the strength of the movement. men are deriding things around them, of the significance of which they have not the remotest idea. ireland is calling her children to a common banner, to the defence of her frontier, to the building up of a national life, harmonious and beautiful--a conception of citizenship, from which a right is conceded, not because it can be compelled, but because it is just: to the foundation of a state that will by its defence of the least powerful prove all powerful, that will be strong because true, beautiful because free, full of the music of her olden speech and caught by the magic of her encircling sea. chapter x literature and freedom--the propagandist playwright i a nation's literature is an index to its mind. if the nation has its freedom to win, from its literature may we learn if it is passionately in earnest in the fight, or if it is half-hearted, or if it cares not at all. whatever state prevails, passionate men can pour their passion through literature to the nation's soul and make it burn and move and fight. for this reason it is of transcendent importance to the cause. literature is the shrine of freedom, its fortress, its banner, its charter. in its great temple patriots worship; from it soldiers go forth, wave its challenge, and fight, and conquering, write the charter of their country. its great power is contested by none; rather, all recognise it, and many and violent are the disputes as to its right use and purpose. i propose to consider two of the disputants--the propagandist playwright and the art-for-art's-sake artist, since they raise issues that are our concern. it is curious that two so violently opposed should be so nearly alike in error: they are both afraid of life. the propagandist is all for one side; the artist afraid of every side. the one lacks imagination; the other lacks heart; they are both wide of the truth. the service of the truth requires them to pursue one course; in their dispute they swerve from that course, one to right, one to left. because they leave the path on opposite sides, they do not see how much alike is their error; but that they do both leave the path is my point, and it is well we should consider it. it would be difficult to deal with both sides at once; so i will consider the propagandist first. what i have to charge against him is that his work is insincere, that he is afraid to do justice to the other side, that he makes ridicule of our exemplars, that he helps to keep the _poseur_ in being; and to conclude, that only by a saving sense of humour can we find our way back to the truth. ii when we judge literature we do so by reference to the eternal truth, not by what the writer considers the present phase of truth; and if literature so tested is found guilty of suppression, evasion or misinterpretation, we call the work insincere, though the author may have written in perfect good faith. that is a necessary distinction to keep in mind. if you call a man's work insincere, the superficial critic will take it as calling the man himself insincere; but the two are distinct, and it needs to be emphasised, for sincere men are making these propagandist plays, of which the manifest and glaring untruth is working mischief to the national mind. a type of such a play is familiar enough in these days when we like to ridicule the west briton. we are served up puppets representing the shoneen with a lisp set over against the patriot who says all the proper things suitable to the occasion. now, such a play serves no good purpose, but it has a certain bad effect. it does not give a true interpretation of life; it enlightens no one; but it flatters the prejudices of people who profess things for which they have no zeal. that is the root of the mischief. many of us will readily profess a principle for which we will not as readily suffer, but when the pinch comes and we are asked to do service for the flag, we cover our unwillingness by calling the man on the other side names. where such a spirit prevails there can be no national awakening. if we put a play before the people, it must be with a hope of arresting attention, striking their imagination, giving them a grip of reality, and filling them with a joy in life. now, the propagandist play does none of these things; it has neither joy nor reality; its characters are puppets and ridiculous; they are essentially caricatures. this is supposed to convert the unbeliever; but the intelligent unbeliever coming to it is either bored or irritated by its extravagant absurdity, and if he admits our sincerity, it is only at the expense of our intelligence. iii a propagandist play for a political end is even more mischievous--at least lovers of freedom have more cause for protest. it makes our heroes ridiculous. no man of imagination can stand these impossible persons of the play who "walk on" eternally talking of ireland. our heroes were men; these are _poseurs_. get to understand davis, tone, or any of our great ones, and you will find them human, gay, and lovable. "were you ever in love, davis?" asked one of his wondering admirers, and prompt and natural came the reply: "i'm never out of it." we swear by tone for his manly virtues; we love him because we say to ourselves: "what a fine fellow for a holiday." a friend of mitchel's travelling with him once through a storm, was astonished to find him suddenly burst out into a fine recitation, which he delivered with fine effect. he was joyous in spirit. for their buoyancy we love them all, and because of it we emulate them. we are influenced, not by the man who always wants to preach a sermon at us, but by the one with whom we go for a holiday. our history-makers were great, joyous men, of fine spirit, fine imagination, fine sensibility, and fine humour. they loved life; they loved their fellow man; they loved all the beautiful, brave things of earth. when you know them you can picture them scaling high mountains and singing from the summits, or boating on fine rivers in the sunlight, or walking about in the dawn, to the music of creation, evolving the philosophy of revolutions and building beautiful worlds. you get no hint of this from the absurd propagandist play, yet this is what the heart of man craves. when he does not get it, he cannot explain what he wants; but he knows what he does not want, and he goes away and keeps his distance. the play has missed fire, and the playwright and his hero are ridiculous. let us understand one thing: if we want to make men dutiful we must make them joyous. iv it is because we must talk of grave things that we must preserve our gaiety; otherwise we could not preserve our balance. by some freak of nature, the average man strikes attitudes as readily as the average boy whistles. we know how the _poseur_ works mischief to every cause, and we can see the _poseur_ on every side. in politics, he has made the platform contemptible, which is a danger to the nation, needing the right use of platform; in literature--well, we all know bourgeois, but who has done justice to the artist who gets on a platform to talk about the bourgeois?--in religion, the _poseur_ is more likely to make agnostics than all the rationalist press; and the agnostic _poseur_ in turn is very funny. now all these are an affliction, a collection of absurdities of which we must cure the nation. if we cannot cure the nation of absurdity we cannot set her free. let it be our rule to combine gaiety with gravity and we will acquire a saving sense of proportion. only the solemn man is dull; the serious man has a natural fund of gaiety: we need only be natural to bring back joy to serious endeavour. then we shall begin to move. let us remember a revolution will surely fail when its leaders have no sense of humour. v but our humour will not be a saving humour unless it is of high order. a great humorist is as rare as a great poet or a great philosopher. though ours may not be great we must keep it in the line of greatness. remember, great humour must be made out of ourselves rather than out of others. the fine humorist is delightfully courteous; the commonplace wit, invariably insulting. we must keep two things in mind, that in laughter at our own folly is the beginning of wisdom; and the keenest wit is pure fun, never coarse fun. we start a laugh at others by getting an infallible laugh at ourselves. the commonplace wit arranges incidents to make someone he dislikes ridiculous; his attitude is the attitude of the superior person. he is nearly always--often unintentionally--offensive; he repels the public sometimes in irritation, sometimes in amusement, for they often see point in his joke, but see a greater joke in him, and they are often laughing, not at his joke, but at himself. let us for our salvation avoid the attitude of the superior person. don't make sport of others--make it of yourself. ridicule of your neighbour must be largely speculation; of the comedy in yourself there can be no doubt. when you get the essential humour out of yourself, you get the infallible touch, and you arrest and attract everyone. you are not the superior person. in effect, you slap your neighbour on the back and say, "we're all in the same boat; let us enjoy the joke"; and you find he will come to you with glistening eye. he may feel a little foolish at first--you are poking his ribs; but you cannot help it--having given him the way to poke your own. by your merry honesty he knows you for a safe comrade, and he comes with relief and confidence--we like to talk about ourselves. he will be equally frank with yourself; you will tell one another secrets; you will reach the heart of man. that is what we need. we must get the heart-beat into literature. then will it quiver and dance and weep and sing. then we are in the line of greatness. vi it is because we need the truth that we object to the propagandist playwright. only in a rare case does he avoid being partial; and when he is impartial he is cold and unconvincing. he gives us argument instead of emotion; but emotion is the language of the heart. he does not touch the heart; he tries to touch the mind: he is a pamphleteer and out of place. he fails, and his failure has damaged his cause, for it leaves us to feel that the cause is as cold as his play; but when the cause is a great one it is always vital, warm and passionate. it is for the sake of the cause we ask that a play be made by a sincere man-of-letters, who will give us not propagandist literature nor art-for-art's-sake, but the throbbing heart of man. the great dramatist will have the great qualities needed, sensibility, sympathy, insight, imagination, and courage. the special pleader and the _poseur_ lack all these things, and they make themselves and their work foolish. let us stand for the truth, not pruning it for the occasion. the man who is afraid to face life is not competent to lead anyone, to speak for anyone, or to interpret anything: he inspires no confidence. the one to rouse us must be passionate, and his passion will win us heart and soul. when from some terribly intense moment, he turns with a merry laugh, only the fool will take him as laughing at his cause; the general instinct will see him detecting an attitude, tripping it up, and making us all merry and natural again. in that moment we shall spring up astonished, enthusiastic, exultant--here is one inspired; we shall enter a passionate brotherhood, no cold disputes now--the smouldering fire along the land shall quicken to a blaze, history shall be again in the making. we shall be caught in the living flame. chapter xi literature and freedom--art for art's sake i art for art's sake has come to have a meaning which must be challenged, but yet it can be used in a sense that is both high and sacred. if a gifted writer take literature as a great vocation and determine to use his talents faithfully and well, without reference to fee or reward; if prosperity cannot seduce him to the misuse of his genius, then we give him our high praise. let it still not be forgotten that the labourer is worthy of his hire. but if the hire is not forthcoming, and he knowing it, yet says in his heart, "the work must still be done"; and if he does it loyally and bravely, despite the present coldness of the world, doing the good work for the love of the work and all beautiful things; and if with this meaning he take "art for art's sake" as his battle-cry, then we repeat it is used in a sense both high and sacred. ii but there are artists abroad whose chief glory seems to be to deny that they have convictions--that is, convictions about the passionate things of life that rouse and move their generation. now that they should not be special pleaders is an obvious duty, but unless they have a passionate feeling for the vital things that move men, heart and soul, they cannot interpret the heart and soul of passionate men, and their work must be for ever cold. when literature is not passionate it does not touch the spirit to lift and spread its wings and soar to finer air. that is the great want about all the clever books now being turned out--they often give us excitement; they never give us ecstasy. then there is an obvious feeling of something lacking which men try to make up with art; and they produce work faultless in form and fastidious in phrase, but still it lacks the touch of fire that would lift it from common things to greatness. iii if we are to apply art to great work we must distinguish art from artifice. we find the two well contrasted in synge's "riders to the sea" and his "playboy." the first was written straight from the heart. we feel synge must have followed those people carrying the dead body, and touched to the quick by the _caoine_, passed the touch on to us, for in the lyric swell of the close we get the true emotion. here alone is he in the line of greatness. this gripped his heart and he wrote out of himself. but in the other work of his it was otherwise. he has put his method on record: he listened through a chink in the floor, and wrote around other people. it is characteristic of the art of our time. let it be called art if the critics will, but it is not life. iv no, it is not life. but there is so much talk just now of getting "down to fundamentals," of the poetry of the tramp "walking the world," and the rest of it, that it would be well if we _did get_ down to fundamentals; and this is one thing fundamental--the tramp is a deserter from life. he evades the troubled field where great causes are fought; he shuns the battle because of the wounds and the sacrifice; he has no heart for high conflict and victory. let him under the cover of darkness but secure his share of the spoils and the world may go to wreck. yes, he is the meanest of things--a deserter. on the field of battle he would be shot. if we let him desert the field of life, go his way and walk the world, let us not at least hail him as a hero. the repertory theatre is the nursery of this particular art-cult, and 'twould relieve some of us to talk freely about it. the repertory theatre has already become fashionable, and is quite rapidly become a nuisance. men are making songs and plays and lectures for art's sake, for the praise of a coterie or to shock the bourgeois--above all shock the bourgeois. a certain type of artist delights in shocking the bourgeois--a riot over a play gives him great satisfaction. in passing, one must note with exasperation, perhaps with some misgiving, how men raise a riot over something not worth a thought, and will not fight for things for which they ought to die. but he likes the bourgeois to think him a terrible person; in his own esteem he is on an eminence, and he proceeds to send out more shock-the-bourgeois literature; and 'tis mostly very sorry stuff. sometimes he tries to be emotional and is but painfully artificial; sometimes he tries to be merry and gives us flippancy for fun. and we feel a terrible need for getting back to a standard, worthy and true. great work can be made only for the love of work; not for money, not for art's sake, not for intellectual appeal nor flippant ridicule, but for the pure love of things, good, true and beautiful. with the best of intentions we may fail; and this should be laid down as a safe guiding principle; a dramatist should be moved by his own tragedy; the novelist should be interested in his own story; the poet should make his song for the love of the song and his comedy for the fun of the thing. vi we naturally think of the abbey theatre when we speak of these things, and as the abbey work has certainly suffered from overpraise we may correct it by comparison with shakespeare. before the abbey we were so used to triviality that when clever and artistic work appeared we at once hailed it great. we _did_ get one or two great things, a fact to note with hearty pleasure and pride. but the rest was merely clever; and now that we are getting nothing great we must insist, and keep on insisting, that 'tis merely clever. but let us remember that value of the word great. let it be kept for such names as shakespeare and moliã¨re; and lesser men may be called brilliant, talented or able--anything you will but great. consider the scenes from the supreme plays of shakespeare and compare with them the innumerable plays now coming forth and note a vital difference. these give us excitement, where shakespeare gave us vision. we may be reminded of shakespeare's duels and brawls and battles and blood; his generation revelled in excitement. yes, they craved it, and he gave it to them, but shot through with wonder, subtlety, ecstasy; and his splendid creations, like mighty worlds, keep us wondering for ever. we must get back that supreme note of blended music and wonder, that makes the spirit beautiful and tempts it to soar, till it rise over common things and mere commotion, spreading its wings for the finer air where reason faints and falls to earth. vii a dramatist cannot make a great play out of little people. his chief characters at least must be great of heart and soul--the great hearts that fight great causes. when such are caught, in the inevitable struggle of affections and duties and the general clash of life their passionate spirits send up all the elements that make great literature. the writer who cannot enter into their battles and espouse their cause cannot give utterance to their hearts; and we don't want what he thinks about them; we want what they think about themselves. he who is in passionate sympathy with them feels their emotion and writing from the heart does great things. the artist who is in mortal dread of being thought a politician or suspected of motives cannot feel, and will as surely fail, as the one who sits down to play the rã´le of politician disguised as play-right. that is what the artist has got to see; and he has got to see that while the irish revolution for centuries has attracted the greatest hearts and brains of ireland, for him carefully to avoid it is to avoid the line of greatness. for a propagandist to sit down to give it utterance would be as if a handy-man were to set out to build a cathedral. the revolution does not need to be argued; it justifies itself--all we need is to give it utterance--give it utterance once greatly. then the writer may proceed to give utterance to every good thing under the sun. but our artists are making, and will continue to make, only second-class literature, for they are afraid of the revolution, and it is all over our best of life; they are afraid of that life. but to enter the arena of greatness they must give it a voice. that is the vocation of the poet. viii yes, and the poet will be unlike you, gentlemen of the fastidious phrase. he will not be careless of form, but the passion that is in him will make simple words burn and live; never will he in the mode of the time go wide of the truth to make a picturesque phrase; his mind rapt on the thing will fix on the true word; his heart warm with the battle will fashion more beautiful forms than you, o detached and dainty artist; his soul full of music and adventure will scale those heights it is your fate to dream of but not your fortune to possess. yet, you, too, might possess them would you but step with him into the press of adventurous legions, and make articulate the dream of men, and make splendid their triumph. he is the prophet of to-morrow, though you deny him to-day. he is not like to you, supercilious and aloof--he would have you for a passionate brother, would raise your spirit in ecstasy, flood your mind with thought, and touch your lips with fire. because of his sensitiveness he knows every mood and every heart and gives a voice and a song to all. you might know him for a good comrade, where freedom is to win or to hold, over in the van or the breach; able to deal good blows and take them in the fine manner, a fine fighter; not with darkened brow crying, "an eye for an eye"--for who _could_ give him blow for blow or match his deed with a deed?--but one of open front and open hand who will count it happiness to have made for a victory he may not live to enjoy, as ready to die in its splendour as he had been to live through the darkness before the dawn; remembering with soldier tenderness the comrades of old battles, forgetting the malice of old enemies; a high example of the magnanimous spirit, happily not yet unknown on earth; with fine generosity and noble fire, full of that great love the common cry can never make other than humanising and beautiful, not without a gleam of humour more than half divine, he will pass, leaving to the foe that hated him heartily equally with the friend that loved him well, the wonder of his thought and the rapture of his melody. chapter xii religion i it ought to be laid down as a first principle that grave questions which have divided us in the past, and divide us still with much bitterness, should not be thrust aside and kept out of view in the hope of harmony. where the attitude is such, the hope is vain. they should be approached with courage in the hope of creating mutual respect and an honourable solution for all. religion is such a question. to the majority of men this touches their most intimate life. because of their jealous regard for that intimate part of themselves they are prepared for bitter hostilities with anyone who will assail it; and because of the unmeasured bitterness of assaults on all sides we have come to count it a virtue to bring together in societies labelled non-sectarian, men who have been violently opposed on this issue. it will be readily allowed that to bring men together anyhow, even suspiciously, is somewhat of an advance, when we keep in mind how angrily they have quarrelled. but 'tis not to our credit that in any assembly a particular name hardly dare be mentioned; and it must be realised that, whatever purpose it may serve in lesser undertakings, in the great fight for freedom no such attitude will suffice. no grave question can be settled by ignoring it. since it is our duty to make the war of independence a reality and a success, we must invoke a contest that will as surely rouse every latent passion and give every latent suspicion an occasion and a field. that is the danger ahead. we must anticipate that danger, meet and destroy it. perhaps at this suggestion most of us will at once get restive. some may say with irritation: why raise this matter? others on the other side may prepare forthwith to dig up the hatchet. is not the attitude on both sides evidence of the danger? does anyone suppose we can start a fight for freedom without making that danger a grimmer reality? who can claim it a wise policy merely for the moment to dodge it? for that is what we do. let us have courage and face it. at what i have to say let no man take offence or fright--it commits no one to anything. it is written to try and make opponents understand and respect one another, not to set them at one another, least of all to make them "liberal," that is, lax and contemptible, ready to explain everything away. we want primarily the man who is prepared to fight his ground, but who is big enough in heart and mind to respect opponents who will also fight theirs. in the integrity and courage of both sides is the guarantee of the independence of both. that should be our guiding thought. but as on this question most people abandon all tolerance, it is quite possible what may be written will satisfy none; still, it may serve the purpose of making a need apparent. to repeat, we must face the question. but whoever elects to start it, should approach the issue with sympathy and forbearance. these are as necessary as courage and resolution; yet, since many often sacrifice firmness to sympathy, others will take the opposite line of riding roughshod over everyone, a harshness that confirms the weakling in his weakness. to note all this is but to note the difficulty; and if what is now written fails in its appeal, it need only be said to walk unerringly here would require the insight of a prophet and the balance of an angel. ii what everyone should take as a fair demand is that all men should be sincere in their professions, and that we should justify ourselves by the consistency of our own lives rather than by the wickedness of our neighbours: which is nothing new. it is our trouble that we must emphasise obvious duties. to approach the question frankly with no matter what good faith will lead to much heart-burning, perhaps, to no little bitterness; but if we realise that all sides are about equally to blame, we may induce an earnestness that may lead to better things. it is in that hope i write. catholics and protestants, instead of saying to one another the things with which we are familiar, should look to their own houses; and if in this age of fashionable agnosticism, they should conclude that the general enemy is the atheist, socialist, and the syndicalist, they should still be reminded to look to their own houses; and if the agnostic take this to justify himself, he should be reminded he has never done anything to justify himself. it may seem a curious way for inducing harmony to set out to prove everyone in the wrong; but the point is clear, not to attack what men believe but to ask them to justify their words by their deeds. the request is not unreasonable and it may be asked in a tone that will show the sincerity of him who makes it and waken a kindred feeling in all earnest men. the world will be a better place to live in, and we shall be all better friends when every man makes a genuine resolve to give us all the example of a better life. iii a development that would require a treatise in itself i will but touch on, to suggest to all interested a matter of general and grave concern--the growing materialism of religious bodies. on all sides self-constituted defenders of the faith are troubling themselves, not with the faith but with the numbers of their adherents who have jobs, equal sharers in emoluments, and so forth. a protestant of standing writes a book and proves his religion is one of efficiency; a catholic of equal standing quickly rejoins with another book to prove his religion is also efficient; each blind to the fact that the resulting campaign is disgraceful to both. when religion ceases to represent to us something spiritual, and purely spiritual, we begin to drift away from it. "where thy treasure is, there thy heart is also." "no man can serve god and mammon." the modern rejoinder is familiar: "we must live." this, our generation is not likely to forget. the grave concern is that well-meaning men are accustoming themselves to this cry to sacrifice all higher considerations for the "equal division of emoluments." let us as citizens and a community see that every man has the right and the means to live; but when self-interested bodies start a rivalry in the name of their particular creeds, we know it ends in a squalid greed and fight for place, in a pursuit of luxury, the logical outcome of which must be to make the world ugly, sordid and brutal. it would be a mistake to overlook that high-minded men are allowing themselves to be committed by plausible reasons to this growing evil. it is misguided enthusiasm. there is a divine authority that warns us all: "be zealous for the better gifts." iv i wish to examine the attitude of the average christian to the agnostic. "the world is falling away from religion," he will cry when depressed, without thinking how much he himself may be a contributing cause. let him study it in this light. what is his attitude? when he comes to speak of the tendency of the age he will indulge in vague generalities about atheism, socialism, irreligion, and the rest; always the cause is outside of him, and against him; he is not part of it. i ask him to pass by the atheist awhile and take what may be of more concern. there is a type of catholic and protestant who has as little genuine religion in him as any infidel, who does not deny the letter of the law, but who does not observe its spirit, whose only use for the letter is to criticise and harass adversaries. observe the high use he has for liberty--drinking, card-playing, gambling, luxury; he has no place in his life for any worthy deeds, nay, only scorn for such. still he passes for orthodox. if he is a catholic, he secures that by putting in an appearance at mass on sundays. his mind is not there; he arrives late and goes early. his protestant fellow in his private judgment finds more scope: "let the women go listen to the parson." this is the sort of saying gives him such a conceit of himself. we have the type on both sides, so all can see it. now it is not in the way of the pharisee we come to note them, but to note that, strange as it may appear, either or both together will come to applaud the denouncing of the atheist. we gather such into our religious societies, and flatter them that they are adherents of religion and the bulwark of the faith, and they forthwith anathematise the atheist with great gusto. the one so anathematised is often as worthless as themselves with a conceit to despise priest and parson alike. but it sometimes happens he is a fine character who has no religion as most of us understand it, but who has yet a fine spiritual fervour, ready to fight and make sacrifices for a national or social principle that he believes will make for better things, a man of integrity and worth whom the best of men may be glad to hold as a friend. yet we find in the condition to which we have drifted such a one may be pilloried by wasters, gamblers, rioters, a crew that are the curse of every community. we lash the atheist and the age but give little heed to the insincerity and cant of those we do not refuse to call our own. what an example for the man anathematised. he sees the vice and meanness of those we allow to pass for orthodox, and when he sees also the complacency of the better part, he is unconvinced. we praise the sweetness of the healing waters of christ-like charity, but despite our gospel he never gets it, never. we give him execration, injustice; if we let him go with a word, it is never a gentle word, but a bitter epithet; and we wonder he is estranged, when he sees our amazing composure in an amazing welter of hypocrisy and deceit. there is, of course, the better side, the many thousands of catholics and protestants who sincerely aim at better things. but what has to be admitted is that most sincerely religious people adopt to the man of no established religion the same attitude as does the hypocrite: they join in the general cry. they should look to their own houses; they should purge the temple of the money-lender and the knave; they should see that their field gives good harvest; they should remember that not to the atheist only but to the orthodox was it written: "every tree therefore that doth not yield good fruit shall be cut down and cast into the fire." v there is a word to be said to the man for whom was invented the curious name agnostic. i'm concerned only with him who is sincere and high-minded. let us pass the flippant critics of things they do not understand. but all sincere men are comrades in a deep and fine sense. what the honest unbeliever has to keep in mind is that the darker side is but one side. if he stands studying a crowd of the orthodox and finds therein the drunkard, the gambler, the sensualist; and if he says bitter things of the value of religion and gets in return the clerical fiat of one who is more a politician than a priest; and if he rejoins contemptuously, "this is fit for women and children," let him be reminded that he can also study the other side if he care. if he has the instinct of a fighter he must know every army has in its trail the camp-follower and the vulture, but when the battle is set and the danger is imminent, only the true soldier stands his ground. because some who are of poor spirit are in high place, let him not forget the old spirit still exists. not only the women but the best intellects of men still keep the old traditions. newman and pascal, dante and milton, erigena and aquinas, are all dead, but in our time even they have had followers not too far off. in the same spirit gilbert chesterton found wonder at a wooden post, and francis thompson, in his divine wandering, troubled the gold gateways of the stars. let our friend before he frames his final judgment pause here. he may well be baffled by many anomalies of the time, his eye may rest on the meaner horde, his ear be filled with the arrogance of some unworthy successor of paul; and if he says: "why permit these things?" he may be told there are some alive in this generation who will question all such things, and who, however hard it go with them, have no fear for the final victory. vi perhaps the conventional christian and conventional non-christian may rest a moment to consider the reality. between the bitter believer and the exasperated unbeliever, christianity is being turned from a practice to a polemic, and if we are to recall the old spirit we must recall the old earnestness and simplicity of the early martyrs. we do not hear that they called nero an atheist, but we do hear that they went singing to the arena. by their example we may recover the spirit of song, and have done with invective. if we find music and joyousness in the old conception, it is not in the fashion of the time to explain it away in some "new theology," for he to whom it is not a fashion, but a vital thing, keeps his anchor by tradition. to him it is the shining light away in the mists of antiquity; it is the strong sun over the living world; it is the pillar of fire over the widening seas and worlds of the unknown; it is the expanse of infinity. when he is lost in its mystery he adverts to the wonder about him, for all that is wonderful is touched with it, and all that is lovely is its expression. it is in the breath of the wind, pure and bracing from the mountain top. it is in the song of the lark holding his musical revel in the sunlight. it is in the ecstasy of a spring morning. it is in the glory of all beautiful things. when it has entered and purified his spirit, his heart goes out to the persecuted in all ages and countries. none will he reject. "i am not come to call the just but sinners." he remembers those words, and his great charity encompasses not only the persecuted orthodox, but the persecuted heretics and infidels. vii i will not say if such an endeavour as i suggest can have an immediate success. but i think it will be a step forward if we get sincere men on one side to understand the sincerity of the other side; and if in matters of religion and speculation, where there is so much difficulty and there is likely to be so much conflict of opinion, there should be no constraint, but rather the finest charity and forbearance; then the orthodox would be concerned with practising their faith rather than in harassing the infidel, and the infidel would receive a more useful lesson than the ill-considered tirades he despises. he may remain still unconvinced, but he will give over his contempt. this question of religion is one on which men will differ, and differing, ultimately they will fight if we find no better way. we must remember while freedom is to win we are facing a national struggle, and if we are threatened within by a civil war of creeds it may undo us. that is why we must face the question. that is why i think utter frankness in these grave matters is of grave urgency. if we approach them in the right spirit we need have no fear--for at heart the most of men are susceptible to high appeals. what we need is courage and intensity; it is gabbling about surface things makes the bitterness. if in truth we safeguard the right of every man as we are bound to do we shall win the confidence of all, and we may hope for a braver and better future, wherein some light of the primal beauty may wander again over earth as in the beginning it dawned on chaos when the spirit of god first moved over the waters. chapter xiii intellectual freedom i it will probably cause surprise if i say there is, possibly, more intellectual freedom in ireland than elsewhere in europe. but i do not mean by intellectual freedom conventional free-thought, which is, perhaps, as far as any superstition from true freedom of the mind. the point may not be admitted but its consideration will clear the air, and help to dispose of some objections hindering that spiritual freedom, fundamental to all liberty. ii i have no intention here of in any way criticising the doctrine of free-thought, but one so named cannot be ignored when we consider intellectual freedom. this, then, has to be borne in mind when speaking of free-thought, that while it allows you latitude of opinion in many things, it will not allow you freedom in all things, in, for example, revealed religion. i only mention this to show that on both sides of such burning questions you have disputants dogmatic. a dogmatic "yes" meets an equally dogmatic "no." the dogmas differ and it is not part of our business here to discuss them: but to come to a clear conception of the matter in hand, it must be kept in mind, that if you, notwithstanding, freely of your own accord, accept belief in certain doctrines, the freethinkers will for that deny you freedom. and the freethinkers are right in that they are dogmatic. (but this they themselves appear to overlook.) freedom is absolutely dogmatic. it is fundamentally false that freedom implies no attachment to any belief, no being bound by any law, "as free as the wind," as the saying goes, for the wind is not free. simple indeterminism is not liberty. iii we must, then, find the true conception of intellectual freedom. it is the freedom of the individual to follow his star and reach his goal. that star binds him down to certain lines and his freedom is in exact proportion to his fidelity to the lines. the seeming paradox may be puzzling: a concrete example will make it clear. suppose a man, shipwrecked, finds himself at sea in an open boat, without his bearings or a rudder. he is at the mercy of the wind and wave, without freedom, helpless. but give him his bearings and a helm, and at once he recovers his course; he finds his position and can strike the path to freedom. he is at perfect liberty to scuttle his boat, drive it on the rocks or do any other irrational thing; but if he would have freedom, he must follow his star. iv this leads us to track a certain error that has confused modern debate. a man in assumed impartiality tells you he will stand away from his own viewpoint and consider a case from yours. now, if he does honestly hold by his own view and thinks he can put it by and judge from his opponent's, he is deceiving both himself and his opponent. he can do so _apparently,_ but, whatever assumption is made, he is governed subconsciously by his own firm conviction. his belief is around him like an atmosphere; it goes with him wherever he goes; he can only stand free of it by altogether abandoning it. if his case is such that he can come absolutely to the other side to view it uninfluenced by his own, then he has abandoned his own. he is like a man in a boat who has thrown over rudder and bearings: he may be moved by any current: he is adrift. if he is to recover the old ground, he must win it as something he never had. but if instead of this he does at heart hold by his own view, he should give over the deception that he is uninfluenced by it in framing judgment. it is psychologically impossible. let the man understand it as a duty to himself to be just to others, and to substitute this principle for his spurious impartiality. this is the frank and straightforward course. while he is under his own star, he is moving in its light: he has, if unconsciously, his hand on the helm: he judges all currents scrupulously and exactly, but always from his own place at the wheel and with his own eyes. to abandon one or the other is to betray his trust, or in good faith and ignorance to cast it off till it is gone, perhaps, too far to recover. v if we so understand intellectual freedom, in what does its denial consist? in this: around every set of principles guiding men, there grows up a corresponding set of prejudices that with the majority in practice often supersede the principles; and these prejudices with the march of time assume such proportions, gather such power, both by the numbers of their adherents and the authority of many supporting them, that for a man of spirit, knowing them to be evil and urgent of resistance, there is needed a vigour and freedom of mind that but few understand and even fewer appreciate or encourage. the prejudices that grow around a man's principles are like weeds and poison in his garden: they blight his flowers, trees and fruit; and he must go forth with fire and sword and strong unsparing hand to root out the evil things. he will find with his courage and strength are needed passion and patience and dogged persistence. for men defend a prejudice with bitter venom altogether unlike the fire that quickens the fighter for freedom; and the destroyer of the evil may find himself assailed by an astonishing combination--charged with bad faith or treachery or vanity or sheer perversity, in proportion as those who dislike his principles deny his good faith; or those who profess them, because of his vigour and candour denounce him for an enemy within the fold. but for all that he should stand fast. if he has the courage so to do, he gives a fine example of intellectual freedom. vi it will serve us to consider some prejudices, free-thinking and religious. first the free-thinker. he has a prejudice very hard to kill. if i believe in the beginning what bernard shaw has found out thus late in the day, that priests are not as bad as they are painted, the free-thinker would deny me intellectual freedom. the fact of my right to think the matter out and come to that conclusion would count for nothing. on the other hand, if i were known to have professed a certain faith and to have abandoned it, he would acclaim that as casting off mental slavery. this is hopelessly confusing. if a man has ceased to hold a certain belief he deserves no credit for courage in saying so openly. if he thinks what he once believed, or is supposed to have believed, has no vitality, surely he can have no reason for being afraid of it, and to speak of dangerous consequences from it to him, can be _for him_ at least only a bogey. his simple denial is, then, no mark of courage. courage is a positive thing. yet he may well have that courage. suppose him in taking his stand to have taken up some social faith that for him has promise of better things. he will find his new creed surrounded by its own swarm of prejudices, and if he refuse to worship every fetish of the free-thinker, declaring that this stands to him for a certain definite, beautiful thing, and fighting for it, he will find himself denied and scouted by his new friends. he may find himself often in company with some supposed enemies. he will surely need in his sincere attitude to life a freedom of mind that is not a name merely but a positive virtue that demands of him more than denunciation of obscurantism, the recognition of a personal duty and the justification of personal works. vii the religious prejudice will be no less hard to kill. indiscriminate denunciation of unbelievers as wicked men serves no good purpose and leads nowhere. there are wicked men on all sides. our standard must be one that will distinguish the sincere men on all sides; and our loyalty to our particular creeds must be shown in our lives and labours, not in the reviling of the infidel. we are justified in casting out the hypocrite from every camp, and when we come to this task we can be sure only of the hypocrites in our own; and we should lay it as an injunction on all bodies to purge themselves. the burden will be laid on all--not one surely of which men can complain--that they shall prove their principles in action and lay their prejudices by. christians might well find exemplars in the early martyrs, those who for their principles went so readily to the lions. one may anticipate the complacent rejoinder: "this is not so exacting an age; men are not asked to die for religion now"--and one may in turn reply, that, perhaps our age may not be without occasion for such high service, but that we may be unwilling to go to the lions. our time has its own trial--by no means unexacting let me tell you--but we quietly slip it by: it is much easier to revile the infidel. this as a test of loyalty should be pinned: we shall shut up thereby the hypocrite. and the earnest man, more conscious of his own burden, will be more sympathetic, generous and just, and will come to be more logical and to see what newman well remarked, that one who asks questions shows he has no belief and in asking may be but on the road to one. if to ask a question is to express a doubt, it is no less, perhaps, to seek a way out of it. "what better can he do than inquire, if he is in doubt?" asks newman. "not to inquire is in his case to be satisfied with disbelief." we should, acting in this light, instead of denouncing the questioner, answer his question freely and frankly, encourage him to ask others and put him one or two by the way. men meeting in this manner may still remain on opposite sides, but there will be formed between them a bond of sympathy that mutual sincerity can never fail to establish. this is freedom, and a fine beautiful thing, surely worth a fine effort. what we have grown accustomed to, the bitterness, the recriminations, the persecutions and retaliations, are all the evil weeds of prejudice, growing around our principles and choking them. they are so far a denial of principle, a proof of mental slavery. our freedom will attest to faith: "where the spirit of the lord is, there is liberty." viii this, in conclusion, is the root of the matter: to claim freedom and to allow it in like measure; rather than to deny, to urge men to follow their beliefs: only thus can they find salvation. to constrain a man to profess what we profess is worse than delusion: should he give lip service to what he does not hold at heart, 'twere for him deceitful and for us dangerous. where his star calls, let him walk sincerely. if his creed is insufficient or inconsistent, in his struggle he shall test it, and in his sincerity he must make up the insufficiency or remove the inconsistency. this is the only course for honourable men and no man should object. to repeat, it puts an equal burden on all--the onus of justifying the faith that is in them. life is a divine adventure and he whose faith is finest, firmest and clearest will go farthest. god does not hold his honours for the timid: the man who buried his talent, fearing to lose it, was cast into exterior darkness. he who will step forward fearlessly will be justified. "all things are possible to him who believeth." many on both sides may be surprised to find suddenly proposed as a test to both sides the readiness to adventure bravely on the sea of life. the free-thinker may be astonished to hear, not that he goes too far, but does not go far enough. he may gasp at the test, but it is in effect the test and the only true one. the man who does not believe he is to be blotted out when his body ceases to breathe, who holds all history for his heritage and the wide present for his battle-ground, believes also the future is no repellent void but a widening and alluring world. if in his travel he is scrupulous in detail, it is in the spirit of the mariner who will neither court a ship-wreck nor be denied his adventure. he cannot deny to others the right to hesitate and halt by the way, but his spirit asks no less than the eternal and the infinite. yes, but many good religious people are not used to seeing the issue in this light, and those who make a trade of fanning old bitterness will still ply their bitter trade, crying that anarchists, atheists, heretics, infidels, all outcasts and wicked men, are all rampant for our destruction. it may be disputed, but, admitting it, one may ask: is there no place among christian people for those distinctive virtues on which we base the superiority of our religion? when the need is greatest, should the practice be less urgent? it is not evident that the free-thinker is obliged by any of his principles to give better example. it is evident the christian is so obliged. why is he found wanting? if human weakness were pleaded, one could understand. it is against the making a virtue of it lies the protest. how many noble things there are in our philosophies, and how little practised. no violent convulsions should be needed to make us free, if men were but consistent: we should find ourselves wakening from a wicked dream in a bloodless and beautiful revolution. we are in the desert truly and a long way from the promised land. but we must get to the higher ground and consider our position; and if one by one we are stripped of the prejudices that too long have usurped the place of faith, and we find ourselves, to our dismay, perhaps lacking that faith that we have so long shouted but so little testified, and tremble on the verge of panic, there is one last line that gives in four words with divine simplicity and completeness a final answer to all timidity and objections: "fear not; only believe." chapter xiv militarism i to defend or recover freedom men must be always ready for the appeal to arms. here is a principle that has been vindicated through all history and needs vindication now. but in our time the question of rightful war has been crossed by the evil of militarism, and in our assertion of the principle, that in the last resort freemen must have recourse to the sword, we find ourselves crossed by the anti-militarist campaign. we must dispose of this confusing element before we can come to the ethics of war. of the evil of militarism there can be no question, but a careful study of some anti-militaristic literature discloses very different motives for the campaign. i propose to lay some of the motives bare and let the reader judge whether there may not be an insidious plot on foot to make a deal between the big nations to crush the little ones. for this purpose i will consider two books on the question, one by mr. norman angell, "the great illusion," and one by m. jacques novikow, "war and its alleged benefits." in the work of mr. angell the reader will find the suggestion of the deal, while in the work of m. novikow is given a clear and honest statement of the anti-militarist position, with which we can all heartily agree. those of us who would assert our freedom should understand the right anti-militarist position, because in its exponents we shall find allies at many points. but with mr. angell's book it is otherwise. these points emerge: the basis of morality is self-interest; the great powers have nothing to gain by destroying one another, they should agree to police and exploit the territory of the "backward races"; if the statesmen take a different view from the financiers, the financiers can bring pressure to bear on the statesmen by their international organisation; the capitalist has no country. well, our comment is, the patriot has a country, and when he wakens to the new danger, he may spoil the capitalist dream, and this book of mr. angell's may in a sense other than that the author intended be appropriately named "the great illusion." ii the limits of this essay do not admit of detailed examination of the book named. what i propose to do is make characteristic extracts sufficiently full to let the reader form judgment. as we are only concerned for the present with the danger i mention, i take particular notice of mr. angell's book, and i refer the reader for further study to the original. but the charge of taking an accidental line from its context cannot be made here, as the extracts are numerous, the tendency of all alike, and more of the same nature can be found. i divide the extracts into three groups, which i name: 1. the ethics of the case. 2. the power of money. 3. the deal. where italics are used they are mine. 1. the ethics of the case.--"the real basis of social morality is self-interest." ("the great illusion," 3rd ed., p. 66.) "have we not abundant evidence, indeed, that the passion of patriotism, as divorced from material interest, is being modified by the pressure of material interest?" (p. 167.) "piracy was magnificent, doubtless, but it was not business." (speaking of the old vikings, p. 245.) "the pacifist propaganda has failed largely because it has not put (and proven) the plea of interest as distinct from the moral plea." (p. 321.) 2. the power of money.--"the complexity of modern finance makes new york dependent on london, london upon paris, paris upon berlin, to a greater degree than has ever yet been the case in history." (p. 47.) "it would be a miracle if already at this point the whole influence of british finance were not thrown against the action of the british government." (on the assumed british capture of hamburg, p. 53). "the most absolute despots cannot command money." (p. 226.) "with reference to capital, it may almost be said that it is organised so naturally internationally that _formal organisation is not necessary_." (p. 269.) 3. the deal.--"france has benefited by the conquest of algeria, england by that of india, because in each case the arms were employed not, properly speaking, for conquest at all, but _for police purposes_." (p. 115.) "while even the wildest pan-german has never cast his eyes in the direction of canada, he has cast them, and does cast them, in the direction of asia minor.... _germany may need to police asia minor_." (pp. 117, 118.) "_it is much more to our interest to have an orderly and organised asia minor under german tutelage than to have an unorganised and disorderly one which should be independent_." (p. 120.) "sir harry johnston, in the 'nineteenth century' for december, 1910, comes a great deal nearer to touching the real kernel of the problem.... he adds that the best informed germans used this language to him: '_you know that we ought to make common cause in our dealings with backward races of the world_!'" the quotations speak for themselves. note the policing of the "backward races." the colonies are not in favour. mr. angell writes: "what in the name of common sense is the advantage of conquering them if the only policy is to let them do as they like?" (p. 92.) south africa occasions bitter reflections: "the present government of the transvaal is in the hands of the boer party." (p. 95.) and he warns germany, that, supposing she wishes to conquer south africa, "she would learn that the policy that great britain has adopted was not adopted by philanthropy, but in the hard school of bitter experience." (p. 104.) we believe him, and we may have to teach a lesson or two in the same school. it may be noted in passing mr. angell gives ireland the honour of a reference. in reply to a critic of the _morning post_, who wrote thus: "it is the sublime quality of human nature that every great nation has produced citizens ready to sacrifice themselves rather than submit to external force attempting to dictate to them a conception other than their own of what is right." (p. 254.) mr. angell replied: "one is, of course, surprised to see the foregoing in the _morning post_; the concluding phrase would justify the present agitation in india, or in egypt, or in ireland against british, rule." (p. 254.) comment is needless. the reading and re-reading of this book forces the conclusion as to its sinister design. once that design is exposed its danger recedes. there is one at least of the "backward races" that may not be sufficiently alive to self-interest, but may for all that upset the capitalist table and scatter the deal by what ruskin described in another context as "the inconvenience of the reappearance of a soul." iii we must not fail to distinguish the worth of the best type of anti-militarist and to value the truth of his statement. it is curious to find mr. angell writing an introduction to m. novikow's book, for m. novikow's position is, in our point of view, quite different. he does not draw the fine distinction of policing the "backward races." rather, he defends the bengalis. suppose their rights had never been violated, he says: "they would have held their heads higher; they would have been proud and dignified, and perhaps might have taken for their motto, _dieu et mon droit_." ("war and its alleged benefits," p. 12.) he can be ironical and he can be warm. later, he writes; "the french (and all other people) should vindicate their rights with their last drop of blood; so what i write does not refer to those who defend their rights, but to those who violate the rights of others." (note p. 70.) he does not put by the moral plea, but says: "political servitude develops the greatest defects in the subjugated peoples." (p. 79.) and he pays his tribute to those who die for a noble cause: "my warmest sympathy goes out to those noble victims who preferred death to disgrace." (p. 82.) this is the true attitude and one to admire; and any writer worthy of esteem who writes for peace never fails to take the same stand. emerson, in his essay on "war," makes a fine appeal for peace, but he writes: "if peace is sought to be defended or preserved for the safety of the luxurious or the timid, it is a sham and the peace will be base. war is better, and the peace will be broken." and elsewhere on "politics," he writes: "a nation of men unanimously bent on freedom or conquest can easily confound the arithmetic of the statists and achieve extravagant actions out of all proportions to their means." yes, and by our unanimity for freedom we mean to prove it true. chapter xv the empire i with the immediate promise of home rule many strange apologists for the empire have stepped into the sun. perhaps it is well--we may find ourselves soon more directly than heretofore struggling with the empire. so far the fight has been confused. imperialists fighting for home rule obscured the fact that they were _not_ fighting the empire. now home rule is likely to come, and it will serve at least the good purpose of clearing the air and setting the issue definitely between the nation and the empire. we shall have our say for the nation, but as even now many things, false and hypocritical, are being urged on behalf of the empire, it will serve us to examine the imperial creed and show its tyranny, cruelty, hypocrisy, and expose the danger of giving it any pretext whatever for aggression. for the empire, as we know it and deal with it, is a bad thing in itself, and we must not only get free of it and not be again trapped by it, but must rather give hope and encouragement to every nation fighting the same fight all the world over. ii one candid writer, machiavelli, has put the imperial creed into a book, the examination of which will--for those willing to see--clear the air of illusion. now, we are conscious that defenders of the empire profess to be shocked by the wickedness of machiavelli's utterance--we shall hear macaulay later--but this shocked attitude won't delude us. let those who have not read machiavelli's book, "the prince," consider carefully the extracts given below and see exactly how they fit the english occupation of ireland, and understand thoroughly that the empire is a thing, bad in itself, utterly wicked, to be resisted everywhere, fought without ceasing, renounced with fervour and without qualification, as we have been taught from the cradle to renounce the devil with all his works and pomps. consider first the invasion. machiavelli speaks:--"the common method in such cases is this. as soon as a foreign potentate enters into a province those who are weaker or disobliged join themselves with him out of emulation and animosity to those who are above them, insomuch that in respect to those inferior lords no pains are to be omitted that may gain them; and when gained, they will readily and unanimously fall into one mass with the state that is conquered. only the conqueror is to take special care that they grow not too strong, nor be entrusted with too much authority, and then he can easily with his own forces and their assistance keep down the greatness of his neighbours, and make himself absolute arbiter in that province." here is the old maxim, "divide and conquer." to gain an entry some pretence is advisable. machiavelli speaks with approval of a certain potentate who always made religion a pretence. having entered a vigorous policy must be pursued. we read--"he who usurps the government of any state is to execute and put in practice all the cruelties which he thinks material at once." cromwell rises before us. "a prince," says machiavelli, "is not to regard the scandal of being cruel if thereby he keeps his subjects in their allegiance." "for," he is cautioned, "whoever conquers a free town and does not demolish it commits a great error and may expect to be ruined himself; because whenever the citizens are disposed to revolt they betake themselves, of course, to that blessed name of liberty, and the laws of their ancestors, which no length of time nor kind usage whatever will be able to eradicate." an alternative to utter destruction is flattery and indulgence. "men are either to be flattered and indulged or utterly destroyed." we think of the titles and the bribes. again, "a town that has been anciently free cannot more easily be kept in subjection than by employing its own citizens." we think of the place-hunter, the king's visit, the "loyal" address. to make the conquest secure we read: "when a prince conquers a new state and annexes it as a member to his old, then it is necessary your subjects be disarmed, all but such as appeared for you in the conquest, and they are to be mollified by degrees and brought into such a condition of laziness and effeminacy that in time your whole strength may devolve upon your own natural militia." we think of the arms acts and our weakened people. but while one-half is disarmed and the other half bribed, with neither need the conqueror keep faith. we read: "a prince who is wise and prudent cannot, or ought not, to keep his parole, when the keeping of it is to his prejudice and the causes for which he promised removed." this is made very clear to prevent any mistake. "it is of great consequence to disguise your inclination and play the hypocrite well." we think of the broken treaty and countless other breaches of faith. it is, of course, well to seem honourable, but machiavelli cautions: "it is honourable to seem mild, and merciful, and courteous, and religious, and sincere, and indeed to be so, provided your mind be so rectified and prepared, that you can act quite contrary upon occasion." should anyone hesitate at all this let him hear: "he is not to concern himself if run under the infamy of those vices, without which his dominion was not to be preserved." thus far the philosophy of machiavelli. the imperialist out to "civilise the barbarians" is, of course, shocked by such wickedness; but we are beginning to open our eyes to the wickedness and hypocrisy of both. to us this book reads as if a shrewd observer of the english occupation in ireland had noted the attending features and based these principles thereon. we have reason to be grateful to machiavelli for his exposition. his advice to the prince, in effect, lays bare the marauders of his age and helps us to expose the empire in our own. iii there is a lesson to be learnt from the fact that this book of machiavelli's, written four centuries ago in italy, is so apt here to-day. we must take this exposition as the creed of empire and have no truck with the empire. it may be argued that the old arts will be no longer practised on us. let the new supporters of the empire know that by the new alliance they should practise these arts on other people, which would be infamy. we are not going to hold other people down; we are going to encourage them to stand up. if it means a further fight we have plenty of stimulus still. our oppression has been doubly bitter for having been mean. the tyranny of a strong mind makes us rage, but the tyranny of a mean one is altogether insufferable. the cruelty of a cromwell can be forgotten more easily than the cant of a macaulay. when we read certain lines we go into a blaze, and that fire will burn till it has burnt every opposition out. in his essay on milton, macaulay having written much bombast on the english revolution, introduces this characteristic sentiment: "one part of the empire there was, so unhappily circumstanced, that at that time its misery was necessary to our happiness and its slavery to our freedom." for insolence this would be hard to beat. let it be noted well. it is the philosophy of the "predominant partner." if he had thanked god for having our throats to cut, and cut them with loud gratitude like cromwell, a later generation would be incensed. but this other attitude is the gall in the cup. macaulay is, of course, shocked by machiavelli's "prince." in his essay on machiavelli we read: "it is indeed scarcely possible for any person not well acquainted with the history and literature of italy to read without horror and amazement the celebrated treatise which has brought so much obloquy on the name of machiavelli. such a display of wickedness, naked, yet not ashamed, such cool, judicious, scientific atrocity, seemed rather to belong to a fiend than to the most depraved of men." but, later, in the same essay, is a valuable sidelight. he writes of machiavelli as a man "whose only fault was that, having adopted some of the maxims then generally received, he arranged them most luminously and expressed them more forcibly than any other writer." here we have the truth, of course not so intended, but evident: machiavelli's crime is not for the sentiments he entertained but for writing them down luminously and forcibly--in other words, for giving the show away. think of macaulay's "horror and amazement," and read this further in the same essay: "every man who has seen the world knows that nothing is so useless as a general maxim. if it be very moral and very true it may serve for a copy to a charity boy." so the very moral and the very true are not for the statesman but for the charity-boy. this perhaps may be defended as irony; hardly, but even so, in such irony the character appears as plainly as in volumes of solemn rant. to us it stands out clearly as the characteristic attitude of the english government. the english people are used to it, practise it, and will put up with it; but the irish people never were, are not now, and never will be used to it; and we won't put up with it. we get calm as old atrocities recede into history, but to repeat the old cant, above all to try and sustain such now, sets all the old fire blazing--blazing with a fierceness that will end only with the british connection. iv not many of us in ireland will be deceived by macaulay, but there is danger in an occasional note of writers, such as bernard shaw and stuart mill. our instinct often saves us by natural repugnance from the hypocrite, when we may be confused by some sentiment of a sincere man, not foreseeing its tendency. when an aggressive power looks for an opening for aggression it first looks for a pretext, and our danger lies in men's readiness to give it the pretext. such a sentiment as this from mill--on "liberty"--gives the required opening: "despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement"; or this from shaw's preface to the home rule edition of "john bull's other island": "i am prepared to steam-roll tibet if tibet persist in refusing me my international rights." now, it is within our right to enforce a principle within our own territory, but to force it on other people, called for the occasion "barbarians," is quite another thing. shaw may get wrathful, and genuinely so, over the denshawai horror, and expose it nakedly and vividly as he did in his first edition of "john bull's other island," preface for politicians; but the aggressors are undisturbed as long as he gives them pretexts with his "steam-roll tibet" phrase. and when he says further that he is prepared to co-operate with france, italy, russia, germany and england in morocco, tripoli, siberia and africa to civilise these places, not only are his denunciations of denshawai horrors of no avail--except to draw tears after the event--but he cannot co-operate in the civilising process without practising the cruelty; and perhaps in their privacy the empire-makers may smile when shaw writes of empire with evident earnestness as "a name that every man who has ever felt the sacredness of his own native soil to him, and thus learnt to regard that feeling in other men as something holy and inviolable, spits out of his mouth with enormous contempt." when, further, in his "representative government" mill tells the english people--a thing about which shaw has no illusions--that they are "the power which of all in existence best understands liberty, and, whatever may have been its errors in the past, has attained to more of conscience and moral principle in its dealing with foreigners than any other great nation seems either to conceive as possible or recognise as desirable"--they not only go forward to civilise the barbarians by denshawai horrors, but they do so unctuously in the true macaulayan style. we feel a natural wrath at all this, not unmingled with amusement and amazement. in studying the question we read much that rouses anger and contempt, but one must laugh out heartily in coming to this gem of mill's, uttered with all mill's solemnity: "place-hunting is a form of ambition to which the english, considered nationally, are almost strangers." when the sincerest expression of the english mind can produce this we need to have our wits about us; and when, as just now, so much nonsense, and dangerous nonsense, is being poured abroad about the empire, we need to pause, carefully consider all these things, and be on our guard. v in conclusion, we may add our own word to the talk of the hour--the politicians on home rule. it should raise a smile to hear so often the prophecy that ireland will be loyal to the empire when she gets home rule. we are surprised that any irishman could be so foolish, though, no doubt, many englishmen are so simple as to believe it. history and experience alike deny it. possibly the home rule chiefs realise their active service is now limited to a decade or two, and assume home rule may be the limit for that time, and speak only for that time; but at the end of that time our generation will be vigorous and combative, and if we cannot come into our own before then, we shall be ready then. we need say for the moment no more than this--the limit of the old generation is not the limit of ours. if anyone doubt the further step to take let him consider our history, recent and remote. the old effort to subdue or exterminate us having failed, the new effort to conciliate us began. minor concessions led to the bigger question of the land. one land act led to another till the people came by their own. home rule, first to be killed by resolute government, was next to be killed by kindness, and local government came. local government made home rule inevitable; and now home rule is at hand and we come to the last step. anyone who reads the history of ireland, who understands anything of progress, who can draw any lesson from experience, must realise that the advent of home rule marks the beginning of the end. chapter xvi resistance in arms--foreword i the discussion of freedom leads inevitably to the discussion of an appeal to arms. if proving the truth and justice of a people's claim were sufficient there would be little tyranny in the world, but a tyrannical power is deaf to the appeal of truth--it cannot be moved by argument, and must be met by force. the discussion of the ethics of revolt is, then, inevitable. ii the ubiquitous pseudo-practical man, petulant and critical, will at once arise: "what is the use of discussing arms in ireland? if anyone wanted to fight it would be impossible, and no one wants to fight. what prevents ye going out to begin?" such peevish criticism is anything but practical, and one may ignore it; but it suggests the many who would earnestly wish to settle our long war with a swift, conclusive fight, yet who feel it no longer practical. keeping to the practical issue, we must bear in mind a few things. though ireland has often fought at odds, and could do so again, it is not just now a question of ireland poorly equipped standing up to england invincible. england will never again have such an easy battle. the point now to emphasise is this--by remaining passive and letting ourselves drift we drift into the conflict that involves england. we must fight for her or get clear of her. there can be no neutrality while bound to her; so a military policy is an eminently practical question. moreover, it is an urgent one: to stand in with england in any danger that threatens her will be at least as dangerous as a bold bid to break away from her. one thing above all, conditions have changed in a startling manner; england is threatened within as without; there are labour complications of all kinds of which no one can foresee the end, while as a result of another complication we find the prime minister of england going about as carefully protected as the czar of russia.[footnote: the militant suffragette agitation.] the unrest of the times is apt to be even bewildering. england is not alone in her troubles--all the great powers are likewise; and it is at least as likely for any one of them to be paralysed by an internal war as to be prepared to wage an external one. this stands put clearly--we cannot go away from the turmoil and sit down undisturbed; we must stand in and fight for our own hand or the hand of someone else. let us prepare and stand for our own. however it be, no one can deny that in all the present upheavals it is at least practical to discuss the ethics of revolt. iii we can count on a minority who will see wisdom in such a discussion; it must be our aim to make the discussion effective. we must be patient as well as resolute. we are apt to get impatient and by hasty denunciation drive off many who are wavering and may be won. these are held back, perhaps, by some scruple or nervousness, and by a fine breath of the truth and a natural discipline may yet be made our truest soldiers. emerson, in his address at the dedication of the soldiers' monument, concord, made touching reference in some such in the american civil war. he told of one youth he knew who feared he was a coward, and yet accustomed himself to danger, by forcing himself to go and meet it. "he enlisted in new york," says emerson, "went out to the field, and died early." and his comment for us should be eloquent. "it is from this temperament of sensibility that great heroes have been formed." the pains we are at to make men physically fit we must take likewise to make them mentally fit. we are minutely careful in physical training, drill regulations and the rest, which is right, for thus we turn a mob into an army and helplessness into strength. let us be minutely careful, too, with the untried minds--timid, anxious, sensitive in matters of conscience; like him emerson spoke of, they may be found yet in the foremost fighting line, but we must have patience in pleading with them. here above all must we keep our balance, must we come down with sympathy to every particular. it is surely evident that it is essential to give the care we lavish on the body with equal fulness to the mind. iv at the heart of the question we will be met by the religious objection to revolt. here all scruples, timidity, wavering, will concentrate; and here is our chief difficulty to face. the right to war is invariably allowed to independent states. the right to rebel, even with just cause, is not by any means invariably allowed to subject nations. it has been and is denied to us in ireland. we must answer objectors line by line, leading them, where it serves, step by step to our conclusions; but this is not to make freedom a mere matter of logic--it is something more. when it comes to war we shall frequently give, not our promises, but our conclusions. this much must be allowed, however, that, as far as logic will carry, our position must be perfectly sound; yet, be it borne in mind, our cause reaches above mere reasoning--mere logic does not enshrine the mysterious touch of fire that is our life. so, when we argue with opponents we undertake to give them as good as or better than they can give, but we stake our cause on the something that is more. on this ground i argue not in general on the right of war, but in particular on the right of revolt; not how it may touch other people elsewhere ignoring how it touches us here in ireland. a large treatise could be written on the general question, but to avoid seeming academic i will confine myself as far as possible to the side that is our concern. for obvious reasons i propose to speak as to how it affects catholics, and let them and others know what some catholic writers of authority have said on the matter. one thing has to be carefully made clear. it is seen in the following quotation from an eminent catholic authority writing in ireland in the middle of the last century, dr. murray, of maynooth: "the church has issued no definition whatever on the question--has left it open. many theologians have written on it; the great majority, however (so far as i have been able to examine them), pass it over in silence." (_essays chiefly theological_, vol. 4). this has to be kept in mind. theologians have written, some on one side and some on the other, but the church has left it open. i need not labour the point why it is useful to quote catholic authorities in particular, since in ireland an army representative of the people would be largely catholic, and much former difficulty arose from catholics in ireland meeting with opposition from some catholic authorities. it may be seen the position is delicate as well as difficult, and in writing a preliminary note one point should be emphasised. we must not evade a difficulty because it is delicate and dangerous, and we must not temporise. in a physical contest on the field of battle it is allowable to use tactics and strategy, to retreat as well as advance, to have recourse to a ruse as well as open attack; but _in matters of principle there can be no tactics, there is one straightforward course to follow, and that course must be found and followed without swerving to the end_. chapter xvii resistance in arms--the true meaning of law i when we stand up to question false authority we should first make our footing firm by showing we understand true authority and uphold it. let us be clear then as to the meaning of the word law. it may be defined; an ordinance of reason, the aim of which is the public good and promulgated by the ruling power. let us cite a few authorities. "a human law bears the character of law so far as it is in conformity with right reason; and in that point of view it is manifestly derived from the eternal law." (_aquinas ethicus,_ vol. 1, p. 276.) writing of laws that are unjust either in respect to end, author or form, st. thomas says: "such proceedings are rather acts of violence than laws; because st. augustine says: 'a law that is not just goes for no law at all.'" (_aquinas ethicus_, vol. 1, p. 292.) "the fundamental idea of all law," writes balmez, "is that it be in accordance with reason, that it be an emanation from reason, an application of reason to society" (_european civilisation_, chap. 53). in the same chapter balmez quotes st. thomas with approval: "the kingdom is not made for the king, but the king for the kingdom"; and he goes on to the natural inference: "that all governments have been established for the good of society, and that this alone should be the compass to guide those who are in command, whatever be the form of government." it is likewise the view of mill, in _representative government_, that the well-being of the governed is the sole object of government. it was the view of plato before the christian era: his ideal city should be established, "that the whole city might be in the happiest condition." (_the republic_, book 4.) calderwood writes: "political government can be legitimately constructed only on condition of the acknowledgment of natural obligations and rights as inviolable." (_handbook of modern philosophy, applied ethics_, sec. 4.) here all schools and all times are in agreement. till these conditions are fulfilled for us we are at war. when an independent and genuine irish government is established we shall yield it a full and hearty allegiance: the law shall then be in repute. we do not stand now to deny the idea of authority, but to say that the wrong people are in authority, the wrong flag is over us. ii "we must overthrow the arguments that might be employed against us by the advocates of blind submission to any power that happens to be established," writes balmez, on resistance to _de facto_ governments. (_european civilisation_, chap. 55.) we could not be more explicit than the famous spanish theologian. to such arguments let the following stand out from his long and emphatic reply:--"illegitimate authority is no authority at all; the idea of power involves the idea of right, without which it is mere physical power, that is force." he writes further: "the conqueror, who, by mere force of arms, has subdued a nation, does not thereby acquire a right to its possession; the government, which by gross iniquities has despoiled entire classes of citizens, exacted undue contributions, abolished legitimate rights, cannot justify its acts by the simple fact of its having sufficient strength to execute these iniquities." there is much that is equally clear and definite. what extravagant things can be said on the other side by people in high places we know too well. balmez in the same book and chapter gives an excellent example and an excellent reply: "don felix amat, archbishop of palmyra, in the posthumous work entitled _idea of the church militant_, makes use of these words: 'jesus christ, by his plain and expressive answer, _render to cã¦sar the things that are cã¦sar's_, has sufficiently established that the mere fact of a government's existence is sufficient for enforcing the obedience of subjects to it....' his work was forbidden at rome," is balmez' expressive comment, and he continues, "and whatever may have been the motives for such a prohibition, we may rest assured that, in the case of a book advocating such doctrines, every man who is jealous of his rights might acquiesce in the decree of the sacred congregation." so much for _de facto_ government. it is usurpation; by being consummated it does not become legitimate. when its decrees are not resisted, it does not mean we accept them in principle--nor can we even pretend to accept them--but that the hour to resist has not yet come. it is the strategy of war. iii we stand on the ground that the english government in ireland is founded in usurpation and as such deny its authority. but if it be argued, assuming it as ireland's case, that a usurped authority, gradually acquiesced in by the people, ultimately becomes the same as legitimate, the reply is still clear. for ourselves we meet the assumption with a simple denial, appealing to irish history for evidence that we never acquiesced in the english usurpation. but to those who are not satisfied with this simple denial, we can point out that even an authority, originally founded legitimately, may be resisted when abusing its power to the ruin of the commonwealth. we still stand on the ground that the english government is founded in usurpation, but we can dispose of all objections by proving the extremer case. this is the case dr. murray, already quoted, discusses. "the question," he writes, "is about resistance to an established and legitimate government which abuses its power." (_essays, chiefly theological_, vol. 4.) he continues: "the common opinion of a large number of our theologians, then, is that it is lawful to resist by force, and if necessary to depose, the sovereign ruler or rulers, in the extreme--the very extreme--case wherein the following conditions are found united: "1. the tyranny must be excessive--intolerable. "2. the tyranny must be manifest, manifest to men of good sense and right feeling. "3. the evils inflicted by the tyrant must be greater than those which would ensue from resisting and deposing him. "4. there must be no other available way of getting rid of the tyranny except by recurring to the extreme course. "5. there must be a moral certainty of success. "6. the revolution must be one conducted or approved by the community at large ... the refusal of a small party in the state to join with the overwhelming mass of their countrymen would not render the resistance of the latter unlawful." (_essays, chiefly theological_; see also rickaby, _moral philosophy_, chap. 8, sec. 7.) some of these conditions are drawn out at much length by dr. murray. i give what is outstanding. how easily they could fit irish conditions must strike anyone. i think it might fairly be said that our leaders generally would, if asked to lay down conditions for a rising, have framed some more stringent than these. it might be said, in truth, of some of them that they seem to wait for more than a moral certainty of success, an absolute certainty, that can never be looked for in war. iv when a government through its own iniquity ceases to exist, we must, to establish a new government on a true and just basis, go back to the origin of civil authority. no one argues now for the divine right of kings, but in studying the old controversy we get light on the subject of government that is of all time. to the conception that kings held their power immediately from god, "suarez boldly opposed the thesis of the initial sovereignty of the people; from whose consent, therefore, all civil authority immediately sprang. so also, in opposition to melanchthon's theory of governmental omnipotence, suarez _a fortiori_ admitted the right of the people to depose those princes who would have shown themselves unworthy of the trust reposed in them." (de wulf, _history of medieval philosophy,_ third edition, p. 495.) suarez' refutation of the anglican theory, described by hallam as clear, brief, and dispassionate, has won general admiration. hallam quotes him to the discredit of the english divines: "for this power, by its very nature, belongs to no one man but to a multitude of men. this is a certain conclusion, being common to all our authorities, as we find by st. thomas, by the civil laws, and by the great canonists and casuists; all of whom agree that the prince has that power of law-giving which the people have given him. and the reason is evident, since all men are born equal, and consequently no one has a political jurisdiction over another, nor any dominion; nor can we give any reason from the nature of the thing why one man should govern another rather than the contrary." (hallam--_literature of europe_, vol. 3, chap. 4.) dr. murray, in the essay already quoted, speaks of sir james mackintosh as the ablest protestant writer who refuted the anglican theory, which mackintosh speaks of as "the extravagance of thus representing obedience as the only duty without an exception." dr. murray concludes his own essay on _resistance to the supreme civil power_ by a long passage from mackintosh, the weight and wisdom of which he praises. the greater part of the passage is devoted to the difficulties even of success and emphasising the terrible evils of failure. in what has already been written here i have been at pains rather to lay bare all possible evils than to hide them. but when revolt has become necessary and inevitable, then the conclusion of the passage dr. murray quotes should be endorsed by all: "an insurrection rendered necessary by oppression, and warranted by a reasonable probability of a happy termination, is an act of public virtue, always environed with so much peril as to merit admiration." yes, and given the happy termination, the right and responsibility of establishing a new government rest with the body of the people. v we come, then, to this conclusion, that government is just only when rightfully established and for the public good; that usurpation not only may but ought to be resisted; that an authority originally legitimate once it becomes habitually tyrannical may be resisted and deposed; and that when from abuse or tyranny a particular government ceases to exist, we have to re-establish a true one. it is sometimes carelessly said, "liberty comes from anarchy," but this is a very dangerous doctrine. it would be nearer truth to say from anarchy inevitably comes tyranny. men receive a despot to quell a mob. but when a people, determined and disciplined, resolve to have neither despotism nor anarchy but freedom, then they act in the light of the natural law. it is well put in the doctrine of st. thomas, as given by turner in his _history of philosophy_ (chap. 38): "the redress to which the subjects of a tyrant have a just right must be sought, not by an individual, but by an authority temporarily constituted by the people and acting according to law." yes, and when wild and foolish people talk hysterically of our defiance of all authority, let us calmly show we best understand the basis of authority--which is truth, and most highly reverence its presiding spirit--which is liberty. chapter xviii resistance in arms--objections i having stated the case for resistance, it will serve us to consider some objections. many inquiring minds may be made happy by a clear view of the doctrine, till some clever opponent holds them up with remarks on prudence, possibly sensible, or remarks on revolutionists, most probably wild, with, perhaps, the authority of a great name, or unfailing refuge in the concrete. it is curious that while often noticed how men, trying to evade a concrete issue, take refuge in the abstract, it is not noticed that men, trying to avoid acknowledging the truth of some principle, take refuge in the concrete. a living and pressing difficulty, though transient, looms larger than any historical fact or coming danger. seeing this, we may restore confidence to a baffled mind, by helping it to distinguish the contingent from the permanent. thus, by disposing of objections, we make our ground secure. ii to the name of prudence the most imprudent people frequently appeal. those whose one effort is to evade difficulties, who to cover their weakness plead patience, would be well advised to consider how men passionately in earnest, enraged by these evasions, pour their scorn on patience as a thing to shun. the plea does not succeed; it only for the moment damages the prestige of a great name. patience is not a virtue of the weak but of the strong. an objector says: "of course, all this is right in the abstract, but consider the frightful abuses in practice," and some apt replies spring to mind. dr. murray, writing on "mental reservation," in his _essays, chiefly theological_, speaks thus: "but it is no objection to any principle of morals to say that unscrupulous men will abuse it, or that, if publicly preached to such and such an audience or in such and such circumstances, it will lead to mischief." this is admirable, to which the objector can only give some helpless repetitions. with balmez, we reply: "but in recommending prudence to the people let us not disguise it under false doctrines--let us beware of calming the exasperation of misfortune by circulating errors subversive of all governments, of all society." (_european civilisation_, chap. 55.) of men who shrink from investigating such questions, balmez wrote: "i may be permitted to observe that their prudence is quite thrown away, that their foresight and precaution are of no avail. whether they investigate these questions or not, they _are_ investigated, agitated and decided, in a manner that we must deplore." (ibid. chap. 54.) take with this turner on france under the old _rã©gime_ and the many and serious grievances of the people: "the church, whose duty it was to inculcate justice and forbearance, was identified, in the minds of the people, with the monarchy which they feared and detested." (_history of philosophy_, chap. 59.) the moral is that when injustice and evil are rampant, let us have no palliation, no weakness disguising itself as a virtue. what we cannot at once resist, we can always repudiate. to ignore these things is the worst form of imprudence--an imprudence which we, for our part at least, take the occasion here heartily to disclaim. iii there is so much ill-considered use of the word revolutionist, we should bear in mind it is a strictly relative term. if the freedom of a people is overthrown by treachery and violence, and oppression practised on their once thriving land, that is a revolution, and a bad revolution. if, with tyranny enthroned and a land wasting under oppression, the people rise and by their native courage, resource and patience re-establish in their original independence a just government, that is a revolution, and a good revolution. the revolutionist is to be judged by his motives, methods and ends; and, when found true, his insurrection, in the words of mackintosh, is "an act of public virtue." it is the restoration of, truth to its place of honour among men. iv balmez mentions bossuet as apparently one who denies the right here maintained; and we may with profit read some things bossuet has said in another context, yet which touches closely what is our concern. writing of _les empires_, thus bossuet: "les rã©volutions des empires sont rã©glã©es par la providence, et servent ã  humilier les princes." this is hardly calculated to deter us from a bid for freedom; and if we go on to read what he has written further under this heading, we get testimony to the hardihood and love of freedom and country that distinguished early greece and rome in language of eloquence that might inflame any people to liberty. of undegenerate greece, free and invincible: "mais ce que la grece avait de plus grand ã©tait une politique ferme et prã©voyante, qui savait abandonner, hasarder et dã©fendre, ce qu'il fallait; et, ce qui est plus grand encore, un courage que l'amour de la libertã© et celui de la patrie rendaient invincible." of undegenerate rome, her liberty: "la libertã© leur ã©tait donc un trã©sor qu'ils prã©feroient ã  toutes les richesses de l'univers." again: "la maxime fondamentale de la rã©publique ã©tait de regarder la libertã© comme une chose insã©parable du nom roman." and her constancy: "voila de fruit glorieux de la patience romaine. des peuples qui s'enhardissaient et se fortifiaient par leurs malheurs avaient bien raison de croire qu'on sauvait tout pourvu qu'on ne perdit pas l'esperance." and again: "parmi eux, dans les ã©tats les plus tristes, jamais les faibles conseils n'ont ã©tã© seulement ã©coutã©s." the reading of such a fine tribute to the glory of ancient liberties is not likely to diminish our desire for freedom; rather, to add to the natural stimulus found in our own splendid traditions, the further stimulus of this thought that must whisper to us: "persevere and conquer, and to-morrow our finest opponent will be our finest panegyrist when the battle has been fought and won." v in conclusion, in the concrete this simple fact will suffice: we have established immutable principles; the concrete circumstances are contingent and vary. it is admirably put in the following passage: "the historical and sociological sciences, so carefully cultivated in modern times, have proved to evidence that social conditions _vary_ with the epoch and the country, that they are the resultant of quite a number of fluctuating influences, and that, accordingly, the science of natural right should not merely establish _immutable_ principles bearing on the moral end of man, but should likewise deal with the _contingent_ circumstances accompanying the application of those principles." (de wulf, _scholasticism, old and new_, part 2, chap. 2, sec. 33.) yes, and if we apply principles to-morrow, it is not with the conditions of to-day we must deal, but "with the contingent circumstances accompanying the application of those principles." let that be emphasised. the conditions of twenty years ago are vastly changed to-day; and how altered the conditions of to-morrow can be, how astonishing can be the change in the short span of twenty years, let this fact prove. ireland in '48 was prostrate after a successful starvation and an unsuccessful rising--to all appearances this time hopelessly crushed; yet within twenty years another rising was planned that shook english government in ireland to its foundations. let us bear in mind this further from de wulf: "sociology, understood in the wider and larger sense, is transforming the methods of the science of natural right." in view of that transformation he is wise who looks to to-morrow. what de wulf concludes we may well endorse, when he asks us to take facts as they are brought to light and study "each question on its merits, in the light of these facts and not merely in its present setting but as presented in the pages of history." it can be fairly said of those who have always stood for the separation of ireland from the british empire, that they alone have always appealed to historical evidence, have always regarded the conditions of the moment as transient, have always discussed possible future contingencies. the men who temporised were always hypnotised by the conditions of the hour. but in the life-story of a nation stretching over thousands of years, the british occupation is a contingent circumstance, and the immutable principle is the liberty of the irish people. chapter xix the bearna baoghail--conclusion i but when principles have been proved and objections answered, there are still some last words to say for some who stand apart--the men who held the breach. for, they do stand apart, not in error but in constancy; not in doubt of the truth but its incarnation; not average men of the multitude for whom human laws are made, who must have moral certainty of success, who must have the immediate allegiance of the people. for it is the distinguishing glory of our prophets and our soldiers of the forlorn hope, that the defeats of common men were for them but incentives to further battle; and when they held out against the prejudices of their time, they were not standing in some new conceit, but most often by prophetic insight fighting for a forgotten truth of yesterday, catching in their souls to light them forward, the hidden glory of to-morrow. they knew to be theirs by anticipation the general allegiance without which lesser men cannot proceed. they knew they stood for the truth, against which nothing can prevail, and if they had to endure struggle, suffering and pain, they had the finer knowledge born of these things, a knowledge to which the best of men ever win--that if it is a good thing to live, it is a good thing also to die. not that they despised life or lightly threw it away; for none better than they knew its grandeur, none more than they gloried in its beauty, none were so happily full as they of its music; but they knew, too, the value of this deep truth, with the final loss of which earth must perish: the man who is afraid to die is not fit to live. and the knowledge for them stamped out earth's oldest fear, winning for life its highest ecstasy. yes, and when one or more of them had to stand in the darkest generation and endure all penalties to the extreme penalty, they knew for all that they had had the best of life and did not count it a terrible thing if called by a little to anticipate death. they had still the finest appreciation of the finer attributes of comradeship and love; but it is part of the mystery of their happiness and success, that they were ready to go on to the end, not looking for the suffrage of the living nor the monuments of the dead. yes, and when finally the re-awakened people by their better instincts, their discipline, patriotism and fervour, will have massed into armies, and marched to freedom, they will know in the greatest hour of triumph that the success of their conquering arms was made possible by those who held the breach. ii when, happily, we can fall back on the eloquence of the world's greatest orator, we turn with gratitude to the greatest tribute ever spoken to the memory of those men to whom the world owes most. demosthenes, in the finest height of his finest oration, vindicates the men of every age and nation who fight the forlorn hope. he was arraigned by his rival, ã�schines, for having counselled the athenians to pursue a course that ended in defeat, and he replies thus: "if, then, the results had been foreknown to all--not even then should the commonwealth have abandoned her design, if she had any regard for glory, or ancestry, or futurity. as it is, she appears to have failed in her enterprise, a thing to which all mankind are liable, if the deity so wills it." and he asks the athenians: "why, had we resigned without a struggle that which our ancestors encountered every danger to win, who would not have spit upon you?" and he asks them further to consider strangers, visiting their city, sunk in such degradation, "especially when in former times our country had never preferred an ignominious security to the battle for honour." and he rises from the thought to this proud boast: "none could at any period of time persuade the commonwealth to attach herself in secure subjection to the powerful and unjust; through every age has she persevered in a perilous struggle for precedency and honour and glory." and he tells them, appealing to the memory of themistocles, how they honoured most their ancestors who acted in such a spirit: "yes; the athenians of that day looked not for an orator or a general, who might help them to a pleasant servitude: they scorned to live if it could not be with freedom." and he pays them, his listeners, a tribute: "what i declare is, that such principles are your own; i show that before my time such was the spirit of the commonwealth." from one eloquent height to another he proceeds, till, challenging ã�schines for arraigning him, thus counselling the people, he rises to this great level: "but, never, never can you have done wrong, o athenians, in undertaking the battle for the freedom and safety of all: i swear it by your forefathers--those that met the peril at marathon, those that took the field at platã¦a, those in the sea-fight at salamis, and those at artimesium, and many other brave men who repose in the public monuments, all of whom alike, as being worthy of the same honour, the country buried, ã�schines, not only the successful and victorious." we did not need this fine eloquence to assure us of the greatness of our o'neills and our tones, our o'donnells and our mitchels, but it so quickens the spirit and warms the blood to read it, it so touches--by the admiration won from ancient and modern times--an enduring principle of the human heart--the capacity to appreciate a great deed and rise over every physical defeat--that we know in the persistence of the spirit we shall come to a veritable triumph. yes; and in such light we turn to read what ruskin called the greatest inscription ever written, that which herodotus tells us was raised over the spartans, who fell at thermopylã¦, and which mitchel's biographer quotes as most fitting to epitomise mitchel's life: "stranger, tell thou the lacedemonians that we are lying here, having obeyed their words." and the biographer of mitchel is right in holding that he who reads into the significance of these brave lines, reads a message not of defeat but of victory. iii yes; and in paying a fitting tribute to those great men who are our exemplars, it would be fitting also, in conclusion, to remember ourselves as the inheritors of a great tradition; and it would well become us not only to show the splendour of the banner that is handed on to us, but to show that this banner _we_, too, are worthy to bear. for, how often it shall be victorious and how high it shall be planted, will depend on the conception we have of its supreme greatness, the knowledge that it can be fought for in all times and places, the conviction that we may, when least we expect, be challenged to deny it; and that by our bearing we may bring it new credit and glory or drag it low in repute. we do well, i say, to remember these things. for in our time it has grown the fashion to praise the men of former times but to deny their ideal of independence; and we who live in that ideal, and in it breathe the old spirit, and preach it and fight for it and prophesy for it an ultimate and complete victory--we are young men, foolish and unpractical. and what should be our reply? a reply in keeping with the flag, its history and its destiny. let them, who deride or pity us, see we despise or pity their standards, and let them know by our works--lest by our election they misunderstand--that we are not without ability in a freer time to contest with them the highest places--avoiding the boast, not for an affected sense of modesty but for a saving sense of humour. for in all the vanities of this time that make life and literature choke with absurdities, pretensions and humbug, let us have no new folly. let us with the old high confidence blend the old high courtesy of the gaedheal. let us grow big with our cause. shall we honour the flag we bear by a mean, apologetic front? no! wherever it is down, lift it; wherever it is challenged, wave it; wherever it is high, salute it; wherever it is victorious, glorify and exult in it. at all times and forever be for it proud, passionate, persistent, jubilant, defiant; stirring hidden memories, kindling old fires, wakening the finer instincts of men, till all are one in the old spirit, the spirit that will not admit defeat, that has been voiced by thousands, that is noblest in emmet's one line, setting the time for his epitaph: "_when_ my country"--not _if_--but "_when_ my country takes her place among the nations of the earth." it is no hypothesis; it is a certainty. there have been in every generation, and are in our own, men dull of apprehension and cold of heart, who could not believe this, but we believe it, we live in it: _we know it_. yes, we know it, as emmet knew it, and as it shall be seen to-morrow; and when the historian of to-morrow, seeing it accomplished, will write its history, he will not note the end with surprise. rather will he marvel at the soul in constancy, rivalling the best traditions of undegenerate greece and rome, holding through disasters, persecutions, suffering, and not less through the seductions of milder but meaner times, seeing through all shining clearly the goal: he will record it all, and, still marvelling, come to the issue that dauntless spirit has reached, proud and happy; but he will write of that issue--_liberty; inevitable_: in two words to epitomise the history of a people that is without a parallel in the annals of the world. on liberty. by john stuart mill. with an introduction by w. l. courtney, ll.d. the walter scott publishing co., ltd. london and felling-on-tyne new york and melbourne _to the beloved and deplored memory of her who was the inspirer, and in part the author, of all that is best in my writings--the friend and wife whose exalted sense of truth and right was my strongest incitement, and whose approbation was my chief reward--i dedicate this volume. like all that i have written for many years, it belongs as much to her as to me; but the work as it stands has had, in a very insufficient degree, the inestimable advantage of her revision; some of the most important portions having been reserved for a more careful re-examination, which they are now never destined to receive. were i but capable of interpreting to the world one-half the great thoughts and noble feelings which are buried in her grave, i should be the medium of a greater benefit to it than is ever likely to arise from anything that i can write, unprompted and unassisted by her all but unrivalled wisdom._ introduction. i. john stuart mill was born on 20th may 1806. he was a delicate child, and the extraordinary education designed by his father was not calculated to develop and improve his physical powers. "i never was a boy," he says; "never played cricket." his exercise was taken in the form of walks with his father, during which the elder mill lectured his son and examined him on his work. it is idle to speculate on the possible results of a different treatment. mill remained delicate throughout his life, but was endowed with that intense mental energy which is so often combined with physical weakness. his youth was sacrificed to an idea; he was designed by his father to carry on his work; the individuality of the boy was unimportant. a visit to the south of france at the age of fourteen, in company with the family of general sir samuel bentham, was not without its influence. it was a glimpse of another atmosphere, though the studious habits of his home life were maintained. moreover, he derived from it his interest in foreign politics, which remained one of his characteristics to the end of his life. in 1823 he was appointed junior clerk in the examiners' office at the india house. mill's first essays were written in the _traveller_ about a year before he entered the india house. from that time forward his literary work was uninterrupted save by attacks of illness. his industry was stupendous. he wrote articles on an infinite variety of subjects, political, metaphysical, philosophic, religious, poetical. he discovered tennyson for his generation, he influenced the writing of carlyle's _french revolution_ as well as its success. and all the while he was engaged in studying and preparing for his more ambitious works, while he rose step by step at the india office. his _essays on unsettled questions in political economy_ were written in 1831, although they did not appear until thirteen years later. his _system of logic_, the design of which was even then fashioning itself in his brain, took thirteen years to complete, and was actually published before the _political economy_. in 1844 appeared the article on michelet, which its author anticipated would cause some discussion, but which did not create the sensation he expected. next year there were the "claims of labour" and "guizot," and in 1847 his articles on irish affairs in the _morning chronicle_. these years were very much influenced by his friendship and correspondence with comte, a curious comradeship between men of such different temperament. in 1848 mill published his _political economy_, to which he had given his serious study since the completion of his _logic_. his articles and reviews, though they involved a good deal of work--as, for instance, the re-perusal of the _iliad_ and the _odyssey_ in the original before reviewing grote's _greece_--were recreation to the student. the year 1856 saw him head of the examiners' office in the india house, and another two years brought the end of his official work, owing to the transfer of india to the crown. in the same year his wife died. _liberty_ was published shortly after, as well as the _thoughts on parliamentary reform_, and no year passed without mill making important contributions on the political, philosophical, and ethical questions of the day. seven years after the death of his wife, mill was invited to contest westminster. his feeling on the conduct of elections made him refuse to take any personal action in the matter, and he gave the frankest expression to his political views, but nevertheless he was elected by a large majority. he was not a conventional success in the house; as a speaker he lacked magnetism. but his influence was widely felt. "for the sake of the house of commons at large," said mr. gladstone, "i rejoiced in his advent and deplored his disappearance. he did us all good." after only three years in parliament, he was defeated at the next general election by mr. w. h. smith. he retired to avignon, to the pleasant little house where the happiest years of his life had been spent in the companionship of his wife, and continued his disinterested labours. he completed his edition of his father's _analysis of the mind_, and also produced, in addition to less important work, _the subjection of women_, in which he had the active co-operation of his step-daughter. a book on socialism was under consideration, but, like an earlier study of sociology, it never was written. he died in 1873, his last years being spent peacefully in the pleasant society of his step-daughter, from whose tender care and earnest intellectual sympathy he caught maybe a far-off reflection of the light which had irradiated his spiritual life. ii. the circumstances under which john stuart mill wrote his _liberty_ are largely connected with the influence which mrs. taylor wielded over his career. the dedication is well known. it contains the most extraordinary panegyric on a woman that any philosopher has ever penned. "were i but capable of interpreting to the world one-half the great thoughts and noble feelings which are buried in her grave, i should be the medium of a greater benefit to it than is ever likely to arise from anything that i can write, unprompted and unassisted by her all but unrivalled wisdom." it is easy for the ordinary worldly cynicism to curl a sceptical lip over sentences like these. there may be exaggeration of sentiment, the necessary and inevitable reaction of a man who was trained according to the "dry light" of so unimpressionable a man as james mill, the father; but the passage quoted is not the only one in which john stuart mill proclaims his unhesitating belief in the intellectual influence of his wife. the treatise on _liberty_ was written especially under her authority and encouragement, but there are many earlier references to the power which she exercised over his mind. mill was introduced to her as early as 1831, at a dinner-party at mr. taylor's house, where were present, amongst others, roebuck, w. j. fox, and miss harriet martineau. the acquaintance rapidly ripened into intimacy and the intimacy into friendship, and mill was never weary of expatiating on all the advantages of so singular a relationship. in some of the presentation copies of his work on _political economy_, he wrote the following dedication:--"to mrs. john taylor, who, of all persons known to the author, is the most highly qualified either to originate or to appreciate speculation on social advancement, this work is with the highest respect and esteem dedicated." an article on the enfranchisement of women was made the occasion for another encomium. we shall hardly be wrong in attributing a much later book, _the subjection of women_, published in 1869, to the influence wielded by mrs. taylor. finally, the pages of the _autobiography_ ring with the dithyrambic praise of his "almost infallible counsellor." the facts of this remarkable intimacy can easily be stated. the deductions are more difficult. there is no question that mill's infatuation was the cause of considerable trouble to his acquaintances and friends. his father openly taxed him with being in love with another man's wife. roebuck, mrs. grote, mrs. austin, miss harriet martineau were amongst those who suffered because they made some allusion to a forbidden subject. mrs. taylor lived with her daughter in a lodging in the country; but in 1851 her husband died, and then mill made her his wife. opinions were widely divergent as to her merits; but every one agreed that up to the time of her death, in 1858, mill was wholly lost to his friends. george mill, one of mill's younger brothers, gave it as his opinion that she was a clever and remarkable woman, but "nothing like what john took her to be." carlyle, in his reminiscences, described her with ambiguous epithets. she was "vivid," "iridescent," "pale and passionate and sad-looking, a living-romance heroine of the royalist volition and questionable destiny." it is not possible to make much of a judgment like this, but we get on more certain ground when we discover that mrs. carlyle said on one occasion that "she is thought to be dangerous," and that carlyle added that she was worse than dangerous, she was patronising. the occasion when mill and his wife were brought into close contact with the carlyles is well known. the manuscript of the first volume of the _french revolution_ had been lent to mill, and was accidentally burnt by mrs. mill's servant. mill and his wife drove up to carlyle's door, the wife speechless, the husband so full of conversation that he detained carlyle with desperate attempts at loquacity for two hours. but dr. garnett tells us, in his _life of carlyle_, that mill made a substantial reparation for the calamity for which he was responsible by inducing the aggrieved author to accept half of the £200 which he offered. mrs. mill, as i have said, died in 1858, after seven years of happy companionship with her husband, and was buried at avignon. the inscription which mill wrote for her grave is too characteristic to be omitted:--"her great and loving heart, her noble soul, her clear, powerful, original, and comprehensive intellect, made her the guide and support, the instructor in wisdom and the example in goodness, as she was the sole earthly delight of those who had the happiness to belong to her. as earnest for all public good as she was generous and devoted to all who surrounded her, her influence has been felt in many of the greatest improvements of the age, and will be in those still to come. were there even a few hearts and intellects like hers, this earth would already become the hoped-for heaven." these lines prove the intensity of mill's feeling, which is not afraid of abundant verbiage; but they also prove that he could not imagine what the effect would be on others, and, as grote said, only mill's reputation could survive these and similar displays. every one will judge for himself of this romantic episode in mill's career, according to such experience as he may possess of the philosophic mind and of the value of these curious but not infrequent relationships. it may have been a piece of infatuation, or, if we prefer to say so, it may have been the most gracious and the most human page in mill's career. mrs. mill may have flattered her husband's vanity by echoing his opinions, or she may have indeed been an egeria, full of inspiration and intellectual helpfulness. what usually happens in these cases,--although the philosopher himself, through his belief in the equality of the sexes, was debarred from thinking so,--is the extremely valuable action and reaction of two different classes and orders of mind. to any one whose thoughts have been occupied with the sphere of abstract speculation, the lively and vivid presentment of concrete fact comes as a delightful and agreeable shock. the instinct of the woman often enables her not only to apprehend but to illustrate a truth for which she would be totally unable to give the adequate philosophic reasoning. on the other hand, the man, with the more careful logical methods and the slow processes of formal reasoning, is apt to suppose that the happy intuition which leaps to the conclusion is really based on the intellectual processes of which he is conscious in his own case. thus both parties to the happy contract are equally pleased. the abstract truth gets the concrete illustration; the concrete illustration finds its proper foundation in a series of abstract inquiries. perhaps carlyle's epithets of "iridescent" and "vivid" refer incidentally to mrs. mill's quick perceptiveness, and thus throw a useful light on the mutual advantages of the common work of husband and wife. but it savours almost of impertinence even to attempt to lift the veil on a mystery like this. it is enough to say, perhaps, that however much we may deplore the exaggeration of mill's references to his wife, we recognise that, for whatever reason, the pair lived an ideally happy life. it still, however, remains to estimate the extent to which mrs. taylor, both before and after her marriage with mill, made actual contributions to his thoughts and his public work. here i may be perhaps permitted to avail myself of what i have already written in a previous work.[1] mill gives us abundant help in this matter in the _autobiography_. when first he knew her, his thoughts were turning to the subject of logic. but his published work on the subject owed nothing to her, he tells us, in its doctrines. it was mill's custom to write the whole of a book so as to get his general scheme complete, and then laboriously to re-write it in order to perfect the phrases and the composition. doubtless mrs. taylor was of considerable help to him as a critic of style. but to be a critic of doctrine she was hardly qualified. mill has made some clear admissions on this point. "the only actual revolution which has ever taken place in my modes of thinking was already complete,"[2] he says, before her influence became paramount. there is a curiously humble estimate of his own powers (to which dr. bain has called attention), which reads at first sight as if it contradicted this. "during the greater part of my literary life i have performed the office in relation to her, which, from a rather early period, i had considered as the most useful part that i was qualified to take in the domain of thought, that of an interpreter of original thinkers, and mediator between them and the public." so far it would seem that mill had sat at the feet of his oracle; but observe the highly remarkable exception which is made in the following sentence:--"for i had always a humble opinion of my own powers as an original thinker, _except in abstract science (logic, metaphysics, and the theoretic principles of political economy and politics.)_"[3] if mill then was an original thinker in logic, metaphysics, and the science of economy and politics, it is clear that he had not learnt these from her lips. and to most men logic and metaphysics may be safely taken as forming a domain in which originality of thought, if it can be honestly professed, is a sufficient title of distinction. mrs. taylor's assistance in the _political economy_ is confined to certain definite points. the purely scientific part was, we are assured, not learnt from her. "but it was chiefly her influence which gave to the book that general tone by which it is distinguished from all previous expositions of political economy that had any pretensions to be scientific, and which has made it so useful in conciliating minds which those previous expositions had repelled. this tone consisted chiefly in making the proper distinction between the laws of the production of wealth, which are real laws of nature, dependent on the properties of objects, and the modes of its distribution, which, subject to certain conditions, depend on human will.... _i had indeed partially learnt this view of things from the thoughts awakened in me by the speculations of st. simonians_; but it was made a living principle, pervading and animating the book, by my wife's promptings."[4] the part which is italicised is noticeable. here, as elsewhere, mill thinks out the matter by himself; the concrete form of the thoughts is suggested or prompted by the wife. apart from this "general tone," mill tells us that there was a specific contribution. "the chapter which has had a greater influence on opinion than all the rest, that on the probable future of the labouring classes, is entirely due to her. in the first draft of the book that chapter did not exist. she pointed out the need of such a chapter, and the extreme imperfection of the book without it; she was the cause of my writing it." from this it would appear that she gave mill that tendency to socialism which, while it lends a progressive spirit to his speculations on politics, at the same time does not manifestly accord with his earlier advocacy of peasant proprietorships. nor, again, is it, on the face of it, consistent with those doctrines of individual liberty which, aided by the intellectual companionship of his wife, he propounded in a later work. the ideal of individual freedom is not the ideal of socialism, just as that invocation of governmental aid to which the socialist resorts is not consistent with the theory of _laisser-faire_. yet _liberty_ was planned by mill and his wife in concert. perhaps a slight visionariness of speculation was no less the attribute of mrs. mill than an absence of rigid logical principles. be this as it may, she undoubtedly checked the half-recognised leanings of her husband in the direction of coleridge and carlyle. whether this was an instance of her steadying influence,[5] or whether it added one more unassimilated element to mill's diverse intellectual sustenance, may be wisely left an open question. we cannot, however, be wrong in attributing to her the parentage of one book of mill, _the subjection of women_. it is true that mill had before learnt that men and women ought to be equal in legal, political, social, and domestic relations. this was a point on which he had already fallen foul of his father's essay on _government_. but mrs. taylor had actually written on this very point, and the warmth and fervour of mill's denunciations of women's servitude were unmistakably caught from his wife's view of the practical disabilities entailed by the feminine position. iii. _liberty_ was published in 1859, when the nineteenth century was half over, but in its general spirit and in some of its special tendencies the little tract belongs rather to the standpoint of the eighteenth century than to that which saw its birth. in many of his speculations john stuart mill forms a sort of connecting link between the doctrines of the earlier english empirical school and those which we associate with the name of mr. herbert spencer. in his _logic_, for instance, he represents an advance on the theories of hume, and yet does not see how profoundly the victories of science modify the conclusions of the earlier thinker. similarly, in his _political economy_, he desires to improve and to enlarge upon ricardo, and yet does not advance so far as the modifications of political economy by sociology, indicated by some later--and especially german--speculations on the subject. in the tract on _liberty_, mill is advocating the rights of the individual as against society at the very opening of an era that was rapidly coming to the conclusion that the individual had no absolute rights against society. the eighteenth century view is that individuals existed first, each with their own special claims and responsibilities; that they deliberately formed a social state, either by a contract or otherwise; and that then finally they limited their own action out of regard for the interests of the social organism thus arbitrarily produced. this is hardly the view of the nineteenth century. it is possible that logically the individual is prior to the state; historically and in the order of nature, the state is prior to the individual. in other words, such rights as every single personality possesses in a modern world do not belong to him by an original ordinance of nature, but are slowly acquired in the growth and development of the social state. it is not the truth that individual liberties were forfeited by some deliberate act when men made themselves into a commonwealth. it is more true to say, as aristotle said long ago, that man is naturally a political animal, that he lived under strict social laws as a mere item, almost a nonentity, as compared with the order, society, or community to which he belonged, and that such privileges as he subsequently acquired have been obtained in virtue of his growing importance as a member of a growing organisation. but if this is even approximately true, it seriously restricts that liberty of the individual for which mill pleads. the individual has no chance, because he has no rights, against the social organism. society can punish him for acts or even opinions which are anti-social in character. his virtue lies in recognising the intimate communion with his fellows. his sphere of activity is bounded by the common interest. just as it is an absurd and exploded theory that all men are originally equal, so it is an ancient and false doctrine to protest that a man has an individual liberty to live and think as he chooses in any spirit of antagonism to that larger body of which he forms an insignificant part. nowadays this view of society and of its development, which we largely owe to the _philosophie positive_ of m. auguste comte, is so familiar and possibly so damaging to the individual initiative, that it becomes necessary to advance and proclaim the truth which resides in an opposite theory. all progress, as we are aware, depends on the joint process of integration and differentiation; synthesis, analysis, and then a larger synthesis seem to form the law of development. if it ever comes to pass that society is tyrannical in its restrictions of the individual, if, as for instance in some forms of socialism, based on deceptive analogies of nature's dealings, the type is everything and the individual nothing, it must be confidently urged in answer that the fuller life of the future depends on the manifold activities, even though they may be antagonistic, of the individual. in england, at all events, we know that government in all its different forms, whether as king, or as a caste of nobles, or as an oligarchical plutocracy, or even as trades unions, is so dwarfing in its action that, for the sake of the future, the individual must revolt. just as our former point of view limited the value of mill's treatise on _liberty_, so these considerations tend to show its eternal importance. the omnipotence of society means a dead level of uniformity. the claim of the individual to be heard, to say what he likes, to do what he likes, to live as he likes, is absolutely necessary, not only for the variety of elements without which life is poor, but also for the hope of a future age. so long as individual initiative and effort are recognised as a vital element in english history, so long will mill's _liberty_, which he confesses was based on a suggestion derived from von humboldt, remain as an indispensable contribution to the speculations, and also to the health and sanity, of the world. what his wife really was to mill, we shall, perhaps, never know. but that she was an actual and vivid force, which roused the latent enthusiasm of his nature, we have abundant evidence. and when she died at avignon, though his friends may have regained an almost estranged companionship, mill was, personally, the poorer. into the sorrow of that bereavement we cannot enter: we have no right or power to draw the veil. it is enough to quote the simple words, so eloquent of an unspoken grief--"i can say nothing which could describe, even in the faintest manner, what that loss was and is. but because i know that she would have wished it, i endeavour to make the best of what life i have left, and to work for her purposes with such diminished strength as can be derived from thoughts of her, and communion with her memory." w. l. courtney. london, _july 5th, 1901_. footnotes: [1] _life of john stuart mill_, chapter vi. (walter scott.) [2] _autobiography_, p. 190. [3] _ibid._, p. 242. [4] _autobiography_, pp. 246, 247. [5] cf. an instructive page in the _autobiography_, p. 252. contents. chapter i. page introductory 1 chapter ii. of the liberty of thought and discussion 28 chapter iii. of individuality, as one of the elements of well-being 103 chapter iv. of the limits to the authority of society over the individual 140 chapter v. applications 177 the grand, leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity.--wilhelm von humboldt: _sphere and duties of government_. on liberty. chapter i. introductory. the subject of this essay is not the so-called liberty of the will, so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of philosophical necessity; but civil, or social liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. a question seldom stated, and hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but which profoundly influences the practical controversies of the age by its latent presence, and is likely soon to make itself recognised as the vital question of the future. it is so far from being new, that in a certain sense, it has divided mankind, almost from the remotest ages; but in the stage of progress into which the more civilised portions of the species have now entered, it presents itself under new conditions, and requires a different and more fundamental treatment. the struggle between liberty and authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of greece, rome, and england. but in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government. by liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. the rulers were conceived (except in some of the popular governments of greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled. they consisted of a governing one, or a governing tribe or caste, who derived their authority from inheritance or conquest, who, at all events, did not hold it at the pleasure of the governed, and whose supremacy men did not venture, perhaps did not desire, to contest, whatever precautions might be taken against its oppressive exercise. their power was regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external enemies. to prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. but as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defence against his beak and claws. the aim, therefore, of patriots, was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty. it was attempted in two ways. first, by obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which if he did infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable. a second, and generally a later expedient, was the establishment of constitutional checks; by which the consent of the community, or of a body of some sort, supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power. to the first of these modes of limitation, the ruling power, in most european countries, was compelled, more or less, to submit. it was not so with the second; and to attain this, or when already in some degree possessed, to attain it more completely, became everywhere the principal object of the lovers of liberty. and so long as mankind were content to combat one enemy by another, and to be ruled by a master, on condition of being guaranteed more or less efficaciously against his tyranny, they did not carry their aspirations beyond this point. a time, however, came, in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to themselves. it appeared to them much better that the various magistrates of the state should be their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. in that way alone, it seemed, could they have complete security that the powers of government would never be abused to their disadvantage. by degrees, this new demand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions of the popular party, wherever any such party existed; and superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous efforts to limit the power of rulers. as the struggle proceeded for making the ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled, some persons began to think that too much importance had been attached to the limitation of the power itself. _that_ (it might seem) was a resource against rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the people. what was now wanted was, that the rulers should be identified with the people; that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation. the nation did not need to be protected against its own will. there was no fear of its tyrannising over itself. let the rulers be effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and it could afford to trust them with power of which it could itself dictate the use to be made. their power was but the nation's own power, concentrated, and in a form convenient for exercise. this mode of thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, was common among the last generation of european liberalism, in the continental section of which it still apparently predominates. those who admit any limit to what a government may do, except in the case of such governments as they think ought not to exist, stand out as brilliant exceptions among the political thinkers of the continent. a similar tone of sentiment might by this time have been prevalent in our own country, if the circumstances which for a time encouraged it, had continued unaltered. but, in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have concealed from observation. the notion, that the people have no need to limit their power over themselves, might seem axiomatic, when popular government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of the past. neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the french revolution, the worst of which were the work of a usurping few, and which, in any case, belonged, not to the permanent working of popular institutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against monarchical and aristocratic despotism. in time, however, a democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface, and made itself felt as one of the most powerful members of the community of nations; and elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact. it was now perceived that such phrases as "self-government," and "the power of the people over themselves," do not express the true state of the case. the "people" who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the "self-government" spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. the will of the people, moreover, practically means, the will of the most numerous or the most active _part_ of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority: the people, consequently, _may_ desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this, as against any other abuse of power. the limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals, loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. this view of things, recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those important classes in european society to whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had no difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations "the tyranny of the majority" is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard. like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. but reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant--society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it--its means of tyrannising are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. there is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism. but though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general terms, the practical question, where to place the limit--how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control--is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done. all that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. what these rules should be, is the principal question in human affairs; but if we except a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those which least progress has been made in resolving. no two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of one age or country is a wonder to another. yet the people of any given age and country no more suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a subject on which mankind had always been agreed. the rules which obtain among themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. this all but universal illusion is one of the examples of the magical influence of custom, which is not only, as the proverb says, a second nature, but is continually mistaken for the first. the effect of custom, in preventing any misgiving respecting the rules of conduct which mankind impose on one another, is all the more complete because the subject is one on which it is not generally considered necessary that reasons should be given, either by one person to others, or by each to himself. people are accustomed to believe, and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects of this nature, are better than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary. the practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathises, would like them to act. no one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one person's preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people's liking instead of one. to an ordinary man, however, his own preference, thus supported, is not only a perfectly satisfactory reason, but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of morality, taste, or propriety, which are not expressly written in his religious creed; and his chief guide in the interpretation even of that. men's opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable or blamable, are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject. sometimes their reason--at other times their prejudices or superstitions: often their social affections, not seldom their anti-social ones, their envy or jealousy, their arrogance or contemptuousness: but most commonly, their desires or fears for themselves--their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest. wherever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the country emanates from its class interests, and its feelings of class superiority. the morality between spartans and helots, between planters and negroes, between princes and subjects, between nobles and roturiers, between men and women, has been for the most part the creation of these class interests and feelings: and the sentiments thus generated, react in turn upon the moral feelings of the members of the ascendant class, in their relations among themselves. where, on the other hand, a class, formerly ascendant, has lost its ascendancy, or where its ascendancy is unpopular, the prevailing moral sentiments frequently bear the impress of an impatient dislike of superiority. another grand determining principle of the rules of conduct, both in act and forbearance, which have been enforced by law or opinion, has been the servility of mankind towards the supposed preferences or aversions of their temporal masters, or of their gods. this servility, though essentially selfish, is not hypocrisy; it gives rise to perfectly genuine sentiments of abhorrence; it made men burn magicians and heretics. among so many baser influences, the general and obvious interests of society have of course had a share, and a large one, in the direction of the moral sentiments: less, however, as a matter of reason, and on their own account, than as a consequence of the sympathies and antipathies which grew out of them: and sympathies and antipathies which had little or nothing to do with the interests of society, have made themselves felt in the establishment of moralities with quite as great force. the likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion. and in general, those who have been in advance of society in thought and feeling have left this condition of things unassailed in principle, however they may have come into conflict with it in some of its details. they have occupied themselves rather in inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a law to individuals. they preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular points on which they were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in defence of freedom, with heretics generally. the only case in which the higher ground has been taken on principle and maintained with consistency, by any but an individual here and there, is that of religious belief: a case instructive in many ways, and not least so as forming a most striking instance of the fallibility of what is called the moral sense: for the _odium theologicum_, in a sincere bigot, is one of the most unequivocal cases of moral feeling. those who first broke the yoke of what called itself the universal church, were in general as little willing to permit difference of religious opinion as that church itself. but when the heat of the conflict was over, without giving a complete victory to any party, and each church or sect was reduced to limit its hopes to retaining possession of the ground it already occupied; minorities, seeing that they had no chance of becoming majorities, were under the necessity of pleading to those whom they could not convert, for permission to differ. it is accordingly on this battle-field, almost solely, that the rights of the individual against society have been asserted on broad grounds of principle, and the claim of society to exercise authority over dissentients, openly controverted. the great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for his religious belief. yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about, that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realised, except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. in the minds of almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves. one person will bear with dissent in matters of church government, but not of dogma; another can tolerate everybody, short of a papist or a unitarian; another, every one who believes in revealed religion; a few extend their charity a little further, but stop at the belief in a god and in a future state. wherever the sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense, it is found to have abated little of its claim to be obeyed. in england, from the peculiar circumstances of our political history, though the yoke of opinion is perhaps heavier, that of law is lighter, than in most other countries of europe; and there is considerable jealousy of direct interference, by the legislative or the executive power, with private conduct; not so much from any just regard for the independence of the individual, as from the still subsisting habit of looking on the government as representing an opposite interest to the public. the majority have not yet learnt to feel the power of the government their power, or its opinions their opinions. when they do so, individual liberty will probably be as much exposed to invasion from the government, as it already is from public opinion. but, as yet, there is a considerable amount of feeling ready to be called forth against any attempt of the law to control individuals in things in which they have not hitherto been accustomed to be controlled by it; and this with very little discrimination as to whether the matter is, or is not, within the legitimate sphere of legal control; insomuch that the feeling, highly salutary on the whole, is perhaps quite as often misplaced as well grounded in the particular instances of its application. there is, in fact, no recognised principle by which the propriety or impropriety of government interference is customarily tested. people decide according to their personal preferences. some, whenever they see any good to be done, or evil to be remedied, would willingly instigate the government to undertake the business; while others prefer to bear almost any amount of social evil, rather than add one to the departments of human interests amenable to governmental control. and men range themselves on one or the other side in any particular case, according to this general direction of their sentiments; or according to the degree of interest which they feel in the particular thing which it is proposed that the government should do, or according to the belief they entertain that the government would, or would not, do it in the manner they prefer; but very rarely on account of any opinion to which they consistently adhere, as to what things are fit to be done by a government. and it seems to me that in consequence of this absence of rule or principle, one side is at present as often wrong as the other; the interference of government is, with about equal frequency, improperly invoked and improperly condemned. the object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. that principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. his own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. he cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. these are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. to justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. the only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. in the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. it is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. we are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. for the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. the early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an akbar or a charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. but as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others. it is proper to state that i forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. i regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. those interests, i contend, authorise the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the interest of other people. if any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a _primâ facie_ case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. there are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature's life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. a person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. the latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. to make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception. yet there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that exception. in all things which regard the external relations of the individual, he is _de jure_ amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as their protector. there are often good reasons for not holding him to the responsibility; but these reasons must arise from the special expediencies of the case: either because it is a kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act better, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any way in which society have it in their power to control him; or because the attempt to exercise control would produce other evils, greater than those which it would prevent. when such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgment seat, and protect those interests of others which have no external protection; judging himself all the more rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being made accountable to the judgment of his fellow-creatures. but there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. when i say only himself, i mean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever affects himself, may affect others _through_ himself; and the objection which may be grounded on this contingency, will receive consideration in the sequel. this, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. it comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. the liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived. no society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest. though this doctrine is anything but new, and, to some persons, may have the air of a truism, there is no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general tendency of existing opinion and practice. society has expended fully as much effort in the attempt (according to its lights) to compel people to conform to its notions of personal, as of social excellence. the ancient commonwealths thought themselves entitled to practise, and the ancient philosophers countenanced, the regulation of every part of private conduct by public authority, on the ground that the state had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental discipline of every one of its citizens; a mode of thinking which may have been admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies, in constant peril of being subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion, and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so easily be fatal, that they could not afford to wait for the salutary permanent effects of freedom. in the modern world, the greater size of political communities, and above all, the separation between spiritual and temporal authority (which placed the direction of men's consciences in other hands than those which controlled their worldly affairs), prevented so great an interference by law in the details of private life; but the engines of moral repression have been wielded more strenuously against divergence from the reigning opinion in self-regarding, than even in social matters; religion, the most powerful of the elements which have entered into the formation of moral feeling, having almost always been governed either by the ambition of a hierarchy, seeking control over every department of human conduct, or by the spirit of puritanism. and some of those modern reformers who have placed themselves in strongest opposition to the religions of the past, have been noway behind either churches or sects in their assertion of the right of spiritual domination: m. comte, in particular, whose social system, as unfolded in his _traité de politique positive_, aims at establishing (though by moral more than by legal appliances) a despotism of society over the individual, surpassing anything contemplated in the political ideal of the most rigid disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers. apart from the peculiar tenets of individual thinkers, there is also in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over the individual, both by the force of opinion and even by that of legislation: and as the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society, and diminish the power of the individual, this encroachment is not one of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and more formidable. the disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power; and as the power is not declining, but growing, unless a strong barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief, we must expect, in the present circumstances of the world, to see it increase. it will be convenient for the argument, if, instead of at once entering upon the general thesis, we confine ourselves in the first instance to a single branch of it, on which the principle here stated is, if not fully, yet to a certain point, recognised by the current opinions. this one branch is the liberty of thought: from which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of speaking and of writing. although these liberties, to some considerable amount, form part of the political morality of all countries which profess religious toleration and free institutions, the grounds, both philosophical and practical, on which they rest, are perhaps not so familiar to the general mind, nor so thoroughly appreciated by many even of the leaders of opinion, as might have been expected. those grounds, when rightly understood, are of much wider application than to only one division of the subject, and a thorough consideration of this part of the question will be found the best introduction to the remainder. those to whom nothing which i am about to say will be new, may therefore, i hope, excuse me, if on a subject which for now three centuries has been so often discussed, i venture on one discussion more. chapter ii. of the liberty of thought and discussion. the time, it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any defence would be necessary of the "liberty of the press" as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. no argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear. this aspect of the question, besides, has been so often and so triumphantly enforced by preceding writers, that it need not be specially insisted on in this place. though the law of england, on the subject of the press, is as servile to this day as it was in the time of the tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force against political discussion, except during some temporary panic, when fear of insurrection drives ministers and judges from their propriety;[6] and, speaking generally, it is not, in constitutional countries, to be apprehended that the government, whether completely responsible to the people or not, will often attempt to control the expression of opinion, except when in doing so it makes itself the organ of the general intolerance of the public. let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. but i deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government. the power itself is illegitimate. the best government has no more title to it than the worst. it is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in or opposition to it. if all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. but the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. if the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. it is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it. we can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still. first: the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. they have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging. to refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that _their_ certainty is the same thing as _absolute_ certainty. all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common. unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, the fact of their fallibility is far from carrying the weight in their practical judgment, which is always allowed to it in theory; for while every one well knows himself to be fallible, few think it necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any opinion, of which they feel very certain, may be one of the examples of the error to which they acknowledge themselves to be liable. absolute princes, or others who are accustomed to unlimited deference, usually feel this complete confidence in their own opinions on nearly all subjects. people more happily situated, who sometimes hear their opinions disputed, and are not wholly unused to be set right when they are wrong, place the same unbounded reliance only on such of their opinions as are shared by all who surround them, or to whom they habitually defer: for in proportion to a man's want of confidence in his own solitary judgment, does he usually repose, with implicit trust, on the infallibility of "the world" in general. and the world, to each individual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact; his party, his sect, his church, his class of society: the man may be called, by comparison, almost liberal and large-minded to whom it means anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age. nor is his faith in this collective authority at all shaken by his being aware that other ages, countries, sects, churches, classes, and parties have thought, and even now think, the exact reverse. he devolves upon his own world the responsibility of being in the right against the dissentient worlds of other people; and it never troubles him that mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make him a churchman in london, would have made him a buddhist or a confucian in pekin. yet it is as evident in itself as any amount of argument can make it, that ages are no more infallible than individuals; every age having held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that many opinions, now general, will be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present. the objection likely to be made to this argument, would probably take some such form as the following. there is no greater assumption of infallibility in forbidding the propagation of error, than in any other thing which is done by public authority on its own judgment and responsibility. judgment is given to men that they may use it. because it may be used erroneously, are men to be told that they ought not to use it at all? to prohibit what they think pernicious, is not claiming exemption from error, but fulfilling the duty incumbent on them, although fallible, of acting on their conscientious conviction. if we were never to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong, we should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties unperformed. an objection which applies to all conduct, can be no valid objection to any conduct in particular. it is the duty of governments, and of individuals, to form the truest opinions they can; to form them carefully, and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure of being right. but when they are sure (such reasoners may say), it is not conscientiousness but cowardice to shrink from acting on their opinions, and allow doctrines which they honestly think dangerous to the welfare of mankind, either in this life or in another, to be scattered abroad without restraint, because other people, in less enlightened times, have persecuted opinions now believed to be true. let us take care, it may be said, not to make the same mistake: but governments and nations have made mistakes in other things, which are not denied to be fit subjects for the exercise of authority: they have laid on bad taxes, made unjust wars. ought we therefore to lay on no taxes, and, under whatever provocation, make no wars? men, and governments, must act to the best of their ability. there is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life. we may, and must, assume our opinion to be true for the guidance of our own conduct: and it is assuming no more when we forbid bad men to pervert society by the propagation of opinions which we regard as false and pernicious. i answer that it is assuming very much more. there is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. when we consider either the history of opinion, or the ordinary conduct of human life, to what is it to be ascribed that the one and the other are no worse than they are? not certainly to the inherent force of the human understanding; for, on any matter not self-evident, there are ninety-nine persons totally incapable of judging of it, for one who is capable; and the capacity of the hundredth person is only comparative; for the majority of the eminent men of every past generation held many opinions now known to be erroneous, and did or approved numerous things which no one will now justify. why is it, then, that there is on the whole a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and rational conduct? if there really is this preponderance--which there must be, unless human affairs are, and have always been, in an almost desperate state--it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of everything respectable in man either as an intellectual or as a moral being, namely, that his errors are corrigible. he is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. not by experience alone. there must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it. very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning. the whole strength and value, then, of human judgment, depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand. in the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so? because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and conduct. because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him; to profit by as much of it as was just, and expound to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious. because he has felt, that the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind. no wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner. the steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it: for, being cognisant of all that can, at least obviously, be said against him, and having taken up his position against all gainsayers--knowing that he has sought for objections and difficulties, instead of avoiding them, and has shut out no light which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter--he has a right to think his judgment better than that of any person, or any multitude, who have not gone through a similar process. it is not too much to require that what the wisest of mankind, those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary to warrant their relying on it, should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public. the most intolerant of churches, the roman catholic church, even at the canonisation of a saint, admits, and listens patiently to, a "devil's advocate." the holiest of men, it appears, cannot be admitted to posthumous honours, until all that the devil could say against him is known and weighed. if even the newtonian philosophy were not permitted to be questioned, mankind could not feel as complete assurance of its truth as they now do. the beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded. if the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty still; but we have done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of; we have neglected nothing that could give the truth a chance of reaching us: if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving it; and in the meantime we may rely on having attained such approach to truth, as is possible in our own day. this is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being, and this the sole way of attaining it. strange it is, that men should admit the validity of the arguments for free discussion, but object to their being "pushed to an extreme;" not seeing that unless the reasons are good for an extreme case, they are not good for any case. strange that they should imagine that they are not assuming infallibility, when they acknowledge that there should be free discussion on all subjects which can possibly be _doubtful_, but think that some particular principle or doctrine should be forbidden to be questioned because it is _so certain_, that is, because _they are certain_ that it is certain. to call any proposition certain, while there is any one who would deny its certainty if permitted, but who is not permitted, is to assume that we ourselves, and those who agree with us, are the judges of certainty, and judges without hearing the other side. in the present age--which has been described as "destitute of faith, but terrified at scepticism"--in which people feel sure, not so much that their opinions are true, as that they should not know what to do without them--the claims of an opinion to be protected from public attack are rested not so much on its truth, as on its importance to society. there are, it is alleged, certain beliefs, so useful, not to say indispensable to well-being, that it is as much the duty of governments to uphold those beliefs, as to protect any other of the interests of society. in a case of such necessity, and so directly in the line of their duty, something less than infallibility may, it is maintained, warrant, and even bind, governments, to act on their own opinion, confirmed by the general opinion of mankind. it is also often argued, and still oftener thought, that none but bad men would desire to weaken these salutary beliefs; and there can be nothing wrong, it is thought, in restraining bad men, and prohibiting what only such men would wish to practise. this mode of thinking makes the justification of restraints on discussion not a question of the truth of doctrines, but of their usefulness; and flatters itself by that means to escape the responsibility of claiming to be an infallible judge of opinions. but those who thus satisfy themselves, do not perceive that the assumption of infallibility is merely shifted from one point to another. the usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion: as disputable, as open to discussion, and requiring discussion as much, as the opinion itself. there is the same need of an infallible judge of opinions to decide an opinion to be noxious, as to decide it to be false, unless the opinion condemned has full opportunity of defending itself. and it will not do to say that the heretic may be allowed to maintain the utility or harmlessness of his opinion, though forbidden to maintain its truth. the truth of an opinion is part of its utility. if we would know whether or not it is desirable that a proposition should be believed, is it possible to exclude the consideration of whether or not it is true? in the opinion, not of bad men, but of the best men, no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful: and can you prevent such men from urging that plea, when they are charged with culpability for denying some doctrine which they are told is useful, but which they believe to be false? those who are on the side of received opinions, never fail to take all possible advantage of this plea; you do not find _them_ handling the question of utility as if it could be completely abstracted from that of truth: on the contrary, it is, above all, because their doctrine is "the truth," that the knowledge or the belief of it is held to be so indispensable. there can be no fair discussion of the question of usefulness, when an argument so vital may be employed on one side, but not on the other. and in point of fact, when law or public feeling do not permit the truth of an opinion to be disputed, they are just as little tolerant of a denial of its usefulness. the utmost they allow is an extenuation of its absolute necessity, or of the positive guilt of rejecting it. in order more fully to illustrate the mischief of denying a hearing to opinions because we, in our own judgment, have condemned them, it will be desirable to fix down the discussion to a concrete case; and i choose, by preference, the cases which are least favourable to me--in which the argument against freedom of opinion, both on the score of truth and on that of utility, is considered the strongest. let the opinions impugned be the belief in a god and in a future state, or any of the commonly received doctrines of morality. to fight the battle on such ground, gives a great advantage to an unfair antagonist; since he will be sure to say (and many who have no desire to be unfair will say it internally), are these the doctrines which you do not deem sufficiently certain to be taken under the protection of law? is the belief in a god one of the opinions, to feel sure of which, you hold to be assuming infallibility? but i must be permitted to observe, that it is not the feeling sure of a doctrine (be it what it may) which i call an assumption of infallibility. it is the undertaking to decide that question _for others_, without allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side. and i denounce and reprobate this pretension not the less, if put forth on the side of my most solemn convictions. however positive any one's persuasion may be, not only of the falsity, but of the pernicious consequences--not only of the pernicious consequences, but (to adopt expressions which i altogether condemn) the immorality and impiety of an opinion; yet if, in pursuance of that private judgment, though backed by the public judgment of his country or his contemporaries, he prevents the opinion from being heard in its defence, he assumes infallibility. and so far from the assumption being less objectionable or less dangerous because the opinion is called immoral or impious, this is the case of all others in which it is most fatal. these are exactly the occasions on which the men of one generation commit those dreadful mistakes, which excite the astonishment and horror of posterity. it is among such that we find the instances memorable in history, when the arm of the law has been employed to root out the best men and the noblest doctrines; with deplorable success as to the men, though some of the doctrines have survived to be (as if in mockery) invoked, in defence of similar conduct towards those who dissent from _them_, or from their received interpretation. mankind can hardly be too often reminded that there was once a man named socrates, between whom and the legal authorities and public opinion of his time, there took place a memorable collision. born in an age and country abounding in individual greatness, this man has been handed down to us by those who best knew both him and the age, as the most virtuous man in it; while _we_ know him as the head and prototype of all subsequent teachers of virtue, the source equally of the lofty inspiration of plato and the judicious utilitarianism of aristotle, "_i maëstri di color che sanno_," the two headsprings of ethical as of all other philosophy. this acknowledged master of all the eminent thinkers who have since lived--whose fame, still growing after more than two thousand years, all but outweighs the whole remainder of the names which make his native city illustrious--was put to death by his countrymen, after a judicial conviction, for impiety and immorality. impiety, in denying the gods recognised by the state; indeed his accuser asserted (see the "apologia") that he believed in no gods at all. immorality, in being, by his doctrines and instructions, a "corruptor of youth." of these charges the tribunal, there is every ground for believing, honestly found him guilty, and condemned the man who probably of all then born had deserved best of mankind, to be put to death as a criminal. to pass from this to the only other instance of judicial iniquity, the mention of which, after the condemnation of socrates, would not be an anticlimax: the event which took place on calvary rather more than eighteen hundred years ago. the man who left on the memory of those who witnessed his life and conversation, such an impression of his moral grandeur, that eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage to him as the almighty in person, was ignominiously put to death, as what? as a blasphemer. men did not merely mistake their benefactor; they mistook him for the exact contrary of what he was, and treated him as that prodigy of impiety, which they themselves are now held to be, for their treatment of him. the feelings with which mankind now regard these lamentable transactions, especially the later of the two, render them extremely unjust in their judgment of the unhappy actors. these were, to all appearance, not bad men--not worse than men commonly are, but rather the contrary; men who possessed in a full, or somewhat more than a full measure, the religious, moral, and patriotic feelings of their time and people: the very kind of men who, in all times, our own included, have every chance of passing through life blameless and respected. the high-priest who rent his garments when the words were pronounced, which, according to all the ideas of his country, constituted the blackest guilt, was in all probability quite as sincere in his horror and indignation, as the generality of respectable and pious men now are in the religious and moral sentiments they profess; and most of those who now shudder at his conduct, if they had lived in his time, and been born jews, would have acted precisely as he did. orthodox christians who are tempted to think that those who stoned to death the first martyrs must have been worse men than they themselves are, ought to remember that one of those persecutors was saint paul. let us add one more example, the most striking of all, if the impressiveness of an error is measured by the wisdom and virtue of him who falls into it. if ever any one, possessed of power, had grounds for thinking himself the best and most enlightened among his cotemporaries, it was the emperor marcus aurelius. absolute monarch of the whole civilised world, he preserved through life not only the most unblemished justice, but what was less to be expected from his stoical breeding, the tenderest heart. the few failings which are attributed to him, were all on the side of indulgence: while his writings, the highest ethical product of the ancient mind, differ scarcely perceptibly, if they differ at all, from the most characteristic teachings of christ. this man, a better christian in all but the dogmatic sense of the word, than almost any of the ostensibly christian sovereigns who have since reigned, persecuted christianity. placed at the summit of all the previous attainments of humanity, with an open, unfettered intellect, and a character which led him of himself to embody in his moral writings the christian ideal, he yet failed to see that christianity was to be a good and not an evil to the world, with his duties to which he was so deeply penetrated. existing society he knew to be in a deplorable state. but such as it was, he saw, or thought he saw, that it was held together, and prevented from being worse, by belief and reverence of the received divinities. as a ruler of mankind, he deemed it his duty not to suffer society to fall in pieces; and saw not how, if its existing ties were removed, any others could be formed which could again knit it together. the new religion openly aimed at dissolving these ties: unless, therefore, it was his duty to adopt that religion, it seemed to be his duty to put it down. inasmuch then as the theology of christianity did not appear to him true or of divine origin; inasmuch as this strange history of a crucified god was not credible to him, and a system which purported to rest entirely upon a foundation to him so wholly unbelievable, could not be foreseen by him to be that renovating agency which, after all abatements, it has in fact proved to be; the gentlest and most amiable of philosophers and rulers, under a solemn sense of duty, authorised the persecution of christianity. to my mind this is one of the most tragical facts in all history. it is a bitter thought, how different a thing the christianity of the world might have been, if the christian faith had been adopted as the religion of the empire under the auspices of marcus aurelius instead of those of constantine. but it would be equally unjust to him and false to truth, to deny, that no one plea which can be urged for punishing anti-christian teaching, was wanting to marcus aurelius for punishing, as he did, the propagation of christianity. no christian more firmly believes that atheism is false, and tends to the dissolution of society, than marcus aurelius believed the same things of christianity; he who, of all men then living, might have been thought the most capable of appreciating it. unless any one who approves of punishment for the promulgation of opinions, flatters himself that he is a wiser and better man than marcus aurelius--more deeply versed in the wisdom of his time, more elevated in his intellect above it--more earnest in his search for truth, or more single-minded in his devotion to it when found;--let him abstain from that assumption of the joint infallibility of himself and the multitude, which the great antoninus made with so unfortunate a result. aware of the impossibility of defending the use of punishment for restraining irreligious opinions, by any argument which will not justify marcus antoninus, the enemies of religious freedom, when hard pressed, occasionally accept this consequence, and say, with dr. johnson, that the persecutors of christianity were in the right; that persecution is an ordeal through which truth ought to pass, and always passes successfully, legal penalties being, in the end, powerless against truth, though sometimes beneficially effective against mischievous errors. this is a form of the argument for religious intolerance, sufficiently remarkable not to be passed without notice. a theory which maintains that truth may justifiably be persecuted because persecution cannot possibly do it any harm, cannot be charged with being intentionally hostile to the reception of new truths; but we cannot commend the generosity of its dealing with the persons to whom mankind are indebted for them. to discover to the world something which deeply concerns it, and of which it was previously ignorant; to prove to it that it had been mistaken on some vital point of temporal or spiritual interest, is as important a service as a human being can render to his fellow-creatures, and in certain cases, as in those of the early christians and of the reformers, those who think with dr. johnson believe it to have been the most precious gift which could be bestowed on mankind. that the authors of such splendid benefits should be requited by martyrdom; that their reward should be to be dealt with as the vilest of criminals, is not, upon this theory, a deplorable error and misfortune, for which humanity should mourn in sackcloth and ashes, but the normal and justifiable state of things. the propounder of a new truth, according to this doctrine, should stand, as stood, in the legislation of the locrians, the proposer of a new law, with a halter round his neck, to be instantly tightened if the public assembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his proposition. people who defend this mode of treating benefactors, cannot be supposed to set much value on the benefit; and i believe this view of the subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now. but, indeed, the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience refutes. history teems with instances of truth put down by persecution. if not suppressed for ever, it may be thrown back for centuries. to speak only of religious opinions: the reformation broke out at least twenty times before luther, and was put down. arnold of brescia was put down. fra dolcino was put down. savonarola was put down. the albigeois were put down. the vaudois were put down. the lollards were put down. the hussites were put down. even after the era of luther, wherever persecution was persisted in, it was successful. in spain, italy, flanders, the austrian empire, protestantism was rooted out; and, most likely, would have been so in england, had queen mary lived, or queen elizabeth died. persecution has always succeeded, save where the heretics were too strong a party to be effectually persecuted. no reasonable person can doubt that christianity might have been extirpated in the roman empire. it spread, and became predominant, because the persecutions were only occasional, lasting but a short time, and separated by long intervals of almost undisturbed propagandism. it is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error, of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake. men are not more zealous for truth than they often are for error, and a sufficient application of legal or even of social penalties will generally succeed in stopping the propagation of either. the real advantage which truth has, consists in this, that when an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it. it will be said, that we do not now put to death the introducers of new opinions: we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets, we even build sepulchres to them. it is true we no longer put heretics to death; and the amount of penal infliction which modern feeling would probably tolerate, even against the most obnoxious opinions, is not sufficient to extirpate them. but let us not flatter ourselves that we are yet free from the stain even of legal persecution. penalties for opinion, or at least for its expression, still exist by law; and their enforcement is not, even in these times, so unexampled as to make it at all incredible that they may some day be revived in full force. in the year 1857, at the summer assizes of the county of cornwall, an unfortunate man,[7] said to be of unexceptionable conduct in all relations of life, was sentenced to twenty-one months' imprisonment, for uttering, and writing on a gate, some offensive words concerning christianity. within a month of the same time, at the old bailey, two persons, on two separate occasions,[8] were rejected as jurymen, and one of them grossly insulted by the judge and by one of the counsel, because they honestly declared that they had no theological belief; and a third, a foreigner,[9] for the same reason, was denied justice against a thief. this refusal of redress took place in virtue of the legal doctrine, that no person can be allowed to give evidence in a court of justice, who does not profess belief in a god (any god is sufficient) and in a future state; which is equivalent to declaring such persons to be outlaws, excluded from the protection of the tribunals; who may not only be robbed or assaulted with impunity, if no one but themselves, or persons of similar opinions, be present, but any one else may be robbed or assaulted with impunity, if the proof of the fact depends on their evidence. the assumption on which this is grounded, is that the oath is worthless, of a person who does not believe in a future state; a proposition which betokens much ignorance of history in those who assent to it (since it is historically true that a large proportion of infidels in all ages have been persons of distinguished integrity and honour); and would be maintained by no one who had the smallest conception how many of the persons in greatest repute with the world, both for virtues and for attainments, are well known, at least to their intimates, to be unbelievers. the rule, besides, is suicidal, and cuts away its own foundation. under pretence that atheists must be liars, it admits the testimony of all atheists who are willing to lie, and rejects only those who brave the obloquy of publicly confessing a detested creed rather than affirm a falsehood. a rule thus self-convicted of absurdity so far as regards its professed purpose, can be kept in force only as a badge of hatred, a relic of persecution; a persecution, too, having the peculiarity, that the qualification for undergoing it, is the being clearly proved not to deserve it. the rule, and the theory it implies, are hardly less insulting to believers than to infidels. for if he who does not believe in a future state, necessarily lies, it follows that they who do believe are only prevented from lying, if prevented they are, by the fear of hell. we will not do the authors and abettors of the rule the injury of supposing, that the conception which they have formed of christian virtue is drawn from their own consciousness. these, indeed, are but rags and remnants of persecution, and may be thought to be not so much an indication of the wish to persecute, as an example of that very frequent infirmity of english minds, which makes them take a preposterous pleasure in the assertion of a bad principle, when they are no longer bad enough to desire to carry it really into practice. but unhappily there is no security in the state of the public mind, that the suspension of worse forms of legal persecution, which has lasted for about the space of a generation, will continue. in this age the quiet surface of routine is as often ruffled by attempts to resuscitate past evils, as to introduce new benefits. what is boasted of at the present time as the revival of religion, is always, in narrow and uncultivated minds, at least as much the revival of bigotry; and where there is the strong permanent leaven of intolerance in the feelings of a people, which at all times abides in the middle classes of this country, it needs but little to provoke them into actively persecuting those whom they have never ceased to think proper objects of persecution.[10] for it is this--it is the opinions men entertain, and the feelings they cherish, respecting those who disown the beliefs they deem important, which makes this country not a place of mental freedom. for a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal penalties is that they strengthen the social stigma. it is that stigma which is really effective, and so effective is it that the profession of opinions which are under the ban of society is much less common in england, than is, in many other countries, the avowal of those which incur risk of judicial punishment. in respect to all persons but those whose pecuniary circumstances make them independent of the good will of other people, opinion, on this subject, is as efficacious as law; men might as well be imprisoned, as excluded from the means of earning their bread. those whose bread is already secured, and who desire no favours from men in power, or from bodies of men, or from the public, have nothing to fear from the open avowal of any opinions, but to be ill-thought of and ill-spoken of, and this it ought not to require a very heroic mould to enable them to bear. there is no room for any appeal _ad misericordiam_ in behalf of such persons. but though we do not now inflict so much evil on those who think differently from us, as it was formerly our custom to do, it may be that we do ourselves as much evil as ever by our treatment of them. socrates was put to death, but the socratic philosophy rose like the sun in heaven, and spread its illumination over the whole intellectual firmament. christians were cast to the lions, but the christian church grew up a stately and spreading tree, overtopping the older and less vigorous growths, and stifling them by its shade. our merely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion. with us, heretical opinions do not perceptibly gain, or even lose, ground in each decade or generation; they never blaze out far and wide, but continue to smoulder in the narrow circles of thinking and studious persons among whom they originate, without ever lighting up the general affairs of mankind with either a true or a deceptive light. and thus is kept up a state of things very satisfactory to some minds, because, without the unpleasant process of fining or imprisoning anybody, it maintains all prevailing opinions outwardly undisturbed, while it does not absolutely interdict the exercise of reason by dissentients afflicted with the malady of thought. a convenient plan for having peace in the intellectual world, and keeping all things going on therein very much as they do already. but the price paid for this sort of intellectual pacification, is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the human mind. a state of things in which a large portion of the most active and inquiring intellects find it advisable to keep the genuine principles and grounds of their convictions within their own breasts, and attempt, in what they address to the public, to fit as much as they can of their own conclusions to premises which they have internally renounced, cannot send forth the open, fearless characters, and logical, consistent intellects who once adorned the thinking world. the sort of men who can be looked for under it, are either mere conformers to commonplace, or time-servers for truth, whose arguments on all great subjects are meant for their hearers, and are not those which have convinced themselves. those who avoid this alternative, do so by narrowing their thoughts and interest to things which can be spoken of without venturing within the region of principles, that is, to small practical matters, which would come right of themselves, if but the minds of mankind were strengthened and enlarged, and which will never be made effectually right until then: while that which would strengthen and enlarge men's minds, free and daring speculation on the highest subjects, is abandoned. those in whose eyes this reticence on the part of heretics is no evil, should consider in the first place, that in consequence of it there is never any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions; and that such of them as could not stand such a discussion, though they may be prevented from spreading, do not disappear. but it is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated most, by the ban placed on all inquiry which does not end in the orthodox conclusions. the greatest harm done is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is cramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy. who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them in something which would admit of being considered irreligious or immoral? among them we may occasionally see some man of deep conscientiousness, and subtle and refined understanding, who spends a life in sophisticating with an intellect which he cannot silence, and exhausts the resources of ingenuity in attempting to reconcile the promptings of his conscience and reason with orthodoxy, which yet he does not, perhaps, to the end succeed in doing. no one can be a great thinker who does not recognise, that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead. truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think. not that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great thinkers, that freedom of thinking is required. on the contrary, it is as much, and even more indispensable, to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of. there have been, and may again be, great individual thinkers, in a general atmosphere of mental slavery. but there never has been, nor ever will be, in that atmosphere, an intellectually active people. where any people has made a temporary approach to such a character, it has been because the dread of heterodox speculation was for a time suspended. where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be disputed; where the discussion of the greatest questions which can occupy humanity is considered to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high scale of mental activity which has made some periods of history so remarkable. never when controversy avoided the subjects which are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm, was the mind of a people stirred up from its foundations, and the impulse given which raised even persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity of thinking beings. of such we have had an example in the condition of europe during the times immediately following the reformation; another, though limited to the continent and to a more cultivated class, in the speculative movement of the latter half of the eighteenth century; and a third, of still briefer duration, in the intellectual fermentation of germany during the goethian and fichtean period. these periods differed widely in the particular opinions which they developed; but were alike in this, that during all three the yoke of authority was broken. in each, an old mental despotism had been thrown off, and no new one had yet taken its place. the impulse given at these three periods has made europe what it now is. every single improvement which has taken place either in the human mind or in institutions, may be traced distinctly to one or other of them. appearances have for some time indicated that all three impulses are well-nigh spent; and we can expect no fresh start, until we again assert our mental freedom. let us now pass to the second division of the argument, and dismissing the supposition that any of the received opinions may be false, let us assume them to be true, and examine into the worth of the manner in which they are likely to be held, when their truth is not freely and openly canvassed. however unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth. there is a class of persons (happily not quite so numerous as formerly) who think it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to what they think true, though he has no knowledge whatever of the grounds of the opinion, and could not make a tenable defence of it against the most superficial objections. such persons, if they can once get their creed taught from authority, naturally think that no good, and some harm, comes of its being allowed to be questioned. where their influence prevails, they make it nearly impossible for the received opinion to be rejected wisely and considerately, though it may still be rejected rashly and ignorantly; for to shut out discussion entirely is seldom possible, and when it once gets in, beliefs not grounded on conviction are apt to give way before the slightest semblance of an argument. waiving, however, this possibility--assuming that the true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument--this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. this is not knowing the truth. truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth. if the intellect and judgment of mankind ought to be cultivated, a thing which protestants at least do not deny, on what can these faculties be more appropriately exercised by any one, than on the things which concern him so much that it is considered necessary for him to hold opinions on them? if the cultivation of the understanding consists in one thing more than in another, it is surely in learning the grounds of one's own opinions. whatever people believe, on subjects on which it is of the first importance to believe rightly, they ought to be able to defend against at least the common objections. but, some one may say, "let them be _taught_ the grounds of their opinions. it does not follow that opinions must be merely parroted because they are never heard controverted. persons who learn geometry do not simply commit the theorems to memory, but understand and learn likewise the demonstrations; and it would be absurd to say that they remain ignorant of the grounds of geometrical truths, because they never hear any one deny, and attempt to disprove them." undoubtedly: and such teaching suffices on a subject like mathematics, where there is nothing at all to be said on the wrong side of the question. the peculiarity of the evidence of mathematical truths is, that all the argument is on one side. there are no objections, and no answers to objections. but on every subject on which difference of opinion is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting reasons. even in natural philosophy, there is always some other explanation possible of the same facts; some geocentric theory instead of heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen; and it has to be shown why that other theory cannot be the true one: and until this is shown, and until we know how it is shown, we do not understand the grounds of our opinion. but when we turn to subjects infinitely more complicated, to morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life, three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the appearances which favour some opinion different from it. the greatest orator, save one, of antiquity, has left it on record that he always studied his adversary's case with as great, if not with still greater, intensity than even his own. what cicero practised as the means of forensic success, requires to be imitated by all who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth. he who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. his reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. but if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion. the rational position for him would be suspension of judgment, and unless he contents himself with that, he is either led by authority, or adopts, like the generality of the world, the side to which he feels most inclination. nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. that is not the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. he must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. he must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of; else he will never really possess himself of the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty. ninety-nine in a hundred of what are called educated men are in this condition; even of those who can argue fluently for their opinions. their conclusion may be true, but it might be false for anything they know: they have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them, and considered what such persons may have to say; and consequently they do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess. they do not know those parts of it which explain and justify the remainder; the considerations which show that a fact which seemingly conflicts with another is reconcilable with it, or that, of two apparently strong reasons, one and not the other ought to be preferred. all that part of the truth which turns the scale, and decides the judgment of a completely informed mind, they are strangers to; nor is it ever really known, but to those who have attended equally and impartially to both sides, and endeavoured to see the reasons of both in the strongest light. so essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects, that if opponents of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most skilful devil's advocate can conjure up. to abate the force of these considerations, an enemy of free discussion may be supposed to say, that there is no necessity for mankind in general to know and understand all that can be said against or for their opinions by philosophers and theologians. that it is not needful for common men to be able to expose all the misstatements or fallacies of an ingenious opponent. that it is enough if there is always somebody capable of answering them, so that nothing likely to mislead uninstructed persons remains unrefuted. that simple minds, having been taught the obvious grounds of the truths inculcated on them, may trust to authority for the rest, and being aware that they have neither knowledge nor talent to resolve every difficulty which can be raised, may repose in the assurance that all those which have been raised have been or can be answered, by those who are specially trained to the task. conceding to this view of the subject the utmost that can be claimed for it by those most easily satisfied with the amount of understanding of truth which ought to accompany the belief of it; even so, the argument for free discussion is no way weakened. for even this doctrine acknowledges that mankind ought to have a rational assurance that all objections have been satisfactorily answered; and how are they to be answered if that which requires to be answered is not spoken? or how can the answer be known to be satisfactory, if the objectors have no opportunity of showing that it is unsatisfactory? if not the public, at least the philosophers and theologians who are to resolve the difficulties, must make themselves familiar with those difficulties in their most puzzling form; and this cannot be accomplished unless they are freely stated, and placed in the most advantageous light which they admit of. the catholic church has its own way of dealing with this embarrassing problem. it makes a broad separation between those who can be permitted to receive its doctrines on conviction, and those who must accept them on trust. neither, indeed, are allowed any choice as to what they will accept; but the clergy, such at least as can be fully confided in, may admissibly and meritoriously make themselves acquainted with the arguments of opponents, in order to answer them, and may, therefore, read heretical books; the laity, not unless by special permission, hard to be obtained. this discipline recognises a knowledge of the enemy's case as beneficial to the teachers, but finds means, consistent with this, of denying it to the rest of the world: thus giving to the _élite_ more mental culture, though not more mental freedom, than it allows to the mass. by this device it succeeds in obtaining the kind of mental superiority which its purposes require; for though culture without freedom never made a large and liberal mind, it can make a clever _nisi prius_ advocate of a cause. but in countries professing protestantism, this resource is denied; since protestants hold, at least in theory, that the responsibility for the choice of a religion must be borne by each for himself, and cannot be thrown off upon teachers. besides, in the present state of the world, it is practically impossible that writings which are read by the instructed can be kept from the uninstructed. if the teachers of mankind are to be cognisant of all that they ought to know, everything must be free to be written and published without restraint. if, however, the mischievous operation of the absence of free discussion, when the received opinions are true, were confined to leaving men ignorant of the grounds of those opinions, it might be thought that this, if an intellectual, is no moral evil, and does not affect the worth of the opinions, regarded in their influence on the character. the fact, however, is, that not only the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often the meaning of the opinion itself. the words which convey it, cease to suggest ideas, or suggest only a small portion of those they were originally employed to communicate. instead of a vivid conception and a living belief, there remain only a few phrases retained by rote; or, if any part, the shell and husk only of the meaning is retained, the finer essence being lost. the great chapter in human history which this fact occupies and fills, cannot be too earnestly studied and meditated on. it is illustrated in the experience of almost all ethical doctrines and religious creeds. they are all full of meaning and vitality to those who originate them, and to the direct disciples of the originators. their meaning continues to be felt in undiminished strength, and is perhaps brought out into even fuller consciousness, so long as the struggle lasts to give the doctrine or creed an ascendency over other creeds. at last it either prevails, and becomes the general opinion, or its progress stops; it keeps possession of the ground it has gained, but ceases to spread further. when either of these results has become apparent, controversy on the subject flags, and gradually dies away. the doctrine has taken its place, if not as a received opinion, as one of the admitted sects or divisions of opinion: those who hold it have generally inherited, not adopted it; and conversion from one of these doctrines to another, being now an exceptional fact, occupies little place in the thoughts of their professors. instead of being, as at first, constantly on the alert either to defend themselves against the world, or to bring the world over to them, they have subsided into acquiescence, and neither listen, when they can help it, to arguments against their creed, nor trouble dissentients (if there be such) with arguments in its favour. from this time may usually be dated the decline in the living power of the doctrine. we often hear the teachers of all creeds lamenting the difficulty of keeping up in the minds of believers a lively apprehension of the truth which they nominally recognise, so that it may penetrate the feelings, and acquire a real mastery over the conduct. no such difficulty is complained of while the creed is still fighting for its existence: even the weaker combatants then know and feel what they are fighting for, and the difference between it and other doctrines; and in that period of every creed's existence, not a few persons may be found, who have realised its fundamental principles in all the forms of thought, have weighed and considered them in all their important bearings, and have experienced the full effect on the character, which belief in that creed ought to produce in a mind thoroughly imbued with it. but when it has come to be a hereditary creed, and to be received passively, not actively--when the mind is no longer compelled, in the same degree as at first, to exercise its vital powers on the questions which its belief presents to it, there is a progressive tendency to forget all of the belief except the formularies, or to give it a dull and torpid assent, as if accepting it on trust dispensed with the necessity of realising it in consciousness, or testing it by personal experience; until it almost ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human being. then are seen the cases, so frequent in this age of the world as almost to form the majority, in which the creed remains as it were outside the mind, encrusting and petrifying it against all other influences addressed to the higher parts of our nature; manifesting its power by not suffering any fresh and living conviction to get in, but itself doing nothing for the mind or heart, except standing sentinel over them to keep them vacant. to what an extent doctrines intrinsically fitted to make the deepest impression upon the mind may remain in it as dead beliefs, without being ever realised in the imagination, the feelings, or the understanding, is exemplified by the manner in which the majority of believers hold the doctrines of christianity. by christianity i here mean what is accounted such by all churches and sects--the maxims and precepts contained in the new testament. these are considered sacred, and accepted as laws, by all professing christians. yet it is scarcely too much to say that not one christian in a thousand guides or tests his individual conduct by reference to those laws. the standard to which he does refer it, is the custom of his nation, his class, or his religious profession. he has thus, on the one hand, a collection of ethical maxims, which he believes to have been vouchsafed to him by infallible wisdom as rules for his government; and on the other, a set of every-day judgments and practices, which go a certain length with some of those maxims, not so great a length with others, stand in direct opposition to some, and are, on the whole, a compromise between the christian creed and the interests and suggestions of worldly life. to the first of these standards he gives his homage; to the other his real allegiance. all christians believe that the blessed are the poor and humble, and those who are ill-used by the world; that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven; that they should judge not, lest they be judged; that they should swear not at all; that they should love their neighbour as themselves; that if one take their cloak, they should give him their coat also; that they should take no thought for the morrow; that if they would be perfect, they should sell all that they have and give it to the poor. they are not insincere when they say that they believe these things. they do believe them, as people believe what they have always heard lauded and never discussed. but in the sense of that living belief which regulates conduct, they believe these doctrines just up to the point to which it is usual to act upon them. the doctrines in their integrity are serviceable to pelt adversaries with; and it is understood that they are to be put forward (when possible) as the reasons for whatever people do that they think laudable. but any one who reminded them that the maxims require an infinity of things which they never even think of doing, would gain nothing but to be classed among those very unpopular characters who affect to be better than other people. the doctrines have no hold on ordinary believers--are not a power in their minds. they have a habitual respect for the sound of them, but no feeling which spreads from the words to the things signified, and forces the mind to take _them_ in, and make them conform to the formula. whenever conduct is concerned, they look round for mr. a and b to direct them how far to go in obeying christ. now we may be well assured that the case was not thus, but far otherwise, with the early christians. had it been thus, christianity never would have expanded from an obscure sect of the despised hebrews into the religion of the roman empire. when their enemies said, "see how these christians love one another" (a remark not likely to be made by anybody now), they assuredly had a much livelier feeling of the meaning of their creed than they have ever had since. and to this cause, probably, it is chiefly owing that christianity now makes so little progress in extending its domain, and after eighteen centuries, is still nearly confined to europeans and the descendants of europeans. even with the strictly religious, who are much in earnest about their doctrines, and attach a greater amount of meaning to many of them than people in general, it commonly happens that the part which is thus comparatively active in their minds is that which was made by calvin, or knox, or some such person much nearer in character to themselves. the sayings of christ coexist passively in their minds, producing hardly any effect beyond what is caused by mere listening to words so amiable and bland. there are many reasons, doubtless, why doctrines which are the badge of a sect retain more of their vitality than those common to all recognised sects, and why more pains are taken by teachers to keep their meaning alive; but one reason certainly is, that the peculiar doctrines are more questioned, and have to be oftener defended against open gainsayers. both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there is no enemy in the field. the same thing holds true, generally speaking, of all traditional doctrines--those of prudence and knowledge of life, as well as of morals or religion. all languages and literatures are full of general observations on life, both as to what it is, and how to conduct oneself in it; observations which everybody knows, which everybody repeats, or hears with acquiescence, which are received as truisms, yet of which most people first truly learn the meaning, when experience, generally of a painful kind, has made it a reality to them. how often, when smarting under some unforeseen misfortune or disappointment, does a person call to mind some proverb or common saying, familiar to him all his life, the meaning of which, if he had ever before felt it as he does now, would have saved him from the calamity. there are indeed reasons for this, other than the absence of discussion: there are many truths of which the full meaning _cannot_ be realised, until personal experience has brought it home. but much more of the meaning even of these would have been understood, and what was understood would have been far more deeply impressed on the mind, if the man had been accustomed to hear it argued _pro_ and _con_ by people who did understand it. the fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their errors. a contemporary author has well spoken of "the deep slumber of a decided opinion." but what! (it may be asked) is the absence of unanimity an indispensable condition of true knowledge? is it necessary that some part of mankind should persist in error, to enable any to realise the truth? does a belief cease to be real and vital as soon as it is generally received--and is a proposition never thoroughly understood and felt unless some doubt of it remains? as soon as mankind have unanimously accepted a truth, does the truth perish within them? the highest aim and best result of improved intelligence, it has hitherto been thought, is to unite mankind more and more in the acknowledgment of all important truths: and does the intelligence only last as long as it has not achieved its object? do the fruits of conquest perish by the very completeness of the victory? i affirm no such thing. as mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase: and the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested. the cessation, on one question after another, of serious controversy, is one of the necessary incidents of the consolidation of opinion; a consolidation as salutary in the case of true opinions, as it is dangerous and noxious when the opinions are erroneous. but though this gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion is necessary in both senses of the term, being at once inevitable and indispensable, we are not therefore obliged to conclude that all its consequences must be beneficial. the loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefit of its universal recognition. where this advantage can no longer be had, i confess i should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide a substitute for it; some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient champion, eager for his conversion. but instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost those they formerly had. the socratic dialectics, so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of plato, were a contrivance of this description. they were essentially a negative discussion of the great questions of philosophy and life, directed with consummate skill to the purpose of convincing any one who had merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion, that he did not understand the subject--that he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed; in order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. the school disputations of the middle ages had a somewhat similar object. they were intended to make sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it, and could enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other. these last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect, that the premises appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason; and, as a discipline to the mind, they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the "socratici viri": but the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit, and the present modes of education contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other. a person who derives all his instruction from teachers or books, even if he escape the besetting temptation of contenting himself with cram, is under no compulsion to hear both sides; accordingly it is far from a frequent accomplishment, even among thinkers, to know both sides; and the weakest part of what everybody says in defence of his opinion, is what he intends as a reply to antagonists. it is the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic--that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in practice, without establishing positive truths. such negative criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result; but as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again systematically trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of intellect, in any but the mathematical and physical departments of speculation. on any other subject no one's opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents. that, therefore, which when absent, it is so indispensable, but so difficult, to create, how worse than absurd is it to forego, when spontaneously offering itself! if there are any persons who contest a received opinion, or who will do so if law or opinion will let them, let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them, and rejoice that there is some one to do for us what we otherwise ought, if we have any regard for either the certainty or the vitality of our convictions, to do with much greater labour for ourselves. it still remains to speak of one of the principal causes which make diversity of opinion advantageous, and will continue to do so until mankind shall have entered a stage of intellectual advancement which at present seems at an incalculable distance. we have hitherto considered only two possibilities: that the received opinion may be false, and some other opinion, consequently, true; or that, the received opinion being true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth. but there is a commoner case than either of these; when the conflicting doctrines, instead of being one true and the other false, share the truth between them; and the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part. popular opinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom or never the whole truth. they are a part of the truth; sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, and disjoined from the truths by which they ought to be accompanied and limited. heretical opinions, on the other hand, are generally some of these suppressed and neglected truths, bursting the bonds which kept them down, and either seeking reconciliation with the truth contained in the common opinion, or fronting it as enemies, and setting themselves up, with similar exclusiveness, as the whole truth. the latter case is hitherto the most frequent, as, in the human mind, one-sidedness has always been the rule, and many-sidedness the exception. hence, even in revolutions of opinion, one part of the truth usually sets while another rises. even progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only substitutes one partial and incomplete truth for another; improvement consisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the needs of the time, than that which it displaces. such being the partial character of prevailing opinions, even when resting on a true foundation; every opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be considered precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that truth may be blended. no sober judge of human affairs will feel bound to be indignant because those who force on our notice truths which we should otherwise have overlooked, overlook some of those which we see. rather, he will think that so long as popular truth is one-sided, it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should have one-sided asserters too; such being usually the most energetic, and the most likely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole. thus, in the eighteenth century, when nearly all the instructed, and all those of the uninstructed who were led by them, were lost in admiration of what is called civilisation, and of the marvels of modern science, literature, and philosophy, and while greatly overrating the amount of unlikeness between the men of modern and those of ancient times, indulged the belief that the whole of the difference was in their own favour; with what a salutary shock did the paradoxes of rousseau explode like bombshells in the midst, dislocating the compact mass of one-sided opinion, and forcing its elements to recombine in a better form and with additional ingredients. not that the current opinions were on the whole farther from the truth than rousseau's were; on the contrary, they were nearer to it; they contained more of positive truth, and very much less of error. nevertheless there lay in rousseau's doctrine, and has floated down the stream of opinion along with it, a considerable amount of exactly those truths which the popular opinion wanted; and these are the deposit which was left behind when the flood subsided. the superior worth of simplicity of life, the enervating and demoralising effect of the trammels and hypocrisies of artificial society, are ideas which have never been entirely absent from cultivated minds since rousseau wrote; and they will in time produce their due effect, though at present needing to be asserted as much as ever, and to be asserted by deeds, for words, on this subject, have nearly exhausted their power. in politics, again, it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary elements of a healthy state of political life; until the one or the other shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally of order and of progress, knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away. each of these modes of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other; but it is in a great measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within the limits of reason and sanity. unless opinions favourable to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to equality, to co-operation and to competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other standing antagonisms of practical life, are expressed with equal freedom, and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no chance of both elements obtaining their due; one scale is sure to go up and the other down. truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners. on any of the great open questions just enumerated, if either of the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not merely to be tolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced, it is the one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a minority. that is the opinion which, for the time being, represents the neglected interests, the side of human well-being which is in danger of obtaining less than its share. i am aware that there is not, in this country, any intolerance of differences of opinion on most of these topics. they are adduced to show, by admitted and multiplied examples, the universality of the fact, that only through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intellect, a chance of fair-play to all sides of the truth. when there are persons to be found, who form an exception to the apparent unanimity of the world on any subject, even if the world is in the right, it is always probable that dissentients have something worth hearing to say for themselves, and that truth would lose something by their silence. it may be objected, "but _some_ received principles, especially on the highest and most vital subjects, are more than half-truths. the christian morality, for instance, is the whole truth on that subject, and if any one teaches a morality which varies from it, he is wholly in error." as this is of all cases the most important in practice, none can be fitter to test the general maxim. but before pronouncing what christian morality is or is not, it would be desirable to decide what is meant by christian morality. if it means the morality of the new testament, i wonder that any one who derives his knowledge of this from the book itself, can suppose that it was announced, or intended, as a complete doctrine of morals. the gospel always refers to a pre-existing morality, and confines its precepts to the particulars in which that morality was to be corrected, or superseded by a wider and higher; expressing itself, moreover, in terms most general, often impossible to be interpreted literally, and possessing rather the impressiveness of poetry or eloquence than the precision of legislation. to extract from it a body of ethical doctrine, has ever been possible without eking it out from the old testament, that is, from a system elaborate indeed, but in many respects barbarous, and intended only for a barbarous people. st. paul, a declared enemy to this judaical mode of interpreting the doctrine and filling up the scheme of his master, equally assumes a pre-existing morality, namely, that of the greeks and romans; and his advice to christians is in a great measure a system of accommodation to that; even to the extent of giving an apparent sanction to slavery. what is called christian, but should rather be termed theological, morality, was not the work of christ or the apostles, but is of much later origin, having been gradually built up by the catholic church of the first five centuries, and though not implicitly adopted by moderns and protestants, has been much less modified by them than might have been expected. for the most part, indeed, they have contented themselves with cutting off the additions which had been made to it in the middle ages, each sect supplying the place by fresh additions, adapted to its own character and tendencies. that mankind owe a great debt to this morality, and to its early teachers, i should be the last person to deny; but i do not scruple to say of it, that it is, in many important points, incomplete and one-sided, and that unless ideas and feelings, not sanctioned by it, had contributed to the formation of european life and character, human affairs would have been in a worse condition than they now are. christian morality (so called) has all the characters of a reaction; it is, in great part, a protest against paganism. its ideal is negative rather than positive; passive rather than active; innocence rather than nobleness; abstinence from evil, rather than energetic pursuit of good: in its precepts (as has been well said) "thou shalt not" predominates unduly over "thou shalt." in its horror of sensuality, it made an idol of asceticism, which has been gradually compromised away into one of legality. it holds out the hope of heaven and the threat of hell, as the appointed and appropriate motives to a virtuous life: in this falling far below the best of the ancients, and doing what lies in it to give to human morality an essentially selfish character, by disconnecting each man's feelings of duty from the interests of his fellow-creatures, except so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him for consulting them. it is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience; it inculcates submission to all authorities found established; who indeed are not to be actively obeyed when they command what religion forbids, but who are not to be resisted, far less rebelled against, for any amount of wrong to ourselves. and while, in the morality of the best pagan nations, duty to the state holds even a disproportionate place, infringing on the just liberty of the individual; in purely christian ethics, that grand department of duty is scarcely noticed or acknowledged. it is in the koran, not the new testament, that we read the maxim--"a ruler who appoints any man to an office, when there is in his dominions another man better qualified for it, sins against god and against the state." what little recognition the idea of obligation to the public obtains in modern morality, is derived from greek and roman sources, not from christian; as, even in the morality of private life, whatever exists of magnanimity, high-mindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honour, is derived from the purely human, not the religious part of our education, and never could have grown out of a standard of ethics in which the only worth, professedly recognised, is that of obedience. i am as far as any one from pretending that these defects are necessarily inherent in the christian ethics, in every manner in which it can be conceived, or that the many requisites of a complete moral doctrine which it does not contain, do not admit of being reconciled with it. far less would i insinuate this of the doctrines and precepts of christ himself. i believe that the sayings of christ are all, that i can see any evidence of their having been intended to be; that they are irreconcilable with nothing which a comprehensive morality requires; that everything which is excellent in ethics may be brought within them, with no greater violence to their language than has been done to it by all who have attempted to deduce from them any practical system of conduct whatever. but it is quite consistent with this, to believe that they contain, and were meant to contain, only a part of the truth; that many essential elements of the highest morality are among the things which are not provided for, nor intended to be provided for, in the recorded deliverances of the founder of christianity, and which have been entirely thrown aside in the system of ethics erected on the basis of those deliverances by the christian church. and this being so, i think it a great error to persist in attempting to find in the christian doctrine that complete rule for our guidance, which its author intended it to sanction and enforce, but only partially to provide. i believe, too, that this narrow theory is becoming a grave practical evil, detracting greatly from the value of the moral training and instruction, which so many well-meaning persons are now at length exerting themselves to promote. i much fear that by attempting to form the mind and feelings on an exclusively religious type, and discarding those secular standards (as for want of a better name they may be called) which heretofore co-existed with and supplemented the christian ethics, receiving some of its spirit, and infusing into it some of theirs, there will result, and is even now resulting, a low, abject, servile type of character, which, submit itself as it may to what it deems the supreme will, is incapable of rising to or sympathising in the conception of supreme goodness. i believe that other ethics than any which can be evolved from exclusively christian sources, must exist side by side with christian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of mankind; and that the christian system is no exception to the rule, that in an imperfect state of the human mind, the interests of truth require a diversity of opinions. it is not necessary that in ceasing to ignore the moral truths not contained in christianity, men should ignore any of those which it does contain. such prejudice, or oversight, when it occurs, is altogether an evil; but it is one from which we cannot hope to be always exempt, and must be regarded as the price paid for an inestimable good. the exclusive pretension made by a part of the truth to be the whole, must and ought to be protested against, and if a reactionary impulse should make the protestors unjust in their turn, this one-sidedness, like the other, may be lamented, but must be tolerated. if christians would teach infidels to be just to christianity, they should themselves be just to infidelity. it can do truth no service to blink the fact, known to all who have the most ordinary acquaintance with literary history, that a large portion of the noblest and most valuable moral teaching has been the work, not only of men who did not know, but of men who knew and rejected, the christian faith. i do not pretend that the most unlimited use of the freedom of enunciating all possible opinions would put an end to the evils of religious or philosophical sectarianism. every truth which men of narrow capacity are in earnest about, is sure to be asserted, inculcated, and in many ways even acted on, as if no other truth existed in the world, or at all events none that could limit or qualify the first. i acknowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by the freest discussion, but is often heightened and exacerbated thereby; the truth which ought to have been, but was not, seen, being rejected all the more violently because proclaimed by persons regarded as opponents. but it is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. not the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil: there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood. and since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial faculty which can sit in intelligent judgment between two sides of a question, of which only one is represented by an advocate before it, truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to. we have now recognised the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds; which we will now briefly recapitulate. first, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. to deny this is to assume our own infallibility. secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions, that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. and not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience. before quitting the subject of freedom of opinion, it is fit to take some notice of those who say, that the free expression of all opinions should be permitted, on condition that the manner be temperate, and do not pass the bounds of fair discussion. much might be said on the impossibility of fixing where these supposed bounds are to be placed; for if the test be offence to those whose opinion is attacked, i think experience testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is telling and powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent. but this, though an important consideration in a practical point of view, merges in a more fundamental objection. undoubtedly the manner of asserting an opinion, even though it be a true one, may be very objectionable, and may justly incur severe censure. but the principal offences of the kind are such as it is mostly impossible, unless by accidental self-betrayal, to bring home to conviction. the gravest of them is, to argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion. but all this, even to the most aggravated degree, is so continually done in perfect good faith, by persons who are not considered, and in many other respects may not deserve to be considered, ignorant or incompetent, that it is rarely possible on adequate grounds conscientiously to stamp the misrepresentation as morally culpable; and still less could law presume to interfere with this kind of controversial misconduct. with regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like, the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they may not only be used without general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation. yet whatever mischief arises from their use, is greatest when they are employed against the comparatively defenceless; and whatever unfair advantage can be derived by any opinion from this mode of asserting it, accrues almost exclusively to received opinions. the worst offence of this kind which can be committed by a polemic, is to stigmatise those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral men. to calumny of this sort, those who hold any unpopular opinion are peculiarly exposed, because they are in general few and uninfluential, and nobody but themselves feel much interest in seeing justice done them; but this weapon is, from the nature of the case, denied to those who attack a prevailing opinion: they can neither use it with safety to themselves, nor, if they could, would it do anything but recoil on their own cause. in general, opinions contrary to those commonly received can only obtain a hearing by studied moderation of language, and the most cautious avoidance of unnecessary offence, from which they hardly ever deviate even in a slight degree without losing ground: while unmeasured vituperation employed on the side of the prevailing opinion, really does deter people from professing contrary opinions, and from listening to those who profess them. for the interest, therefore, of truth and justice, it is far more important to restrain this employment of vituperative language than the other; and, for example, if it were necessary to choose, there would be much more need to discourage offensive attacks on infidelity, than on religion. it is, however, obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining either, while opinion ought, in every instance, to determine its verdict by the circumstances of the individual case; condemning every one, on whichever side of the argument he places himself, in whose mode of advocacy either want of candour, or malignity, bigotry, or intolerance of feeling manifest themselves; but not inferring these vices from the side which a person takes, though it be the contrary side of the question to our own: and giving merited honour to every one, whatever opinion he may hold, who has calmness to see and honesty to state what his opponents and their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing to their discredit, keeping nothing back which tells, or can be supposed to tell, in their favour. this is the real morality of public discussion; and if often violated, i am happy to think that there are many controversialists who to a great extent observe it, and a still greater number who conscientiously strive towards it. footnotes: [6] these words had scarcely been written, when, as if to give them an emphatic contradiction, occurred the government press prosecutions of 1858. that ill-judged interference with the liberty of public discussion has not, however, induced me to alter a single word in the text, nor has it at all weakened my conviction that, moments of panic excepted, the era of pains and penalties for political discussion has, in our own country, passed away. for, in the first place, the prosecutions were not persisted in; and, in the second, they were never, properly speaking, political prosecutions. the offence charged was not that of criticising institutions, or the acts or persons of rulers, but of circulating what was deemed an immoral doctrine, the lawfulness of tyrannicide. if the arguments of the present chapter are of any validity, there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered. it would, therefore, be irrelevant and out of place to examine here, whether the doctrine of tyrannicide deserves that title. i shall content myself with saying, that the subject has been at all times one of the open questions of morals; that the act of a private citizen in striking down a criminal, who, by raising himself above the law, has placed himself beyond the reach of legal punishment or control, has been accounted by whole nations, and by some of the best and wisest of men, not a crime, but an act of exalted virtue; and that, right or wrong, it is not of the nature of assassination, but of civil war. as such, i hold that the instigation to it, in a specific case, may be a proper subject of punishment, but only if an overt act has followed, and at least a probable connection can be established between the act and the instigation. even then, it is not a foreign government, but the very government assailed, which alone, in the exercise of self-defence, can legitimately punish attacks directed against its own existence. [7] thomas pooley, bodmin assizes, july 31, 1857. in december following, he received a free pardon from the crown. [8] george jacob holyoake, august 17, 1857; edward truelove, july, 1857. [9] baron de gleichen, marlborough-street police court, august 4, 1857. [10] ample warning may be drawn from the large infusion of the passions of a persecutor, which mingled with the general display of the worst parts of our national character on the occasion of the sepoy insurrection. the ravings of fanatics or charlatans from the pulpit may be unworthy of notice; but the heads of the evangelical party have announced as their principle, for the government of hindoos and mahomedans, that no schools be supported by public money in which the bible is not taught, and by necessary consequence that no public employment be given to any but real or pretended christians. an under-secretary of state, in a speech delivered to his constituents on the 12th of november, 1857, is reported to have said: "toleration of their faith" (the faith of a hundred millions of british subjects), "the superstition which they called religion, by the british government, had had the effect of retarding the ascendency of the british name, and preventing the salutary growth of christianity.... toleration was the great corner-stone of the religious liberties of this country; but do not let them abuse that precious word toleration. as he understood it, it meant the complete liberty to all, freedom of worship, _among christians, who worshipped upon the same foundation_. it meant toleration of all sects and denominations of _christians who believed in the one mediation_." i desire to call attention to the fact, that a man who has been deemed fit to fill a high office in the government of this country, under a liberal ministry, maintains the doctrine that all who do not believe in the divinity of christ are beyond the pale of toleration. who, after this imbecile display, can indulge the illusion that religious persecution has passed away, never to return? chapter iii. of individuality, as one of the elements of well-being. such being the reasons which make it imperative that human beings should be free to form opinions, and to express their opinions without reserve; and such the baneful consequences to the intellectual, and through that to the moral nature of man, unless this liberty is either conceded, or asserted in spite of prohibition; let us next examine whether the same reasons do not require that men should be free to act upon their opinions--to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance, either physical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own risk and peril. this last proviso is of course indispensable. no one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. on the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. an opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard. acts, of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of mankind. the liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people. but if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost. that mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most part, are only half-truths; that unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more capable than at present of recognising all sides of the truth, are principles applicable to men's modes of action, not less than to their opinions. as it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them. it is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. where, not the person's own character, but the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress. in maintaining this principle, the greatest difficulty to be encountered does not lie in the appreciation of means towards an acknowledged end, but in the indifference of persons in general to the end itself. if it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being; that it is not only a co-ordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilisation, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things; there would be no danger that liberty should be under-valued, and the adjustment of the boundaries between it and social control would present no extraordinary difficulty. but the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognised by the common modes of thinking, as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its own account. the majority, being satisfied with the ways of mankind as they now are (for it is they who make them what they are), cannot comprehend why those ways should not be good enough for everybody; and what is more, spontaneity forms no part of the ideal of the majority of moral and social reformers, but is rather looked on with jealousy, as a troublesome and perhaps rebellious obstruction to the general acceptance of what these reformers, in their own judgment, think would be best for mankind. few persons, out of germany, even comprehend the meaning of the doctrine which wilhelm von humboldt, so eminent both as a _savant_ and as a politician, made the text of a treatise--that "the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole;" that, therefore, the object "towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which especially those who design to influence their fellow-men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development;" that for this there are two requisites, "freedom, and a variety of situations;" and that from the union of these arise "individual vigour and manifold diversity," which combine themselves in "originality."[11] little, however, as people are accustomed to a doctrine like that of von humboldt, and surprising as it may be to them to find so high a value attached to individuality, the question, one must nevertheless think, can only be one of degree. no one's idea of excellence in conduct is that people should do absolutely nothing but copy one another. no one would assert that people ought not to put into their mode of life, and into the conduct of their concerns, any impress whatever of their own judgment, or of their own individual character. on the other hand, it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they came into it; as if experience had as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct, is preferable to another. nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth, as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of human experience. but it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. it is for him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances and character. the traditions and customs of other people are, to a certain extent, evidence of what their experience has taught _them_; presumptive evidence, and as such, have a claim to his deference: but, in the first place, their experience may be too narrow; or they may not have interpreted it rightly. secondly, their interpretation of experience may be correct, but unsuitable to him. customs are made for customary circumstances, and customary characters: and his circumstances or his character may be uncustomary. thirdly, though the customs be both good as customs, and suitable to him, yet to conform to custom, merely _as_ custom, does not educate or develop in him any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being. the human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice. he who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice. he gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. the mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used. the faculties are called into no exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it, no more than by believing a thing only because others believe it. if the grounds of an opinion are not conclusive to the person's own reason, his reason cannot be strengthened, but is likely to be weakened by his adopting it: and if the inducements to an act are not such as are consentaneous to his own feelings and character (where affection, or the rights of others, are not concerned), it is so much done towards rendering his feelings and character inert and torpid, instead of active and energetic. he who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. he who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. he must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. and these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one. it is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm's way, without any of these things. but what will be his comparative worth as a human being? it really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it. among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself. supposing it were possible to get houses built, corn grown, battles fought, causes tried, and even churches erected and prayers said, by machinery--by automatons in human form--it would be a considerable loss to exchange for these automatons even the men and women who at present inhabit the more civilised parts of the world, and who assuredly are but starved specimens of what nature can and will produce. human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing. it will probably be conceded that it is desirable people should exercise their understandings, and that an intelligent following of custom, or even occasionally an intelligent deviation from custom, is better than a blind and simply mechanical adhesion to it. to a certain extent it is admitted, that our understanding should be our own: but there is not the same willingness to admit that our desires and impulses should be our own likewise; or that to possess impulses of our own, and of any strength, is anything but a peril and a snare. yet desires and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being, as beliefs and restraints: and strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced; when one set of aims and inclinations is developed into strength, while others, which ought to co-exist with them, remain weak and inactive. it is not because men's desires are strong that they act ill; it is because their consciences are weak. there is no natural connection between strong impulses and a weak conscience. the natural connection is the other way. to say that one person's desires and feelings are stronger and more various than those of another, is merely to say that he has more of the raw material of human nature, and is therefore capable, perhaps of more evil, but certainly of more good. strong impulses are but another name for energy. energy may be turned to bad uses; but more good may always be made of an energetic nature, than of an indolent and impassive one. those who have most natural feeling, are always those whose cultivated feelings may be made the strongest. the same strong susceptibilities which make the personal impulses vivid and powerful, are also the source from whence are generated the most passionate love of virtue, and the sternest self-control. it is through the cultivation of these, that society both does its duty and protects its interests: not by rejecting the stuff of which heroes are made, because it knows not how to make them. a person whose desires and impulses are his own--are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture--is said to have a character. one whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character. if, in addition to being his own, his impulses are strong, and are under the government of a strong will, he has an energetic character. whoever thinks that individuality of desires and impulses should not be encouraged to unfold itself, must maintain that society has no need of strong natures--is not the better for containing many persons who have much character--and that a high general average of energy is not desirable. in some early states of society, these forces might be, and were, too much ahead of the power which society then possessed of disciplining and controlling them. there has been a time when the element of spontaneity and individuality was in excess, and the social principle had a hard struggle with it. the difficulty then was, to induce men of strong bodies or minds to pay obedience to any rules which required them to control their impulses. to overcome this difficulty, law and discipline, like the popes struggling against the emperors, asserted a power over the whole man, claiming to control all his life in order to control his character--which society had not found any other sufficient means of binding. but society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and preferences. things are vastly changed, since the passions of those who were strong by station or by personal endowment were in a state of habitual rebellion against laws and ordinances, and required to be rigorously chained up to enable the persons within their reach to enjoy any particle of security. in our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, every one lives as under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship. not only in what concerns others, but in what concerns only themselves, the individual, or the family, do not ask themselves--what do i prefer? or, what would suit my character and disposition? or, what would allow the best and highest in me to have fair-play, and enable it to grow and thrive? they ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? what is usually done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances? or (worse still) what is usually done by persons of a station and circumstances superior to mine? i do not mean that they choose what is customary, in preference to what suits their own inclination. it does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is customary. thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke: even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; they live in crowds; they exercise choice only among things commonly done: peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally with crimes: until by dint of not following their own nature, they have no nature to follow: their human capacities are withered and starved: they become incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth, or properly their own. now is this, or is it not, the desirable condition of human nature? it is so, on the calvinistic theory. according to that, the one great offence of man is self-will. all the good of which humanity is capable, is comprised in obedience. you have no choice; thus you must do, and no otherwise: "whatever is not a duty, is a sin." human nature being radically corrupt, there is no redemption for any one until human nature is killed within him. to one holding this theory of life, crushing out any of the human faculties, capacities, and susceptibilities, is no evil: man needs no capacity, but that of surrendering himself to the will of god: and if he uses any of his faculties for any other purpose but to do that supposed will more effectually, he is better without them. that is the theory of calvinism; and it is held, in a mitigated form, by many who do not consider themselves calvinists; the mitigation consisting in giving a less ascetic interpretation to the alleged will of god; asserting it to be his will that mankind should gratify some of their inclinations; of course not in the manner they themselves prefer, but in the way of obedience, that is, in a way prescribed to them by authority; and, therefore, by the necessary conditions of the case, the same for all. in some such insidious form there is at present a strong tendency to this narrow theory of life, and to the pinched and hidebound type of human character which it patronises. many persons, no doubt, sincerely think that human beings thus cramped and dwarfed, are as their maker designed them to be; just as many have thought that trees are a much finer thing when clipped into pollards, or cut out into figures of animals, than as nature made them. but if it be any part of religion to believe that man was made by a good being, it is more consistent with that faith to believe, that this being gave all human faculties that they might be cultivated and unfolded, not rooted out and consumed, and that he takes delight in every nearer approach made by his creatures to the ideal conception embodied in them, every increase in any of their capabilities of comprehension, of action, or of enjoyment. there is a different type of human excellence from the calvinistic; a conception of humanity as having its nature bestowed on it for other purposes than merely to be abnegated. "pagan self-assertion" is one of the elements of human worth, as well as "christian self-denial."[12] there is a greek ideal of self-development, which the platonic and christian ideal of self-government blends with, but does not supersede. it may be better to be a john knox than an alcibiades, but it is better to be a pericles than either; nor would a pericles, if we had one in these days, be without anything good which belonged to john knox. it is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. in proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. there is a greater fulness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them. as much compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with; but for this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human development. the means of development which the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the expense of the development of other people. and even to himself there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part. to be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object. but to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by their mere displeasure, develops nothing valuable, except such force of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint. if acquiesced in, it dulls and blunts the whole nature. to give any fair-play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives. in proportion as this latitude has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to posterity. even despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long as individuality exists under it; and whatever crushes individuality is despotism, by whatever name it may be called, and whether it professes to be enforcing the will of god or the injunctions of men. having said that individuality is the same thing with development, and that it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings, i might here close the argument: for what more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? or what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents this? doubtless, however, these considerations will not suffice to convince those who most need convincing; and it is necessary further to show, that these developed human beings are of some use to the undeveloped--to point out to those who do not desire liberty, and would not avail themselves of it, that they may be in some intelligible manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use of it without hindrance. in the first place, then, i would suggest that they might possibly learn something from them. it will not be denied by anybody, that originality is a valuable element in human affairs. there is always need of persons not only to discover new truths, and point out when what were once truths are true no longer, but also to commence new practices, and set the example of more enlightened conduct, and better taste and sense in human life. this cannot well be gainsaid by anybody who does not believe that the world has already attained perfection in all its ways and practices. it is true that this benefit is not capable of being rendered by everybody alike: there are but few persons, in comparison with the whole of mankind, whose experiments, if adopted by others, would be likely to be any improvement on established practice. but these few are the salt of the earth; without them, human life would become a stagnant pool. not only is it they who introduce good things which did not before exist; it is they who keep the life in those which already existed. if there were nothing new to be done, would human intellect cease to be necessary? would it be a reason why those who do the old things should forget why they are done, and do them like cattle, not like human beings? there is only too great a tendency in the best beliefs and practices to degenerate into the mechanical; and unless there were a succession of persons whose ever-recurring originality prevents the grounds of those beliefs and practices from becoming merely traditional, such dead matter would not resist the smallest shock from anything really alive, and there would be no reason why civilisation should not die out, as in the byzantine empire. persons of genius, it is true, are, and are always likely to be, a small minority; but in order to have them, it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow. genius can only breathe freely in an _atmosphere_ of freedom. persons of genius are, _ex vi termini_, _more_ individual than any other people--less capable, consequently, of fitting themselves, without hurtful compression, into any of the small number of moulds which society provides in order to save its members the trouble of forming their own character. if from timidity they consent to be forced into one of these moulds, and to let all that part of themselves which cannot expand under the pressure remain unexpanded, society will be little the better for their genius. if they are of a strong character, and break their fetters, they become a mark for the society which has not succeeded in reducing them to commonplace, to point at with solemn warning as "wild," "erratic," and the like; much as if one should complain of the niagara river for not flowing smoothly between its banks like a dutch canal. i insist thus emphatically on the importance of genius, and the necessity of allowing it to unfold itself freely both in thought and in practice, being well aware that no one will deny the position in theory, but knowing also that almost every one, in reality, is totally indifferent to it. people think genius a fine thing if it enables a man to write an exciting poem, or paint a picture. but in its true sense, that of originality in thought and action, though no one says that it is not a thing to be admired, nearly all, at heart, think that they can do very well without it. unhappily this is too natural to be wondered at. originality is the one thing which unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of. they cannot see what it is to do for them: how should they? if they could see what it would do for them, it would not be originality. the first service which originality has to render them, is that of opening their eyes: which being once fully done, they would have a chance of being themselves original. meanwhile, recollecting that nothing was ever yet done which some one was not the first to do, and that all good things which exist are the fruits of originality, let them be modest enough to believe that there is something still left for it to accomplish, and assure themselves that they are more in need of originality, the less they are conscious of the want. in sober truth, whatever homage may be professed, or even paid, to real or supposed mental superiority, the general tendency of things throughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind. in ancient history, in the middle ages, and in a diminishing degree through the long transition from feudality to the present time, the individual was a power in himself; and if he had either great talents or a high social position, he was a considerable power. at present individuals are lost in the crowd. in politics it is almost a triviality to say that public opinion now rules the world. the only power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses. this is as true in the moral and social relations of private life as in public transactions. those whose opinions go by the name of public opinion, are not always the same sort of public: in america they are the whole white population; in england, chiefly the middle class. but they are always a mass, that is to say, collective mediocrity. and what is a still greater novelty, the mass do not now take their opinions from dignitaries in church or state, from ostensible leaders, or from books. their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapers. i am not complaining of all this. i do not assert that anything better is compatible, as a general rule, with the present low state of the human mind. but that does not hinder the government of mediocrity from being mediocre government. no government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the sovereign many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they always have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed one or few. the initiation of all wise or noble things, comes and must come from individuals; generally at first from some one individual. the honour and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes open. i am not countenancing the sort of "hero-worship" which applauds the strong man of genius for forcibly seizing on the government of the world and making it do his bidding in spite of itself. all he can claim is, freedom to point out the way. the power of compelling others into it, is not only inconsistent with the freedom and development of all the rest, but corrupting to the strong man himself. it does seem, however, that when the opinions of masses of merely average men are everywhere become or becoming the dominant power, the counterpoise and corrective to that tendency would be, the more and more pronounced individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences of thought. it is in these circumstances most especially, that exceptional individuals, instead of being deterred, should be encouraged in acting differently from the mass. in other times there was no advantage in their doing so, unless they acted not only differently, but better. in this age the mere example of nonconformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service. precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that people should be eccentric. eccentricity has always abounded when and where strength of character has abounded; and the amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional to the amount of genius, mental vigour, and moral courage which it contained. that so few now dare to be eccentric, marks the chief danger of the time. i have said that it is important to give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in order that it may in time appear which of these are fit to be converted into customs. but independence of action, and disregard of custom are not solely deserving of encouragement for the chance they afford that better modes of action, and customs more worthy of general adoption, may be struck out; nor is it only persons of decided mental superiority who have a just claim to carry on their lives in their own way. there is no reason that all human existences should be constructed on some one, or some small number of patterns. if a person possesses any tolerable amount of common-sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode. human beings are not like sheep; and even sheep are not undistinguishably alike. a man cannot get a coat or a pair of boots to fit him, unless they are either made to his measure, or he has a whole warehouseful to choose from: and is it easier to fit him with a life than with a coat, or are human beings more like one another in their whole physical and spiritual conformation than in the shape of their feet? if it were only that people have diversities of taste, that is reason enough for not attempting to shape them all after one model. but different persons also require different conditions for their spiritual development; and can no more exist healthily in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can in the same physical, atmosphere and climate. the same things which are helps to one person towards the cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances to another. the same mode of life is a healthy excitement to one, keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment in their best order, while to another it is a distracting burthen, which suspends or crushes all internal life. such are the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable. why then should tolerance, as far as the public sentiment is concerned, extend only to tastes and modes of life which extort acquiescence by the multitude of their adherents? nowhere (except in some monastic institutions) is diversity of taste entirely unrecognised; a person may, without blame, either like or dislike rowing, or smoking, or music, or athletic exercises, or chess, or cards, or study, because both those who like each of these things, and those who dislike them, are too numerous to be put down. but the man, and still more the woman, who can be accused either of doing "what nobody does," or of not doing "what everybody does," is the subject of as much depreciatory remark as if he or she had committed some grave moral delinquency. persons require to possess a title, or some other badge of rank, or of the consideration of people of rank, to be able to indulge somewhat in the luxury of doing as they like without detriment to their estimation. to indulge somewhat, i repeat: for whoever allow themselves much of that indulgence, incur the risk of something worse than disparaging speeches--they are in peril of a commission _de lunatico_, and of having their property taken from them and given to their relations.[13] there is one characteristic of the present direction of public opinion, peculiarly calculated to make it intolerant of any marked demonstration of individuality. the general average of mankind are not only moderate in intellect, but also moderate in inclinations: they have no tastes or wishes strong enough to incline them to do anything unusual, and they consequently do not understand those who have, and class all such with the wild and intemperate whom they are accustomed to look down upon. now, in addition to this fact which is general, we have only to suppose that a strong movement has set in towards the improvement of morals, and it is evident what we have to expect. in these days such a movement has set in; much has actually been effected in the way of increased regularity of conduct, and discouragement of excesses; and there is a philanthropic spirit abroad, for the exercise of which there is no more inviting field than the moral and prudential improvement of our fellow-creatures. these tendencies of the times cause the public to be more disposed than at most former periods to prescribe general rules of conduct, and endeavour to make every one conform to the approved standard. and that standard, express or tacit, is to desire nothing strongly. its ideal of character is to be without any marked character; to maim by compression, like a chinese lady's foot, every part of human nature which stands out prominently, and tends to make the person markedly dissimilar in outline to commonplace humanity. as is usually the case with ideals which exclude one-half of what is desirable, the present standard of approbation produces only an inferior imitation of the other half. instead of great energies guided by vigorous reason, and strong feelings strongly controlled by a conscientious will, its result is weak feelings and weak energies, which therefore can be kept in outward conformity to rule without any strength either of will or of reason. already energetic characters on any large scale are becoming merely traditional. there is now scarcely any outlet for energy in this country except business. the energy expended in that may still be regarded as considerable. what little is left from that employment, is expended on some hobby; which may be a useful, even a philanthropic hobby, but is always some one thing, and generally a thing of small dimensions. the greatness of england is now all collective: individually small, we only appear capable of anything great by our habit of combining; and with this our moral and religious philanthropists are perfectly contented. but it was men of another stamp than this that made england what it has been; and men of another stamp will be needed to prevent its decline. the despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement. the spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and temporarily with the opponents of improvement; but the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals. the progressive principle, however, in either shape, whether as the love of liberty or of improvement, is antagonistic to the sway of custom, involving at least emancipation from that yoke; and the contest between the two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind. the greater part of the world has, properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of custom is complete. this is the case over the whole east. custom is there, in all things, the final appeal; justice and right mean conformity to custom; the argument of custom no one, unless some tyrant intoxicated with power, thinks of resisting. and we see the result. those nations must once have had originality; they did not start out of the ground populous, lettered, and versed in many of the arts of life; they made themselves all this, and were then the greatest and most powerful nations in the world. what are they now? the subjects or dependants of tribes whose forefathers wandered in the forests when theirs had magnificent palaces and gorgeous temples, but over whom custom exercised only a divided rule with liberty and progress. a people, it appears, may be progressive for a certain length of time, and then stop: when does it stop? when it ceases to possess individuality. if a similar change should befall the nations of europe, it will not be in exactly the same shape: the despotism of custom with which these nations are threatened is not precisely stationariness. it proscribes singularity, but it does not preclude change, provided all change together. we have discarded the fixed costumes of our forefathers; every one must still dress like other people, but the fashion may change once or twice a year. we thus take care that when there is change, it shall be for change's sake, and not from any idea of beauty or convenience; for the same idea of beauty or convenience would not strike all the world at the same moment, and be simultaneously thrown aside by all at another moment. but we are progressive as well as changeable: we continually make new inventions in mechanical things, and keep them until they are again superseded by better; we are eager for improvement in politics, in education, even in morals, though in this last our idea of improvement chiefly consists in persuading or forcing other people to be as good as ourselves. it is not progress that we object to; on the contrary, we flatter ourselves that we are the most progressive people who ever lived. it is individuality that we war against: we should think we had done wonders if we had made ourselves all alike; forgetting that the unlikeness of one person to another is generally the first thing which draws the attention of either to the imperfection of his own type, and the superiority of another, or the possibility, by combining the advantages of both, of producing something better than either. we have a warning example in china--a nation of much talent, and, in some respects, even wisdom, owing to the rare good fortune of having been provided at an early period with a particularly good set of customs, the work, in some measure, of men to whom even the most enlightened european must accord, under certain limitations, the title of sages and philosophers. they are remarkable, too, in the excellence of their apparatus for impressing, as far as possible, the best wisdom they possess upon every mind in the community, and securing that those who have appropriated most of it shall occupy the posts of honour and power. surely the people who did this have discovered the secret of human progressiveness, and must have kept themselves steadily at the head of the movement of the world. on the contrary, they have become stationary--have remained so for thousands of years; and if they are ever to be farther improved, it must be by foreigners. they have succeeded beyond all hope in what english philanthropists are so industriously working at--in making a people all alike, all governing their thoughts and conduct by the same maxims and rules; and these are the fruits. the modern _régime_ of public opinion is, in an unorganised form, what the chinese educational and political systems are in an organised; and unless individuality shall be able successfully to assert itself against this yoke, europe, notwithstanding its noble antecedents and its professed christianity, will tend to become another china. what is it that has hitherto preserved europe from this lot? what has made the european family of nations an improving, instead of a stationary portion of mankind? not any superior excellence in them, which, when it exists, exists as the effect, not as the cause; but their remarkable diversity of character and culture. individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another: they have struck out a great variety of paths, each leading to something valuable; and although at every period those who travelled in different paths have been intolerant of one another, and each would have thought it an excellent thing if all the rest could have been compelled to travel his road, their attempts to thwart each other's development have rarely had any permanent success, and each has in time endured to receive the good which the others have offered. europe is, in my judgment, wholly indebted to this plurality of paths for its progressive and many-sided development. but it already begins to possess this benefit in a considerably less degree. it is decidedly advancing towards the chinese ideal of making all people alike. m. de tocqueville, in his last important work, remarks how much more the frenchmen of the present day resemble one another, than did those even of the last generation. the same remark might be made of englishmen in a far greater degree. in a passage already quoted from wilhelm von humboldt, he points out two things as necessary conditions of human development, because necessary to render people unlike one another; namely, freedom, and variety of situations. the second of these two conditions is in this country every day diminishing. the circumstances which surround different classes and individuals, and shape their characters, are daily becoming more assimilated. formerly, different ranks, different neighbourhoods, different trades and professions, lived in what might be called different worlds; at present, to a great degree in the same. comparatively speaking, they now read the same things, listen to the same things, see the same things, go to the same places, have their hopes and fears directed to the same objects, have the same rights and liberties, and the same means of asserting them. great as are the differences of position which remain, they are nothing to those which have ceased. and the assimilation is still proceeding. all the political changes of the age promote it, since they all tend to raise the low and to lower the high. every extension of education promotes it, because education brings people under common influences, and gives them access to the general stock of facts and sentiments. improvements in the means of communication promote it, by bringing the inhabitants of distant places into personal contact, and keeping up a rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and another. the increase of commerce and manufactures promotes it, by diffusing more widely the advantages of easy circumstances, and opening all objects of ambition, even the highest, to general competition, whereby the desire of rising becomes no longer the character of a particular class, but of all classes. a more powerful agency than even all these, in bringing about a general similarity among mankind, is the complete establishment, in this and other free countries, of the ascendency of public opinion in the state. as the various social eminences which enabled persons entrenched on them to disregard the opinion of the multitude, gradually become levelled; as the very idea of resisting the will of the public, when it is positively known that they have a will, disappears more and more from the minds of practical politicians; there ceases to be any social support for non-conformity--any substantive power in society, which, itself opposed to the ascendency of numbers, is interested in taking under its protection opinions and tendencies at variance with those of the public. the combination of all these causes forms so great a mass of influences hostile to individuality, that it is not easy to see how it can stand its ground. it will do so with increasing difficulty, unless the intelligent part of the public can be made to feel its value--to see that it is good there should be differences, even though not for the better, even though, as it may appear to them, some should be for the worse. if the claims of individuality are ever to be asserted, the time is now, while much is still wanting to complete the enforced assimilation. it is only in the earlier stages that any stand can be successfully made against the encroachment. the demand that all other people shall resemble ourselves, grows by what it feeds on. if resistance waits till life is reduced _nearly_ to one uniform type, all deviations from that type will come to be considered impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it. footnotes: [11] _the sphere and duties of government_, from the german of baron wilhelm von humboldt, pp. 11-13. [12] sterling's _essays_. [13] there is something both contemptible and frightful in the sort of evidence on which, of late years, any person can be judicially declared unfit for the management of his affairs; and after his death, his disposal of his property can be set aside, if there is enough of it to pay the expenses of litigation--which are charged on the property itself. all the minute details of his daily life are pried into, and whatever is found which, seen through the medium of the perceiving and describing faculties of the lowest of the low, bears an appearance unlike absolute commonplace, is laid before the jury as evidence of insanity, and often with success; the jurors being little, if at all, less vulgar and ignorant than the witnesses; while the judges, with that extraordinary want of knowledge of human nature and life which continually astonishes us in english lawyers, often help to mislead them. these trials speak volumes as to the state of feeling and opinion among the vulgar with regard to human liberty. so far from setting any value on individuality--so far from respecting the rights of each individual to act, in things indifferent, as seems good to his own judgment and inclinations, judges and juries cannot even conceive that a person in a state of sanity can desire such freedom. in former days, when it was proposed to burn atheists, charitable people used to suggest putting them in a madhouse instead: it would be nothing surprising nowadays were we to see this done, and the doers applauding themselves, because, instead of persecuting for religion, they had adopted so humane and christian a mode of treating these unfortunates, not without a silent satisfaction at their having thereby obtained their deserts. chapter iv. of the limits to the authority of society over the individual. what, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself? where does the authority of society begin? how much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society? each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more particularly concerns it. to individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests society. though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. this conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person's bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation. these conditions society is justified in enforcing, at all costs to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment. nor is this all that society may do. the acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of their constituted rights. the offender may then be justly punished by opinion though not by law. as soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. but there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding). in all such cases there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences. it would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine, to suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other's conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others. but disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their good, than whips and scourges, either of the literal or the metaphorical sort. i am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues; they are only second in importance, if even second, to the social. it is equally the business of education to cultivate both. but even education works by conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion, and it is by the former only that, when the period of education is past, the self-regarding virtues should be inculcated. human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. they should be for ever stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and contemplations. but neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it. he is the person most interested in his own well-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases of strong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has; the interest which society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and altogether indirect: while, with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else. the interference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what only regards himself, must be grounded on general presumptions; which may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from without. in this department, therefore, of human affairs, individuality has its proper field of action. in the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect; but in each person's own concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise. considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others; but he himself is the final judge. all errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning, are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good. i do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by others, ought not to be in any way affected by his self-regarding qualities or deficiencies. this is neither possible nor desirable. if he is eminent in any of the qualities which conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper object of admiration. he is so much the nearer to the ideal perfection of human nature. if he is grossly deficient in those qualities, a sentiment the opposite of admiration will follow. there is a degree of folly, and a degree of what may be called (though the phrase is not unobjectionable) lowness or depravation of taste, which, though it cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in extreme cases, even of contempt: a person could not have the opposite qualities in due strength without entertaining these feelings. though doing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order: and since this judgment and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it beforehand, as of any other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself. it would be well, indeed, if this good office were much more freely rendered than the common notions of politeness at present permit, and if one person could honestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault, without being considered unmannerly or presuming. we have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. we are not bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us. we have a right, and it may be our duty, to caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. we may give others a preference over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his improvement. in these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which directly concern only himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment. a person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit--who cannot live within moderate means--who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences--who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect--must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favourable sentiments; but of this he has no right to complain, unless he has merited their favour by special excellence in his social relations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, which is not affected by his demerits towards himself. what i contend for is, that the inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavourable judgment of others, are the only ones to which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of his conduct and character which concerns his own good, but which does not affect the interests of others in their relations with him. acts injurious to others require a totally different treatment. encroachment on their rights; infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his own rights; falsehood or duplicity in dealing with them; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them; even selfish abstinence from defending them against injury--these are fit objects of moral reprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment. and not only these acts, but the dispositions which lead to them, are properly immoral, and fit subjects of disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence. cruelty of disposition; malice and ill-nature; that most anti-social and odious of all passions, envy; dissimulation and insincerity; irascibility on insufficient cause, and resentment disproportioned to the provocation; the love of domineering over others; the desire to engross more than one's share of advantages (the [greek: pleonexia] of the greeks); the pride which derives gratification from the abasement of others; the egotism which thinks self and its concerns more important than everything else, and decides all doubtful questions in its own favour;--these are moral vices, and constitute a bad and odious moral character: unlike the self-regarding faults previously mentioned, which are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be carried, do not constitute wickedness. they may be proofs of any amount of folly, or want of personal dignity and self-respect; but they are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a breach of duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have care for himself. what are called duties to ourselves are not socially obligatory, unless circumstances render them at the same time duties to others. the term duty to oneself, when it means anything more than prudence, means self-respect or self-development; and for none of these is any one accountable to his fellow-creatures, because for none of them is it for the good of mankind that he be held accountable to them. the distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may rightly incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity, and the reprobation which is due to him for an offence against the rights of others, is not a merely nominal distinction. it makes a vast difference both in our feelings and in our conduct towards him, whether he displeases us in things in which we think we have a right to control him, or in things in which we know that we have not. if he displeases us, we may express our distaste, and we may stand aloof from a person as well as from a thing that displeases us; but we shall not therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable. we shall reflect that he already bears, or will bear, the whole penalty of his error; if he spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire to spoil it still further: instead of wishing to punish him, we shall rather endeavour to alleviate his punishment, by showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to bring upon him. he may be to us an object of pity, perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or resentment; we shall not treat him like an enemy of society: the worst we shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself, if we do not interfere benevolently by showing interest or concern for him. it is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection of his fellow-creatures, individually or collectively. the evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on others; and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe. in the one case, he is an offender at our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in judgment on him, but, in one shape or another, to execute our own sentence: in the other case, it is not our part to inflict any suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow from our using the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs, which we allow to him in his. the distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life which concerns only himself, and that which concerns others, many persons will refuse to admit. how (it may be asked) can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other members? no person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them. if he injures his property, he does harm to those who directly or indirectly derived support from it, and usually diminishes, by a greater or less amount, the general resources of the community. if he deteriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only brings evil upon all who depended on him for any portion of their happiness, but disqualifies himself for rendering the services which he owes to his fellow-creatures generally; perhaps becomes a burthen on their affection or benevolence; and if such conduct were very frequent, hardly any offence that is committed would detract more from the general sum of good. finally, if by his vices or follies a person does no direct harm to others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious by his example; and ought to be compelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom the sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead. and even (it will be added) if the consequences of misconduct could be confined to the vicious or thoughtless individual, ought society to abandon to their own guidance those who are manifestly unfit for it? if protection against themselves is confessedly due to children and persons under age, is not society equally bound to afford it to persons of mature years who are equally incapable of self-government? if gambling, or drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, are as injurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance to improvement, as many or most of the acts prohibited by law, why (it may be asked) should not law, so far as is consistent with practicability and social convenience, endeavour to repress these also? and as a supplement to the unavoidable imperfections of law, ought not opinion at least to organise a powerful police against these vices, and visit rigidly with social penalties those who are known to practise them? there is no question here (it may be said) about restricting individuality, or impeding the trial of new and original experiments in living. the only things it is sought to prevent are things which have been tried and condemned from the beginning of the world until now; things which experience has shown not to be useful or suitable to any person's individuality. there must be some length of time and amount of experience, after which a moral or prudential truth may be regarded as established: and it is merely desired to prevent generation after generation from falling over the same precipice which has been fatal to their predecessors. i fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself, may seriously affect, both through their sympathies and their interests, those nearly connected with him, and in a minor degree, society at large. when, by conduct of this sort, a person is led to violate a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons, the case is taken out of the self-regarding class, and becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term. if, for example, a man, through intemperance or extravagance, becomes unable to pay his debts, or, having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family, becomes from the same cause incapable of supporting or educating them, he is deservedly reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it is for the breach of duty to his family or creditors, not for the extravagance. if the resources which ought to have been devoted to them, had been diverted from them for the most prudent investment, the moral culpability would have been the same. george barnwell murdered his uncle to get money for his mistress, but if he had done it to set himself up in business, he would equally have been hanged. again, in the frequent case of a man who causes grief to his family by addiction to bad habits, he deserves reproach for his unkindness or ingratitude; but so he may for cultivating habits not in themselves vicious, if they are painful to those with whom he passes his life, or who from personal ties are dependent on him for their comfort. whoever fails in the consideration generally due to the interests and feelings of others, not being compelled by some more imperative duty, or justified by allowable self-preference, is a subject of moral disapprobation for that failure, but not for the cause of it, nor for the errors, merely personal to himself, which may have remotely led to it. in like manner, when a person disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from the performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he is guilty of a social offence. no person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty. whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law. but with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called, constructive injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom. if grown persons are to be punished for not taking proper care of themselves, i would rather it were for their own sake, than under pretence of preventing them from impairing their capacity of rendering to society benefits which society does not pretend it has a right to exact. but i cannot consent to argue the point as if society had no means of bringing its weaker members up to its ordinary standard of rational conduct, except waiting till they do something irrational, and then punishing them, legally or morally, for it. society has had absolute power over them during all the early portion of their existence: it has had the whole period of childhood and nonage in which to try whether it could make them capable of rational conduct in life. the existing generation is master both of the training and the entire circumstances of the generation to come; it cannot indeed make them perfectly wise and good, because it is itself so lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom; and its best efforts are not always, in individual cases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly well able to make the rising generation, as a whole, as good as, and a little better than, itself. if society lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on by rational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the consequences. armed not only with all the powers of education, but with the ascendency which the authority of a received opinion always exercises over the minds who are least fitted to judge for themselves; and aided by the _natural_ penalties which cannot be prevented from falling on those who incur the distaste or the contempt of those who know them; let not society pretend that it needs, besides all this, the power to issue commands and enforce obedience in the personal concerns of individuals, in which, on all principles of justice and policy, the decision ought to rest with those who are to abide the consequences. nor is there anything which tends more to discredit and frustrate the better means of influencing conduct, than a resort to the worse. if there be among those whom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or temperance, any of the material of which vigorous and independent characters are made, they will infallibly rebel against the yoke. no such person will ever feel that others have a right to control him in his concerns, such as they have to prevent him from injuring them in theirs; and it easily comes to be considered a mark of spirit and courage to fly in the face of such usurped authority, and do with ostentation the exact opposite of what it enjoins; as in the fashion of grossness which succeeded, in the time of charles ii., to the fanatical moral intolerance of the puritans. with respect to what is said of the necessity of protecting society from the bad example set to others by the vicious or the self-indulgent; it is true that bad example may have a pernicious effect, especially the example of doing wrong to others with impunity to the wrong-doer. but we are now speaking of conduct which, while it does no wrong to others, is supposed to do great harm to the agent himself: and i do not see how those who believe this, can think otherwise than that the example, on the whole, must be more salutary than hurtful, since, if it displays the misconduct, it displays also the painful or degrading consequences which, if the conduct is justly censured, must be supposed to be in all or most cases attendant on it. but the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place. on questions of social morality, of duty to others, the opinion of the public, that is, of an overruling majority, though often wrong, is likely to be still oftener right; because on such questions they are only required to judge of their own interests; of the manner in which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be practised, would affect themselves. but the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as a law on the minority, on questions of self-regarding conduct, is quite as likely to be wrong as right; for in these cases public opinion means, at the best, some people's opinion of what is good or bad for other people; while very often it does not even mean that; the public, with the most perfect indifference, passing over the pleasure or convenience of those whose conduct they censure, and considering only their own preference. there are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which they have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings; as a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding the religious feelings of others, has been known to retort that they disregard his feelings, by persisting in their abominable worship or creed. but there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it. and a person's taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse. it is easy for any one to imagine an ideal public, which leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in all uncertain matters undisturbed, and only requires them to abstain from modes of conduct which universal experience has condemned. but where has there been seen a public which set any such limit to its censorship? or when does the public trouble itself about universal experience? in its interferences with personal conduct it is seldom thinking of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently from itself; and this standard of judgment, thinly disguised, is held up to mankind as the dictate of religion and philosophy, by nine-tenths of all moralists and speculative writers. these teach that things are right because they are right; because we feel them to be so. they tell us to search in our own minds and hearts for laws of conduct binding on ourselves and on all others. what can the poor public do but apply these instructions, and make their own personal feelings of good and evil, if they are tolerably unanimous in them, obligatory on all the world? the evil here pointed out is not one which exists only in theory; and it may perhaps be expected that i should specify the instances in which the public of this age and country improperly invests its own preferences with the character of moral laws. i am not writing an essay on the aberrations of existing moral feeling. that is too weighty a subject to be discussed parenthetically, and by way of illustration. yet examples are necessary, to show that the principle i maintain is of serious and practical moment, and that i am not endeavouring to erect a barrier against imaginary evils. and it is not difficult to show, by abundant instances, that to extend the bounds of what may be called moral police, until it encroaches on the most unquestionably legitimate liberty of the individual, is one of the most universal of all human propensities. as a first instance, consider the antipathies which men cherish on no better grounds than that persons whose religious opinions are different from theirs, do not practise their religious observances, especially their religious abstinences. to cite a rather trivial example, nothing in the creed or practice of christians does more to envenom the hatred of mahomedans against them, than the fact of their eating pork. there are few acts which christians and europeans regard with more unaffected disgust, than mussulmans regard this particular mode of satisfying hunger. it is, in the first place, an offence against their religion; but this circumstance by no means explains either the degree or the kind of their repugnance; for wine also is forbidden by their religion, and to partake of it is by all mussulmans accounted wrong, but not disgusting. their aversion to the flesh of the "unclean beast" is, on the contrary, of that peculiar character, resembling an instinctive antipathy, which the idea of uncleanness, when once it thoroughly sinks into the feelings, seems always to excite even in those whose personal habits are anything but scrupulously cleanly, and of which the sentiment of religious impurity, so intense in the hindoos, is a remarkable example. suppose now that in a people, of whom the majority were mussulmans, that majority should insist upon not permitting pork to be eaten within the limits of the country. this would be nothing new in mahomedan countries.[14] would it be a legitimate exercise of the moral authority of public opinion? and if not, why not? the practice is really revolting to such a public. they also sincerely think that it is forbidden and abhorred by the deity. neither could the prohibition be censured as religious persecution. it might be religious in its origin, but it would not be persecution for religion, since nobody's religion makes it a duty to eat pork. the only tenable ground of condemnation would be, that with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of individuals the public has no business to interfere. to come somewhat nearer home: the majority of spaniards consider it a gross impiety, offensive in the highest degree to the supreme being, to worship him in any other manner than the roman catholic; and no other public worship is lawful on spanish soil. the people of all southern europe look upon a married clergy as not only irreligious, but unchaste, indecent, gross, disgusting. what do protestants think of these perfectly sincere feelings, and of the attempt to enforce them against non-catholics? yet, if mankind are justified in interfering with each other's liberty in things which do not concern the interests of others, on what principle is it possible consistently to exclude these cases? or who can blame people for desiring to suppress what they regard as a scandal in the sight of god and man? no stronger case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is regarded as a personal immorality, than is made out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those who regard them as impieties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are right, and that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves. the preceding instances may be objected to, although unreasonably, as drawn from contingencies impossible among us: opinion, in this country, not being likely to enforce abstinence from meats, or to interfere with people for worshipping, and for either marrying or not marrying, according to their creed or inclination. the next example, however, shall be taken from an interference with liberty which we have by no means passed all danger of. wherever the puritans have been sufficiently powerful, as in new england, and in great britain at the time of the commonwealth, they have endeavoured, with considerable success, to put down all public, and nearly all private, amusements: especially music, dancing, public games, or other assemblages for purposes of diversion, and the theatre. there are still in this country large bodies of persons by whose notions of morality and religion these recreations are condemned; and those persons belonging chiefly to the middle class, who are the ascendant power in the present social and political condition of the kingdom, it is by no means impossible that persons of these sentiments may at some time or other command a majority in parliament. how will the remaining portion of the community like to have the amusements that shall be permitted to them regulated by the religious and moral sentiments of the stricter calvinists and methodists? would they not, with considerable peremptoriness, desire these intrusively pious members of society to mind their own business? this is precisely what should be said to every government and every public, who have the pretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which they think wrong. but if the principle of the pretension be admitted, no one can reasonably object to its being acted on in the sense of the majority, or other preponderating power in the country; and all persons must be ready to conform to the idea of a christian commonwealth, as understood by the early settlers in new england, if a religious profession similar to theirs should ever succeed in regaining its lost ground, as religions supposed to be declining have so often been known to do. to imagine another contingency, perhaps more likely to be realised than the one last mentioned. there is confessedly a strong tendency in the modern world towards a democratic constitution of society, accompanied or not by popular political institutions. it is affirmed that in the country where this tendency is most completely realised--where both society and the government are most democratic--the united states--the feeling of the majority, to whom any appearance of a more showy or costly style of living than they can hope to rival is disagreeable, operates as a tolerably effectual sumptuary law, and that in many parts of the union it is really difficult for a person possessing a very large income, to find any mode of spending it, which will not incur popular disapprobation. though such statements as these are doubtless much exaggerated as a representation of existing facts, the state of things they describe is not only a conceivable and possible, but a probable result of democratic feeling, combined with the notion that the public has a right to a veto on the manner in which individuals shall spend their incomes. we have only further to suppose a considerable diffusion of socialist opinions, and it may become infamous in the eyes of the majority to possess more property than some very small amount, or any income not earned by manual labour. opinions similar in principle to these, already prevail widely among the artisan class, and weigh oppressively on those who are amenable to the opinion chiefly of that class, namely, its own members. it is known that the bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry, are decidedly of opinion that bad workmen ought to receive the same wages as good, and that no one ought to be allowed, through piecework or otherwise, to earn by superior skill or industry more than others can without it. and they employ a moral police, which occasionally becomes a physical one, to deter skilful workmen from receiving, and employers from giving, a larger remuneration for a more useful service. if the public have any jurisdiction over private concerns, i cannot see that these people are in fault, or that any individual's particular public can be blamed for asserting the same authority over his individual conduct, which the general public asserts over people in general. but, without dwelling upon supposititious cases, there are, in our own day, gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life actually practised, and still greater ones threatened with some expectation of success, and opinions proposed which assert an unlimited right in the public not only to prohibit by law everything which it thinks wrong, but in order to get at what it thinks wrong, to prohibit any number of things which it admits to be innocent. under the name of preventing intemperance, the people of one english colony, and of nearly half the united states, have been interdicted by law from making any use whatever of fermented drinks, except for medical purposes: for prohibition of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to be, prohibition of their use. and though the impracticability of executing the law has caused its repeal in several of the states which had adopted it, including the one from which it derives its name, an attempt has notwithstanding been commenced, and is prosecuted with considerable zeal by many of the professed philanthropists, to agitate for a similar law in this country. the association, or "alliance" as it terms itself, which has been formed for this purpose, has acquired some notoriety through the publicity given to a correspondence between its secretary and one of the very few english public men who hold that a politician's opinions ought to be founded on principles. lord stanley's share in this correspondence is calculated to strengthen the hopes already built on him, by those who know how rare such qualities as are manifested in some of his public appearances, unhappily are among those who figure in political life. the organ of the alliance, who would "deeply deplore the recognition of any principle which could be wrested to justify bigotry and persecution," undertakes to point out the "broad and impassable barrier" which divides such principles from those of the association. "all matters relating to thought, opinion, conscience, appear to me," he says, "to be without the sphere of legislation; all pertaining to social act, habit, relation, subject only to a discretionary power vested in the state itself, and not in the individual, to be within it." no mention is made of a third class, different from either of these, viz. acts and habits which are not social, but individual; although it is to this class, surely, that the act of drinking fermented liquors belongs. selling fermented liquors, however, is trading, and trading is a social act. but the infringement complained of is not on the liberty of the seller, but on that of the buyer and consumer; since the state might just as well forbid him to drink wine, as purposely make it impossible for him to obtain it. the secretary, however, says, "i claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate whenever my social rights are invaded by the social act of another." and now for the definition of these "social rights." "if anything invades my social rights, certainly the traffic in strong drink does. it destroys my primary right of security, by constantly creating and stimulating social disorder. it invades my right of equality, by deriving a profit from the creation of a misery, i am taxed to support. it impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development, by surrounding my path with dangers, and by weakening and demoralising society, from which i have a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse." a theory of "social rights," the like of which probably never before found its way into distinct language--being nothing short of this--that it is the absolute social right of every individual, that every other individual shall act in every respect exactly as he ought; that whosoever fails thereof in the smallest particular, violates my social right, and entitles me to demand from the legislature the removal of the grievance. so monstrous a principle is far more dangerous than any single interference with liberty; there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify; it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them: for the moment an opinion which i consider noxious, passes any one's lips, it invades all the "social rights" attributed to me by the alliance. the doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other's moral, intellectual, and even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to his own standard. another important example of illegitimate interference with the rightful liberty of the individual, not simply threatened, but long since carried into triumphant effect, is sabbatarian legislation. without doubt, abstinence on one day in the week, so far as the exigencies of life permit, from the usual daily occupation, though in no respect religiously binding on any except jews, is a highly beneficial custom. and inasmuch as this custom cannot be observed without a general consent to that effect among the industrious classes, therefore, in so far as some persons by working may impose the same necessity on others, it may be allowable and right that the law should guarantee to each, the observance by others of the custom, by suspending the greater operations of industry on a particular day. but this justification, grounded on the direct interest which others have in each individual's observance of the practice, does not apply to the self-chosen occupations in which a person may think fit to employ his leisure; nor does it hold good, in the smallest degree, for legal restrictions on amusements. it is true that the amusement of some is the day's work of others; but the pleasure, not to say the useful recreation, of many, is worth the labour of a few, provided the occupation is freely chosen, and can be freely resigned. the operatives are perfectly right in thinking that if all worked on sunday, seven days' work would have to be given for six days' wages: but so long as the great mass of employments are suspended, the small number who for the enjoyment of others must still work, obtain a proportional increase of earnings; and they are not obliged to follow those occupations, if they prefer leisure to emolument. if a further remedy is sought, it might be found in the establishment by custom of a holiday on some other day of the week for those particular classes of persons. the only ground, therefore, on which restrictions on sunday amusements can be defended, must be that they are religiously wrong; a motive of legislation which never can be too earnestly protested against. "deorum injuriæ diis curæ." it remains to be proved that society or any of its officers holds a commission from on high to avenge any supposed offence to omnipotence, which is not also a wrong to our fellow-creatures. the notion that it is one man's duty that another should be religious, was the foundation of all the religious persecutions ever perpetrated, and if admitted, would fully justify them. though the feeling which breaks out in the repeated attempts to stop railway travelling on sunday, in the resistance to the opening of museums, and the like, has not the cruelty of the old persecutors, the state of mind indicated by it is fundamentally the same. it is a determination not to tolerate others in doing what is permitted by their religion, because it is not permitted by the persecutor's religion. it is a belief that god not only abominates the act of the misbeliever, but will not hold us guiltless if we leave him unmolested. i cannot refrain from adding to these examples of the little account commonly made of human liberty, the language of downright persecution which breaks out from the press of this country, whenever it feels called on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of mormonism. much might be said on the unexpected and instructive fact, that an alleged new revelation, and a religion founded on it, the product of palpable imposture, not even supported by the _prestige_ of extraordinary qualities in its founder, is believed by hundreds of thousands, and has been made the foundation of a society, in the age of newspapers, railways, and the electric telegraph. what here concerns us is, that this religion, like other and better religions, has its martyrs; that its prophet and founder was, for his teaching, put to death by a mob; that others of its adherents lost their lives by the same lawless violence; that they were forcibly expelled, in a body, from the country in which they first grew up; while, now that they have been chased into a solitary recess in the midst of a desert, many in this country openly declare that it would be right (only that it is not convenient) to send an expedition against them, and compel them by force to conform to the opinions of other people. the article of the mormonite doctrine which is the chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the ordinary restraints of religious tolerance, is its sanction of polygamy; which, though permitted to mahomedans, and hindoos, and chinese, seems to excite unquenchable animosity when practised by persons who speak english, and profess to be a kind of christians. no one has a deeper disapprobation than i have of this mormon institution; both for other reasons, and because, far from being in any way countenanced by the principle of liberty, it is a direct infraction of that principle, being a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the community, and an emancipation of the other from reciprocity of obligation towards them. still, it must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it, and who may be deemed the sufferers by it, as is the case with any other form of the marriage institution; and however surprising this fact may appear, it has its explanation in the common ideas and customs of the world, which teaching women to think marriage the one thing needful, make it intelligible that many a woman should prefer being one of several wives, to not being a wife at all. other countries are not asked to recognise such unions, or release any portion of their inhabitants from their own laws on the score of mormonite opinions. but when the dissentients have conceded to the hostile sentiments of others, far more than could justly be demanded; when they have left the countries to which their doctrines were unacceptable, and established themselves in a remote corner of the earth, which they have been the first to render habitable to human beings; it is difficult to see on what principles but those of tyranny they can be prevented from living there under what laws they please, provided they commit no aggression on other nations, and allow perfect freedom of departure to those who are dissatisfied with their ways. a recent writer, in some respects of considerable merit, proposes (to use his own words), not a crusade, but a _civilizade_, against this polygamous community, to put an end to what seems to him a retrograde step in civilisation. it also appears so to me, but i am not aware that any community has a right to force another to be civilised. so long as the sufferers by the bad law do not invoke assistance from other communities, i cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and require that a condition of things with which all who are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should be put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant, who have no part or concern in it. let them send missionaries, if they please, to preach against it; and let them, by any fair means (of which silencing the teachers is not one), oppose the progress of similar doctrines among their own people. if civilisation has got the better of barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, it is too much to profess to be afraid lest barbarism, after having been fairly got under, should revive and conquer civilisation. a civilisation that can thus succumb to its vanquished enemy, must first have become so degenerate, that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it. if this be so, the sooner such a civilisation receives notice to quit, the better. it can only go on from bad to worse, until destroyed and regenerated (like the western empire) by energetic barbarians. footnote: [14] the case of the bombay parsees is a curious instance in point. when this industrious and enterprising tribe, the descendants of the persian fire-worshippers, flying from their native country before the caliphs, arrived in western india, they were admitted to toleration by the hindoo sovereigns, on condition of not eating beef. when those regions afterwards fell under the dominion of mahomedan conquerors, the parsees obtained from them a continuance of indulgence, on condition of refraining from pork. what was at first obedience to authority became a second nature, and the parsees to this day abstain both from beef and pork. though not required by their religion, the double abstinence has had time to grow into a custom of their tribe; and custom, in the east, is a religion. chapter v. applications. the principles asserted in these pages must be more generally admitted as the basis for discussion of details, before a consistent application of them to all the various departments of government and morals can be attempted with any prospect of advantage. the few observations i propose to make on questions of detail, are designed to illustrate the principles, rather than to follow them out to their consequences. i offer, not so much applications, as specimens of application; which may serve to bring into greater clearness the meaning and limits of the two maxims which together form the entire doctrine of this essay, and to assist the judgment in holding the balance between them, in the cases where it appears doubtful which of them is applicable to the case. the maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishments, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection. in the first place, it must by no means be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference. in many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others, or intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining. such oppositions of interest between individuals often arise from bad social institutions, but are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some would be unavoidable under any institutions. whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive examination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion and their disappointment. but it is, by common admission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences. in other words, society admits no rights, either legal or moral, in the disappointed competitors, to immunity from this kind of suffering; and feels called on to interfere, only when means of success have been employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit--namely, fraud or treachery, and force. again, trade is a social act. whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society: accordingly, it was once held to be the duty of governments, in all cases which were considered of importance, to fix prices, and regulate the processes of manufacture. but it is now recognised, though not till after a long struggle, that both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. this is the so-called doctrine of free trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this essay. restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, _quâ_ restraint, is an evil: but the restraints in question affect only that part of conduct which society is competent to restrain, and are wrong solely because they do not really produce the results which it is desired to produce by them. as the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of free trade, so neither is it in most of the questions which arise respecting the limits of that doctrine: as for example, what amount of public control is admissible for the prevention of fraud by adulteration; how far sanitary precautions, or arrangements to protect work-people employed in dangerous occupations, should be enforced on employers. such questions involve considerations of liberty, only in so far as leaving people to themselves is always better, _cæteris paribus_, than controlling them: but that they may be legitimately controlled for these ends, is in principle undeniable. on the other hand, there are questions relating to interference with trade, which are essentially questions of liberty; such as the maine law, already touched upon; the prohibition of the importation of opium into china; the restriction of the sale of poisons; all cases, in short, where the object of the interference is to make it impossible or difficult to obtain a particular commodity. these interferences are objectionable, not as infringements on the liberty of the producer or seller, but on that of the buyer. one of these examples, that of the sale of poisons, opens a new question; the proper limits of what may be called the functions of police; how far liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of accident. it is one of the undisputed functions of government to take precautions against crime before it has been committed, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards. the preventive function of government, however, is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than the punitory function; for there is hardly any part of the legitimate freedom of action of a human being which would not admit of being represented, and fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form or other of delinquency. nevertheless, if a public authority, or even a private person, sees any one evidently preparing to commit a crime, they are not bound to look on inactive until the crime is committed, but may interfere to prevent it. if poisons were never bought or used for any purpose except the commission of murder, it would be right to prohibit their manufacture and sale. they may, however, be wanted not only for innocent but for useful purposes, and restrictions cannot be imposed in the one case without operating in the other. again, it is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents. if either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river. nevertheless, when there is not a certainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk: in this case, therefore (unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting faculty), he ought, i conceive, to be only warned of the danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it. similar considerations, applied to such a question as the sale of poisons, may enable us to decide which among the possible modes of regulation are or are not contrary to principle. such a precaution, for example, as that of labelling the drug with some word expressive of its dangerous character, may be enforced without violation of liberty: the buyer cannot wish not to know that the thing he possesses has poisonous qualities. but to require in all cases the certificate of a medical practitioner, would make it sometimes impossible, always expensive, to obtain the article for legitimate uses. the only mode apparent to me, in which difficulties may be thrown in the way of crime committed through this means, without any infringement, worth taking into account, upon the liberty of those who desire the poisonous substance for other purposes, consists in providing what, in the apt language of bentham, is called "preappointed evidence." this provision is familiar to every one in the case of contracts. it is usual and right that the law, when a contract is entered into, should require as the condition of its enforcing performance, that certain formalities should be observed, such as signatures, attestation of witnesses, and the like, in order that in case of subsequent dispute, there may be evidence to prove that the contract was really entered into, and that there was nothing in the circumstances to render it legally invalid: the effect being, to throw great obstacles in the way of fictitious contracts, or contracts made in circumstances which, if known, would destroy their validity. precautions of a similar nature might be enforced in the sale of articles adapted to be instruments of crime. the seller, for example, might be required to enter into a register the exact time of the transaction, the name and address of the buyer, the precise quality and quantity sold; to ask the purpose for which it was wanted, and record the answer he received. when there was no medical prescription, the presence of some third person might be required, to bring home the fact to the purchaser, in case there should afterwards be reason to believe that the article had been applied to criminal purposes. such regulations would in general be no material impediment to obtaining the article, but a very considerable one to making an improper use of it without detection. the right inherent in society, to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim, that purely self-regarding misconduct cannot properly be meddled with in the way of prevention or punishment. drunkenness, for example, in ordinary cases, is not a fit subject for legislative interference; but i should deem it perfectly legitimate that a person, who had once been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence of drink, should be placed under a special legal restriction, personal to himself; that if he were afterwards found drunk, he should be liable to a penalty, and that if when in that state he committed another offence, the punishment to which he would be liable for that other offence should be increased in severity. the making himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime against others. so, again, idleness, except in a person receiving support from the public, or except when it constitutes a breach of contract, cannot without tyranny be made a subject of legal punishment; but if either from idleness or from any other avoidable cause, a man fails to perform his legal duties to others, as for instance to support his children, it is no tyranny to force him to fulfil that obligation, by compulsory labour, if no other means are available. again, there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly, are a violation of good manners and coming thus within the category of offences against others may rightfully be prohibited. of this kind are offences against decency; on which it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they are only connected indirectly with our subject, the objection to publicity being equally strong in the case of many actions not in themselves condemnable, nor supposed to be so. there is another question to which an answer must be found, consistent with the principles which have been laid down. in cases of personal conduct supposed to be blamable, but which respect for liberty precludes society from preventing or punishing, because the evil directly resulting falls wholly on the agent; what the agent is free to do, ought other persons to be equally free to counsel or instigate? this question is not free from difficulty. the case of a person who solicits another to do an act, is not strictly a case of self-regarding conduct. to give advice or offer inducements to any one, is a social act, and may therefore, like actions in general which affect others, be supposed amenable to social control. but a little reflection corrects the first impression, by showing that if the case is not strictly within the definition of individual liberty, yet the reasons on which the principle of individual liberty is grounded, are applicable to it. if people must be allowed, in whatever concerns only themselves, to act as seems best to themselves at their own peril, they must equally be free to consult with one another about what is fit to be so done; to exchange opinions, and give and receive suggestions. whatever it is permitted to do, it must be permitted to advise to do. the question is doubtful, only when the instigator derives a personal benefit from his advice; when he makes it his occupation, for subsistence or pecuniary gain, to promote what society and the state consider to be an evil. then, indeed, a new element of complication is introduced; namely, the existence of classes of persons with an interest opposed to what is considered as the public weal, and whose mode of living is grounded on the counteraction of it. ought this to be interfered with, or not? fornication, for example, must be tolerated, and so must gambling; but should a person be free to be a pimp, or to keep a gambling-house? the case is one of those which lie on the exact boundary line between two principles, and it is not at once apparent to which of the two it properly belongs. there are arguments on both sides. on the side of toleration it may be said, that the fact of following anything as an occupation, and living or profiting by the practice of it, cannot make that criminal which would otherwise be admissible; that the act should either be consistently permitted or consistently prohibited; that if the principles which we have hitherto defended are true, society has no business, _as_ society, to decide anything to be wrong which concerns only the individual; that it cannot go beyond dissuasion, and that one person should be as free to persuade, as another to dissuade. in opposition to this it may be contended, that although the public, or the state, are not warranted in authoritatively deciding, for purposes of repression or punishment, that such or such conduct affecting only the interests of the individual is good or bad, they are fully justified in assuming, if they regard it as bad, that its being so or not is at least a disputable question: that, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavouring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial--who have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the state believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only. there can surely, it may be urged, be nothing lost, no sacrifice of good, by so ordering matters that persons shall make their election, either wisely or foolishly, on their own prompting, as free as possible from the arts of persons who stimulate their inclinations for interested purposes of their own. thus (it may be said) though the statutes respecting unlawful games are utterly indefensible--though all persons should be free to gamble in their own or each other's houses, or in any place of meeting established by their own subscriptions, and open only to the members and their visitors--yet public gambling-houses should not be permitted. it is true that the prohibition is never effectual, and that whatever amount of tyrannical power is given to the police, gambling-houses can always be maintained under other pretences; but they may be compelled to conduct their operations with a certain degree of secrecy and mystery, so that nobody knows anything about them but those who seek them; and more than this, society ought not to aim at. there is considerable force in these arguments; i will not venture to decide whether they are sufficient to justify the moral anomaly of punishing the accessary, when the principal is (and must be) allowed to go free; or fining or imprisoning the procurer, but not the fornicator, the gambling-house keeper, but not the gambler. still less ought the common operations of buying and selling to be interfered with on analogous grounds. almost every article which is bought and sold may be used in excess, and the sellers have a pecuniary interest in encouraging that excess; but no argument can be founded on this, in favour, for instance, of the maine law; because the class of dealers in strong drinks, though interested in their abuse, are indispensably required for the sake of their legitimate use. the interest, however, of these dealers in promoting intemperance is a real evil, and justifies the state in imposing restrictions and requiring guarantees, which but for that justification would be infringements of legitimate liberty. a further question is, whether the state, while it permits, should nevertheless indirectly discourage conduct which it deems contrary to the best interests of the agent; whether, for example, it should take measures to render the means of drunkenness more costly, or add to the difficulty of procuring them, by limiting the number of the places of sale. on this as on most other practical questions, many distinctions require to be made. to tax stimulants for the sole purpose of making them more difficult to be obtained, is a measure differing only in degree from their entire prohibition; and would be justifiable only if that were justifiable. every increase of cost is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the augmented price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on them for gratifying a particular taste. their choice of pleasures, and their mode of expending their income, after satisfying their legal and moral obligations to the state and to individuals, are their own concern, and must rest with their own judgment. these considerations may seem at first sight to condemn the selection of stimulants as special subjects of taxation for purposes of revenue. but it must be remembered that taxation for fiscal purposes is absolutely inevitable; that in most countries it is necessary that a considerable part of that taxation should be indirect; that the state, therefore, cannot help imposing penalties, which to some persons may be prohibitory, on the use of some articles of consumption. it is hence the duty of the state to consider, in the imposition of taxes, what commodities the consumers can best spare; and _à fortiori_, to select in preference those of which it deems the use, beyond a very moderate quantity, to be positively injurious. taxation, therefore, of stimulants, up to the point which produces the largest amount of revenue (supposing that the state needs all the revenue which it yields) is not only admissible, but to be approved of. the question of making the sale of these commodities a more or less exclusive privilege, must be answered differently, according to the purposes to which the restriction is intended to be subservient. all places of public resort require the restraint of a police, and places of this kind peculiarly, because offences against society are especially apt to originate there. it is, therefore, fit to confine the power of selling these commodities (at least for consumption on the spot) to persons of known or vouched-for respectability of conduct; to make such regulations respecting hours of opening and closing as may be requisite for public surveillance, and to withdraw the licence if breaches of the peace repeatedly take place through the connivance or incapacity of the keeper of the house, or if it becomes a rendezvous for concocting and preparing offences against the law. any further restriction i do not conceive to be, in principle, justifiable. the limitation in number, for instance, of beer and spirit-houses, for the express purpose of rendering them more difficult of access, and diminishing the occasions of temptation, not only exposes all to an inconvenience because there are some by whom the facility would be abused, but is suited only to a state of society in which the labouring classes are avowedly treated as children or savages, and placed under an education of restraint, to fit them for future admission to the privileges of freedom. this is not the principle on which the labouring classes are professedly governed in any free country; and no person who sets due value on freedom will give his adhesion to their being so governed, unless after all efforts have been exhausted to educate them for freedom and govern them as freemen, and it has been definitively proved that they can only be governed as children. the bare statement of the alternative shows the absurdity of supposing that such efforts have been made in any case which needs be considered here. it is only because the institutions of this country are a mass of inconsistencies, that things find admittance into our practice which belong to the system of despotic, or what is called paternal, government, while the general freedom of our institutions precludes the exercise of the amount of control necessary to render the restraint of any real efficacy as a moral education. it was pointed out in an early part of this essay, that the liberty of the individual, in things wherein the individual is alone concerned, implies a corresponding liberty in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard no persons but themselves. this question presents no difficulty, so long as the will of all the persons implicated remains unaltered; but since that will may change, it is often necessary, even in things in which they alone are concerned, that they should enter into engagements with one another; and when they do, it is fit, as a general rule, that those engagements should be kept. yet in the laws, probably, of every country, this general rule has some exceptions. not only persons are not held to engagements which violate the rights of third parties, but it is sometimes considered a sufficient reason for releasing them from an engagement, that it is injurious to themselves. in this and most other civilised countries, for example, an engagement by which a person should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and void; neither enforced by law nor by opinion. the ground for thus limiting his power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life, is apparent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme case. the reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person's voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty. his voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at the least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. but by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it, beyond that single act. he therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. he is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer the presumption in its favour, that would be afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it. the principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. it is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom. these reasons, the force of which is so conspicuous in this peculiar case, are evidently of far wider application; yet a limit is everywhere set to them by the necessities of life, which continually require, not indeed that we should resign our freedom, but that we should consent to this and the other limitation of it. the principle, however, which demands uncontrolled freedom of action in all that concerns only the agents themselves, requires that those who have become bound to one another, in things which concern no third party, should be able to release one another from the engagement: and even without such voluntary release, there are perhaps no contracts or engagements, except those that relate to money or money's worth, of which one can venture to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever of retractation. baron wilhelm von humboldt, in the excellent essay from which i have already quoted, states it as his conviction, that engagements which involve personal relations or services, should never be legally binding beyond a limited duration of time; and that the most important of these engagements, marriage, having the peculiarity that its objects are frustrated unless the feelings of both the parties are in harmony with it, should require nothing more than the declared will of either party to dissolve it. this subject is too important, and too complicated, to be discussed in a parenthesis, and i touch on it only so far as is necessary for purposes of illustration. if the conciseness and generality of baron humboldt's dissertation had not obliged him in this instance to content himself with enunciating his conclusion without discussing the premises, he would doubtless have recognised that the question cannot be decided on grounds so simple as those to which he confines himself. when a person, either by express promise or by conduct, has encouraged another to rely upon his continuing to act in a certain way--to build expectations and calculations, and stake any part of his plan of life upon that supposition, a new series of moral obligations arises on his part towards that person, which may possibly be overruled, but cannot be ignored. and again, if the relation between two contracting parties has been followed by consequences to others; if it has placed third parties in any peculiar position, or, as in the case of marriage, has even called third parties into existence, obligations arise on the part of both the contracting parties towards those third persons, the fulfilment of which, or at all events the mode of fulfilment, must be greatly affected by the continuance or disruption of the relation between the original parties to the contract. it does not follow, nor can i admit, that these obligations extend to requiring the fulfilment of the contract at all costs to the happiness of the reluctant party; but they are a necessary element in the question; and even if, as von humboldt maintains, they ought to make no difference in the _legal_ freedom of the parties to release themselves from the engagement (and i also hold that they ought not to make _much_ difference), they necessarily make a great difference in the _moral_ freedom. a person is bound to take all these circumstances into account, before resolving on a step which may affect such important interests of others; and if he does not allow proper weight to those interests, he is morally responsible for the wrong. i have made these obvious remarks for the better illustration of the general principle of liberty, and not because they are at all needed on the particular question, which, on the contrary, is usually discussed as if the interest of children was everything, and that of grown persons nothing. i have already observed that, owing to the absence of any recognised general principles, liberty is often granted where it should be withheld, as well as withheld where it should be granted; and one of the cases in which, in the modern european world, the sentiment of liberty is the strongest, is a case where, in my view, it is altogether misplaced. a person should be free to do as he likes in his own concerns; but he ought not to be free to do as he likes in acting for another, under the pretext that the affairs of another are his own affairs. the state, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others. this obligation is almost entirely disregarded in the case of the family relations, a case, in its direct influence on human happiness, more important than all others taken together. the almost despotic power of husbands over wives need not be enlarged upon here because nothing more is needed for the complete removal of the evil, than that wives should have the same rights, and should receive the protection of law in the same manner, as all other persons; and because, on this subject, the defenders of established injustice do not avail themselves of the plea of liberty, but stand forth openly as the champions of power. it is in the case of children, that misapplied notions of liberty are a real obstacle to the fulfilment by the state of its duties. one would almost think that a man's children were supposed to be literally, and not metaphorically, a part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with his absolute and exclusive control over them; more jealous than of almost any interference with his own freedom of action: so much less do the generality of mankind value liberty than power. consider, for example, the case of education. is it not almost a self-evident axiom, that the state should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen? yet who is there that is not afraid to recognise and assert this truth? hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of the most sacred duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now stand, the father), after summoning a human being into the world, to give to that being an education fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others and towards himself. but while this is unanimously declared to be the father's duty, scarcely anybody, in this country, will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it. instead of his being required to make any exertion or sacrifice for securing education to the child, it is left to his choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis! it still remains unrecognised, that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society; and that if the parent does not fulfil this obligation, the state ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of the parent. were the duty of enforcing universal education once admitted, there would be an end to the difficulties about what the state should teach, and how it should teach, which now convert the subject into a mere battle-field for sects and parties, causing the time and labour which should have been spent in educating, to be wasted in quarrelling about education. if the government would make up its mind to _require_ for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of _providing_ one. it might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer class of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them. the objections which are urged with reason against state education, do not apply to the enforcement of education by the state, but to the state's taking upon itself to direct that education; which is a totally different thing. that the whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in state hands, i go as far as any one in deprecating. all that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. a general state education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another; and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. an education established and controlled by the state, should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence. unless, indeed, when society in general is in so backward a state that it could not or would not provide for itself any proper institutions of education, unless the government undertook the task; then, indeed, the government may, as the less of two great evils, take upon itself the business of schools and universities, as it may that of joint stock companies, when private enterprise, in a shape fitted for undertaking great works of industry, does not exist in the country. but in general, if the country contains a sufficient number of persons qualified to provide education under government auspices, the same persons would be able and willing to give an equally good education on the voluntary principle, under the assurance of remuneration afforded by a law rendering education compulsory, combined with state aid to those unable to defray the expense. the instrument for enforcing the law could be no other than public examinations, extending to all children, and beginning at an early age. an age might be fixed at which every child must be examined, to ascertain if he (or she) is able to read. if a child proves unable, the father, unless he has some sufficient ground of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate fine, to be worked out, if necessary, by his labour, and the child might be put to school at his expense. once in every year the examination should be renewed, with a gradually extending range of subjects, so as to make the universal acquisition, and what is more, retention, of a certain minimum of general knowledge, virtually compulsory. beyond that minimum, there should be voluntary examinations on all subjects, at which all who come up to a certain standard of proficiency might claim a certificate. to prevent the state from exercising, through these arrangements, an improper influence over opinion, the knowledge required for passing an examination (beyond the merely instrumental parts of knowledge, such as languages and their use) should, even in the higher class of examinations, be confined to facts and positive science exclusively. the examinations on religion, politics, or other disputed topics, should not turn on the truth or falsehood of opinions, but on the matter of fact that such and such an opinion is held, on such grounds, by such authors, or schools, or churches. under this system, the rising generation would be no worse off in regard to all disputed truths, than they are at present; they would be brought up either churchmen or dissenters as they now are, the state merely taking care that they should be instructed churchmen, or instructed dissenters. there would be nothing to hinder them from being taught religion, if their parents chose, at the same schools where they were taught other things. all attempts by the state to bias the conclusions of its citizens on disputed subjects, are evil; but it may very properly offer to ascertain and certify that a person possesses the knowledge, requisite to make his conclusions, on any given subject, worth attending to. a student of philosophy would be the better for being able to stand an examination both in locke and in kant, whichever of the two he takes up with, or even if with neither: and there is no reasonable objection to examining an atheist in the evidences of christianity, provided he is not required to profess a belief in them. the examinations, however, in the higher branches of knowledge should, i conceive, be entirely voluntary. it would be giving too dangerous a power to governments, were they allowed to exclude any one from professions, even from the profession of teacher, for alleged deficiency of qualifications: and i think, with wilhelm von humboldt, that degrees, or other public certificates of scientific or professional acquirements, should be given to all who present themselves for examination, and stand the test; but that such certificates should confer no advantage over competitors, other than the weight which may be attached to their testimony by public opinion. it is not in the matter of education only, that misplaced notions of liberty prevent moral obligations on the part of parents from being recognised, and legal obligations from being imposed, where there are the strongest grounds for the former always, and in many cases for the latter also. the fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most responsible actions in the range of human life. to undertake this responsibility--to bestow a life which may be either a curse or a blessing--unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being. and in a country either over-peopled, or threatened with being so, to produce children, beyond a very small number, with the effect of reducing the reward of labour by their competition, is a serious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their labour. the laws which, in many countries on the continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the state: and whether such laws be expedient or not (a question mainly dependent on local circumstances and feelings), they are not objectionable as violations of liberty. such laws are interferences of the state to prohibit a mischievous act--an act injurious to others, which ought to be a subject of reprobation, and social stigma, even when it is not deemed expedient to superadd legal punishment. yet the current ideas of liberty, which bend so easily to real infringements of the freedom of the individual, in things which concern only himself, would repel the attempt to put any restraint upon his inclinations when the consequence of their indulgence is a life, or lives, of wretchedness and depravity to the offspring, with manifold evils to those sufficiently within reach to be in any way affected by their actions. when we compare the strange respect of mankind for liberty, with their strange want of respect for it, we might imagine that a man had an indispensable right to do harm to others, and no right at all to please himself without giving pain to any one. i have reserved for the last place a large class of questions respecting the limits of government interference, which, though closely connected with the subject of this essay, do not, in strictness, belong to it. these are cases in which the reasons against interference do not turn upon the principle of liberty: the question is not about restraining the actions of individuals, but about helping them: it is asked whether the government should do, or cause to be done, something for their benefit, instead of leaving it to be done by themselves, individually, or in voluntary combination. the objections to government interference, when it is not such as to involve infringement of liberty, may be of three kinds. the first is, when the thing to be done is likely to be better done by individuals than by the government. speaking generally, there is no one so fit to conduct any business, or to determine how or by whom it shall be conducted, as those who are personally interested in it. this principle condemns the interferences, once so common, of the legislature, or the officers of government, with the ordinary processes of industry. but this part of the subject has been sufficiently enlarged upon by political economists, and is not particularly related to the principles of this essay. the second objection is more nearly allied to our subject. in many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education--a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal. this is a principal, though not the sole, recommendation of jury trial (in cases not political); of free and popular local and municipal institutions; of the conduct of industrial and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary associations. these are not questions of liberty, and are connected with that subject only by remote tendencies; but they are questions of development. it belongs to a different occasion from the present to dwell on these things as parts of national education; as being, in truth, the peculiar training of a citizen, the practical part of the political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint interests, the management of joint concerns--habituating them to act from public or semi-public motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from one another. without these habits and powers, a free constitution can neither be worked nor preserved, as is exemplified by the too-often transitory nature of political freedom in countries where it does not rest upon a sufficient basis of local liberties. the management of purely local business by the localities, and of the great enterprises of industry by the union of those who voluntarily supply the pecuniary means, is further recommended by all the advantages which have been set forth in this essay as belonging to individuality of development, and diversity of modes of action. government operations tend to be everywhere alike. with individuals and voluntary associations, on the contrary, there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of experience. what the state can usefully do, is to make itself a central depository, and active circulator and diffuser, of the experience resulting from many trials. its business is to enable each experimentalist to benefit by the experiments of others, instead of tolerating no experiments but its own. the third, and most cogent reason for restricting the interference of government, is the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power. every function superadded to those already exercised by the government, causes its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused, and converts, more and more, the active and ambitious part of the public into hangers-on of the government, or of some party which aims at becoming the government. if the roads, the railways, the banks, the insurance offices, the great joint-stock companies, the universities, and the public charities, were all of them branches of the government; if, in addition, the municipal corporations and local boards, with all that now devolves on them, became departments of the central administration; if the employés of all these different enterprises were appointed and paid by the government, and looked to the government for every rise in life; not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of the legislature would make this or any other country free otherwise than in name. and the evil would be greater, the more efficiently and scientifically the administrative machinery was constructed--the more skilful the arrangements for obtaining the best qualified hands and heads with which to work it. in england it has of late been proposed that all the members of the civil service of government should be selected by competitive examination, to obtain for those employments the most intelligent and instructed persons procurable; and much has been said and written for and against this proposal. one of the arguments most insisted on by its opponents, is that the occupation of a permanent official servant of the state does not hold out sufficient prospects of emolument and importance to attract the highest talents, which will always be able to find a more inviting career in the professions, or in the service of companies and other public bodies. one would not have been surprised if this argument had been used by the friends of the proposition, as an answer to its principal difficulty. coming from the opponents it is strange enough. what is urged as an objection is the safety-valve of the proposed system. if indeed all the high talent of the country _could_ be drawn into the service of the government, a proposal tending to bring about that result might well inspire uneasiness. if every part of the business of society which required organised concert, or large and comprehensive views, were in the hands of the government, and if government offices were universally filled by the ablest men, all the enlarged culture and practised intelligence in the country, except the purely speculative, would be concentrated in a numerous bureaucracy, to whom alone the rest of the community would look for all things: the multitude for direction and dictation in all they had to do; the able and aspiring for personal advancement. to be admitted into the ranks of this bureaucracy, and when admitted, to rise therein, would be the sole objects of ambition. under this régime, not only is the outside public ill-qualified, for want of practical experience, to criticise or check the mode of operation of the bureaucracy, but even if the accidents of despotic or the natural working of popular institutions occasionally raise to the summit a ruler or rulers of reforming inclinations, no reform can be effected which is contrary to the interest of the bureaucracy. such is the melancholy condition of the russian empire, as is shown in the accounts of those who have had sufficient opportunity of observation. the czar himself is powerless against the bureaucratic body; he can send any one of them to siberia, but he cannot govern without them, or against their will. on every decree of his they have a tacit veto, by merely refraining from carrying it into effect. in countries of more advanced civilisation and of a more insurrectionary spirit, the public, accustomed to expect everything to be done for them by the state, or at least to do nothing for themselves without asking from the state not only leave to do it, but even how it is to be done, naturally hold the state responsible for all evil which befalls them, and when the evil exceeds their amount of patience, they rise against the government and make what is called a revolution; whereupon somebody else, with or without legitimate authority from the nation, vaults into the seat, issues his orders to the bureaucracy, and everything goes on much as it did before; the bureaucracy being unchanged, and nobody else being capable of taking their place. a very different spectacle is exhibited among a people accustomed to transact their own business. in france, a large part of the people having been engaged in military service, many of whom have held at least the rank of non-commissioned officers, there are in every popular insurrection several persons competent to take the lead, and improvise some tolerable plan of action. what the french are in military affairs, the americans are in every kind of civil business; let them be left without a government, every body of americans is able to improvise one, and to carry on that or any other public business with a sufficient amount of intelligence, order, and decision. this is what every free people ought to be: and a people capable of this is certain to be free; it will never let itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the reins of the central administration. no bureaucracy can hope to make such a people as this do or undergo anything that they do not like. but where everything is done through the bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all. the constitution of such countries is an organisation of the experience and practical ability of the nation, into a disciplined body for the purpose of governing the rest; and the more perfect that organisation is in itself, the more successful in drawing to itself and educating for itself the persons of greatest capacity from all ranks of the community, the more complete is the bondage of all, the members of the bureaucracy included. for the governors are as much the slaves of their organisation and discipline, as the governed are of the governors. a chinese mandarin is as much the tool and creature of a despotism as the humblest cultivator. an individual jesuit is to the utmost degree of abasement the slave of his order, though the order itself exists for the collective power and importance of its members. it is not, also, to be forgotten, that the absorption of all the principal ability of the country into the governing body is fatal, sooner or later, to the mental activity and progressiveness of the body itself. banded together as they are--working a system which, like all systems, necessarily proceeds in a great measure by fixed rules--the official body are under the constant temptation of sinking into indolent routine, or, if they now and then desert that mill-horse round, of rushing into some half-examined crudity which has struck the fancy of some leading member of the corps: and the sole check to these closely allied, though seemingly opposite, tendencies, the only stimulus which can keep the ability of the body itself up to a high standard, is liability to the watchful criticism of equal ability outside the body. it is indispensable, therefore, that the means should exist, independently of the government, of forming such ability, and furnishing it with the opportunities and experience necessary for a correct judgment of great practical affairs. if we would possess permanently a skilful and efficient body of functionaries--above all, a body able to originate and willing to adopt improvements; if we would not have our bureaucracy degenerate into a pedantocracy, this body must not engross all the occupations which form and cultivate the faculties required for the government of mankind. to determine the point at which evils, so formidable to human freedom and advancement, begin, or rather at which they begin to predominate over the benefits attending the collective application of the force of society, under its recognised chiefs, for the removal of the obstacles which stand in the way of its well-being; to secure as much of the advantages of centralised power and intelligence, as can be had without turning into governmental channels too great a proportion of the general activity, is one of the most difficult and complicated questions in the art of government. it is, in a great measure, a question of detail, in which many and various considerations must be kept in view, and no absolute rule can be laid down. but i believe that the practical principle in which safety resides, the ideal to be kept in view, the standard by which to test all arrangements intended for overcoming the difficulty, may be conveyed in these words: the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency; but the greatest possible centralisation of information, and diffusion of it from the centre. thus, in municipal administration, there would be, as in the new england states, a very minute division among separate officers, chosen by the localities, of all business which is not better left to the persons directly interested; but besides this, there would be, in each department of local affairs, a central superintendence, forming a branch of the general government. the organ of this superintendence would concentrate, as in a focus, the variety of information and experience derived from the conduct of that branch of public business in all the localities, from everything analogous which is done in foreign countries, and from the general principles of political science. this central organ should have a right to know all that is done, and its special duty should be that of making the knowledge acquired in one place available for others. emancipated from the petty prejudices and narrow views of a locality by its elevated position and comprehensive sphere of observation, its advice would naturally carry much authority; but its actual power, as a permanent institution, should, i conceive, be limited to compelling the local officers to obey the laws laid down for their guidance. in all things not provided for by general rules, those officers should be left to their own judgment, under responsibility to their constituents. for the violation of rules, they should be responsible to law, and the rules themselves should be laid down by the legislature; the central administrative authority only watching over their execution, and if they were not properly carried into effect, appealing, according to the nature of the case, to the tribunal to enforce the law, or to the constituencies to dismiss the functionaries who had not executed it according to its spirit. such, in its general conception, is the central superintendence which the poor law board is intended to exercise over the administrators of the poor rate throughout the country. whatever powers the board exercises beyond this limit, were right and necessary in that peculiar case, for the cure of rooted habits of maladministration in matters deeply affecting not the localities merely, but the whole community; since no locality has a moral right to make itself by mismanagement a nest of pauperism, necessarily overflowing into other localities, and impairing the moral and physical condition of the whole labouring community. the powers of administrative coercion and subordinate legislation possessed by the poor law board (but which, owing to the state of opinion on the subject, are very scantily exercised by them), though perfectly justifiable in a case of first-rate national interest, would be wholly out of place in the superintendence of interests purely local. but a central organ of information and instruction for all the localities, would be equally valuable in all departments of administration. a government cannot have too much of the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids and stimulates, individual exertion and development. the mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activity and powers of individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs; when, instead of informing, advising, and, upon occasion, denouncing, it makes them work in fetters, or bids them stand aside and does their work instead of them. the worth of a state, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a state which postpones the interests of _their_ mental expansion and elevation, to a little more of administrative skill, or of that semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a state which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish. second treatise of government by john locke digitized by dave gowan <dgowan@tfn.net>. john locke's "second treatise of government" was published in 1690. the complete unabridged text has been republished several times in edited commentaries. this text is recovered entire from the paperback book, "john locke second treatise of government", edited, with an introduction, by c.b. mcpherson, hackett publishing company, indianapolis and cambridge, 1980. none of the mcpherson edition is included in the etext below; only the original words contained in the 1690 locke text is included. the 1690 edition text is free of copyright. * * * * * two treatises of government by iohn locke salus populi suprema lex esto london printed mdclxxxviii reprinted, the sixth time, by a. millar, h. woodfall, 1. whiston and b. white, 1. rivington, l. davis and c. reymers, r. baldwin, hawes clarke and collins; w. iohnston, w. owen, 1. richardson, s. crowder, t. longman, b. law, c. rivington, e. dilly, r. withy, c. and r. ware, s. baker, t. payne, a. shuckburgh, 1. hinxman mdcclxiii two treatises of government. in the former the false principles and foundation of sir robert filmer and his followers are detected and overthrown. the latter is an essay concerning the true original extent and end of civil government. 1764 editor's note the present edition of this book has not only been collated with the first three editions, which were published during the author's life, but also has the advantage of his last corrections and improvements, from a copy delivered by him to mr. peter coste, communicated to the editor, and now lodged in christ college, cambridge. preface reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning government; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not worth while to tell thee. these, which remain, i hope are sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present king william; to make good his title, in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any prince in christendom; and to justify to the world the people of england, whose love of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin. if these papers have that evidence, i flatter myself is to be found in them, there will be no great miss of those which are lost, and my reader may be satisfied without them: for i imagine, i shall have neither the time, nor inclination to repeat my pains, and fill up the wanting part of my answer, by tracing sir robert again, through all the windings and obscurities, which are to be met with in the several branches of his wonderful system. the king, and body of the nation, have since so thoroughly confuted his hypothesis, that i suppose no body hereafter will have either the confidence to appear against our common safety, and be again an advocate for slavery; or the weakness to be deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular stile, and well-turned periods: for if any one will be at the pains, himself, in those parts, which are here untouched, to strip sir robert's discourses of the flourish of doubtful expressions, and endeavour to reduce his words to direct, positive, intelligible propositions, and then compare them one with another, he will quickly be satisfied, there was never so much glib nonsense put together in well-sounding english. if he think it not worth while to examine his works all thro', let him make an experiment in that part, where he treats of usurpation; and let him try, whether he can, with all his skill, make sir robert intelligible, and consistent with himself, or common sense. i should not speak so plainly of a gentleman, long since past answering, had not the pulpit, of late years, publicly owned his doctrine, and made it the current divinity of the times. it is necessary those men, who taking on them to be teachers, have so dangerously misled others, should be openly shewed of what authority this their patriarch is, whom they have so blindly followed, that so they may either retract what upon so ill grounds they have vented, and cannot be maintained; or else justify those principles which they preached up for gospel; though they had no better an author than an english courtier: for i should not have writ against sir robert, or taken the pains to shew his mistakes, inconsistencies, and want of (what he so much boasts of, and pretends wholly to build on) scripture-proofs, were there not men amongst us, who, by crying up his books, and espousing his doctrine, save me from the reproach of writing against a dead adversary. they have been so zealous in this point, that, if i have done him any wrong, i cannot hope they should spare me. i wish, where they have done the truth and the public wrong, they would be as ready to redress it, and allow its just weight to this reflection, viz. that there cannot be done a greater mischief to prince and people, than the propagating wrong notions concerning government; that so at last all times might not have reason to complain of the drum ecclesiastic. if any one, concerned really for truth, undertake the confutation of my hypothesis, i promise him either to recant my mistake, upon fair conviction; or to answer his difficulties. but he must remember two things. first, that cavilling here and there, at some expression, or little incident of my discourse, is not an answer to my book. secondly, that i shall not take railing for arguments, nor think either of these worth my notice, though i shall always look on myself as bound to give satisfaction to any one, who shall appear to be conscientiously scrupulous in the point, and shall shew any just grounds for his scruples. i have nothing more, but to advertise the reader, that observations stands for observations on hobbs, milton, &c. and that a bare quotation of pages always means pages of his patriarcha, edition 1680. book ii chapter. i. an essay concerning the true original, extent and end of civil government sect. 1. it having been shewn in the foregoing discourse, (<i>1</i>). that adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by positive donation from god, any such authority over his children, or dominion over the world, as is pretended: (<i>2</i>). that if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it: (<i>3</i>). that if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive law of god that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined: (<i>4</i>). that if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of adam's posterity, being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one above another, the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to have the right of inheritance: all these premises having, as i think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what sir robert filmer hath taught us. sect. 2. to this purpose, i think it may not be amiss, to set down what i take to be political power; that the power of a magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from that of a father over his children, a master over his servant, a husband over his wife, and a lord over his slave. all which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one from wealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley. sect. 3. political power, then, i take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good. chapter. ii. of the state of nature. sect. 4. to understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. a state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. sect. 5. this equality of men by nature, the judicious hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. his words are, /# the like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty, to love others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, must needs all have one measure; if i cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should i look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the same nature? to have any thing offered them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that if i do harm, i must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should shew greater measure of love to me, than they have by me shewed unto them: my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no man is ignorant, eccl. pol. lib. 1. #/ sect. 6. but though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another. sect. 7. and that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world be in vain, if there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. and if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do. sect. 8. and thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. in transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure god has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. and in the case, and upon this ground, every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature. sect. 9. i doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men: but before they condemn it, i desire them to resolve me, by what right any prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commits in their country. it is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. the legislative authority, by which they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath no power over him. those who have the supreme power of making laws in england, france or holland, are to an indian, but like the rest of the world, men without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, i see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over another. sect, 10. besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some person or other, and some other man receives damage by his transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the right of punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it just, may also join with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has suffered. sect. 11. from these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the law, remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has received. that, he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and measure god hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. and cain was so fully convinced, that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his brother, he cries out, every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind. sect. 12. by the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser breaches of that law. it will perhaps be demanded, with death? i answer, each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. every offence, that can be committed in the state of nature, may in the state of nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it may, in a commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present purpose, to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there is such a law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studier of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted. sect. 13. to this strange doctrine, viz. that in the state of nature every one has the executive power of the law of nature, i doubt not but it will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore god hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. i easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but i shall desire those who make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore not to be endured, i desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the state of nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or controul those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to? much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind. sect. 14. it is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were there any men in such a state of nature? to which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. i have named all governors of independent communities, whether they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature. the promises and bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by garcilasso de la vega, in his history of peru; or between a swiss and an indian, in the woods of america, are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of society. sect. 15. to those that say, there were never any men in the state of nature, i will not only oppose the authority of the judicious hooker, eccl. pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where he says, /# the laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of nature, do bind men absolutely, even as they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do, or not to do: but forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things, needful for such a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others: this was the cause of men's uniting themselves at first in politic societies. #/ but i moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till by their own consents they make themselves members of some politic society; and i doubt not in the sequel of this discourse, to make it very clear. chapter. iii. of the state of war. sect. 16. the state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another man's life, puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just, i should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power. sect. 17. and hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life: for i have reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his power without my consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body can desire to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a slave. to be free from such force is the only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my preservation, who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. he that, in the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away every thing else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he that, in the state of society, would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away from them every thing else, and so be looked on as in a state of war. sect. 18. this makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than, by the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he has no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence be what it will, i have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty, would not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing else. and therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if i can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of war, and is aggressor in it. sect. 19. and here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded, are as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction, are one from another. men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature. but force, or a declared design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, tho' he be in society and a fellow subject. thus a thief, whom i cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that i am worth, i may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without right, upon a man's person, makes a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge. sect. 20. but when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between those that are in society, and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair determination of the law; because then there lies open the remedy of appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no such appeal is, as in the state of nature, for want of positive laws, and judges with authority to appeal to, the state of war once begun, continues, with a right to the innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can, until the aggressor offers peace, and desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he has already done, and secure the innocent for the future; nay, where an appeal to the law, and constituted judges, lies open, but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice, and a barefaced wresting of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is hard to imagine any thing but a state of war: for wherever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to all who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven. sect. 21. to avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason of men's putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature: for where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power. had there been any such court, any superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the right between jephtha and the ammonites, they had never come to a state of war: but we see he was forced to appeal to heaven. the lord the judge (says he) be judge this day between the children of israel and the children of ammon, judg. xi. 27. and then prosecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to battle: and therefore in such controversies, where the question is put, who shall be judge? it cannot be meant, who shall decide the controversy; every one knows what jephtha here tells us, that the lord the judge shall judge. where there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to god in heaven. that question then cannot mean, who shall judge, whether another hath put himself in a state of war with me, and whether i may, as jephtha did, appeal to heaven in it? of that i myself can only be judge in my own conscience, as i will answer it, at the great day, to the supreme judge of all men. chapter. iv. of slavery. sect. 22. the natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. the liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it. freedom then is not what sir robert filmer tells us, observations, a. 55. a liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws: but freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of nature. sect. 23. this freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases. no body can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over it. indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life, by some act that deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his power) delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service, and he does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires. sect. 24. this is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, but the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive: for, if once compact enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the state of war and slavery ceases, as long as the compact endures: for, as has been said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which he hath not in himself, a power over his own life. i confess, we find among the jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for, it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure, so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free, exod. xxi. chapter. v. of property. sect. 25. whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives us an account of those grants god made of the world to adam, and to noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that god, as king david says, psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the children of men; given it to mankind in common. but this being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a property in any thing: i will not content myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make out property, upon a supposition that god gave the world to adam, and his posterity in common, it is impossible that any man, but one universal monarch, should have any property upon a supposition, that god gave the world to adam, and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. but i shall endeavour to shew, how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which god gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners. sect. 26. god, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. the earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being. and tho' all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man. the fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life. sect. 27. though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. the labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. it being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others. sect. 28. he that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. no body can deny but the nourishment is his. i ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. that labour put a distinction between them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right. and will any one say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? if such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty god had given him. we see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. and the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore i have digged in any place, where i have a right to them in common with others, become my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. the labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them. sect. 29. by making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to any one's appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common, children or servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master had provided for them in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar part. though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? his labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself. sect. 30. thus this law of reason makes the deer that indian's who hath killed it; it is allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before it was the common right of every one. and amongst those who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have made and multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning of property, in what was before common, still takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind; or what ambergrise any one takes up here, is by the labour that removes it out of that common state nature left it in, made his property, who takes that pains about it. and even amongst us, the hare that any one is hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the chase: for being a beast that is still looked upon as common, and no man's private possession; whoever has employed so much labour about any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a property. sect. 31. it will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or other fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one may ingross as much as he will. to which i answer, not so. the same law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does also bound that property too. god has given us all things richly, 1 tim. vi. 12. is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. but how far has he given it us? to enjoy. as much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. nothing was made by god for man to spoil or destroy. and thus, considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world, and the few spenders; and to how small a part of that provision the industry of one man could extend itself, and ingross it to the prejudice of others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for his use; there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so established. sect. 32. but the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest; i think it is plain, that property in that too is acquired as the former. as much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. he by his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common. nor will it invalidate his right, to say every body else has an equal title to it; and therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot inclose, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners, all mankind. god, when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him. god and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. he that in obedience to this command of god, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him. sect. 33. nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. so that, in effect, there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. no body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same. sect. 34. god gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. he gave it to the use of the industrious and rational, (and labour was to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. he that had as good left for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labour: if he did, it is plain he desired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to, and not the ground which god had given him in common with others to labour on, and whereof there was as good left, as that already possessed, and more than he knew what to do with, or his industry could reach to. sect. 35. it is true, in land that is common in england, or any other country, where there is plenty of people under government, who have money and commerce, no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common by compact, i.e. by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. and though it be common, in respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind; but is the joint property of this country, or this parish. besides, the remainder, after such enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the commoners, as the whole was when they could all make use of the whole; whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world, it was quite otherwise. the law man was under, was rather for appropriating. god commanded, and his wants forced him to labour. that was his property which could not be taken from him where-ever he had fixed it. and hence subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see are joined together. the one gave title to the other. so that god, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate: and the condition of human life, which requires labour and materials to work on, necessarily introduces private possessions. sect. 36. the measure of property nature has well set by the extent of men's labour and the conveniencies of life: no man's labour could subdue, or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice of his neighbour, who would still have room for as good, and as large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. this measure did confine every man's possession to a very moderate proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself, without injury to any body, in the first ages of the world, when men were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from their company, in the then vast wilderness of the earth, than to be straitened for want of room to plant in. and the same measure may be allowed still without prejudice to any body, as full as the world seems: for supposing a man, or family, in the state they were at first peopling of the world by the children of adam, or noah; let him plant in some inland, vacant places of america, we shall find that the possessions he could make himself, upon the measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day, prejudice the rest of mankind, or give them reason to complain, or think themselves injured by this man's incroachment, though the race of men have now spread themselves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely exceed the small number was at the beginning. nay, the extent of ground is of so little value, without labour, that i have heard it affirmed, that in spain itself a man may be permitted to plough, sow and reap, without being disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his making use of it. but, on the contrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him, who, by his industry on neglected, and consequently waste land, has increased the stock of corn, which they wanted. but be this as it will, which i lay no stress on; this i dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety, (viz.) that every man should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the world, without straitening any body; since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions, and a right to them; which, how it has done, i shall by and by shew more at large. sect. 37. this is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man; or had agreed, that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, should be worth a great piece of flesh, or a whole heap of corn; though men had a right to appropriate, by their labour, each one of himself, as much of the things of nature, as he could use: yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left to those who would use the same industry. to which let me add, that he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the provisions serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness lying waste in common. and therefore he that incloses land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind: for his labour now supplies him with provisions out of ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in common. i have here rated the improved land very low, in making its product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an hundred to one: for i ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of america, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life, as ten acres of equally fertile land do in devonshire, where they are well cultivated? before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of the beasts, as he could; he that so imployed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature, as any way to alter them from the state which nature put them in, by placing any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them: but if they perished, in his possession, without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified, before he could spend it, he offended against the common law of nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour's share, for he had no right, farther than his use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him conveniencies of life. sect. 38. the same measures governed the possession of land too: whatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed, and make use of, the cattle and product was also his. but if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of any other. thus, at the beginning, cain might take as much ground as he could till, and make it his own land, and yet leave enough to abel's sheep to feed on; a few acres would serve for both their possessions. but as families increased, and industry inlarged their stocks, their possessions inlarged with the need of them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of, till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and built cities; and then, by consent, they came in time, to set out the bounds of their distinct territories, and agree on limits between them and their neighbours; and by laws within themselves, settled the properties of those of the same society: for we see, that in that part of the world which was first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even as low down as abraham's time, they wandered with their flocks, and their herds, which was their substance, freely up and down; and this abraham did, in a country where he was a stranger. whence it is plain, that at least a great part of the land lay in common; that the inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed property in any more than they made use of. but when there was not room enough in the same place, for their herds to feed together, they by consent, as abraham and lot did, gen. xiii. 5. separated and inlarged their pasture, where it best liked them. and for the same reason esau went from his father, and his brother, and planted in mount seir, gen. xxxvi. 6. sect. 39. and thus, without supposing any private dominion, and property in adam, over all the world, exclusive of all other men, which can no way be proved, nor any one's property be made out from it; but supposing the world given, as it was, to the children of men in common, we see how labour could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it, for their private uses; wherein there could be no doubt of right, no room for quarrel. sect. 40. nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may appear, that the property of labour should be able to over-balance the community of land: for it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing; and let any one consider what the difference is between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the same land lying in common, without any husbandry upon it, and he will find, that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value. i think it will be but a very modest computation to say, that of the products of the earth useful to the life of man nine tenths are the effects of labour: nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the several expences about them, what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour. sect. 41. there cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than several nations of the americans are of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of life; whom nature having furnished as liberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty, i.e. a fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might serve for food, raiment, and delight; yet for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in england. sect. 42. to make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of life, through their several progresses, before they come to our use, and see how much they receive of their value from human industry. bread, wine and cloth, are things of daily use, and great plenty; yet notwithstanding, acorns, water and leaves, or skins, must be our bread, drink and cloathing, did not labour furnish us with these more useful commodities: for whatever bread is more worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins or moss, that is wholly owing to labour and industry; the one of these being the food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other, provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how much they exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world: and the ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at most, but a very small part of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing. this shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to largeness of dominions; and that the increase of lands, and the right employing of them, is the great art of government: and that prince, who shall be so wise and godlike, as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and encouragement to the honest industry of mankind, against the oppression of power and narrowness of party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbours: but this by the by. to return to the argument in hand. sect. 43. an acre of land, that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and another in america, which, with the same husbandry, would do the like, are, without doubt, of the same natural intrinsic value: but yet the benefit mankind receives from the one in a year, is worth 5l. and from the other possibly not worth a penny, if all the profit an indian received from it were to be valued, and sold here; at least, i may truly say, not one thousandth. it is labour then which puts the greatest part of value upon land, without which it would scarcely be worth any thing: it is to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful products; for all that the straw, bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land, which lies waste, is all the effect of labour: for it is not barely the plough-man's pains, the reaper's and thresher's toil, and the baker's sweat, is to be counted into the bread we eat; the labour of those who broke the oxen, who digged and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timber employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are a vast number, requisite to this corn, from its being feed to be sown to its being made bread, must all be charged on the account of labour, and received as an effect of that: nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless materials, as in themselves. it would be a strange catalogue of things, that industry provided and made use of, about every loaf of bread, before it came to our use, if we could trace them; iron, wood, leather, bark, timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and all the materials made use of in the ship, that brought any of the commodities made use of by any of the workmen, to any part of the work; all which it would be almost impossible, at least too long, to reckon up. sect. 44. from all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are given in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniencies of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others. sect. 45. thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever any one was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes use of. men, at first, for the most part, contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the world, (where the increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some value) the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories, and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of the private men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property which labour and industry began; and the leagues that have been made between several states and kingdoms, either expresly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in the others possession, have, by common consent, given up their pretences to their natural common right, which originally they had to those countries, and so have, by positive agreement, settled a property amongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their common money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it do, or can make use of, and so still lie in common; tho' this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money. sect. 46. the greatest part of things really useful to the life of man, and such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world look after, as it doth the americans now, are generally things of short duration; such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of themselves: gold, silver and diamonds, are things that fancy or agreement hath put the value on, more than real use, and the necessary support of life. now of those good things which nature hath provided in common, every one had a right (as hath been said) to as much as he could use, and property in all that he could effect with his labour; all that his industry could extend to, to alter from the state nature had put it in, was his. he that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they were his goods as soon as gathered. he was only to look, that he used them before they spoiled, else he took more than his share, and robbed others. and indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could make use of. if he gave away a part to any body else, so that it perished not uselesly in his possession, these he also made use of. and if he also bartered away plums, that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselesly in his hands. again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by him all his life he invaded not the right of others, he might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his possession, but the perishing of any thing uselesly in it. sect. 47. and thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life. sect. 48. and as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them: for supposing an island, separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein there were but an hundred families, but there were sheep, horses and cows, with other useful animals, wholsome fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as many, but nothing in the island, either because of its commonness, or perishableness, fit to supply the place of money; what reason could any one have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his family, and a plentiful supply to its consumption, either in what their own industry produced, or they could barter for like perishable, useful commodities, with others? where there is not some thing, both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land, were it never so rich, never so free for them to take: for i ask, what would a man value ten thousand, or an hundred thousand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of america, where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money to him by the sale of the product? it would not be worth the enclosing, and we should see him give up again to the wild common of nature, whatever was more than would supply the conveniencies of life to be had there for him and his family. sect. 49. thus in the beginning all the world was america, and more so than that is now; for no such thing as money was any where known. find out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions. sect. 50. but since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the consent of men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is plain, that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth, they having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out, a way how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any one; these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor. this partage of things in an inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out of the bounds of society, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of money: for in governments, the laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions. sect. 51. and thus, i think, it is very easy to conceive, without any difficulty, how labour could at first begin a title of property in the common things of nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it. so that there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it gave. right and conveniency went together; for as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of. this left no room for controversy about the title, nor for encroachment on the right of others; what portion a man carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was useless, as well as dishonest, to carve himself too much, or take more than he needed. chapter. vi. of paternal power. sect. 52. it may perhaps be censured as an impertinent criticism, in a discourse of this nature, to find fault with words and names, that have obtained in the world: and yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new ones, when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes, as this of paternal power probably has done, which seems so to place the power of parents over their children wholly in the father, as if the mother had no share in it; whereas, if we consult reason or revelation, we shall find, she hath an equal title. this may give one reason to ask, whether this might not be more properly called parental power? for whatever obligation nature and the right of generation lays on children, it must certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent causes of it. and accordingly we see the positive law of god every where joins them together, without distinction, when it commands the obedience of children, honour thy father and thy mother, exod. xx. 12. whosoever curseth his father or his mother, lev. xx. 9. ye shall fear every man his mother and his father, lev. xix. 3. children, obey your parents, &c. eph. vi. 1. is the stile of the old and new testament. sect. 53. had but this one thing been well considered, without looking any deeper into the matter, it might perhaps have kept men from running into those gross mistakes, they have made, about this power of parents; which, however it might, without any great harshness, bear the name of absolute dominion, and regal authority, when under the title of paternal power it seemed appropriated to the father, would yet have founded but oddly, and in the very name shewn the absurdity, if this supposed absolute power over children had been called parental; and thereby have discovered, that it belonged to the mother too: for it will but very ill serve the turn of those men, who contend so much for the absolute power and authority of the fatherhood, as they call it, that the mother should have any share in it; and it would have but ill supported the monarchy they contend for, when by the very name it appeared, that that fundamental authority, from whence they would derive their government of a single person only, was not placed in one, but two persons jointly. but to let this of names pass. sect. 54. though i have said above, chap. ii. that all men by nature are equal, i cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality: age or virtue may give men a just precedency: excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level: birth may subject some, and alliance or benefits others, to pay an observance to those to whom nature, gratitude, or other respects, may have made it due: and yet all this consists with the equality, which all men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another; which was the equality i there spoke of, as proper to the business in hand, being that equal right, that every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man. sect. 55. children, i confess, are not born in this full state of equality, though they are born to it. their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them, when they come into the world, and for some time after; but it is but a temporary one. the bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling clothes they are wrapt up in, and supported by, in the weakness of their infancy: age and reason as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free disposal. sect. 56. adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in full possession of their strength and reason, and so was capable, from the first instant of his being to provide for his own support and preservation, and govern his actions according to the dictates of the law of reason which god had implanted in him. from him the world is peopled with his descendants, who are all born infants, weak and helpless, without knowledge or understanding: but to supply the defects of this imperfect state, till the improvement of growth and age hath removed them, adam and eve, and after them all parents were, by the law of nature, under an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the children they had begotten; not as their own workmanship, but the workmanship of their own maker, the almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for them. sect. 57. the law, that was to govern adam, was the same that was to govern all his posterity, the law of reason. but his offspring having another way of entrance into the world, different from him, by a natural birth, that produced them ignorant and without the use of reason, they were not presently under that law; for no body can be under a law, which is not promulgated to him; and this law being promulgated or made known by reason only, he that is not come to the use of his reason, cannot be said to be under this law; and adam's children, being not presently as soon as born under this law of reason, were not presently free: for law, in its true notion, is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the general good of those under that law: could they be happier without it, the law, as an useless thing, would of itself vanish; and that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices. so that, however it may be mistaken, the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom: for in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law, there is no freedom: for liberty is, to be free from restraint and violence from others; which cannot be, where there is no law: but freedom is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to do what he lists: (for who could be free, when every other man's humour might domineer over him?) but a liberty to dispose, and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own. sect. 58. the power, then, that parents have over their children, arises from that duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their off-spring, during the imperfect state of childhood. to inform the mind, and govern the actions of their yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place, and ease them of that trouble, is what the children want, and the parents are bound to: for god having given man an understanding to direct his actions, has allowed him a freedom of will, and liberty of acting, as properly belonging thereunto, within the bounds of that law he is under. but whilst he is in an estate, wherein he has not understanding of his own to direct his will, he is not to have any will of his own to follow: he that understands for him, must will for him too; he must prescribe to his will, and regulate his actions; but when he comes to the estate that made his father a freeman, the son is a freeman too. sect. 59. this holds in all the laws a man is under, whether natural or civil. is a man under the law of nature? what made him free of that law? what gave him a free disposing of his property, according to his own will, within the compass of that law? i answer, a state of maturity wherein he might be supposed capable to know that law, that so he might keep his actions within the bounds of it. when he has acquired that state, he is presumed to know how far that law is to be his guide, and how far he may make use of his freedom, and so comes to have it; till then, some body else must guide him, who is presumed to know how far the law allows a liberty. if such a state of reason, such an age of discretion made him free, the same shall make his son free too. is a man under the law of england? what made him free of that law? that is, to have the liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions according to his own will, within the permission of that law? a capacity of knowing that law; which is supposed by that law, at the age of one and twenty years, and in some cases sooner. if this made the father free, it shall make the son free too. till then we see the law allows the son to have no will, but he is to be guided by the will of his father or guardian, who is to understand for him. and if the father die, and fail to substitute a deputy in his trust; if he hath not provided a tutor, to govern his son, during his minority, during his want of understanding, the law takes care to do it; some other must govern him, and be a will to him, till he hath attained to a state of freedom, and his understanding be fit to take the government of his will. but after that, the father and son are equally free as much as tutor and pupil after nonage; equally subjects of the same law together, without any dominion left in the father over the life, liberty, or estate of his son, whether they be only in the state and under the law of nature, or under the positive laws of an established government. sect. 60. but if, through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of nature, any one comes not to such a degree of reason, wherein he might be supposed capable of knowing the law, and so living within the rules of it, he is never capable of being a free man, he is never let loose to the disposure of his own will (because he knows no bounds to it, has not understanding, its proper guide) but is continued under the tuition and government of others, all the time his own understanding is uncapable of that charge. and so lunatics and ideots are never set free from the government of their parents; /# children, who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may have; and innocents which are excluded by a natural defect from ever having; thirdly, madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right reason to guide themselves, have for their guide, the reason that guideth other men which are tutors over them, to seek and procure their good for them, #/ says hooker, eccl. pol. lib. i. sec. 7. all which seems no more than that duty, which god and nature has laid on man, as well as other creatures, to preserve their offspring, till they can be able to shift for themselves, and will scarce amount to an instance or proof of parents regal authority. sect. 61. thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we have actually the exercise of either: age, that brings one, brings with it the other too. and thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist together, and are both founded on the same principle. a child is free by his father's title, by his father's understanding, which is to govern him till he hath it of his own. the freedom of a man at years of discretion, and the subjection of a child to his parents, whilst yet short of that age, are so consistent, and so distinguishable, that the most blinded contenders for monarchy, by right of fatherhood, cannot miss this difference; the most obstinate cannot but allow their consistency: for were their doctrine all true, were the right heir of adam now known, and by that title settled a monarch in his throne, invested with all the absolute unlimited power sir robert filmer talks of; if he should die as soon as his heir were born, must not the child, notwithstanding he were never so free, never so much sovereign, be in subjection to his mother and nurse, to tutors and governors, till age and education brought him reason and ability to govern himself and others? the necessities of his life, the health of his body, and the information of his mind, would require him to be directed by the will of others, and not his own; and yet will any one think, that this restraint and subjection were inconsistent with, or spoiled him of that liberty or sovereignty he had a right to, or gave away his empire to those who had the government of his nonage? this government over him only prepared him the better and sooner for it. if any body should ask me, when my son is of age to be free? i shall answer, just when his monarch is of age to govern. but at what time, says the judicious hooker, eccl. pol. l. i. sect. 6. a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws whereby he is then bound to guide his actions: this is a great deal more easy for sense to discern, than for any one by skill and learning to determine. sect. 62. common-wealths themselves take notice of, and allow, that there is a time when men are to begin to act like free men, and therefore till that time require not oaths of fealty, or allegiance, or other public owning of, or submission to the government of their countries. sect. 63. the freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to his own will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. to turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty, before he has reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free; but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as their's. this is that which puts the authority into the parents hands to govern the minority of their children. god hath made it their business to employ this care on their offspring, and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and concern to temper this power, to apply it, as his wisdom designed it, to the children's good, as long as they should need to be under it. sect. 64. but what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due to their off-spring into an absolute arbitrary dominion of the father, whose power reaches no farther, than by such a discipline, as he finds most effectual, to give such strength and health to their bodies, such vigour and rectitude to their minds, as may best fit his children to be most useful to themselves and others; and, if it be necessary to his condition, to make them work, when they are able, for their own subsistence. but in this power the mother too has her share with the father. sect. 65. nay, this power so little belongs to the father by any peculiar right of nature, but only as he is guardian of his children, that when he quits his care of them, he loses his power over them, which goes along with their nourishment and education, to which it is inseparably annexed; and it belongs as much to the foster-father of an exposed child, as to the natural father of another. so little power does the bare act of begetting give a man over his issue; if all his care ends there, and this be all the title he hath to the name and authority of a father. and what will become of this paternal power in that part of the world, where one woman hath more than one husband at a time? or in those parts of america, where, when the husband and wife part, which happens frequently, the children are all left to the mother, follow her, and are wholly under her care and provision? if the father die whilst the children are young, do they not naturally every where owe the same obedience to their mother, during their minority, as to their father were he alive? and will any one say, that the mother hath a legislative power over her children? that she can make standing rules, which shall be of perpetual obligation, by which they ought to regulate all the concerns of their property, and bound their liberty all the course of their lives? or can she inforce the observation of them with capital punishments? for this is the proper power of the magistrate, of which the father hath not so much as the shadow. his command over his children is but temporary, and reaches not their life or property: it is but a help to the weakness and imperfection of their nonage, a discipline necessary to their education: and though a father may dispose of his own possessions as he pleases, when his children are out of danger of perishing for want, yet his power extends not to the lives or goods, which either their own industry, or another's bounty has made their's; nor to their liberty neither, when they are once arrived to the infranchisement of the years of discretion. the father's empire then ceases, and he can from thence forwards no more dispose of the liberty of his son, than that of any other man: and it must be far from an absolute or perpetual jurisdiction, from which a man may withdraw himself, having license from divine authority to leave father and mother, and cleave to his wife. sect. 66. but though there be a time when a child comes to be as free from subjection to the will and command of his father, as the father himself is free from subjection to the will of any body else, and they are each under no other restraint, but that which is common to them both, whether it be the law of nature, or municipal law of their country; yet this freedom exempts not a son from that honour which he ought, by the law of god and nature, to pay his parents. god having made the parents instruments in his great design of continuing the race of mankind, and the occasions of life to their children; as he hath laid on them an obligation to nourish, preserve, and bring up their offspring; so he has laid on the children a perpetual obligation of honouring their parents, which containing in it an inward esteem and reverence to be shewn by all outward expressions, ties up the child from any thing that may ever injure or affront, disturb or endanger, the happiness or life of those from whom he received his; and engages him in all actions of defence, relief, assistance and comfort of those, by whose means he entered into being, and has been made capable of any enjoyments of life: from this obligation no state, no freedom can absolve children. but this is very far from giving parents a power of command over their children, or an authority to make laws and dispose as they please of their lives or liberties. it is one thing to owe honour, respect, gratitude and assistance; another to require an absolute obedience and submission. the honour due to parents, a monarch in his throne owes his mother; and yet this lessens not his authority, nor subjects him to her government. sect. 67. the subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary government, which terminates with the minority of the child: and the honour due from a child, places in the parents a perpetual right to respect, reverence, support and compliance too, more or less, as the father's care, cost, and kindness in his education, has been more or less. this ends not with minority, but holds in all parts and conditions of a man's life. the want of distinguishing these two powers, viz. that which the father hath in the right of tuition, during minority, and the right of honour all his life, may perhaps have caused a great part of the mistakes about this matter: for to speak properly of them, the first of these is rather the privilege of children, and duty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power. the nourishment and education of their children is a charge so incumbent on parents for their children's good, that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it: and though the power of commanding and chastising them go along with it, yet god hath woven into the principles of human nature such a tenderness for their off-spring, that there is little fear that parents should use their power with too much rigour; the excess is seldom on the severe side, the strong byass of nature drawing the other way. and therefore god almighty when he would express his gentle dealing with the israelites, he tells them, that though he chastened them, he chastened them as a man chastens his son, deut. viii. 5. i.e. with tenderness and affection, and kept them under no severer discipline than what was absolutely best for them, and had been less kindness to have slackened. this is that power to which children are commanded obedience, that the pains and care of their parents may not be increased, or ill rewarded. sect. 68. on the other side, honour and support, all that which gratitude requires to return for the benefits received by and from them, is the indispensable duty of the child, and the proper privilege of the parents. this is intended for the parents advantage, as the other is for the child's; though education, the parents duty, seems to have most power, because the ignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in need of restraint and correction; which is a visible exercise of rule, and a kind of dominion. and that duty which is comprehended in the word honour, requires less obedience, though the obligation be stronger on grown, than younger children: for who can think the command, children obey your parents, requires in a man, that has children of his own, the same submission to his father, as it does in his yet young children to him; and that by this precept he were bound to obey all his father's commands, if, out of a conceit of authority, he should have the indiscretion to treat him still as a boy? sect. 69. the first part then of paternal power, or rather duty, which is education, belongs so to the father, that it terminates at a certain season; when the business of education is over, it ceases of itself, and is also alienable before: for a man may put the tuition of his son in other hands; and he that has made his son an apprentice to another, has discharged him, during that time, of a great part of his obedience both to himself and to his mother. but all the duty of honour, the other part, remains never the less entire to them; nothing can cancel that: it is so inseparable from them both, that the father's authority cannot dispossess the mother of this right, nor can any man discharge his son from honouring her that bore him. but both these are very far from a power to make laws, and enforcing them with penalties, that may reach estate, liberty, limbs and life. the power of commanding ends with nonage; and though, after that, honour and respect, support and defence, and whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the highest benefits he is naturally capable of, be always due from a son to his parents; yet all this puts no scepter into the father's hand, no sovereign power of commanding. he has no dominion over his son's property, or actions; nor any right, that his will should prescribe to his son's in all things; however it may become his son in many things, not very inconvenient to him and his family, to pay a deference to it. sect. 70. a man may owe honour and respect to an ancient, or wise man; defence to his child or friend; relief and support to the distressed; and gratitude to a benefactor, to such a degree, that all he has, all he can do, cannot sufficiently pay it: but all these give no authority, no right to any one, of making laws over him from whom they are owing. and it is plain, all this is due not only to the bare title of father; not only because, as has been said, it is owing to the mother too; but because these obligations to parents, and the degrees of what is required of children, may be varied by the different care and kindness, trouble and expence, which is often employed upon one child more than another. sect. 71. this shews the reason how it comes to pass, that parents in societies, where they themselves are subjects, retain a power over their children, and have as much right to their subjection, as those who are in the state of nature. which could not possibly be, if all political power were only paternal, and that in truth they were one and the same thing: for then, all paternal power being in the prince, the subject could naturally have none of it. but these two powers, political and paternal, are so perfectly distinct and separate; are built upon so different foundations, and given to so different ends, that every subject that is a father, has as much a paternal power over his children, as the prince has over his: and every prince, that has parents, owes them as much filial duty and obedience, as the meanest of his subjects do to their's; and can therefore contain not any part or degree of that kind of dominion, which a prince or magistrate has over his subject. sect. 72. though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children, and the obligation on children to honour their parents, contain all the power on the one hand, and submission on the other, which are proper to this relation, yet there is another power ordinarily in the father, whereby he has a tie on the obedience of his children; which tho' it be common to him with other men, yet the occasions of shewing it, almost constantly happening to fathers in their private families, and the instances of it elsewhere being rare, and less taken notice of, it passes in the world for a part of paternal jurisdiction. and this is the power men generally have to bestow their estates on those who please them best; the possession of the father being the expectation and inheritance of the children, ordinarily in certain proportions, according to the law and custom of each country; yet it is commonly in the father's power to bestow it with a more sparing or liberal hand, according as the behaviour of this or that child hath comported with his will and humour. sect. 73. this is no small tie on the obedience of children: and there being always annexed to the enjoyment of land, a submission to the government of the country, of which that land is a part; it has been commonly supposed, that a father could oblige his posterity to that government, of which he himself was a subject, and that his compact held them; whereas, it being only a necessary condition annexed to the land, and the inheritance of an estate which is under that government, reaches only those who will take it on that condition, and so is no natural tie or engagement, but a voluntary submission: for every man's children being by nature as free as himself, or any of his ancestors ever were, may, whilst they are in that freedom, choose what society they will join themselves to, what commonwealth they will put themselves under. but if they will enjoy the inheritance of their ancestors, they must take it on the same terms their ancestors had it, and submit to all the conditions annexed to such a possession. by this power indeed fathers oblige their children to obedience to themselves, even when they are past minority, and most commonly too subject them to this or that political power: but neither of these by any peculiar right of fatherhood, but by the reward they have in their hands to inforce and recompence such a compliance; and is no more power than what a french man has over an english man, who by the hopes of an estate he will leave him, will certainly have a strong tie on his obedience: and if, when it is left him, he will enjoy it, he must certainly take it upon the conditions annexed to the possession of land in that country where it lies, whether it be france or england. sect. 74. to conclude then, tho' the father's power of commanding extends no farther than the minority of his children, and to a degree only fit for the discipline and government of that age; and tho' that honour and respect, and all that which the latins called piety, which they indispensably owe to their parents all their life-time, and in all estates, with all that support and defence is due to them, gives the father no power of governing, i.e. making laws and enacting penalties on his children; though by all this he has no dominion over the property or actions of his son: yet it is obvious to conceive how easy it was, in the first ages of the world, and in places still, where the thinness of people gives families leave to separate into unpossessed quarters, and they have room to remove or plant themselves in yet vacant habitations, for the father of the family to become the prince of it;* he had been a ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children: and since without some government it would be hard for them to live together, it was likeliest it should, by the express or tacit consent of the children when they were grown up, be in the father, where it seemed without any change barely to continue; when indeed nothing more was required to it, than the permitting the father to exercise alone, in his family, that executive power of the law of nature, which every free man naturally hath, and by that permission resigning up to him a monarchical power, whilst they remained in it. but that this was not by any paternal right, but only by the consent of his children, is evident from hence, that no body doubts, but if a stranger, whom chance or business had brought to his family, had there killed any of his children, or committed any other fact, he might condemn and put him to death, or other-wise have punished him, as well as any of his children; which it was impossible he should do by virtue of any paternal authority over one who was not his child, but by virtue of that executive power of the law of nature, which, as a man, he had a right to: and he alone could punish him in his family, where the respect of his children had laid by the exercise of such a power, to give way to the dignity and authority they were willing should remain in him, above the rest of his family. (*it is no improbable opinion therefore, which the archphilosopher was of, that the chief person in every houshold was always, as it were, a king: so when numbers of housholds joined themselves in civil societies together, kings were the first kind of governors amongst them, which is also, as it seemeth, the reason why the name of fathers continued still in them, who, of fathers, were made rulers; as also the ancient custom of governors to do as melchizedec, and being kings, to exercise the office of priests, which fathers did at the first, grew perhaps by the same occasion. howbeit, this is not the only kind of regiment that has been received in the world. the inconveniences of one kind have caused sundry others to be devised; so that in a word, all public regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have risen from the deliberate advice, consultation and composition between men, judging it convenient and behoveful; there being no impossibility in nature considered by itself, but that man might have lived without any public regiment, hooker's eccl. pol. lib. i. sect. 10.) sect. 75. thus it was easy, and almost natural for children, by a tacit, and scarce avoidable consent, to make way for the father's authority and government. they had been accustomed in their childhood to follow his direction, and to refer their little differences to him, and when they were men, who fitter to rule them? their little properties, and less covetousness, seldom afforded greater controversies; and when any should arise, where could they have a fitter umpire than he, by whose care they had every one been sustained and brought up, and who had a tenderness for them all? it is no wonder that they made no distinction betwixt minority and full age; nor looked after one and twenty, or any other age that might make them the free disposers of themselves and fortunes, when they could have no desire to be out of their pupilage: the government they had been under, during it, continued still to be more their protection than restraint; and they could no where find a greater security to their peace, liberties, and fortunes, than in the rule of a father. sect. 76. thus the natural fathers of families, by an insensible change, became the politic monarchs of them too: and as they chanced to live long, and leave able and worthy heirs, for several successions, or otherwise; so they laid the foundations of hereditary, or elective kingdoms, under several constitutions and manners, according as chance, contrivance, or occasions happened to mould them. but if princes have their titles in their fathers right, and it be a sufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political authority, because they commonly were those in whose hands we find, de facto, the exercise of government: i say, if this argument be good, it will as strongly prove, that all princes, nay princes only, ought to be priests, since it is as certain, that in the beginning, the father of the family was priest, as that he was ruler in his own houshold. chapter. vii. of political or civil society. sect. 77. god having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it. the first society was between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and children; to which, in time, that between master and servant came to be added: and though all these might, and commonly did meet together, and make up but one family, wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family; each of these, or all together, came short of political society, as we shall see, if we consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of these. sect. 78. conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman; and tho' it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one another's bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of interests too, as necessary not only to unite their care and affection, but also necessary to their common off-spring, who have a right to be nourished, and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves. sect. 79. for the end of conjunction, between male and female, being not barely procreation, but the continuation of the species; thisconjunction betwixt male and female ought to last, even after procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones, who are to be sustained by those that got them, till they are able to shift and provide for themselves. this rule, which the infinite wise maker hath set to the works of his hands, we find the inferior creatures steadily obey. in those viviparous animals which feed on grass, the conjunction between male and female lasts no longer than the very act of copulation; because the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish the young, till it be able to feed on grass, the male only begets, but concerns not himself for the female or young, to whose sustenance he can contribute nothing. but in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer: because the dam not being able well to subsist herself, and nourish her numerous off-spring by her own prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more dangerous way of living, than by feeding on grass, the assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family, which cannot subsist till they are able to prey for themselves, but by the joint care of male and female. the same is to be observed in all birds, (except some domestic ones, where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding, and taking care of the young brood) whose young needing food in the nest, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are able to use their wing, and provide for themselves. sect. 80. and herein i think lies the chief, if not the only reason, why the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other creatures, viz. because the female is capable of conceiving, and de facto is commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, long before the former is out of a dependency for support on his parents help, and able to shift for himself, and has all the assistance is due to him from his parents: whereby the father, who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is under an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same woman longer than other creatures, whose young being able to subsist of themselves, before the time of procreation returns again, the conjugal bond dissolves of itself, and they are at liberty, till hymen at his usual anniversary season summons them again to chuse new mates. wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great creator, who having given to man foresight, and an ability to lay up for the future, as well as to supply the present necessity, hath made it necessary, that society of man and wife should be more lasting, than of male and female amongst other creatures; that so their industry might be encouraged, and their interest better united, to make provision and lay up goods for their common issue, which uncertain mixture, or easy and frequent solutions of conjugal society would mightily disturb. sect. 81. but tho' these are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man, than the other species of animals; yet it would give one reason to enquire, why this compact, where procreation and education are secured, and inheritance taken care for, may not be made determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should always be for life; i mean, to such as are under no restraint of any positive law, which ordains all such contracts to be perpetual. sect. 82. but the husband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore being necessary that the last determination, i. e. the rule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally falls to the man's share, as the abler and the stronger. but this reaching but to the things of their common interest and property, leaves the wife in the full and free possession of what by contract is her peculiar right, and gives the husband no more power over her life than she has over his; the power of the husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch, that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate from him, where natural right, or their contract allows it; whether that contract be made by themselves in the state of nature, or by the customs or laws of the country they live in; and the children upon such separation fall to the father or mother's lot, as such contract does determine. sect. 83. for all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under politic government, as well as in the state of nature, the civil magistrate doth not abridge the right or power of either naturally necessary to those ends, viz. procreation and mutual support and assistance whilst they are together; but only decides any controversy that may arise between man and wife about them. if it were otherwise, and that absolute sovereignty and power of life and death naturally belonged to the husband, and were necessary to the society between man and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of those countries where the husband is allowed no such absolute authority. but the ends of matrimony requiring no such power in the husband, the condition of conjugal society put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that state. conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends without it; nay, community of goods, and the power over them, mutual assistance and maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal society, might be varied and regulated by that contract which unites man and wife in that society, as far as may consist with procreation and the bringing up of children till they could shift for themselves; nothing being necessary to any society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made. sect. 84. the society betwixt parents and children, and the distinct rights and powers belonging respectively to them, i have treated of so largely, in the foregoing chapter, that i shall not here need to say any thing of it. and i think it is plain, that it is far different from a politic society. sect. 85. master and servant are names as old as history, but given to those of far different condition; for a freeman makes himself a servant to another, by selling him, for a certain time, the service he undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he is to receive: and though this commonly puts him into the family of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof; yet it gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no greater than what is contained in the contract between them. but there is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. these men having, as i say, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their estates; and being in the state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society; the chief end whereof is the preservation of property. sect. 86. let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, united under the domestic rule of a family; which, what resemblance soever it may have in its order, offices, and number too, with a little commonwealth, yet is very far from it, both in its constitution, power and end: or if it must be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the absolute monarch in it, absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered and short power, when it is plain, by what has been said before, that the master of the family has a very distinct and differently limited power, both as to time and extent, over those several persons that are in it; for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family, and his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death over any of them, and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he. and he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family, who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. but how a family, or any other society of men, differ from that which is properly political society, we shall best see, by considering wherein political society itself consists. sect. 87. man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. but because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and there only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it. and thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not, in political society together. those who are united into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another: but those who have no such common appeal, i mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as i have before shewed it, the perfect state of nature. sect. 88. and thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that society, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war and peace;) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. but though every man who has entered into civil society, and is become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given up to the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the commonwealth to employ his force, for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his own judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. and herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be punished, when committed within the commonwealth; and also to determine, by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ all the force of all the members, when there shall be need. sect. 89. where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society. and this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme government; or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. and this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. and where-ever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature. sect. 90. hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the society ought to obey;* where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion. (*the public power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society; and the principal use of that power is, to give laws unto all that are under it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless there be reason shewed which may necessarily inforce, that the law of reason, or of god, doth enjoin the contrary, hook. eccl. pol. l. i. sect. 16.) sect. 91. for he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any injury or inconviency, that may be suffered from the prince, or by his order: so that such a man, however intitled, czar, or grand seignior, or how you please, is as much in the state of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind: for where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and common judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in the state of* nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the subject, or rather slave of an absolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in society ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so is exposed to all the misery and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and armed with power. (*to take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e. such as attend men in the state of nature, there was no way but only by growing into composition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind of govemment public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govem, by them the peace, tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be procured. men always knew that where force and injury was offered, they might be defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may seek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be withstood. finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards himself, and them whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common consent, all to be ordered by some, whom they should agree upon, without which consent there would be no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another, hooker's eccl. pol. l. i. sect. 10.) sect. 92. for he that thinks absolute power purifies men's blood, and corrects the baseness of human nature, need read but the history of this, or any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. he that would have been insolent and injurious in the woods of america, would not probably be much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out to justify all that he shall do to his subjects, and the sword presently silence all those that dare question it: for what the protection of absolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be and to what a degree of happiness and security it carries civil society, where this sort of government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation of ceylon, may easily see. sect. 93. in absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of the world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controversies, and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects themselves, one amongst another. this every one thinks necessary, and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind, who should go about to take it away. but whether this be from a true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no more than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may and naturally must do, keep those animals from hurting, or destroying one another, who labour and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out of any love the master has for them, but love of himself, and the profit they bring him: for if it be asked, what security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler? the very question can scarce be borne. they are ready to tell you, that it deserves death only to ask after safety. betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. to ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the voice of faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. this is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions. sect. 94. but whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people's understandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they perceive, that any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil society which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against any harm, they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon as they can, to have that safety and security in civil society, for which it was first instituted, and for which only they entered into it. and therefore, though perhaps at first, (as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this discourse) some one good and excellent man having got a pre-eminency amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his hands, without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade us) sacredness of customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing innocence of the first ages began, had brought in successors of another stamp, the people finding their properties not secure under the government, as then it was, (whereas government has no other end but the preservation of* property) could never be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men, call them senate, parliament, or what you please. by which means every single person became subject, equally with other the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative, had established; nor could any one, by his own authority; avoid the force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption, thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of any of his dependents.** no man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it: for if any man may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redress or security against any harm he shall do; i ask, whether he be not perfectly still in the state of nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society; unless any one will say, the state of nature and civil society are one and the same thing, which i have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm. (*at the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed, it may be that nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of goveming, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, which were to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the sore, which it should have cured. they saw, that to live by one man's will, became the cause of all men's misery. this constrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. hooker's eccl. pol. l. i. sect. 10.) (**civil law being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore over-rule each several part of the same body. hooker, ibid.) chapter. viii. of the beginning of political societies. sect. 95. men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. the only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it. this any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. when any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest. sect. 96. for when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. and therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole. sect. 97. and thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of nature. for what appearance would there be of any compact? what new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent to? this would be still as great a liberty, as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state of nature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit. sect. 98. for if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole: but such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had, if we consider the infirmities of health, and avocations of business, which in a number, though much less than that of a commonwealth, will necessarily keep many away from the public assembly. to which if we add the variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, the coming into society upon such terms would be only like cato's coming into the theatre, only to go out again. such a constitution as this would make the mighty leviathan of a shorter duration, than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was born in: which cannot be supposed, till we can think, that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved: for where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again. sect. 99. whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the community, unless they expresly agreed in any number greater than the majority. and this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. and thus that, which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. and this is that, and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world. sect. 100. to this i find two objections made. first, that there are no instances to be found in story, of a company of men independent, and equal one amongst another, that met together, and in this way began and set up a government. secondly, it is impossible of right, that men should do so, because all men being born under government, they are to submit to that, and are not at liberty to begin a new one. sect. 101. to the first there is this to answer, that it is not at all to be wondered, that history gives us but a very little account of men, that lived together in the state of nature. the inconveniences of that condition, and the love and want of society, no sooner brought any number of them together, but they presently united and incorporated, if they designed to continue together. and if we may not suppose men ever to have been in the state of nature, because we hear not much of them in such a state, we may as well suppose the armies of salmanasser or xerxes were never children, because we hear little of them, till they were men, and imbodied in armies. government is every where antecedent to records, and letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuation of civil society has, by other more necessary arts, provided for their safety, ease, and plenty: and then they begin to look after the history of their founders, and search into their original, when they have outlived the memory of it: for it is with commonwealths as with particular persons, they are commonly ignorant of their own births and infancies: and if they know any thing of their original, they are beholden for it, to the accidental records that others have kept of it. and those that we have, of the beginning of any polities in the world, excepting that of the jews, where god himself immediately interposed, and which favours not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain instances of such a beginning as i have mentioned, or at least have manifest footsteps of it. sect. 102. he must shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact, when it agrees not with his hypothesis, who will not allow, that the beginning of rome and venice were by the uniting together of several men free and independent one of another, amongst whom there was no natural superiority or subjection. and if josephus acosta's word may be taken, he tells us, that in many parts of america there was no government at all. there are great and apparent conjectures, says he, that these men, speaking of those of peru, for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths, but lived in troops, as they do this day in florida, the cheriquanas, those of brazil, and many other nations, which have no certain kings, but as occasion is offered, in peace or war, they choose their captains as they please, 1. i. c. 25. if it be said, that every man there was born subject to his father, or the head of his family; that the subjection due from a child to a father took not away his freedom of uniting into what political society he thought fit, has been already proved. but be that as it will, these men, it is evident, were actually free; and whatever superiority some politicians now would place in any of them, they themselves claimed it not, but by consent were all equal, till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves. so that their politic societies all began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governors, and forms of government. sect. 103. and i hope those who went away from sparta with palantus, mentioned by justin, 1. iii. c. 4. will be allowed to have been freemen independent one of another, and to have set up a government over themselves, by their own consent. thus i have given several examples, out of history, of people free and in the state of nature, that being met together incorporated and began a commonwealth. and if the want of such instances be an argument to prove that government were not, nor could not be so begun, i suppose the contenders for paternal empire were better let it alone, than urge it against natural liberty: for if they can give so many instances, out of history, of governments begun upon paternal right, i think (though at best an argument from what has been, to what should of right be, has no great force) one might, without any great danger, yield them the cause. but if i might advise them in the case, they would do well not to search too much into the original of governments, as they have begun de facto, lest they should find, at the foundation of most of them, something very little favourable to the design they promote, and such a power as they contend for. sect. 104. but to conclude, reason being plain on our side, that men are naturally free, and the examples of history shewing, that the governments of the world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning laid on that foundation, and were made by the consent of the people; there can be little room for doubt, either where the right is, or what has been the opinion, or practice of mankind, about the first erecting of governments. sect. 105. i will not deny, that if we look back as far as history will direct us, towards the original of commonwealths, we shall generally find them under the government and administration of one man. and i am also apt to believe, that where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself, and continued entire together, without mixing with others, as it often happens, where there is much land, and few people, the government commonly began in the father: for the father having, by the law of nature, the same power with every man else to punish, as he thought fit, any offences against that law, might thereby punish his transgressing children, even when they were men, and out of their pupilage; and they were very likely to submit to his punishment, and all join with him against the offender, in their turns, giving him thereby power to execute his sentence against any transgression, and so in effect make him the law-maker, and governor over all that remained in conjunction with his family. he was fittest to be trusted; paternal affection secured their property and interest under his care; and the custom of obeying him, in their childhood, made it easier to submit to him, rather than to any other. if therefore they must have one to rule them, as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live together; who so likely to be the man as he that was their common father; unless negligence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body made him unfit for it? but when either the father died, and left his next heir, for want of age, wisdom, courage, or any other qualities, less fit for rule; or where several families met, and consented to continue together; there, it is not to be doubted, but they used their natural freedom, to set up him, whom they judged the ablest, and most likely, to rule well over them. conformable hereunto we find the people of america, who (living out of the reach of the conquering swords, and spreading domination of the two great empires of peru and mexico) enjoyed their own natural freedom, though, caeteris paribus, they commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king; yet if they find him any way weak, or uncapable, they pass him by, and set up the stoutest and bravest man for their ruler. sect. 106. thus, though looking back as far as records give us any account of peopling the world, and the history of nations, we commonly find the government to be in one hand; yet it destroys not that which i affirm, viz. that the beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals, to join into, and make one society; who, when they are thus incorporated, might set up what form of government they thought fit. but this having given occasion to men to mistake, and think, that by nature government was monarchical, and belonged to the father, it may not be amiss here to consider, why people in the beginning generally pitched upon this form, which though perhaps the father's pre-eminency might, in the first institution of some commonwealths, give a rise to, and place in the beginning, the power in one hand; yet it is plain that the reason, that continued the form of government in a single person, was not any regard, or respect to paternal authority; since all petty monarchies, that is, almost all monarchies, near their original, have been commonly, at least upon occasion, elective. sect. 107. first then, in the beginning of things, the father's government of the childhood of those sprung from him, having accustomed them to the rule of one man, and taught them that where it was exercised with care and skill, with affection and love to those under it, it was sufficient to procure and preserve to men all the political happiness they sought for in society. it was no wonder that they should pitch upon, and naturally run into that form of government, which from their infancy they had been all accustomed to; and which, by experience, they had found both easy and safe. to which, if we add, that monarchy being simple, and most obvious to men, whom neither experience had instructed in forms of government, nor the ambition or insolence of empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative, or the inconveniences of absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt to lay claim to, and bring upon them, it was not at all strange, that they should not much trouble themselves to think of methods of restraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given the authority over them, and of balancing the power of government, by placing several parts of it in different hands. they had neither felt the oppression of tyrannical dominion, nor did the fashion of the age, nor their possessions, or way of living, (which afforded little matter for covetousness or ambition) give them any reason to apprehend or provide against it; and therefore it is no wonder they put themselves into such a frame of government, as was not only, as i said, most obvious and simple, but also best suited to their present state and condition; which stood more in need of defence against foreign invasions and injuries, than of multiplicity of laws. the equality of a simple poor way of living, confining their desires within the narrow bounds of each man's small property, made few controversies, and so no need of many laws to decide them, or variety of officers to superintend the process, or look after the execution of justice, where there were but few trespasses, and few offenders. since then those, who like one another so well as to join into society, cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together, and some trust one in another; they could not but have greater apprehensions of others, than of one another: and therefore their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves against foreign force. it was natural for them to put themselves under a frame of government which might best serve to that end, and chuse the wisest and bravest man to conduct them in their wars, and lead them out against their enemies, and in this chiefly be their ruler. sect. 108. thus we see, that the kings of the indians in america, which is still a pattern of the first ages in asia and europe, whilst the inhabitants were too few for the country, and want of people and money gave men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land, or contest for wider extent of ground, are little more than generals of their armies; and though they command absolutely in war, yet at home and in time of peace they exercise very little dominion, and have but a very moderate sovereignty, the resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people, or in a council. tho' the war itself, which admits not of plurality of governors, naturally devolves the command into the king's sole authority. sect. 109. and thus in israel itself, the chief business of their judges, and first kings, seems to have been to be captains in war, and leaders of their armies; which (besides what is signified by going out and in before the people, which was, to march forth to war, and home again in the heads of their forces) appears plainly in the story of jephtha. the ammonites making war upon israel, the gileadites in fear send to jephtha, a bastard of their family whom they had cast off, and article with him, if he will assist them against the ammonites, to make him their ruler; which they do in these words, and the people made him head and captain over them, judg. xi, 11. which was, as it seems, all one as to be judge. and he judged israel, judg. xii. 7. that is, was their captain-general six years. so when jotham upbraids the shechemites with the obligation they had to gideon, who had been their judge and ruler, he tells them, he fought for you, and adventured his life far, and delivered you out of the hands of midian, judg. ix. 17. nothing mentioned of him but what he did as a general: and indeed that is all is found in his history, or in any of the rest of the judges. and abimelech particularly is called king, though at most he was but their general. and when, being weary of the ill conduct of samuel's sons, the children of israel desired a king, like all the nations to judge them, and to go out before them, and to fight their battles, i. sam viii. 20. god granting their desire, says to samuel, i will send thee a man, and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over my people israel, that he may save my people out of the hands of the philistines, ix. 16. as if the only business of a king had been to lead out their armies, and fight in their defence; and accordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon him, declares to saul, that the lord had anointed him to be captain over his inheritance, x. 1. and therefore those, who after saul's being solemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at mispah, were unwilling to have him their king, made no other objection but this, how shall this man save us? v. 27. as if they should have said, this man is unfit to be our king, not having skill and conduct enough in war, to be able to defend us. and when god resolved to transfer the government to david, it is in these words, but now thy kingdom shall not continue: the lord hath sought him a man after his own heart, and the lord hath commanded him to be captain over his people, xiii. 14. as if the whole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their general: and therefore the tribes who had stuck to saul's family, and opposed david's reign, when they came to hebron with terms of submission to him, they tell him, amongst other arguments they had to submit to him as to their king, that he was in effect their king in saul's time, and therefore they had no reason but to receive him as their king now. also (say they) in time past, when saul was king over us, thou wast he that reddest out and broughtest in israel, and the lord said unto thee, thou shalt feed my people israel, and thou shalt be a captain over israel. sect. 110. thus, whether a family by degrees grew up into a commonwealth, and the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder son, every one in his turn growing up under it, tacitly submitted to it, and the easiness and equality of it not offending any one, every one acquiesced, till time seemed to have confirmed it, and settled a right of succession by prescription: or whether several families, or the descendants of several families, whom chance, neighbourhood, or business brought together, uniting into society, the need of a general, whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in war, and the great confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age, (such as are almost all those which begin governments, that ever come to last in the world) gave men one of another, made the first beginners of commonwealths generally put the rule into one man's hand, without any other express limitation or restraint, but what the nature of the thing, and the end of government required: which ever of those it was that at first put the rule into the hands of a single person, certain it is no body was intrusted with it but for the public good and safety, and to those ends, in the infancies of commonwealths, those who had it commonly used it. and unless they had done so, young societies could not have subsisted; without such nursing fathers tender and careful of the public weal, all governments would have sunk under the weakness and infirmities of their infancy, and the prince and the people had soon perished together. sect. 111. but though the golden age (before vain ambition, and amor sceleratus habendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted men's minds into a mistake of true power and honour) had more virtue, and consequently better governors, as well as less vicious subjects, and there was then no stretching prerogative on the one side, to oppress the people; nor consequently on the other, any dispute about privilege, to lessen or restrain the power of the magistrate, and so no contest betwixt rulers and people about governors or government: yet, when ambition and luxury in future ages* would retain and increase the power, without doing the business for which it was given; and aided by flattery, taught princes to have distinct and separate interests from their people, men found it necessary to examine more carefully the original and rights of government; and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances, and prevent the abuses of that power, which they having intrusted in another's hands only for their own good, they found was made use of to hurt them. (*at first, when some certain kind of regiment was once approved, it may be nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of governing, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion which were to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the sore which it should have cured. they saw, that to live by one man's will, became the cause of all men's misery. this constrained them to come unto laws wherein all men might see their duty before hand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. hooker's eccl. pol. l. i. sect. 10.) sect. 112. thus we may see how probable it is, that people that were naturally free, and by their own consent either submitted to the government of their father, or united together out of different families to make a government, should generally put the rule into one man's hands, and chuse to be under the conduct of a single person, without so much as by express conditions limiting or regulating his power, which they thought safe enough in his honesty and prudence; though they never dreamed of monarchy being lure divino, which we never heard of among mankind, till it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age; nor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion, or to be the foundation of all government. and thus much may suffice to shew, that as far as we have any light from history, we have reason to conclude, that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people. i say peaceful, because i shall have occasion in another place to speak of conquest, which some esteem a way of beginning of governments. the other objection i find urged against the beginning of polities, in the way i have mentioned, is this, viz. sect. 113. that all men being born under government, some or other, it is impossible any of them should ever be free, and at liberty to unite together, and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful government. if this argument be good; i ask, how came so many lawful monarchies into the world? for if any body, upon this supposition, can shew me any one man in any age of the world free to begin a lawful monarchy, i will be bound to shew him ten other free men at liberty, at the same time to unite and begin a new government under a regal, or any other form; it being demonstration, that if any one, born under the dominion of another, may be so free as to have a right to command others in a new and distinct empire, every one that is born under the dominion of another may be so free too, and may become a ruler, or subject, of a distinct separate government. and so by this their own principle, either all men, however born, are free, or else there is but one lawful prince, one lawful government in the world. and then they have nothing to do, but barely to shew us which that is; which when they have done, i doubt not but all mankind will easily agree to pay obedience to him. sect. 114. though it be a sufficient answer to their objection, to shew that it involves them in the same difficulties that it doth those they use it against; yet i shall endeavour to discover the weakness of this argument a little farther. all men, say they, are born under government, and therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one. every one is born a subject to his father, or his prince, and is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection and allegiance. it is plain mankind never owned nor considered any such natural subjection that they were born in, to one or to the other that tied them, without their own consents, to a subjection to them and their heirs. sect. 115. for there are no examples so frequent in history, both sacred and profane, as those of men withdrawing themselves, and their obedience, from the jurisdiction they were born under, and the family or community they were bred up in, and setting up new governments in other places; from whence sprang all that number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of ages, and which always multiplied, as long as there was room enough, till the stronger, or more fortunate, swallowed the weaker; and those great ones again breaking to pieces, dissolved into lesser dominions. all which are so many testimonies against paternal sovereignty, and plainly prove, that it was not the natural right of the father descending to his heirs, that made governments in the beginning, since it was impossible, upon that ground, there should have been so many little kingdoms; all must have been but only one universal monarchy, if men had not been at liberty to separate themselves from their families, and the government, be it what it will, that was set up in it, and go and make distinct commonwealths and other governments, as they thought fit. sect. 116. this has been the practice of the world from its first beginning to this day; nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind, that they are born under constituted and ancient polities, that have established laws, and set forms of government, than if they were born in the woods, amongst the unconfined inhabitants, that run loose in them: for those, who would persuade us, that by being born under any government, we are naturally subjects to it, and have no more any title or pretence to the freedom of the state of nature, have no other reason (bating that of paternal power, which we have already answered) to produce for it, but only, because our fathers or progenitors passed away their natural liberty, and thereby bound up themselves and their posterity to a perpetual subjection to the government, which they themselves submitted to. it is true, that whatever engagements or promises any one has made for himself, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot, by any compact whatsoever, bind his children or posterity: for his son, when a man, being altogether as free as the father, any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the son, than it can of any body else: he may indeed annex such conditions to the land, he enjoyed as a subject of any commonwealth, as may oblige his son to be of that community, if he will enjoy those possessions which were his father's; because that estate being his father's property, he may dispose, or settle it, as he pleases. sect. 117. and this has generally given the occasion to mistake in this matter; because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be dismembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community, the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father, but under the same terms his father did, by becoming a member of the society; whereby he puts himself presently under the government he finds there established, as much as any other subject of that commonwealth. and thus the consent of freemen, born under government, which only makes them members of it, being given separately in their turns, as each comes to be of age, and not in a multitude together; people take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not necessary, conclude they are naturally subjects as they are men. sect. 118. but, it is plain, governments themselves understand it otherwise; they claim no power over the son, because of that they had over the father; nor look on children as being their subjects, by their fathers being so. if a subject of england have a child, by an english woman in france, whose subject is he? not the king of england's; for he must have leave to be admitted to the privileges of it: nor the king of france's; for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away, and breed him as he pleases? and who ever was judged as a traytor or deserter, if he left, or warred against a country, for being barely born in it of parents that were aliens there? it is plain then, by the practice of governments themselves, as well as by the law of right reason, that a child is born a subject of no country or government. he is under his father's tuition and authority, till he comes to age of discretion; and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he will put himself under, what body politic he will unite himself to: for if an englishman's son, born in france, be at liberty, and may do so, it is evident there is no tie upon him by his father's being a subject of this kingdom; nor is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors. and why then hath not his son, by the same reason, the same liberty, though he be born any where else? since the power that a father hath naturally over his children, is the same, where-ever they be born, and the ties of natural obligations, are not bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths. sect. 119. every man being, as has been shewed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only his own consent; it is to be considered, what shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent, to make him subject to the laws of any government. there is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent, which will concern our present case. no body doubts but an express consent, of any man entering into any society, makes him a perfect member of that society, a subject of that government. the difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e. how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no expressions of it at all. and to this i say, that every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government. sect. 120. to understand this the better, it is fit to consider, that every man, when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth, he, by his uniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits to the community, those possessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do not already belong to any other government: for it would be a direct contradiction, for any one to enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of property; and yet to suppose his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws of the society, should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government, to which he himself, the proprietor of the land, is a subject. by the same act therefore, whereby any one unites his person, which was before free, to any commonwealth, by the same he unites his possessions, which were before free, to it also; and they become, both of them, person and possession, subject to the government and dominion of that commonwealth, as long as it hath a being. whoever therefore, from thenceforth, by inheritance, purchase, permission, or otherways, enjoys any part of the land, so annexed to, and under the government of that commonwealth, must take it with the condition it is under; that is, of submitting to the government of the commonwealth, under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any subject of it. sect. 121. but since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over the land, and reaches the possessor of it, (before he has actually incorporated himself in the society) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys that; the obligation any one is under, by virtue of such enjoyment, to submit to the government, begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that whenever the owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit consent to the government, will, by donation, sale, or otherwise, quit the said possession, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth; or to agree with others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the world, they can find free and unpossessed: whereas he, that has once, by actual agreement, and any express declaration, given his consent to be of any commonwealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the state of nature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was under comes to be dissolved; or else by some public act cuts him off from being any longer a member of it. sect. 122. but submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, and enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of that society: this is only a local protection and homage due to and from all those, who, not being in a state of war, come within the territories belonging to any government, to all parts whereof the force of its laws extends. but this no more makes a man a member of that society, a perpetual subject of that commonwealth, than it would make a man a subject to another, in whose family he found it convenient to abide for some time; though, whilst he continued in it, he were obliged to comply with the laws, and submit to the government he found there. and thus we see, that foreigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in conscience, to submit to its administration, as far forth as any denison; yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that commonwealth. nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive engagement, and express promise and compact. this is that, which i think, concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent which makes any one a member of any commonwealth. chapter. ix. of the ends of political society and government. sect. 123. if man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other power? to which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. this makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which i call by the general name, property. sect. 124. the great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting. first, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases. sect. 125. secondly, in the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law: for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's. sect. 126. thirdly, in the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution, they who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it. sect. 127. thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society. hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. the inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. it is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. and in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the governments and societies themselves. sect. 128. for in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers. the first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and others within the permission of the law of nature: by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. and were it not for the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations. the other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law. both these he gives up, when he joins in a private, if i may so call it, or particular politic society, and incorporates into any commonwealth, separate from the rest of mankind. sect. 129. the first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature. sect. 130. secondly, the power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the society do the like. sect. 131. but though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. and so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. and all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people. chapter. x. of the forms of a common-wealth. sect. 132. the majority having, as has been shewed, upon men's first uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy: or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors; and then it is an oligarchy: or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor to return to them; an elective monarchy. and so accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. and if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert to them again; when it is so reverted, the community may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please, and so constitute a new form of government: for the form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power, which is the legislative, it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws, according as the power of making laws is placed, such is the form of the commonwealth. sect. 133. by commonwealth, i must be understood all along to mean, not a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community, which the latines signified by the word civitas, to which the word which best answers in our language, is commonwealth, and most properly expresses such a society of men, which community or city in english does not; for there may be subordinate communities in a government; and city amongst us has a quite different notion from commonwealth: and therefore, to avoid ambiguity, i crave leave to use the word commonwealth in that sense, in which i find it used by king james the first; and i take it to be its genuine signification; which if any body dislike, i consent with him to change it for a better. chapter. xi. of the extent of the legislative power. sect. 134. the great end of men's entering into society, being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society; the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power; as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it. this legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without this the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a law,* the consent of the society, over whom no body can have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received from them; and therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts: nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society, which is not the supreme. (*the lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men, belonging so properly unto the same intire societies, that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of himself, and not by express commission immediately and personally received from god, or else by authority derived at the first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere tyranny. laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not made so. hooker's eccl. pol. l. i. sect. 10. of this point therefore we are to note, that such men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent, we could in such sort be at no man's commandment living. and to be commanded we do consent, when that society, whereof we be a part, hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement. laws therefore human, of what kind so ever, are available by consent. ibid.) sect. 135. though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being, or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power in every commonwealth; yet: first, it is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society, and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. a man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society. it is a power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects.* the obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them, to inforce their observation. thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. the rules that they make for other men's actions, must, as well as their own and other men's actions, be conformable to the law of nature, i.e. to the will of god, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against it. (*two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one a natural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other an order, expresly or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner of their union in living together: the latter is that which we call the law of a common-weal, the very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and set on work in such actions as the common good requireth. laws politic, ordained for external order and regiment amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common good, for which societies are instituted. unless they do this, they are not perfect. hooker's eccl. pol. l. i. sect. 10.) sect. 136. secondly, the legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to its self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges:* for the law of nature being unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of men, they who through passion or interest shall miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge: and so it serves not, as it ought, to determine the rights, and fence the properties of those that live under it, especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own case: and he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries, or to punish delinquents. to avoid these inconveniences, which disorder men's propperties in the state of nature, men unite into societies, that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. to this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society which they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the state of nature. (*human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must direct, howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules to be measured by, which rules are two, the law of god, and the law of nature; so that laws human must be made according to the general laws of nature, and without contradiction to any positive law of scripture, otherwise they are ill made. hooker's eccl. pol. l. iii. sect. 9. to constrain men to any thing inconvenient doth seem unreasonable. ibid. l. i. sect. 10.) sect. 137. absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. it cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them. this were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man, or many in combination. whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him, to make a prey of them when he pleases; he being in a much worse condition, who is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of 100,000, than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 single men; no body being secure, that his will, who has such a command, is better than that of other men, though his force be 100,000 times stronger. and therefore, whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions: for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature, if they shall have armed one, or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment unknown wills, without having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions: for all the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds, and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to such purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly. sect. 138. thirdly, the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering into society, which was the end for which they entered into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to own. men therefore in society having property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are their's, that no body hath a right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent: without this they have no property at all; for i have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent. hence it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. this is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists, wholly or in part, in assemblies which are variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the assembly, are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the rest. but in governments, where the legislative is in one lasting assembly always in being, or in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there is danger still, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community; and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power, by taking what they think fit from the people: for a man's property is not at all secure, tho' there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands those subjects have power to take from any private man, what part he pleases of his property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks good. sect. 139. but government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as i have before shewed, intrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men might have and secure their properties; the prince, or senate, however it may have power to make laws, for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or any part of the subjects property, without their own consent: for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all. and to let us see, that even absolute power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited by that reason, and confined to those ends, which required it in some cases to be absolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of martial discipline: for the preservation of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see, that neither the serjeant, that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach, where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or for not obeying the most desperate orders, can yet, with all his absolute power of life and death, dispose of one farthing of that soldier's estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command any thing, and hang for the least disobedience; because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end, for which the commander has his power, viz. the preservation of the rest; but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do with it. sect. 140. it is true, governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection, should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. but still it must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves, or their representatives chosen by them: for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, and subverts the end of government: for what property have i in that, which another may by right take, when he pleases, to himself? sect. 141. fourthly, the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. the people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. and when the people have said, we will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them. the power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in other hands. sect. 142. these are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the society, and the law of god and nature, have set to the legislative power of every commonwealth, in all forms of government. first, they are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough. secondly, these laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately, but the good of the people. thirdly, they must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of the people, given by themselves, or their deputies. and this properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves. fourthly, the legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body else, or place it any where, but where the people have. chapter. xii. of the legislative, executive, and federative power of the common-wealth. sect. 143. the legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it. but because those laws which are constantly to be executed, and whose force is always to continue, may be made in a little time; therefore there is no need, that the legislative should be always in being, not having always business to do. and because it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making, and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of society and government: therefore in wellordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered, as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons, who duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when they have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that they make them for the public good. sect. 144. but because the laws, that are at once, and in a short time made, have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution, or an attendance thereunto; therefore it is necessary there should be a power always in being, which should see to the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force. and thus the legislative and executive power come often to be separated. sect. 145. there is another power in every commonwealth, which one may call natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man naturally had before he entered into society: for though in a commonwealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another, and as such as governed by the laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest of mankind, they make one body, which is, as every member of it before was, still in the state of nature with the rest of mankind. hence it is, that the controversies that happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it, are managed by the public; and an injury done to a member of their body, engages the whole in the reparation of it. so that under this consideration, the whole community is one body in the state of nature, in respect of all other states or persons out of its community. sect. 146. this therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities without the commonwealth, and may be called federative, if any one pleases. so the thing be understood, i am indifferent as to the name. sect. 147. these two powers, executive and federative, though they be really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society within its self, upon all that are parts of it; the other the management of the security and interest of the public without, with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are always almost united. and though this federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the executive; and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good: for the laws that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct their actions, may well enough precede them. but what is to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those, who have this power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill, for the advantage of the commonwealth. sect. 148. though, as i said, the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated, and placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct persons: for both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands; or that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons, that might act separately, whereby the force of the public would be under different commands: which would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin. chapter. xiii. of the subordination of the powers of the common-wealth. sect. 149. though in a constituted commonwealth, standing upon its own basis, and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for the preservation of the community, there can be but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them: for all power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and security. and thus the community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of any body, even of their legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish, or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject: for no man or society of men, having a power to deliver up their preservation, or consequently the means of it, to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another; when ever any one shall go about to bring them into such a slavish condition, they will always have a right to preserve, what they have not a power to part with; and to rid themselves of those, who invade this fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of self-preservation, for which they entered into society. and thus the community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power, but not as considered under any form of government, because this power of the people can never take place till the government be dissolved. sect. 150. in all cases, whilst the government subsists, the legislative is the supreme power: for what can give laws to another, must needs be superior to him; and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative of the society, but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts, and for every member of the society, prescribing rules to their actions, and giving power of execution, where they are transgressed, the legislative must needs be the supreme, and all other powers, in any members or parts of the society, derived from and subordinate to it. sect. 151. in some commonwealths, where the legislative is not always in being, and the executive is vested in a single person, who has also a share in the legislative; there that single person in a very tolerable sense may also be called supreme: not that he has in himself all the supreme power, which is that of law-making; but because he has in him the supreme execution, from whom all inferior magistrates derive all their several subordinate powers, or at least the greatest part of them: having also no legislative superior to him, there being no law to be made without his consent, which cannot be expected should ever subject him to the other part of the legislative, he is properly enough in this sense supreme. but yet it is to be observed, that tho' oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken to him, it is not to him as supreme legislator, but as supreme executor of the law, made by a joint power of him with others; allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law, which when he violates, he has no right to obedience, nor can claim it otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law, and so is to be considered as the image, phantom, or representative of the commonwealth, acted by the will of the society, declared in its laws; and thus he has no will, no power, but that of the law. but when he quits this representation, this public will, and acts by his own private will, he degrades himself, and is but a single private person without power, and without will, that has any right to obedience; the members owing no obedience but to the public will of the society. sect. 152. the executive power, placed any where but in a person that has also a share in the legislative, is visibly subordinate and accountable to it, and may be at pleasure changed and displaced; so that it is not the supreme executive power, that is exempt from subordination, but the supreme executive power vested in one, who having a share in the legislative, has no distinct superior legislative to be subordinate and accountable to, farther than he himself shall join and consent; so that he is no more subordinate than he himself shall think fit, which one may certainly conclude will be but very little. of other ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth, we need not speak, they being so multiplied with infinite variety, in the different customs and constitutions of distinct commonwealths, that it is impossible to give a particular account of them all. only thus much, which is necessary to our present purpose, we may take notice of concerning them, that they have no manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is by positive grant and commission delegated to them, and are all of them accountable to some other power in the commonwealth. sect. 153. it is not necessary, no, nor so much as convenient, that the legislative should be always in being; but absolutely necessary that the executive power should, because there is not always need of new laws to be made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made. when the legislative hath put the execution of the laws, they make, into other hands, they have a power still to resume it out of those hands, when they find cause, and to punish for any maladministration against the laws. the same holds also in regard of the federative power, that and the executive being both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative, which, as has been shewed, in a constituted commonwealth is the supreme. the legislative also in this case being supposed to consist of several persons, (for if it be a single person, it cannot but be always in being, and so will, as supreme, naturally have the supreme executive power, together with the legislative) may assemble, and exercise their legislature, at the times that either their original constitution, or their own adjournment, appoints, or when they please; if neither of these hath appointed any time, or there be no other way prescribed to convoke them: for the supreme power being placed in them by the people, it is always in them, and they may exercise it when they please, unless by their original constitution they are limited to certain seasons, or by an act of their supreme power they have adjourned to a certain time; and when that time comes, they have a right to assemble and act again. sect. 154. if the legislative, or any part of it, be made up of representatives chosen for that time by the people, which afterwards return into the ordinary state of subjects, and have no share in the legislature but upon a new choice, this power of chusing must also be exercised by the people, either at certain appointed seasons, or else when they are summoned to it; and in this latter case the power of convoking the legislative is ordinarily placed in the executive, and has one of these two limitations in respect of time: that either the original constitution requires their assembling and acting at certain intervals, and then the executive power does nothing but ministerially issue directions for their electing and assembling, according to due forms; or else it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections, when the occasions or exigencies of the public require the amendment of old, or making of new laws, or the redress or prevention of any inconveniencies, that lie on, or threaten the people. sect. 155. it may be demanded here, what if the executive power, being possessed of the force of the commonwealth, shall make use of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative, when the original constitution, or the public exigencies require it? i say, using force upon the people without authority, and contrary to the trust put in him that does so, is a state of war with the people, who have a right to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their power: for having erected a legislative, with an intent they should exercise the power of making laws, either at certain set times, or when there is need of it, when they are hindered by any force from what is so necessary to the society, and wherein the safety and preservation of the people consists, the people have a right to remove it by force. in all states and conditions, the true remedy of force without authority, is to oppose force to it. the use of force without authority, always puts him that uses it into a state of war, as the aggressor, and renders him liable to be treated accordingly. sect. 156. the power of assembling and dismissing the legislative, placed in the executive, gives not the executive a superiority over it, but is a fiduciary trust placed in him, for the safety of the people, in a case where the uncertainty and variableness of human affairs could not bear a steady fixed rule: for it not being possible, that the first framers of the government should, by any foresight, be so much masters of future events, as to be able to prefix so just periods of return and duration to the assemblies of the legislative, in all times to come, that might exactly answer all the exigencies of the commonwealth; the best remedy could be found for this defect, was to trust this to the prudence of one who was always to be present, and whose business it was to watch over the public good. constant frequent meetings of the legislative, and long continuations of their assemblies, without necessary occasion, could not but be burdensome to the people, and must necessarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniencies, and yet the quick turn of affairs might be sometimes such as to need their present help: any delay of their convening might endanger the public; and sometimes too their business might be so great, that the limited time of their sitting might be too short for their work, and rob the public of that benefit which could be had only from their mature deliberation. what then could be done in this case to prevent the community from being exposed some time or other to eminent hazard, on one side or the other, by fixed intervals and periods, set to the meeting and acting of the legislative, but to intrust it to the prudence of some, who being present, and acquainted with the state of public affairs, might make use of this prerogative for the public good? and where else could this be so well placed as in his hands, who was intrusted with the execution of the laws for the same end? thus supposing the regulation of times for the assembling and sitting of the legislative, not settled by the original constitution, it naturally fell into the hands of the executive, not as an arbitrary power depending on his good pleasure, but with this trust always to have it exercised only for the public weal, as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require. whether settled periods of their convening, or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the legislative, or perhaps a mixture of both, hath the least inconvenience attending it, it is not my business here to inquire, but only to shew, that though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking and dissolving such conventions of the legislative, yet it is not thereby superior to it. sect. 157. things of this world are in so constant a flux, that nothing remains long in the same state. thus people, riches, trade, power, change their stations, flourishing mighty cities come to ruin, and prove in times neglected desolate corners, whilst other unfrequented places grow into populous countries, filled with wealth and inhabitants. but things not always changing equally, and private interest often keeping up customs and privileges, when the reasons of them are ceased, it often comes to pass, that in governments, where part of the legislative consists of representatives chosen by the people, that in tract of time this representation becomes very unequal and disproportionate to the reasons it was at first established upon. to what gross absurdities the following of custom, when reason has left it, may lead, we may be satisfied, when we see the bare name of a town, of which there remains not so much as the ruins, where scarce so much housing as a sheepcote, or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found, sends as many representatives to the grand assembly of law-makers, as a whole county numerous in people, and powerful in riches. this strangers stand amazed at, and every one must confess needs a remedy; tho' most think it hard to find one, because the constitution of the legislative being the original and supreme act of the society, antecedent to all positive laws in it, and depending wholly on the people, no inferior power can alter it. and therefore the people, when the legislative is once constituted, having, in such a government as we have been speaking of, no power to act as long as the government stands; this inconvenience is thought incapable of a remedy. sect. 158. salus populi suprema lex, is certainly so just and fundamental a rule, that he, who sincerely follows it, cannot dangerously err. if therefore the executive, who has the power of convoking the legislative, observing rather the true proportion, than fashion of representation, regulates, not by old custom, but true reason, the number of members, in all places that have a right to be distinctly represented, which no part of the people however incorporated can pretend to, but in proportion to the assistance which it affords to the public, it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative, but to have restored the old and true one, and to have rectified the disorders which succession of time had insensibly, as well as inevitably introduced: for it being the interest as well as intention of the people, to have a fair and equal representative; whoever brings it nearest to that, is an undoubted friend to, and establisher of the government, and cannot miss the consent and approbation of the community; prerogative being nothing but a power, in the hands of the prince, to provide for the public good, in such cases, which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences, certain and unalterable laws could not safely direct; whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the good of the people, and the establishing the government upon its true foundations, is, and always will be, just prerogative, the power of erecting new corporations, and therewith new representatives, carries with it a supposition, that in time the measures of representation might vary, and those places have a just right to be represented which before had none; and by the same reason, those cease to have a right, and be too inconsiderable for such a privilege, which before had it. 'tis not a change from the present state, which perhaps corruption or decay has introduced, that makes an inroad upon the government, but the tendency of it to injure or oppress the people, and to set up one part or party, with a distinction from, and an unequal subjection of the rest. whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society, and people in general, upon just and lasting measures, will always, when done, justify itself; and whenever the people shall chuse their representatives upon just and undeniably equal measures, suitable to the original frame of the government, it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society, whoever permitted or caused them so to do. chapter. xiv. of prerogative. sect. 159. where the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands, (as they are in all moderated monarchies, and well-framed governments) there the good of the society requires, that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power: for the legislators not being able to foresee, and provide by laws, for all that may be useful to the community, the executor of the laws having the power in his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make use of it for the good of the society, in many cases, where the municipal law has given no direction, till the legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it. many things there are, which the law can by no means provide for; and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands, to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require: nay, it is fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the executive power, or rather to this fundamental law of nature and government, viz. that as much as may be, all the members of the society are to be preserved: for since many accidents may happen, wherein a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm; (as not to pull down an innocent man's house to stop the fire, when the next to it is burning) and a man may come sometimes within the reach of the law, which makes no distinction of persons, by an action that may deserve reward and pardon; 'tis fit the ruler should have a power, in many cases, to mitigate the severity of the law, and pardon some offenders: for the end of government being the preservation of all, as much as may be, even the guilty are to be spared, where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent. sect. 160. this power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative: for since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe. sect. 161. this power, whilst employed for the benefit of the community, and suitably to the trust and ends of the government, is undoubted prerogative, and never is questioned: for the people are very seldom or never scrupulous or nice in the point; they are far from examining prerogative, whilst it is in any tolerable degree employed for the use it was meant, that is, for the good of the people, and not manifestly against it: but if there comes to be a question between the executive power and the people, about a thing claimed as a prerogative; the tendency of the exercise of such prerogative to the good or hurt of the people, will easily decide that question. sect. 162. it is easy to conceive, that in the infancy of governments, when commonwealths differed little from families in number of people, they differed from them too but little in number of laws: and the governors, being as the fathers of them, watching over them for their good, the government was almost all prerogative. a few established laws served the turn, and the discretion and care of the ruler supplied the rest. but when mistake or flattery prevailed with weak princes to make use of this power for private ends of their own, and not for the public good, the people were fain by express laws to get prerogative determined in those points wherein they found disadvantage from it: and thus declared limitations of prerogative were by the people found necessary in cases which they and their ancestors had left, in the utmost latitude, to the wisdom of those princes who made no other but a right use of it, that is, for the good of their people. sect. 163. and therefore they have a very wrong notion of government, who say, that the people have encroached upon the prerogative, when they have got any part of it to be defined by positive laws: for in so doing they have not pulled from the prince any thing that of right belonged to him, but only declared, that that power which they indefinitely left in his or his ancestors hands, to be exercised for their good, was not a thing which they intended him when he used it otherwise: for the end of government being the good of the community, whatsoever alterations are made in it, tending to that end, cannot be an encroachment upon any body, since no body in government can have a right tending to any other end: and those only are encroachments which prejudice or hinder the public good. those who say otherwise, speak as if the prince had a distinct and separate interest from the good of the community, and was not made for it; the root and source from which spring almost all those evils and disorders which happen in kingly governments. and indeed, if that be so, the people under his government are not a society of rational creatures, entered into a community for their mutual good; they are not such as have set rulers over themselves, to guard, and promote that good; but are to be looked on as an herd of inferior creatures under the dominion of a master, who keeps them and works them for his own pleasure or profit. if men were so void of reason, and brutish, as to enter into society upon such terms, prerogative might indeed be, what some men would have it, an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the people. sect. 164. but since a rational creature cannot be supposed, when free, to put himself into subjection to another, for his own harm; (though, where he finds a good and wise ruler, he may not perhaps think it either necessary or useful to set precise bounds to his power in all things) prerogative can be nothing but the people's permitting their rulers to do several things, of their own free choice, where the law was silent, and sometimes too against the direct letter of the law, for the public good; and their acquiescing in it when so done: for as a good prince, who is mindful of the trust put into his hands, and careful of the good of his people, cannot have too much prerogative, that is, power to do good; so a weak and ill prince, who would claim that power which his predecessors exercised without the direction of the law, as a prerogative belonging to him by right of his office, which he may exercise at his pleasure, to make or promote an interest distinct from that of the public, gives the people an occasion to claim their right, and limit that power, which, whilst it was exercised for their good, they were content should be tacitly allowed. sect. 165. and therefore he that will look into the history of england, will find, that prerogative was always largest in the hands of our wisest and best princes; because the people, observing the whole tendency of their actions to be the public good, contested not what was done without law to that end: or, if any human frailty or mistake (for princes are but men, made as others) appeared in some small declinations from that end; yet 'twas visible, the main of their conduct tended to nothing but the care of the public. the people therefore, finding reason to be satisfied with these princes, whenever they acted without, or contrary to the letter of the law, acquiesced in what they did, and, without the least complaint, let them inlarge their prerogative as they pleased, judging rightly, that they did nothing herein to the prejudice of their laws, since they acted conformable to the foundation and end of all laws, the public good. sect. 166. such god-like princes indeed had some title to arbitrary power by that argument, that would prove absolute monarchy the best government, as that which god himself governs the universe by; because such kings partake of his wisdom and goodness. upon this is founded that saying, that the reigns of good princes have been always most dangerous to the liberties of their people: for when their successors, managing the government with different thoughts, would draw the actions of those good rulers into precedent, and make them the standard of their prerogative, as if what had been done only for the good of the people was a right in them to do, for the harm of the people, if they so pleased; it has often occasioned contest, and sometimes public disorders, before the people could recover their original right, and get that to be declared not to be prerogative, which truly was never so; since it is impossible that any body in the society should ever have a right to do the people harm; though it be very possible, and reasonable, that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings, or rulers, who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good: for prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule. sect. 167. the power of calling parliaments in england, as to precise time, place, and duration, is certainly a prerogative of the king, but still with this trust, that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation, as the exigencies of the times, and variety of occasions, shall require: for it being impossible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to assemble in, and what the best season; the choice of these was left with the executive power, as might be most subservient to the public good, and best suit the ends of parliaments. sect. 168. the old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative, but who shall be judge when this power is made a right use of one answer: between an executive power in being, with such a prerogative, and a legislative that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be no judge on earth; as there can be none between the legislative and the people, should either the executive, or the legislative, when they have got the power in their hands, design, or go about to enslave or destroy them. the people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to heaven: for the rulers, in such attempts, exercising a power the people never put into their hands, (who can never be supposed to consent that any body should rule over them for their harm) do that which they have not a right to do. and where the body of the people, or any single man, is deprived of their right, or is under the exercise of a power without right, and have no appeal on earth, then they have a liberty to appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment. and therefore, though the people cannot be judge, so as to have, by the constitution of that society, any superior power, to determine and give effective sentence in the case; yet they have, by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men, reserved that ultimate determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind, where there lies no appeal on earth, viz. to judge, whether they have just cause to make their appeal to heaven. and this judgment they cannot part with, it being out of a man's power so to submit himself to another, as to give him a liberty to destroy him; god and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself, as to neglect his own preservation: and since he cannot take away his own life, neither can he give another power to take it. nor let any one think, this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder; for this operates not, till the inconveniency is so great, that the majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it amended. but this the executive power, or wise princes, never need come in the danger of: and it is the thing, of all others, they have most need to avoid, as of all others the most perilous. chapter. xv. of paternal, political, and despotical power, considered together. sect. 169. though i have had occasion to speak of these separately before, yet the great mistakes of late about government, having, as i suppose, arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another, it may not, perhaps, be amiss to consider them here together. sect. 170. first, then, paternal or parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their children, to govern them for the children's good, till they come to the use of reason, or a state of knowledge, wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule, whether it be the law of nature, or the municipal law of their country, they are to govern themselves by: capable, i say, to know it, as well as several others, who live as freemen under that law. the affection and tenderness which god hath planted in the breast of parents towards their children, makes it evident, that this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary government, but only for the help, instruction, and preservation of their offspring. but happen it as it will, there is, as i have proved, no reason why it should be thought to extend to life and death, at any time, over their children, more than over any body else; neither can there be any pretence why this parental power should keep the child, when grown to a man, in subjection to the will of his parents, any farther than having received life and education from his parents, obliges him to respect, honour, gratitude, assistance and support, all his life, to both father and mother. and thus, 'tis true, the paternal is a natural government, but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that which is political. the power of the father doth not reach at all to the property of the child, which is only in his own disposing. sect. 171. secondly, political power is that power, which every man having in the state of nature, has given up into the hands of the society, and therein to the governors, whom the society hath set over itself, with this express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good, and the preservation of their property: now this power, which every man has in the state of nature, and which he parts with to the society in all such cases where the society can secure him, is to use such means, for the preserving of his own property, as he thinks good, and nature allows him; and to punish the breach of the law of nature in others, so as (according to the best of his reason) may most conduce to the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind. so that the end and measure of this power, when in every man's hands in the state of nature, being the preservation of all of his society, that is, all mankind in general, it can have no other end or measure, when in the hands of the magistrate, but to preserve the members of that society in their lives, liberties, and possessions; and so cannot be an absolute, arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as possible to be preserved; but a power to make laws, and annex such penalties to them, as may tend to the preservation of the whole, by cutting off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt, that they threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful. and this power has its original only from compact and agreement, and the mutual consent of those who make up the community. sect. 172. thirdly, despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power one man has over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleases. this is a power, which neither nature gives, for it has made no such distinction between one man and another; nor compact can convey: for man not having such an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give another man such a power over it; but it is the effect only of forfeiture, which the aggressor makes of his own life, when he puts himself into the state of war with another: for having quitted reason, which god hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and having renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of the force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where he has no right; and so revolting from his own kind to that of beasts, by making force, which is their's, to be his rule of right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and the rest of mankind, that will join with him in the execution of justice, as any other wild beast, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have neither society nor security*. and thus captives, taken in a just and lawful war, and such only, are subject to a despotical power, which, as it arises not from compact, so neither is it capable of any, but is the state of war continued: for what compact can be made with a man that is not master of his own life? what condition can he perform? and if he be once allowed to be master of his own life, the despotical, arbitrary power of his master ceases. he that is master of himself, and his own life, has a right too to the means of preserving it; so that as soon as compact enters, slavery ceases, and he so far quits his absolute power, and puts an end to the state of war, who enters into conditions with his captive. (*another copy corrected by mr. locke, has it thus, noxious brute that is destructive to their being.) sect. 173. nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal power to parents for the benefit of their children during their minority, to supply their want of ability, and understanding how to manage their property. (by property i must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods.) voluntary agreement gives the second, viz. political power to governors for the benefit of their subjects, to secure them in the possession and use of their properties. and forfeiture gives the third despotical power to lords for their own benefit, over those who are stripped of all property. sect. 174. he, that shall consider the distinct rise and extent, and the different ends of these several powers, will plainly see, that paternal power comes as far short of that of the magistrate, as despotical exceeds it; and that absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from being one kind of civil society, that it is as inconsistent with it, as slavery is with property. paternal power is only where minority makes the child incapable to manage his property; political, where men have property in their own disposal; and despotical, over such as have no property at all. chapter. xvi. of conquest. sect. 175. though governments can originally have no other rise than that before mentioned, nor polities be founded on any thing but the consent of the people; yet such have been the disorders ambition has filled the world with, that in the noise of war, which makes so great a part of the history of mankind, this consent is little taken notice of: and therefore many have mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people, and reckon conquest as one of the originals of government. but conquest is as far from setting up any government, as demolishing an house is from building a new one in the place. indeed, it often makes way for a new frame of a commonwealth, by destroying the former; but, without the consent of the people, can never erect a new one. sect. 176. that the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war with another, and unjustly invades another man's right, can, by such an unjust war, never come to have a right over the conquered, will be easily agreed by all men, who will not think, that robbers and pyrates have a right of empire over whomsoever they have force enough to master; or that men are bound by promises, which unlawful force extorts from them. should a robber break into my house, and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to convey my estate to him, would this give him any title? just such a title, by his sword, has an unjust conqueror, who forces me into submission. the injury and the crime is equal, whether committed by the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain. the title of the offender, and the number of his followers, make no difference in the offence, unless it be to aggravate it. the only difference is, great robbers punish little ones, to keep them in their obedience; but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs, because they are too big for the weak hands of justice in this world, and have the power in their own possession, which should punish offenders. what is my remedy against a robber, that so broke into my house? appeal to the law for justice. but perhaps justice is denied, or i am crippled and cannot stir, robbed and have not the means to do it. if god has taken away all means of seeking remedy, there is nothing left but patience. but my son, when able, may seek the relief of the law, which i am denied: he or his son may renew his appeal, till he recover his right. but the conquered, or their children, have no court, no arbitrator on earth to appeal to. then they may appeal, as jephtha did, to heaven, and repeat their appeal till they have recovered the native right of their ancestors, which was, to have such a legislative over them, as the majority should approve, and freely acquiesce in. if it be objected, this would cause endless trouble; i answer, no more than justice does, where she lies open to all that appeal to her. he that troubles his neighbour without a cause, is punished for it by the justice of the court he appeals to: and he that appeals to heaven must be sure he has right on his side; and a right too that is worth the trouble and cost of the appeal, as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived, and will be sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he hath created to his fellow subjects; that is, any part of mankind: from whence it is plain, that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of the conquered. sect. 177. but supposing victory favours the right side, let us consider a conqueror in a lawful war, and see what power he gets, and over whom. first, it is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered with him. they that fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest, but must at least be as much freemen as they were before. and most commonly they serve upon terms, and on condition to share with their leader, and enjoy a part of the spoil, and other advantages that attend the conquering sword; or at least have a part of the subdued country bestowed upon them. and the conquering people are not, i hope, to be slaves by conquest, and wear their laurels only to shew they are sacrifices to their leaders triumph. they that found absolute monarchy upon the title of the sword, make their heroes, who are the founders of such monarchies, arrant draw-can-sirs, and forget they had any officers and soldiers that fought on their side in the battles they won, or assisted them in the subduing, or shared in possessing, the countries they mastered. we are told by some, that the english monarchy is founded in the norman conquest, and that our princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion: which if it were true, (as by the history it appears otherwise) and that william had a right to make war on this island; yet his dominion by conquest could reach no farther than to the saxons and britons, that were then inhabitants of this country. the normans that came with him, and helped to conquer, and all descended from them, are freemen, and no subjects by conquest; let that give what dominion it will. and if i, or any body else, shall claim freedom, as derived from them, it will be very hard to prove the contrary: and it is plain, the law, that has made no distinction between the one and the other, intends not there should be any difference in their freedom or privileges. sect. 178. but supposing, which seldom happens, that the conquerors and conquered never incorporate into one people, under the same laws and freedom; let us see next what power a lawful conqueror has over the subdued: and that i say is purely despotical. he has an absolute power over the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them; but not over the lives or fortunes of those who engaged not in the war, nor over the possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it. sect. 179. secondly, i say then the conqueror gets no power but only over those who have actually assisted, concurred, or consented to that unjust force that is used against him: for the people having given to their governors no power to do an unjust thing, such as is to make an unjust war, (for they never had such a power in themselves) they ought not to be charged as guilty of the violence and unjustice that is committed in an unjust war, any farther than they actually abet it; no more than they are to be thought guilty of any violence or oppression their governors should use upon the people themselves, or any part of their fellow subjects, they having empowered them no more to the one than to the other. conquerors, it is true, seldom trouble themselves to make the distinction, but they willingly permit the confusion of war to sweep all together: but yet this alters not the right; for the conquerors power over the lives of the conquered, being only because they have used force to do, or maintain an injustice, he can have that power only over those who have concurred in that force; all the rest are innocent; and he has no more title over the people of that country, who have done him no injury, and so have made no forfeiture of their lives, than he has over any other, who, without any injuries or provocations, have lived upon fair terms with him. sect. 180. thirdly, the power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes in a just war, is perfectly despotical: he has an absolute power over the lives of those, who, by putting themselves in a state of war, have forfeited them; but he has not thereby a right and title to their possessions. this i doubt not, but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine, it being so quite contrary to the practice of the world; there being nothing more familiar in speaking of the dominion of countries, than to say such an one conquered it; as if conquest, without any more ado, conveyed a right of possession. but when we consider, that the practice of the strong and powerful, how universal soever it may be, is seldom the rule of right, however it be one part of the subjection of the conquered, not to argue against the conditions cut out to them by the conquering sword. sect. 181. though in all war there be usually a complication of force and damage, and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate, when he uses force against the persons of those he makes war upon; yet it is the use of force only that puts a man into the state of war: for whether by force he begins the injury, or else having quietly, and by fraud, done the injury, he refuses to make reparation, and by force maintains it, (which is the same thing, as at first to have done it by force) it is the unjust use of force that makes the war: for he that breaks open my house, and violently turns me out of doors; or having peaceably got in, by force keeps me out, does in effect the same thing; supposing we are in such a state, that we have no common judge on earth, whom i may appeal to, and to whom we are both obliged to submit: for of such i am now speaking. it is the unjust use of force then, that puts a man into the state of war with another; and thereby he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of his life: for quitting reason, which is the rule given between man and man, and using force, the way of beasts, he becomes liable to be destroyed by him he uses force against, as any savage ravenous beast, that is dangerous to his being. sect. 182. but because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of the children, and they may be rational and peaceable, notwithstanding the brutishness and injustice of the father; the father, by his miscarriages and violence, can forfeit but his own life, but involves not his children in his guilt or destruction. his goods, which nature, that willeth the preservation of all mankind as much as is possible, hath made to belong to the children to keep them from perishing, do still continue to belong to his children: for supposing them not to have joined in the war, either thro' infancy, absence, or choice, they have done nothing to forfeit them: nor has the conqueror any right to take them away, by the bare title of having subdued him that by force attempted his destruction; though perhaps he may have some right to them, to repair the damages he has sustained by the war, and the defence of his own right; which how far it reaches to the possessions of the conquered, we shall see by and by. so that he that by conquest has a right over a man's person to destroy him if he pleases, has not thereby a right over his estate to possess and enjoy it: for it is the brutal force the aggressor has used, that gives his adversary a right to take away his life, and destroy him if he pleases, as a noxious creature; but it is damage sustained that alone gives him title to another man's goods: for though i may kill a thief that sets on me in the highway, yet i may not (which seems less) take away his money, and let him go: this would be robbery on my side. his force, and the state of war he put himself in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his goods. the right then of conquest extends only to the lives of those who joined in the war, not to their estates, but only in order to make reparation for the damages received, and the charges of the war, and that too with reservation of the right of the innocent wife and children. sect. 183. let the conqueror have as much justice on his side, as could be supposed, he has no right to seize more than the vanquished could forfeit: his life is at the victor's mercy; and his service and goods he may appropriate, to make himself reparation; but he cannot take the goods of his wife and children; they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed, and their shares in the estate he possessed: for example, i in the state of nature (and all commonwealths are in the state of nature one with another) have injured another man, and refusing to give satisfaction, it comes to a state of war, wherein my defending by force what i had gotten unjustly, makes me the aggressor. i am conquered: my life, it is true, as forfeit, is at mercy, but not my wife's and children's. they made not the war, nor assisted in it. i could not forfeit their lives; they were not mine to forfeit. my wife had a share in my estate; that neither could i forfeit. and my children also, being born of me, had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance. here then is the case: the conqueror has a title to reparation for damages received, and the children have a title to their father's estate for their subsistence: for as to the wife's share, whether her own labour, or compact, gave her a title to it, it is plain, her husband could not forfeit what was her's. what must be done in the case? i answer; the fundamental law of nature being, that all, as much as may be, should be preserved, it follows, that if there be not enough fully to satisfy both, viz, for the conqueror's losses, and children's maintenance, he that hath, and to spare, must remit something of his full satisfaction, and give way to the pressing and preferable title of those who are in danger to perish without it. sect. 184. but supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be made up to the conqueror, to the utmost farthing; and that the children of the vanquished, spoiled of all their father's goods, are to be left to starve and perish; yet the satisfying of what shall, on this score, be due to the conqueror, will scarce give him a title to any country he shall conquer: for the damages of war can scarce amount to the value of any considerable tract of land, in any part of the world, where all the land is possessed, and none lies waste. and if i have not taken away the conqueror's land, which, being vanquished, it is impossible i should; scarce any other spoil i have done him can amount to the value of mine, supposing it equally cultivated, and of an extent any way coming near what i had overrun of his. the destruction of a year's product or two (for it seldom reaches four or five) is the utmost spoil that usually can be done: for as to money, and such riches and treasure taken away, these are none of nature's goods, they have but a fantastical imaginary value: nature has put no such upon them: they are of no more account by her standard, than the wampompeke of the americans to an european prince, or the silver money of europe would have been formerly to an american. and five years product is not worth the perpetual inheritance of land, where all is possessed, and none remains waste, to be taken up by him that is disseized: which will be easily granted, if one do but take away the imaginary value of money, the disproportion being more than between five and five hundred; though, at the same time, half a year's product is more worth than the inheritance, where there being more land than the inhabitants possess and make use of, any one has liberty to make use of the waste: but there conquerors take little care to possess themselves of the lands of the vanquished, no damage therefore, that men in the state of nature (as all princes and governments are in reference to one another) suffer from one another, can give a conqueror power to dispossess the posterity of the vanquished, and turn them out of that inheritance, which ought to be the possession of them and their descendants to all generations. the conqueror indeed will be apt to think himself master: and it is the very condition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right. but if that be all, it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the stronger over the weaker: and, by this reason, he that is strongest will have a right to whatever he pleases to seize on. sect. 185. over those then that joined with him in the war, and over those of the subdued country that opposed him not, and the posterity even of those that did, the conqueror, even in a just war, hath, by his conquest, no right of dominion: they are free from any subjection to him, and if their former government be dissolved, they are at liberty to begin and erect another to themselves. sect. 186. the conqueror, it is true, usually, by the force he has over them, compels them, with a sword at their breasts, to stoop to his conditions, and submit to such a government as he pleases to afford them; but the enquiry is, what right he has to do so? if it be said, they submit by their own consent, then this allows their own consent to be necessary to give the conqueror a title to rule over them. it remains only to be considered, whether promises extorted by force, without right, can be thought consent, and how far they bind. to which i shall say, they bind not at all; because whatsoever another gets from me by force, i still retain the right of, and he is obliged presently to restore. he that forces my horse from me, ought presently to restore him, and i have still a right to retake him. by the same reason, he that forced a promise from me, ought presently to restore it, i.e. quit me of the obligation of it; or i may resume it myself, i.e. chuse whether i will perform it: for the law of nature laying an obligation on me only by the rules she prescribes, cannot oblige me by the violation of her rules: such is the extorting any thing from me by force. nor does it at all alter the case to say, i gave my promise, no more than it excuses the force, and passes the right, when i put my hand in my pocket, and deliver my purse myself to a thief, who demands it with a pistol at my breast. sect. 187. from all which it follows, that the government of a conqueror, imposed by force on the subdued, against whom he had no right of war, or who joined not in the war against him, where he had right, has no obligation upon them. sect. 188. but let us suppose, that all the men of that community, being all members of the same body politic, may be taken to have joined in that unjust war wherein they are subdued, and so their lives are at the mercy of the conqueror. sect. 189. i say this concerns not their children who are in their minority: for since a father hath not, in himself, a power over the life or liberty of his child, no act of his can possibly forfeit it. so that the children, whatever may have happened to the fathers, are freemen, and the absolute power of the conqueror reaches no farther than the persons of the men that were subdued by him, and dies with them: and should he govern them as slaves, subjected to his absolute arbitrary power, he has no such right of dominion over their children. he can have no power over them but by their own consent, whatever he may drive them to say or do; and he has no lawfull authority, whilst force, and not choice, compels them to submission. sect. 190. every man is born with a double right: first, a right of freedom to his person, which no other man has a power over, but the free disposal of it lies in himself. secondly, a right, before any other man, to inherit with his brethren his father's goods. sect. 191. by the first of these, a man is naturally free from subjection to any government, tho' he be born in a place under its jurisdiction; but if he disclaim the lawful government of the country he was born in, he must also quit the right that belonged to him by the laws of it, and the possessions there descending to him from his ancestors, if it were a government made by their consent. sect. 192. by the second, the inhabitants of any country, who are descended, and derive a title to their estates from those who are subdued, and had a government forced upon them against their free consents, retain a right to the possession of their ancestors, though they consent not freely to the government, whose hard conditions were by force imposed on the possessors of that country: for the first conqueror never having had a title to the land of that country, the people who are the descendants of, or claim under those who were forced to submit to the yoke of a government by constraint, have always a right to shake it off, and free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny which the sword hath brought in upon them, till their rulers put them under such a frame of government as they willingly and of choice consent to. who doubts but the grecian christians, descendants of the ancient possessors of that country, may justly cast off the turkish yoke, which they have so long groaned under, whenever they have an opportunity to do it? for no government can have a right to obedience from a people who have not freely consented to it; which they can never be supposed to do, till either they are put in a full state of liberty to chuse their government and governors, or at least till they have such standing laws, to which they have by themselves or their representatives given their free consent, and also till they are allowed their due property, which is so to be proprietors of what they have, that no body can take away any part of it without their own consent, without which, men under any government are not in the state of freemen, but are direct slaves under the force of war. sect. 193. but granting that the conqueror in a just war has a right to the estates, as well as power over the persons, of the conquered; which, it is plain, he hath not: nothing of absolute power will follow from hence, in the continuance of the government; because the descendants of these being all freemen, if he grants them estates and possessions to inhabit his country, (without which it would be worth nothing) whatsoever he grants them, they have, so far as it is granted, property in. the nature whereof is, that without a man's own consent it cannot be taken from him. sect. 194. their persons are free by a native right, and their properties, be they more or less, are their own, and at their own dispose, and not at his; or else it is no property. supposing the conqueror gives to one man a thousand acres, to him and his heirs for ever; to another he lets a thousand acres for his life, under the rent of 50_l_. or 500_l_. per ann. has not the one of these a right to his thousand acres for ever, and the other, during his life, paying the said rent? and hath not the tenant for life a property in all that he gets over and above his rent, by his labour and industry during the said term, supposing it be double the rent? can any one say, the king, or conqueror, after his grant, may by his power of conqueror take away all, or part of the land from the heirs of one, or from the other during his life, he paying the rent? or can he take away from either the goods or money they have got upon the said land, at his pleasure? if he can, then all free and voluntary contracts cease, and are void in the world; there needs nothing to dissolve them at any time, but power enough: and all the grants and promises of men in power are but mockery and collusion: for can there be any thing more ridiculous than to say, i give you and your's this for ever, and that in the surest and most solemn way of conveyance can be devised; and yet it is to be understood, that i have right, if i please, to take it away from you again to morrow? sect. 195. i will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the laws of their country; but this i am sure, they owe subjection to the laws of god and nature. no body, no power, can exempt them from the obligations of that eternal law. those are so great, and so strong, in the case of promises, that omnipotency itself can be tied by them. grants, promises, and oaths, are bonds that hold the almighty: whatever some flatterers say to princes of the world, who all together, with all their people joined to them, are, in comparison of the great god, but as a drop of the bucket, or a dust on the balance, inconsiderable, nothing! sect. 196. the short of the case in conquest is this: the conqueror, if he have a just cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all, that actually aided, and concurred in the war against him, and a right to make up his damage and cost out of their labour and estates, so he injure not the right of any other. over the rest of the people, if there were any that consented not to the war, and over the children of the captives themselves, or the possessions of either, he has no power; and so can have, by virtue of conquest, no lawful title himself to dominion over them, or derive it to his posterity; but is an aggressor, if he attempts upon their properties, and thereby puts himself in a state of war against them, and has no better a right of principality, he, nor any of his successors, than hingar, or hubba, the danes, had here in england; or spartacus, had he conquered italy, would have had; which is to have their yoke cast off, as soon as god shall give those under their subjection courage and opportunity to do it. thus, notwithstanding whatever title the kings of assyria had over judah, by the sword, god assisted hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire. and the lord was with hezekiah, and he prospered; wherefore he went forth, and he rebelled against the king of assyria, and served him not, 2 kings xviii. 7. whence it is plain, that shaking off a power, which force, and not right, hath set over any one, though it hath the name of rebellion, yet is no offence before god, but is that which he allows and countenances, though even promises and covenants, when obtained by force, have intervened: for it is very probable, to any one that reads the story of ahaz and hezekiah attentively, that the assyrians subdued ahaz, and deposed him, and made hezekiah king in his father's lifetime; and that hezekiah by agreement had done him homage, and paid him tribute all this time. chapter. xvii. of usurpation. sect. 197. as conquest may be called a foreign usurpation, so usurpation is a kind of domestic conquest, with this difference, that an usurper can never have right on his side, it being no usurpation, but where one is got into the possession of what another has right to. this, so far as it is usurpation, is a change only of persons, but not of the forms and rules of the government: for if the usurper extend his power beyond what of right belonged to the lawful princes, or governors of the commonwealth, it is tyranny added to usurpation. sect. 198. in all lawful governments, the designation of the persons, who are to bear rule, is as natural and necessary a part as the form of the government itself, and is that which had its establishment originally from the people; the anarchy being much alike, to have no form of government at all; or to agree, that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to design the person that shall have the power, and be the monarch. hence all commonwealths, with the form of government established, have rules also of appointing those who are to have any share in the public authority, and settled methods of conveying the right to them: for the anarchy is much alike, to have no form of government at all; or to agree that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to know or design the person that shall have the power, and be the monarch. whoever gets into the exercise of any part of the power, by other ways than what the laws of the community have prescribed, hath no right to be obeyed, though the form of the commonwealth be still preserved; since he is not the person the laws have appointed, and consequently not the person the people have consented to. nor can such an usurper, or any deriving from him, ever have a title, till the people are both at liberty to consent, and have actually consented to allow, and confirm in him the power he hath till then usurped. chapter. xviii. of tyranny. sect. 199. as usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a right to; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no body can have a right to. and this is making use of the power any one has in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private separate advantage. when the governor, however intitled, makes not the law, but his will, the rule; and his commands and actions are not directed to the preservation of the properties of his people, but the satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion. sect. 200. if one can doubt this to be truth, or reason, because it comes from the obscure hand of a subject, i hope the authority of a king will make it pass with him. king james the first, in his speech to the parliament, 1603, tells them thus, /# i will ever prefer the weal of the public, and of the whole commonwealth, in making of good laws and constitutions, to any particular and private ends of mine; thinking ever the wealth and weal of the commonwealth to be my greatest weal and worldly felicity; a point wherein a lawful king doth directly differ from a tyrant: for i do acknowledge, that the special and greatest point of difference that is between a rightful king and an usurping tyrant, is this, that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of his desires and unreasonable appetites, the righteous and just king doth by the contrary acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and property of his people. #/ and again, in his speech to the parliament, 1609, he hath these words: /# the king binds himself by a double oath, to the observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom; tacitly, as by being a king, and so bound to protect as well the people, as the laws of his kingdom; and expressly, by his oath at his coronation, so as every just king, in a settled kingdom, is bound to observe that paction made to his people, by his laws, in framing his government agreeable thereunto, according to that paction which god made with noah after the deluge. hereafter, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night, shall not cease while the earth remaineth. and therefore a king governing in a settled kingdom, leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, as soon as he leaves off to rule according to his laws. #/ and a little after, /# therefore all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad to bound themselves within the limits of their laws; and they that persuade them the contrary, are vipers, and pests both against them and the commonwealth. #/ thus that learned king, who well understood the notion of things, makes the difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to consist only in this, that one makes the laws the bounds of his power, and the good of the public, the end of his government; the other makes all give way to his own will and appetite. sect. 201. it is a mistake, to think this fault is proper only to monarchies; other forms of government are liable to it, as well as that: for wherever the power, that is put in any hands for the government of the people, and the preservation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have it; there it presently becomes tyranny, whether those that thus use it are one or many. thus we read of the thirty tyrants at athens, as well as one at syracuse; and the intolerable dominion of the decemviri at rome was nothing better. sect. 202. where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another's harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another. this is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. he that hath authority to seize my person in the street, may be opposed as a thief and a robber, if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ, notwithstanding that i know he has such a warrant, and such a legal authority, as will impower him to arrest me abroad. and why this should not hold in the highest, as well as in the most inferior magistrate, i would gladly be informed. is it reasonable, that the eldest brother, because he has the greatest part of his father's estate, should thereby have a right to take away any of his younger brothers portions? or that a rich man, who possessed a whole country, should from thence have a right to seize, when he pleased, the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour? the being rightfully possessed of great power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of adam, is so far from being an excuse, much less a reason, for rapine and oppression, which the endamaging another without authority is, that it is a great aggravation of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great, than in a petty officer; no more justifiable in a king than a constable; but is so much the worse in him, in that he has more trust put in him, has already a much greater share than the rest of his brethren, and is supposed, from the advantages of his education, employment, and counsellors, to be more knowing in the measures of right and wrong. sect. 203. may the commands then of a prince be opposed? may he be resisted as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he has not right done him? this will unhinge and overturn all polities, and, instead of government and order, leave nothing but anarchy and confusion. sect. 204. to this i answer, that force is to be opposed to nothing, but to unjust and unlawful force; whoever makes any opposition in any other case, draws on himself a just condemnation both from god and man; and so no such danger or confusion will follow, as is often suggested: for, sect. 205. first, as, in some countries, the person of the prince by the law is sacred; and so, whatever he commands or does, his person is still free from all question or violence, not liable to force, or any judicial censure or condemnation. but yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of any inferior officer, or other commissioned by him; unless he will, by actually putting himself into a state of war with his people, dissolve the government, and leave them to that defence which belongs to every one in the state of nature: for of such things who can tell what the end will be? and a neighbour kingdom has shewed the world an odd example. in all other cases the sacredness of the person exempts him from all inconveniencies, whereby he is secure, whilst the government stands, from all violence and harm whatsoever; than which there cannot be a wiser constitution: for the harm he can do in his own person not being likely to happen often, nor to extend itself far; nor being able by his single strength to subvert the laws, nor oppress the body of the people, should any prince have so much weakness, and ill nature as to be willing to do it, the inconveniency of some particular mischiefs, that may happen sometimes, when a heady prince comes to the throne, are well recompensed by the peace of the public, and security of the government, in the person of the chief magistrate, thus set out of the reach of danger: it being safer for the body, that some few private men should be sometimes in danger to suffer, than that the head of the republic should be easily, and upon slight occasions, exposed. sect. 206. secondly, but this privilege, belonging only to the king's person, hinders not, but they may be questioned, opposed, and resisted, who use unjust force, though they pretend a commission from him, which the law authorizes not; as is plain in the case of him that has the king's writ to arrest a man, which is a full commission from the king; and yet he that has it cannot break open a man's house to do it, nor execute this command of the king upon certain days, nor in certain places, though this commission have no such exception in it; but they are the limitations of the law, which if any one transgress, the king's commission excuses him not: for the king's authority being given him only by the law, he cannot impower any one to act against the law, or justify him, by his commission, in so doing; the commission, or command of any magistrate, where he has no authority, being as void and insignificant, as that of any private man; the difference between the one and the other, being that the magistrate has some authority so far, and to such ends, and the private man has none at all: for it is not the commission, but the authority, that gives the right of acting; and against the laws there can be no authority. but, notwithstanding such resistance, the king's person and authority are still both secured, and so no danger to governor or government. sect. 207. thirdly, supposing a government wherein the person of the chief magistrate is not thus sacred; yet this doctrine of the lawfulness of resisting all unlawful exercises of his power, will not upon every slight occasion indanger him, or imbroil the government: for where the injured party may be relieved, and his damages repaired by appeal to the law, there can be no pretence for force, which is only to be used where a man is intercepted from appealing to the law: for nothing is to be accounted hostile force, but where it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal; and it is such force alone, that puts him that uses it into a state of war, and makes it lawful to resist him. a man with a sword in his hand demands my purse in the high-way, when perhaps i have not twelve pence in my pocket: this man i may lawfully kill. to another i deliver 100 pounds to hold only whilst i alight, which he refuses to restore me, when i am got up again, but draws his sword to defend the possession of it by force, if i endeavour to retake it. the mischief this man does me is a hundred, or possibly a thousand times more than the other perhaps intended me (whom i killed before he really did me any); and yet i might lawfully kill the one, and cannot so much as hurt the other lawfully. the reason whereof is plain; because the one using force, which threatened my life, i could not have time to appeal to the law to secure it: and when it was gone, it was too late to appeal. the law could not restore life to my dead carcass: the loss was irreparable; which to prevent, the law of nature gave me a right to destroy him, who had put himself into a state of war with me, and threatened my destruction. but in the other case, my life not being in danger, i may have the benefit of appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 100 pounds that way. sect. 208. fourthly, but if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate be maintained (by the power he has got), and the remedy which is due by law, be by the same power obstructed; yet the right of resisting, even in such manifest acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight occasions, disturb the government: for if it reach no farther than some private men's cases, though they have a right to defend themselves, and to recover by force what by unlawful force is taken from them; yet the right to do so will not easily engage them in a contest, wherein they are sure to perish; it being as impossible for one, or a few oppressed men to disturb the government, where the body of the people do not think themselves concerned in it, as for a raving mad-man, or heady malcontent to overturn a well settled state; the people being as little apt to follow the one, as the other. sect. 209. but if either these illegal acts have extended to the majority of the people; or if the mischief and oppression has lighted only on some few, but in such cases, as the precedent, and consequences seem to threaten all; and they are persuaded in their consciences, that their laws, and with them their estates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion too; how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force, used against them, i cannot tell. this is an inconvenience, i confess, that attends all governments whatsoever, when the governors have brought it to this pass, to be generally suspected of their people; the most dangerous state which they can possibly put themselves in, wherein they are the less to be pitied, because it is so easy to be avoided; it being as impossible for a governor, if he really means the good of his people, and the preservation of them, and their laws together, not to make them see and feel it, as it is for the father of a family, not to let his children see he loves, and takes care of them. sect. 210. but if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind, and actions of another; arts used to elude the law, and the trust of prerogative (which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the prince's hand to do good, not harm to the people) employed contrary to the end for which it was given: if the people shall find the ministers and subordinate magistrates chosen suitable to such ends, and favoured, or laid by, proportionably as they promote or oppose them: if they see several experiments made of arbitrary power, and that religion underhand favoured, (tho' publicly proclaimed against) which is readiest to introduce it; and the operators in it supported, as much as may be; and when that cannot be done, yet approved still, and liked the better: if a long train of actions shew the councils all tending that way; how can a man any more hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind, which way things are going; or from casting about how to save himself, than he could from believing the captain of the ship he was in, was carrying him, and the rest of the company, to algiers, when he found him always steering that course, though cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of men and provisions did often force him to turn his course another way for some time, which he steadily returned to again, as soon as the wind, weather, and other circumstances would let him? chapter. xix. of the dissolution of government. sect. 211. he that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of government, ought in the first place to distinguish between the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government. that which makes the community, and brings men out of the loose state of nature, into one politic society, is the agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate, and act as one body, and so be one distinct commonwealth. the usual, and almost only way whereby this union is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest upon them: for in that case, (not being able to maintain and support themselves, as one intire and independent body) the union belonging to that body which consisted therein, must necessarily cease, and so every one return to the state he was in before, with a liberty to shift for himself, and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some other society. whenever the society is dissolved, it is certain the government of that society cannot remain. thus conquerors swords often cut up governments by the roots, and mangle societies to pieces, separating the subdued or scattered multitude from the protection of, and dependence on, that society which ought to have preserved them from violence. the world is too well instructed in, and too forward to allow of, this way of dissolving of governments, to need any more to be said of it; and there wants not much argument to prove, that where the society is dissolved, the government cannot remain; that being as impossible, as for the frame of an house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered and dissipated by a whirl-wind, or jumbled into a confused heap by an earthquake. sect. 212. besides this over-turning from without, governments are dissolved from within. first, when the legislative is altered. civil society being a state of peace, amongst those who are of it, from whom the state of war is excluded by the umpirage, which they have provided in their legislative, for the ending all differences that may arise amongst any of them, it is in their legislative, that the members of a commonwealth are united, and combined together into one coherent living body. this is the soul that gives form, life, and unity, to the commonwealth: from hence the several members have their mutual influence, sympathy, and connexion: and therefore, when the legislative is broken, or dissolved, dissolution and death follows: for the essence and union of the society consisting in having one will, the legislative, when once established by the majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that will. the constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society, whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union, under the direction of persons, and bonds of laws, made by persons authorized thereunto, by the consent and appointment of the people, without which no one man, or number of men, amongst them, can have authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest. when any one, or more, shall take upon them to make laws, whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws without authority, which the people are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again to be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a new legislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those, who without authority would impose any thing upon them. every one is at the disposure of his own will, when those who had, by the delegation of the society, the declaring of the public will, are excluded from it, and others usurp the place, who have no such authority or delegation. sect. 213. this being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth who misuse the power they have; it is hard to consider it aright, and know at whose door to lay it, without knowing the form of government in which it happens. let us suppose then the legislative placed in the concurrence of three distinct persons. (<i>1</i>). a single hereditary person, having the constant, supreme, executive power, and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the other two within certain periods of time. (<i>2</i>). an assembly of hereditary nobility. (<i>3</i>). an assembly of representatives chosen, pro tempore, by the people. such a form of government supposed, it is evident, sect. 214. first, that when such a single person, or prince, sets up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws, which are the will of the society, declared by the legislative, then the legislative is changed: for that being in effect the legislative, whose rules and laws are put in execution, and required to be obeyed; when other laws are set up, and other rules pretended, and inforced, than what the legislative, constituted by the society, have enacted, it is plain that the legislative is changed. whoever introduces new laws, not being thereunto authorized by the fundamental appointment of the society, or subverts the old, disowns and overturns the power by which they were made, and so sets up a new legislative. sect. 215. secondly, when the prince hinders the legislative from assembling in its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends for which it was constituted, the legislative is altered: for it is not a certain number of men, no, nor their meeting, unless they have also freedom of debating, and leisure of perfecting, what is for the good of the society, wherein the legislative consists: when these are taken away or altered, so as to deprive the society of the due exercise of their power, the legislative is truly altered; for it is not names that constitute governments, but the use and exercise of those powers that were intended to accompany them; so that he, who takes away the freedom, or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due seasons, in effect takes away the legislative, and puts an end to the government. sect. 216. thirdly, when, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors, or ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and contrary to the common interest of the people, there also the legislative is altered: for, if others than those whom the society hath authorized thereunto, do chuse, or in another way than what the society hath prescribed, those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the people. sect. 217. fourthly, the delivery also of the people into the subjection of a foreign power, either by the prince, or by the legislative, is certainly a change of the legislative, and so a dissolution of the government: for the end why people entered into society being to be preserved one intire, free, independent society, to be governed by its own laws; this is lost, whenever they are given up into the power of another. sect. 218. why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of the government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince, is evident; because he, having the force, treasure and offices of the state to employ, and often persuading himself, or being flattered by others, that as supreme magistrate he is uncapable of controul; he alone is in a condition to make great advances toward such changes, under pretence of lawful authority, and has it in his hands to terrify or suppress opposers, as factious, seditious, and enemies to the government: whereas no other part of the legislative, or people, is capable by themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative, without open and visible rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which, when it prevails, produces effects very little different from foreign conquest. besides, the prince in such a form of government, having the power of dissolving the other parts of the legislative, and thereby rendering them private persons, they can never in opposition to him, or without his concurrence, alter the legislative by a law, his consent being necessary to give any of their decrees that sanction. but yet, so far as the other parts of the legislative any way contribute to any attempt upon the government, and do either promote, or not, what lies in them, hinder such designs, they are guilty, and partake in this, which is certainly the greatest crime which men can partake of one towards another. sec. 219.there is one way more whereby such a government may be dissolved, and that is: when he who has the supreme executive power, neglects and abandons that charge, so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution. this is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy, and so effectually to dissolve the government: for laws not being made for themselves, but to be, by their execution, the bonds of the society, to keep every part of the body politic in its due place and function; when that totally ceases, the government visibly ceases, and the people become a confused multitude, without order or connexion. where there is no longer the administration of justice, for the securing of men's rights, nor any remaining power within the community to direct the force, or provide for the necessities of the public, there certainly is no government left. where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one as if there were no laws; and a government without laws is, i suppose, a mystery in politics, unconceivable to human capacity, and inconsistent with human society. sect. 220. in these and the like cases, when the government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new legislative, differing from the other, by the change of persons, or form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good: for the society can never, by the fault of another, lose the native and original right it has to preserve itself, which can only be done by a settled legislative, and a fair and impartial execution of the laws made by it. but the state of mankind is not so miserable that they are not capable of using this remedy, till it be too late to look for any. to tell people they may provide for themselves, by erecting a new legislative, when by oppression, artifice, or being delivered over to a foreign power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them, they may expect relief when it is too late, and the evil is past cure. this is in effect no more than to bid them first be slaves, and then to take care of their liberty; and when their chains are on, tell them, they may act like freemen. this, if barely so, is rather mockery than relief; and men can never be secure from tyranny, if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly under it: and therefore it is, that they have not only a right to get out of it, but to prevent it. sect. 221. there is therefore, secondly, another way whereby governments are dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the prince, either of them, act contrary to their trust. first, the legislative acts against the trust reposed in them, when they endeavour to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community, masters, or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people. sect. 222. the reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a legislative, is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the society: for since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society, that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure, by entering into society, and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making; whenever the legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which god hath provided for all men, against force and violence. whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society. what i have said here, concerning the legislative in general, holds true also concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him, both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of the society. he acts also contrary to his trust, when he either employs the force, treasure, and offices of the society, to corrupt the representatives, and gain them to his purposes; or openly preengages the electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, whom he has, by sollicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his designs; and employs them to bring in such, who have promised before-hand what to vote, and what to enact. thus to regulate candidates and electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is it but to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of public security? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act, and advise, as the necessity of the commonwealth, and the public good should, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to require. this, those who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing. to prepare such an assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his own will, for the true representatives of the people, and the law-makers of the society, is certainly as great a breach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the government, as is possible to be met with. to which, if one shall add rewards and punishments visibly employed to the same end, and all the arts of perverted law made use of, to take off and destroy all that stand in the way of such a design, and will not comply and consent to betray the liberties of their country, it will be past doubt what is doing. what power they ought to have in the society, who thus employ it contrary to the trust went along with it in its first institution, is easy to determine; and one cannot but see, that he, who has once attempted any such thing as this, cannot any longer be trusted. sect. 223. to this perhaps it will be said, that the people being ignorant, and always discontented, to lay the foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people, is to expose it to certain ruin; and no government will be able long to subsist, if the people may set up a new legislative, whenever they take offence at the old one. to this i answer, quite the contrary. people are not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest. they are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to. and if there be any original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption; it is not an easy thing to get them changed, even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it. this slowness and aversion in the people to quit their old constitutions, has, in the many revolutions which have been seen in this kingdom, in this and former ages, still kept us to, or, after some interval of fruitless attempts, still brought us back again to our old legislative of king, lords and commons: and whatever provocations have made the crown be taken from some of our princes heads, they never carried the people so far as to place it in another line. sect. 224. but it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion. to which i answer, first, no more than any other hypothesis: for when the people are made miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power, cry up their governors, as much as you will, for sons of jupiter; let them be sacred and divine, descended, or authorized from heaven; give them out for whom or what you please, the same will happen. the people generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them. they will wish, and seek for the opportunity, which in the change, weakness and accidents of human affairs, seldom delays long to offer itself. he must have lived but a little while in the world, who has not seen examples of this in his time; and he must have read very little, who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments in the world. sect. 225. secondly, i answer, such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty, will be born by the people without mutiny or murmur. but if a long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie under, and see whither they are going; it is not to be wondered, that they should then rouze themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was at first erected; and without which, ancient names, and specious forms, are so far from being better, that they are much worse, than the state of nature, or pure anarchy; the inconveniencies being all as great and as near, but the remedy farther off and more difficult. sect. 226. thirdly, i answer, that this doctrine of a power in the people of providing for their safety a-new, by a new legislative, when their legislators have acted contrary to their trust, by invading their property, is the best fence against rebellion, and the probablest means to hinder it: for rebellion being an opposition, not to persons, but authority, which is founded only in the constitutions and laws of the government; those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by force justify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels: for when men, by entering into society and civil-government, have excluded force, and introduced laws for the preservation of property, peace, and unity amongst themselves, those who set up force again in opposition to the laws, do rebellare, that is, bring back again the state of war, and are properly rebels: which they who are in power, (by the pretence they have to authority, the temptation of force they have in their hands, and the flattery of those about them) being likeliest to do; the properest way to prevent the evil, is to shew them the danger and injustice of it, who are under the greatest temptation to run into it. sect. 227. in both the fore-mentioned cases, when either the legislative is changed, or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they were constituted; those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion: for if any one by force takes away the established legislative of any society, and the laws by them made, pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes away the umpirage, which every one had consented to, for a peaceable decision of all their controversies, and a bar to the state of war amongst them. they, who remove, or change the legislative, take away this decisive power, which no body can have, but by the appointment and consent of the people; and so destroying the authority which the people did, and no body else can set up, and introducing a power which the people hath not authorized, they actually introduce a state of war, which is that of force without authority: and thus, by removing the legislative established by the society, (in whose decisions the people acquiesced and united, as to that of their own will) they untie the knot, and expose the people a-new to the state of war, and if those, who by force take away the legislative, are rebels, the legislators themselves, as has been shewn, can be no less esteemed so; when they, who were set up for the protection, and preservation of the people, their liberties and properties, shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and so they putting themselves into a state of war with those who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace, are properly, and with the greatest aggravation, rebellantes, rebels. sect. 228. but if they, who say it lays a foundation for rebellion, mean that it may occasion civil wars, or intestine broils, to tell the people they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or properties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were their magistrates, when they invade their properties contrary to the trust put in them; and that therefore this doctrine is not to be allowed, being so destructive to the peace of the world: they may as well say, upon the same ground, that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed. if any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbours. if the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has, for peace sake, to him who will lay violent hands upon it, i desire it may be considered, what a kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only in violence and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors. who would not think it an admirable peace betwix the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance, yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf? polyphemus's den gives us a perfect pattern of such a peace, and such a government, wherein ulysses and his companions had nothing to do, but quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured. and no doubt ulysses, who was a prudent man, preached up passive obedience, and exhorted them to a quiet submission, by representing to them of what concernment peace was to mankind; and by shewing the inconveniences might happen, if they should offer to resist polyphemus, who had now the power over them. sect. 229. the end of government is the good of mankind; and which is best for mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed, when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruction, and not the preservation of the properties of their people? sect. 230. nor let any one say, that mischief can arise from hence, as often as it shall please a busy head, or turbulent spirit, to desire the alteration of the government. it is true, such men may stir, whenever they please; but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition: for till the mischief be grown general, and the ill designs of the rulers become visible, or their attempts sensible to the greater part, the people, who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by resistance, are not apt to stir. the examples of particular injustice, or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man, moves them not. but if they universally have a persuation, grounded upon manifest evidence, that designs are carrying on against their liberties, and the general course and tendency of things cannot but give them strong suspicions of the evil intention of their governors, who is to be blamed for it? who can help it, if they, who might avoid it, bring themselves into this suspicion? are the people to be blamed, if they have the sense of rational creatures, and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel them? and is it not rather their fault, who put things into such a posture, that they would not have them thought to be as they are? i grant, that the pride, ambition, and turbulency of private men have sometimes caused great disorders in commonwealths, and factions have been fatal to states and kingdoms. but whether the mischief hath oftener begun in the peoples wantonness, and a desire to cast off the lawful authority of their rulers, or in the rulers insolence, and endeavours to get and exercise an arbitrary power over their people; whether oppression, or disobedience, gave the first rise to the disorder, i leave it to impartial history to determine. this i am sure, whoever, either ruler or subject, by force goes about to invade the rights of either prince or people, and lays the foundation for overturning the constitution and frame of any just government, is highly guilty of the greatest crime, i think, a man is capable of, being to answer for all those mischiefs of blood, rapine, and desolation, which the breaking to pieces of governments bring on a country. and he who does it, is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind, and is to be treated accordingly. sect. 231. that subjects or foreigners, attempting by force on the properties of any people, may be resisted with force, is agreed on all hands. but that magistrates, doing the same thing, may be resisted, hath of late been denied: as if those who had the greatest privileges and advantages by the law, had thereby a power to break those laws, by which alone they were set in a better place than their brethren: whereas their offence is thereby the greater, both as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the law, and breaking also that trust, which is put into their hands by their brethren. sect. 232. whosoever uses force without right, as every one does in society, who does it without law, puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses it; and in that state all former ties are cancelled, all other rights cease, and every one has a right to defend himself, and to resist the aggressor. this is so evident, that barclay himself, that great assertor of the power and sacredness of kings, is forced to confess, that it is lawful for the people, in some cases, to resist their king; and that too in a chapter, wherein he pretends to shew, that the divine law shuts up the people from all manner of rebellion. whereby it is evident, even by his own doctrine, that, since they may in some cases resist, all resisting of princes is not rebellion. his words are these. quod siquis dicat, ergone populus tyrannicae crudelitati & furori jugulum semper praebebit? ergone multitude civitates suas fame, ferro, & flamma vastari, seque, conjuges, & liberos fortunae ludibrio & tyranni libidini exponi, inque omnia vitae pericula omnesque miserias & molestias a rege deduci patientur? num illis quod omni animantium generi est a natura tributum, denegari debet, ut sc. vim vi repellant, seseq; ab injuria, tueantur? huic breviter responsum sit, populo universo negari defensionem, quae juris naturalis est, neque ultionem quae praeter naturam est adversus regem concedi debere. quapropter si rex non in singulares tantum personas aliquot privatum odium exerceat, sed corpus etiam reipublicae, cujus ipse caput est, i.e. totum populum, vel insignem aliquam ejus partem immani & intoleranda saevitia seu tyrannide divexet; populo, quidem hoc casu resistendi ac tuendi se ab injuria potestas competit, sed tuendi se tantum, non enim in principem invadendi: & restituendae injuriae illatae, non recedendi a debita reverentia propter acceptam injuriam. praesentem denique impetum propulsandi non vim praeteritam ulciscenti jus habet. horum enim alterum a natura est, ut vitam scilicet corpusque tueamur. alterum vero contra naturam, ut inferior de superiori supplicium sumat. quod itaque populus malum, antequam factum sit, impedire potest, ne fiat, id postquam factum est, in regem authorem sceleris vindicare non potest: populus igitur hoc amplius quam privatus quispiam habet: quod huic, vel ipsis adversariis judicibus, excepto buchanano, nullum nisi in patientia remedium superest. cum ille si intolerabilis tyrannus est (modicum enim ferre omnino debet) resistere cum reverentia possit, barclay contra monarchom. 1. iii. c. 8. in english thus: sect. 233. but if any one should ask, must the people then always lay themselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny? must they see their cities pillaged, and laid in ashes, their wives and children exposed to the tyrant's lust and fury, and themselves and families reduced by their king to ruin, and all the miseries of want and oppression, and yet sit still? must men alone be debarred the common privilege of opposing force with force, which nature allows so freely to all other creatures for their preservation from injury? i answer: self-defence is a part of the law of nature; nor can it be denied the community, even against the king himself: but to revenge themselves upon him, must by no means be allowed them; it being not agreeable to that law. wherefore if the king shall shew an hatred, not only to some particular persons, but sets himself against the body of the commonwealth, whereof he is the head, and shall, with intolerable ill usage, cruelly tyrannize over the whole, or a considerable part of the people, in this case the people have a right to resist and defend themselves from injury: but it must be with this caution, that they only defend themselves, but do not attack their prince: they may repair the damages received, but must not for any provocation exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect. they may repulse the present attempt, but must not revenge past violences: for it is natural for us to defend life and limb, but that an inferior should punish a superior, is against nature. the mischief which is designed them, the people may prevent before it be done; but when it is done, they must not revenge it on the king, though author of the villany. this therefore is the privilege of the people in general, above what any private person hath; that particular men are allowed by our adversaries themselves (buchanan only excepted) to have no other remedy but patience; but the body of the people may with respect resist intolerable tyranny; for when it is but moderate, they ought to endure it. sect. 234. thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of resistance. sect. 235. it is true, he has annexed two limitations to it, to no purpose: first, he says, it must be with reverence. secondly, it must be without retribution, or punishment; and the reason he gives is, because an inferior cannot punish a superior. first, how to resist force without striking again, or how to strike with reverence, will need some skill to make intelligible. he that shall oppose an assault only with a shield to receive the blows, or in any more respectful posture, without a sword in his hand, to abate the confidence and force of the assailant, will quickly be at an end of his resistance, and will find such a defence serve only to draw on himself the worse usage. this is as ridiculous a way of resisting, as juvenal thought it of fighting; ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum. and the success of the combat will be unavoidably the same he there describes it: /*[4] -----libertas pauperis haec est: pulsatus rogat, et pugnis concisus, adorat, ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti. */ this will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance, where men may not strike again. he therefore who may resist, must be allowed to strike. and then let our author, or any body else, join a knock on the head, or a cut on the face, with as much reverence and respect as he thinks fit. he that can reconcile blows and reverence, may, for aught i know, desire for his pains, a civil, respectful cudgeling where-ever he can meet with it. secondly, as to his second, an inferior cannot punish a superior; that is true, generally speaking, whilst he is his superior. but to resist force with force, being the state of war that levels the parties, cancels all former relation of reverence, respect, and superiority: and then the odds that remains, is, that he, who opposes the unjust agressor, has this superiority over him, that he has a right, when he prevails, to punish the offender, both for the breach of the peace, and all the evils that followed upon it. barclay therefore, in another place, more coherently to himself, denies it to be lawful to resist a king in any case. but he there assigns two cases, whereby a king may un-king himself. his words are, quid ergo, nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere atque in regem impotentius dominantem arma capere & invadere jure suo suaque authoritate liceat? nulli certe quamdiu rex manet. semper enim ex divinis id obstat, regem honorificato; & qui potestati resistit, dei ordinationi resisit: non alias igitur in eum populo potestas est quam si id committat propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat. tunc enim se ipse principatu exuit atque in privatis constituit liber: hoc modo populus & superior efficitur, reverso ad eum sc. jure illo quod ante regem inauguratum in interregno habuit. at sunt paucorum generum commissa ejusmodi quae hunc effectum pariunt. at ego cum plurima animo perlustrem, duo tantum invenio, duos, inquam, casus quibus rex ipso facto ex rege non regem se facit & omni honore & dignitate regali atque in subditos potestate destituit; quorum etiam meminit winzerus. horum unus est, si regnum disperdat, quemadmodum de nerone fertur, quod is nempe senatum populumque romanum, atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque vastare, ac novas sibi sedes quaerere decrevisset. et de caligula, quod palam denunciarit se neque civem neque principem senatui amplius fore, inque animo habuerit interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo quoque alexandriam commigrare, ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret, unam ei cervicem optavit. talia cum rex aliquis meditator & molitur serio, omnem regnandi curam & animum ilico abjicit, ac proinde imperium in subditos amittit, ut dominus servi pro derelicto habiti dominium. sect. 236. alter casus est, si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit, ac regnum quod liberum a majoribus & populo traditum accepit, alienae ditioni mancipavit. nam tunc quamvis forte non ea mente id agit populo plane ut incommodet: tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae dignitatis amifit, ut summus scilicet in regno secundum deum sit, & solo deo inferior, atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum, cujus libertatem sartam & tectam conservare debuit, in alterius gentis ditionem & potestatem dedidit; hac velut quadam regni ab alienatione effecit, ut nec quod ipse in regno imperium habuit retineat, nec in eum cui collatum voluit, juris quicquam transferat; atque ita eo facto liberum jam & suae potestatis populum relinquit, cujus rei exemplum unum annales scotici suppeditant. barclay contra monarchom. 1. iii. c. 16. which in english runs thus: sect. 237. what then, can there no case happen wherein the people may of right, and by their own authority, help themselves, take arms, and set upon their king, imperiously domineering over them? none at all, whilst he remains a king. honour the king, and he that resists the power, resists the ordinance of god; are divine oracles that will never permit it, the people therefore can never come by a power over him, unless he does something that makes him cease to be a king: for then he divests himself of his crown and dignity, and returns to the state of a private man, and the people become free and superior, the power which they had in the interregnum, before they crowned him king, devolving to them again. but there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to this state. after considering it well on all sides, i can find but two. two cases there are, i say, whereby a king, ipso facto, becomes no king, and loses all power and regal authority over his people; which are also taken notice of by winzerus. the first is, if he endeavour to overturn the government, that is, if he have a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth, as it is recorded of nero, that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of rome, lay the city waste with fire and sword, and then remove to some other place. and of caligula, that he openly declared, that he would be no longer a head to the people or senate, and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the worthiest men of both ranks, and then retire to alexandria: and he wisht that the people had but one neck, that he might dispatch them all at a blow, such designs as these, when any king harbours in his thoughts, and seriously promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth; and consequently forfeits the power of governing his subjects, as a master does the dominion over his slaves whom he hath abandoned. sect. 238. the other case is, when a king makes himself the dependent of another, and subjects his kingdom which his ancestors left him, and the people put free into his hands, to the dominion of another: for however perhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people; yet because he has hereby lost the principal part of regal dignity, viz. to be next and immediately under god, supreme in his kingdom; and also because he betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought to have carefully preserved, into the power and dominion of a foreign nation. by this, as it were, alienation of his kingdom, he himself loses the power he had in it before, without transferring any the least right to those on whom he would have bestowed it; and so by this act sets the people free, and leaves them at their own disposal. one example of this is to be found in the scotch annals. sect. 239. in these cases barclay, the great champion of absolute monarchy, is forced to allow, that a king may be resisted, and ceases to be a king. that is, in short, not to multiply cases, in whatsoever he has no authority, there he is no king, and may be resisted: for wheresoever the authority ceases, the king ceases too, and becomes like other men who have no authority. and these two cases he instances in, differ little from those above mentioned, to be destructive to governments, only that he has omitted the principle from which his doctrine flows: and that is, the breach of trust, in not preserving the form of government agreed on, and in not intending the end of government itself, which is the public good and preservation of property. when a king has dethroned himself, and put himself in a state of war with his people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king, as they would any other man, who has put himself into a state of war with them, barclay, and those of his opinion, would do well to tell us. this farther i desire may be taken notice of out of barclay, that he says, the mischief that is designed them, the people may prevent before it be done: whereby he allows resistance when tyranny is but in design. such designs as these (says he) when any king harbours in his thoughts and seriously promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth; so that, according to him, the neglect of the public good is to be taken as an evidence of such design, or at least for a sufficient cause of resistance. and the reason of all, he gives in these words, because he betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought carefully to have preserved. what he adds, into the power and dominion of a foreign nation, signifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture lying in the loss of their liberty, which he ought to have preserved, and not in any distinction of the persons to whose dominion they were subjected. the peoples right is equally invaded, and their liberty lost, whether they are made slaves to any of their own, or a foreign nation; and in this lies the injury, and against this only have they the right of defence. and there are instances to be found in all countries, which shew, that it is not the change of nations in the persons of their governors, but the change of government, that gives the offence. bilson, a bishop of our church, and a great stickler for the power and prerogative of princes, does, if i mistake not, in his treatise of christian subjection, acknowledge, that princes may forfeit their power, and their title to the obedience of their subjects; and if there needed authority in a case where reason is so plain, i could send my reader to bracton, fortescue, and the author of the mirrour, and others, writers that cannot be suspected to be ignorant of our government, or enemies to it. but i thought hooker alone might be enough to satisfy those men, who relying on him for their ecclesiastical polity, are by a strange fate carried to deny those principles upon which he builds it. whether they are herein made the tools of cunninger workmen, to pull down their own fabric, they were best look. this i am sure, their civil policy is so new, so dangerous, and so destructive to both rulers and people, that as former ages never could bear the broaching of it; so it may be hoped, those to come, redeemed from the impositions of these egyptian under-task-masters, will abhor the memory of such servile flatterers, who, whilst it seemed to serve their turn, resolved all government into absolute tyranny, and would have all men born to, what their mean souls fitted them for, slavery. sect. 240. here, it is like, the common question will be made, who shall be judge, whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust? this, perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst the people, when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative. to this i reply, the people shall be judge; for who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him, and must, by having deputed him, have still a power to discard him, when he fails in his trust? if this be reasonable in particular cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in that of the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions is concerned, and also where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the redress very difficult, dear, and dangerous? sect. 241. but farther, this question, (who shall be judge?) cannot mean, that there is no judge at all: for where there is no judicature on earth, to decide controversies amongst men, god in heaven is judge. he alone, it is true, is judge of the right. but every man is judge for himself, as in all other cases, so in this, whether another hath put himself into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal to the supreme judge, as jeptha did. sect. 242. if a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the people, in a matter where the law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing be of great consequence, i should think the proper umpire, in such a case, should be the body of the people: for in cases where the prince hath a trust reposed in him, and is dispensed from the common ordinary rules of the law; there, if any men find themselves aggrieved, and think the prince acts contrary to, or beyond that trust, who so proper to judge as the body of the people, (who, at first, lodged that trust in him) how far they meant it should extend? but if the prince, or whoever they be in the administration, decline that way of determination, the appeal then lies no where but to heaven; force between either persons, who have no known superior on earth, or which permits no appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a state of war, wherein the appeal lies only to heaven; and in that state the injured party must judge for himself, when he will think fit to make use of that appeal, and put himself upon it. sect. 243. to conclude, the power that every individual gave the society, when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the community; because without this there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary to the original agreement: so also when the society hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to continue in them and their successors, with direction and authority for providing such successors, the legislative can never revert to the people whilst that government lasts; because having provided a legislative with power to continue for ever, they have given up their political power to the legislative, and cannot resume it. but if they have set limits to the duration of their legislative, and made this supreme power in any person, or assembly, only temporary; or else, when by the miscarriages of those in authority, it is forfeited; upon the forfeiture, or at the determination of the time set, it reverts to the society, and the people have a right to act as supreme, and continue the legislative in themselves; or erect a new form, or under the old form place it in new hands, as they think good. finis. * * * * * +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | transcriber's note: | | | | inconsistent hyphenation in the original document has | | been preserved. | | | | obvious typographical errors have been corrected. for | | a complete list, please see the end of this document. | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ * * * * * proclaim liberty! also by gilbert seldes on related subjects your money and your life mainland the years of the locust against revolution the stammering century the seven living arts the united states and the war (london, 1917) this is america (moving picture) and the movies come from america the movies and the talkies the future of drinking the wings of the eagle lysistrata (a modern version) _proclaim_ liberty! _by_ gilbert seldes proclaim liberty throughout the land unto all the inhabitants thereof; it shall be a jubilee unto them.... leviticus xxv, 10. [illustration] the greystone press new york printed in the united states of america by the william byrd press, inc. richmond, virginia to the children who will have to live in the world we are making acknowledgements thanks are given to the macmillan company for their permission to quote several paragraphs from arthur koestler's _darkness at noon_ in my first chapter. _the grand strategy_ by h.a. sargeaunt and geoffrey west, referred to in chapter two, is published by thomas y. crowell co. g.s. contents page chapter i total victory 13 chapter ii strategy for the citizen 29 chapter iii united...? 44 chapter iv "the strategy of truth" 61 chapter v the forgotten document 77 chapter vi "the population of these states" 92 chapter vii address to europe 111 chapter viii the science of short wave 119 chapter ix definition of america 129 chapter x popularity and politics 156 chapter xi the tools of democracy 163 chapter xii democratic control 170 chapter xiii the liberty bell 199 proclaim liberty! chapter i total victory the peril we are in today is this: for the first time since we became a nation, a power exists strong enough to destroy us. this book is about the strength we have to destroy our enemies--where it lies, what hinders it, how we can use it. it is not about munitions, but about men and women; it deals with the unity we have to create, the victory we have to win; it deals with the character of america, what it has been and is and will be. and since character is destiny, this book is about the destiny of america. the next few pages are in the nature of counter-propaganda. with the best of motives, and the worst results, americans for months after december 7, 1941, said that pearl harbor was a costly blessing because it united all americans and made us understand why the war was inevitable. a fifty-mile bus trip outside of new york--perhaps even a subway ride within its borders--would have proved both of these statements blandly and dangerously false. american unity could not be made in japan; like most other imports from that country, it was a cheap imitation, lasting a short time, and costly in the long run; and recognition of the nature of the war can never come as the result of anything but a realistic analysis of our own purposes as well as those of our enemies. what follows is, obviously, the work of a citizen, not a specialist. for some twenty years i have observed the sources of american unity and dispersion; during the past fifteen years my stake in the future of american liberty has been the most important thing in my life, as it is the most important thing in the life of anyone whose children will live in the world we are now creating. i am therefore not writing frivolously, or merely to testify to my devotion; i am writing to persuade--to uncover sources of strength which others may have overlooked, to create new weapons, to stir new thoughts. if i thought the war for freedom could be won by writing lies, i would write lies. i am afraid the war will be lost if we do not face the truth, so i write what i believe to be true about america--about its past and present and future, meaning its history and character and destiny--but mostly about the present, with only a glance at our forgotten past, and a declaration of faith in the future which is, i hope, the inevitable result of our victory. we know the name and character of our enemy--the axis; but after months of war we are not entirely convinced that it intends to destroy us because we do not see why it has to destroy us. destroy; not defeat. the desperate war we are fighting is still taken as a gigantic maneuvre; obviously the axis wants to "win" battles and dictate "peace terms". we still use these phrases of 1918, unaware that the purpose of axis war is not defeat of an enemy, but destruction of his national life. we have seen it happen in france and poland and norway and holland; but we cannot imagine that the nazis intend actually to appoint a german governor general over the mississippi valley, a gauleiter in the new england provinces, and forbid us to read newspapers, go to the movies or drink coffee; we cannot believe that the axis intends to destroy the character of america, annihilating the liberties our ancestors fought for, and the level of comfort which we cherished so scrupulously in later generations. in moments of pure speculation, when we wonder what would happen "at worst", we think of a humiliating defeat on land and sea, bombardment of our cities, surrender--and a peace conference at which we and britain agree to pay indemnities; perhaps, until we pay off, german and japanese soldiers would be quartered in our houses, police our streets; but we assume that after the "shooting war" was over, they would not ravish our women. _victory_ (_axis model_) all this is the war of 1918. in 1942 the purpose of axis victory is the destruction of the american system, the annihilation of the financial and industrial power of the united states, the reduction of this country to an inferior position in the world and the enslavement of the american people by depriving them of their liberty and of their wealth. the actual physical slavery of the american people and the deliberate taking over of our factories and farms and houses and motor cars and radios are both implied in an axis victory; the enslavement is automatic, the robbery of our wealth will depend on axis economic strategy: if we can produce more _for them_ by remaining in technical possession of our factories, they will let us keep them. we cannot believe this is so because we see no reason for it. our intentions toward the german and italian people are not to enslave and impoverish; on the contrary, we think of the defeat of their leaders as the beginning of liberty. we do not intend to make venice a tributary city, nor essen a factory town run by american government officials. we may police the streets of berlin until a democratic government proves its strength by punishing the ss and the gestapo, until the broken prisoners of dachau return in whatever triumph they can still enjoy. but our basic purpose is still to defeat the armed forces of the axis and to insure ourselves against another war by the creation of free governments everywhere. (neither the american people nor their leaders have believed that a responsible peaceable government can be erected _now_ in japan. toward the japanese our unclarified intentions are simple: annihilation of the power, to such an extent that it cannot rise again--as a military or a commercial rival. the average citizen would probably be glad to hand over to the chinese the job of governing japan.) fortunately, the purposes of any war alter as the war goes on; as we fight we discover the reasons for fighting and the intensity of our effort, the cost of victory, the danger of defeat, all compel us to think desperately about the kind of peace for which we are fighting. the vengeful articles of the treaty of versailles were written after the armistice by politicians; the constructive ones were created during the war, and it is quite possible that they would have been accepted by americans if the united states had fought longer and therefore thought longer about them. we shall probably have time to think out a good peace in this war. but we will not create peace of any kind unless we know why an axis peace means annihilation for us; and why, at the risk of defeat in the field and revolution at home, the axis powers had to go to war on the united states. if we impose our moral ideas upon the future, the attack on pearl harbor will stand as the infamous immediate cause of the war; by axis standards, pearl harbor was the final incident of one series of events, the first incident of another, all having the same purpose, the destruction of american democracy--which, so long as it endured, undermined the strength of the totalitarian powers. why? why are hitler and mussolini and tojo insecure if we survive? why were we in danger so long as they were victorious? the answer lies in the character of the two groups of nations; in all great tragedy, the _reason_ has to be found in the character of those involved; the war is tragic, in noble proportions, and we have to know the character of our enemy, the character of our own people, too, to understand why it was inevitable--and how we will win. our character, molded by our past, upholds or betrays us in our present crisis, and so creates our future. that is the sense in which character is destiny. we know everything hateful about our enemies; long before the war began we knew the treachery of the japanese military caste, the jackal aggression of mussolini, the brutality and falseness of hitler; and the enthusiastic subservience of millions of people to each of these leaders. but these things do not explain why we are a danger to the axis, and the axis to us. "_historic necessity_" the profound necessity underlying this war rises from the nature of fascism: it is a combination of forces and ideas; the forces are new, but the basic ideas have occurred at least once before in history, as the feudal order. democracy destroyed feudalism; and feudalism, returning in a new form as fascism, must destroy democracy or go down in the attempt; the new order and the new world cannot exist side by side, because they are both expanding forces; they have touched one another and only one will survive. we might blindly let the new despotism live although it is the most expansive and dynamic force since 1776; but it cannot let us live. we could co-exist with czarism because it was a shrinking force; or with british imperialism because its peak of expansion was actually reached before ours began. we could not have lived side by side with trotskyite communism because it was as aggressive as the exploding racialism of the german nazis. as it happened, stalin, not trotsky, took over from lenin; socialism in one country supplanted "the permanent revolution". stalin made a sort of peace with all the world; he called off his dogs of propaganda; he allowed german communism to be beaten to death in concentration camps; and, as trotsky might have said, the "historical obligation" to destroy capitalist-democracy was undertaken not by the bearded old marxian enemies of capital, but by capital's own young sadists, the storm troopers, called in by the frightened bankers and manufacturers of italy and germany. that is why, since 1932, realist democrats have known that the enemy had to be hitler, not stalin. it was not a choice between ideologies; it was a choice between degrees of expansion. moreover, stalin himself recognized the explosive force of fascism in germany and shrank within his own borders; he withdrew factories to the urals, he dispersed his units of force as far from the german border as he could. by doing so, he became the ideal ally of all those powers whom hitler's expanding pressure was discommoding. the relatively static democratic nations of europe, the shrinking semi-socialist states like france and austria, were bruised by contact with hitler; presently they were absorbed because the nazi geography demanded a continent for a military base. the destruction of america was a geographical necessity, for hitler; and something more. geographically, the united states lies between hitler's enemies, england and russia; we are not accustomed to the thought, but the fact is that we are a transatlantic base for england's fleet; so long as we are undefeated, the fleet remains a threat to germany. look at the other side: we are a potential transpacific base for russia; our fleet can supply the soviets and china; russia can retreat toward siberian ports and join us. so we dominate the two northern oceans, and with russia, the arctic as well. that is the geographic reason for hitler's attack on us. the moral reason is greater than the strategic reason: the history of the united states must be destroyed, its future must turn black and bitter; because fasci-feudalism, the new order, cannot rest firmly on its foundations until democracy perishes from the earth. so long as a democracy (with a comparatively high standard of living) survives, the propaganda of fascism must fail; the essence of that propaganda is that democratic nations cannot combine liberty and security. in order to have security, says hitler, you must give up will and want, freedom of action and utterance; you must be disciplined and ordered--because the modern world is too complex to allow for the will of the individual. the democracies insist that the rich complexity of the world was created by democratic freedom and that production, distribution, security and progress have not yet outstripped the capacity of man, so that there is room for the private life, the undisciplined, even the un-social. the essential democratic belief in "progress" is not a foolish optimism, it is basic belief in the desirability of _change_; and we, democratic people, believe that the critical unregimented individual must have some leeway so that progress will be made. the terror of change in which dictators live is shown in their constant appeal to permanence; we know that the only thing permanent in life is change; when change ceases, life ceases. it does not surprise us that the logic of fascism ends in death. so long as the democratic nations achieve change without revolution, and prosperity without regimentation, the nazi states are in danger. in a few generations they may indoctrinate their people to love poverty and ignorance, to fear independence; for fascism, the next twenty years are critical. unless we, the democratic people, are destroyed now, the fascist adults of 1940 to 1960 will still know that freedom and wealth co-exist in this world and are better than slavery. so much--which is enough--was true even before the declaration of war; since then the nazi-fascists must prove that democracies cannot defend themselves, cannot sacrifice comfort, cannot invent and produce engines of war, cannot win victories. and we are equally compelled, for our own safety, to destroy the _principle_ which tries to destroy us. the alternative to victory over america is therefore not defeat--or an inconclusive truce. the alternative is annihilation for the fascist regime and death for hundreds of thousands of nazi party men. they will be liquidated because when they are defeated they will no longer have a function to perform; their only function is the organization of victory. the fascist powers are expanding and are situated so that with their subordinates, they can control the world. and the purpose of their military expansion is to exclude certain nations from the markets of the world. even for the "self sufficient" united states, this means that the standard of living must go down--drastically and for ever. the policy is not entirely new. it develops from tariff barriers and subsidies; we have suffered from it at the hands of our best friends--under the stevenson act regulating rubber prices, for instance; we have profited by it, as when we refused to sell helium to germany or when our tariff laws kept britain and france out of our markets, so that they never were able to pay their war debts. this means only that we have been living in a capitalist world and have defended ourselves against other capitalists, as well as we could. _revolution in reverse_ the new thing under nazi-fascism is the destruction of private business, buying and selling. as trade is the basic activity of our time, nazi-fascism is revolutionary; it is also reactionary; and there is nothing in the world more dangerous than a reactionary revolution. the communist revolution was radical and whoever had any stake in the world--a house, a car, a job--shied away from the uncertainty of the future. but the reactionary revolution of mussolini and hitler instantly captivated the rich and well-born; to them, fascism was not a mere protection against the reds, it was a positive return to the days of absolute authority; it was the annihilation of a hundred and fifty years of democracy, it blotted out the french and american revolutions, it erased the names of napoleon and garibaldi from continental european history, leaving the name of metternich all the more splendid in its isolation. the manufacturers of motor cars and munitions were terrified of reds in the factories; the great bankers and landowners looked beyond the momentary danger, and they embraced fascism because they hoped it would destroy the power let loose by the world war--which was first political and then economic democracy. this was, in theory, correct; fascism meant to destroy democracy, but it had to destroy capitalism with it. the idiots who ran the financial and industrial world in the 1920's proved their incompetence by the end of 1929; but their frivolous and irresponsible minds were exposed years earlier when they began to support the power which by its own confessed character had to destroy them. it is a pleasant irony that ten minutes with karl marx or lenin or with a parlor pink could have shown the great tycoons that they were committing suicide. only an enemy can really appreciate karl marx. the faithful have to concentrate on the future coming of the communists' millenium; but the sceptic can admire the cool analysis of the past by which marx arrived at his criticism of the capitalist system. in that analysis marx simplifies history so: no economic system lives for ever. each system has in it the germ of its own successor. the feudal system came to its end when columbus broke through its geographical walls. (gutenburg and leonardo and a thousand others broke through its intellectual walls at about the same time, and luther through the social and religious barriers.) with these clues we can see that democratic capitalism is the successor to feudalism. from this point marx had to go into prophecy and according to his followers he did rather well in predicting the next stages: he saw, in the 1860's, the kind of capitalism we enjoyed in 1914. he did not see all its results--the enormous increase in the number of prosperous families was not in his calculations and he might have been surprised to see the least, not the most, industrialized country fall first into communism. but to the sceptic only one thing in the marxian prophecy is important. he says that in the later stages of capitalism, it will become incompetent; it will not be able to handle the tools of production and distribution; and suddenly or gradually, it will change into a _new_ system. (according to marx, this new system will be communism.) there were moments under the grim eyes of mr. hoover when all the parts of this prophecy seemed to have been fulfilled. there are apparently some americans who wish that the new deal had not interposed itself between the gold standard and the red flag. these are the great leaders (silenced now by war) who might have studied marx before flirting with the fascists. for even the rudimentary analysis above shows that capitalism cannot _grow into_ fascism; fascism moves _backward_ from democratic capitalism, it moves into the system which democracy destroyed--the feudal system. the capitalist system may be headed for slow or sudden death if it goes on as it is; it may have a long life if it can adapt itself to the world it has itself created; but in every sense of the words, capitalism has no future if it goes back to the past. and fascism is the discarded past of capitalism. we think we know this now because the fasci-feudal states have declared war on us. now we see how natural is the alliance between the european states who wish to restore feudalism and the asiatic state which never abandoned it. now we recognize the nazi or fascist party as the equivalent of feudal nobles and in "labor battalions" we see the outlines of serfs cringing from their masters. but we do not yet see that a feudal state cannot live in the same world as a free state--and that we are as committed to destroy fascism as hitler is to destroy democracy. we strike back at japan because japan attacked us, and fight germany and italy because they declared war on us; but we will not win the war until we understand that the axis had to attack us and that we must destroy the system which made the attack inevitable. _walled town and open door_ at first glance, the feudal nature of fascism seems unimportant. in pure logic, maybe, feudal and democratic systems cannot co-exist, but in fact, feudal japan did exist in 1830 and the united states was enjoying jacksonian democracy. there must be something more than abstract hostility between the two systems. there is. feudalism is a walled town; democracy is a ship at sea and a covered wagon. the capitalist pioneer gaps every wall in his path and his path is everywhere. the defender of the wall must destroy the invader before he comes near. in commercial terms, the fascists must conquer us in order to eliminate us as competitors for world trade. we can understand the method if we compare fascism at peace with democracy at war. in the first days of the war we abandoned several essential freedoms: speech and press and radio and assembly as far as they might affect the conduct of the war; and then, with more of a struggle, we gave up the right to manufacture motor cars, the right to buy or sell tires; we accepted an allotment of sugar; we abandoned the right to go into the business of manufacturing radio sets; we allowed the government to limit our installment buying; we neither got nor gave credit as freely as before; we gave up, in short, the system of civil liberty and free business enterprise--in order to win the war. six hundred years ago, all over europe the economy of peace was exactly our economy of war. in the middle ages, the _right_ to become a watchmaker did not exist; the guild of watchmakers accepted or rejected an applicant. by this limitation, the total number of watches produced was roughly governed; the price was also established (and overcharging was a grave offense in the middle ages). foreign competition was excluded; credit was for financiers, and the installment system had not been invented. the feudalism of six hundred years ago is the peace-time fascism of six years ago. the fascist version of feudalism is state control of production. in nazi germany the liberty to work at a trade, to manufacture a given article, to stop working, to change professions, were all seriously limited. the supply of materials was regulated by the state, the number of radios to be exported was set by the state in connection with the purchase of strategic imports; the state could encourage or prevent the importation of coffee or helium or silk stockings; it could and did force men and women to raise crops, to make fuses, to learn flying, to stop reading. it created a feudal state far more benighted than any in the actual middle ages; it was in peace _totally_ coordinated for production--far more so than we are now, at war. the purpose of our sacrifice of liberty is to make things a thousand times faster than before; to save raw materials we abolish the cuff on our trousers and we use agate pots instead of aluminum; we work longer hours and work harder; we keep machines going twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week--all for the single purpose of maximum output. for the same purpose, the fascist state is organized _at peace_--to out-produce and _under-sell_ its competitors. the harried german people gave up their freedom in order to recover prosperity. they became a nation of war-workers in an economic war. a vast amount of their production went into tanks and stukas; another segment went into export goods to be traded for strategic materials; and only a small amount went for food and the comforts of life. almost nothing went into luxuries. _burning books--and underselling_ that is why the _internal_ affairs of germany became of surpassing importance to us. whether we knew it or not, we were in competition with the labor battalions. when we denounced the nazi suppression of free speech, the jailing of religious leaders, the silencing of catholics, the persecution of jews, we were as correct economically as we were ethically; the destruction of liberty had to be accomplished in germany as the comfort level fell, to prevent criticism and conflict. because liberals were tortured and books burned and jews and catholics given over to satisfy a frightful appetite for hatred, the people of germany were kept longer at their work, and got less and less butter, and made more and more steel to undersell us in soviet russia or the argentine; they made also more and more submarines to sink our ships if we ever came to war. every liberty erased by hitler was an economic attack on us, it made slave labor a more effective competitor to our free labor. the concentration camp and the blackguards on the streets were all part of an _economic_ policy, to create a feudal serfdom in the place of free labor. if the policy succeeds, we will have to break down our standard of living and give up entirely our habits of freedom, in order to meet the competition of slave labor. it means today that we will not have cheap motor cars and presently it may mean that we will not have high test steel or meat every day. victory for the axis system means that we work for the germans and the japanese, literally, actually, on their terms, in factories bossed by their local representatives; and anything less than complete victory for us means that we work harder and longer for less and less, paying for defeat by accepting a mean standard of living, not daring to fight our way into the markets of the world which fascism has closed to us. readers of _you can't do business with hitler_ will not need to be convinced again that the two systems--his and ours--are mutually incompatible. fortunately for us, they are also mutually destructive. the basis of fascism is, as i have noted, the feudal hope of a fixed unchangeable form of society which will last forever; the basis of democracy is change (which we call progress). hitler announces that nazism will last a thousand years; the japanese assert that their society has lasted longer; and the voice of mussolini, when it used to be heard, spoke of ancient rome. we who are too impatient of the past, and need to understand our tradition, are at any rate aware of one thing--it is a tradition of change. (jefferson to lincoln to theodore roosevelt--the acceptance of change, even of radical change, is basic in american history.) we might tolerate the tactics of fascism; the racial hatred, the false system of education, the attack on religion, all might pass if they weren't part of the great strategic process of the fascists, which is our mortal enemy, as our process is theirs. they exclude and we penetrate; they have to _destroy_ liberty in order to control making and buying and selling and using steel and bread and radios, and we have to _create_ liberty in order to create more customers for more things. they have to suppress dissent because dissent means difference which no feudal system can afford; we have to encourage criticism because only free inquiry destroys error and discovers new and useful truths. these hostile actions make us enemies because our penetration will not accept the axis wall thrown up around nations normally free and friendly to us; and the axis must make us into fascists because there can be no exceptions in a system dedicated to conformity. the whole world must accept a world-system. in particular, we must be eliminated because we do expose the fraud of fascism--which is that liberty must be sacrificed to attain power. this is an open principle of fascism, as it is of all dictatorships and "total" states. it is very appealing to tyrants and to weaklings, and the ruthlessness of the attack on liberty seems "realistic" even to believers in democracy--especially during the critical moments when action is needed and democracies seem to do nothing but talk. the truth is that our executive is tremendously prompt and unhampered in war time; the appeaser of fascism does not tell the truth; he wants an end to talk, which is dangerous, because he is always at war and the secret fascist would have to admit that his perpetual war is against the people of the united states. so he says only that in modern times, liberty is too great a luxury, too easily abused; he says that a great state is too delicately balanced to tolerate the whims and idiosyncrasies of individuals; if the state has discovered the best diet for all the citizens, then no citizen can "prefer" another diet, and no expert may cast doubt on the official rations. to cause uncertainty is to diminish efficiency; to back "wrong" ideas is treason. one of the best descriptions of this state of mind occurs in a page of arthur koester's _darkness at noon_. it is fiction, but not untrue: "a short time ago, our leading agriculturist, b., was shot with thirty of his collaborators because he maintained the opinion that nitrate artificial manure was superior to potash. no. 1 is all for potash; therefore b. and the thirty had to be liquidated as _saboteurs_. in a nationally centralized agriculture, the alternative of nitrate or potash is of enormous importance: it can decide the issue of the next war. if no. 1 was in the right, history will absolve him, and the execution of the thirty-one men will be a mere bagatelle. if he was wrong.... "it is that alone that matters: who is objectively in the right. the cricket-moralists are agitated by quite another problem: whether b. was subjectively in good faith when he recommended nitrogen. if he was not, according to their ethics he should be shot, even if it should subsequently be shown that nitrogen would have been better after all. if he was in good faith, then he should be acquitted and allowed to continue making propaganda for nitrate, even if the country should be ruined by it.... "that is, of course, complete nonsense. for us the question of subjective good faith is of no interest. he who is in the wrong must pay; he who is in the right will be absolved. that is the law of historical credit; it was our law." intellectual fascists are particularly liable to the error of thinking that this sort of thing is above morality, beyond good and evil. the "cricket-moralists" are people like ourselves and the english, who are agitated because "innocent" men are put to death; the hard-headed ones answer that innocence isn't important; effectiveness is what counts. yet the democratic-cricket-morality is in the long run more realistic than the tough school which kills its enemies first and then finds out if they were guilty. the reason we allow a scientist to cry for nitrates after we have decided on potash is that we have to keep scientific investigation alive; we cannot trust ourselves for too long to the potash group. in five years, both nitrate and potash may be discarded because we have found something better. and no scientist will for long retain his critical pioneering spirit if an official superior can reject his research. (an army board rejected the research of general william mitchell and it took a generation for army men to recover initiative; and this was in an organization accustomed to respect rank and tradition. in science, which is more sensitive, the only practical thing is to reward the heretic and the explorer even while one adopts the idea of the orthodox.) this question of heresy, apparently so trifling, is critical for us because it is a clue to the weakness of hitlerism and it provides us with the only strategy by which hitlerism can be destroyed. chapter ii strategy for the citizen there is a tendency at this moment to consider hitler a master strategist, master psychologist, master statesman. his analysis of democracy, however, leaves something unsaid, and the nervous strong men who admire hitler, as well as the weaklings who need "leadership", are doing their best to fill in the gaps. the hitlerian concept of totality allows no room for difference; an official bread ration and an official biochemistry are equally to be accepted by everyone; in democracy hitler finds a deplorable tendency to shrink from rationing and to encourage deviations from the established principles of biochemistry. this, he says, weakens the state; for one thing it leads to endless discussion. (hitler is an orator, not a debater; dislike of letting other people talk is natural; his passion for action on a world-scale, immense in space, enduring for all time, has the same terrific concentration on himself.) hitler's admirers in a democracy take this up with considerable pleasure; in each of his victories they see an argument against the bill of rights. then war comes; sugar is wanting and we accept a ration card; supreme commands are established in various fields; and the sentiment spreads that "we can only beat hitler by becoming a 'total' state". (no one dares say "nazi".) hitler, discerning in us a toleration of dissent, has driven hard into every crevice, trying to split us apart, like cannel coal. he has tried to turn dissent into disunion--and he has been helped by some of the most loyal and patriotic americans almost as much as he has been helped by bundists. we have not known how to deal with dissent; we stopped looking for the causes of disagreement; even when war came, we confused the areas of human action in which difference is vital with the areas in which difference is a mortal danger. the moment we saw the direction of hitler's drive, which was to magnify our differences, we began to encourage him by actively intensifying all our disagreements; the greater our danger, the more we were at odds. the results were serious enough. no policy governing production had been accepted by industry; no policy governing labor relations had been put into practise so that it was operating smoothly; no great stock of vital raw materials was laid up; no great stock of vital war machinery had been created; no keen awareness of the significance of the war had become an integrated part of american thought; no awareness of all the possibilities of attack had become an integrated part of military and naval thought. to this pitch of unreadiness the technique of "divide and disturb" had brought us--but it had, none the less, failed. for the purpose of disruption in america was to paralyze our will, to prevent us from entering the war, to create a dangerous internal front if we did enter the war. what we proved was this: dissent is not a symptom of weakness, it is a source of strength. it is the counterpart of the great scientific methods of exploration, comparison, proof. our dissents mean that we continue to search; they mean that we do not rule out improvement after we have accepted a machine or a method. (we carried this "dissent" to an extreme in "yearly models" of motor cars and almost daily models of lipstick; but we did manufacture in quantity, and the error of _change before production_ which stalled our aircraft program of 1917 was not repeated.) _why we can't use hitler_ if we "need a hitler" to defeat hitler, we are lost, at this moment, irretrievably, because the _final_ triumph of hitlerism is to make us need hitler. the truth is we cannot use a hitler, we cannot use fascism, we cannot use any form of "total" organization except in the one field where totality has always existed, which is war. so far as war touches the composition of women's stockings or children's ice-cream sodas, we need unified organization in the domestic field; but not "total government". we have to be told (since it is not a matter of individual taste) how many flavors of ice-cream may be manufactured; but the regimentation of people is not required. (the united states army has officially declared against complete regimentation in one of its own fields; every soldier studies the history of this war and is encouraged to ask questions about it, because "the war department considers that every american soldier should know clearly why and for what we are fighting.") we cannot use a hitler because we lack the time. we cannot catch up with hitler on hitlerism. we cannot wait ten years to re-condition the people of america, the ten vital years which hitler spent enslaving the german mind were spent by us in digging the american people out from the ruined economic system which collapsed on them in 1929. we are conditioned by the angry and excited controversy over the new deal; we are opinionated, variant, prejudiced, individual, argumentative. we cannot be changed over to the german model. perhaps in a quieter moment we could be captivated (if not captured) by an american-type dictator, a huey long; in wartime, when people undergo incalculable changes of habit without a murmur, the old framework and the established forms of life must be scrupulously revered. otherwise people will be scared; they will not respond to encouragement. that is why we cannot take time to learn how to love a dictator. the alternative is obvious: to re-discover the virtue which hitler calls a vice, to defeat totality by variety (which is the essential substance of unity). i do not mean five admirals disputing command of one fleet or one assembly line ordered to make three wholly different aeroplane engines. i mean the combination of elements, as they are combined in the food we eat and the water we drink; and as they are combined in the people we are. we have lived by combining a variety of elements; we have always allowed as much freedom to variety as we could, believing that out of this freedom would come a steady progress, a definite betterment of our state; so, we have been taught, the human race has progressed, not by utter uniformity, and not by anarchy, but by an alternation of two things--the standard and the variant. now we face death--called totality. for us it is death; and we can not avoid it by taking it in homeopathic doses, we can only live by destroying whatever is deadly to us. it is hard for a layman to translate the "strategy of variety" into terms of production or naval movement. the translation is being made every day by men in the factories and in the field; instinctively they follow the technique of variety because it is natural to them. all the layman can do is to watch and make sure that out of panic we do not betray ourselves to the enemy. it is not a matter of military technique, but of common sense that we can only destroy our enemy out of our strength, striking at his weakness; we can never defeat him by striking with our weakest arm against his strongest. and our strong point is the variety, the freedom, the independence of our thought and action. hitler calls all this a weakness, because he has destroyed it in his own country; and so gives us the clue to his own weak spot. _has hitler a weakness?_ in the face of the stupendous victories of germany, it is hard to say that hitler's army has a weak spot; but it did not take london or moscow in its first attempts, nor suez. somewhere in this formidable strength a weakness is to be discovered; it will not be discovered by us if we are intimidated into imitation. we have to be flexible, feeling out our adversary, falling back when we have to, lunging forward in another place or on another level; for this war is being fought on several planes at once, and if we are not strong enough today on one, we can fight on another; we are, in fact, fighting steadily on the production front, intermittently on the v (or foreign-propaganda) front, on the front of domestic stability, on the financial front (in connection with the united nations); and the war front itself is divided into military and naval (with air in each) and transport; our opportunity is to win by creating our own most effective front, and keep hammering on it while we get ready to fight on the ones our enemies have chosen. every soldier feels the difference between his own army and any other; every general or statesman knows that the kind of war a nation fights rises out of the kind of nation it is. this is the form of strategy which the layman has to understand--in self-defense against the petrified mind which either will not change the methods of the last war, or will scrap everything in order to imitate the enemy. the layman knows something of warfare now, because the layman is in it. he knows that the tank and the stuka and the parachute troop were separate alien inventions combined by the german high command; but combinations of various arms is not an exclusively german conception. the new concept in this war is ten years old, it is the sacrifice of a nation to its army, the creation of mass-munitions, the concentration on offensive striking power. all of these are successful against broken and betrayed armies in france, against small armies unsupported by tanks and planes; they are not entirely successful against huge armies, fighting under trusted leaders, for a civilization they love, an army of individual heroes, supported by guerillas on one side, and an incalculable production power on the other. possibly the soviet union has discovered one weakness in the german war-strategy; it may not be the weakness through which we can strike; we may have to find another. we have to find the weakness of japan, too--and we are not so inclined to imitate them. there is a famous picture of winston churchill, hatless in the street, with a napkin in his hand, looking up at the sky; it was in antwerp in 1914 and churchill had left his dinner to see enemy aircraft in the sky--an omen of things to come. at antwerp churchill had tried to head off the german swing to the sea, but antwerp was a defeat and churchill returned to london, still looking for some way to refuse the german system of the trench, the bombardment, and the breakthrough. he tried it with the tank; he tried it at gallipoli; finally the allies tried it, half-heartedly, at salonika. the war, on germany's terms, was a stalemate and germany might have broken through; the war ended because the balance was dislocated when america came in and, simultaneously, both england and america began to fight the war also on the propaganda level. by that time churchill was "discredited"; he had tried to shorten the war by two years and the british forces, with success in their hands, had failed to strike home, failed to send the one more battleship, the one more division which would have insured victory--because kitchener and the war office and the french high command wanted to keep on fighting the war in the german way. _escape from despair_ the desperation which overcomes the inexpert civilian at the thought of fighting the military machines of germany and japan is justified _only_ if we propose to fight them on their terms, in the way they propose to us. analogies are dangerous, but there is a sense in which war is a chess game (as chess is a war game). white opens with queen's pawn to qu 3, and black recognizes the gambit. he can accept or decline. if he accepts, it is because he thinks he can fight well on that basis, but black can also reject white's plan of campaign. the good player is one who can break out of the strategy which the other tries to impose. we have felt ourselves incapable of fighting hitler because we hate hitlerism and we do not want to think as he does, feel as he does, act as he does--with more horror, more cruelty, more debasement of humanity, in order to defeat him. and the public statements of our leaders have necessarily concealed any new plan of attack; in fact we have heard chiefly of super-fascist production, implying our acceptance of the fascist tactics in the field; the best we can expect is that soon we, not they, will take the offensive. if this were all, it would still leave us fighting the fascist war. the civilian's totally untrained dislike of this prospect is of considerable importance because it is a parallel to the citizen's authoritative and decisive objection to the hitlerian strategy of propaganda; and if the civilian holds out, if he discovers our native natural strategy of civil action in the war, the army will be constantly recruiting anti-fascists, will live in an atmosphere of inventive anti-fascism, and therefore will never completely fall under the spell of the enemy's tactics. that is why it is important for the citizen to know that he is right. _we do not have to fight hitler in his way_; that is what hitler wants us to do, because _if we do we can not win_. there is another way--although we may not have found it yet. in its celebrated "orientation course" the united states army explains the strategy of the war to every one of its soldiers, not to make them strategists, but to make them better soldiers. the civilian needs at least as much knowledge so that he is not over-elated by a stroke of luck or too cast down by disaster. the jokes about amateur strategists and the high command's justifiable resentment of ignorant criticism are both beside the point; civilians do not need text books on tactics; they need to know the nature of warfare. they needed desperately to know in february, 1942, why general macarthur was performing a useful function in bataan and why bombers were not sent to his aid; and this information came to them from the president. but the president is not the only one who can tell civilians how long it takes to transport a division and put it into action; how air and sea power interact; what a beach action involves; and a few other facts which would allay impatience and give the worker in the factory some sense of the importance of his work. the civilian in war work or out of it should know something about war, and in particular he should know that there are several kinds of war, one of which is correct and appropriate and effective for us. _military mummery_ it might be a good thing if some of the mumbo-jumbo about military strategy were reduced to simple terms, so that the civilians, whose lives and fortunes and sacred honor are involved, would know what is happening to them. the military mind, aided by the military expert, loves to use special terms; until recently the commentator on strategy was as obscure and difficult as a music critic, and despatches from the field as obscure as prescriptions in latin. it is supposed that doctors wrote in latin not only because it was an exact and universal language, but because it was not understood by laymen, so it gave mystery and authority to their prescriptions. latin is still not understood, but the simple art of advertising has destroyed a vast amount of business for the doctors because ads in english persuaded the ignorant to use quack remedies and patent and proprietary medicines, without consulting the doctor. a rebellion like this against the military mind may occur; experts are now writing for the popular press, and talking in elementary terms to millions by radio. they cannot teach the techniques of correlated tank and air attack any more than music critics can teach the creation of head tones. but they can expound the fundamentals--and so expose the military leadership to the _criticism it desperately needs_ if it is to function properly. the essentials of warfare are dreadfully simple--the production manager of any great industrial concern deals with most of them every day. you have to get materials and equipment; train men to use certain tools and instruments; bring power to bear at chosen points, in sufficient quantity, at the right time, for the right length of time; you have to combine the various kinds of force at your disposal, and arrange a schedule, as there is a schedule for chassis and body work in a motor car factory, so that the right chassis is in the right place as its body is lowered upon it; you have to stop or go on, according to judgments based on information. the terrifying decisions, the choice of place and time, the selection of instruments, the allocation of power to several points, are made by the high command on the grand scale or by a sergeant if his officer is shot down; and the right judgments distinguish the great commander or the good platoon leader from the second rate. the civilian, without information, cannot decide what to do; but, as britain's _civilian_ courts of inquiry have shown, he can tell whether the right decisions have been made. he can tell as well as the greatest commander, that indecision and dispersion of forces made success at the dardanelles impossible in 1916; or that lack of a unified plan of tank attack made the wreck of france certain in 1940. the civilian american who has taken a hundred detours on motor roads can understand even the purely military elements of a flanking movement; the industrial american need not be baffled by the problems of fire-power, coordination, or supply. we can understand the war if the mystery is stripped away, and if we are allowed to understand that the wrong strategy is as fatal to us as the wrong prescription. i believe that we will have to strip the false front from international diplomacy, from warfare, from all the inherited "mysteries" which are still pre-revolutionary in essence. we will have to bring these things up to date because our lives depend on them, we can no longer depend on the strategy of gustavus adolphus or the diplomacy of metternich. five million soldiers in khaki, with a nation's life disrupted for their support, require a different strategy from that of burgoyne's hired hessians; and a hundred and thirty million individuals simply do not want the intrigue and congress-dances diplomacy which traded territory, set up kings, and found pretexts for good wars. we have destroyed a good deal of the mummery of economics--not without help; politics has become more familiar to us, we now know that a thief in office is a thief, that tariffs are not made by abstract thinkers, but by manufacturers and farmers and factory workers; we know, with some poignancy, that taxes are paid by people like ourselves and we are beginning to know that taxes are spent to keep people alive and healthy and in jobs and, to a minute extent, also to keep people cheerful, their minds alert, their spirits buoyant. the very fact that we are now _all_ critics of spending is a great advance, because it means we are all paying; when we are all critics of foreign policy it will mean that we are all signing contracts with other nations; and when we are all critics of war, it will mean that we are all fighting. as a student, i know what a layman can know about strategy; less about tactics; as a citizen i should be of greater service to my country if i knew more. what i have learned, from many sources, seems to hold together and to demonstrate one thing: behind strategy in the field is a strategy of a people in action; and victory comes to the leaders who organize and use the national forces in keeping with the national character. i have gone to several authorities to discover whether the "tactics of variety" (a "natural" in propaganda) has any counterpart in the field. i cannot pretend that it is an accepted idea; it is hardly more than a name for an attitude of mind; but i did find authority for the feeling that an american (or united nations) strategy need not be--and must not be--the strategy of hitler. so much the civilian can take to his bosom, for comfort. _a variety of strategies_ the greatest comfort to myself was in a little book published just in time to corroborate a few guesses and immensely to widen my outlook; it is called _grand strategy_; the authors are h.a. sargeaunt, a specialist in poison gas and tank design, a scientist and historian; and geoffrey west, biographer and student of politics; both british. although there are some difficult pages and some odd conclusions, this book is a revelation--particularly it shows the connection between war and the social conditions of nations making war; in the authors' own words, "war and society condition each other"; they connect war with progress and show how each nation can develop a strategy out of its own resources. the hint we all got at school, that the french revolution is responsible for vast civilian armies, is carried into a history of the nineteenth century--and into this war. the authors have their own names for each kind of war--each is a "solution" to the problem of victory. each adds a special factor to the body of strategy known at the time, and this added special factor rises from the country which uses it--from its methods of production, its education, its religion, its banking and commercial habits, and its whole social organization. napoleon's solution was based on the revolutionary enthusiasm of the french people; he added zeal, the intense application of force, speed of movement, repeated hammering, throwing in reserves. all of these things demand devotion, patriotic self-sacrifice, and these qualities had been created, for the french, by the republic; they were not qualities known to the mercenaries and small standing armies of napoleon's enemies. against napoleon's total use of the strategy of force, the british opposed a strength based on the way they lived; it was a sea-strength of blockade, but also on land they refused to accept the challenge of napoleon. they would not come out (until they were ready at waterloo) and let napoleon find their weak spot for the exercise of his force. wellington defeated napoleon at waterloo, but the turning point came years earlier at torres vedras in spain; as napoleon increased force, wellington increased "persistence"; it is called the "strategy of attrition" and it means that wellington's "aim was to wear down the enemy troops by inducing them to attack [where wellington] could withdraw to take up positions and fight again." today, getting news of a campaign like wellington's in spain, the average man would repeatedly read and hear headlines of retreat; he would get the impression of an uninterrupted series of defeats. but the peninsular war was actually a triumph for british arms. it was a triumph because wellington refused to fight in any way not natural to the british; his masterly retreats did not disturb the "inborn toughness and phlegm, that saving lack of imagination" which makes the british, as these british authors say, "good at retreats". moreover, this war of slow retreats gave britain time to develop a tremendous manufacturing power, to organize the blockade of napoleon and the merchant fleet for supply to spain. the whole history of modern england, its acceptance of the factory system, its naval supremacy, its relation to the continent, and its internal reforms--all rise from the kind of war wellington made, and the kind he refused to make. for the curious, the later "solutions" are: under bismark and moltke, increased training and use of equipment and material resources; under hitler, "synchronized timing" (connected with air-power and the impossibility of large-scale surprise; also connected with "alertness and intelligence" in the individual soldier, a frightening development under a totalitarian military dictatorship); and finally, under churchill, "the national sandbag defense", increasing "usable morale and initiative". sandbag defense gets its name from the battle of london; but it refers to all sorts of defensive operations--a bullet is shot into sand and the dislodged grains of sand form themselves again so that the next bullet has the same depth of sand to go through--unless the bullets come so fast in "synchronized timing" or blitzkrieg that the sand hasn't time to close over the gap again. the defense "demands that every person in the nation be capable of sticking to his task even without detailed orders from others, regardless of the odds against him and though it may mean certain death. _every_ person--not merely the trained minority. this happened at dunkirk...." at dunkirk the grains of sand were hundreds of small yachts, motor boats, trawlers, coasting vessels, many of which were taken to the dreadful beach by civilians virtually without orders; some of them became ferry-boats, taking men off the shore to the transports which could not get close enough, going back and forth, without stop--the grains of sand reforming until an army was rescued. these examples drive home the principle that a form or style of warfare must be found by each nation corresponding to the state of the nation _at that time_; the "psychology" of the nation may remain constant for a century, but the way to make war will change if the methods of production have changed. if the nation has lost (or won) colonies, if education has reached the poor, if child labor has ended (so that youths of eighteen are strong enough for tank duty), if women are without civil rights, if a wave of irreligion or political illiberality has swept over the country--if any vital change has occurred, the style of war must change also. every social change affects the kind of war we can fight, the kind we must discover for ourselves if we are to defeat an enemy who has chosen his style and is trying to impose it on us. the analysis of hitler's war-style must be left to experts; if its essence is "synchronized timing", our duty is to find a way of upsetting the time-table, not only by months, but by minutes. possibly the style developed by stalin can do both--by pulling back into the vast spaces of russia, stalin created a battlefield without shape or definition, which may have prevented the correlation of the parts of hitler's armies; by encouraging guerillas, he may have upset the timing of individual soldiers, tanks, and planes. the success of the eighth route army in china was based on a totally different military style, the only completely communist style on record; for the army was successful because it built a communist society on the march, actually and literally, establishing schools, manufacturing arms, bearing children, and fighting battles at the same time, so that at the end of several years the army had extricated itself from a trap, crossed and recrossed miles of enemy territory, reformed itself with more men and arms than it had at the beginning--and had operated as a center of living civilization for hundreds of thousands. the operations of chiang kai chek against the japanese are another example of rejecting the enemy's style; over the enormous terrain of china, the defending armies could scatter and hide from aircraft; the cities fell or were gutted by fire; but the people moved around them, the armies remained. japan's attack on britain and ourselves began with islands, where the lesson of china could not be applied; and the islands were dependencies, not free nations like china, so the psychology of defense was also different; in the opening phases there was no choice and the japanese forced us to accept their way of making war. their way, it appears, is appropriate to their beliefs, their requirements in food, their capacity to imitate europe, and dozens of other factors, not precisely similar to ours. their experience and outlook in life and ideas of honor may lead to the suicide bomber; ours do not. our dive bombers feel no shame if they miss a target; they have a duty which is to save their ships and return for another try; it is against the whole natural tradition of the west that a man should kill himself for the honor of a ruler; we would not send out an army with orders to gain honor by death, as we prefer to gain honor by victory. so in the true sense it would be suicidal for us to imitate the japanese; our heroism-to-the-death is the arrival, at the final moment, of a last reserve of courage and devotion; it is not a planned bravery, nor a communal devotion, it is as private as liberty--or death. our heroism rises out of our lives. our science of victory will have to be based on our lives, too, on the way we manufacture, play games, read newspapers, eat and drink and bring up children. it is the function of our high command to translate what we can do best into a practical military strategy. the civilian's function is to provide the physical and moral strength needed to support the forces in the field. here the civilian is qualified to make certain demands, because we know where our intellectual and moral strength lies; we can work to keep the tactics of variety operative in the field of public emotion. the next two chapters are a translation of the tactics of variety into terms of propaganda and its objective, which is unity of action. chapter iii united...? when i began to write this book the unity "made in japan" was beginning to wear thin; when i finished people were slowly accustoming themselves to a new question: they did not know whether an illusion of unity was better than no unity at all. we know now that we were galvanized into common action by the shock of attack; but to recoil from a blow, to huddle together for self-protection, to cry for revenge--are not the signs of a national unity. before the war was three months old it was clear that we were not united on any question; while we all intended to win the war, the new appeasers had arrived--who wanted to buy themselves off the consequences of war by not fighting it boldly; or by fighting only japan; or fighting japan only at hawaii; we disagreed about the methods of warfare and the purpose of victory; there were those who wanted the war won without aid from liberals and those who would rather the war were lost than have labor contribute to victory; and those who seemed more interested in preventing profit than in creating munitions; it was a great chance "to put something over"--possibly the radicals could be destroyed, possibly the rich; possibly the president or his wife could be trapped into an error, possibly a sales tax would prevent a new levy on corporations, possibly labor could maneuvre itself into dominance; the requirements of war could be a good excuse for postponing all new social legislation and slily dropping some of the less vital projects; and the inescapable regimentation of millions of people, the necessary propaganda among others, could be used as an opportunity for new social experiments and indoctrination. in these differences and in the bitterness of personal dislike, people believed that the war could not be won unless their separate purposes were also fulfilled; our activities were not designed to fit with one another, and we were like ionized particles, held within a framework, but each pulling away from the others. the attack on pearl harbor silenced the pacifists; not even the most misguided could suggest that the president had maneuvred japan into the attack; the direct cause of the war, including the war which italy and germany declared on us, was self-protection. we were not fighting for england, for the jews, for the munition makers. but did we know what we _were_ fighting for? the president had said that we did not intend to be constantly at the mercy of aggressors; and the atlantic charter provided a rough sketch of the future. but we did not know whether we were to be allied with britain, reconstruct europe, raise china to dominance in the far east, enter a supernational system, withdraw as we did at the end of the last war, or simply make ourselves the rulers of the world. matching our casual uncertainty was the dead-shot clear-minded intention of our enemies--to conquer, to subjugate, to rule; by forgetting all other aims, eliminating all private purposes; by putting aside whatever the war did not require and omitting nothing necessary for victory; by making war itself the great social experiment, using war to destroy morals, habits and enterprises which did not help the war, destroying, above all, the prejudices, the rights, the character of civilized humanity as we have known them. have we a source of unity which can oppose this totality? according to hitler, we have not: we are a nation of many races and people; we are a capitalist country divided between the rich and the poor; we break into political parties; we reject leadership; we are given up to private satisfactions and do not understand the sacrifices which unity demands. therefore, in the hitlerian prophecy, america needs only to be put under the slightest tension and it will fall apart. the strains under which people live account for their strength as well as their weakness; we are strong in another direction precisely because we are not "unified" in the nazi sense. actually the nazis have no conception of unity; their purpose is totality, which is not the same thing at all. a picture or a motor has unity when all the _different_ parts are arranged and combined to produce a specific effect; but a canvas all painted the same shade of blue has no unity--it is a totality, a total blank; there is no unity in a thousand ball-bearings; they are _totally_ alike. if the nazi argument is not valid, why did we first thank japan for unity, and then discover that we had no unity? why were we pulling against one another, so that in the first year of the war we were distracted and ineffective, as france had been? if outright pacifism was our only disruptive element, why didn't we, after we were attacked, embrace one another in mutual forgiveness, high devotion to our country, and complete harmony of purpose? months of disaster in the pacific and the grinding process of reorganizing for production at home left us unaware of the sacrifices we had still to make, and at the mercy of demagogues waiting only for the right moment to start a new appeasement. perhaps next summer, when the american people won't get their motor trips to the mountains and the lakes; perhaps next winter when coal and oil may not be delivered promptly; perhaps when the first casualty lists come in.... we were not a united people and were not mature enough, in war years, to face our disunion. when we become mature we will discover that unity means agreement as to purpose, consent as to methods, and willingness to function. all the parts of the motor car have to do their work, or the car will not run well; that is their unity; and our unity will bring every one of us jobs to do for which we have to prepare. we can remember pearl harbor with banners and diamond clasps, but until we forget pearl harbor and do the work which national unity requires of us, we will still be children playing a war game--and still persuading ourselves that we can't lose. _the background of disunion_ in the urgency of the moment no one asked how it happened that the united states were not a united people. no one wondered what had happened to us in the past twenty years to make religious and racial animosities, political heresy-hunts, and class hatreds so common that they were used not only by demagogues, but by men responsible to the nation. no one asked whether the unity we had always assumed was ever a real thing, not a politician's device, for use on national holidays only. and, when the disunion of the people's leaders began to be apparent, and the people began to be ill-at-ease--then they were told to remember pearl harbor, or that we were all united really, but were helping our country best by constructive criticism. the fatal circumstance of our disunity we dared not face. no one who _could_ unite the people was willing to work out the basis of unity--and everyone left it to the president, as if in the strain of battle, a general were compelled to orate to the troops. the president's work was to win over our enemies; it should not have been necessary for him to win us over, too. the situation is grave because we have no tradition of early defeat and ultimate victory; we have no habit of national feeling, so that when hardships fall on us we feel alone, and victimized. we do not know what "all being in the same boat" really signifies; we will, of course, pull together if we are shipwrecked; but the better way to win wars is to avoid shipwrecks, not to survive them. we cannot improvise a national unity; we can only capitalize on gusts of anger or jubilation, from day to day--these are the tactics of war propaganda, not its grand strategy. for our basic unity we have to go where it already exists, we have to uncover a great mother-lode of the true metal, where it has always been; we have to _remind_ ourselves of what we have been and are, so that our unity will come from within ourselves, and not be plastered on like a false front. for it is only the strength inside us that will win the war and create a livable world for us when we have won it. we have this deep, internal, mother-lode of unity--in our history, our character, and our destiny. we are awkward in approaching it, because in the past generation we have falsified our history and corrupted our character; the men now in training camps grew up between the treaty of versailles and the crash of 1929; they lived in the atmosphere of normalcy and debunking; of the ku klux klan and bolshevism; of boom and charity; and it is not surprising that they were, at first, bewildered by the sudden demands on their patriotism. _losing a generation_ we have to look into those twenty years before we can create an effective national unity; what we find there is a disaster--but facing it is a tonic to the nerves. what happened was this: for the first time since the civil war, progressivism--our basic habit of mind--disappeared from effective politics. the moral fervor of the abolitionists, the agrarian anger of the populists, the evangelical fervor of william j. bryan, the impulsive almost boyish square deal of theodore roosevelt, the studious reformism of woodrow wilson, all form a continuity of political idealism; from 1856 to 1920 a party, usually out of office, was bringing the fervor and passion of moral righteousness into politics. the passion was defeated, but the political value of fighting for morally desirable ends remained high; and in the end the wildest demands of the "anarchists" and enemies of the republic were satisfied by congresses under roosevelt and wilson and taft. this constant battle for progressive principles is one of the most significant elements in american life--and we have unduly neglected it. james bryce once wrote that there was no basic difference in the philosophy of democrats and republicans, and thousands of teachers have repeated it to millions of children; intellectuals have neglected politics because the corruption of local battles has left little to choose between the vare machine in philadelphia, the kelly in chicago, the long in louisiana. for many years, in the general rise of our national wealth, politics seemed relatively unimportant and "vulgar"; and the figure of the idealist and social reformer was always ludicrous, because the reformers almost always came from the land, from the midwest, from the heart of america, not from its centers of financial power and social graces. so constant--and so critical--is the continuity of reformist politics in america, that the break, in 1920, becomes an event of extreme significance--a symptom to be watched, analysed and compared. why did america suddenly break with its progressive tradition--and what was the result? the break occurred because the reformist, comparatively radical party was in power in 1918 when the war ended; all radicalism was discredited by the rise of bolshevism in russia, with its implied threat to the sanctity of property. disappointment in the outcome of the war, wilson's maladroit handling of the league of nations, and his untimely illness, doomed the democratic party to impotence and the republicans to reaction, which is often worse. so there could be no effective, respectable party agitating for reform, for a saner distribution of the pleasures and burdens of citizenship; in the years that followed, certain social gains were kept, some laws were passed by the momentum gained in the past generation, but the characteristic events were the ohio scandals, the lowering of income taxes in the highest brackets, the failure of the child labor amendment, and the heartfelt, complete abandonment of america to normalcy--a condition totally abnormal in american history. it is interesting to note that the only reformer of this period was the prohibitionist; the word changed meaning; a derisive echo clings to it still. the new deal hardly ever used the word; and the reformers of the new deal were called revolutionists because reform was no longer in the common language--or perhaps because reforms delayed _are_ revolutionary when they come. the disappearance of liberalism as an active political force left a vacuum; into it came, triumphantly, the wholly un-american normalcy of harding and coolidge and, in opposition, the wholly un-american radicalism of the marxists; the republicans gave us our first touch of true plutocracy and the reds our most effective outburst of debunking. between them they almost ruined the character of an entire generation. for 150 years the united states had tried to do two things: first, allow as many people as possible to make as much money as possible and, second, prevent the rich from acquiring complete control of the government. as each new source of power grew, the attempt to limit kept pace with it; under jackson, it was the banking power that had to be broken; under lincoln the manufacturing power was somewhat balanced if not checked by the grant of free land; the interstate commerce commission regulated rates and reduced the power of the railroads; the sherman act, relatively ineffective, was directed against trusts; changes in tariff laws occasionally gave relief to the victims of "infant industries". under theodore roosevelt the railroads and the coal mine owners were held back and a beginning made in the recognition of organized labor; under wilson the financial power was seriously compromised by the federal reserve act, and industrial-financial power was balanced, a little, by special legislation for rural banking; under taft the income tax amendment was passed and an effort made to deduct from great fortunes a part of the cost of the government which protected those fortunes. _robbers and pharisees_ the era of normalcy was unique in one thing, it made the encouragement and protection of great fortunes the first concern of government. nothing else counted. through its executives and administrators, through cabinet members and those closest to the white house, normalcy first declared that no moral standard, no patriotism, no respect for the dead, should stand in the way of robbing the people of the united states; and so cynically did the rulers of america steal the public funds, that the people returned them to power with hardly a reproach. the rectitude of calvin coolidge made his party respectable; his dry worship of the money power was as complete a betrayal as harding's. he spoke the dialect of the new england rustic, but he was false to the economy and to the idealism of new england; his whole career was an encouragement to extravagance; he was ignorant or misled or indifferent, for he watched a spiral of inflated values and a fury of gambling, and helped it along; he refused even to admonish the people, although he knew that the mania for speculation was drawing the strength of the country away from its functions. money was being made--and he respected money; money in large enough quantities could do no harm. even after the crash, he could not believe that money had erred. when he was asked to write a daily paragraph of comment on the state of the nation, he was embarrassed; he had been the president of prosperity and he did not want to face a long depression; he asked his friends at morgan and company to advise him and they told him that the depression would be over almost immediately, so he began his writings, admitting that "the condition of the country is not good"; but the depression outlasted his writing and his life. by the usual process of immediate history, this singularly loquacious, narrow-minded, ignorant, and financially destructive president stands in public memory as the typical laconic yankee who preached thrift and probably would have prevented the depression if we had followed his advice. his successor was a reformed idealist. he had fed the belgians, looked after the commercial interests of american businessmen, and promised two cars in every american garage. at last plutocracy was to pay off in comfort--but it was too late. not enough americans had garages, not enough cars could be bought by the speculators on wall street, to make up for the lack of sales among the disinherited. _no more ideals_ normalcy was a debasement of the normal instincts of the average american; it deprived us of political morality, not only because it began in corruption, but because it ended with indifference; normalcy destroyed idealism, particularly the simple faith in ideals of the common man, the somewhat uncritical belief that one ought "to have ideals" which intellectuals find so absurd. in the attack on american idealism, our relations with europe changed and this reacted corrosively on the great foundations of american life, on freedom of conscience and freedom of worship, on the political equality of man. by the anti-american policy of harding and coolidge we lost the great opportunity of resuming communication with europe; a generation grew up not only hostile to the nations of europe ("quarrelsome defaulters" who "hired the money") but suspicious of europeans who had become americans. the ku klux klan, ford's and coughlin's attacks on the jews, pelley's attacks on the jews and the catholics, and a hundred others--were reflections in domestic life of our withdrawal from foreign affairs. _left deviation_ parallel to normalcy ran the stream of radicalism, its enemy. broken from political moorings by the collapse of wilsonian democracy, progressives and liberals drifted to the left and presently a line was thrown to them from the only established haven of radicalism functioning in the world: moscow. not all american liberals tied themselves to the party line; but few found any other attachment. the progressive party of lafollette vanished; the liberal intellectuals were unable to work into the democratic party; and, in fact, when franklin delano roosevelt was elected and called his election a victory for liberals, no one was more impressed than the liberals themselves. that the new president was soon to appear as a revolutionary radical was unthinkable. what had happened to the constant american liberal tradition? what had rendered sterile the ancient fruitful heritage of american radicalism? the apoplectic committees investigating bolshevism cried aloud that moscow gold had bought out the american intellectuals, which was a silly lie; but why was moscow gold more potent than american gold, of which much more was available? (american gold, it turned out, was busy trying to subsidize college professors and ministers of god, to propagandize against public ownership of public utilities.) it was not the gold of moscow, but the iron determination of lenin that captivated the american radical. at home the last trace of idealism was being destroyed and in russia a new world was being created with all the harshness and elation of a revolutionary action. the direction in america was, officially, _back_ (to normalcy; against the american pioneering tradition of forward movement); the direction of russia was forward--to the unknown. few reached moscow; few were acceptable to the stern hierarchy of communism; but all american liberal intellectuals were drawn out of their natural orbit by the attraction of the new economic planet. most of them remained suspended between the two worlds--and in that unhappy state they tried to solace their homelessness by jeering at their homeland. the american radical's turn against america was a new thing, as new as the normalcy which provoked it. in the 19th century a few painters and poets had fled from america; the politicians and critics stayed home, to fight. they fought for america, passionately convinced that it was worth fighting for. the populists and later the muck-rakers and finally the progressives were violent, opinionated, cross-grained and their "lunatic fringe" was dangerous, but none of them despised america; they despised only the betrayers of america: the railroads, the bankers, the oil monopolies, the speculators in wall street, the corrupt men in city hall, the bribed men in congress. it was not the time for nice judgments, not the moment to distinguish between a plunderer like gould and a builder like hill. what rockefeller had done to _save_ the oil industry wasn't seen until long after he had destroyed a dozen competitors; what the trusts were doing to prepare for large-scale production and mass-distribution wasn't to be discovered until the trusts themselves were a memory. so the radicals of 1880 and 1900 were unfair; they usually wanted easy money in a country which was getting rich with hard money; they wanted the farmer to rule as he had ruled in jefferson's day, but they did not want to give up the cotton gin and the machine loom and the reaper and the railroads which were transferring power to the city and the factory. the radical seemed often to be as selfish and greedy as the fat republicans who sat in congress and in bankers' offices and juggled rates of interest and passed tariffs to make industrial infants fat also. yet the liberal-radical until 1920 was a man who loved america and wanted only that america should fulfill its destiny, should be always more american, giving our special quality of freedom and prosperity to more and more men; whereas the radical-critic of the 1920's wept because america was too american and wanted her to become as like europe as we could--and not a living europe, of course. the europe held before america as an ideal in the 1920's was the europe which died in the first world war. _working both sides of the street_ the radical attack on america completed the destruction begun by the plutocrats; they played into each other's hands like crooked gamblers. the plutocrat and the politician made patriotism sickening by using it to blackjack those who saw skullduggery corrupting our country; and the radical critic made patriotism ridiculous by belittling the nation's past and denying its future. the politicians supported committees to make lists of heretics, and tried to deny civil rights to citizens in minority parties; and the intellectuals pretended that the ku klux klan was the true spirit of america; the plutocrats and the politicians murdered sacco and vanzetti and the radicals acted as if no man had ever suffered for his beliefs in france or england or germany or spain. the debasement of american life was rapid and ugly--and instead of fighting, the radical critic rejoiced, because he did not care for the america that had been; it was not communist and not civilized in the european sense--why bother to save it? in 1936 i summed up years of disagreement with the fashionable attitude under the (borrowed) caption, _the treason of the intellectuals_. looking back at it now, i find a conspicuous error--i failed to bracket the politician with the debunker, the plutocrat with the radical. i was for the average man against both his enemies, but i did not see how the reactionary and the radical were combining to create a vacuum in american social and political life. the people of the united states were--and are--"materialistic" and in love with the things that money can buy; but the ascendancy of speculative wealth in the 1920's was not altogether satisfying. more people than ever before gambled in wall street; but considering the stakes, the steady upswing of prices, the constant stories of success, the open boasting of our great industrialists and the benign, tacit assent of calvin coolidge--considering all these, the miracle is that eight out of ten capable citizens did not speculate. the chance to make money was part of the american tradition--for which millions of europeans had come to america; but it did not fulfill all the requirements of a purpose in life. it wasn't good enough by any standard; it allowed a class of disinherited to rise in america, a fatal error because our wealth depended on customers and the penniless are not good risks; and the riches-system could not protect itself from external shock. europe began to shiver with premonitions of disaster, a bank in austria fell, and america loyally responded with the greatest panic in history. long before the money-ideal crashed, it had been rejected by some of the american people. it would have been scorned by more if anything else had been offered to them, anything remotely acceptable to them. the longest tradition of american life was cooperative effort; the great traditions of hardship and experiment and progressive liberalism and the mingling of races and the creation of free communities--all these were still in our blood. but when the plutocrat and politician tried to destroy them by neglect or persecution, the intellectual did not rebuild them; he told us that the traditions had always been a false front for greed, and asked us to be content with laughing at the past; or he told us that nothing was good in the future of the world except the russian version of karl marx. _we l'arn the furriner_ the crushing double-grip of the anti-americans of the right and left was most effective in foreign affairs. normalcy wanted back the money which europe had hired, as president coolidge said; and normalcy wanted to hear nothing more of europe. at the same time the radical was basically internationalist; the true believer in lenin was also revolutionist. sheer isolationism didn't work; we were constantly on the side lines of the league of nations; we stepped in to save germany and presumably to help all europe; we trooped to the deathbed of old europe (with the exchange in our favor); the sickness made us uneasy at last--but we could not break from isolation because normalcy and radicalism together had destroyed the common, and acceptable, american basis of friendly independent relations with europe. internationalism, with a communistic tinge, was equally unthinkable; and presently we began to think that a treaty of commerce might somehow be "internationalist". europe, meanwhile, broke into three parts, fascist, communist, and the victims of both, the helpless ones we called our friends, the "democracies". by 1932 economics had destroyed isolation and hitler began to destroy internationalism. the american people had for twelve years shrunk from both, now found that it had no shell to shrink into--america had repudiated all duty to the world; it had tried to make the league of nations unnecessary by a few pacts and treaties; it had flared up over china and, rebuffed by england, sunk back into apathy. it was uninformed, without habit or tradition or will in foreign affairs; without any ideal around which all the people of america could gather; and with nothing to do in the world. the new deal repaired some of the destruction of normalcy, but it could not allay the mischief and unite the country at the same time. loyalty to the gold standard and devotion to the principle of letting people starve were both abandoned; the shaming moral weakness of the hoover regime, the resignation to defeat, were overcome. the direct beneficiaries of the new deal were comparatively few; the indirect were the middle and upper income classes. they saw president roosevelt save them from a dizzy drop into revolution; a few years later the danger was over, and when the rich and well-born saw that the president was not going to turn conservative, they regretted being saved--thinking that perhaps the revolution of 1933 might have turned fascist, and in their favor. these were extremists. the superior common man was not a reactionary when he voted for landon or willkie. after the blue eagle was killed by the supreme court and the supreme court was saved by resignations, the average american could accept ninety percent of the objectives of fdr--and ask only for superior efficiency from the republican party. the newspapers of the country were violent; martin dies was violent; john l. lewis was violent; but labor and radicals and people were _not_ violent. we were approaching some unity of belief in america's national future when the war broke out. _quarterback vs. pedagogue_ the new deal had no visible foreign policy, but president roosevelt made up for it by having several, one developing out of the other, each a natural consequence of events abroad in relation to the state of public opinion at home. to a great extent this policy was based on the president's dislike of tyranny and his love for the navy, a fortunate combination for the people of the united states, for it allied us with the atlantic democracies and compeled us to face the prospect of war in the pacific. so far as we were at all prepared to defend ourselves, we are indebted to the president's recognition of our position as a naval power requiring a friend at the farther end of each ocean, britain in the atlantic, russia and china in the pacific. the president's policy, singularly correct, was not the people's policy. it was not part of the new deal; it was not tied into domestic policies; it subsisted in a dreadful void. mr. roosevelt, who once called himself the nation's quarterback, never had the patient almost pedantic desire to teach the american people which was so useful to wilson. the notes to germany, scorned at the time, were an education in international law for the american people; by 1917 the people were aware of the war and beginning to discover a part in it for themselves. mr. roosevelt's methods were more spectacular, but not as patient, so that he sometimes alienated people, and he faced a wilier enemy at home; wilson overcame ignorance and roosevelt had to overcome deliberate malice, organized hostility to our system of government, and a true pacificism which has always been native to america. racial, religious, and national prejudices were all practised upon to prevent the creation of unity; it was not remarked at the time that class prejudice did not arise. the defect of roosevelt's method led to this: the american people did not understand their own position in the world. the president had appealed to their moral sense when he asked for a quarantine of the aggressors; he appealed to fear when he cited the distances between dakar and des moines; but he had no unified body of opinion behind him. the republican party might easily have nominated an isolationist as a matter of politics if not of principle; and it was a stroke of luck that politics (not international principles) gave the opportunity to wendell willkie. yet the boldest move made by mr. roosevelt, the exchange of destroyers for bases, had to be an accomplished fact, and a good bargain, before it could be announced. even mr. willkie's refusal to play politics with the fate of britain did not assure the president of a country willing to understand its new dangers and its new opportunities. nothing in the past twenty years had prepared america; and the isolationists picked up the weapons of both the plutocrat and the debunker to prevent our understanding our function in a fascist world. the grossest appeal to self-interest and the most cynical imputation of self-interest in others, went together. there were faithful pacifists who disliked armaments and disliked the sale of armaments even more; but there were also those who wanted the profit of selling without the risk; there were the alarming fellow travelers who wished america to be destroyed until they discovered the ussr wanted american guns. there were snide businessmen who wanted hitler even more than they wanted peace, and a mob, united by nothing--except a passion for the cruelty and the success of the nazis. the spectacle of america arguing war in 1941 was painful and ludicrous and one sensed changes ahead; but it had one great redeeming quality, it was in our tradition of public discussion and a vast deal of the discussion was honest and fair. the war did not change americans over night. the argument had not united us; but in the first days we dared not admit this; we began a dangerous game of hypnotizing ourselves. chapter iv "the strategy of truth" the consequences of building on a unity which does not exist are serious. we have discovered that all war is total war; we have also found that while our enemies lie to us, they do not lie to their high commands. total war requires total effort from the civilian and we have assumed that, in america, this means enthusiasm for our cause, understanding of our danger, willingness to sacrifice, confidence in our leaders, faith in ultimate victory. we may be wrong; total effort in germany is based more on compulsion and promise than on understanding. but we cannot immediately alter the atmosphere in which we are living. if we could, if our leaders believed that total effort could be achieved more quickly by lies than by truth, it would be their obligation to lie to us. in total war there is no alternative to the most effective weapon. only the weapon must be effective over a sufficient length of time; the advantage of a lie must be measured against the loss when the lie is shown up; if the balance is greater, over a period of time, than the value of the truth, the lie still must be told. if we are a people able to recognize a lie too fast for it to be effective, the lie must not be used; if we react "correctly" to certain forms of persuasion (as, say, magazine ads and radio commercials), the psychological counterparts of these should be used, at least until a new technique develops. this is a basis for "the strategy of truth" which archibald macleish set in opposition to the nazi "strategy of terror". the opposition is not perfect because the nazis have used the truth plentifully in spreading terror, especially by the use of moving pictures. their strategy, ethically, is a mixture of truth and lies, in combination; practically speaking, this strategy is on the highest ethical plane because it saves nazi lives, brings quick victory, protects the state and the people. it is, however, ill-suited to our purposes. _ethics of lying_ mr. macleish is being an excellent propagandist in the very use of the phrase, "strategy of truth", which corresponds to the president's "solemn pact of truth between government and the people"; there are a hundred psychological advantages in telling us that we are getting the truth; but propaganda has no right to use the truth if the truth ceases to be effective. lies are easier to tell, but harder to handle; in a democracy they are tricky and dangerous because the conditions for making lies effective have not been created; such conditions were created in germany; they came easily in other countries where no direct relations between people and government existed. before propaganda can lie to us, safely and for our own preservation, honorably and desirably, it must persuade us to give up our whole system of communication, our political habits, our tradition of free criticism. this could be done; but it would be difficult; no propagandist now working in america is cunning and brutal enough to destroy our civil liberties without a struggle which would cost more (in terms of united effort) than it would be worth. we cannot stop in the middle of a war to break down one system of persuasion and create another; the frame of mind which advertising men call "consumer acceptance" is, as they know, induced by a touch of newness in a familiar framework; the new element catches attention but it has to become familiar before it is effective. our propagandists, therefore, must use the truth, as they incline to do, but they have to learn its uses. we gain prestige by advertising the truth, even though the use of truth is forced upon us; but we have not yet won approval of the suppression of truth. it is good to use truth as flattery ("you are brave enough to know the truth") but truth also creates fear which (advertisers again know this) is a potent incentive to action. finally, the use of truth requires the canalization of propaganda; it is too dangerous to be handled by everyone. the propagandists of our cause include everyone who speaks to the people, sells a bond, writes, broadcasts, publishes, by executive order or private will; they vary in skill and in detailed purpose; they blurt out prejudices and conceal information useful to the citizen. they have not, so far as any one has discovered, lied to the people of america, contenting themselves at first with concealing the extent, or belittling the significance, of our reverses; presently the same sources began to abuse the american people for not being aware of the danger threatening them; and no one officially recognized the connection between ignorance and concealment. _maxims for propagandists_ it is easy to mark down the detailed errors of propaganda. the more difficult work is to create a positive program; and it is possible that we have been going through an experimental period, while such a program is being worked out in washington. a few of the requirements are obvious. _propaganda must be used._ our government has no more right to deprive us of propaganda than it has to deprive us of pursuit planes or bombers or anti-aircraft guns or antitoxin. propaganda is the great offensive-defensive weapon of the home front; if we do not get it, we should demand it. if what we get is defective, we should protest as we would protest against defective bombsights. _propaganda must be organized._ otherwise it becomes a diffused babel of opinion. _propaganda must be unscrupulous._ it has one duty--to the state. _propaganda must not be confused with policy._ if at a given moment the grand strategy of the war absolutely requires us to offer a separate peace to italy or to make war on rumania, propaganda must show this need in its happiest light; if the reverse is required, propaganda's job does not alter. policy should not be made by propagandists and propagandists should have no policy. _propaganda must interact with policy._ if at a given moment, the grand strategy has a free choice between recognizing or rejecting a danish government-in-exile, the action which propaganda can use to best advantage is the better. _propaganda must have continuity._ the general principles of propaganda have to be worked out, and followed. the principle, in regard to direct war news, may be to tell all, to tell nothing, or to alter the dosage according to the temper of the people. the choice of one of these principles is of the gravest importance; it must be done, or approved, by the president. after the choice is made, sticking to one principle is the only way to build confidence. except for details of naval losses, the british official announcements are prompt and accurate; the british people generally do not go about in the fear of hidden catastrophe. the italian system differs and may be suited to the temper of the people; the russian communiques are exactly adapted to stalin's concept of the war: the red soldier is cited for heroism, in small actions, the germans are always identified as fascists, the vast actions of the entire front are passed over in a formal opening sentence. the german method has its source in hitler; the announcements of action are rhetorical, contemptuous, and sometimes threatening; the oratory which accompanies the official statements has, for the first time, had a setback, since the destruction of the russian army was announced in the autumn of 1941, but no one has discovered any serious reaction as a result. the german people have been conditioned by action; and action has worked with propaganda for this result. the concentration camp, the death of free inquiry, and the triumph of munich have been as potent as goebbels' lies to prepare the german people for total war; so that they have not reacted against hitler when a prediction has failed or a promise gone sour. each of these methods has been consistently followed. our propagandists on the home front began with the knowledge that a great part of the country did not want a war; a rather grim choice was presented: to frighten the people, or to baby them. the early waverings about pearl harbor reflected the dilemma; the anger roused by pearl harbor gave time to the propagandist to plan ahead. the result has been some excellent and some fumbling propaganda; but no principle has yet come to light. _propaganda must supply positive symbols._ the symbol, the slogan, the picture, which unites the citizen, and inspires to action, can be created by an individual, but can only be made effective by correct propaganda. the swastika is a positive symbol, a mark of unity (because it was once a mark of the revolutionary outcast); we have no such symbol. uncle sam is a cartoonists' fiction, too often appearing in comic guises, too often used in advertising, no longer corresponding even to the actuality of the american physique. the minute-man has an antique flavor but is not sufficiently generalized; he is a brilliant defensive symbol and corresponded precisely to the phase of the militia, an "armed citizenry" leaping to the defense of the country. with my prejudice it is natural that i should suggest the liberty bell as a positive symbol of the thing we fight for. it is possible to draw its form on a wall--not to ward off evil, but to inspire fortitude. _propaganda must be independent._ it is a fighting arm; it has (or should have) special techniques; it is based on researches, measurements, comparisons, all approaching a scientific method. it should therefore be recognized as a separate function; mr. gorham munson, preceded by mr. edward l. bernays in 1928, has proposed a secretary for propaganda in the cabinet, which would make the direct line of authority from the executive to the administrators of policy, without interference. the conflicts of publicity (aircraft versus navy for priorities, for instance) will eventually force some organization of propaganda. the confusion of departmental interests is a constant drawback to propaganda, even if there is no direct conflict. _propaganda must be popular._ since the first world war several new ways of approaching the american people have been developed. these have been chiefly commercial, as the radio and the popular illustrated magazine; the documentary moving picture has never been popular, except for the march of time, but it has been tolerated; in the past two years a new type, the patriotic short, has been skilfully developed. the full length picture has hardly ever been used for direct communication; it is a "morale builder", not a propaganda weapon. _propaganda must be measured._ at the same time the method of the selective poll has been developed in several forms and a quick, dependable survey of public sentiment can be used to check the effectiveness of any propaganda. recent refinements in the techniques promise even greater usefulness; the polls "weight" themselves, and, in effect, tell how important their returns should be considered. the objections to the polling methods are familiar; but until something better comes along, the reports on opinion, and notably on the fluctuations of opinion, are not to be sneered away. to my mind this is one of the basic operations of propaganda; and although i have no evidence, i assume that it is constantly being done. _who can do it?_ an effective use of the instruments is now possible. we may blunder in our intentions, but technical blunders need not occur; the people who have used radio or print or pictures are skilled in their trade and they can use it for the nation as they used it for toothpaste or gasoline. and the people of america are accustomed to forms of publicity and persuasion which need not be significantly altered. moreover, we can measure the tightness of our methods in the field, not by rejoicing over "mail response", or newspaper comment, but by discovering exactly how far we have created the attitude of mind and the temper of spirit at which we aim. the advertising agency and the sampler of public opinion can supply the groundwork of a flexible propaganda method. they cannot do everything, because certain objectives have always escaped them. but they are the people who have persuaded most effectively and reported most accurately the results of persuasion. they cannot create policy, not even the policy of propaganda; but they can propagandize. all of this refers to propaganda at home. it need not be called propaganda, but it must _be_ propaganda--the organized use of all means of communication to create specific attitudes, leading to--or from--specific action. _what is morale's pulse?_ this is, of course, another way of saying that morale is affected by propaganda. i avoid the word "morale" because it has unhappily fallen into a phrase, "boosting morale", or "keeping morale at a high level." we have it on military authority that morale is an essential of victory, but no authority has told us how to create it, nor exactly to what high level morale should be "boosted". the concept of morale constantly supercharged by propaganda is fatally wrong; it confuses morale with cheerfulness and leads to the dangerous fluctuations of public emotion on which our enemies have always capitalized. morale should be defined as a desirable and effective attitude toward events. as despair and defeatism are undesirable, they break up morale; as cheerfulness leads at times to ineffectiveness, it is bad for morale. to induce cheerfulness in the week of singapore, the burning of the normandie, and the escape of the german battleships from brest, would have been the worst kind of morale-boosting; to prevent elation over a substantial victory would have been not quite so bad, but bad enough. there is a "classic example" of the effect of belittling a victory. the british public first got details of the battle of jutland from the german announcement of a naval victory, including names and number of british vessels sunk. the first british communique was no more subdued than usual, but coming _after_ the german claims and making no assertions of victory, taking scrupulous care to list _all_ british losses and only positively observed german losses, the announcement pulled morale down--not because it gave bad news, but because it put a bad light on good news; it did not allow morale to be level with events. the best opinion of the time considered jutland a victory lacking finality, but with tremendous consequences; and churchill was called in as a special writer to do the admiralty's propaganda on the battle after the mischief was done. the time element was against him for a belated explanation is never as effective as a quick capture of the field by bold assertion and proof. mr. churchill was himself belated, a generation later, when he first defended the navy for letting the gneisenau and scharnhorst escape and then, a day later, asserted that the ships had been compelled to leave brest and that their removal was a gain for the british. the point is the same in both cases: the truth or an effective substitute may be used; but it has to correspond to actuality. the admiralty underplayed its statement at jutland. churchill over-explained the situation at brest. both were bad for morale. _the hypodermic technique_ the "shot-in-the-arm" theory of morale is a confession of incompetence in propaganda. for the healthy human being does not need sudden injections of drugs, not even for exceptional labors; and the objective of propaganda is to create an atmosphere in which the average citizen will work harder and bear more discomfort and live through more anxiety and suffer greater unhappiness _without considering his situation exceptional or abnormal_. to "boost morale", to give the public a shot of good news (or even a shot of bad news), is an attempt to make us live above our normal temperature, to speed up our heart-beat and our metabolism. war itself raises the level; and all we have to do for morale is to stay on the new level. the principle that the citizen must not consider his situation exceptional is one of the few accepted by democratic and autocratic states alike. hitler announces that until the war is over he will wear a simple soldier's uniform; churchill refuses to accept a hoard of cigars; the president buys a bond. in every case the conspicuous head of a nation does what the average citizen has to do; and because each citizen is like his leader, all citizens are like one another. a unity is created. _re-uniting america_ this completes the circle which began with our need for unity, and proceeded through propaganda to morale. for the foundation of our war effort has to be unity and the base of good morale is the feeling of one-ness in the privations and in the triumphs of war. we can now proceed to some of the reasons for the breaks in unity, which propaganda has not seen, nor mended. first, the propagandists have rejected certain large groups of americans because of pre-war pacifism; second, they have failed to recognize the use to which isolationism can be put; third, they have not thought out the principles of free criticism in a democracy at war. to rehearse all the other forms of separatist action would be to recall angers and frustrations dormant now, just below the level of conscious action. moreover, a list of the causes of separation, with a remedy for each, would repeat the error of civilian propaganda in the early phases of the war--it would still be negative, and the need now is to set in motion the positive forces of unity, which have always been available to us. _the accord we need is for free and complete and effective action, for sweating in the heat and crying in the night when disaster strikes, for changing the face of our private world, for losing what we have labored to build, for learning to be afraid and to suffer and to fight; it is an accord on the things that are vital because they are our life: what have we been, what shall we do, what do we want--past, present, future; history, character, destiny._ the propaganda of the first six months of the war was not directed to the creation of unity in this sense; it was not concerned with anything but the immediate daily feeling of americans toward the day's news; the civilian propagandists insisted that "disunity is ended" because all americans knew what they were fighting for, so that it became faintly disloyal to point out that reiteration was not proof and that disunity could end, leaving mere chaos, a dispersed indifferent emotion, in its place. the end of dissension was not enough; unity had to be created, a fellow-feeling called up from the memory of the people, binding them to one another because it bound them to our soil and our heroes and our myths and our realities; and the act of creation of unity automatically destroyed disunion; when the gods arrive, not only the half-gods, but the devils also, depart. _myth and money_ faintly one felt a lack of conviction in the propagandists themselves. they were afraid of the debunkers, under whose shadow they had grown up. they did not venture to create an effective myth. myth to them was washington's cherry tree, and lincoln's boyish oath against slavery and theodore roosevelt's wild west; so they could not, with rhetoric to lift the hearts of harried men and women, recall the truth-myth of america, the loyalty which triumphed over desertion at valley forge, the psychological miracle of lincoln's recovery from self-abasement to create his destiny and shape the destiny of the new world; the health and humor and humanity of the west as roosevelt remembered it. at every point in our history the reality had something in it to touch the imagination, the heart, to make one feel how complex and fortunate is the past we carry in us if we are americans. the propagandists were also afraid of the plutocrats--as they were afraid of the myth, they were afraid of reality. they did not dare to say that america was an imperfect democracy whose greatness lay in the chance it gave to all men to work for perfection; they did not dare to say that the war itself must create democracy over again, they did not dare to proclaim liberty to this land or to all lands; in the name of unity they could not offend the enemies of human freedom. moreover, the propagandists for unity had to defend the administration. the rancor of politics had never actually disappeared in america, during wars; it was barely sweetened by a trace of patriotism three months after the war began. as a good fight needs two sides, defenders of the president were as happy as his opponents to call names, play politics, and distress the country. the groundwork for defeating the nation's aims in war was laid before those aims had been expressed; and one reason why we could make no proclamation of our purpose was that our purpose was clouded over; we had not yet gone back to the source of our national strength; and we had not yet begun to use our strength to accomplish a national purpose. we were effecting a combination of individual capacities--not a unity of will. we were adding one individual to another, a slow process: we needed to multiply one by the other--which can only be done in complete union of purpose. some of the weakness of propaganda rose from its mixed intentions: to make us hate the enemy, to make us understand our allies, to harden us for disaster, to defend the conduct of the war, to make us pay, to assure us that production was terrific, and then to make us pay more because production was inadequate; to silence the critics of the administration, to appease the men of violence crying for vichy's scalp or the men of violence crying for formulation of war aims. all these things _had_ to be done, promptly and effectively. they would have to be done no matter how unified in feeling we were; and they could not be done at all unless unity came first. _call back the pacifists_ small purposes were put first because the propagandists suffered from their own success. they had gone ahead of all and had brilliantly been teaching the american people the meaning of the european war; they were among the president's most potent allies and they deserve well of the country; the committee to defend america by aiding the allies and the other active interventionist groups were a rallying point for the enemies of hitler, and a strong point for attack by all the pacifists. but the moment the aim of these committees was accomplished and war was declared, the first objective must have been the re-incorporation of the pacifist 40% of our population into the functioning national group. the actual enemies of the country soon declared themselves; the hidden ones could be discovered. the millions who did not want to go to war had to be persuaded first of all that _we_ understood why _they_ had been pacifists; we could not treat them as cowards, or pro-germans, or reds, or idiots. we needed the best of them to unite the country, and all of them to fight for it. our propagandists did not know how to turn to their advantage the constant, native, completely sensible pacifism of the american people, especially of the midwestern americans. if the history of the united states has meaning, the pacifism of the midwest is bound to become dominant; our part in the first world war achieved grandeur because the people of the middle west, at least, meant it to be a war to end war, a war to end pacifism also, because there would be no need for it. the people of the middle west want our position in the world to keep us out of the wars of other nations; they saw no wars into which we could be drawn. they were wrong--but their instincts were not wrong. they do not believe that the wars of the united states have been like the wars of other nations; nor that the united states must now look forward to such a series of wars as every nation of europe has fought for domination or survival. this may be naive, as to the past and the future; but it is a naivete we cannot brush aside. it rises from too many natural causes. and the people of the middle west may, if need be, fight to make their dream of peace come true; they will have to fight the american imperialists, whom they have fought before; and this time they will have new allies; for the pacifist of the midwest will be joined by the pacifists of the industrial cities; and the great hope of the future is that the pacifists of america will help to organize the world after the war. _they will not help if they remain isolationists; and they will remain isolationist, in the middle of a global war, until they are certain that a world-order they can join is to be the outcome of the war._ again, our propagandists have to understand isolationism, an historic american tradition in one sense, a falsehood in another. our dual relation to europe is expressed in two phrases: we _came from_ europe. we _went away from_ europe. for a time we were anti-european; now we are non-europe; if europe changes, we may become pro-european; but we can never be part of europe. isolation is half our story; communication the other. on the foundation of half the truth, the isolationist built the fairy tale of physical separation; the interventionist, on the basis of our communication with europe, built more strongly--the positive overbore the negative. yet the whole structure of our relation to europe has to be built on both truths, we have to balance one strength with the other. we cannot make war or make peace without the help of the isolationists; and to jeer at them because they failed to understand the mathematics of air power and sea-bases is not to reconcile them to us; nor, for that matter, is it peculiarly honest. for few of those who wanted us to go to war against england's enemy warned us that we should have to fight japan also; and none, so far as i know, told us that the task of a two-ocean war might be for several years a burden of losses and defeat. the defeat of pacifist isolationism was not accomplished by the interventionists, but by japan. the interventionists, because they were better prophets, gained the appearance of being truer patriots; they were actually more intelligent observers of the war in europe and more passionately aware of its meaning. but they can be trusted with propaganda only if they recognize the positive value of their former enemies, and do not try to create a caste of ex-pacifist "untouchables." that is the method of totality; it is hitler declaring that liberals cannot take part in ruling germany, and communists cannot be germans. unity does not require us to destroy those who have differed with us, it requires total agreement as to aims, and temporary assent as to methods; we cannot tolerate the action of those who want hitler to defeat us, just as the body cannot tolerate cells which proliferate in disharmony with other cells, and cause cancer. we cannot afford the time to answer every argument before we take any action, so temporary assent is needed (the executive in war time automatically has it because he orders action without argument). in democratic countries we add critical examination after the event, and free discussion of future policy as correctives to error. none of these break into unity; none requires the isolation of any group except the enemies of the state. the purpose of unity is effective action--more tanks and planes, delivered more promptly; more pilots, better trained; more people helping one another in the readjustments of war. it is part of the groundwork of morale; in a democracy it is based on reconciliation, not on revenge. _the limits of criticism_ the pacifists and the isolationists are being punished for their errors if their legitimate emotions are not recognized as part of the natural composition of the american mind. criticism presents a problem more irritating because it is constantly changing its form and because no principle of action has been evolved. at one of the grimmest moments of the war, a correspondent of the _new york times_ wrote that "for a while not politics but the war effort appeared to have undergone an 'adjournment'". at another, the president remarked that he did not care whether democrats or republicans were elected, provided congress prosecuted the war energetically, and comment on this was that the president wanted to smash the two-party system, in order to have a non-critical congress under him as he had had in 1933. both of these items suggest, that propaganda has not yet taught us how to criticize our government in war time. the desirable limits of criticism have not been made clear. every attack on the administration has been handled as if it were treason; and there has been a faint suggestion of party pride in the achievements of our factories and of our bombers. neither the war nor criticism of the war can be a party-matter; and no party-matter can be tolerated in the path of the war effort. all americans know this, but the special application of this loyalty to our present situation has to be clarified. it has been left obscure. for the question of criticism is connected with the problem of unity in the simplest and most satisfying way. the moment we have unity, we can allow all criticism which rises from any large group of people. off-center criticism, from small groups, is dangerous. it does not ask questions in the public mind, and its tendency is to divert energies, not to combine them; small groups, if they are not disloyal, are the price we pay for freedom of expression in war time; it is doubtful whether, at present, any american group can do much harm; it is even a matter of doubt whether eugene v. debs or several opposition senators were a graver danger to the armies of the united states in 1917. small groups may be tolerated or, under law, suppressed; large groups never expose themselves to prosecution, but their criticism is serious and unless it is turned to advantage, it may be dangerous. the tendency of any executive, in war time, is to consider any criticism as a check on war effort. it is. if a commanding officer has to take five minutes to explain an order, five minutes are lost; if the president, or the head of opm, has to defend an action or reply to a critic, energy is used up, time is lost. but time and energy may be lost a hundred times more wastefully if the explanation is not given, if the criticism is not uttered and grows internally and becomes suspicion and fear. freedom of criticism is, in our country, a positive lever for bringing morale into logical relation to events. the victims of criticism can use it positively, their answers can create confidence; and best of all, it can be anticipated, so that it can do no harm. but this is true only if the right to criticize is subtly transformed into a duty; if, in doing his duty, the citizen refuses to criticize until he is fully informed; if the state makes available to the citizen enough information on which criticism can be based. then the substance and the intention of criticism become positive factors in our fight for freedom. since it is freedom we are fighting for. freedom, nothing else, is the source of unity--our purpose in the war, our reason for fighting. on a low level of survival we have forgotten some of our differences and combined our forces to fight because we were attacked; on the high level which makes us a nation we are united to fight for freedom, and this unites us to one another because it unites us with every american who ever fought for freedom. most particularly our battle today unites us with those who first proclaimed liberty throughout the land. chapter v the forgotten document to distract attention, to put people's minds on useless or bewildering projects is a bit of sabotage, in a total war. it is well enough to divert people, for a moment, so that they are refreshed; but no one has the right to confuse a clear issue or to start inessential projects or to ask people to look at anything except the job in hand. for five minutes, i propose a look at the declaration of independence, because it is the one document essential to our military and moral success; it is the standard by which we can judge the necessity of all projects; and although our destiny, and the means to fulfill it, are written into it, the declaration is the forgotten document of american history. we remember the phrases too often repeated by politicians and dreamers; we do not study the hard realistic plan of national action embodied in every paragraph of the instrument. the famous phrases at the beginning give the moral, and revolutionary, reason for action; the magnificent ground plan of the character and history of the american people is explained in the forgotten details of the declaration; and nothing in the conservative constitution could do more than delay the unfolding of the plan or divide its fruits a little unevenly. i suggest that the declaration supplies the _motive_ of action for today; the moment we understand it, we have a definition of america, a specific blueprint of what we have been, what we are, and what we can become--and the action necessary for our future evolves from this; moreover the unnecessary action is likewise defined. our course before we were attacked and our plans for the world after the war may seem the mere play of prejudice and chance; but the destiny of america will be determined not by the affections of one group or the fears of another, nor by hysteria and passion; our fate will be determined by the whole course of our history--and by our decision to continue its direction or to reverse it. the rest of this book flows out of this belief in the decisive role of the declaration, but it does not attempt to indicate a course of action in detail. for the sake of illustration i cite these instances. _q._ should the u.s. try to democratize the germans or accept the view that the germans are a race incapable of self-government? _a._ the history of immigration, based on the declaration, proves that germans are capable of being good and great democratic citizens. _q._ can the u.s. unite permanently with any single nation or any exclusive group of nations? _a._ our history, under the declaration, makes it impossible. _q._ can the u.s. join a world federation regulating specific economic problems, such as access to raw materials, tariffs, etc.? _a._ nothing in the declaration is against, everything in our history is for, such a move. _q._ can the u.s. fight the war successfully without accepting the active principles of the totalitarian states? _a._ if our history is any guide, the only way we can _lose_ the war is by failing to fight it in our own way. i have already indicated the possibility that our whole military grand plan must be based on variety, which is the characteristic of america created by specific passages in the declaration; i am sure that the whole grand plan of civilian unity (the plan of morale and propaganda) has to return to the leading lines of our history, if we want to act quickly, harmoniously and effectively; and the peace we make will be another versailles, with another article x in the covenant, if we make it without returning to the sources of our strength. so, if we want to win in the field and at home, win the war and the peace, we must be aware of our history and of the principles laid down in 1776 and never, in the long run, betrayed. _to whom it may concern_ the declaration is in four parts and all of them have some bearing on the present. the first explains why the declaration is issued. the words are so familiar that their significance is gone; but if we remember that days were spent in revision and the effect of every word was calculated, we can assume that there are no accidents, that the declaration is precise and says what it means. here is the passage: "_when, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's god entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation._" the first official utterance of america is based on _human necessity_--not the necessity of princes or powers. it is the utterance of a people, not a nation. it invokes first nature and then nature's god as lawgivers. it asks independence and equality--in the same phrase; the habit of nations, to enslave or be enslaved, is not to be observed in the new world. and finally "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind"; the first utterance of america is addressed not to the nations of the world, but to the men and women who inhabit them. _human--people--nature--nature's god--mankind._ these are the words boldly written across the map of america. a century and a half of change have not robbed one of them of their power--because they were not fad-words, not the catchwords of a revolution; they were words with cold clear meanings--and they destroyed feudalism in europe for a hundred and sixty years. the practical application of the preamble is this: whenever we have spoken to the people of other nations, as we did in the declaration, we have been successful; we have failed only when we have addressed ourselves to governments. the time is rapidly coming when our only communication with europe must be over the heads of its rulers, to the people. it does not seem practical; but we shall see later that, for us, it has always been good politics. _the logic of freedom_ the next passage in the declaration is the one with all the quotations. there can be little harm in reprinting it: "_we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experiences hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. but when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evidence a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. such has been the patient sufferance of these colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former system of government the history of the present king of great britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states. to prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world._" starting off with a rhetorical device--the pretense that its heresies are acceptable commonplaces, this long paragraph builds a philosophy of government on the unproved and inflammatory assumptions which it calls "self-evident". the self-evident truths are, in effect, _the terms agreed upon by the signers_. these signers now appear for the first time, they say "_we_ hold", they say that, to themselves, certain truths are self-evident. the first three of "these truths" are some general statements about "all men"; the fourth and fifth tell why governments are established and why they should be overthrown. these two are the objective of the first three; but they have been neglected in favor of adolescent disputation over the equality of men at birth, and they have been forgotten in our adult pursuit of happiness which has often made us forget that life and liberty, no less than large incomes, are among our inalienable rights. the historians of the declaration always remind us of john locke's principle that governments exist only to protect property; when states fail they cease to be legitimate, they can be overthrown; and locke is taken to be, more than rousseau, the inspiration of the declaration. the declaration, it happens, never mentions the right to own property; but the argument for revolution is essentially the same: when a government ceases to function, it should be overthrown. the critical point is the definition of the chief duty of a government. the colonists, in the declaration, said it is to secure certain rights to all men; not to guarantee privileges granted by the state, but to protect rights which are born when men are born, in them, with them--inalienably theirs. so the declaration sets us for ever in opposition to the totalitarian state--for that state has all the inalienable rights, and the people exist only to protect the state. the catalogue of rights is comparatively unimportant; once we agree that the state exists to secure inherent rights, the great revolutionary stride has been taken; and immediately we see that our historic opposition to old europe is of a piece with our present opposition to hitler. the purpose of our state is not the purpose of the european states; we might work with them, side by side, but a chemical union would result only in an explosion. there is one word artfully placed in the description of the state; the declaration does not say that governments derive their powers from the consent of the governed. it says that governments instituted among men to protect their rights "derive their _just_ powers from the consent of the governed". always realistic, the declaration recognizes the tendency of governors to reach out for power and to absorb whatever the people fail to hold. the idea of consent is also revolutionary--but the moment "inalienability" is granted, consent to be governed _must_ follow. the fascist state recognizes _no_ inalienable right, and needs no consent from its people. it is "self-evident", i think, that we have given wrong values to the three elements involved. we have talked about the "pursuit of happiness"; we have been impressed by the idea of any right being ours "for keeps", inalienable; and we have never thought much about the fundamental radicalism of the declaration: that it makes government our servant, instructed _by us_ to protect our rights. the chain of reasoning, as the declaration sets it forth, leads to a practical issue: all men are created equal--their equality lies in their having rights; these rights cannot be alienated; governments are set up to prevent alienation; power to secure the rights of the people is given by the people to the government; and if one government fails, the people give the power to another. so in the first three hundred words of the declaration the purpose of our government is logically developed. _blueprint of america_ there follows first a general and then a particular condemnation of the king of england. this is the longest section of the declaration. it is the section no one bothers to read; the statute of limitations has by this time outlawed our bill of complaint against george the third. but the grievances of the colonials were not high-pitched trifles; every complaint rises out of a definite desire to live under a decent government; and the whole list is like a picture, seen in negative, of the actual government the colonists intended to set up; and the basic habits of american life, its great traditions, its good fortune and its deficiencies are all foreshadowed in this middle section. here--for the sake of completeness--is the section: "_he has refused his assent to laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good._ "_he has forbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained, and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend them._ "_he has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only._ "_he has called together legislative bodies at places, unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures._ "_he has dissolved representative houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people._ "_he has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people at large for their exercise; the state remaining in the meantime exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within._ here i omit one "count", reserved for separate consideration. "_he has obstructed the administration of justice, by refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers._ "_he has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries._ "_he has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance._ "_he has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our legislatures._ "_he has affected to render the military independent of and superior to the civil power._ "_he has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation: for quartering large bodies of armed troops among us: for protecting them by a mock trial from punishment for any murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these states: for cutting off our trade with all parts of the world: for depriving us in many cases of the benefits of trial by jury: for transporting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended offenses: for abolishing the free system of english laws in a neighbouring province, establishing therein an arbitrary government, and enlarging its boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these colonies: for taking away our charters, abolishing our most valuable laws and altering fundamentally the forms of our governments: for suspending our own legislatures and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever._ "_he has abdicated government here by declaring us out of his protection and waging war against us._ "_he has plundered our seas, ravished our coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people._ "_he is at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolation, and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the head of a civilized nation._ "_he has constrained our fellow citizens taken captive on the high seas to bear arms against friends and brethren, or to fall themselves by their hands._ "_he has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions. in every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms. our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. a prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people. nor have we been wanting in attention to our british brethren. we have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. we have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. we have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. they too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. we must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity which denounces our separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends._" the eighteen paragraphs of denunciation fall into seven general sections: the king has thwarted representative government; he has obstructed justice; he has placed military above civil power; he has imposed taxes without the consent of the taxed; he has abolished the rule of law; he has placed obstacles in the way of the growth and prosperity of the colonies; he has, in effect, ceased to rule them, because he is making war on them. so the bill of complaint signifies these things about the founders of our country: they demanded government with the consent, by the representatives, of the governed. they cherished civil rights, respect for law, and would not tolerate any power superior to law--whether royal or military. they wished for a minimum of civil duties, hated bureaucrats, wanted to adjust their own taxes, and were afraid of the establishment of any tyranny on nearby soil. they wanted free trade with the rest of the world, and no restraints on commerce and industry. they intended to be prosperous. they considered themselves freemen and proposed to remain so. these were the rights to which lovers of human freedom aspired in england or france; they were the practical application of locke and rousseau and the encyclopedists and the roundheads. little in the whole list reflects the special conditions of life in the colonies; troops had been quartered in ireland, trial by jury suspended in england, tyrants then as now created their praetorian guard or storm troops and placed military above civil rights, and colonies from early time had been considered as tributaries of the mother country. _the practical "dream"_ the american colonists were about to break the traditions of european settlement, and with it the traditions of european government. and, with profound insight into the material conditions of their existence, they foreshadowed the entire history of our country in the one specification which had never been made before, and _could_ never have been made before: "_he has endeavored to prevent the population of these states; for that purpose obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriations of lands._" this amazing paragraph is placed directly after the sections on representative government; it is so important that it comes before the items on trial by jury, taxation, and trade. it is a critical factor in the history of america; if we understand it, we can go forward to understand our situation today. the other complaints point toward our systems of law, our militia, our constant rebellion against taxes, our mild appreciation of civil duties, our unswerving insistence upon the act of choosing representatives; all these are details; but this unique item indicates how the nation was to be built and what its basic social, economic, and psychological factors were to be. this brief paragraph condemns the crown for obstructing the two processes by which america was made: immigration pioneering with absolute clairvoyance the declaration sets naturalization, which means political equality, in between the two other factors. naturalization is the formal recognition of the deep underlying truth, the new thing in the new world, that one could _become_ what one willed and worked to become--one could, regardless of birth or race or creed, _become an american_. so long as the colonies were held by the crown, the process of populating the country by immigration was checked. the colonists had no "dream" of a great american people combining racial bloods and the habits of all the european nations. they wanted only to secure their prosperity by growing; they constantly were sending agents to westphalia and the palatinate to induce good germans to come to america, one colony competing with another, issuing pamphlets in platt-deutsch, promising not utopia with rivers of milk and honey, not a dream, but something grander and greater--citizenship, equality under the law, and land. across this traffic the king and his ministers threw the dam of royal prerogative; they meant to keep the colonies, and they knew they could not keep them if men from many lands came in as citizens; and they meant to keep the virgin lands from the appalachians to the mississippi--or as much of it as they could take from the spaniards and the french. so as far back as 1763, the crown took over _all_ title to the 250,000 square miles of land which are now indiana and illinois and michigan and minnesota, the best land lying beyond the alleghenies. into this territory no man could enter; none could settle; no squatters' right was recognized; no common law ran. suddenly the natural activity of america, uninterrupted since 1620, stopped. the right of americans to move westward and to take land, the right of non-americans to become americans, both were denied. the outcry from the highlands and the forest clearing was loud; presently the seaboard saw that america was one country, its true prosperity lay within its own borders, not across the ocean. and to make the unity clear, the crown which had taken the land, now took the sea; the trade of the colonies was broken; they were cut off from europe, forbidden to bring over its men, forbidden to send over their goods. for the first time america was isolated from europe. so the british crown touched every focal spot--and bruised it. the outward movement, to and from europe, always fruitful for america, was stopped; the inward movement, across the land, was stopped. the energies of america had always expressed themselves in movement; when an artificial brake on movements was applied, friction followed; then the explosion of forces we call the revolution. and nothing that happened afterward could effectively destroy what the revolution created. the thing that people afterward chose to call "the american dream" was no dream; it was then, and it remained, the substantial fabric of american life--a systematic linking of free land, free trade, free citizenship, in a free society. a grim version of our history implies that the pure idealism of the declaration was corrupted by the rich and well-born who framed the constitution. as charles beard is often made the authority for this economic interpretation, his own account of the economic effects of the declaration may be cited in evidence: the great estates were broken up; the hold of the first-born and of the dead-hand were equally broken; in the new states, the property qualification was never accepted and it disappeared steadily from the old. and the ordnance of 1787, last great act of the continental congress, inspired by the declaration, created the northwest territory, the heart of america for a hundred years, in a spirit of love and intelligence which the constitution in all its wisdom did not surpass. that is what the declaration accomplished. it set in action _all_ the forces that ultimately made america. the action rose out of the final section, in which, naming themselves for the first time as "representatives of the united states of america", the signers declare that "these united colonies are, and of right ought to be free and independent states...." in this clear insight, the declaration says that the things separating one people from another have already happened--differences in experiences, desires, habits--and that the life of the colonies is already so independent of britain that the purely political bond must be dissolved. "_we, therefore, the representatives of the united states of america, in general congress, assembled, appealing to the supreme judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions do, in the name, and by authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare, that these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the british crown, and that all political connection between them and the state of great britain is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as free and independent states, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do. and for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor._" so finally, as a unity of free and independent states, the new nation arrogates to itself four specific powers: to levy war conclude peace contract alliances establish commerce. only these four powers, by name; the rest were lumped together, a vast, significant et cetera; but these were so much more significant that they had to be separately written down; three of them--war--peace--alliances--are wholly international; the fourth, commerce, at least partly so. the signers of the declaration made no mistake; they wished to be independent; and in order to remain independent, they were fighting _against_ isolation. the error we must not make about the declaration is to think of it as a purely domestic document, dealing with taxes and election of representatives and redcoats in our midst; it is the beginning of our national, domestic life, but only because it takes the rule of our life out of english hands; and the moment this is done, the declaration sets us up as an independent nation among other nations, and places us in relation, above all, to the nations of europe. at this moment our intercourse with the nations of europe is a matter of life and death--death to the destroyer of free europe or death to ourselves; but if we live, life for all europe, also. like parachute troops, our address to europe must precede our armies; we have to know what to say to europe, to whom to say, how to say it. and the answer was provided by the declaration which let all europe come to us--but held us independent of all europe. chapter vi "the population of these states" in the back of our minds we have an image labeled "the immigrant"; and it is never like ourselves. the image has changed from generation to generation, but it has never been accurate, because in each generation it is a political cartoon, an exaggeration of certain features to prove a point. we have to tear up the cartoon; then we can get back to the picture it distorts. _english-speaking aliens_ the immigrant-cartoon since 1910 has been the south-european: slavic, jewish, italian; usually a woman with a shawl over her head, her husband standing beside her, with slavic cheekbones or a graying beard; and eager children around them. this is not a particularly false picture of several million immigrants; among them some of the most valuable this country has had. but it erases from our mind the bare statistical fact that the largest single language group, nearly _one third of all_ the immigrants to the united states, were english-speaking. for several decades, the bulk of all immigration was from great britain and ireland. if one takes the three principal sources of immigration for every decade between 1820 and 1930, one finds that germany and ireland were among the leaders for sixty years; italy for forty; russia only thirty; the great scandinavian movement to the middle west lasted a single decade; but great britain was one of the chief sources of immigration for seventy years, and probably was the principal source for thirty years more--from 1790 until 1820--during which time no official figures were kept. out of thirty-eight million arrivals in this country, about twelve spoke the dominant tongue, and most of them were aware of the tradition of anglo-saxon self-government; some had suffered from british domination, more had enjoyed the fruits of liberty; but all knew what liberty and respect for law meant. many of these millions fled from poverty; but most were not refugees from religious or political persecution. many millions came to relatives and friends already established; and began instantly to add to the wealth of the country; many millions were already educated. the cost of their upbringing had been borne abroad; they came here grown, trained, and willing to work. they fell quickly into the american system, without causing friction; they helped to continue the dominance of the national groups which had fought the revolution and created the new nation. it is important to remember that they were, none the less, immigrants; they made themselves into americans and helped to make america; they helped to make us what we are by keeping some of their habits, by abandoning others. for this is essential: the british immigrant, even when he came to a country predominantly anglo-saxon, did not remain british and did not make the country anglo-saxon. the process of change affected the dominant group as deeply as it affected the minorities. it was a little easier for a kentish man to become an american than it was for a serbian; but it was just as hard for the man from kent to remain a briton as it was for the serbian to remain a serb. both became americans. neither of them tried to remake america in the mold of his old country. _who asked them to come?_ the next image in our minds is a bad one for us to hold because it makes us feel smug and benevolent. it is the image of america, the foster-mother of the world, receiving first the unfortunate and later the scum of the old world. it is true that the oppressed came to america, and that in the forty million arrivals there were criminals as well as saints. the picture is false not only in perspective, but in basic values. for in many generations, at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end of the great inrush of europeans, the united states actively desired and solicited immigration. obviously when people were eager to emigrate, the solicitation fell off; irish famine and german reaction sent us floods of immigrants who had not been individually urged to come. but their fathers and elder brothers had been invited. the colonies and the states in their first years wanted settlers and, as noted, wrote their need for new citizens into the declaration; between two eras of hard times we built the railroads of the country and imported irish and chinese to help the civil war veterans lay the ties and dig the tunnels; in the gilded age and again at the turn of the century, we were enormously expanding and again agents were busy abroad, agents for land companies, agents for shipping, agents for great industries which required unskilled labor. moreover, the congress of the united states refused to place any restrictions upon immigration. the vested interest of labor might demand restrictions; but heavy industry loved the unhappy foreigner (the nearest thing to coolie labor we would tolerate) and made it a fixed policy of the united states not to discourage immigration. the only restriction was a technical one about contract labor. it did not lower the totals. _america was fulfilment!_ the moment we have corrected the cartoon we can go back to fact without self-righteousness. the fact is that arrival in america was the end toward which whole generations of europeans aspired. it did not mean instant wealth and high position; but it did mean an end to the only poverty which is degrading--the poverty which is accepted as permanent and inevitable. the shock of reality in the strike-ridden mills around pittsburgh, on the blizzard-swept plains of the dakotas, brought dismay to many after the gaudy promises made by steamship agents and labor bosses. but in one thing america never failed its immigrants--the promise and hope of better things for their children. america was not only promises; america was fulfilment. no one has measured the exact dollar-and-cents value of believing that the next generation will have a chance to live better, in greater comfort and freedom. in america this belief in the future was only a projection of the parallel belief in the present; it was a reaction against the european habit of assuming that the children would, with luck, be able to live where their parents lived, on the same income, in the same way. the elder son was fairly assured of this; war and disease and colonies and luck would have to take care of the others. the less fortunate, the oppressed, could not even hope for this much. at various times the jew in russia, the liberal in germany, the sicilian sulphur-miner, the landless irish, and families in a dozen other countries could only expect a worse lot for their children; they had to uproot themselves and if they themselves did not stand transplanting, they were sure their children would take root in the new world. and this confidence--which was always justified--became as much a part of the atmosphere of america as our inherited parliamentary system, our original town-meetings, our casual belief in civil freedom, our passion for wealth, our habits of movement, and all the other essential qualities which describe and define us and set us apart from all other nations. the immigrant knew his children would be born americans; for himself there was a more difficult and in some ways more satisfying fate: he could _become_ an american. it was not a cant phrase; it had absolute specific meaning. the immigrant became in essence one of the people of the country. as soon as he was admitted, he had the same civil rights as the native; within a few years he could acquire all the basic political rights; and neither the habits of the people nor the laws of the government placed anything in the way of social equality; the immigrant's life was his own to make. this did not mean that the immigrant instantly ceased to be a slav or saxon or latin any more than it meant that he ceased to be freckled or brunette. the immigrant became a part of american life because the life of america was prepared to receive him and could not, for six generations, get along without him. _america is various_ during the years in which big business solicited immigration and organized labor attacked it, the argument about the immigrant took an unfortunate shift. the question was whether the melting pot was "working", whether immigrants could be americanized. there were people who worried if an immigrant wore a shawl, when "old americans" were wearing capes; (the "old americans" wore shawls when they arrived, forty years earlier); it was "unfortunate" if new arrivals spoke with an "accent" different from the particular american speech developed at the moment. there were others who worried if an immigrant too quickly foreswore the costume or customs of his native land. employers of unskilled labor liked to prevent superficial americanization; sometimes immigrants were kept in company villages, deliberately isolated from earlier arrivals and native americans; wages could be kept low so long as the newcomers remained at their own level of comfort, not at ours. others felt the danger (foreseen by franklin and jefferson) of established groups, solidified by common memories, living outside the circle of common interests. the actual danger to the american system was that it wouldn't work, that immigrants coming in vast numbers would form separate bodies, associated not with america but with their homeland. (this is precisely what happened in argentina, by the deliberate action of the german government, and it is not an invention of hitler's. thomas beer reports that "in 1892 ... a german imperialist invited the reichstag to secure the ... dismemberment of the united states by planting colonies of civilized europeans" within our borders, colonies with their own religious leaders, speaking their own language; german leaders never could accept the american idea of change; in hitler's mind a mystic "blood" difference makes changing of nationality impossible.) the first world war proved that the "new immigrants", the masses from south europe, as well as the germans, could keep their ancient customs and be good americans; then observers saw that their worries over "assimilation" were beside the point; because the essence of america's existence was to create a unity in which almost all variety could find a place--not to create a totality brooking no variation, demanding uniformity. in the flush of the young century william james, as typical of america as edison or theodore roosevelt, looking about him, seeing an america made up of many combining into one, made our variety the base of his religious outlook. he had studied "the varieties of religious experience", and he began, experimentally, to think of a universe not necessarily totalitarian. he saw us building a country out of diverse elements and found approval in philosophy. he saw infinite change; "it would have depressed him," said a cynical and admiring friend, "if he had had to confess that any important action was finally settled"; just as it would have depressed america to admit that the important action of creating america had come to an end. james "felt the call of the future"; he believed that the future "could be far better, totally other than the past". he was living in an atmosphere of transformation, seeing men and women becoming "far better, totally other" than they had been. he looked to a better world; he helped by assuring us that we need never have one king, one ruler, one fixed and unalterable fate. he said that there was no proof of the one single truth. he threw out all the old totalitarians, and cast his vote for a pluralistic universe. we were building it politically every day; without knowing it, james helped to fortify us against the totalitarians who were yet to come. this was, to be sure, not americanization. it was the far more practical thing: becoming american. americanization was something celebrated on "days"; it implied something to be done _to_ the foreigners. the truth was that the immigrant needed only one thing, to be allowed to experience america; then slowly, partially, but consistently, he became an american. the immigrant of 1880 did not become an american of the type of 1845; he became an american as americans were in his time; in every generation the mutual experience of the immigrant, naturalized citizens and native born, created the america of the next generation. and in every generation, the native born and the older immigrants wept because _their_ america and their way of becoming american had been outmoded. the process passed them by; america had to be reborn. so long as the immigrant thought of "taking out citizen papers" and the native born was annoyed by accents, odd customs, beards and prolific parenthood, the process of becoming american was not observed, and the process of americanization seemed obvious and relatively unimportant. the tremendous revolution in human affairs was hidden under social discords and economic pressures. people began to think it was time to slacken the flow of immigrants until we had absorbed what we had. good land was scarce; foreigners in factions began to join unions; second-generation children grew up to be great tennis players and took scholarships; the pure costless joy of having immigrants do the dirty work was gone. the practical people believed something had to be done. but the practical people forgot the great practical side--which is also the mystical side--of our immigration. for the first time since the bright days of primitive christianity, a great thing was made possible to all men: they could become what they wished to become. as peter said to the romans, and paul to the athenians, that through faith and desire and grace they could become christians, equal, in the eyes of god, to all other christians, so the apostles of freedom spoke to the second son of an english lord, to the ten sons of a russian serf, to old and young, ignorant and wise, befriended or alone, and said that their will, their ambition, their work, and their faith could make of them true americans. the instant practical consequences of this new element in human history are incalculable. they are like the practical consequences of early christianity, which can be measured in terms of empires and explorations and crusades. the transformation of millions of europeans into americans was like the conversion of millions of pagans to christianity; it was accompanied by an outburst of confidence and energy. the same phenomena occurred in the renaissance and reformation, a period of conversion accompanied by a great surge of trade, invention, exploration, wealth, and vast human satisfaction. this idea of becoming american, as personal as religion, as mystical as conversion, as practical as a contract, was in fact a foundation stone of the growth and prosperity of the united states. it was a practical result of the exact kind of equality which the declaration invoked; it allowed men to regain their birthright of equality, snatched from them by tyrants. it persuaded them that they could enjoy life--and allowed them to produce and to consume. in that way it was as favorable to prosperity as our land and our climate. and it had other consequences. for, as it stemmed from equality, it went deep under the roots of the european system--and loosened them so that a tremor could shake the system entirely. _change and status_ for the european system stood against _becoming_; its objective was to remain, to be still, to stand. its ancient greatness and the tone of time which made it lovely, both came from this faith in the steady long-abiding changelessness of human institutions. all that it possessed was built to endure for ever; its cathedrals, its prisons, its symbols, its systems--including the symbols and the systems by which it denied freedom to its people. each national-racial-religious complex of europe was a triple anchor against change; it prevented men from drifting as the great winds of revolution and reform swept over europe. nor were men permitted to change, as they pleased. nations waged war and won land, but neither the czars nor the german emperors thought of the poles as their own people; the poles were irrevocably poles, excluded from the nobler society of russians, austrians and germans. religious societies made converts, but looked with fear or hatred or suspicion against the very people from whom the converts came--the jew was irretrievably a jew, the catholic a catholic. in each country one religion was uppermost, the rest tolerated. in each country one folk-group was dominant, the rest tolerated or persecuted. and in each country one class--the same class--ruled, and all other classes served. by ones or twos, men and women might be accepted into the established church, marry into the dominant race, rise to the governing class; but the exceptions proved nothing. the european believed in his _station_ in life, his civil _status_, the _standing_ of his family in the financial or social world. the englishman settling in timbuctoo remained an englishman because the englishman at home remained a middle-class bank clerk or "not a gentleman" or a marquess; and while an alien could become a subject of the king, he never for a moment imagined that he could become an englishman--any more than a scot. the english knew that names change; men do not. _only when they came to america, they did._ they did because the basic american system, the dynamics of becoming american, rejected the racialism of europe; it rejected aggressive nationalism by building a new nation; it rejected an established religion; and almost in passing it destroyed the class-system. to the familiar european systems of damnation--by original sin, by economic determinism, by pre-natal influence--has been added a new one--damnation by racial inferiority; the chamberlain-wagner-nietzsche-rosenberg-hitler myth of the superior race-nation means in practise that whoever is not born german is damned to serve germany; there is no escape because the inferiority is inherent. this is the european class-system carried to its loftiest point. we say that this system is inhuman, unscientific, probably suicidal. the poverty-system on which europe "prospered" for generations and into which we almost fell, was also inhuman, unscientific and probably suicidal; there is no logic in the british aristocratic system coupled with a financial-industrial overlordship and universal suffrage; there is little logic even in our own setup of vast organizations of labor, huge combinations of money, unplumbed technical skill hampered by both capital and labor, and some forty million underfed and half sick human beings in the most productive land in the world. it is not logic we look for in the framework of human society; we look for operations. what does it do? for all its failures, our system works toward human liberty; for all its success, the nazi system works against human liberty. we tend to give more and more people an opportunity to change and improve; their system is based on the impossibility of change. our system is a nation built out of many races; theirs is a nation excluding all but one race. our system has lapses, we do not grant citizenship to certain orientals nor social equality to negroes; but we do not write racial inferiority into our laws, we do not teach it in _our_ schools (it may be taught in sectional schools we tolerate, but do not support); and this is important. so long as we accept the ideal of political equality, hope lives for every man. the moment we abandon it, we nazify ourselves--and destroy the foundation of the republic. _americans all_ turning from the brutal leveling and uniformity of the nazis, good americans have begun to wish that more of the folk qualities of our settlers had been preserved. at every point america is the enemy of fasci-feudalism, and this is no exception. our music, our dancing, the language we speak, the foods we eat, all incorporate elements brought from europe; but we have not deliberately encouraged the second generation to preserve clothes and cooking any more than we have encouraged the preservation of political habits. there has been a loss in variety and color; and now, while there is still time, efforts are being made to create a general american interest in the separate cultures combined here. it has to be carefully done, so that we do not lose sight of the total american civilization in our enthusiasm for the contributing parts. there is always the chance that descendants of norwegians, proud and desperate as they consider the plight of their country, will become nationalistic here; and that they will not be interested in the music or the art of ukrainians in america; and that americans of italian descent may be the only ones concerned in adding to the italian contribution to american life. this is the constant danger of all work concerned with immigrant groups; and the supersensitiveness of all these groups, in a period of intense 100%-ism, tends to defeat the purpose of assaying what each has done to help all the others. yet some success is possible. in 1938 i worked with the office of education on a series of broadcasts which drew its title from the president's remark to the daughters of the american revolution, that we are all the descendants of immigrants. (the president also added "and revolutionaries", but this was not essential in our broadcasts.) everything i now feel about the focal position of the immigrant in american life is developed from the work done on the immigrants all series and, especially, from the difficulties encountered, as well as from one special element of success. i set down some basic principles: that the programs would not _glorify_ one national group after another; that the interrelation of each arriving group to the ones already here would be noted; the vast obligation of every immigrant to those who had prepared the way would be stressed; cooperation between groups would be dramatically rendered if possible; the immigrants' contribution to america would be paralleled by america's contribution to the immigrant; and the making of america, by its natives and its immigrants, would overshadow the special contribution of any single group. these were principles. in practise, some disappeared, but none was knowingly violated. from time to time, enthusiasts for a given group would complain that another had been more warmly treated; more serious was the indifference of many leaders of national and folk groups to the general problem of the immigrant, to any group outside their own. we were, by that time, in a period of sharpened national sensibilities; but this did not entirely account for an apparently ingrained habit of considering immigrant problems as problems of one's own group, only. suspicion of other groups went with this neglect of the problem as a whole; the natives born with longer american backgrounds were the ones who showed a clearer grasp of the whole problem; they were not bothered by jealousies and they were interested in america. on the other side, the series had an almost spectacular success. more than half of the letters after each weekly broadcast came from men and women who were _not_ descendants of the national group presented that week. after the program on the irish, some 48% of the letters were from irish immigrants or native-born descendants of the irish; the other 52% came from children of serbs and ffv's and jews and portuguese, from sicilians and germans and scots, scandinavians and englishmen and greeks. it was so for all of the programs; the defects of the scripts were forgotten, because the people who heard them were so much better americans than anyone had dared predict. of a hundred thousand letters, almost all were american, not sectarian in spirit; the bitterness of the cheap fascist movements had not affected even a fringe of the listeners. all in all, we were encouraged; it seemed to us that the immigrant was accepted as the co-maker of america. much of our future depends on the exact place we give to the immigrant. it has been taken for granted that immigration is over and that the proportions of racial strains in america today are fixed for ever. it is not likely that vast immigration will head for the united states in the next decade; but the principle of "becoming american" will operate for the quotas and the refugees; and it is now of greater significance than ever because the great fascist countries have laid down the principle of unchangeable nationality. the nazi government has pretended a right to call german-born american citizens to the colors; and a regular practise of that government is to plant "colonies" as spies. if we do not re-assert the principle of change of nationality (the legal counterpart to the process of becoming american) we will be lost in the aggressive nationalism of the nazis, and we will no longer be safe from racialism. preposterous as it will seem to scholars, degrading as it will be to men of sense, racialism can establish itself in america by the re-assertion of anglo-saxonism (with variations). _are we anglo-saxon?_ at this point the direct political implications of "becoming american" become evident. toward the end of this book there are some questions about union with britain; the point to note here is that so far as union-now (or any variant thereof) is based emotionally on the anglo-saxonism of the united states of america, it is based on a myth and is politically an impossible combination; if we plan union with britain, let it be based on the actuality of the american status, not on a snobbish desire. we cannot falsify our history, not even in favor of those who did most for our history. there is a way, however, of imputing anglo-saxonism to america, which is by starting with the great truth: the english and the scots--and the scots-irish--founded the first colonies (some time after the spaniards to be sure, but that is "a detail"); they established here certain basic forms of law and cultivated the appetite for freedom; they were good law-abiding citizens, and accustomed to self-discipline; they were great pioneers in the wilderness; they suffered for religious liberty and more than any other national or racial group, they fought the war of independence. can we say these men created the true, the original america; and everything since then has been a corruption of its 100% goodness and purity? this would allow us to rejoice in andrew carnegie, but not in george w. goethals; in hearst but not in pulitzer; in cyrus mccormick but not in eleuthã¨re dupont; in the wright brothers, but not in boeing and bellanca; in edison (partly as he was not all scot) but not in his associate berliner; in bell who invented the telephone but not in pupin who created long distance. we should have to denounce as un-american the civil service work of carl schurz and bela schick's test for diphtheria and goldberger's work on pellagra (which was destroying the pure descendants of the good americans); we would have to say that america would be better off without audubon and agassiz and thoreau; or boas and luther burbank; or john philip sousa and paul robeson and jonas lie. when we have denied all these their place in america, we can begin to belittle the contribution of still others to our national life. for the later immigrants had less to give to transportation and basic manufactures and to building the nation. these things were done by the earlier immigrants. the later ones gave their sweat and blood, and presently they and their children were troubling about education, or civil service, or conservation of forests, or the right of free association, or art or music or philanthropy. if our own special fascists lay their hands on our traditions, the burning of books will be only a trifle; for they will tear down the museums and the settlement houses, the kindergartens and the labor temples--and when they are done they will say, with some truth, that they have purged america of its foreign influence. all reform, all culture will be destroyed by the new klansmen, and they will re-write history to make us believe that wave after wave of corruption came from europe (especially from catholic and greek orthodox and jewish europe) to destroy the simple purity of anglo-saxon america. that is why, now, when we can still assess the truth, when we need the help of every american, we must declare the truth, that there never was a purely anglo-saxon united states. frenchmen and swedes and spaniards and negroes and walloons and hollanders and portuguese and finns and germans and german swiss were here before 1700; quakers, catholics, freethinkers and jews fought side by side with huguenots, episcopalians, calvinists and lutherans in the wars with the indians. in the colony of georgia, in the year washington was born, men of six nations had settled: german lutherans, italian protestants, scots, swiss, portuguese, jews and english. in 1750 four times as many germans arrived in pennsylvania as english and irish together. _the creative anglo-saxon_ the greatness of the anglo-saxon contribution to america--the gift greater than all their other great gifts--was the conception of a state making over the people who came here, and made over by them. by the end of the revolution, power and prestige were in the hands of the anglo-saxon majority; and in three successive instruments they destroyed the idea of anglo-saxon superiority: the declaration of independence, the ordnance of 1787, the constitution. "becoming" was not an ideal and it was not the base of anglo-saxon society in england; the concept of change and "becoming" was based on actuality; on what was happening all over the colonial dominion. people were becoming american, even before a new nation was born. all that followed--the vast complexity of creating america, would have been impossible without that first supreme act of creative self-sacrifice. when the statesmen of our revolutionary period established the principles of statehood and naturalization and citizenship in terms of absolute equality, they knew the risk they ran. in pennsylvania the official minutes were printed in both english and german; in maryland the catholics were dominant; there were still some influential dutch along the upper hudson who might secede from new york. on the western boundary, unsettled, uneasy, lay the spaniards and the french. there was danger of division, everywhere; but the great descendants of the english immigrants did not withdraw. their principle was equality; since men were born free, they could _become_ equal if artificial barriers were removed. the statesmen of that day declared for america; they knew that men did not, in this country, remain dutch or portuguese; but grew into something else. with their own eyes they had seen it happen. they pledged their lives and sacred honor that it would happen again. so, if ever we re-write history to prove that all the other nations contributed nothing and failed to become americans, we will also have to write it down that the anglo-saxons failed more miserably than the others. for the great idea, the practical dynamics of equality, was theirs; they set it in motion, guarded it, and saw it triumph. in the next ten years it will be impossible to extemporize an immigration policy for the united states. the world economy will change all around us; the dreadful alternations of plenty and starvation may be adjusted and controlled; we may enter a world order in which we will be responsible for a given number of souls, and some of these may be admitted to our country. by that time we will have learned that nationalist fascism and international communism are powerless here; and no one but professional haters of america will be left to bait the foreigners and persecute the alien. but above all, by that time we will have had time to reassert the great practical idea behind immigration and naturalization--the idea of men making themselves over--as for a century and a half they have made themselves into americans. _an experiment in evolution_ note: i have used the phrase "becoming american" and defined it as it defined itself; legally, in the customs of the country, it seems to mean becoming a citizen; experimentally "becoming" has happened to us, we have seen it happen, it means that we recognize an essential affinity between an immigrant and americans, living or dead. yet to many people the words may be vague; to others they may seem a particularly dangerous lie. those who are interested in certain foreign groups, less promptly "americanized", will protest that for all this "becoming", some are not accepted as american; those who are basically haters of all foreigners will say that the _law_ accepts citizens, but no power on earth can make them americans. it is my experience that the phrases created by poets, politicians and people are often the truest words about america; and one of the profound satisfactions of life is to see the wild imagery of the poet or the lush oratory of the politician come true, literally and exactly true, scientifically demonstrated and proved. in this particular case, absolute proof is still lacking, because we are dealing with human beings, we cannot make controlled experiments. we can observe and compare. under the inspiration of the eminent anthropologist dr. franz boas, the research has been made; so far as it goes it proves that the children of foreigners do become americans. specifically, their gestures, the way they stand and the way they walk, their metabolism and their susceptibility to disease, all tend to become american. in all of these aspects, there is an american norm or standard; and the children of immigrants forsaking the norm or standard of the fatherland, grow to that of america. the most entertaining of these researches was in the field of gesture. the observers took candid movie shots of groups of italians and of jews; they differ from one another and both differ from the american mode (which is a composite, with probably an anglo-saxon dominant). the observers found that the extreme gesture of the foreign-born jew is one in which a speaker gesticulates with one hand while with the other he holds his opponent's arm, to prevent a rival movement; and one case was noted in which the speaker actually gesticulated with the other man's arm. to the american of native stock this is "foreign"; and research proves that the american is right; such gestures are foreign even to the american-born children of the foreigner himself. the typical foreign gesture disappears and the typical american gesture takes its place. and this is not merely imitation; it is not an "accent" disappearing in a new land. because metabolism and susceptibility to disease are as certainly altered as gait and posture. the vital physical nature changes in the atmosphere of liberty--as the mind and the spirit change. the frightened lie of racial doom which has fascinated the german mind (under its meaner guise of racial superiority) was never needed in america. seeing men become americans, the fathers of our freedom declared that nothing should prevent them; they were not afraid of any race because they knew that the men of all races would become americans. their faith of 1776 begins to be scientifically proved today; a hundred and sixty-six years of creative america proved it in action. it is on the basis of what europeans became in america, that we now have to consider our relations with the europeans who remained in europe. chapter vii address to europe the communications of america and europe have always run in two channels: our fumbling, foolish diplomacy, our direct, candid, successful dealings with the people. our first word was to the people of europe; the declaration of independence tried to incite the british people against their own parliament; and the "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" refers to citizens, not to chancelleries. the declaration was addressed to the world; it was heard in paris and later in a dozen provinces of germany, and in savoy and in manchester, and presently along the nevski and the yellow river. since 1776, the people of the world have always listened to us, and answered. we have never failed when we have spoken to the people. after the declaration, the american people spoke to all the people of europe in the most direct way: they invited europeans to come here, offering them land, wages, freedom; presently our railroads and steamship lines solicited larger numbers; and the policy of the government added inducements. free immigration, and free movement, demanded in the declaration, made possible by laws under the constitution, were creating america. in domestic life we saw it at once; but the effects of immigration on our dealings with europe were not immediate. we need only remember that for a hundred and twenty years the peoples of europe and the people of the united states were constantly writing to one another; not merely doing business together, but exchanging ideas, mingling in marriage, coming together as dispersed families come together. whatever went on in the mississippi valley was known along the fjords and in the volga basin and by the danube; if sulphur was discovered in louisiana it first impoverished sicily--then brought sicilians to louisiana; greeks knew that sponges were to be found off tampa. and more and more people in america knew what was happening in europe--a famine, a revolution, a brief era of peace, a repressive ministry, a reform bill. the constant interaction of europe and america was one beat of our existence--it was in counterpoint to the tramp of the pioneer moving westward; immigration and migration meshed together. our government from time to time spoke to the governments of europe. a tone of sharp reproof was heard at times, a warm word for revolutionaries was coupled with indignation against tyrants: turkey, the dual monarchy, the tsar, all felt the lash--or congress hoped they felt it; in the boer war, england was the victim of semi-official criticism; and whenever possible, we were the first to recognize republics, even if they failed to maintain themselves on the ruins of monarchy. we fluttered official papers and were embarrassed by protocol, not believing in it anyhow, and were outwitted or out-charmed by second-rate diplomatists of europe. _people and protocol_ the campaign platforms always demanded a "firm, vigorous, dignified" diplomacy; the diplomacy of europe was outwardly correct, inwardly devious, shifting, flexible, and in our opinion corrupt. but our address to the _people_ of europe was, in all this time, so candid, so persuasive, that we destroyed the chancelleries and recaptured our losses. the first great communication, after 1776, was made by lincoln--it was not a single speech or letter, it was a constant appeal to the conscience of the british people, begging them, as the declaration had done, to override the will of their rulers. and this appeal also was successful; few events in our relations with england are more moving than the action of the starving midlanders. their government, like their men of wealth and birth, like their press and parliament, were eager to see america split, and willing to see slavery upheld in order to destroy democracy. but the men and women of manchester, starved by the northern blockade of cotton, still begged their government not to interfere with the blockade--and sent word to lincoln to assure him that the _people_ of britain were on the side of liberty, imploring him "not to faint in your providential mission. while your enthusiasm is aflame, and the tide of events runs high, let the work be finished effectually. leave no root of bitterness to spring up and work fresh misery to your children." nor did lincoln fail to respond; americans who could interest britain in the northern cause were unofficial ambassadors to the people; and our minister, charles francis adams labored with all sorts and conditions of men to make the government of britain accept the will of the british people. the emancipation proclamation was a final step in the domestic statesmanship of the war; it was also a step in the diplomacy of the war, for it insured us the good will of the british people; and that good will was vital to the success of the union. the north was coming close to war with the _government_ of britain, and the people's open prejudice in favor of lincoln and freedom kept england from sufficient aid to the confederacy. the next address of the united states to the people of europe is a long tragedy, its consequences so dreadful today that we can barely analyze the steps by which the great work for human freedom was destroyed. _wilson to the world_ following the precedent of the declaration, woodrow wilson began in 1916 to address himself to the people of the nations at war in europe. to ministries, german and british both, wilson was sending expostulations on u-boats and embargos; to the peoples of europe he addressed those speeches which were made at home; presently he wrote inquiries to the ministers which they were compelled to make public (since publication in neutral countries was certain). then, after the soviets of russia had gone over the heads of the foreign offices, to appeal to the workers of the world, wilson carried his own method to its necessary point and, after we entered the war, began the masterly series of addresses to the german people which were so effective in creating the atmosphere of defeat. they created at the same time the purposes of allied victory. the war ended and one of the magnificent spectacles of modern times occurred: the people of europe were for a moment united, and they were united by an american declaring the objectives of american life. the moment was so brief that few knew all it meant until it had passed; in the excitement of spectacles and events, of plots and processions, this moment when europe trembled with a new hope passed unnoticed. what happened later to woodrow wilson is tragic enough; but nothing can take away from america this great moment in european history--to which every observer bears testimony, even the most cynical. the defeated people of germany saw in america their only defence against the rapacity of clemenceau, the irresponsible, volatile opportunism of lloyd george, the crafty merchandising of orlando; the first "liberal" leader, prince max, had deliberately pretended acceptance of the fourteen points in order to embarrass wilson; but he spoke the truth when he said that wilson's ideals were cherished by the overwhelming majority of the german _people_; and quite correctly the germans saw that nothing but american idealism stood between them and a peace of vengeance. the enthusiasm of the victorious peoples was less selfish, but it was equally great; a profound distrust of their leaders had grown in the minds of realistic frenchmen and britons, they sensed the incapacity of their leaders to raise the objectives of the war above the level of the "knockout blow" or the _revanche_. as the germans cried to be protected in their defeat, the victorious people asked to be protected from such fruits of victory as europe had known for a thousand years. the demagogues still shouted hoarsely for a noose for the kaiser and the old order in germany began to plan for the next time--but the people of europe were united; they had gone through the same war and, for the first time in their history, they wanted the same peace. it was the first time that an american peace was proposed to them. _how wilson was trapped_ woodrow wilson made a triumphal tour of the allied capitals and by the time he returned to paris for the actual business of the peace, he had become the spiritual leader of the world. he was not, however, the political leader of his own country--he had lost the congressional elections and he allowed the diplomats of europe to make use of this defeat. they began to cut him off from the people of europe; he fell into the ancient traps of statesmanship, the secret sessions, the quarrels and departures; once he recovered control, ordered steam up in the george washington to take him home; but in the end he was outguessed--in the smart word, he was outsmarted. he had imagined that he could defeat the old europe by refusing to recognize its intrigues. he had, in effect, declared that secret treaties and all commitments preceding the fourteen points couldn't exist; he had hoped that they would be cancelled to conform to his pious pretence of ignorance. and clemenceau and lloyd george kept him quarreling over a mile of boundary or a religious enclave within a racial minority; they stirred passions; they starved german children by an embargo; they rumored reparations; they promised to hang the kaiser; they drew wilson deeper into smaller conferences; they promised him a league about which their cynicism was boundless, and he let them have war guilt and reparations and the betrayal of the russian revolution and the old european system triumphant. they had fretted him and tried him and they had made their own people forget the passionate faith wilson had inspired; they made wilson the agent of disillusion for all that was generous and hopeful in europe. they could do it because the moment wilson began to talk to the premiers, he stopped talking to the people. from the moment he allowed the theme of exclusive war guilt to be announced, he cut himself off from all germany; he did not know the temper of the working class in europe, and he refused to listen to the men he himself had sent to report on russia, which did not help him with the radical trade unions in france or the liberals in england. one by one the nations fell back into their ancient groove, the italians sullenly nursing a grievance, the french whipping up a drama of revenge and memory in the hall of mirrors at versailles, the british "isolating" themselves in virtual control of the continent, everybody frightened of russia--and everyone still listening for another word of honest truth from wilson, who was silent; for america was starting on a long era of isolation from europe (the first in a century), an aberration in american life, against all its actual traditions, in keeping only with its vulgar oratory. _the excommunication of europe_ the united states had no obligations to the nations which emerged out of the treaty of versailles, only a human obligation to their people to keep faith with them. the people of germany believed in all fervor that they had gained an armistice and sought peace on the basis of the fourteen points; the people of france and england believed that their own governments had accepted the same points. and the same people might have been stirred to insist on a peace of reconciliation--not with princes and ministers, but with peoples--if wilson and the americans had continued to communicate with them. we withdrew into a stuffy silence. just as we played a queer game of protocol and refused to "recognize" the ussr, so we sulked because the old bitch europe wasn't being a gentleman--the only communication we made to europe was when we dunned her for money. we have seen how the years of harding and coolidge affected our domestic life; they were not only a reaction against the fervor of the war months; they were a carefully calculated reaction against basic american policy at home and abroad; they betrayed american enterprise, delivered industry into the hands of finance, degraded government, laughed at corruption, and under the guise of "a return to normalcy" attempted to revive the dead conservatism of mckinley and penrose in american politics. in this period, it is no wonder that we failed to utter one kind word to help the first democratic government in germany, that we trembled with fear of the reds, sneered at british labor until it became respectable enough to send us a prime minister, and excluded more and more rigorously the people of europe whose blood had created our own. slowly, as the depression of 1929-32 squeezed us, we began to see that our miseries connected us with europe; it was a republican president who first attempted to address europe; but mr. hoover's temperament makes it difficult for him to speak freely to anyone; the talks with ramsay macdonald were pleasurable; the offer of a moratorium was the first kindness to europe in a generation of studied american indifference. it failed (because france still preferred to avenge herself on germany); and thereafter we had too many unpleasant things to do at home. _one good deed_ we had, in the interval, spoken once to all the world. on the day the japanese moved into manchuria we had, in effect, notified the british that we chose not to accept the destruction or dismemberment of a friendly nation. the cynical indifference of sir john simon was the first intimation of the way europe felt about american "idealism". it was also the first step toward "non-intervention" in spain and the destruction of europe at the hands of adolf hitler. when we were rebuffed by downing street, we sulked; we did not attempt to speak to the people of asia, or try to win the british public to our side. we had lost the habit. we were not even candid in our talks with the chinese whose cause we favored because we had japan (and american dealers in oil and scrap iron) to appease. in 1933 adolf hitler was elected leader of a germany which had been out of communication with us for a generation. the united states which had been in the minds of generations of germans, was forgotten by the people. in a few years hitler had overthrown the power of france on the continent, challenged communism as an international force, and frightened the british empire into an ignoble flutter of appeasement. to that dreary end our failure of communication had tended. we were the one power which might have held europe together--in a league, in a mere hope of friendship and peace between nations, in the matrix of the fourteen points if nothing more. the moment we withdrew from europe, its nations fell apart, not merely into victors and vanquished, but into querulous, distrustful, and angry people, each whipped into hysteria by demagogues or soothed to complaisance by frightened ministers. the obligation to address europe is no longer a moral one. for our own security, for the cohesion of our own people, for victory over every element that works to break america into hostile parts--now we have the golden opportunity again, to speak to europe, and to ask europe to answer. as we look back on our ancient triumphs with the peoples of europe and the sour end to which we let them come, this new chance is heaven-sent, undeserved, as if we could live our lives over again. and it is nearly so--for if we want to have a life to live in the future, if it is still to be the confident, secure life of a united america, we must speak now to europe. chapter viii the science of short wave what we say to europe is to be an incitement to revolution, a promise of liberation, a hope of a decent, orderly, comfortable living, in freedom; but it must be as hard and real and un-dreamlike as the declaration, which was our first word to the people of the world. we have to begin by telling all the peoples of europe, our friends and our enemies, what they have done for america, and what america has done for them. we have to destroy the slander that the italians were kept at digging ditches, the yugoslavs in the mills, the hungarians and poles and czechs in the mines and at the boilers, the greeks at the fruit stands; we must destroy the great lie that all the "lesser races" whom hitler now enslaves were first slaves to our economic system. we can begin by reading the roster of the great names, the men who came to america and were liberated from poverty and prejudice, and made themselves fame or wealth, and deserved well of the republic, and were honored. _38 million freemen_ directly after the great names, we have to tell the story of the nameless ones, the thirty-eight million who came here and suffered the pains of transportation, but took root and grew, understanding freedom as it came to them, making their way in the world, becoming part of america, deprived of no civil rights, fighting against exploitation with other americans, free to fight against oppression, and with a fair chance of winning. there is no need to prettify the record; the record, as it stands, in all its crude natural colors, is good enough. the immigrant was exploited, greedily and brutally; and twenty years later he or his sons exploited other immigrants in turn, as greedily and brutally as the law allowed. the ancient passions of race and ritual were not dead in america; but they were never embodied into law, nor entirely accepted by custom; and as the unity of america was enriched by the blood of more races and nations, prejudice had to be organized, it had to be whipped up and put on a profit basis, as the klan did, or it would have died away. _the new world was new_ for nearly a hundred and fifty years the peoples of europe wanted to come to america; they knew, from those who were already here, what the plight of the foreigner was in pittsburgh or in tontitown, on buzzards bay or puget sound. they knew that outlanders were sometimes mocked and often cheated; that work was hard in a new land; that those who came before had chosen the best farms and worked themselves into the best jobs; they knew that for a time life would be strange, and even its pleasures would be alien to them. they knew, in short, that america was not the new eden; but they also knew that it _was_ the new world, which was enough. we have no apologies to make to the immigrant; except for those incivilities which people often show to strangers. our law showed them nothing but honor and equity. the errors we made were grave enough; but as a nation we never committed the sin of considering an immigrant as an alien first, and then as a man. the economic disadvantages he suffered were the common misfortunes of alien and native alike. we could have gained more from our immigrants if we and they were not in such haste to slough off the culture they brought us. but we can face europe with a clear conscience. what we have to say to europe is not only that "we are all the descendants of immigrants"; we go forward and say that the hunkie, the wop, the bohunk, the big dumb swede, the yid, the polack, and all the later immigrants, created billions of our wealth, built our railroads and pipe lines and generators and motor cars and highways and telephone systems; and that we are getting our laws, our movies, our dentistry, our poems, our news stories, our truck gardening, and a thousand other necessities of life, from immigrants and from first generation descendants of immigrants; and that they are respected and rewarded, as richly as a child of the dar or the ffv's would be in the same honored and needed professions; we have to give to europeans statistical proof of their fellow-countrymen's value to us, and cite the high places they occupy, the high incomes they enjoy, the high honors we give them; all these things are true and have to be said, so that europe knows why america understands her people, why we can, without smugness or arrogance, talk to all the people of europe. and when that is said, we have to say one thing, harder to say honorably and modestly and persuasively: _that all these great things were done because the europeans who did them were free of europe, because they had ceased to be europeans and become americans._ _the soil of liberty_ this is the true incitement to revolution. not that nations need americanize themselves; the image of freedom has many aspects, and the customs in which freedom expresses itself in france need not be the same as those in britain or germany. but the base of freedom is unmistakable--we know freedom as we know pure air, by our instincts, not by formula or definition. and it was the freedom of america which made it possible for forty million men and women to flourish, so that often the russian and the irish, the bulgar and the sicilian, the croatian and the lett, expressed the genius of their country more completely in america than their contemporaries at home; because on the free soil of america, they were not alien, they were not in exile. one can ask what was contributed to medicine by any japanese who remained at home, comparable to the work of noguchi or takamine in america; or whether any spaniard has surpassed the clarity of a santayana; any czech the scrupulous research of a hrdlicka; any hungarian the brilliant, courageous journalism of a pulitzer; any serb the achievements of michael pupin. the lives of all peoples, all over the world, are incalculably enriched by men set free to work when they came to america, and, it seems, only to america. the warm hospitality of france to men of genius did not always work out; americans and russians and spaniards and english flocked to paris and became precious, or disgruntled; they felt expatriated; in america men from all over the world felt repatriated, it was here they became normal, and natural, and great. beyond this--which deals with great men and is flattering to national pride--we have to say to the men and women of europe that their own people have created democracy, proving that no european need be a slave. the great lie hitler is spreading over the world is that there are "countries which love order", and that they are by nature the enemies of the anglo-saxon democracies. it is a lie because our democracy was created by all these "order-loving" peoples; america is anglo-saxon only in its origin; the answer to hitler is in what all the people of europe have created here. they have also annihilated the myth of race by which hitler's germany creates a propaganda of hatred. _all_ the peoples of europe have lived together in amity in america, all have intermarried. nothing in america--not even its crimes--can be ascribed to one group, nation, or race. even the kkk, one suspects, was not 100% aryan. as the world has seen the german people, for the second time in twenty years, support with enthusiasm a regime of brutal militarism, a sinister retrogression into the bestiality of the dark ages, people have wondered whether the german people themselves may not be incapable of civilization. their eagerness to serve any master sufficiently ignorant, if they can brutalize people weaker than themselves, is a pathological strain. their quick abandonment of the effort at self-government is sub-adolescent. so it seems. _germans as freemen_ if it is so, then the great triumph of america is that in america even the germans have become good citizens, lovers of liberty, quick to resent dictation. they have fought for good government from the time of carl schurz; for freedom of the press since the days of zenger; they have hated tyranny and corruption since the time of thomas nast; they have fought for the oppressed since the time of altgeld. of the six million germans who emigrated, the vast majority were capable of living peaceably and serviceably with their fellowmen. of these six, one million fled from reactionary governments after the democratic revolution of 1848 had failed, millions of others came to escape the harsh imperialism of victorious germany after 1870. to them, the germany of the kaiser was undesirable, the germany of hitler unthinkable. yet their countrymen, left behind, tolerated one and embraced the other with sickening adulation. it is as if america had drawn off the six million germans capable of understanding and taking part in a democratic civilization, leaving the materials for hitlerism behind. in any case, the germans in america have proved that hitler lies to the germans; they are neither a superior race nor a people incapable of self-government; they will not rule the world, nor be a nation of slaves. _the brotherhood of the oppressed_ we can say this to the germans, destroying their illusions and their fears at one stroke. how much more we can say to the great patient peoples whom germany now enslaves! they have seen the german conquest of continental europe; the ascendancy of the teutonic-aryan is complete. what can the norwegian or the bulgar or the rumanian believe, except that there is a superior race--and it is not his own? fortunately for us, the european has never ceased to believe in america, in us. not as a military race, not as a race at all; but as people of incredible good fortune in the world. and we can say to every man who has bowed his head, but kept his heart bitter against hitler, that we have the proof of the equal dignity of every man's soul, a proof which hitlerism can never destroy. we can say to the greeks who see the swastika over the parthenon and the norwegian whose bed is stripped of its comforters, and to the serb still fighting in the mountain passes, the one thing hitler dares not let them believe--that they are as good as other men. we have the proof that under liberty croats and finns and catalans and norwegians are as good as germans--because they are men, because under liberty there is no end to what they and their children may accomplish. if we ever again think that this is oratory, we shall lose our greatest hope of a free world. the orators were too often promising too much because they were betraying america on the side; still they could not falsify the truth which the practical men and the poets both had discovered: _america means opportunity_. now we can see the vast implications of the simple assertion. because america meant opportunity, we can incite riot against hitler in the streets of oslo and prague and even in vienna; we have proved that given opportunity, freed of artificial impediments, men walk erect, do their work, collaborate to rule over and be ruled by their fellowmen; and that there is no master race, no master class. this is our address to the people of europe--that we believe in them, because we know them. we know they can free themselves because they have shown the instincts of free men here; we know they are destined to create a free europe. the people of europe have to know that we are their friends. it will be hard for us to make some of them believe it--as the french did not believe it when we failed to break the british blockade in their favor. but we must persuade them--we have their brothers and mothers and sons here to speak for us. it was not easy for woodrow wilson to speak to the germans and the austrians. he had no radio; his facilities for pamphleteering were limited. but he succeeded. our task is formidable enough; because the radio is so guarded, it may be harder for us to reach the captured populations. but it can be done and will be, as soon as we see how necessary the job is. _our first effective front_ we have a job with germans and italians, too. not with germany and italy, which must be defeated; not with their rulers who must be annihilated; but with the people, the simple, ignorant masses of people, the day laborers and the housewives; and with the intelligent section of the middle class which resisted fascism too little and too late, but never accepted it. we have to revive the spirit of moderate liberation which fell so ignominiously between communism and fascism; and we have to restore communication with the socialists in dachau, the communist cells in italy and germany. i am not trying to predict the form of our propaganda. we shall probably try to scare our enemies and to cajole them; to prove them misled; to promise them security if they revolt. none of these things will be of much use if we forget to tell _the people_ that their brothers are here with us--and that we are not enemies. it has seemed to us in the past year that we have a quarrel with more of the german people than we had in 1918; we are contemptuous of the italians; but it is still our business to distinguish between the storm troopers and their unfortunate victims, between the lackeys of fascism and the easy-going italian peasant who never knew what had hit him. there are millions of germans and italians in america, who were once exactly like the germans and italians in europe; they have undergone the experience of liberty while their brothers have been enslaved; but we must be hard-headed enough to know that our greatest potential allies, next to the embittered captives of the nazi regime, are the italians and germans who could not come to america in the past twenty years. the golden opportunity of talking to the people of europe before we went to war has been missed. now it is harder for us, but it is not impossible. we have to counter the despair of europe with the hope of america. the desperation of the occupied territories rises from the belief that the germans are invincible and that they themselves are doomed to servility; to that we reply with the argument of war--but in the first part of our war, the argument will be hard to follow; we shall be pushed back, as the british were, because we are not yet ready for the offensive; so for a year perhaps our very entrance into the war will tend to increase the prestige of our enemies. therefore, in this time, we must use other powers, our other front, to touch sources of despair: our counter-propaganda must rebuild the self-respect of the europeans, of those who resisted and were conquered and even of those who failed to resist. we can send them the record of heroism of their fellow-countrymen in our armies; if we can reach them, we should smuggle a sack of flour for every act of sabotage they commit; and we should send them at once a rough sketch, if not a blueprint, of a post-war world in which they will have a part--with our plans for recovering what was stolen from them, rebuilding what was destroyed, and restoring the liberty which in their hearts they never surrendered. and there is a special reason why we must speak promptly. we have to declare our unity to europe in order to destroy the antagonisms which our enemies will incite at home. it will be good fascist propaganda to lead us to attack americans of german and italian birth or parentage; our enemies will say that the unity of america is a fraud, that we have only welcomed italians and germans to make them support the anglo-saxon upper classes--and that "good europeans" can never become good americans. the moment we give any pretext for this propaganda, our communication with _all_ of europe is lost. _short wave to ourselves_ we cannot afford to lose our only immediate weapon. we have to anticipate the italo-german blow at our national unity by our own attack, led by italians and germans who are americans. we have to remain united so that we can deal effectively with europe and every time we speak to europe, we can reinforce the foundations of unity at home. we have not achieved a perfect balance of national elements, and in the past few years we have tolerated fascist enemies, we have seen good americans being turned into fascists and bundists while our leaders made loans to mussolini or dined with goering and came back to talk of peace. it is possible that a true fifth column exists and, more serious, that a deep disaffection has touched many americans of european birth. we have to watch the dangerous ones; the others have to be re-absorbed into our common society--and we can best take them in by the honesty and the friendliness of our relation with their fellowmen abroad. we have to tell the italians here what we are saying to the umbrian peasant and the factory worker in milan and the clerk in a roman bank whose movements are watched by a german soldier; the germans, too. and what we say has to be confident and clear and consistent. for months the quarrel about short wave has continued and americans returning from europe have wept at the frivolity and changeableness and lack of imagination in our communications to men who risk their lives to hear what we have to say; it was incredible to them that this vital arm of our attack on hitler should have been left so long unused, that anyone who could pay could say something to someone in europe, within the limits of safety, to be sure, but not within the limits of a coordinated policy. one could advise the swedes to declare war or assure them that we understood why they did not; one could do almost as much for france. short wave to europe is a mystery to the average citizen; he does not pick it up, and would be only mildly interested if he did. in his mind, that sort of propaganda should be left to the experts; as it is in other lands. but in our case, there are re-echoes at home. not a "government in exile" speaks from america, but we have here part of many nations, emigrated and transformed, but still with understanding of all that was left behind. we have to think of the norwegians in minnesota when we speak to the norwegians in the lofotens; the germans in yorkville and the poles in pittsburgh should know what we say to berlin and to warsaw. our words have to help win the war, and to begin the reconciliation of europe without which we are not safe. that reconciliation we have turned into a positive thing, a cooperative life which has made us strong; we have to tell europe what we have done, how europe has lived in us. we may have to promise and to threaten, too; but mostly we will want to destroy the myth of america-against-europe by showing the reality of europe-in-america; we will want to destroy the lie of an anglo-saxon america by letting all the voices be heard of an american america; we will want to destroy the rumor of a disunited america by uniting all the voices in one declaration of ultimate freedom--for europe and for ourselves. europe will ask, if it can reach us, what freedom will mean, how we will organize it, how far we mean to go. if we want to answer honestly, we will have to take stock quickly of what we have--and can offer. chapter ix definition of america we have two prodigious victories to gain--the war and the world after the war. the chatter about not "defining war aims" because specific aims are bound to disturb us, is dangerously beside the point, because the kind of world we will create depends largely on the kind of war we wage. if we nazify ourselves to win, we will win a nazified world; if we communize ourselves, we will probably share a modified marxian world with the soviets; and if we win by intensification of our democracy, we will create the only kind of world in which we can live. and, as noted in discussing the strategy of the war, the chances are that we can only win if we divine the essential nature of our people and create a corresponding strategy. in addition to the direct military need for knowing what kind of people we are, there is the propaganda need, so that we can create a national unity and put aside the constant irritation of partisanship, the fear of "incidents", the wastage of emotional energy in quarrels among ourselves. and there is a third reason for an exact and candid review of what we are: it is our future. when this war ends we will make, in one form or another, solemn agreements with the nations of the world, our allies and what is left of our enemies. we know almost nothing about any of them--we, the american people. our state department knows little enough; what it knows, it has not communicated to us; and we have never been interested enough to make discoveries of our own. we are about to commit a huge international polygamy, with forty picture brides, each one in a different national costume. some conditions of this mass marriage are the subject of the next section of this book. here i am concerned with the one thing we can do to make the preliminary steps intelligent. we cannot learn all we need to know about all the other nations of the world; but we can reflect on some things within ourselves, we can know ourselves better; and on this knowledge we can erect the framework into which the other nations will fit; or out of which they will remain if they choose not to fit. we can, by knowing a few vital things about ourselves, learn a lot about south america and europe and asia and australia; what _we_ are will determine whom we will marry, whom reject, and whom we will set up, if agreeable, in an unsanctified situation. the laws of man, in many states, require certificates of eligibility to marry, the services of the church inquire if an obstacle exists. before we enter into compacts full of tragic and noble possibilities, we might also make inquiries. something in us shies away from the pomp of the old diplomacy--what is that something? we used to like revolutionaries and never understood colonial exploitation--how do these things affect us now? are we prepared to deal with a government in one country and a people in another? is it possible for us to ally ourselves to communists, reformed fascists, variously incomplete democracies, cooperative democratic monarchies, and centralized empires, all at the same time? is there anything in us which requires us to make terms with britain about india, with russia about propaganda, with sweden about exports, before we make a new world with all of them? can we, honorably, enter any agreement, with any state or with all states, while they are ignorant of our character--as ignorant, possibly, as we are of theirs? the difficulty we are in is nicely doubled, because introspection is no happy habit and we say that we _know_ all about america, or we say that america cannot be known--it is too big, too varied, too complicated. and these two opposite statements are in themselves a beginning of a definition. america, by this testimony, is a country, large, varied, complex, inhabited by people who either understand their country perfectly or will not make an effort to understand it. i would not care to rest on this definition--but it shows the need of definition. _mathematics of character_ by "definition of america" i mean neither epigrams nor statistics; we are defined by everything which separates and distinguishes us from others. we are, for instance, the only country lying between the atlantic and pacific oceans, and 25â° 35' and 49â° north latitude. this definition is exact and complete; it is neither a boast nor a criticism; it establishes no superiority or inferiority; it is a fact, the consequences of which are tremendously significant (our varied climate, our resources, our bigness with _its_ consequences in the temper of the people, all go back to this mathematical _fact_.) not all the distinguishing marks of our country can be expressed in mathematical terms; if they could be, we would avoid the danger of jingo pride, the logical error of making every difference into a superiority. moreover, if we had mathematics, we should be able to put on one side what we have in common with other countries, on the other what is exclusively ours--and make a comparison, a guide to international conduct "on scientific principles". we would know how far our likeness joined us to others, so that we could lay a firm basis for action; and how far our differences required compromises or made compromise impossible. we lack mathematics; our physical boundaries are fixed, but our social boundaries are fluid, our national "genius" escapes definition. yet we can describe these imponderables even if we cannot force them into a diagram, and their vital significance is as great as any statistics can be. it is a fact that millions of people came to america in the hope of a better life--the number who came can be written down, the intensity of hope can be guessed; and only a compassionate imagination can say what this country gained by the hopes fulfilled or lost by those which ended in despair. yet the elation and the disillusion of men and women are both reflected in our laws and customs; and so far as they did not occur in other lands, they are factors in defining the great complex of our national character. we are defined by events--immigration was an event. but immigrants came to other countries as well, to canada and brazil and england. when they came and in what numbers becomes the defining mark for us. it is self-evident that we are different from all other nations both absolutely and relatively; no other nation lies within our boundaries or has all our habits, because none has had our history--that is the base of absolute difference; all other nations share something with us, but we differ from each relatively--in some degree. this would not be worth mentioning if chauvinism did not insist that we differed (and were superior) in all things, while a base cosmopolitanism insisted that we were alike in all things and should be made more so. the corrective for each of these errors is to see what we are. _the revolution in property_ when this country was settled the ownership of land was the most important economic factor in the lives of all western peoples. the ruling class in europe was a "landed aristocracy"; the poor had become poorer because they had usually been gradually driven off the land (as in england) or forced to pay outrageous rents (as in france). in the thirteen original colonies alone we had almost as many square miles of land as france and england together and this seemingly immeasurable area was only the fringe, the shore line, of continental america; the mississippi valley had been explored, and the southwest, so that the french and spanish people shared, to an extent, in the hopes which unlimited land offered to the dispossessed. before the declaration of independence had been uttered, a revolution in the deepest instincts of man had taken place--land became a commodity of less permanence than a man's musket or horse. in europe, land was to be built upon (literally and symbolically; ducal or royal houses were founded on land); land was _real_ estate, everything else was by comparison trifling; land was guarded by laws, property laws, laws of inheritance, laws of trespass, laws governing rents and foreclosures; far above laws governing human life was the law governing property, and the greatest property was land; title to property often carried with it what we call "a title" today; count and marquis, their names signify "counties" and "marches" of land; and the prince (or _princeps_) was often the first man in the land because he was the first owner of the land. land was the one universal permanent thing; upon it men were born; over it they slaved or rode in grandeur; in it they were buried. the american pioneer began to abandon his land, his farm in the clearing of the wilderness, before 1776. he moved away, westward, and complained against king george's legal fence around the land beyond the alleghenies. the european transplanted to america often founded a house, notably in the aristocratic tradition of the virginia tidewater; but most of the colonists lacked money or inclination to buy land in quantities; they went inland and took what they needed (often legally, often by squatters' right--which is the right of work, not of law); and then, for a number of reasons, they left the land and went further into the wilderness and made another clearing. there is something magnificent and mysterious about this mania to move which overtook men when they came to america. perhaps the primal instinct of man, to wander with his arrow or with his flock, reasserted itself after generations of the hemmed-in life of european cities; perhaps it was some uneasiness, some insecurity in themselves--or some spirit of adventure which could not be satisfied so long as a river or a forest or a plain lay unexplored. romance has beglamored the pioneer and he has been called rude names for his "rape of a continent". i have once before quoted lewis mumford's positively puritan rage at the pioneer who did not heed wordsworth's advice to seek nature "in a wise passiveness"--advice based on the poet's love for the english lake district, about as uncivilized then as northern vermont is today. the raging pioneer, says mumford, "raped his new mistress in a blind fury of obstreperous passion". our more familiar figure of the pioneer in a coonskin cap, leading the way for wife and children, is the romantic counterpart of this grim raper who wasn't aware of the fact that rousseau and wordsworth didn't like what he was doing. he was doing more to undermine the old order than rousseau ever did. the moment land ceased to be universally the foundation of wealth and position, the way was open for wealth based on the machine--which is wealth made by hand, not inherited, wealth made by the _industry_ of one man or group of men; it was wealth made by things in motion, not by land which stands still. the whole concept of aristocracy began to alter--for the worse. if wealth could be made, then wealth became a criterion; presently the money-lender (on a large scale) became respectable; presently money itself became respectable. it was divorced from land, from power, and from responsibility; a few generations later the new money bought up land to be respectable--but not responsible. _the consequences of free land_ this was the revolution in which america led the way and it had astounding consequences. the american pioneer did not care for the land--in two senses, for he neither loved it nor took care of it. the european peasant had to nourish the soil before it would, in turn, nourish him and his family; the american did not; he exhausted the soil and left it, as a man unchivalrously leaves an aging wife for a younger; there was so much land available that only an obstinate unadventurous man would not try a hazard of new fortunes. this may be morally reprehensible, but politically it had a satisfactory result: the american farmer exhausted the soil, but did not let the soil exhaust him; so that we established the tradition of waste, but escaped the worse tradition of a stingy, frightened, miserly, peasant class. the more aesthetic american critics of america never quite forgave us for not having peasant arts and crafts, the peasant virtues, the peasant sturdiness and all the rest of the good qualities which go with slavery to the soil. so the physical definition of america leads to these opening social definitions: we first destroyed the land-basis of wealth, position and power; we were the first nation to exhaust and abandon the soil; we were supremely the great wasters of the world; we were the first great nation to exist without a peasant class. from this beginning we can go on to other effects: our myths grew out of conquest of the land, not out of war against neighboring states; we created no special rights for the eldest son (as the younger could find more and better land); the national center of gravity was constantly changing as population moved to take up new land; we remained relatively unsophisticated because we were constantly opening new frontiers; our society, for the same reason, was relatively unstable; we lived at half a dozen social levels (of comfort and education, for instance) at the same time; we created a "various" nation, and when the conditions of owning and working land changed, we were plunged into a new kind of political revolution, known then as the populist movement. the effects of a century of fairly free land are still the dominant psychological factor in america; the obvious effects are that the land invited the immigrant and rewarded the pioneer--who between them created the forms of society and established half a dozen norms of character. in addition, the opportunities offered kept us ambitious at home and peaceful abroad. once we felt secure within our territorial limits, we became basically pacifist, and it took the "atrocities" of the spaniards in cuba to bring us into our first war against a european nation since 1814. this pacifism was more intense in the more agricultural states and was fed by the settlement there of pacific scandinavians whose country's record of avoiding wars was better than ours. pacifism was constantly fed by other immigrants, from germany and russia and minor states, who fled from compulsory military service (for their children, if not for themselves). in revenge for this un-european pacifism we created a purely american lawlessness--and a toleration of it which is the amazement of nazi germany, where the leaders prefer the sanctions of law for their murders; civilized europe, having lived through duels and massacres, is still shocked by our constant disregard of law, which began with the absence of law in pioneering days, and was met, later, by our failure to educate new citizens to obedience or adapt our laws to their customs. _america on the move_ one more thing, directly, the land did: it made us a mobile people and all the changes of three hundred years (since the first settlers struck inland from plymouth and upland from jamestown) have not altered us. the voyage which brought us here often lost momentum for a generation; but the pioneer in the conestoga wagon was moving into the northwest territory as soon as the revolution was over; then new england began to move to the west; the covered wagon followed trails broken by outriders to the western ocean; the gold rush pulled men through the wintry passes or around the horn, and by then our passion for moving swiftly over great distances had given us the clipper ship; after the civil war the homestead act started a new move to the west, and the railroads began to make movement less romantic, but regular and abundant. if the 1870's were not marked by great migrations of men, they were scored into the earth by the tremendous drives of cattle, north from texas in the summer, south from wyoming as winter threatened, hundreds of thousands of them, herded across state lines and prairies and riverbeds, back and forth, until the last drive to the railheads at abilene or kansas city. we were moving a bit more slowly, chiefly from the country to the cities, but the far northwest was beginning to grow; then, when it seemed that we could move no more, the motor car, which had been a luxury for the few in europe, developed as a common tool for the average family, and america was mobile again, first with naive pleasure in movement (and a satisfaction in the tool itself), then in an extraordinary outburst of activity which has not been sufficiently studied--the tin can tourist, the first middle-class-on-the-march in history. this search for the sun, with its effects on florida and california, broke the established habits of the middle-class and of the middle-aged; it wrote a new ending to the life of the prudent, industrious american, it required initiative and if it ended in the rather ugly tourist camp, that was only a new beginning. the great migration of negroes to the north followed the first world war; since then the mobility of americans is the familiar, almost tragic, story of a civilization allowing itself to be tied almost entirely to one industry, and not providing for the security of that one. every aspect of american life was altered by the quantity-production of motor cars; the method of production itself caused minor mass-movements, small armies of unemployed marching on key cities, small armies marching back; and the universal dependence on trucks, busses and cars, which bankrupted railroads, shifted populations away from cities, slaughtered tens of thousands annually, altered the conditions of crime and pursuit, and, in passing, made the country known to its inhabitants; moreover, the motor car which created only a small number of anti-social millionaires, made some twenty million americans feel equal to the richest and the poorest man on the road. mobility which in the pioneer days had created the forms of democracy came back to the new democracy of the filling station and the roadside cabin. "everybody" had a car in america, but there was no "peoples' car"; that was left for dictators to promise--without fulfilment. the cars made in america were wasteful; they were artificially aged by "new models" and the sales pressure distracted millions of americans from a more intelligent allocation of their incomes; these were the errors, widely remarked. that the motor car could be used--was being used--as a civilizing agent, escaped the general attention until the war threatened to put a new car into the old barn, beside the buggy which had rested there for thirty years--but might still be good for transport. in one field america seemed to lag: aviation. because the near frontiers of europe made aircraft essential, all european _governments_ subsidized production; the commercial possibilities were not so apparent to americans; no way existed for doing two things--making planes in mass production, and getting millions of people to use them. the present war has anticipated normal progress in methods of production by a generation; it may start the motor car on a downward path, as the motor car dislodged the trolley and the train; but this will only happen if the aeroplane fits into the basic american pattern of machines for mobility. "_the richest nation on earth_" from free land to free air, movement and change have produced a vast amount of wealth in america. because land could not be the exclusive base of riches, wealth in america began to take on many meanings and, for the first time in history, a wealthy people began to emerge, instead of a wealthy nation. we were, in the economist's sense, always a wealthy nation. the overpowering statistics of our share of all the world's commodities are often published because we are not afraid of the envy of the gods; of coal and iron and most of the rarer metals used to make steel, we have an impressive plenty; of food and the materials for shelter and clothing, we can always have enough; from south america, we can get foods we cannot raise but have become accustomed to use; of a few strategic materials in the present war economy, we have nothing; except for these, we are copiously supplied; but we should still be poor if we lacked ability and knack and desire to make the raw materials serviceable to all of us. so that our power to work, our way of inventing a machine, our habit of letting nearly everybody in on the good things of life, is specifically a part of our wealth. we have a tradition about wealth, too. the government, to some degree, has always tried to rectify the worst inequalities of fortune; and the people have done their share: they have not long tolerated any artificial bar to enterprise. "_rugged individuals_" government's care of the less fortunate struck some twenty million americans as something new and dangerous in the early days of the hoover depression, and in the sudden upward spiral of the first new deal. perhaps the most hackneyed remark was that "real americans" would reject federal aid--a pious hope usually bracketed with remarks about valley forge. it was forgotten that the men who froze and swore at valley forge demanded direct government aid the moment the republic was established; and that the cumberland road, the artery from fredericksburg, maryland to uniontown, pennsylvania, was built by the government of the united states for its citizens. government gave bounties and free land; government gave enormous sums of money to industry by way of tariff, and gave 200 million acres of land to railroads. there was never a time when the federal government was not giving aid, in one form or another, to some of the citizens. the outcry when government attempted to save _all_ the citizens indicated an incomplete knowledge of our history. in particular, the steady reduction of the price of land was a subsidy to the poor, a chance for them to start again. the country, for all its obedience to financial power, never accepted the theory of inevitable poverty. after the era of normalcy, when the new deal declared that one-third of a nation was ill clothed and ill fed, the other two-thirds were astonished--and not pleased; the fact that two-thirds had escaped poverty--the almost universal condition of man throughout the world--was not enough for america. it is an evil thing that we have not conquered poverty or the stupidity and greed which cause poverty; but our distinguishing mark in this field is the expectation of success. we are the first large nation reasonably planning to abolish poverty without also abolishing wealth. the axis countries may precede us; on the lowest level it is possible that hitler has already succeeded, for like the administration in 1931, hitler can say that no one dies of starvation. our intention has always been a little different; it is to make sure that no one lacks the essentials of life, not too narrowly conceived, and that the opportunity to add to these essentials will remain. this may betray a low liking for riches--but it has its good points also. it has helped to keep us free, which is something. "_ye shall live in plenty_" wealth--and the prospect of wealth--are positive elements in the american makeup. we differ from large sections of europe because we take a positive pleasure in working to make money, and because we spend money less daintily, having a tendency to let our women do that for us; this evens things up somewhat, for if men become too engrossed in business, women make the balance good by undervaluing business and spending its proceeds on art, or amenity, or foolishness. the tradition that we could all become millionaires never had much to do with forming the american character, because no one took it too seriously; the serious thing was that americans all believed they could prosper. those who did not, suffered a double odium--they were disgraced because they had failed to make good and they had betrayed the american legend. the legend existed because it corresponded to some of the facts of american life; only it persisted long after the facts had been changed by industrialism and the closing of the frontiers and our coming of age as a financial power had changed the facts. we were heading toward normalcy and the last effort to preserve equality of opportunity was choked off when wilson had to abandon domestic reform to concentrate on the war. social security, a possible eighty dollars a month after the age of sixty-five, are poor substitutes for a nation of spend-thrifts; we accept the new prospect grimly, because the general standard of living and the expectation of improvement are still high in most parts of america. in spite of setbacks, the general belief is still, as herbert croly said it was in 1919, "that americans are not destined to renounce, but to enjoy". normal as enjoyment seems to us, it is not universal. there have been people happier than ours, no doubt, with a fraction of our material goods; religious people, simple races, people born to hardship, have their special kinds of contentment in life. but with minor variations, most western people, since the industrial revolution, are trying to get a share of the basic pleasures of life; in a great part of the world it is certain that most people will get very little; in america it is assumed that all will get a great deal. the struggle for wealth is so ingrained in us that we hate the thought of giving it up; we are submitting reluctantly to rules which are intended to equalize opportunity, if opportunity comes again. _america invented prosperity_ in this new organization of our lives, money becomes purely a device of calculation, since the costs of the war exhaust all we have; we can now look back on america's "money-madness" with some detachment; without balancing the good and evil done to our souls by the effort to become rich, we should estimate how powerful the incentive still is--and then use it, or defeat it, for the best social advantage. for it has its advantages, if we know how to use them, and fear of money is not the beginning of a sound economy. people occasionally talk as if the desire for money is an american invention; actually our invention is the satisfaction of the desire, which we call prosperity. for prosperity is the truth of which wealth is the legend, prosperity is the substantial fact and wealth the distorted shadow on the wall. the economics implied in the declaration of independence and the constitution alike indicate a new intent in the world, to create a prosperous people. the great men who proclaimed liberty in 1776 have often been blamed because they did not create "economic freedom" to run beside their political freedom. actually they did not create either, leaving it to the separate states to say whether one man with one vote was the true symbol of equality, whether he who paid ten times the average tax should have ten times the voice in spending it. as for economic equality, which is what later critics really want, it would have been inappropriate to the undeveloped resources of the country and impossible in the political climate of the time. the people of the new nation had suffered from centralized government; they would not have tolerated the only practical way of establishing economic controls--a highly concentrated government over a single, not a federated, nation. the men who fought the war of independence did not even set up an executive, only a committee of thirteen to act while congress was not in session; they erected no system of national courts; and congress, with the duty of creating an army and navy, could not draft men to either, nor pay them if they volunteered. when this system of confederation broke down, the constitution was carefully built up, to prevent government from regulating the lives of the people; and the people, who were confident that they could make their own way, wanted only to be secure against interference. they did not ask government to equalize anything but opportunity. the "rich and well-born" managed to turn the constitution to their own advantage; their opportunities were greater than the immediate chances of the poor farmer and the city rabble; but government by the men of property was never made permanent, and the most critical historian of the constitution is the one who says that "in the long reach of time ... the fair prophecy of the revolutionary era was surprisingly fulfilled." the intention, so commonplace to us, was wildly radical in its time; poets and philosophers had imagined a world freed from want (usually also a world peopled by ascetics); the promise of the united states was a reasonable gratification of the desires of all men. that was the reason for giving land to migrants, and citizenship to foreigners, and statehood to territories. when the french revolution began to settle down, the people had acquired rights, they had been freed of intolerable taxes, the great estates had been cut up; but the expectation of steadily improving conditions of life did not become a _constant_ in the french character; nor did the upheaval in england in 1832 and under the chartists leave a permanent hope for better things in the mind of the lower classes. the idea of class and the idea of a "station in life", a "lot" with which one must be content, persisted after _all_ the revolutions in europe in the 19th century. only in america the revolution set out to--and did--destroy the principle of natural inevitable poverty. we have not actually destroyed poverty, and this gap between our intent and our achievement has been publicized. but what we intended to do and what we accomplished and what we still have power to do are more significant than the part we failed to do. we created for the first time in history a nation which did not accept poverty as inevitable. this had profound effects on ourselves and on the rest of the world. we became restless and infected europe with our instability. we became optimistic and europe rather deplored our lack of philosophy. we enjoyed many things and became "materialistic", and europe sent us preachers of renunciation and the simple life. it became clear that, for good and evil, our character was departing from any european mold, and parts of europe were tempted to join the confederacy in 1861 or spain in 1898 in the hope of destroying us. _our fifty years of class war_ from about 1880 to 1930 we were moving into a new system of government; in the midwest the children of new england and the children of scandinavia agreed to call this system plutocracy--the system of great wealth which is based on poverty; it threatened to displace the system of almost equally great wealth which is based on prosperity. the constant radicalism of america, based on free land, frequent movement, and belief in the future, flared up in the 1880's and for generations this country was engaged in a class war between the rich and the poor (as it had been in shays' time and in jackson's). our political education was won in this time, but populism died under the combined effects of a war against spain and a new process of extracting gold; it was revived under theodore roosevelt, under woodrow wilson, and under franklin delano roosevelt, all of whom tried to shift the base of wealth without cracking the structure itself. wealth had come into conflict with some other american desires, it had begun to _limit_ enterprise and, in its bad spots, was creating a peasantry and a proletariat. with some feeling that europe must not repeat itself in america, the people on three occasions chose liberal presidents and these men built on the "wild" ideas of the 1880's the safeguards of economic democracy which seemed needed at the time. we are a nation in which the continental european class system has not become rooted; it is socially negated and politically checked; we are a democracy tempered by the special influence of wealth and, more important, by the special position of working-wealth; (inherited money counts so little that the great inheritors of our time fight their way back into production or politics, with a dosage of liberal principles). according to radicals we are still governed by massed and concentrated finance-capital, and according to certain congressmen we are living under a labor-dictatorship. very little perspective is required to see that we are living as we always have lived, our purposes not fully realized, our errors a little too glaring, our capacity to change and improve not yet impaired. _labor troubles_ the reason we seem to be particularly unsure of ourselves now is that we are creating a national labor policy forty years late. we are hurried and immature; the depression drained our vitality because we were told that change in our institutions meant death to our "way of life"; the traditional american eagerness to abandon whatever he had exhausted, died down; the investment was too great and the interests were too complex. so the changes we had to make all seemed revolutionary if not vengeful, and men whose fathers had lived through the populist rebellion often seriously felt that the recognition of organized labor was the beginning of class warfare in america. the forty year lag in the labor situation had evil effects on all concerned: the government was too often uncertain, and the leaders of labor too often unfit. like other organized groups, labor unions did not always consult the public good and criminals were found among them; but organized labor should be compared with organized production or organized banking or medicine or law; all of these have long traditions, all have the active support of the public; yet their ethics are quite as often dubious, they act out of basic self-interest, and the criminals among them, utility magnates stealing from stockholders, doctors splitting fees, manufacturers bribing legislators, are as shocking as the grafters and racketeers of the labor unions. the temporary dismay over labor's advances and obstinacy will pass, the laws will finally be written; but we will still be a country backward in the _habits_ of organized dealing between management and labor. the advantage lies in the past; we did not create a basic hostile relationship because the laborer was always on the point of becoming a foreman or thought he would start his own shop; or a new wave of high wages "settled" strikes without any settled principles--to the dismay of the few statesmen among labor leaders. firm relations imply some permanence. the employer expected to retain his business; the worker expected to better it. consequently, the basic american labor policy is not grounded in despair; it does not represent endless poverty, or cruelty, or a desire to revenge ancient wrongs. nor does it represent fear. the disgraces of memorial day in chicago and of gate four in detroit will come again if the laws we create do not correspond to the facts; but the habits of americans have not created two sullen armies, of capital with its bullies, of labor with its demagogues. these exist on the frontiers, where border clashes occur. the main bodies are not hostile armies, but forces capable of coordinated effort. theodore roosevelt was prepared to send the troops of the united states to take over the pennsylvania coal mines, because the mine owners (with "divine right" baer to guide them) refused to deal with the unions under john mitchell; as soon as that was known, the possibility of creating a labor policy became bright, because roosevelt was, in effect, restoring the balance lost when cleveland sent troops to pullman. the position of government as the impartial but decisive third party was sketched, and some forty years later we are beginning to see a labor policy in which the government protects both parties and provides the machinery for the settlement of all disputes. our immaturity and peevishness about an established routine for labor disputes has to be counted on as a factor in our character, chiefly because we shall remain for some time behind the other great industrial countries in the smoothness of operation. in normal times a british contractor did not have to allow for strikes, an american did; and our present war effort, our propaganda, and our plans for the future, all have to take this element into consideration. the false unity of december, 1941, resulted in a serious pledge of "no strikes, no lockouts"; but within three months the national labor relations board was admitting that it needed guidance to create a policy, and worse than sporadic trouble was in the wind. so much the more did we have to know what we were like in labor affairs, and without self-imposture, act accordingly. the war gave an opportunity for statesmen to make a new amalgam of the elements in the labor situation; but the war also made people hysterical about unrealities, and the labor situation was treated in two equally bad ways: as if we could have maximum production without any policy, or as if no policy could be evolved, and we would have to fight the axis while the administration destroyed capital and congress destroyed labor. _the danger of godlessness_ i am listing certain actualities of american life, with notes on their sources, as a guide to conduct--particularly the conduct of the war (which should be built on our character) and the conduct of civilian propaganda which must, at times, effect temporary alterations in our habits. i have, so far, named those aspects of our total outlook which come from the size and many-sided wealth of the country, and from our confident, unskilled attempts to deal with wealth and labor and the shifts of power which are bound to occur in a democracy. i come now to items which are no less potent because they are impalpable. any effort which counts on bringing the whole strength of america into play must count also on these. we are a profoundly irreligious people. we are highly sectarian and we are a church-going people; but in the sense that religion rises from our relation to a higher power, we are irreligious. we are not constantly aware of any duty: to the state, to our fellowmen, to mankind, to the universal principle, to god. we live unaware even of a connection between ourselves and anything we do not instantly touch or see or hear; we have grown out of asking for help or protection, and disasters fall on us heavily because we are separated from our fellowmen, having no common needs, or faith. the coming together, in freedom, of many faiths, and the rise of material happiness in the great era of scepticism, left us without a functioning state religion; the emancipation of each individual man from political tyranny and economic degradation left us without any sense of the universal; we have been able to gratify so many private purposes, that we are unaware of any great purpose beyond. as for the mystic's faith, it never makes itself felt, and the name "mystic" itself, far from connoting a deeper insight into the nature of god, is now associated with flummery and hoax. we are irreligious because we have set out to conquer the physical world and deliver a part of the spoils to every man. in our good intention to create and to distribute wealth, creating democracy in our stride, we approach a new relation to others. we are capable of cooperation; but religious people do not cooperate with god; they seek his will and bow to it. we exalt our own will. this has to be taken into account, because it makes the creation of a practical unity difficult. if we had felt ourselves linked through god with one another, it would have been easier to join hands in any job we had to do. i do not know whether any of the western democratic countries had a remnant of this mystical religion; but the appeal to the "blood" and the "race" of both japan and germany, the appeal to universal brotherhood in both china and soviet russia, indicate what a deep source of strength can be found in man if he can be persuaded to abandon himself. and as this is the fundamental demand of the state in war time, means must be found to compensate for the absence of deep universally shared feeling in america. we shall not find a substitute for religion and we will do well to concentrate on the non-religious actions and emotions which bring men together. common fears we already have and we may rediscover our common hopes; common pleasures we are enjoying and preparing to sacrifice them for the common good. (fear and hope and sacrifice and the common good all lie on the periphery of religious feeling; and point toward the center.) but i doubt whether the american people would accept "a great wave of religious feeling" which would be artificially induced to persuade us that all our past was a mistake and that our childish pleasure in good things was as vain as our hope for better. _the alger factor_ the end result of all the separate elements, the land, the people, the departure from europe, the struggle for wealth, the fight against wealth, was to make us a people of unbounding optimism, which was our horatio alger substitute for religious faith. the cool realistic appraisal of man's fate which an average frenchman makes, the trust of the englishman that he will "muddle through", the ancient indifference of the russian peasant, the resignation of the orient, are matched in america by an intense and confident appeal to _action_, in the faith that action will bring far better things than have been known. the vulgar side of this is bustle and activity for its own sake and a childish confusion between what is better and what is merely bigger or newer or more expensive or cheaper; we have to accept all this because on the other side our faith in action has broken the vise of poverty in which man has been held since the beginning of modern history; it has destroyed tyranny and set free the bodies and the minds of the hundred millions who have lived in a new world. we have rejected some of the most desirable and beautiful creations of other peoples, the arts of europe, the asiatic life of contemplation, the wisdom of philosophers, the exaltation of saints--but we have also rejected the slavery on which these rest or the negation of life to which they tend. the "materialism" of america is not as terrible as it looks; and it must be respected by those who want us to make sacrifices. what aristocratic europeans call gross in us is a hundred million hands reaching for the very things the aristocrats held dear. in the scuffle, some harm is done; the first pictures reproduced on magazine covers were not equal to the mona lisa; within fifty years the mona lisa could be reproduced in a magazine for ten million readers, but the aristocrats still complained of vulgarizing. the first music popularized by records or radio was popular in itself; within fifty years records and radio will have multiplied the audience for the greatest music, popular or sublime, ten thousand fold; it is possible that on one saturday or sunday afternoon music, good even by pedantic standards, is heard by more people than used to hear it in an entire year. and both of these instances have another special point of interest: each is creating new works on its own terms, so that pictures, very good ones, are painted for multiple reproduction and music, as good as any other, is specially composed for radio. i shall return to the special field of creative work presently. on a "lower" level, note that some (not all) europeans and all american expatriates condemn our preoccupation with plumbing. we multiply by twenty million the number of individuals who can take baths agreeably, without servants hauling inadequate buckets of hot water up three flights of stairs; and are materialistic; but the aristocrat who goes to an hotel with "modern comfort" is spiritual because he doesn't think constantly of plumbing. the truth is that the few can buy themselves out of worry, letting their servants "live for them"; and it is equally true that the only way, short of sainthood, to forget about the material comforts of life is to have them always at hand. _the morals of plenty_ we have never formulated the morals of prosperity, nor understood that nearly all the practical morality we know (apart from religion) is based on scarcity; it is intended to make man content with less than his share, it even carries into the field of action and praises those who do not try too hard to gain wealth. this was not good morality for a pioneering country, so poor richard preached the gospel of industry and thrift, which is not the gospel of resignation to fate. (industry clears the wilderness, thrift finances the growth of a nation; franklin was economically right for his time; in 1920 we were preaching leisure and installment buying, the exact opposite; but we never accepted the reverse morality of working for low wages and living on less than we needed.) the morals of plenty, by which we are usually guided, have created in our minds a few fixed ideas about what is good: it is good to work and to get good wages, so as to have money beyond our instant needs; it is bad to be ill and to be inefficient and to disrupt production by demanding high wages. (like most moralities, this one has several faces; like most american products it adapts itself to a variety of needs.) in a broader field our morality denies that anything is too good for the average man (if it can be made by mass production). mass production put an end to the old complaint that the poor would only put coal into the bathtub--mass production of tubs and central heating in apartments. the morality of scarcity reserves all that is good for the few, who must therefore be considered "the best", the "elite" (which means, in effect, the chosen), the "civilized minority". democracy began by declaring men born equal and proceeded in a hundred and seventy years to create equality because it needed every man as a customer. incomplete this was, perhaps only two-thirds of the way; it was nonetheless the practical application of the declaration, by way of the system of mass production; it was a working morality. _merchant prince to 5-and-dime_ we came a long way from nabob-morality, based on a splendor of spending; money is not our criterion of excellence, but the reverse; cheapness is the democratic equivalent of quality, and the five-and-ten cent store is the typical institution of our immediate time. we may deplore the vanishing craftsman and long for the time when the american will make clay pots and plaited hats as skillfully as the guatemalan; but our immediate job is to understand that the process which killed the individual craftsman is also the process that substituted the _goods_ of the many for the good of the few. the five-and-ten had its parallels in europe before the war, but it remains a distinguishing mark of america, and whoever wants to enlist us or persuade us has to touch that side of our life. it is as near to a universal as we possess; i have known people who have never listened to the radio (until 1939) and never went to the movies, but i have never known anyone who did not with great pleasure go to the five-and-ten. it is a combination of good value and attractive presentation; it is shrewdly managed and pleasantly staffed. one finds cheap substitutes, but one also finds new commodities made for the five-and-ten trade. the chain five-and-ten is, moreover, big business. in all these things the five-and-ten is a great american phenomenon; characteristic of the twentieth century as the crossroads general store was of the nineteenth. the hominess of the country store is gone and is a loss; but the gain in other directions is impressive. it is impressive, too, that a store should be so typical of american methods and enterprise and satisfactions. small commerce is not universally held in esteem. when one remembers the fussiness of the average french bazaar and the ancient prejudice against trade in england, the five-and-ten as a key to our intentions becomes even more effective. _prosperity and politics_ our persistent intention is to make good the declaration of independence; often minor purposes get in the way, or we are in conflict with ourselves. we attempted equal opportunity (with free land) and at the same time contract labor in the mines; we fought to emancipate the negro and we created an abominable factory system in the same decades; at times we slackened our check on abuses, because in spite of them we flourished; all too often we let the job of watching over our liberties fall into the hands of newcomers; sometimes we were so engrossed in the fact, the necessary work, that we forgot what the work was for; a ruling group forgot, or a political party, or a generation--but america did not forget. each time we forgot, it seemed that the lapse was longer and it took more tragic means to recall us to the straight line of our purpose; but each time we proved that we could bear neglect and forgetfulness and would come back to create a free america. there was reason always for the years when we marked time; our prosperity increased so that the redistribution of wealth was harder to do, but was more worth doing; and even the black backward era of normalcy served us with proof that america could create the materials for a high standard of life, although we could not put them into the proper hands. we justified supremely stalin's compliment to capitalism: "it made society wealthy"; and we did it so handsomely as to leave questionable his further statement that socialism will displace capitalism "because it can furnish society with more products and make society wealthier than the capitalist system can." we planned and eventually produced the machinery for making our lives comfortable; our industrial methods interacted with our land and immigration policy, from the day eli whitney put the quantity system into action; and all of them required the same thing--equality of political rights, indifference to social status, a high level of education, the maximum of civil freedom. our factories wanted free speech for us as certainly as our philosophers did; a free people, aware of novelties, critical of the present, anticipating the future, capable of earning and not afraid to spend--these are the customers required by mass production. and the same freedom, the same intention to be sceptical of authority, the same eagerness to risk all in the future, are the marks of a free man. our economic system with all its iniquities and stupid faults, worked around in the end to liberate men from poverty and to uphold them in their freedom. the fact that individual producers were afraid of debs in 1890 and whimpered for mussolini in 1931 is a pleasing irony; for these reactionaries in politics were often radicals in production; they had contributed to our freedom by their labors and our freedom was the condition of their prosperity. only free people fulfill their wants, and it is not merely a coincidence that the freest of all peoples should be also the freest spenders. the consequences of the declaration are now beginning to be understood. the way we took the land and left it, or held it until it failed us; the way we brought men of all nations here and let them move, as we moved, over the face of a continent; our absorption in our own capacities and our persistent endeavor to create national well-being for every man; our parallel indifference to our fellowmen, our state, and our god; our wealth and our endless optimism and our fulfilment of democracy by technology are some of the basic elements in our lives. whoever neglects them, and their meaning, in practical life, will not ever have us wholeheartedly on his side; whoever starts with these, among other, clues to discover what america is, will at least be on the right way. all we have to do in the war will rise out of all we have done in our whole history; our past is in the air we breathe, it runs in our veins, it is what we are. chapter x popularity and politics there are some consequences of our history so conspicuous and so significant that they deserve to be separated from the rest and examined briefly by themselves. in the united states every week 34 million families listen on an average four hours a day to the radio; 90 million individual movie admissions are bought; 16 million men and women go bowling at least once, probably oftener; thousands of couples dance in roadhouses, juke-joints, and dance halls; in winter 12 million hunting licenses are issued; millions of copies of the leading illustrated magazines are sold; and, in normal times, some ten or fifteen million families take their cars and go driving. these are not mass enterprises; they are popular enterprises; there are others: mass-attendance at sport, or smaller, but steady, attendance at conventions, lodge meetings and lectures. for the most part, all these can be divided into sport, games, fun; the search for information in entertainment; and entertainment by mass-communication. sport is pleasant to think about; after all the scoldings we have had because we like to watch athletic events (just as the ancient greeks did), it is gratifying to report the great number of people who are actually making their own fun. the same ignoble but useful desire for money which has so often served us has now built bowling alleys, dance halls and tennis courts, so that we are doing more sports ourselves. sport began to come into its own after populism and theodore roosevelt's square deal; it is therefore not anti-social and even withstood the prosperity of harding and coolidge. _means of communication_ the other elements i have mentioned, movies, radio and a new journalism, are the products of our immediate time. although the moving picture was exhibited earlier, it began to be vastly popular just before the first world war, and was promptly recognized as a prime instrument of propaganda by lenin as he began to build the socialist state in 1917; the moving picture may have been colossal then, but it did not become prodigious, a social engine of incalculable force, until the problems of speech had been mastered. by that time another pre-war invention, the radio, had established itself in its present commercial base. radio was first conceived as an instrument of secret communication; it began to be useful, as wireless telegraphy, when the soviets used it to appeal to peoples over the heads of their governments--although this appeal still had to be printed, the radio receiver did not exist. when the necessary inventions were working (and the tinkering american forced the issue by building his own receivers and his own ham-senders), radio began to serve the public. among its earliest transmissions were a sermon, the election results in the harding-cox campaign, crop reports, and music. the entrance of commerce was easy and natural; and before the crash of 1929 the decisive step was taken: the stations went out of the business of creating programs and sold "time", allowing the buyer to fill it with music or comedy or anything not offensive to the morals of the community. by the time commercial radio made its first spectacular successes, in the early days of vallee and amos and andy, a new form of publication had established itself, a fresh combination of text and picture, devoted to fact and deriving more entertainment from fact than the old straight fiction magazine had offered. these three new means of mass communication are revolutionary inventions of democracy. to use them is the first obligation of statesmanship. they have been seized by dictators; literally, for the first move of a _coup d'etat_ is to take over the radio and the next is to divert the movies into propaganda. before these instruments can be used, their nature has to be understood and their meaning to the average man has to be calculated. _words and pictures_ of the fact and picture publications _life_ and _look_ are the best examples; _time_ and _news-week_ are fact and illustration magazines which is basically different, although their success is also important. the appetite for fact appears in a nation supposed to be adolescent and given over to the silliest of romantic fictions; _time_ and the _readers' digest_ become the great magazine phenomena of our time, growing in seriousness as they understand better the temper of their readers, learning to present fact forcefully, directing themselves to maturity, and helping to create mature minds. their faults are private trifles, their basic editorial policies are public services. the word and picture magazine is not yet completely realized; both its chief examples grow and develop, but the full integration of word and image is yet to come. it is probably the most significant development in communication since the depression struck; it promises to rescue the printed page from the obscurity into which radio, the movies, and conservatism in format were pushing books and magazines and newspapers. it is odd that book publication, the oldest use of quantity production, should have so long been content with relatively small circulations. changes now are apparent. the most interesting developments in recent years are mail-order selling (the basis of the book clubs) and mass selling over the counter, the method of the pocketbook series. both withdraw book-sales from the stuffiness of old methods and the artiness of book "shoppes" which always got in the way of good book-sellers. the text-and-image publication need not be a magazine; the method is especially applicable to argument, to the pamphlet and the report. the art of visualization has progressed in the making of charts and isotypes and in the pure intellectual grasp of the function of the visual. the economic and technical problems of the use of color have been solved and all the effectiveness of images has been multiplied by the contrast and clarity which color provides. a new language is in process of being formed. until television-in-color, which exists, becomes common, the need for this new language is great. for neither the movies nor radio can be used for reasoned persuasion; their attack is too immediate, the listener-spectator does not have time for argument and contemplation. radio profits positively by its limitation to sound when it works with the right materials; but when president roosevelt asked his audience to have a map at hand, television supplied the map and the meaning of the map without diverting attention from the speech, which radio could not do. the movies, great pioneer in text and sound, have mastered none of the arts of demonstration or persuasion; they have the immediate gain of a single method and a single objective: appeal to the emotions by absorption in the visual; and the fact that the moving picture's appeal is to a group, means that every element must be over-simplified and every effect is over-multiplied by the group presence. by this the movies also gain when they use the right materials. the use of the new combination of text and image, growing out of the tabloid and the picture magazine, is, in effect, the creation of a mobile reserve of propaganda. when the radio and the movies have established the facts and aroused the desired emotion, the final battery of argument comes in picture and print; and this, ideally, is carried to the ward meeting, to the after-supper visit, the drugstore soda counter and the lunch hour at the factory--where the action is determined by men and women in private discussion. _universal languages_ radio, which instantly creates the desired situation, and movies, which so plausibly arouse the desired emotion, are the two great mass inventions of america. the patents may have been taken out elsewhere, but it was in america that these two forms of mass communication were instantly placed at the service of all people. the errors of judgment have been gross, but the error of purpose was not made; the movies were kept out of the hands of the aesthete and radio was kept out of the hands of the bureaucrat. for a generation we deplored the vulgarity of movies made for morons' money at the box office, and discovered that the only other effective movies were made by dictators, to falsify history, as the russians did when the miserable trotsky was cinematically liquidated, or to stir hate as did every film made by hitler. for a generation we wept over the commercialism of radio and at the end found that commercial radio had created an audience for statesmen and philosophers; and again the alternative was the hammering of dictators' propaganda, to which one listened under compulsion. the intermediate occasions, the exceptions, are not significant. some great inventions in the realm of ideas were made by british radio (which is government owned, but not government operated); some exceptional and important films were made for the few. but the dictators and the businessmen both had the right idea--movies and the radio are for all men; they can be used to entertain, to arouse, to soothe, to persuade; but they must not ever be used without thinking of _all_ the people. this universality lies in the nature of the instruments, in the endless duplication of the films, the unlimited reception of the broadcasts; and only hitler and stalin and the sponsors have been happy to understand this. like all those who are habituated to the movies, i have suffered much from hollywood, my pain being all the greater because i am so devoted; like all those who work in radio, i am acutely conscious of its faults; but the faults and the banalities are not in question now. now we have to take instruments perfected by others, and use them for our purposes. we have to discover what the ignoramus in hollywood and the businessman in the sponsor's booth have paid for. the one thing we cannot do is risk the value of the medium. we have to learn how to use popularity; we have to learn why the movies never could carry advertising, and adjust our propaganda accordingly; and why radio can not quickly teach, but can create a receptive situation; and why we may have to use rhetoric instead of demonstrations to accomplish an end. moreover, we have to study the field so that we know when _not_ to use these instruments, what we must not take from them, in order to preserve their incomparable appeal. a coordinated use of _all_ the means of persuasion is required; to let the movie makers make movies is good, but the exact function of the movies in the complete effort has to be established, or we will waste time and do badly on the screen what can be done well only in print or most effectively on the air. there are many things to be done; we need excitement and prophecy and cold reason, and they must not come haphazard, but in an order of combined effect; we need news and history and fable and diversion, and each must minister to the other. if we fail to use the instruments correctly they can destroy us; one ill-timed, but brilliantly made, documentary on production rendered futile whole weeks of facts about a lagging program; and one ill-advised news reel shot can undo a dozen radio hours. when the means of communication and entertainment become engines of victory, we have to use each medium only at its highest effectiveness; and we have to use all of them together. the movies, the radio, the popular publication are so new, they seem to rise on the international horizon of the 1920's, to have no link with our past, to be the same with us as they are all over the world. with these, it is true, we return to the universals of human expression and communication. but what we have done with them is unique, and their significance as part of our war machinery is based on both the universal and the special qualities they possess. that is why i have treated them separately; because they are powerful and have enormous inertia, the slightest error may accumulate tremendous consequences, and the instinctively right use of them will be the most complete protection against disaster at home. we have to study the right use because these tools have never yet been completely used for the purposes of democracy; and with them we have to remind the american people of other tools and instruments they have neglected, so many that it sometimes seems a passion with us to invent the best instruments and to hand them over to our enemies to use against us. chapter xi the tools of democracy the tools of democracy are certain civil actions, certain inventions, certain habits. they can be used against us--but only if we fail to use them ourselves. the greatest tools are civil liberties which we have been considering as "rights" or "privileges". the right to free speech is a great one; free speech probably was originally intended to protect property; it preserves liberty; the rights of assembly, of protest for redress, of a free press all have this double value, that they guarantee the integrity of the private man and protect the state. the great debate on the war brought back some long forgotten phenomena: broadsides, street meetings, marches, and brawls. before they began, virtually _all_ the civil rights were being used either by newcomers to america or by enemies of the american system. the poor had no access to the radio; they used a soap box instead and genteel people shrank away; the bundist and the american communist assembled and protested and published and spoke; the believers in america waited for an election to roll around again, and then did nothing about it. the enemies of the people sent a hundred thousand telegrams to congressmen, signing the names of dead men to kill the regulation of utilities, but the believer in the democratic process didn't remember the name of his congressman. bewildered aliens got their second papers and were inducted into political clubs; the old line americans never found out how the primaries worked. _public addresses_ a dangerous condition rose. no families from beacon street spoke in boston common; therefore, whoever spoke on the common was an enemy of beacon street; all over america the well-born (and the well-heeled) retired from direct communication with the people, and all over america the privilege of talking to the citizens fell into the hands of radicals, lunatics, and dangerous enemies of the republic--so that in time the very fact that one tried to exercise the right of free speech became suspect; and beacon street and park avenue could think of no way to protect themselves from boston common and union square--except to abolish free speech entirely. they did not dare to say it, but the remarkable frank hague, mayor of jersey city, said it for them: "whenever i hear anyone talk about civil liberties, i know he's not a good american". the dreadful humiliation was that it came so close to the truth. the red and the bundist, clamoring or conspiring against america, were almost the only ones doing what all americans had the right to do. we hated cranks, we did not want to be so conspicuous, we hadn't the time, the police would attend to it, if they didn't like it here let them go back ... we allowed our most precious rights to atrophy. when suddenly they were remembered, as they were by the bonus marchers of 1932, we yelled revolution and the president of the united states called out the troops to shoot down the defenders of our country. it was the first time that a petition for redress had been offered by good citizens, by veterans, by men of notable american stock--and it frightened us because they were doing what "only foreigners" or "dangerous agitators" used to do; they were in fact being americans in action. what is not used, dies. the habit of protecting our freedom was dying in the united states. there was no conspiracy of power against us; there was no need. we were carrying experimental democracy forward so far on several planes--the material and social planes particularly--that we let it go by default on the vital plane of practical politics. we did not go into politics, we did not electioneer, we did not threaten ward bosses or county chairmen, we did not form third parties, we did nothing except vote, if it was a fair day (but not too fair if we meant to play golf). as for private action to defend our liberties, it was unnecessary and vulgar and bothersome. the depression scared us, but not into free speech; by that time free speech was red; and the deeper we floundered in the mire of defeatism, the more intimidated we were by shouting congressmen and super-patriots; it was only after the new deal pulled us out of our tailspin that we saw the light: we too could have been obscure men speaking at street corners, we did not have to give all the soap boxes to men like sacco and vanzetti; we too could have published pamphlets like the dreadful communists, and held meetings and badgered our congressmen. suddenly the people were reincorporated into their government; suddenly the people began to be concerned with government; and the tremendous revitalization of political anger was one of the best symptoms of democratic recovery in our generation. _return to politics_ the merciless pressure of taxation and then the grip of war have pushed us forward and in a generation we will be again as politically aware as our great-grandfathers were when they had one newspaper a week, and only their determination to rule themselves as a principle of action. perhaps we shall take the trouble they took; they travelled a day's journey to hear a debate and discussed it for a fortnight; they thought about politics and studied the meaning of events. and they quite naturally did their duties as citizens; they dug their neighbors out of snow-blocked roads, they nominated their candidates, they watched and rebuked their representatives. it was not a political utopia, but it was a more intelligent use of political power than ours has been. the usual excuse for the breakdown of political action in america is that so many "foreigners" came, to whom the politics of freedom were alien. this may have been true of some of the later arrivals; but the irish were captivated by, and presently captured, city politics wherever they settled; the germans were the steadiest of citizens and so were the scandinavians, their studious earnest belief in our institutions shaming our flippant disregard. the southern slavs, the russian jews and the italians were farthest removed from our political habits; but their passion for america was great. it could have been worked into political action, and often was worked into political skulduggery by bosses of a more political bent. many of these immigrants came after the exhaustion of free lands; many were plunged into slums and sweatshops and steel mills on a twelve hour day; and they emerged on the angry side, as disillusioned with america as some of its most ancient families. that political action dwindled after the great immigrations is true; but it was not the immigrant who refused to act; it was the old family and the typical american; the grafting politicians and the sidewalk radical both kept politics alive; the real americans were slowly smothering politics. we shall never quite repay our debt to tammany hall and the communists; between them political machines and saintly radicals managed to keep the instruments of democratic action from rusting. now we have to take them back and learn how to use them again. fortunately we have no choice. we neglected our rights because we wanted to sidestep our duties; today the war makes our duties inescapable and we are already beginning to use our rights. for in spite of censorship and regimentation, we will use more of our instruments of democracy than ever; we will because we are fighting for them and they have become valuable to us. the radio, the movies, and popular print are the three tools by which we can create democratic action. the action itself will be appropriate to our time and our conditions; we will not travel ten miles to hear a debate, so long as the radio lasts; but we will have to form units of self-protection in bombed cities; we may need other associations, to apportion food, to house the homeless, to support the bereaved. we will have to learn how to live together, to share what was once as private as a motor car, to elect a village constable who may have our lives in his hands a dozen times a day. in the process we will be reverting to old and good democratic habits--in a city block in atlanta or in a prairie village outside emporia, or in a chic suburb along lake michigan. something like the town-meeting is taking place in a thousand apartment houses where air-raid precautions and the disposal of waste paper are discussed and mothers who have to work trade time with wives who want to go to the movies; the farmers have, since 1932, been meeting; the suburbanites are discussing trains and creation of bus-routes. we are making the discovery that it is our country and we can decide its destiny. we are not to let others rule us; for in this emergency every man must rule himself; the man who neglects his political duty is as dangerous today as the man who leaves his lights on in a blackout. in the early months of the war our democratic processes were muscle-bound. we hadn't been doing things together; whenever we had organized, it was against some one else; we didn't fall naturally into a simple cooperative effort. and within two months we were breaking into hostile particles, until, in desperation, we discovered that men can work together. the obstructionist manufacturer and the stubborn labor leader could hold up an entire industry; but two men, one from each side, could set each factory going again. the creation of the labor-management committees of two was the first light in the darkness of our domestic policy. still to come was the spontaneous outbreak of fervor and the cold organization for victory. we had forgotten the tools of democracy which we had to work together, as simply as men had to work on a snowbound country road together. in a small town of ohio a pleasant event occurred which had a stir of promise; dorothy thompson's report was: "they got together in the old-fashioned american way: in the old opera house. they warmed and instilled enthusiasm and resolution into one another, by the mass of their presence, and by music, and prayer. "mr. sweet had put the f.f.a. (the future farmers of america and the older brothers of the four-h clubs) to work, and they had made a survey of the existing resources of the community, in trucks, autos, combines, tractors. and he proposed to them that they use these resources, _as a community_, getting the greatest work out of them with the greatest conservation of them; organizing transportation to the factory where war production was going on, so that no auto travelled for its owner alone, but for as many workers as it could carry." _democratic action_ there is a field of endeavor in war time where this sort of spontaneous, amateur organization is best; and our government will be wise if it prevents the inexpert from building bombers but lets them, as far as possible, get children to and from school by local effort. we want to feel that we are being used, that our powers are working for the common good. so far we have been irritated by sudden demands, and frightened by long indifference to our offers--until an angry man has done something, as mr. fred sweet did in mt. gilead. a government determined to win this war will create the opportunities for democratic action without waiting for angry men. the combination of maximum control (the single head of production) and maximum dispersion (two men in each factory solving the local problem) is exactly what we understand; to translate civilian emotion into terms of maximum use is the next step. already this is happening to us: on one side we are grouping ourselves into smaller units; on the other we are discovering that we are parts of the whole nation. it is a tremendous release of energies for us; we are discovering what we had hoped--that america is of indescribable significance to us and that we for the first time signify in america--we, not bosses or financiers or critics or cliques or groups or movements--but we ourselves. something almost dead stirs again and we know that we shall be able to work with our fellowmen, and work with our government, and watch those we chose to speak for us, and challenge corruption, and see to it that we, who are the people, are not betrayed. we may not revive the _forms_ of democracy as they existed in lincoln's time, but we will never again let the _spirit_ of his democracy come so near to being beyond all revival. we will use the weapons we have and invent new ones; and we had better be prompt. because we have a victory to win with these weapons and a world to make. we have to work democracy because we have to create a world in which democracy can live. there is no time to lose. chapter xii democratic control the shape of this war was created in dark back rooms of cheap saloons, in a lodging house in geneva, in several prison cells, in small half secret meetings, up back flights of stairs, behind drawn shades, in boarding houses over the dining table, in the lobbies of movie-houses, at lectures attended by the idle and the curious and the hopeless, in the kitchen of a new york restaurant where waiters talked more about the future than about tips; it was molded also in british pubs and by the sullen lives of dole-gatherers; it took a definable shape and could have been re-formed but was not, so that its shape today is the result of the pressure of those who willed to act and the missing pressure of groups which failed to meet and talk and plan. the earth-shaking events of our time may have been created by the great and mysterious forces of history, but their exact form was fixed by obscure people: the russian revolution by lenin and trotsky, students, impractical men, and the homeless stalin; and the war by hitler, the house painter, the despised little man, the corporal who couldn't get over his military dreams. these were the leaders, the conspicuous ones. they planned--and wrote--and gathered a few even more obscure followers, and talked and lived in utter darkness until the time came for them to fight. for a thousand years the destiny of mankind will be shaped by what these men did in countries barely emerging into freedom--and we to whom the gods have given all freedom, sit by and hesitate even to talk about the future, folding our hands and piously saying that in any case it will be decided for us. that is the result of forgetting our democratic rights and duties; with them we have forgotten that the future is ours to make. it will not be made for us; it will not be made in our favor unless we make it for ourselves; the weapons with which we fight the war will be strong and terrible when we come to create the peace. and we will create it either by using the weapons or by dropping them and running away from our triumph, which is also our responsibility. we will not escape the responsibility by saying that we cannot control "the great forces", the "wave" of events. we can do what hitler and lenin did, when they were starving and fanatic and obscure: we can work and wait and work again. we must not say that we are helpless in the face of international intrigue. we--not churchill and roosevelt--wrote the atlantic charter, and we can un-write it and write it over again; we the people, not henry cabot lodge, crushed the league of nations by our indifference; we, not congressmen bribed by scrap-iron dealers, armed japan by our greed, and we, all of us, let hitler go ahead by our ignorance. we have done all these things without working; and the only thing we have not tried, is to put out our hands and take hold of our destiny. in the first dreadful crisis of our war, we saw china begin to plan the world after the war, preparing a democratic center of 800 million people in asia, putting pressure on britain to proclaim liberty for india, taking hold of the future with faith and confidence--while we said not one open word to asia, and had barely spoken to our nearest friends, the oppressed of europe, to tell them that our purpose was liberty. we cannot let the shape of the future be molded by other hands. the price of living as we want to live is more than sweat and blood and tears: we have to make the grim effort of thinking and take the risk of making decisions. a painful truth comes home to us: we are no longer the spoiled children of destiny--our destiny is our action. _record of isolation_ for more than a hundred years the people of the united states did not have to act and avoided the consequences of democracy in international affairs. officially we had nothing to do with europe, except on special occasions when we snapped at britain, frightened the barbary pirates, helped napoleon i, drove napoleon iii out of mexico. we had no continuing policy and the details of foreign affairs were not submitted to the voter. this was natural enough; the eyes of america turned away from the atlantic seaboard toward the mississippi valley; turned back from the pacific to chicago and the east; turned again to detroit and birmingham and kansas city. we have not yet got the habit of thinking steadily about other nations. our post-war suspicion of the league, our terror of the ussr, our pious agreements with england and japan, our weak dislike of mussolini and hitler, still left us unconcerned with _policy_. we remained in the diplomatic era of william jennings bryan while europe marched back into the era of metternich or talleyrand. yet the voters have, since 1893, determined some aspects of our foreign policy. they did not vote on a loan to china, but they did keep in power the party that made war in spain, bought the philippines, protected cuba, and policed central america. this tentative imperialism was never the supreme issue of a campaign; the republican party had always a better one, which was prosperity. in the early twentieth century, the american voter only accepted, he did not directly approve, the beginnings of a new international outlook. our tradition is obviously not going to help us here; but there is another--the tradition of democratic control. it has not begun to operate in foreign affairs; before it can operate, we will have to clear our minds of some romantic illusions. our future lies balanced between europe and asia; the disagreeable certainty, like a chill in our bones now, is that we cannot escape the world. we still think of participation in world affairs negatively as a favor we may, if we choose, bestow on less favored nations, or as a mere necessity to keep the plagues of war and tyranny quarantined from our shores. the prospect is disagreeable because we, the people, have no experience of international affairs; we have not yet made over diplomacy as we have made over domestic politics. we have begun to send newspapermen into foreign lands and to trust them more than we trust our ambassadors--because the journalists have begun to democratize diplomacy. they have told us more, they have often represented us more completely, and represented international business less; they have been curious, indiscreet, and generally unaffected by the snobbery which used to ruin our ministers to smart european capitals. the correspondents have taken the characteristic american democratic way of altering an ancient european institution, by shrewdly publicised disrespect. whenever we have had a strong secretary of state, something further has been done; but the permanent officials of our state department have completely accepted the european style of international dealings; they have been so aware, and ashamed, of being born on the wrong side of the atlantic sheets, that all the brash independence of america has been hushed; our leading career diplomats have never been americanized by the middle west; they came from an almost alien institution, the private school; they represented smart cosmopolitanism disproportionately; they represented the east, banking, leisure, intellectualism; they did not represent america. on occasions, political chance brought a son of the wild jackass into the state department, or gave him an embassy; and the pained professionals had to resort to the language of diplomacy for the _gaffes_ and _gaucheries_ of american diplomacy. these awkward americans were slipping all over the polished floors of the chancelleries of europe; but they were not falling into the hands of the european diplomats. neither the fumbles of our occasional ignorant envoys nor the correct discretion of the career men gave us any habit of thinking about other countries. on the west coast there is a tradition of wariness about the orient--but it rises from immigration, not international relations. we have no habit of hatred as the french had for germany, no cultivated friendships except for the occasional visit of a prince. we are not susceptible to european flattery if we live beyond the atlantic seaboard--or below the $50,000 income level; for crowds, a hollywood star is at least as magnetic as a balkan queen; and it is not conceivable that we should ever treat the coming of a russian ballet as a part of a political campaign, as the french, quite correctly, did in 1913. we are now paying for our quiet unfortified borders, for the broad seas so suddenly narrowed. we have to learn about foreign affairs, about our own empire (we hardly know that we have one). and this is the hardest thing of all: that while we move in ignorance, _we have to re-work all the basic concepts of international affairs_, or they will destroy us. we will have some support in the people of great britain, in the governments of scandinavia, and in the diplomatic habits of the ussr; but for the most part we must make our way alone. _debunking protocol_ again, as in the case of military strategy, the average man must study the subject to protect himself. he can no longer risk his life, and the fortunes of his family, in the hands of a few career men in the state department, working secretly, studying protocol, forgetting the people of the united states. the amateur statesman is as laughable as the amateur strategist, but the laugh is not always going to be on us. we will popularize diplomacy or it will destroy us. we have first of all to destroy the myth of "high politics". we have to examine macchiavelli and talleyrand and bismarck and disraeli with as much realism as we examine benedict arnold and james j. hill and edison and kruger. we need journalist-debunkers to do the work, a parallel, by the way, to the process of simplifying military discussion, which is being done by newspaper and radio experts. we have to learn that the great tricks, the great arrangements of power, have been as shady as horse-trades, as ruthless as robbery, and often as magnificent as building a railroad--but in all cases they have represented the desires of certain groups, powerful enough at any given time to impose their wishes on the people. war, business, patriotism, medicine, sociology, religion, and sex have all been re-examined and debunked in the past two generations; but diplomacy which can destroy our satisfaction in all of them, still parades as the perfect stuffed shirt, with a red ribbon across it. at the moment no one can say whether hitler has blasted the foreign office and our state department; if he has, it is an achievement equal to taking crete; and we ought to thank him for it. we should learn that diplomacy has swapped national honor, and betrayed it, and used it cynically for the advantage of a few--as well as protected it. we should examine the assertion of "national destiny" before the era of democracy, to see whether the private wealth of a prince and the starvation of a people actually are predestined, whether the mine-owners of france could have allowed german democracy to live, whether locarno satisfied national honor less than munich. and, above all, we should know that this great "game" of european statesmanship, going on from the renaissance to our own time, is a colossal and tragic failure. at times it has brought incalculable wealth to a thousand english families, to a few hundred frenchmen, and power to some others. but it has always ended in the desolation of war--and the suspicion holds that to make war advantageously has been the aim of statesmanship, not to avoid it with honor. we have to rid ourselves of the intolerable flummery of the diplomats because in the future foreign affairs are going to be connected by a thousand wires to our domestic problems, and we propose to see who pulls the wires. the old tradition of betraying a president at home while supporting any stupidity abroad will have to be scrapped; and we will be a more formidable nation, in external affairs, if we conduct those affairs in our way, not in the way of our enemies. _a "various" diplomacy_ it will not be enough to destroy the myth of high diplomacy and reduce it to its basic combinations of chicanery and power-pressure, its motives of pride and honor and greed. we have to take the positive step of creating a new diplomacy, based on the needs of america, and those needs have to be consciously understood by the american people. out of that, we may create a layman's foreign policy executed by professional diplomats; just as we are on the way to create a layman's labor policy, executed by professional statisticians, mediators and agents. we have to recognize diplomacy as a polite war; and, as suggested in connection with actual war, we must not fight in the style or strategy of our enemies. we have always imitated in routine statesmanship; and only in the past twenty years have we begun an american style of diplomacy. the "strategy of variety" may serve us here as on the battlefield; it may not. but the strategy of european diplomacy is their weapon, and their strength; we are always defeated when we attempt it, as wilson was, as stimson was over manchuria. our only successes have been when we sidestepped diplomacy entirely and talked to people. the first step toward creating our own, democratic, diplomacy will be to convince the american people that they will not escape the consequences of this war. many of us believe that we actually escaped the consequences of the first world war by rejecting the league of nations; a process of re-education is indicated, for background. this education can begin with the future and move backward--for our relation to post-war europe can be diagrammed almost as accurately as a fever chart. we withdrew from the league for peace and found ourselves in an alliance for war. it can hardly be called a successful retreat. actually we were in europe, up to our financial necks, from the moment the war ended to the day when the collapse of an austrian bank sent us spiralling to destruction in 1929; we stayed in it, trying to recover the benefits of the davis and young plans by the hoover moratorium. we did everything with europe except recognize its first weak effort to federalize itself on our model. decisive our part in this war will be, but if we withdraw as we did the last time, leaving the nations of europe to work out their own destiny, we will, as a practical matter, destroy ourselves. the only other certainty we have is that the prosperity of the united states is better served by peace in the world than by war. this is true of all nations; the only difference for us is that the dislocation may be a trace more severe, and that we have no tradition of huge territorial repayments, or indemnities, by which a nation may recoup the losses of war, while its people starve. given that basis, we can observe europe and asia after the present war. _phases of the future_ we ought at once to make a calendar. this war will probably not follow the tradition of the last one; it may not gratify us with an exact moment for an armistice; we may defeat our enemies piecemeal and miss the headlines and tickertape and international broadcasts and cities alight again and all the gaiety and solemn emotion of an end to war. this war breaks patterns and sets new ones, so the first date on our calendar is a doubtful one; but let us say that by a certain day we will have smashed germany and japan; italy would have betrayed them long before. our next step is the "peace conference" stage. again this war may disappoint us; we may have a long armistice and a reorganization of the world's powers, without versailles and premiers in secret conferences; perhaps by that time the peoples of europe and america will have captured their diplomats. still, let us say that an interim between armistice and world-order will occur. the phases of the future grow longer as we progress. we will celebrate the armistice for a day; the interim period may well be a year, because in that time we are going to create the organization which will bring us peace for a century--or for ever. this middle period is the critical one; without much warning, we will be in it; the day after we recover from celebrating the armistice, we will have to begin thinking of the future of the world--and at the same time think about demobilization and seeing whether the old car can still go (if we get tires) and sending food to the liberated territories and smacking down capital or labor as the case may be, and planning the next election--by this time we will have forgotten that the desperate crisis in human history has not passed, but has been transformed into the longer crisis of planning and creating a new world--for which there are even fewer good brains than there are for destroying the old one. we can take cold comfort in this: if we do not work out a form of world-cooperation acceptable to ourselves and the other principal nations, we will bring on an event in europe beside which the rise of hitler will seem trivial; it will be world revolution, the final act of destruction which hitler began. and whatever comes out of it, fascist, communist, or chaos, will be no friend to us; twenty years later we can celebrate the anniversary of a new armistice by observing the start of another european war, which will spread more rapidly to asia and ourselves. those of us who went through the first world war, and are in good moral status because we have been under shell fire, may be resigned to a third act in the 1960's; but the men who fight this war may be as revolutionary in england and america as they turned out to be last time in russia or in germany. they may want assurance, the day after the war ends, that we have been thinking about them and the future of the world. they will give us the choice between world organization and world revolution, and no amount of good intentions will help us. we will have to choose and to act; fascism may be destroyed, but an army returning to the turbulence of a disorganized world will not lack leaders; we can have modified communism or super-fascism, all beautifully americanized, if we have nothing better, nothing positive to be achieved when the war ends. and by the time it ends we may understand that disorganization at home or abroad will mean starvation and plague and repression and death. _seven new worlds_ forming now, openly or privately, are groups to put forth a number of different alternatives to revolution and chaos. some of these are based on political necessity or the desire to punish the axis; some correspond to the necessities of a single nation, some are more inclusive. they can be summarized so: re-isolating america; collaboration with fascism; collaboration with communism; anglo-american domination; american imperialism; revival of the league of nations; a federal organization of the world. to some people in the united states, none of these seems possible, all of them disastrous. if the confusion of propaganda continues, these people will fall back on the principle of isolation; it is a fatal backward step, but it is better than any of the seemingly fatal forward steps; it is in keeping with part of our tradition; and if europe as always, with asia now added, goes forward to another war, the centre and core of america will say "we want out", and mean it. but isolating america cannot be an immediate post-war policy; if we plan to withdraw, we virtually hand over the world to revolution and hand ourselves into moral and financial bankruptcy. isolation can only be a constant threat to the world, that we will withdraw unless some of our basic terms are met. we have to know our terms, or our threat is meaningless. there is much to be said for isolation, or autarchy; i pass it over quickly because i am not attempting to criticise each sketch of the post-war world; only to note certain aspects of them all--notably their relation to the america which i have described in earlier pages. the next two programs are also easy to assay: they are at the opposite extreme; they rise from no part of our basic tradition, and collaboration with either fascism or communism would have to come either by revolution after defeat or by long skillful propaganda which would disguise the fact and make us think that we were converting the world to our democracy. it is, nevertheless, childish to assume that the thing can't happen. given a good unscrupulous american dictator we could have made peace with the nazis, and the japanese, by squeezing britain out of the atlantic and russia out of the pacific; our gain would have been the whole western hemisphere; this would have gratified both the isolationists and the imperialists; it would have preserved peace and the monroe doctrine; the only disqualification is that it would destroy freedom throughout the world--which is the purpose of fascism. this was possible; it may become possible again. unless britain shows more intellectual strength in the final phases of the war than she did in the earlier ones, the chance to scuttle her will appeal to any anti-european american dictator; liquidate hitler, make peace with the anti-hitlerian nazis, especially the generals, send our appeasers as ambassadors, and in five years we can re-invigorate a defeated germany and start world-fascism going again. the alternative is not so remote. it is a distinct and immediate possibility. _red america_ a socialist england after the war is promised, in effect, by everyone except the rulers of the british empire. add a free china indebted to communist armies; add russia victoriously on the side of democracy; red successor states will rise in italy, germany and the balkans; and our destiny would be the fourth or fifth international. if we say these things are fanciful, we convict ourselves of inability to break out of our own mythology. either collaboration is as likely as complete isolation; neither would shock us if a good american led us into it. sir stafford cripps is certain that the ussr and the usa fight for the same ideals; and collaboration with hitler's enemies is our standing policy today. so that a "revolution" in germany would automatically lead us into friendly relations with the revolutionaries; they will be either fascist or communist, quite possibly they will be hitler's best friends. actually we may approach either a fascist or a communist world order by easy steps, our little hand held by proud propagandists guiding us on our way. _parva carta_ the dominant american relation to europe, now, is expressed in the atlantic charter which is not an alliance, not a step toward union, but a statement of principles. however, the charter has been used as a springboard and been taken as an omen; so it must be examined and its true bearings discovered. it has, for us, two essential points: one of these is the anglo-american policing of the world; it is a curt reminder that this war is not waged to end war; that future wars are being taken for granted and preparations to win them will be made. the charter was, however, a pre-war instrument for us. presently the necessities of war may force us to go further and declare our intention to prevent war entirely. the specific economic point in the atlantic charter promises "all states, great and small, victor and vanquished ... access, on equal terms, to the trade and the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity." this is a mixture of oil and the mercantile philosophy of a hundred years ago. it has a moral value; it knocks on the head all theories of "rights" in colonies; a nation subscribing to the atlantic charter and attempting to isolate a source of bauxite or pitchblende, will have to be hypocritical as well as powerful. "access to", even on equal terms, does not however imply "power to take and use". lapland may have access to montana copper, unhindered by our law; and copper may be deemed vital to lapland's prosperity (by a commission of experts); but lapland will not get our copper unless we choose to let her have it. in effect, the maritime nations, england and america, have said that if they can get to a port in the dutch east indies, they propose to trade there, for oil or ivory or sea shells; and they have also said, proudly, that germany can trade there also, after germany becomes de-nazified. no realistic attempt to face the necessity of organized production and distribution is even implied in this point. instead, president roosevelt was able virtually to write into an international document a statement of his ideals; as woodrow wilson wrote his league of nations into the fourteen points. mr. roosevelt's freedoms are specific; people (not "nations") are to be free from want, from fear, from oppression. freedom from want is the actual new thing in the world; want--need--hard times--poverty--from the beginning of european history these have been the accepted order, the lot of man, the inescapable fate to which he was doomed by being born. the charter rose out of our history and out of england's need. let me outline again the connection with our history. in 1776, the declaration of independence showed a way out of the poverty-labyrinth in the destiny of man; the declaration declared for prosperity (then synonymous with free land) and offered it to all (citizenship and equal rights to the immigrant, the chance to share in this new belief in prosperity by becoming american). in a century and a half europe has scoffed and sneered at this (relatively successful) attempt to break through economic damnation--and at the end, as europe rocks over the edge of destruction, an american offers this still new and imperfect thing as a foundation stone of peace in the world: freedom from want. it has not yet been completely achieved in america; but we know it can be achieved; we have gone far enough on our way to say that it can be achieved in the whole world. the american standard is far above freedom from want. it is based, in fact, on wanting too many things and getting a fair percentage of them. but president roosevelt's point does not involve "leveling"; it is not an equal standard of living all over the world (which is the implied necessity of international communism). the negative freedom from want is not freedom from wanting; it is explicit, as the words are used: it means that men shall have food and shelter and clothes; and medicine against plague; and an opportunity to learn and some leisure to enjoy life; in accordance with the standards of their people. this is a great deal. it was not too much for the soviet republics to promise, and to begin to bring, to kalmucks and tartars and georgians; it is more than we have brought to our own disinherited in the south, in mining towns, in the fruitful valleys of california. our partial failure is a disgrace, but not a disaster; our success, though incomplete, is important. for we have carried forward in the light of the other great freedom which communism has had to sacrifice, which is freedom from fear. all the specific freedoms--to think, to utter, to believe, to act, are encompassed in this freedom from fear. our basic disagreement with communism is the same as our attack on nazi-fascism--both are based on illegitimate power (not power delegated or given, not power with the consent of the governed): hence both live on domination; on their capacity to instil fear. the war will prove how far this fear penetrated in russia and in germany, and how much longer it will be the instrument of coercion in either country. the president's freedoms are a wide promise to the people of the world--a promise made, like woodrow wilson's promises, before entering any agreement with any foreign power. into the atlantic charter, mr. roosevelt also injected his basic domestic policies and, by some astute horsetrading managed to make them _theoretically_ the basis for international agreement. this point promises improved labor standards, economic adjustment, and social security throughout the world. improvement, adjustment, security--they are not absolutes; freedom from want is, in effect, security; any reasonable adjustment between owners and workers will be an improvement in most countries. but the principle behind the labor point is as clear as the inspiration of the points on raw materials and freedom: it is that wars are caused by the miseries of peoples; when the people rule, they will prevent wars unless their miseries are acute; if they are not in dire want, if they have a chance to work, if they are free of coercion and threat, they will not make war--nor will they fall under the hand of the tyrant and the demagogue. in plain practical statesmanship, mr. roosevelt and mr. churchill apologized for versailles, which denied germany access to raw materials and prevented improvement in labor standards and drove millions of europeans into want and fear; and at the same time they acknowledged the connection between high diplomacy and the food and shelter and comforts of the citizen. the eight points reiterate some of the fourteen; they withdraw from others; but the new thing is all american, it is the injection of the rights of the common man into an international document. but there the atlantic charter ends. as an instrument of propaganda and as a basis of making war and peace, it was outlawed by events; it is forgotten. _what is lacking_ the charter could not carry its own logic beyond a first step: since we were not allied to britain we could not discuss a world system--all we could say was that aggressors would be disarmed (by ourselves and great britain, neither gaining a military or naval predominance) and later we also might disarm--when the world seemed safe. this was on the power side; on the economic side, our role was gratifyingly vague. out of the atlantic mists a few certainties rose, like icebergs. we soon saw: 1. that britain has no method of organizing europe; its tradition is isolation plus alliances. 2. that britain has no system of production parallel to the slave system of germany, by which europe would restore the ravages of war. 3. that britain cannot impose its relatively democratic habits and relatively high level of comfort on the continent. in effect, after an uprush of enthusiasm following the defeat of hitler, the democratic countries will face with panic their tragic incapacity to do what the fascists have almost done--unify the nations of europe. _slow union-now_ it was not the function of the charter to outline the new map of europe. but the map is being worked over and the most effective of the workers are those led by clarence k. streit toward union-now. long before the atlantic charter was issued, federal union had proposed free access to raw materials, even for germans if they destroyed their nazi leaders; and the entire publicity, remarkably organized, has a tone of authority which makes it profoundly significant. i do not know that it is a trial balloon of downing street or of the white house; but in america a justice of the supreme court and a member of the cabinet recommend the proposal to the "serious consideration" of the citizens and it has equally notable sponsors in england. i believe that union with the british commonwealth of nations stands in the way of america's actual function after the war; i see it as a sudden reversal of our historic direction, a shock we should not contemplate in war time; it does not correspond to the living actualities of our past or present. but i think we owe the unionists a great deal; they have incited thought and even action; they serve as the committee to aid the allies did before last december, to supply a rallying point for enthusiasts and enemies; we are doing far too little thinking about our international affairs, and federal union makes us think. it has two aims: the instant purpose of combining all our powers to win the war, using the fact of our union as an engine of propaganda in occupied and enemy countries; and second, "that this program be only the first step in the gradual, peaceful extension of ... federal union to all peoples willing and able to adhere to them, so that from this nucleus may grow eventually a universal world government of, by and for the people". (it sounds impractical, but so did the communist manifesto and hitler's "ravings".) as to the immediate program, it would instantly revive the latent isolationism of tens of millions who used to insist that the roosevelt policy would end in the sacrifice of our independence; we should have a unified control of production, but some 40% of our producers would lose all faith in our government. in the midst of winning the war, we should have to re-convince millions that we had not intentionally betrayed them. military and productive unity can be independent of political unity. unified command was achieved in france in 1918 and in the pacific in 1942, without unions. as for effect abroad, propaganda could present a better case to frenchmen who believe britain let them down if complete anglo-american union were not an accomplished fact; and the whole continental and russian and asiatic suspicion of our motives might be allayed if we did not unite completely and permanently with "the people of canada, the united kingdom, eire, australia, new zealand, and the union of south africa" while we were not so fondly embracing the peoples of india, china, and the netherlands east indies. the abiding union of literate, superior, capitalist white men is not going to be taken as a first step to world equality by slavs and orientals; and much as the british empire may wish not to acknowledge the fact, communism has completely undermined the idea of white supremacy, and has given a new hope to asia and africa. it may have been a very bad thing to do, but we cannot stop for recriminations now. there are new soldiers for democracy in the world, and if they are fighting beside us, we cannot ignore them and fall into the arms of their traditional oppressors. we have a great work to do with the chinese and the indians, and all the other peoples who can stand against our enemy; we cannot begin to do it if our first move is accepting british overlordship in the east, uncritically, without pledges or promises. as a post-war program federal union is more persuasive. it begins with a wilsonian peace offer--the influence is strong and supplies the deep emotional appeal of the organization. it guarantees free access to rubber and oil and gold; it accepts any nation whose people had certain minimal freedoms; it implies, of course, free trade--with new markets for our manufactured products, and no duties on british woolens; plans for the union congress "assure the american people a majority" at the start. (as between the united states and the british commonwealth; as soon as "all peoples willing and able" to, enter, the 200 million american and british commonwealthers would be swamped by 800 million chinese and indians and other asiatics.) the average american pays a great tribute to the largeness of the concept of "union-now"--he doesn't believe that anyone really means it. he thinks it is a fancy name for a war alliance, or possibly a new simplified league of nations. the gross actuality of iowa and yorkshire ruled by one governing body, he cannot take in. and as the argument develops, this general scepticism is justified; for the american learns that while he may be ruled, he will not be over-ruled, and he wonders what mr. churchill and the man in the london street will say to that, or in what disguise this plan is being presented to the english or the scots or the new zealanders. so far no responsible british statesman has offered union to the united states, but mr. leslie hore-belisha has said that we need a declaration of inter-dependence and our ambassador to the court of st. james's told an international society of writers that we need a sort of international citizenship. mr. wendell willkie however has said that "american democracy must rule the world." _entry into europe_ by union or by alliance, american or anglo-american rule over the world will have some strange consequences for us, citizens not accustomed to worry over "foreign affairs". perhaps the strangest thing is that the results will be almost the same whether we are partners with britain or alone in our mighty domination, with england as a satellite. an american or anglo-american imperium can only be organized by force; it is, in effect, the old order of europe, with america playing britain's old star part, britain reduced to the supporting role of france or holland or portugal. in any controversy, we step in, with our vast industrial power, our democratic tradition, our aloofness from europe, just as england used to step in with _her_ power and traditions; the atlantic is to us what the channel or north sea was to britain. england's policy was to prevent the rise of any single continental power, so she made an alliance with prussia to fight france in 1814 and made an alliance with france to fight prussia in 1914. in an anglo-american alliance, england would be our european outpost, just as prussia or france was england's continental outpost. our policy would still be the balance of power. like england, we should be involved in every war, whether we take up arms or not--as she was involved in the crimea and the balkans, and south africa and north africa; we should have our fashodas and our algeciras and our mafeking; our peace will be uneasy, our wars not our own. the atlantic charter suggests a "policing" of the world after the war; it holds off from anything further; it does not actually hint that a reorganization of power in the world is needed. yet, at the same time, the creation of an oceanic bloc to combat the european land bloc is hinted. it is all rather like a german professor's dream of geo-politics; russia becomes a pacific power and japan, by a miserable failure of geography, is virtually a continental one, while the united states is reduced to two strips of ocean frontage, like a real estate development with no back lot, with no back country, with no background in the history of a continent. the sea-powers unit is as treacherous as "the atlantic group" or "the democratic countries"; the intent is still to create a dominant power and give ourselves (and britain) control of the raw materials and the trade of the world. no matter how naturally the group comes together, by tradition or self-interest, it becomes instantly the nucleus for an alliance; and as the alliance begins to form, nations we omit or reject begin to crystallize around some other centre, and we have the balance of power again, the race for markets and the race for armaments. this will be particularly true if we begin to play the diplomatic game with the stakes greater than those ever thrown--since we are the first two-ocean nation to enter world affairs. at the moment nothing seems more detestable than the policy of japan; but diplomacy overcomes all detestation, and if we are going in for the game of dealing with nations instead of peoples, we can foresee ourselves years from now as the great balance between the atlantic and the pacific, between japan and england, or japan and germany, perhaps the honest broker between the two sets of powers. in 1942 we are independent, fighting for freedom, helping all those who fight against tyranny; and we can do this because we have kept out of the groupings and combinations of the powers. but we are being pushed into a combination and we know now that there is only one way to avoid entanglement: we must prevent the combination from coming into existence. _our historic decision_ in 1919 an attempt was made, by america, to put an end to all european combinations of power. that attempt was unanimously approved by the people of the united states, some of whom voted for the league while the others endorsed a society of nations, to which w.g. harding promised our adhesion. the society of nations was never seriously proposed, and harding betrayed the american people; at the same time it was monumentally clear that france, with england's help, had sabotaged the actual league by making it a facade for a punitive alliance. between these two betrayals, the idea of world organization was mortally compromised. we may quarrel over the blame for the impotence of the league; did france invade the ruhr because, without us in the league, she needed "protection"? or did we stay out of the league because we knew france would go into the ruhr? that can be argued for ever. we know reasonably well why we kept out of the league; but no one troubles to remember how earnestly we wanted the league and prayed for it and wanted to enter, so that it remained always to trouble us as we tried to sleep through the destruction of ethiopia or spain or czecho-slovakia. the league was not a promise of security to the _people_ of the united states. our government may have felt the need of a world order; we did not; the war had barely touched us, yet even those whom it had touched least were enthusiasts for a new federation of nations. it was neither fear nor any abstract love of peace. the league, or any other confederation of europe, corresponded to our american need, which was to escape alliance with any single power or small group; to escape the danger of europe united against us; and to escape the devil's temptation of imperialism--_because the people of the united states do not want to rule the world_. there is an instinct which tells us that those who rule are not independent; they are slaves to their slaves; it tells us that we are so constituted that we cannot rule over part of europe or join with any part to rule the rest; it is our instinct of independence which forbids us in the end to destroy the liberty of any other nation. this goes back to the thought of union with the british nations. if we unite, and we are dominant, do we not accept the responsibility of domination? the appetite for empire is great and as the old world turned to us in 1941, as the war of the worlds placed us in the centre of action, as more and more we came to make the decisions, as australia, russia, china, britain called to us for help--the image of america ruling the world grew dazzling bright. it was our duty--our destiny; mr. henry luce recognized the american century, seeing us accepted by the world which already accepts our motor cars, chewing gum and moving pictures. to shrink from ruling the world is abject cowardice. did england shrink in 1914? or france under napoleon? or rome under augustus? or sweden under gustavus adolphus? no. no despotism ever shrank from its "destiny" to destroy the freedom of other nations. but the history of america will still create our destiny--and our destiny is _not_ to rule the world. _our destiny is to remain independent and the only way we can remain independent is by cooperation with all the other nations of the earth. that is the only way for us to escape exclusive alliances, the pull of grandiose imperial schemes, the danger of alliances against us, and a tragic drift into the european war system which can destroy us._ there is an area of action in which nationality plays no part: like labor statistics--and this area is steadily growing; there is another area jealously guarded, the area of honor and tariffs and taxes. we have to mark out the parts of our lives which we can offer up to international supervision and the parts we cannot. it will surprise us to see that we can become more independent if we collaborate more. "_far as human eye can see_" i have no capacity to describe the world order after the war. if, as i have said, the war is fought by us in accordance with our national character, we will create a democratic relationship between the nations of the world; and our experience added to that of britain and the ussr will tend toward a federation of commonwealths; the three great powers have arrived, by three separate experiences, at the idea of federation; two of them are working out the problems of sovereign independent states within a union; the third, ourselves, worked the problem out long ago by expunging states rights in theory and allowing a great deal in practise. as a result of our experience, we dogmatically assert that no federation can be created without the ultimate extinction of independence; we may be right. but the thought persists that independence was wanted for the sake of liberty; that independence without security was the downfall of czecho-slovakia and france; and that we have cherished independence because the rest of the world did not cherish liberty as we did. profoundly as i believe independence to be the key to american action, i can imagine the translation of the word into other terms; we are allied to britain and the netherlands and the soviets today, we have accepted alien command of our troops and ships; we are supplying arms to the soviets and building a naval base in ecuador and have accepted an agreement by which great britain will have a word in the creation of the most cherished of our independent creations, the tariff. independence, so absolute in origin, is like all absolutes, non-existent in fact; we know this in private life, for the man of "independent means" may depend on ten thousand people to pay him dividends; and only the mad are totally independent of human needs and duties. we will not willingly give up our right to elect a president; we may allow the president to appoint an american member to an international commission to allocate east indies rubber; in return for which we will allocate our wheat or cotton or motors--on the advice of other nations, but without bowing our neck to their rule. we have always accepted specific international interference in our affairs--the alabama claims and the oregon boundary and the successive troubles in venezuela prove that our "sovereign right" to do what we please was never exercised without some respect for the opinion of mankind--and the strength of the british navy. indeed recent events indicate that for generations our independence of action, the reality of independence, rested on our faith in the british fleet. the moment we become realistic about our independence we will be able to collaborate effectively with other nations. we got a few lessons in realistic dealings in 1941--lend-lease and the trade for the naval bases were blunt, statesmanlike but most undiplomatic--moves to strengthen the british fleet, to extend our own area of safety, and to give us time against the threat of japan. they protected our independence, but they also compromised it; the british by any concession to japan might have weakened us; we took the risk, and our action was in effect an act of defensive war against germany. like jefferson, buying louisiana to protect us against any foreign power across the mississippi, president roosevelt acted under dire necessity and as jefferson (not roosevelt) put it, was not too deeply concerned with constitutionality. the situation in 1941 required not only the bases but the continued functioning of the british fleet in the atlantic; and we got what we needed. the economic agreement of 1942 is probably a greater invasion of our simon-pure independence of action; although it empowers a post-war president to decide how much of lend-lease was returned by valor in the field, it specifically binds us to alter our tariff if britain can induce its commonwealth of nations to give up the system of "imperial preference". all our tariffs are horsetrades and the most-favored nation is a sweet device; but heretofore we have not bartered our tariffs in advance. certainly a post-war economic union is in the wind; certainly we will accept it if it comes to us piecemeal, by agreements and joint-commissions and international resolutions which are not binding, but are accepted and become as routine as the law of copyright which once invaded our sacred national right to steal or the international postal union which gave us the right to send a letter to any country for five cents. when we think of the future our minds are clouded by memory of the league; we are psychologically getting ready to accept or reject the league all over again. we are worried over the form--will it be geneva again or will headquarters be in washington; will germany have a vote; will we have to go to war if the supreme council tells us to. these are important if we are actually going to reconstitute the league; but if we are not, the only question is what we want the new world organization to do. in keeping with our political tradition we will pretend that we want it to do as little as possible and put upon it all the work we are too lazy to do ourselves; but even the minimum will be enough. _our standing offer_ everything points to an economic council representing the free nations of the world; the lease-lend principles in time of peace may be invoked, as harold laski has suggested, to provide food and raw materials for less favored nations; and the need for "economic sanctions" will not be lost on the nation which supplied japan with scrap-iron and oil for five years of aggression against china and then was repaid at pearl harbor. if there is any wisdom--in the people or in their leaders--we will not have a formulated league to accept or reject; we will have a series of agreements (such as we have had for generations) covering more and more subjects, with more and more nations. we have drawn up treaties and agreements with twenty south american states, with forty-six nations united for liberty; we can draw up an agreement with russia and rumania and the netherlands so that england and the continent and china get oil; and another agreement may give us tungsten; we may have to take universal action to stop typhus--and no one will be an isolationist then. if the war ends by a series of uprisings we may be establishing temporary governments as part of our military strategy. slowly the form of international cooperation will be seen; by that time it will be familiar to us--and we will see that we have not lost our independence, but have gained our liberty. we began the war with one weapon: liberty. if we fight the war well, we will begin the long peace with two: liberty and production. with them we will not need to rule the world; with them the world will be able to rule itself. all we have to do is to demonstrate the best use of the instruments--and to let others learn. before our part in the war began, it was often suggested that america would feed and clothe europe, send medicine and machinery to china, and make itself generally the post-war stockpile of democracy as it had been the arsenal and treasury during the war; and the monotonous uncrushing answer was about "the money". realities of war have blown "the money" question into atoms; no sensible person pretends that there is a real equation between our production and money value; we can't in any sense "afford" bombers and battleships; if we stopped to ask where "the money" would come from, and if the question were actually relevant, we would have to stop the war. another actuality of war relieves us of the danger of being too generous--the actuality of rubber and tin and tungsten and all the other materials critical to production in peace time. since we will have to rebuild our stocks of vital goods, our practical men will see to it that we get as well as give; we may send food to greece and get rubber from java, but on the books we will not be doing too badly. neither money nor the bogey of a balance of trade is going to decide our provisioning of europe and asia; the cold necessity of preventing revolution and typhus will force us to rebuild and re-energize; in the end, like all enlargements of the market, this will repay us. the rest of the world will know a great deal about mass production by the end of the war: indians and australians will be expert at interchangeable parts; but we will have the immeasurable advantage of our long experience on which the war has forced us to build a true productive system. we will jump years ahead of our schedule of increase and improvement because of the war; and we will be able to face any problem of production--if we want to, or have to. the choice between people's lives and the gold standard will have to be made again, as it was by many nations in the 1930's; only this time the choice is not without a threat. after wars, people are accustomed to bloodshed; they prefer it to starvation. _alternative to prosperity_ the greatest invention of democracy is the wealth of the people. we discovered that wealth rested more firmly on prosperity than on poverty and the genius of our nation has gone into creating a well-to-do mass of citizens. unfinished as the job is, we can start to demonstrate its principles to others. in return they may refrain from teaching us the principles of revolution. recovery and freedom are our concrete actual offer to the nations of europe, counter to the offer of hitler. without this literal, concrete offer, we shall have to fight longer to defeat hitler--and every added day costs us lives and money and strength inside ourselves which we need to create the new world; if we can defeat hitler without the aim of liberty, our victory will be incomplete; we will not automatically emancipate france or jugo-slavia, or draw rumania back into the orbit of free nations. within each nation a powerful group profits by the nazi-system; within each a vast population, battered, disheartened, diseased, wants only the meanest security, one meal a day, shelter only from the bitter days, something more than a rag for clothing--and an end to the struggle; these are not heroes, they are old people, men and women struck down and beaten and starved so that they cannot rise, but can drag down those who attempt to rise. these we may save only by giving them food and forgetfulness. on the other side there are the young--carefully indoctrinated, worked over to believe that the offer of fascism is hard, but practical; it is an offer of slavery and security; whereas they are told the offer of the democratic countries is an hypocrisy and--worse still--cannot be made good. we have to face the disagreeable fact that the balkan peasant in 1900 heard of universal suffrage and high wages in america, and his grandchildren know more about our sharecroppers and race riots and strike breakers than we do--because the goebbels machine has played the dark side of our record a million times. the first year of the war was bound to show the "superiority" of the german production technique over ours, since europe will not know that we are still at the beginning of actual production. the mind of europe knows little good of us; we have not yet begun to undermine the fascist influence by words, and our acts are not yet planned. even after hitler is destroyed, we will have to act to overcome impotence in political action which years of nazi "conditioning" induces, and to compensate for the destruction of technical skill in the occupied areas. to us the end of the war is a wild moving picture of gay processions, swastikas demolished, prisons opened, and the governments-in-exile hailed at the frontiers; all of these things may happen, but the reality, after the parade, will be a grim business of re-making the flesh and the spirit of peoples. the children of israel rejoiced and sang as they crossed the red sea; but they had been slaves. so moses led them forty years in the wilderness, when he could have gone directly to the promised land in forty months, because he wanted a generation of slaves to die, and a generation of hardy freemen to be in full mature power.[a] the generation we will raise to power in the occupied countries will have great experience of tyranny, none of freedom; it will know all about our shortcomings and nothing of our triumphs; it will distrust our motives and methods; it will have seen the nazis at work and know nothing of new techniques of production; we will have to teach them to be free and to work. footnotes: [footnote a: i have not traveled the route; but general sir francis younghusband who had, gave me the figures--and the motive.] chapter xiii the liberty bell above all things our function is to proclaim liberty, to proclaim it as the soil on which we grow and as the air we breathe, to make the world understand that liberty is what we fight for and live by. we have to keep the word always sounding so that people will not forget--and we have to create liberty so that it is always real and people will have a goal to fight for, and never believe that it is only a word. we do not need to convert the world to a special form of political democracy, but we have to keep liberty alive so that the peoples who want to be free can destroy their enemies and count on us to help. we will do it by the war we are waging and the peace we will make and the prosperity of the peoples of the world which we will underwrite. for in the act of proclaiming and creating liberty we must also give to the world the demonstration we have made at home: that there is no liberty if the people perish of starvation and that alone among all the ways of living tried in the long martyrdom of man, freedom can destroy poverty. we have been bold in creating food and cars and radios and electric power; now we must be bold in creating liberty on a scale never known before, not even to ourselves. for we have to create enough liberty to take up the shameful slack in our own country. we all know, indifferently, that people (somewhere--where was it?--wasn't there a movie about them?) hadn't enough to eat. but we assume that americans always have enough liberty. the senate's committee report on the fascism of organized big-farming in california is a shock which americans are not aware of; in the greater shock of war we do not understand that we have been weakened internally, as england was weakened by its distressed areas and its malayan snobbery. we do not yet see the difference between the misfortune of an imperfect economic system and calculated denials of liberty. we have denied liberty in hundreds of instances, until certain sections of the country, certain portions of industry, have become black infections of fascism and have started the counter-infection of communism. most of the shameful occasions we have cheerfully forgotten; in the midst of our war against tyranny, any new blow at our liberty is destructive. here are the facts in the california case, chosen because the documentation comes from official sources: "unemployment, underemployment, disorganized and haphazard migrancy, lack of adequate wages or annual income, bad housing, insufficient education, little medical care, the great public burden of relief, the denial of civil liberties, riots, strife, corruption are all part and parcel of this autocratic system of labor relations that has for decades dominated california's agricultural industry." the american people do not know that such things exist; no american orator has dared to say "except in three or four states, all men are equal in the eyes of the law"--or, "trial by jury is the right of every man except farm hands in california, who may be beaten at will." when the senate's report is repeated to us from japanese short-wave we will call it propaganda--and it will be the terrible potent propaganda of truth. we will still call for "stern measures", if a laborer who has lost the rights of man on american soil does not go into battle with a passion in his heart to die for liberty, and we will not understand that we have been at fault, because we have not created liberty. we have been living on borrowed liberty, not of our own making. we have not seen that some of our "cherished liberties" are heirlooms, beautiful antiques, not usable in the shape they come to us. we have the right to publish--but we cannot afford to print a newspaper--so that we have to create a new freedom of the press. we have the right to keep a musket on the wall, but our enemies have ceased to prowl, the musket is an antique, and we need a new freedom to protect ourselves from officious bureaucrats. we have the right to assemble, but men of one mind, men of one trade, live a thousand miles apart, so we need a new freedom to combine--and a new restriction on combination, too. freedom is always more dangerous than discipline, and the more complex our lives, the more dangerous is any freedom. this we know; we know that discipline and order are dangerous, too, because they cannot tolerate imperfection. a nation cannot exist half-slave and half-free, but it can exist 90% free, especially if the direction of life is toward freedom; that is what we have proved in 160 years. but a nation cannot exist 90% slave--or 90% regimented--because every degree of order multiplies the power of disorder. if a machine needs fifty meshed-in parts, for smooth operation, the failure of one part destroys forty-nine; if it needs five million, the failure of one part destroys five million. that is the hope of success for our strategy against the strategy of "totality"; the nazis have surpassed the junkers by their disciplined initiative in the field, a genuine triumph; but we still do not know whether a whole people can be both disciplined and flexible; we have not yet seen the long-run effect of hitler's long vituperation of bolshevism, his treaty with stalin, and his invasion of russia--unless the weakening of nazi power, its failure to press success into victory at the gates of moscow and leningrad reflect a hesitation in the stupefied german mind, an incapacity to change direction. whether our dangers are greater than those of fascism may be proved in war; it remains for us to make the most of them, to transform danger into useful action. we have to increase freedom, because as freedom grows, it brings its own regulation and discipline; the dangers of liberty came to us only after we began to neglect it or suppress it; freedom itself is orderly, because it is a natural state of men, it is not chaos, it begins when the slave is set free and ends when the murderer destroys the freedom of others; between the tyrant and the anarchist lies the area of human freedom. it is also the area of human cooperation, the condition of life in which man uses all of his capacities because he is not deprived of the right to work, by choice, with other men. in that area, freedom expands and is never destructive. the flowering of freedom in the past hundred years has been less destructive to humanity than the attempted extension of slavery has been in the past decade; for when men create liberty, they destroy only what is already dead. i have used the phrase "creating enough liberty"--as if the freedom of man were a commodity; _and it is_. so long as we think of it as a great abstraction, it will remain one; the moment we _make_ liberty it becomes a reality; the declaration of independence _made_ liberty, concretely, out of taxes and land and jury trials and muskets. liberty, like love, has to be made; the passion out of which love rises exists always, but people have to _make love_, or the passion is betrayed; and the acts by which human beings make liberty are as fundamental as the act of sexual intercourse by which love is made. and as love recreates itself and has to be made, in order to live again, liberty has also to be re-created, or it dies out. whatever lovers do affects the profound relation between them, for the passion is complex; whatever we do affects our liberties, for freedom rises out of a thousand circumstances; and we have to be not only eternally vigilant, but eternally creative; we can no longer live on the liberty inherited from the great men who created liberty in the declaration of independence. all that quantity has been exhausted, stolen from us, misused; if we want to survive, we must begin to make liberty again and proclaim it throughout the land, to all the inhabitants thereof; and it shall be a jubilee unto them. * * * * * +------------------------------------------------------------+ | typographical errors corrected in text: | | | | page 54: "what the trust were" replaced with | | "what the trusts were" | | page 83: "given by the the people" replaced with | | "given by the people" | | page 156: enterprizes replaced with enterprises | | | | ------------------------------------ | | | | note that on page 85 there are words missing from the | | quoted section of the declaration of independence. | | the missing words "to our british brethren. we have warned | | them" have been inserted in the paragraph that begins: | | "nor have we been wanting in attention (to our british | | brethren. we have warned them) from time to time of | | attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable | | jurisdiction over us." | | | +------------------------------------------------------------+ * * * * * liberty in the nineteenth century by frederic may holland 1899 by preface this book is a result of having studied the development of political and religious liberty for forty years. how well i have selected my authorities the reader can judge. i will merely say that i have mentioned no writer whom i have not studied carefully. the sun-dial has been so far my model that victories in the cause of freedom are more prominent than defeats in the pages that follow. it did not seem necessary to give much space to familiar authors, though i should have liked to do justice to buckle, george eliot, and swinburne. i regret that i have been unable to tell at any adequate length how the republic which was proclaimed at paris in 1870 has survived longer than any other government set up in france during the century. its enemies have been voted down repeatedly everywhere; the schools have been made free from ecclesiastical control; and the hostility of the clergy has been suppressed by the pope. the french are still too fond of military glory, and too ignorant of the value of personal liberty and local self-government; but rapid advance in freedom is already possible under the constitution of 1884. not only france, but also great britain, canada, and australia, give proof that the time has gone by when americans had any right to claim, as they did in my boyhood, to be the only people able to govern themselves. if any nation can maintain a free press, just laws, and elections of local magistrates, it ought to enjoy these rights, however slight may be its fitness for becoming a real republic; and the suppression of such rights by cromwell and napoleon cannot be pardoned consistently by any friend to liberty. napoleon's chief guilt, as i must here mention, was in ordering the expulsion from office by soldiers, in 1797, of representatives of the people who were striving to maintain liberty at home and establish peace abroad. if there were any necessity for his usurpation two years later, it was largely of his own making. despotism had already been made tolerable, however, even during the first republic, by the national fondness for war. this is according to a principle which is taught by herbert spencer, and which is illustrated in the following pages by many instances from the history of france and other nations. the horrors of the reign of terror may be explained, though not excused, by the greatness of the danger from invaders as well as rebels. and there were very few cases of punishing differences merely about religion by the guillotine. i have also tried to show how the centralising tendencies of a government are strengthened by the wish of its citizens to gain private advantages by state aid. john stuart mill and herbert spencer have published timely warnings against the danger of checking the development of individual energy and ability by meddlesome laws. whether the power of the government ought to be reduced to the narrow limits proposed by these great thinkers, is a question which has been discussed at some length in my last chapter. it is there suggested that such a reduction would be much more practicable in the case of national than of local governments. it is not likely to be made anywhere at present; but it might be well for reformers to try to restrict the operations of governments according to the following rule: nothing to be undertaken by a national government which can be done as well by municipalities; and nothing to be attempted by either a local or central government which can be done as well by private citizens, acting singly or in voluntary associations. this rule would justify towns and cities in taking such care of roads, streets, and schools as is not sanctioned by spencer; but it would leave municipalities free to decide the question whether they ought to carry on gasand water-works, electric roads, and other enterprises according to the merits of each special case. here in america internal improvements seem to be the proper charge of the state, rather than of the nation; but whether the former has any right to enforce sunday laws, and the latter to impose protective tariffs, are questions which i have taken the liberty of discussing thoroughly. herbert spencer should not be held responsible for any opinions not printed plainly as his. most of the instances of the working of sunday statutes were taken from a religious newspaper entitled the american sentinel. among very recent cases are these. a georgian was sentenced on may 16, 1899, to pay a fine of twenty dollars or spend six months in the chain-gang for working on his farm. that same month a clergyman was arrested in mississippi, merely for taking a little exercise with a hoe in his garden. in 1898, a farmer in the state of new york was arrested for picking a few apples from one of his own trees. the total number of sabbath-breakers arrested that year in new york city is estimated at a thousand; and there were nearly four thousand arrests for sunday trading in england and wales in 1897. the principle of giving each citizen every opportunity of development compatible with the general welfare, is so plainly irreconcilable with socialism, that i have thought it well to give several instances of the fact that a man seldom does his best work except for his own benefit and that of his family. even the exceptionally energetic and conscientious founders of new england did not raise food enough until it was agreed that "they should set corne, every man for his own particular." another difficulty in the way of state socialism is that the requisite number of competent managers could not be found after the abolition of the competitive system. it is that which brings forward men of unusual ability and energy, though scarcely in sufficient numbers. socialism would increase the demand, but lessen the supply. spencer calls it "the coming slavery." it might better be called a slavery which is becoming obsolete. our existing system of industry certainly needs improvement; but this will have to be made by following the laws of social science. their action has done much during the present century to improve the condition of the poor; and we may trust that it will do more hereafter. the nineteenth might be called the philanthropic century, if that title did not belong also to the eighteenth. the latter has the peculiar merit of doing so much to abolish persecution that there have been comparatively few instances during the period covered by this book. much more has been done during the last hundred years to extend political than religious liberty; but i have not neglected to mention the most active champions of the great principle, that human rights ought not to be affected by individual differences about theology. if there is too little agitation at present for this principle in the united states, it is largely on account of an unfortunate occurrence of which i have written at some length in the last chapter but one. here i had the valuable assistance of francis e. abbot, ph.d., author of _scientific theism_, and benjamin f. underwood. if the words, "militant liberals," had been used in this chapter, they would express my meaning more plainly than the term "aggressive." the least pleasant part of my work has been the pointing out defects in a system of philosophy, ethics, and theology which i once delighted to honour. as valuable results may have been reached by the metaphysical method as by the scientific; but if the latter is right the former is certainly wrong. when we find so consistent and warmhearted a transcendentalist as miss cobbe placing pantheism and scepticism among "the greatest of sins" (see her _religious duty_, pp. 19, 65, and 100), we may suspect that this philosophy aggravated carlyle's natural bitterness against opponents. there has been comparatively little intolerance among american intuitionalists, thanks to the genial influence of emerson. f. m. h. august, 1899. liberty in the nineteenth century chapter i. napoleon and his work i. france had been freed by the revolution from many ghosts of kingly, feudal, and priestly privileges; but she was still the prey of the most deadly of vampires,--military glory. the followers of this fatal guide had driven the party of peace and liberty from power by force and fraud, and found a ruler after their own hearts in the conqueror who, in 1804, became the emperor napoleon. thus was established what some metaphysicians suppose to be the best form of government,--an enlightened despotism. the autocrat knew that he had risen to power as the most popular champion of political equality; and he gave this democratic principle such additional authority that it has continued supreme in france. her sons are still equals before the law, owners of the land they till, exempt from taxes levied for the benefit of any privileged class, and free to choose their own career and mode of worship. this is due in great part to the usurper who reduced representative government to an empty shell, and who centralised the administration of schools, police, streets, roads, and bridges, and all other local concerns even more completely than had ever been done before the revolution. he knew the real needs of france well enough to give her peace with all her enemies; but scarcely had he signed the last treaty when he took possession of switzerland, and continued to annex territory, in defiance of the protests of the british ministers that he was making peace impossible. war was declared by them in 1803 and kept up against him for eleven years continuously, with occasional assistance from russia, austria, prussia, spain, and other countries. this was a period of great glory for france, but also of great suffering. her boundaries were enlarged; but her most patriotic citizens were slaughtered in foreign lands; her shipping was swept away by british cruisers; her people were hindered in obtaining american grain, british cloth, and other necessaries of life, in exchange for wine, silk, lace, and other luxuries; the emperor could not supervise the prefects who managed, or mismanaged, all internal interests, and who were responsible to him alone; freedom of the press was prohibited; and all the arts of peace decayed. this was the price which france paid for auster-litz, jena, and other famous victories over russia, austria, and prussia, which in 1807 brought peace with every enemy but england, and made napoleon master, either directly through his prefects, or indirectly through tributary kings, not only of france but of the netherlands, denmark, switzerland, spain, venice with the rest of italy, and about three-fourths of germany, including one-half of what had formerly been prussian territory. eight years from the usurpation in 1799 brought him to his zenith: eight years later, he was at saint helena. his german, swiss, and italian subjects gained political equality, and also the permanent advantage of the code which bears his name. it had really been made by his lawyers, on foundations laid by the convention. throughout his dominions, jew, catholic, and protestant became equals before the law. the fact that these reforms survived his authority proves that they could have been established without it. they were unavoidable results of the eighteenth century. how little he was influenced by philanthropy is shown by his driving into exile a statesman named stein, who had abolished serfdom in prussia, and made it equally possible for the members of all classes to buy land and choose occupations. the establishment of the empire had been preceded by the revival of slavery in several colonies where it had been abolished by the convention. it was for helping the haytians preserve their independence by heroic resistance, that toussaint was sent by napoleon to die in prison. the conquered nations in europe were handed over from one master to another, without being even invited to consent; but what was still more oppressive was inability to exchange their own products for cloth and hardware from england, grain from the united states, coffee and sugar from the west indies, and many other articles whose lack was keenly felt. this trouble was largely due to the blockade kept up by british ships; but napoleon was so ignorant of the advantage of commerce to both parties engaged in it as to suppose he could conquer england by a plan which really injured only himself and his subjects. he forbade all importation from great britain and her colonies wherever he had power or even influence; and many of the prohibited goods were taken from merchants and destroyed without compensation. germany suffered also from having her manufactures forbidden to compete with the french. the latter asked in vain for freer trade, and were told by napoleon that he understood their business better than they did. countless outrages on prominent individuals helped the growth of disaffection. ii. the british ministry retaliated against napoleon's attack on the right to trade freely, with a success which led to a great outrage on individual liberty in the united states. the war with europe gave much of the world's commerce to american ships; but they were forbidden by great britain, in 1806, to trade with some of their best customers unless they stopped to pay tribute in her ports. the seizures for disobedience increased the anger which had been long felt against the british for impressing sailors on board of american ships. three thousand citizens of the united states had been forced into a hostile navy before the refusal of our frigate, _chesapeake_, in 1807, to submit to a search brought on a bloody contest. napoleon was then at the height of his power; and great britain was fighting against him single-handed. it was an unusually good time for declaring a war which soon proved inevitable in defence of merchants' and sailors' rights. jefferson preferred to violate those rights himself, as had been done by the federalists in 1794, and congress aided him in forbidding american ships to sail for foreign ports. this embargo was so plainly unnecessary that every captain who was able to get out of new york harbour did so at once without caring what crew, cargo, or papers he had on board. fifty million dollars' worth of shipping was kept idle for more than a year; a hundred thousand sailors and mechanics were thrown out of work; farms and plantations ceased to be profitable; clothing and tools became ruinously dear; thirteen hundred new yorkers, who had been ruined by the embargo, were imprisoned for debt; and laws for protection against creditors were passed by the southern and western states. no one gained by the embargo except the smugglers; and attempts to suppress them called out dangerous manifestations of popular discontent. no one suffered less than the british merchants. iii. meantime, napoleon took the first step towards ruin in placing his brother on the throne of spain. the spaniards had borne patiently the loss of ships, commerce, and colonies; but this fresh wrong stirred up insurrection. the new king was brought to madrid by french troops; but not a single spaniard would enter his service; and he was soon obliged to leave the city. he said to his brother, "your glory will be wrecked in spain"; but napoleon kept on sending in armies, whose victories made him hated, but not obeyed. he offered to abolish feudal privileges, the inquisition, and the tariffs which separated province from province. the only result was to make reform odious to a people which cared much more for nationality than progress. the clergy encouraged the peasants to keep up a guerilla war, in which his veterans perished ignominiously; and british auxiliaries won victories which made wellington famous. austria took advantage of the situation to try to reconquer the lost provinces. the tyrolese had been made subjects of the king of bavaria; but they rose at the call of hofer, and gained glorious victories over french and bavarian soldiers. other defeats were suffered by napoleon; but he soon succeeded in forcing austria to grant him, not only much more of her territory, but the hand of a young princess, who had never thought of him but with abhorrence. this involved his divorce from the loving josephine. he pleaded desire for a son who might succeed him; but he was not likely to live until any child who might be born after this would be old enough to keep together an empire whose basis was conquest. the austrian princess had been demanded before napoleon's application for a russian one had been answered decisively; his plans for restoring poland had given additional offence to the czar; and the welfare of russia demanded freedom to use the products of her forests, fields, and mines in buying british goods. this right was insisted upon by the czar; and napoleon had only abuse for the friends who warned him that defeat in russia would call all germany to arms against him. he was already so unpopular at paris, that he had to remove with his court. the enormous army with which he invaded russia might easily have taken possession of her polish provinces, where the people were friendly. he preferred to march a thousand miles, through a hostile and barren country, to moscow. the city was set on fire at his arrival; but he wasted so much time there, that winter helped the russians turn his retreat into a rout. hundreds of thousands of soldiers perished miserably. the prussians flew to arms; and austria demanded restoration of her provinces. he replied that he should not yield an inch, and cared nothing for the loss of a million lives. he was driven out of germany by "the battle of the nations," which was won at leipsic, in october, 1813, by zealous cooperation of the russians with prussians, austrians, bavarians, and other germans. one result was described by saying that "the dutch have taken holland." need of a strong government in time of war had given a power almost monarchical to the successors of that prince of orange who had saved his republic from philip ii. one of these princes was driven out by a democratic rebellion in 1787, but restored by a prussian army. the french revolution enabled holland to return to republicanism; but alliance with the directory meant continual spoliation; and there were grievous conscriptions under napoleon, whose rule was extremely unpopular in a nation which lived by commerce. when the dutch heard of his defeat at leipsic, they rose against him without waiting for auxiliaries; and the french garrisons were soon driven out by the help of soldiers from russia, prussia, and england. the rulers of these countries sanctioned the desire of the orange faction to make the prince a king. the people were not consulted, but were reconciled by a constitution, under which there was a legislature with some power, local self-government, freedom of worship, political equality, and liberty in commerce. napoleon might have remained emperor; but he refused to make any concessions, and kept on fighting until his generals abandoned him, and his deposition was voted by the senate. the people would not rise for him, as they had done for the republic; and the parisians refused to cry "vive l'empereur" as he returned from elba, to be overthrown at waterloo. three million frenchmen perished in his wars; and he left france smaller than he found her. his restrictions on commerce were removed so suddenly as to destroy the industries which he had tried to foster; and the proportion of paupers to the population was three times as great as in 1880. france was still desirous that the press should be free, and that taxation should be controlled by representatives of the people. louis xviii. had to promise that he would respect these rights which his predecessors had violated. toleration continued; and the peasants kept the property and equality which the revolution had given them, and which no sovereign could take away. napoleon is the most famous of generals; but his greatness as a statesman would have been plainer if he had not undertaken so many showy enterprises which had little chance of success. he failed signally in founding a dynasty, in making france the greatest of manufacturers, and in giving her an invincible navy, though he might have gained the first of these objects by peace, and the last by free trade. he could not even leave to his successor the territory which had been conquered by the revolution. yet these were his dearest purposes, except the wild dream of humbling england. was he the greatest of architects, every one of whose colossal structures fell under their own weight before they could be used? greater is he who builds what lasts for ages. napoleon made the twenty years ending with 1815 more glorious than any later period, and much more wretched. western europe was afflicted by bloody wars, and impoverished by restrictions on commerce. if his reign had been peaceable, he might have deprived france much more completely of what liberty she had enjoyed under the directory. every despot, however enlightened and benevolent, must necessarily interfere so much with the liberty of his subjects as to hinder their making themselves happy. france and germany lost nothing in freedom and gained much in prosperity by his defeat; for it gave the world many years of peace. what he brought of political and religious equality to prussia, western germany, and switzerland survived him; for it was part of his inheritance from the revolution which he closed treacherously. france had received her legacy without his help; and she retained much of it in spite of his interference. his victories over hereditary monarchs were so suggestive that books about him are still prohibited in russia; but no people lost much by his overthrow except the italians. iv. waterloo might have been called a "of the nations" as well as leipsic; but the best fighting was under the british flag. the english had suffered much from napoleon, in spite of his never succeeding in making an invasion. the worst injury he did was in forcing them to remain in that absorption in war which had checked the growth of toleration, democracy, and prosperity in 1793. george iii. was personally popular; but his weak, unprincipled successor was merely a figurehead. two-thirds of the members of the house of commons in 1815 had been appointed by the ministry, or by some nobleman, and most of the others owned or rented some pocket-borough almost destitute of inhabitants. the house of lords was overwhelmingly opposed to government by the people; and no tories were more consistent than those sons or protã©gã©s of noblemen, the bishops. the successors of the apostles had no sympathy with the struggle of the cross against the crescent in lands where paul had preached. they helped to vote down propagation of the gospel in india, as well as enfranchisement of roman catholics, and mitigation of laws which punished pilfering with death. they tried in vain to save the slave-trade from prohibition; and most of the clerical and lay members of both houses were in league to keep the tax on importation of wheat heavy enough to give them large incomes from their real estate. this tariff and the depreciation of currency made food excessively dear. the country labourer was often unable to earn more than the price of a loaf a day. employers agreed on wages so low that the peasants had to ask continually for parochial relief, and could not afford to go out of the parish to seek higher pay. their degradation was increased by their almost universal illiteracy; and their misdemeanours, especially poaching, were punished cruelly; for the rural magistrate was either the squire or his ally, the parson. there was little chance of justice for the poor against the rich; the rural labourer could seldom improve his position; and the bad harvests of 1816, 1817, and 1818 helped to make him worse off than ever before or since. the operatives had higher wages, but suffered under the friction of an industrial revolution, which has done more than any political convulsion for human happiness. the factory had been enabled by the invention of the steam-engine and other machines, shortly before 1800, to take the place of the cottages in making cloth. british goods were in great demand abroad during the war, and had to be carried in british ships. improved roads and canals led merchants and manufacturers to opulence. the rich grew richer, as has usually been the case; but there were some exceptional years during which the poor really grew poorer. one man could make as much cotton cloth in a day as two hundred could have done before; but what was to become of the one hundred and ninety-nine? demand for factory labour kept increasing until 1815; but population grew faster still. wages were already falling; the return of peace lessened the demand abroad; and hundreds of thousands of discharged soldiers and sailors were added to the multitude of unemployed. labourers were forbidden either to emigrate or to combine in order to keep up wages; and their earnings were lowest at the time when bread was the highest. meat, sugar, foreign fruit, and many other articles now in common use were almost unattainable by the poor until late in the century. there was much more intelligence in the towns than in the country; but there were no opportunities of education in 1818 in england for one-half of the children. boys and girls entered the factory at the age of six, and often from the poor-house, where they had been sold into slavery. the regular time was fourteen hours a day; sitting down was seldom permitted; food was scanty and bad; punishment was constant and cruel; deformity and disease were frequent; and the death-rate was unusually high. terrible cases occurred of pauper children, kept sixteen hours at a stretch without rest or food, driven by hunger to rob the troughs in the pig-sty, tortured merely for amusement by the overseer, and even advertised for sale with the mill. the middle class differed much more widely than at present, both from the masses on one hand and from the aristocracy on the other, as regards food, dress, culture, amusements, and political liberty. taxation was heavy and vexatious; representation in parliament was notoriously inadequate; and honest men and women were still liable to imprisonment for debt. no one but an episcopalian had a right to study at a university, enter parliament, or hold any civil, naval, or military office in england; and neither dissenters nor catholics could marry without going through ceremonies which conscience forbade. the press was fettered by laws which kept leigh hunt imprisoned for two years, on account of an article acknowledging the unpopularity of the prince regent. cobbett underwent an equally long imprisonment in newgate for blaming the cruelty of sentencing insubordinate militiamen to be flogged five hundred lashes. no plays could be performed in london in 1814 until they had been read and licensed by the lord chamberlain's deputy. as soon as a strong government ceased to be needed for protection against napoleon, there broke out much agitation for relief of the disfranchised as well as of the destitute. there was an unprecedented circulation of the cheap pamphlets in which cobbett advised the discontented to abstain from lawless violence, which could only give them another robespierre, and devote themselves to striving peaceably for their political rights. among these he asserted that of every man who paid taxes to vote for members of parliament. the serious riots which took place in many parts of great britain, even london, made the aristocracy consider all opportunities of addressing the people dangerous. the ministry were empowered in 1817 to arrest speakers and authors without any warrant, and keep them in prison without a trial. prohibition of public meetings was made possible by an act which extended to reading-rooms, debating societies, even among students at cambridge, and scientific lectures. the mounted militia was sent to disperse a meeting of fifty thousand unarmed men and women at manchester, on august 16, 1819, in behalf of parliamentary reform. the people were packed together so closely that they were unable to separate quickly. fear that some of the young gentlemen who had ridden into the throng might get hurt led the magistrates to order several hundred hussars to charge, without notice, into the dense crowd. the meeting was soon reduced to heaps of fallen men and women, who had been overthrown in the general struggle to escape or cut down by the soldiers; and the field was covered with bloody hats, shawls, and bonnets. six people were killed, and more than thirty others wounded severely. there was indignation everywhere against this wanton cruelty; and the common council of london voted their censure; but parliament passed laws that same year which made public meetings almost impossible, and put cheap pamphlets under a prohibitory tax, by requiring that they must have such an expensive stamp as kept newspapers beyond the reach of people generally. arrests for printing and selling unstamped publications were thenceforward frequent. there were many bloody riots; and a conspiracy for assassinating the ministry was organised in 1820. a dangerous revolution might then have broken out, if food had not been made plenty by abundant harvests. roman catholics were still forbidden to hold any office under the british government. they could not sit in either house of parliament, or be married legally in ireland, where they formed four-fifths of the population, and almost all the offices on that island were filled by protestants who had been sent over from england, or else elected by close corporations containing scarcely any catholics. the disfranchised nation was all the more indignant on account of such facts as that two-thirds of the soil of ireland had been taken away without compensation by english invaders before 1700, and that the share of the irish in 1800 was only one-tenth. this was held mostly in great estates, as was the rest of the island. rents were everywhere high and wages low, for population was superabundant; manufactures had been crushed by laws to protect british interests; the people were left ignorant, even of agriculture; and there were frequent famines. both the land and the government were mismanaged by an anti-irish minority which took little pains to keep its own partisans from lawless violence, but did its utmost to extort money for a legion of priests, who were merely servants of oppression to nine-tenths of the people. how little they cared about their professed duty may be judged from the case mentioned by a traveller named inglis (vol. i., p. 349), of a bishop who drew four or five hundred pounds a year for calling himself rector of a parish where there was no pretence of any public worship but the catholic. indignation of irish presbyterians had been one main cause of the bloody rebellion of 1798; and all patriotic irishmen were exasperated at the oppression of the poor by the rich. removal of religious disabilities was urgently demanded, and most of the men were members in 1825 of an independent association, which could easily have turned the island into one vast camp. v. germany had been devastated by twenty years of battles; and many thousand germans had perished, either in defending their homes against napoleon, or in serving under him in russia. his overthrow left them in deeper subjection than ever to a league of despots, who differed in pomp of title and extent of territory, but agreed in obstinately denying any political liberty to the people. the servitude of germany was confirmed by the agreement of clergymen and philosophers, that absolute monarchy was "ordained of god." the ban of church and university was on the revolutionary rationalism which had inspired the eighteenth century. the predominant philosophy during the first half of the nineteenth century insisted on the infallibility of what was called intuition, but was often merely tradition. this was already the case in germany, where moribund ideas of politics and theology were worshipped as the loftiest revelations of pure reason. devout disciples still hold that all established institutions are justified and all knowledge revealed by hegel's method of deduction from his own peculiar definition of the infinite. that definition seems self-contradictory; but this is only a trifle, compared with the method's permitting the master to prefer absolute monarchy, and forcing him to deny that any nation, not extremely limited in area, can long remain a democracy. hegel's indifference to the existence of the united states was like his asserting, after the discovery of ceres, that the place where it had been found, and where hundreds of other planets are now known to exist, must be empty. among other results of his system were a denial that lightning is electricity, and an assertion that rain is merely a change of air into water. neither liberty nor knowledge gains by disregard of experience in favour of deductions from imaginary intuitions. unfortunately, the experience of europe under napoleon, as well as during the revolution, seemed to justify restoration of old institutions as well as of former boundaries. the latter purpose was ostensibly that for which the conquerors of napoleon met at vienna, soon after he had retired to elba; but their real object was to divide the spoils among themselves. the emperors of russia and austria had the assistance, or opposition, of five kings, and of so many princes and nobles that three hundred carriages of state were kept in constant readiness. lovely ladies of high rank came from many lands; and it seemed to the uninitiated as if nothing was going on but masked balls, private theatricals, hunting parties, stately dinners, and concerts. beethoven was among the musicians. there was no general meeting of the monarchs and ambassadors; but there were frequent conferences of those most interested in one point or another; and the name of congress of vienna was amply justified by the number of bargains and compromises. the only persons never consulted were the thirty millions whose masters were thus selected. belgium, for instance, was forced into a union with holland, which led to civil war; and the norwegians were put under subjection to the swedes, against whom they had just been fighting. ten millions more of poles were made subjects of the czar; and his original wish to rule mildly was frustrated by their rebellion. the italians had been brought by napoleon into such unity and sense of nationality as they had not felt for many centuries. offers of greater liberty made lombardy and venice take sides against him; they were rewarded by being put under the most hated of rulers, the austrians; and the latter were made virtually masters of all italy. when all the plunder had been divided, the royal robbers united in a declaration, acknowledging jesus as the only sovereign and recommending the daily and universal practice of religion. the only sovereign who kept his promise, that he would give his subjects a new constitution if they would help him conquer napoleon, was goethe's patron at weimar. he presided over the university of jena, which schiller, fichte, and other professors had made the centre of democratic influence in germany. a secret political society was formed by students who had fought at waterloo; and all the universities were invited to help celebrate, on october 18, 1817, the anniversary, not only of the victory at leipsic, but of the opening of the protestant reformation. five hundred students from various parts of germany met in the wartburg, the castle where luther found refuge after bidding defiance at worms to both pope and emperor. it was agreed that the new society should extend through all the universities, and should have banners of black, red, and yellow. these henceforth were the colours of liberty in germany. napoleon had reduced prussia's army to a minimum; among the preparations for breaking his yoke had been the practice of such gymnastics as are still kept up by the turners; and a public exhibition was given that evening near the castle, before an immense bonfire. reference was made there to kings who broke their word; and as the audience broke up, some of the students fed the blaze with various emblems of despotism, such as the canes with which soldiers were flogged by corporals. then they burned a number of blank books, with titles copied from those of pamphlets recently published in opposition to progress. the king of prussia had taken some steps towards constitutional liberty, but these boyish freaks brought him completely under the influence of prince metternich. this crafty but kind-hearted austrian worked steadily, from 1814 to 1848, at much sacrifice of ease and pleasure, in hope of preserving civilisation and religion from being destroyed by any new revolution. he was now the real emperor of germany; the british ministry was in sympathy; and the czar, who had at first been an admirer of parliamentary government, was converted by an outrage in the name of liberty on the right of free speech. one of the literary champions of russian autocracy, kotzebue, was assassinated, early in 1819, by a divinity student who had been at the wartburg. that same year the representatives of the leading german states met at carlsbad, and agreed, with the czar's approval, that all german journals and universities should be under strict supervision, that political offenders should be tried by a special central tribunal, and that the new colours should be prohibited. vi. louis xviii. cared as little as charles ii. of england about promises, but was quite as unwilling to have to travel abroad. he dissolved a legislature which was too reactionary; subsequent elections returned liberal candidates, though only one man in a hundred could vote; the national guard was revived; and progressive ideas were expressed freely. france was moving forwards until february 13, 1820, when a bonapartist murdered the king's nephew, in hope of cutting off the succession. the legislature was obliged, two days later, to let the press be muzzled; sanctions of individual liberty were thrown aside; and a law was passed to give rich men two votes apiece. the liberal ministry was dismissed; and its successor put all education under control of the priests, forbade cousin and guizot to lecture, and sent bã©ranger to prison for publishing incendiary songs. louis xviii., like charles ii., left the crown to a bigoted brother, who had been taught by the jesuits to care much more for religion than human rights, or the duty of chastity; and charles x. did his utmost to make himself an absolute monarch. still worse results of assassination in the name of liberty had already been suffered in spain and italy. no people had really lost much by the overthrow of napoleon except the italians. they were learning how to love each other as fellow-citizens of one common country, and how to care more for the welfare of the people than for that of the priests. the congress of vienna restored the supremacy of the clergy, and cut up italy once more into little principalities, whose stupid and cruel despots were guided by metternich. the people were already conscious of the tie of nationality, desirous to be governed with some regard to their own welfare, and destitute of faith in the divine right of kings. few of them have been so plainly not "ordained of god" as ferdinand of naples and sicily. he had run away basely from the invaders, and been brought back to promise amnesty, and to massacre men, women, and children by thousands. no criminals but patriots were watched closely; and brigands defied the government. there was no pretence of liberty, even on the stage; and the jesuits kept literature and education down to merely nominal existence. the only refuge of freedom was among the carbonari, or members of a secret society, half a million strong. their flags of black, red, and blue were hoisted in many towns and villages on july 2, 1820, when the army led the revolt. the king swore on the bible, and after hearing mass, that he would establish a constitution like the french one of 1791, and then asked help from metternich. the latter brought the austrian, russian, and prussian monarchs together at troppau, silesia, where they agreed, on december 8, 1820, to put down all rebels, especially in italy. an austrian army won a decisive victory next march over the neapolitans, whose best troops were fighting against an attempt at secession in sicily. austria took part, a month later, in suppressing a revolt which had just broken out against the petty despot nicknamed "king of sardines." his first step on his restoration, in 1814, had been to reappoint every man who had been in office in 1798; and napoleon's code gave way to ancient statutes which, for instance, forbade the piedmontese to send wheat they could not use themselves to the savoyards, who were starving. he was forced to abdicate by a revolt of citizens who wanted a constitution and of soldiers who wished to free lombardy from austria. her help enabled his successor to keep the monarchy absolute; and her influence became paramount in sardinia, as elsewhere in italy. vii. the month of april, 1821, brought an end of rebellion in italy, and the outbreak of a ferocious revolution in greece. the turkish rule was intolerant, and intentionally oppressive. exportation of food and clothing, for instance, was forbidden in hope of keeping down prices; and the result was to check production. the country was full of brigands; and the worst of wrongs were inflicted on unbelievers by the officials. priests and rulers in other lands refused to help their fellow-christians against moslem tyrants; and the famous victory won by bozzaris was over roman catholics. the new republic had only nominal authority. independent bands of patriots fought desperately; and the crescent soon gave place to the cross in the archipelago as well as in the morea, once famous as the peloponnesus; but the cause was continually disgraced by pillage, perfidy, massacre, and civil war. several millions of contributions, mainly english, were squandered by the captains. byron sacrificed his life in a vain attempt to create military discipline; and lack of any permitted the morea to be conquered in 1825 by the regular army sent over by the pasha of egypt. all resistance, north of the isthmus of corinth, was soon suppressed by the co-operation of egyptians and turks; and the islanders could do nothing better than ask help from foreigners. the only government which had thus far aided greece was the american; and congress had done much less than the people to relieve distress. an alliance between great britain, france, and russia, for preventing extermination of the greeks, was brought about by canning. the sovereigns of turkey and egypt were so obstinate that their ships were destroyed by the allied fleet at navarino, messenia, on october 20, 1827. the egyptians were driven out of the morea by french soldiers; and northern greece rose against the turks with a success which secured the present boundary. the greeks were not permitted to establish a republic; but the monarchy finally became constitutional under the pressure of insurrection. viii. no nation had been less capable than the spanish of appreciating the advantage, either of a vigorous government, or of toleration, freedom of the press, political equality, and personal liberty. all the time-honoured abuses abolished by napoleon had been at once restored with the help of the populace; but nothing effective was done to suppress the insurrections which had broken out, during the war, in mexico and south america. up to that time, the indians were serfs and the negroes were slaves. all political power was monopolised by officials sent over from spain. spanish interests were protected so thoroughly that all domestic industries were crippled, and goods often cost six times as much as in europe. schools and newspapers were almost unknown; no books but religious ones could be bought; and heresy was punished pitilessly. the invasion of spain by napoleon gave opportunity for several simultaneous insurrections. that in venezuela was crushed by a great earthquake, which was accepted as a sign of divine wrath. among the leaders was bolivar, who retreated to colombia. a spanish version of paine's _rights of man_ had been circulated there, and the patriots were fighting gallantly. there were many bloody battles in venezuela and colombia; but both countries were finally made free by the battle of carabolo, won on june 24, 1821, by bolivar. on july 28th, in that same year, the independence of peru was proclaimed by general san martin, who had liberated chili, three years previously, with an army which he led from the argentine republic across the andes by paths never used thus before. his decisive victories were won by the help of emancipated slaves. chili would have made him her ruler; but he asked only her help against the spaniards, who were concentrated in peru. there he found such disorder as led him to declare himself protector; but this made him so unpopular that he resigned his power and left the continent which he had done more than anyone else to liberate. the war went on until the hold of spain on america was broken forever by a battle fought, 12,000 feet above the sea, on december 9, 1826, at ayacucho, a name given long before by indians who had fought there among themselves, and meaning "the corner of death." constitutions like that of the united states had already been proclaimed; too much power was held by bolivar and other despots; but they did not keep the people in such poverty, ignorance, and apathy as had been inflicted by spain. paraguay, however, had a tyrant who dressed himself after a caricature of napoleon, and tried to imitate his despotism, but had nothing of his genius. francia was one of carlyle's model rulers, perhaps because he allowed no elections, juries, public meetings, or newspapers, and sent everyone who talked politics to prison. men who would not take off their hats to him were cut down by his guards; and timid boys were seen running through the streets with no other article of dress. there were no imports or exports, except by special permission; and goods cost ten times as much as at buenos ayres. equality of races was sought by degrading the whites; but francia's reign had the one merit of peace. ix. intelligent spaniards were provoked at their king's failure to suppress the rebellion; and the soldiers who were called together for this purpose in 1819 had been so badly paid that they plotted with the friends of progress. a revolt broke out in the camp on the first day of 1820; and it was soon followed by one at madrid, where the dungeon of the inquisition was broken open. the king was forced to restore the constitution which had been framed by the patriots in 1812, after the model of the french instrument of 1791. the prospect of freedom in religion made the clergy and peasantry mutinous. the reactionists in france and spain found favour with the sovereigns of russia, austria, and prussia. the liberal government was overthrown in april, 1823, by a french army. the peasants took sides with the invaders, and many patriots were massacred by the populace. absolute monarchy and other ancient iniquities were restored, but not the inquisition. france would have gone on to subdue the rebels in south america for her own benefit; but this was prevented by the british ministry, which was now showing the liberalising influence of peace. napoleon's despotism had the awful and baneful grandeur of an eruption of vesuvius; but his despicable enemies merely kept up the oppression of his empire without its glory. their work completed his, as the last of the petty emperors at rome and constantinople showed the legitimate tendency of the political system of the mighty founder. caesar and napoleon had much in common as conquerors; but it showed far more greatness to found an empire which endured for fifteen centuries, than one which held together for scarcely as many years. even that length of despotism was sadly too long for the welfare of mankind. chapter ii. fruits of peace exigencies of war had given the british nobles a despotic power, which they retained long after it ceased to be needed for the nation's safety. the king was their puppet and parliament their property. the laws were framed and administered for their protection and emolument. clergy, army, militia, and police were all organised for keeping the people down; and education could do nothing to raise the lowly. pensions and salaries, even in the church, were reserved for members and servants of the aristocracy, with little care for the public good. wages were low, food dear, illiteracy common, and paupers numerous. even the middle class was in great part disfranchised; taxation was needlessly severe; the press was restricted grievously; and ireland was shamefully oppressed. i. as public attention ceased to be absorbed by victorious generals, it turned to the miseries of the poor; and there was much discussion of plans for their relief. early in the century it became generally known that robert owen's factories were unusually profitable, on account of what he did for the intelligence, health, and happiness of the operatives. his pamphlet, published in 1813, and often reprinted as a _new view of society_ argued strongly for universal education as the remedy for poverty and crime; public opinion was much enlightened on the continent, as well as in england; but a sagacious member of the british aristocracy said to him: "oh, i see it all! nothing could be more complete for the working-classes; but what will become of us?" owen complained in this pamphlet that sabbatarianism denied "innocent and cheerful recreation to the labouring man"; and he spoke in public of the influence of religion on progress, with a hostility which sadly injured his popularity. his life was examined with a jealousy which brought to light only its elevation. the opposition of people who thought themselves respectable drove him into agitation for what he was the first to call "socialism." he published on may 1, 1820, his plan for forming villages, where the people were to work under the supervision of the eldest, and "be freely permitted to receive from the general store of the community whatever they might require." these last words contain the characteristic principle of socialism, that every labourer is to be paid according to his needs, whatever the value of the work. a dozen such experiments were made in the united states, about 1825; but it was found impossible to unlearn the experience of the race. progress has consisted in bringing each man's welfare into more exact proportion to the value of his work. this tendency has never safely been suspended, except under such coercion as has kept up industry and economy among monks, rappites, shakers, and other docile enthusiasts. the cooperative stores which owen was among the first to open seem to have failed because the salaries were not high enough to secure skilful managers. ii. the proof that a reformer was before his age is the fact that later years caught up with him; and this is by no means so true of owen as of bentham, who declared socialism impracticable. he was one of the first to advocate woman suffrage (_works_, vol. iii., p. 463), savings banks, cheap postage, collection of statistics, direction of punishment towards reformation, and repeal of usury laws. his bulky volumes are in great part occupied with suggestions for making the courts of justice less dilatory and uncertain, less expensive to the poor, and less partial to the rich. his _principles of morals and legislation_ declared, in 1787, that the sole end of a ruler ought to be the happiness of all the people, and that this rule should be the basis of ethics as well as politics. one of his publications in 1817 claimed the suffrage for every man and woman who could read, but insisted that this would be "worse than nothing" without that "shield to freedom," the secret ballot. an opponent who feared that this would destroy private property was answered thus: "has he ever heard of pennsylvania?" the complaint that freedom of the press to expose corrupt officials might weaken the government was met by showing that there can be no good government without it. to think our ancestors wiser than us, he says, is to take it for granted that it is not experience but inexperience that is the "mother of wisdom." bentham's best work was in sowing seed that his friends might reap the harvest. other authors were generously assisted by his manuscripts, purse, and library; and there has been no stronger advocate of reform than the _westminster review_, which he founded in 1824. the first number showed that the whigs were too much like the tories. their leaders were noblemen or millionaires; their favourite measure, abolition of rotten boroughs, was mainly in the interest of the middle class; and their policy towards the masses was a seesaw between promising elevation and permitting oppression. this article was by james mill, who showed in a later number that any church which was established must, on that account, be bigoted. his essay _on government_ urges that the masses cannot be protected unless fully represented. they had not yet found out all they needed; but education would teach it; and occasional mistakes would not be so bad as systematic oppression. among his ablest books is a defence of the rationalism, bequeathed by the eighteenth century, against transcendentalism, which eclipsed it during the first half of the nineteenth. the inspiration of the new philosophy was added to that of many new reforms; and a glorious literature blossomed in the long summer of peace. wordsworth's fear of "too much liberty" did not prevent his encouraging intellectual independence most impressively. scott tried "to revive the declining spirit of loyalty"; but the result was universal admiration of rebels and sympathy with peasants. many authors who adapted themselves much more closely and intentionally to the needs of the age ceased long ago, for this very reason, to find readers. this, for instance, was the fate of the indefatigable cobbett. landor, on the other hand, was unpopular from the first, because devotion to greek and latin literature made his style as well as some of his favourite topics uninteresting, except for scholarly people who were soon offended by such remarks as "law in england and in most other countries is the crown of injustice. according to her laws and usages, brutus would have been hanged at newgate; cato buried with a stake through his body in the highroad; cicero transported to botany bay." "certain i am, that several of the bishops would not have patted cain upon the back while he was about to kill abel." "a peerage i consider as the park-paling of despotism." in his _imaginary conversations_, hofer and metternich, the emperors of russia and china, the kings of spain and portugal, the spanish priest, merino, and many other extraordinary personages tell how badly england was governed by "the hereditarily wise," and what a misfortune it was for all europe, to have her rulers enjoy such an intimate and universal friendship as was never known among their predecessors. no writer has spoken more mightily than byron against the "blasphemy" of ascribing divine authority to these "royal vampires." he knew that napoleon had been "the scourge of the world"; but he was indignant to see the men who had struck down the lion kneeling before wolves; and yet he looked forward to the reign everywhere of "equal rights and laws." he spoke freely of the "sacerdotal gain but general loss" in superstition; and his own highest faith was that "they who die in a great cause" would "augment the deep and sweeping thoughts which overpower all others and conduct the world at last to freedom." his poems revealed the grandeur of scenery, as well as history, and made delight in mountains and thunderstorms felt as an ennobling influence. his speeches in the house of lords were pleas for parliamentary reform, catholic emancipation, and mercy to rioters infuriated by famine. in 1820, he was one of the leading carbonari in italy; he gave his life to help the greeks become free; and his name is still a watchword of revolution. his friend, shelley, went so far in the same direction as to call himself a republican, as well as an atheist. his life was pure in his own eyes; but his opinions about divorce were punished by a decision in chancery that he was unfit to be trusted with his own children. he had consecrated himself in boyhood to war against all oppressors; and his position to the last was that of his own prometheus, suffering continually with the enslaved, but consoled by faith that his sympathy will hasten the glorious day when every man shall be "king over himself," when women, free "from custom's evil taint," shall make earth like heaven, when "thrones, altars, judgment-seats, and prisons" shall seem as antiquated as the pyramids, and when human nature shall be "its own divine control." he took the side of the poor against the rich in a drama which was suppressed on account of its severity against george iv., and which ends with a portentous scene, where "freedom calls famine, her eternal foe, to brief alliance." he spoke as well as wrote for the independence of ireland; and he would have done much for that of greece, if he had not died soon after publishing a magnificent tragedy, in which he showed what cruel massacres were perpetrated while the rulers of christendom refused to help christian patriots against the turks. byron is called the poet of revolution; but shelley was the poet of liberty. one was like a painter who captivated the multitude, sometimes by his brilliancy of colour, sometimes by his tragic pathos, and sometimes by his amorous warmth. the other was like a sculptor who left a few statues and tablets, fanciful in design and majestic in execution, for the delight of connoisseurs. fortunately the marble is likely to outlast the canvas. iii. these poets and philanthropists helped the people of england contrast the wrongs they were suffering with the rights they ought to have. that love of liberty which drove out the stuarts revived, as despotism was seen to increase pauperism and excite more crime than it suppressed. the conflict between republicanism and monarchy in europe had changed to one between despotism and constitutionalism; and peace made england free to resume the advanced position she had held in the eighteenth century. the declaration of president monroe, in december, 1823, that the united states would not permit the south american republics to be overthrown by any despot in europe, gained much authority from the concurrence of the british ministry; and the latter was induced by canning to form that alliance with france and russia which gave independence to greece. the attack on the slave-trade, which began while england was at peace with her neighbours, had slackened in the shadow of the long war. the wicked traffic was prohibited in 1807; but little more could be done before 1823. then an appeal for emancipation in the west indies was made to parliament by wilberforce and other organised abolitionists; and the agitation went on until victory was made possible by the rescue of the house of commons from the aristocrats. the acts forbidding workingmen to combine for higher wages, or to emigrate were repealed in 1824. the criminal laws had already been mitigated, and some protection given to children in factories; and the duties on wool and raw silk were now reduced, to the common benefit of consumer, manufacturer, and operative. the whigs were strong enough in 1828 to repeal the test act, which had been passed in 1673, for the purpose of enabling the episcopalians to hold all the offices, but had become a dead letter so far as regarded protestants. the house of lords gave way unwillingly; and one of the bishops secured such a compromise as kept jews out of parliament for the next thirty years. conscientious scruples against taking oaths were treated at this time with due respect; and all british protestants became equals before the law. canning had already made the house of commons willing to emancipate catholics; but neither this reform nor that of abolishing rotten boroughs could pass the bench of bishops; and the church stood in the way of a plan for free public schools. it was the organised resistance of all ireland to disfranchisement of catholics which won toleration from a tory ministry. its leader, wellington, cared nothing for public opinion or the people's rights; but he was too good a general to risk a war with a united nation. even the minister whose sympathy with orangemen had won the nickname of "orange peel" declared that it was time to yield. popular prejudice against romanism had been much diminished by gratitude for the aid given by catholic allies against napoleon. the bishops rallied around the king, who had never before been influenced by what he called religion; but he was forced to sign, on april 13, 1829, the bill which ended a strife that had cursed europe for three hundred years. two-thirds of the bishops resisted to the last; and the tory party was so badly divided as to be unable to prevent england from following the example set next year by france. iv. by the constitution of 1814, the power belonged mainly to the parisian bankers, merchants, and manufacturers. these men preferred constitutional monarchy to either democracy or military despotism; but they meant to maintain their own rights; and they were much offended at the attempts of charles x. to check mental progress and revive superstition. his plans for fettering the press were voted down in the chamber of nobles; journalists prosecuted by his orders were acquitted by the courts; and he could not enforce a law under which burglars who robbed a catholic church would have mounted the guillotine. early in 1830, he dissolved the legislature for declaring that he was not governing according to the wish of the people. the candidates next elected were two to one against him. on monday, july 26, appeared his ordinances forbidding publication of newspapers without his permission, unseating all the deputies just chosen, and threatening that subsequent elections would be empty formalities. the plan was like that of 1797; but this time the soldiers in paris were few in number and ill-supplied with provisions, while their general was not even notified of his appointment. the police allowed the journalists to spread the news throughout paris and publish a protest declaring that they would not obey the ordinances and appealing to the people for support. the leader, thiers, had already called for a king who would reign but not govern. lawyers and magistrates pronounced the ordinances illegal. printers and other employers told their men that the next day would be a holiday. on tuesday, the crowds of operatives, clerks, students, ragged men and boys could not be dispersed by the police. marmont took command of the troops that afternoon, and shot a few insurgents. that night all the street-lamps were put out; thousands of barricades went up, after plans but recently invented; and gun-shops, powder-magazines, arsenals, and even museums were broken open. on wednesday, there was a new city government in the hã´tel de ville; everywhere hung the tri-coloured banner of napoleon and the republic; and the tocsin called out a hundred thousand rebels in arms. the weapons of crusaders were seen side by side with the bayonets and uniforms of the national guard, which had been revived by napoleon but disbanded by charles x. marmont's orders were to clear the streets that afternoon; but the soldiers were met everywhere by a heavy fire and a shower of paving stones and furniture. one patriotic girl was said to have sacrificed her piano. all the detachments were finally hemmed in between barricades and crowds of rebels with pikes, muskets, and bayonets. during the night they were concentrated around the tuileries, where they suffered greatly from hunger and thirst, as they had done during the day. their ammunition was almost exhausted; and new barricades were put up around them. marmont ordered that there should be no more firing, except in self-defence, and tried in vain to make truce with the rebels. the latter were joined on thursday by the regiments in the place vendã´me. this position was entrusted to part of the swiss who had defended the louvre; but the others were soon driven out by men and boys who swarmed in at unguarded doors and windows. all the soldiers took flight that noon from paris. all this time the king was amusing himself at st. cloud, and boasting that there would be no concessions. he now offered to dismiss his ministry and revoke the ordinances; but more than a thousand lives had been lost. the parisians marched against him: he abdicated and fled: the bourbons had ceased to reign. the men who had fought against him called for a republic with universal suffrage and no state church; but the wealthier citizens were afraid of war with russia and austria. a descendant of louis xiii. and a friend of thiers was made king by the legislature. he called himself louis philippe, and promised cordially to carry out the constitution, which now meant freedom of the press, and equal privileges for all christian churches. the supremacy of rome in france was at an end. seats in the upper house could no longer be inherited; and the right to vote for deputies was given to twice as many frenchmen as before. patriots in all nations were encouraged; and the swiss cantons became more democratic; but hegel was frightened to death. among other results were unsuccessful revolts in rome and warsaw, with successful ones in brussels, cassell, and dresden. the subjection to holland, which had been imposed by the congress of vienna, was hated by the belgians, partly because it made education secular, and partly because it gave them only half the legislature, and very few offices elsewhere, although they formed three-fifths of the population. priests were active in stirring up the revolt which began at brussels on august 25, 1830, after the performance of an opera telling how masaniello had set naples free. the dutch were driven out; belgium was made a separate constitutional monarchy by the vote of a convention of deputies; france and england helped her maintain political independence; but it was to the loss of intellectual liberty. v. the success of rebellion with the pressure of hard times enabled the whigs to carry england for parliamentary reform. peel and wellington hastened their fall by boasting that there could be no improvement of a legislature which accepted members for places without any inhabitants, but not for birmingham, leeds, manchester, or some parts of london, and which actually enabled one scotchman to elect himself as sole representative of fourteen thousand people, in a district where he was the only voter. the people were so discontented with the whole system of church and state, that thousands of sympathisers gathered around cobbett in july, 1831, when he was tried for printing a statement that riots of farm hands were doing good in forcing the clergy to reduce their tithes. lord brougham, who had been made chancellor, was among the witnesses to the generally pacific tendency of cobbett's writings. the jury did not agree; and the government gave up the case. there was but little more political persecution of british authors. reform triumphed that autumn in the house of commons. the house of lords would then have been conquered, if the bishops had acted like successors of the apostles; but twenty-one out of twenty-three voted for prolonging their own dominion. their conduct made it unsafe for them to wear their peculiar costume in the streets. bells tolled, and newspapers put on mourning. there were riots in all the cathedral towns. a duke's castle was burned, because he insisted that the votes of his tenants were his private property, and attempts to punish the incendiaries brought bristol, one sunday, into the hands of a mob which burned the bishop's palace, the custom-house, and many other buildings. it was agreed by a meeting of a hundred thousand people at birmingham, that no more taxes should be paid until parliament was reformed; and on very many houses, especially in london, there was the following notice: "to save the collector unnecessary trouble, he is informed that no taxes on this house will be paid, until the reform bill pass into a law." it was at a meeting to encourage this course that sydney smith, who had done good service for catholic emancipation, told how vainly mrs. partington tried to sweep back the atlantic, during a great storm, and added: "be quiet and steady. you will beat mrs. partington." the episcopal partingtons continued to be even more hostile than the lay members of the house of lords; but all finally yielded to the threat that there would be new peers enough created to vote them down. a popular song made the reform bill boast that, "twenty peers shall carry me, if twenty won't, then forty will; for i 'm his majesty's bouncing bill." the throne was then filled by william iv., who reigned from 1830 to 1837, and who gave his consent, though sometimes unwillingly, to several of the greatest reforms ever passed in england. the bill which he signed on june 7, 1832, enabled 141 members of parliament to be elected by populous districts hitherto unrepresented, instead of by little boroughs where the voters were so few as to be bought up easily, or else intimidated constantly; and the franchise was also much extended, though not outside of the middle class. thus great britain ceased to be governed by a league of irresponsible nobles, bishops, and other lords of vast estates. vi. they had kept the lower classes ignorant, in order to secure obedience; and their methods were not given up at once. newspapers had already become the chief teachers of politics; and therefore they were under a triple tax. a duty on paper added one-fourth to the cost of publication. there was also a tax of three-and-sixpence on each advertisement; and more of this lucrative business was done by the publishers in new york city than by all those in great britain. a third exaction was that of fourpence for a stamp on every copy; and prices were thus prevented from falling below seven-pence, except in case of violation of the laws. these threatened fine or imprisonment to whoever should publish or sell any periodical costing less than sixpence, and containing "news, intelligence, occurrences, and remarks and observations thereon, tending to excite hatred and contempt of the government and constitution of this country as by law established, and also to vilify religion." this purpose was avowed explicitly, in so many words, by _the poor man's guardian_, which announced that it was published "contrary to law" and would be sold for one penny. the circulation was twice that of _the times_, and the language often violent. the publisher, hetherington, was sent twice to prison for six months; and could not go about except disguised as a quaker. his papers were packed in chests of tea, by an agent who was afterwards mayor of manchester. another publisher, who devoted himself to reports of criminal trials, used to send them out in coffins. many unstamped periodicals were in circulation. some dealers carried them about in their hats and pockets. others hawked them in the streets, and declared, when sentenced to prison, that they should resume the business on the same spot as soon as they were released. paid informers and spies helped the whig government carry on more than two hundred prosecutions in 1835, and more than five hundred previously. subscription boxes for the relief of the martyrs could be seen everywhere. remonstrances were signed and indignation meetings held in london and manchester. "the society for the repeal of all taxes on knowledge" kept up a vigorous agitation, which was aided by bulwer in parliament. at last the publishers who bought stamps found they could not compete with men who bought none. this duty, and also that on advertisements, were reduced in 1836; and the result was so gratifying, even to publishers of the best periodicals, that all these taxes have been abolished. protestant bigotry had not prevented unsectarian public schools from being opened in ireland in 1833; and that year is also memorable for the abolition of slavery in the west indies, the extension of universal suffrage in scotland, the beginning of free trade with india and china, the removal of disability for office from hindoo subjects of great britain, the protection of children from being overworked in factories, and the suppression of supernumerary bishops and rectors in ireland. during the next three years, the local government of most english towns and cities, though not yet of london, was taken from corrupt oligarchies and given to all inhabitants who paid even a moderate rent; seamen ceased to be impressed; irish catholics and english dissenters were enabled to marry without apostasy; vexatious methods of collecting tithes were abolished in england; the poor-laws were made less favourable to the increase of pauperism; and the growth of prosperity and independence among the poor was assisted by the introduction of a system of unsectarian education, in 1839, though the bishops would have preferred that one-third of the people of england should remain illiterate. penny postage was established in 1840, the last year when great britain was governed by the whigs. parliament was so philanthropic and tolerant as to reject repeatedly a proposal to impose heavy fines for attending secular meetings, visiting eating-houses, travelling, fishing, or hiring horses on sunday. labour, too, was to be forbidden, but not that of "menial servants." this bill would have prevented the poor from enjoying their only holiday; but there was to be no interference with the pleasures of the rich; and the fact was pointed out by a young man, whose _pickwick papers_ had just begun to appear in monthly parts. his illustrated pamphlet is entitled: _sunday as it is; as sabbath bills would make it; as it might be made_. it has been reprinted with his plays and poems. he tells how much was done for the health and happiness of london by those privileges which the sabbatarians were trying to abolish; and he shows what gain there would be in knowledge and virtue from opening all the museums and galleries sunday afternoons. the pamphlet shows that delight in the bright side of life, and that sympathy with the pleasures of the poor, which won popularity for _the pickwick papers_ in 1836, and afterwards for _the old curiosity shop_ and the _christmas carol_. the novels most like _sunday as it is_, however, are such protests against bigotry and cruelty as _oliver twist, nicholas nickleby, and barnaby rudge_. powerful pictures of the gloom of that british sabbath which locked up everything "that could by any possibility afford relief to an overworked people," may be found in _little dorrit_; and the plot turns on the sabbatarianism of a cruel fanatic who had made felony part of her religion. much was done by this novel, as well as by _pickwick_ and _nicholas nickleby_ towards the abolition of imprisonment for debt in 1869. his tone was very mild, compared with that of the popular orators. resistance to bad laws was urged by richard carlile; and a clergyman named taylor, who held the gospel to be a solar myth, was imprisoned on october 24, 1827, for saying that the first martyrs for jesus christ were the gadarene pigs. another london lecturer declared on sunday evening, december 2, 1832, that "the elective franchise should belong to women, as a part of the people," and again that "women are qualified to elect and to be elected to all public offices." "any argument for exclusion is of that kind which has justified every tyranny," says this discourse, which was printed for the first time, on may 11, 1833, in an american newspaper, _the free enquirer_. its columns show that a young lady had already presented very advanced ideas as a lecturer at the rotunda in london; but the general opinion of the sex was expressed by the wife of the rev. john sandford, whose popular book declared that "there is something unfeminine in independence. a really sensible woman... is conscious of inferiority." the irish have supported themselves so successfully in america, and obeyed the laws so generally, as to prove that failure to do either in ireland should not be attributed to their race or their religion, but wholly to their oppression. memory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was all the more bitter in the nineteenth, because the destitution of the peasantry was increasing hopelessly. removal of religious disabilities and reform of parliament did not prevent bands of armed peasants from fighting against attempts to take away their cattle in payment of the tithes exacted by well-paid dignitaries of the hated church. it sometimes happened that a dozen of the combatants were killed. sydney smith estimated that this way of keeping up a state church cost a million lives, from first to last, and ireland had to be as heavily garrisoned as india, until a less vexatious system was established in 1838. municipal government was wholly in the hands of little corporations, which had the sole power of electing new members and seldom admitted a catholic. the ruling oligarchy was to the population as one to two hundred in limerick, and only as one to twenty-five hundred in protestant belfast. the right of local self-government was given to the people of these cities and a few others in 1840; but even this small and tardy justice provoked an english bishop to threaten that it would call down vengeance from god. full municipal suffrage throughout the island and a domestic parliament were demanded by all ireland, under the guidance of the mighty orator o'connell; but the prejudice against his cause in great britain was made invincible by his denouncing "the saxons," as he called the english, for the crimes of their ancestors. vii. all reforms stopped in 1841, when the whigs lost the supremacy. it was not their fault that excess in speculation on both sides of the atlantic had brought on a panic which threw thousands of people out of work in the factory towns, and reduced other thousands to earning only twopence a day. a succession of bad harvests, just before 1841, made wages very low on the farms, and food too dear everywhere. bread was sold in halfpenny slices; labourers robbed pigs of swill; children fought with dogs for bones in the streets; one person in every eleven was a pauper; and england seemed to dickens like one vast poorhouse. the old ways of giving charity had been so lavish and indiscriminate as to encourage pauperism; the new system of relief proved really kinder; but at first it was administered too slowly and cautiously for the emergency; and there was some ground for the complaints in _oliver twist_. knowledge that paupers were neglected strengthened the belief of the working-men, that all they needed to make them as well off as their brethren in america was the ballot. paine, cobbett, and hetherington were widely read; manhood suffrage and a secret ballot were called "the people's charter"; and there were more than a million signatures to the chartist petition in 1839. these demands were just; but about one englishman in three was unable to write his name at this time; and many who had acquired this accomplishment knew dangerously little about politics. when we think how much mischief has recently been done in the united states by illiterate and venal votes, we cannot blame englishmen of the upper and middle classes for delaying to grant universal suffrage. they ought to have made rapid preparation for it, by liberal encouragement of popular education through free schools and a cheap press; but even the whigs were too indignant at the violence of the chartists, who made bloody riots in 1841. how ignorant these men were was shown by their doing their worst that year to help carry the elections against the whigs, who were much less hostile to chartism than the conservatives, as those tories were called who still condescended to politics. the most culpable blunder of the whigs had been that of allowing the revenue to fall below the expenses; and the policy they had proposed for making up the deficit was too much like that halfhearted way of dealing with slavery which brought ruin upon the party of the same name in america. the british tariff was raised by the war against napoleon, as the american was under similar pressure afterwards, so high as in some cases to prohibit imports and actually check revenue. either tariff could have been used as an almost complete list of the world's products; and both were framed on the principle of protecting everybody, except consumers, against competition. great britain unfortunately could produce only part of the food needed by the people; and the tariff was so much in the interest of owners of land as to make bread and meat dearer than if the island had been barren. importation of cattle was prohibited; and that of wheat and other grain was not permitted until prices were high enough to cause famine. then importation would begin slowly, and keep increasing until the supply of both foreignand home-grown wheat would become large enough to glut the market and make farmers bankrupt. these duties on grain, which were known as the corn laws, acted with similar taxes on all other necessaries of life in impoverishing factory hands and other members of the working class. they were told that the laws which kept living dear kept wages high; but we shall see that this turned out not to be the fact. the only real gainers by the corn laws were those wealthy owners of great estates of whom parliament was composed entirely, with the exception of a few members of the house of commons. that body allowed manchester and other factory towns to send representatives who had found out the tendency of protectionism from their own business experience, as well as from study of political economy. among these men was cobden, who had already planted himself in the road to wealth, but who preferred to remain poor that he might make england rich. he and his associates knew that imports are paid for by exporting what can be produced most profitably; that nothing is imported which could be produced as cheaply at home; that large imports make large exports; that the average englishman knows how to carry on his own business; and that the government could not encourage any otherwise unprofitable industry without checking the really profitable ones. on these facts were based the following predictions. in the first place, free trade in grain and cattle would lower the average price of food in england, and make the supply so regular that there would be no more famines. second, those countries which were allowed to send grain and cattle, cotton and other raw materials, etc., to england would buy british manufactures in return. third, removal of duties from raw materials would enable factories to produce goods more cheaply, and sell larger quantities at home as well as abroad. then, fourth, this increased activity in manufacturing would raise wages, while remission of duties would make all the necessaries of life cheaper, so that pauperism would diminish and prosperity become more general in the working class. and finally, the commerce of england with other countries would grow rapidly to their mutual benefit; and thus international relations would be kept friendly by free trade. in this faith the reformers at manchester and birmingham asserted the right of all men to buy and sell freely, and demanded the removal of all duties except those best adapted to bring in necessary revenue. they were wise enough to attack the monstrous tariff at its weakest point, the tax on bread. the anti-corn-law league was organised in 1839; the spot where the peterloo massacre had been perpetrated, twenty years before, was soon used for a free trade banquet in which five thousand working-men took part; and appeals to the people were made in all parts of england. the conservatives were all protectionists; and so many whigs were on that side that those leaders who were opposed to the bread tax did not dare to come out against it. they did propose in 1841 to meet the deficit in the revenue by reducing some duties which were so high as to prevent importation, for instance, the tax on all sugar not grown in british colonies. the protectionist whigs voted with the conservatives against the ministry; and it had to go out of office without having done enough against the corn laws to secure the support of the league. protectionists, chartists, and opponents of the new poor-law helped to give the conservatives control of the next parliament, where the free-traders were one to four. such was the state of things in october, 1841, when the league went to work more vigorously than before in educating the people, and especially voters of the poorer class. during the next twelve months, half a million dollars was spent in this work. in 1843, there were fourteen regular lecturers in the field, besides countless volunteers, and five hundred distributors of tracts. the annual number of publications was about ten million copies; and the annual weight exceeded a hundred tons. the dissenting ministers did good work for reform; but the episcopalian clergy were too friendly to a tax which kept up the value of tithes. the league soon had the support of john bright, who was one of the greatest of british orators. prominent among opponents was the chartist leader, feargus o'connor; and those chartists who were not protectionists held that their cause ought to take the lead. public opinion was so strongly for free trade in 1845 that parliament took off the duties from cotton and other raw materials, in hope of conciliating the manufacturers; but these latter redoubled their efforts to abolish the tax on food. subscriptions were larger than ever; and much land was bought by free-traders who wished to qualify themselves as voters for members of the next parliament, which would have to be elected in or before 1848. reform seemed still distant, when shelley's prophecy was fulfilled. freedom's eternal foe, famine, came suddenly to her help. dearness of wheat and meat had obliged half of the irish and many of the english to live entirely on potatoes. wages were often paid in ireland by loan of land for raising this crop. the rot which began in august, 1845, soon became so destructive that peel, who was then prime minister, proposed in october that grain should be made free of duty. wellington and other members of the cabinet demurred; and the question had to be submitted to parliament. disraeli insisted to the last on keeping up the tariff; but famine was increasing; and both houses finally agreed, after long debate, to accept peel's proposal, that not only the duties on food and raw materials, but most of the others, should be either reduced or abolished. his conservatism did not keep him from seeing that the whole system of protecting home industries must stand or fall together. prominent among obstructionists were the bishops. the house of lords did not agree before june 25, 1846, to the reform which had been accepted on may 15th by the house of commons, and which was publicly acknowledged by wellington to be inevitable. such was the exasperation of the protectionists that they helped the opponents, of coercion in ireland to drive peel out of office, by a vote which was taken in the house of commons on the very day when his plan of tariff reform gained that victory in the house of lords which made free trade for ever the system of great britain. about one-half of the import duties are now levied on tobacco, one-fourth more on wine and strong drink; and most of the rest on tea and other groceries. duties on articles which could be produced in great britain are offset by internal-revenue taxes. no monopoly is given to farm or factory; no necessary article is made too dear for the poor; and there are no needless violations of the right of the labourer to spend his wages in the best market. this reform made the relief of ireland possible, though the loss of life was terrible. never again has england been so near to a famine as in 1841. food is now so plenty that five times as much sugar is used in proportion to population as in 1842, and more than twice as much butter and eggs. this does not mean that the millionaire eats five times as much sugar, or twice as many eggs, as before, but that poor people can now buy freely what formerly were almost unattainable luxuries. the proportion of money in savings banks in england and wales has doubled; and that of paupers sank from 1 in 11 in 1842 to 1 in 37 in 1895. wages have risen fifty per cent., while other prices have fallen; and british workmen are better off than any others in europe. the annual value of english exports declined steadily from 1815 to 1842; but it is now four times as great as in the latter year; and it is more than twice as large in proportion to population as in those highly protected countries, the united states and france. low tariffs also enable belgium to export nearly three times as much for each inhabitant as france, and new south wales to export five times as much as the united states. large exports do not depend on density of population but on ability to import freely. readiness of any country to buy freely of her neighbours keeps them able and willing to buy whatever she has to sell. free trade has given great britain, new south wales, and belgium their choice of the world's markets. great britain has also been enabled to keep up much more friendly relations with the rest of europe than would otherwise have been the case. liberty of commerce has helped her enjoy peace; and peace has preserved free institutions. the reforms which culminated in free trade showed englishmen that they could right any wrong without resort to violence. the attempt of the chartists to overawe parliament in 1848 was seen to be inexcusable; and it failed ridiculously. never since then has insurrection in england been even possible. the atmosphere of thought has been so quiet that suffrage was greatly extended in 1867, and made practically universal in 1894. voters gained the protection of a secret ballot in 1872; and municipal self-government was given in 1894 to every part of england where it had not already been established. no wonder that there is little of the revolutionary ardor of shelley and byron in tennyson, browning, and other recent poets. they have delighted in progress; but they have seen that it must come through such peaceable changes in public opinion, and then in legislation, as are caused by free discussion. the benign influence of peace has enabled them to display such brilliancy as had not been seen in england for more than two hundred years. no other writers ever paid so much attention to public health and the general happiness. the ablest thought of the century has been devoted to enriching human life, and not to destroying it. this has enabled science to make unprecedented progress. a new period of intellectual history has been opened by spencer and darwin. viii. prominent among reformers who had no wish for revolution, and no respect for science, were dickens and carlyle. the latter's ("former's" ed.) aversion to political economy as "the dismal science" was echoed in the pages of _hard times_; and the absence of any reference in _dombey and son_ to the great movement against the corn laws is characteristic of a novelist whose _pickwick papers_ made fun of scientific investigation. what was there called the "tittlebat" is really that nest-building fish, the stickleback. passages ridiculing the use of statistics might be quoted at great length from both authors. dickens had too much sympathy with paupers, especially those who suffered under the poor-law of 1834; and carlyle had much too little. they agreed in opposition to model prisons and other new forms of philanthropy. perhaps it was mainly the habit of indiscriminate ridicule which suggested such caricatures as mrs. jellaby and mrs. pardiggle. carlyle's belief that abolitionism was "an alarming devil's gospel" and his denunciation of "the sugary, disastrous jargon of philanthropy" were legitimate results of idolatry of what he called "early, earnest times," namely the dark ages. his sympathy with mediaeval methods was so narrow that he spoke of a poet of weak health and high culture, whom he saw suffering under a sentence of two years in a pestilential prison, forbidden books or writing materials, kept most of the time alone and on bread and water, but guilty of nothing worse than a chartist speech, as "master of his own time and spiritual resources to, as i supposed, a really enviable extent." dickens shows much more appreciation of the real superiority of modern times, though personal disappointments, during his visit to america, prevented him from acknowledging the merits of democracy. carlyle's reverence for the early hebrews and other primitive barbarians made him present hero-worship as the only secure corner-stone of politics. his receipt for a perfect government is this: "find in any country the ablest man that exists there; raise him to the supreme place; and loyally reverence him." "such a government is not to be improved by voting or debating." "neither except in obedience to the heaven-chosen is freedom so much as conceivable." this theory showed its own absurdity in prompting eulogies on francia and other despots; but carlyle's apologies for cromwell were of some service to the cause of liberty fifty years ago, when england had forgotten to honour the champions of the long parliament. dickens thought more about the asceticism than the independence of the puritans. he and carlyle have dispelled some of the prejudices against the heroes of the first republic; but they perpetuated others. carlyle's best work was in encouraging the readers of his first books to think for themselves. the power of dickens to call out sympathy with the unfortunate will never cease to bless mankind. as much pity for the outcast has been shown by his great rival, victor hugo, and even more fellow-feeling with the oppressed. the spirit which has made france free animates all his writings, especially those grand poems which were called out by the usurpation of louis napoleon bonaparte. his early dramas dealt so vigorously with royal weakness and vice that _marion de lorme_ was suppressed by charles x. and _le roi s'amuse_ by louis philippe. the work which has made him best known, and which appeared in 1862 in nine languages, is a plea for mercy to criminals, or in his own words, to "the miserable." the chief aim is to show "the oppression of laws," and the mistake of aiding the tyranny of the police by thinking too severely of the fallen. he finds an opportunity to introduce an enthusiastic panegyric on the victories of napoleon, closing with the question: "what could be more grand?" "to be free," is the reply. full justice to the french revolution is done by that most dramatic of novels, _ninety-three_. here he says: "the agony of the nations ended with the fall of the bastile." "perhaps the convention is the culmination of history." "it declared poverty and disability sacred." "it branded the slave-trade, and freed the blacks." "it decreed gratuitous education." "the object of two-thirds of its decrees was philanthropic." such facts are all the more worthy of mention, because they were omitted by carlyle. supplement to chapter ii i. thomas carlyle's prejudice against democracy was strengthened by the failure of the revolutions of 1848. constitutional monarchy was as hostile to reform in france as it was friendly in england. only one frenchman in thirty could vote; and the legislature cared nothing for public opinion. louis philippe was hated for habitual dishonesty. there had been several attempts at regicide and some bloody revolts. one of the latter gave a basis from history for victor hugo's _misã©rables_. restrictions on the press and on public meetings increased the unwillingness of the working-men at paris to be governed by the rich. socialism was popular, and employment insufficient. the prohibition of a reform banquet caused barricades to be thrown up on february 22d in paris. the militia took sides with the populace; the king fled to england; and all france accepted the republic, which was proclaimed on february 24th. slavery had been reestablished in the colonies by napoleon; but it was now abolished; and so was capital punishment for political offences. the example of paris was followed in march by successful insurrections at berlin, vienna, and other german cities, as well as in lombardy and venice. home rule was demanded by hungary and bohemia, and constitutional governments were soon established there as well as in austria, prussia, and other german states, and in every part of italy. the king of sardinia took the lead in a war for driving back the austrians across the alps. co-operation of french, german, hungarian, and italian patriots might have made all these countries permanently free. such a union would have been difficult on account of international jealousies; and it was made impossible by the socialists at paris. scarcely had a provisional government been set up, when recognition of "the right of employment" was demanded by a workman, who came musket in hand, and was supported by a multitude of armed artisans. they extorted a decree which promised every citizen work enough for his support. a ten-hour law was passed. co-operative factories were started with aid from the city authorities, and had some success. opening national workshops was not advised by leading socialists; but it was considered necessary by some of the ministry in order to keep the unemployed from revolt. every applicant drew money constantly, even if not at work. what little labour was actually performed was done so lazily, and paid so highly, that the number of men soon rose to 120,000. the expenses became enormous; and the tax-payers insisted that they too had rights. in order to be able to employ all the labourers a government would have to own all the property; and it would also have to be strong enough to enforce industry. even victor hugo admitted that the experiment had failed. the national assembly, of which he was a member, notified the men in the shops that they must enlist in the army, or go to work at a safe distance from paris on state pay, or look out for themselves. they rose in arms against the republic, and took possession of nearly one-half of the city on june 23, 1848. "bread or lead" was the motto on their red flags; and two of their terrible barricades are described at the beginning of the last part of _les misã©rables_. they held out against regular troops and cannon during four days of such fighting as had never been seen before in paris. more frenchmen are supposed to have fallen than in any of napoleon's battles. two thousand of the soldiers were slain; but no one knows how many times that number of insurgents perished in the fight or in penal colonies. thenceforth the french government was much more desirous to repress insurrection at home than to sustain it abroad. louis napoleon bonaparte was elected president that same year, partly on account of his name, and partly on account of his promise that he would defend the right of private property against socialism. austrian generals of the rough and reckless type which carlyle loved forced lombardy and bohemia back into the empire, and restored absolute monarchy at vienna, while the king of sardinia was obliged to abdicate after such a defeat in march, 1849, as almost extinguished liberty in italy. venice alone held out against them under that purest of patriots, manin, and suffered terribly during a siege of twenty-one weeks. hungary was subdued that summer with the aid of russia. france did nothing except to revive the papal despotism at rome. mazzini's republic was crushed by that which had a bonaparte for president. his power had been increased by the disfranchisement of several million french voters of the poorer class. his promise to restore universal suffrage joined with memory of the massacres of june, 1848, in preventing much resistance to his usurpation of absolute power on december 2, 1851. there was a monstrous vote, next november, for an empire, where the centralisation of administration was complete, and the legislature merely ornamental. thus the liberation of europe was prevented, partly by race prejudices, but mainly by attempts to benefit the poor by overtaxing the rich. france and hungary were left with less political liberty than before; and italy gained very little; but some of the constitutional freedom acquired in 1848 was retained in prussia and other parts of western germany. ii. it was contrary to the general tendency of wars, that those of the latter half of the century aided the growth of free institutions in italy. an honoured place among nations was given by the crimean war to sardinia. then her patriotic statesman, cavour, persuaded napoleon iii. to help him rescue lombardy from austria. garibaldi took the opportunity to liberate naples; and victor emanuel made himself king over all italy except rome and venice. the latter city also was brought under a constitutional and friendly government by a third great war, which made the king of prussia and his successors emperors of germany, while austria was compelled to grant home rule to hungary. the liberation and secularisation of italy were completed in 1870 by the expulsion from rome of the french garrison. the emperor had lost his throne by waging war wantonly against a united germany. iii. the third republic was soon obliged to fight for her life against the same enemy which had wounded her sister mortally. socialism was still the religion of the working-men of paris, who now formed the majority of the national guard. indignation at the failure of the new government to repulse the prussians led, on march 18, 1871, to the capture of all paris by what was avowedly the revolution of the workmen against the shopkeepers, "in the name of the rights of labour," for "the suppression of all monopolies," "the reign of labour instead of capital," and "the emancipation of the worker by himself." this was in harmony with the teaching of the international working-men's association, which endorsed the insurrection fully and formally, and which held with karl marx that wealth is produced entirely by labour and belongs only to the working class. socialists were active in the rebellion; but property-holders in paris took no part; and all the rest of france took sides with the government. what professed to be the rising of the many against the few turned out to be that of the few against the many. impressment was necessary for manning the barricades, and pillage for raising money. the general closing of stores, factories, and offices showed that capital had been frightened away by the red flag. one of the last decrees of its defenders was, "destroy all factories employing more than fifteen workers. this monopoly crushes the artisan." this spirit would have caused the confiscation of the funds of the national bank, if the managers had not said: "if you do that, you will turn the money your own comrades have in their pockets to waste paper." the priceless pictures and statues in the louvre were condemned to destruction because they represented "gods, kings, and priests." millions of dollars worth of works of art perished in company with docks, libraries, and public buildings; but this vandalism, like the massacre of prisoners, was largely the work of professional criminals. the capture of paris, late in may, was accompanied with pitiless slaughter of the rebels, though many lives were saved by victor hugo. since then the french republic has been able to keep down not only the socialists but the bonapartists and royalists. it has also succeeded, with the help of writers like renan, in checking the ambition of the clergy. continuance of peace in europe has assisted the growth of local self-government in france, and also in germany. the famous prussian victories seem, however, to have increased the power of the german emperor; and there is still danger that the growth of standing armies may check that of free institutions. chapter iii. democrats and garrisonians i. the fall of the english aristocracy was hastened by the success of democracy in america. nowhere were the masses more willing to obey the law; and nowhere else were they so intelligent and prosperous. the gains of the many made the country rich; territory and population increased rapidly; and britannia found a dangerous competitor on every sea. political liberty and equality were secured by the almost uninterrupted supremacy of the democratic party from 1800 to 1860. twelve presidential elections out of fifteen were carried by jefferson and his successors; and the congress whose term began in 1841 was the only one out of the thirty in which both houses were anti-democratic. political equality was increased in state after state by dispensing with property qualifications for voting or holding office. jefferson and his successor, madison, refused to appoint days for fasting and giving thanks, or grant any other special privileges to those citizens who held favoured views about religion. congress after congress refused to appoint chaplains; so did some of the states; and a national law, still in force, for opening the post-offices on every day of the week, was passed in 1810. many attempts were made by sabbatarians to stop the mails; but the senate voted in 1829, that "our government is a civil, and not a religious institution"; and the lower house denied next year that the majority has "any authority over the minority except in matters which regard the conduct of man to his fellow-man." the opposition made by the federalists to the establishment of religious equality in connecticut, in 1816, increased the odium which they had incurred by not supporting the war against great britain. four years later, the party was practically extinct; and the disestablishment of congregationalism as the state church of massachusetts, in 1833, was accomplished easily. the northern states were already so strong in congress that they might have prevented missouri from entering the union that year without any pledge to emancipate her slaves. the sin of extending the area of bondage so far northwards was scarcely palliated by the other conditions of the compromise. the admission of maine gave her citizens no privileges beyond what they had previously as citizens of massachusetts; and the pledge that slavery should not again be extended north of latitude thirty-six, thirty, proved worthless. the north was so far from being united in 1820 that it was not even able to raise the tariff. new york, pennsylvania, and ohio wished to exclude foreign competition in manufacturing; but the embargo was too recent for new england to forget the evils of restricting commerce. the salem merchants petitioned for "free trade" "as the sure foundation of national prosperity"; and the solid men of boston declared with webster that "a system of bounties and protection" "would have a tendency to diminish the industry, impede the prosperity, and corrupt the morals of the people." ii. the dark age of american literature had ended in 1760. before that date there were few able books except about theology; and there were not many during the next sixty years except about politics. the works of franklin, jefferson, and other statesmen were more useful than brilliant. sydney smith was not far wrong in 1820, when he complained in the _edinburgh review_ that the americans "have done absolutely nothing for the sciences, for art, for literature." he went on to ask, "in the four quarters of the globe, who reads an american book?" his question was answered that same year by the publication in london of irving's _rip van winkle_ and _legend of sleepy hoi-low_. bryant's first volume of poems appeared next year, as did cooper's popular novel, _the spy_; and the _north american review_ had begun half a dozen years before. but even in 1823, channing could not claim that there really was any national literature, or much devotion of intellectual labour to great subjects. "shall america," he asked, "be only an echo of what is thought and written in the aristocracies beyond the ocean?" this was published during the very year in which president monroe declared that the people of the united states would look upon attempts of european monarchs "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and liberty." channing was much interested in the study of german philosophy; but he rested his "chief hopes of an improved literature," on "an improved religion." he maintained that no man could unfold his highest powers until he had risen above "the prevalent theology, which has come down to us from the dark ages," and which was then "arrayed against intellect, leagued with oppression, fettering inquiry, and incapable of being blended with the sacred dictates of reason and conscience." unitarianism claimed for every individual, what protestantism had at most asked for the congregation,--the right to think for one's self. this right was won earlier in europe than in america, for here the clergy kept much of their original authority and popularity. their influence over politics collapsed with federalism. on all other subjects they were still listened to as "stewards of the mysteries of god," who had been taught all things by the holy spirit, and were under a divine call to preach the truth necessary for salvation. the clergyman was supposed to have acquired by his ordination a peculiar knowledge of all the rights and duties of human life. no one else, however wise and philanthropic, could speak with such authority about what books might be read and what amusements should be shunned. scientific habits of thought, free inquiry about religion, and scholarly study of the bible were put under the same ban with dancing, card-playing, reading novels, and travelling on sunday. the pulpit blocked the path of intellectual progress. its influence on literature was wholly changed by the unitarian controversy, which was at its height in 1820. still more beneficial controversies followed. the trinitarian clergymen tried to retain their imperilled supremacy by getting up revivals. one of these, in the summer of 1828, was carried so far at cincinnati that many a woman lost her reason or her life. these excesses confirmed the anti-clerical suspicions of frances wright, who had come over from england to study the negro character, and had failed, after much labour and expense, to find the slaves she bought for the purpose capable of working out their freedom. she had made up her mind that slavery is only one of many evils caused by ignorance of the duties of man to man, that these duties needed to be studied scientifically, and that scientific study, especially among women, was dangerously impeded by the pulpit. that autumn she delivered the first course of public lectures ever given by a woman in america. anne hutchinson and other women had preached; but she was the first lecturer. the men and women of cincinnati crowded to hear the tall, majestic woman, who stood in the court-house, plainly dressed in white. her style was ladylike throughout; but she complained of the many millions wasted on mere teachers of opinions, whose occupation was to set people by the ears, and whose influence was stifling the breath of science. "listen," she said, "to the denunciations of fanaticism against pleasures the most innocent, recreations the most necessary to bodily health." "see it make of the people's day of leisure a day of penance." her main theme was the necessity of establishing schools to teach children trades, and also halls of science with museums and public libraries. this course was repeated in baltimore, philadelphia, new york, boston, and other cities. her audiences were always large, but she charged no admission fee. what were called "fanny wright societies" were formed in many places. a baptist church in new york city was turned into a hall of science, which remained open for three years, beginning with the last sunday of april, 1829. it contained a hall for scientific lectures and theological discussions, a free dispensary, a gymnasium, and a bookstore. here was published _the free enquirer_, the only paper in america which permitted the infallibility of christianity to be called in question. the principal editor, robert dale owen, son of the famous socialist, claimed to have twenty thousand adherents in that city, and a controlling influence in buffalo. celebrations of paine's birthday were now frequent. it was fortunate for the clergy that controversies about religion soon lost their interest in the fierce struggle about politics. iii. the fame won by jackson as a conqueror of british invaders in 1815, blinded americans to a fact which had been made manifest by both napoleon and wellington, as it is said to have been still more recently by grant. the habit of commanding an army has a tendency to create scorn of public opinion, and also of those restrictions on arbitrary authority which are necessary for popular government, as well as for individual liberty. jackson had the additional defect of holding slaves; and it is probable that if he had never done so, nor even had soldiers under his orders, he would have been sadly indifferent to the rights of his fellow-citizens and to the principles of free government. he was elected in 1828, and proved enough of a democrat to renounce the policy, which had recently become popular, of making local improvements at the national expense; but he was the first president who dismissed experienced officials, in order to appoint his own partisans without inquiry as to their capacity to serve the nation. he was especially arbitrary about a problem not yet fully solved, namely, what the government should do with the banks. the public money was then deposited in a national bank whose constitutionality was admitted by the supreme court. its stock was at a premium and its notes at par in 1829; and it had five hundred officials in various states. jackson thought it had opposed his election; and he suggested that the public money should be removed to the custody of a branch of the treasury, to be established for that purpose. the plan has since been adopted; but his friends were too much interested in rival banks, and his opponents thought only of preventing his re-election in 1832. they could not, however, prevent his obtaining a great majority as "the poor man's champion." the bank had spent vast sums in publishing campaign documents, and even in bribery; and jackson suspected that it would try to buy a new charter. he decided, with no sanction from congress, and against the advice of his own cabinet, that the public money already in the bank should be drawn out as fast as it could be spent, and that no more should be deposited there. he removed the secretary of the treasury for refusing to carry out this plan; and obliged his successor to set about it before he was confirmed by the senate. to all remonstrances he replied, "i take the responsibility"; and he met the vote of the senators, that he was assuming an authority not conferred by the constitution, by boasting that he was "the direct representative of the american people." webster replied that this would reduce the government to an elective monarchy; and the opponents to what they called jackson's toryism agreed to call themselves whigs. their leader was henry clay; and they believed, like the federalists, in centralisation, internal improvements, and protective tariffs. jackson was sustained by the democrats; but their quarrel with the whigs prevented congress from providing any safe place for the public money. it was loaned to some of the state banks; and all these institutions were encouraged to increase their liabilities enormously. speculation was active and prices high. that of wheat in particular rose so much after the bad harvest of 1836 that there was a bread riot in new york city. scarcely had jackson closed his eight years of service, in 1837, when the failure of a business firm in new orleans brought on so many others that all the banks suspended payment. prices of merchandise fell so suddenly as to make the dealers bankrupt; many thousand men were thrown out of employment; and so much public money was lost that there was a deficit in the treasury, where there had been a surplus. iv. these bad results of jackson's administration strengthened the whigs. they had not ventured to make protectionism the main issue in 1832; and clay had acknowledged that all the leading newspapers and magazines were against it in 1824. its adoption that year was by close votes, and in spite of webster's insisting that american manufactures were growing rapidly without any unnatural restrictions on commerce. the duties were raised in 1828 to nearly five times their average height in 1789; and there was so much discontent at the south, that some slight reductions had to be made in the summer of 1832; but the protectionist purpose was still predominant. if the opponents of all taxation except for revenue had done nothing more than appeal to the people that autumn, they would have had congress with them; jackson was already on their side; and the question might have been decided on its merits after full discussion. the threat of south carolina to secede caused the reduction, which was actually made in 1833, to appear too much like a concession made merely to avoid civil war; and this second attempt to preserve the union by a compromise was a premium upon disloyalty. this bargain, like that of 1820, was arranged by henry clay; and one condition was that the rates should fall gradually to a maximum of twenty per cent. before that process was completed, the treasury was exhausted by bad management; and additional revenue had to be obtained by raising the tariff in 1842. the whigs were then in power; but they were defeated in the presidential election of 1844, when the main issue was protectionism. the tariff was reduced in 1846 by a much larger majority than that of 1842 in the house of representatives; and the results were so satisfactory that a further reduction to an average of twenty per cent, was made in 1857, with the general approval of members of both parties. the revenue needed for war had to be procured by increase of taxation in 1861; but the country had then had for twenty-eight years an almost uninterrupted succession of low tariffs. the universal prosperity in america between 1833 and 1842 is mentioned by a french traveller, chevalier, by a german philanthropist, dr. julius, by miss martineau, lyell, and dickens. the novelist was especially struck by the healthy faces and neat dresses of the factory girls at lowell, where they began to publish a magazine in 1840. lyell said that the operatives in that city looked like "a set of ladies and gentlemen playing at factory for their own amusement." our country had seven times as many miles of railroads in 1842 as in 1833; our factories made more than nine times as many dollars' worth of goods in 1860 as in 1830; and they sold more than three times as many abroad as in 1846. twice as much capital was invested in manufacturing in 1860 as in 1850; the average wages of the operatives increased sixteen per cent, during these ten years; america became famous for inventions; her farms doubled in value, as did both her imports and her exports; and the tonnage of her vessels increased greatly. such are the blessings of liberty in commerce. especially gratifying is the growth of respect for the right of free speech. the complaints by dickens, chevalier, and miss martineau of the despotism of the majority were corroborated by tocqueville, who travelled here in 1831 and published in 1835 a very valuable statement of the results and tendencies of democracy. the destruction that year of a catholic convent near boston by a mob is especially significant, because the anniversary was celebrated next year as a public holiday. the worst sufferers under persecution at that time were the philanthropists. v. in order to do justice to all parties in this controversy we should take especial notice of the amount of opposition to slavery about 1825 in what were afterwards called the border states. here all manual labour could have been done by whites; and much of it was actually, especially in kentucky. there slaves never formed a quarter of the population; and in maryland they sank steadily from one-fourth in 1820 to one-eighth in 1860. of masters over twenty or more bondmen in 1856, there were only 256 in kentucky and 735 in maryland. it was these large holders who monopolised the profits, as they did the public offices. white men with few or no slaves had scarcely any political power; and their chance to make money, live comfortably, and educate their children, was much less than if all labour had become free. such a change would have made manufacturing prosper in both kentucky and maryland; but all industries languished except that of breeding slaves for the south. the few were rich at the expense of the many. only time was needed in these and other states to make the majority intelligent enough to vote the guilty aristocrats down. two thousand citizens of baltimore petitioned against admitting missouri as a slave state in 1820; and several avowed abolitionists ran for the legislature shortly before 1830. at this time there were annual anti-slavery conventions in baltimore, with prominent whigs among the officers, and nearly two hundred affiliated societies in the border states. there were fifty in north carolina, where two thousand slaves had been freed in 1825, and three-fifths of the whites were reported as favourable to emancipation. henry clay was openly so in 1827; and the kentucky colonisation society voted in 1830 that the disposition towards voluntary emancipation was strong enough to make legislation unnecessary. the abolition of slavery as "the greatest curse that god in his wrath ever inflicted upon a people" was demanded by a dozen members of the virginia legislature, as well as by the _richmond inquirer_, in 1832; and similar efforts were made shortly before 1850 in kentucky, delaware, maryland, western virginia, western north carolina, eastern tennessee, and missouri. from 1812 to 1845 the senate was equally divided between free and slave states; and any transfer, even of delaware, from one side to the other would have enabled the north to control the upper house as well as the lower. the plain duty of a northern philanthropist was to co-operate with the southern emancipationists and accept patiently their opinion that abolition had better take place gradually, as it had done in new york, and, what was much more important, that the owner should have compensation. this had been urged by wilberforce in 1823, as justice to the planters in the west indies; the legislatures of ohio, pennsylvania, and new. jersey recommended, shortly before 1830, that the nation should buy and free the slaves; and compensation was actually given by congress to loyal owners of the three thousand slaves in the district of columbia emancipated in 1862. who can tell the evils which we should have escaped, if slavery could have continued after 1830 to be abolished gradually by state after state, with pecuniary aid from congress or the north? this was the hope of benjamin lundy, who passed much of his life in the south, though he was born in new jersey. he had advocated gradual emancipation in nearly every state, visiting even texas and missouri, organising anti-slavery societies, and taking subscriptions to his _genius of universal emancipation_, which was founded in tennessee in 1821, but afterwards was issued weekly at baltimore. he published the names of nine postmasters among his agents, and copied friendly articles from more than forty newspapers. one of his chief objects was to prevent that great extension of slavery, the annexation of texas. vi. the election of the first pro-slavery president, jackson, in 1828, discouraged the abolitionists; and lundy was obliged to suspend his paper for lack of subscribers early next year. when he resumed it in september, he took an assistant editor, who had declared on the previous fourth of july, in a fashionable boston church: "i acknowledge that immediate and complete emancipation is not desirable. no rational man cherishes so wild a vision." before garrison set foot on slave soil, it occurred to him that every slave had a right to instant freedom, and also that no master had any right to compensation. these two ideas he advocated at once, and ever after, as obstinately as george the third insisted on the right to tax america. garrison, of course, was a zealous philanthropist; and he was as conscientious as paul was in persecuting the christians. but he seems to have been more anxious to free his own conscience than to free the slaves. immediate emancipation had been advocated in lundy's paper at much length, and even as early as 1825, but so mildly as to call out little opposition. insisting on no compensation was much more irritating; and garrison's writings show that his mind was apt to free itself in bitter words, even against such men as whittier, channing, longfellow, douglass, and sumner. he had been but three months in baltimore when he published a censure by name of the owner and captain of one of the many vessels which were permitted by law to carry slaves south, as "highway robbers and murderers," who "should be sentenced to solitary confinement for life," and who deserved "to occupy the lowest depths of perdition." he was found guilty of libel, and imprisoned for seven weeks because he could not pay a moderate fine. the money was given by a generous new yorker; but garrison's work in the south was over, and lundy's was of little value thenceforth. the man who brought the libel suit was an influential citizen of massachusetts; and boston pulpits were shut against garrison on his return. he could not pay for a hall; but one was given him without cost by the anti-clerical society, whose leader, abner knee-land, was imprisoned thirty days in 1834 for a brief expression of atheism which would not now be considered blasphemous. two weeklies, which were unpopular from the first, began to be published at boston early in 1831. kneeland's _investigator_ was pledged "to contend for the abolition of slavery" and "advocate the rights of women." it was friendly to labour reform as well as to scientific education, and opposed capital punishment, imprisonment for debt, and legislation about religion; but its predominant tone has been skeptical to the present day. garrison was too orthodox in 1831 to favour the emancipation of women; he was in sympathy with other reforms; but his chief theme was the "pernicious doctrine of gradual abolition." the next mistake of his _liberator_ was the prominence given to negro insurrection and other crimes against whites. the southerners were naturally afraid to have such subjects mentioned, even in condemnation; and guilty consciences made slave-holders think the danger much greater than it was. the first number of the _liberator_ contained garrison's verses about the horrors of the revolt which might bring emancipation. he announced at the same time that he was going to review a recent pamphlet which he described thus: "a better promoter of insurrection was never sent forth to an oppressed people." his contributors spoke often of the right of slaves to resist, and asked, "in god's name, why should they not cut their masters' throats?" many women and children were massacred by rebel slaves in virginia that autumn; and garrison promptly declared that the assassins "deserve no more blame than our fathers did for slaughtering the british," and that "when the contest shall have again begun, it must again be a war of extermination." similar language was often used in the _liberator_ afterwards. garrison was too firm a non-resistant to go further than this; but the majority of northerners would have agreed with the reverend doctor wayland, president of brown university, who declared slavery "very wicked," but declined to have the _liberator_ sent him, and wrote to mr. garrison that its tendency was to incite the slaves to rebellion. of course this was not the editor's intention; but history deals mainly with causes and results. the consequences were especially bad at the south. calhoun and other democrats were striving to unite all her people in resistance to emancipation, as well as to protectionism. they appealed to the insurrection in 1831, and to the treatment of this subject in the _liberator_, as proofs that abolitionism was incendiary; and the feeling was so intense in georgia, that the governor was authorised by the legislature, before the end of 1831, to offer five thousand dollars for the head of the editor or of any of his agents in that state. southerners were generally provoked at such comparisons of slave-holders to thieves as were often made in the _liberator_ and were incorporated into the formal declaration made by garrison and the other founders of the new england anti-slavery society at boston early in 1832. planters friendly to emancipation were discouraged by garrison's insisting that they ought not to have compensation, an opinion which was adopted by the american anti-slavery society at its organisation at philadelphia in 1833. such protests on moral grounds were of great use to politicians who opposed any grant of money for emancipation, because they wished to preserve slavery. the national constitution provided that emancipation should not take place in any state which did not give its consent; and this was much less attainable in 1835 than it had been ten years earlier. so fierce was the hatred of anti-slavery periodicals, that many pounds of them were taken from the charleston post-office and burned by the leading citizens in july, 1835; and this action was praised by a public meeting, which was attended by all the clergy. the papers were printed in new york, and do not seem to have been destroyed on account of their own mistakes, but of those made by the liberator. southern postmasters refused after this to deliver any anti-slavery matter; and their conduct was approved by the postmaster-general, as well as by the president. the legislatures of north carolina and virginia demanded, in the session of 1835 and 1836, that all such publications be suppressed legally by the northern states. south carolina, georgia, and alabama took the same course; and it was agreed everywhere that abolitionists were to be lynched. loyalty to slavery was required of all preachers and editors; no other qualification for every office, in the service either of the nation or of the state, was exacted so strictly; other controversies lost interest; and men who would have gained greatly from the introduction of free labour helped the slave-holders silence those intelligent southerners who knew what urgent need there was in their section of emancipation for the general welfare. garrison, meantime, made both friends and enemies at the north. he had the support of nearly four hundred anti-slavery societies in 1835; but some of these had been founded in ohio by lundy on the principle of gradual emancipation, and others in new york by jay, whose main objects were repeal of the fugitive slave act and emancipation in the district of columbia. agitation for immediate abolition without compensation was nowhere active at that time, except in new england. the highest estimate of its partisans in 1840 was only two hundred thousand; most of them had already renounced the leadership of garrison; and there is no reason to believe that the number of his thorough going followers ever reached one hundred thousand. most of the original abolitionists were church members; and the agitation was never opposed, even at first, by so large a proportion of the clergy at the north as of the people generally. several ministers joined garrison at once; 125 enrolled their names for publication as abolitionists in 1833; and two years later he had the open support of the new england methodist conference, the maine baptist convention, and the detroit presbytery, as well as of many congregationalists, and of most of the quakers, unitarians, and free-will baptists. preaching against slavery was not common in denominations where the pastor was more liable to be gagged by ecclesiastical superiors. one reason that this authority, as well as that of public opinion in the northern cities, was directed against agitation, was the pressure of business interests. the south sent most of her products, especially cotton, to manufacturers or merchants in philadelphia, new york, and new england. this region in return supplied her with clothes, tools, and furniture. much of her food came from the western farmers; and these latter were so unable to send grain or cattle eastward until after 1850, that the best road for most of them to market was the mississippi. the slave-holders were such good customers, that people along the ohio river, as well as in eastern seaports and factory towns, were slow to see how badly the slaves were oppressed. enlightenment on this subject, as well as about capacity for free labour, was also delayed by prejudices of race and colour, while there was much honest ignorance throughout the north. what was best understood about slavery was that it was merely a state institution, not to be abolished or even much ameliorated by the national government. the main responsibility rested accordingly upon the southern states; and the danger that these might be provoked to secede could not be overlooked. these considerations prevented the majority of the northerners, and especially the leading members of every sect, from opposing slavery as actively as they would otherwise have been glad to do. the most active partisan of the slave-holders was the politician who knew they had votes in congress and in the electoral college for all the whites in the south and also for three-fifths of the coloured people. the views of the democratic party about the tariff, the bank, and state rights had made it in 1832 victorious everywhere south of maryland and kentucky; and its preponderance in the cotton states, as well as in virginia, enabled it long to resist the growing disaffection at the north. the whigs went far enough in the same course for their own destruction; and the principle of individual liberty found few champions. vii. politicians and merchants worked together in getting up the series of mobs against abolitionists, which began in 1833, under the lead of a methodist bishop in new york, and kept breaking out in that city, philadelphia, cincinnati, boston, and less important places, until they culminated in the burning of pennsylvania hall in 1838. after that year, they were neither frequent nor violent. the worst crime of the rioters was murdering a clergyman named lovejoy in 1837 for trying to save his printing-press. most of the baptist, methodist, and presbyterian preachers and editors were now doing what they could to suppress the agitation; but the riots called out no indignation like that which had poured forth from all the churches in 1828 against sunday mails. there was little freedom of speech for unpopular opinions in america in 1835, when channing declared that the mob against garrison had made abolitionism "the cause of freedom." there were many readers, even in the south, for the little book in which he insisted that "slavery ought to be discussed." he protested against depriving the slave of his right to improve and respect himself, and vindicated "the sacredness of individual man." he was the first to appeal from the fugitive slave law to that "everlasting and immutable rule of right revealed in conscience." and few other clergymen gave such help to john quincy adams, who was then asserting the right of petition and of discussion in congress. memorials with a hundred and fifty thousand signatures had been presented against the annexation of texas, and in favour of emancipation in the district of columbia, when it was voted by all the southern representatives, as well as by the northern democrats, in january, 1837, that all petitions relating to slavery "shall be laid on the table and no action taken thereon." the ex-president, who was then a representative from massachusetts, protested indignantly, as did other whigs, and they continued to plead for the constitutional rights of the north until 1844, when the gag-rule was abolished. on july 4, 1837, adams told the people that "freedom of speech is the only safety-valve which, under the high pressure of slavery, can preserve your political boiler from a fearful explosion." the number of names, including many repetitions, signed in the next two years to anti-slavery petitions was two millions. emancipation in the district of columbia was out of the question, if only because the south chose half the senate. the north was strong enough in the house of representatives to prevent any pro-slavery legislation; and the annexation of texas was actually postponed until 1845, in consequence partly of the petitions and partly of remonstrances from the legislatures of massachusetts, new york, pennsylvania, ohio, and other states. these bodies also protested against the neglect of petitions in congress. the subsidence of mobs after 1838 was due to a general feeling at the north, not only that the rioters were too violent, but also that the south was too dictatorial in gagging congress, in tampering with the mails, in asking northern legislatures to suppress public meetings, and in trying to annex texas. viii. on all these points the whigs were so far in advance of the democrats in 1840, as to receive much support from abolitionists. these last, however, were widely and unfortunately divided among themselves. many of the men still called themselves democrats; for the old party which had been founded by jefferson had liberal members, who had formerly been called "fanny wright men," and were now known as "loco focos." a few abolitionists took the gospel aphorisms about non-resistance so blindly as to say it would be a sin for them to vote. garrison renounced the franchise "for conscience" sake and the slave's; but it is hard to see precisely what any slave gained by his friends' refusing to vote for adams, sumner, or lincoln. the most consistent abolitionists voted regularly, and selected a candidate for his work in the cause, without regard to his party record. the democrats took decided ground in the national convention of 1840 and afterwards against abolitionism. their nominee, van buren, was then at the head of a corrupt administration. the whig candidate, harrison, was in favour of free speech and honest government. he had been chosen in preference to clay, because of the latter's attacking the abolitionists. another slave-holder who wanted to lynch them, had, however, been nominated by acclamation for vice-president at the whig convention; and the party had no platform. it is hard to see what ought to have been done under these circumstances by abolitionists. some who were afterwards known as "liberty men" set up an independent ticket, headed by a martyr to the cause. they had quite as much right to do this as garrison had to refuse to vote. he had hitherto taken little responsibility for the proceedings of the national society; but when the annual meeting was held at new york in may, 1840, he brought on more than five hundred of his own adherents from new england, in order to pack the convention. thus he secured the passage of a declaration that the independent nominations were "injurious to the cause" and ought not to be supported. garrison has justly been compared to luther, and this was like luther at his worst. most of the officers and members seceded and organised a rival society which did good work in sympathy not only with the liberty men but with the free soilers; and these parties gained most of the new converts to abolitionism. in 1847 the _liberator_ published without comment an estimate that it did not represent the views of one active abolitionist in ten; and a coloured clergyman of high ability, dr. garnett, declared in 1851 that the proportion was less than one per cent. most of the clergymen who were friendly to garrison before 1840 were thenceforth against him. so many pulpits were suddenly closed against the agitators, that one of them, named foster, kept insisting on speaking in meeting without leave in various parts of new england. he was usually dragged out summarily, and often to the injury of his coat-tails, though never of his temper. boston was one of the most strongly anti-slavery cities; but twenty pastors out of forty-four refused to asked the people to pray for a fugitive slave who was imprisoned illegally in 1842. those who complied had comparatively little influence. the rural clergy in new england, new york, michigan, and northern ohio, had much more sympathy with reform than their brethren to the southward, especially in large cities. garrison's personal unpopularity in the churches had been much increased by his violent language against them, and also by his asserting the injustice of sunday laws, as well as the right of women to speak for the slave. his position on these points will be considered later. ix. his worst mistake was the demand, which he published in the _liberator_, in may, 1842, for "a repeal of the union between northern liberty and southern slavery." this he called "essential" for emancipation. in january, 1843, the massachusetts anti-slavery society passed the resolution which was afterwards published regularly in the _liberator_ as the garrisonist creed. it declared the union "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell" which "should be immediately annulled." this position was held by garrison, phillips, and their adherents until 1861. it was largely due, like their refusal to vote, to indignation at the support given to slavery by the national constitution, the fugitive slave act, and some recent legislation at washington. garrison was also confident, as he said at a disunion convention in 1857, that if the south were to secede, she would not "be able to hold a single slave one hour after the deed is done." phillips, too, declared that "all the slave asks of us is to stand out of his way." "let no cement of the union bind the slave, and he will right himself." it is true that secession brought on emancipation; but it would not have done so if phillips and garrison had succeeded in quenching love of the union in the north. that patriotic feeling burst out in a fierce flame; and it was the restoration of the union which abolished slavery. another important fact is that the chief guilt of slavery rested on the south. the national government was only an accessory at worst. no northerner was responsible for any clause in the constitution which he had not sanctioned, or for any action of congress which he had done his best to prevent. the best work against slavery which could be done in 1843 and 1844 was to defeat a new attempt to annex texas. this scheme was avowedly for the extension of slavery over a great region where it had been prohibited by mexico. there would probably be war with that country; and success would increase the power of the slave-holders in the senate. one half of its members were from the slave states in 1844; but annexation was rejected in june by a vote of two to one; and the house of representatives was plainly on the same side, though otherwise controlled by the democrats. public warning of the danger to liberty had been given by adams and other whigs in congress early in 1843; but little heed was taken either by the clergy or by the garrisonists. both were too busy with their own plans. channing died in 1842; and parker went to europe in september, 1843. it was not until two months later that the _liberator_ found room for texas. garrison never spoke against annexation until too late; and it was scarcely mentioned in the may meetings of 1843 at new york and boston, in the one hundred anti-slavery conventions which were held that summer in western new york, ohio, and indiana, with the powerful aid of frederick douglass, or in the one hundred conventions in massachusetts early in 1844. at the may meeting in new york, foster said he should rejoice to see texas annexed; and phillips exulted in the prospect that this would provoke the north to trample on the constitution. annexation had been opposed by three candidates for the presidency: birney, who had already been selected by the "liberty men"; van buren, who was rejected soon after on this account by the democrats; and clay, who had already been accepted by the whigs. all three were formally censured, under various pretexts, in company with john quincy adams, at this and other gatherings of the garrisonians. their convention soon after in boston voted ten to one for disunion, and closed on june 1st with the presentation to garrison of a red flag bearing on one side the motto, "no union with slave-holders," and on the other an eagle wrapped in the american flag and trampling on a prostrate slave. two months later, and three before the election, this banner was carried through gaily decorated streets in hingham, amid ringing of church bells, to a meeting attended by several thousand disunionists. the garrisonians thought so much about getting out of the union, that they had nothing to say in favour of keeping out texas. among the few abolitionists who saw the duty of the hour were whittier and lowell. the full force of their poetry was not much felt before 1850; but among the stirring publications early in 1842 was a _rallying-cry for new england against the annexation of texas_, which lowell sent forth anonymously. it was reprinted in _harper's weekly_ for april 23, 1892, but not in the earlier editions of the poems. among the most striking lines are these: "rise up new england, buckle on your mail of proof sublime, your stern old hate of tyranny, your deep contempt of crime. one flourish of a pen, and fetters shall be riveted on millions more of men. one drop of ink to sign a name, and slavery shall find for all her surplus flesh and blood a market to her mind. awake new england! while you sleep, the foe advance their lines, already on your stronghold's wall their bloody banner shines. awake and hurl them back again in terror and despair! the time has come for earnest deeds: we 've not a man to spare." if the whigs had nominated webster that may, on a platform opposing both annexation and disunion, they would have gained more votes at the north than they would have lost at the south. they might possibly have carried that election; and their strength in the border states would have enabled them, sooner or later, to check the extension of slavery without bringing on civil war. their platform was silent about texas, as well as about the union; their chief candidate, clay, had already made compromises in the interest of the south in 1820 and 1833; he did so again in 1850; and he admitted, soon after the convention, that he "should be glad to see" texas annexed, if it could be done without war. this failure of the whigs to oppose the extension of slavery, together with their having made the tariff highly protective in 1842, cost them so many votes in new york and michigan that they lost the election. negligence and dissension at the north had enabled the south to set aside van buren in favour of polk at the democratic convention. the party was pledged to annex texas; and northern members were appeased by a crafty promise that all which was worth having in british america, west of the rocky mountains, should be acquired also. the declaration in the platform of 1840, that the government ought not "to foster one branch of industry to the detriment of others," was repeated in 1844, as often afterwards, but it was so cunningly explained away in pennsylvania that this state voted for the president who signed the low-tariff bill of 1846. the election of 1844 strengthened the influence of the south. texas was soon annexed by the same congress which had refused to do so previously, and was admitted like florida, as a slave state, in spite of remonstrances made by the legislatures of massachusetts and vermont, as well as by two-thirds of the unitarian ministers. in march, 1846, polk's army invaded mexico; her soldiers resisted; the democrats in congress voted that she had begun the war, which lasted for the next eighteen months; and the whigs assented reluctantly. most of the volunteers were southerners, and there was much opposition at the north to warfare for the extension of slavery. the indignation was increased by the publication of whittier's pathetic poem, _the angels of buena vista_, as well as of that series of powerful satires, lowell's _biglow papers_, the greatest achievement of literary genius thus far in america was the creation of _birdofre-dom sawin_; and no book except mrs. stowe's famous novel did so much for emancipation. a foremost place among abolitionists was taken by parker in 1845, when he began to preach in boston. his first sermon against the war with mexico was delivered the same month as the publication of the first of the _biglow papers_, june, 1846. early in 1847 he spoke with such severity, at an indignation meeting in faneuil hall, that his life was threatened by drunken volunteers. other preachers that year in massachusetts followed his example so generally as to win praise from the garrisonians, as well as from the most patriotic abolitionists; and great effect was produced by his _letter to the people_, which showed, early in 1848, that slavery was ruining the prosperity, as well as the morals, of the south. more about his work may be found in chapter v. there we shall see how active the transcendentalists were in carrying on the revolt begun by channing. the most important victory for liberty recorded in this chapter was that of 1844 over the protectionists. the defeat of the garrisonians was due largely to their mistakes; and there was urgent need of a new anti-slavery movement on broader ground. chapter iv. emancipation the revolutionary movements of 1848 did much to encourage love of liberty in america, where the anti-slavery agitation was now becoming prominent in politics. the indignation against the mexican war increased as it was found that nothing would be done to keep the promise of 1844, that great britain should be excluded from the pacific. the purpose of the south, to enlarge the area of slavery but not that of freedom, was so plain that the northern democrats proposed the wilmot proviso, by which slavery would have been forbidden in all territory acquired from mexico; and they actually carried it through the house of representatives, with the help of the whigs, in 1846. similar action was taken by the legislatures of new york, ohio, pennsylvania, delaware, and seven other states. the senate was so unwilling to have slavery prohibited anywhere as to oppose, merely on this account, a bill for giving a territorial government to oregon. i. many of the new york delegates to the national democratic convention in 1848 came pledged to "uncompromising hostility to the extension of slavery," and were so badly treated that they withdrew. cass was nominated as a friend to the south; the mexican war was declared "just and necessary"; and abolitionism was denounced, as it had been in 1840 and 1844. van buren was nominated soon after by the anti-slavery democrats. a similar movement had already been made by sumner, wilson, and other men who were known as "conscience whigs," and who had some support from clay and webster. both these candidates for the presidency were set aside in favour of a slave-holder, who had been very successful in conquering mexico, but never cast a vote. in fact, general taylor had taken so little interest in politics, that he was supported in the north as a friend, and in the south as an enemy, to the wilmot proviso. no opinion on this or any other question could be extorted from the majority; wilson declared in the convention that he should do all he could to defeat its nominee; the conscience whigs made an alliance with the van buren democrats; and the new movement was joined by the "liberty men," whose vote of sixty thousand had decided the election of 1844. thus was formed the free soil party, whose fundamental idea, like that afterwards held by the republicans, was preservation of the union by checking the extension of slavery. douglass and other garrisonists were present at the free soil convention, where he was invited to speak. the new party pledged itself to "free soil, free speech, free labour, and free men." the national government was to relieve itself of "all responsibility for slavery," and begin by prohibiting its extension. there should be "no more slave states," "no more slave territory," and "no more compromises with slavery." the convention also demanded that oregon should be organised as a territory with free labour only; and this was granted at once by president polk and both houses of congress. most of the members of the convention were transcendental enough to think that wisdom must be spontaneous; and their scorn of political machinery left it to be used for making van buren the candidate. lowell, who was then at his height of productiveness, complained that, "he aint half anti-slav'ry 'nough"; but whittier exclaimed, that september: "now joy and thanks forever more! the dreary night has well-nigh passed: the slumbers of the north are o'er: the giant stands erect at last!" the anti-slavery vote was nearly five times as large as in 1844. cass would have been elected if the free soilers had supported him in new york. their hostility gave that state, as well as vermont and massachusetts, to taylor, who thus became president. he also carried georgia and seven other southern states; but the west was solidly democratic. it was not an anti-slavery victory, but a pro-slavery defeat. ii. the first question before the new president and congress was about california. the discovery of gold, before the country was ceded by mexico, had brought in crowds of settlers, but scarcely any slaves. unwillingness to have another free state prevented polk and his senate from allowing california to have any better government than a military one; and this was deprived of all authority by the desertion of the soldiers to the diggings. the settlers knew the value of a free government, and made one independently. the constitution which they completed in october, 1848, was so anti-slavery that it was not sanctioned for nearly two years by congress. meantime there was no legal authority in california to levy taxes, or organise fire departments, or arrest criminals. robberies and conflagrations were numerous; the mushroom cities were not graded, paved, or lighted; the uncertainty of titles to land caused fights in which lives were lost; and criminals became so desperate that several were lynched by a vigilance committee. the duty of admitting california as a free state was urged upon the new congress in december, 1849, by taylor, who promised to make an unexpectedly good president. this plan had become so popular at the north that it was recommended by the democratic state conventions of massachusetts and wisconsin, as well as by the legislature of every northern state, except iowa. the house of representatives could easily have been carried; for the whigs and free soilers constituted a majority, and would have had some help from northern democrats. the senate would probably not have consented until after another appeal to the people; but this might have been made with success at the elections of 1850. taylor had carried kentucky, tennessee, louisiana, florida, georgia, north carolina, maryland, and delaware. the last two states had permitted some free soil votes to be cast; this was also the case in virginia; and anti-slavery meetings had been held publicly in st. louis. the pro-slavery defeat in 1848 encouraged southerners who knew the advantage of free labour to agitate for emancipation. the convention held for this purpose in kentucky, in 1849, was attended by delegates from twenty-four counties; and its declaration that slavery was "injurious to the prosperity of the commonwealth," was endorsed by southern newspapers. clay himself proposed a plan of gradual emancipation; and such a measure was called for, according to the _richmond southerner_ (quoted in hoist's _constitutional history_, vol. iii., p. 433), by "two-thirds of the people of virginia." admissions that "kentucky must be free," that "delaware and maryland are now in a transition, preparatory to becoming free states," and that "emancipation is inevitable in all the farming states, where free labour can be advantageously used," were published in 1853, at new orleans, in de bow's _industrial resources of the southern and western states_ (vols. i., p. 407; ii., p. 310; hi., p. 60). a book which was written soon after by a north carolinian named helper, and denounced violently in congress, shows how much those southerners who did not hold slaves would have gained by emancipation; and what was so plainly for the interest of the majority of the voters would have been established by them, sooner or later, if it had not been for the breaking out of civil war. how much danger there was, even in 1849, to slave-holders is shown by their threats to secede. they wished to increase the hostility between north and south in order to check the spread southwards of northern views. it was in this spirit that senators and representatives from the cotton states demanded a more efficient law for returning fugitives. most of the thirty thousand then at the north had come from maryland, virginia, kentucky, and missouri; and these states were invited to act with their southern neighbours against abolitionism. there were very few secessionists at this time, except in south carolina, mississippi, and texas. president taylor was so popular at the south, and so avowedly ready to take command himself against rebels, that no army could have been raised to resist him. webster declared, in february, 1850, that there was no danger of secession; and the same opinion was held by benton of missouri, seward, and other senators. there was not enough alarm at the north to affect the stock-market. all that the whigs needed to do for the union was to sustain it with all the strength which they could use for that purpose at the south. if they had also insisted that california should be admitted unconditionally, they would soon have had support enough from northern democrats in congress. the demand for a national party of freedom was urgent. the free soilers were too sectional; but the whigs had so much influence at the south that they could have checked the extension of slavery without bloodshed; and this would have ensured the progress of emancipation. iii. all this might have been done if clay's hatred of the abolitionists, who had refused to make him president, had not made him try to cripple them by another compromise. he proposed that california should be admitted at once and without slavery; that it should be left to the settlers in utah and new mexico to decide whether these territories should ultimately become free or slave states; that texas should receive a large sum of money, as well as a great tract of land which she had threatened to take from new mexico by force; and, worst of all, that a new fugitive-slave bill should be passed. the law then on the statute books left the question whether the defendant should be enslaved to be decided by a magistrate elected by the people or appointed by the governor; and the court was so apt to be restricted by local legislation or public opinion, that recovery of fugitives was practically impossible in new england. the new law retained the worst provision of the old one; namely, that no jury could be asked to decide whether the defendant had ever been a slave. the principal change was that the judge was to come into such close relations with the national administration as to be independent of the people of the state. in short, fugitive slaves were to be punished, and disloyal texans rewarded, in order that california might get her rights. this plan was approved by webster, who hoped that the grateful south would make him president, and then help him restore those protective duties which had been removed in 1846. other northerners called the compromise one-sided; and so did men from those cotton states which were to gain scarcely anything. president taylor would yield nothing to threats of rebellion. it was not until after his death that clay's proposals could be carried through congress; and it was necessary to present them one by one. the bill by which california was admitted, in september, 1850, was sandwiched in between those about texas and the fugitives. the latter were put under a law by which their friends were liable to be fined or imprisoned; but the new fugitive slave act had only three votes from the northern whigs in the house of representatives; and there were only four senators who actually consented to all clay's propositions. the compromise seemed at first to have silenced both secessionists and abolitionists. the latter were assailed by worse mobs in boston and new york than had been the case in these cities for many years. the rioters were sustained by public opinion; enthusiastic union meetings were held in the large cities; and webster's course was praised by leading ministers of all denominations, even the unitarian. abolitionism had apparently been reduced to such a position that it could lead to nothing but civil war. parker complained, in may, 1850, that the clergy were deserting the cause. phillips spoke at this time as if there were no anti-slavery ministers left. i once heard friendly hearers interrupt him by shouting out names like parker's and beecher's. he smiled, and began counting up name after name on the fingers of his left hand; but he soon tossed it up, and said with a laugh, "i have not got one hand full yet." webster's friends boasted that satan was trodden underfoot; but the compromise was taken as an admission by the whigs that their party had cared too little about slavery. many of its adherents went over, sooner or later, to the democratic party, which had at least the merit of consistency. about half of the free soilers deserted what seemed to be a lost cause; but few if any went back to help the whigs. the latter did not elect even three-fourths as many members of congress in november, 1850, as they did in 1848; and they fared still worse in 1852. democratic aid enabled the free soilers in 1851 to send sumner to represent them in the senate, in company with hale and chase. seward had already been sent there by the anti-slavery whigs, and had met webster's plea for the constitutionality of the new fugitive slave law by declaring that "there is a higher law than the constitution." sumner maintained in washington, as he had done in boston, that the constitution as well as the moral law forbade helping kidnappers. he was never a disunionist; but he insisted that "unjust laws are not binding"; and he was supported by the mighty influence of emerson. the effects of transcendentalism will be so fully considered in the next chapter but one, that i need speak here merely of what it did to encourage resistance to the new law which made philanthropy a crime. the penalties on charity to fugitives were so severe as to call out much indignation from the rural clergy at the north. in november, 1850, the methodist ministers of new york city agreed to demand the repeal of the law; and parker wrote to fillmore, who had been made president by taylor's death, that among eighty protestant pastors in boston there were not five who would refuse hospitality to a slave. the first hunters of men who came there met such a resistance that they did not try to capture the fugitives. a negro who was arrested was taken by coloured friends from the court-house; and a second rescue was prevented only by filling the building with armed hirelings, surrounding it with heavy chains under which the judges were obliged to stoop, and finally calling out the militia to guard the victim through the streets of boston. a slaveholder who was supposed to be trying to drag his own son back to bondage, was shot dead by coloured men in pennsylvania. other fugitives were rescued in milwaukee and syracuse. the new law lost much of its power in twelve months of such conflicts; and it was reduced almost to a dead letter by personal liberty bills, which were enacted in nearly every northern state. the compromise was not making the north and south friends, but enemies. the hostility was increased by the publication of the most influential book of the century. _uncle tom's cabin_ had attracted much attention as a serial; and three thousand copies were sold on the day it appeared in book form, march 20, 1852. there was a sale that year of two hundred thousand copies, which were equally welcome in parlour, nursery, and kitchen. dramatic versions had a great run; and one actress played "little eva" at more than three hundred consecutive performances. some of the most effective scenes were intended to excite sympathy with fugitive slaves. the total number of votes for all parties did not increase one-third as fast between 1848 and 1852 as between 1852 and 1856, when many of "uncle tom's" admirers went to the polls for the first time. the whigs were so much ashamed of their party, that they permitted every state, except massachusetts, vermont, kentucky, and tennessee to be carried by the democrats. the latter had the advantage, not only of unity and consistency as regards slavery, but of having made their low tariff so much of a success that there was another reduction in 1857. the two parties had been made nearly equal in congress by the election of 1848; but the proportion was changed four years later, to two to one, and the beaten party soon went to pieces. the free soil candidates and platform were singularly good in 1852; yet the vote was but little more than one-half as large as in 1848. there was no election between 1835 and 1865 when anti-slavery votes seemed so little likely to do any immediate good. the compromise looked like an irreparable error; and many reformers thought they could do nothing better than vote with the democrats for free trade. iv. the victors in 1852 might have had many years of supremacy, if they had kept true to the jeffersonian principle of state rights. they were consistent in holding that the position of coloured people in each state ought to be determined by the local majority. the rights of northerners had been invaded by the new law, which forbade hospitality to fugitives and demanded participation in kidnapping; but this wrong might have been endured if the south had not denied the right of kansas to become a free state. this was guaranteed by the compromise of 1820, which had been kept by the north. early in 1854, senator douglas of illinois proposed that the compact should be repudiated, and that it should be left for future settlers to decide whether there should be freedom or slavery in a region ten times as large as massachusetts, with a fertile soil and a climate warm enough for negro labour. there was such prompt and intense indignation throughout the north at this breach of faith, that douglas said he could find his way from chicago to boston by the light of the bonfires in which he was burned in effigy. the difference of opinion between city and country clergy ceased at once. an episcopalian bishop headed the remonstrance which was signed by nearly every minister in new york city. two other bishops signed the new england protest in company with the presidents of yale, brown, williams, and amherst, with the leaders of every protestant sect, and with so many other clergymen that the sum total rose above three thousand, which was four-fifths of the whole number. five hundred ministers in the north-west signed a remonstrance which douglas was obliged to present; and so many such memorials came in from all the free states, as to show that there was very little pro-slavery feeling left among the clergy, except in the black belt north of the ohio. one-half of the northern democrats in the house of representatives refused to follow douglas. leading men from all parties united to form the new one, which took the name of republican on july 6, 1854, and gained control of the next house of representatives. it was all the more popular because it began "on the sole basis of the non-extension of slavery." victory over the south could be gained only by uniting the north; but garrison still kept on saying, "if we would see the slave-power overthrown, the union must be dissolved." on july 4, 1854, two days before the republican party adopted its name, he burned the constitution of the united states amid several thousand spectators. then it was that thoreau publicly denied his allegiance to massachusetts, which was already doing its best to save kansas. emigrants from new england were sent into that territory so rapidly that the douglas plan seemed likely to hasten the time when it would be a free state. the south had insisted on the rights of the settlers; but they were outvoted, in november, 1854, and afterwards, by bands of armed missourians, who marched off when they had carried the election. the free state men were then supplied with rifles; and an anti-slavery constitution was adopted by the majority of actual residents. the minority were supported by the president, as well as by the "border-ruffians"; two rival governments were set up; and civil war began early in 1855. lawrence, the principal town in kansas, was sacked by command of the united states marshal, the most important buildings burned, and much private property stolen. five settlers, whose threats of violence had offended john brown, were slain in cold blood by him and his men, in retaliation for the lawrence outrage, in may, 1856. anarchy continued; but the new state was not admitted until 1861. prominent among the northerners who insisted on the right of kansas to govern herself, was sumner. his speech in the senate in may, 1856, was so powerful that half a million copies were printed as campaign literature, and whittier said, "it has saved the country." the orator had attacked some of his colleagues with needless severity; and on the day after the sack of lawrence, he was assaulted by a representative from south carolina in the senate chamber with such ferocity that he could not return to his seat before 1860. this cruel outrage against freedom of speech was universally applauded throughout the south. there was indignation enough at the north in 1856 to have given the election to the republicans, if the field had been clear; but protestant bigotry enabled the south to choose the president who failed to oppose rebellion. the catholics had objected as early as 1840 to the protestantism which was taught, in part at their expense, to their children in the public schools. some ways in which this was done then have since been abandoned; but the principal controversy has been about using a book which is universally acknowledged to be a bulwark of protestantism. there would not be so much zeal at present for having it read daily in the schools, if it has no religious influence; and our catholic citizens have a right to prefer that their children should be taught religion in ways not forbidden by their church. pupils have not had much moral or even religious benefit from school-books against which their conscience rebelled, however unreasonably. the catholic position in 1841, according to bishop hughes, afterwards archbishop, was this: "we do not ask money from the school fund;--all our desire is that it should be administered in such a way as to promote the education of all" and "leave the various denominations each in the full possession of its religious rights over the minds of its own children. if the children are to be educated promiscuously, as at present, let religion in every shape and form be excluded." the catholics soon changed their ground, and demanded that their parochial schools should be supported by public money. this called out the opposition of a secret society, which insisted on keeping the bible in the schools and excluding catholics from office. the know nothings had the aid of so many whigs in 1854 as to elect a large number of candidates, most of whom were friendly to the republicans. the leaders wished to remain neutral between north and south; but it is hard to say whether the pledge of loyalty to the union did not facilitate the capture of the organisation by the insatiable south early in 1856. beecher had already declared that the know nothing lodges were "catacombs of freedom" in which indignation against slavery was stifled. the presidential election showed that the outburst of bigotry had done more harm to friends than enemies of liberty. the democrats lost maryland, but gained pennsylvania and four other northern states. this enabled them to retain the presidency and the senate, as well as to recover the house of representatives, where they had become weaker than the republicans. the party of freedom polled eight times as many votes as in 1852, and made its first appearance in the electoral colleges. it carried eleven states. the whigs had accepted the know nothing nominee; and both these neutral parties soon dissolved. anarchy in kansas had been suppressed by united states dragoons; but they did not prevent the adoption of a pro-slavery constitution by bogus elections. buchanan promptly advised congress to admit kansas as a slave state, and declared she was already as much one as georgia or south carolina. this opinion he based on the dred scott decision by the supreme court, that congress had no power to prohibit slavery in any territory. douglas insisted on the right of the people of kansas to "vote slavery up or down." they were enabled by the joint efforts of republicans and northern democrats to have a fair chance to say whether they wished to become a slave state or remain a territory; and the latter was preferred by four-fifths of the voters. v. the south called douglas a traitor; but leading republicans helped the illinois democrats, in 1858, to elect the legislature which gave him another term in the senate. he might have become the next president if his opponent in the senatorial contest, abraham lincoln, had not led the republican party into the road towards emancipation. on june 16, 1858, he said, in the state convention: "a house divided against itself cannot stand. i believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. i do not expect the union to be dissolved--i do not expect the house to fall--but i do expect it will cease to be divided. it will become all one thing or all the other." seward took the same position, four months later, in his speech about the "irrepressible conflict." lincoln held that summer and autumn a series of joint debates with his opponent, before audiences one of which was estimated at twenty thousand. the speeches were circulated by the republicans as campaign documents; and lincoln's were remarkable, not only for his giving no needless provocation to the south, but for his proving that slavery ought not to be introduced into any new territory or state by local elections. he represented douglas as really holding that if one man chooses to enslave another no third man has any business to interfere; and he repudiated the decision in the dred scott case, that coloured people "had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." he had more votes that fall than douglas; but the latter's friends were enabled by the district system to control the legislature. douglas was sent back to the senate. lincoln gained the national reputation which made him president. the congressional elections were more favourable to the republicans than in 1856, for northern indignation was growing under the stimulus, not only of the new wrong to kansas, but of attempts to annex cuba and revive the slave trade. plans for emancipation were still discussed in the south; and the agitation had reached even texas. helper's _impending crisis_ had gained circulation enough in his own state, north carolina, to alarm the slaveholders. they knew that they constituted only three-tenths of the southern voters, and that the proportion was less than one-sixth in maryland. helper proved that emancipation would be greatly to the advantage of many men who held slaves, as well as of all who did not. when this was found out by the majority in any southern state, slavery would begin to fall by its own weight. it had been kept up by popular ignorance; but the prop was crumbling away. this way of emancipation might have been long; but it would have led to friendly relations between whites and blacks, as well as between north and south. what was most needed in 1859 was that all friends of freedom should work together, and that no needless pretext should be given for secession. garrison still insisted on disunion, and predicted that the south would not "be able to hold a single slave one hour after the deed is done," but he also maintained, as most abolitionists did, that nothing would be more foolish than trying to excite a slave insurrection. precisely this greatest of blunders was committed at harper's ferry. if the attempt had been made six months later, or had had even a few weeks of success, it might have enabled the slaveholders to elect at least one more president. the bad effect, in dividing the north, was much diminished by john brown's heroism at his trial and execution; but great provocation was given to the south, and especially to virginia, which soon turned out to be the most dangerous of the rebel states. business men were driven north by the dozen from cities which were preparing for war. the quarrel between northern and southern democrats kept growing fiercer; and the party broke up at the convention for 1860 into two sectional factions with antagonistic platforms and candidates. douglas still led the opposition to those southerners who maintained that the nation ought to protect slavery in the territories. a third ticket was adopted by neutrals who had been whigs or know nothings, and who now professed no principle but a vague patriotism. the republicans remained pledged to exclude slavery from the territories; but they condemned john brown, and said nothing against the fugitive slave law or in favour of emancipation in the district of columbia. their leaders had favoured free trade in 1857; but the platform was now made protectionist, in order to prevent pennsylvania from being carried again by the democrats. illinois and indiana were secured by the nomination of lincoln. he was supported enthusiastically by the young men throughout the north: public meetings were large and frequent; torchlight processions were a prominent feature of the campaign. the wealth and intellect of the nation, as well as its conscience, were now arrayed against slavery; but the clergy are said to have been less active than in 1856. lincoln had the majority in every northern state, except new jersey, california, and oregon. he also had 17,028 votes in missouri, and 8042 in other slave states which had sent delegates to the republican convention. not one of the southern electors was for lincoln; but he would have become president if all his opponents had combined against him. vi. the south had nothing to fear from congress before 1863, but she had lost control of the north. kansas would certainly be admitted sooner or later; and there would never be another slave state, for the republican plan for the territories was confirmed by their geographical position. the free states might soon become so numerous and populous as to prohibit the return of fugitives, abolish slavery in the district of columbia, repeal the clause of the constitution which allowed representation for slaves, and forbid their transportation from state to state. it was also probable, in the opinion of salmon p. chase, afterwards secretary of the treasury, and of many leading southerners, that under federal patronage there might soon be a majority for emancipation in maryland, kentucky, and other states (see _life of theodore parker_, by weiss, vol. ii., pp. 229, 519). the vote of thanks given to parker in 1855 by the hearers of his anti-slavery lecture in delaware, showed that abolitionism would eventually become predominant in the senate, as it was already in the house of representatives. this prospect was especially alarming to the comparatively few men who owned so many slaves that they could not afford emancipation on any terms. their wealth and leisure gave them complete control of politics, business, public opinion, and social life in the cotton states; where both press and pulpit were in bondage. their influence was much less in the farming states than in 1850; but they had since come into such perfect union among themselves, as to constitute the most powerful aristocracy then extant. their number may be judged from the fact that there were in 1850 about six thousand people in the cotton states who owned fifty slaves or more each. it was in the interest of these barons of slavery that south carolina seceded soon after the election, and that her example was followed by georgia and all the gulf states before lincoln was inaugurated. the garrisonists wished to have them depart in peace; but there was a strong and general preference for another compromise. lincoln and other republicans insisted that the territories should be kept sacred to freedom, and that "the union must be preserved." the question was settled by those aggressions on national property which culminated in the bombardment of fort sumter. lincoln's call to arms was answered by a great uprising of the united north. loyalty to the nation burst forth in so fierce a flame that abolitionists who had been trying for many years to extinguish it now welcomed it as the destined destroyer of slavery. war had been declared for the sole purpose of suppressing rebellion; and nothing more could at first have been attempted without violating the constitution. fugitives were sent back promptly by federal generals, and anti-slavery songs forbidden in the camps. this policy seemed necessary to keep the north united, and prevent secession of doubtful states. some of those already in revolt might thus, it was hoped, be induced to return voluntarily, or be conquered easily. these expectations were soon disappointed. a few of the slave states were kept in subjection by military force; but the people of the others united in a desperate resistance, with the aid of the slaves, who supplied the armies with food and laboured without complaint in camps and forts. but little was accomplished by the immense armies raised at the north; for the discipline was at first lax, and the generals were inefficient. many defeats of union armies by inferior forces showed how difficult it is for a nation that has enjoyed many years of peace to turn conqueror. vii. the innate incompatibility of war and liberty was disclosed by the unfortunate fact that even lincoln was obliged to consent unwillingly to war measures of a very questionable sort; for instance, the conscription and that legal tender act which was really a forced loan, and which has done much to encourage subsequent violations of the right of property by both republicans and democrats in congress. more harm than good was done to the union cause by arbitrary arrests for talking and writing against the war. phillips declared, in december, 1861, that "the right of free meetings and a free press is suspended in every square mile of the republic." "at this moment one thousand men are bastilled." hale and other republican senators remonstrated; and so patriotic an author as holmes said that teapots might be dangerous, if the lids were shut. all political prisoners but spies were released by the president early in 1862; and there were no more arbitrary arrests except under plea of military necessity. failures of union generals encouraged opposition to the war from men who still preferred compromise; and their disaffection was increased by the passage, in march, 1863, of a bill establishing a conscription and putting all the people under martial law. the commander of the military district that included ohio issued orders which forbade "declaring sympathy for the enemy," and threatened with death "all persons within our lines who harbour, protect, feed, clothe, or in any way aid the enemies." these orders were denounced as unconstitutional at a public meeting before more than ten thousand citizens. many wore badges cut from the large copper coins then in use and bearing the sacred image and superscription of liberty. this practice brought the nickname "copperheads" upon people who longed to have the south invited back on her own terms. such a policy was recommended at the meeting by vallandigham, who had recently represented ohio in congress. he called upon the people to vote against the "wicked war," and said he would never obey orders aimed against public discussion. for this speech he was arrested at night, by soldiers who broke into his house, tried by court-martial, and sentenced on may 7, 1863, to imprisonment during the remainder of the war. a writ of _habeas corpus_ was refused by the united states court, which admitted itself "powerless to enforce obedience." at the clang of war, laws are silent. indignation meetings in great cities voted that "the union cannot be restored without freedom of speech." loyal newspapers regretted that vallandigham was under "a penalty which will make him a martyr." a petition for his release was sent to lincoln, who had not ordered the arrest and admitted that it was not justified by the speech. he concluded that the culprit's behaviour towards the army had been so dangerous that he had better be sent south, beyond the lines. this was done at once; but the agitator was allowed to return through canada in the last summer of the war. even lincoln found it difficult to respect individual liberty under the pressure of military necessity. a strong government was needed; and that fact has opened the way for congress to interfere with private business, for instance in changing the tariff, during the latter part of the century much more frequently and extensively than had been done before. another significant fact is that the old controversy about internal improvements has died away since our government was centralised by war; and much money is wasted under that pretext by congress. viii. the impossibility of putting down the rebellion without interfering with slavery gradually became plain, even to men who had formerly hated abolitionism. the only question was how to turn what was the strength of the confederacy into its weakness. in march, 1862, congress forbade the army to return fugitives; and many thousand fled into the union camps, where they did good service, not only as teamsters and labourers, but even as soldiers. the number under arms amounted finally to more than a hundred thousand; and they did some of the best fighting that took place during the war. the colour prejudice at the north yielded slowly; but the leading republicans saw not only the need of more soldiers, but the justice of setting free the wives and children of men who were risking death for the nation. an emancipation league was formed during the first gloomy winter of the war; and frederick douglass said on the fourth of july amid great applause: "you must abolish slavery, or abandon the union"; "for slavery is the life of the rebellion." lincoln was already thinking of setting free the slaves in all the states which should continue in rebellion after the close of the year; and his draft of a proclamation, announcing this purpose, was read to the cabinet on july 22, 1862. the army in virginia had been so unfortunate that summer as to cause a postponement; but the victory of antietam was followed by the publication, on september 22d, of the formal notice that emancipation might be proclaimed on the 1st of january. how welcome the new policy was to loyal citizens may be judged from the approbation expressed by the clergy of all denominations, even the new school presbyterian, episcopalian, and roman catholic. when new year's day dawned there was much doubt whether the promise would be fulfilled. abolitionists and coloured people met in boston and other cities, and waited hour after hour, hoping patiently. it was evening before the proclamation began to pass over the wires. it promised freedom to all slaves in arkansas, texas, mississippi, alabama, florida, georgia, south carolina, and north carolina, besides most of those in louisiana and virginia. tennessee and some other states were not mentioned, because held to have been brought back into the union. there was to be freedom thenceforth wherever the stars and stripes waved. no wonder that the news caused great audiences to shout or weep with joy, and many to spend the night in praise and prayer. the north was now inspired by motives amply sufficient to justify even a war of conquest; and her men and money were given freely, until superiority in resources enabled general grant to close the war in april, 1865. the revolted states came back, one by one, and left slavery behind. even where it had not been formally abolished, it was practically extinct. douglass was right in saying "it was not the destruction, but the salvation of the union, that saved the slave." an amendment to the constitution, which swept away the last vestiges of slavery, and made it for ever impossible in the united states, was adopted on december 18, 1865. it had been proposed two years before; but the assent of several states then actually in revolt would have been necessary to secure the majority of three-fourths necessary for adoption of an amendment. it was by no means certain that even the nominally loyal states would all vote unanimously for emancipation. in order to increase the majority for the thirteenth amendment, the admission of nevada and colorado as states was voted by congress, despite some opposition by the democrats, in march, 1864. nevada had a population of less than 43,000 in 1870. there were not 46,000 people there in 1890, and there had been a decline since 1880. it is not likely that her inhabitants will ever be numerous enough to justify her having as much power in the senate as new york or pennsylvania. senators who represent millions of constituents have actually been prevented from passing necessary laws by senators who did not represent even twenty-five thousand people each. nevada is still the worst instance of such injustice; but it is by no means the only one; and these wrongs can never be righted, for the constitution provides that. "no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the senate." the thirteenth amendment did not, i think, come into force a day earlier than it would have done if nevada had never been admitted, for the _bona-fide_ states came forward with unexpected willingness. colorado was not fully admitted before 1876. lincoln's favouring the bills for admitting these states was a serious error, though the motive was patriotic. his beauty and grandeur of character make the brightest feature of those dark, sad years. no name stands higher among martyrs for freedom. ix. there is no grander event in all history than the emancipation of four million slaves. this was all the more picturesque because done by a conquering army; but it was all the more hateful to the former owners. they refused to educate or enfranchise the freedmen, and tried to reduce them to serfdom by heavy taxes and cruel punishments for petty crimes. the states which had seceded were kept under military dictators after the war was over; and their people were forced to accept the fourteenth amendment, which gave protection to coloured people as citizens of the united states. in 1867 there were twenty-one northern states; but only maine, new hampshire, and vermont gave the ballot freely to illiterate negroes without property. massachusetts had an educational test for all voters; there were other restrictions elsewhere; and no coloured men could vote in pennsylvania, new jersey, or the north-west. in fact, very few had ever voted anywhere when congress gave the suffrage to all the freed men for their own protection, with no discrimination against illiteracy. the result of this measure in the district of columbia was that unscrupulous politicians gained strong support from needy and ignorant voters of all colours. public money was spent recklessly; taxation became oppressive; and the public debt grew to alarming size. on june 17, 1874, when grant was president and each branch of congress was more than two-thirds republican, the house of representatives voted, ten to one, in favour of taking away the suffrage, not only from the blacks who had received it seven years before, but even from the whites who had exercised it since the beginning of the century. all local government was entrusted to three commissioners appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate. there was no opposition; for the arrangement seemed only temporary. it proved permanent. even taxation without representation has been thought better than negro suffrage; and the citizens of the national capital remain in 1899 without any voice in their own municipal government. the problem has been still more difficult in those eleven states which had to accept negro suffrage, in or after 1867, as a condition of restoration to the union. the extension of franchise made in all the states by the fifteenth amendment, in 1870, seemed such a blessing to the republicans that frederick douglass was much censured for holding that it might possibly have been attained without special supernatural assistance. it soon became plain, however, that congress ought to have given the spelling-book earlier than the ballot. the suffrage proved no protection to the freedman; for his white neighbours found that he could be more easily intimidated than educated. congress tried to prevent murder of coloured voters by having the polls guarded by federal troops and the elections supervised by united states marshals. the _habeas corpus_ act was suspended by president grant in districts where the blacks outnumbered the whites. it was hard to see what liberty had gained. the negro's worst enemies were his own candidates. they had enormous majorities in south carolina; and there, as blaine admits, they "brought shame upon the republican party," "and thus wrought for the cause of free government and equal suffrage in the south incalculable harm." between 1868 and 1872 they added ten millions by wanton extravagance to the state debt. large sums were stolen; taxes rose to six per cent.; and land was assessed far above its value, with the avowed purpose of taking it away from the whites. such management was agreed at a public meeting of coloured voters under federal protection, in charleston, in 1874, to have "ruined our people and disgraced our state." negro suffrage was declared by the new york evening post to have resulted in "organising the ignorance and poverty of the state against its property and intelligence." this took place all over the south, and also in philadelphia, new york, and other northern cities. here the illiterate vote was largely european; and the corruption of politics was facilitated by the absorption of property-holders in business. there was great need that intelligent citizens of all races, parties, and sections should work together to reform political methods sufficiently to secure honest government. some progress has already been made, but by no means so much as might have been gained if the plundered taxpayers at the south had made common cause with those at the north in establishing constitutional bulwarks against all swindlers whose strength was in the illiterate and venal vote. unfortunately, prejudice against negroes encouraged intimidation; and fraud was used freely by both parties. when elections were doubted, republican candidates were seated by federal officials and united states soldiers. these latter were not resisted; but the southern democrats made bloody attacks on the negro militia. one such fight at new orleans, on september 14, 1874, cost nearly thirty lives. what was called a republican administration collapsed that day throughout louisiana; but it was soon set up again by the army which had brought it into power. at last the negroes found out that, whoever might conquer in this civil war, they would certainly lose. they grew tired of having hostile parties fighting over them, and dropped out of politics. the republicans held full possession of the presidency, both branches of congress, the federal courts, the army, the offices in the nation's service, and most of the state governments; but they could not prevent the south from becoming solidly democratic. the new governments proved more economical, and the lives of the coloured people more secure. the last important result of negro suffrage in south carolina and louisiana was an alarming dispute as to who was elected president in 1876. the ballot has not been so great a blessing to the freedmen as it might have been if it had been preceded by national schools, and given voluntarily by state after state. these considerations justify deep regret that emancipation was not gained peaceably and gradually. facts have been given to show that it might have been if there had been more philanthropy among the clergy, more principle among the whigs, and more wisdom among the abolitionists. chapter v. emerson and other transcendentalists i. the best work for liberty has been done by men who loved her too wisely to vituperate anyone for differing from them, or to forestall the final verdict of public opinion by appealing to an ordeal by battle. such were the men who took the lead in establishing freedom of thought in america. very little individual independence of opinion was found there by tocqueville in 1831; and the flood of new ideas which had already burst forth in england was not as yet feeding the growth of originality in american literature. this sterility was largely due to preoccupation with business and politics; but even the best educated men in the united states were repressed by the dead weight of the popular theology; and channing complained that the orthodox churches were "arrayed against intellect." the silence of the pulpit about slavery is only one instance of the general indifference of the clergy to new ideas. we shall see that at least one other reform was opposed much more zealously. the circulation of new books and magazines from europe was retarded by warnings against infidelity; and colleges were carefully guarded against the invasion of new truth. intercourse with europe was fortunately close enough for the brightness of her literature and art to attract many longing eyes from new england. goethe, schiller, fichte, jean paul, mme. de stã¢el, and rousseau won readers in the original, as well as in translations; and the influence of shelley, wordsworth, coleridge, and carlyle increased rapidly. plato and kant found many worshippers, and a few students. the plain incapacity of orthodoxy to solve the pressing moral and intellectual problems of the day permitted young people who knew nothing about science to welcome the idea that the highest truth is revealed by intuitions which transcend experience and should supersede logic. this system is peculiarly that of schelling, who was then expounding it in germany; but the credit for it in america was given to his disciples, and especially to coleridge. a few admirers of these authors formed the transcendental club in boston, in september, 1836; and the new philosophy made converts rapidly. severity of climate and lack of social amusements favoured introspection. thinkers welcomed release from the tyranny of books. lovers of art were glad of the prospect of a broader culture than was possible in the shadow of puritanism. reformers seized the opportunity of appealing from pro-slavery texts and constitutions to a higher law. friends of religion hoped that the gloom of the popular theology would be dispelled by a new revelation coming direct from god into their souls. ii. a mighty declaration of religious independence was made on july 15, 1838, when emerson said to the unitarian ministers: "the need was never greater of new revelation than now." "it cannot be received at second hand." there has been "noxious exaggeration about the person of jesus." "cast aside all conformity, and acquaint men at first hand with deity." "the old is for slaves." much controversy was called out by the publication of this address. it was preceded by another in which educated men were told that they must believe themselves "inspired by the divine soul which inspires all men." "there can be no scholar without the heroic mind." "each age must write its own books." emerson had also sent out in 1836 a pamphlet entitled _nature_; and one of its first readers has called it "an 'open sesame' to all thought, and the first we had ever had." still more important were the essays on "heroism" and "self-reliance," which were part of a volume published in 1841. then emerson's readers were awakened from the torpor of submission to popular clergymen and politicians by the stern words: "whoso would be a man must be a nonconformist." "insist on yourself: never imitate." "the soul looketh steadily forwards." "it is no follower: it never appeals from itself." the russian government was so well aware of the value of these essays as to imprison a student for borrowing them. a lord mayor in england acknowledged that their influence had raised him out of poverty and obscurity. bradlaugh's first impulse to do battle for freedom in religion came from emerson's exhortation to self-reliance. the author's influence was all the greater, because he was already an impressive lecturer. there was much more demand, both in england and in america, between 1830 and 1860, for literary culture and useful knowledge than was supplied by the magazines and public libraries. the americans were peculiarly destitute of public amusements. dancing, playing cards, and going to the theatre were still under the ban; and there was not yet culture enough for concerts to be popular. there was at the same time much more interest, especially in new england, in the anti-slavery movement than has been called out for later reforms; for these have been much less picturesque. the power with which phillips and parker pleaded for the slave was enough to make lectures popular; but i have known courses attended, even in 1855, by young people who went merely because there was nowhere else to go, and who came away in blissful ignorance of the subjects. deeper than all other needs lay that of a live religion. emerson was among the first to satisfy this demand. his earliest lecture, in 1833, took a scientific subject, as was then customary; but he soon found that he had the best possible opportunity for declaring that "from within, or from behind, a light shines through upon things and makes us aware that we are nothing, but the light is all." invitations were frequent as early as 1844, though the audience was usually small; and his genius became generally recognised after his return, in 1848, from a visit to england. there scholarship was high enough to give him, as early as 1844, thousands of readers for that little book on _nature_, of which only a few hundred copies had been sold in america. invitations to lecture came from all parts of great britain, and in such numbers that many had to be declined. the aristocracy of rank as well as of intellect helped to crowd the halls in manchester, edinburgh, and london. once at least, he had more than two thousand hearers. the newspapers reported his lectures at such length that much of his time was spent in writing new ones. he had not intended to be anyone's guest; but invitations were so numerous and cordial, that he could seldom escape into solitude. he wrote to his wife, "my reception here is really a premium on authorship." success in england increased his opportunities, as well as his courage, to speak in america. invitations grew more and more frequent, and compensation more liberal. his thrilling voice was often heard, thenceforth, in the towns and cities of new england. in 1850, he went to lecture at st. louis, and met audience after audience on the way. during the next twenty years he spent at least two months of discomfort, every winter, lecturing in city after city throughout the free states. everywhere he gave his best thought, and as much as possible of it, in every lecture. logical order seemed less important; and he spent much more time in condensing than in arranging the sentences selected from his note-books. strikingly original ideas, which had flashed upon him at various times, were presented one after another as if each were complete in itself. the intermixture of quotations and anecdotes did not save the general character from becoming often chaotic; but the chaos was always full of power and light. star after star rose rapidly upon his astonished and delighted hearers. they sometimes could not understand him; but they always felt lifted up. parker described him in 1839 as pouring forth "a stream of golden atoms of thought"; and lowell called him some twenty years later "the most steadily attractive lecturer in america." these young men and others of like aspirations walked long distances to visit him or hear him speak in public. the influence of his lectures increased that of the books into which they finally crystallised. in 1860, he had made his way of thinking so common that his _conduct of life_ had a sale of 2500 copies in two days. his readers were nowhere numerous, outside of boston; but they were, and are, to be found everywhere. lovers of liberty on both sides of the atlantic were brought into closer fellowship by books singularly free from anti-british prejudice; but he was so thoroughly american that he declared, even in london, that the true aristocracy must be founded on merit, for "birth has been tried and failed." this lecture was often repeated, and was finally given in 1881 as his last word in public. introspective and retiring habits kept him for some time from engaging actively in the reforms which were in full blast about 1840; but lowell said he was "the sleeping partner who has supplied a great part of their capital." his words about slavery were few and cold before the fugitive slave bill was passed in 1850. indignation at this command to kidnap made him publicly advise his neighbours to break the wicked law. he spoke in support of a free soil candidate in 1852, and for the republican party in 1854; but john brown called out much more of his praise than any other abolitionist. the attempt of the garrisonians to persuade the north to suffer the seceders to depart in peace won his active aid; but the speech which he tried to deliver on their platform, early in 1861, was made inaudible by a mob of enthusiasts for maintaining the union by war. he rejoiced in emancipation; but it was not achieved until he had lost much of his mental vigour. this, in fact, was at its height between 1840 and 1850. his last volumes were in great part made up of his earliest writings. there was no change in his opinions; and his address in 1838 was fully approved by him when he re-read it shortly before his death. his most useful contribution to the cause of reform was the characteristic theory which underlies all he wrote. in the essays published in 1841, he states it thus: "every man knows that to his involuntary perceptions a perfect faith is due."... "we know truth when we see it." from first to last he held that "books are for the scholar's idle hours."... "a sound mind will derive its principles from insight."... "truth is always present; it only needs to lift the iron lids of the mind's eye to read its oracles." this was a doctrine much more revolutionary than luther's. emerson proclaimed independence of the bible as well as of the church. his innate reverence was expressed in such sayings as "the relations of the soul to the divine spirit are so pure, that it is profane to interpose helps." love of spontaneity made him declare that "creeds are a disease of the intellect." it was in his indignation at the fugitive-slave law that he said, "we should not forgive the clergy for taking on every issue the immoral side." his treatment of religious institutions was not perfectly consistent; but the aim of all his writings was to encourage heroic thought. he wrote the gospel of nonconformity. personal knowledge of his influence justified bishop huntington in saying that he has "done more to unsettle the faith of the educated young men of our age and country in the christianity of the bible than any other twenty men combined." how desirous emerson was to have the inner light obeyed promptly and fully may be judged from his describing his own habit of writing as follows: "i would not degrade myself by casting about for a thought, nor by waiting for it."... "if it come not spontaneously, it comes not rightly at all." much of the peculiar charm of his books is due to his having composed them thus. again and again he says: "it is really of little importance what blunders in statement we make, so only that we make no wilful departure from the truth."... "why should i give up my thought, because i cannot answer an objection to it?"... "with consistency, a great soul has simply nothing to do."... "speak what you think now in hard words, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict everything you said to-day."... "i hope in these days we have heard the last of conformity and consistency. let the words be"... "ridiculous henceforward." this is not meant for mere theory. we are told often that "virtue is the spontaneity of the will."... "our spontaneous action is always the best."... "the only right is what is after my own constitution, the only wrong what is against it." iii. the passages quoted in the last paragraph are of great importance; for they did more than any others to abolish slavery. its defenders appealed to the bible as confidently as to the national constitution; but the garrisonians declared with emerson, that "the highest virtue is always against the law." they were confident that they knew the truth as soon as they saw it, and had no need to answer objections. the same faith in spontaneous impressions inspired the suffragists, of whom the next chapter will give some account. agitations against established institutions sprang up thickly under the first step of transcendentalism. church, state, family ties, and business relations seemed all likely to be broken up. lowell says that "everybody had a mission (with a capital m) to attend to everybody else's business."... "conventions were held for every hitherto inconceivable purpose." "communities were established where everything was to be in common but common sense." the popular authors about 1840 were mostly transcendentalists; and nearly every transcendentalist was a socialist. some forty communities were started almost simultaneously; but not one-half lasted through the second year. one of the first failures was led by a man who had been working actively against slavery, but who had come to think that the only way to attack it was to try to do away with all private property whatever. brook farm lasted half a dozen years, with a success due partly to the high culture of the inmates, and partly to some recognition of the right of private ownership. the general experience, however, was that a transcendentalist was much more willing to make plans for other people, than to conform in his own daily life to regulations proposed by anyone else. the very multiplicity of the reforms, started in the light of the new philosophy, did much to prevent most of them from attaining success. we have seen how slavery was abolished; but no one should regret the failure of most of the transcendentalist schemes. the subsidence of socialism was especially fortunate on account of the frankness with which matrimony was repudiated by the system most in vogue, that of fourier. he had followed the spontaneous and instinctive impulses of man with the utmost consistency. other socialists have been more cautious; but the problem of reconciling family ties with communal life has not been solved. some of the english transcendentalists published a pamphlet recommending systematic encouragement of licentiousness; and an american philosopher, who turned roman catholic in 1844, declared that free love was "transcendentalism in full bloom." the term "higher law" was used to support the pretence of some obligation more binding than marriage. a free-love convention was held in new york about 1857; and very lax ideas had been already announced by active apostles of spontaneity known as spiritualists. no writer has done more to encourage purity of thought than emerson. his life was stainless; but perhaps the best proof of this is his saying, "our moral nature is vitiated by any interference of our will"; and again, "if the single man plant himself indomitably on his instincts, and there abide, the huge world will come round to him." no man ever wrote thus who was not either notoriously corrupt or singularly innocent. policemen and jailers exist largely for the purpose of preventing people from planting themselves on their instincts--for instance, those which lead to theft, drunkenness, and murder. socialism would perhaps be practicable if industry were as natural as laziness. almost all moralists have thought it necessary to insist on constant interference with the instincts. so earnest and able a transcendentalist as miss cobbe gives these definitions in her elaborate treatise on _intuitive morals_: "happiness is the gratification of all the desires of our nature." "virtue is the renunciation of such of them as are forbidden by the moral law." theodore parker insisted on the duty of subordinating "the low qualities to the higher," but emerson held, as already mentioned, that "virtue is the spontaneity of the will." such language was largely due to his perception that all activity, however innocent, of thought and feeling had been too much repressed by the puritanical churches, in whose shadow he was brought up. the same mistake was made in the dark ages; and the reaction from that asceticism was notorious during the renaissance. the early unitarians overrated human nature in their hostility to the trinitarians, who underrated it; and emerson went beyond his original associates in the unitarian ministry because he was more transcendental. the elevation of his own character encouraged him to hope that our higher qualities are so strong as to need only freedom to be enabled to keep all impure desire in subjection. it was a marked change of tone when in 1876 he allowed these words to be printed in one of his books: "self-control is the rule. you have in you there a noisy, sensual savage which you are to keep down, and turn all his strength to beauty." similar passages, especially a censure of the pruriency of fourierism, occur in essays which were probably written some years earlier, but were not published until after his death. most of the transcendentalists have fortunately acknowledged the duty of self-control much more plainly and readily. it is a fair question whether they were more consistent. how does anyone know which of his instincts and impulses to control and which to cultivate? what better light has he than is given either by his own experience or by that of his parents and other teachers? i acknowledge the power of conscience; but its dictates differ so much in different individuals as to be plainly due to early education. thus even a transcendentalist has to submit himself to experience; as he would not do if it were really transcended by his philosophy. emerson himself was singularly fortunate in his "involuntary perceptions." those of most men are dark with superstition and prejudice. it is what we have heard earliest and oftenest that recurs most spontaneously. if all mankind had continued satisfied to "trust the instinct to the end though it can render no reason," we should still believe in the divine right of kings, and the supremacy of evil spirits. there would have been very little persecution if men could have known truth when they saw it. parker believed devoutly in the intuitions, but he said that emerson exaggerated their accuracy to such an extent that he "discourages hard and continuous thought." "some of his followers will be more faithful than he to the false principles which he lays down, and will think themselves wise because they do not study, and inspired because they say what outrages common sense." the danger of following instinctive impressions in regard to the currency has been shown in recent american politics. anyone who is familiar with scientific methods will see where emerson's failed. it is true that he prized highly many of the results of science, especially the theory of evolution as it was taught by lamarck and other forerunners of darwin. his inability to see the value of investigation and verification is disclosed plainly; and he preferred to have people try to "build science on ideas." he acknowledged that too much time was given to latin and greek in college; but his wishes in regard to study of the sciences were so old-fashioned as to call out a remonstrance from agassiz. iv. how little scientific culture there was before 1860 may be judged from the rapid growth of spiritualism. transcendentalism had shown tremendous strength in helping people escape from the old churches; but it was of little use in building new ones. churches exist for the express purpose of enabling believers in a common faith to unite in public worship. no society could be so holy as solitude to a sincere transcendentalist; and the beliefs of his neighbours seemed much less sacred than his own peculiar intuitions. exceptional eloquence might make him pastor of a large society; but it began to decline when he ceased to speak. transcendentalism was excellent material for weathercocks, but it had to be toughened by adulteration with baser metal before it supplied any solid foundation for a new temple. most of the people who had lost faith in the old churches were longing after some better way of receiving knowledge about the heavenly world. millions of americans and europeans rejoiced to hear that spirits had begun to communicate by mysterious raps at rochester, n. y., on the last day of march, 1848. messages from the departed were soon received in many places; but the one thing needful was that the room be filled with believers; and a crowded hall was peculiarly likely to be favoured with strange sounds and sights. here was the social element necessary for founding a new religion. it appealed as confidently as its rivals to miracles and prophecies, while it had the peculiar attraction of being preached mainly by young women. instinctive impulses were regarded as revelations from the spirit-land, but not considered infallible except by the very superstitious. the highest authority of an intelligent spiritualist has usually been his own individual intuition. some of the earliest lectures on that platform had little faith in anything but science, and put their main strength into announcing those revelations of geology which have dethroned genesis. one of the first teachers of evolution in america was a spiritualist named denton, who held a public debate in ohio, in 1858, when he defended the theory of man's gradual development from lower animals against a preacher named garfield, who became president of the united states. some eminent scientists have become converts to spiritualism; but its general literature has shown little influence from scientific methods of thought. the advocates of the new religion have owed much of their success to impassioned eloquence. opposition to christianity has been expressed boldly and frequently. girls of seventeen have declared, before large audiences, that all the creeds and ceremonies of the churches are mere idolatry. among the earliest communications which were published as dictated by angels in the new dispensation were denials of the miracles of jesus, and denunciations of the clergy as "the deadliest foes of progress." an eminent unitarian divine declared in 1856, that "the doctrines professedly revealed by a majority of the spirits, whose words we have seen quoted, are at open war with the new testament." some moderate spiritualists have kept in friendly relations with liberal churches; but many others have been in active co-operation with the most aggressive of unbelievers in religion. the speakers at the spiritualist anniversary in 1897 said to one another, "you and i are christs, just as jesus was," and claimed plainly that "our religion" was distinct from every "christian denomination." spiritualists have all, i think, been in favour of woman suffrage; and the majority were abolitionists. some of garrison's companions, however, deserted in the heat of the battle, saying that there was nothing more to do, for the spirits would free the slaves. anti-slavery lecturers in the north-west found themselves crowded out of halls and school-houses by trance-speakers and mediums. one of the most eminent of converts made by the latter, judge edmonds, was prominent among the defenders of slavery in the free states. freedom from any definite creed or rigid code of morality joined with the constant supply of ever-varying miracles in attracting converts. those in the united states were soon estimated in millions. spiritualism swept over great britain so rapidly that it was declared by the _westminster review_ to give quite as much promise as christianity had done, at the same age, of becoming a universal religion. no impartial observer expects that now. believers are still to be found in all parts of europe and south america, and they are especially numerous in the united states. proselytes do not seem to be coming in anywhere very thickly; and the number of intelligent men and women who have renounced spiritualism, after a brief trial, is known to be large. the new religion has followed the old ones into the policy of standing on the defensive. one instance of this is the opposition to investigation. a mediums' national defence association was in open operation before 1890. a leading spiritualist paper suggested in 1876, that the would-be inquirer should be "tied securely hand and foot, and placed in a strong iron cage, with a rope or small chain put tightly about his neck, and fastened to an iron ring in the wall." early in 1897, some young men who claimed to have exposed an impostor, before a large audience in the spiritualist temple in boston, were prosecuted by his admirers on the charge of having disturbed public worship. v. during the last quarter of the century, free love has been much less prominent than before in spiritualistic teachings; but the only americans who were able to proclaim liberty without encouraging self-indulgence, prior to 1870, were the logical and scholarly transcendentalists. theodore parker, for instance, is to be reckoned among the followers of hegel rather than of schelling; for he tried by hard study and deep thought to build up a consistent system of religion and morality by making deductions from a few central principles which he revered as great primary intuitions, held always and everywhere sacred. his faith in his ideas of god, duty, and immortality was very firm; and he did his best to live and think accordingly. he began to preach in 1836, the year of the publication of emerson's first book, but soon found his work hindered by an idolatry of the bible, then prevalent even among unitarians. familiarity with german scholarship enabled him to teach his people to think rationally. his brethren in the unitarian ministry were alarmed; and a sermon which he preached in boston against the mediatorship of jesus made it impossible for him to occupy an influential pulpit. the lectures which he delivered that year in a hall in the city, and published in 1842, won the support of many seekers for a new religion. they voted that he should "have a chance to be heard in boston"; and on february 16, 1845, he preached in a large hall to what soon became a permanent and famous congregation. thither, as parker said, he "came to build up piety and morality; to pull down only what cumbered the ground." his main purpose to the last was to teach "the naturalness of religion," "the adequacy of man for his functions" without priestly aid, and, most important of all, that superiority of the real deity to the pictures drawn in the orthodox creeds, which parker called "the infinite perfection of god." he was singularly successful in awakening the spirit of religion in men who were living without it, but the plainness with which he stated his faith, in sermons which had a large circulation, called out many attacks. prayers were publicly offered up in boston, asking that the lord would "put a hook in this man's jaws, so that he may not be able to preach, or else remove him out of the way and let his influence die with him." no controversy hindered his labouring systematically for the moral improvement of his hearers, who sometimes amounted to three thousand. his sermons are full of definite appeals for self-control and self-culture; and his personal interest in every individual who could be helped was so active that he soon had seven thousand names on his pastoral visiting list. appeals for advice came from strangers at a distance, and were never neglected. not one of the great national sins, however popular, escaped his severe rebuke; and he became prominent as early as 1845 among the preachers against slavery. he was active in many ways as an abolitionist, but was not a disunionist. he seldom quitted his pulpit without speaking for the slave; and every phase of the anti-slavery movement is illustrated in his published works. pro-slavery politicians were as bitter as orthodox clergymen against him; and he describes himself as "continually fired upon for many years from the barroom and pulpit." his resistance to the fugitive slave law caused him to be arrested and prosecuted, in company with wendell phillips, by the officials of the national government. desire to awaken the people to the danger that lay in the growth of the national sin made him begin to lecture in 1844. invitations flowed in freely; and he said, after he had broken down under the joint burden of overwork and of exposure in travelling: "since 1848, i have lectured eighty or a hundred times each year, in every northern state east of the mississippi,--once also in a slave state and on slavery itself." this was his favourite subject, but he never missed an opportunity of encouraging intellectual independence; and he found he could say what he pleased. the total number of hearers exceeded half a million; among them were the most influential men in the north; and he never failed to make himself understood. no one else did so much to develop that love of the people for union and liberty which secured emancipation. his works have no such brilliancy as emerson's; but they burned at the time of need with a much more warm and steady light. no words did more to melt the chains of millions of slaves. no excess of individualism made him shrink back, like emerson, from joining the abolitionists; or discredit them, as thoreau did, by publicly renouncing his allegiance to massachusetts in 1854, when that state stood foremost on the side of freedom. the account of a solitary life in the woods, which thoreau published that year, has done much to encourage independence of public opinion; and americans of that generation needed sadly to be told that they took too little amusement, especially out of doors, and made too great haste to get rich. their history, however, like that of the swiss, scotch, and ancient athenians, proves that it is the industrious, enterprising, money-making nations that are best fitted for maintaining free institutions. as for individual independence of thought and action, the average man will enjoy much more of it, while he keeps himself in comfortable circumstances by regular but not excessive work, than he could if he were to follow the advice of an author who prided himself on not working more than "about six weeks in a year," and on enduring privations which apparently shortened his days. thoreau's self-denial was heroic; but he sometimes failed to see the right of his neighbours to indulge more expensive tastes than his own. the necessary conditions of health and comfort for different individuals vary much more than he realised. many a would-be reformer still complains of the "luxury" of people who find physical rest or mental culture in innocent ways, not particularly to his own fancy. such censures are really intolerant. they are survivals of that meddlesome disposition which has sadly restricted freedom of trade, amusement, and worship. we have had only one emerson; but many scholarly transcendentalists have laboured to construct the new morality needed in the nineteenth century. parker's work has peculiar interest, because done in a terrible emergency; but others have toiled as profitably though less famously. the search after fundamental intuitions has led to a curious variety of statements which agree only in the assumption of infallibility; but the result has been the general agreement of liberal preachers in teaching a system of ethics at once free from superstition, bigotry, or asceticism, and at the same time vigorous enough to repress impure desire and encourage active philanthropy. theology has improved in liberality, as well as in claiming less prominence. thus the clergy have come into much more friendly relations with the philosophers than in the middle of the century. our popular preachers quote emerson; but really they follow, though often unconsciously, the methods of hegel and kant. this increases their sympathy with parker, who has the advantage over emerson of having believed strongly in personal immortality. his works are circulated by the very denomination which cast him out. the most popular preachers in many sects openly accept him and emerson among their highest authorities. transcendentalism has become the foundation of liberal christianity. this agreement is not, however, necessary and may not be permanent. hegel's great success was in bringing forward the old dogmas with new claims to infallibility. when some of his disciples showed that his methods were equally well adapted for the destruction of orthodoxy, schelling gave his last lectures in its defence. the singular fitness of traditions for acceptance as intuitions has been proved, late in the century, by the rev. joseph cook in boston as well as by many speakers at the concord school of philosophy. the reactionary tendency is already so strong that it may yet become predominant. we must not forget that shelley called himself an atheist, or that among hegel's most famous followers were strauss and renan. who can say whether unbelief, orthodoxy, or liberal christianity is the legitimate outcome of this ubiquitous philosophy? transcendentalism has been the inspiration of the century. its influence has been mighty in behalf of political liberty and social progress. but there was no inconsistency in hegel's opposing the education of women, and denying the possibility of a great republic, or in carlyle's defending absolute monarchy and chattel slavery, or in parker's successor in boston trying to justify the russian despotism. transcendentalism is a swivel-gun, which can be fired easily in any direction. perhaps it can be used most easily against science. the difference in methods, of course, is irreconcilable, as is seen in emerson; and the brilliant results attained by herbert spencer have been sadly disparaged by leading transcendentalists in the conventions of the free religious association, as well as in sessions of the concord school of philosophy. vi. the necessary tendency of transcendentalism may be seen in the agitation against vivisection, which was begun in 1863 by miss cobbe. she was aided by carlyle, browning, ruskin, lecky, mar-tineau, and other transcendentalists, one of whom, rev. w. h. channing, had been prominent in america about 1850. most of the active anti-vivisectionists, however, belong to the sex which has been peculiarly ready to adopt unscientific methods of thought. it is largely due to women with a taste for metaphysics or theology that the agitation still goes on in great britain and the united states. attempts ought certainly to be made to prevent torture of animals by inexperienced students, or by teachers who merely wish to illustrate the working of well-known laws. there ought to be little difficulty in securing the universal adoption of such statutes as were passed by parliament in 1876. vivisection was then forbidden, except when carried out for the purpose of important discoveries, by competent investigators duly licensed, and in regular laboratories. it was further required that complete protection against suffering pain be given by anaesthetics, though these last could be dispensed with in exceptional cases covered by a special license. the animal must at all events be killed as soon as the experiment was over. this law actually put a stop to attempts to find some antidote to the poison of the cobra, which slays thousands of hindoos annually. professor ferrier, who was discovering the real functions of various parts of the brain, was prosecuted in 1881 by the anti-vivisection society for operating without a license upon monkeys; but the charge turned out to be false. the real question since 1876 has been as to whether vivisection should be tolerated as an aid to scientific and medical discovery. darwin's opinion on this point is all the more valuable, because he hated all cruelty to animals. in april, 1881, he wrote to _the times_ as follows: "i know that physiology cannot possibly progress except by means of experiments on living animals; and i feel the deepest conviction that he who retards the progress of physiology commits a crime against mankind.... no one, unless he is grossly ignorant of what science has done for mankind, can entertain any doubt of the incalculable benefits which will hereafter be derived from physiology, not only by man but by the lower animals. look, for instance, at pasteur's results in modifying the germs of the most malignant diseases, from which, as it so happens, animals will in the first place receive more relief than man. let it be remembered how many lives, and what a fearful amount of suffering, have been saved by the knowledge gained of parasitic worms, through the experiments of virchow and others upon living animals." another high authority, carpenter, says that vivisection has greatly aided physicians in curing heart disease, as well as in preventing blood-poisoning by taking antiseptic precautions. much has been learned as to the value of hypodermic injections, and also of bromide of potassium, chloral, salicylic acid, cocaine, amyl, digitalis, and strychnia. some of these drugs are so poisonous that they would never have been administered to human beings if they could not have been tried previously on the lower animals. the experiments in question have recently assisted in curing yellow fever, sunstroke, diabetes, epilepsy, erysipelas, cholera, consumption, and trichinosis. the german professors of medicine testified in a body that vivisection has regenerated the healing art. similar testimony was given in 1881 by the three thousand members of the international medical congress; and the british medical association has taken the same position. the facts are so plain that an english judge, who was a vice-president of miss cobbe's society, admitted that "vivisection enlarges knowledge"; but he condemned it as ''displeasing to almighty god.'' it was said to go "hand in hand with atheism"; and several of the episcopalian bishops, together with cardinal manning, opposed it as irreligious. transcendentalists are compelled by their philosophy to decide on the morality of all actions solely by the inner light, and not permitted to pay any attention to consequences. many of them in england and america agreed to demand the total suppression of vivisection, "even should it chance to prove useful." this ground was taken in 1877 by miss cobbe's society; and she declared, five years later, in _the fortnightly_, that she was determined "to stop the torture of animals, a grave moral offence, with the consequences of which--be they fortunate or the reverse--we are no more concerned than with those of any other evil deed." later she said: "into controversies concerning the utility of vivisection, i for one refuse to enter"; and she published a leaflet advising her sisters to follow her example. ruskin took the same ground. these hasty enthusiasts were equally indifferent to another fact, which ought not to have been overlooked, namely, that suffering was usually prevented by the use of anaesthetics, which are indispensable for the success of many experiments. the bill for prohibiting any vivisection was brought into the house of lords in 1879; but was opposed by a nobleman who presided over the society for the prevention of cruelty to animals; and it was lost by 16 votes against 97. the house of commons refused even to take action on the subject, despite four years of agitation. thus the right of scientific research was finally secured. miss cobbe was one of the noblest of women; but even she was made blind by her philosophy to the right of people who prefer scientific methods to act up to their convictions. garrison, too, was notoriously unable to do justice to anyone, even an abolitionist, who did not agree with him. there is nothing in transcendentalism to prevent intolerance. this philosophy has done immense service to the philanthropy as well as the poetry of the nineteenth century; but human liberty will gain by the discovery that no such system of metaphysics can be anything better than a temporary bridge for passing out of the swamps of superstition, across the deep and furious torrent of scepticism, into a land of healthy happiness and clear, steady light. chapter vi. platform versus pulpit during the nineteenth century the authority of preachers and pastors has diminished plainly; and this is largely due to a fact of which emerson spoke thus: "we should not forgive the clergy for taking on every issue the immoral side." this was true in england, where the great reforms were achieved for the benefit of the masses, and against the interest of the class to which most clergymen belonged. the american pastor seldom differed from his parishioners, unless he was more philanthropic. he was usually in favour of the agitation against drunkenness; and he had a right to say that the disunionism of phillips and garrison, together with their systematically repelling sympathy in the south, went far to offset their claim for his support. it was difficult, during many years, to see what ought to be done in the north. when a practical issue was made by the attack on kansas, the clergy took the side of freedom almost unanimously in new england, and quite generally in rural districts throughout the free states. the indifference of the ministers to abolitionism, before 1854, was partly due, however, to their almost universal opposition to a kindred reform, which they might easily have helped. i. it was before garrison began his agitation that frances wright denounced the clergy for hindering the intellectual emancipation of her sex; and her first ally was not _the liberator_, but _the investigatory_ though both began almost simultaneously. she pleaded powerfully for the rights of slaves, as well as of married women, before large audiences in the middle states as early as 1836, when these reforms were also advocated by mrs. ernestine l. rose, a liberal jewess. these ladies spoke to men as well as women; and so next summer did miss angelina grimkã©, whose zeal against slavery had lost her her home in south carolina. her first public lecture was in massachusetts; and the congregationalist ministers of that state promptly issued a declaration that they had a right to say who should speak to their parishioners, and that the new testament forbade any woman to become a "public reformer." their action called out the spirited poem in which whittier said: "what marvel if the people learn to claim the right of free opinion? what marvel if at times they spurn the ancient yoke of your dominion?" garrison now came out in favour of "the rights of women," and thus lost much of the support which he was receiving from the country clergy generally in new england. the final breach was in may, 1840, at the meeting of the national association of abolitionists in new york city. there came garrison with more than five hundred followers from new england. they gained by a close vote a place on the business committee for that noble woman, abby kelley. ministers and church members seceded and started a new anti-slavery society, which carried away most of the members and even the officers of the old one. the quarrel was embittered by the vote of censure, passed at this meeting upon those abolitionists who had dared to nominate a candidate of their own for the presidency without leave from mr. garrison; but the chief trouble came from the prejudice which, that same summer, caused most of the members of the world's anti-slavery convention in london, to refuse places to harriet martineau and other ladies as delegates. this exclusion was favoured by all the eight clergymen who spoke, and by no other speakers so earnestly. among the rejected delegates were mrs. lucretia mott and mrs. elizabeth cady stanton; and they resolved, that night, to hold a convention for the benefit of their sex in america. the volume of essays which emerson published in 1844 praised "the new chivalry in behalf of woman's rights"; and the other transcendentalists in america came, one after another, to the same position. mrs. stanton and mrs. mott called their convention in that year of revolutions, 1848, on july 19th. the place was the methodist church at seneca falls, in central new york. the reformers found the door locked against them; and a little boy had to climb in at the window. the declaration of independence, adopted on july 4, 1776, furnished a model for a protest against the exclusion of girls from high schools and colleges, the closing of almost every remunerative employment against the sex, and the laws forbidding a married woman to own any property, whether earned or inherited by her, even her own clothing. this declaration was adopted unanimously; but a demand for the suffrage had only a small majority. not a single minister is known to have been present; but there were two at a second convention, that august, in rochester, where the unitarian church was full of men and women. there were more than twenty-five thousand ministers in the united states; but only three are mentioned among the members of the national convention, held at worcester, massachusetts, in october, 1850, by delegates from eleven states. as phillips was returning from this meeting, theodore parker said to him, "wendell, why do you make a fool of yourself?" the great preacher came out a few years later in behalf of the rights of women; but it was long before a single religious newspaper caught up with _the investigator_. how the clergy generally felt was shown in 1851, at akron, in northern ohio. there episcopalian, presbyterian, baptist, methodist, and universalist ministers appealed to the bible in justification of the subjugation of women. there was no reply until they began to boast of the intellectual superiority of their own sex. then an illiterate old woman who had been a slave arose and said: "what 's dat got to do with women's rights, or niggers' rights either? if my cup won't hold but a pint, and yourn holds a quart, would n't ye be mean not to let me have my little half-measure full?" the convention was with her; but the bible argument was not to be disposed of easily. the general tone of both testaments is in harmony with the familiar texts attributed to paul and peter. these latter passages were written, in all probability, when the position of women was changing for the better throughout the roman empire: and the original words, asserting the authority of husbands, are the same as are used in regard to the power of masters over slaves. such language had all the more weight, because the ministers had been brought up as members of the ruling sex. they may have also been biassed by the fact that their profession depends, more than any other, for success upon the unpaid services in many ways of devoted women. emancipation was by no means likely to promote work for the church. there was an audience of two thousand at syracuse, in 1852, when what was called the "bloomer convention," on account of the short dresses worn by some members, took up a resolution, declaring that the bible recognises the rights of women. mrs. rose said that the reform had merits enough of its own, and needed no justification by any book. a letter was read from mrs. stanton, saying that "among the clergy we find our most violent enemies, those most opposed to any change in woman's position." the accuracy of this statement was readily admitted, after a reverend gentleman had denounced the infidelity of the movement, in a speech described as "indecent" and "coarsely offensive" in the new york herald; and the resolution was lost. the lady who offered it was ordained soon after for the congregationalist ministry; but she was obliged to confess, at the woman's rights' convention, in 1853, that "the church has so far cast me off, that to a great extent i have been obliged to go to just such infidels as those around me for aid to preach my christian views." it was at this meeting that a doctor of divinity, and pastor of a prominent society, denounced the reform so violently that mr. garrison called him a blackguard and a rowdy, with the result of having his nose pulled by the champion of the church militant. there were many such unseemly manifestations of clerical wrath. the _history of woman suffrage_, which was edited by mrs. stanton and other leading reformers, said, in 1881: "the deadliest opponents to the recognition of the equal rights of women have ever been among the orthodox clergy." the unitarians were more friendly; but i do not think that the reform was openly favoured, even as late as 1860, by one clergyman in a thousand out of the whole number in the united states. the proportion was even smaller in europe. even as late as 1878, it was resolved by the woman suffrage convention at rochester, n. y., "that as the first duty of every individual is self-development, the lessons of self-sacrifice and obedience taught woman by the christian church have been fatal, not only to her own vital interests but through her to those of the race." influences were already at work, however, which have made the relations of platform and pulpit comparatively friendly in this respect. the women of the north showed their patriotism, during the great war, by establishing and managing the sanitary commission, the freedman's bureau, and the woman's loyal national league. important elections were carried in 1862 by the eloquence of anna e. dickinson, for the republican party; and it has often since had similar help. the success of the women's christian temperance union and other partly philanthropic and partly religious organisations, has proved the ability of women to think and act independently. many of their demands have been granted, one by one; and public opinion has changed so much in their favour, that they ceased long ago to encounter any general hostility from the clergy in the northern states. even there, however, women still find it much too difficult for them to enter a peculiarly easy, honourable, and lucrative profession. their elocutionary powers are shown on the stage as well as the platform. their capacity for writing sermons is plain to every one familiar with recent literature. their ability to preach is recognised cordially in the salvation army, as well as by spiritualists, quakers, unitarians, and universalists. much of the pastoral work is done by women, in actual fact; and more ought to be. the sunday-school, choir, social gathering, and other important auxiliaries to the pulpit are almost entirely in female hands. women enjoy practically the monopoly of those kinds of church work for which there is no pay; and their exclusion from the kind which is paid highly, in the largest and wealthiest denominations, looks too much like a preference of clergymen to look after the interest of their own sex. the most orthodox churches are the most exclusive; and the same forces which are driving bigotry out of the pulpits are bringing women in. this reform is one of many in which a much more advanced position has been taken by new england and the far west than by the south; and the american transcendentalists led public opinion in the section where most of them lived. in great britain the struggle has been carried on in the interest of the middle and lower classes, and under much opposition from the class to which most admirers of philosophy belonged. no wonder that one of the keenest critics of transcendentalism was prominent among the champions in england of the oppressed sex. john stuart mill declared, in his widely circulated book on _the subjection of women_, that "nobody ever arrived at a general rule of duty by intuition." he held that the legal subjection of wives to husbands bore more resemblance, as far as the laws were concerned, to slavery, than did any other relationship existing in great britain in 1869. he did not argue from any theory of natural rights, but pointed out the advantage to society of women's developing their capacities freely. he also insisted on the duty of government not to restrict the liberty of any woman, except when necessary to prevent her diminishing that of her neighbours. this last proposition will be examined in the next chapter. the fact that mill's great work for freedom was done through the press, and not on the platform, makes it unnecessary to say more about him in this place. ii. clergymen, like transcendentalists, in england were generally conservative, or reactionary; and the friends of reform were much more irreligious than in america. their appeal against the authority of church and bible was not to intuition but to science; and they were aided by lyell's demonstration, in 1830, that geology had superseded genesis. working-men were warned in lectures, tracts, and newspapers against immorality in the old testament; and even the new was said to discourage resistance to oppression and efforts to promote health, comfort, and knowledge. the most popular of these champions against superstition and tyranny was bradlaugh. he began to lecture in 1850, when only seventeen, and continued for forty years to speak and write diligently. his atheism obliged him to undergo poverty for many years, and much hardship. he charged no fee for lecturing, went willingly to the smallest and poorest places, and was satisfied with whatever was brought in by selling tickets, often for only twopence each. he once travelled six hundred miles in forty-eight hours, to deliver four lectures which did not repay his expenses. many a hall which he had engaged was closed against him; and he was thus obliged to speak in the open air one rainy sunday, when he had two thousand hearers. at such times his voice pealed out like a trumpet; his information was always accurate; opposition quickened the flow of ideas; and he had perfect command of the people's english. his great physical strength was often needed to defend him against violence, sometimes instigated by the clergy. he had much to say against the old testament; but no struggle for political liberty, whether at home or abroad, failed to receive his support; and he was especially active for that great extension of suffrage which took place in 1867. his knowledge that women would vote against him did not prevent his advocating their right to the ballot; but it was in the name of "the great mass of the english people" that he was an early supporter of the cause of union and liberty against the slave-holders who seceded. in 1866 he became president of the national society of secularists, who believe only in "the religion of the present life." most of the members were agnostics; and one of bradlaugh's many debates was with holyoake, the founder of secularism, on the question whether that term ought to be used instead of atheism. the society was so well organised that only a telegram from the managers was needed to call out a public meeting anywhere in england. among bradlaugh's hearers in america in 1873 were emerson, sumner, garrison, phillips, and o. b. frothingham. he won soon after a powerful ally in a clergyman's wife, who had been driven from her home by her husband because she would not partake of the communion. mrs. besant began to lecture in 1874, and with views like bradlaugh's; but her chief interest was in woman suffrage. both held strict views about the obligation of marriage; and their relations were blameless. bradlaugh's place in history is mainly as a champion of the right of atheists to sit in parliament. he was elected by the shoemakers of northampton in 1880, when oaths of allegiance were exacted in the house of commons. quakers, however, could affirm; and he asked the same privilege. as this was refused, he offered to take the oath, and declared that the essential part would be "binding upon my honour and conscience." this, too, was forbidden; but there was much discussion, not only in parliament but throughout england, as to his right to affirm. his friends held two hundred public meetings in a single week, and sent in petitions with two hundred thousand signatures during twelve months. the liberal newspapers were on his side; but the methodist and episcopalian pulpits resounded with denials of the right of atheists to enter parliament on any terms. among the expounders of this view in leading periodicals were cardinal manning and other prominent ecclesiastics. they had the support of the archbishop of canterbury, as well as of many petitions from sunday-schools. public opinion showed itself so plainly that brad-laugh was finally allowed by a close vote to make affirmation and take his seat. he was soon forced to leave it by an adverse decision of the judges, but was promptly re-elected. again he offered in vain to take the oath. after several months of litigation, and many appeals to audiences which he made almost unanimous, he gave notice that he should try to take his seat on august 3, 1881, unless prevented by force. it took fourteen men to keep him out; and he was dragged down-stairs with such violence that he fainted away. his clothes were badly torn; and the struggle brought on an alarming attack of erysipelas. a great multitude had followed him to westminster hall, and there would have been a dangerous riot, if it had not been for the entreaties of mrs. besant, who spoke at bradlaugh's request. his next move was to take the oath without having it properly administered. he was expelled in consequence, but re-elected at once. thus the contest went on, until the speaker decided that every member had a right to take the oath which could not be set aside. bradlaugh was admitted accordingly, on january 13, 1886; and two years later he brought about the passage of a bill by which unbelievers were enabled to enter parliament by making affirmation. the irish members had tried to keep him out; but this did not prevent his advocating home rule for ireland, and also for india. from first to last he fought fearlessly and steadily for freedom of speech and of the press. his beauty of character increased his influence. mrs. besant is right in saying: "that men and women are now able to speak as openly as they do, that a broader spirit is visible in the churches, that heresy is no longer regarded as morally disgraceful--these things are very largely due to the active and militant propaganda carried on under the leadership of charles bradlaugh." iii. similar ideas to his have been presented ever since 1870 to immense audiences, composed mostly of young men, in chicago, new york, boston, and other american cities, by robert g. ingersoll. burning hatred of all tyranny and cruelty often makes him denounce the bible with a pathos like rousseau's or a brilliancy like voltaire's. he was decidedly original when he asked why jesus, if he knew how christianity would develop, did not say that his followers ought not to persecute one another. in protesting against subordinating reason to faith, ingersoll says: "ought the sailor to throw away his compass and depend entirely on the fog?" among other characteristic passages are these: "banish me from eden when you will, but first let me eat of the tree of knowledge!"... "religion has not civilised man: man has civilised religion."... "miracles are told simply to be believed, not to be understood." ingersoll is not merely a destroyer but an earnest pleader for what he calls the gospel of cheerfulness and good health, "the gospel of water and soap," the gospels of education, liberty, justice, and humanity. he regards "marriage as the holiest institution among men"; but holds that "the woman is the equal of the man. she has all the rights i have and one more; and that is the right to be protected." he believes fully "in the democracy of the family," and "in allowing the children to think for themselves." he is not so much interested as bradlaugh was in political reform and social progress, but has often taken the conservative side; and his speaking in public has been more like an occasional recreation than a life-work. some of his lectures have had an immense circulation as pamphlets; and his biblical articles in the _north american review_ attracted much notice. he is never at his best, however, without an audience before him; and he sometimes writes too rapidly to be strictly accurate. iv. a better parallel to bradlaugh is furnished by mr. b. f. underwood, who was only eighteen when he began to lecture in rhode island. the great revival of 1857 was in full blast; and he showed its evils with an energy which called down much denunciation from the pulpit. he spoke from the first as an evolutionist, though darwin had not yet demonstrated the fact. to and fro through the connecticut valley went the young iconoclast, speaking wherever he could find hearers, asking only for repayment of expenses, and sometimes failing to receive even that. his work was interrupted by the war, in which he took an active and honourable part. when peace was restored, he studied thoroughly the _origin of species_ and the _descent of man_; and he began in 1868 to give course after course of lectures on darwinism in new england, new york, and pennsylvania. the new view had been nine years before the public, but had received little or no support from any clergyman in the united states, or any journal except _the investigator_. for thirty years mr. underwood has been busily propagating evolutionism on the platform, as well as in print. no other american has done so much to make the system popular, or has reproduced herbert spencer's statements with such fidelity. he has taken especial pains to prove that "evolution disposes of the theory that the idea of god is innate," as well as of the once mighty argument from design. he has said a great deal about the bible and christianity, but in a more constructive spirit than either bradlaugh or ingersoll. he has discredited old books by unfolding new truth. among his favourite subjects have been: "what free thought gives us in place of the creeds," "the positive side of modern liberal thought," "if you take away religion, what will you give in its place?" "the influence of civilisation on christianity." he has always shown himself in favour of the interests of working-men, and also of women's rights and other branches of political reform. during the twelve years ending in 1881, he lectured five or six times a week for at least nine months out of twelve, often travelling from canada to arkansas and oregon. occasionally he spoke every night for a month; but he has seldom lectured in summer, except when on the pacific coast. his lectures in oregon in 1871 on evolution awoke much opposition in the pulpits. two years afterwards he held a debate in that state against a clergyman who was president of a college, and who denounced evolution as in conflict with "the word of god." such views were then prevalent in that city; but in 1888 it was found by mr. underwood to have become the seat of the state university, where the new system was taught regularly. underwood, like bradlaugh, has always challenged discussion, and he has held over a hundred public debates. the first was in 1867; and some have occupied twenty evenings. most of his opponents have been clergymen; and a hundred and fifty of the profession were in the audience at one contest in illinois in 1870. how much public opinion differs in various states of the union is shown by the fact that nine years later the doors of a hall which had been engaged for him in pennsylvania were closed against him, merely because he was "an infidel." his friends broke in without his consent; and he was fined $70. the first lecture which he tried to give in canada was prevented by similar dishonesty. another hall was hired for the next night at great expense; but much interruption was made by clergymen; and when suit was brought for damages through breach of contract, the courts decided that bargains with unbelievers were not binding in canada. both bradlaugh and underwood have usually spoken _extempore_, but both have been busy journalists. the american agitator wrote as early as 1856 for both _the liberator_ and _the investigator_. his connection with the latter paper lasted until the time when a serious difference of opinion arose between those aggressive unbelievers who called themselves "freethinkers," or even "infidels," and those moderate liberals who belong to the free religious association, and formerly supported _the index_. this journal came in 1881 under the management of mr. underwood. his colleague, rev. w. j. potter, was nominally his equal in authority; but i know, from personal acquaintance with both gentlemen, that the real editor from first to last was mr. underwood. it was mainly due to him that much attention was given, both in the columns of the journal and in the meetings of the association, to efforts for secularising the state. he was in charge of _the index_ until it stopped at the end of 1886. in 1882 he held a discussion in boston with the president of williams college, and professor gray, the great botanist, on the relations between evolution and "evangelical religion." about four hundred orthodox clergymen were present. in 1897 mr. underwood was still in his original occupation. early that year he lectured in illinois, indiana, michigan, ohio, new york, connecticut, rhode island, massachusetts, and canada. he now believes, like emerson, in "a higher origin for events than the will i call mine." v. the difference of opinion among liberals, just referred to, grew out of the agitation for a free sunday, which had been begun by frances wright in 1828. a call for "an anti-sabbath convention" in boston was issued by some transcendentalists in 1848, when men had recently been imprisoned in massachusetts for getting in hay, and in pennsylvania for selling anti-slavery books. churches were closed on sunday against lecturers for any reform, however popular; and even the most innocent amusement was prohibited by public opinion. only a moderate protest had any chance of a hearing; but garrison and the other managers insisted in the call that "the first day of the week is no holier than any other," and refused to allow anyone who did not believe this to speak. very little was said about what the sunday laws really were; but most of the time was occupied with arguments that the sabbath was only for the jews, and that keeping sunday is not a religious duty. this last assertion called out an earnest remonstrance from theodore parker; but his resolutions were voted down. the garrisonians insisted, as usual, that the big end of the wedge ought to go in first; and their convention was a failure. twenty-eight years went by without any protest of importance against sunday laws in america. meantime the free religious association was organised in boston by unitarian clergymen who were indignant at the recent introduction into their denomination of a doctrinal condition of fellowship. the first public meeting, on may 30, 1867, called out an immense audience. emerson was one of the speakers; and he held his place among the vice-presidents as long as he lived. a similar position was offered to lucretia mott, but she declined on the platform. her reason was that practical work was subordinated to theological speculation by the announcement in the constitution that the association was organised "to promote the interests of pure religion, to encourage the scientific study of theology, and to increase fellowship in the spirit." these phrases were altered afterwards; but the association has always been, in the words of one of its leading members "a voice without a hand." free religious conventions have regularly increased the confusion of tongues in that yearly boston babel called "anniversary week"; and there have been many similar gatherings in various cities; but not one in four of these meetings has given much attention to any practical subject, like the use of the bible in the public schools. a vigorous discussion of the sunday laws of massachusetts took place in 1876, under peculiar circumstances to be described in the next section; but there was no other until 1887. _the index_ started in 1870; but it was largely occupied with vague speculations about theology; and its discontinuance in 1886 left the association without any organ of frequent communication among its members, or even an office for business. dr. adler, who became president in 1878, tried to awaken an interest in unsectarian education, and especially in ethical culture; but he resigned on account of lack of support; and the ethical culture societies were started outside of the association. comparatively few of its members took any interest in the petitions presented by its direction to the massachusetts legislature in 1884 and 1885, asking for taxation of churches, protection of witnesses from molestation on account of unbelief, and rescue of the sunday law from giving sanctuary to fraud. the president acknowledged in 1892 that there had been a "general debility for practical work." there seems to have been a lack of energy among the managers; and some of the members were too anxious to preserve their individuality, while others had too much regard for ecclesiastical interests. the parliament of religions next year, however, showed what good the association had done by insisting continually on fellowship in religion, and keeping its platform open to jews, hindoos, and unbelievers, as well as to christians of every sect. vi. prominent among the founders of the free religious association was francis e. abbot, who lost his place soon after as pastor of an independent society, because the supreme court of new hampshire decided, on the request of some unitarians for an injunction against him, that his opinions were "subversive of the fundamental principles of christianity. he was the first editor of _the index_; and there appeared in april, 1872, his statement of what are generally recognised as "the demands of liberalism "1. we demand that churches and other ecclesiastical property shall no longer be exempt from just taxation. "2. we demand that the employment of chaplains in congress, in state legislatures, in the navy and militia, and in prisons, asylums, and all other institutions supported by public money, shall be discontinued. "3. we demand that all public appropriations for educational and charitable institutions of a sectarian character shall cease. "4. we demand that all religious services now sustained by the government shall be abolished; and especially that the use of the bible in the public schools, whether ostensibly as a text-book or avowedly as a book of religious worship, shall be prohibited. "5. we demand that the appointment, by the president of the united states, or by the governors of the various states, of all religious festivals and fasts shall wholly cease. "6. we demand that the judicial oath in the courts and in all other departments of the government shall be abolished, and that simple affirmation under the pains and penalties of perjury shall be established in its stead. "7. we demand that all laws directly or indirectly enforcing the observance of sunday as the sabbath shall be repealed. "8. we demand that all laws looking to the enforcement of "christian" morality shall be abrogated, and that all laws shall be conformed to the requirements of natural morality, equal rights, and impartial liberty. "9. we demand that not only in the constitutions of the united states, and of the several states, but also in the practical administration of the same, no privilege or advantage shall be conceded to christianity or any other special religion; that our entire political system shall be founded and administered on a purely secular basis; and that whatever changes shall prove necessary to this end shall be consistently, unflinchingly, and promptly made." he knew how unlikely it was that the association would agitate for anything; and in january, 1873, he published a call for organisation of liberal leagues, in order to obtain the freedom already asked. such leagues were soon formed in most of the states, as well as in germany and canada. among the members were phillips, garrison, lucretia mott, higginson, and other famous abolitionists, karl heinzen and other radical germans, several rabbis and editors of jewish papers, inger-soll, underwood, the editor of _the investigatory_ and other active agitators, several wealthy men of business, collyer, savage, and other unitarian clergymen. hundreds of newspapers supported the movement; and eight hundred members had been enrolled before a convention of the national liberal league met in philadelphia, on the first four days of july, 1876. the managers of the international exhibition in that city had already decided that it should be closed on sunday, in violation of the rights, and against the wishes, of the jews, unbelievers, and many other citizens. the free religious association had been requested in vain, at a recent meeting, to remonstrate against this iniquity. the league passed a strong vote of censure without opposition, and appointed a committee to present a protest which had been circulated during the convention. resolutions were also passed asserting the right of all americans to enjoy on sunday the public libraries, museums, parks, and similar institutions "for the support of which they are taxed," and demanding "that all religious exercises should be prohibited in the public schools." it was under the influence of this example that the free religious association held a special convention on november 15, 1876, to protest against the sunday laws of massachusetts. a jewish rabbi complained that more than two thousand hebrew children in boston were prevented from keeping holy the day set apart for rest and worship in exodus and deuteronomy, and many of them actually obliged by their teachers to break the sabbath. this was the effect of the law commanding them to go to school on saturday, which is that "seventh day" whose observance is required by the fourth commandment. other speakers declared that no legislation was needed to ensure sunday's remaining a day of rest. mention was made of the fact that "any game, sport, play, or public diversion," not specially licensed, on saturday evening, made all persons present liable to be fined. this was already a dead letter; and the theatres had announced with perfect safety twenty years before, in their playbills, "we defy the law." a few months after this convention, its influence was shown in the opening of the art museum free of charge to the people of boston, sunday afternoons. thus the association began to co-operate with the national league; and the latter soon had the support of more than sixty local organisations. the movement for establishing "equal rights in religion" was uniting liberal christians, jews, independent theists, spiritualists, materialists, evolutionists, agnostics, and atheists. all were willing to call themselves "freethinkers" and work together as they have never done since 1877. then the league felt itself strong enough to call for "taxation of church property," "secularisation of public schools," "abrogation of sabbatarian laws," and also for woman suffrage, as well as compulsory education throughout the united states. steps were taken towards nominating ingersoll on this platform for president of the republic. these plans had to be abandoned; the agitation subsided; and the harmony between lovers of liberty from various standpoints was lost. a fatal difference of opinion was manifest in 1878, in regard to those acts of congress called "the comstock laws." these statutes forbade sending obscene literature through the mails; and there had been more than a hundred recent convictions. some of the prosecutions were said to have been prompted by religious bigotry; and there seems to have been unjustifiable examination of mail matter. the most important question was whether the laws ought to be enforced against newspapers and pamphlets about free love and marital tyranny, which were not meant to be indecent but really were so occasionally. a publisher in massachusetts was sentenced in june, 1878, to two years of imprisonment for trying to mail such a pamphlet; but he was soon released. more severe punishment has been inflicted recently for similar offences. the majority of people in america and england favoured the exclusion by law of indecent literature from circulation; and this course has been considered necessary on account of the known frailty of human nature. the members of the free religious association were willing to have the comstock laws changed, but not repealed; and they voted, early in 1878, to take no part in what threatened to be an unfortunate controversy. the league, however, was divided on the question whether these laws ought to be amended or repealed. abbot, underwood, and other prominent members declared that literature ought to be excluded from the mails or admitted according as it was intentionally and essentially indecent, or only accidentally so. thus ingersoll said: "we want all nastiness suppressed for ever; but we also want the mails open to all decent people." other members held that the comstock laws ought to be repealed entirely, and no restriction put on the circulation of any literature except by public opinion. this must be admitted to agree with the principle that each one ought to have all the liberty consistent with the equal liberty of everyone else; but this application of the theory cannot be considered politic in agitating for religious freedom. the _investigator, truthseeker_, and other aggressive papers, however, called for complete repeal; and a petition with this object received seventy thousand signatures. the national league had voted, in 1876, that legislation against obscene publications was absolutely necessary, but that the existing laws needed amendment. the question whether this position should be maintained, was announced as the principal business to be settled in the convention which met at syracuse on october 26, 1878. mr. abbot, the president, and other prominent officers declared that they should not be candidates for re-election if the position assumed two years before was not kept. scarcely had the convention met, when its management passed into the hands of the friends of repeal. they allowed judge hurlbut, formerly on the bench in the supreme court of the state, to argue in favour of closing the mails against publications "manifestly designed or mainly tending to corrupt the morals of the young." much respect was due to the author of a book which declared, in 1850, that married women had a right to vote and hold property, as well as that the state "cannot rightfully compel any man to keep sunday as a religious institution; nor can it compel him to cease from labour or recreation on that day; since it cannot be shown that the ordinary exercise of the human faculties on that day is in any way an infringement upon the rights of mankind." on sunday morning, october 27th, it was agreed that the question of repeal or reform should be postponed until the next annual convention; but the decision was made a foregone conclusion that afternoon, when three-fifths of the members voted not to re-elect mr. abbot and other champions of reform. the defeated candidates left the convention at once, as did mr. underwood and many other members, judge hurlbut taking the lead. a new league was organised by the seceders; but it was not a success. the movement for amending, but not repealing, the comstock laws was given up; and most of those who had favoured it took sides with those who had refused to agitate. there was little interest in "the demands of liberalism" thenceforth among the liberal christians, reformed jews, transcendentalists, and evolutionists. these and other moderate liberals refuse to call themselves "freethinkers"; and they make little attempt at collective and distinctive action. the free religious association did nothing towards secularising the laws of massachusetts between 1876 and 1884. the agitation which began in the latter year ended on may 27, 1887, when the sunday laws were discussed at boston in a large and enthusiastic convention. the legislature had just passed a bill to legalise saturday evening amusements, as well as boating, sailing, driving, use of telegraph, and sale of milk, bread, newspapers, and medicines on sunday; the signature of the governor had not yet been given; but it was agreed that these changes must be made, and for the reason that the old restrictions could not be enforced. judge putnam, of the state district court, told the convention that "the sunday law, so called, has not in a long, long time been enforced," except by "a prosecution here and there"; and that if it were to be enforced strictly, the prosecutions would occupy nearly all the week. he opposed any restraint on "entertainments not of an immoral tendency." mr. garrison, son of the famous abolitionist, declared that sunday ought to be "the holiday of the week." captain adams, of montreal, said: "this is not a mere question how much men may do or enjoy on sunday: it is a question of human liberty, a question whether ecclesiastical tyranny shall still put its yoke on our necks." the tone was bold, but thoroughly practical from first to last. an earnest protest against closing the chicago exposition on the people's day of leisure was made by the f. r. a., in may, 1893; and an important victory in behalf of religious liberty was won in 1898 in massachusetts. the sunday laws of this state have been so improved as to permit what are called "charity concerts," and are not made up entirely of ecclesiastical music, to be given for the pecuniary benefit of charitable and religious societies on sunday evenings. the legislature which met early in 1898 was asked by representatives of the monday conference of unitarian ministers, the women's christian temperance union, and several other religious organisations to alter the law so as to prevent any but "sacred music" from being heard on the only evening when many people in boston can go to concerts. the officers of the f. r. a. made a formal request to be heard by a committee of the legislature through counsel, who proved that the "charity concerts" were really unobjectionable, and that the opposition to them was due entirely to zeal for an ancient text forbidding hebrews to labour on saturday in palestine. the injustice of stretching this prohibition so far as to try to stop concerts on sunday evenings in america was pointed out by representatives, not only of the f. r. a., but also of the international religious liberty association, which has been formed to protect christians who have kept the sabbath on the original day set apart in exodus and deuteronomy, from being punished for not prolonging their rest from honest labour over an additional day, first selected by an emperor whose decrees are not worthy of reverence. this association has offices in chicago, new york city, toronto, london, basel, and other cities; and its principles are ably advocated in a weekly paper entitled the _american sentinel_. representatives of this organisation assisted those of the f. r. a. in forcing the "charity concerts" question to be decided on its own merits, independent of ancient texts. the members of the legislative committee made a unanimous report against suppressing these harmless amusements; and their opinion was sustained by their colleagues. this victory was duly celebrated at the annual convention of the f. r. a., in boston, on may 27, 1898. among the speakers that afternoon was the secretary of the i.r.l. a., who said: "if any nation under heaven has the right to confiscate one-seventh of my time, and tell how i shall and how i shall not use that, then the whole principle of inherent rights is denied, and it now is simply a matter of policy whether it shall not confiscate two-sevenths, three-sevenths, or seven-sevenths, and take away all my liberty." since 1878, the agitation for religious equality has been carried on mainly by materialistic atheists and agnostics, with some assistance from spiritualists. these aggressive liberals continue to call themselves to liberty in the nineteenth century. "freethinkers," and to support the _investigatory truthseeker_, and other papers which have much to say against sunday laws, religious use of the bible in public schools, and exemption of churches from taxation. they often reprint "the demands of liberalism"; and one of these requests has been so amended in canada as to ask for the repeal of "all laws directly or indirectly enforcing the observance of sunday or the sabbath." the attack on the comstock laws has subsided; and no reference was made to them in 1897 in the call for a convention of the organisation which took the place of the whole system of national and local leagues in 1885. the name then chosen was "the american secular union." the words, "and freethought federation" were added in 1895, when two kindred associations were consolidated. it was under strong and constant pressure from these aggressive liberals that the great museums of art and natural history in new york were thrown open on sundays to longing crowds. one of the petitions was signed by representatives of a hundred and twelve labour organisations. the trustees of the art museum were induced to open it in the summer of 1891 by the contribution of $3000, which had been collected by some young ladies for meeting extra expenses. thirty-eight thousand people took advantage, in august, 1892, of their first opportunity to visit the museum of natural history on their one day of leisure; and these visitors were remarkable for good behaviour. there has been a similar experience in the boston art museum ever since the sunday opening in 1877. vii. an exciting contest took place at chicago in 1893. more than fifty nations were co-operating with the people of every one of the united states in commemorating the discovery of america. disreputable politicians had persuaded congress to pass a bill, by which closing the exposition on sundays was made a condition of receiving aid from the national treasury. the people of chicago had given three times as much, however, as congress; and there was much dissatisfaction among those citizens who had bought stock in the enterprise. the grounds had been kept open to visitors for some months, sunday after sunday, until the buildings were formally thrown open on may 1st; and the receipts had been liberal enough to prove that continuance of this course would be greatly to the advantage of these shareholders, while sunday closing might result in heavy loss. during the first three sundays of may the gates were kept shut by order of the board of national commissioners, made up of members from every state. their action and that of congress had been sanctioned by petitions bearing millions of signatures; but it is a significant fact that the alleged signers in pennsylvania were three times as many as the entire population of the state. many people had been counted again and again as members of different organisations; and this fraud was committed in other parts of the country. no attempt to find out what the people really wished was made except in texas; and there the majority was in favour of opening the gates. sabbatarians acknowledged publicly that they got little support from the secular press; and much opposition was made to them by some of the great dailies, as well as by the organs of aggressive liberalism. sunday after sunday in may the gates were surrounded by immense crowds who waited there vainly, hour after hour. many of them could evidently not come on other days; and the number was so large that the local directors, who had been elected by the shareholders, voted on may 16th for opening both gates and doors. this action was warmly approved by the leading citizens of chicago at a public meeting; but sabbatarians demanded that visitors be kept out by federal bayonets. the national commissioners, however, permitted the entrance of a hundred and fifty thousand people on the last sunday of may. on monday, the 29th, a judge of hebrew race, in a state court, pronounced the contract with congress null and void, because the money had not been fully paid. he decided, accordingly, that there was no excuse for violating the illinois law, which guaranteed the right of the citizens to visit on sunday the park where the exposition was held. this ensured the admission of visitors on june 4th, and for twenty of the remaining twenty-one sundays. the government buildings and many others, however, were closed; numerous exhibits, for instance, one of bibles, were shrouded in white; machinery was not allowed to run; there were no cheap conveyances about the ground; and there was little opportunity to get food or drink. no wonder that the sunday attendance was comparatively small; but there were one hundred and forty thousand paying visitors on october 22d and 29th. this was a victory of the press rather than the platform. there has been no successor to the original liberty league, and no rival to the sunday society. the latter was organised in 1875 in england, where there has been constant agitation since 1853 for opening the british museum, crystal palace, and other public institutions to their owners on sunday. dean stanley was president of this society; and among its members have been herbert spencer, huxley, tyndall, charles reade, lecky, miss cobbe, mrs. craik, and many prominent clergymen. the real issue was stated clearly at one of the public meetings by tyndall as follows: "we only ask a part of the sunday for intellectual improvement." the justice of this request has been so far admitted that on may 24, 1896, all the national museums and galleries in london were opened for the first time on sunday. among these educational institutions from which the owners are no longer shut out are the national gallery and the south kensington, british, and natural history museums. many libraries and museums in other parts of england were opened some years earlier. viii. nowhere has the platform done so much to regenerate the pulpit as in chicago. religious history has been largely a record of strife. there was little brotherly feeling between clergymen of different sects in america before 1860; but they were often brought into co-operation by the great war. even unitarians were shocked to hear emerson speak with reverence of zoroaster in 1838; but he won only applause in 1869 when he spoke of the charm of finding "identities in all the religions of men." this was at a convention of the free religious association, which has pleaded from the first for "fellowship in religion," and often made this real upon its platform. the secretary, mr. potter, said in 1872, that some of his hearers would live to see "a peace convention" "of representatives from all the great religions of the globe." chicago was so peculiarly cosmopolitan that the local managers of the columbian exposition were glad to have products of the various intellectual activities of mankind exhibited freely. ample provision was made for conventions in behalf of education and reform; but what was to be done for religion? an orthodox citizen of chicago, mr. charles carroll bonney, took counsel in 1891 with rev. j. li. jones, a unitarian, who has been preaching for twenty years the essential oneness of all religions. rabbis, bishops, and doctors of divinity were consulted also; and thus was formed the committee which invited "the leading representatives of the great historic religions of the world for the first time in history," to meet in friendly conference and show what they "hold and teach in common," as well as "the important distinctive truths" claimed for each religion. thus the columbian exposition offered an opportunity "to promote and deepen the spirit of human brotherhood among religious men of diverse faiths," "to inquire what light each religion has afforded or may afford to the other religions of the world," and, finally, "to bring the nations of the earth into a more friendly fellowship in the hope of securing a permanent international peace." thus was announced the "parliament of religions." all the members were to meet as equals; and there was to be neither controversy nor domination. the archbishop of canterbury and some leading protestants in america protested against abandoning the exclusive claims made for christianity; and similar objections were offered by the sultan of turkey. the jews, buddhists, and other believers in the ancient religions welcomed the invitation, as did the dignitaries of the greek church, and also the protestants on the continent of europe, and many members of every christian sect in the united states. the catholic archbishops of america appointed a delegate; and many methodist and episcopalian bishops agreed to attend the parliament. the sessions were held in the permanent building erected in the centre of chicago to accommodate the intellectual portion of the exposition. four thousand people assembled on monday, september 11, 1893, to see a roman catholic cardinal mount the platform at 10 a.m., in company with the shinto high-priest, an archbishop of the greek church, a hindoo monk, a confucian mandarin, and a long array of buddhists and taoists from the far east. all these dignitaries wore gorgeous robes of various colours. with them were a parsee girl, a theosophist, a moslem magistrate from india, a catholic archbishop from new zealand, a russian and an african prince, a negro bishop, several episcopalian prelates, rabbis, and jewesses, missionaries returned from many lands, doctors of divinity of various protestant sects, and the lady managers of the great fair. a prominent presbyterian pastor took the chair, and cordial declarations of the brotherhood of religions were made by catholic archbishops, the shinto high-priest, a buddhist delegate, and the confucian sent by the emperor of china. full hearing was given in subsequent sessions to advocates of the jain religion, which is perhaps the oldest, as well as of the parsee, jewish, moslem, taoist, and vedic faiths, besides a score of the leading christian denominations. the parliament lasted seventeen days; and the audiences were so large that most of the essays were repeated in overflow meetings. there were also some forty congresses held in smaller halls for speakers who could not find room on the great platforms. one of these meetings was held by jewesses, of whom nineteen spoke. some of them were also heard from the platform of the parliament; as were many clergy women. mr. underwood presided at the congress of evolutionists. there was also a convention of the free religionists, in connection with the parliament which they had made possible; but "the freethought federation" could get no chance to meet in the great building, or even to sell pamphlets. mr. bonney had proposed a union of all religions against irreligion; and this would have been in harmony with the policy adopted by many states of the american union. their sunday laws and similar statutes show a purpose of encouraging all the popular sects alike, with little regard for the rights of citizens outside of these favoured associations. most of the speakers in the parliament, especially the buddhists, were so zealous for the brotherhood of man, that they protested against any discrimination on account of theology. the great audiences gave most applause to the broadest declarations; and the few utterances of protestant bigotry were plainly out of place. the general tendency of the parliament was strongly in favour of recognising the equal rights of all mankind, without regard to belief or unbelief. all legislation inconsistent with this principle will be swept away, sooner or later, by that great wave of public opinion which broke forth during the parliament of religions. there the golden age of religion began, and war must give place to peace. chapter vii. the evolutionists we have seen how the transcendentalists tried to suppress vivisection, in spite of all it has done for the health and happiness of mankind. the sanguinary intolerance of robespierre and other disciples of rousseau was described earlier in this volume. and the notorious inability of carlyle and garrison to argue calmly with those who differed with them further illustrates the tendency of confidence in one's own infallibility. only he who knows that he may be wrong can admit consistently that those who reject his favourite beliefs may be right. the parliament of religions showed that there has been a growing conviction of the equal rights of holders of all forms of belief and unbelief; this conviction has been promoted by recognition of two great facts: first, that knowledge is based upon experience, and, second, that no one's life is so complete that he has nothing to learn from other people. if they do not believe as he does, it may be merely because experience has taught them truth which he still needs to learn. each one knows only in part; and therefore no one can afford to take it for granted that anyone else is completely in error. i. this tolerant method of thought has gained greatly in popularity since darwin proved its capacity to solve the problem of the origin of man. the possibility that all forms of life, even the highest, are results of a natural process of gradual development has often been suggested by poets and philosophers. the probability was much discussed by men of science early in the nineteenth century; but it was not until 1858 that sufficient evidence was presented to justify acceptance of evolution as anything better than merely a theory. twenty-one years had then elapsed since darwin began a long series of investigations. in the first place, he collected an irresistible number of cases of the influence of environment in causing variations in structure, and of the tendency of such variations to be inherited. most men who accepted these propositions admitted their insufficiency to account for the multiplicity of species; but the explanation became complete when darwin discovered that any plant or animal which is peculiarly fit for survival in the continual struggle for existence is likely to become largely represented in the next generation. a spontaneous variation which prolongs the life of its possessor may thus become not only more common but more firmly fixed in successive generations, until a new species is established. to this tendency darwin gave the name "natural selection"; but this term literally implies a deliberate choice by some superhuman power. herbert spencer proposed the phrase, "survival of the fittest"; but it must be remembered that the fitness is not necessarily that of greater moral worth. there may be merely such a superiority in strength and cunning as enables savages to devour a missionary. spencer says that "the expression, 'survival of the fittest,'" merely means "the leaving alive of those which are best able to utilise surrounding aids to life, and best able to combat or avoid surrounding dangers." weeds are fitter than flowers for natural growth; and joan of arc proved unfit to survive in the contest against wicked men. this discovery of darwin's made it his duty to avow a view which was so unpopular that he felt as if he were about "confessing a murder." he was making "a big book" out of the facts he had collected, when a manuscript statement of conclusions like his own was sent him by wallace, who had discovered independently the great fact of the survival of the fittest. darwin wished at first to resign all claim to originality; but his friends insisted on his taking a share of the honour of the discovery. accordingly an essay, which he had written in 1844, was read in company with that sent him by wallace before the linnã¦an society, in london, on july 1, 1858. the importance of the new view was so well understood that the entire first edition, amounting to 1250 copies, of darwin's _origin of species_, which book he wrote soon after, was sold on the day of publication, november 24, 1859. other editions followed rapidly, with translations into many languages. no book of the century has been more revolutionary. ii. theologians still insisted on the supernatural creation of each species of plant or animal, and especially of the human race, in its final form. the inference that man had been developed by natural processes out of some lower animal, was easily drawn from the _origin of species_, though not expressly stated therein; and there was great alarm among the clergy. an anglican bishop, who was nicknamed "soapy sam" on account of his subserviency to public opinion, declared in a leading quarterly that darwin held views "absolutely incompatible" with the bible, and tending to "banish god from nature." other prominent episcopalians called the new book "an attempt to dethrone god," and propagate infidelity. cardinal manning denounced the "brutal philosophy" which taught that "there is no god, and the ape is our adam." both catholics and protestants started anti-darwinian societies in london, and, in 1863, huxley saw "the whole artillery of the pulpit brought upon the doctrine of evolution and its supporters." the example of england was followed promptly by france and germany. america was distracted by civil war; and her men of science were so few and timid that the denunciations of darwinism which were prompted by the theological and metaphysical prejudices of agassiz were generally accepted as final decisions. the position of the unitarians and transcendentalists may be judged from the fact that, during a period of nearly three years after the publication of the _origin of species_, nothing was said about darwinism in the extremely liberal divinity school where i was then a student. evolutionism had to look for advocates in america to spiritualists like denton or unbelievers like underwood at that period. clerical opposition increased the general unwillingness of scientific men to snatch up new views. as early as 1863, however, darwin received the support of the famous geologist, lyell, as well as of a younger naturalist destined to achieve even more brilliant success. huxley has distinguished himself in arguments against the scientific value of the bible. among his other exploits was a demonstration that a chain, in which no link is missing, connects the horse with a small, extinct quadruped possessed of comparatively few equine peculiarities. in this case, transformation of species is an undeniable fact. other young naturalists in england, as well as in germany, gradually became willing to push the new view to its last results; and darwin was encouraged to publish, in 1871, his elaborate account of the origin of our race, entitled _the descent of man_. the wrath of the churches blazed forth once more; and gladstone entered the arena. englishmen ventured no longer to say much about the differences between moses and darwin; for the obvious retort would have been, "so much the worse for moses." a german lutheran, however, bade his congregation choose between christ and darwin; and the infallibility of moses was asserted so zealously by a parisian catholic as to win formal thanks from the pope. america was now wide awake; irreligious tendencies were assigned to evolutionism by the president of yale, as well as by some princeton professors; and one of these latter warned believers in the development of man that they would be punished as infidels after death. the verdict of men of science has at last been pronounced so plainly as to be accepted by thoroughly educated people in the northern states; but the southerners are more bigoted. even so late as 1894, a professor of biology at the university of texas was dismissed, in violation of contract, for teaching evolutionism. a similar offence had been found sufficient, ten years before, by the presbyterians of south carolina, for driving a devout member of their own sect from his chair in a theological seminary. that popular writer on geology, winchell, was requested in 1878 by a methodist bishop to resign a professorship at nashville, tennessee, where he had expressed doubt of the descent of all men from adam. the geologist refused to resign, and the chair was suppressed. voltaire's chief grievance was the intolerance of christianity. paine and bradlaugh complained that there was much immorality in the old testament. the most damaging of recent attacks have been made in the name of science. genesis and geology had been found irreconcilable before the appearance of darwinism; but the new system widened the breach. the most serious offence to the theologian, however, was that he could not longer point without danger of contradiction to beneficial peculiarities in the structure of plants and animals, as marks of the divine hand. the old argument about design was met by a demonstration that such peculiarities were apt to arise spontaneously, and become permanent under the pressure of the struggle for existence. the theologian has had to retreat to the position that darwinism has not accounted for the soul, the intellect, and especially the intuitions. iii. whether darwin succeeded or not in this part of his work is not so important as the fact that, several years before he announced his great discovery, an elaborate account of the process by which the powers of thought and feeling have been developed gradually out of the lowest forms of consciousness was given by herbert spencer. the first edition of his _principles of psychology_, published in 1855, carried the explanation so far as to show the real origin and value of the intuitions. their importance had been almost ignored by thinkers who relied entirely on individual experience, and greatly overrated by the transcendentalists; but neither set of philosophers could explain these mysterious ideas. the infallibility of conscience is not to be reconciled with such facts as that paul thought it his duty to persecute the christians, or that garrison, sumner, john brown, and stonewall jackson were among the most conscientious men of the century. the ancient greeks agreed in recognising justice, but not benevolence, among the cardinal virtues; precisely the opposite error was made by kant and miss cobbe; and a tabular view of all the lists of fundamental intuitions which have been made out by noted metaphysicians might be mistaken for a relic from the tower of babel. emerson's religious instincts were not so much impressed as parker's with the personality of god and immortality; but the difference seems almost insignificant when we remember what ideas of theology arose spontaneously in new zealand. how widely the intuition of beauty varies may be judged from the inability of aesthetic chinamen to admire the white teeth and rosy cheeks of an english belle. intuition is plainly not an infallible oracle; but is it merely a misleading prejudice? the puzzle was solved when spencer showed that intuition is a result of the experience of the race. courage, for instance, was so important for the survival of a primitive tribe in the struggle against its neighbours, that every man found his comfort and reputation depend mainly on his prowess. if he fought desperately he gained wealth, honour, and plenty of wives; but cowards were maltreated by other men and scorned even by the women. the bravest man left the largest number of offspring; and every boy was told so early and earnestly to be courageous as to develop a pugnacious instinct, which has come down to the present day in much greater strength than is needed for the ordinary demands of civilised life. we love war too much, because our ancestors were in danger of not loving it enough for their own safety. as courage ceased to be the one all-important excellence, industry, fidelity, and honesty were found so useful as to be encouraged with a care which has done much to mould conscience into its present shape. other virtues were inculcated in the same way. the welfare of the family was found to depend largely on the fidelity of wife to husband; and the result was that chastity has held a much higher place in the feminine than in the masculine conscience. so our religious instincts owe much of their strength to the zeal with which our ancestors sought to avert the divine wrath. thus we have ideas which were originally only vague inferences from primitive experience, but which have gradually gained such strength and definiteness, that they have much more power than if we had thought them out unaided by the past. spencer himself says, "there have been, and still are, developing in the race certain fundamental moral intuitions" which "are the results of accumulated experiences of utility, gradually organised and inherited," but "have come to be quite independent of conscious experience." they "have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility"; and thus conscience has acquired its characteristic disinterestedness. when we feel this inner prompting to a brave or honest action which must be done promptly or left undone, it is our duty to act without hesitation or regard to our own interest. we are serving our race in the way which its experience has taught. suppose, however, that there is time enough for deliberation, and that we see a possibility of harm to our neighbours, our family, or even to our own highest welfare. in this case, we ought to compare the good and evil results carefully. we should also do well to consider what was the decision of the consciences of the best and wisest men under similar circumstances. if we neglect these precautions, we may be in danger of following not conscience but passion. there is also a possibility that conscience may embody only such primitive ideas of duty as have since been found incorrect. this has often been the case with persecutors and monarchists. generosity is still too apt to take an impulsive and reckless form which perpetuates pauperism. spencer has taught us that conscience is worthy not only of obedience, but of education. spencer's attempt to substitute a thoughtful for a thoughtless goodness of character has been much aided by his protest against such undiscriminating exhortations to self-sacrifice as are constantly heard from the pulpit. good people, and especially good women, welcome the idea of giving up innocent pleasure and enduring needless pain. the glory of martyrdom blinds them to the fact that, as spencer says in his _psychology_, "pains are the correlatives of actions injurious to the organism, while pleasures are the correlatives of actions conducive to its welfare." in other words, "pleasures are the incentives to life-supporting acts, and pains the deterrents from life-destroying acts." abstinence from pleasure may involve loss of health. self-sacrifice is scarcely possible without some injury to mind or body; as is the case with people who make it a religious duty to read no interesting books and take scarcely any exercise on sunday. it is further true that "the continual acceptance of benefits at the expense of a fellow-being is morally injurious"; as "the continual giving up of pleasures and continual submission to pains are physically injurious." blind self-sacrifice "curses giver and receiver--physically deteriorates the one and morally deteriorates the other," "the outcome of the policy being destruction of the worthy in making worse the unworthy." no wonder that men are stronger, and also more selfish, than women. almost all self-sacrifice involves loss of individual liberty. the subjection of women has been deepened by their readiness to sacrifice themselves to those they love; their fondness for martyrdom often leads them into the sin of marrying without love; and generosity of heart facilitates ruin. women would really be more virtuous if they felt less obligation to their lovers and more to their race. iv. spencer's psychological discoveries were corollaries to that great principle of evolution of which he made the following announcement as early as 1857 in the _westminster review_. after declaring his belief in "that divergence of many races from one race which we inferred must have continually been occurring during geologic time," he stated that "the law of all progress is to be found in these varied evolutions of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous," or in other words, "out of the simple into the complex." the discoveries of darwin and wallace were not announced before 1858, but spencer avowed in 1852 his belief in "the theory of evolution" or "development hypothesis," according to which "complex organic forms may have arisen by successive modifications out of simple ones." it was without any aid or suggestion from darwin that spencer's statement of the law of evolution was brought into the final form published in 1862. evolution was then described as change, not only from the simple to the complex, but also from the chaotic to the concentric and consolidated, or, in spencer's own words, "from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity." progress, he says, consists in integration as well as differentiation. there is an increase in permanence and definiteness as well as in variety. higher forms are not only more complex and unlike than lower ones, but also more stable and more strongly marked. spencer has been represented by some transcendentalists as darwin's pupil; but the whole system just described would, in all probability, have been built up in substantially its present form, if both darwin and wallace had kept their discoveries to themselves. the only difference would have been that spencer could not have been sustained by such a great mass of evidence. all these facts were collected by darwin merely to prove the physical development of men and other animals from lower forms of life; but spencer showed that all the phenomena of thought and feeling, as well as of astronomy, geology, and chemistry, are results of the great laws of integration and differentiation. all human history and social relations can be accounted for in this way. and if this extension had not been given to the principle of evolution, darwin's discoveries might soon have ceased to have much interest, except for students of natural history. each of the two great evolutionists helped the other gain influence; but their co-operation was almost as unintentional as that of two luminaries which form a double star. v. spencer has done much to diminish intolerance, by teaching, as early as 1862, that all religions are necessary steps in the upward march of evolution. he has also attempted to reconcile religion and science, by teaching that the one all-essential belief is in a great unknowable reality, which is not only inscrutable but inconceivable. in writing about this supreme power, he uses capitals with a constancy which would look like an assumption of knowledge, if the same habit were not followed in regard to many other words of much less importance. he admits that "we cannot decide between the alternative suppositions, that phenomena are due to the variously conditioned workings of a single force, and that they are due to the conflict of two forces." "matter cannot be conceived," he says, "except as manifesting forces of attraction and repulsion"; but he also says that these antagonistic and conflicting forces "must not be taken as realities but as our symbols of the reality," "the forms under which the workings of the unknowable are cognisable." this creed is accepted by many american evolutionists. it is the doctrine of one of spencer's most elaborate and brilliant interpreters, professor john fiske, of such popular clergymen as doctors minot j. savage and lyman abbott, and of many of the members of that energetic organisation, "the brooklyn ethical association." _the open court_ of chicago and other periodicals are working avowedly for "the religion of science"; but that is not to be established without much closer conformity to the old-fashioned creeds and ceremonies than has been made by spencer. his later works seem more orthodox than his earlier ones; but his final decision is that "the very notions, origin, cause, and purpose, are relations belonging to human thought, which are probably irrelevant to the ultimate reality." he has also admitted that the proposition, "evolution is caused by mind," "cannot be rendered into thought." and he is right in saying that he has nowhere suggested worship. whether he has proposed a reconciliation, or only a compromise, whether evolutionism will ever be as popular in the pulpit as transcendentalism, and whether there is not more reality in the forces of attraction and repulsion than in spencer's great unknowable, are problems which i will not discuss. darwin was an agnostic like huxley, who held that "we know nothing of what may be beyond phenomena," and "science commits suicide when she adopts a creed." huxley pronounced the course of nature "neither moral nor immoral, but non-moral," and declared that "the ethical progress of society depends not on imitating the cosmic process but on combating it." the severity of his criticism of the gospel narratives called out threats of prosecution for blasphemy. he avowed "entire concurrence" with haeckel, who holds that belief in a personal god and an immortal soul are incompatible with the fundamental principles of evolution. the german scientist argues in his elaborate history of the development of animals, that life is no manifestation of divine power, working with benevolent purpose, but merely the necessary result of unconscious forces, inherent in the chemical constitution and physical properties of matter, and acting mechanically according to immutable laws. the position of haeckel and huxley is all the more significant because frederic harrison knows of "no single thinker in europe who has come forward to support this religion of an unknown cause." vi. a much more important controversy has been called out by spencer's theory of the limits of government. as early as 1842 he proposed "the limitation of state action to the maintenance of equitable relations among citizens." his _social statics_ demanded, in 1850, as a necessary condition of high development, "the liberty of each, limited only by the like liberty of all." his ideal would be a government where "every man has freedom to do all he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man." these propositions are repeated in the revised edition of 1892, which differs from the earlier one in omitting a denial of the right of private property in land, and also a demand for female suffrage. how far spencer had changed his views may be seen in his volume on _justice_. both editions of _social statics_ deny the right of governments to support churches, public schools, boards of health, poorhouses, lighthouses, or mints. spencer would have titles to land guaranteed by the state, and property-holders protected against unjust lawsuits; but otherwise the government ought to confine itself, he thinks, to managing the army, navy, and police. this position is defended by an appeal to the fact that the citizen is most energetic and intelligent where he is most free to act for himself. no american is as helpless before pestilence or famine as a russian peasant, or as afraid to go to a burning house until summoned by the police. a despotism may begin with a strong army; but it ends, like the roman empire, in the weakness which it has brought on by crushing the spirit of its soldiers. strong governments make weak men. never was there a mightier army than was given by the french republic to napoleon. industrial prosperity depends even more closely than military glory on the energy of men who have been at liberty to think and act freely. people develop most vigorously where they are least meddled with. the average man knows much more than his rulers do about his own private business; and he is active to promote it in ways which secure the general welfare. great stress is laid not only in _social statics_ but in spencer's book on _the man versus the state_, and in several essays, on the many times that the british government has increased an evil by trying to cure it. what is said about its extravagance will not surprise any american who remembers what vast sums are squandered by congress. the post-office is often spoken of as proof that our government could run our railroads; but one of boston's best postmasters said, "no private business could be managed like this without going into bankruptcy." the british government has a monopoly of the telegraph; and introduction of the telephone was very difficult in consequence. in victoria, the postmaster-general has abused his privileges so much as to appoint a "sporting agent" to telegraph the results of a horse-race; and this same highly protectionist colony has had laws forbidding any shop to be open after 7 p.m., except on saturday, and any woman to work more than forty-eight hours a week in any factory. how governments interfered in former centuries with people's right to feed, clothe, employ, and amuse themselves, seems almost inconceivable at present. persecution was one among many forms of mischievous meddling. locke, in arguing for toleration in 1689, was obliged to take the ground that "the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only" to securing unto all the people "life, liberty, health," and also "outward things such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like." "government," he said, "hath no end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subject." clearer language was used by those french patriots who declared in the constitution of 1791 that liberty consists in ability to do everything which brings no harm to others; and, two years afterwards, that the liberty of each citizen should extend to where that of some other citizen begins. nearly fifty years later, a theory very like spencer's was published by wilhelm von humboldt, brother of the great naturalist. among the many writers who have held that government ought not to be merely limited but repudiated totally was thoreau. it was in 1854 that this zealous abolitionist publicly renounced his allegiance to a great anti-slavery commonwealth, and that he asserted, in _walden_, the necessity of preserving individual liberty by conforming as little as possible to any social usages, even that of working regularly in order to support one's self and family in comfort. that same year, spencer showed in his essay on _manners and fashion_ the difference between a regulation by which public opinion tries to prevent rude people from making themselves unnecessarily disagreeable to their neighbours, and one which encourages dissipation by arbitrarily check-ing innocent amusement. even in the latter case, however, there is, as he says, but little gain from any solitary nonconformity. reform must be carried on in co-operation. that powerful assailant of transcendentalism, john stuart mill, was not an evolutionist; but it was largely due to his liberal aid that the system of differentiation and integration was published. this generosity was consistent with his own position, that all opinions ought to have a hearing, and especially those which are novel and unpopular, for they are peculiarly likely to contain some exposure of ancient error or revelation of new truth. this fact was set forth with such ability in his book, _on liberty_, in 1859, that several long passages were quoted in the public protest, delivered in ohio five years later by vallandigham, against the war then carried on for bringing back the seceded states. mill holds that neither government nor public opinion ought to interfere with any individual, except "to prevent doing harm to others." he says, for instance, that there would be no tyranny in forcing parents to let their children have education enough to become safe members of society. such a law could scarcely be justified by the principle of giving all the liberty to each compatible with the like liberty of all. among the restrictions which mill mentions as oppressive are those in england and america against selling liquor, gambling, and sunday amusements. he admits the difficulty of deciding "how far liberty may be legitimately invaded for the prevention of crime." vii. it was in full conformity with the principles of mill, spencer, and locke that the constitution of louisiana, as revised in 1879, declared that the only legitimate object of government "is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. when it assumes other functions, it is usurpation and oppression." similar sentiments have been occasionally expressed in political platforms. such narrow limits have not, so far as i know, ever been observed in the united states or in any other civilised land. few people love liberty so much as not to be willing that the state should give them security against conflagration and contagious disease. there is also a general demand for such safety as is given by roads, streets, bridges, lighthouses, and life-saving stations. the necessity of hospitals, asylums, and poorhouses is manifest. if all this expense had to be met by public-spirited individuals, it is probable that their wealth would prove insufficient. it is further necessary for the public safety that there should be compulsory vaccination during epidemics of smallpox, confinement of dangerous lunatics and tramps, rescue of children from vicious parents, and maintenance of what ought not to be called compulsory but guaranteed education. marriage has to be made binding for the protection of mothers as well as children. the thirst for drink needs at least as much restraint as is kept up in scandinavia. and the tendency of bad money to drive out good is strong enough to justify laws against circulation of depreciated currency. public schools are particularly important in america, where presidential and congressional elections are apt to turn on financial issues which can scarcely be understood by men not thoroughly educated. spencer's objections apply more closely to the european system, that of centralisation of management, than to the american. it is well to know also that he was misled by a hasty reference, perhaps by some assistant, to an english statistician named fletcher. this high authority did admit, in 1849, that he found "a superficial evidence against instruction." he went on, however, to say much which is not mentioned in _social statics_, and which proved the evidence to be only superficial. by classifying crimes according to enormity, he showed that the worst were most frequent in the least educated districts. he also discovered that those counties in england where ability to sign the marriage register was most common were most free from paupers, dangerous criminals, and illegitimate children. "the conclusion is therefore irresistible," says fletcher, "that education is essential to the security of modern society." most of the other testimony brought forward in _social statics_ is invalidated by fletcher's method; and spencer added nothing in the second edition to the insufficient statements in the first. british education has improved greatly in both quality and quantity since 1876; but the prisons of england and wales had only two-thirds as many inmates in 1890 as in 1878, and only one-half as large a part of the population. the most dangerous prisoners were only one-third as numerous in 1890 and 1891 as forty-five years earlier; and the percentage of forgers only one-tenth as great as in 1857. we ought further to remember the almost complete unanimity of opinion in favour of free education wherever it is universal. public schools in america are all the more useful because they are superintended by town and city officials, elected in great part by men who know them personally. this is also the case with the boards of health, and the managers of poorhouses, cemeteries, public libraries, and parks. among other subjects of local self-government are the roads, bridges, streets, and sewers. our large cities are notoriously misgoverned, but it will be easier to raise the character of the officials than to contract their powers. much is to be hoped from civil service reform, proportional representation, and nonpartisan elections. town affairs are usually so carefully looked after by people not in office as to be managed for the public welfare. both in towns and cities the tendency is to enlarge rather than contract the functions of the government. a proposal that any city should let tenements or sell coal more cheaply than is done by individuals, would seem to be for the advantage of everybody except a few payers of heavy taxes. the majority of voters would care little about increase of taxation, in comparison with the prospect of more demand for labour and greater activity in business. it is easy to make extravagance popular where the majority rules. our state constitutions would probably make it impossible for coal to be sold or tenements let by cities and towns; but these latter often carry on gas-works, water-works, electric roads, and other highly beneficial industries. this may be necessary to check the rapacity of corporations; but otherwise there is too much danger of extravagance, discouragement of individual enterprise, and delay in improving the processes monopolised by the municipality. some evils would be lessened by a transfer of the control of lighthouses and life-saving stations from the national government to that of the nearest cities, or else of single states. our people are much better able to judge of the success of state than of federal legislation and management. of course the chief duties of the state are to pass laws for the protection of life and property against crime, and to manage such indispensable penal, charitable, and educational institutions as are not provided by the municipalities. it is still necessary for the states of our union to keep up the militia; but perhaps the best thing that could be done for the public safety would be to have tramps kept from crime, and assisted to employment by a state police. ownership of real estate would be more secure, and sale easier, if titles were guaranteed by the state; and it would also do well, as spencer suggests, to help people of moderate means resist lawsuits brought to extort money. it seems, at all events, well that our states keep up their boards of health, and their supervision of banks, railroads, steamboats, and factories. there are a great many unnecessary laws, as, for instance, was one in massachusetts for selling coal below market price. this was fortunately decided to be unconstitutional; but whether this commonwealth ought to continue to supply free text-books, especially in high schools, seems to me questionable. many individualists object to laws against gambling, selling liquor, and other conduct which does no direct injury except to those who take part voluntarily. there are vicious tendencies enough in human nature, i think, to justify attempts to keep temptation out of sight. no advantage of this kind can be claimed for the sunday laws in our eastern and southern states. it is certainly desirable to have one day a week of rest from labour and business; but it is equally true that a man's ploughing his field or weeding his garden does not infringe on the liberty of his neighbours, diminish their security of person and property, or encourage their vicious propensities, even on sunday. it is setting a bad example to break any law; but i do not think that any citizen of massachusetts was seriously corrupted by resisting the fugitive slave act; and i doubt if any vermonter was morally the worse for breaking the law in that state against sunday "visits from house to house, except from motives of humanity or charity, or for moral and religious edification." it is better to have the laws obeyed intelligently than blindly; and those really worthy of respect would have more authority if every prohibition which is never enforced, except out of malice, were repealed. much aid is given to morality by such religious observances as are voluntary and conscientious; but compulsory observance breeds both slaves and rebels. how far our sunday laws are meant to encourage the peculiar usages of the popular sects is seen in the fact that, since 1877, about 150 professed christians, who had kept the sabbath on the day set apart in the bible, were arrested on the charge of having profaned sunday by such actions as ploughing a retired field, weeding a garden, cutting wood needed for immediate use, or making a dress. they refused to pay any fine; most of them were imprisoned accordingly; in one case the confinement lasted 129 days; two deaths were hastened by incarceration; and in the summer of 1895 eight of these "saturdarians," as they were nicknamed, were working in a chain-gang on the roads in tennessee. one of the eight was a clergyman. among the commonwealths which prosecuted observers of the original sabbath as sabbath-breakers were georgia, maryland, missouri, arkansas, ohio, pennsylvania, massachusetts, and seven other states. such prosecutions were too much like persecutions; for people who kept neither saturday nor sunday were not so much molested. if the sunday laws were really meant for the public welfare, every citizen would be allowed to choose his own sabbath, and no one who kept saturday sacred would be required to rest on sunday also. such liberal legislation has actually been passed by rhode island and many other states. how strict the law is against doing business on sunday may be judged from the fact that in 1896 a decrepit old woman was sent to jail in new york city for selling a couple of bananas, and a boy of fifteen was arrested for selling five cents' worth of coal in january. three men were fined for selling umbrellas in the street on a rainy sunday in 1895, and others were arrested for selling five cents' worth of ice. people who have no refrigerators suffer under the difficulty of buying ice, fruit, and meat on a hot sunday in our eastern cities. sunday laws and customs differ so widely in our various states, that they cannot all be wise and just. rest from labour and business is secured in southern california, without state legislation, by the action of public opinion; and were this to become too weak, it would be reinforced by the trades-unions. personal liberty is not necessarily violated by laws prohibiting disturbance of public worship; but it would be if anyone were compelled to testify in court, or sit on the jury, or do any other business elsewhere, on any day set apart for rest by his conscience and religion. there seems to be little necessity for other legislation, except under peculiar local circumstances to which town and city magistrates are better able than members of state and national legislatures to do justice. the question, what places of business that have no vicious tendencies ought to be allowed to open on sunday, might settle itself, as does the question how early they are to close on other days of the week. there needs no law to prevent business being done at night. stores which could offer nothing that many people need to buy on sunday, would have so few customers that the proprietors could ill afford to open their doors. where the demand is as great and innocent as it is for fresh meat and fruit in hot weather, the interest of the proprietor is no more plain than is the duty of the legislator and magistrate. people employed in hotels, stables, telegraph offices, libraries, museums, and parks, can, of course, protect themselves from overwork, as domestic servants do, by stipulating for holidays and half-holidays. whatever may be the gain to public health from cessation of labour and business on sunday, there is no such advantage, but rather injury, from the prohibition of healthy recreations and amusements, which are acknowledged to be perfectly innocent on at least six days of the week. sunday is by no means so strictly observed, especially in this respect, on the continent of europe as in the united states. sabbatarianism is peculiarly an american and british institution; and this fact justifies the position that it is by no means a necessary condition of the security, or even the welfare, of civilised nations. if our sunday laws cannot be proved to be necessary, they must be admitted to be oppressive. over-taxation is but a slight grievance compared with the tyranny of sending men and women to jail for inability or unwillingness to pay the fines imposed in 1895 by the state of tennessee for working on their farms, or in massachusetts soon after for playing cards in their own rooms. further consideration of the question, what amusements should be permitted on sunday, will be found in an appendix. such problems are peculiarly unfit for treatment by our central government. its chief duty, of course, is protection of our people against invasion and rebellion; and the authority of the president and congress ought not to be weakened by vain attempts to settle disputes which would be dealt with much more satisfactorily by the cities and towns. a sunday law too lax for pennsylvania might be too strict for california. the system of post-offices is too well adapted for the general welfare to be given up hastily; but the government ought to surrender the monopoly which now makes it almost impossible for citizens to free themselves from dependence on disobliging or incompetent postmasters. i have nothing to say against the census, education, health, and patent bureaus, nor against the smithsonian museum, except that our citizens have a right to use their own property as freely on sunday as on any other day of the week. i do not see why our government should have more than that of other nations to do with the issue of paper money; but i leave the bank question to abler pens. the tariff is a much plainer issue. we are told in _social statics_ that "a government trenches upon men's liberties of action" in obstructing commercial intercourse; "and by so doing directly reverses its function. to secure for each man the fullest freedom to exercise his faculties, compatible with the like freedom of all others, we find to be the state's duty. now trade-prohibitions and trade-restrictions not only do not secure this freedom, but they take it away, so that in enforcing them the state is transformed from a maintainer of rights into a violator of rights." the obstacles to importation deliberately set up by american tariffs, indirectly check exportation; for unwillingness to buy from any other nation diminishes not only its willingness but its ability to buy our products in return. the united states are actually exporting large amounts of cattle, wheat, and cotton, as well as of boots and shoes, agricultural implements, steel rails, hardware, watches, and cotton cloth. these commodities are produced by americans who can defy foreign competition. in some cases the tariff enables them to raise their prices at home, to the loss of their fellow-citizens. prices abroad cannot be raised by our government. what it can and does do is to burden both farms and factories by duties on lumber, glass, coal, wool, woollen goods, and many other imports. the rates are arranged with a view to increase, not individual liberty or public security, but the profits of managers of enterprises which would not pay without such help. men who are carrying on profitable industries have to make up part of what is lost in unprofitable ones. in fact, the cost of living is increased needlessly for all our citizens, except the privileged few. there would be less injustice in aiding new enterprises by bounties; but the proper authorities to decide how much money should be voted for such purposes are the cities and towns. some of the makers of our national constitution wished to make tariff legislation in congress impossible except by a majority of two-thirds; and this might properly be required for all measures not planned in behalf of individual liberty or the public safety. much of the business now done by the nation ought to be transferred to the states. they took the lead between 1830 and 1870 in improving rivers and harbours, building railroads, and digging canals. the result of transferring such work to congress was that in 1890 it voted $25,000,000 to carry on 435 undertakings, more than one-fourth of which had been judged unnecessary by engineers. two years later, four times as many new jobs were voted as had been recommended by the house committee. among these plans was one, in regard to the hudson river, which was the proper business of the state of new york. the extravagance of our pension system is notorious. if the restriction proposed by spencer is applicable anywhere, it is to central rather than local governments. viii. great as are the evils of unnecessary laws, spencer's remedy is too sweeping to be universally supported by evolutionists. huxley protests against it as "administrative nihilism," and declares that if his next-door neighbour is allowed to bring up children "untaught and untrained to earn their living, he is doing his best to restrict my freedom, by increasing the burden of taxation for the support of gaols and workhouses which i have to pay." his conclusion is that "no limit is or can be theoretically set to state interference." the impossibility of drawing "a hard and fast line" is admitted even by so extreme an individualist as wordsworth donisthorpe, who complains that "crimes go unpunished in england," while the "great national pickpocket" is busy "reading through all the comedies and burlesques brought out in the theatres," "running after little boys who dare to play pitch-farthing," or "going on sledging expeditions to the north pole." lecky agrees so far with spencer and mill as to say, in _democracy and liberty_, that punishment should "be confined, as a general rule, to acts which are directly injurious to others," and accordingly that "with sunday amusements in private life, the legislator should have no concern." as a check to over-legislation, he recommends biennial sessions, instead of annual; and he protests against the despotism of trades-unions. his strongest point against spencer is that sanitary legislation has added several years to the average length of life in england and wales, prevented more than eighty thousand deaths there in a single year, and actually reduced the death-rate of the army in india by more than four-fifths. ix. spencer has succeeded in increasing the number of individualists so much, that donisthorpe says they can be counted by the thousand, though there were scarcely enough in 1875 in england to fill an omnibus. transcendentalism had made individualism comparatively common long before in america. the principle of not interfering with other people, except to prevent their wronging us, is fully applicable, as spencer says, to the relation of husband with wife, and also to that of parent and teacher with child. it could also be followed with great advantage in the case of domestic servants. there can be no doubt of the correctness of the position, taken in the _principles of sociology_, that delight in war has a tendency to stifle love of liberty. sparta, russia, and the new german empire show that where the ideal of a nation is military glory, "the individual is owned by the state." the citizens are so graded, that "all are masters of those below and subjects of those above." the workers must live for the benefit of the fighters, and both be controlled closely by the government. armies flourish on the decay of individual rights. how difficult it was to avoid this, during some bloody years, even in america, has been shown in chapter iv. a nation of shopkeepers is better fitted than a nation of soldiers to develop free institutions. one of spencer's objections to socialism is that it would "end in military despotism." nothing else could replace competition so far as to keep a nation industrious. spencer is right in saying, "benefit and worth must vary together," which means that wages and salaries should correspond to value of work. otherwise, "the society decays from increase of its least worthy members and decrease of its most worthy members." these facts are so generally known already, that there is less danger than is thought by spencer, of either the national establishment of socialism or of a ruinous extension of governmental interference. the average american is altogether too willing to have his wealthy neighbours taxed for his own benefit; but he knows that he can make himself and his family more comfortable by his own exertions than his poor neighbours are; and he is not going to let any government forbid his doing so. he does not object to public libraries, and perhaps would not to free theatres; but he would vote down any plan which would prevent his using his money and time to his own greatest advantage. he is sometimes misled by plausible excuses for wasting public money, and arresting innocent people; but he insists on at least some better pretext than was made for the old-fashioned meddling with food, clothing, business, and religion. he may not call himself an individualist; but he will never practise socialism. this sort of man is already predominant in great britain, as well as in america; and multiplication of the type elsewhere is fostered by mighty tendencies. the duty of treating every form of religion according to ethical and not theological standards is rapidly becoming the practice of all civilised governments; and persecution is peculiar to turkey and russia. these two despotisms form, with germany, the principal exceptions to the rule that political liberty is on the increase throughout europe, especially in the form of local self-government. the nineteenth century has made even the poorest people more secure than ever before from oppression and lawless violence, as well as from pestilence and famine. destitution is relieved more amply and wisely, while industry and intelligence are encouraged by opportunity to enjoy comforts and luxuries once almost or altogether out of the reach of monarchs. the fetters formerly laid on trade of cities with their own suburbs have been broken; and the examples of great britain and new south wales are proving that nations profit more by helping than hindering one another in the broad paths of commerce. industrial efficiency has certainly been much promoted by the tendency, not only of scientific education but of manual training, to substitute knowledge of realities for quarrels about abstractions. all these changes favour the extension of free institutions and also of individual liberty, wherever peace can be maintained. industrial nations gain more than warlike ones by encouraging intellectual independence; but the general advantage is great enough to ensure the final triumph of liberty. appendix: sunday recreation this is much more common in new england and great britain than it was in the eighteenth century. the dinner has become the best, instead of the worst in the week. scarcely anyone rises early; and nobody is shocked at reading novels. there is an enormous circulation in both english and american cities of sunday papers whose aim is simply amusement. there is plenty of lively music in the parlours, as well as of merry talk in which clergymen are ready to lead. people who have comfortable homes can easily make sunday the pleasant-est day of the week. for people who cannot get much recreation at home, there are increasing opportunities to go to concerts, picture-galleries, and museums. among the reading-rooms thrown open on sunday in america about 1870 was that of the boston public library; and no difference is now made in this great institution among the seven days, except that more children's books and magazines are accessible on sunday. what important museums are now open in london, boston, and new york have been already mentioned in chapter vi. these opportunities are still limited; but there is no obstacle, except that of bad weather, to excursions on foot or bicycle, behind horse or locomotive, in electric car or steamboat, to beaches, ponds, and other places of amusement. the public parks are crowded all day long in summer; and people who go to church in the morning have no scruple about walking or riding for pleasure in the afternoon. these practices were expressly sanctioned by massachusetts in 1887, and by new jersey in 1893; and the old law against sunday visiting has been repealed since 1880 in vermont. the newer states have taken care not to pass such absurd statutes. i believe that the majority of our people were willing, as for instance was that prominent episcopalian, bishop potter, to have the chicago exposition open on sundays. theatres and baseball grounds attract crowds of visitors in our cities, especially those west of the alleghanies. whatever changes are made in the east will probably be in the direction of greater liberty. the only question is how fast the present opportunities of recreation ought to be increased. no one would now agree with dr. chalmers in calling the sabbath "an expedient for pacifying the jealousies of a god of vengeance." good people have ceased to think, as the puritans did, that "pleasures are most carefully to be avoided" on every day of the week, or that "amity to ourselves is enmity against god." preachers no longer recommend "abstaining not only from unlawful pleasures, but also from lawful delights." popular clergymen now say with dr. bellows: "amusement is not only a privilege but a duty, indispensable to health of body and mind, and essential even to the best development of religion itself." "i put amusement among the necessaries and not the luxuries of life." "it is as good a friend to the church as to the theatre, to sound morals and unsuperstitious piety as to health and happiness,... an interest of society which the religious class instead of regarding with hostility and jealousy, ought to encourage and direct." "there is hardly a more baleful error in the world than that which has produced the feud between morality and amusement, piety and pleasure." the fact is that pleasure means health. as i have said in a newspaper entitled _the index_: "it is a violation of the laws of health for anyone, not absolutely bed-ridden or crushed by fatigue, to spend thirty-six hours without some active exercise in the open air. trying to take enough on saturday to last until monday, is dangerous, and most people have little chance for healthy exercise except on sunday. the poor, ignorant girl who has had no fresh air for six days ought to be encouraged to take it freely on the seventh. and we all need our daily exercise just as much as our regular food and sleep. the two thousand delegates who asked, in behalf of ninety thousand working men, in 1853, to have the crystal palace open on sundays, were right in declaring that 'physical recreation is as necessary to the working man as food and drink on the sabbath.' the fact is that pleasure is naturally healthy even when not involving active exercise. dark thoughts breed disease like dark rooms. the man who never laughs has something wrong about his digestion or his conscience. herbert spencer has proved that our pleasant actions are beneficial, while painful ones are injurious both to ourselves and to our race. (_principles of psychology_, vol. i., pp. 278-286; am. ed.). thus sunday amusements are needed for the general health. "they are also necessary for the preservation of morality. this consists in performing the actions which benefit ourselves and our neighbours, in other words, pleasant ones, and abstaining from whatever is painful and injurious. it is only in exceptional cases that we can make others happy by suffering pain ourselves. now and then the paths of virtue and pleasure diverge; but they always come together again. as a rule, they traverse precisely the same ground and in exactly the same direction. this is very fortunate; for if pleasure were always vicious, virtue would be hateful and impossible. the most blessed of all peacemakers is he who keeps virtue and pleasure from falling out. there is no better text than that which the little girl said she had learned at sunday-school: 'chain up a child and away she will go!' even so strict a man as dr. johnson said: 'i am a great friend to public amusements, for they keep people from vice.' is there no need of them on the day when there is more drinking, gambling, and other gross vice than on any other? need i say what day keeps our policemen and criminal courts most busy, or crowds our hospitals with sufferers from riotous brawls? has not the experience of two hundred and fifty years justified those english statesmen who showed themselves much wiser than their puritan contemporaries in recommending archery, dancing, and other diversions on sunday, because forbidding them 'sets up filthy tippling and drunkenness?' to keep a man who does not care to go to church from getting any amusement, is to push him towards the saloon. and not only the laws against liquor selling, but others even more necessary for our safety, would be much better enforced if we did not encourage lawlessness by keeping up statutes which our best men and women violate without scruple and with impunity, or which actually prevent good people from taking such recreation as they know they ought to have. outgrown ordinances should not be suffered to drag just and necessary laws down into contempt. "nobody wants to revive those old laws of massachusetts bay which forbade people to wear lace, or buy foreign fruit, or charge more than a fixed price for a day's work. no more quakers will ever swing from a boston gallows merely for preaching. but our laws against sunday amusements are in the same spirit as that which hung mary dyer. in old times, government kept continually telling people what to do, and took especial pains to make them go to church on sunday. if they stayed away, they were fined; if they did not become members, they were not allowed to vote; if they got up rival services, they were hung; if they took any amusement on sunday, they were whipped. all four classes of laws for the same unjust end have passed away, except that against sunday recreation. this still survives in a modified form. but even in this shape it is utterly irreconcilable with the fundamental principles of our government. all american legislation, from the declaration of independence, rests on the great truth that our government is founded in order to secure us in our unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. our state is a limited partnership for mutual protection. we carry it on in order to make our freedom more complete; and we tolerate no restrictions on ourselves except such as are necessary conditions of the greatest possible liberty. these principles are already fully acknowledged on six days of the week, but only partly on the seventh. still, there is a growing recognition of the likeness between laws against sunday amusements and such prohibitions of eating meat in lent as once caused people to be burned alive." a weekly day of rest is a blessing; but david swing is right in saying that "absolute rest, perfectly satisfactory to horse and dog, is not adequate to the high nature of man." complete torpor of mind and body is more characteristic of a hindoo fakir than of a christian saint. should those who wish to rest as much as possible on sunday sleep in church? there is nothing irreligious in fresh air. the tendency of outdoor exercise to purify and elevate our thoughts is so strong that kingsley actually defended playing cricket on sunday as "a carrying out of the divineness of the sabbath." if there is no hostility between religion and amusement on six days of the week, there cannot be much on the seventh. no protestants are more religious than the swedes and norwegians. everybody goes to church; there is theological teaching in the public-schools; and advocacy of liberal religious views was punished in 1888 with imprisonment. no scandinavian objects, so far as i know, to indoor games, croquet, dancing, or going to the theatre on sunday; and these amusements are acknowledged to be perfectly proper throughout continental europe. no one who allows himself any exercise or recreation on sunday has a right to say that his neighbours do not need more than he does. lyman beecher could not preach his best on any day when he did not work hard at sawing wood or shovelling sand in his cellar. there would be less dyspepsia on monday if there were more exercise on sunday. herbert spencer tells us that "happiness is the most powerful of tonics. by accelerating the circulation of the blood, it facilitates the performance of every function; and so tends alike to increase health where it exists, and to restore it when it has been lost. hence the essential superiority of play to gymnastics." a bible dancing class is said to have been organised, in deference to such facts, in new jersey by an episcopalian pastor, who perhaps wishes to accomplish jeremiah's prediction of the messianic kingdom, "then shall the virgin rejoice in the dance." among other liberal clergymen is brooke herford, who says: "we want sunday to be the happiest day in all the week. keep it free from labour, but free for all quiet, innocent recreations." rev. charles voysey wrote me in 1887, lamenting the immorality arising "from the curse of having nothing to do or nowhere to go on sunday afternoons and evenings." "young persons especially," he said, "would be better, and morally more safe, for greater opportunities of innocent pleasure and games at the hours of enforced idleness on the sunday." the spirit of the legislators is changing like that of the clergy. the first laws against sunday amusement were passed by men who thought all pleasure vicious on every day of the week. our present statutes are kept in force by people who like amusement, and get all they want of it; but who make it almost impossible for their poor neighbours, in order to conciliate ecclesiastical prejudice. "they bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne and lay them on men's shoulders"; but they themselves do not feel the weight. whatever may be the advantage of keeping sunday, it cannot be kept religiously when it is kept compulsorily. rest from unnecessary labour and business on one day every week may be for the public welfare; but this rest is not made more secure by indiscriminate prohibitions of amusement. the idlest man is the most easily tempted to disturb his neighbours. no man's property is more safe or his personal liberty more secure because his neighbours are liable to be fined for playing golf. laws against sunday recreation do not protect but violate individual liberty. a free government has no business to interfere with the right of the citizens to take healthy exercise and innocent amusement whenever they choose. these considerations would justify a protest, not only against the sunday laws made by congress for the district of columbia, but also against the statutes of every state in the union, except arizona, california, idaho, louisiana, and wyoming. "whoever is present at any sport, game, play, or public diversion, except a concert of sacred music, or an entertainment given by a religious or charitable society, the proceeds of which, if any, are to be devoted exclusively to a religious or charitable purpose," on what is called "the lord's day" in massachusetts is liable to a fine of five dollars; the penalty for taking part may be fifty dollars; and the proprietor or manager may be fined as much as five hundred dollars. new jersey still keeps her old law against "singing, fiddling, or other music for the sake of merriment"; and express prohibitions of "any sport" are still maintained by connecticut, maine, and rhode island. prominent among other states which forbid amusements acknowledged innocent on six days of the week, are new hampshire, new york, pennsylvania, and vermont. many of our states show particular hostility to card-playing, dancing, and theatre-going. the fact that fishing was practised by some of the apostles on sunday has not saved this quiet recreation from being prohibited by more than twenty commonwealths. if every sunday law were a dead letter, it ought to be repealed, because it tends to bring needed laws into contempt; but among recent results of sunday legislation are the following. in 1876 some children were fined for playing ball in rhode island; so, about this time, in massachusetts, were a boy for skating, a young man for playing lawn-tennis, and a merchant for fishing with his little son. in 1894 two men were fined $10 each for playing golf on a lonely hill, in the commonwealth just mentioned; five boys under fifteen arrested for playing marbles in new york city; and every member of a baseball club in pennsylvania fined. in 1895 a man and a boy of fifteen were fined $20 each for fishing in new york; and the attempt of some clergymen, aided by police, to break up a show in missouri, caused a tumult in which men's heads were broken by clubs, while women and children were trampled underfoot. on the first sunday that the london galleries and museums were thrown open to their owners, may 24, 1896, two men were shot dead in attleboro, mass., by a policeman who had been ordered to break up a clambake. in that same year and state, a manager was fined $70 for allowing _yankee doodle_ to be performed in the boston theatre; three men were arrested for bowling; half a dozen jews who had been playing cards in a private house were fined $10 or $20 each, and those who could not pay were sent to jail. among the sabbath-breakers arrested in 1897 were a number of newsboys at the national capital, nine golfers in massachusetts, a young man for holding one end of a rope over which some little girls were skipping in new york city, and also the manager of a show in new jersey, who spent ten days in jail. fines were levied in 1898 for playing golf in connecticut, and twenty-five fishermen were arrested on one sunday in buffalo, n. y. such are the risks which still accompany innocent and healthy amusements in the eastern states. many such arrests are made in order to collect fees, or gratify malice; and neither motive ought to be encouraged by the friends of religion. some magistrates in long island, n. y., are believed, while still holding that baseball breaks the sabbath, to have discovered that golf does not. it is further said that on july 9, 1899, some baseball men who had been playing a sunday game to a large crowd saved themselves from arrest by using their bats and balls to imitate golfing as soon as a policeman appeared in their grounds. none of the sunday laws is so mischievous as the decree of mrs. grundy against all forms of recreation not practised by the wealthy and fashionable. these people have so much time on six days of the week for active outdoor sport and indoor public entertainments, that they make little attempt to indulge in such recreations on sunday. people who have only this one chance of playing ball, or dancing, or going to stereopticon lectures, concerts, and operas, suffer in health by having these recreations made unpopular as well as illegal. the climate of new england and new york, as well as of great britain and canada, has unfortunately been so arranged that there are a great many cold and rainy sundays, when much time cannot be spent pleasantly in walking or riding. this matters little to people who get all the amusement they want in their parlours. but what becomes of people who have no parlours? for instance, of servant-girls who have no place where they can sing or even laugh? shop-girls and factory-girls find their little rooms, sunday after sunday, too much like prisons. young men are perhaps even more unfortunate; for they go to the saloon, though this is often closed without any better place of amusement being opened. why should every week in a democratic country begin with an aristocratic sunday, a day whose pleasures are mainly for the rich? libraries and museums are blessed places of refuge; but "what are they among so many?" the residents of the district of columbia are particularly unfortunate, as the smithsonian museum, national library, and other buildings, which are open during six days, are kept shut on sunday. congress seems to be of the opinion that working people need no knowledge of natural history, except what they can get from sermons about jonah's whale and noah's ark. washington is not the only city whose rich men ought to remember the warning of heber newton: "everything that tends to foster among our working people the notion of class privilege is making against the truest morality in our midst. as they look upon the case, it is the wealthy people, whose homes are private libraries and galleries of art, who protest against the opening of our libraries and museums to those who can afford no libraries and buy no pictures. sabbatarianism is building very dangerous fires to-day." we should all be glad to have more intellectual culture given on sunday. one way of giving it would be for the churches to open public reading-rooms in the afternoon. this would be decidedly for their own interest; and so would be delivery of evening lectures on history, biography, and literature. the sunday-schools in england found it necessary, even as late as 1850, to give much time to teaching reading and writing as well as the higher branches. sunday-school rooms in america, which now are left useless after sunday noon, might be employed in teaching english to german, italian, and scandinavian immigrants during the afternoon and evening. classes might also be formed in vocal music, light gymnastics, american and english history and literature, physiology, sociology, and political economy. such changes would make our churches all the more worthy of the founder, who "went about doing good." the observance of sunday as a day of rest from labour and business will be all the more popular as it is made precious to irreligious people. they are numerous enough to have a right to ask that the public school-houses be opened for free classes in french, german, drawing, and modelling; botany, chemistry, and bird-lore; cooking, sewing, and wood-work. if teachers of these branches were employed on sunday by our cities, less money would be needed for police. our industrial interests would certainly gain by having this system carried out as far, for instance, as is done by lyons and milan, which have special sunday-schools for teaching weaving. goldsmiths are instructed by similar schools in austria, and blacksmiths in saxony. the full advantage of sunday classes of the various kinds here suggested might not perhaps be seen until a taste for them could be made general, but doing this would go far to diminish the taste for saloons. the first step, however, which ought to be taken by our legislatures is the repeal of all laws hindering the sale of tickets on sunday to exhibitions of pictures or curiosities, concerts, stereopticon lectures, or other instructive entertainments which are acknowledged inoffensive during the rest of the week. how far dramatic performances and other very attractive forms of public amusement should be permitted to take place on sunday is a question which ought to be settled by municipal authorities, with due reference to each special case. the people whose feelings ought to be considered are not those who wish to stay away from such places. they can easily do that without help from the police. the people who ought to be heard, first and last, are those who wish to get innocent amusement on their one day of leisure; and the only thing which the police need do is to see that they do get it without being defrauded or tempted into vice. only the actual existence of such temptation can justify interference with dancing or card-playing in a private house. the sunday reforms most needed, however, are those which will promote out-door exercise and mental culture. list of dates 1776. declaration of american independence, july 4th. 1780. emancipation in massachusetts and pennsylvania. 1783. peace between il s. a. and great britain, september 3d. 1785. great prosperity of british factories about this time. 1787. slavery prohibited north of ohio river; slave-trade opposed in england; bentham's principles of morals and legislation published. 1788. constitution of u. s. a. ratified by a sufficient number of states, june 21st. 1789. bastille taken, july 14th. 1791. paine's rights of man, part l, published, march 13th; louis xvi. accepts the new constitution, september 14th. 1792. france a republic, september 21st. 1793. slavery abolished in french colonies, february 4th. 1795. insurrection in paris crushed by bonaparte, october 5th; free public schools founded throughout france. 1796. bonaparte commander of army of italy, march 4th. 1797. french directory makes itself absolute, september 4th; venice ceded by france to austria. 1798. irish rebellion, may 23d. 1799. usurpation by bonaparte, november 10th. 1800. election of jefferson; schelling's transcendental idealism published. 1801. inauguration of jefferson, march 4th. 1802. birth of victor hugo, february 26th; lamarck's recherches published. 1803. hayti declares herself independent, january 2d; death of toussaint in prison, april 27th; birth of emerson, may 25th; emmet's insurrection in ireland, july 23d. 1804. the code napoleon announced, january; napoleon pro-liberty in the nineteenth century claimed emperor, may 18th; crowned, december 2d; schiller's william tell published. 1805. battle of austerlitz, december 2d. 1806. death of schiller, may 9th; birth of j. s. mill, may 20th; battle of jena, october 14th; berlin decree of napoleon against commerce with great britain, november 21st. 1807. slave-trade prohibited by great britain, march 25th; peace of tilsit, july 7th, raises napoleon to height of power; embargo laid by u. s. a., december 22d; oken announces the vertebral analogy of the skull; hegel's phaenomenologie des geistes published. 1808. rebellion of spaniards against french rule; witchcraft mob in england; goethe's faust, part l, published. 1809. birth of darwin, february 12th; revolt of tyrolese under hofer, april 8th; states of the church annexed to france, may 17th; death of paine, june 8th; pope imprisoned, july 6th; divorce of josephine, december 15th; lamarck's philosophie zoã´logique published. 1810. hofer shot, february 20th; marriage of napoleon with austrian archduchess, april 1st; post-offices required to open every sunday in u. s. a., april 30th; revolt against spanish rule of buenos ayres, may 25th, and of chili, september 18th. 1811. nottingham riots against machinery, november. 1812. birth of dickens, february 7th; war against great britain declared by u. s. a., june 18th; wellington enters madrid, august 12th; moscow burned, september 14th; byron's childe harold, coleridge's friend, and hegel's logik published. 1813. wellington invades france, october 7th; battle of leipsic, october 16th, 18th, and 19th; francia ruler of paraguay; unitarian disabilities removed in england; shelley's queen mab and owen's new view of society published. 1814. napoleon is deposed by senate, april 1st, and abdicates, april 11th; liberal constitution introduced by louis xviii., may; washington taken and burned by british, august 24th; peace of ghent between u. s. a. and great britain, december 24th; congress of vienna opens november 3d; graves of voltaire and rousseau violated. 1815. battle of new orleans, january 8th; waterloo, june 18th; controversy of unitarians and trinitarians in u. s. a.; last heretic burned in mexico; lamarck publishes the first volume of his histoire naturelle. 1817. shelley's children taken from him on account of his opinions, march 26th; demonstration at the wartburg, october 18th; unusual poverty in england; her authors and orators made liable to imprisonment without a trial; ben-tham demands suffrage for men and women not illiterate; shelley's revolt of islam published. 1818. chili liberated by battle of maipu, won by san martin, april 5th; religious tests abolished in connecticut; hannah m. crocker's rights of women published. 1819. assassination of kotzebue, march 23d; carlsbad conference, august 1st; "peterloo" massacre at manchester, august 16th; shelley's prometheus unbound published. 1820. revolution in spain, january 1st; and at naples, july 2d; assassination of french princes, february 13th, causes reaction against liberalism; birth of herbert spencer, april 27th; owen's plan of socialism proposed, may 1st; conference of troppau, december 8th; missouri compromise; sydney smith asks, "who reads an american book?"; irving's rip van winkle and legend of sleepy hollow published. 1821. brazil begins a revolt, january 1st, as do greece and sardinia in april, and peru in july; death of napoleon, may 5th; venezuela and colombra made free by battle of carabolo, won june 24th, by bolivar; austria supreme in italy; lundy begins his genius of universal emancipation. 1822. death of shelley, july 8th; independence of brazil proclaimed, september 8th; massacre at scio; fourrier's book on association published. 1823. spanish patriots crushed by french army, april; monroe doctrine announced, december 1st; british anti-slavery society formed; victor hugo's odes and ballads published. 1824. mexico a republic, january 31st; bolivar, dictator of feru, february 10th, defeats spaniards at ayachuco, december 9th; death of byron, april 19th; accession of charles x., september 16th; repeal of statutes forbidding english labourers to combine or emigrate; westminster review founded. 1825. much opposition to slavery in kentucky, maryland, and north carolina; many socialist communities founded in u. s. a.; elective courses of study at harvard college, and also at the university of virginia, where attendance at religious exercises is made voluntary; coleridge's aids to reflection published. 1826. citizens of new york petition for repeal of fugitive slave law, and for emancipation in the district of columbia. 1827. battle of navarino, october 20th; taylor sent to prison for blasphemy, october 24th. 1828. test act repealed; frances wright lectures against clergy. 1829. jackson inaugurated march 4th; catholic emancipation act signed, april 13th; miss wright opens a hall of science in new york city on sunday, april 25th; james mill's analysis and fourrier's industrial new world published. 1830. independence of greece acknowledged by turkey, april 25th; accession of william iv., july 26th; revolution at paris begins july 27th; king's troops driven out, july 29th; he is succeeded by louis philippe, august 9th; revolts in brussels, warsaw, and dresden; independence of belgium acknowledged, december 26th; hetherington sent to prison for six months for publishing the poor man's guardian; victor hugo's hernani acted; tennyson's poems and lyell's principles of geology published. 1831. first number of the liberator\ january 1st, and of the investigator, april 2d; carlile sent to prison for his writings, january 10th; cobbett tried and acquitted, july 31st; massacre of fifty-five white men, women, and children by slaves in virginia, sunday, august 21st; warsaw surrenders to russians, september 7th; reform bill defeated by bishops, october 7th; jamaica insurrection, december 22d; free trade convention in philadelphia; victor hugo's notre dame de paris published. 1832. new england anti-slavery society founded in boston, january 1st (becomes mass. a. s. in 1836); death of goethe, march 22d; the insurrection at paris described in les misã©rables, june 5th and 6th; reform bill passed and signed, june 7th; jackson re-elected, november 6th; woman suffrage lecture in london, december 2d; jackson's proclamation against attempt of south carolina to secede, december 11th; bloody resistance to tithes in ireland; elliott's corn law rhymes published. 1833. gradual reduction of tariff voted by congress, march 1st; death of bentham, june 6th; act of parliament for emancipation in west indies passed august 28th; american anti-slavery society founded at philadelphia, december; pro-slavery mobs there and in new york city; municipal suffrage extended in scotland; unsectarian public schools in ireland; first free town library in u. s. a. founded at peterboro, n. h., and opened sundays thenceforth; emerson's first lecture; carlyle's sartor resartus published. 1834. emancipation in west indies takes place, august ist; new poor law in england, august 14th; insurrection headed by mazzini in italy. 1835. death of cobbett, june 16th; anti-slavery periodicals taken from post-office at charleston, s. c, and burned by mob, july; convent at charlestown, mass., burned by a mob, august; garrison mobbed in boston, and other abolitionists in new york and vermont, october 21st; extension of municipal suffrage in england; tocqueville's democracy in america and strauss's life of jesus published. 1836. transcendental club founded in boston, september; parker begins to preach; tithes commuted in england; taxes on newspapers reduced; dissenters permitted to marry without disobedience to conscience; emerson's nature and dickens' pickwick papers published. 1837. discussion of slavery in house of representatives suppressed, january; miss grimkã©'s anti-slavery lectures, june; emerson's address on the american scholar, august 31st; anti-slavery convention of n. e. methodists, october 25th; carlyle's french revolution published. 1838. emerson's divinity school address, july 15th; kneeland imprisoned sixty days, that same summer, for blasphemy; pennsylvania hall burned by a pro-slavery mob; irish tithe system reformed; daguerreotypes invented; atlantic crossed by steam; railroad from london to birmingham; channing's self-culture published. 1839. anti-corn-law league organised, march 20th; unsectarian common schools in england; great chartist petition; pope forbids attendance at the scientific congress at pisa. 1840. penny postage, january 10th; nomination of candidate for president, april ist, by liberty party: quarrels in may among abolitionists; world's anti-slavery convention at london, in june, refuses seats to female delegates; local self-government in irish cities; protest of american catholics against sectarianism of public schools; the dial begins; carlyle's heroes and hero worship published. 1841, hetherington imprisoned in england for publishing letters to the clergy, and the editor of the oracle of reason for attacking the bible; emerson's first volume of essays published. 1842. garrison calls on free states to secede, may; death of channing, october 2d; brook farm started, as are many communties about this time; spencer's theory of the limits of government published, 1844. morse proves value of telegraph by announcing nomination of frelinghuysen for vice-president by whigs, may 1st; disunion banner publicly accepted by garrison, june 1st; annexation of texas and reduction of tariff decided by election on november 5th; rule against discussing slavery repealed by house of representatives; lowell's poems published. 1845. parker begins to preach regularly in boston, february 16th; potato rot in ireland, august; vestiges of creation published. 1846. mexico invaded by u. s. troops, march; free trade established in england, june 25th, and bill to reduce american tariff signed, june 26th; first volume of grote's greece and first number of lowell's biglow papers published. 1847. mexicans defeated at buena vista by general taylor, february 22d and 23d; death of o'connell, may 15th. 1848. revolution in paris, february 22d; king abdicates, february 24th; insurrections in munich, vienna, berlin, venice, and milan in march, afterwards in other cities; "spirit rappings" at rochester, n.y., begin march 31st; chartist demonstration at london, april 10th; emancipation decreed by french republic, april 27th; socialist insurrection at paris, june 23d, 24th, 25th, and 26th; "woman's rights" convention at seneca falls, n. y., july 19th; revolt in ireland, july 29th; buffalo convention of free soilers, august 9th; kossuth dictator of hungary, september 25th; state constitution and town ordinances made in october by citizens of california without federal sanction; pro-slavery defeat at election of taylor, november 7th; flight of pope from rome, november 24th; louis napoleon president of france, december 10th; lowell's vision of sir launfal, fable for critics, and biglow papers published, 1849. defeat of king of sardinia by austrians at novara, march 23d, prevents liberation of italy; rome captured by french, july 3d; hungarian army surrendered to russians by gorgei, august 13th; venice taken by austrians, august 28th; emancipation convention in kentucky. 1850. death of wordsworth, april 24th, and of president taylor, july 9th; fugitive slave bill signed, september 18th; first national "woman's rights" convention at worcester, mass., october 23d and 24th; bradlaugh's first lecture; hawthorne's scarlet letter, spencer's social statics, and tennyson's in memoriam published. 1851. london great exhibition opens may ist; a fugitive slave rescued at boston, sunday, february 16th, another at syracuse, n. y., october ist; usurpation of louis napoleon, december 2d, 1851. 1852. uncle tom's cabin published, march 20th; death of frances wright, and accession of napoleon iii., december 2d; herbert spencer announces the principle of differentiation. 1854. repeal of missouri compromise proposed by douglas, january 23d; return of burns, a fugitive slave, from boston, june 2d; u. s. constitution publicly burned by garrison, july 4th; kansas election carried by border ruffians, november 29th; thoreau's walden published. 1855. spencer's pyschology and walt whitman's leaves of grass published, 1856. sumner assaulted, may 22d.. 1857. disunion convention, worcester, mass., january 15th; death of bã©ranger, july 16th, and of comte, september 5th; tariff reduced twenty per cent, in u. s. a.; buckle's history of civilisation, vol. i., published. 1858. essays by darwin and wallace read in public, july ist; jews admitted to parliament by act passed july 23d; death of robert owen, november 17th; lincoln and douglas campaign in illinois. 1859. austrians defeated at magenta, june 4th, and solferino. june 24th; lombardy annexed to sardinia by treaty of villafranca, july nth; john brown takes possession of harper's ferry, sunday, october 16th, and is tried november 2d; darwin's origin of species published, november 24th; john brown hung, december 2d. 1860. split of democratic party, april 30th; death of theodore parker, may 10th; garibaldi enters naples, september 7th; election of lincoln, november 6th; secession of south carolina, december 20th; annexation of two sicilies to sardinia, december 26th; mill on liberty published. 1861. confederate states of america organised, february 8th; protective tariff passed, march 2d; russian serfs emancipated, march 3d; lincoln inaugurated, march 4th; victor emmanuel king of italy, march 17th; fort sumter bombarded, april 12th, surrendered, april 13th; lincoln's proclamation, monday, april 15th, calls all the north to arms; death of cavour, june 6th; union defeat at bull run, sunday, july 21st. 1862. paper money made legal tender in u. s. a., february 25th; return of fugitives from slavery by army or navy forbidden, march 13th; negro soldiers, april; death of thoreau, may 6th, and of buckle, may 29th; disastrous campaign of mcclellan in virginia ends by his retreat, july 8th; union victory at antietam, september 19th; emancipation announced as a possible war measure by lincoln, september 22d; union defeat at fredericksburg, december 13th; victor hugo's les misã©rables published, also spencer's first principles containing his full theory of integration and differentiation. 1863. lincoln proclaims emancipation, january 1st; signs bills suspending habeas corpus act and establishing conscription, march 3d; union defeat at chancellorsville, may 3d; vallandigham sentenced, may 7th; battle of gettysburg, july 1st, 2d, and 3d, ending in a union victory; vicksburg surrendered to general grant, july 4th; mississippi opened by surrender of port hudson, july 9th; union victories at lookout mountain, november 24th, and chattanooga, november 25th; fenian convention at chicago, november 25th; darwinism much opposed by european clergy about this time. 1864. general grant takes command of all the union armies, march 12th; undecisive battles in the wilderness and at spottsylvania, may 5th-10th; fugitive slave act repealed, june 23d; nevada admitted, october 31st; lincoln re-elected, november 8th; sherman marches from atlanta, november 16th, and enters savannah, december 22d. 1865. death of cobden, april 2d; richmond entered by coloured cavalry, april 3d; lee surrenders, april 9th; lincoln shot, good friday, april 14th, dies april 15th; slavery abolished by thirteenth amendment, december 18th; lecky's rationalism published. 1866. prussian victory over austria at kã´nã®ggratz, july 3d; venice part of kingdom of italy, november 4th. 1867. first convention of the free religious association, may 30th; suffrage extended in england, august 15th; home rule in hungary. 1868. fourteenth amendment in force, july 28th; cuban declaration of independence, october 10th. 1869. irish church disestablished, july 26th; witnesses allowed to affirm in great britain. 1870. death of dickens, june 9th; napoleon iii. defeated at sedan, september 1st; france a republic, september 4th; rome part of the kingdom of italy, october 9th; inger-soll begins to lecture; home rule agitation in ireland, 1871. paris surrendered to prussians, january 28th; communists supreme there, march 18th, suppressed, may 28th; emancipation in brazil; darwin's descent of man published. 1872. death of mazzini, march 10th; secret ballot in england; abbot's "demands of liberalism" published in the index (which began january 1, 1870). 1873. spain a republic, february 11th; death of j. s. mill, may 8th; american liberal league, september 1st. 1874. military usurpation at madrid, january 3d; death of sumner, march 11th; citizens of district of columbia disfranchised, june 17th; alphonso xii. king of spain, december 30th; mrs. besant begins to lecture; victor hugo's ninety-three published. 1875. sunday society organised at london. 1876. centennial exhibition at philadelphia opens, may 10th, and conventiom of liberal league, july 1st; disputed election for president, november 7th; sunday convention in boston, november 15th; vivisection restricted in england; cuban rebellion suppressed, 242 liberty in the nineteenth century. 1877. museum of fine arts in boston open in and after march on sundays. 1878. anti-clerical resolution passed by woman suffrage convention, rochester, n. y., july; split of liberal league at syracuse, n. y., sunday, october 27th; professor winchell obliged to leave nashville, tenn., for evolutionism. 1879. specie payment resumed in u. s. a., january 1st; death of garrison, may 24th; henry george's progress and poverty published. 1880. bradlaugh refused his seat in parliament, may 21st; many patriots banished to siberia. 1881. czar alexander ii. assassinated, march 13th, anti-jewish mobs on and after april 27th; bradlaugh excluded by force, august 1st. 1882. death of longfellow, march 24th, of darwin, april 18th, of emerson, april 27th, and of garibaldi, june 2d. 1883. foote and ramsay, english journalists, sentenced respectively to twelve and nine months in prison for blasphemy. 1884. death of wendell phillips; february 2d; cleveland elected president, november 4th; professor woodrow dismissed from presbyterian theological seminary at columbia, s. c, for teaching evolution, december 12th. 1885. death of victor hugo, may 20th, and of general grant, july 23d. 1886. bradlaugh takes his seat, january 13th; railroad strike in missouri suppressed by federal troops, march; bloody conflict of chicago anarchists with police, may 4th; statue of liberty unveiled in new york harbour, october 28th. 1887. chicago anarchists hung, november 11th. 1888. u. s. tariff reduced by mills bill, july 21st; cleveland defeated, november 6th; imprisonment in sweden for blasphemy; bellamy's looking backward published. 1889. brazil a republic, november 15th; death of browning, december 12th. 1890. australian ballot tried in rhode island, april 2d; u. s. tariff raised by mckinley bill, passed by the 4 billion dollars congress, and signed october 1st. 1891. death of bradlaugh, january 30th, and of lowell, august 12th; jews expelled from moscow in april, and much persecuted this year and in 1892; new york museum of art opened on sunday, may 31st, to 10,000 visitors. 1892. death of walt whitman, march 26th, of whittier, september 7th, and of tennyson, october 6th; bill excluding chinese from u. s. a. signed, may 5th; congress votes for closing chicago exposition on sundays, july 19th; cleveland re-elected, november 8th; new york museum of natural history open sundays; revised edition of spencer's social statics published. 1893. chicago exposition formally opened may ist, first open sunday, may 28th; parliament of religions begins monday, september nth, 10 a.m. 1894. death of kossuth, march 20th, of holmes, october 7th, of lucy stone, october 18th, and of tyndall, december 4th; debs, leader of a riot in chicago, enjoined by u. s. judges, july 2d, and put down by federal troops; reduction of u. s. tariff, august 2d; home rule approved by house of commons, september ist, refused by house of lords, september 8th; universal suffrage and extension of local self-government in england; a professor in university of texas dismissed for evolutionism. 1895. death of frederick douglass, february 20th, and of huxley, june 29th; rebellion in cuba; men arrested in new york city for selling ice, umbrellas, etc., on sunday; eight men who had worked on that day, after keeping saturday as the sabbath, forced to labour in the chain-gang in tennessee. 1896. british museum, national gallery, and other institutions opened to the public on sunday, may 24th, and afterwards; two sabbath-breakers shot dead that same day by a policeman in massachusetts; death of william morris, october 3d; democratic candidates defeated on a free-silver platform, november 3d. 1897. dingley bill to increase tariff, signed july 24th; death of henry george, october 27th. 1898. war declared by u. s. a. against spain, april 21st; death of gladstone, ascension day, may 19th; independence of cuba secured by treaty, august 12th. 1899. death of ingersoll, july 21st. the history of freedom and other essays macmillan and co., limited london · bombay · calcutta melbourne the macmillan company new york · boston · chicago atlanta · san fransisco the macmillan co. of canada ltd. toronto [illustration: acton] the history of freedom and other essays by john emerich edward dalberg-acton first baron acton d.c.l., l.l.d., etc. etc. regius professor of modern history in the university of cambridge edited with an introduction by john neville figgis, litt.d. sometime lecturer in st. catharine's college, cambridge and reginald vere laurence, m.a. fellow and lecturer of trinity college, cambridge macmillan and co., limited st. martin's street, london 1909 _first edition 1907_ _reprinted 1909_ prefatory note the editors desire to thank the members of the acton family for their help and advice during the preparation of this volume and of the volume of _historical essays and studies_. they have had the advantage of access to many of acton's letters, especially those to döllinger and lady blennerhasset. they have thus been provided with valuable material for the introduction. at the same time they wish to take the entire responsibility for the opinions expressed therein. they are again indebted to professor henry jackson for valuable suggestions. this volume consists of articles reprinted from the following journals: _the quarterly review_, _the english historical review_, _the nineteenth century_, _the rambler_, _the home and foreign review_, _the north british review_, _the bridgnorth journal_. the editors have to thank mr. john murray, messrs. longmans, kegan paul, williams and norgate, and the proprietors of _the bridgnorth journal_ for their kind permission to republish these articles, and also the delegacy of the clarendon press for allowing the reprint of the introduction to mr. burd's edition of _il principe_. they desire to point out that in _lord acton and his circle_ the article on "the protestant theory of persecution" is attributed to simpson: this is an error. j.n.f. r.v.l. _august 24, 1907._ contents page portrait of lord acton _frontispiece_ chronicle viii introduction ix i. the history of freedom in antiquity 1 ii. the history of freedom in christianity 30 iii. sir erskine may's democracy in europe 61 iv. the massacre of st. bartholomew 101 v. the protestant theory of persecution 150 vi. political thoughts on the church 188 vii. introduction to l.a. burd's edition of il principe by machiavelli 212 viii. mr. goldwin smith's irish history 232 ix. nationality 270 x. döllinger on the temporal power 301 xi. döllinger's historical work 375 xii. cardinal wiseman and the home and foreign review 436 xiii. conflicts with rome 461 xiv. the vatican council 492 xv. a history of the inquisition of the middle ages. by henry charles lea 551 xvi. the american commonwealth. by james bryce 575 xvii. historical philosophy in france and french belgium and switzerland. by robert flint 588 appendix 597 index 599 chronicle john emerich edward dalberg-acton, born at naples, 10th january 1834, son of sir ferdinand richard edward dalberg-acton and marie de dalberg, afterwards countess granville. french school near paris. 1843-1848. student at oscott " " edinburgh. 1848-1854. " " munich university, living with döllinger. 1855. visits america in company with lord ellesmere. 1858-1862. becomes editor of _the rambler_. 1859-1865. m.p. for carlow. 1862-1864. founds, edits, and concludes _the home and foreign review_. 1864. pius ix. issued _quanta cura_, with appended _syllabus errorum_. 1865-1866. m.p. for bridgnorth 1865. marries countess marie arco-valley. 1867-1868. writes for _the chronicle_. 1869. created baron acton. 1869-1871. writes for _north british review_. 1869-1870. vatican council. acton at rome. writes "letters of quirinus" in _alleging zeitung_. 1872. honorary degree at munich. 1874. letters to _the times_ on "the vatican decrees." 1888. honorary degree at cambridge. 1889. " " oxford. 1890. honorary fellow of all souls'. 1892-1895. lord-in-waiting. 1895-1902. regius professor of modern history at cambridge honorary fellow of trinity college. 19th june 1902. died at tegernsee. introduction the two volumes here published contain but a small selection from the numerous writings of acton on a variety of topics, which are to be found scattered through many periodicals of the last half-century. the result here displayed is therefore not complete. a further selection of nearly equal quantity might be made, and still much that is valuable in acton's work would remain buried. here, for instance, we have extracted nothing from the _chronicle_; and acton's gifts as a leader-writer remain without illustration. yet they were remarkable. rarely did he show to better advantage than in the articles and reviews he wrote in that short-lived rival of the _saturday review_. from the two bound volumes of that single weekly, there might be made a selection which would be of high interest to all who cared to learn what was passing in the minds of the most acute and enlightened members of the roman communion at one of the most critical epochs in the history of the papacy. but what could never be reproduced is the general impression of acton's many contributions to the _rambler_, the _home and foreign_, and the _north british review_. perhaps none of his longer and more ceremonious writings can give to the reader so vivid a sense at once of the range of acton's erudition and the strength of his critical faculty as does the perusal of these short notices. any one who wished to understand the personality of acton could not do better than take the published bibliography and read a few of the articles on "contemporary literature" furnished by him to the three reviews. in no other way could the reader so clearly realise the complexity of his mind or the vast number of subjects which he could touch with the hand of a master. in a single number there are twenty-eight such notices. his writing before he was thirty years of age shows an intimate and detailed knowledge of documents and authorities which with most students is the "hard won and hardly won" achievement of a lifetime of labour. he always writes as the student, never as the _littérateur_. even the memorable phrases which give point to his briefest articles are judicial, not journalistic. yet he treats of matters which range from the dawn of history through the ancient empires down to subjects so essentially modern as the vast literature of revolutionary france or the leaders of the romantic movement which replaced it. in all these writings of acton those qualities manifest themselves, which only grew stronger with time, and gave him a distinct and unique place among his contemporaries. here is the same austere love of truth, the same resolve to dig to the bed-rock of fact, and to exhaust all sources of possible illumination, the same breadth of view and intensity of inquiring ardour, which stimulated his studies and limited his productive power. above all, there is the same unwavering faith in principles, as affording the only criterion of judgment amid the ever-fluctuating welter of human passions, political manoeuvring, and ecclesiastical intrigue. but this is not all. we note the same value for great books as the source of wisdom, combined with the same enthusiasm for immediate justice which made acton the despair of the mere academic student, an enigma among men of the world, and a stumbling-block to the politician of the clubs. beyond this, we find that certainty and decision of judgment, that crisp concentration of phrase, that grave and deliberate irony and that mastery of subtlety, allusion, and wit, which make his interpretation an adventure and his judgment a sword. a few instances may be given. in criticising a professor of history famous in every way rather than as a student, acton says, "his lectures are indeed not entirely unhistorical, for he has borrowed quite discriminatingly from tocqueville." of another writer he says that "ideas, if they occur to him, he rejects like temptations to sin." of ranke, thinking perhaps also of himself, he declares that "his intimate knowledge of all the contemporary history of europe is a merit not suited to his insular readers." of a partisan french writer under louis napoleon he says that "he will have a fair grievance if he fails to obtain from a discriminating government some acknowledgment of the services which mere historical science will find it hard to appreciate." of laurent he says, that "sometimes it even happens that his information is not second-hand, and there are some original authorities with which he is evidently familiar. the ardour of his opinions, so different from those which have usually distorted history, gives an interest even to his grossest errors. mr. buckle, if he had been able to distinguish a good book from a bad one, would have been a tolerable imitation of m. laurent." perhaps, however, the most characteristic of these forgotten judgments is the description of lord liverpool and the class which supported him. not even disraeli painting the leader of that party which he was destined so strangely to "educate" could equal the austere and accurate irony with which acton, writing as a student, not as a novelist, sums up the characteristics of the class of his birth. lord liverpool governed england in the greatest crisis of the war, and for twelve troubled years of peace, chosen not by the nation, but by the owners of the land. the english gentry were well content with an order of things by which for a century and a quarter they had enjoyed so much prosperity and power. desiring no change they wished for no ideas. they sympathised with the complacent respectability of lord liverpool's character, and knew how to value the safe sterility of his mind. he distanced statesmen like grenville, wellesley, and canning, not in spite of his inferiority, but by reason of it. his mediocrity was his merit. the secret of his policy was that he had none. for six years his administration outdid the holy alliance. for five years it led the liberal movement throughout the world. the prime minister hardly knew the difference. he it was who forced canning on the king. in the same spirit he wished his government to include men who were in favour of the catholic claims and men who were opposed to them. his career exemplifies, not the accidental combination but the natural affinity, between the love of conservatism and the fear of ideas. the longer essays republished in these volumes exhibit in most of its characteristics a personality which even those who disagreed with his views must allow to have been one of the most remarkable products of european culture in the nineteenth century. they will show in some degree how acton's mind developed in the three chief periods of his activity, something of the influences which moulded it, a great deal of its preferences and its antipathies, and nearly all its directing ideals. during the first period--roughly to be dated from 1855 to 1863--he was hopefully striving, under the influence of döllinger (his teacher from the age of seventeen), to educate his co-religionists in breadth and sympathy, and to place before his countrymen ideals of right in politics, which were to him bound up with the catholic faith. the combination of scientific inquiry with true rules of political justice he claimed, in a letter to döllinger, as the aim of the _home and foreign review_. the result is to be seen in a quarterly, forgotten, like all such quarterlies to-day, but far surpassing, alike in knowledge, range, and certainty, any of the other quarterlies, political, or ecclesiastical, or specialist, which the nineteenth century produced. there is indeed no general periodical which comes near to it for thoroughness of erudition and strength of thought, if not for brilliance and ease; while it touches on topics contemporary and political in a way impossible to any specialist journal. a comparison with the _british critic_ in the religious sphere, with the _edinburgh_ in the political, will show how in all the weightier matters of learning and thought, the _home and foreign_ (indeed the _rambler_) was their superior, while it displayed a cosmopolitan interest foreign to most english journals. we need not recapitulate the story so admirably told already by doctor gasquet of the beginning and end of the various journalistic enterprises with which acton was connected. so far as he was concerned, however, the time may be regarded as that of youth and hope. next came what must be termed the "fighting period," when he stood forth as the leader among laymen of the party opposed to that "insolent and aggressive faction" which achieved its imagined triumph at the vatican council. this period, which may perhaps be dated from the issue of the syllabus by pius ix. in 1864, may be considered to close with the reply to mr. gladstone's pamphlet on "the vatican decrees," and with the attempt of the famous cardinal, in whose mind history was identified with heresy, to drive from the roman communion its most illustrious english layman. part of this story tells itself in the letters published by the abbot gasquet; and more will be known when those to döllinger are given to the world. we may date the third period of acton's life from the failure of manning's attempt, or indeed a little earlier. he had now given up all attempt to contend against the dominant influence of the court of rome, though feeling that loyalty to the church of his baptism, as a living body, was independent of the disastrous policy of its hierarchy. during this time he was occupied with the great unrealised project of the history of liberty or in movements of english politics and in the usual avocations of a student. in the earlier part of this period are to be placed some of the best things that acton ever wrote, such as the lectures on liberty, here republished. it is characterised by his discovery in the "eighties" that döllinger and he were divided on the question of the severity of condemnation to be passed on persecutors and their approvers. acton found to his dismay that döllinger (like creighton) was willing to accept pleas in arrest of judgment or at least mitigation of sentence, which the layman's sterner code repudiated. finding that he had misunderstood his master, acton was for a time profoundly discouraged, declared himself isolated, and surrendered the outlook of literary work as vain. he found, in fact, that in ecclesiastical as in general politics he was alone, however much he might sympathise with others up to a certain point. on the other hand, these years witnessed a gradual mellowing of his judgment in regard to the prospects of the church, and its capacity to absorb and interpret in a harmless sense the dogma against whose promulgation he had fought so eagerly. it might also be correct to say that the english element in acton came out most strongly in this period, closing as it did with the cambridge professorship, and including the development of the friendship between himself and mr. gladstone. we have spoken both of the english element in acton and of his european importance. this is the only way in which it is possible to present or understand him. there were in him strains of many races. on his father's side he was an english country squire, but foreign residence and the neapolitan court had largely affected the family, in addition to that flavour of cosmopolitan culture which belongs to the more highly placed englishmen of the roman communion. on his mother's side he was a member of one of the oldest and greatest families in germany, which was only not princely. the dalbergs, moreover, had intermarried with an italian family, the brignoli. trained first at oscott under wiseman, and afterwards at munich under döllinger, in whose house he lived, acton by education as well as birth was a cosmopolitan, while his marriage with the family of arco-valley introduced a further strain of bavarian influence into his life. his mother's second marriage with lord granville brought him into connection with the dominant influences of the great whig houses. for a brief period, like many another county magnate, he was a member of the house of commons, but he never became accustomed to its atmosphere. for a longer time he lived at his house in shropshire, and was a stately and sympathetic host, though without much taste for the avocations of country life. his english birth and whig surroundings were largely responsible for that intense constitutionalism, which was to him a religion, and in regard both to ecclesiastical and civil politics formed his guiding criterion. this explains his detestation of all forms of absolutism on the one hand, and what he always called "the revolution" on the other. it was not, however, the english strain that was most obvious in acton, but the german. it was natural that he should become fired under döllinger's influence with the ideals of continental scholarship and exact and minute investigation. he had a good deal of the massive solidity of the german intellect. he liked, as in the "letter to a german bishop," to make his judgment appear as the culmination of so much weighty evidence, that it seemed to speak for itself. he had, too, a little of the german habit of breaking a butterfly upon a wheel, and at times he makes reading difficult by a more than teutonic allusiveness. it was not easy for acton to bear in mind that the public is often ignorant of even the names of distinguished scholars, and that "a european reputation" is sometimes confined to the readers of specialist publications. the italian strain in acton is apparent in another quality, which is perhaps his one point of kinship with machiavelli, the absence of hesitation from his thought, and of mystery from his writing. subtle and ironic as his style is, charged with allusion and weighted with passion, it is yet entirely devoid both of german sentiment and english vagueness. there was no haze in his mind. he judges, but does not paint pictures. it may have been this absence of half-tones in his vein of thought, and of _chiaroscuro_ in his imagination that made manning, an intelligent however hostile critic, speak of "the ruthless talk of undergraduates." but however much or little be allowed to the diverse strains of hereditary influence or outward circumstances, the interest of acton to the student lies in his intense individuality. that austerity of moral judgment, that sense of the greatness of human affairs, and of the vast issues that lie in action and in thought, was no product of outside influences, and went beyond what he had learnt from his master döllinger. to treat politics as a game, to play with truth or make it subservient to any cause other than itself, to take trivial views, was to acton as deep a crime as to waste in pleasure or futility the hours so brief given for salvation of the soul would have seemed to baxter or bunyan; indeed, there was an element of puritan severity in his attitude towards statesmen both ecclesiastical and civil. he was no "light half-believer of a casual creed," but had a sense of reality more like dante than many moderns. this, perhaps, it was that drew him ever closer to mr. gladstone, while it made the house of commons and the daily doings of politicians uncongenial. there is no doubt that he had learned too well "the secret of intellectual detachment." early in his life his shrewd and kindly stepfather had pointed out to him the danger of losing influence by a too unrestrained desire to escape worshipping the idols of the marketplace. there are, it is true, not wanting signs that his view of the true relations of states and churches may become one day more dominant, for it appears as though once more the earlier middle ages will be justified, and religious bodies become the guardians of freedom, even in the political sphere. still, a successful career in public life could hardly be predicted for one who felt at the beginning that "i agree with nobody, and nobody agrees with me," and towards the close admitted that he "never had any contemporaries." on the other hand, it may be questioned whether, in the chief of his self-imposed tasks, he failed so greatly as at first appeared. if he did not prevent "infallibility" being decreed, the action of the party of strossmayer and hefele assuredly prevented the form of the decree being so dangerous as they at first feared. we can only hazard a guess that the mild and minimising terms of the dogma, especially as they have since been interpreted, were in reality no triumph to veuillot and the jesuits. in later life acton seems to have felt that they need not have the dangerous consequences, both in regard to historical judgments or political principles, which he had feared from the registered victory of ultramontane reaction. however this may be, acton's whole career is evidence of his detachment of mind, and entire independence even of his closest associates. it was a matter to him not of taste but of principle. what mainly marked him out among men was the intense reality of his faith. this gave to all his studies their practical tone. he had none of the pedant's contempt for ordinary life, none of the æsthete's contempt for action as a "little vulgar," and no desire to make of intellectual pursuits an end in themselves. his scholarship was to him as practical as his politics, and his politics as ethical as his faith. thus his whole life was a unity. all his various interests were inspired by one unconquered resolve, the aim of securing universally, alike in church and in state, the recognition of the paramountcy of principles over interests, of liberty over tyranny, of truth over all forms of evasion or equivocation. his ideal in the political world was, as he said, that of securing _suum cuique_ to every individual or association of human life, and to prevent any institution, however holy its aims, acquiring more. to understand the ardour of his efforts it is necessary to bear in mind the world into which he was born, and the crises intellectual, religious, and political which he lived to witness and sometimes to influence. born in the early days of the july monarchy, when reform in england was a novelty, and catholic freedom a late-won boon, acton as he grew to manhood in munich and in england had presented to his regard a series of scenes well calculated to arouse a thoughtful mind to consideration of the deepest problems, both of politics and religion. what must have been the "long, long thoughts" of a youth, naturally reflective and acutely observant, as he witnessed the break-up of the old order in '48 and the years that followed. in the most impressionable age of life he was driven to contemplate a europe in solution; the crash of the kingdoms; the pope a liberal, an exile, and a reactionary; the principle of nationality claiming to supersede all vested rights, and to absorb and complete the work of '89; even socialism for once striving to reduce theory to practice, till there came the "saviour of society" with the _coup d'état_ and a new era of authority and despotism. this was the outward aspect. in the world of thought he looked upon a period of moral and intellectual anarchy. philosopher had succeeded philosopher, critic had followed critic, strauss and baur were names to conjure with, and hegel was still unforgotten in the land of his birth. materialistic science was in the very heyday of its parvenu and tawdry intolerance, and historical knowledge in the splendid dawn of that new world of knowledge, of which ranke was the columbus. everywhere faith was shaken, and except for a few resolute and unconquered spirits, it seemed as though its defence were left to a class of men who thought the only refuge of religion was in obscurity, the sole bulwark of order was tyranny, and the one support of eternal truth plausible and convenient fiction. what wonder then that the pupil of döllinger should exhaust the intellectual and moral energies of a lifetime, in preaching to those who direct the affairs of men the paramount supremacy of principle. the course of the plebiscitary empire, and that gradual campaign in the united states by which the will of the majority became identified with that necessity which knows no law, contributed further to educate his sense of right in politics, and to augment the distrust of power natural to a pupil of the great whigs, of burke, of montesquieu, of madame de staël. on the other hand, as a pupil of döllinger, his religious faith was deeper than could be touched by the recognition of facts, of which too many were notorious to make it even good policy to deny the rest; and he demanded with passion that history should set the follies and the crimes of ecclesiastical authority in no better light than those of civil. we cannot understand acton aright, if we do not remember that he was an english roman catholic, to whom the penal laws and the exploitation of ireland were a burning injustice. they were in his view as foul a blot on the protestant establishment and the whig aristocracy as was the st. bartholomew's medal on the memory of gregory xiii., or the murder of the duc d'enghien on the genius of napoleon, or the burning of servetus on the sanctity of calvin, or the permission of bigamy on the character of luther, or the september massacres on danton. two other tendencies dominant in germany--tendencies which had and have a great power in the minds of scholars, yet to acton, both as a christian and a man, seemed corrupting--compelled him to a search for principles which might deliver him from slavery alike to traditions and to fashion, from the historian's vice of condoning whatever has got itself allowed to exist, and from the politician's habit of mere opportunist acquiescence in popular standards. first of these is the famous maxim of schiller, _die welt-geschichte ist das welt-gericht_, which, as commonly interpreted, definitely identifies success with right, and is based, consciously or unconsciously, on a pantheistic philosophy. this tendency, especially when envisaged by an age passing through revolutionary nationalism back to machiavelli's ideals and _realpolitik_, is clearly subversive of any system of public law or morality, and indeed is generally recognised as such nowadays even by its adherents. the second tendency against which acton's moral sense revolted, had arisen out of the laudable determination of historians to be sympathetic towards men of distant ages and of alien modes of thought. with the romantic movement the early nineteenth century placed a check upon the habit of despising mediæval ideals, which had been increasing from the days of the renaissance and had culminated in voltaire. instead of this, there arose a sentiment of admiration for the past, while the general growth of historical methods of thinking supplied a sense of the relativity of moral principles, and led to a desire to condone if not to commend the crimes of other ages. it became almost a trick of style to talk of judging men by the standard of their day and to allege the spirit of the age in excuse for the albigensian crusade or the burning of hus. acton felt that this was to destroy the very bases of moral judgment and to open the way to a boundless scepticism. anxious as he was to uphold the doctrine of growth in theology, he allowed nothing for it in the realm of morals, at any rate in the christian era, since the thirteenth century. he demanded a code of moral judgment independent of place and time, and not merely relative to a particular civilisation. he also demanded that it should be independent of religion. his reverence for scholars knew no limits of creed or church, and he desired some body of rules which all might recognise, independently of such historical phenomena as religious institutions. at a time when such varied and contradictory opinions, both within and without the limits of christian belief, were supported by some of the most powerful minds and distinguished investigators, it seemed idle to look for any basis of agreement beyond some simple moral principles. but he thought that all men might agree in admitting the sanctity of human life and judging accordingly every man or system which needlessly sacrificed it. it is this preaching in season and out of season against the reality of wickedness, and against every interference with the conscience, that is the real inspiration both of acton's life and of his writings. it is related of frederick robertson of brighton, that during one of his periods of intellectual perplexity he found that the only rope to hold fast by was the conviction, "it must be right to do right." the whole of lord acton's career might be summed up in a counterphrase, "it must be wrong to do wrong." it was this conviction, universally and unwaveringly applied, and combined with an unalterable faith in christ, which gave unity to all his efforts, sustained him in his struggle with ecclesiastical authority, accounted for all his sympathies, and accentuated his antipathies, while it at once expanded and limited his interests. it is this that made his personality so much greater a gift to the world than any book which he might have written--had he cared less for the end and more for the process of historical knowledge. he was interested in knowledge--that it might diminish prejudice and break down barriers. to a world in which the very bases of civilisation seemed to be dissolving he preached the need of directing ideals. artistic interests were not strong in him, and the decadent pursuit of culture as a mere luxury had no stronger enemy. intellectual activity, apart from moral purpose, was anathema to acton. he has been censured for bidding the student of his hundred best books to steel his mind against the charm of literary beauty and style. yet he was right. his list of books was expressly framed to be a guide, not a pleasure; it was intended to supply the place of university direction to those who could not afford a college life, and it throws light upon the various strands that mingled in acton and the historical, scientific, and political influences which formed his mind. he felt the danger that lurks in the charm of literary beauty and style, for he had both as a writer and a reader a strong taste for rhetoric, and he knew how young minds are apt to be enchained rather by the persuasive spell of the manner than the living thought beneath it. above all, he detested the modern journalistic craze for novelty, and despised the shallowness which rates cleverness above wisdom. in the same way his eulogy of george eliot has been censured far more than it has been understood. it was not as an artist superior to all others that he praised the author of _daniel deronda_ and the translator of strauss. it was because she supplied in her own person the solution of the problem nearest to his heart, and redeemed (so far as teaching went) infidelity in religion from immorality in ethics. it was, above all, as a constructive teacher of morals that he admired george eliot, who might, in his view, save a daily increasing scepticism from its worst dangers, and preserve morals which a future age of faith might once more inspire with religious ideals. here was a writer at the summit of modern culture, saturated with materialistic science, a convinced and unchanging atheist, who, in spite of this, proclaimed in all her work that moral law is binding, and upheld a code of ethics, christian in content, though not in foundation. in the same way his admiration for mr. gladstone is to be explained. it was not his successes so much as his failures that attracted acton, and above all, his refusal to admit that nations, in their dealings with one another, are subject to no law but that of greed. doubtless one who gave himself no credit for practical aptitude in public affairs, admired a man who had gifts that were not his own. but what acton most admired was what many condemned. it was because he was not like lord palmerston, because bismarck disliked him, because he gave back the transvaal to the boers, and tried to restore ireland to its people, because his love of liberty never weaned him from loyalty to the crown, and his politics were part of his religion, that acton used of gladstone language rarely used, and still more rarely applicable, to any statesman. for this very reason--his belief that political differences do, while religious differences do not, imply a different morality--he censured so severely the generous eulogy of disraeli, just as in döllinger's case he blamed the praise of dupanloup. for acton was intolerant of all leniency towards methods and individuals whom he thought immoral. he could give quarter to the infidel more easily than to the jesuit. we may, of course, deny that acton was right. but few intelligent observers can dispute the accuracy of his diagnosis, or deny that more than anything else the disease of western civilisation is a general lack of directing ideals other than those which are included in the gospel of commercialism. it may surely be further admitted that even intellectual activity has too much of triviality about it to-day; that if people despise the schoolmen, it is rather owing to their virtues than their defects, because impressionism has taken the place of thought, and brilliancy that of labour. on the other hand, acton's dream of ethical agreement, apart from religion, seems further off from realisation than ever. acton, however, wrote for a world which breathed in the atmosphere created by kant. his position was something as follows: after the discovery of facts, a matter of honesty and industry independent of any opinions, history needs a criterion of judgment by which it may appraise men's actions. this criterion cannot be afforded by religion, for religion is one part of the historic process of which we are tracing the flow. the principles on which all can combine are the inviolable sanctity of human life, and the unalterable principle of even justice and toleration. wherever these are violated our course is clear. neither custom nor convenience, neither distance of time nor difference of culture may excuse or even limit our condemnation. murder is always murder, whether it be committed by populace or patricians, by councils or kings or popes. had they had their dues, paolo sarpi would have been in newgate and george i. would have died at tyburn. the unbending severity of his judgment, which is sometimes carried to an excess almost ludicrous, is further explained by another element in his experience. in his letters to döllinger and others he more than once relates how in early life he had sought guidance in the difficult historical and ethical questions which beset the history of the papacy from many of the most eminent ultramontanes. later on he was able to test their answers in the light of his constant study of original authorities and his careful investigation of archives. he found that the answers given him had been at the best but plausible evasions. the letters make it clear that the harshness with which acton always regarded ultramontanes was due to that bitter feeling which arises in any reflecting mind on the discovery that it has been put off with explanations that did not explain, or left in ignorance of material facts. liberalism, we must remember, was a religion to acton--_i.e._ liberalism as he understood it, by no means always what goes by the name. his conviction that ultramontane theories lead to immoral politics prompted his ecclesiastical antipathies. his anger was aroused, not by any feeling that papal infallibility was a theological error, but by the belief that it enshrined in the church monarchical autocracy, which could never maintain itself apart from crime committed or condoned. it was not intellectual error but moral obliquity that was to him here, as everywhere, the enemy. he could tolerate unbelief, he could not tolerate sin. machiavelli represented to him the worst of political principles, because in the name of the public weal he destroyed the individual's conscience. yet he left a loophole in private life for religion, and a sinning statesman might one day become converted. but when the same principles are applied, as they have been applied by the jesuit organisers of ultramontane reaction (also on occasion by protestants), _ad majorem dei gloriam_, it is clear that the soul is corrupted at its highest point, and the very means of serving god are made the occasion of denying him. because for acton there was no comparison between goodness and knowledge, and because life was to him more than thought, because the passion of his life was to secure for all souls the freedom to live as god would have them live, he hated in the church the politics of ultramontanism, and in the state the principles of machiavelli. in the same way he denied the legitimacy of every form of government, every economic wrong, every party creed, which sacrificed to the pleasures or the safety of the few the righteousness and salvation of the many. his one belief was the right of every man not to have, but to be, his best. this fact gives the key to what seems to many an unsolved contradiction, that the man who said what he did say and fought as he had fought should yet declare in private that it had never occurred to him to doubt any single dogma of his church, and assert in public that communion with it was "dearer than life itself" yet all the evidence both of his writings and his most intimate associates confirms this view. his opposition to the doctrine of infallibility was ethical and political rather than theological. as he wrote to döllinger, the evil lay deeper, and vaticanism was but the last triumph of a policy that was centuries old. unless he were turned out of her he would see no more reason to leave the church of his baptism on account of the vatican decrees than on account of those of the lateran council. to the dogma of the immaculate conception he had no hostility. and could not understand döllinger's condemnation of it, or reconcile it with his previous utterances. he had great sympathy with the position of liberal high anglicans; but there is not the slightest reason to suppose that he ever desired to join the english church. even with the old catholic movement he had no sympathy, and dissuaded his friends from joining it.[1] all forms of gallicanism were distasteful to acton, and he looked to the future for the victory of his ideas. his position in the roman church symbolises in an acute form what may be called the soul's tragedy of the whole nineteenth century, but acton had not the smallest inclination to follow either gavazzi or lamennais. it was, in truth, the unwavering loyalty of his churchmanship and his far-reaching historical sense that enabled him to attack with such vehemence evils which he believed to be accidental and temporary, even though they might have endured for a millennium. long searching of the vista of history preserved acton from the common danger of confusing the eternal with what is merely lengthy. to such a mind as his, it no more occurred to leave the church because he disapproved some of its official procedure, than it would to an englishman to surrender his nationality when his political opponents came into office. he distinguished, as he said froschammer ought to have done, between the authorities and the authority of the church. he had a strong belief in the doctrine of development, and felt that it would prove impossible in the long run to bind the christian community to any explanation of the faith which should have a non-christian or immoral tendency. he left it to time and the common conscience to clear the dogma from association with dangerous political tendencies, for his loyalty to the institution was too deep to be affected by his dislike of the _camarilla_ in power. he not only did not desire to leave the church, but took pains to make his confession and receive absolution immediately after his letters appeared in the _times_. it must also be stated that so far from approving mr. gladstone's attack on vaticanism, he did his utmost to prevent its publication, which he regarded as neither fair nor wise. it is true that acton's whole tendency was individualistic, and his inner respect for mere authority apart from knowledge and judgment was doubtless small. but here we must remember what he said once of the political sphere--that neither liberty nor authority is conceivable except in an ordered society, and that they are both relative to conditions remote alike from anarchy and tyranny. doubtless he leaned away from those in power, and probably felt of manning as strongly as the latter wrote of him. yet his individualism was always active within the religious society, and never contemplated itself as outside. he showed no sympathy for any form of protestantism, except the purely political side of the independents and other sects which have promoted liberty of conscience. acton's position as a churchman is made clearer by a view of his politics. at once an admirer and an adviser of mr. gladstone, he probably helped more than any other single friend to make his leader a home ruler. yet he was anything but a modern radical: for liberty was his goddess, not equality, and he dreaded any single power in a state, whether it was the king, or parliament, or people. neither popes nor princes, not even protestant persecutors, did acton condemn more deeply than the crimes of majorities and the fury of uncontrolled democracy. it was not the rule of one or many that was his ideal, but a balance of powers that might preserve freedom and keep every kind of authority subject to law. for, as he said, "liberty is not a means to a higher end, it is itself the highest political end." his preference was, therefore, not for any sovereign one or number, such as formed the ideal of rousseau or the absolutists; but for a monarchy of the english type, with due representation to the aristocratic and propertied classes, as well as adequate power to the people. he did not believe in the doctrine of numbers, and had no sympathy with the cry _vox populi vox dei_; on the other hand, he felt strongly that the stake in the country argument really applied with fullest force to the poor, for while political error means mere discomfort to the rich, it means to the poor the loss of all that makes life noble and even of life itself. as he said in one of his already published letters:- the men who pay wages ought not to be the political masters of those who earn them, for laws should be adapted to those who have the heaviest stake in the country, for whom misgovernment means not mortified pride or stinted luxury, but want and pain and degradation, and risk to their own lives and to their children's souls. while he felt the dangers of rousseau's doctrine of equality, declaring that in the end it would be destructive alike of liberty and religion, he was yet strongly imbued with the need of reconciling some of the socialists' ideals with the regard due to the principles which he respected. he was anxious to promote the study of roscher and the historical economists, and he seems to have thought that by their means some solution of the great economic evils of the modern world might be found, which should avoid injustice either to the capitalist or the wage-earner. he had a burning hatred of injustice and tyranny, which made him anxious to see the horrors of the modern proletariat system mitigated and destroyed; but combined with this there was a very deep sense of the need of acting on principles universally valid, and a distrust of any merely emotional enthusiasm which might, in the future, create more evils than it cured. acton was, in truth, the incarnation of the "spirit of whiggism," although in a very different sense of the phrase from that in which it became the target for the arrows of disraeli's scorn and his mockery of the venetian constitution. he was not the conservative whig of the "glorious revolution," for to him the memory of william of orange might be immortal but was certainly not pious: yet it was "revolution principles" of which he said that they were the great gift of england to the world. by this he meant the real principles by which the events of 1688 could be philosophically justified, when purged of all their vulgar and interested associations, raised above their connection with a territorial oligarchy, and based on reasoned and universal ideals. acton's liberalism was above all things historical, and rested on a consciousness of the past. he knew very well that the roots of modern constitutionalism were mediæval, and declared that it was the stolid conservatism of the english character, which had alone enabled it to preserve what other nations had lost in the passion for autocracy that characterised the men of the renaissance and the reformation. constitutional government was for him the sole eternal truth in politics, the rare but the only guardian of freedom. he loved to trace the growth of the principle of power limiting itself and law triumphant alike over king, aristocracies, and majorities; and to show how it arose out of the cruel conflicts of the religious wars and rested upon the achievements of constance and the efforts of basle, and how it was influenced in expression by the thinkers of the ancient world and the theologians of the modern, by the politics of aristotle, by the maxims of ulpian and of gaius, by the theology of st. thomas and ockham, and even by suarez and molina. what acton feared and hated was the claim of absolutism to crush the individuality and destroy the conscience of men. it was indifferent to him whether this claim was exercised by church or state, by pope or council, or king or parliament. he felt, however, that it was more dangerous because more absorbing when exercised in religious matters, and thus condemned the protestant theory more deeply than the catholic permission of persecution. he also felt that monarchy was more easily checked than pure democracy, and that the risk of tyranny was greater in the latter. provided that freedom was left to men to do their duty, acton was not greatly careful of mere rights. he had no belief in the natural equality of men, and no dislike of the subordination of classes on the score of birth. his ideal of freedom as of the church was in some respects that of the earlier middle ages. he did not object to serfdom, provided that it safeguarded the elementary rights of the serf to serve god as well as man. in the great struggle in america, he had no sympathy with the north, which seemed to him to make majority rule the only measure of right: and he wrote, if not in favour, at least in palliation, of slavery. it may be doubted how far he would have used the same language in later life, but his reasons were in accord with all his general views. slavery might be rendered harmless by the state, and some form of compulsion might be the only way of dealing with child-races, indeed, it might be merely a form of education no more morally blameworthy than the legal disabilities of minors. but the absolute state recognising no limits but its own will, and bound by no rule either of human or divine law, appeared to him definitely immoral. acton's political conscience was also very broad on the side technically called moral. no one had higher ideals of purity. yet he had little desire to pry into the private morality of kings or politicians. it was by the presence or absence of _political_ principles that he judged them. he would have condemned pope paul the fourth more than rodrigo borgia, and the inventor of the "dragonnades" more than his great-grandson. he did not view personal morality as relevant to political judgment. in this, if in nothing else, he agreed with creighton. his correspondence with the latter throws his principles into the strongest light, and forms the best material for a judgment. for it must, we think, be admitted that he applied these doctrines with a rigidity which human affairs will not admit, and assumed a knowledge beyond our capacity. to declare that no one could be in a state of grace who praised s. carlo borromeo, because the latter followed the evil principle of his day in the matter of persecution, is not merely to make the historian a hanging judge, but to ignore the great truth that if crime is always crime, degrees of temptation are widely variable. the fact is, acton's desire to maintain the view that "morality is not ambulatory," led him at times to ignore the complementary doctrine that it certainly develops, and that the difficulties of statesmen or ecclesiastics, if they do not excuse, at least at times explain their less admirable courses. at the very close of his life acton came to this view himself. in a pathetic conversation with his son, he lamented the harshness of some of his judgments, and hoped the example would not be followed. still, acton, if he erred here, erred on the nobler side. the doctrine of moral relativity had been overdone by historians, and the principles of machiavelli had become so common a cry of politicians, that severe protest was necessary. the ethics of nietzsche are the logical expansion of machiavelli, and his influence is proof that, in the long-run, men cannot separate their international code from their private one. we must remember that acton lived in a time when, as he said, the course of history had been "twenty-five times diverted by actual or attempted crime," and when the old ideals of liberty seemed swallowed up by the pursuit of gain. to all those who reflect on history or politics, it was a gain of the highest order that at the very summit of historical scholarship and profound political knowledge there should be placed a leader who erred on the unfashionable side, who denied the statesmen's claim to subject justice to expediency, and opposed the partisan's attempt to palter with facts in the interest of his creed. it is these principles which both explain acton's work as a student, and make it so difficult to understand. he believed, that as an investigator of facts the historian must know no passion, save that of a desire to sift evidence; and his notion of this sifting was of the remorseless scientific school of germany, which sometimes, perhaps, expects more in the way of testimony than human life affords. at any rate, acton demanded that the historian must never misconceive the case of the adversaries of his views, or leave in shade the faults of his own side. but on the other hand, when he comes to interpret facts or to trace their relation, his views and even his temperament will affect the result. it is only the barest outline that can be quite objective. in acton's view the historian as investigator is one thing, the historian as judge another. in an early essay on döllinger he makes a distinction of this kind. the reader must bear it in mind in considering acton's own writing. some of the essays here printed, and still more the lectures, are anything but colourless; they show very distinctly the predilections of the writer, and it is hardly conceivable that they should have been written by a defender of absolutism, or even by an old-fashioned tory. what acton really demanded was not the academic aloofness of the pedant who stands apart from the strife of principles, but the honesty of purpose which "throws itself into the mind of one's opponents, and accounts for their mistakes," giving their case the best possible colouring. for, to be sure of one's ground, one must meet one's adversaries' strongest arguments, and not be content with merely picking holes in his armour. otherwise one's own belief may be at the mercy of the next clever opponent. the reader may doubt how far acton succeeded in his own aim, for there was a touch of intolerance in his hatred of absolutism, and he believed himself to be divided from his ecclesiastical and political foes by no mere intellectual difference but by a moral cleavage. further, his writing is never half-hearted. his convictions were certitudes based on continual reading and reflection, and admitting in his mind of no qualification. he was eminently a victorian in his confidence that he was right. he had none of the invertebrate tendency of mind which thinks it is impartial, merely because it is undecided, and regards the judicial attitude as that which refrains from judging. acton's was not a doubting mind. if he now and then suspended his judgment, it was as an act of deliberate choice, because he had made up his mind that the matter could not be decided, not because he could not decide to make up his mind. whether he was right or wrong, he always knew what he thought, and his language was as exact an expression of his meaning as he could make it. it was true that his subtle and far-sighted intelligence makes his style now and then like a boomerang, as when he says of ranke's method "it is a discipline we shall all do well to adopt, and also do well to relinquish." indeed, it is hardly possible to read a single essay without observing this marked characteristic. he has been called a "meredith turned historian," and that there is truth in this judgment, any one who sees at once the difficulty and the suggestiveness of his reviews can bear witness. he could hardly write the briefest note without stamping his personality upon it and exhibiting the marks of a very complex culture. but the main characteristic of his style is that it represents the ideals of a man to whom every word was sacred. its analogies are rather in sculpture than painting. each paragraph, almost every sentence is a perfectly chiselled whole, impressive by no brilliance or outside polish, so much as by the inward intensity of which it is the symbol. thus his writing is never fluent or easy, but it has a moral dignity rare and unfashionable. acton, indeed, was by no means without a gift of rhetoric, and in the "lecture on mexico," here republished, there is ample evidence of a power of handling words which should impress a popular audience. it is in gravity of judgment and in the light he can draw from small details that his power is most plainly shown. on the other hand, he had a little of the scholar's love of clinging to the bank, and, as the notes to his "inaugural" show, he seems at times too much disposed to use the crutches of quotation to prop up positions which need no such support. it was of course the same habit--the desire not to speak before he had read everything that was relevant, whether in print or manuscript--that hindered so severely his output. his projected _history of liberty_ was, from the first, impossible of achievement. it would have required the intellects of napoleon and julius cæsar combined, and the lifetime of the patriarchs, to have executed that project as acton appears to have planned it. a _history of liberty_, beginning with the ancient world and carried down to our own day, to be based entirely upon original sources, treating both of the institutions which secured it, the persons who fought for it, and the ideas which expressed it, and taking note of all that scholars had written about every several portion of the subject, was and is beyond the reach of a single man. probably towards the close of his life acton had felt this. the _cambridge modern history_, which required the co-operation of so many specialists, was to him really but a fragment of this great project. two other causes limited acton's output. towards the close of the seventies he began to suspect, and eventually discovered, that he and döllinger were not so close together as he had believed. that is to say, he found that in regard to the crimes of the past, döllinger's position was more like that of creighton than his own--that, while he was willing to say persecution was always wrong, he was not willing to go so far as acton in rejecting every kind of mitigating plea and with mediæval certainty consigning the persecutors to perdition. acton, who had as he thought, learnt all this from döllinger, was distressed at what seemed to him the weakness and the sacerdotal prejudice of his master, felt that he was now indeed alone, and for the time surrendered, as he said, all views of literary work. this was the time when he had been gathering materials for a _history of the council of trent_. that this cleavage, coming when it did, had a paralysing effect on acton's productive energy is most probable, for it made him feel that he was no longer one of a school, and was without sympathy and support in the things that lay nearest his heart. another cause retarded production--his determination to know all about the work of others. acton desired to be in touch with university life all over europe, to be aware, if possible through personal knowledge, of the trend of investigation and thought of scholars working in all the cognate branches of his subject. to keep up thoroughly with other people's work, and do much original writing of one's own, is rarely possible. at any rate we may say that the same man could not have produced the essay on german schools of history, and written a _magnum opus_ of his own. his life marks what, in an age of minute specialism, must always be at once the crown and the catastrophe of those who take all knowledge for their province. his achievement is something different from any book. acton's life-work was, in fact, himself. those who lament what he might have written as a historian would do well to reflect on the unique position which he held in the world of letters, and to ask themselves how far he could have wielded the influence that was his, or held the standard so high, had his own achievement been greater. men such as acton and hort give to the world, by their example and disposition, more than any written volume could convey. in both cases a great part of their published writings has had, at least in book form, to be posthumous. but their influence on other workers is incalculable, and has not yet determined. to an age doubting on all things, and with the moral basis of its action largely undermined, acton gave the spectacle of a career which was as moving as it was rare. he stood for a spirit of unwavering and even childlike faith united to a passion for scientific inquiry, and a scorn of consequences, which at times made him almost an iconoclast. his whole life was dedicated to one high end, the aim of preaching the need of principles based on the widest induction and the most penetrating thought, as the only refuge amid the storm and welter of sophistical philosophies and ecclesiastical intrigues. the union of faith with knowledge, and the eternal supremacy of righteousness, this was the message of acton to mankind. it may be thought that he sometimes exaggerated his thesis, that he preached it out of season, that he laid himself open to the charge of being doctrinaire, and that in fighting for it he failed to utter the resources of his vast learning. enough, however, is left to enable the world to judge what he was. no books ever do more than that for any man. those who are nice in comparisons may weigh against the book lost the man gained. those who loved him will know no doubt. * * * * * the following document was found among lord acton's papers. it records in an imaginative form the ideals which he set before him. perhaps it forms the most fitting conclusion to this introduction. this day's post informed me of the death of adrian, who was the best of all men i have known. he loved retirement, and avoided company, but you might sometimes meet him coming from scenes of sorrow, silent and appalled, as if he had seen a ghost, or in the darkest corner of churches, his dim eyes radiant with light from another world. in youth he had gone through much anxiety and contention; but he lived to be trusted and honoured. at last he dropped out of notice and the memory of men, and that part of his life was the happiest. years ago, when i saw much of him, most people had not found him out. there was something in his best qualities themselves that baffled observation, and fell short of decided excellence. he looked absent and preoccupied, as if thinking of things he cared not to speak of, and seemed but little interested in the cares and events of the day. often it was hard to decide whether he had an opinion, and when he showed it, he would defend it with more eagerness and obstinacy than we liked. he did not mingle readily with others or co-operate in any common undertaking, so that one could not rely on him socially, or for practical objects. as he never spoke harshly of persons, so he seldom praised them warmly, and there was some apparent indifference and want of feeling. ill success did not depress, but happy prospects did not elate him, and though never impatient, he was not actively hopeful. facetious friends called him the weather-cock, or mr. facingbothways, because there was no heartiness in his judgments, and he satisfied nobody, and said things that were at first sight grossly inconsistent, without attempting to reconcile them. he was reserved about himself, and gave no explanations, so that he was constantly misunderstood, and there was a sense of failure, of disappointment, of perplexity about him. these things struck me, as well as others, and at first repelled me. i could see indeed, at the same time, that his conduct was remarkably methodical, and was guided at every step by an inexhaustible provision of maxims. he had meditated on every contingency in life, and was prepared with rules and precepts, which he never disobeyed. but i doubted whether all this was not artificial,--a contrivance to satisfy the pride of intellect and establish a cold superiority. in time i discovered that it was the perfection of a developed character. he had disciplined his soul with such wisdom and energy as to make it the obedient and spontaneous instrument of god's will, and he moved in an orbit of thoughts beyond our reach. it was part of his religion to live much in the past, to realise every phase of thought, every crisis of controversy, every stage of progress the church has gone through. so that the events and ideas of his own day lost much of their importance in comparison, were old friends with new faces, and impressed him less than the multitude of those that went before. this caused him to seem absent and indifferent, rarely given to admire, or to expect. he respected other men's opinions, fearing to give pain, or to tempt with anger by contradiction, and when forced to defend his own he felt bound to assume that every one would look sincerely for the truth, and would gladly recognise it. but he could not easily enter into their motives when they were mixed, and finding them generally mixed, he avoided contention by holding much aloof. being quite sincere, he was quite impartial, and pleaded with equal zeal for what seemed true, whether it was on one side or on the other. he would have felt dishonest if he had unduly favoured people of his own country, his own religion, or his own party, or if he had entertained the shadow of a prejudice against those who were against them, and when he was asked why he did not try to clear himself from misrepresentation, he said that he was silent both from humility and pride. at last i understood that what we had disliked in him was his virtue itself. j.n.f. r.v.l. footnotes: [footnote 1: there is no foundation for the statement of canon meyrick in his _reminiscences_, that acton, had he lived on the continent, would have undoubtedly become an old catholic. he did very largely live on the continent. nor did even döllinger, of whom dr. meyrick also asserts it, ever become an adherent of that movement.] i the history of freedom in antiquity[2] liberty, next to religion, has been the motive of good deeds and the common pretext of crime, from the sowing of the seed at athens, two thousand four hundred and sixty years ago, until the ripened harvest was gathered by men of our race. it is the delicate fruit of a mature civilisation; and scarcely a century has passed since nations, that knew the meaning of the term, resolved to be free. in every age its progress has been beset by its natural enemies, by ignorance and superstition, by lust of conquest and by love of ease, by the strong man's craving for power, and the poor man's craving for food. during long intervals it has been utterly arrested, when nations were being rescued from barbarism and from the grasp of strangers, and when the perpetual struggle for existence, depriving men of all interest and understanding in politics, has made them eager to sell their birthright for a mess of pottage, and ignorant of the treasure they resigned. at all times sincere friends of freedom have been rare, and its triumphs have been due to minorities, that have prevailed by associating themselves with auxiliaries whose objects often differed from their own; and this association, which is always dangerous, has been sometimes disastrous, by giving to opponents just grounds of opposition, and by kindling dispute over the spoils in the hour of success. no obstacle has been so constant, or so difficult to overcome, as uncertainty and confusion touching the nature of true liberty. if hostile interests have wrought much injury, false ideas have wrought still more; and its advance is recorded in the increase of knowledge, as much as in the improvement of laws. the history of institutions is often a history of deception and illusions; for their virtue depends on the ideas that produce and on the spirit that preserves them, and the form may remain unaltered when the substance has passed away. a few familiar examples from modern politics will explain why it is that the burden of my argument will lie outside the domain of legislation. it is often said that our constitution attained its formal perfection in 1679, when the habeas corpus act was passed. yet charles ii. succeeded, only two years later, in making himself independent of parliament. in 1789, while the states-general assembled at versailles, the spanish cortes, older than magna charta and more venerable than our house of commons, were summoned after an interval of generations, but they immediately prayed the king to abstain from consulting them, and to make his reforms of his own wisdom and authority. according to the common opinion, indirect elections are a safeguard of conservatism. but all the assemblies of the french revolution issued from indirect elections. a restricted suffrage is another reputed security for monarchy. but the parliament of charles x., which was returned by 90,000 electors, resisted and overthrew the throne; while the parliament of louis philippe, chosen by a constitution of 250,000, obsequiously promoted the reactionary policy of his ministers, and in the fatal division which, by rejecting reform, laid the monarchy in the dust, guizot's majority was obtained by the votes of 129 public functionaries. an unpaid legislature is, for obvious reasons, more independent than most of the continental legislatures which receive pay. but it would be unreasonable in america to send a member as far as from here to constantinople to live for twelve months at his own expense in the dearest of capital cities. legally and to outward seeming the american president is the successor of washington, and still enjoys powers devised and limited by the convention of philadelphia. in reality the new president differs from the magistrate imagined by the fathers of the republic as widely as monarchy from democracy, for he is expected to make 70,000 changes in the public service; fifty years ago john quincy adams dismissed only two men. the purchase of judicial appointments is manifestly indefensible; yet in the old french monarchy that monstrous practice created the only corporation able to resist the king. official corruption, which would ruin a commonwealth, serves in russia as a salutary relief from the pressure of absolutism. there are conditions in which it is scarcely a hyperbole to say that slavery itself is a stage on the road to freedom. therefore we are not so much concerned this evening with the dead letter of edicts and of statutes as with the living thoughts of men. a century ago it was perfectly well known that whoever had one audience of a master in chancery was made to pay for three, but no man heeded the enormity until it suggested to a young lawyer that it might be well to question and examine with rigorous suspicion every part of a system in which such things were done. the day on which that gleam lighted up the clear hard mind of jeremy bentham is memorable in the political calendar beyond the entire administration of many statesmen. it would be easy to point out a paragraph in st. augustine, or a sentence of grotius that outweighs in influence the acts of fifty parliaments, and our cause owes more to cicero and seneca, to vinet and tocqueville, than to the laws of lycurgus or the five codes of france. by liberty i mean the assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what he believes his duty against the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion. the state is competent to assign duties and draw the line between good and evil only in its immediate sphere. beyond the limits of things necessary for its well-being, it can only give indirect help to fight the battle of life by promoting the influences which prevail against temptation,--religion, education, and the distribution of wealth. in ancient times the state absorbed authorities not its own, and intruded on the domain of personal freedom. in the middle ages it possessed too little authority, and suffered others to intrude. modern states fall habitually into both excesses. the most certain test by which we judge whether a country is really free is the amount of security enjoyed by minorities. liberty, by this definition, is the essential condition and guardian of religion; and it is in the history of the chosen people, accordingly, that the first illustrations of my subject are obtained. the government of the israelites was a federation, held together by no political authority, but by the unity of race and faith, and founded, not on physical force, but on a voluntary covenant. the principle of self-government was carried out not only in each tribe, but in every group of at least 120 families; and there was neither privilege of rank nor inequality before the law. monarchy was so alien to the primitive spirit of the community that it was resisted by samuel in that momentous protestation and warning which all the kingdoms of asia and many of the kingdoms of europe have unceasingly confirmed. the throne was erected on a compact; and the king was deprived of the right of legislation among a people that recognised no lawgiver but god, whose highest aim in politics was to restore the original purity of the constitution, and to make its government conform to the ideal type that was hallowed by the sanctions of heaven. the inspired men who rose in unfailing succession to prophesy against the usurper and the tyrant, constantly proclaimed that the laws, which were divine, were paramount over sinful rulers, and appealed from the established authorities, from the king, the priests, and the princes of the people, to the healing forces that slept in the uncorrupted consciences of the masses. thus the example of the hebrew nation laid down the parallel lines on which all freedom has been won--the doctrine of national tradition and the doctrine of the higher law; the principle that a constitution grows from a root, by process of development, and not of essential change; and the principle that all political authorities must be tested and reformed according to a code which was not made by man. the operation of these principles, in unison, or in antagonism, occupies the whole of the space we are going over together. the conflict between liberty under divine authority and the absolutism of human authorities ended disastrously. in the year 622 a supreme effort was made at jerusalem to reform and preserve the state. the high priest produced from the temple of jehovah the book of the deserted and forgotten law, and both king and people bound themselves by solemn oaths to observe it. but that early example of limited monarchy and of the supremacy of law neither lasted nor spread; and the forces by which freedom has conquered must be sought elsewhere. in the very year 586, in which the flood of asiatic despotism closed over the city which had been, and was destined again to be, the sanctuary of freedom in the east, a new home was prepared for it in the west, where, guarded by the sea and the mountains, and by valiant hearts, that stately plant was reared under whose shade we dwell, and which is extending its invincible arms so slowly and yet so surely over the civilised world. according to a famous saying of the most famous authoress of the continent, liberty is ancient, and it is despotism that is new. it has been the pride of recent historians to vindicate the truth of that maxim. the heroic age of greece confirms it, and it is still more conspicuously true of teutonic europe. wherever we can trace the earlier life of the aryan nations we discover germs which favouring circumstances and assiduous culture might have developed into free societies. they exhibit some sense of common interest in common concerns, little reverence for external authority, and an imperfect sense of the function and supremacy of the state. where the division of property and labour is incomplete there is little division of classes and of power. until societies are tried by the complex problems of civilisation they may escape despotism, as societies that are undisturbed by religious diversity avoid persecution. in general, the forms of the patriarchal age failed to resist the growth of absolute states when the difficulties and temptations of advancing life began to tell; and with one sovereign exception, which is not within my scope to-day, it is scarcely possible to trace their survival in the institutions of later times. six hundred years before the birth of christ absolutism held unbounded sway. throughout the east it was propped by the unchanging influence of priests and armies. in the west, where there were no sacred books requiring trained interpreters, the priesthood acquired no preponderance, and when the kings were overthrown their powers passed to aristocracies of birth. what followed, during many generations, was the cruel domination of class over class, the oppression of the poor by the rich, and of the ignorant by the wise. the spirit of that domination found passionate utterance in the verses of the aristocratic poet theognis, a man of genius and refinement, who avows that he longed to drink the blood of his political adversaries. from these oppressors the people of many cities sought deliverance in the less intolerable tyranny of revolutionary usurpers. the remedy gave new shape and energy to the evil. the tyrants were often men of surprising capacity and merit, like some of those who, in the fourteenth century, made themselves lords of italian cities; but rights secured by equal laws and by sharing power existed nowhere. from this universal degradation the world was rescued by the most gifted of the nations. athens, which like other cities was distracted and oppressed by a privileged class, avoided violence and appointed solon to revise its laws. it was the happiest choice that history records. solon was not only the wisest man to be found in athens, but the most profound political genius of antiquity; and the easy, bloodless, and pacific revolution by which he accomplished the deliverance of his country was the first step in a career which our age glories in pursuing, and instituted a power which has done more than anything, except revealed religion, for the regeneration of society. the upper class had possessed the right of making and administering the laws, and he left them in possession, only transferring to wealth what had been the privilege of birth. to the rich, who alone had the means of sustaining the burden of public service in taxation and war, solon gave a share of power proportioned to the demands made on their resources. the poorest classes were exempt from direct taxes, but were excluded from office. solon gave them a voice in electing magistrates from the classes above them, and the right of calling them to account. this concession, apparently so slender, was the beginning of a mighty change. it introduced the idea that a man ought to have a voice in selecting those to whose rectitude and wisdom he is compelled to trust his fortune, his family, and his life. and this idea completely inverted the notion of human authority, for it inaugurated the reign of moral influence where all political power had depended on moral force. government by consent superseded government by compulsion, and the pyramid which had stood on a point was made to stand upon its base. by making every citizen the guardian of his own interest solon admitted the element of democracy into the state. the greatest glory of a ruler, he said, is to create a popular government. believing that no man can be entirely trusted, he subjected all who exercised power to the vigilant control of those for whom they acted. the only resource against political disorders that had been known till then was the concentration of power. solon undertook to effect the same object by the distribution of power. he gave to the common people as much influence as he thought them able to employ, that the state might be exempt from arbitrary government. it is the essence of democracy, he said, to obey no master but the law. solon recognised the principle that political forms are not final or inviolable, and must adapt themselves to facts; and he provided so well for the revision of his constitution, without breach of continuity or loss of stability, that for centuries after his death the attic orators attributed to him, and quoted by his name, the whole structure of athenian law. the direction of its growth was determined by the fundamental doctrine of solon, that political power ought to be commensurate with public service. in the persian war the services of the democracy eclipsed those of the patrician orders, for the fleet that swept the asiatics from the egean sea was manned by the poorer athenians. that class, whose valour had saved the state and had preserved european civilisation, had gained a title to increase of influence and privilege. the offices of state, which had been a monopoly of the rich, were thrown open to the poor, and in order to make sure that they should obtain their share, all but the highest commands were distributed by lot. whilst the ancient authorities were decaying, there was no accepted standard of moral and political right to make the framework of society fast in the midst of change. the instability that had seized on the forms threatened the very principles of government. the national beliefs were yielding to doubt, and doubt was not yet making way for knowledge. there had been a time when the obligations of public as well as private life were identified with the will of the gods. but that time had passed. pallas, the ethereal goddess of the athenians, and the sun god whose oracles, delivered from the temple between the twin summits of parnassus, did so much for the greek nationality, aided in keeping up a lofty ideal of religion; but when the enlightened men of greece learnt to apply their keen faculty of reasoning to the system of their inherited belief, they became quickly conscious that the conceptions of the gods corrupted the life and degraded the minds of the public. popular morality could not be sustained by the popular religion. the moral instruction which was no longer supplied by the gods could not yet be found in books. there was no venerable code expounded by experts, no doctrine proclaimed by men of reputed sanctity like those teachers of the far east whose words still rule the fate of nearly half mankind. the effort to account for things by close observation and exact reasoning began by destroying. there came a time when the philosophers of the porch and the academy wrought the dictates of wisdom and virtue into a system so consistent and profound that it has vastly shortened the task of the christian divines. but that time had not yet come. the epoch of doubt and transition during which the greeks passed from the dim fancies of mythology to the fierce light of science was the age of pericles, and the endeavour to substitute certain truth for the prescriptions of impaired authorities, which was then beginning to absorb the energies of the greek intellect, is the grandest movement in the profane annals of mankind, for to it we owe, even after the immeasurable progress accomplished by christianity, much of our philosophy and far the better part of the political knowledge we possess. pericles, who was at the head of the athenian government, was the first statesman who encountered the problem which the rapid weakening of traditions forced on the political world. no authority in morals or in politics remained unshaken by the motion that was in the air. no guide could be confidently trusted; there was no available criterion to appeal to, for the means of controlling or denying convictions that prevailed among the people. the popular sentiment as to what was right might be mistaken, but it was subject to no test. the people were, for practical purposes, the seat of the knowledge of good and evil. the people, therefore, were the seat of power. the political philosophy of pericles consisted of this conclusion. he resolutely struck away all the props that still sustained the artificial preponderance of wealth. for the ancient doctrine that power goes with land, he introduced the idea that power ought to be so equitably diffused as to afford equal security to all. that one part of the community should govern the whole, or that one class should make laws for another, he declared to be tyrannical. the abolition of privilege would have served only to transfer the supremacy from the rich to the poor, if pericles had not redressed the balance by restricting the right of citizenship to athenians of pure descent. by this measure the class which formed what we should call the third estate was brought down to 14,000 citizens, and became about equal in numbers with the higher ranks. pericles held that every athenian who neglected to take his part in the public business inflicted an injury on the commonwealth. that none might be excluded by poverty, he caused the poor to be paid for their attendance out of the funds of the state; for his administration of the federal tribute had brought together a treasure of more than two million sterling. the instrument of his sway was the art of speaking. he governed by persuasion. everything was decided by argument in open deliberation, and every influence bowed before the ascendency of mind. the idea that the object of constitutions is not to confirm the predominance of any interest, but to prevent it; to preserve with equal care the independence of labour and the security of property; to make the rich safe against envy, and the poor against oppression, marks the highest level attained by the statesmanship of greece. it hardly survived the great patriot who conceived it; and all history has been occupied with the endeavour to upset the balance of power by giving the advantage to money, land, or numbers. a generation followed that has never been equalled in talent--a generation of men whose works, in poetry and eloquence, are still the envy of the world, and in history, philosophy, and politics remain unsurpassed. but it produced no successor to pericles, and no man was able to wield the sceptre that fell from his hand. it was a momentous step in the progress of nations when the principle that every interest should have the right and the means of asserting itself was adopted by the athenian constitution. but for those who were beaten in the vote there was no redress. the law did not check the triumph of majorities or rescue the minority from the dire penalty of having been outnumbered. when the overwhelming influence of pericles was removed, the conflict between classes raged without restraint, and the slaughter that befell the higher ranks in the peloponnesian war gave an irresistible preponderance to the lower. the restless and inquiring spirit of the athenians was prompt to unfold the reason of every institution and the consequences of every principle, and their constitution ran its course from infancy to decrepitude with unexampled speed. two men's lives span the interval from the first admission of popular influence, under solon, to the downfall of the state. their history furnishes the classic example of the peril of democracy under conditions singularly favourable. for the athenians were not only brave and patriotic and capable of generous sacrifice, but they were the most religious of the greeks. they venerated the constitution which had given them prosperity, and equality, and freedom, and never questioned the fundamental laws which regulated the enormous power of the assembly. they tolerated considerable variety of opinion and great licence of speech; and their humanity towards their slaves roused the indignation even of the most intelligent partisan of aristocracy. thus they became the only people of antiquity that grew great by democratic institutions. but the possession of unlimited power, which corrodes the conscience, hardens the heart, and confounds the understanding of monarchs, exercised its demoralising influence on the illustrious democracy of athens. it is bad to be oppressed by a minority, but it is worse to be oppressed by a majority. for there is a reserve of latent power in the masses which, if it is called into play, the minority can seldom resist. but from the absolute will of an entire people there is no appeal, no redemption, no refuge but treason. the humblest and most numerous class of the athenians united the legislative, the judicial, and, in part, the executive power. the philosophy that was then in the ascendant taught them that there is no law superior to that of the state--the lawgiver is above the law. it followed that the sovereign people had a right to do whatever was within its power, and was bound by no rule of right or wrong but its own judgment of expediency. on a memorable occasion the assembled athenians declared it monstrous that they should be prevented from doing whatever they chose. no force that existed could restrain them; and they resolved that no duty should restrain them, and that they would be bound by no laws that were not of their own making. in this way the emancipated people of athens became a tyrant; and their government, the pioneer of european freedom, stands condemned with a terrible unanimity by all the wisest of the ancients. they ruined their city by attempting to conduct war by debate in the marketplace. like the french republic, they put their unsuccessful commanders to death. they treated their dependencies with such injustice that they lost their maritime empire. they plundered the rich until the rich conspired with the public enemy, and they crowned their guilt by the martyrdom of socrates. when the absolute sway of numbers had endured for near a quarter of a century, nothing but bare existence was left for the state to lose; and the athenians, wearied and despondent, confessed the true cause of their ruin. they understood that for liberty, justice, and equal laws, it is as necessary that democracy should restrain itself as it had been that it should restrain the oligarchy. they resolved to take their stand once more upon the ancient ways, and to restore the order of things which had subsisted when the monopoly of power had been taken from the rich and had not been acquired by the poor. after a first restoration had failed, which is only memorable because thucydides, whose judgment in politics is never at fault, pronounced it the best government athens had enjoyed, the attempt was renewed with more experience and greater singleness of purpose. the hostile parties were reconciled, and proclaimed an amnesty, the first in history. they resolved to govern by concurrence. the laws, which had the sanction of tradition, were reduced to a code; and no act of the sovereign assembly was valid with which they might be found to disagree. between the sacred lines of the constitution which were to remain inviolate, and the decrees which met from time to time the needs and notions of the day, a broad distinction was drawn; and the fabric of a law which had been the work of generations was made independent of momentary variations in the popular will. the repentance of the athenians came too late to save the republic. but the lesson of their experience endures for all times, for it teaches that government by the whole people, being the government of the most numerous and most powerful class, is an evil of the same nature as unmixed monarchy, and requires, for nearly the same reasons, institutions that shall protect it against itself, and shall uphold the permanent reign of law against arbitrary revolutions of opinion. * * * * * parallel with the rise and fall of athenian freedom, rome was employed in working out the same problems, with greater constructive sense, and greater temporary success, but ending at last in a far more terrible catastrophe. that which among the ingenious athenians had been a development carried forward by the spell of plausible argument, was in rome a conflict between rival forces. speculative politics had no attraction for the grim and practical genius of the romans. they did not consider what would be the cleverest way of getting over a difficulty, but what way was indicated by analogous cases; and they assigned less influence to the impulse and spirit of the moment, than to precedent and example. their peculiar character prompted them to ascribe the origin of their laws to early times, and in their desire to justify the continuity of their institutions, and to get rid of the reproach of innovation, they imagined the legendary history of the kings of rome. the energy of their adherence to traditions made their progress slow, they advanced only under compulsion of almost unavoidable necessity, and the same questions recurred often, before they were settled. the constitutional history of the republic turns on the endeavours of the aristocracy, who claimed to be the only true romans, to retain in their hands the power they had wrested from the kings, and of the plebeians to get an equal share in it. and this controversy, which the eager and restless athenians went through in one generation, lasted for more than two centuries, from a time when the _plebs_ were excluded from the government of the city, and were taxed, and made to serve without pay, until, in the year 286, they were admitted to political equality. then followed one hundred and fifty years of unexampled prosperity and glory; and then, out of the original conflict which had been compromised, if not theoretically settled, a new struggle arose which was without an issue. the mass of poorer families, impoverished by incessant service in war, were reduced to dependence on an aristocracy of about two thousand wealthy men, who divided among themselves the immense domain of the state. when the need became intense the gracchi tried to relieve it by inducing the richer classes to allot some share in the public lands to the common people. the old and famous aristocracy of birth and rank had made a stubborn resistance, but it knew the art of yielding. the later and more selfish aristocracy was unable to learn it. the character of the people was changed by the sterner motives of dispute. the fight for political power had been carried on with the moderation which is so honourable a quality of party contests in england. but the struggle for the objects of material existence grew to be as ferocious as civil controversies in france. repulsed by the rich, after a struggle of twenty-two years, the people, three hundred and twenty thousand of whom depended on public rations for food, were ready to follow any man who promised to obtain for them by revolution what they could not obtain by law. for a time the senate, representing the ancient and threatened order of things, was strong enough to overcome every popular leader that arose, until julius cæsar, supported by an army which he had led in an unparalleled career of conquest, and by the famished masses which he won by his lavish liberality, and skilled beyond all other men in the art of governing, converted the republic into a monarchy by a series of measures that were neither violent nor injurious. the empire preserved the republican forms until the reign of diocletian; but the will of the emperors was as uncontrolled as that of the people had been after the victory of the tribunes. their power was arbitrary even when it was most wisely employed, and yet the roman empire rendered greater services to the cause of liberty than the roman republic. i do not mean by reason of the temporary accident that there were emperors who made good use of their immense opportunities, such as nerva, of whom tacitus says that he combined monarchy and liberty, things otherwise incompatible; or that the empire was what its panegyrists declared it, the perfection of democracy. in truth it was at best an ill-disguised and odious despotism. but frederic the great was a despot; yet he was a friend to toleration and free discussion. the bonapartes were despotic; yet no liberal ruler was ever more acceptable to the masses of the people than the first napoleon, after he had destroyed the republic, in 1805, and the third napoleon at the height of his power in 1859. in the same way, the roman empire possessed merits which, at a distance, and especially at a great distance of time, concern men more deeply than the tragic tyranny which was felt in the neighbourhood of the palace. the poor had what they had demanded in vain of the republic. the rich fared better than during the triumvirate. the rights of roman citizens were extended to the people of the provinces. to the imperial epoch belong the better part of roman literature and nearly the entire civil law; and it was the empire that mitigated slavery, instituted religious toleration, made a beginning of the law of nations, and created a perfect system of the law of property. the republic which cæsar overthrew had been anything but a free state. it provided admirable securities for the rights of citizens; it treated with savage disregard the rights of men; and allowed the free roman to inflict atrocious wrongs on his children, on debtors and dependants, on prisoners and slaves. those deeper ideas of right and duty, which are not found on the tables of municipal law, but with which the generous minds of greece were conversant, were held of little account, and the philosophy which dealt with such speculations was repeatedly proscribed, as a teacher of sedition and impiety. at length, in the year 155, the athenian philosopher carneades appeared at rome, on a political mission. during an interval of official business he delivered two public orations, to give the unlettered conquerors of his country a taste of the disputations that flourished in the attic schools. on the first day he discoursed of natural justice. on the next he denied its existence, arguing that all our notions of good and evil are derived from positive enactment. from the time of that memorable display, the genius of the vanquished held its conquerors in thrall. the most eminent of the public men of rome, such as scipio and cicero, formed their minds on grecian models, and her jurists underwent the rigorous discipline of zeno and chrysippus. if, drawing the limit in the second century, when the influence of christianity becomes perceptible, we should form our judgment of the politics of antiquity by its actual legislation, our estimate would be low. the prevailing notions of freedom were imperfect, and the endeavours to realise them were wide of the mark. the ancients understood the regulation of power better than the regulation of liberty. they concentrated so many prerogatives in the state as to leave no footing from which a man could deny its jurisdiction or assign bounds to its activity. if i may employ an expressive anachronism, the vice of the classic state was that it was both church and state in one. morality was undistinguished from religion and politics from morals; and in religion, morality, and politics there was only one legislator and one authority. the state, while it did deplorably little for education, for practical science, for the indigent and helpless, or for the spiritual needs of man, nevertheless claimed the use of all his faculties and the determination of all his duties. individuals and families, associations and dependencies were so much material that the sovereign power consumed for its own purposes. what the slave was in the hands of his master, the citizen was in the hands of the community. the most sacred obligations vanished before the public advantage. the passengers existed for the sake of the ship. by their disregard for private interests, and for the moral welfare and improvement of the people, both greece and rome destroyed the vital elements on which the prosperity of nations rests, and perished by the decay of families and the depopulation of the country. they survive not in their institutions, but in their ideas, and by their ideas, especially on the art of government, they are-the dead, but sceptred sovereigns who still rule our spirits from their urns. to them, indeed, may be tracked nearly all the errors that are undermining political society--communism, utilitarianism, the confusion between tyranny and authority, and between lawlessness and freedom. the notion that men lived originally in a state of nature, by violence and without laws, is due to critias. communism in its grossest form was recommended by diogenes of sinope. according to the sophists, there is no duty above expediency and no virtue apart from pleasure. laws are an invention of weak men to rob their betters of the reasonable enjoyment of their superiority. it is better to inflict than to suffer wrong; and as there is no greater good than to do evil without fear of retribution, so there is no worse evil than to suffer without the consolation of revenge. justice is the mask of a craven spirit; injustice is worldly wisdom; and duty, obedience, self-denial are the impostures of hypocrisy. government is absolute, and may ordain what it pleases, and no subject can complain that it does him wrong, but as long as he can escape compulsion and punishment, he is always free to disobey. happiness consists in obtaining power and in eluding the necessity of obedience; and he that gains a throne by perfidy and murder, deserves to be truly envied. epicurus differed but little from the propounders of the code of revolutionary despotism. all societies, he said, are founded on contract for mutual protection. good and evil are conventional terms, for the thunderbolts of heaven fall alike on the just and the unjust. the objection to wrongdoing is not the act, but in its consequences to the wrongdoer. wise men contrive laws, not to bind, but to protect themselves; and when they prove to be unprofitable they cease to be valid. the illiberal sentiments of even the most illustrious metaphysicians are disclosed in the saying of aristotle, that the mark of the worst governments is that they leave men free to live as they please. if you will bear in mind that socrates, the best of the pagans, knew of no higher criterion for men, of no better guide of conduct, than the laws of each country; that plato, whose sublime doctrine was so near an anticipation of christianity that celebrated theologians wished his works to be forbidden, lest men should be content with them, and indifferent to any higher dogma--to whom was granted that prophetic vision of the just man, accused, condemned and scourged, and dying on a cross--nevertheless employed the most splendid intellect ever bestowed on man to advocate the abolition of the family and the exposure of infants; that aristotle, the ablest moralist of antiquity, saw no harm in making raids upon a neighbouring people, for the sake of reducing them to slavery--still more, if you will consider that, among the moderns, men of genius equal to these have held political doctrines not less criminal or absurd--it will be apparent to you how stubborn a phalanx of error blocks the paths of truth; that pure reason is as powerless as custom to solve the problem of free government; that it can only be the fruit of long, manifold, and painful experience; and that the tracing of the methods by which divine wisdom has educated the nations to appreciate and to assume the duties of freedom, is not the least part of that true philosophy that studies to assert eternal providence, and justify the ways of god to men. but, having sounded the depth of their errors, i should give you a very inadequate idea of the wisdom of the ancients if i allowed it to appear that their precepts were no better than their practice. while statesmen and senates and popular assemblies supplied examples of every description of blunder, a noble literature arose, in which a priceless treasure of political knowledge was stored, and in which the defects of the existing institutions were exposed with unsparing sagacity. the point on which the ancients were most nearly unanimous is the right of the people to govern, and their inability to govern alone. to meet this difficulty, to give to the popular element a full share without a monopoly of power, they adopted very generally the theory of a mixed constitution. they differed from our notion of the same thing, because modern constitutions have been a device for limiting monarchy; with them they were invented to curb democracy. the idea arose in the time of plato--though he repelled it--when the early monarchies and oligarchies had vanished, and it continued to be cherished long after all democracies had been absorbed in the roman empire. but whereas a sovereign prince who surrenders part of his authority yields to the argument of superior force, a sovereign people relinquishing its own prerogative succumbs to the influence of reason. and it has in all times proved more easy to create limitations by the use of force than by persuasion. the ancient writers saw very clearly that each principle of government standing alone is carried to excess and provokes a reaction. monarchy hardens into despotism. aristocracy contracts into oligarchy. democracy expands into the supremacy of numbers. they therefore imagined that to restrain each element by combining it with the others would avert the natural process of self-destruction, and endow the state with perpetual youth. but this harmony of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy blended together, which was the ideal of many writers, and which they supposed to be exhibited by sparta, by carthage, and by rome, was a chimera of philosophers never realised by antiquity. at last tacitus, wiser than the rest, confessed that the mixed constitution, however admirable in theory, was difficult to establish and impossible to maintain. his disheartening avowal is not disowned by later experience. the experiment has been tried more often than i can tell, with a combination of resources that were unknown to the ancients--with christianity, parliamentary government, and a free press. yet there is no example of such a balanced constitution having lasted a century. if it has succeeded anywhere it has been in our favoured country and in our time; and we know not yet how long the wisdom of the nation will preserve the equipoise. the federal check was as familiar to the ancients as the constitutional. for the type of all their republics was the government of a city by its own inhabitants meeting in the public place. an administration embracing many cities was known to them only in the form of the oppression which sparta exercised over the messenians, athens over her confederates, and rome over italy. the resources which, in modern times, enabled a great people to govern itself through a single centre did not exist. equality could be preserved only by federalism; and it occurs more often amongst them than in the modern world. if the distribution of power among the several parts of the state is the most efficient restraint on monarchy, the distribution of power among several states is the best check on democracy. by multiplying centres of government and discussion it promotes the diffusion of political knowledge and the maintenance of healthy and independent opinion. it is the protectorate of minorities, and the consecration of self-government. but although it must be enumerated among the better achievements of practical genius in antiquity, it arose from necessity, and its properties were imperfectly investigated in theory. when the greeks began to reflect on the problems of society, they first of all accepted things as they were, and did their best to explain and defend them. inquiry, which with us is stimulated by doubt, began with them in wonder. the most illustrious of the early philosophers, pythagoras, promulgated a theory for the preservation of political power in the educated class, and ennobled a form of government which was generally founded on popular ignorance and on strong class interests. he preached authority and subordination, and dwelt more on duties than on rights, on religion than on policy; and his system perished in the revolution by which oligarchies were swept away. the revolution afterwards developed its own philosophy, whose excesses i have described. but between the two eras, between the rigid didactics of the early pythagoreans and the dissolving theories of protagoras, a philosopher arose who stood aloof from both extremes, and whose difficult sayings were never really understood or valued until our time. heraclitus, of ephesus, deposited his book in the temple of diana. the book has perished, like the temple and the worship, but its fragments have been collected and interpreted with incredible ardour, by the scholars, the divines, the philosophers, and politicians who have been engaged the most intensely in the toil and stress of this century. the most renowned logician of the last century adopted every one of his propositions; and the most brilliant agitator among continental socialists composed a work of eight hundred and forty pages to celebrate his memory. heraclitus complained that the masses were deaf to truth, and knew not that one good man counts for more than thousands; but he held the existing order in no superstitious reverence. strife, he says, is the source and the master of all things. life is perpetual motion, and repose is death. no man can plunge twice into the same current, for it is always flowing and passing, and is never the same. the only thing fixed and certain in the midst of change is the universal and sovereign reason, which all men may not perceive, but which is common to all. laws are sustained by no human authority, but by virtue of their derivation from the one law that is divine. these sayings, which recall the grand outlines of political truth which we have found in the sacred books, and carry us forward to the latest teaching of our most enlightened contemporaries, would bear a good deal of elucidation and comment. heraclitus is, unfortunately, so obscure that socrates could not understand him, and i won't pretend to have succeeded better. if the topic of my address was the history of political science, the highest and the largest place would belong to plato and aristotle. the _laws_ of the one, the _politics_ of the other, are, if i may trust my own experience, the books from which we may learn the most about the principles of politics. the penetration with which those great masters of thought analysed the institutions of greece, and exposed their vices, is not surpassed by anything in later literature; by burke or hamilton, the best political writers of the last century; by tocqueville or roscher, the most eminent of our own. but plato and aristotle were philosophers, studious not of unguided freedom, but of intelligent government. they saw the disastrous effects of ill-directed striving for liberty; and they resolved that it was better not to strive for it, but to be content with a strong administration, prudently adapted to make men prosperous and happy. now liberty and good government do not exclude each other; and there are excellent reasons why they should go together. liberty is not a means to a higher political end. it is itself the highest political end. it is not for the sake of a good public administration that it is required, but for security in the pursuit of the highest objects of civil society, and of private life. increase of freedom in the state may sometimes promote mediocrity, and give vitality to prejudice; it may even retard useful legislation, diminish the capacity for war, and restrict the boundaries of empire. it might be plausibly argued that, if many things would be worse in england or ireland under an intelligent despotism, some things would be managed better; that the roman government was more enlightened under augustus and antoninus than under the senate, in the days of marius or of pompey. a generous spirit prefers that his country should be poor, and weak, and of no account, but free, rather than powerful, prosperous, and enslaved. it is better to be the citizen of a humble commonwealth in the alps, without a prospect of influence beyond the narrow frontier, than a subject of the superb autocracy that overshadows half of asia and of europe. but it may be urged, on the other side, that liberty is not the sum or the substitute of all the things men ought to live for; that to be real it must be circumscribed, and that the limits of circumscription vary; that advancing civilisation invests the state with increased rights and duties, and imposes increased burdens and constraint on the subject; that a highly instructed and intelligent community may perceive the benefit of compulsory obligations which, at a lower stage, would be thought unbearable; that liberal progress is not vague or indefinite, but aims at a point where the public is subject to no restrictions but those of which it feels the advantage; that a free country may be less capable of doing much for the advancement of religion, the prevention of vice, or the relief of suffering, than one that does not shrink from confronting great emergencies by some sacrifice of individual rights, and some concentration of power; and that the supreme political object ought to be sometimes postponed to still higher moral objects. my argument involves no collision with these qualifying reflections. we are dealing, not with the effects of freedom, but with its causes. we are seeking out the influences which brought arbitrary government under control, either by the diffusion of power, or by the appeal to an authority which transcends all government, and among those influences the greatest philosophers of greece have no claim to be reckoned. it is the stoics who emancipated mankind from its subjugation to despotic rule, and whose enlightened and elevated views of life bridged the chasm that separates the ancient from the christian state, and led the way to freedom. seeing how little security there is that the laws of any land shall be wise or just, and that the unanimous will of a people and the assent of nations are liable to err, the stoics looked beyond those narrow barriers, and above those inferior sanctions, for the principles that ought to regulate the lives of men and the existence of society. they made it known that there is a will superior to the collective will of man, and a law that overrules those of solon and lycurgus. their test of good government is its conformity to principles that can be traced to a higher legislator. that which we must obey, that to which we are bound to reduce all civil authorities, and to sacrifice every earthly interest, is that immutable law which is perfect and eternal as god himself, which proceeds from his nature, and reigns over heaven and earth and over all the nations. the great question is to discover, not what governments prescribe, but what they ought to prescribe; for no prescription is valid against the conscience of mankind. before god, there is neither greek nor barbarian, neither rich nor poor, and the slave is as good as his master, for by birth all men are free; they are citizens of that universal commonwealth which embraces all the world, brethren of one family, and children of god. the true guide of our conduct is no outward authority, but the voice of god, who comes down to dwell in our souls, who knows all our thoughts, to whom are owing all the truth we know, and all the good we do; for vice is voluntary, and virtue comes from the grace of the heavenly spirit within. what the teaching of that divine voice is, the philosophers who had imbibed the sublime ethics of the porch went on to expound: it is not enough to act up to the written law, or to give all men their due; we ought to give them more than their due, to be generous and beneficent, to devote ourselves for the good of others, seeking our reward in self-denial and sacrifice, acting from the motive of sympathy and not of personal advantage. therefore we must treat others as we wish to be treated by them, and must persist until death in doing good to our enemies, regardless of unworthiness and ingratitude. for we must be at war with evil, but at peace with men, and it is better to suffer than to commit injustice. true freedom, says the most eloquent of the stoics, consists in obeying god. a state governed by such principles as these would have been free far beyond the measure of greek or roman freedom; for they open a door to religious toleration, and close it against slavery. neither conquest nor purchase, said zeno, can make one man the property of another. these doctrines were adopted and applied by the great jurists of the empire. the law of nature, they said, is superior to the written law, and slavery contradicts the law of nature. men have no right to do what they please with their own, or to make profit out of another's loss. such is the political wisdom of the ancients, touching the foundations of liberty, as we find it in its highest development, in cicero, and seneca, and philo, a jew of alexandria. their writings impress upon us the greatness of the work of preparation for the gospel which had been accomplished among men on the eve of the mission of the apostles. st. augustine, after quoting seneca, exclaims: "what more could a christian say than this pagan has said?" the enlightened pagans had reached nearly the last point attainable without a new dispensation, when the fulness of time was come. we have seen the breadth and the splendour of the domain of hellenic thought, and it has brought us to the threshold of a greater kingdom. the best of the later classics speak almost the language of christianity, and they border on its spirit. but in all that i have been able to cite from classical literature, three things are wanting,--representative government, the emancipation of the slaves, and liberty of conscience. there were, it is true, deliberative assemblies, chosen by the people; and confederate cities, of which, both in asia and africa, there were so many leagues, sent their delegates to sit in federal councils. but government by an elected parliament was even in theory a thing unknown. it is congruous with the nature of polytheism to admit some measure of toleration. and socrates, when he avowed that he must obey god rather than the athenians, and the stoics, when they set the wise man above the law, were very near giving utterance to the principle. but it was first proclaimed and established by enactment, not in polytheistic and philosophical greece, but in india, by asoka, the earliest of the buddhist kings, two hundred and fifty years before the birth of christ. slavery has been, far more than intolerance, the perpetual curse and reproach of ancient civilisation, and although its rightfulness was disputed as early as the days of aristotle, and was implicitly, if not definitely, denied by several stoics, the moral philosophy of the greeks and romans, as well as their practice, pronounced decidedly in its favour. but there was one extraordinary people who, in this as in other things, anticipated the purer precept that was to come. philo of alexandria is one of the writers whose views on society were most advanced. he applauds not only liberty but equality in the enjoyment of wealth. he believes that a limited democracy, purged of its grosser elements, is the most perfect government, and will extend itself gradually over all the world. by freedom he understood the following of god. philo, though he required that the condition of the slave should be made compatible with the wants and claims of his higher nature, did not absolutely condemn slavery. but he has put on record the customs of the essenes of palestine, a people who, uniting the wisdom of the gentiles with the faith of the jews, led lives which were uncontaminated by the surrounding civilisation, and were the first to reject slavery both in principle and practice. they formed a religious community rather than a state, and their numbers did not exceed 4000. but their example testifies to how great a height religious men were able to raise their conception of society even without the succour of the new testament, and affords the strongest condemnation of their contemporaries. this, then, is the conclusion to which our survey brings us: there is hardly a truth in politics or in the system of the rights of man that was not grasped by the wisest of the gentiles and the jews, or that they did not declare with a refinement of thought and a nobleness of expression that later writers could never surpass. i might go on for hours, reciting to you passages on the law of nature and the duties of man, so solemn and religious that though they come from the profane theatre on the acropolis, and from the roman forum, you would deem that you were listening to the hymns of christian churches and the discourse of ordained divines. but although the maxims of the great classic teachers, of sophocles, and plato, and seneca, and the glorious examples of public virtue were in the mouths of all men, there was no power in them to avert the doom of that civilisation for which the blood of so many patriots and the genius of such incomparable writers had been wasted in vain. the liberties of the ancient nations were crushed beneath a hopeless and inevitable despotism, and their vitality was spent, when the new power came forth from galilee, giving what was wanting to the efficacy of human knowledge to redeem societies as well as men. it would be presumptuous if i attempted to indicate the numberless channels by which christian influence gradually penetrated the state. the first striking phenomenon is the slowness with which an action destined to be so prodigious became manifest. going forth to all nations, in many stages of civilisation and under almost every form of government, christianity had none of the character of a political apostolate, and in its absorbing mission to individuals did not challenge public authority. the early christians avoided contact with the state, abstained from the responsibilities of office, and were even reluctant to serve in the army. cherishing their citizenship of a kingdom not of this world, they despaired of an empire which seemed too powerful to be resisted and too corrupt to be converted, whose institutions, the work and the pride of untold centuries of paganism, drew their sanctions from the gods whom the christians accounted devils, which plunged its hands from age to age in the blood of martyrs, and was beyond the hope of regeneration and foredoomed to perish. they were so much overawed as to imagine that the fall of the state would be the end of the church and of the world, and no man dreamed of the boundless future of spiritual and social influence that awaited their religion among the race of destroyers that were bringing the empire of augustus and of constantine to humiliation and ruin. the duties of government were less in their thoughts than the private virtues and duties of subjects; and it was long before they became aware of the burden of power in their faith. down almost to the time of chrysostom, they shrank from contemplating the obligation to emancipate the slaves. although the doctrine of self-reliance and self-denial, which is the foundation of political economy, was written as legibly in the new testament as in the _wealth of nations_, it was not recognised until our age. tertullian boasts of the passive obedience of the christians. melito writes to a pagan emperor as if he were incapable of giving an unjust command; and in christian times optatus thought that whoever presumed to find fault with his sovereign exalted himself almost to the level of a god. but this political quietism was not universal. origen, the ablest writer of early times, spoke with approval of conspiring for the destruction of tyranny. after the fourth century the declarations against slavery are earnest and continual. and in a theological but yet pregnant sense, divines of the second century insist on liberty, and divines of the fourth century on equality. there was one essential and inevitable transformation in politics. popular governments had existed, and also mixed and federal governments, but there had been no limited government, no state the circumference of whose authority had been defined by a force external to its own. that was the great problem which philosophy had raised, and which no statesmanship had been able to solve. those who proclaimed the assistance of a higher authority had indeed drawn a metaphysical barrier before the governments, but they had not known how to make it real. all that socrates could effect by way of protest against the tyranny of the reformed democracy was to die for his convictions. the stoics could only advise the wise man to hold aloof from politics, keeping the unwritten law in his heart. but when christ said: "render unto cæsar the things that are cæsar's, and unto god the things that are god's," those words, spoken on his last visit to the temple, three days before his death, gave to the civil power, under the protection of conscience, a sacredness it had never enjoyed, and bounds it had never acknowledged; and they were the repudiation of absolutism and the inauguration of freedom. for our lord not only delivered the precept, but created the force to execute it. to maintain the necessary immunity in one supreme sphere, to reduce all political authority within defined limits, ceased to be an aspiration of patient reasoners, and was made the perpetual charge and care of the most energetic institution and the most universal association in the world. the new law, the new spirit, the new authority, gave to liberty a meaning and a value it had not possessed in the philosophy or in the constitution of greece or rome before the knowledge of the truth that makes us free. footnotes: [footnote 2: an address delivered to the members of the bridgnorth institution at the agricultural hall, 26th february 1877.] ii the history of freedom in christianity[3] when constantine the great carried the seat of empire from rome to constantinople he set up in the marketplace of the new capital a porphyry pillar which had come from egypt, and of which a strange tale is told. in a vault beneath he secretly buried the seven sacred emblems of the roman state, which were guarded by the virgins in the temple of vesta, with the fire that might never be quenched. on the summit he raised a statue of apollo, representing himself, and enclosing a fragment of the cross; and he crowned it with a diadem of rays consisting of the nails employed at the crucifixion, which his mother was believed to have found at jerusalem. the pillar still stands, the most significant monument that exists of the converted empire; for the notion that the nails which had pierced the body of christ became a fit ornament for a heathen idol as soon as it was called by the name of a living emperor indicates the position designed for christianity in the imperial structure of constantine. diocletian's attempt to transform the roman government into a despotism of the eastern type had brought on the last and most serious persecution of the christians; and constantine, in adopting their faith, intended neither to abandon his predecessor's scheme of policy nor to renounce the fascinations of arbitrary authority, but to strengthen his throne with the support of a religion which had astonished the world by its power of resistance, and to obtain that support absolutely and without a drawback he fixed the seat of his government in the east, with a patriarch of his own creation. nobody warned him that by promoting the christian religion he was tying one of his hands, and surrendering the prerogative of the cæsars. as the acknowledged author of the liberty and superiority of the church, he was appealed to as the guardian of her unity. he admitted the obligation; he accepted the trust; and the divisions that prevailed among the christians supplied his successors with many opportunities of extending that protectorate, and preventing any reduction of the claims or of the resources of imperialism. constantine declared his own will equivalent to a canon of the church. according to justinian, the roman people had formally transferred to the emperors the entire plenitude of its authority, and, therefore, the emperor's pleasure, expressed by edict or by letter, had force of law. even in the fervent age of its conversion the empire employed its refined civilisation, the accumulated wisdom of ancient sages, the reasonableness and subtlety of roman law, and the entire inheritance of the jewish, the pagan, and the christian world, to make the church serve as a gilded crutch of absolutism. neither an enlightened philosophy, nor all the political wisdom of rome, nor even the faith and virtue of the christians availed against the incorrigible tradition of antiquity. something was wanted beyond all the gifts of reflection and experience--a faculty of self-government and self-control, developed like its language in the fibre of a nation, and growing with its growth. this vital element, which many centuries of warfare, of anarchy, of oppression had extinguished in the countries that were still draped in the pomp of ancient civilisation, was deposited on the soil of christendom by the fertilising stream of migration that overthrew the empire of the west. in the height of their power the romans became aware of a race of men that had not abdicated freedom in the hands of a monarch; and the ablest writer of the empire pointed to them with a vague and bitter feeling that, to the institutions of these barbarians, not yet crushed by despotism, the future of the world belonged. their kings, when they had kings, did not preside at their councils; they were sometimes elective; they were sometimes deposed; and they were bound by oath to act in obedience with the general wish. they enjoyed real authority only in war. this primitive republicanism, which admits monarchy as an occasional incident, but holds fast to the collective supremacy of all free men, of the constituent authority over all constituted authorities, is the remote germ of parliamentary government. the action of the state was confined to narrow limits; but, besides his position as head of the state, the king was surrounded by a body of followers attached to him by personal or political ties. in these, his immediate dependants, disobedience or resistance to orders was no more tolerated than in a wife, a child, or a soldier; and a man was expected to murder his own father if his chieftain required it. thus these teutonic communities admitted an independence of government that threatened to dissolve society; and a dependence on persons that was dangerous to freedom. it was a system very favourable to corporations, but offering no security to individuals. the state was not likely to oppress its subjects; and was not able to protect them. the first effect of the great teutonic migration into the regions civilised by rome was to throw back europe many centuries to a condition scarcely more advanced than that from which the institutions of solon had rescued athens. whilst the greeks preserved the literature, the arts, and the science of antiquity and all the sacred monuments of early christianity with a completeness of which the rended fragments that have come down to us give no commensurate idea, and even the peasants of bulgaria knew the new testament by heart, western europe lay under the grasp of masters the ablest of whom could not write their names. the faculty of exact reasoning, of accurate observation, became extinct for five hundred years, and even the sciences most needful to society, medicine and geometry, fell into decay, until the teachers of the west went to school at the feet of arabian masters. to bring order out of chaotic ruin, to rear a new civilisation and blend hostile and unequal races into a nation, the thing wanted was not liberty but force. and for centuries all progress is attached to the action of men like clovis, charlemagne, and william the norman, who were resolute and peremptory, and prompt to be obeyed. the spirit of immemorial paganism which had saturated ancient society could not be exorcised except by the combined influence of church and state; and the universal sense that their union was necessary created the byzantine despotism. the divines of the empire who could not fancy christianity flourishing beyond its borders, insisted that the state is not in the church, but the church in the state. this doctrine had scarcely been uttered when the rapid collapse of the western empire opened a wider horizon; and salvianus, a priest at marseilles, proclaimed that the social virtues, which were decaying amid the civilised romans, existed in greater purity and promise among the pagan invaders. they were converted with ease and rapidity; and their conversion was generally brought about by their kings. christianity, which in earlier times had addressed itself to the masses, and relied on the principle of liberty, now made its appeal to the rulers, and threw its mighty influence into the scale of authority. the barbarians, who possessed no books, no secular knowledge, no education, except in the schools of the clergy, and who had scarcely acquired the rudiments of religious instruction, turned with childlike attachment to men whose minds were stored with the knowledge of scripture, of cicero, of st. augustine; and in the scanty world of their ideas, the church was felt to be something infinitely vaster, stronger, holier than their newly founded states. the clergy supplied the means of conducting the new governments, and were made exempt from taxation, from the jurisdiction of the civil magistrate, and of the political administrator. they taught that power ought to be conferred by election; and the councils of toledo furnished the framework of the parliamentary system of spain, which is, by a long interval, the oldest in the world. but the monarchy of the goths in spain, as well as that of the saxons in england, in both of which the nobles and the prelates surrounded the throne with the semblance of free institutions, passed away; and the people that prospered and overshadowed the rest were the franks, who had no native nobility, whose law of succession to the crown became for one thousand years the fixed object of an unchanging superstition, and under whom the feudal system was developed to excess. feudalism made land the measure and the master of all things. having no other source of wealth than the produce of the soil, men depended on the landlord for the means of escaping starvation; and thus his power became paramount over the liberty of the subject and the authority of the state. every baron, said the french maxim, is sovereign in his own domain. the nations of the west lay between the competing tyrannies of local magnates and of absolute monarchs, when a force was brought upon the scene which proved for a time superior alike to the vassal and his lord. in the days of the conquest, when the normans destroyed the liberties of england, the rude institutions which had come with the saxons, the goths, and the franks from the forests of germany were suffering decay, and the new element of popular government afterwards supplied by the rise of towns and the formation of a middle class was not yet active. the only influence capable of resisting the feudal hierarchy was the ecclesiastical hierarchy; and they came into collision, when the process of feudalism threatened the independence of the church by subjecting the prelates severally to that form of personal dependence on the kings which was peculiar to the teutonic state. to that conflict of four hundred years we owe the rise of civil liberty. if the church had continued to buttress the thrones of the kings whom it anointed, or if the struggle had terminated speedily in an undivided victory, all europe would have sunk down under a byzantine or muscovite despotism. for the aim of both contending parties was absolute authority. but although liberty was not the end for which they strove, it was the means by which the temporal and the spiritual power called the nations to their aid. the towns of italy and germany won their franchises, france got her states-general, and england her parliament out of the alternate phases of the contest; and as long as it lasted it prevented the rise of divine right. a disposition existed to regard the crown as an estate descending under the law of real property in the family that possessed it. but the authority of religion, and especially of the papacy, was thrown on the side that denied the indefeasible title of kings. in france what was afterwards called the gallican theory maintained that the reigning house was above the law, and that the sceptre was not to pass away from it as long as there should be princes of the royal blood of st. louis. but in other countries the oath of fidelity itself attested that it was conditional, and should be kept only during good behaviour; and it was in conformity with the public law to which all monarchs were held subject, that king john was declared a rebel against the barons, and that the men who raised edward iii. to the throne from which they had deposed his father invoked the maxim _vox populi vox dei_. and this doctrine of the divine right of the people to raise up and pull down princes, after obtaining the sanctions of religion, was made to stand on broader grounds, and was strong enough to resist both church and king. in the struggle between the house of bruce and the house of plantagenet for the possession of scotland and ireland, the english claim was backed by the censures of rome. but the irish and the scots refused it, and the address in which the scottish parliament informed the pope of their resolution shows how firmly the popular doctrine had taken root. speaking of robert bruce, they say: "divine providence, the laws and customs of the country, which we will defend till death, and the choice of the people, have made him our king. if he should ever betray his principles, and consent that we should be subjects of the english king, then we shall treat him as an enemy, as the subverter of our rights and his own, and shall elect another in his place. we care not for glory or for wealth, but for that liberty which no true man will give up but with his life." this estimate of royalty was natural among men accustomed to see those whom they most respected in constant strife with their rulers. gregory vii. had begun the disparagement of civil authorities by saying that they are the work of the devil; and already in his time both parties were driven to acknowledge the sovereignty of the people, and appealed to it as the immediate source of power. two centuries later this political theory had gained both in definiteness and in force among the guelphs, who were the church party, and among the ghibellines, or imperialists. here are the sentiments of the most celebrated of all the guelphic writers: "a king who is unfaithful to his duty forfeits his claim to obedience. it is not rebellion to depose him, for he is himself a rebel whom the nation has a right to put down. but it is better to abridge his power, that he may be unable to abuse it. for this purpose, the whole nation ought to have a share in governing itself; the constitution ought to combine a limited and elective monarchy, with an aristocracy of merit, and such an admixture of democracy as shall admit all classes to office, by popular election. no government has a right to levy taxes beyond the limit determined by the people. all political authority is derived from popular suffrage, and all laws must be made by the people or their representatives. there is no security for us as long as we depend on the will of another man." this language, which contains the earliest exposition of the whig theory of the revolution, is taken from the works of st. thomas aquinas, of whom lord bacon says that he had the largest heart of the school divines. and it is worth while to observe that he wrote at the very moment when simon de montfort summoned the commons; and that the politics of the neapolitan friar are centuries in advance of the english statesman's. the ablest writer of the ghibelline party was marsilius of padua. "laws," he said, "derive their authority from the nation, and are invalid without its assent. as the whole is greater than any part, it is wrong that any part should legislate for the whole; and as men are equal, it is wrong that one should be bound by laws made by another. but in obeying laws to which all men have agreed, all men, in reality, govern themselves. the monarch, who is instituted by the legislature to execute its will, ought to be armed with a force sufficient to coerce individuals, but not sufficient to control the majority of the people. he is responsible to the nation, and subject to the law; and the nation that appoints him, and assigns him his duties, has to see that he obeys the constitution, and has to dismiss him if he breaks it. the rights of citizens are independent of the faith they profess; and no man may be punished for his religion." this writer, who saw in some respects farther than locke or montesquieu, who, in regard to the sovereignty of the nation, representative government, the superiority of the legislature over the executive, and the liberty of conscience, had so firm a grasp of the principles that were to sway the modern world, lived in the reign of edward ii., five hundred and fifty years ago. it is significant that these two writers should agree on so many of the fundamental points which have been, ever since, the topic of controversy; for they belonged to hostile schools, and one of them would have thought the other worthy of death. st. thomas would have made the papacy control all christian governments. marsilius would have had the clergy submit to the law of the land; and would have put them under restrictions both as to property and numbers. as the great debate went on, many things gradually made themselves clear, and grew into settled convictions. for these were not only the thoughts of prophetic minds that surpassed the level of contemporaries; there was some prospect that they would master the practical world. the ancient reign of the barons was seriously threatened. the opening of the east by the crusades had imparted a great stimulus to industry. a stream set in from the country to the towns, and there was no room for the government of towns in the feudal machinery. when men found a way of earning a livelihood without depending for it on the good will of the class that owned the land, the landowner lost much of his importance, and it began to pass to the possessors of moveable wealth. the townspeople not only made themselves free from the control of prelates and barons, but endeavoured to obtain for their own class and interest the command of the state. the fourteenth century was filled with the tumult of this struggle between democracy and chivalry. the italian towns, foremost in intelligence and civilisation, led the way with democratic constitutions of an ideal and generally an impracticable type. the swiss cast off the yoke of austria. two long chains of free cities arose, along the valley of the rhine, and across the heart of germany. the citizens of paris got possession of the king, reformed the state, and began their tremendous career of experiments to govern france. but the most healthy and vigorous growth of municipal liberties was in belgium, of all countries on the continent, that which has been from immemorial ages the most stubborn in its fidelity to the principle of self-government. so vast were the resources concentrated in the flemish towns, so widespread was the movement of democracy, that it was long doubtful whether the new interest would not prevail, and whether the ascendency of the military aristocracy would not pass over to the wealth and intelligence of the men that lived by trade. but rienzi, marcel, artevelde, and the other champions of the unripe democracy of those days, lived and died in vain. the upheaval of the middle class had disclosed the need, the passions, the aspirations of the suffering poor below; ferocious insurrections in france and england caused a reaction that retarded for centuries the readjustment of power, and the red spectre of social revolution arose in the track of democracy. the armed citizens of ghent were crushed by the french chivalry; and monarchy alone reaped the fruit of the change that was going on in the position of classes, and stirred the minds of men. looking back over the space of a thousand years, which we call the middle ages, to get an estimate of the work they had done, if not towards perfection in their institutions, at least towards attaining the knowledge of political truth, this is what we find: representative government, which was unknown to the ancients, was almost universal. the methods of election were crude; but the principle that no tax was lawful that was not granted by the class that paid it--that is, that taxation was inseparable from representation--was recognised, not as the privilege of certain countries, but as the right of all. not a prince in the world, said philip de commines, can levy a penny without the consent of the people. slavery was almost everywhere extinct; and absolute power was deemed more intolerable and more criminal than slavery. the right of insurrection was not only admitted but defined, as a duty sanctioned by religion. even the principles of the habeas corpus act, and the method of the income tax, were already known. the issue of ancient politics was an absolute state planted on slavery. the political produce of the middle ages was a system of states in which authority was restricted by the representation of powerful classes, by privileged associations, and by the acknowledgment of duties superior to those which are imposed by man. as regards the realisation in practice of what was seen to be good, there was almost everything to do. but the great problems of principle had been solved, and we come to the question, how did the sixteenth century husband the treasure which the middle ages had stored up? the most visible sign of the times was the decline of the religious influence that had reigned so long. sixty years passed after the invention of printing, and thirty thousand books had issued from european presses, before anybody undertook to print the greek testament. in the days when every state made the unity of faith its first care, it came to be thought that the rights of men, and the duties of neighbours and of rulers towards them, varied according to their religion; and society did not acknowledge the same obligations to a turk or a jew, a pagan or a heretic, or a devil worshipper, as to an orthodox christian. as the ascendency of religion grew weaker, this privilege of treating its enemies on exceptional principles was claimed by the state for its own benefit; and the idea that the ends of government justify the means employed was worked into system by machiavelli. he was an acute politician, sincerely anxious that the obstacles to the intelligent government of italy should be swept away. it appeared to him that the most vexatious obstacle to intellect is conscience, and that the vigorous use of statecraft necessary for the success of difficult schemes would never be made if governments allowed themselves to be hampered by the precepts of the copy-book. his audacious doctrine was avowed in the succeeding age by men whose personal character stood high. they saw that in critical times good men have seldom strength for their goodness, and yield to those who have grasped the meaning of the maxim that you cannot make an omelette if you are afraid to break the eggs. they saw that public morality differs from private, because no government can turn the other cheek, or can admit that mercy is better than justice. and they could not define the difference or draw the limits of exception; or tell what other standard for a nation's acts there is than the judgment which heaven pronounces in this world by success. machiavelli's teaching would hardly have stood the test of parliamentary government, for public discussion demands at least the profession of good faith. but it gave an immense impulse to absolutism by silencing the consciences of very religious kings, and made the good and the bad very much alike. charles v. offered 5000 crowns for the murder of an enemy. ferdinand i. and ferdinand ii., henry iii. and louis xiii., each caused his most powerful subject to be treacherously despatched. elizabeth and mary stuart tried to do the same to each other. the way was paved for absolute monarchy to triumph over the spirit and institutions of a better age, not by isolated acts of wickedness, but by a studied philosophy of crime and so thorough a perversion of the moral sense that the like of it had not been since the stoics reformed the morality of paganism. the clergy, who had in so many ways served the cause of freedom during the prolonged strife against feudalism and slavery, were associated now with the interest of royalty. attempts had been made to reform the church on the constitutional model; they had failed, but they had united the hierarchy and the crown against the system of divided power as against a common enemy. strong kings were able to bring the spirituality under subjection in france and spain, in sicily and in england. the absolute monarchy of france was built up in the two following centuries by twelve political cardinals. the kings of spain obtained the same effect almost at a single stroke by reviving and appropriating to their own use the tribunal of the inquisition, which had been growing obsolete, but now served to arm them with terrors which effectually made them despotic. one generation beheld the change all over europe, from the anarchy of the days of the roses to the passionate submission, the gratified acquiescence in tyranny that marks the reign of henry viii. and the kings of his time. the tide was running fast when the reformation began at wittenberg, and it was to be expected that luther's influence would stem the flood of absolutism. for he was confronted everywhere by the compact alliance of the church with the state; and great part of his country was governed by hostile potentates who were prelates of the court of rome. he had, indeed, more to fear from temporal than from spiritual foes. the leading german bishops wished that the protestant demands should be conceded; and the pope himself vainly urged on the emperor a conciliatory policy. but charles v. had outlawed luther, and attempted to waylay him; and the dukes of bavaria were active in beheading and burning his disciples, whilst the democracy of the towns generally took his side. but the dread of revolution was the deepest of his political sentiments; and the gloss by which the guelphic divines had got over the passive obedience of the apostolic age was characteristic of that mediæval method of interpretation which he rejected. he swerved for a moment in his later years; but the substance of his political teaching was eminently conservative, the lutheran states became the stronghold of rigid immobility, and lutheran writers constantly condemned the democratic literature that arose in the second age of the reformation. for the swiss reformers were bolder than the germans in mixing up their cause with politics. zurich and geneva were republics, and the spirit of their governments influenced both zwingli and calvin. zwingli indeed did not shrink from the mediæval doctrine that evil magistrates must be cashiered; but he was killed too early to act either deeply or permanently on the political character of protestantism. calvin, although a republican, judged that the people are unfit to govern themselves, and declared the popular assembly an abuse that ought to be abolished. he desired an aristocracy of the elect, armed with the means of punishing not only crime but vice and error. for he thought that the severity of the mediæval laws was insufficient for the need of the times; and he favoured the most irresistible weapon which the inquisitorial procedure put into the hand of the government, the right of subjecting prisoners to intolerable torture, not because they were guilty, but because their guilt could not be proved. his teaching, though not calculated to promote popular institutions, was so adverse to the authority of the surrounding monarchs, that he softened down the expression of his political views in the french edition of his _institutes_. the direct political influence of the reformation effected less than has been supposed. most states were strong enough to control it. some, by intense exertion, shut out the pouring flood. others, with consummate skill, diverted it to their own uses. the polish government alone at that time left it to its course. scotland was the only kingdom in which the reformation triumphed over the resistance of the state; and ireland was the only instance where it failed, in spite of government support. but in almost every other case, both the princes that spread their canvas to the gale and those that faced it, employed the zeal, the alarm, the passions it aroused as instruments for the increase of power. nations eagerly invested their rulers with every prerogative needed to preserve their faith, and all the care to keep church and state asunder, and to prevent the confusion of their powers, which had been the work of ages, was renounced in the intensity of the crisis. atrocious deeds were done, in which religious passion was often the instrument, but policy was the motive. fanaticism displays itself in the masses, but the masses were rarely fanaticised, and the crimes ascribed to it were commonly due to the calculations of dispassionate politicians. when the king of france undertook to kill all the protestants, he was obliged to do it by his own agents. it was nowhere the spontaneous act of the population, and in many towns and in entire provinces the magistrates refused to obey. the motive of the court was so far from mere fanaticism that the queen immediately challenged elizabeth to do the like to the english catholics. francis i. and henry ii. sent nearly a hundred huguenots to the stake, but they were cordial and assiduous promoters of the protestant religion in germany. sir nicholas bacon was one of the ministers who suppressed the mass in england. yet when the huguenot refugees came over he liked them so little that he reminded parliament of the summary way in which henry v. at agincourt dealt with the frenchmen who fell into his hands. john knox thought that every catholic in scotland ought to be put to death, and no man ever had disciples of a sterner or more relentless temper. but his counsel was not followed. all through the religious conflict policy kept the upper hand. when the last of the reformers died, religion, instead of emancipating the nations, had become an excuse for the criminal art of despots. calvin preached and bellarmine lectured, but machiavelli reigned. before the close of the century three events occurred which mark the beginning of a momentous change. the massacre of st. bartholomew convinced the bulk of calvinists of the lawfulness of rebellion against tyrants, and they became advocates of that doctrine in which the bishop of winchester had led the way,[4] and which knox and buchanan had received, through their master at paris, straight from the mediæval schools. adopted out of aversion to the king of france, it was soon put in practice against the king of spain. the revolted netherlands, by a solemn act, deposed philip ii., and made themselves independent under the prince of orange, who had been, and continued to be, styled his lieutenant. their example was important, not only because subjects of one religion deposed a monarch of another, for that had been seen in scotland, but because, moreover, it put a republic in the place of a monarchy, and forced the public law of europe to recognise the accomplished revolution. at the same time, the french catholics, rising against henry iii., who was the most contemptible of tyrants, and against his heir, henry of navarre, who, as a protestant, repelled the majority of the nation, fought for the same principles with sword and pen. many shelves might be filled with the books which came out in their defence during half a century, and they include the most comprehensive treatises on laws ever written. nearly all are vitiated by the defect which disfigured political literature in the middle ages. that literature, as i have tried to show, is extremely remarkable, and its services in aiding human progress are very great. but from the death of st. bernard until the appearance of sir thomas more's _utopia_, there was hardly a writer who did not make his politics subservient to the interest of either pope or king. and those who came after the reformation were always thinking of laws as they might affect catholics or protestants. knox thundered against what he called _the monstrous regiment of women_, because the queen went to mass, and mariana praised the assassin of henry iii. because the king was in league with huguenots. for the belief that it is right to murder tyrants, first taught among christians, i believe, by john of salisbury, the most distinguished english writer of the twelfth century, and confirmed by roger bacon, the most celebrated englishman of the thirteenth, had acquired about this time a fatal significance. nobody sincerely thought of politics as a law for the just and the unjust, or tried to find out a set of principles that should hold good alike under all changes of religion. hooker's _ecclesiastical polity_ stands almost alone among the works i am speaking of, and is still read with admiration by every thoughtful man as the earliest and one of the finest prose classics in our language. but though few of the others have survived, they contributed to hand down masculine notions of limited authority and conditional obedience from the epoch of theory to generations of free men. even the coarse violence of buchanan and boucher was a link in the chain of tradition that connects the hildebrandine controversy with the long parliament, and st. thomas with edmund burke. that men should understand that governments do not exist by divine right, and that arbitrary government is the violation of divine right, was no doubt the medicine suited to the malady under which europe languished. but although the knowledge of this truth might become an element of salutary destruction, it could give little aid to progress and reform. resistance to tyranny implied no faculty of constructing a legal government in its place. tyburn tree may be a useful thing, but it is better still that the offender should live for repentance and reformation. the principles which discriminate in politics between good and evil, and make states worthy to last, were not yet found. the french philosopher charron was one of the men least demoralised by party spirit, and least blinded by zeal for a cause. in a passage almost literally taken from st. thomas, he describes our subordination under a law of nature, to which all legislation must conform; and he ascertains it not by the light of revealed religion, but by the voice of universal reason, through which god enlightens the consciences of men. upon this foundation grotius drew the lines of real political science. in gathering the materials of international law, he had to go beyond national treaties and denominational interests for a principle embracing all mankind. the principles of law must stand, he said, even if we suppose that there is no god. by these inaccurate terms he meant that they must be found independently of revelation. from that time it became possible to make politics a matter of principle and of conscience, so that men and nations differing in all other things could live in peace together, under the sanctions of a common law. grotius himself used his discovery to little purpose, as he deprived it of immediate effect by admitting that the right to reign may be enjoyed as a freehold, subject to no conditions. when cumberland and pufendorf unfolded the true significance of his doctrine, every settled authority, every triumphant interest recoiled aghast. none were willing to surrender advantages won by force or skill, because they might be in contradiction, not with the ten commandments, but with an unknown code, which grotius himself had not attempted to draw up, and touching which no two philosophers agreed. it was manifest that all persons who had learned that political science is an affair of conscience rather than of might or expediency, must regard their adversaries as men without principle, that the controversy between them would perpetually involve morality, and could not be governed by the plea of good intentions, which softens down the asperities of religious strife. nearly all the greatest men of the seventeenth century repudiated the innovation. in the eighteenth, the two ideas of grotius, that there are certain political truths by which every state and every interest must stand or fall, and that society is knit together by a series of real and hypothetical contracts, became, in other hands, the lever that displaced the world. when, by what seemed the operation of an irresistible and constant law, royalty had prevailed over all enemies and all competitors, it became a religion. its ancient rivals, the baron and the prelate, figured as supporters by its side. year after year, the assemblies that represented the self-government of provinces and of privileged classes, all over the continent, met for the last time and passed away, to the satisfaction of the people, who had learned to venerate the throne as the constructor of their unity, the promoter of prosperity and power, the defender of orthodoxy, and the employer of talent. the bourbons, who had snatched the crown from a rebellious democracy, the stuarts, who had come in as usurpers, set up the doctrine that states are formed by the valour, the policy, and the appropriate marriages of the royal family; that the king is consequently anterior to the people, that he is its maker rather than its handiwork, and reigns independently of consent. theology followed up divine right with passive obedience. in the golden age of religious science, archbishop ussher, the most learned of anglican prelates, and bossuet, the ablest of the french, declared that resistance to kings is a crime, and that they may lawfully employ compulsion against the faith of their subjects. the philosophers heartily supported the divines. bacon fixed his hope of all human progress on the strong hand of kings. descartes advised them to crush all those who might be able to resist their power. hobbes taught that authority is always in the right. pascal considered it absurd to reform laws, or to set up an ideal justice against actual force. even spinoza, who was a republican and a jew, assigned to the state the absolute control of religion. monarchy exerted a charm over the imagination, so unlike the unceremonious spirit of the middle ages, that, on learning the execution of charles i., men died of the shock; and the same thing occurred at the death of louis xvi. and of the duke of enghien. the classic land of absolute monarchy was france. richelieu held that it would be impossible to keep the people down if they were suffered to be well off. the chancellor affirmed that france could not be governed without the right of arbitrary arrest and exile; and that in case of danger to the state it may be well that a hundred innocent men should perish. the minister of finance called it sedition to demand that the crown should keep faith. one who lived on intimate terms with louis xiv. says that even the slightest disobedience to the royal will is a crime to be punished with death. louis employed these precepts to their fullest extent. he candidly avows that kings are no more bound by the terms of a treaty than by the words of a compliment; and that there is nothing in the possession of their subjects which they may not lawfully take from them. in obedience to this principle, when marshal vauban, appalled by the misery of the people, proposed that all existing imposts should be repealed for a single tax that would be less onerous, the king took his advice, but retained all the old taxes whilst he imposed the new. with half the present population, he maintained an army of 450,000 men; nearly twice as large as that which the late emperor napoleon assembled to attack germany. meanwhile the people starved on grass. france, said fénelon, is one enormous hospital. french historians believe that in a single generation six millions of people died of want. it would be easy to find tyrants more violent, more malignant, more odious than louis xiv., but there was not one who ever used his power to inflict greater suffering or greater wrong; and the admiration with which he inspired the most illustrious men of his time denotes the lowest depth to which the turpitude of absolutism has ever degraded the conscience of europe. the republics of that day were, for the most part, so governed as to reconcile men with the less opprobrious vices of monarchy. poland was a state made up of centrifugal forces. what the nobles called liberty was the right of each of them to veto the acts of the diet, and to persecute the peasants on his estates--rights which they refused to surrender up to the time of the partition, and thus verified the warning of a preacher spoken long ago: "you will perish, not by invasion or war, but by your infernal liberties." venice suffered from the opposite evil of excessive concentration. it was the most sagacious of governments, and would rarely have made mistakes if it had not imputed to others motives as wise as its own, and had taken account of passions and follies of which it had little cognisance. but the supreme power of the nobility had passed to a committee, from the committee to a council of ten, from the ten to three inquisitors of state; and in this intensely centralised form it became, about the year 1600, a frightful despotism. i have shown you how machiavelli supplied the immoral theory needful for the consummation of royal absolutism; the absolute oligarchy of venice required the same assurance against the revolt of conscience. it was provided by a writer as able as machiavelli, who analysed the wants and resources of aristocracy, and made known that its best security is poison. as late as a century ago, venetian senators of honourable and even religious lives employed assassins for the public good with no more compunction than philip ii. or charles ix. the swiss cantons, especially geneva, profoundly influenced opinion in the days preceding the french revolution, but they had had no part in the earlier movement to inaugurate the reign of law. that honour belongs to the netherlands alone among the commonwealths. they earned it, not by their form of government, which was defective and precarious, for the orange party perpetually plotted against it, and slew the two most eminent of the republican statesmen, and william iii. himself intrigued for english aid to set the crown upon his head; but by the freedom of the press, which made holland the vantage-ground from which, in the darkest hour of oppression, the victims of the oppressors obtained the ear of europe. the ordinance of louis xiv., that every french protestant should immediately renounce his religion, went out in the year in which james ii. became king. the protestant refugees did what their ancestors had done a century before. they asserted the deposing power of subjects over rulers who had broken the original contract between them, and all the powers, excepting france, countenanced their argument, and sent forth william of orange on that expedition which was the faint dawn of a brighter day. it is to this unexampled combination of things on the continent, more than to her own energy, that england owes her deliverance. the efforts made by the scots, by the irish, and at last by the long parliament to get rid of the misrule of the stuarts had been foiled, not by the resistance of monarchy, but by the helplessness of the republic. state and church were swept away; new institutions were raised up under the ablest ruler that had ever sprung from a revolution; and england, seething with the toil of political thought, had produced at least two writers who in many directions saw as far and as clearly as we do now. but cromwell's constitution was rolled up like a scroll; harrington and lilburne were laughed at for a time and forgotten, the country confessed the failure of its striving, disavowed its aims, and flung itself with enthusiasm, and without any effective stipulations, at the feet of a worthless king. if the people of england had accomplished no more than this to relieve mankind from the pervading pressure of unlimited monarchy, they would have done more harm than good. by the fanatical treachery with which, violating the parliament and the law, they contrived the death of king charles, by the ribaldry of the latin pamphlet with which milton justified the act before the world, by persuading the world that the republicans were hostile alike to liberty and to authority, and did not believe in themselves, they gave strength and reason to the current of royalism, which, at the restoration, overwhelmed their work. if there had been nothing to make up for this defect of certainty and of constancy in politics england would have gone the way of other nations. at that time there was some truth in the old joke which describes the english dislike of speculation by saying that all our philosophy consists of a short catechism in two questions: "what is mind? no matter. what is matter? never mind." the only accepted appeal was to tradition. patriots were in the habit of saying that they took their stand upon the ancient ways, and would not have the laws of england changed. to enforce their argument they invented a story that the constitution had come from troy, and that the romans had allowed it to subsist untouched. such fables did not avail against strafford; and the oracle of precedent sometimes gave responses adverse to the popular cause. in the sovereign question of religion, this was decisive, for the practice of the sixteenth century, as well as of the fifteenth, testified in favour of intolerance. by royal command, the nation had passed four times in one generation from one faith to another, with a facility that made a fatal impression on laud. in a country that had proscribed every religion in turn, and had submitted to such a variety of penal measures against lollard and arian, against augsburg and rome, it seemed there could be no danger in cropping the ears of a puritan. but an age of stronger conviction had arrived; and men resolved to abandon the ancient ways that led to the scaffold and the rack, and to make the wisdom of their ancestors and the statutes of the land bow before an unwritten law. religious liberty had been the dream of great christian writers in the age of constantine and valentinian, a dream never wholly realised in the empire, and rudely dispelled when the barbarians found that it exceeded the resources of their art to govern civilised populations of another religion, and unity of worship was imposed by laws of blood and by theories more cruel than the laws. but from st. athanasius and st. ambrose down to erasmus and more, each age heard the protest of earnest men in behalf of the liberty of conscience, and the peaceful days before the reformation were full of promise that it would prevail. in the commotion that followed, men were glad to get tolerated themselves by way of privilege and compromise, and willingly renounced the wider application of the principle. socinus was the first who, on the ground that church and state ought to be separated, required universal toleration. but socinus disarmed his own theory, for he was a strict advocate of passive obedience. the idea that religious liberty is the generating principle of civil, and that civil liberty is the necessary condition of religious, was a discovery reserved for the seventeenth century. many years before the names of milton and taylor, of baxter and locke were made illustrious by their partial condemnation of intolerance, there were men among the independent congregations who grasped with vigour and sincerity the principle that it is only by abridging the authority of states that the liberty of churches can be assured. that great political idea, sanctifying freedom and consecrating it to god, teaching men to treasure the liberties of others as their own, and to defend them for the love of justice and charity more than as a claim of right, has been the soul of what is great and good in the progress of the last two hundred years. the cause of religion, even under the unregenerate influence of worldly passion, had as much to do as any clear notions of policy in making this country the foremost of the free. it had been the deepest current in the movement of 1641, and it remained the strongest motive that survived the reaction of 1660. the greatest writers of the whig party, burke and macaulay, constantly represented the statesmen of the revolution as the legitimate ancestors of modern liberty. it is humiliating to trace a political lineage to algernon sidney, who was the paid agent of the french king; to lord russell, who opposed religious toleration at least as much as absolute monarchy; to shaftesbury, who dipped his hands in the innocent blood shed by the perjury of titus oates; to halifax, who insisted that the plot must be supported even if untrue; to marlborough, who sent his comrades to perish on an expedition which he had betrayed to the french; to locke, whose notion of liberty involves nothing more spiritual than the security of property, and is consistent with slavery and persecution; or even to addison, who conceived that the right of voting taxes belonged to no country but his own. defoe affirms that from the time of charles ii. to that of george i. he never knew a politician who truly held the faith of either party; and the perversity of the statesmen who led the assault against the later stuarts threw back the cause of progress for a century. when the purport of the secret treaty became suspected by which louis xiv. pledged himself to support charles ii. with an army for the destruction of parliament, if charles would overthrow the anglican church, it was found necessary to make concession to the popular alarm. it was proposed that whenever james should succeed, great part of the royal prerogative and patronage should be transferred to parliament. at the same time, the disabilities of nonconformists and catholics would have been removed. if the limitation bill, which halifax supported with signal ability, had passed, the monarchical constitution would have advanced, in the seventeenth century, farther than it was destined to do until the second quarter of the nineteenth. but the enemies of james, guided by the prince of orange, preferred a protestant king who should be nearly absolute, to a constitutional king who should be a catholic. the scheme failed. james succeeded to a power which, in more cautious hands, would have been practically uncontrolled, and the storm that cast him down gathered beyond the sea. by arresting the preponderance of france, the revolution of 1688 struck the first real blow at continental despotism. at home it relieved dissent, purified justice, developed the national energies and resources, and ultimately, by the act of settlement, placed the crown in the gift of the people. but it neither introduced nor determined any important principle, and, that both parties might be able to work together, it left untouched the fundamental question between whig and tory. for the divine right of kings it established, in the words of defoe, the divine right of freeholders; and their domination extended for seventy years, under the authority of john locke, the philosopher of government by the gentry. even hume did not enlarge the bounds of his ideas; and his narrow materialistic belief in the connection between liberty and property captivated even the bolder mind of fox. by his idea that the powers of government ought to be divided according to their nature, and not according to the division of classes, which montesquieu took up and developed with consummate talent, locke is the originator of the long reign of english institutions in foreign lands. and his doctrine of resistance, or, as he finally termed it, the appeal to heaven, ruled the judgment of chatham at a moment of solemn transition in the history of the world. our parliamentary system, managed by the great revolution families, was a contrivance by which electors were compelled, and legislators were induced to vote against their convictions; and the intimidation of the constituencies was rewarded by the corruption of their representatives. about the year 1770 things had been brought back, by indirect ways, nearly to the condition which the revolution had been designed to remedy for ever. europe seemed incapable of becoming the home of free states. it was from america that the plain ideas that men ought to mind their own business, and that the nation is responsible to heaven for the acts of the state,--ideas long locked in the breast of solitary thinkers, and hidden among latin folios,--burst forth like a conqueror upon the world they were destined to transform, under the title of the rights of man. whether the british legislature had a constitutional right to tax a subject colony was hard to say, by the letter of the law. the general presumption was immense on the side of authority; and the world believed that the will of the constituted ruler ought to be supreme, and not the will of the subject people. very few bold writers went so far as to say that lawful power may be resisted in cases of extreme necessity. but the colonisers of america, who had gone forth not in search of gain, but to escape from laws under which other englishmen were content to live, were so sensitive even to appearances that the blue laws of connecticut forbade men to walk to church within ten feet of their wives. and the proposed tax, of only £12,000 a year, might have been easily borne. but the reasons why edward i. and his council were not allowed to tax england were reasons why george iii. and his parliament should not tax america. the dispute involved a principle, namely, the right of controlling government. furthermore, it involved the conclusion that the parliament brought together by a derisive election had no just right over the unrepresented nation, and it called on the people of england to take back its power. our best statesmen saw that whatever might be the law, the rights of the nation were at stake. chatham, in speeches better remembered than any that have been delivered in parliament, exhorted america to be firm. lord camden, the late chancellor, said: "taxation and representation are inseparably united. god hath joined them. no british parliament can separate them." from the elements of that crisis burke built up the noblest political philosophy in the world. "i do not know the method," said he, "of drawing up an indictment against a whole people. the natural rights of mankind are indeed sacred things, and if any public measure is proved mischievously to affect them, the objection ought to be fatal to that measure, even if no charter at all could be set up against it. only a sovereign reason, paramount to all forms of legislation and administration, should dictate." in this way, just a hundred years ago, the opportune reticence, the politic hesitancy of european statesmanship, was at last broken down; and the principle gained ground, that a nation can never abandon its fate to an authority it cannot control. the americans placed it at the foundation of their new government. they did more; for having subjected all civil authorities to the popular will, they surrounded the popular will with restrictions that the british legislature would not endure. during the revolution in france the example of england, which had been held up so long, could not for a moment compete with the influence of a country whose institutions were so wisely framed to protect freedom even against the perils of democracy. when louis philippe became king, he assured the old republican, lafayette, that what he had seen in the united states had convinced him that no government can be so good as a republic. there was a time in the presidency of monroe, about fifty-five years ago, which men still speak of as "the era of good feeling," when most of the incongruities that had come down from the stuarts had been reformed, and the motives of later divisions were yet inactive. the causes of old-world trouble,--popular ignorance, pauperism, the glaring contrast between rich and poor, religious strife, public debts, standing armies and war,--were almost unknown. no other age or country had solved so successfully the problems that attend the growth of free societies, and time was to bring no further progress. but i have reached the end of my time, and have hardly come to the beginning of my task. in the ages of which i have spoken, the history of freedom was the history of the thing that was not. but since the declaration of independence, or, to speak more justly, since the spaniards, deprived of their king, made a new government for themselves, the only known forms of liberty, republics and constitutional monarchy, have made their way over the world. it would have been interesting to trace the reaction of america on the monarchies that achieved its independence; to see how the sudden rise of political economy suggested the idea of applying the methods of science to the art of government; how louis xvi., after confessing that despotism was useless, even to make men happy by compulsion, appealed to the nation to do what was beyond his skill, and thereby resigned his sceptre to the middle class, and the intelligent men of france, shuddering at the awful recollections of their own experience, struggled to shut out the past, that they might deliver their children from the prince of the world and rescue the living from the clutch of the dead, until the finest opportunity ever given to the world was thrown away, because the passion for equality made vain the hope of freedom. and i should have wished to show you that the same deliberate rejection of the moral code which smoothed the paths of absolute monarchy and of oligarchy, signalised the advent of the democratic claim to unlimited power,--that one of its leading champions avowed the design of corrupting the moral sense of men, in order to destroy the influence of religion, and a famous apostle of enlightenment and toleration wished that the last king might be strangled with the entrails of the last priest. i would have tried to explain the connection between the doctrine of adam smith, that labour is the original source of all wealth, and the conclusion that the producers of wealth virtually compose the nation, by which sieyès subverted historic france; and to show that rousseau's definition of the social compact as a voluntary association of equal partners conducted marat, by short and unavoidable stages, to declare that the poorer classes were absolved, by the law of self-preservation, from the conditions of a contract which awarded to them misery and death; that they were at war with society, and had a right to all they could get by exterminating the rich, and that their inflexible theory of equality, the chief legacy of the revolution, together with the avowed inadequacy of economic science to grapple with problems of the poor, revived the idea of renovating society on the principle of self-sacrifice, which had been the generous aspiration of the essenes and the early christians, of fathers and canonists and friars, of erasmus, the most celebrated precursor of the reformation, of sir thomas more, its most illustrious victim, and of fénelon, the most popular of bishops, but which, during the forty years of its revival, has been associated with envy and hatred and bloodshed, and is now the most dangerous enemy lurking in our path. last, and most of all, having told so much of the unwisdom of our ancestors, having exposed the sterility of the convulsion that burned what they adored, and made the sins of the republic mount up as high as those of the monarchy, having shown that legitimacy, which repudiated the revolution, and imperialism, which crowned it, were but disguises of the same element of violence and wrong, i should have wished, in order that my address might not break off without a meaning or a moral, to relate by whom, and in what connection, the true law of the formation of free states was recognised, and how that discovery, closely akin to those which, under the names of development, evolution, and continuity, have given a new and deeper method to other sciences, solved the ancient problem between stability and change, and determined the authority of tradition on the progress of thought; how that theory, which sir james mackintosh expressed by saying that constitutions are not made, but grow; the theory that custom and the national qualities of the governed, and not the will of the government, are the makers of the law; and therefore that the nation, which is the source of its own organic institutions, should be charged with the perpetual custody of their integrity, and with the duty of bringing the form into harmony with the spirit, was made, by the singular co-operation of the purest conservative intellect with red-handed revolution, of niebuhr with mazzini, to yield the idea of nationality, which, far more than the idea of liberty, has governed the movement of the present age. i do not like to conclude without inviting attention to the impressive fact that so much of the hard fighting, the thinking, the enduring that has contributed to the deliverance of man from the power of man, has been the work of our countrymen, and of their descendants in other lands. we have had to contend, as much as any people, against monarchs of strong will and of resources secured by their foreign possession, against men of rare capacity, against whole dynasties of born tyrants. and yet that proud prerogative stands out on the background of our history. within a generation of the conquest, the normans were compelled to recognise, in some grudging measure, the claims of the english people. when the struggle between church and state extended to england, our churchmen learned to associate themselves with the popular cause; and, with few exceptions, neither the hierarchical spirit of the foreign divines, nor the monarchical bias peculiar to the french, characterised the writers of the english school. the civil law, transmitted from the degenerate empire to be the common prop of absolute power, was excluded from england. the canon law was restrained, and this country never admitted the inquisition, nor fully accepted the use of torture which invested continental royalty with so many terrors. at the end of the middle ages foreign writers acknowledged our superiority, and pointed to these causes. after that, our gentry maintained the means of local self-government such as no other country possessed. divisions in religion forced toleration. the confusion of the common law taught the people that their best safeguard was the independence and the integrity of the judges. all these explanations lie on the surface, and are as visible as the protecting ocean; but they can only be successive effects of a constant cause which must lie in the same native qualities of perseverance, moderation, individuality, and the manly sense of duty, which give to the english race its supremacy in the stern art of labour, which has enabled it to thrive as no other can on inhospitable shores, and which (although no great people has less of the bloodthirsty craving for glory and an army of 50,000 english soldiers has never been seen in battle) caused napoleon to exclaim, as he rode away from waterloo, "it has always been the same since crecy." therefore, if there is reason for pride in the past, there is more for hope in the time to come. our advantages increase, while other nations fear their neighbours or covet their neighbours' goods. anomalies and defects there are, fewer and less intolerable, if not less flagrant than of old. but i have fixed my eyes on the spaces that heaven's light illuminates, that i may not lay too heavy a strain on the indulgence with which you have accompanied me over the dreary and heart-breaking course by which men have passed to freedom; and because the light that has guided us is still unquenched, and the causes that have carried us so far in the van of free nations have not spent their power; because the story of the future is written in the past, and that which hath been is the same thing that shall be. footnotes: [footnote 3: an address delivered to the members of the bridgnorth institution at the agricultural hall, 28th may 1877.] [footnote 4: [poynet, in his _treatise on political power_.]] iii sir erskine may's democracy in europe[5] scarcely thirty years separate the europe of guizot and metternich from these days of universal suffrage both in france and in united germany; when a condemned insurgent of 1848 is the constitutional minister of austria; when italy, from the alps to the adriatic, is governed by friends of mazzini; and statesmen who recoiled from the temerities of peel have doubled the electoral constituency of england. if the philosopher who proclaimed the law that democratic progress is constant and irrepressible had lived to see old age, he would have been startled by the fulfilment of his prophecy. throughout these years of revolutionary change sir thomas erskine may has been more closely and constantly connected with the centre of public affairs than any other englishman, and his place, during most of the time, has been at the table of the house of commons, where he has sat, like canute, and watched the rising tide. few could be better prepared to be the historian of european democracy than one who, having so long studied the mechanism of popular government in the most illustrious of assemblies at the height of its power, has written its history, and taught its methods to the world. it is not strange that so delicate and laborious a task should have remained unattempted. democracy is a gigantic current that has been fed by many springs. physical and spiritual causes have contributed to swell it. much has been done by economic theories, and more by economic laws. the propelling force lay sometimes in doctrine and sometimes in fact, and error has been as powerful as truth. popular progress has been determined at one time by legislation, at others by a book, an invention, or a crime; and we may trace it to the influence of greek metaphysicians and roman jurists, of barbarian custom and ecclesiastical law, of the reformers who discarded the canonists, the sectaries who discarded the reformers, and the philosophers who discarded the sects. the scene has changed, as nation succeeded nation, and during the most stagnant epoch of european life the new world stored up the forces that have transformed the old. a history that should pursue all the subtle threads from end to end might be eminently valuable, but not as a tribute to peace and conciliation. few discoveries are more irritating than those which expose the pedigree of ideas. sharp definitions and unsparing analysis would displace the veil beneath which society dissembles its divisions, would make political disputes too violent for compromise and political alliances too precarious for use, and would embitter politics with all the passion of social and religious strife. sir erskine may writes for all who take their stand within the broad lines of our constitution. his judgment is averse from extremes. he turns from the discussion of theories, and examines his subject by the daylight of institutions, believing that laws depend much on the condition of society, and little on notions and disputations unsupported by reality. he avows his disbelief even in the influence of locke, and cares little to inquire how much self-government owes to independency, or equality to the quakers; and how democracy was affected by the doctrine that society is founded on contract, that happiness is the end of all government, or labour the only source of wealth; and for this reason, because he always touches ground, and brings to bear, on a vast array of sifted fact, the light of sound sense and tried experience rather than dogmatic precept, all men will read his book with profit, and almost all without offence. although he does not insist on inculcating a moral, he has stated in his introductory pages the ideas that guide him; and, indeed, the reader who fails to recognise the lesson of the book in every chapter will read in vain. sir erskine may is persuaded that it is the tendency of modern progress to elevate the masses of the people, to increase their part in the work and the fruit of civilisation, in comfort and education, in self-respect and independence, in political knowledge and power. taken for a universal law of history, this would be as visionary as certain generalisations of montesquieu and tocqueville; but with the necessary restrictions of time and place, it cannot fairly be disputed. another conclusion, supported by a far wider induction, is that democracy, like monarchy, is salutary within limits and fatal in excess; that it is the truest friend of freedom or its most unrelenting foe, according as it is mixed or pure; and this ancient and elementary truth of constitutional government is enforced with every variety of impressive and suggestive illustration from the time of the patriarchs down to the revolution which, in 1874, converted federal switzerland into an unqualified democracy governed by the direct voice of the entire people. the effective distinction between liberty and democracy, which has occupied much of the author's thoughts, cannot be too strongly drawn. slavery has been so often associated with democracy, that a very able writer pronounced it long ago essential to a democratic state; and the philosophers of the southern confederation have urged the theory with extreme fervour. for slavery operates like a restricted franchise, attaches power to property, and hinders socialism, the infirmity that attends mature democracies. the most intelligent of greek tyrants, periander, discouraged the employment of slaves; and pericles designates the freedom from manual labour as the distinguishing prerogative of athens. at rome a tax on manumissions immediately followed the establishment of political equality by licinius. an impeachment of england for having imposed slavery on america was carefully expunged from the declaration of independence; and the french assembly, having proclaimed the rights of man, declared that they did not extend to the colonies. the abolition controversy has made everybody familiar with burke's saying, that men learn the price of freedom by being masters of slaves. from the best days of athens, the days of anaxagoras, protagoras, and socrates, a strange affinity has subsisted between democracy and religious persecution. the bloodiest deed committed between the wars of religion and the revolution was due to the fanaticism of men living under the primitive republic in the rhætian alps; and of six democratic cantons only one tolerated protestants, and that after a struggle which lasted the better part of two centuries. in 1578 the fifteen catholic provinces would have joined the revolted netherlands but for the furious bigotry of ghent; and the democracy of friesland was the most intolerant of the states. the aristocratic colonies in america defended toleration against their democratic neighbours, and its triumph in rhode island and pennsylvania was the work not of policy but of religion. the french republic came to ruin because it found the lesson of religious liberty too hard to learn. down to the eighteenth century, indeed, it was understood in monarchies more often than in free commonwealths. richelieu acknowledged the principle whilst he was constructing the despotism of the bourbons; so did the electors of brandenburg, at the time when they made themselves absolute; and after the fall of clarendon, the notion of indulgence was inseparable from the design of charles ii. to subvert the constitution. a government strong enough to act in defiance of public feeling may disregard the plausible heresy that prevention is better than punishment, for it is able to punish. but a government entirely dependent on opinion looks for some security what that opinion shall be, strives for the control of the forces that shape it, and is fearful of suffering the people to be educated in sentiments hostile to its institutions. when general grant attempted to grapple with polygamy in utah, it was found necessary to pack the juries with gentiles; and the supreme court decided that the proceedings were illegal, and that the prisoners must be set free. even the murderer lee was absolved, in 1875, by a jury of mormons. modern democracy presents many problems too various and obscure to be solved without a larger range of materials than tocqueville obtained from his american authorities or his own observation. to understand why the hopes and the fears that it excites have been always inseparable, to determine under what conditions it advances or retards the progress of the people and the welfare of free states, there is no better course than to follow sir erskine may upon the road which he has been the first to open. in the midst of an invincible despotism, among paternal, military, and sacerdotal monarchies, the dawn rises with the deliverance of israel out of bondage, and with the covenant which began their political life. the tribes broke up into smaller communities, administering their own affairs under the law they had sworn to observe, but which there was no civil power to enforce. they governed themselves without a central authority, a legislature, or a dominant priesthood; and this polity, which, under the forms of primitive society, realised some aspirations of developed democracy, resisted for above three hundred years the constant peril of anarchy and subjugation. the monarchy itself was limited by the same absence of a legislative power, by the submission of the king to the law that bound his subjects, by the perpetual appeal of prophets to the conscience of the people as its appointed guardian, and by the ready resource of deposition. later still, in the decay of the religious and national constitution, the same ideas appeared with intense energy, in an extraordinary association of men who lived in austerity and self-denial, rejected slavery, maintained equality, and held their property in common, and who constituted in miniature an almost perfect republic. but the essenes perished with the city and the temple, and for many ages the example of the hebrews was more serviceable to authority than to freedom. after the reformation, the sects that broke resolutely with the traditions of church and state as they came down from catholic times, and sought for their new institutions a higher authority than custom, reverted to the memory of a commonwealth founded on a voluntary contract, on self-government, federalism, equality, in which election was preferred to inheritance, and monarchy was an emblem of the heathen; and they conceived that there was no better model for themselves than a nation constituted by religion, owning no lawgiver but moses, and obeying no king but god. political thought had until then been guided by pagan experience. among the greeks, athens, the boldest pioneer of republican discovery, was the only democracy that prospered. it underwent the changes that were the common lot of greek society, but it met them in a way that displayed a singular genius for politics. the struggle of competing classes for supremacy, almost everywhere a cause of oppression and bloodshed, became with them a genuine struggle for freedom; and the athenian constitution grew, with little pressure from below, under the intelligent action of statesmen who were swayed by political reasoning more than by public opinion. they avoided violent and convulsive change, because the rate of their reforms kept ahead of the popular demand. solon, whose laws began the reign of mind over force, instituted democracy by making the people, not indeed the administrators, but the source of power. he committed the government not to rank or birth, but to land; and he regulated the political influence of the landowners by their share in the burdens of the public service. to the lower class, who neither bore arms nor paid taxes, and were excluded from the government, he granted the privilege of choosing and of calling to account the men by whom they were governed, of confirming or rejecting the acts of the legislature and the judgments of the courts. although he charged the areopagus with the preservation of his laws, he provided that they might be revised according to need; and the ideal before his mind was government by all free citizens. his concessions to the popular element were narrow, and were carefully guarded. he yielded no more than was necessary to guarantee the attachment of the whole people to the state. but he admitted principles that went further than the claims which he conceded. he took only one step towards democracy, but it was the first of a series. when the persian wars, which converted aristocratic athens into a maritime state, had developed new sources of wealth and a new description of interests, the class which had supplied many of the ships and most of the men that had saved the national independence and founded an empire, could not be excluded from power. solon's principle, that political influence should be commensurate with political service, broke through the forms in which he had confined it, and the spirit of his constitution was too strong for the letter. the fourth estate was admitted to office, and in order that its candidates might obtain their share, and no more than their share, and that neither interest nor numbers might prevail, many public functionaries were appointed by lot. the athenian idea of a republic was to substitute the impersonal supremacy of law for the government of men. mediocrity was a safeguard against the pretensions of superior capacity, for the established order was in danger, not from the average citizens, but from men, like miltiades, of exceptional renown. the people of athens venerated their constitution as a gift of the gods, the source and title of their power, a thing too sacred for wanton change. they had demanded a code, that the unwritten law might no longer be interpreted at will by archons and areopagites; and a well-defined and authoritative legislation was a triumph of the democracy. so well was this conservative spirit understood, that the revolution which abolished the privileges of the aristocracy was promoted by aristides and completed by pericles, men free from the reproach of flattering the multitude. they associated all the free athenians with the interest of the state, and called them, without distinction of class, to administer the powers that belonged to them. solon had threatened with the loss of citizenship all who showed themselves indifferent in party conflicts, and pericles declared that every man who neglected his share of public duty was a useless member of the community. that wealth might confer no unfair advantage, that the poor might not take bribes from the rich, he took them into the pay of the state during their attendance as jurors. that their numbers might give them no unjust superiority, he restricted the right of citizenship to those who came from athenian parents on both sides; and thus he expelled more than 4000 men of mixed descent from the assembly. this bold measure, which was made acceptable by a distribution of grain from egypt among those who proved their full athenian parentage, reduced the fourth class to an equality with the owners of real property. for pericles, or ephialtes--for it would appear that all their reforms had been carried in the year 460, when ephialtes died--is the first democratic statesman who grasped the notion of political equality. the measures which made all citizens equal might have created a new inequality between classes, and the artificial privilege of land might have been succeeded by the more crushing preponderance of numbers. but pericles held it to be intolerable that one portion of the people should be required to obey laws which others have the exclusive right of making; and he was able, during thirty years, to preserve the equipoise, governing by the general consent of the community, formed by free debate. he made the undivided people sovereign; but he subjected the popular initiative to a court of revision, and assigned a penalty to the proposer of any measure which should be found to be unconstitutional. athens, under pericles, was the most successful republic that existed before the system of representation; but its splendour ended with his life. the danger to liberty from the predominance either of privilege or majorities was so manifest, that an idea arose that equality of fortune would be the only way to prevent the conflict of class interests. the philosophers, phaleas, plato, aristotle, suggested various expedients to level the difference between rich and poor. solon had endeavoured to check the increase of estates; and pericles had not only strengthened the public resources by bringing the rich under the control of an assembly in which they were not supreme, but he had employed those resources in improving the condition and the capacity of the masses. the grievance of those who were taxed for the benefit of others was easily borne so long as the tribute of the confederates filled the treasury. but the peloponnesian war increased the strain on the revenue and deprived athens of its dependencies. the balance was upset; and the policy of making one class give, that another might receive, was recommended not only by the interest of the poor, but by a growing theory, that wealth and poverty make bad citizens, that the middle class is the one most easily led by reason, and that the way to make it predominate is to depress whatever rises above the common level, and to raise whatever falls below it. this theory, which became inseparable from democracy, and contained a force which alone seems able to destroy it, was fatal to athens, for it drove the minority to treason. the glory of the athenian democrats is, not that they escaped the worst consequences of their principle, but that, having twice cast out the usurping oligarchy, they set bounds to their own power. they forgave their vanquished enemies; they abolished pay for attendance in the assembly; they established the supremacy of law by making the code superior to the people; they distinguished things that were constitutional from things that were legal, and resolved that no legislative act should pass until it had been pronounced consistent with the constitution. the causes which ruined the republic of athens illustrate the connection of ethics with politics rather than the vices inherent to democracy. a state which has only 30,000 full citizens in a population of 500,000, and is governed, practically, by about 3000 people at a public meeting, is scarcely democratic. the short triumph of athenian liberty, and its quick decline, belong to an age which possessed no fixed standard of right and wrong. an unparalleled activity of intellect was shaking the credit of the gods, and the gods were the givers of the law. it was a very short step from the suspicion of protagoras, that there were no gods, to the assertion of critias that there is no sanction for laws. if nothing was certain in theology, there was no certainty in ethics and no moral obligation. the will of man, not the will of god, was the rule of life, and every man and body of men had the right to do what they had the means of doing. tyranny was no wrong, and it was hypocrisy to deny oneself the enjoyment it affords. the doctrine of the sophists gave no limits to power and no security to freedom; it inspired that cry of the athenians, that they must not be hindered from doing what they pleased, and the speeches of men like athenagoras and euphemus, that the democracy may punish men who have done no wrong, and that nothing that is profitable is amiss. and socrates perished by the reaction which they provoked. the disciples of socrates obtained the ear of posterity. their testimony against the government that put the best of citizens to death is enshrined in writings that compete with christianity itself for influence on the opinions of men. greece has governed the world by her philosophy, and the loudest note in greek philosophy is the protest against athenian democracy. but although socrates derided the practice of leaving the choice of magistrates to chance, and plato admired the bloodstained tyrant critias, and aristotle deemed theramenes a greater statesman than pericles, yet these are the men who laid the first stones of a purer system, and became the lawgivers of future commonwealths. the main point in the method of socrates was essentially democratic. he urged men to bring all things to the test of incessant inquiry, and not to content themselves with the verdict of authorities, majorities, or custom; to judge of right and wrong, not by the will or sentiment of others, but by the light which god has set in each man's reason and conscience. he proclaimed that authority is often wrong, and has no warrant to silence or to impose conviction. but he gave no warrant to resistance. he emancipated men for thought, but not for action. the sublime history of his death shows that the superstition of the state was undisturbed by his contempt for its rulers. plato had not his master's patriotism, nor his reverence for the civil power. he believed that no state can command obedience if it does not deserve respect; and he encouraged citizens to despise their government if they were not governed by wise men. to the aristocracy of philosophers he assigned a boundless prerogative; but as no government satisfied that test, his plea for despotism was hypothetical. when the lapse of years roused him from the fantastic dream of his republic, his belief in divine government moderated his intolerance of human freedom. plato would not suffer a democratic polity; but he challenged all existing authorities to justify themselves before a superior tribunal; he desired that all constitutions should be thoroughly remodelled, and he supplied the greatest need of greek democracy, the conviction that the will of the people is subject to the will of god, and that all civil authority, except that of an imaginary state, is limited and conditional. the prodigious vitality of his writings has kept the glaring perils of popular government constantly before mankind; but it has also preserved the belief in ideal politics and the notion of judging the powers of this world by a standard from heaven. there has been no fiercer enemy of democracy; but there has been no stronger advocate of revolution. in the _ethics_ aristotle condemns democracy, even with a property qualification, as the worst of governments. but near the end of his life, when he composed his _politics_, he was brought, grudgingly, to make a memorable concession. to preserve the sovereignty of law, which is the reason and the custom of generations, and to restrict the realm of choice and change, he conceived it best that no class of society should preponderate, that one man should not be subject to another, that all should command and all obey. he advised that power should be distributed to high and low; to the first according to their property, to the others according to numbers; and that it should centre in the middle class. if aristocracy and democracy were fairly combined and balanced against each other, he thought that none would be interested to disturb the serene majesty of impersonal government. to reconcile the two principles, he would admit even the poorer citizens to office and pay them for the discharge of public duties; but he would compel the rich to take their share, and would appoint magistrates by election and not by lot. in his indignation at the extravagance of plato, and his sense of the significance of facts, he became, against his will, the prophetic exponent of a limited and regenerated democracy. but the _politics_, which, to the world of living men, is the most valuable of his works, acquired no influence on antiquity, and is never quoted before the time of cicero. again it disappeared for many centuries; it was unknown to the arabian commentators, and in western europe it was first brought to light by st. thomas aquinas, at the very time when an infusion of popular elements was modifying feudalism, and it helped to emancipate political philosophy from despotic theories and to confirm it in the ways of freedom. the three generations of the socratic school did more for the future reign of the people than all the institutions of the states of greece. they vindicated conscience against authority, and subjected both to a higher law; and they proclaimed that doctrine of a mixed constitution, which has prevailed at last over absolute monarchy, and still has to contend against extreme republicans and socialists, and against the masters of a hundred legions. but their views of liberty were based on expediency, not on justice. they legislated for the favoured citizens of greece, and were conscious of no principle that extended the same rights to the stranger and the slave. that discovery, without which all political science was merely conventional, belongs to the followers of zeno. the dimness and poverty of their theological speculation caused the stoics to attribute the government of the universe less to the uncertain design of gods than to a definite law of nature. by that law, which is superior to religious traditions and national authorities, and which every man can learn from a guardian angel who neither sleeps nor errs, all are governed alike, all are equal, all are bound in charity to each other, as members of one community and children of the same god. the unity of mankind implied the existence of rights and duties common to all men, which legislation neither gives nor takes away. the stoics held in no esteem the institutions that vary with time and place, and their ideal society resembled a universal church more than an actual state. in every collision between authority and conscience they preferred the inner to the outer guide; and, in the words of epictetus, regarded the laws of the gods, not the wretched laws of the dead. their doctrine of equality, of fraternity, of humanity; their defence of individualism against public authority; their repudiation of slavery, redeemed democracy from the narrowness, the want of principle and of sympathy, which are its reproach among the greeks. in practical life they preferred a mixed constitution to a purely popular government. chrysippus thought it impossible to please both gods and men; and seneca declared that the people is corrupt and incapable, and that nothing was wanting, under nero, to the fulness of liberty, except the possibility of destroying it. but their lofty conception of freedom, as no exceptional privilege but the birthright of mankind, survived in the law of nations and purified the equity of rome. whilst dorian oligarchs and macedonian kings crushed the liberties of greece, the roman republic was ruined, not by its enemies, for there was no enemy it did not conquer, but by its own vices. it was free from many causes of instability and dissolution that were active in greece--the eager quickness, the philosophic thought, the independent belief, the pursuit of unsubstantial grace and beauty. it was protected by many subtle contrivances against the sovereignty of numbers and against legislation by surprise. constitutional battles had to be fought over and over again; and progress was so slow, that reforms were often voted many years before they could be carried into effect. the authority allowed to fathers, to masters, to creditors, was as incompatible with the spirit of freedom as the practice of the servile east. the roman citizen revelled in the luxury of power; and his jealous dread of every change that might impair its enjoyment portended a gloomy oligarchy. the cause which transformed the domination of rigid and exclusive patricians into the model republic, and which out of the decomposed republic built up the archetype of all despotism, was the fact that the roman commonwealth consisted of two states in one. the constitution was made up of compromises between independent bodies, and the obligation of observing contracts was the standing security for freedom. the plebs obtained self-government and an equal sovereignty, by the aid of the tribunes of the people, the peculiar, salient, and decisive invention of roman statecraft. the powers conferred on the tribunes, that they might be the guardians of the weak, were ill defined, but practically were irresistible. they could not govern, but they could arrest all government. the first and the last step of plebeian progress was gained neither by violence nor persuasion, but by seceding; and, in like manner, the tribunes overcame all the authorities of the state by the weapon of obstruction. it was by stopping public business for five years that licinius established democratic equality. the safeguard against abuse was the right of each tribune to veto the acts of his colleagues. as they were independent of their electors, and as there could hardly fail to be one wise and honest man among the ten, this was the most effective instrument for the defence of minorities ever devised by man. after the hortensian law, which in the year 286 gave to the plebeian assembly co-ordinate legislative authority, the tribunes ceased to represent the cause of a minority, and their work was done. a scheme less plausible or less hopeful than one which created two sovereign legislatures side by side in the same community would be hard to find. yet it effectually closed the conflict of centuries, and gave to rome an epoch of constant prosperity and greatness. no real division subsisted in the people, corresponding to the artificial division in the state. fifty years passed away before the popular assembly made use of its prerogative, and passed a law in opposition to the senate. polybius could not detect a flaw in the structure as it stood. the harmony seemed to be complete, and he judged that a more perfect example of composite government could not exist. but during those happy years the cause which wrought the ruin of roman freedom was in full activity; for it was the condition of perpetual war that brought about the three great changes which were the beginning of the end--the reforms of the gracchi, the arming of the paupers, and the gift of the roman suffrage to the people of italy. before the romans began their career of foreign conquest they possessed an army of 770,000 men; and from that time the consumption of citizens in war was incessant. regions once crowded with the small freeholds of four or five acres, which were the ideal unit of roman society and the sinew of the army and the state, were covered with herds of cattle and herds of slaves, and the substance of the governing democracy was drained. the policy of the agrarian reform was to reconstitute this peasant class out of the public domains, that is, out of lands which the ruling families had possessed for generations, which they had bought and sold, inherited, divided, cultivated, and improved. the conflict of interests that had so long slumbered revived with a fury unknown in the controversy between the patricians and the plebs. for it was now a question not of equal rights but of subjugation. the social restoration of democratic elements could not be accomplished without demolishing the senate; and this crisis at last exposed the defect of the machinery and the peril of divided powers that were not to be controlled or reconciled. the popular assembly, led by gracchus, had the power of making laws; and the only constitutional check was, that one of the tribunes should be induced to bar the proceedings. accordingly, the tribune octavius interposed his veto. the tribunician power, the most sacred of powers, which could not be questioned because it was founded on a covenant between the two parts of the community and formed the keystone of their union, was employed, in opposition to the will of the people, to prevent a reform on which the preservation of the democracy depended. gracchus caused octavius to be deposed. though not illegal, this was a thing unheard of, and it seemed to the romans a sacrilegious act that shook the pillars of the state, for it was the first significant revelation of democratic sovereignty. a tribune might burn the arsenal and betray the city, yet he could not be called to account until his year of office had expired. but when he employed against the people the authority with which they had invested him, the spell was dissolved. the tribunes had been instituted as the champions of the oppressed, when the plebs feared oppression. it was resolved that they should not interfere on the weaker side when the democracy were the strongest. they were chosen by the people as their defence against the aristocracy. it was not to be borne that they should become the agents of the aristocracy to make them once more supreme. against a popular tribune, whom no colleague was suffered to oppose, the wealthy classes were defenceless. it is true that he held office, and was inviolable, only for a year. but the younger gracchus was re-elected. the nobles accused him of aiming at the crown. a tribune who should be practically irremovable, as well as legally irresistible, was little less than an emperor. the senate carried on the conflict as men do who fight, not for public interests but for their own existence. they rescinded the agrarian laws. they murdered the popular leaders. they abandoned the constitution to save themselves, and invested sylla with a power beyond all monarchs, to exterminate their foes. the ghastly conception of a magistrate legally proclaimed superior to all the laws was familiar to the stern spirit of the romans. the decemvirs had enjoyed that arbitrary authority; but practically they were restrained by the two provisions which alone were deemed efficacious in rome, the short duration of office, and its distribution among several colleagues. but the appointment of sylla was neither limited nor divided. it was to last as long as he chose. whatever he might do was right; and he was empowered to put whomsoever he pleased to death, without trial or accusation. all the victims who were butchered by his satellites suffered with the full sanction of the law. when at last the democracy conquered, the augustan monarchy, by which they perpetuated their triumph, was moderate in comparison with the licensed tyranny of the aristocratic chief. the emperor was the constitutional head of the republic, armed with all the powers requisite to master the senate. the instrument which had served to cast down the patricians was efficient against the new aristocracy of wealth and office. the tribunician power, conferred in perpetuity, made it unnecessary to create a king or a dictator. thrice the senate proposed to augustus the supreme power of making laws. he declared that the power of the tribunes already supplied him with all that he required. it enabled him to preserve the forms of a simulated republic. the most popular of all the magistracies of rome furnished the marrow of imperialism. for the empire was created, not by usurpation, but by the legal act of a jubilant people, eager to close the era of bloodshed and to secure the largess of grain and coin, which amounted, at last, to 900,000 pounds a year. the people transferred to the emperor the plenitude of their own sovereignty. to limit his delegated power was to challenge their omnipotence, to renew the issue between the many and the few which had been decided at pharsalus and philippi. the romans upheld the absolutism of the empire because it was their own. the elementary antagonism between liberty and democracy, between the welfare of minorities and the supremacy of masses, became manifest. the friend of the one was a traitor to the other. the dogma, that absolute power may, by the hypothesis of a popular origin, be as legitimate as constitutional freedom, began, by the combined support of the people and the throne, to darken the air. legitimate, in the technical sense of modern politics, the empire was not meant to be. it had no right or claim to subsist apart from the will of the people. to limit the emperor's authority was to renounce their own; but to take it away was to assert their own. they gave the empire as they chose. they took it away as they chose. the revolution was as lawful and as irresponsible as the empire. democratic institutions continued to develop. the provinces were no longer subject to an assembly meeting in a distant capital. they obtained the privileges of roman citizens. long after tiberius had stripped the inhabitants of rome of their electoral function, the provincials continued in undisturbed enjoyment of the right of choosing their own magistrates. they governed themselves like a vast confederation of municipal republics; and, even after diocletian had brought in the forms as well as the reality of despotism, provincial assemblies, the obscure germ of representative institutions, exercised some control over the imperial officers. but the empire owed the intensity of its force to the popular fiction. the principle, that the emperor is not subject to laws from which he can dispense others, _princeps legibus solutus_, was interpreted to imply that he was above all legal restraint. there was no appeal from his sentence. he was the living law. the roman jurists, whilst they adorned their writings with the exalted philosophy of the stoics, consecrated every excess of imperial prerogative with those famous maxims which have been balm to so many consciences and have sanctioned so much wrong; and the code of justinian became the greatest obstacle, next to feudalism, with which liberty had to contend. ancient democracy, as it was in athens in the best days of pericles, or in rome when polybius described it, or even as it is idealised by aristotle in the sixth book of his _politics_, and by cicero in the beginning of the republic, was never more than a partial and insincere solution of the problem of popular government. the ancient politicians aimed no higher than to diffuse power among a numerous class. their liberty was bound up with slavery. they never attempted to found a free state on the thrift and energy of free labour. they never divined the harder but more grateful task that constitutes the political life of christian nations. by humbling the supremacy of rank and wealth; by forbidding the state to encroach on the domain which belongs to god; by teaching man to love his neighbour as himself; by promoting the sense of equality; by condemning the pride of race, which was a stimulus of conquest, and the doctrine of separate descent, which formed the philosopher's defence of slavery; and by addressing not the rulers but the masses of mankind, and making opinion superior to authority, the church that preached the gospel to the poor had visible points of contact with democracy. and yet christianity did not directly influence political progress. the ancient watchword of the republic was translated by papinian into the language of the church: "summa est ratio quæ pro religione fiat:" and for eleven hundred years, from the first to the last of the constantines, the christian empire was as despotic as the pagan. meanwhile western europe was overrun by men who in their early home had been republicans. the primitive constitution of the german communities was based on association rather than on subordination. they were accustomed to govern their affairs by common deliberation, and to obey authorities that were temporary and defined. it is one of the desperate enterprises of historical science to trace the free institutions of europe and america, and australia, to the life that was led in the forests of germany. but the new states were founded on conquest, and in war the germans were commanded by kings. the doctrine of self-government, applied to gaul and spain, would have made frank and goth disappear in the mass of the conquered people. it needed all the resources of a vigorous monarchy, of a military aristocracy, and of a territorial clergy, to construct states that were able to last. the result was the feudal system, the most absolute contradiction of democracy that has coexisted with civilisation. the revival of democracy was due neither to the christian church nor to the teutonic state, but to the quarrel between them. the effect followed the cause instantaneously. as soon as gregory vii. made the papacy independent of the empire, the great conflict began; and the same pontificate gave birth to the theory of the sovereignty of the people. the gregorian party argued that the emperor derived his crown from the nation, and that the nation could take away what it had bestowed. the imperialists replied that nobody could take away what the nation had given. it is idle to look for the spark either in flint or steel. the object of both parties was unqualified supremacy. fitznigel has no more idea of ecclesiastical liberty than john of salisbury of political. innocent iv. is as perfect an absolutist as peter de vineis. but each party encouraged democracy in turn, by seeking the aid of the towns; each party in turn appealed to the people, and gave strength to the constitutional theory. in the fourteenth century english parliaments judged and deposed their kings, as a matter of right; the estates governed france without king or noble; and the wealth and liberties of the towns, which had worked out their independence from the centre of italy to the north sea, promised for a moment to transform european society. even in the capitals of great princes, in rome, in paris, and, for two terrible days, in london, the commons obtained sway. but the curse of instability was on the municipal republics. strasburg, according to erasmus and bodin, the best governed of all, suffered from perpetual commotions. an ingenious historian has reckoned seven thousand revolutions in the italian cities. the democracies succeeded no better than feudalism in regulating the balance between rich and poor. the atrocities of the jacquerie, and of wat tyler's rebellion, hardened the hearts of men against the common people. church and state combined to put them down. and the last memorable struggles of mediæval liberty--the insurrection of the comuneros in castile, the peasants' war in germany, the republic of florence, and the revolt of ghent--were suppressed by charles v. in the early years of the reformation. the middle ages had forged a complete arsenal of constitutional maxims: trial by jury, taxation by representation, local self-government, ecclesiastical independence, responsible authority. but they were not secured by institutions, and the reformation began by making the dry bones more dry. luther claimed to be the first divine who did justice to the civil power. he made the lutheran church the bulwark of political stability, and bequeathed to his disciples the doctrine of divine right and passive obedience. zwingli, who was a staunch republican, desired that all magistrates should be elected, and should be liable to be dismissed by their electors; but he died too soon for his influence, and the permanent action of the reformation on democracy was exercised through the presbyterian constitution of calvin. it was long before the democratic element in presbyterianism began to tell. the netherlands resisted philip ii. for fifteen years before they took courage to depose him, and the scheme of the ultra-calvinist deventer, to subvert the ascendency of the leading states by the sovereign action of the whole people, was foiled by leicester's incapacity, and by the consummate policy of barnevelt. the huguenots, having lost their leaders in 1572, reconstituted themselves on a democratic footing, and learned to think that a king who murders his subjects forfeits his divine right to be obeyed. but junius brutus and buchanan damaged their credit by advocating regicide; and hotoman, whose _franco-gallia_ is the most serious work of the group, deserted his liberal opinions when the chief of his own party became king. the most violent explosion of democracy in that age proceeded from the opposite quarter. when henry of navarre became the next heir to the throne of france, the theory of the deposing power, which had proved ineffectual for more than a century, awoke with a new and more vigorous life. one-half of the nation accepted the view, that they were not bound to submit to a king they would not have chosen. a committee of sixteen made itself master of paris, and, with the aid of spain, succeeded for years in excluding henry from his capital. the impulse thus given endured in literature for a whole generation, and produced a library of treatises on the right of catholics to choose, to control, and to cashier their magistrates. they were on the losing side. most of them were bloodthirsty, and were soon forgotten. but the greater part of the political ideas of milton, locke, and rousseau, may be found in the ponderous latin of jesuits who were subjects of the spanish crown, of lessius, molina, mariana, and suarez. the ideas were there, and were taken up when it suited them by extreme adherents of rome and of geneva; but they produced no lasting fruit until, a century after the reformation, they became incorporated in new religious systems. five years of civil war could not exhaust the royalism of the presbyterians, and it required the expulsion of the majority to make the long parliament abandon monarchy. it had defended the constitution against the crown with legal arts, defending precedent against innovation, and setting up an ideal in the past which, with all the learning of selden and of prynne, was less certain than the puritan statesmen supposed. the independents brought in a new principle. tradition had no authority for them, and the past no virtue. liberty of conscience, a thing not to be found in the constitution, was more prized by many of them than all the statutes of the plantagenets. their idea that each congregation should govern itself abolished the force which is needed to preserve unity, and deprived monarchy of the weapon which made it injurious to freedom. an immense revolutionary energy resided in their doctrine, and it took root in america, and deeply coloured political thought in later times. but in england the sectarian democracy was strong only to destroy. cromwell refused to be bound by it; and john lilburne, the boldest thinker among english democrats, declared that it would be better for liberty to bring back charles stuart than to live under the sword of the protector. lilburne was among the first to understand the real conditions of democracy, and the obstacle to its success in england. equality of power could not be preserved, except by violence, together with an extreme inequality of possessions. there would always be danger, if power was not made to wait on property, that property would go to those who had the power. this idea of the necessary balance of property, developed by harrington, and adopted by milton in his later pamphlets, appeared to toland, and even to john adams, as important as the invention of printing, or the discovery of the circulation of the blood. at least it indicates the true explanation of the strange completeness with which the republican party had vanished, a dozen years after the solemn trial and execution of the king. no extremity of misgovernment was able to revive it. when the treason of charles ii. against the constitution was divulged, and the whigs plotted to expel the incorrigible dynasty, their aspirations went no farther than a venetian oligarchy, with monmouth for doge. the revolution of 1688 confined power to the aristocracy of freeholders. the conservatism of the age was unconquerable. republicanism was distorted even in switzerland, and became in the eighteenth century as oppressive and as intolerant as its neighbours. in 1769, when paoli fled from corsica, it seemed that, in europe at least, democracy was dead. it had, indeed, lately been defended in books by a man of bad reputation, whom the leaders of public opinion treated with contumely, and whose declamations excited so little alarm that george iii. offered him a pension. what gave to rousseau a power far exceeding that which any political writer had ever attained was the progress of events in america. the stuarts had been willing that the colonies should serve as a refuge from their system of church and state, and of all their colonies the one most favoured was the territory granted to william penn. by the principles of the society to which he belonged, it was necessary that the new state should be founded on liberty and equality. but penn was further noted among quakers as a follower of the new doctrine of toleration. thus it came to pass that pennsylvania enjoyed the most democratic constitution in the world, and held up to the admiration of the eighteenth century an almost solitary example of freedom. it was principally through franklin and the quaker state that america influenced political opinion in europe, and that the fanaticism of one revolutionary epoch was converted into the rationalism of another. american independence was the beginning of a new era, not merely as a revival of revolution, but because no other revolution ever proceeded from so slight a cause, or was ever conducted with so much moderation. the european monarchies supported it. the greatest statesmen in england averred that it was just. it established a pure democracy; but it was democracy in its highest perfection, armed and vigilant, less against aristocracy and monarchy than against its own weakness and excess. whilst england was admired for the safeguards with which, in the course of many centuries, it had fortified liberty against the power of the crown, america appeared still more worthy of admiration for the safeguards which, in the deliberations of a single memorable year, it had set up against the power of its own sovereign people. it resembled no other known democracy, for it respected freedom, authority, and law. it resembled no other constitution, for it was contained in half a dozen intelligible articles. ancient europe opened its mind to two new ideas--that revolution with very little provocation may be just; and that democracy in very large dimensions may be safe. whilst america was making itself independent, the spirit of reform had been abroad in europe. intelligent ministers, like campomanes and struensee, and well-meaning monarchs, of whom the most liberal was leopold of tuscany, were trying what could be done to make men happy by command. centuries of absolute and intolerant rule had bequeathed abuses which nothing but the most vigorous use of power could remove. the age preferred the reign of intellect to the reign of liberty. turgot, the ablest and most far-seeing reformer then living, attempted to do for france what less gifted men were doing with success in lombardy, and tuscany, and parma. he attempted to employ the royal power for the good of the people, at the expense of the higher classes. the higher classes proved too strong for the crown alone; and louis xvi. abandoned internal reforms in despair, and turned for compensation to a war with england for the deliverance of her american colonies. when the increasing debt obliged him to seek heroic remedies, and he was again repulsed by the privileged orders, he appealed at last to the nation. when the states-general met, the power had already passed to the middle class, for it was by them alone that the country could be saved. they were strong enough to triumph by waiting. neither the court, nor the nobles, nor the army, could do anything against them. during the six months from january 1789 to the fall of the bastille in july, france travelled as far as england in the six hundred years between the earl of leicester and lord beaconsfield. ten years after the american alliance, the rights of man, which had been proclaimed at philadelphia, were repeated at versailles. the alliance had borne fruit on both sides of the atlantic, and for france, the fruit was the triumph of american ideas over english. they were more popular, more simple, more effective against privilege, and, strange to say, more acceptable to the king. the new french constitution allowed no privileged orders, no parliamentary ministry, no power of dissolution, and only a suspensive veto. but the characteristic safeguards of the american government were rejected: federalism, separation of church and state, the second chamber, the political arbitration of the supreme judicial body. that which weakened the executive was taken: that which restrained the legislature was left. checks on the crown abounded; but should the crown be vacant, the powers that remained would be without a check. the precautions were all in one direction. nobody would contemplate the contingency that there might be no king. the constitution was inspired by a profound disbelief in louis xvi. and a pertinacious belief in monarchy. the assembly voted without debate, by acclamation, a civil list three times as large as that of queen victoria. when louis fled, and the throne was actually vacant, they brought him back to it, preferring the phantom of a king who was a prisoner to the reality of no king at all. next to this misapplication of american examples, which was the fault of nearly all the leading statesmen, excepting mounier, mirabeau, and sieyès, the cause of the revolution was injured by its religious policy. the most novel and impressive lesson taught by the fathers of the american republic was that the people, and not the administration, should govern. men in office were salaried agents, by whom the nation wrought its will. authority submitted to public opinion, and left to it not only the control, but the initiative of government. patience in waiting for a wind, alacrity in catching it, the dread of exerting unnecessary influence, characterise the early presidents. some of the french politicians shared this view, though with less exaggeration than washington. they wished to decentralise the government, and to obtain, for good or evil, the genuine expression of popular sentiment. necker himself, and buzot, the most thoughtful of the girondins, dreamed of federalising france. in the united states there was no current of opinion, and no combination of forces, to be seriously feared. the government needed no security against being propelled in a wrong direction. but the french revolution was accomplished at the expense of powerful classes. besides the nobles, the assembly, which had been made supreme by the accession of the clergy, and had been led at first by popular ecclesiastics, by sieyès, talleyrand, cicé, la luzerne, made an enemy of the clergy. the prerogative could not be destroyed without touching the church. ecclesiastical patronage had helped to make the crown absolute. to leave it in the hands of louis and his ministers was to renounce the entire policy of the constitution. to disestablish, was to make it over to the pope. it was consistent with the democratic principle to introduce election into the church. it involved a breach with rome; but so, indeed, did the laws of joseph ii., charles iii., and leopold. the pope was not likely to cast away the friendship of france, if he could help it; and the french clergy were not likely to give trouble by their attachment to rome. therefore, amid the indifference of many, and against the urgent, and probably sincere, remonstrances of robespierre and marat, the jansenists, who had a century of persecution to avenge, carried the civil constitution. the coercive measures which enforced it led to the breach with the king, and the fall of the monarchy; to the revolt of the provinces, and the fall of liberty. the jacobins determined that public opinion should not reign, that the state should not remain at the mercy of powerful combinations. they held the representatives of the people under control, by the people itself. they attributed higher authority to the direct than to the indirect voice of the democratic oracle. they armed themselves with power to crush every adverse, every independent force, and especially to put down the church, in whose cause the provinces had risen against the capital. they met the centrifugal federalism of the friends of the gironde by the most resolute centralisation. france was governed by paris; and paris by its municipality and its mob. obeying rousseau's maxim, that the people cannot delegate its power, they raised the elementary constituency above its representatives. as the greatest constituent body, the most numerous accumulation of primary electors, the largest portion of sovereignty, was in the people of paris, they designed that the people of paris should rule over france, as the people of rome, the mob as well as the senate, had ruled, not ingloriously, over italy, and over half the nations that surround the mediterranean. although the jacobins were scarcely more irreligious than the abbé sieyès or madame roland, although robespierre wanted to force men to believe in god, although danton went to confession and barère was a professing christian, they imparted to modern democracy that implacable hatred of religion which contrasts so strangely with the example of its puritan prototype. the deepest cause which made the french revolution so disastrous to liberty was its theory of equality. liberty was the watchword of the middle class, equality of the lower. it was the lower class that won the battles of the third estate; that took the bastille, and made france a constitutional monarchy; that took the tuileries, and made france a republic. they claimed their reward. the middle class, having cast down the upper orders with the aid of the lower, instituted a new inequality and a privilege for itself. by means of a taxpaying qualification it deprived its confederates of their vote. to those, therefore, who had accomplished the revolution, its promise was not fulfilled. equality did nothing for them. the opinion, at that time, was almost universal, that society is founded on an agreement which is voluntary and conditional, and that the links which bind men to it are terminable, for sufficient reason, like those which subject them to authority. from these popular premises the logic of marat drew his sanguinary conclusions. he told the famished people that the conditions on which they had consented to bear their evil lot, and had refrained from violence, had not been kept to them. it was suicide, it was murder, to submit to starve and to see one's children starving, by the fault of the rich. the bonds of society were dissolved by the wrong it inflicted. the state of nature had come back, in which every man had a right to what he could take. the time had come for the rich to make way for the poor. with this theory of equality, liberty was quenched in blood, and frenchmen became ready to sacrifice all other things to save life and fortune. twenty years after the splendid opportunity that opened in 1789, the reaction had triumphed everywhere in europe; ancient constitutions had perished as well as new; and even england afforded them neither protection nor sympathy. the liberal, at least the democratic revival, came from spain. the spaniards fought against the french for a king, who was a prisoner in france. they gave themselves a constitution, and placed his name at the head of it. they had a monarchy, without a king. it required to be so contrived that it would work in the absence, possibly the permanent absence, of the monarch. it became, therefore, a monarchy only in name, composed, in fact, of democratic forces. the constitution of 1812 was the attempt of inexperienced men to accomplish the most difficult task in politics. it was smitten with sterility. for many years it was the standard of abortive revolutions among the so-called latin nations. it promulgated the notion of a king who should flourish only in name, and should not even discharge the humble function which hegel assigns to royalty, of dotting i's for the people. the overthrow of the cadiz constitution, in 1823, was the supreme triumph of the restored monarchy of france. five years later, under a wise and liberal minister, the restoration was advancing fairly on the constitutional paths, when the incurable distrust of the liberal party defeated martignac, and brought in the ministry of extreme royalists that ruined the monarchy. in labouring to transfer power from the class which the revolution had enfranchised to those which it had overthrown, polignac and la bourdonnaie would gladly have made terms with the working men. to break the influence of intellect and capital by means of universal suffrage, was an idea long and zealously advocated by some of their supporters. they had not foresight or ability to divide their adversaries, and they were vanquished in 1830 by the united democracy. the promise of the revolution of july was to reconcile royalists and democrats. the king assured lafayette that he was a republican at heart; and lafayette assured france that louis philippe was the best of republics. the shock of the great event was felt in poland, and belgium, and even in england. it gave a direct impulse to democratic movements in switzerland. swiss democracy had been in abeyance since 1815. the national will had no organ. the cantons were supreme; and governed as inefficiently as other governments under the protecting shade of the holy alliance. there was no dispute that switzerland called for extensive reforms, and no doubt of the direction they would take. the number of the cantons was the great obstacle to all improvement. it was useless to have twenty-five governments in a country equal to one american state, and inferior in population to one great city. it was impossible that they should be good governments. a central power was the manifest need of the country. in the absence of an efficient federal power, seven cantons formed a separate league for the protection of their own interests. whilst democratic ideas were making way in switzerland, the papacy was travelling in the opposite direction, and showing an inflexible hostility for ideas which are the breath of democratic life. the growing democracy and the growing ultramontanism came into collision. the sonderbund could aver with truth that there was no safety for its rights under the federal constitution. the others could reply, with equal truth, that there was no safety for the constitution with the sonderbund. in 1847, it came to a war between national sovereignty and cantonal sovereignty. the sonderbund was dissolved, and a new federal constitution was adopted, avowedly and ostensibly charged with the duty of carrying out democracy, and repressing the adverse influence of rome. it was a delusive imitation of the american system. the president was powerless. the senate was powerless. the supreme court was powerless. the sovereignty of the cantons was undermined, and their power centred in the house of representatives. the constitution of 1848 was a first step towards the destruction of federalism. another and almost a final step in the direction of centralisation was taken in 1874. the railways, and the vast interests they created, made the position of the cantonal governments untenable. the conflict with the ultramontanes increased the demand for vigorous action; and the destruction of state rights in the american war strengthened the hands of the centralists. the constitution of 1874 is one of the most significant works of modern democracy. it is the triumph of democratic force over democratic freedom. it overrules not only the federal principle, but the representative principle. it carries important measures away from the federal legislature to submit them to the votes of the entire people, separating decision from deliberation. the operation is so cumbrous as to be generally ineffective. but it constitutes a power such as exists, we believe, under the laws of no other country. a swiss jurist has frankly expressed the spirit of the reigning system by saying, that the state is the appointed conscience of the nation. the moving force in switzerland has been democracy relieved of all constraint, the principle of putting in action the greatest force of the greatest number. the prosperity of the country has prevented complications such as arose in france. the ministers of louis philippe, able and enlightened men, believed that they would make the people prosper if they could have their own way, and could shut out public opinion. they acted as if the intelligent middle class was destined by heaven to govern. the upper class had proved its unfitness before 1789; the lower class, since 1789. government by professional men, by manufacturers and scholars, was sure to be safe, and almost sure to be reasonable and practical. money became the object of a political superstition, such as had formerly attached to land, and afterwards attached to labour. the masses of the people, who had fought against marmont, became aware that they had not fought for their own benefit. they were still governed by their employers. when the king parted with lafayette, and it was found that he would not only reign but govern, the indignation of the republicans found a vent in street fighting. in 1836, when the horrors of the infernal machine had armed the crown with ampler powers, and had silenced the republican party, the term socialism made its appearance in literature. tocqueville, who was writing the philosophic chapters that conclude his work, failed to discover the power which the new system was destined to exercise on democracy. until then, democrats and communists had stood apart. although the socialist doctrines were defended by the best intellects of france, by thierry, comte, chevalier, and georges sand, they excited more attention as a literary curiosity than as the cause of future revolutions. towards 1840, in the recesses of secret societies, republicans and socialists coalesced. whilst the liberal leaders, lamartine and barrot, discoursed on the surface concerning reform, ledru rollin and louis blanc were quietly digging a grave for the monarchy, the liberal party, and the reign of wealth. they worked so well, and the vanquished republicans recovered so thoroughly, by this coalition, the influence they had lost by a long series of crimes and follies, that, in 1848, they were able to conquer without fighting. the fruit of their victory was universal suffrage. from that time the promises of socialism have supplied the best energy of democracy. their coalition has been the ruling fact in french politics. it created the "saviour of society," and the commune; and it still entangles the footsteps of the republic. it is the only shape in which democracy has found an entrance into germany. liberty has lost its spell; and democracy maintains itself by the promise of substantial gifts to the masses of the people. since the revolution of july and the presidency of jackson gave the impulse which has made democracy preponderate, the ablest political writers, tocqueville, calhoun, mill, and laboulaye, have drawn, in the name of freedom, a formidable indictment against it. they have shown democracy without respect for the past or care for the future, regardless of public faith and of national honour, extravagant and inconstant, jealous of talent and of knowledge, indifferent to justice but servile towards opinion, incapable of organisation, impatient of authority, averse from obedience, hostile to religion and to established law. evidence indeed abounds, even if the true cause be not proved. but it is not to these symptoms that we must impute the permanent danger and the irrepressible conflict. as much might be made good against monarchy, and an unsympathising reasoner might in the same way argue that religion is intolerant, that conscience makes cowards, that piety rejoices in fraud. recent experience has added little to the observations of those who witnessed the decline after pericles, of thucydides, aristophanes, plato, and of the writer whose brilliant tract against the athenian republic is printed among the works of xenophon. the manifest, the avowed difficulty is that democracy, no less than monarchy or aristocracy, sacrifices everything to maintain itself, and strives, with an energy and a plausibility that kings and nobles cannot attain, to override representation, to annul all the forces of resistance and deviation, and to secure, by plebiscite, referendum, or caucus, free play for the will of the majority. the true democratic principle, that none shall have power over the people, is taken to mean that none shall be able to restrain or to elude its power. the true democratic principle, that the people shall not be made to do what it does not like, is taken to mean that it shall never be required to tolerate what it does not like. the true democratic principle, that every man's free will shall be as unfettered as possible, is taken to mean that the free will of the collective people shall be fettered in nothing. religious toleration, judicial independence, dread of centralisation, jealousy of state interference, become obstacles to freedom instead of safeguards, when the centralised force of the state is wielded by the hands of the people. democracy claims to be not only supreme, without authority above, but absolute, without independence below; to be its own master, not a trustee. the old sovereigns of the world are exchanged for a new one, who may be flattered and deceived, but whom it is impossible to corrupt or to resist, and to whom must be rendered the things that are cæsar's and also the things that are god's. the enemy to be overcome is no longer the absolutism of the state, but the liberty of the subject. nothing is more significant than the relish with which ferrari, the most powerful democratic writer since rousseau, enumerates the merits of tyrants, and prefers devils to saints in the interest of the community. for the old notions of civil liberty and of social order did not benefit the masses of the people. wealth increased, without relieving their wants. the progress of knowledge left them in abject ignorance. religion flourished, but failed to reach them. society, whose laws were made by the upper class alone, announced that the best thing for the poor is not to be born, and the next best, to die in childhood, and suffered them to live in misery and crime and pain. as surely as the long reign of the rich has been employed in promoting the accumulation of wealth, the advent of the poor to power will be followed by schemes for diffusing it. seeing how little was done by the wisdom of former times for education and public health, for insurance, association, and savings, for the protection of labour against the law of self-interest, and how much has been accomplished in this generation, there is reason in the fixed belief that a great change was needed, and that democracy has not striven in vain. liberty, for the mass, is not happiness; and institutions are not an end but a means. the thing they seek is a force sufficient to sweep away scruples and the obstacle of rival interests, and, in some degree, to better their condition. they mean that the strong hand that heretofore has formed great states, protected religions, and defended the independence of nations, shall help them by preserving life, and endowing it for them with some, at least, of the things men live for. that is the notorious danger of modern democracy. that is also its purpose and its strength. and against this threatening power the weapons that struck down other despots do not avail. the greatest happiness principle positively confirms it. the principle of equality, besides being as easily applied to property as to power, opposes the existence of persons or groups of persons exempt from the common law, and independent of the common will; and the principle, that authority is a matter of contract, may hold good against kings, but not against the sovereign people, because a contract implies two parties. if we have not done more than the ancients to develop and to examine the disease, we have far surpassed them in studying the remedy. besides the french constitution of the year iii., and that of the american confederates,--the most remarkable attempts that have been made since the archonship of euclides to meet democratic evils with the antidotes which democracy itself supplies,--our age has been prolific in this branch of experimental politics. many expedients have been tried, that have been evaded or defeated. a divided executive, which was an important phase in the transformation of ancient monarchies into republics, and which, through the advocacy of condorcet, took root in france, has proved to be weakness itself. the constitution of 1795, the work of a learned priest, confined the franchise to those who should know how to read and write; and in 1849 this provision was rejected by men who intended that the ignorant voter should help them to overturn the republic. in our time no democracy could long subsist without educating the masses; and the scheme of daunou is simply an indirect encouragement to elementary instruction. in 1799 sieyès suggested to bonaparte the idea of a great council, whose function it should be to keep the acts of the legislature in harmony with the constitution--a function which the _nomophylakes_ discharged at athens, and the supreme court in the united states, and which produced the sénat conservateur, one of the favourite implements of imperialism. sieyès meant that his council should also serve the purpose of a gilded ostracism, having power to absorb any obnoxious politician, and to silence him with a thousand a year. napoleon the third's plan of depriving unmarried men of their votes would have disfranchised the two greatest conservative classes in france, the priest and the soldier. in the american constitution it was intended that the chief of the executive should be chosen by a body of carefully selected electors. but since, in 1825, the popular candidate succumbed to one who had only a minority of votes, it has become the practice to elect the president by the pledged delegates of universal suffrage. the exclusion of ministers from congress has been one of the severest strains on the american system; and the law which required a majority of three to one enabled louis napoleon to make himself emperor. large constituencies make independent deputies; but experience proves that small assemblies, the consequence of large constituencies, can be managed by government. the composite vote and the cumulative vote have been almost universally rejected as schemes for baffling the majority. but the principle of dividing the representatives equally between population and property has never had fair play. it was introduced by thouret into the constitution of 1791. the revolution made it inoperative; and it was so manipulated from 1817 to 1848 by the fatal dexterity of guizot as to make opinion ripe for universal suffrage. constitutions which forbid the payment of deputies and the system of imperative instructions, which deny the power of dissolution, and make the legislature last for a fixed term, or renew it by partial re-elections, and which require an interval between the several debates on the same measure, evidently strengthen the independence of the representative assembly. the swiss veto has the same effect, as it suspends legislation only when opposed by a majority of the whole electoral body, not by a majority of those who actually vote upon it. indirect elections are scarcely anywhere in use out of germany, but they have been a favourite corrective of democracy with many thoughtful politicians. where the extent of the electoral district obliges constituents to vote for candidates who are unknown to them, the election is not free. it is managed by wire-pullers, and by party machinery, beyond the control of the electors. indirect election puts the choice of the managers into their hands. the objection is that the intermediate electors are generally too few to span the interval between voters and candidates, and that they choose representatives not of better quality, but of different politics. if the intermediate body consisted of one in ten of the whole constituency, the contact would be preserved, the people would be really represented, and the ticket system would be broken down. the one pervading evil of democracy is the tyranny of the majority, or rather of that party, not always the majority, that succeeds, by force or fraud, in carrying elections. to break off that point is to avert the danger. the common system of representation perpetuates the danger. unequal electorates afford no security to majorities. equal electorates give none to minorities. thirty-five years ago it was pointed out that the remedy is proportional representation. it is profoundly democratic, for it increases the influence of thousands who would otherwise have no voice in the government; and it brings men more near an equality by so contriving that no vote shall be wasted, and that every voter shall contribute to bring into parliament a member of his own opinions. the origin of the idea is variously claimed for lord grey and for considérant. the successful example of denmark and the earnest advocacy of mill gave it prominence in the world of politics. it has gained popularity with the growth of democracy, and we are informed by m. naville that in switzerland conservatives and radicals combined to promote it. of all checks on democracy, federalism has been the most efficacious and the most congenial; but, becoming associated with the red republic, with feudalism, with the jesuits, and with slavery, it has fallen into disrepute, and is giving way to centralism. the federal system limits and restrains the sovereign power by dividing it, and by assigning to government only certain defined rights. it is the only method of curbing not only the majority but the power of the whole people, and it affords the strongest basis for a second chamber, which has been found the essential security for freedom in every genuine democracy. the fall of guizot discredited the famous maxim of the doctrinaires, that reason is sovereign, and not king or people; and it was further exposed to the scoffer by the promise of comte that positivist philosophers shall manufacture political ideas, which no man shall be permitted to dispute. but putting aside international and criminal law, in which there is some approach to uniformity, the domain of political economy seems destined to admit the rigorous certainty of science. whenever that shall be attained, when the battle between economists and socialists is ended, the evil force which socialism imparts to democracy will be spent. the battle is raging more violently than ever, but it has entered into a new phase, by the rise of a middle party. whether that remarkable movement, which is promoted by some of the first economists in europe, is destined to shake the authority of their science, or to conquer socialism, by robbing it of that which is the secret of its strength, it must be recorded here as the latest and the most serious effort that has been made to disprove the weighty sentence of rousseau, that democracy is a government for gods, but unfit for man. we have been able to touch on only a few of the topics that crowd sir erskine may's volumes. although he has perceived more clearly than tocqueville the contact of democracy with socialism, his judgment is untinged with tocqueville's despondency, and he contemplates the direction of progress with a confidence that approaches optimism. the notion of an inflexible logic in history does not depress him, for he concerns himself with facts and with men more than with doctrines, and his book is a history of several democracies, not of democracy. there are links in the argument, there are phases of development which he leaves unnoticed, because his object has not been to trace out the properties and the connection of ideas, but to explain the results of experience. we should consult his pages, probably, without effect, if we wished to follow the origin and sequence of the democratic dogmas, that all men are equal; that speech and thought are free; that each generation is a law to itself only; that there shall be no endowments, no entails, no primogeniture; that the people are sovereign; that the people can do no wrong. the great mass of those who, of necessity, are interested in practical politics have no such antiquarian curiosity. they want to know what can be learned from the countries where the democratic experiments have been tried; but they do not care to be told how m. waddington has emended the _monumentum ancyranum_, what connection there was between mariana and milton, or between penn and rousseau, or who invented the proverb _vox populi vox dei_. sir erskine may's reluctance to deal with matters speculative and doctrinal, and to devote his space to the mere literary history of politics, has made his touch somewhat uncertain in treating of the political action of christianity, perhaps the most complex and comprehensive question that can embarrass a historian. he disparages the influence of the mediæval church on nations just emerging from a barbarous paganism, and he exalts it when it had become associated with despotism and persecution. he insists on the liberating action of the reformation in the sixteenth century, when it gave a stimulus to absolutism; and he is slow to recognise, in the enthusiasm and violence of the sects in the seventeenth, the most potent agency ever brought to bear on democratic history. the omission of america creates a void between 1660 and 1789, and leaves much unexplained in the revolutionary movement of the last hundred years, which is the central problem of the book. but if some things are missed from the design, if the execution is not equal in every part, the praise remains to sir erskine may, that he is the only writer who has ever brought together the materials for a comparative study of democracy, that he has avoided the temper of party, that he has shown a hearty sympathy for the progress and improvement of mankind, and a steadfast faith in the wisdom and the power that guide it. footnotes: [footnote 5: _the quarterly review_, january 1878.] iv the massacre of st. bartholomew[6] the way in which coligny and his adherents met their death has been handed down by a crowd of trustworthy witnesses, and few things in history are known in more exact detail. but the origin and motives of the tragedy, and the manner of its reception by the opinion of christian europe, are still subject to controversy. some of the evidence has been difficult of access, part is lost, and much has been deliberately destroyed. no letters written from paris at the time have been found in the austrian archives. in the correspondence of thirteen agents of the house of este at the court of rome, every paper relating to the event has disappeared. all the documents of 1572, both from rome and paris, are wanting in the archives of venice. in the registers of many french towns the leaves which contained the records of august and september in that year have been torn out. the first reports sent to england by walsingham and by the french government have not been recovered. three accounts printed at rome, when the facts were new, speedily became so rare that they have been forgotten. the bull of gregory xiii. was not admitted into the official collections; and the reply to muretus has escaped notice until now. the letters of charles ix. to rome, with the important exception of that which he wrote on the 24th _of_ august, have been dispersed and lost the letters of gregory xiii. to france have never been seen by persons willing to make them public. in the absence of these documents the most authentic information is that which is supplied by the french ambassador and by the nuncio. the despatches of ferralz, describing the attitude of the roman court, are extant, but have not been used. those of salviati have long been known. chateaubriand took a copy when the papal archives were at paris, and projected a work on the events with which they are concerned. some extracts were published, with his consent, by the continuator of mackintosh; and a larger selection, from the originals in the vatican, appeared in theiner's _annals of gregory xiii_. the letters written under pius v. are beyond the limits of that work; and theiner, moreover, has omitted whatever seemed irrelevant to his purpose. the criterion of relevancy is uncertain; and we shall avail ourselves largely of the unpublished portions of salviati's correspondence, which were transcribed by chateaubriand. these manuscripts, with others of equal importance not previously consulted, determine several doubtful questions of policy and design. the protestants never occupied a more triumphant position, and their prospects were never brighter, than in the summer of 1572. for many years the progress of their religion had been incessant. the most valuable of the conquests it has retained were already made; and the period of its reverses had not begun. the great division which aided catholicism afterwards to recover so much lost ground was not openly confessed; and the effectual unity of the reformed churches was not yet dissolved. in controversial theology the defence was weaker than the attack. the works to which the reformation owed its popularity and system were in the hands of thousands, while the best authors of the catholic restoration had not begun to write. the press continued to serve the new opinions better than the old; and in literature protestantism was supreme. persecuted in the south, and established by violence in the north, it had overcome the resistance of princes in central europe, and had won toleration without ceasing to be intolerant. in france and poland, in the dominions of the emperor and under the german prelates, the attempt to arrest its advance by physical force had been abandoned. in germany it covered twice the area that remained to it in the next generation, and, except in bavaria, catholicism was fast dying out. the polish government had not strength to persecute, and poland became the refuge of the sects. when the bishops found that they could not prevent toleration, they resolved that they would not restrict it. trusting to the maxim, "bellum haereticorum pax est ecclesiae," they insisted that liberty should extend to those whom the reformers would have exterminated.[7] the polish protestants, in spite of their dissensions, formed themselves into one great party. when the death of the last of the jagellons, on the 7th of july 1572, made the monarchy elective, they were strong enough to enforce their conditions on the candidates; and it was thought that they would be able to decide the election, and obtain a king of their own choosing. alva's reign of terror had failed to pacify the low countries, and he was about to resign the hopeless task to an incapable successor. the taking of the brill in april was the first of those maritime victories which led to the independence of the dutch. mons fell in may; and in july the important province of holland declared for the prince of orange. the catholics believed that all was lost if alva remained in command.[8] the decisive struggle was in france. during the minority of charles ix. persecution had given way to civil war, and the regent, his mother, had vainly striven, by submitting to neither party, to uphold the authority of the crown. she checked the victorious catholics, by granting to the huguenots terms which constituted them, in spite of continual disaster in the field, a vast and organised power in the state. to escape their influence it would have been necessary to invoke the help of philip ii., and to accept protection which would have made france subordinate to spain. philip laboured to establish such an alliance; and it was to promote this scheme that he sent his queen, elizabeth of valois, to meet her mother at bayonne. in 1568 elizabeth died; and a rumour came to catherine touching the manner of her death which made it hard to listen to friendly overtures from her husband. antonio perez, at that time an unscrupulous instrument of his master's will, afterwards accused him of having poisoned his wife. "on parle fort sinistrement de sa mort, pour avoir été advancée," says brantôme. after the massacre of the protestants, the ambassador at venice, a man distinguished as a jurist and a statesman, reproached catherine with having thrown france into the hands of him in whom the world recognised her daughter's murderer. catherine did not deny the truth of the report. she replied that she was "bound to think of her sons in preference to her daughters, that the foul-play was not fully proved, and that if it were it could not be avenged so long as france was weakened by religious discord."[9] she wrote as she could not have written if she had been convinced that the suspicion was unjust. when charles ix. began to be his own master he seemed resolved to follow his father and grandfather in their hostility to the spanish power. he wrote to a trusted servant that all his thoughts were bent on thwarting philip.[10] while the christian navies were fighting at lepanto, the king of france was treating with the turks. his menacing attitude in the following year kept don juan in sicilian waters, and made his victory barren for christendom. encouraged by french protection, venice withdrew from the league. even in corsica there was a movement which men interpreted as a prelude to the storm that france was raising against the empire of spain. rome trembled in expectation of a huguenot invasion of italy; for charles was active in conciliating the protestants both abroad and at home. he married a daughter of the tolerant emperor maximilian ii.; and he carried on negotiations for the marriage of his brother with queen elizabeth, not with any hope of success, but in order to impress public opinion.[11] he made treaties of alliance, in quick succession, with england, with the german protestants, and with the prince of orange. he determined that his brother anjou, the champion of the catholics, of whom it was said that he had vowed to root out the protestants to a man,[12] should be banished to the throne of poland. disregarding the threats and entreaties of the pope, he gave his sister in marriage to navarre. by the peace of st. germains the huguenots had secured, within certain limits, freedom from persecution and the liberty of persecuting; so that pius v. declared that france had been made the slave of heretics. coligny was now the most powerful man in the kingdom. his scheme for closing the civil wars by an expedition for the conquest of the netherlands began to be put in motion. french auxiliaries followed lewis of nassau into mons; an army of huguenots had already gone to his assistance; another was being collected near the frontier, and coligny was preparing to take the command in a war which might become a protestant crusade, and which left the catholics no hope of victory. meanwhile many hundreds of his officers followed him to paris, to attend the wedding which was to reconcile the factions, and cement the peace of religion. in the midst of those lofty designs and hopes, coligny was struck down. on the morning of the 22nd of august he was shot at and badly wounded. two days later he was killed; and a general attack was made on the huguenots of paris. it lasted some weeks, and was imitated in about twenty places. the chief provincial towns of france were among them. judged by its immediate result, the massacre of st. bartholomew was a measure weakly planned and irresolutely executed, which deprived protestantism of its political leaders, and left it for a time to the control of zealots. there is no evidence to make it probable that more than seven thousand victims perished. judged by later events, it was the beginning of a vast change in the conflict of the churches. at first it was believed that a hundred thousand huguenots had fallen. it was said that the survivors were abjuring by thousands,[13] that the children of the slain were made catholics, that those whom the priest had admitted to absolution and communion were nevertheless put to death.[14] men who were far beyond the reach of the french government lost their faith in a religion which providence had visited with so tremendous a judgment;[15] and foreign princes took heart to employ severities which could excite no horror after the scenes in france. contemporaries were persuaded that the huguenots had been flattered and their policy adopted only for their destruction, and that the murder of coligny and his followers was a long premeditated crime. catholics and protestants vied with each other in detecting proofs of that which they variously esteemed a sign of supernatural inspiration or of diabolical depravity. in the last forty years a different opinion has prevailed. it has been deemed more probable, more consistent with testimony and with the position of affairs at the time, that coligny succeeded in acquiring extraordinary influence over the mind of charles, that his advice really predominated, and that the sanguinary resolution was suddenly embraced by his adversaries as the last means of regaining power. this opinion is made plausible by many facts. it is supported by several writers who were then living, and by the document known as the confession of anjou. the best authorities of the present day are nearly unanimous in rejecting premeditation. the evidence on the opposite side is stronger than they suppose. the doom which awaited the huguenots had been long expected and often foretold. people at a distance, monluc in languedoc, and the protestant mylius in italy, drew the same inference from the news that came from the court. strangers meeting on the road discussed the infatuation of the admiral.[16] letters brought from rome to the emperor the significant intimation that the birds were all caged, and now was the time to lay hands on them.[17] duplessis-mornay, the future chief of the huguenots, was so much oppressed with a sense of coming evil, that he hardly ventured into the streets on the wedding-day. he warned the admiral of the general belief among their friends that the marriage concealed a plot for their ruin, and that the festivities would end in some horrible surprise.[18] coligny was proof against suspicion. several of his followers left paris, but he remained unmoved. at one moment the excessive readiness to grant all his requests shook the confidence of his son-in-law téligny; but the doubt vanished so completely that téligny himself prevented the flight of his partisans after the attempt on the admiral's life. on the morning of the fatal day, montgomery sent word to walsingham that coligny was safe under protection of the king's guards, and that no further stir was to be apprehended.[19] for many years foreign advisers had urged catherine to make away with these men. at first it was computed that half a dozen victims would be enough.[20] that was the original estimate of alva, at bayonne.[21] when the duke of ferrara was in france, in 1564, he proposed a larger measure, and he repeated this advice by the mouth of every agent whom he sent to france.[22] after the event, both alva and alfonso reminded catherine that she had done no more than follow their advice.[23] alva's letter explicitly confirms the popular notion which connects the massacre with the conference of bayonne; and it can no longer now be doubted that la roche-sur-yon, on his deathbed, informed coligny that murderous resolutions had been taken on that occasion.[24] but the nuncio, santa croce, who was present, wrote to cardinal borromeo that the queen had indeed promised to punish the infraction of the edict of pacification, but that this was a very different thing from undertaking to extirpate heresy. catherine affirmed that in this way the law could reach all the huguenot ministers; and alva professed to believe her.[25] whatever studied ambiguity of language she may have used, the action of 1572 was uninfluenced by deliberations which were seven years old. during the spring and summer the tuscan agents diligently prepared their master for what was to come. petrucci wrote on the 19th of march that, for a reason which he could not trust to paper, the marriage would certainly take place, though not until the huguenots had delivered up their strongholds. four weeks later alamanni announced that the queen's pious design for restoring unity of faith would, by the grace of god, be speedily accomplished. on the 9th of august petrucci was able to report that the plan arranged at bayonne was near execution.[26] yet he was not fully initiated. the queen afterwards assured him that she had confided the secret to no foreign resident except the nuncio,[27] and petrucci resentfully complains that she had also consulted the ambassador of savoy. venice, like florence and savoy, was not taken by surprise. in february the ambassador contarini explained to the senate the specious tranquillity in france, by saying that the government reckoned on the death of the admiral or the queen of navarre to work a momentous change.[28] cavalli, his successor, judged that a business so grossly mismanaged showed no signs of deliberation.[29] there was another venetian at paris who was better informed. the republic was seeking to withdraw from the league against the turks; and her most illustrious statesman, giovanni michiel, was sent to solicit the help of france in negotiating peace.[30] the account which he gave of his mission has been pronounced by a consummate judge of venetian state-papers the most valuable report of the sixteenth century.[31] he was admitted almost daily to secret conference with anjou, nevers, and the group of italians on whom the chief odium rests; and there was no counsellor to whom catherine more willingly gave ear.[32] michiel affirms that the intention had been long entertained, and that the nuncio had been directed to reveal it privately to pius v.[33] salviati was related to catherine, and had gained her good opinion as nuncio in the year 1570. the pope had sent him back because nobody seemed more capable of diverting her and her son from the policy which caused so much uneasiness at rome.[34] he died many years later, with the reputation of having been one of the most eminent cardinals at a time when the sacred college was unusually rich in talent. personally, he had always favoured stern measures of repression. when the countess of entremont was married to coligny, salviati declared that she had made herself liable to severe penalties by entertaining proposals of marriage with so notorious a heretic, and demanded that the duke of savoy should, by all the means in his power, cause that wicked bride to be put out of the way.[35] when the peace of st. germains was concluded, he assured charles and catherine that their lives were in danger, as the huguenots were seeking to pull down the throne as well as the altar. he believed that all intercourse with them was sinful, and that the sole remedy was utter extermination by the sword. "i am convinced," he wrote, "that it will come to this." "if they do the tenth part of what i have advised, it will be well for them."[36] after an audience of two hours, at which he had presented a letter from pius v., prophesying the wrath of heaven, salviati perceived that his exhortations made some impression. the king and queen whispered to him that they hoped to make the peace yield such fruit that the end would more than countervail the badness of the beginning; and the king added, in strict confidence, that his plan was one which, once told, could never be executed.[37] this might have been said to delude the nuncio; but he was inclined on the whole to believe that it was sincerely meant. the impression was confirmed by the archbishop of sens, cardinal pellevé, who informed him that the huguenot leaders were caressed at court in order to detach them from their party, and that after the loss of their leaders it would not take more than three days to deal with the rest.[38] salviati on his return to france was made aware that his long-deferred hopes were about to be fulfilled. he shadowed it forth obscurely in his despatches. he reported that the queen allowed the huguenots to pass into flanders, believing that the admiral would become more and more presumptuous until he gave her an opportunity of retribution; for she excelled in that kind of intrigue. some days later he knew more, and wrote that he hoped soon to have good news for his holiness.[39] at the last moment his heart misgave him. on the morning of the 21st of august the duke of montpensier and the cardinal of bourbon spoke with so much unconcern, in his presence, of what was then so near, that he thought it hardly possible the secret could be kept.[40] the foremost of the french prelates was the cardinal of lorraine. he had held a prominent position at the council of trent; and for many years he had wielded the influence of the house of guise over the catholics of france. in may 1572 he went to rome; and he was still there when the news came from paris in september. he at once made it known that the resolution had been taken before he left france, and that it was due to himself and his nephew, the duke of guise.[41] as the spokesman of the gallican church in the following year he delivered a harangue to charles ix., in which he declared that charles had eclipsed the glory of preceding kings by slaying the false prophets, and especially by the holy deceit and pious dissimulation with which he had laid his plans.[42] there was one man who did not get his knowledge from rumour, and who could not be deceived by lies. the king's confessor, sorbin, afterwards bishop of nevers, published in 1574 a narrative of the life and death of charles ix. he bears unequivocal testimony that that clement and magnanimous act, for so he terms it, was resolved upon beforehand, and he praises the secrecy as well as the justice of his hero.[43] early in the year a mission of extraordinary solemnity had appeared in france. pius v., who was seriously alarmed at the conduct of charles, had sent the cardinal of alessandria as legate to the kings of spain and portugal, and directed him, in returning, to visit the court at blois. the legate was nephew to the pope, and the man whom he most entirely trusted.[44] his character stood so high that the reproach of nepotism was never raised by his promotion. several prelates destined to future eminence attended him. his chief adviser was hippolyto aldobrandini, who, twenty years later, ascended the papal chair as clement viii. the companion whose presence conferred the greatest lustre on the mission was the general of the jesuits, francis borgia, the holiest of the successors of ignatius, and the most venerated of men then living. austerities had brought him to the last stage of weakness; and he was sinking under the malady of which he was soon to die. but it was believed that the words of such a man, pleading for the church, would sway the mind of the king. the ostensible purpose of the legate's journey was to break off the match with navarre, and to bring france into the holy league. he gained neither object. when he was summoned back to rome it was understood in france that he had reaped nothing but refusals, and that he went away disappointed.[45] the jeers of the protestants pursued him.[46] but it was sufficiently certain beforehand that france could not plunge into a turkish war.[47] the real business of the legate, besides proposing a catholic husband for the princess, was to ascertain the object of the expedition which was fitting out in the western ports. on both points he had something favourable to report. in his last despatch, dated lyons, the 6th of march, he wrote that he had failed to prevent the engagement with navarre, but that he had something for the pope's private ear, which made his journey not altogether unprofitable.[48] the secret was soon divulged in italy. the king had met the earnest remonstrances of the legate by assuring him that the marriage afforded the only prospect of wreaking vengeance on the huguenots: the event would show; he could say no more, but desired his promise to be carried to the pope. it was added that he had presented a ring to the legate, as a pledge of sincerity, which the legate refused. the first to publish this story was capilupi, writing only seven months later. it was repeated by folieta,[49] and is given with all details by the historians of pius v.--catena and gabuzzi. catena was secretary to the cardinal of alessandria as early as july 1572, and submitted his work to him before publication.[50] gabuzzi wrote at the instance of the same cardinal, who supplied him with materials; and his book was examined and approved by borghese, afterwards paul v. both the cardinal of alessandria and paul v., therefore, were instrumental in causing it to be proclaimed that the legate was acquainted in february 1572 with the intention which the king carried out in august. the testimony of aldobrandini was given still more distinctly, and with greater definiteness and authority. when he was required, as pope, to pronounce upon the dissolution of the ill-omened marriage, he related to borghese and other cardinals what had passed in that interview between the legate and the king, adding that, when the report of the massacre reached rome, the cardinal exclaimed: "god be praised! the king of france has kept his word." clement referred d'ossat to a narrative of the journey which he had written himself, and in which those things would be found.[51] the clue thus given has been unaccountably neglected, although the report was known to exist. one copy is mentioned by giorgi; and mazzuchelli knew of another. neither of them had read it; for they both ascribe it to michele bonelli, the cardinal of alessandria. the first page would have satisfied them that it was not his work. clement viii. describes the result of the mission to blois in these words: "quae rationes eo impulerunt regem ut semel apprehensa manu cardinalis in hanc vocem proruperit: significate pontifici illumque certum reddite me totum hoc quod circa id matrimonium feci et facturus sum, nulla alia de causa facere, quam ulciscendi inimicos dei et hujus regni, et puniendi tam infidos rebelles, ut eventus ipse docebit, nec aliud vobis amplius significare possum. quo non obstante semper cardinalis eas subtexuit difficultates quas potuit, objiciens regi possetne contrahi matrimonium a fidele cum infidele, sitve dispensatio necessaria; quod si est nunquam pontificem inductum iri ut illam concedat. re ipsa ita in suspenso relicta discedendum esse putavit, cum jam rescivisset qua de causa naves parabantur, qui apparatus contra rocellam tendebant." the opinion that the massacre of st. bartholomew was a sudden and unpremeditated act cannot be maintained; but it does not follow that the only alternative is to believe that it was the aim of every measure of the government for two years before. catherine had long contemplated it as her last expedient in extremity; but she had decided that she could not resort to it while her son was virtually a minor.[52] she suggested the idea to him in 1570. in that year he gave orders that the huguenots should be slaughtered at bourges. the letter is preserved in which la chastre spurned the command: "if the people of bourges learn that your majesty takes pleasure in such tragedies, they will repeat them often. if these men must die, let them first be tried; but do not reward my services and sully my reputation by such a stain."[53] in the autumn of 1571 coligny came to blois. walsingham suspected, and was afterwards convinced that the intention to kill him already existed. the pope was much displeased by his presence at court; but he received assurances from the ambassador which satisfied him. it was said at the time that he at first believed that coligny was to be murdered, but that he soon found that there was no such praiseworthy design.[54] in december the king knew that, when the moment came, the burghers of paris would not fail him. marcel, the prévôt des marchands, told him that the wealth was driven out of the country by the huguenots: "the catholics will bear it no longer.... let your majesty look to it. your crown is at stake, paris alone can save it."[55] by the month of february 1572 the plan had assumed a practical shape. the political idea before the mind of charles was the same by which richelieu afterwards made france the first power in the world; to repress the protestants at home, and to encourage them abroad. no means of effectual repression was left but murder. but the idea of raising up enemies to spain by means of protestantism was thoroughly understood. the huguenots were allowed to make an expedition to aid william of orange. had they gained some substantial success, the government would have followed it up, and the scheme of coligny would have become for the moment the policy of france. but the huguenot commander genlis was defeated and taken. coligny had had his chance. he had played and lost. it was useless now to propose his great venture against the king of spain.[56] philip ii. perfectly understood that this event was decisive. when the news came from hainaut, he sent to the nuncio castagna to say that the king of france would gain more than himself by the loss of so many brave protestants, and that the time was come for him, with the aid of the people of paris, to get rid of coligny and the rest of his enemies.[57] it appears from the letters of salviati that he also regarded the resolution as having been finally taken after the defeat of genlis. the court had determined to enforce unity of faith in france. an edict of toleration was issued for the purpose of lulling the huguenots; but it was well known that it was only a pretence.[58] strict injunctions were sent into the provinces that it should not be obeyed;[59] and catherine said openly to the english envoy, "my son will have exercise but of one religion in his realm." on the 26th the king explained his plan to mondoucet, his agent at brussels: "since it has pleased god to bring matters to the point they have now reached, i mean to use the opportunity to secure a perpetual repose in my kingdom, and to do something for the good of all christendom. it is probable that the conflagration will spread to every town in france, and that they will follow the example of paris, and lay hands on all the protestants.... i have written to the governors to assemble forces in order to cut to pieces those who may resist."[60] the great object was to accomplish the extirpation of protestantism in such a way as might leave intact the friendship with protestant states. every step was governed by this consideration; and the difficulty of the task caused the inconsistencies and the vacillation that ensued. by assassinating coligny alone it was expected that such an agitation would be provoked among his partisans as would make it appear that they were killed by the catholics in self-defence. reports were circulated at once with that object. a letter written on the 23rd states that, after the admiral was wounded on the day before, the huguenots assembled at the gate of the louvre, to avenge him on the guises as they came out.[61] and the first explanation sent forth by the government on the 24th was to the effect that the old feud between the houses of guise and of châtillon had broken out with a fury which it was impossible to quell. this fable lasted only for a single day. on the 25th charles writes that he has begun to discover traces of a huguenot conspiracy;[62] and on the following day this was publicly substituted for the original story. neither the vendetta of the guises nor the conspiracy at paris could be made to explain the massacre in the provinces. it required to be so managed that the king could disown it; salviati describes the plan of operations. it was intended that the huguenots should be slaughtered successively by a series of spontaneous outbreaks in different parts of the country. while rochelle held out, it was dangerous to proceed with a more sweeping method.[63] accordingly, no written instructions from the king are in existence; and the governors were expressly informed that they were to expect none.[64] messengers went into the provinces with letters requiring that the verbal orders which they brought should be obeyed.[65] many governors refused to act upon directions so vague and so hard to verify. burgundy was preserved in this way. two gentlemen arrived with letters of recommendation from the king, and declared his commands. they were asked to put them on paper; but they refused to give in writing what they had received by word of mouth. mandelot, the governor of lyons, the most ignoble of the instruments in this foul deed, complained that the intimation of the royal wishes sent to him was obscure and insufficient.[66] he did not do his work thoroughly, and incurred the displeasure of the king. the orders were complicated as well as obscure. the public authorities were required to collect the huguenots in some prison or other safe place, where they could be got at by hired bands of volunteer assassins. to screen the king it was desirable that his officers should not superintend the work themselves. mandelot, having locked the gates of lyons, and shut up the huguenots together, took himself out of the way while they were being butchered. carouge, at rouen, received a commission to visit the other towns in his province. the magistrates implored him to remain, as nobody, in his absence, could restrain the people. when the king had twice repeated his commands, carouge obeyed; and five hundred huguenots perished.[67] it was thought unsafe even for the king's brother to give distinct orders under his own hand. he wrote to his lieutenant in anjou that he had commissioned puygaillard to communicate with him on a matter which concerned the king's service and his own, and desired that his orders should be received as if they came directly from himself. they were, that every huguenot in angers, saumur, and the adjoining country should be put to death without delay and without exception.[68] the duke of montpensier himself sent the same order to brittany; but it was indignantly rejected by the municipality of nantes. when reports came in of the manner in which the event had been received in foreign countries, the government began to waver, and the sanguinary orders were recalled. schomberg wrote from germany that the protestant allies were lost unless they could be satisfied that the king had not decreed the extermination of their brethren.[69] he was instructed to explain the tumult in the provinces by the animosity bequeathed by the wars of religion.[70] the bishop of valence was intriguing in poland on behalf of anjou. he wrote that his success had been made very doubtful, and that, if further cruelties were perpetrated, ten millions of gold pieces would not bribe the venal poles. he advised that a counterfeit edict, at least, should be published.[71] charles perceived that he would be compelled to abandon his enterprise, and set about appeasing the resentment of the protestant powers. he promised that an inquiry should be instituted, and the proofs of the conspiracy communicated to foreign governments. to give a judicial aspect to the proceedings, two prominent huguenots were ceremoniously hanged. when the new ambassador from spain praised the long concealment of the plan, charles became indignant.[72] it was repeated everywhere that the thing had been arranged with rome and spain; and he was especially studious that there should be no symptoms of a private understanding with either power.[73] he was able to flatter himself that he had at least partially succeeded. if he had not exterminated his protestant subjects, he had preserved his protestant allies. william the silent continued to solicit his aid; elizabeth consented to stand godmother to the daughter who was born to him in october; he was allowed to raise mercenaries in switzerland; and the polish protestants agreed to the election of his brother. the promised evidence of the huguenot conspiracy was forgotten; and the king suppressed the materials which were to have served for an official history of the event.[74] zeal for religion was not the motive which inspired the chief authors of this extraordinary crime. they were trained to look on the safety of the monarchy as the sovereign law, and on the throne as an idol that justified sins committed in its worship. at all times there have been men, resolute and relentless in the pursuit of their aims, whose ardour was too strong to be restricted by moral barriers or the instinct of humanity. in the sixteenth century, beside the fanaticism of freedom, there was an abject idolatry of power; and laws both human and divine were made to yield to the intoxication of authority and the reign of will. it was laid down that kings have the right of disposing of the lives of their subjects, and may dispense with the forms of justice. the church herself, whose supreme pontiff was now an absolute monarch, was infected with this superstition. catholic writers found an opportune argument for their religion in the assertion that it makes the prince master of the consciences as well as the bodies of the people, and enjoins submission even to the vilest tyranny.[75] men whose lives were precious to the catholic cause could be murdered by royal command, without protest from rome. when the duke of guise, with the cardinal his brother, was slain by henry iii., he was the most powerful and devoted upholder of catholicism in france. sixtus v. thundered against the sacrilegious tyrant who was stained with the blood of a prince of the church; but he let it be known very distinctly that the death of the duke caused him little concern.[76] catherine was the daughter of that medici to whom machiavelli had dedicated his _prince_. so little did religion actuate her conduct that she challenged elizabeth to do to the catholics of england what she herself had done to the protestants of france, promising that if they were destroyed there would be no loss of her good will.[77] the levity of her religious feelings appears from her reply when asked by gomicourt what message he should take to the duke of alva: "i must give you the answer of christ to the disciples of st. john, 'ite et nuntiate quae vidistis et audivistis; caeci vident, claudi ambulant, leprosi mundantur.'" and she added, "beatus qui non fuerit in me scandalizatus."[78] if mere fanaticism had been their motive, the men who were most active in the massacre would not have spared so many lives. while guise was galloping after ferrières and montgomery, who had taken horse betimes, and made for the coast, his house at paris was crowded with families belonging to the proscribed faith, and strangers to him. a young girl who was amongst them has described his return, when he sent for the children, spoke to them kindly, and gave orders that they should be well treated as long as his roof sheltered them.[79] protestants even spoke of him as a humane and chivalrous enemy.[80] nevers was considered to have disgraced himself by the number of those whom he enabled to escape.[81] the nuncio was shocked at their ill-timed generosity. he reported to rome that the only one who had acted in the spirit of a christian, and had refrained from mercy, was the king; while the other princes, who pretended to be good catholics, and to deserve the favour of the pope, had striven, one and all, to save as many huguenots as they could.[82] the worst criminals were not the men who did the deed. the crime of mobs and courtiers, infuriated by the lust of vengeance and of power, is not so strange a portent as the exultation of peaceful men, influenced by no present injury or momentary rage, but by the permanent and incurable perversion of moral sense wrought by a distorted piety. philip ii., who had long suspected the court of france, was at once relieved from the dread which had oppressed him, and betrayed an excess of joy foreign to his phlegmatic nature.[83] he immediately sent six thousand crowns to the murderer of coligny.[84] he persuaded himself that the breach between france and her allies was irreparable, that charles would now be driven to seek his friendship, and that the netherlands were out of danger.[85] he listened readily to the french ambassador, who assured him that his court had never swerved from the line of catholic policy, but had intended all along to effect this great change.[86] ayamonte carried his congratulations to paris, and pretended that his master had been in the secret. it suited philip that this should be believed by protestant princes, in order to estrange them still more from france; but he wrote on the margin of ayamonte's instructions, that it was uncertain how long previously the purpose had subsisted.[87] juan and diego de zuñiga, his ambassadors at rome and at paris, were convinced that the long display of enmity to spain was genuine, that the death of coligny had been decided at the last moment, and that the rest was not the effect of design.[88] this opinion found friends at first in spain. the general of the franciscans undertook to explode it. he assured philip that he had seen the king and the queen-mother two years before, and had found them already so intent on the massacre that he wondered how anybody could have the courage to detract from their merit by denying it.[89] this view generally prevailed in spain. mendoça knows not which to admire more, the loyal and catholic inhabitants of paris, or charles, who justified his title of the most christian king by helping with his own hands to slaughter his subjects.[90] mariana witnessed the carnage, and imagined that it must gladden every catholic heart. other spaniards were gratified to think that it had been contrived with alva at bayonne. alva himself did not judge the event by the same light as philip. he also had distrusted the french government; but he had not feared it during the ascendency of the huguenots. their fall appeared to him to strengthen france. in public he rejoiced with the rest. he complimented charles on his valour and his religion, and claimed his own share of merit. but he warned philip that things had not changed favourably for spain, and that the king of france was now a formidable neighbour.[91] for himself, he said, he never would have committed so base a deed. the seven catholic cantons had their own reason for congratulation. their countrymen had been busy actors on the scene; and three soldiers of the swiss guard of anjou were named as the slayers of the admiral.[92] on the 2nd of october they agreed to raise 6000 men for the king's service. at the following diet they demanded the expulsion of the fugitive huguenots who had taken refuge in the protestant parts of the confederation. they made overtures to the pope for a secret alliance against their confederates.[93] in italy, where the life of a heretic was cheap, their wholesale destruction was confessed a highly politic and ingenious act. even the sage venetians were constrained to celebrate it with a procession. the grand duke cosmo had pointed out two years before that an insidious peace would afford excellent opportunities of extinguishing protestantism; and he derived inexpressible consolation from the heroic enterprise.[94] the viceroy of naples, cardinal granvelle, received the tidings coldly. he was surprised that the event had been so long postponed, and he reproved the cardinal of lorraine for the unstatesmanlike delay.[95] the italians generally were excited to warmer feelings. they saw nothing to regret but the death of certain catholics who had been sacrificed to private revenge. profane men approved the skill with which the trap was laid; and pious men acknowledged the presence of a genuine religious spirit in the french court.[96] the nobles and the parisian populace were admired for their valour in obeying the sanctified commands of the good king. one fervent enthusiast praises god for the heavenly news, and also st. bartholomew for having lent his extremely penetrating knife for the salutary sacrifice.[97] a month after the event the renowned preacher panigarola delivered from the pulpit a panegyric on the monarch who had achieved what none had ever heard or read before, by banishing heresy in a single day, and by a single word, from the christian land of france.[98] the french churches had often resounded with furious declamations; and they afterwards rang with canticles of unholy joy. but the french clergy does not figure prominently in the inception or the execution of the sanguinary decree. conti, a contemporary indeed, but too distant for accurate knowledge, relates that the parish priest went round, marking with a white cross the dwellings of the people who were doomed.[99] he is contradicted by the municipal registers of paris.[100] morvilliers, bishop of orleans, though he had resigned the seals which he received from l'hôpital, still occupied the first place at the royal council. he was consulted at the last moment, and it is said that he nearly fainted with horror. he recovered, and gave his opinion with the rest. he is the only french prelate, except the cardinals, whose complicity appears to be ascertained. but at orleans, where the bloodshed was more dreadful in proportion than at paris, the signal is said to have been given, not by the bishop, but by the king's preacher, sorbin. sorbin is the only priest of the capital who is distinctly associated with the act of the government. it was his opinion that god has ordained that no mercy shall be shown to heretics, that charles was bound in conscience to do what he did, and that leniency would have been as censurable in his case as precipitation was in that of theodosius. what the calvinists called perfidy and cruelty seemed to him nothing but generosity and kindness.[101] these were the sentiments of the man from whose hands charles ix. received the last consolations of his religion. it has been related that he was tortured in his last moments with remorse for the blood he had shed. his spiritual adviser was fitted to dispel such scruples. he tells us that he heard the last confession of the dying king, and that his most grievous sorrow was that he left the work unfinished.[102] in all that bloodstained history there is nothing more tragic than the scene in which the last words preparing the soul for judgment were spoken by such a confessor as sorbin to such a penitent as charles. edmond auger, one of the most able and eloquent of the jesuits, was at that time attracting multitudes by his sermons at bordeaux. he denounced with so much violence the heretics and the people in authority who protected them, that the magistrates, fearing a cry for blood, proposed to silence or to moderate the preacher. montpezat, lieutenant of guienne, arrived in time to prevent it. on the 30th of september he wrote to the king that he had done this, and that there were a score of the inhabitants who might be despatched with advantage. three days later, when he was gone, more than two hundred huguenots were murdered.[103] apart from these two instances it is not known that the clergy interfered in any part of france to encourage the assassins. the belief was common at the time, and is not yet extinct, that the massacre had been promoted and sanctioned by the court of rome. no evidence of this complicity, prior to the event, has ever been produced; but it seemed consistent with what was supposed to have occurred in the affair of the dispensation. the marriage of margaret of valois with the king of navarre was invalid and illicit in the eyes of the church; and it was known that pius v. had sworn that he would never permit it. when it had been celebrated by a cardinal, in the presence of a splendid court, and no more was heard of resistance on the part of rome, the world concluded that the dispensation had been obtained. de thou says, in a manuscript note, that it had been sent, and was afterwards suppressed by salviati; and the french bishop, spondanus, assigns the reasons which induced gregory xiii. to give way.[104] others affirmed that he had yielded when he learned that the marriage was a snare, so that the massacre was the price of the dispensation.[105] the cardinal of lorraine gave currency to the story. as he caused it to be understood that he had been in the secret, it seemed probable that he had told the pope; for they had been old friends.[106] in the commemorative inscription which he put up in the church of st. lewis he spoke of the king's gratitude to the holy see for its assistance and for its advice in the matter--"consiliorum ad eam rem datorum." it is probable that he inspired the narrative which has contributed most to sustain the imputation. among the italians of the french faction who made it their duty to glorify the act of charles ix., the capilupi family was conspicuous. they came from mantua, and appear to have been connected with the french interest through lewis gonzaga, who had become by marriage duke of nevers, and one of the foremost personages in france. hippolyto capilupi, bishop of fano, and formerly nuncio at venice, resided at rome, busy with french politics and latin poetry. when charles refused to join the league, the bishop of fano vindicated his neutrality in a letter to the duke of urbino.[107] when he slew the huguenots, the bishop addressed him in verse,- fortunate puer, paret cui gallica tellus, quique vafros ludis pervigil arte viros, ille tibi debet, toti qui praesidet orbi, cui nihil est cordi religione prius.... qui tibi saepe dolos struxit, qui vincla paravit, tu puer in laqueos induis arte senem.... nunc florent, tolluntque caput tua lilia, et astris clarius hostili tincta cruore micant.[108] camillo capilupi, a nephew of the mantuan bard, held office about the person of the pope, and was employed on missions of consequence.[109] as soon as the news from paris reached rome he drew up the account which became so famous under the title of _lo stratagemma di carlo ix_. the dedication is dated the 18th of september 1572.[110] this tract was suppressed, and was soon so rare that its existence was unknown in 1574 to the french translator of the second edition. capilupi republished his book with alterations, and a preface dated the 22nd of october. the substance and purpose of the two editions is the same. capilupi is not the official organ of the roman court: he was not allowed to see the letters of the nuncio. he wrote to proclaim the praises of the king of france and the duke of nevers. at that moment the french party in rome was divided by the quarrel between the ambassador ferralz and the cardinal of lorraine, who had contrived to get the management of french affairs into his own hands.[111] capilupi was on the side of the cardinal, and received information from those who were about him. the chief anxiety of these men was that the official version which attributed the massacre to a huguenot conspiracy should obtain no credence at rome. if the cardinal's enemies were overthrown without his participation, it would confirm the report that he had become a cipher in the state. he desired to vindicate for himself and his family the authorship of the catastrophe. catherine could not tolerate their claim to a merit which she had made her own; and there was competition between them for the first and largest share in the gratitude of the holy see. lorraine prevailed with the pope, who not only loaded him with honours, but rewarded him with benefices worth 4000 crowns a year for his nephew, and a gift of 20,000 crowns for his son. but he found that he had fallen into disgrace at paris, and feared for his position at rome.[112] in these circumstances capilupi's book appeared, and enumerated a series of facts proving that the cardinal was cognisant of the royal design. it adds little to the evidence of premeditation. capilupi relates that santa croce, returning from france, had assured pius v., in the name of catherine, that she intended one day to entrap coligny, and to make a signal butchery of him and his adherents, and that letters in which the queen renewed this promise to the pope had been read by credible witnesses. santa croce was living, and did not contradict the statement. the _stratagemma_ had originally stated that lorraine had informed sermoneta of the project soon after he arrived at rome. in the reprint this passage was omitted. the book had, therefore, undergone a censorial revision, which enhances the authenticity of the final narrative. two other pieces are extant, which were printed at the stamperia camerale, and show what was believed at rome. one is in the shape of a letter written at lyons in the midst of scenes of death, and describing what the author had witnessed on the spot, and what he heard from paris.[113] he reports that the king had positively commanded that not one huguenot should escape, and was overjoyed at the accomplishment of his orders. he believes the thing to have been premeditated, and inspired by divine justice. the other tract is remarkable because it strives to reconcile the pretended conspiracy with the hypothesis of premeditation.[114] there were two plots which went parallel for months. the king knew that coligny was compassing his death, and deceived him by feigning to enter into his plan for the invasion of the low countries; and coligny, allowing himself to be overreached, summoned his friends to paris, for the purpose of killing charles, on the 23rd of august. the writer expects that there will soon be no huguenots in france. capilupi at first borrowed several of his facts, which he afterwards corrected. the real particulars relative to the marriage are set forth minutely in the correspondence of ferralz; and they absolutely contradict the supposition of the complicity of rome.[115] it was celebrated in flagrant defiance of the pope, who persisted in refusing the dispensation, and therefore acted in a way which could only serve to mar the plot. the accusation has been kept alive by his conduct after the event. the jesuit who wrote his life by desire of his son, says that gregory thanked god in private, but that in public he gave signs of a tempered joy.[116] but the illuminations and processions, the singing of te deum and the firing of the castle guns, the jubilee, the medal, and the paintings whose faded colours still vividly preserve to our age the passions of that day, nearly exhaust the modes by which a pope could manifest delight. charles ix. and salviati both wrote to rome on st. bartholomew's day; and the ambassador's nephew, beauville, set off with the tidings. they were known before he arrived. on the 27th, mandelot's secretary despatched a secret messenger from lyons with orders to inform the pope that the huguenot leaders were slain, and that their adherents were to be secured all over france. the messenger reached rome on the 2nd of september, and was immediately carried to the pope by the cardinal of lorraine. gregory rewarded him for the welcome intelligence with a present of a hundred crowns, and desired that rome should be at once illuminated. this was prevented by ferralz, who tried the patience of the romans by declining their congratulations as long as he was not officially informed.[117] beauville and the courier of the nuncio arrived on the 5th. the king's letter, like all that he wrote on the first day, ascribed the outbreak to the old hatred between the rival houses, and to the late attempt on the admiral's life. he expressed a hope that the dispensation would not now be withheld, but left all particulars to beauville, whose own eyes had beheld the scene.[118] beauville told his story, and repeated the king's request; but gregory, though much gratified with what he heard, remained inflexible.[119] salviati had written on the afternoon of the 24th. he desired to fling himself at the pope's feet to wish him joy. his fondest hopes had been surpassed. although he had known what was in store for coligny, he had not expected that there would be energy and prudence to seize the occasion for the destruction of the rest. a new era had commenced; a new compass was required for french affairs. it was a fair sight to see the catholics in the streets wearing white crosses, and cutting down heretics; and it was thought that, as fast as the news spread, the same thing would be done in all the towns of france.[120] this letter was read before the assembled cardinals at the venetian palace, and they thereupon attended the pope to a te deum in the nearest church.[121] the guns of st. angelo were fired in the evening, and the city was illuminated for three nights. to disregard the pope's will in this respect would have savoured of heresy. gregory xiii. exclaimed that the massacre was more agreeable to him than fifty victories of lepanto. for some weeks the news from the french provinces sustained the rapture and excitement of the court.[122] it was hoped that other countries would follow the example of france; the emperor was informed that something of the same kind was expected of him.[123] on the 8th of september the pope went in procession to the french church of st. lewis, where three-and-thirty cardinals attended at a mass of thanksgiving. on the 11th he proclaimed a jubilee. in the bull he said that forasmuch as god had armed the king of france to inflict vengeance on the heretics for the injuries done to religion, and to punish the leaders of the rebellion which had devastated his kingdom, catholics should pray that he might have grace to pursue his auspicious enterprise to the end, and so complete what he had begun so well.[124] before a month had passed vasari was summoned from florence to decorate the hall of kings with paintings of the massacre.[125] the work was pronounced his masterpiece; and the shameful scene may still be traced upon the wall, where, for three centuries, it has insulted every pontiff that entered the sixtine chapel. the story that the huguenots had perished because they were detected plotting the king's death was known at rome on the 6th of september. while the sham edict and the imaginary trial served to confirm it in the eyes of europe, catherine and her son took care that it should not deceive the pope. they assured him that they meant to disregard the edict. to excuse his sister's marriage, the king pleaded that it had been concluded for no object but vengeance; and he promised that there would soon be not a heretic in the country.[126] this was corroborated by salviati. as to the proclaimed toleration, he knew that it was a device to disarm foreign enmity, and prevent a popular commotion. he testified that the queen spoke truly when she said that she had confided to him, long before, the real purpose of her daughter's engagement.[127] he exposed the hollow pretence of the plot. he announced that its existence would be established by formalities of law, but added that it was so notoriously false that none but an idiot could believe in it.[128] gregory gave no countenance to the official falsehood. at the reception of the french ambassador, rambouillet, on the 23rd of december, muretus made his famous speech. he said that there could not have been a happier beginning for a new pontificate, and alluded to the fabulous plot in the tone exacted of french officials. the secretary, boccapaduli, replying in behalf of the pope, thanked the king for destroying the enemies of christ; but strictly avoided the conventional fable.[129] cardinal orsini went as legate to france. he had been appointed in august, and he was to try to turn the king's course into that line of policy from which he had strayed under protestant guidance. he had not left rome when the events occurred which altered the whole situation. orsini was now charged with felicitations, and was to urge charles not to stop half-way.[130] an ancient and obsolete ceremonial was suddenly revived; and the cardinals accompanied him to the flaminian gate.[131] this journey of orsini, and the pomp with which it was surrounded, were exceedingly unwelcome at paris. it was likely to be taken as proof of that secret understanding with rome which threatened to rend the delicate web in which charles was striving to hold the confidence of the protestant world.[132] he requested that the legate might be recalled; and the pope was willing that there should be some delay. while orsini tarried on his way, gregory's reply to the announcement of the massacre arrived at paris. it was a great consolation to himself, he said, and an extraordinary grace vouchsafed to christendom. but he desired, for the glory of god and the good of france, that the huguenots should be extirpated utterly; and with that view he demanded the revocation of the edict. when catherine knew that the pope was not yet satisfied, and sought to direct the actions of the king, she could hardly restrain her rage. salviati had never seen her so furious. the words had hardly passed his lips when she exclaimed that she wondered at such designs, and was resolved to tolerate no interference in the government of the kingdom. she and her son were catholics from conviction, and not through fear or influence. let the pope content himself with that.[133] the nuncio had at once foreseen that the court, after crushing the huguenots, would not become more amenable to the counsels of rome. he wrote, on the very day of st. bartholomew, that the king would be very jealous of his authority, and would exact obedience from both sides alike. at this untoward juncture orsini appeared at court. to charles, who had done so much, it seemed unreasonable that he should be asked for more. he represented to orsini that it was impossible to eradicate all the remnants of a faction which had been so strong. he had put seventy thousand huguenots to the sword; and, if he had shown compassion to the rest, it was in order that they might become good catholics.[134] the hidden thoughts which the court of rome betrayed by its conduct on this memorable occasion have brought upon the pope himself an amount of hatred greater than he deserved. gregory xiii. appears as a pale figure between the two strongest of the modern popes, without the intense zeal of the one and the ruthless volition of the other. he was not prone to large conceptions or violent resolutions. he had been converted late in life to the spirit of the tridentine reformation; and when he showed rigour it was thought to be not in his character, but in the counsels of those who influenced him.[135] he did not instigate the crime, nor the atrocious sentiments that hailed it. in the religious struggle a frenzy had been kindled which made weakness violent, and turned good men into prodigies of ferocity; and at rome, where every loss inflicted on catholicism and every wound was felt, the belief that, in dealing with heretics, murder is better than toleration prevailed for half a century. the predecessor of gregory had been inquisitor-general. in his eyes protestants were worse than pagans, and lutherans more dangerous than other protestants.[136] the capuchin preacher, pistoja, bore witness that men were hanged and quartered almost daily at rome;[137] and pius declared that he would release a culprit guilty of a hundred murders rather than one obstinate heretic.[138] he seriously contemplated razing the town of faenza because it was infested with religious error, and he recommended a similar expedient to the king of france.[139] he adjured him to hold no intercourse with the huguenots, to make no terms with them, and not to observe the terms he had made. he required that they should be pursued to the death, that not one should be spared under any pretence, that all prisoners should suffer death.[140] he threatened charles with the punishment of saul when he forebore to exterminate the amalekites.[141] he told him that it was his mission to avenge the injuries of the lord, and that nothing is more cruel than mercy to the impious.[142] when he sanctioned the murder of elizabeth he proposed that it should be done in execution of his sentence against her.[143] it became usual with those who meditated assassination or regicide on the plea of religion to look upon the representatives of rome as their natural advisers. on the 21st of january 1591, a young capuchin came, by permission of his superiors, to sega, bishop of piacenza, then nuncio at paris. he said that he was inflamed with the desire of a martyr's death; and having been assured by divines that it would be meritorious to kill that heretic and tyrant, henry of navarre, he asked to be dispensed from the rule of his order while he prepared his measures and watched his opportunity. the nuncio would not do this without authority from rome; but the prudence, courage, and humility which he discerned in the friar made him believe that the design was really inspired from above. to make this certain, and to remove all scruples, he submitted the matter to the pope, and asked his blessing upon it, promising that whatever he decided should be executed with all discretion.[144] the same ideas pervaded the sacred college under gregory. there are letters of profuse congratulation by the cardinals of lorraine, este, and pellevé. bourbon was an accomplice before the fact. granvelle condemned not the act but the delay. delfino and santorio approved. the cardinal of alessandria had refused the king's gift at blois, and had opposed his wishes at the conclave. circumstances were now so much altered that the ring was offered to him again, and this time it was accepted.[145] the one dissentient from the chorus of applause is said to have been montalto. his conduct when he became pope makes it very improbable; and there is no good authority for the story. but leti has it, who is so far from a panegyrist that it deserves mention. the theory which was framed to justify these practices has done more than plots and massacres to cast discredit on the catholics. this theory was as follows: confirmed heretics must be rigorously punished whenever it can be done without the probability of greater evil to religion. where that is feared, the penalty may be suspended or delayed for a season, provided it be inflicted whenever the danger is past.[146] treaties made with heretics, and promises given to them must not be kept, because sinful promises do not bind, and no agreement is lawful which may injure religion or ecclesiastical authority. no civil power may enter into engagements which impede the free scope of the church's law.[147] it is part of the punishment of heretics that faith shall not be kept with them.[148] it is even mercy to kill them that they may sin no more.[149] such were the precepts and the examples by which the french catholics learned to confound piety and ferocity, and were made ready to immolate their countrymen. during the civil war an association was formed in the south for the purpose of making war upon the huguenots; and it was fortified by pius v. with blessings and indulgences. "we doubt not," it proclaimed, "that we shall be victorious over these enemies of god and of all humankind; and if we fall, our blood will be as a second baptism, by which, without impediment, we shall join the other martyrs straightway in heaven."[150] monluc, who told alva at bayonne that he had never spared an enemy, was shot through the face at the siege of rabasteins. whilst he believed that he was dying, they came to tell him that the place was taken. "thank god!" he said, "that i have lived long enough to behold our victory; and now i care not for death. go back, i beseech you, and give me a last proof of friendship, by seeing that not one man of the garrison escapes alive."[151] when alva had defeated and captured genlis, and expected to make many more huguenot prisoners in the garrison of mons, charles ix. wrote to mondoucet "that it would be for the service of god, and of the king of spain, that they should die. if the duke of alva answers that this is a tacit request to have all the prisoners cut to pieces, you will tell him that that is what he must do, and that he will injure both himself and all christendom if he fails to do it."[152] this request also reached alva through spain. philip wrote on the margin of the despatch that, if he had not yet put them out of the world, he must do so immediately, as there could be no reason for delay.[153] the same thought occurred to others. on the 22nd of july salviati writes that it would be a serious blow to the faction if alva would kill his prisoners; and granvelle wrote that, as they were all huguenots, it would be well to throw them all into the river.[154] where these sentiments prevailed, gregory xiii. was not alone in deploring that the work had been but half done. after the first explosion of gratified surprise men perceived that the thing was a failure, and began to call for more. the clergy of rouen cathedral instituted a procession of thanksgiving, and prayed that the king might continue what he had so virtuously begun, until all france should profess one faith.[155] there are signs that charles was tempted at one moment, during the month of october, to follow up the blow.[156] but he died without pursuing the design; and the hopes were turned to his successor. when henry iii. passed through italy on his way to assume the crown, there were some who hoped that the pope would induce him to set resolutely about the extinction of the huguenots. a petition was addressed to gregory for this purpose, in which the writer says that hitherto the french court has erred on the side of mercy, but that the new king might make good the error if rejecting that pernicious maxim that noble blood spilt weakens a kingdom, he would appoint an execution which would be cruel only in appearance, but in reality glorious and holy, and destroy the heretics totally, sparing neither life nor property.[157] similar exhortations were addressed from rome to henry himself by muzio, a layman who had gained repute, among other things, by controversial writings, of which pius v. said that they had preserved the faith in whole districts, and who had been charged with the task of refuting the centuriators. on the 17th of july 1574, muzio wrote to the king that all italy waited in reliance on his justice and valour, and besought him to spare neither old nor young, and to regard neither rank nor ties of blood.[158] these hopes also were doomed to disappointment; and a frenchman, writing in the year of henry's death, laments over the cruel clemency and inhuman mercy that reigned on st. bartholomew's day.[159] this was not the general opinion of the catholic world. in spain and italy, where hearts were hardened and consciences corrupted by the inquisition; in switzerland, where the catholics lived in suspicion and dread of their protestant neighbours; among ecclesiastical princes in germany, whose authority waned as fast as their subjects abjured their faith, the massacre was welcomed as an act of christian fortitude. but in france itself the great mass of the people was struck with consternation.[160] "which maner of proceedings," writes walsingham on the 13th of september, "is by the catholiques themselves utterly condemned, who desire to depart hence out of this country, to quit themselves of this strange kind of government, for that they see here none can assure themselves of either goods or life." even in places still steeped in mourning for the atrocities suffered at the hands of huguenots during the civil war, at nîmes, for instance, the king's orders produced no act of vengeance. at carcassonne, the ancient seat of the inquisition, the catholics concealed the protestants in their houses.[161] in provence, the news from lyons and the corpses that came down in the poisoned waters of the rhone awakened nothing but horror and compassion.[162] sir thomas smith wrote to walsingham that in england "the minds of the most number are much alienated from that nation, even of the very papists."[163] at rome itself zuñiga pronounced the treachery of which the french were boasting unjustifiable, even in the case of heretics and rebels;[164] and it was felt as an outrage to public opinion when the murderer of coligny was presented to the pope.[165] the emperor was filled with grief and indignation. he said that the king and queen-mother would live to learn that nothing could have been more iniquitously contrived or executed: his uncle charles v., and his father ferdinand, had made war on the protestants, but they had never been guilty of so cruel an act.[166] at that moment maximilian was seeking the crown of poland for his son; and the events in france were a weapon in his hands against his rival, anjou. even the czar of muscovy, ivan the terrible, replying to his letters, protested that all christian princes must lament the barbarous and needless shedding of so much innocent blood. it was not the rivalry of the moment that animated maximilian. his whole life proves him to have been an enemy of violence and cruelty; and his celebrated letter to schwendi, written long after, shows that his judgment remained unchanged. it was the catholic emperor who roused the lutheran elector of saxony to something like resentment of the butchery in france.[167] for the lutherans were not disposed to recognise the victims of charles ix. as martyrs for the protestant cause. during the wars of religion lutheran auxiliaries were led by a saxon prince, a margrave of baden, and other german magnates, to aid the catholic forces in putting down the heresy of calvin. these feelings were so well known that the french government demanded of the duke of wirtemberg the surrender of the huguenots who had fled into his dominions.[168] lutheran divines flattered themselves at first with the belief that it was the calvinistic error, not the protestant truth, that had invited and received the blow.[169] the most influential of them, andreæ, declared that the huguenots were not martyrs but rebels, who had died not for religion but sedition; and he bade the princes beware of the contagion of their spirit, which had deluged other lands with blood. when elizabeth proposed a league for the defence of protestantism, the north german divines protested against an alliance with men whose crime was not only religious error but blasphemous obstinacy, the root of many dreadful heresies. the very proposal, they said, argued a disposition to prefer human succour rather than the word of god.[170] when another invitation came from henry of navarre, the famous divine chemnitz declared union with the disciples of calvin a useless abomination.[171] the very men whose own brethren had perished in france were not hearty or unanimous in execrating the deed.[172] there were huguenots who thought that their party had brought ruin on itself, by provoking its enemies, and following the rash counsels of ambitious men.[173] this was the opinion of their chief, theodore beza, himself. six weeks before, he wrote that they were gaining in numbers but losing in quality, and he feared lest, after destroying superstition, they should destroy religion: "valde metuo ne superstitioni successerit impietas."[174] and afterwards he declared that nobody who had known the state of the french protestants could deny that it was a most just judgment upon them.[175] beza held very stringent doctrines touching the duty of the civil magistrate to repress religious error. he thought that heresy is worse than murder, and that the good of society requires no crime to be more severely punished.[176] he declared toleration contrary to revealed religion and the constant tradition of the church, and taught that lawful authority must be obeyed, even by those whom it persecutes. he expressly recognised this function in catholic states, and urged sigismund not to rest until he had got rid of the socinians in poland;[177] but he could not prevail against the vehement resistance of cardinal hosius. it was embarrassing to limit these principles when they were applied against his own church. for a moment beza doubted whether it had not received its death-blow in france. but he did not qualify the propositions which were open to be interpreted so fatally,[178] or deny that his people, by their vices, if not by their errors, had deserved what they had suffered. the applause which greeted their fate came not from the catholics generally, nor from the catholics alone. while the protestants were ready to palliate or excuse it, the majority of the catholics who were not under the direct influence of madrid or rome recognised the inexpiable horror of the crime. but the desire to defend what the pope approved survived sporadically, when the old fierceness of dogmatic hatred was extinct. a generation passed without any perceptible change in the judgment of rome. it was a common charge against de thou that he had condemned the blameless act of charles ix. the blasphemies of the huguenots, said one of his critics, were more abominable than their retribution.[179] his history was put on the index; and cardinal barberini let him know that he was condemned because he not only favoured protestants to the detriment of catholics, but had even disapproved the massacre of st. bartholomew.[180] eudæmon-johannes, the friend of bellarmine, pronounces it a pious and charitable act, which immortalised its author.[181] another jesuit, bompiani, says that it was grateful to gregory, because it was likely to relieve the church.[182] the well-known apology for charles ix. by naudé is based rather on political than religious grounds; but his contemporary guyon, whose history of orleans is pronounced by the censors full of sound doctrine and pious sentiment, deems it unworthy of catholics to speak of the murder of heretics as if it were a crime, because, when done under lawful authority, it is a blessed thing.[183] when innocent xi. refused to approve the revocation of the edict of nantes, frenchmen wondered that he should so far depart from the example which was kept before him by one of the most conspicuous ornaments of his palace.[184] the old spirit was decaying fast in france, and the superb indignation of bossuet fairly expresses the general opinion of his time. two works were published on the medals of the popes, by a french and an italian writer. the frenchman awkwardly palliates the conduct of gregory xiii.; the italian heartily defends it.[185] in italy it was still dangerous ground. muratori shrinks from pronouncing on the question,[186] while cienfuegos, a jesuit whom his order esteemed one of the most distinguished cardinals of the day, judges that charles ix. died too soon for his fame.[187] tempesti, who lived under the enlightened rule of benedict xiv., accuses catherine of having arrested the slaughter, in order that some cause should remain to create a demand for her counsels.[188] the german jesuit biner and the papal historian piatti, just a century ago, are among the last downright apologists.[189] then there was a change. a time came when the catholics, having long relied on force, were compelled to appeal to opinion. that which had been defiantly acknowledged and defended required to be ingeniously explained away. the same motive which had justified the murder now prompted the lie. men shrank from the conviction that the rulers and restorers of their church had been murderers and abetters of murder, and that so much infamy had been coupled with so much zeal. they feared to say that the most monstrous of crimes had been solemnly approved at rome, lest they should devote the papacy to the execration of mankind. a swarm of facts were invented to meet the difficulty: the victims were insignificant in number; they were slain for no reason connected with religion; the pope believed in the existence of the plot; the plot was a reality; the medal is fictitious; the massacre was a feint concerted with the protestants themselves; the pope rejoiced only when he heard that it was over.[190] these things were repeated so often that they have been sometimes believed; and men have fallen into this way of speaking whose sincerity was unimpeachable, and who were not shaken in their religion by the errors or the vices of popes. möhler was pre-eminently such a man. in his lectures on the history of the church, which were published only last year,[191] he said that the catholics, as such, took no part in the massacre; that no cardinal, bishop, or priest shared in the councils that prepared it; that charles informed the pope that a conspiracy had been discovered; and that gregory made his thanksgiving only because the king's life was saved.[192] such things will cease to be written when men perceive that truth is the only merit that gives dignity and worth to history. footnotes: [footnote 6: _north british review_, oct. 1869.] [footnote 7: satius fore ducebam, si minus profligari possent omnes, ut ferrentur omnes, quo mordentes et comedentes invicem, consumerentur ab invicem (hosius to karnkowsky, feb. 26, 1568).] [footnote 8: the secretary of medina celi to çayas, june 24, 1572 (_correspondance de philippe ii._, ii. 264).] [footnote 9: quant à ce qui me touche à moy en particulier, encores que j'ayme unicquement tous mes enffans, je veulx préférer, comme il est bien raysonnable, les filz aux filles; et pour le regard de ce que me mandez de celluy qui a faict mourir ma fille, c'est chose que l'on ne tient point pour certaine, et où elle le seroit, le roy monsieur mondit filz n'en pouvoit faire la vengence en l'estat que son royaulme estoit lors; mais à présent qu'il est tout uni, il aura assez de moien et de forces pour sen ressentir quant l'occasion s'en présentera (catherine to du ferrier, oct. 1, 1572; bib. imp. f. fr. 15,555). the despatches of fourquevaulx from madrid, published by the marquis du prat in the _histoire d' elisabeth de valois_, do not confirm the rumour.] [footnote 10: toutes mes fantaisies sont bandées pour m'opposer à la grandeur des espagnols, et délibère m'y conduire le plus dextrement qu'il me sera possible (charles ix. to noailles, may 2, 1572; noailles, _henri de valois_, i. 8).] [footnote 11: il fault, et je vous prie ne faillir, quand bien il seroit du tout rompu, et que verriés qu'il n'y auroit nulle espérance, de trouver moyen d'en entrettenir toujours doucement le propos, d'ici à quelque temps; car cella ne peut que bien servir à establir mes affaires et aussy pour ma réputation (charles ix. to la mothe, aug. 9, 1572; _corr. de la mothe_, vii. 311).] [footnote 12: this is stated both by his mother and by the cardinal of lorraine (michelet, _la ligue_, p. 26).] [footnote 13: in reliqua gallia fuit et est incredibilis defectio, quae tamen usque adeo non pacavit immanes illas feras, ut etiam eos qui defecerunt (qui pene sunt innumerabiles) semel ad internecionem una cum integris familiis trucidare prorsus decreverint (beza, dec. 3, 1572; _ill. vir. epp. sel._, p. 621, 1617).] [footnote 14: languet to the duke of saxony, nov. 30, 1572 (_arcana_, sec. xvi. 183).] [footnote 15: vidi et cum dolore intellexi lanienam illam gallicam perfidissimam et atrocissimam plurimos per germaniam ita offendisse, ut jam etiam de veritate nostrae religionis et doctrinae dubitare incoeperint (bullinger to wittgenstein, feb. 23, 1573; friedländer, _beiträge zur rel. gesch._, p. 254).] [footnote 16: de thou, _mémoires_, p. 9.] [footnote 17: il me dist qu'on luy avoist escript de rome, n'avoit que trois semaines ou environ, sur le propos des noces du roy de navarre en ces propres termes; que à ceste heure que tous les oiseaux estoient en cage, on les pouvoit prendre tous ensemble (vulcob to charles ix., sept. 26, 1572; noailles, iii. 214).] [footnote 18: _mémoires de duplessis-mornay_, i. 38; ambert, _duplessis-mornay_, p. 38.] [footnote 19: digges, _compleat ambassador_, pp. 276, 255.] [footnote 20: correr, _relazione_; tommaseo, ii. 116.] [footnote 21: he said to catherine: que quando quisiesen usar de otro y averlo, con no mas personas que con cinc o seys que son el cabo de todo esto, los tomasen a su mano y les cortasen las cabeças (alva to philip ii., june 21, 1565; _papiers de granvelle_, ix. 298).] [footnote 22: ci rallegriamo con la maestà sua con tutto l' affetto dell' animo, ch' ella habbia presa quella risolutione cosi opportunamente sopra la quale noi stesso l' ultima volta che fummo in francia parlammo con la regina madre.... dipoi per diversi gentilhuomini che in varie occorrenze habbiamo mandato in corte siamo instati nel suddetto ricordo (alfonso ii. to fogliani, sept. 13, 1572; modena archives).] [footnote 23: muchas vezes me ha accordado de aver dicho a su mag. esto mismo en bayona, y de lo que mi offrecio, y veo que ha muy bien desempeñado su palabra (alva to zuñiga, sept. 9, 1572; coquerel, _la st. barthélemy_, p. 12).] [footnote 24: kluckhohn, _zur geschichte des angeblichen bündnisses von bayonne_, p. 36, 1868.] [footnote 25: il signor duca di alva ... mi disse, che come in questo abboccamento negotio alcuno non havevano trattato, ne volevano trattare, altro che della religione, cosi la lor differenza era nata per questo, perchè non vedeva che la regina ci pigliasse risolutione a modo suo ne de altro, che di buone parole ben generali.... è stato risoluto che alla tornata in parigi si farà una ricerca di quelli che hanno contravenuto all' editto, e si castigaranno; nel che dice s.m. che gli ugonotti ci sono talmente compresi, che spera con questo mezzo solo cacciare i ministri di francia.... il signor duca di alva si satisfa piu di questa deliberatione di me, perchè io non trovo che serva all' estirpation dell' heresia il castigar quelli che hanno contravenuto all' editto (santa croce to borromeo, bayonne, july 1, 1565, ms.).] [footnote 26: desjardins, _négociations avec la toscane_, iii. 756, 765, 802.] [footnote 27: io non no fatto intendere cosa alcuna a nessuno principe; ho ben parlato al nunzio solo (desp. aug. 31; desjardins, iii. 828).] [footnote 28: alberi, _relazioni venete_, xii. 250.] [footnote 29: alberi, xii. 328.] [footnote 30: son principal but et dessein estoit de sentir quelle espérance ilz pourroient avoir de parvenir à la paix avec le g.s. dont il s'est ouvert et a demandé ce qu'il en pouvoit espérer et attendre (charles ix. to du ferrier, sept. 28, 1572; charrière, _négociations dans le levant_, iii. 310).] [footnote 31: ranke, _französische geschichte_, v. 76.] [footnote 32: digges, p. 258; cosmi, _memorie di morosini_, p. 26.] [footnote 33: alberi, xii. 294.] [footnote 34: mittit eo antonium mariam salviatum, reginae affinem eique pergratum, qui eam in officio contineat (cardinal of vercelli, _comment. de rebus gregorii_ xiii.; ranke, _päpste_, app. 85).] [footnote 35: desp. aug. 30, 1570.] [footnote 36: oct. 14, 1570.] [footnote 37: sept. 24, 1570.] [footnote 38: nov. 28, 1570.] [footnote 39: quando scrissi ai giorni passati alla s.v. illma in cifra, che l'ammiraglio s' avanzava troppo et che gli darebbero su l' unge, gia mi ero accorto, che non lo volevano più tollerare, et molto più mi confermai nell' opinione, quando con caratteri ordinarii glie scrivevo che speravo di dover haver occasione di dar qualche buona nova a sua beatitudine, benchè mai havrei creduto la x. parte di quello, che al presente veggo con gli occhi (desp. aug. 24; theiner, _annales_, i. 329).] [footnote 40: che molti siano stati consapevoli del fatto è necessario, potendogli dizer che a 21 la mattina, essendo col cardinal di borbone et m. de montpensier, viddi che ragionavano si domesticamente di quello che doveva seguire, che in me medesimo restando confuso, conobbi che la prattica andava gagliarda, e piutosto disperai di buon fine che altrimente (same desp.; mackintosh, _history of england_, ii. 355).] [footnote 41: attribuisce a se, et al nipote, et a casa sua, la morte del' ammiraglio, gloriandosene assai (desp. oct. 1; theiner, p. 331). the emperor told the french ambassador "que, depuis les choses avenues, on lui avoit mandé de rome que mr. le cardinal de lorraine avoit dit que tout le fait avoit esté délibéré avant qu'il partist de france" (vulcob to charles ix., nov. 8; groen van prinsterer, _archives de nassau_, iv. app. 22).] [footnote 42: marlot, _histoire de reims_, iv. 426. this language excited the surprise of dale, walsingham's successor (mackintosh, iii. 226).] [footnote 43: _archives curieuses_, viii. 305.] [footnote 44: egli solo tra tutti gli altri è solito particolarmente di sostenere le nostre fatiche.... essendo partecipe di tutti i nostri consigli, et consapevole de segreti dell' intimo animo nostro (pius v. to philip ii., june 20, 1571; zucchi, _idea del segretario_, i. 544).] [footnote 45: serranus, _commentarii_, iv. 14; davila, ii. 104.] [footnote 46: digges, p. 193.] [footnote 47: finis hujus legationis erat non tam suadere regi ut foedus cum aliis christianis principibus iniret (id nempe notum erat impossibile illi regno esse); sed ut rex ille praetermissus non videretur, et revera ut sciretur quo tenderent gallorum cogitationes. non longe nempe a rocella naves quasdam praegrandes instruere et armare coeperat philippus strozza praetexens velle ad indias a gallis inventas navigare (_relatio gestorum in legatione card. alexandrini ms._).] [footnote 48: con alcuni particulari che io porto, de' quali ragguaglierò n. signore a bocca, posso dire di non partirmi affatto mal espedito (ranke, _zeitschrift_, iii. 598). le temps et les effectz luy témoigneront encores d'advantage (_mémoire baillé au légat alexandrin_, feb. 1572; bib. imp. f. dupuy, 523).] [footnote 49: _de sacro foedere, graevius thesaurus_, i. 1038.] [footnote 50: catena, _vita di pio v._, p. 197; gabutius, _vita pii v._, p. 150, and the dedication.] [footnote 51: d'ossat to villeroy, sept. 22, 1599; _lettres_, iii. 503. an account of the legate's journey was found by mendham among lord guildford's manuscripts, and is described in the supplement to his life of pius v., p. 13. it is written by the master of ceremonies, and possesses no interest. the _relatio_ already quoted, which corresponds to the description given by clement viii. of his own work, is among the manuscripts of the marquis capponi, no. 164.] [footnote 52: vuol andar con ogni quiete et dissimulatione, fin che il rè suo figliolo sia in età (santa croce, desp. june 27, 1563; _lettres du card. santa croce_, p. 243).] [footnote 53: la chastre to charles ix., jan. 21, 1570; raynal, _histoire du berry_, iv. 105; lavallée, _histoire des français_, ii. 478. both raynal and lavallée had access to the original.] [footnote 54: il papa credeva che la pace fatta, e l'aver consentito il rè che l'ammiraglio venisse in corte, fusse con disegno di ammazzarlo; ma accortosi come passa il fatto, non ha creduto che nel rè nostro sia quella brava resoluzione (letter of nov. 28, 1571; desjardins, iii. 732). pour le regard de m. l'admiral, je n'ay failly de luy faire entendre ce que je devois, suyvant ce qu'il a pleu à v.m. me commander, dont il est demeuré fort satisfaict (ferralz to charles ix., dec. 25, 1571; bib. imp. f. fr. 16,039; walsingham to herbert, oct. 10, 1571; to smith, nov. 26, 1572; digges, p. 290).] [footnote 55: marcel to charles ix., december 20, 1571; _cabinet historique_, ii. 253.] [footnote 56: le roy estoit d'intelligence, ayant permis à ceux de la religion de l'assister, et, cas advenant que leurs entreprises succédassent, qu'il les favoriserait ouvertement ... genlis, menant un secours dans mons, fut défait par le duc d'alve, qui avoit comme investi la ville. la journée de saint-barthélemi se résolut (bouillon, _mémoires_, p. 9).] [footnote 57: si potria distruggere il resto, maxime che l'ammiraglio si trova in parigi, populo catholico et devoto del suo rè, dove potria se volesse facilmente levarselo dinnanzi per sempre (castagna, desp. aug. 5, 1572; theiner, i. 327).] [footnote 58: _mémoires de claude haton_, 687.] [footnote 59: en quelque sorte que ce soit ledict seigneur est résollu faire vivre ses subjectz en sa religion, et ne permettre jamais ny tollérer, quelque chose qui puisse advenir, qu'il n'y ait aultre forme ny exercice de religion en son royaulme que de la catholique (instruction for the governors of normandy, nov. 3, 1572; la mothe, vii. 390).] [footnote 60: charles ix. to mondoucet, aug. 26, 1572; _compte rendu de la commission royale d' histoire_, 2e série, iv. 327.] [footnote 61: li ugonotti si ridussero alla porta del louvre, per aspettare che mons. di guisa e mons. d'aumale uscissero per ammazzarli (borso trotti, desp. aug. 23; modena archives).] [footnote 62: l'on a commencé à descouvrir la conspiration que ceux de la religion prétendue réformée avoient faicte contre moy mesmes, ma mère et mes frères (charles ix. to la mothe, aug. 25; la mothe, vii. 325).] [footnote 63: desp. sept. 19, 1572.] [footnote 64: il ne fault pas attendre d'en avoir d'autre commandement du roy ne de monseigneur, car ils ne vous en feront point (puygaillard to montsoreau, aug. 26, 1572; mourin, _la réforme en anjou_, p. 106).] [footnote 65: vous croirez le présent porteur de ce que je luy ay donné charge de vous dire (charles ix. to mandelot, aug. 24, 1572; _corr. de charles ix. avec mandelot_, p. 42).] [footnote 66: je n'en ay aucune coulpe, n'ayant sceu quelle estoit la volunté que par umbre, encores bien tard et à demy (mandelot to charles ix., sept. 17, p. 73).] [footnote 67: floquet, _histoire du parlement de normandie_, iii. 121.] [footnote 68: anjou to montsoreau, aug. 26; mourin, p. 107; falloux, _vie de pie v._, i. 358; port, _archives de la mairie d'angers_, pp. 41, 42.] [footnote 69: schomberg to brulart, oct. 10, 1572; capefigue, _la réforme_, iii. 264.] [footnote 70: instructions for schomberg, feb. 15, 1573; noailles, iii. 305.] [footnote 71: monluc to brulart, nov. 20, 1572; jan. 20, 1573: to charles ix., jan. 22, 1573; noailles, iii. 218, 223, 220.] [footnote 72: charles ix. to st. goard, jan. 20, 1573; groen, iv. app. 29.] [footnote 73: letter from paris in strype's _life of parker_, iii. 110; "tocsain contre les massacreurs," _archives curieuses_, vii. 7.] [footnote 74: afin que ce que vous avez dressé des choses passées à la saint-barthélemy ne puisse être publié parmi le peuple, et mêmement entre les étrangers, comme il y en a plusieurs qui se mêlent d'écrire et qui pourraient prendre occasion d'y répondre, je vous prie qu'il n'en soit rien imprimé ni en français ni en latin, mais si vous en avez retenu quelque chose, le garder vers vous (charles ix. to the president de cély, march 24, 1573; _revue rétrospective_, 2 série. iii. 195).] [footnote 75: botero, _della ragion di stato_, 92. a contemporary says that the protestants were cut to pieces out of economy, "pour afin d'éviter le coust des exécutions qu'il eust convenu payer pour les faire pendre"; and that this was done "par permission divine" (_relation des troubles de rouen par un témoin oculaire_, ed. pottier, 36, 46).] [footnote 76: del resto poco importerebbe a roma (card. montalto to card. morosini; tempesti, _vita di sisto v._, ii. 116).] [footnote 77: quand ce seroit contre touts les catholiques, que nous ne nous en empescherions, ny altérerions aucunement l'amitié d'entre elle et nous (catherine to la mothe, sept. 13, 1572; la mothe, vii. 349).] [footnote 78: alva's report; _bulletins de l'académie de bruxelles_, ix. 564.] [footnote 79: jean diodati, _door schotel_, 88.] [footnote 80: _oeuvres de brantôme_, ed. lalanne, iv. 38.] [footnote 81: otros que salvò el duque de nevers con harto vituperio suyo (cabrera de cordova, _felipe segundo_, p. 722).] [footnote 82: il rè christianissimo in tutti questi accidenti, in luogo di giudicio e di valore ha mostrato animo christiano, con tutto habbia salvato alcuno. ma li altri principi che fanno gran professione di cattolici et di meritar favori e gratie del papa hanno poi con estrema diligenza cercato a salvare quelli più di ugonotti che hanno potuto, e se non gli nomino particolarmente, non si maravigli, per che indiferentemente tutti hanno fatto a un modo (salviati, desp. sept. 2, 1572).] [footnote 83: estque dictu mirum, quantopere regem exhilaravit nova gallica (hopperus to viglius, madrid, sept. 7, 1572; _hopperi epp._ 360).] [footnote 84: ha avuto, con questa occasione, dal rè di spagna, sei mila scudi a conto della dote di sua moglie e a richiesta di casa di guise (petrucci, desp. sept. 16, 1572; desjardins, iii. 838). on the 27th of december 1574, the cardinal of guise asks philip for more money for the same man (bouillé, _histoire des ducs de guise_, ii. 505).] [footnote 85: siendo cosa clara que, de hoy mas, ni los protestantes de alemania, ni la reyna de inglaterra se fiaran dél (philip to alva, sept. 18, 1572; _bulletins de bruxelles_, xvi. 255).] [footnote 86: st. goard to charles ix., sept. 12, 1572; groen, iv. app. 12; raumer, _briefe aus paris_, i. 191.] [footnote 87: _archives de l'empire_, k. 1530, b. 34, 299.] [footnote 88: zuñiga to alva, aug. 31, 1572: no fue caso pensado sino repentino (_archives de l'empire_, k. 1530, b. 34, 66).] [footnote 89: st. goard to catherine, jan. 6, 1573; groen, iv. app. 28.] [footnote 90: _comment. de b. de mendoça_, i. 344.] [footnote 91: alva to philip, oct. 13, 1572; _corr. de philippe ii._, ii. 287. on the 23rd of august zuñiga wrote to philip that he hoped that coligny would recover from his wound, because, if he should die, charles would be able to obtain obedience from all men (_archives de l'empire_, k. 1530, b. 34, 65).] [footnote 92: _bulletins de la société pour l'histoire du protestantisme français_, viii. 292.] [footnote 93: _eidgenössische abschiede_, iv. 2, 501, 503, 506, 510.] [footnote 94: cosmo to camaiani, oct. 6, 1570 (cantù, _gli eretici d'italia_, iii. 15); cosmo to charles ix., sept. 4, 1572 (gachard, _rapport sur les archives de lille_, 199).] [footnote 95: grappin, _mémoire historique sur le card. de granvelle_, 73.] [footnote 96: bardi, _età del mondo_, 1581, iv. 2011; campana, _historie del mondo_, 1599, i. 145; b.d. da fano, _aggiunte all' historie di mambrino roseo_, 1583, v. 252; pellini, _storia di perugia_, vol. iii. ms.] [footnote 97: si è degnato di prestare alli suoi divoti il suo taglientissimo coltello in cosi salutifero sacrificio (letter of aug. 26; alberi, _vita di caterina de' medici_, 401).] [footnote 98: labitte, _démocratie chez les prédicateurs de la ligue_, 10.] [footnote 99: natalis comes, _historiae sui temporis_, 512.] [footnote 100: capefigue, iii. 150.] [footnote 101: pourront-ils arguer de trahison le feu roy, qu'ils blasphèment luy donnant le nom de tyran, veu qu'il n'a rien entrepris et exécuté que ce qu'il pouvoit faire par l'expresse parole de dieu ... dieu commande qu'on ne pardonne en façon que ce soit aux inventeurs ou sectateurs de nouvelles opinions ou hérésies.... ce que vous estimez cruauté estre plutôt vraye magnanimité et doulceur (sorbin, _le vray resveille-matin des calvinistes_, 1576, pp. 72, 74, 78).] [footnote 102: il commanda à chacun de se retirer au cabinet et à moy de m'asseoir au chevet de son lict, tant pour ouyr sa confession, et luy donner ministérialement absolution de ses péchez, que aussi pour le consoler durant et après la messe (sorbin, _vie de charles ix.; archives curieuses_, viii. 287). est très certain que le plus grand regret qu'il avoit à l'heure de sa mort estoit de ce qu'il voyoit l'idole calvinesque n'estre encores du tout chassée (_vray resveille-matin_, 88).] [footnote 103: the charge against the clergy of bordeaux is brought by d'aubigné (_histoire universelle_, ii. 27) and by de thou. de thou was very hostile to the jesuits, and his language is not positive. d'aubigné was a furious bigot. the truth of the charge would not be proved, without the letters of the president l'agebaston and of the lieutenant montpezat: "quelques prescheurs se sont par leurs sermons (ainsi que dernièrement j'ai escript plus amplement à votre majesté) estudié de tout leur pouvoir de troubler ciel et terre, et conciter le peuple à sédition, et en ce faisant à passer par le fil de l'espée tous ceulx de la prétendue religion réformée.... après avoir des le premier et deuxième de ceste mois fait courrir un bruit sourd que vous, sire, aviez envoyé nom par nom un rolle signé de votre propre main au sieur de montferaud, pour par voie de fait et sans aultre forme de justice, mettre à mort quarante des principaulx de cette ville...." (l'agebaston to charles ix., oct. 7, 1572; mackintosh, iii. 352). "j'ai trouvé que messieurs de la cour de parlement avoyent arresté que monsieur edmond, prescheur, seroit appellé en ladicte court pour luy faire des remonstrances sur quelque langaige qu'il tenoit en ses sermons, tendant à sédition, à ce qu'ils disoyent. ce que j'ay bien voullu empescher, craignant que s'il y eust esté appellé cella eust animé plusieurs des habitants et estre cause de quelque émotion, ce que j'eusse voluntiers souffert quant j'eusse pansé qu'il n'y en eust qu'une vingtaine de despéchés" (montpezat to charles ix., sept. 30., 1572; _archives de la gironde_, viii. 337).] [footnote 104: _annal. baronii contin._ ii. 734; bossuet says: "la dispense vint telle qu'on la pouvoit désirer" (_histoire de france_, p. 820).] [footnote 105: ormegregny, _réflexions sur la politique de france_, p. 121.] [footnote 106: de thou, iv. 537.] [footnote 107: charrière, iii. 154.] [footnote 108: _carmina ill. poetarum italorum_, iii. 212, 216.] [footnote 109: tiepolo, desp. aug. 6, 1575; mutinelli, _storia arcana_, i. 111.] [footnote 110: parendomi, che sia cosa, la quale possa apportar piacere, e utile al mondo, si per la qualità del soggetto istesso, come anco per l'eleganza, e bello ordine con che viene cosi leggiadramente descritto questo nobile, e glorioso fatto ... a fine che una cosi egregia attione non resti defraudata dell' honor, che merita (the editor, gianfrancesco ferrari, to the reader).] [footnote 111: huc accedit, oratorem sermi regis galliae, et impulsu inimicorum saepedicti domini cardinalis, et quia summopere illi displicuit, quod superioribus mensibus illma sua dominatio operam dedisset, hoc sibi mandari, ut omnia regis negotia secum communicaret, nullam praetermisisse occasionem ubi ei potuit adversari (cardinal delfino to the emperor, rome, nov. 29, 1572; vienna archives).] [footnote 112: fà ogni favor et gratia gli addimanda il cardinale di lorena, il consiglio del quale usa in tutte le più importanti negotiationi l' occorre di haver a trattar (cusano to the emperor, rome, sept. 27, 1572).--conscia igitur sua dominatio illma quorundam arcanorum regni galliae, creato pontifice sibi in concilio tridentino cognito et amico, statuit huc se recipere, ut privatis suis rebus consuleret, et quia tunc foederati contra thurcam, propter suspicionem regi catholico injectam de orangio, et gallis, non admodum videbantur concordes, et non multo post advenit nuncius mortis domini de colligni, et illius asseclarum; pontifex justa de causa existimavit dictum illmum cardinalem favore et gratia sua merito esse complectendum. evenit postmodum, ut ad serenissimam reginam galliarum deferretur, bonum hunc dominum jactasse se, quod particeps fuerit consiliorum contra dictum colligni; id quod illa serenissima domina iniquo animo tulit, quae neminem gloriae socium vult habere; sibi enim totam vendicat, quod sola talis facinoris auctor, et dux extiterit. idcirco commorationem ipsius lotharingiae in hac aula improbare, ac reprehendere aggressa est. haec cum ille illustrissimus cardinalis perceperit, oblata sibi occasione utens, exoravit a sua sanctitate gratuitam expeditionem quatuor millia scutorum reditus pro suo nepote, et 20 millia pro filio praeter sollicitationem, quam prae se fert, ut dictus nepos in cardinalium numerum cooptetur.... cum itaque his de causis authoritas hujus domini in gallia imminuta videatur, ipseque praevideat, quanto in gallia minoris aestimabitur, tanto minori etiam loco hic se habitum id, statuit optimo judicio, ac pro eo quod suae existimacioni magis conducit, in galliam reverti (delfino, _ut supra_, both in the vienna archives).] [footnote 113: _intiera relatione della morte dell' ammiraglio._] [footnote 114: _ragguaglio degli ordini et modi tenuti dalla majesta christianissima nella distruttione della setta degli ugonotti con la morte dell' ammiraglio_, etc.] [footnote 115: bib. imp. f. fr. 16, 139.] [footnote 116: maffei, _annali di gregorio xiii._, i. 34.] [footnote 117: la nouvelle qui arriva le deuxième jour du présent par ung courrier qui estoit depesché secrétememt de lyon par ung nommé danes, secrétaire de m. de mandelot ... à ung commandeur de sainct anthoine, nommé mr. de gou, il luy manda qu'il allast advertir le pape, pour en avoir quelque présant ou bienfaict, de la mort de tous les chefs de ceulx de la religion prétendue refformée, et de tous les huguenotz de france, et que v.m. avoit mandé et commandé à tous les gouverneurs de se saisir de tous iceulx huguenotz en leurs gouvernemens; ceste nouvelle, sire, apporta si grand contentement a s.s., que sans ce que je luy remonstray lors me trouvant sur le lieu, en presence de monseigneur le c1 de lorraine, qu'elle devoit attendre ce que v.m. m'en manderoit et ce que son nonce luy en escriroit, elle en vouloit incontinent faire des feux de joye.... et pour ce que je ne voulois faire ledict feu de joye la première nuict que ledit courrier envoyé par ledict danes feust arrivé, ny en recevoir les congratulations que l'on m'en envoyoit faire, que premièrement je n'eusse eu nouvelles de v.m. pour sçavoir et sa voulanté et comme je m'avoys a conduire, aucuns commençoient desjà de m'en regarder de maulvais oeills (ferralz to charles ix., rome, sept. 11, 1572; bib. imp. f. fr. 16,040). al corriero che porto tal nuova nostro signore diede 100 scudi oltre li 200 che hebbe dall' illustrissimo lorena, che con grandissima allegrezza se n'ando subito a dar tal nuova per allegrarsene con sua santita (letter from rome to the emperor, sept. 6, 1572; vienna archives).] [footnote 118: charles ix. to ferralz, aug. 24, 1572; mackintosh, iii. 348.] [footnote 119: elle fust merveilheusement ayse d'entendre le discours que mondit neueu de beauville luy en feist. lequel, après luy avoir conté le susdit affayre, supplia sadicte saincteté, suyvant la charge expresse qu'il avoit de v.m. de vouloir concéder, pour le fruict de ceste allegresse, la dispense du mariage du roy et royne de navarre, datée de quelques jours avant que les nopces en feussent faictes, ensemble l'absolution pour messeigneurs les cardinaux de bourbon et de ramboilhet, et pour tous les aultres evesques et prélatz qui y avoient assisté.... il nous feit pour fin response qu'il y adviseroit (ferralz, _ut supra_).] [footnote 120: pensasi che per tutte le citta di francia debba seguire il simile, subitoche arrivi la nuova dell' esecutione di parigi.... a n.s. mi faccia gratia di basciar i piedi in nome mio, col quale mi rallegro con le viscere del cuore che sia piaciuto alla dio. mtà. d' incaminar nel principio del suo pontificato si felicemente e honoratamente le cose di questo regno, havendo talmente havuto in protettione il rè e regina madre che hanno saputo e potuto sbarrare queste pestifere radici con tanta prudenza, in tempo tanto opportuno, che tutti lor ribelli erano sotto chiave in gabbia (salviati, desp. aug. 24; theiner, i. 329; mackintosh, iii. 355).] [footnote 121: sexta septembris, mane, in senatu pontificis et cardinalium lectae sunt literae a legato pontificio e gallia scriptae, admiralium et huguenotos, destinata regis voluntate atque consensu, trucidatos esse. ea re in eodem senatu decretum esse, ut inde recta pontifex cum cardinalibus in aedem d. marci concederet, deoque opt. max. pro tanto beneficio sedi romanae orbique christiano collato gratias solemni more ageret (_scriptum roma missum_ in capilupi, 1574, p. 84). quia die 2a praedicti mensis septembris smus d.n. certior factus fuerat colignium franciae ammiralium a populo parisien occisum fuisse et cum eo multos ex ducibus et primoribus ugonotarum haereticorum eius sequacibus rege ipso franciae approbante, ex quo spes erat tranquillitatem in dicto regno redituram expulsis haereticis, idcirco stas sua expleto concistorio descendit ad ecclesiam sancti marci, praecedente cruce et sequentibus cardinalibus et genuflexus ante altare maius, ubi positum fuerat sanctissimum sacramentum, oravit gratias deo agens, et inchoavit cantando hymnum te deum (_fr. mucantii diaria_, b.m. add. mss. 26,811).] [footnote 122: après quelques autres discours qu'il me feist sur le contentement que luy et le collége des cardinaux avoient receu de ladicte execution faicte et des nouvelles qui journellement arrivoient en ceste court de semblables exécutions que l'on a faicte et font encore en plusieurs villes de vostre royaume, qui, à dire la vérité, sont les nouvelles les plus agréables que je pense qu'on eust sceu apporter en ceste ville, sadicte saincteté pour fin me commanda de vous escrire que cest évènement luy a esté cent fois plus agréable que cinquante victoires semblables à celle que ceulx de la ligue obtindrent l'année passée contre le turcq, ne voulant oublier vous dire, sire, les commandemens estroictz qu'il nous feist à tous, mesmement aux françois d'en faire feu de joye, et qui ne l'eust faict eust mal senty de la foy (ferralz, _ut supra_).] [footnote 123: tutta roma stà in allegria di tal fatto et frà i più grandi si dice, che 'l rè di francia ha insegnato alli principi christiani ch' hanno de simili vassalli nè stati loro a liberarsene, et dicono che vostra maestà cesara dovrebbe castigare il conte palatino tanto nemico della serenissima casa d' austria, et della religione cattolica, come l'anni passati fece contra il duca di sassonia tiene tuttavia prigione, che a un tempo vendicarebbe le tante ingiurie ha fatto detto palatino alla chiesa di dio, et poveri christiani, et alla maestà vostra et sua casa serenissima sprezzando li suoi editti et commandamenti, et privarlo dell' elettione dell'imperio et darlo al duca di baviera (cusano to the emperor, rome, sept. 6, 1572; vienna archives).] [footnote 124: the bull, as published in paris, is printed by strype (_life of parker_, iii. 197). la prima occasione che a ciò lo mosse fù per lo stratagemma fatto da carlo nono christianissimo rè di francia contra coligno ammiraglio, capo d' ugonotti, et suoi seguaci, tagliati a pezzi in parigi (ciappi, _vita di gregorio xiii._, 1596, p. 63).] [footnote 125: vasari to borghini, oct. 5, 1572; march 5, 1573; to francesco medici, nov. 17, 1572; gaye, _carteggio d' artisti_, iii. 328, 366, 341.] [footnote 126: indubitatamente non si osservarà interamente, havendomi in questo modo, punto che torno dall' audienza promesso il rè, imponendomi di darne conto in suo nome a nostro signore, di volere in breve tempo liberare il regno dalli ugonotti.... mi ha parlato della dispensa, escusandosi non haver fatto il parentado per ultro, che per liberarsi da suoi inimici (salviati, desp. sept. 3, sept. 2, oct. 11, 1572).] [footnote 127: si vede che l' editto non essendo osservato ne da popoli, ne dal principe, non è per pigliar piede (salviati, desp. sept. 4). qual regina in progresso di tempo intende pur non solo di revocare tal editto, ma per mezzo della giustitia di restituir la fede cattolica nell' antica osservanza, parendogli che nessuno ne debba dubitare adesso, che hanno fatto morire l' ammiraglio con tanti altri huomini di valore, conforme ai raggionamenti altre volte havuti con esso meco essendo a bles, et trattando del parentado di navarra, et dell' altre cose che correvano in quei tempi, il che essendo vero, ne posso rendere testimonianza, e a nostro signore e a tutto il mondo (aug. 27; theiner, i. 329, 330).] [footnote 128: desp. sept. 2, 1572.] [footnote 129: the reply of boccapaduli is printed in french, with the translation of the oration of muretus, paris, 1573.] [footnote 130: troverà le cose cosi ben disposte, che durarà poca fattica in ottener quel tanto si desidera per sua beatitudine, anzi haverà più presto da ringratiar quella maestà christianissima di cosi buona et sant' opera, ha fatto far, che da durare molta fatica in persuaderli l' unione con la santa chiesa romana (cusano to the emperor, rome, sept. 6). sereno (_comment. della guerra di cipro_, p. 329) understands the mission in the same light.] [footnote 131: omnes mulas ascendentes cappis et galeris pontificalibus induti associarunt rmum d. cardinalem ursinum legatum usque ad portam flaminiam et extra eam ubi factis multis reverentiis eum ibi reliquerunt, juxta ritum antiquum in ceremoniali libro descriptum qui longo tempore intermissus fuerat, ita pontifice iubente in concistorio hodierno (_mucantii diaria_). ista associatio fuit determinata in concistorio vocatis x. cardinalibus et ex improviso exequuti fuimus (_c. firmani diaria_, b.m. add. mss. 8448).] [footnote 132: mette in consideratione alla santità sua che havendo deputato un legato apostolico sù la morte dell' ammiraglio, et altri capi ugonotti, ha fatti ammazzare a parigi, saria per metterla in molto sospetto et diffidenza delli principi protestanti, et della regina d' inghilterra, ch' ella fosse d' accordo con la sede apostolica, et principi cattolici per farli guerra, i quali cerca d' acquettar con accertarli tutti, che non ha fatto ammazzar l' ammiraglio et suoi seguaci per conto della religione (cusano to the emperor, sept. 27).] [footnote 133: salviati, desp. sept. 22, 1572.] [footnote 134: charles ix. to s. goard, oct. 5, 1572; charrière, iii. 330. ne poteva esser bastante segno l' haver egli doppo la morte dell' ammiraglio fatto un editto, che in tutti i luoghi del suo regno fossero posti a fil di spada quanti heretici vi si trovassero, onde in pochi giorni n' erano stati ammazzati settanta milla e d' avantaggio (cicarelli, _vita di gregori xiii._; platina, _vite de' pontefici_, 1715, 592).] [footnote 135: il tengono quasiche in filo et il necessitano a far cose contra la sua natura e la sua volontà perche s. sta è sempre stato di natura piacevole e dolce (_relatione di gregorio xiii._; ranke, _päpste_, app. 80). faict cardinal par le pape pie iv., le 12e de mars 1559, lequel en le créant, dit qu'il n'avoit créé un cardinal ains un pape (ferralz to charles ix., may 14, 1572).] [footnote 136: smus dominus noster dixit nullam concordiam vel pacem debere nec posse esse inter nos et hereticos, et cum eis nullum foedus ineundum et habendum ... verissimum est deteriores esse haereticos gentilibus, eo quod sunt adeo perversi et obstinati, ut propemodum infideles sint (_acta concistoralia_, june 18, 1571; bib. imp. f. lat. 12, 561).] [footnote 137: ogni giorno faceva impiccare e squartare ora uno, ora un altro (cantù, ii. 410).] [footnote 138: _legazioni di serristori_, 436, 443.] [footnote 139: elle desire infiniment que vostre majesté face quelque ressentement plus qu'elle n'a faict jusques à ceste heure contre ceux qui lui font la guerre, comme de raser quelques-unes de leurs principales maisons pour une perpétuelle mémoyre (rambouillet to charles ix., rome, jan. 17, 1569; bib. imp. f. fr. 17,989).] [footnote 140: pius v. to catherine, april 13, 1569.] [footnote 141: pius v. to charles ix., march 28, 1569.] [footnote 142: sa saincteté m'a dict que j'escrive à vostre majesté que icelle se souvienne qu'elle combat pour la querelle de dieu, et que ceste à elle de faire ses vengeances (rambouillet to charles ix., rome, march 14, 1569; bib. imp. f. fr. 16,039). nihil est enim ea pietate misericordiaque crudelius, quae in impios et ultima supplicia meritos confertur (pius v. to charles ix., oct. 20, 1569).] [footnote 143: _correspondance de philippe ii._, ii. 185.] [footnote 144: inspirato più d' un anno fa di esporre la vita al martirio col procurare la liberatione della religione, et delle patria per mezzo della morte del tiranno, et assicurato da theologi che il fatto saria stato meritorio, non ne haveva con tutto ciò mai potuto ottenere da superiori suoi la licenza o dispensa.... io quantunque mi sia parso di trovarlo pieno di tale humiltà, prudenza, spirito et core che arguiscono che questa sia inspiratione veramente piuttosto che temerità o legerezza, non cognoscendo tuttavia di potergliela concedere l' ho persuaso a tornarsene nel suo covento raccommandarsi a dio et attendere all' obbedienza delli suoi superiori finchè io attendessi dallo assenso o ripulsa del papa che haverei interpellato per la sua santa beneditione, se questo spirito sia veramente da dio donde si potrà conjetturare che sia venendo approvato da sua stà, e perciò sarà più sicuro da essere eseguito.... resta hora che v.s. illma mi favorisca di communicare a s.b. il caso, et scrivermene come la supplico quanto prima per duplicate et triplicate lettere la sua santa determinatione assicurandosi che per quanto sarà in me il negotio sarà trattato con la debita circumspetione (sega, desp. paris, jan. 23, 1591; deciphered in rome, march 26).] [footnote 145: ferralz to charles ix., nov. 18, dec. 23, 1572.] [footnote 146: de castro, _de justa haeret. punitione_, 1547, p. 119. iure divino obligantur eos extirpare, si absque maiori incommodo possint (lancelottus, _haereticum quare per catholicum quia_, 1615, p. 579). ubi quid indulgendum sit, ratio semper exacta habeatur, an religioni ecclesiae, et reipublicae quid vice mutua accedat quod majoris sit momenti, et plus prodesse possit (pamelius, _de relig. diversis non admittendis_, 1589, p. 159). contagium istud sic grassatum est, ut corrupta massa non ferat antiquissimas leges, severitasque tantisper remittenda sit (possevinus, _animadv. in thuanum_; zachariae, _iter litterarium_, p. 321).] [footnote 147: principi saeculari nulla ratione permissum est, haereticis licentiam tribuere haereses suas docendi, atque adeo contractus ille iniustus.... si quid princeps saecularis attentet in praeiudicium ecclesiasticae potestatis, aut contra eam aliquid statuat et paciscatur, pactum illud nullum futurum (r. sweertii, _de fide haereticis servanda_, 1611, p. 36).] [footnote 148: ad poenam quoque pertinet et odium haereticorum quod fides illis data servanda non sit (simancha, _inst. cath._ pp. 46, 52).] [footnote 149: si nolint converti, expedit eos citius tollere e medio, ne gravius postea damnentur, unde non militat contra mansuetudinem christianam, occidere haereticos, quin potius est opus maximae misericordiae (lancelottus, p. 579).] [footnote 150: de rozoy, _annales de toulouse_, iii. 65.] [footnote 151: alva to philip, june 5, 1565; _pap. de granvelle_, ix. 288; _comment. de monluc_, iii. 425.] [footnote 152: charles ix. to mondoucet, aug. 31, 1572; _compte rendu_, iv, 349.] [footnote 153: _bulletins de bruxelles_, xvi. 256.] [footnote 154: granvelle to morillon, sept. 11, 1572; michelet, p. 475.] [footnote 155: floquet, iii. 137.] [footnote 156: walsingham to smith, nov. 1, 1572; digges, p. 279. ita enim statutum ab illis fuit die 27 octobris (beza, dec. 3, 1572; _ill. vir. epp. sel._ 621). la mothe, v. 164; faustino tasso, _historie de nostri tempi_, 1583, p. 343.] [footnote 157: _discorso di monsignor terracina à gregorio xiii.; thesauri politici contin._ 1618, pp. 73-76.] [footnote 158: infin che ne viverà grande, o picciolo di loro, mai non le mancheranno insidie (_lettere del muzio_, 1590, p. 232).] [footnote 159: coupez, tronquez, cisaillez, ne pardonnez à parens ny amis, princes et subiets, ny à quelque personne de quelque condition qu'ils soient (d'orléans, _premier advertissement des catholiques anglois aux françois catholiques_, 1590, p. 13). the notion that charles had displayed an extreme benignity recurs in many books: "nostre prince a surpassé tout mesure de clémence" (le frère de laval _histoire des troubles_, 1576, p. 527).] [footnote 160: serranus, _comment._ iv. 51.] [footnote 161: bouges, _histoire de carcassonne_, p. 343.] [footnote 162: _sommaire de la félonie commise á lyon._ a contemporary tract reprinted by gonon, 1848, p. 221.] [footnote 163: on this point smith may be trusted rather than parker (_correspondence_, p. 399).] [footnote 164: _bulletins de bruxelles_, xvi. 249.] [footnote 165: qui è venuto quello che dette l' archibusata all' ammiraglio di francia, et è stato condotto dal cardinal di lorena et dall' ambasciator di francia, al papa. a molti non è piaciuto che costui sia venuto in roma (prospero count arco to the emperor, rome, nov. 15, 1572; vienna archives).] [footnote 166: zuñiga to philip, march 4, 1573; _arch. de l'empire_, k. 1531, b. 35, 70. zuñiga heard it from lorraine.] [footnote 167: et est toute la dispute encores sur les derniers évènemens de la france, contre lesquels l'electeur est beaucoup plus aigre qu'il n'estoyt à mon aultre voyage, depuys qu'il a esté en l'escole à vienne (schomberg to brulart, may 12, 1573; groen, iv. app. 76).] [footnote 168: sattler, _geschichte von würtemberg_, v. 23.] [footnote 169: audio quosdam etiam nostralium theologorum cruentam istam nuptiarum feralium celebrationem pertinaciae gallorum in semel recepta de sacramentalibus mysteriis sententia acceptam referre et praeter illos pati neminem somniare (steinberger to crato, nov. 23, 1572; gillet, _craio von crafftheim_, ii. 519).] [footnote 170: heppe, _geschichte des deutschen protestantismus_, iv. 37, 47, 49.] [footnote 171: hachfeld, _martin chemnitz_, p. 137.] [footnote 172: sunt tamen qui hoc factum et excusare et defendere tentant (bullinger to hotoman, oct. 11, 1572; hotoman, _epis._ 35).] [footnote 173: nec dubium est melius cum ipsis actum fuisse, si quemadmodum a principio instituerant, cum disciplinam ecclesiasticam inroduxere, viros modestos et piae veraeque reformationis cupidos tantum in suos coetus admisissent, reiectis petulantibus et fervidis ingeniis, quae eos in diros tumultus, et inextricabilia mala coniecerunt (dinothus, _de bello civili_, 1582, p. 243).] [footnote 174: beza to tilius, july 5, 1572; _ill. vir. epp. sel._ 607.] [footnote 175: quoties autem ego haec ipse praedixi! quoties praemonui! sed sic deo visum est, iustissimis de causis irato, et tamen servatori (beza to tilius, sept. 10, 1572, 614). nihil istorum non iustissimo iudicio accidere necesse est fateri, qui galliarum statum norunt (beza to crato, aug. 26. 1573; gillet, ii. 521).] [footnote 176: ut mihi quidem magis absurde facere videantur quam si sacrilegas parricidas puniendos negarent, quum sint istis omnibus haeretici infinitis partibus deteriores.... in nullos unquam homines severius quam in haereticos, blasphemos et impios debet animadvertere (_de haereticis puniendis_, tract. theol. i. 143, 152).] [footnote 177: _epist. theolog._ 1575, p. 338.] [footnote 178: beza to wittgenstein, pentecost, 1583; friedländer, 143.] [footnote 179: lobo de silveis to de thou, july 7, 1616; _histoire_, xv. 371; j.b. gallus, _ibid._ p. 435.] [footnote 180: le cardinal barberini, que je tiens pour serviteur du roy, a parlé franchement sur ceste affaire, et m'a dit qu'il croyoit presqu'impossible qu'il se trouve jamais remede, si vous ne la voulez recommencer; disant que depuis le commencement jusqu'à la fin vous vous estes monstré du tout passionné contre ce qui est de l'honneur et de la grandeur de l'église, qu'il se trouvera dans vostre histoire que vous ne parlez jamais des catholiques qu'avec du mépris et de la louange de ceux de la religion; que mesme vous avez blasmé ce que feu monsieur le président de thou vostre père avoit approuvé, qui est la s. barthelemy (de brèves to de thou, rome, feb. 18, 1610; bib. imp. f. dupuy, 812).] [footnote 181: crudelitatisne tu esse ac non clementiae potius, pietatisque putas? (_resp. ad ep. casauboni_, 1612, p. 118).] [footnote 182: quae res uti catholicae religioni sublevandae opportuna, ita maxime jucunda gregorio accidit (_hist. pontif. gregori xiii._, p. 30).] [footnote 183: _histoire d'orléans_, pp. 421, 424.] [footnote 184: germain to bretagne, rome, dec. 24, 1685; valery, _corresp. de mabillon_, i. 192.] [footnote 185: du molinet, _hist. s. pont. per numismata_, 1679, 93; buorranni, _numismata pontificum_, i. 336.] [footnote 186: _annali d'italia_ ad ann. 1572.] [footnote 187: si huviera respirado mas tiempo, huviera dado a entender al mundo, que avia rey en la francia, y dios en israel (_vida de s. francisco de borja_, 446).] [footnote 188: _vita di sisto v._, i. 119.] [footnote 189: quo demum res evaderent, si regibus non esset integrum, in rebelles, subditos, quietisque publicae turbatores animadvertere? (_apparatus eruditionis_, vii. 503; piatti, _storia de' pontefici xi._, p. 271).] [footnote 190: per le notizie che ricevette della cessata strage (moroni, _dizionario di erudizione ecclesiastica_, xxxii. 298).] [footnote 191: [1868.]] [footnote 192: _kirchengeschichte_, iii. 211.] v the protestant theory of persecution[193] the manner in which religion influences state policy is more easily ascertained in the case of protestantism than in that of the catholic church: for whilst the expression of catholic doctrines is authoritative and unvarying, the great social problems did not all arise at once, and have at various times received different solutions. the reformers failed to construct a complete and harmonious code of doctrine; but they were compelled to supplement the new theology by a body of new rules for the guidance of their followers in those innumerable questions with regard to which the practice of the church had grown out of the experience of ages. and although the dogmatic system of protestantism was not completed in their time, yet the protestant spirit animated them in greater purity and force than it did any later generation. now, when a religion is applied to the social and political sphere, its general spirit must be considered, rather than its particular precepts. so that in studying the points of this application in the case of protestantism, we may consult the writings of the reformers with greater confidence than we could do for an exposition of protestant theology; and accept them as a greater authority, because they agree more entirely among themselves. we can be more sure that we have the true protestant opinion in a political or social question on which all the reformers are agreed, than in a theological question on which they differ; for the concurrent opinion must be founded on an element common to all, and therefore essential. if it should further appear that this opinion was injurious to their actual interests, and maintained at a sacrifice to themselves, we should then have an additional security for its necessary connection with their fundamental views. the most important example of this law is the protestant theory of toleration. the views of the reformers on religious liberty are not fragmentary, accidental opinions, unconnected with their doctrines, or suggested by the circumstances amidst which they lived; but the product of their theological system, and of their ideas of political and ecclesiastical government. civil and religious liberty are so commonly associated in people's mouths, and are so rare in fact, that their definition is evidently as little understood as the principle of their connection. the point at which they unite, the common root from which they derive their sustenance, is the right of self-government. the modern theory, which has swept away every authority except that of the state, and has made the sovereign power irresistible by multiplying those who share it, is the enemy of that common freedom in which religious freedom is included. it condemns, as a state within the state, every inner group and community, class or corporation, administering its own affairs; and, by proclaiming the abolition of privileges, it emancipates the subjects of every such authority in order to transfer them exclusively to its own. it recognises liberty only in the individual, because it is only in the individual that liberty can be separated from authority, and the right of conditional obedience deprived of the security of a limited command. under its sway, therefore, every man may profess his own religion more or less freely; but his religion is not free to administer its own laws. in other words, religious profession is free, but church government is controlled. and where ecclesiastical authority is restricted, religious liberty is virtually denied. for religious liberty is not the negative right of being without any particular religion, just as self-government is not anarchy. it is the right of religious communities to the practice of their own duties, the enjoyment of their own constitution, and the protection of the law, which equally secures to all the possession of their own independence. far from implying a general toleration, it is best secured by a limited one. in an indifferent state, that is, in a state without any definite religious character (if such a thing is conceivable), no ecclesiastical authority could exist. a hierarchical organisation would not be tolerated by the sects that have none, or by the enemies of all definite religion; for it would be in contradiction to the prevailing theory of atomic freedom. nor can a religion be free when it is alone, unless it makes the state subject to it. for governments restrict the liberty of the favoured church, by way of remunerating themselves for their service in preserving her unity. the most violent and prolonged conflicts for religious freedom occurred in the middle ages between a church which was not threatened by rivals and states which were most attentive to preserve her exclusive predominance. frederic ii., the most tyrannical oppressor of the church among the german emperors, was the author of those sanguinary laws against heresy which prevailed so long in many parts of europe. the inquisition, which upheld the religious unity of the spanish nation, imposed the severest restrictions on the spanish church; and in england conformity has been most rigorously exacted by those sovereigns who have most completely tyrannised over the established church. religious liberty, therefore, is possible only where the co-existence of different religions is admitted, with an equal right to govern themselves according to their own several principles. tolerance of error is requisite for freedom; but freedom will be most complete where there is no actual diversity to be resisted, and no theoretical unity to be maintained, but where unity exists as the triumph of truth, not of force, through the victory of the church, not through the enactment of the state. this freedom is attainable only in communities where rights are sacred, and where law is supreme. if the first duty is held to be obedience to authority and the preservation of order, as in the case of aristocracies and monarchies of the patriarchal type, there is no safety for the liberties either of individuals or of religion. where the highest consideration is the public good and the popular will, as in democracies, and in constitutional monarchies after the french pattern, majority takes the place of authority; an irresistible power is substituted for an idolatrous principle, and all private rights are equally insecure. the true theory of freedom excludes all absolute power and arbitrary action, and requires that a tyrannical or revolutionary government shall be coerced by the people; but it teaches that insurrection is criminal, except as a corrective of revolution and tyranny. in order to understand the views of the protestant reformers on toleration, they must be considered with reference to these points. while the reformation was an act of individual resistance and not a system, and when the secular powers were engaged in supporting the authority of the church, the authors of the movement were compelled to claim impunity for their opinions, and they held language regarding the right of governments to interfere with religious belief which resembles that of friends of toleration. every religious party, however exclusive or servile its theory may be, if it is in contradiction with a system generally accepted and protected by law, must necessarily, at its first appearance, assume the protection of the idea that the conscience is free.[194] before a new authority can be set up in the place of one that exists, there is an interval when the right of dissent must be proclaimed. at the beginning of luther's contest with the holy see there was no rival authority for him to appeal to. no ecclesiastical organism existed, the civil power was not on his side, and not even a definite system had yet been evolved by controversy out of his original doctrine of justification. his first efforts were acts of hostility, his exhortations were entirely aggressive, and his appeal was to the masses. when the prohibition of his new testament confirmed him in the belief that no favour was to be expected from the princes, he published his book on the civil power, which he judged superior to everything that had been written on government since the days of the apostles, and in which he asserts that authority is given to the state only against the wicked, and that it cannot coerce the godly. "princes," he says, "are not to be obeyed when they command submission to superstitious errors, but their aid is not to be invoked in support of the word of god."[195] heretics must be converted by the scriptures, and not by fire, otherwise the hangman would be the greatest doctor.[196] at the time when this was written luther was expecting the bull of excommunication and the ban of the empire, and for several years it appeared doubtful whether he would escape the treatment he condemned. he lived in constant fear of assassination, and his friends amused themselves with his terrors. at one time he believed that a jew had been hired by the polish bishops to despatch him; that an invisible physician was on his way to wittenberg to murder him; that the pulpit from which he preached was impregnated with a subtle poison.[197] these alarms dictated his language during those early years. it was not the true expression of his views, which he was not yet strong enough openly to put forth.[198] the zwinglian schism, the rise of the anabaptists, and the peasants' war altered the aspect of affairs. luther recognised in them the fruits of his theory of the right of private judgment and of dissent,[199] and the moment had arrived to secure his church against the application of the same dissolving principles which had served him to break off from his allegiance to rome.[200] the excesses of the social war threatened to deprive the movement of the sympathy of the higher classes, especially of the governments; and with the defeat of the peasants the popular phase of the reformation came to an end on the continent. "the devil," luther said, "having failed to put him down by the help of the pope, was seeking his destruction through the preachers of treason and blood."[201] he instantly turned from the people to the princes;[202] impressed on his party that character of political dependence, and that habit of passive obedience to the state, which it has ever since retained, and gave it a stability it could never otherwise have acquired. in thus taking refuge in the arms of the civil power, purchasing the safety of his doctrine by the sacrifice of its freedom, and conferring on the state, together with the right of control, the duty of imposing it at the point of the sword, luther in reality reverted to his original teaching.[203] the notion of liberty, whether civil or religious, was hateful to his despotic nature, and contrary to his interpretation of scripture. as early as 1519 he had said that even the turk was to be reverenced as an authority.[204] the demoralising servitude and lawless oppression which the peasants endured, gave them, in his eyes, no right to relief; and when they rushed to arms, invoking his name as their deliverer, he exhorted the nobles to take a merciless revenge.[205] their crime was, that they were animated by the sectarian spirit, which it was the most important interest of luther to suppress. the protestant authorities throughout southern germany were perplexed by their victory over the anabaptists. it was not easy to show that their political tenets were revolutionary, and the only subversive portion of their doctrine was that they held, with the catholics, that the state is not responsible for religion.[206] they were punished, therefore, because they taught that no man ought to suffer for his faith. at nuremberg the magistrates did not know how to proceed against them. they seemed no worse than the catholics, whom there was no question at that time of exterminating. the celebrated osiander deemed these scruples inconsistent. the papists, he said, ought also to be suppressed; and so long as this was not done, it was impossible to proceed to extremities against the anabaptists, who were no worse than they. luther also was consulted, and he decided that they ought not to be punished unless they refused to conform at the command of the government.[207] the margrave of brandenburg was also advised by the divines that a heretic who could not be converted out of scripture might be condemned; but that in his sentence nothing should be said about heresy, but only about sedition and murderous intent, though he should be guiltless of these.[208] with the aid of this artifice great numbers were put to death. luther's proud and ardent spirit despised such pretences. he had cast off all reserve, and spoke his mind openly on the rights and duties of the state towards the church and the people. his first step was to proclaim it the office of the civil power to prevent abominations.[209] he provided no security that, in discharging this duty, the sovereign should be guided by the advice of orthodox divines;[210] but he held the duty itself to be imperative. in obedience to the fundamental principle, that the bible is the sole guide in all things, he defined the office and justified it by scriptural precedents. the mosaic code, he argued, awarded to false prophets the punishment of death, and the majesty of god is not to be less deeply reverenced or less rigorously vindicated under the new testament than under the old; in a more perfect revelation the obligation is stronger. those who will not hear the church must be excluded from the communion; but the civil power is to intervene when the ecclesiastical excommunication has been pronounced, and men must be compelled to come in. for, according to the more accurate definition of the church which is given in the confession of schmalkald, and in the apology of the confession of augsburg, excommunication involves damnation. there is no salvation to be hoped for out of the church, and the test of orthodoxy against the pope, the devil, and all the world, is the dogma of justification by faith.[211] the defence of religion became, on this theory, not only the duty of the civil power, but the object of its institution. its business was solely the coercion of those who were out of the church. the faithful could not be the objects of its action; they did of their own accord more than any laws required. "a good tree," says luther, "brings forth good fruit by nature, without compulsion; is it not madness to prescribe laws to an apple-tree that it shall bear apples and not thorns?"[212] this view naturally proceeded from the axiom of the certainty of the salvation of all who believe in the confession of augsburg.[213] it is the most important element in luther's political system, because, while it made all protestant governments despotic, it led to the rejection of the authority of catholic governments. this is the point where protestant and catholic intolerance meet. if the state were instituted to promote the faith, no obedience could be due to a state of a different faith. protestants could not conscientiously be faithful subjects of catholic powers, and they could not therefore be tolerated. misbelievers would have no rights under an orthodox state, and a misbelieving prince would have no authority over orthodox subjects. the more, therefore, luther expounded the guilt of resistance and the divine sanction of authority, the more subversive his influence became in catholic countries. his system was alike revolutionary, whether he defied the catholic powers or promoted a protestant tyranny. he had no notion of political right. he found no authority for such a claim in the new testament, and he held that righteousness does not need to exhibit itself in works. it was the same helpless dependence on the letter of scripture which led the reformers to consequences more subversive of christian morality than their views on questions of polity. when carlstadt cited the mosaic law in defence of polygamy, luther was indignant. if the mosaic law is to govern everything, he said, we should be compelled to adopt circumcision.[214] nevertheless, as there is no prohibition of polygamy in the new testament, the reformers were unable to condemn it. they did not forbid it as a matter of divine law, and referred it entirely to the decision of the civil legislator.[215] this, accordingly was the view which guided luther and melanchthon in treating the problem, the ultimate solution of which was the separation of england from the church.[216] when the landgrave philip afterwards appealed to this opinion, and to the earlier commentaries of luther, the reformers were compelled to approve his having two wives. melanchthon was a witness at the wedding of the second, and the only reservation was a request that the matter should not be allowed to get abroad.[217] it was the same portion of luther's theology, and the same opposition to the spirit of the church in the treatment of scripture, that induced him to believe in astrology and to ridicule the copernican system.[218] his view of the authority of scripture and his theory of justification both precluded him from appreciating freedom. "christian freedom," he said, "consists in the belief that we require no works to attain piety and salvation."[219] thus he became the inventor of the theory of passive obedience, according to which no motives or provocation can justify a revolt; and the party against whom the revolt is directed, whatever its guilt may be, is to be preferred to the party revolting, however just its cause.[220] in 1530 he therefore declared that the german princes had no right to resist the emperor in defence of their religion. "it was the duty of a christian," he said, "to suffer wrong, and no breach of oath or of duty could deprive the emperor of his right to the unconditional obedience of his subjects."[221] even the empire seemed to him a despotism, from his scriptural belief that it was a continuation of the last of the four monarchies.[222] he preferred submission, in the hope of seeing a future protestant emperor, to a resistance which might have dismembered the empire if it had succeeded, and in which failure would have been fatal to the protestants; and he was always afraid to draw the logical consequences of his theory of the duty of protestants towards catholic sovereigns. in consequence of this fact, ranke affirms that the great reformer was also one of the greatest conservatives that ever lived; and his biographer, jürgens, makes the more discriminating remark that history knows of no man who was at once so great an insurgent and so great an upholder of order as he.[223] neither of these writers understood that the same principle lies at the root both of revolution and of passive obedience, and that the difference is only in the temper of the person who applies it, and in the outward circumstances. luther's theory is apparently in opposition to protestant interests, for it entitles catholicism to the protection of catholic powers. he disguised from himself this inconsistency, and reconciled theory with expediency by the calculation that the immense advantages which his system offered to the princes would induce them all to adopt it. for, besides the consolatory doctrine of justification,--"a doctrine original, specious, persuasive, powerful against rome, and wonderfully adapted, as if prophetically, to the genius of the times which were to follow,"[224]--he bribed the princes with the wealth of the church, independence of ecclesiastical authority, facilities for polygamy, and absolute power. he told the peasants not to take arms against the church unless they could persuade the government to give the order; but thinking it probable, in 1522, that the catholic clergy would, in spite of his advice, be exterminated by the fury of the people, he urged the government to suppress them, because what was done by the constituted authority could not be wrong.[225] persuaded that the sovereign power would be on his side, he allowed no limits to its extent. it is absurd, he says, to imagine that, even with the best intentions, kings can avoid committing occasional injustice; they stand, therefore, particularly in need--not of safeguards against the abuse of power, but--of the forgiveness of sins.[226] the power thus concentrated in the hands of the rulers for the guardianship of the faith, he wished to be used with the utmost severity against unregenerate men, in whom there was neither moral virtue nor civil rights, and from whom no good could come until they were converted. he therefore required that all crimes should be most cruelly punished and that the secular arm should be employed to convert where it did not destroy. the idea of mercy tempering justice he denounced as a popish superstition.[227] the chief object of the severity thus recommended was, of course, efficaciously to promote the end for which government itself was held to be instituted. the clergy had authority over the conscience, but it was thought necessary that they should be supported by the state with the absolute penalties of outlawry, in order that error might be exterminated, although it was impossible to banish sin.[228] no government, it was maintained, could tolerate heresy without being responsible for the souls that were seduced by it;[229] and as ezechiel destroyed the brazen serpent to prevent idolatry, the mass must be suppressed, for the mass was the worst kind of idolatry.[230] in 1530, when it was proposed to leave the matters in dispute to the decision of the future council, luther declared that the mass and monastic life could not be tolerated in the meantime, because it was unlawful to connive at error.[231] "it will lie heavy on your conscience," he writes to the duke of saxony, "if you tolerate the catholic worship; for no secular prince can permit his subjects to be divided by the preaching of opposite doctrines. the catholics have no right to complain, for they do not prove the truth of their doctrine from scripture, and therefore do not conscientiously believe it."[232] he would tolerate them only if they acknowledged themselves, like the jews, enemies of christ and of the emperor, and consented to exist as outcasts of society.[233] "heretics," he said, "are not to be disputed with, but to be condemned unheard, and whilst they perish by fire, the faithful ought to pursue the evil to its source, and bathe their hands in the blood of the catholic bishops, and of the pope, who is a devil in disguise."[234] the persecuting principles which were involved in luther's system, but which he cared neither to develop, to apply, nor to defend, were formed into a definite theory by the colder genius of melanchthon. destitute of luther's confidence in his own strength, and in the infallible success of his doctrine, he clung more eagerly to the hope of achieving victory by the use of physical force. like his master he too hesitated at first, and opposed the use of severe measures against the zwickau prophets; but when he saw the development of that early germ of dissent, and the gradual dissolution of lutheran unity, he repented of his ill-timed clemency.[235] he was not deterred from asserting the duty of persecution by the risk of putting arms into the hands of the enemies of the reformation. he acknowledged the danger, but he denied the right. catholic powers, he deemed, might justly persecute, but they could only persecute error. they must apply the same criterion which the lutherans applied, and then they were justified in persecuting those whom the lutherans also proscribed. for the civil power had no right to proscribe a religion in order to save itself from the dangers of a distracted and divided population. the judge of the fact and of the danger must be, not the magistrate, but the clergy.[236] the crime lay, not in dissent, but in error. here, therefore, melanchthon repudiated the theory and practice of the catholics, whose aid he invoked; for all the intolerance in the catholic times was founded on the combination of two ideas--the criminality of apostasy, and the inability of the state to maintain its authority where the moral sense of a part of the community was in opposition to it. the reformers, therefore, approved the catholic practice of intolerance, and even encouraged it, although their own principles of persecution were destitute not only of connection, but even of analogy, with it. by simply accepting the inheritance of the mediæval theory of the religious unity of the empire, they would have been its victims. by asserting that persecution was justifiable only against error, that is, only when purely religious, they set up a shield for themselves, and a sword against those sects for whose destruction they were more eager than the catholics. whether we refer the origin of protestant intolerance to the doctrines or to the interests of the reformation, it appears totally unconnected with the tradition of catholic ages, or the atmosphere of catholicism. all severities exercised by catholics before that time had a practical motive; but protestant persecution was based on a purely speculative foundation, and was due partly to the influence of scripture examples, partly to the supposed interests of the protestant party. it never admitted the exclusion of dissent to be a political right of the state, but maintained the suppression of error to be its political duty. to say, therefore, that the protestants learnt persecution from the catholics, is as false as to say that they used it by way of revenge. for they founded it on very different and contradictory grounds, and they admitted the right of the catholics to persecute even the protestant sects. melanchthon taught that the sects ought to be put down by the sword, and that any individual who started new opinions ought to be punished with death.[237] he carefully laid down that these severities were requisite, not in consideration of the danger to the state, nor of immoral teaching, nor even of such differences as would weaken the authority or arrest the action of the ecclesiastical organisation, but simply on account of a difference, however slight, in the theologumena of protestantism.[238] thamer, who held the possibility of salvation among the heathen; schwenkfeld, who taught that not the written word, but the internal illumination of grace in the soul was the channel of god's influence on man; the zwinglians, with their error on the eucharist, all these met with no more favour than the fanatical anabaptists.[239] the state was held bound to vindicate the first table of the law with the same severity as those commandments on which civil society depends for its existence. the government of the church being administered by the civil magistrates, it was their office also to enforce the ordinances of religion; and the same power whose voice proclaimed religious orthodoxy and law held in its hand the sword by which they were enforced. no religious authority existed except through the civil power.[240] the church was merged in the state; but the laws of the state, in return, were identified with the commandments of religion.[241] in accordance with these principles, the condemnation of servetus by a civil tribunal, which had no authority over him, and no jurisdiction over his crime--the most aggressive and revolutionary act, therefore, that is conceivable in the casuistry of persecution--was highly approved by melanchthon. he declared it a most useful example for all future ages, and could not understand that there should be any who did not regard it in the same favourable light.[242] it is true that servetus, by denying the divinity of christ, was open to the charge of blasphemy in a stricter sense than that in which the reformers generally applied it. but this was not the case with the catholics. they did not represent, like the sects, an element of dissolution in protestantism, and the bulk of their doctrine was admitted by the reformers. they were not in revolt against existing authority; they required no special innovations for their protection; they demanded only that the change of religion should not be compulsory. yet melanchthon held that they too were to be proscribed, because their worship was idolatrous.[243] in doing this he adopted the principle of aggressive intolerance, which was at that time new to the christian world; and which the popes and councils of the catholic church had condemned when the zeal of laymen had gone beyond the lawful measure. in the middle ages there had been persecution far more sanguinary than any that has been inflicted by protestants. various motives had occasioned it and various arguments had been used in its defence. but the principle on which the protestants oppressed the catholics was new. the catholics had never admitted the theory of absolute toleration, as it was defined at first by luther, and afterwards by some of the sects. in principle, their tolerance differed from that of the protestants as widely as their intolerance. they had exterminated sects which, like the albigenses, threatened to overturn the fabric of christian society. they had proscribed different religions where the state was founded on religious unity, and where this unity formed an integral part of its laws and administration. they had gone one step further, and punished those whom the church condemned as apostates; thereby vindicating, not, as in the first case, the moral basis of society, nor, as in the second, the religious foundation of the state, but the authority of the church and the purity of her doctrine, on which they relied as the pillar and bulwark of the social and political order. where a portion of the inhabitants of any country preferred a different creed, jew, mohammedan, heathen, or schismatic, they had been generally tolerated, with enjoyment of property and personal freedom, but not with that of political power or autonomy. but political freedom had been denied them because they did not admit the common ideas of duty which were its basis. this position, however, was not tenable, and was the source of great disorders. the protestants, in like manner, could give reasons for several kinds of persecution. they could bring the socinians under the category of blasphemers; and blasphemy, like the ridicule of sacred things, destroys reverence and awe, and tends to the destruction of society. the anabaptists, they might argue, were revolutionary fanatics, whose doctrines were subversive of the civil order; and the dogmatic sects threatened the ruin of ecclesiastical unity within the protestant community itself. but by placing the necessity of intolerance on the simple ground of religious error, and in directing it against the church which they themselves had abandoned, they introduced a purely subjective test, and a purely revolutionary system. it is on this account that the _tu quoque_, or retaliatory argument, is inadmissible between catholics and protestants. catholic intolerance is handed down from an age when unity subsisted, and when its preservation, being essential for that of society, became a necessity of state as well as a result of circumstances. protestant intolerance, on the contrary was the peculiar fruit of a dogmatic system in contradiction with the facts and principles on which the intolerance actually existing among catholics was founded. spanish intolerance has been infinitely more sanguinary than swedish; but in spain, independently of the interests of religion, there were strong political and social reasons to justify persecution without seeking any theory to prop it up; whilst in sweden all those practical considerations have either been wanting, or have been opposed to persecution, which has consequently had no justification except the theory of the reformation. the only instance in which the protestant theory has been adopted by catholics is the revocation of the edict of nantes. towards the end of his life, melanchthon, having ceased to be a strict lutheran, receded somewhat from his former uncompromising position, and was adverse to a strict scrutiny into minor theological differences. he drew a distinction between errors that required punishment and variations that were not of practical importance.[244] the english calvinists who took refuge in germany in the reign of mary tudor were ungraciously received by those who were stricter lutherans than melanchthon. he was consulted concerning the course to be adopted towards the refugees, and he recommended toleration. but both at wesel and at frankfort his advice was, to his great disgust, overruled.[245] the severities of the protestants were chiefly provoked by the anabaptists, who denied the lawfulness of civil government, and strove to realise the kingdom of god on earth by absorbing the state in the church.[246] none protested more loudly than they against the lutheran intolerance, or suffered from it more severely. but while denying the spiritual authority of the state, they claimed for their religious community a still more absolute right of punishing error by death. though they sacrificed government to religion, the effect was the same as that of absorbing the church in the state. in 1524 münzer published a sermon, in which he besought the lutheran princes to extirpate catholicism. "have no remorse," he says; "for he to whom all power is given in heaven and on earth means to govern alone."[247] he demanded the punishment of all heretics, the destruction of all who were not of his faith, and the institution of religious unity. "do not pretend," he says, "that the power of god will accomplish it without the use of your sword, or it will grow rusty in the scabbard. the tree that bringeth not forth good fruit must be cut down and cast into the fire." and elsewhere, "the ungodly have no right to live, except so far as the elect choose to grant it them."[248] when the anabaptists were supreme at münster, they exhibited the same intolerance. at seven in the morning of friday, 27th february 1534, they ran through the streets crying, "away with the ungodly!" breaking into the houses of those who refused their baptism, they drove the men out of the town, and forcibly rebaptized the women who remained behind.[249] whilst, therefore, the anabaptists were punished for questioning the authority of the lutherans in religious matters, they practically justified their persecution by their own intolerant doctrines. in fact, they carried the protestant principles of persecution to an extreme. for whereas the lutherans regarded the defence of truth and punishment of error as being, in part, the object of the institution of civil government, they recognised it as an advantage by which the state was rewarded for its pains; but the anabaptists repudiated the political element altogether, and held that error should be exterminated solely for the sake of truth, and at the expense of all existing states. bucer, whose position in the history of the reformation is so peculiar, and who differed in important points from the saxon leaders, agreed with them on the necessity of persecuting. he was so anxious for the success of protestantism, that he was ready to sacrifice and renounce important doctrines, in order to save the appearance of unity;[250] but those opinions in which he took so little dogmatic interest, he was resolved to defend by force. he was very much dissatisfied with the reluctance of the senate of strasburg to adopt severe measures against the catholics. his colleague capito was singularly tolerant; for the feeling of the inhabitants was not decidedly in favour of the change.[251] but bucer, his biographer tells us, was, in spite of his inclination to mediate, not friendly to this temporising system; partly because he had an organising intellect, which relied greatly on practical discipline to preserve what had been conquered, and on restriction of liberty to be the most certain security for its preservation; partly because he had a deep insight into the nature of various religious tendencies, and was justly alarmed at their consequences for church and state.[252] this point in the character of bucer provoked a powerful resistance to his system of ecclesiastical discipline, for it was feared that he would give to the clergy a tyrannical power.[253] it is true that the demoralisation which ensued on the destruction of the old ecclesiastical authority rendered a strict attention on the part of the state to the affairs of religion highly necessary.[254] the private and confidential communications of the german reformers give a more hideous picture of the moral condition of the generation which followed the reformation than they draw in their published writings of that which preceded it. it is on this account that bucer so strongly insisted on the necessity of the interference of the civil power in support of the discipline of the church. the swiss reformers, between whom and the saxons bucer forms a connecting link, differ from them in one respect, which greatly influenced their notions of government. luther lived under a monarchy which was almost absolute, and in which the common people, who were of slavonic origin, were in the position of the most abject servitude; but the divines of zürich and bern were republicans. they did not therefore entertain his exalted views as to the irresistible might of the state; and instead of requiring as absolute a theory of the indefectibility of the civil power as he did, they were satisfied with obtaining a preponderating influence for themselves. where the power was in hands less favourable to their cause, they had less inducement to exaggerate its rights. zwingli abolishes both the distinction between church and state and the notion of ecclesiastical authority. in his system the civil rulers possess the spiritual functions; and, as their foremost duty is the preservation and promotion of the true religion, it is their business to preach. as magistrates are too much occupied with other things, they must delegate the ministry of the word to preachers, for whose orthodoxy they have to provide. they are bound to establish uniformity of doctrine, and to defend it against papists and heretics. this is not only their right, but their duty; and not only their duty, but the condition on which they retain office.[255] rulers who do not act in accordance with it are to be dismissed. thus zwingli combined persecution and revolution in the same doctrine. but he was not a fanatical persecutor, and his severity was directed less against the catholics than against the anabaptists,[256] whose prohibition of all civil offices was more subversive of order in a republic than in a monarchy. even, however, in the case of the anabaptists the special provocation was--not the peril to the state, nor the scandal of their errors, but--the schism which weakened the church.[257] the punishment of heresy for the glory of god was almost inconsistent with the theory that there is no ecclesiastical power. it was not so much provoked in zürich as elsewhere, because in a small republican community, where the governing body was supreme over both civil and religious affairs, religious unity was a matter of course. the practical necessity of maintaining unity put out of sight the speculative question of the guilt and penalty of error. soon after zwingli's death, leo judæ called for severer measures against the catholics, expressly stating, however, that they did not deserve death. "excommunication," he said, "was too light a punishment to be inflicted by the state which wields the sword, and the faults in question were not great enough to involve the danger of death."[258] afterwards he fell into doubts as to the propriety of severe measures against dissenters, but his friends bullinger and capito succeeded in removing his scruples, and in obtaining his acquiescence in that intolerance, which was, says his biographer, a question of life and death for the protestant church.[259] bullinger took, like zwingli, a more practical view of the question than was common in germany. he thought it safer strictly to exclude religious differences than to put them down with fire and sword; "for in this case," he says, "the victims compare themselves to the early martyrs, and make their punishment a weapon of defence."[260] he did not, however, forbid capital punishment in cases of heresy. in the year 1535 he drew up an opinion on the treatment of religious error, which is written in a tone of great moderation. in this document he says "that all sects which introduce division into the church must be put down, and not only such as, like the anabaptists, threaten to subvert society, for the destruction of order and unity often begins in an apparently harmless or imperceptible way. the culprit should be examined with gentleness. if his disposition is good he will not refuse instruction; if not, still patience must be shown until there is no hope of converting him. then he must be treated like other malefactors, and handed over to the torturer and the executioner."[261] after this time there were no executions for religion in zürich, and the number, even in the lifetime of zwingli, was less considerable than in many other places. but it was still understood that confirmed heretics would be put to death. in 1546, in answer to the pope's invitation to the council of trent, bullinger indignantly repudiates the insinuation that the protestant cantons were heretical, "for, by the grace of god, we have always punished the vices of heresy and sodomy with fire, and have looked upon them, and still look upon them, with horror."[262] this accusation of heresy inflamed the zeal of the reformers against heretics, in order to prove to the catholics that they had no sympathy with them. on these grounds bullinger recommended the execution of servetus. "if the high council inflicts on him the fate due to a worthless blasphemer, all the world will see that the people of geneva hate blasphemers, and that they punish with the sword of justice heretics who are obstinate in their heresy.... strict fidelity and vigilance are needed, because our churches are in ill repute abroad, as if we were heretics and friends of heresy. now god's holy providence has furnished an opportunity of clearing ourselves of this evil suspicion."[263] after the event he advised calvin to justify it, as there were some who were taken aback. "everywhere," he says, "there are excellent men who are convinced that godless and blaspheming men ought not only to be rebuked and imprisoned, but also to be put to death.... how servetus could have been spared i cannot see."[264] the position of oecolampadius in reference to these questions was altogether singular and exceptional. he dreaded the absorption of the ecclesiastical functions by the state, and sought to avoid it by the introduction of a council of twelve elders, partly magistrates, partly clergy, to direct ecclesiastical affairs. "many things," he said, "are punished by the secular power less severely than the dignity of the church demands. on the other hand, it punishes the repentant, to whom the church shows mercy. either it blunts the edge of its sword by not punishing the guilty, or it brings some hatred on the gospel by severity."[265] but the people of basel were deaf to the arguments of the reformer, and here, as elsewhere, the civil power usurped the office of the church. in harmony with this jealousy of political interference, oecolampadius was very merciful to the anabaptists. "severe penalties," he said, "were likely to aggravate the evil; forgiveness would hasten the cure."[266] a few months later, however, he regretted this leniency. "we perceive," he writes to a friend, "that we have sometimes shown too much indulgence; but this is better than to proceed tyrannically, or to surrender the keys of the church."[267] whilst, on the other hand, he rejoiced at the expulsion of the catholics, he ingeniously justified the practice of the catholic persecutors. "in the early ages of the church, when the divinity of christ manifested itself to the world by miracles, god incited the apostles to treat the ungodly with severity. when the miracles ceased, and the faith was universally adopted, he gained the hearts of princes and rulers, so that they undertook to protect with the sword the gentleness and patience of the church. they rigorously resisted, in fulfilment of the duties of their office, the contemners of the church."[268] "the clergy," he goes on to say, "became tyrannical because they usurped to themselves a power which they ought to have shared with others; and as the people dread the return of this tyranny of ecclesiastical authority, it is wiser for the protestant clergy to make no use of the similar power of excommunication which is intrusted to them." calvin, as the subject of an absolute monarch, and the ruling spirit in a republic, differed both from the german and the swiss reformers in his idea of the state both in its object and in its duty towards the church. an exile from his own country, he had lost the associations and habits of monarchy, and his views of discipline as well as doctrine were matured before he took up his abode in switzerland.[269] his system was not founded on existing facts; it had no roots in history, but was purely ideal, speculative, and therefore more consistent and inflexible than any other. luther's political ideas were bounded by the horizon of the monarchical absolutism under which he lived. zwingli's were influenced by the democratic forms of his native country, which gave to the whole community the right of appointing the governing body. calvin, independent of all such considerations, studied only how his doctrine could best be realised, whether through the instrumentality of existing authorities, or at their expense. in his eyes its interests were paramount, their promotion the supreme duty, opposition to them an unpardonable crime. there was nothing in the institutions of men, no authority, no right, no liberty, that he cared to preserve, or towards which he entertained any feelings of reverence or obligation. his theory made the support of religious truth the end and office of the state,[270] which was bound therefore to protect, and consequently to obey, the church, and had no control over it. in religion the first and highest thing was the dogma: the preservation of morals was one important office of government; but the maintenance of the purity of doctrine was the highest. the result of this theory is the institution of a pure theocracy. if the elect were alone upon the earth, calvin taught, there would be no need of the political order, and the anabaptists would be right in rejecting it;[271] but the elect are in a minority; and there is the mass of reprobates who must be coerced by the sword, in order that all the world may be made subject to the truth, by the conquerors imposing their faith upon the vanquished.[272] he wished to extend religion by the sword, but to reserve death as the punishment of apostasy; and as this law would include the catholics, who were in calvin's eyes apostates from the truth, he narrowed it further to those who were apostates from the community. in this way, he said, there was no pretext given to the catholics to retaliate.[273] they, as well as the jews and mohammedans, must be allowed to live: death was only the penalty of protestants who relapsed into error; but to them it applied equally whether they were converted to the church or joined the sects and fell into unbelief. only in cases where there was no danger of his words being used against the protestants, and in letters not intended for publication, he required that catholics should suffer the same penalties as those who were guilty of sedition, on the ground that the majesty of god must be as strictly avenged as the throne of the king.[274] if the defence of the truth was the purpose for which power was intrusted to princes, it was natural that it should be also the condition on which they held it. long before the revolution of 1688, calvin had decided that princes who deny the true faith, "abdicate" their crowns, and are no longer to be obeyed;[275] and that no oaths are binding which are in contradiction to the interests of protestantism.[276] he painted the princes of his age in the blackest colours,[277] and prayed to god for their destruction;[278] though at the same time he condemned all rebellion on the part of his friends, so long as there were great doubts of their success.[279] his principles, however, were often stronger than his exhortations, and he had difficulty in preventing murders and seditious movements in france,[280] when he was dead, nobody prevented them, and it became clear that his system, by subjecting the civil power to the service of religion, was more dangerous to toleration than luther's plan of giving to the state supremacy over the church. calvin was as positive as luther in asserting the duty of obedience to rulers irrespective of their mode of government[281] he constantly declared that tyranny was not to be resisted on political grounds; that no civil rights could outweigh the divine sanction of government; except in cases where a special office was appointed for the purpose. where there was no such office--where, for instance, the estates of the realm had lost their independence--there was no protection. this is one of the most important and essential characteristics of the politics of the reformers. by making the protection of their religion the principal business of government, they put out of sight its more immediate and universal duties, and made the political objects of the state disappear behind its religious end. a government was to be judged, in their eyes, only by its fidelity to the protestant church. if it fulfilled those requirements, no other complaints against it could be entertained. a tyrannical prince could not be resisted if he was orthodox; a just prince could be dethroned if he failed in the more essential condition of faith. in this way protestantism became favourable at once to despotism and to revolution, and was ever ready to sacrifice good government to its own interests. it subverted monarchies, and, at the same time, denounced those who, for political causes, sought their subversion; but though the monarchies it subverted were sometimes tyrannical, and the seditions it prevented sometimes revolutionary, the order it defended or sought to establish was never legitimate and free, for it was always invested with the function of religious proselytism,[282] and with the obligation of removing every traditional, social, or political right or power which could oppose the discharge of that essential duty. the part calvin had taken in the death of servetus obliged him to develop more fully his views on the punishment of heresy. he wrote a short account of the trial,[283] and argued that governments are bound to suppress heresy, and that those who deny the justice of the punishment, themselves deserve it.[284] the book was signed by all the clergy of geneva, as calvin's compurgators. it was generally considered a failure; and a refutation appeared, which was so skilful as to produce a great sensation in the protestant world.[285] this famous tract, now of extreme rarity, did not, as has been said, "contain the pith of those arguments which have ultimately triumphed in almost every part of europe;" nor did it preach an unconditional toleration.[286] but it struck hard at calvin by quoting a passage from the first edition of his _institutes_, afterwards omitted, in which he spoke for toleration. "some of those," says the author, "whom we quote have subsequently written in a different spirit. nevertheless, we have cited the earlier opinion as the true one, as it was expressed under the pressure of persecution,"[287] the first edition, we are informed by calvin himself, was written for the purpose of vindicating the protestants who were put to death, and of putting a stop to the persecution. it was anonymous, and naturally dwelt on the principles of toleration. although this book did not denounce all intolerance, and although it was extremely moderate, calvin and his friends were filled with horror. "what remains of christianity," exclaimed beza, "if we silently admit what this man has expectorated in his preface?... since the beginning of christianity no such blasphemy was ever heard."[288] beza undertook to defend calvin in an elaborate work,[289] in which it was easy for him to cite the authority of all the leading reformers in favour of the practice of putting heretics to death, and in which he reproduced all the arguments of those who had written on the subject before him. more systematic than calvin, he first of all excludes those who are not christians--the jews, turks, and heathen--whom his inquiry does not touch; "among christians," he proceeds to say, "some are schismatics, who sin against the peace of the church, or disbelievers, who reject her doctrine. among these, some err in all simplicity; and if their error is not very grave, and if they do not seduce others, they need not be punished."[290] "but obstinate heretics are far worse than parricides, and deserve death, even if they repent."[291] "it is the duty of the state to punish them, for the whole ecclesiastical order is upheld by the political."[292] in early ages this power was exercised by the temporal sovereigns; they convoked councils, punished heretics, promulgated dogmas. the papacy afterwards arose, in evil times, and was a great calamity; but it was preferable a hundred times to the anarchy which was defended under the name of merciful toleration. the circumstances of the condemnation of servetus make it the most perfect and characteristic example of the abstract intolerance of the reformers. servetus was guilty of no political crime; he was not an inhabitant of geneva, and was on the point of leaving it, and nothing immoral could be attributed to him. he was not even an advocate of absolute toleration.[293] the occasion of his apprehension was a dispute between a catholic and a protestant, as to which party was most zealous in suppressing egregious errors. calvin, who had long before declared that if servetus came to geneva he should never leave it alive,[294] did all he could to obtain his condemnation by the inquisition at vienne. at geneva he was anxious that the sentence should be death,[295] and in this he was encouraged by the swiss churches, but especially by beza, farel, bullinger, and peter martyr.[296] all the protestant authorities, therefore, agreed in the justice of putting a writer to death in whose case all the secondary motives of intolerance were wanting. servetus was not a party leader. he had no followers who threatened to upset the peace and unity of the church. his doctrine was speculative, without power or attraction for the masses, like lutheranism; and without consequences subversive of morality, or affecting in any direct way the existence of society, like anabaptism.[297] he had nothing to do with geneva, and his persecutors would have rejoiced if he had been put to death elsewhere. "bayle," says hallam,[298] "has an excellent remark on this controversy." bayle's remark is as follows: "whenever protestants complain, they are answered by the right which calvin and beza recognised in magistrates; and to this day there has been nobody who has not failed pitiably against this _argumentum ad hominem_." no question of the merits of the reformation or of persecution is involved in an inquiry as to the source and connection of the opinions on toleration held by the protestant reformers. no man's sentiments on the rightfulness of religious persecution will be affected by the theories we have described, and they have no bearing whatever on doctrinal controversy. those who--in agreement with the principle of the early church, that men are free in matters of conscience--condemn all intolerance, will censure catholics and protestants alike. those who pursue the same principle one step farther and practically invert it, by insisting on the right and duty not only of professing but of extending the truth, must, as it seems to us, approve the conduct both of protestants and catholics, unless they make the justice of the persecution depend on the truth of the doctrine defended, in which case they will divide on both sides. such persons, again, as are more strongly impressed with the cruelty of actual executions than with the danger of false theories, may concentrate their indignation on the catholics of languedoc and spain; while those who judge principles, not by the accidental details attending their practical realisation, but by the reasoning on which they are founded, will arrive at a verdict adverse to the protestants. these comparative inquiries, however, have little serious interest. if we give our admiration to tolerance, we must remember that the spanish moors and the turks in europe have been more tolerant than the christians; and if we admit the principle of intolerance, and judge its application by particular conditions, we are bound to acknowledge that the romans had better reason for persecution than any modern state, since their empire was involved in the decline of the old religion, with which it was bound up, whereas no christian polity has been subverted by the mere presence of religious dissent. the comparison is, moreover, entirely unreasonable, for there is nothing in common between catholic and protestant intolerance. the church began with the principle of liberty, both as her claim and as her rule; and external circumstances forced intolerance upon her, after her spirit of unity had triumphed, in spite both of the freedom she proclaimed and of the persecutions she suffered. protestantism set up intolerance as an imperative precept and as a part of its doctrine, and it was forced to admit toleration by the necessities of its position, after the rigorous penalties it imposed had failed to arrest the process of internal dissolution.[299] at the time when this involuntary change occurred the sects that caused it were the bitterest enemies of the toleration they demanded. in the same age the puritans and the catholics sought a refuge beyond the atlantic from the persecution which they suffered together under the stuarts. flying for the same reason, and from the same oppression, they were enabled respectively to carry out their own views in the colonies which they founded in massachusetts and maryland, and the history of those two states exhibits faithfully the contrast between the two churches. the catholic emigrants established, for the first time in modern history, a government in which religion was free, and with it the germ of that religious liberty which now prevails in america. the puritans, on the other hand, revived with greater severity the penal laws of the mother country. in process of time the liberty of conscience in the catholic colony was forcibly abolished by the neighbouring protestants of virginia; while on the borders of massachusetts the new state of rhode island was formed by a party of fugitives from the intolerance of their fellow-colonists. footnotes: [footnote 193: _the rambler_, march 1862.] [footnote 194: "le vrai principe de luther est celui-ci: la volonté est esclave par nature.... le libre examen a été pour luther un moyen et non un principe. il s'en est servi, et était contraint de s'en servir pour établir son vrai principe, qui était la toute-puissance de la foi et de la grâce.... c'est ainsi que le libre examen s'imposa au protestantisme. l'accessoire devint le principal, et la forme dévora plus ou moins le fond" (janet, _histoire de la philosophie morale_, ii. 38. 39).] [footnote 195: "if they prohibit true doctrine, and punish their subjects for receiving the entire sacrament, as christ ordained it, compel the people to idolatrous practices, with masses for the dead, indulgences, invocation of saints, and the like, in these things they exceed their office, and seek to deprive god of the obedience due to him. for god requires from us this above all, that we hear his word, and follow it; but where the government desires to prevent this, the subjects must know that they are not bound to obey it" (luther's _werke_, xiii. 2244). "non est, mi spalatine, principum et istius saeculi pontificum tueri verbum dei, nec ea gratia ullorum peto praesidium" (luther's _briefe_, ed. de wette, i. 521, nov. 4, 1520). "i will compel and urge by force no man; for the faith must be voluntary and not compulsory, and must be adopted without violence" ("sermonen an carlstadt," _werke_, xx. 24, 1522).] [footnote 196: "schrift an den christlichen adel" (_werke_, x. 574, june 1520). his proposition, _haereticos comburi esse contra voluntatem spiritus_, was one of those condemned by leo x. as pestilent, scandalous, and contrary to christian charity.] [footnote 197: "nihil non tentabunt romanenses, nec potest satis huttenus me monere, adeo mihi de veneno timet" (de wette, i. 487). "etiam inimici mei quidam miserti per amicos ex halberstadio fecerunt moneri me: esse quemdam doctorem medicinae, qui arte magica factus pro libito invisibilis, quemdam occidit, mandatum habentem et occidendi lutheri, venturumque ad futuram dominicam ostensionis reliquiarum: valde hoc constanter narratur" (de wette, i. 441). "est hic apud nos judaeus polonus, missus sub pretio 2000 aureorum, ut me veneno perdat, ab amicis per literas mihi proditus. doctor est medicinae, et nihil non audere et facere paratus incredibili astutia et agilitate" (de wette, ii. 616). see also jarcke, _studien zur geschichte der reformation_, p. 176.] [footnote 198: "multa ego premo et causa principis et universitatis nostrae cohibeo, quae (si alibi essem) evomerem in vastatricem scripturae et ecclesiae romanae.... timeo miser, ne forte non sim dignus pati et occidi pro tali causa: erit ista felicitas meliorum hominum, non tam foedi peccatoris. dixi tibi semper me paratum esse cedere loco, si qua ego principi ill. viderer periculo hic vivere. aliquando certe moriendum est, quanquam jam edita vernacula quadam apologia satis aduler romanae ecclesiae et pontifici, si quid forte id prosit" (de wette, i. 260, 261). "ubi periculum est, ne iis protectoribus tutus saevius in romanenses sim grassaturus, quam si sub principis imperio publicis militarem officiis docendi.... ego vicissim, nisi ignem habere nequeam damnabo, publiceque concremabo jus pontificium totum, id est, lernam illam haeresium; et finem habebit humilitatis exhibitae hactenusque frustratae observantia qua nolo amplius inflari hostes evangelii" (_ibid._ pp. 465, 466, july 10, 1520).] [footnote 199: "out of the gospel and divine truth come devilish lies; ... from the blood in our body comes corruption; out of luther come müntzer, and rebels, anabaptists, sacramentarians, and false brethren" (_werke_, i. 75).] [footnote 200: "habemus," wrote erasmus, "fructum tui spiritus.... non agnoscis hosce seditiosos, opinor, sed illi te agnoscunt ... nec tamen efficis quominus credant homines per tuos libellos ... pro libertare evangelica, contra tyrannidem humanam, hisce tumultibus fuisse datam occasionem." "and who will deny," adds a protestant classic, "that the fault was partly owing to them?" (planck, _geschichte der protestantischen kirche_, ii, 183).] [footnote 201: "ich sehe das wohl, dass der teufel, so er mich bisher nicht hat mögen umbringen durch den pabst, sucht er mich durch die blutdürstigen mordpropheten und rottengeisten, so unter euch sind, zu vertilgen und auffressen" (_werke_, xvi. 77).] [footnote 202: schenkel. _wesen des protestantismus_, iii. 348, 351; hagen, _geist der reformation_, ii. 146, 151; menzel, _neuere geschichte der deutschen_, i. 115.] [footnote 203: see the best of his biographies, jürgens, _luther's leben_, iii. 601.] [footnote 204: "quid hoc ad me? qui sciam etiam turcam honorandum et ferendum potestatis gratia. quia certus sum non nisi volente deo ullam potestatem consistere" (de wette, i. 236).] [footnote 205: "i beg first of all that you will not help to mollify count albert in these matters, but let him go on as he has begun.... encourage him to go on briskly, to leave things in the hands of god, and obey his divine command to wield the sword as long as he can." "do not allow yourselves to be much disturbed, for it will redound to the advantage of many souls that will be terrified by it, and preserved." "if there are innocent persons amongst them, god will surely save and preserve them, as he did with lot and jeremiah. if he does not, then they are certainly not innocent.... we must pray for them that they obey, otherwise this is no time for compassion; just let the guns deal with them." "sentio melius esse omnes rusticos caedi quam principes et magistratus, eo quod rustici sine autoritate dei gladium accipiunt. quam nequitiam satanae sequi non potest nisi mera satanica vastitas regni dei, et mundi principes etsi excedunt, tamen gladium autoritate dei gerunt. ibi utrumque regnum consistere potest, quare nulla misericordia, nulla patientia rusticis debetur, sed ira et indignatio dei et hominum" (de wette, ii. 653, 655, 666, 669, 671).] [footnote 206: "wir lehren die christlich obrigkeit möge nicht nur, sondern solle auch sich der religion und glaubenssachen mit ernst annehmen; davon halten die wiedertäufer steif das widerspiel, welches sie auch zum theil gemein haben mit den prälaten der römischen kirche" (declaration of the protestants, quoted in jörg, _deutschland von 1522 bis 1526_, p. 709).] [footnote 207: "as to your question, how they are to be punished, i do not consider them blasphemers, but regard them in the light of the turks, or deluded christians, whom the civil power has not to punish, at least bodily. but if they refuse to acknowledge and to obey the civil authority, then they forfeit all they have and are, for then sedition and murder are certainly in their hearts" (de wette, ii. 622; osiander's opinion in jörg, p. 706).] [footnote 208: "dass in dem urtheil und desselben öffentlicher verkündigung keines irrthums oder ketzereien ... sondern allein der aufruhr und fürgenommenen morderei, die ihm doch laut seiner urgicht nie lieb gewesen, gedacht werde" (jörg, p. 708).] [footnote 209: "principes nostri non cogunt ad fidem et evangelion, sed cohibent externas abominationes" (de wette, iii. 50). "wenn die weltliche obrigkeit die verbrechen wider die zweite gesetzestafel bestrafen, und aus der menschlichen gesellschaft tilgen solle, wie vielmehr denn die verbrechen wider die erste?" (luther, _apud_ bucholtz, _geschichte ferdinands i._, iii. 571).] [footnote 210: planck, iv. 61, explains why this was not thought of.] [footnote 211: linde, _staatskirche_, p. 23. "der papst sammt seinem haufen glaubt nicht; darum bekennen wir, er werde nicht selig, das ist verdammt werden" (_table-talk_, ii. 350).] [footnote 212: kaltenborn, _vorläufer des grotius_, 208.] [footnote 213: möhler, _symbolik_, 428.] [footnote 214: "quodsi unam legem mosi cogimur servare, eadem ratione et circumcidemur, et totam legem servare oportebit.... nunc vero non sumus amplius sub lege mosi, sed subjecti legibus civilibus in talibus rebus" (luther to barnes, sept. 5, 1531; de wette, iv. 296).] [footnote 215: "all things that we find done by the patriarchs in the old testament ought to be free and not forbidden. circumcision is abolished, but not so that it would be a sin to perform it, but optional, neither sinful nor acceptable.... in like manner it is not forbidden that a man should have more than one wife. even at the present day i could not prohibit it; but i would not recommend it" (commentary on genesis, 1528; see jarcke, _studien_, p. 108). "ego sane fateor, me non posse prohibere, siquis plures velit uxores ducere, nec repugnat sacris literis: verum tamen apud christianos id exempli nollem primo introduci, apud quos decet etiam ea intermittere, quae licita sunt, pro vitando scandalo, et pro honestate vitae" (de wette, ii. 459, jan. 13, 1524). "from these instances of bigamy (lamech, jacob) no rule can be drawn for our times; and such examples have no power with us christians, for we live under our authorities, and are subject to our civil laws" (_table-talk_, v. 64).] [footnote 216: "antequam tale repudium, probarem potius regi permitterem alteram reginam quoque ducere, et exemplo patrum et regum duas simul uxores seu reginas habere.... si peccavit ducendo uxorem fratris mortui, peccavit in legem humanam seu civilem; si autem repudiaverit, peccabit in legem mere divinam" (de wette, iv. 296). "haud dubio rex angliae uxorem fratris mortui ductam retinere potest ... docendus quod has res politicas commiserit deus magistratibus, neque nos alligaverit ad moisen.... si vult rex successioni prospicere, quanto satius est, id facere sine infamia prioris conjugii. ac potest id fieri sine ullo periculo conscientiae cujuscunque aut famae per polygamiam. etsi enim non velim concedere polygamiam vulgo, dixi enim supra, nos non ferre leges, tamen in hoc casu propter magnam utilitatem regni, fortassis etiam propter conscientiam regis, ita pronuncio: tutissimum esse regi, si ducat secundam uxorem, priore non abjecta, quia certum est polygamiam non esse prohibitam jure divino, nec res est omnino inusitata" (_melanthonis opera_, ed. bretschneider, ii. 524, 526). "nolumus esse auctores divortii, cum conjugium cum jure divino non pugnet. hi, qui diversum pronunciant, terribiliter exaggerant et exasperant jus divinum. nos contra exaggeramus in rebus politicis auctoritatem magistratus, quae profecto non est levis, multaque justa sunt propter magistratus auctoritatem, quae alioqui in dubium vocantur" (melanchthon to bucer, bretschneider, ii. 552).] [footnote 217: "suadere non possumus ut introducatur publice et velut lege sanciatur permissio, plures quam unam uxores ducendi.... primum ante omnia cavendum, ne haec res inducatur in orbem ad modum legis, quam sequendi libera omnibus sit potestas. deinde considerare dignetur vestra celsitudo scandalum, nimirum quod evangelio hostes exclamaturi sint, nos similes esse anabaptistis, qui plures simul duxerunt uxores" (de wette, v. 236. signed by luther, melanchthon, and bucer).] [footnote 218: "he that would appear wise will not be satisfied with anything that others do; he must do something for himself, and that must be better than anything. this fool (copernicus) wants to overturn the whole science of astronomy. but, as the holy scriptures tell us, joshua told the sun to stand still, and not the earth" (_table-talk_, iv. 575).] [footnote 219: "das ist die christliche freiheit, der einige glaube, der da macht, nicht dass wir müssig gehen oder übel thun mögen, sondern dass wir keines werks bedürfen, die frömmigkeit und seligkeit zu erlangen" (_sermon von der freiheit_). a protestant historian, who quotes this passage, goes on to say: "on the other hand, the body must be brought under discipline by every means, in order that it may obey and not burden the inner man. outward servitude, therefore, assists the progress towards internal freedom" (bensen, _geschichte des bauernkriegs_, 269.)] [footnote 220: _werke_, x. 413.] [footnote 221: "according to scripture, it is by no means proper that one who would be a christian should set himself against his superiors, whether by god's permission they act justly or unjustly. but a christian must suffer violence and wrong, especially from his superiors.... as the emperor continues emperor, and princes, though they transgress all god's commandments, yea, even if they be heathen, so they do even when they do not observe their oath and duty.... sin does not suspend authority and allegiance" (de wette, iii. 560).] [footnote 222: ranke, _reformation_, iii. 183.] [footnote 223: ranke, iv. 7; jürgens, iii. 601.] [footnote 224: newman, _lectures on justification_, p. 386.] [footnote 225: "was durch ordentliche gewalt geschieht, ist nicht für aufruhr zu halten" (bensen, p. 269; jarcke, _studien_, p. 312; janet, ii. 40).] [footnote 226: "princes, and all rulers and governments, however pious and god-fearing they may be, cannot be without sin in their office and temporal administration.... they cannot always be so exactly just and successful as some wiseacres suppose; therefore they are above all in need of the forgiveness of sins" (see kaltenborn, p. 209).] [footnote 227: "of old, under the papacy, princes and lords, and all judges, were very timid in shedding blood, and punishing robbers, murderers, thieves, and all manner of evil-doers; for they knew not how to distinguish a private individual who is not in office from one in office, charged with the duty of punishing.... the executioner had always to do penance, and to apologise beforehand to the convicted criminal for what he was going to do to him, just as if it was sinful and wrong." "thus they were persuaded by monks to be gracious, indulgent, and peaceable. but authorities, princes and lords ought not to be merciful" (_table-talk_, iv. 159, 160).] [footnote 228: "den weltlichen bann sollten könige und kaiser wieder aufrichten, denn wir können ihn jetzt nicht anrichten.... aber so wir nicht können die sünde des lebens bannen und strafen, so bannen wir doch die sünde der lehre" (bruns, _luther's predigten_, 63).] [footnote 229: "wo sie solche rottengeister würden zulassen und leiden, so sie es doch wehren und vorkommen können, würden sie ihre gewissen gräulich beschweren, und vielleicht nimmermehr widder stillen können, nicht allein der seelen halben, die dadurch verführt und verdammt werden ... sondern auch der gauzen heiligen kirchen halben" (de wette, iv. 355).] [footnote 230: "nu ist alle abgötterey gegen die messe ein geringes" (de wette, v. 191; sec. iv. 307)] [footnote 231: bucholtz, iii. 570.] [footnote 232: "sie aber verachten die schrift muthwilliglich, darum wären sie billig aus der einigen ursach zu stillen, oder nicht zu leiden" (de wette, iii. 90).] [footnote 233: "wollen sie aber wie die juden seyn, nicht christen heissen, noch kaisers glieder, sondern sich lassen christus und kaisers feinde nennen, wie die juden; wohlan, so wollen wir's auch leiden, dass sie in ihren synagogen, wie die juden, verschlossen lästern, so lang sie wollen" (de wette, iv. 94).] [footnote 234: riffel, _kirchengeschichte_, ii. 9; _table-talk_, iii. 175.] [footnote 235: "ego ab initio, cum primum caepi nosse ciconiam et ciconiae factionem, unde hoc totum genus anabaptistarum exortum est, fui stulte clemens. sentiebant enim et alii haereticos non esse ferro opprimendos. et tunc dux fridericus vehementer iratus erat ciconiae: ac nisi a nobis tectus esset, fuisset de homine furioso et perdite malo sumtum supplicium. nunc me ejus clementiae non parum poenitet.... brentius nimis clemens est" (bretschneider, ii. 17, feb. 1530).] [footnote 236: "sed objiciunt exemplum nobis periculosum: si haec pertinent ad magistratus, quoties igitur magistratus judicabit aliquos errare, saeviet in eos. caesar igitur debet nos opprimere, quoniam ita judicat nos errare. respondeo: certe debet errores et prohibere et punire.... non est enim solius caesaris cognitio, sicut in urbibus haec cognitio non est tantum magistratus prophani, sed est doctorum. viderit igitur magistratus ut recte judicet" (bretschneider, ii. 712). "deliberent igitur principes, non cum tyrannis, non cum pontificibus, non cum hypocritis, monachis aut aliis, sed cum ipsa evangelii voce, cum probatis scriptoribus" (bretschneider, iii. 254).] [footnote 237: "quare ita sentias, magistratum debere uti summa severitate in coercendis hujusmodi spiritibus.... sines igitur novis exemplis timorem incuti multitudini ... ad haec notae tibi sint causae seditionum, quas gladio prohiberi oportet.... propterea sentio de his qui etiamsi non defendunt seditiosos articulos, habent manifeste blasphemos, quod interfici a magistratu debeant" (ii. 17, 18). "de anabaptistis tulimus hic in genere sententiam: quia constat sectam diabolicam esse, non esse tolerandam: dissipari enim ecclesias per eos, cum ipsi nullam habeant certam doctrinam.... ideo in capita factionum in singulis locis ultima supplicia constituenda esse judicavimus" (ii. 549). "it is clear that it is the duty of secular government to punish blasphemy, false doctrine, and heresy, on the bodies of those who are guilty of them.... since it is evident that there are gross errors in the articles of the anabaptist sect, we conclude that in this case the obstinate ought to be punished with death" (iii. 199). "propter hanc causam deus ordinavit politias ut evangelium propagari possit ... nec revocamus politiam moysi, sed lex moralis perpetua est omnium aetatum ... quandocumque constat doctrinam esse impiam, nihil dubium est quin sanior pars ecclesiae debeat malos pastores removere et abolere impios cultus. et hanc emendationem praecipue adjuvare debent magistratus, tanquam potiora membra ecclesiae" (iii. 242, 244). "thammerus, qui mahometicas seu ethnicas opiniones spargit, vagatur in dioecesi mindensi, quem publicis suppliciis adficere debebant.... evomuit blasphemias, quae refutandae sunt non tantum disputatione aut scriptis, sed etiam justo officio pii magistratus" (ix. 125, 131).] [footnote 238: "voco autem blasphemos qui articulos habent, qui proprie non pertinent ad civilem statum, sed continent [greek: theôrias] ut de divinitate christi et similes. etsi enim gradus quidam sunt, tamen huc etiam refero baptismum infantum.... quia magistratui commissa est tutela totius legis, quod attinet ad externam disciplinam et externa facta. quare delicta externa contra primam tabulam prohibere ac punire debet.... quare non solum concessum est, sed etiam mandatum est magistratui, impias doctrinas abolere, et tueri pias in suis ditionibus" (ii. 711). "ecclesiastica potestas tantum judicat et excommunicat haereticos, non occidit. sed potestas civilis debet constituere poenas et supplicia in haereticos, sicut in blasphemos constituit supplicia.... non enim plectitur fides, sed haeresis" (xii. 697).] [footnote 239: "notum est etiam, quosdam tetra et [greek: dysphéma] dixisse de sanguine christi, quos puniri oportuit, et propter gloriam christi, et exempli causa" (viii. 553). "argumentatur ille praestigiator (schwenkfeld), verbum externum non esse medium, quo deus est efficax. talis sophistica principum severitate compescenda erat" (ix. 579).] [footnote 240: "the office of preacher is distinct from that of governor, yet both have to contribute to the praise of god. princes are not only to protect the goods and bodily life of their subjects, but the principal function is to promote the honour of god, and to prevent idolatry and blasphemy" (iii. 199). "errant igitur magistratus, qui divellunt gubernationem a fine, et se tantum pacis ac ventris custodes esse existimant.... at si tantum venter curandus esset, quid differrent principes ab armentariis? nam longe aliter sentiendum est. politias divinitus admirabili sapientia et bonitate constitutas esse, non tantum ad quaerenda et fruenda ventris bona, sed multo magis, ut deus in societate innotescat, ut aeterna bona quaerantur" (iii. 246).] [footnote 241: "neque illa barbarica excusatio audienda est, leges illas pertinere ad politiam mosaicam, non ad nostram. ut decalogus ipse ad omnes pertinet, ita judex ubique omnia decalogi officia in externa disciplina tueatur" (viii. 520).] [footnote 242: "legi scriptum tuum, in quo refutasti luculenter horrendas serveti blasphemias, ac filio dei gratias ago, qui fuit [greek: brabeutês] hujus tui agonis. tibi quoque ecclesia et nunc et ad posteros gratitudinem debet et debebit. tuo judicio prorsus adsentior. affirmo etiam, vestros magistratus juste fecisse, quod hominem blasphemum, re ordine judicata, interfecerunt" (melanchthon to calvin, bretschneider, viii. 362). "judico etiam senatum genevensem recte fecisse, quod hominem pertinacem et non omissurum blasphemias sustulit. ac miratus sum, esse, qui severitatem illam improbent" (viii. 523). "dedit vero et genevensis reip. magistratus ante annos quatuor punitae insanabilis blasphemiae adversus filium dei, sublato serveto arragone pium et memorabile ad omnem posteritatem exemplum" (ix. 133).] [footnote 243: "abusus missae per magistratus debet tolli. non aliter, atque sustulit aeneum serpentem ezechias, aut excelsa demolitus est josias" (i. 480). "politicis magistratibus severissime mandatum est, ut suo quisque loco manibus et armis tollant statuas, ad quas fiunt hominum concursus et invocationes, et puniant suppliciis corporum insanabiles, qui idolorum cultum pertinaciter retinent, aut blasphemias serunt" (ix. 77).] [footnote 244: "if the french and english community at frankfort shared the errors of servetus or thamer, or other enemies of the symbols, or the errors of the anabaptists on infant baptism, against the authority of the state, etc., i should faithfully advise and strongly recommend that they should be soon driven away; for the civil power is bound to prevent and to punish proved blasphemy and sedition. but i find that this community is orthodox in the symbolical articles on the son of god, and in other articles of the symbol.... if the faith of the citizens in every town were inquired into, what trouble and confusion would not arise in many countries and towns!" (ix. 179).] [footnote 245: schmidt, _philipp melanchthon_, p. 640. his exhortations to the landgrave to put down the zwinglians are characteristic: "the zwinglians, without waiting for the council, persecute the papists and the anabaptists; why must it be wrong for others to prohibit their indefensible doctrine independent of the council?" philip replied: "forcibly, to prohibit a doctrine which neither contradicts the articles of faith nor encourages sedition, i do not think right.... when luther began to write and to preach, he admonished and instructed the government that it had no right to forbid books or to prevent preaching, and that its office did not extend so far, but that it had only to govern the body and goods.... i had not heard before that the zwinglians persecute the papists; but if they abolish abuses, it is not unjust, for the papists wish to deserve heaven by their works, and so blaspheme the son of god. that they should persecute the anabaptists is also not wrong, for their doctrine is in part seditious." the divines answered: "if by god's grace our true and necessary doctrine is tolerated as it has hitherto been by the emperor, though reluctantly, we think that we ought not to prevent it by undertaking the defence of the zwinglian doctrine, if that should not be tolerated. ... as to the argument that we ought to spare the people while persecuting the leaders, our answer is, that it is not a question of persons, but only of doctrine, whether it be true or false" (correspondence of brenz and melanchthon with landgrave philip of hesse, bretschneider, ii. 95, 98, 101).] [footnote 246: hardwicke, _reformation_, p. 274.] [footnote 247: seidemann, _thomas münzer_, p. 35.] [footnote 248: schenkel, iii. 381.] [footnote 249: heinrich grosbeck's _bericht_, ed. cornelius, 19.] [footnote 250: herzog, _encyclopädie für protestantische theologie_, ii. 418.] [footnote 251: bussierre, _establissement du protestantisme en alsace_, p. 429.] [footnote 252: baum, _capito und butzer_, p. 489.] [footnote 253: baum, p. 492; erbkam, _protestantische sekten_, p. 581.] [footnote 254: ursinus writes to bullinger: "liberavit nos deus ab idolatria: succedit licentia infinita et horribilis divini nominis, ecclesiae doctrinae purioris et sacramentorum prophanatio et sub pedibus porcorum et canum, conniventibus atque utinam non defendentibus iis qui prohibere suo loco debebant, conculcatio" (sudhoff, _olevianus und ursinus_, p. 340).] [footnote 255: "adserere audemus, neminem magistratum recte gerere ne posse quidem, nisi christianus sit" (zuingli, _opera_, iii. 296). "if they shall proceed in an unbrotherly way, and against the ordinance of christ, then let them be deposed, in god's name" (schenkel, iii. 362).] [footnote 256: christoffel, _huldreich zwingli_, p. 251.] [footnote 257: zwingli's advice to the protestants of st. gall, in pressel, _joachim vadian_, p. 45.] [footnote 258: pestalozzi, _heinrich bullinger_, p. 95.] [footnote 259: _ibid._, _leo judä_, p. 50.] [footnote 260: pestalozzi, _heinrich bullinger_, p. 146.] [footnote 261: _ibid._ p. 149.] [footnote 262: _ibid._ p. 270.] [footnote 263: pestalozzi, _heinrich bullinger_, p. 426.] [footnote 264: in the year 1555 he writes to socinus: "i too am of opinion that heretical men must be cut off with the spiritual sword.... the lutherans at first did not understand that sectaries must be restrained and punished, but after the fall of münster, when thousands of poor misguided men, many of them orthodox, had perished, they were compelled to admit that it is wiser and better for the government not only to restrain wrong-headed men, but also, by putting to death a few that deserve it, to protect thousands of inhabitants" (_ibid._ p. 428).] [footnote 265: herzog, _leben oekolampads_, ii 197.] [footnote 266: _ibid._ p. 189.] [footnote 267: _ibid._ p. 206.] [footnote 268: herzog, _leben oekolampads_, ii. 195. herzog finds an excuse for the harsh treatment of the lutherans at basel in the still greater severity of the lutheran churches against the followers of the swiss reformation (_ibid._ 213).] [footnote 269: hundeshagen, _conflikte des zwinglianismus und calvinismus_, 41.] [footnote 270: "huc spectat (politia) ... ne idololatria, ne in dei nomen sacrilegia, ne adversus ejus veritatem blasphemiae aliaeque religionis offensiones publice emergant ac in populum spargantur.... politicam ordinationem probo, quae in hoc incumbit, ne vera religio, quae dei lege continetur, palam, publicisque sacrilegiis impune violetur" (_institutio christianae religionis_, ed. tholuck, ii. 477). "hoc ergo summopere requiritur a regibus, ut gladio quo praediti sunt utuntur ad cultum dei asserendum" (_praelectiones in prophetas, opera_, v. 233, ed. 1667).] [footnote 271: "huic etiam colligere promptum est, quam stulta fuerit imaginatio eorum qui volebant usum gladii tollere e mundo, evangelii praetextu. scimus anabaptistas fuisse tumultuatos, quasi totus ordo politicus repugnaret christi regno, quia regnum christi continetur sola doctrina; deinde nulla futura sit vis. hoc quidem verum esset, si essemus in hoc mundo angeli: sed quemadmodum jam dixi, exiguus est piorum numerus: ideo necesse est reliquam turbam cohiberi violento freno: quia permixti sunt filii dei vel saevis belluis, vel vulpibus et fraudulentis hominibus" (_pr. in michaeam_, v. 310). "in quo non suam modo inscitiam, sed diabolicum fastum produnt, dum perfectionem sibi arrogant; cujus ne centesima quidem pars in illis conspicitur" (_institutio_, ii. 478).] [footnote 272: "tota igitur excellentia, tota dignitas, tota potentia ecclesiae debet huc referri, ut omnia subjaceant deo, et quicquid erit in gentibus hoc totum sit sacrum, ut scilicet cultus dei tam apud victores quam apud victos vigeat" (_pr. in michaeam_, v. 317).] [footnote 273: "ita tollitur offensio, quae multos imperitos fallit, dum metuunt ne hoc praetextu ad saeviendum armentur papae carnifices." calvin was warned by experience of the imprudence of luther's language. "in gallis proceres in excusanda saevitia immani allegant autoritatem lutheri" (melanchthon. _opera_, v. 176).] [footnote 274: "vous avez deux espèces de mutins qui se sont eslevez entre le roy et l'estat du royaume: les uns sont gens fantastiques, qui soubs couleur de l'évangile vouldroient mettre tout en confusion. les aultres sont gens obstinés aux superstitions de l'antéchrist de rome. tous ensemble méritent bien d'estre réprimés par le glayve qui vous est commis, veu qu'ils s'attaschent non seulement au roy, mais à dieu qui l'a assis au siège royal" (calvin to somerset, oct. 22, 1540: _lettres de calvin_, ed. bonnet, i. 267. see also henry, _leben calvins_, ii. append. 30).] [footnote 275: "abdicant enim se potestate terreni principes dum insurgunt contra deum: imo indigni sunt qui censeantur in hominum numero. potius ergo conspuere oportet in ipsorum capita, quam illis parere, ubi ita proterviunt ut velint etiam spoliare deum jure suo, et quasi occupare solium ejus, acsi possent eum a coelo detrahere" (_pr. in danielem_, v. 91).] [footnote 276: "quant au serment qu'on vous a contraincte de faire, comme vous avez failli et offensé dieu en le faisant, aussi n'estes-vous tenue de le garder" (calvin to the duchess of ferrara, _bonnet_, ii. 338). she had taken an oath, at her husband's death, that she would not correspond with calvin.] [footnote 277: "in aulis regum videmus primas teneri a bestiis. nam hodie, ne repetamus veteres historias, ut reges fere omnes fatui sunt ac bruti, ita etiam sunt quasi equi et asini brutorum animalium.... reges sunt hodie fere mancipia" (_pr. in danielem_, v. 82). "videmus enim ut hodie quoque pro sua libidine commoveant totum orbem principes; quia produnt alii aliis innoxios populus, et exercent foedam nundinationem, dum quisque commodum suum venatur, et sine ullo pudore, tantum ut augeat suam potentiam, alios tradit in manum inimici" (_pr. in nahum_, v. 363). "hodie pudet reges aliquid prae se ferre humanum, sed omnes gestus accommodant ad tyrannidem" (_pr. in jeremiam_, v. 257).] [footnote 278: "sur ce que je vous avais allégué, quo david nous instruict par son exemple de haïr les ennemis de dieu, vous respondez que c'estoit pour ce temps-là duquel sous la loi de rigueur il estoit permis de haïr les ennemis. or, madame, ceste glose seroit pour renverser toute l'escriture, et partant il la fault fuir comme une peste mortelle.... combien que j'aye tousjours prié dieu de luy faire mercy, si est-ce que j'ay souvent désiré que dieu mist la main sur luy (guise) pour en deslivrer son eglise, s'il ne le vouloit convertir" (calvin to the duchess of ferrara, _bonnet_, ii. 551). luther was in this respect equally unscrupulous: "this year we must pray duke maurice to death, we must kill him with our prayers; for he will be an evil man" (ms. quoted in döllinger, _reformation_, iii, 266).] [footnote 279: "quod de praepostero nostrorum fervore scribis, verissimum est, neque tamen ulla occurrit moderandi ratio, quia sanis consiliis non obtemperant. passim denuntio, si judex essem me non minus severe in rabioso, istos impetus vindicaturum, quam rex suis edictis mandat. pergendum nihilominus, quando nos deus voluit stultis esse debitores" (calvin to beza; henry, _leben calvins_, iii. append. 164).] [footnote 280: "il n'a tenu qu'à moi que, devant la guerre, gens de faict et d'exécution ne se soyent efforcez de l'exterminer du monde (guise) lesquels ont esté retenus par ma seule exhortation."--_bonnet_, ii. 553.] [footnote 281: "hoc nobis si assidue ob animos et oculos obversetur, eodem decreto constitui etiam nequissimos reges, quo regum auctoritas statuitur; nunquam in animum nobis seditiosae illae cogitationes venient, tractandum esse pro meritis regem nec aequum esse, ut subditos ei nos praestemus, qui vicissim regem nobis se non praestet.... de privatis hominibus semper loquor. nam si qui nunc sint populares magistratus ad moderandam regum libidinem constituti (quales olim erant ... ephori ... tribuni ... demarchi: et qua etiam forte potestate, ut nunc res habent, funguntur in singulis regnis tres ordines, quum primarios conventus peragunt) ... illos ferocienti regum licentiae pro officio intercedere non veto" (_institutio_, ii. 493, 495).] [footnote 282: "quum ergo ita licentiose omnia sibi permittent (donatistae), volebant tamen impune manere sua scelera: et in primis tenebant hoc principium: non esse poenas sumendas, si quis ab aliis dissideret in religionis doctrina: quemadmodum hodie videmus quosdam de hac re nimis cupide contendere. certum est quid cupiant. nam si quis ipsos respiciat, sunt impii dei contemptores: saltem vellent nihil certum esse in religione; ideo labefactare, et quantum in se est etiam convellere nituntur omnia pietatis principia. ut ergo liceat ipsis evomere virus suum, ideo tantopere litigant pro impunitate, et negant poenas de haereticis et blasphemis sumendas esse" (_pr. in danielem_, v. 51).] [footnote 283: "defensio orthodoxae fidei ... ubi ostenditur haereticos jure gladii coercendos esse," 1554.] [footnote 284: "non modo liberum esse magistratibus poenas sumere de coelestis doctrinae corruptoribus, sed divinitus esse mandatum, ut pestiferis erroribus impunitatem dare nequeant, quin desciscant ab officii sui fide.... nunc vero quisquis haereticis et blasphemis injuste paenam infligi contenderet, sciens et volens se obstringet blasphemiae reatu.... ubi a suis fundamentis convellitur religio, detestandae in deum blasphemiae proferuntur, impiis et pestiferis dogmatibus in exitium rapiuntur animae; denique ubi palam defectio ab unico deo puraque doctrina tentatur, ad extremum illud remedium descendere necesse" (see schenkel, iii. 389; dyer, _life of calvin_, p. 354; henry, iii. 234).] [footnote 285: _de haereticis an sint persequendi_, magdeburgi, 1554. chataillon, to whom it is generally attributed, was not the author (see heppe, _theodor beza_, p. 37).] [footnote 286: hallam, _literature of europe_, ii. 81; schlosser, _leben des beza_, p. 55. this is proved by the following passage from the dedication: "this i say not to favour the heretics, whom i abhor, but because there are here two dangerous rocks to be avoided. in the first place, that no man should be deemed a heretic when he is not ... and that the real rebel be distinguished from the christian who, by following the teaching and example of his master, necessarily causes separation from the wicked and unbelieving. the other danger is, lest the real heretics be not more severely punished than the discipline of the church requires" (baum, _theodor beza_, i. 215).] [footnote 287: "multis piis hominibus in gallia exustis grave passim apud germanos odium ignes illi excitaverant, sparsi sunt, ejus restinguendi causa, improbi ac mendaces libelli, non alios tam crudeliter tractari, quam anabaptistas ac turbulentos homines, qui perversis deliriis non religionem modo sed totum ordinem politicum convellerent.... haec mihi edendae institutionis causa fuit, primum ut ab injusta contumelia vindicarem fratres meos, quorum mors pretiosa erat in conspectu domini; deinde quum multis miseris eadem visitarent supplicia, pro illis dolor saltem aliquis et sollicitudo exteras gentes tangeret" (_praefatio in psalmos._ see "historia litteraria de calvini institutione." in _scrinium antiquarium_, ii. 452).] [footnote 288: baum, i. 206. "telles gens," says calvin, "seroient contents qu'il n'y eust ne loy, ne bride au monde. voilà pourquoy ils ont basti ce beau libvre _de non comburendis haereticis_, où ils out falsifié les noms tant des villes que des personnes, non pour aultre cause sinon pource que le dit livre est farcy de blasphèmes insupportables" (bonnet, ii. 18).] [footnote 289: _de haereticis a civili magistratu puniendis_, 1554.] [footnote 290: "absit autem a nobis, ut in eos, qui vel simplicitate peccant, sine aliorum pernicie et insigni blasphemia, vel in explicando quopiam scripturae loco dissident a recepta opinione, magistratum armemus" (_tractatus theologici_, i. 95).] [footnote 291: this was sometimes the practice in catholic countries, where heresy was equivalent to treason. duke william of bavaria ordered obstinate anabaptists to be burnt; those who recanted to be beheaded. "welcher revocir, den soll man köpfen; welcher nicht revocir, den soll man brennen" (jörg, p. 717).] [footnote 292: "ex quibus omnibus una conjunctio efficitur, istos quibus haeretici videntur non esse puniendi, opinionem in ecclesiam dei conari longe omnium pestilentissimam invehere et ex diametro repugnantem doctrinae primum a deo patre proditae, deinde a christo instauratae, ab universa denique ecclesia orthodoxa perpetuo consensu usurpatae, ut mihi quidem magis absurde facere videantur quam si sacrilegas aut parricidas puniendos negarent, quum sint istis omnibus haeretici infinitis partibus deteriores" (_tract. theol._ i. 143).] [footnote 293: "verum est quod correctione non exspectata ananiam et sapphiram occidit petrus. quia spiritus sanctus tunc maxime vigens, quem spreverant, docebat esse incorrigibiles, in malitia obstinatos. hoc crimen est morte simpliciter dignum et apud deum et apud homines. in aliis autem criminibus, ubi spiritus sanctus speciale quid non docet, ubi non est inveterata malitia, aut obstinatio certa non apparet aut atrocitas magna, correctionem per alias castigationes sperare potius debemus" (servetus, _restitutio christianismi_, 656; henry, iii. 235).] [footnote 294: "nam si venerit, modo valeat mea authoritas, vivum exire nunquam patiar" (calvin to farel, in henry, iii. append. 65; audin, _vie de calvin_, ii. 314; dyer, 544).] [footnote 295: "spero capitale saltem fore judicium; poenae vero atrocitatem remitti cupio" (calvin to farel, henry, iii. 189). dr. henry makes no attempt to clear calvin of the imputation of having caused the death of servetus. nevertheless he proposed, some years later, that the three-hundredth anniversary of the execution should be celebrated in the church of geneva by a demonstration. "it ought to declare itself in a body, in a manner worthy of our principles, admitting that in past times the authorities of geneva were mistaken, loudly proclaiming toleration, which is truly the crown of our church, and paying due honour to calvin, because he had no hand in the business (parcequ'il n'a pas trempé dans cette affaire), of which he has unjustly borne the whole burden." the impudence of this declaration is surpassed by the editor of the french periodical from which we extract it. he appends to the words in our parenthesis the following note: "we underline in order to call attention to this opinion of dr. henry, who is so thoroughly acquainted with the whole question" (_bulletin de la société de l'histoire du protestantisme français_, ii. 114).] [footnote 296: "qui scripserunt de non plectendis haereticis, semper mihi visi sunt non parum errare" (farel to blaarer, henry, iii. 202). during the trial he wrote to calvin: "if you desire to diminish the horrible punishment, you will act as a friend towards your most dangerous enemy. if i were to seduce anybody from the true faith, i should consider myself worthy of death; i cannot judge differently of another than of myself" (schmidt, _farel und viret_, p. 33). before sentence was pronounced bullinger wrote to beza: "quid vero amplissimus senatus genevensis ageret cum blasphemo illo nebulone serveto. si sapit et officium suum facit, caedit, ut totus orbis videat genevam christi gloriam cupere servatam" (baum, i. 204). with reference to socinus he wrote: "sentio ego spirituali gladio abscindendos esse homines haereticos" (henry, iii. 225). peter martyr vermili also gave in his adhesion to calvin's policy: "de serveto hispano, quid aliud dicam non habeo, nisi eum fuisse genuinum diaboli filium, cujus pestifera et detestanda doctrina undique profliganda est, neque magistratus, qui de illo supplicium extremum sumpsit, accusandus est, cum emendationis nulla indiçia in eo possent deprehendi, illiusque blasphemiae omnino intolerabiles essent" (_loci communes_, 1114. see schlosser, _leben des beza und des peter martyr vermili_, 512). zanchi, who at the instigation of bullinger also published a treatise, _de haereticis coercendis_, says of beza's work: "non poterit non probari summopere piis omnibus. satis superque respondit quidem ille novis istis academicis, ita ut supervacanea et inutilis omnino videatur mea tractatio" (baum, i. 232).] [footnote 297: "the trial of servetus," says a very ardent calvinist, "is illegal only in one point--the crime, if crime there be, had not been committed at geneva; but long before the councils had usurped the unjust privilege of judging strangers stopping at geneva, although the crimes they were accused of had not been committed there" (haag, _la france protestante_, iii. 129).] [footnote 298: _literature of europe_, ii. 82.] [footnote 299: this is the ground taken by two dutch divines in answer to the consultation of john of nassau in 1579: "neque in imperio, neque in galliis, neque in belgio speranda esset unquam libertas in externo religionis exercitio nostris ... si non diversarum religionum exercitia in una eademque provincia toleranda.... sic igitur gladio adversus nos armabimus pontificios, si hanc hypothesin tuebimur, quod exercitium religionis alteri parti nullum prorsus relinqui debeat" (_scrinium antiquarium_, i. 335).] vi political thoughts on the church[300] there is, perhaps, no stronger contrast between the revolutionary times in which we live and the catholic ages, or even the period of the reformation, than in this: that the influence which religious motives formerly possessed is now in a great measure exercised by political opinions. as the theory of the balance of power was adopted in europe as a substitute for the influence of religious ideas, incorporated in the power of the popes, so now political zeal occupies the place made vacant by the decline of religious fervour, and commands to an almost equal extent the enthusiasm of men. it has risen to power at the expense of religion, and by reason of its decline, and naturally regards the dethroned authority with the jealousy of a usurper. this revolution in the relative position of religious and political ideas was the inevitable consequence of the usurpation by the protestant state of the functions of the church, and of the supremacy which, in the modern system of government, it has assumed over her. it follows also that the false principles by which religious truth was assailed have been transferred to the political order, and that here, too, catholics must be prepared to meet them; whilst the objections made to the church on doctrinal grounds have lost much of their attractiveness and effect, the enmity she provokes on political grounds is more intense. it is the same old enemy with a new face. no reproach is more common, no argument better suited to the temper of these times, than those which are founded on the supposed inferiority or incapacity of the church in political matters. as her dogma, for instance, is assailed from opposite sides,--as she has had to defend the divine nature of christ against the ebionites, and his humanity against docetism, and was attacked both on the plea of excessive rigorism and excessive laxity (clement alex., _stromata_, iii. 5),--so in politics she is arraigned on behalf of the political system of every phase of heresy. she was accused of favouring revolutionary principles in the time of elizabeth and james i., and of absolutist tendencies under james ii. and his successors. since protestant england has been divided into two great political parties, each of these reproaches has found a permanent voice in one of them. whilst tory writers affirm that the catholic religion is the enemy of all conservatism and stability, the liberals consider it radically opposed to all true freedom. "what are we to think," says the _edinburgh review_ (vol. ciii. p. 586), "of the penetration or the sincerity of a man who professes to study and admire the liberties of england and the character of her people, but who does not see that english freedom has been nurtured from the earliest times by resistance to papal authority, and established by the blessing of a reformed religion? that is, under heaven, the basis of all the rights we possess; and the weight we might otherwise be disposed to concede to m. de montalembert's opinions on england is materially lessened by the discovery that, after all, he would, if he had the power, place this free country under that spiritual bondage which broods over the empires of austria or of spain." on the other hand, let us hearken to the protestant eloquence of the _quarterly review_ (vol. xcii. p. 41):- tyranny, fraud, base adulation, total insensibility, not only to the worth of human freedom, but to the majesty of law and the sacredness of public and private right; these are the malignant and deadly features which we see stamped upon the conduct of the roman hierarchy. besides which, we have the valuable opinion of lord derby, which no catholic, we should suppose, east of the shannon has forgotten, that catholicism is "religiously corrupt, and politically dangerous." lord macaulay tells us that it exclusively promoted the power of the crown; ranke, that it favours revolution and regicide. whilst the belgian and sardinian liberals accuse the church of being the enemy of constitutional freedom, the celebrated protestant statesman, stahl, taunts her with the reproach of being the sole support and pillar of the belgian constitution. thus every error pronounces judgment on itself when it attempts to apply its rules to the standard of truth. among catholics the state of opinion on these questions, whether it be considered the result of unavoidable circumstances, or a sign of ingenious accommodation, or a thing to be deplored, affords at least a glaring refutation of the idea that we are united, for good or for evil, in one common political system. the church is vindicated by her defenders, according to their individual inclinations, from the opposite faults imputed to her; she is lauded, according to circumstances, for the most contradictory merits, and her authority is invoked in exclusive support of very various systems. o'connell, count de montalembert, father ventura, proclaim her liberal, constitutional, not to say democratic, character; whilst such writers as bonald and father taparelli associate her with the cause of absolute government. others there are, too, who deny that the church has a political tendency or preference of any kind; who assert that she is altogether independent of, and indifferent to, particular political institutions, and, while insensible to their influence, seeks to exercise no sort of influence over them. each view may be plausibly defended, and the inexhaustible arsenal of history seems to provide impartially instances in corroboration of each. the last opinion can appeal to the example of the apostles and the early christians, for whom, in the heathen empire, the only part was unconditional obedience. this is dwelt upon by the early apologists: "oramus etiam pro imperatoribus, pro ministris eorum et potestatibus, pro statu saeculi, pro rerum quiete, pro mora finis."[301] it has the authority, too, of those who thought with st. augustine that the state had a sinful origin and character: "primus fuit terrenae civitatis conditor fratricida."[302] the liberals, at the same time, are strong in the authority of many scholastic writers, and of many of the older jesuit divines, of st. thomas and suarez, bellarmine, and mariana. the absolutists, too, countenanced by bossuet and the gallican church, and quoting amply from the old testament, can point triumphantly to the majority of catholic countries in modern times. all these arguments are at the same time serviceable to our adversaries; and those by which one objection is answered help to fortify another. the frequent recurrence of this sort of argument which appears to us as treacherous for defence as it is popular as a weapon of attack, shows that no very definite ideas prevail on the subject, and makes it doubtful whether history, which passes sentence on so many theories, is altogether consistent with any of these. nevertheless it is obviously an inquiry of the greatest importance, and one on which controversy can never entirely be set at rest; for the relation of the spiritual and the secular power is, like that of speculation and revelation, of religion and nature, one of those problems which remain perpetually open, to receive light from the meditations and experience of all ages, and the complete solution of which is among the objects, and would be the end, of all history. at a time when the whole system of ecclesiastical government was under discussion, and when the temporal power was beginning to predominate over the church in france, the greatest theologian of the age made an attempt to apply the principles of secular polity to the church. according to gerson (_opera_, ii. 254), the fundamental forms into which aristotle divides all government recur in the ecclesiastical system. the royal power is represented in the papacy, the aristocracy by the college of cardinals, whilst the councils form an ecclesiastical democracy (_timocratia_). analogous to this is the idea that the constitution of the church served as the model of the christian states, and that the notion of representation, for instance, was borrowed from it. but it is not by the analogy of her own forms that the church has influenced those of the state; for in reality there is none subsisting between them, and gerson's adoption of a theory of grecian origin proves that he scarcely understood the spirit of that mediæval polity which, in his own country especially, was already in its decay. for not only is the whole system of government, whether we consider its origin, its end, or its means absolutely and essentially different, but the temporal notion of power is altogether unknown in the church. "ecclesia subjectos non habet ut servos, sed ut filios."[303] our lord himself drew the distinction: "reges gentium dominantur eorum; et qui potestatem habent super eos, benefici vocantur. vos autem non sic: sed qui major est in vobis, fiat sicut minor; et qui praedecessor, sicut minor" (luc. xxii. 25, 26). the supreme authority is not the will of the rulers, but the law of the church, which binds those who are its administrators as strictly as those who have only to obey it. no human laws were ever devised which could so thoroughly succeed in making the arbitrary exercise of power impossible, as that prodigious system of canon law which is the ripe fruit of the experience and the inspiration of eighteen hundred years. nothing can be more remote from the political notions of monarchy than the authority of the pope. with even less justice can it be said that there is in the church an element of aristocracy, the essence of which is the possession of hereditary personal privileges. an aristocracy of merit and of office cannot, in a political sense, legitimately bear the name. by baptism all men are equal before the church. yet least of all can anything be detected corresponding to the democratic principle, by which all authority resides in the mass of individuals, and which gives to each one equal rights. all authority in the church is delegated, and recognises no such thing as natural rights. this confusion of the ideas belonging to different orders has been productive of serious and dangerous errors. whilst heretics have raised the episcopate to a level with the papacy, the priesthood with the episcopate, the laity with the clergy, impugning successively the primacy, the episcopal authority, and the sacramental character of orders, the application of ideas derived from politics to the system of the church led to the exaggeration of the papal power in the period immediately preceding the reformation, to the claim of a permanent aristocratic government by the council of basel, and to the democratic extravagance of the observants in the fourteenth century. if in the stress of conflicting opinions we seek repose and shelter in the view that the kingdom of god is not of this world; that the church, belonging to a different order, has no interest in political forms, tolerates them all, and is dangerous to none; if we try to rescue her from the dangers of political controversy by this method of retreat and evasion, we are compelled to admit her inferiority, in point of temporal influence, to every other religious system. every other religion impresses its image on the society that professes it, and the government always follows the changes of religion. pantheism and polytheism, judaism and islamism, protestantism, and even the various protestant as well as mahometan sects, call forth corresponding social and political forms. all power is from god, and is exercised by men in his stead. as men's notions are, therefore, in respect to their position towards god, such must their notion of temporal power and obedience also be. the relation of man to man corresponds with his relations to god--most of all his relations towards the direct representative of god. the view we are discussing is one founded on timidity and a desire of peace. but peace is not a good great enough to be purchased by such sacrifices. we must be prepared to do battle for our religious system in every other sphere as well as in that of doctrine. theological error affects men's ideas on all other subjects, and we cannot accept in politics the consequences of a system which is hateful to us in its religious aspect. these questions cannot be decided by mere reasoning, but we may obtain some light by inquiring of the experience of history; our only sure guide is the example of the church herself. "insolentissima est insania, non modo disputare, contra id quod videmus universam ecclesiam credere sed etiam contra id quod videmus eam facere. fides enim ecclesiae non modo regula est fidei nostrae, sed etiam actiones ipsius actionum nostrarum, consuetudo ipsius consuetudinis quam observare debemus."[304] the church which our lord came to establish had a twofold mission to fulfil. her system of doctrine, on the one hand, had to be defined and perpetually maintained. but it was also necessary that it should prove itself more than a mere matter of theory,--that it should pass into practice, and command the will as well as the intellect of men. it was necessary not only to restore the image of god in man, but to establish the divine order in the world. religion had to transform the public as well as the private life of nations, to effect a system of public right corresponding with private morality and without which it is imperfect and insecure. it was to exhibit and confirm its victory and to perpetuate its influence by calling into existence, not only works of private virtue, but institutions which are the product of the whole life of nations, and bear an unceasing testimony to their religious sentiments. the world, instead of being external to the church, was to be adopted by her and imbued with her ideas. the first, the doctrinal or intellectual part of the work, was chiefly performed in the roman empire, in the midst of the civilisation of antiquity and of that unparalleled intellectual excitement which followed the presence of christ on earth. there the faith was prepared for the world whilst the world was not yet ready to receive it. the empire in which was concentrated all the learning and speculation of ancient times was by its intellectual splendour, and in spite, we might even say by reason, of its moral depravity, the fit scene of the intellectual establishment of christianity. for its moral degradation ensured the most violent antipathy and hostility to the new faith; while the mental cultivation of the age ensured a very thorough and ingenious opposition, and supplied those striking contrasts which were needed for the full discussion and vigorous development of the christian system. nowhere else, and at no other period, could such advantages have been found. but for the other, equally essential part of her work the church met with an insurmountable obstacle, which even the official conversion of the empire and all the efforts of the christian emperors could not remove. this obstacle resided not so much in the resistance of paganism as a religion, as in the pagan character of the state. it was from a certain political sagacity chiefly that the romans, who tolerated all religions,[305] consistently opposed that religion which threatened inevitably to revolutionise a state founded on a heathen basis. it appeared from the first a pernicious superstition ("exitiabilem superstitionem," tacit. _annal._ xv. 44), that taught its followers to be bad subjects ("exuere patriam," tacitus, _hist._ v. 5), and to be constantly dissatisfied ("quibus praesentia semper tempora cum enormi libertate displicent," vopiscus, _vit. saturn._ 7). this hostility continued in spite of the protestations of every apologist, and of the submissiveness and sincere patriotism of the early christians. they were so far from recognising what their enemies so vaguely felt, that the empire could not stand in the presence of the new faith, that it was the common belief amongst them, founded perhaps on the words of st. paul, 2 thess. ii. 7,[306] that the roman empire would last to the end of the world.[307] the persecution of julian was caused by the feeling of the danger which menaced the pagan empire from the christian religion. his hostility was not founded on his attachment to the old religion of rome, which he did not attempt to save. he endeavoured to replace it by a new system which was to furnish the state with new vigour to withstand the decay of the old paganism and the invasion of christianity. he felt that the old religious ideas in which the roman state had grown up had lost their power, and that rome could only be saved by opposing at all hazards the new ideas. he was inspired rather with a political hatred of christianity than with a religious love of paganism. consequently christianity was the only religion he could not tolerate. this was the beginning of the persecution of the church on principles of liberalism and religious toleration, on the plea of political necessity, by men who felt that the existing forms of the state were incompatible with her progress. it is with the same feeling of patriotic aversion for the church that symmachus says (_epist._ x. 61): "we demand the restoration of that religion which has so long been beneficial to the state ... of that worship which has subdued the universe to our laws, of those sacrifices which repulsed hannibal from our walls and the gauls from the capitol." very soon after the time of constantine it began to appear that the outward conversion of the empire was a boon of doubtful value to religion. "et postquam ad christianos principes venerint, potentia quidem et divitiis major sed virtutibus minor facta est," says st. jerome (in _vita malchi_). the zeal with which the emperors applied the secular arm for the promotion of christianity was felt to be incompatible with its spirit and with its interest as well. "religion," says lactantius (_inst. div._ v. 19), "is to be defended by exhorting, not by slaying, not by severity, but by patience; not by crime, but by faith: _... nihil enim est tam voluntarium quam religio_."[308] "deus," says st. hilary of poitiers ("ad constantium," _opp._ i. p. 1221 c), "obsequio non eget necessario, non requirit coactam confessionem."[309] st. athanasius and st. john chrysostom protest in like manner against the intemperate proselytism of the day.[310] for the result which followed the general adoption of christianity threw an unfavourable light on the motives which had caused it. it became evident that the heathen world was incapable of being regenerated, that the weeds were choking the good seed. the corruption increased in the church to such a degree that the christians, unable to divest themselves of the roman notion of the _orbis terrarum_, deemed the end of the world at hand. st. augustine (_sermo_ cv.) rebukes this superstitious fear: "si non manet civitas quae nos carnaliter genuit, manet quae nos spiritualiter genuit. numquid (dominus) dormitando aedificium suum perdidit, aut non custodiendo hostes admisit?... quid expavescis quia pereunt regna terrena? ideo tibi coeleste promissum est, ne cum terrenis perires.... transient quae fecit ipse deus; quanto citius quod condidit romulus.... non ergo deficiamus, fratres: finis erit terrenis omnibus regnis."[311] but even some of the fathers themselves were filled with despair at the spectacle of the universal demoralisation: "totius mundi una vox christus est ... horret animus temporum nostrorum ruinas persequi.... romanus orbis ruit, et tamen cervix nostra erecta non flectitur.... nostris peccatis barbari fortes sunt. nostris vitiis romanus superatur exercitus.... nec amputamus causas morbi, ut morbus pariter auferatur.... orbis terrarum ruit, in nobis peccata non ruunt."[312] st. ambrose announces the end still more confidently: "verborum coelestium nulli magis quam nos testes sumus, quos mundi finis invenit.... quia in occasu saeculi sumus, praecedunt quaedam aegritudines mundi."[313] two generations later salvianus exclaims: "quid est aliud paene omnis coetus christianorum quam sentina vitiorum?"[314] and st. leo declares, "quod temporibus nostris auctore diabolo sic vitiata sunt omnia, ut paene nihil sit quod absque idolatria transigatur."[315] when, early in the fifth century, the dismemberment of the western empire commenced, it was clear that christianity had not succeeded in reforming the society and the polity of the ancient world. it had arrested for a time the decline of the empire, but after the arian separation it could not prevent its fall. the catholics could not dissociate the interests of the church and those of the roman state, and looked with patriotic as well as religious horror at the barbarians by whom the work of destruction was done. they could not see that they had come to build up as well as to destroy, and that they supplied a field for the exercise of all that influence which had failed among the romans. it was very late before they understood that the world had run but half its course; that a new skin had been prepared to contain the new wine; and that the barbarous tribes were to justify their claim to the double inheritance of the faith and of the power of rome. there were two principal things which fitted them for their vocation. the romans had been unable to be the instruments of the social action of christianity on account of their moral depravity. it was precisely for those virtues in which they were most deficient that their barbarous enemies were distinguished. salvianus expresses this in the following words (_de gubern. dei_, vii. 6): "miramur si terrae ... nostrorum omnium a deo barbaris datae sunt, cum eas quae romani polluerant fornicatione, nunc mundent barbari castitate?"[316] whilst thus their habits met half-way the morality of the christian system, their mythology, which was the very crown and summit of all pagan religions, predisposed them in like manner for its adoption, by predicting its own end, and announcing the advent of a system which was to displace its gods. "it was more than a mere worldly impulse," says a famous northern divine, "that urged the northern nations to wander forth, and to seek, like birds of passage, a milder clime." we cannot, however, say more on the predisposition for christianity of that race to whose hands its progress seems for ever committed, or on the wonderful facility with which the teutonic invaders accepted it, whether presented to them in the form of catholicism or of arianism.[317] the great marvel in their history, and their chief claim to the dominion of the world, was, that they had preserved so long, in the bleak regions in which the growth of civilisation was in every way retarded, the virtues together with the ignorance of the barbarous state. at a time when arianism was extinct in the empire, it assumed among the teutonic tribes the character of a national religion, and added a theological incitement to their animosity against the romans. the arian tribes, to whom the work of destruction was committed, did it thoroughly. but they soon found that their own preservation depended on their submission to the church. those that persisted in their heresy were extirpated. the lombards and visigoths saved themselves by a tardy conversion from the fate with which they were threatened so long, as their religion estranged them from the roman population, and cut them off from the civilisation of which the church was already the only guardian. for centuries the pre-eminence in the west belonged to that race which alone became catholic at once, and never swerved from its orthodoxy. it is a sense of the importance of this fidelity which dictated the well-known preamble of the salic law: "gens francorum inclita, deo auctore condita, ad catholicam fidem conversa et immunis ab haeresi," etc.[318] then followed the ages which are not unjustly called the dark ages, in which were laid the foundations of all the happiness that has been since enjoyed, and of all the greatness that has been achieved, by men. the good seed, from which a new christian civilisation sprang, was striking root in the ground. catholicism appeared as the religion of masses. in those times of simple faith there was no opportunity to call forth an augustine or an athanasius. it was not an age of conspicuous saints, but sanctity was at no time so general. the holy men of the first centuries shine with an intense brilliancy from the midst of the surrounding corruption. legions of saints--individually for the most part obscure, because of the atmosphere of light around them--throng the five illiterate centuries, from the close of the great dogmatic controversies to the rise of a new theology and the commencement of new contests with hildebrand, anselm, and bernard. all the manifestations of the catholic spirit in those days bear a character of vastness and popularity. a single idea--the words of one man--electrified hundreds of thousands. in such a state of the world, the christian ideas were able to become incarnate, so to speak, in durable forms, and succeeded in animating the political institutions as well as the social life of the nations. the facility with which the teutonic ideas of government shaped themselves to the mould of the new religion, was the second point in which that race was so peculiarly adapted for the position it has ever since occupied towards christianity. they ceased to be barbarians only in becoming christians. their political system was in its infancy, and was capable of being developed variously, according to the influences it might undergo. there was no hostile civilisation to break down, no traditions to oppose which were bound up with the recollections of the national greatness. the state is so closely linked with religion, that no nation that has changed its religion has ever survived in its old political form. in rome it had proved to be impossible to alter the system, which for a thousand years had animated every portion of the state; it was incurably pagan. the conversion of the people and the outward alliance with the church could not make up for this inconsistency. but the teutonic race received the catholic ideas wholly and without reserve. there was no region into which they failed to penetrate. the nation was collectively catholic, as well as individually. the union of the church with the political system of the germans was so complete, that when hungary adopted the religion of rome, it adopted at the same time, as a natural consequence, the institutions of the empire. the ideas of government which the barbarians carried with them into every land which they conquered were always in substance the same. the _respublica christiana_ of the middle ages, consisting of those states in which the teutonic element combined with the catholic system, was governed by nearly the same laws. the mediæval institutions had this also in common, that they grew up everywhere under the protection and guidance of the church; and whilst they subsisted in their integrity, her influence in every nation, and that of the pope over all the nations, attained their utmost height. in proportion as they have since degenerated or disappeared, the political influence of religion has declined. as we have seen that the church was baffled in the full performance of her mission before europe was flooded by the great migration, so it may be said that she has never permanently enjoyed her proper position and authority in any country where it did not penetrate. no other political system has yet been devised, which was consistent with the full development and action of catholic principles, but that which was constructed by the northern barbarians who destroyed the western empire. from this it does not seem too much to conclude, that the catholic religion tends to inspire and transform the public as well as the private life of men; that it is not really master of one without some authority over the other. consequently, where the state is too powerful by long tradition and custom, or too far gone in corruption, to admit of the influence of religion, it can only prevail by ultimately destroying the political system. this helps us to understand the almost imperceptible progress of christianity against mahometanism, and the slowness of its increase in china, where its growth must eventually undermine the whole fabric of government. on the other hand, we know with what ease comparatively savage tribes--as the natives of california and paraguay--were converted to a religion which first initiated them in civilisation and government. there are countries in which the natural conditions are yet wanting for the kingdom of grace. there is a fulness of time for every nation--a time at which it first becomes capable of receiving the faith.[319] it is not harder to believe that certain political conditions are required to make a nation fit for conversion than that a certain degree of intellectual development is indispensable; that the language, for instance, must have reached a point which that of some nations has not attained before it is capable of conveying the truths of christianity. we cannot, therefore, admit that political principles are a matter of utter indifference to the church. to what sort of principles it is that she inclines may be indicated by a single example. the christian notion of conscience imperatively demands a corresponding measure of personal liberty. the feeling of duty and responsibility to god is the only arbiter of a christian's actions. with this no human authority can be permitted to interfere. we are bound to extend to the utmost, and to guard from every encroachment, the sphere in which we can act in obedience to the sole voice of conscience, regardless of any other consideration. the church cannot tolerate any species of government in which this right is not recognised. she is the irreconcilable enemy of the despotism of the state, whatever its name or its forms may be, and through whatever instruments it may be exercised. where the state allows the largest amount of this autonomy, the subject enjoys the largest measure of freedom, and the church the greatest legitimate influence. the republics of antiquity were as incapable as the oriental despotisms of satisfying the christian notion of freedom, or even of subsisting with it. the church has succeeded in producing the kind of liberty she exacts for her children only in those states which she has herself created or transformed. real freedom has been known in no state that did not pass through her mediæval action. the history of the middle ages is the history of the gradual emancipation of man from every species of servitude, in proportion as the influence of religion became more penetrating and more universal. the church could never abandon that principle of liberty by which she conquered pagan rome. the history of the last three centuries exhibits the gradual revival of declining slavery, which appears under new forms of oppression as the authority of religion has decreased. the efforts of deliverance have been violent and reactionary, the progress of dependence sure and inevitable. the political benefits of the mediæval system have been enjoyed by no nation which is destitute of teutonic elements. the slavonic races of the north-east, the celtic tribes of the north-west, were deprived of them. in the centre of mediæval civilisation, the republic of venice, proud of its unmixed descent from the romans, was untouched by the new blood, and that christian people failed to obtain a christian government. where the influence of the ideas which prevailed in those times has not been felt, the consequence has been the utmost development of extreme principles, such as have doomed asia for so many ages to perpetual stagnation, and america to endless heedless change. it is a plain fact, that that kind of liberty which the church everywhere and at all times requires has been attained hitherto only in states of teutonic origin. we need hardly glance at the importance of this observation in considering the missionary vocation of the english race in the distant regions it has peopled and among the nations it has conquered; for, in spite of its religious apostasy, no other country has preserved so pure that idea of liberty which gave to religion of old its power in europe, and is still the foundation of the greatness of england. other nations that have preserved more faithfully their allegiance to the church have more decidedly broken with those political traditions, without which the action of the church is fettered. it is equally clear that, in insisting upon one definite principle in all government, the church has at no time understood that it could be obtained only by particular political forms. she attends to the substance, not to the form, in politics. at various times she has successively promoted monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; and at various times she has been betrayed by each. the three fundamental forms of all government are founded on the nature of things. sovereignty must reside with an individual, or with a minority, or with the majority. but there are seasons and circumstances where one or the other is impossible, where one or the other is necessary; and in a growing nation they cannot always remain in the same relative proportions. christianity could neither produce nor abolish them. they are all compatible with liberty and religion, and are all liable to diverge into tyranny by the exclusive exaggeration of their principle. it is this exaggeration that has ever been the great danger to religion and to liberty, and the object of constant resistance, the source of constant suffering for the church. christianity introduced no new forms of government, but a new spirit, which totally transformed the old ones. the difference between a christian and a pagan monarchy, or between a christian and a rationalist democracy, is as great, politically, as that between a monarchy and a republic. the government of athens more nearly resembled that of persia than that of any christian republic, however democratic. if political theorists had attended more to the experience of the christian ages, the church and the state would have been spared many calamities. unfortunately, it has long been the common practice to recur to the authority of the greeks and the jews. the example of both was equally dangerous; for in the jewish as in the gentile world, political and religious obligations were made to coincide; in both, therefore,--in the theocracy of the jews as in the [greek: politeia] of the greeks,--the state was absolute. now it is the great object of the church, by keeping the two spheres permanently distinct,--by rendering to cæsar the things that are cæsar's, and to god the things that are god's--to make all absolutism, of whatever kind, impossible. as no form of government is in itself incompatible with tyranny, either of a person or a principle, nor necessarily inconsistent with liberty, there is no natural hostility or alliance between the church and any one of them. the same church which, in the confusion and tumult of the great migrations, restored authority by raising up and anointing kings, held in later times with the aristocracy of the empire, and called into existence the democracies of italy. in the eighth century she looked to charlemagne for the reorganisation of society; in the eleventh she relied on the people to carry out the reformation of the clergy. during the first period of the middle ages, when social and political order had to be reconstructed out of ruins, the church everywhere addresses herself to the kings, and seeks to strengthen and to sanctify their power. the royal as well as the imperial dignity received from her their authority and splendour. whatever her disputes on religious grounds with particular sovereigns, such as lothar, she had in those ages as yet no contests with the encroachments of monarchical power. later on in the middle ages, on the contrary, when the monarchy had prevailed almost everywhere, and had strengthened itself beyond the limits of feudal ideas by the help of the roman law and of the notions of absolute power derived from the ancients, it stood in continual conflict with the church. from the time of gregory vii., all the most distinguished pontiffs were engaged in quarrels with the royal and imperial power, which resulted in the victory of the church in germany and her defeat in france. in this resistance to the exaggeration of monarchy, they naturally endeavoured to set barriers to it by promoting popular institutions, as the italian democracies and the aristocratic republics of switzerland, and the capitulations which in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were imposed on almost every prince. times had greatly changed when a pope declared his amazement at a nation which bore in silence the tyranny of their king.[320] in modern times the absolute monarchy in catholic countries has been, next to the reformation, the greatest and most formidable enemy of the church. for here she again lost in great measure her natural influence. in france, spain, and germany, by gallicanism, josephism, and the inquisition, she came to be reduced to a state of dependence, the more fatal and deplorable that the clergy were often instrumental in maintaining it. all these phenomena were simply an adaptation of catholicism to a political system incompatible with it in its integrity; an artifice to accommodate the church to the requirements of absolute government, and to furnish absolute princes with a resource which was elsewhere supplied by protestantism. the consequence has been, that the church is at this day more free under protestant than under catholic governments--in prussia or england than in france or piedmont, naples or bavaria. as we have said that the church commonly allied herself with the political elements which happened to be insufficiently represented, and to temper the predominant principle by encouraging the others, it might seem hardly unfair to conclude that that kind of government in which they are all supposed to be combined,--"aequatum et temperatum ex tribus optimis rerum publicarum modis" (cicero, _rep._ i. 45),--must be particularly suited to her. practically--and we are not here pursuing a theory--this is a mere fallacy. if we look at catholic countries, we find that in spain and piedmont the constitution has served only to pillage, oppress, and insult the church; whilst in austria, since the empire has been purified in the fiery ordeal of the revolution, she is free, secure, and on the highroad of self-improvement. in constitutional bavaria she has but little protection against the crown, or in belgium against the mob. the royal power is against her in one place, the popular element in the other. turning to protestant countries, we find that in prussia the church is comparatively free; whilst the more popular government of baden has exhibited the most conspicuous instance of oppression which has occurred in our time. the popular government of sweden, again, has renewed the refusal of religious toleration at the very time when despotic russia begins to make a show, at least, of conceding it. in the presence of these facts, it would surely be absurd to assume that the church must look with favour on the feeble and transitory constitutions with which the revolution has covered half the continent. it does not actually appear that she has derived greater benefits from them than she may be said to have done from the revolution itself, which in france, for instance in 1848, gave to the church, at least for a season, that liberty and dignity for which she had struggled in vain during the constitutional period which had preceded. the political character of our own country bears hardly more resemblance to the liberal governments of the continent,--which have copied only what is valueless in our institutions,--than to the superstitious despotism of the east, or to the analogous tyranny which in the far west is mocked with the name of freedom. here, as elsewhere, the progress of the constitution, which it was the work of the catholic ages to build up, on the principles common to all the nations of the teutonic stock, was interrupted by the attraction which the growth of absolutism abroad excited, and by the reformation's transferring the ecclesiastical power to the crown. the stuarts justified their abuse of power by the same precepts and the same examples by which the puritans justified their resistance to it. the liberty aimed at by the levellers was as remote from that which the middle ages had handed down, as the power of the stuarts from the mediæval monarchy. the revolution of 1688 destroyed one without favouring the other. unlike the rebellion against charles i., that which overthrew his son did not fall into a contrary extreme. it was a restoration in some sort of the principles of government, which had been alternately assailed by absolute monarchy and by a fanatical democracy. but, as it was directed against the abuse of kingly and ecclesiastical authority, neither the crown nor the established church recovered their ancient position; and a jealousy of both has ever since subsisted. there can be no question but that the remnants of the old system of polity--the utter disappearance of which keeps the rest of christendom in a state of continual futile revolution--exist more copiously in this country than in any other. instead of the revolutions and the religious wars by which, in other protestant countries, catholics have obtained toleration, they have obtained it in england by the force of the very principles of the constitution. "i should think myself inconsistent," says the chief expounder of our political system, "in not applying my ideas of civil liberty to religious." and speaking of the relaxation of the penal laws, he says: "to the great liberality and enlarged sentiments of those who are the furthest in the world from you in religious tenets, and the furthest from acting with the party which, it is thought, the greater part of the roman catholics are disposed to espouse, it is that you owe the whole, or very nearly the whole, of what has been done both here and in ireland."[321] the danger which menaces the continuance of our constitution proceeds simply from the oblivion of those christian ideas by which it was originally inspired. it should seem that it is the religious as well as the political duty of catholics to endeavour to avert this peril, and to defend from the attacks of the radicals and from the contempt of the tories the only constitution which bears some resemblance to those of catholic times, and the principles which are almost as completely forgotten in england as they are misunderstood abroad. if three centuries of protestantism have not entirely obliterated the ancient features of our government, if they have not been so thoroughly barren of political improvement as some of its enemies would have us believe,--there is surely nothing to marvel at, nothing at which we may rejoice. protestants may well have, in some respects, the same terrestrial superiority over catholics that the gentiles had over the people of god. as, at the fall of paganism, the treasures it had produced and accumulated during two thousand years became the spoils of the victor,--when the day of reckoning shall come for the great modern apostasy, it will surrender all that it has gathered in its diligent application to the things of this world; and those who have remained in the faith will have into the bargain those products of the protestant civilisation on which its claims of superiority are founded. when, therefore, in the political shipwreck of modern europe, it is asked which political form of party is favoured by the church, the only answer we can give is, that she is attached to none; but that though indifferent to existing forms, she is attached to a spirit which is nearly extinct. those who, from a fear of exposing her to political animosity, would deny this, forget that the truth is as strong against political as against religious error, and shut their eyes to the only means by which the political regeneration of the modern world is a possibility. for the catholic religion alone will not suffice to save it, as it was insufficient to save the ancient world, unless the catholic idea equally manifests itself in the political order. the church alone, without influence on the state, is powerless as a security for good government. it is absurd to pretend that at the present day france, or spain, or naples, are better governed than england, holland, or prussia. a country entirely protestant may have more catholic elements in its government than one where the population is wholly catholic. the state which is catholic _par excellence_ is a by-word for misgovernment, because the orthodoxy and piety of its administrators are deemed a substitute for a better system. the demand for a really catholic system of government falls with the greatest weight of reproach on the catholic states. yet it is important to remember that in the ages of faith the same unity prevailed in political ideas, and that the civil as well as the religious troubles of our time are in great measure due to the reformation. it is common to advise catholics to make up their minds to accept the political doctrines of the day; but it would be more to the purpose to recall the ideas of catholic times. it is not in the results of the political development of the last three centuries that the church can place her trust; neither in absolute monarchy, nor in the revolutionary liberalism, nor in the infallible constitutional scheme. she must create anew or revive her former creations, and instil a new life and spirit into those remains of the mediæval system which will bear the mark of the ages when heresy and unbelief, roman law, and heathen philosophy, had not obscured the idea of the christian state. these remains are to be found, in various stages of decay, in every state,--with the exception, perhaps, of france,--that grew out of the mediæval civilisation. above all they will be found in the country which, in the midst of its apostasy, and in spite of so much guilt towards religion, has preserved the catholic forms in its church establishment more than any other protestant nation, and the catholic spirit in her political institutions more than any catholic nation. to renew the memory of the times in which this spirit prevailed in europe, and to preserve the remains of it, to promote the knowledge of what is lost, and the desire of what is most urgently needed,--is an important service and an important duty which it behoves us to perform. we are greatly mistaken if these are not reflections which force themselves on every one who carefully observes the political history of the church in modern europe. footnotes: [footnote 300: _the rambler_, 1858.] [footnote 301: tertullian, _apologeticum_, 39; see also 30, 32. "we pray also for the emperors, for the ministers of their government, for the state, for the peace of the world, for the delay of the last day."] [footnote 302: _de civil. dei_, xv. 5. "the fratricide was the first founder of the secular state."] [footnote 303: "the church reckons her subjects not as her servants but as her children."] [footnote 304: "it is the maddest insolence, not only to dispute against that which we see the universal church believing, but also against what we see her doing. for not only is the faith of the church the rule of our faith, but also her actions of ours, and her customs of that which we ought to observe" (morinus, _comment. de discipl. in administ. poenitentiae_, preface).] [footnote 305: "apud vos quodvis colere jus est deum verum" (tertullian, _apolog._ xxiv.).] [footnote 306: august. _de civ. dei_, xx. 19. 3.] [footnote 307: "christianus nullius est hostis, nedum imperatoris, quem ... necesse est ut ... salvum velit cum toto romano imperio quousque saeculum stabit; tamdiu enim stabit" (tert. _ad scapulam_, 2). "cum caput illud orbis occiderit et [greek: rhym] esse coeperit, quod sibyllae fore aiunt, quis dubitet venisse jam finem rebus humanis orbique terrarum?" (lactantius, _inst. div._ vii. 25). "non prius veniet christus, quam regni romani defectio fiat" (ambrose _ad ep._ i. _ad thess._).] [footnote 308: "there is nothing so voluntary as religion."] [footnote 309: "god does not want unwilling worship, nor does he require a forced repentance."] [footnote 310: athanas. i. 363 b and 384 c [greek: mhê hanagkhazein halla peithein] "not compulsion, but persuasion" (chrysost. ii. 540 a and c).] [footnote 311: "if the state of which we are the secular children passes away, that of which we are spiritual children passes not. has god gone to sleep and let the house be destroyed, or let in the enemy through want of watchfulness? why fearest thou when earthly kingdoms fall? heaven is promised thee, that thou mightest not fall with them. the works of god himself shall pass: how much sooner the works of romulus! let us not quail, my brethren: all earthly kingdoms must come to an end."] [footnote 312: "the cry of the whole world is 'christ.' the mind is horrified in reviewing the ruins of our age. the roman world is falling, and yet our stiff neck is not bent. the barbarians' strength is in our sins; the defeat of the roman armies in our vices. we will not cut off the occasions of the malady, that the malady may be healed. the world is falling, but in us there is no falling off from sin" (st. jerome, _ep. 35, ad heliodorum_; _ep. 98, ad gaudentium_).] [footnote 313: "none are better witnesses of the words of heaven than we, on whom the end of the world has come. we assist at the world's setting, and diseases precede its dissolution" (_expos. ep. sec. lucam_, x.).] [footnote 314: "what is well-nigh all christendom but a sink of iniquity?" (_de gub. dei_, iii. 9).] [footnote 315: "in our age the devil has so defiled everything that scarcely a thing is done without idolatry."] [footnote 316: "do we wonder that god has granted all our lands to the barbarians, when they now purify by their chastity the places which the romans had polluted with their debauchery?"] [footnote 317: pope anastasius writes to clovis: "sedes petri in tanta occasione non potest non laetari, cum plenitudinem gentium intuetur ad eam veloci gradu concurrere" (bouquet, iv. 50).] [footnote 318: "the noble people of the franks, founded by god, converted to the catholic faith, and free from heresy."] [footnote 319: "vetati sunt a spiritu sancto loqui verbum dei in asia ... tentabant ire in bithyniam, et non permisit eos spiritus jesu" (_acts_ xvi. 6, 7).] [footnote 320: innocent iv. wrote in 1246 to the sicilians: "in omnem terram vestrae sonus tribulationis exivit ... multis pro miro vehementi ducentibus, quod pressi tam dirae servitutis opprobrio, et personarum ac rerum gravati multiplici detrimento, neglexeritis habere concilium, per quod vobis, sicut gentibus caeteris, aliqua provenirent solatia libertatis ... super hoc apud sedem apostolicam vos excusante formidine.... cogitate itaque corde vigili, ut a collo vestrae servitutis catena decidat, et universitas vestra in libertatis et quietis gaudio reflorescat; sitque ubertate conspicuum, ita divina favente potentia secura sit libertate decorum" (raynaldus, _ann._ ad ann. 1246).] [footnote 321: burke's _works_, i. 391, 404.] vii introduction to l.a. burd's edition of il principe by machiavelli mr. burd has undertaken to redeem our long inferiority in machiavellian studies, and it will, i think, be found that he has given a more completely satisfactory explanation of _the prince_ than any country possessed before. his annotated edition supplies all the solvents of a famous problem in the history of italy and the literature of politics. in truth, the ancient problem is extinct, and no reader of this volume will continue to wonder how so intelligent and reasonable a man came to propose such flagitious counsels. when machiavelli declared that extraordinary objects cannot be accomplished under ordinary rules, he recorded the experience of his own epoch, but also foretold the secret of men since born. he illustrates not only the generation which taught him, but the generations which he taught, and has no less in common with the men who had his precepts before them than with the viscontis, borgias, and baglionis who were the masters he observed. he represents more than the spirit of his country and his age. knowledge, civilisation, and morality have increased; but three centuries have borne enduring witness to his political veracity. he has been as much the exponent of men whom posterity esteems as of him whose historian writes: "cet homme que dieu, après l'avoir fait si grand, avait fait bon aussi, n'avait rien de la vertu." the authentic interpreter of machiavelli, the _commentarius perpetuus_ of the _discorsi_ and _the prince_, is the whole of later history. michelet has said: "rapportons-nous-en sur ceci à quelqu'un qui fut bien plus machiavéliste que machiavel, à la republique de venise." before his day, and long after, down almost to the time when a price was set on the heads of the pretender and of pontiac, venice employed assassins. and this was not the desperate resource of politicians at bay, but the avowed practice of decorous and religious magistrates. in 1569 soto hazards an impersonal doubt whether the morality of the thing was sound: "non omnibus satis probatur venetorum mos, qui cum complures a patria exules habeant condemnatos, singulis facultatem faciunt, ut qui alium eorum interfecerit, vita ac libertate donetur." but his sovereign shortly after obtained assurance that murder by royal command was unanimously approved by divines: "a los tales puede el principe mandarlos matar, aunque esten fuera de su distrito y reinos.--sin ser citado, secretamente se le puede quitar la vita.--esta es doctrina comun y cierta y recevida de todos los theologos." when the king of france, by despatching the guises, had restored his good name in europe, a venetian, francesco da molino, hoped that the example would not be thrown away on the council of ten: "permeti sua divina bontà che questo esempio habbi giovato a farlo proceder come spero con meno fretta e più sodamente a cose tali e d' importanza." sarpi, their ablest writer, their official theologian, has a string of maxims which seem to have been borrowed straight from the florentine predecessor: "proponendo cosa in apparenza non honesta, scusarla come necessaria, come praticata da altri, come propria al tempo, che tende a buon fine, et conforme all' opinione de' molti.--la vendetta non giova se non per fugir lo sprezzo.--ogn'huomo ha opinione che il mendacio sia buono in ragion di medicina, et di far bene a far creder il vero et utile con premesse false." one of his countrymen, having examined his writings, reports: "i ricordi di questo grand' uomo furono più da politico che da christiano." to him was attributed the doctrine of secret punishment, and the use of poison against public enemies: "in casi d' eccessi incorrigibili si punissero secretamente, a fine che il sangue patrizio non resti profanato.--il veleno deve esser l' unico mezzo per levarli dal mondo, quando alla giustizia non complisse farli passare sotto la manaia del carnefice." venice, otherwise unlike the rest of europe, was, in this particular, not an exception. machiavelli enjoyed a season of popularity even at rome. the medicean popes refused all official employment to one who had been the brain of a hostile government; but they encouraged him to write, and were not offended by the things he wrote for them. leo's own dealings with the tyrant of perugia were cited by jurists as a suggestive model for men who have an enemy to get rid of. clement confessed to contarini that honesty would be preferable, but that honest men get the worst of it: "io cognosco certo che voi dicete il vero, et che ad farla da homo da bene, et a far il debito, seria proceder come mi aricordate; ma bisognerebbe trovar la corrispondentia. non vedete che il mondo è ridutto a un termine che colui il qual è più astuto et cum più trame fa il fatto suo, è più laudato, et estimato più valente homo, et più celebrato, et chi fa il contrario vien detto di esso; quel tale è una bona persona, ma non val niente? et se ne sta cum quel titulo solo di bona persona.--chi va bonamente vien trata da bestia." two years after this speech the astute florentine authorised _the prince_ to be published at rome. it was still unprinted when pole had it pressed on his attention by cromwell, and brosch consequently suspects the story. upon the death of clement, pole opened the attack; but it was not pursued during the reaction against things medicean which occupied the reign of farnese. machiavelli was denounced to the inquisition on the 11th of november 1550, by muzio, a man much employed in controversy and literary repression, who, knowing greek, was chosen by pius v. for the work afterwards committed to baronius: "senza rispetto alcuno insegna a non servar ne fede, ne charità, ne religione; et dice che di queste cosi, gli huomini se ne debbono servire per parer buoni, et per le grandezze temporali, alle quali quando non servono non se ne dee fare stima. et non è questo peggio che heretica dottrina? vedendosi che ciò si comporta, sono accetate come opere approvate dalla santa madre chiesa." muzio, who at the same time recommended the _decamerone_, was not acting from ethical motives. his accusation succeeded. when the index was instituted, in 1557, machiavelli was one of the first writers condemned, and he was more rigorously and implacably condemned than anybody else. the trent commissioners themselves prepared editions of certain prohibited authors, such as clarius and flaminius; guicciardini was suffered to appear with retrenchments; and the famous revision of boccaccio was carried out in 1573. this was due to the influence of victorius, who pleaded in vain for a castigated text of machiavelli. he continued to be specially excepted when permission was given to read forbidden books. sometimes there were other exceptions, such as dumoulin, marini, or maimbourg; but the exclusion of machiavelli was permanent, and when lucchesini preached against him at the gesù, he had to apply to the pope himself for licence to read him. lipsius was advised by his roman censors to mix a little catholic salt in his machiavellism, and to suppress a seeming protest against the universal hatred for a writer _qui misera qua non manu hodie vapulat_. one of the ablest but most contentious of the jesuits, raynaud, pursued his memory with a story like that with which tronchin improved the death of voltaire: "exitus impiissimi nebulonis metuendus est eius aemulatoribus, nam blasphemans evomuit reprobum spiritum." in spite of this notorious disfavour, he has been associated with the excesses of the religious wars. the daughter of the man to whom he addressed _the prince_ was catharine of medici, and she was reported to have taught her children "surtout des traictz de cet athée machiavel." boucher asserted that henry iii. carried him in his pocket: "qui perpetuus ei in sacculo atque manibus est"; and montaigne confirms the story when he says: "et dict on, de ce temps, que machiavel est encores ailleurs en crédit." the pertinently appropriate quotation by which the queen sanctified her murderous resolve was supplied, not by her father's rejected and discredited monitor, but by a bishop at the council of trent, whose sermons had just been published: "bisogna esser severo et acuto, non bisogna esser clemente; è crudeltà l' esser pietoso, è pietà l' esser crudele." and the argument was afterwards embodied in the _controversies_ of bellarmin: "haereticis obstinatis beneficium est, quod de hac vita tollantur, nam quo diutius vivunt, eo plures errores excogitant; plures pervertunt, et majorem sibi damnationem acquirunt." the divines who held these doctrines received them through their own channels straight from the middle ages. the germ theory, that the wages of heresy is death, was so expanded as to include the rebel, the usurper, the heterodox or rebellious town, and it continued to develop long after the time of machiavelli. at first it had been doubtful whether a small number of culprits justified the demolition of a city: "videtur quod si aliqui haeretici sunt in civitate potest exuri tota civitas." under gregory xiii. the right is asserted unequivocally: "civitas ista potest igne destrui, quando in ea plures sunt haeretici." in case of sedition, fire is a less suitable agent: "propter rebellionem civitas quandoque supponitur aratro et possunt singuli decapitari." as to heretics the view was: "ut hostes latronesque occidi possunt etiamsi sunt clerici." a king, if he was judged a usurper, was handed over to extinction: "licite potest a quolibet de populo occidi, pro libertate populi, quando non est recursus ad superiorem, a quo possit iustitia fieri." or, in the words of the scrupulous soto: "tunc quisque ius habet ipsum extinguendi." to the end of the seventeenth century theologians taught: "occidatur, seu occidendus proscribatur, quando non alitur potest haberi tranquillitas reipublicae." this was not mere theory, or the enforced logic of men in thrall to mediæval antecedents. under the most carnal and unchristian king, the vaudois of provence were exterminated in the year 1545, and paul sadolet wrote as follows to cardinal farnese just before and just after the event: "aggionta hora questa instantia del predetto paese di provenza a quella che da mons. nuntio s'era fatta a sua maestà christianissima a nome di sua beatitudine et di vostra reverendissima signoria, siamo in ferma speranza, che vi si debbia pigliare qualche bono expediente et farci qualche gagliarda provisione.--è seguito, in questo paese, quel tanto desiderato et tanto necessario effetto circa le cose di cabrieres, che da vostra signoria reverendissima è stato si lungamente ricordato et sollicitato et procurato." even melanchthon was provoked by the death of cromwell to exclaim that there is no better deed than the slaughter of a tyrant; "utinam deus alicui forti viro hanc mentem inserat!" and in 1575 the swedish bishops decided that it would be a good work to poison their king in a basin of soup--an idea particularly repugnant to the author of _de rege et regis institutione_. among mariana's papers i have seen the letter from paris describing the murder of henry iii., which he turned to such account in the memorable sixth chapter: "communicò con sus superiores, si peccaria mortalmente un sacerdote que matase a un tirano. ellos le diceron que non era pecado, mas que quedaria irregular. y no contentandose con esto, ni con las disputas que avia de ordinario en la sorbona sobre la materia, continuando siempre sus oraciones, lo preguntò a otros theologos, que le afirmavan lo mismo; y con esto se resolviò enteramente de executarlo. por el successo es de collegir que tuvo el fraile alguna revelacion de nuestro señor en particular, y inspiracion para executar el caso." according to maffei, the pope's biographer, the priests were not content with saying that killing was no sin: "cum illi posse, nec sine magno quidem merito censuissent." regicide was so acceptable a work that it seemed fitly assigned to a divine interposition. when, on the 21st of january 1591, a youth offered his services to make away with henry iv., the nuncio remitted the matter to rome: "quantunque mi sia parso di trovarlo pieno di tale humilità, prudenza, spirito et cose che arguiscono che questa sia inspiratione veramente piuttosto che temerità e leggerezza." in a volume which, though recent, is already rare, the foreign office published d'avaux's advice to treat the protestants of ireland much as william treated the catholics of glencoe; and the argument of the assassination plot came originally from a belgian seminary. there were at least three men living far into the eighteenth century who defended the massacre of st. bartholomew in their books; and it was held as late as 1741 that culprits may be killed before they are condemned: "etiam ante sententiam impune occidi possunt, quando de proximo erant banniendi, vel quando eorum delictum est notorium, grave, et pro quo poena capitis infligenda esset." whilst these principles were current in religion as well as in society, the official censures of the church and the protests of every divine since catharinus were ineffectual. much of the profaner criticism uttered by such authorities as the cardinal de retz, voltaire, frederic the great, daunou, and mazzini is not more convincing or more real. linguet was not altogether wrong in suggesting that the assailants knew machiavelli at second hand: "chaque fois que je jette les yeux sur les ouvrages de ce grand génie, je ne saurais concevoir, je l'avoue, la cause du décri où il est tombé. je soupçonne fortement que ses plus grands ennemis sont ceux qui ne l'ont pas lu." retz attributed to him a proposition which is not in his writings. frederic and algernon sidney had read only one of his books, and bolingbroke, a congenial spirit, who quotes him so often, knew him very little. hume spoils a serious remark by a glaring eighteenth-century comment: "there is scarcely any maxim in _the prince_ which subsequent experience has not entirely refuted. the errors of this politician proceeded, in a great measure, from his having lived in too early an age of the world to be a good judge of political truth." bodin had previously written: "il n'a jamais sondé le gué de la science politique." mazzini complains of his _analisi cadaverica ed ignoranza della vita_; and barthélemy st hilaire, verging on paradox, says: "on dirait vraiment que l'histoire ne lui a rien appris, non plus que la conscience." that would be more scientific treatment than the common censure of moralists and the common applause of politicians. it is easier to expose errors in practical politics than to remove the ethical basis of judgments which the modern world employs in common with machiavelli. by plausible and dangerous paths men are drawn to the doctrine of the justice of history, of judgment by results, the nursling of the nineteenth century, from which a sharp incline leads to _the prince_. when we say that public life is not an affair of morality, that there is no available rule of right and wrong, that men must be judged by their age, that the code shifts with the longitude, that the wisdom which governs the event is superior to our own, we carry obscurely tribute to the system which bears so odious a name. few would scruple to maintain with mr. morley that the equity of history requires that we shall judge men of action by the standards of men of action; or with retz: "les vices d'un archevêque peuvent être, dans une infinité de rencontres, les vertus d'un chef de parti." the expounder of adam smith to france, j.b. say, confirms the ambitious coadjutor: "louis xiv. et son despotisme et ses guerres n'ont jamais fait le mal qui serait résulté des conseils de ce bon fénelon, l'apôtre et le martyr de la vertu et du bien des hommes." most successful public men deprecate what sir henry taylor calls much weak sensibility of conscience, and approve lord grey's language to princess lieven: "i am a great lover of morality, public and private; but the intercourse of nations cannot be strictly regulated by that rule." while burke was denouncing the revolution, walpole wrote: "no great country was ever saved by good men, because good men will not go the lengths that may be necessary." all which had been formerly anticipated by pole: "quanto quis privatam vitam agens christi similior erit tanto minus aptus ad regendum id munus iudicio hominum existimabitur." the main principle of machiavelli is asserted by his most eminent english disciple: "it is the solecism of power to think, to command the end, and yet not to endure the means." and bacon leads up to the familiar jesuit: "cui licet finis, illi et media permissa sunt." the austere pascal has said: "on ne voit rien de juste ou d'injuste qui ne change de qualité en changeant de climat" (the reading _presque_ rien was the precaution of an editor). the same underlying scepticism is found not only in philosophers of the titanic sort, to whom remorse is a prejudice of education, and the moral virtues are "the political offspring which flattery begat upon pride," but among the masters of living thought. locke, according to mr. bain, holds that we shall scarcely find any rule of morality, excepting such as are necessary to hold society together, and these too with great limitations, but what is somewhere or other set aside, and an opposite established by whole societies of men. maine de biran extracts this conclusion from the _esprit des lois_: "il n'y a rien d'absolu ni dans la religion, ni dans la morale, ni, à plus forte raison, dans la politique." in the mercantile economists turgot detects the very doctrine of helvetius: "il établit qu'il n'y a pas lieu à la probité entre les nations, d'où suivroit que la monde doit être éternellement un coupe-gorge. en quoi il est bien d'accord avec les panégyristes de colbert." these things survive, transmuted, in the edifying and popular epigram: "die weltgeschichte ist das weltgericht." lacordaire, though he spoke so well of "l'empire et les ruses de la durée," recorded his experience in these words: "j'ai toujours vu dieu se justifier à la longue." reuss, a teacher of opposite tendency and greater name, is equally consoling: "les destinées de l'homme s'accomplissent ici-bas; la justice de dieu s'exerce et se manifeste sur cette terre." in the infancy of exact observation massillon could safely preach that wickedness ends in ignominy: "dieu aura son tour." the indecisive providentialism of bossuet's countrymen is shared by english divines. "contemporaries," says hare, "look at the agents, at their motives and characters; history looks rather at the acts and their consequences." thirlwall hesitates to say that whatever is, is best; "but i have a strong faith that it is for the best, and that the general stream of tendency is toward good." and sedgwick, combining induction with theology, writes: "if there be a superintending providence, and if his will be manifested by general laws, operating both on the physical and moral world, then must a violation of those laws be a violation of his will, and be pregnant with inevitable misery." apart from the language of religion, an optimism ranging to the bounds of fatalism is the philosophy of many, especially of historians: "le vrai, c'est, en toutes choses, le fait." sainte-beuve says: "il y a dans tout fait général et prolongé une puissance de démonstration insensible"; and scherer describes progress as "une espèce de logique objective et impersonelle qui résout les questions sans appel." ranke has written: "der beste prüfstein ist die zeit"; and sybel explains that this was not a short way out of confusion and incertitude, but a profound generalisation: "ein geschlecht, ein volk löst das andere ab, und der lebende hat recht." a scholar of a different school and fibre, stahr the aristotelian, expresses the same idea: "die geschichte soll die richtigkeit des denkens bewähren." richelieu's maxim: "les grands desseins et notables entreprises ne se vérifient jamais autrement que par le succès"; and napoleon's: "je ne juge les hommes que par les résultats," are seriously appropriated by fustel de coulanges: "ce qui caractérise le véritable homme d'état, c'est le succès, on le reconnaît surtout à ce signe, qu'il réussit." one of machiavelli's gravest critics applied it to him: "die ewige aufgabe der politik bleibt unter den gegebenen verhältnissen und mit den vorhandenen mitteln etwas zu erreichen. eine politik die das verkennt, die auf den erfolg verzichtet, sich auf eine theoretische propaganda, auf ideale gesichtspunkte beschränkt, von einer verlorenen gegenwart an eine künftige gerechtigkeit appellirt, ist keine politik mehr." one of the mediæval pioneers, stenzel, delivered a formula of purest tuscan cinquecento: "was bei anderen menschen gemeine schlechtigkeit ist, erhält, bei den ungewöhnlichen geistern, den stempel der grösse, der selbst dem verbrechen sich aufdrückt. der maassstab ist anders; denn das ausserordentliche lässt sich nur durch ausserordentliches bewirken." treitschke habitually denounces the impotent doctrinaires who do not understand "dass der staat macht ist und der welt des willens angehört," and who know not how to rise "von der politik des bekenntnisses zu der politik der that." schäfer, though a less pronounced partisan, derides macaulay for thinking that human happiness concerns political science: "das wesen des staates ist die macht, und die politik die kunst ihn zu erhalten." rochau's _realpolitik_ was a treatise in two volumes written to prove "dass der staat durch seine selbsterhaltung das oberste gebot der sittlichkeit erfüllt." wherefore, nobody finds fault when a state in its decline is subjugated by a robust neighbour. in one of those telling passages which moved mr. freeman to complain that he seems unable to understand that a small state can have any rights, or that a generous or patriotic sentiment can find a place anywhere except in the breast of a fool, mommsen justifies the roman conquests: "kraft des gesetzes dass das zum staat entwickelte volk die politisch unmündigen, das civilisirte die geistig unmündigen in sich auflöst." the same idea was imparted into the theory of ethics by kirchmann, and appears, with a sobering touch, in the _geschichte jesu_ of hase, the most popular german divine: "der einzelne wird nach der grösse seiner ziele, nach den wirkungen seiner thaten für das wohl der völker gemessen, aber nicht nach dem maasse der moral und des rechts.--vom leben im geiste seiner zeit hängt nicht der sittliche werth eines menschen, aber seine geschichtliche wirksamkeit ab." rümelin, both in politics and literature the most brilliant suabian of his time, and a strenuous adversary of machiavelli, wrote thus in 1874: "für den einzelnen im staat gilt das princip der selbsthingabe, für den staat das der selbstbehauptung. der einzelne dient dem recht; der staat handhabt, leitet und schafft dasselbe. der einzelne ist nur ein flüchtiges glied in dem sittlichen ganzen; der staat ist, wenn nicht dieses ganze selbst, doch dessen reale, ordnende macht; er ist unsterblich und sich selbst genug.--die erhaltung des staats rechtfertigt jedes opfer und steht über jedem gebot." nefftzer, an alsatian borderer, says: "le devoir suprême des individus est de se dévouer, celui des nations est de se conserver, et se confond par conséquent avec leur intérêt." once, in a mood of pantheism, renan wrote: "l'humanité a tout fait, et, nous voulons le croire, tout bien fait." or, as michelet abridges the _scienza nuova_: "l'humanité est son oeuvre à elle-même. dieu agit sur elle, mais par elle." mr. leslie stephen thus lays down the philosophy of history according to carlyle, "that only succeeds which is based on divine truth, and permanent success therefore proves the right, as the effect proves the cause." darwin, having met carlyle, notes that "in his eyes might was right," and adds that he had a narrow and unscientific mind; but mr. goldwin smith discovers the same lesson: "history, of itself, if observed as science observes the facts of the physical world, can scarcely give man any principle or any object of allegiance, unless it be success." dr. martineau attributes this doctrine to mill: "do we ask what determines the moral quality of actions? we are referred, not to their spring, but to their consequences." jeremy bentham used to relate how he found the greatest happiness principle in 1768, and gave a shilling for it, at the corner of queen's college. he found it in priestley, and he might have gone on finding it in beccaria and hutcheson, all of whom trace their pedigree to the _mandragola_: "io credo che quello sia bene che facci bene a' più, e che i più se ne contentino." this is the centre of unity in all machiavelli, and gives him touch, not with unconscious imitators only, but with the most conspicuous race of reasoners in the century. english experience has not been familiar with a line of thought plainly involving indulgence to machiavelli. dugald stewart raises him high, but raises him for a heavy fall: "no writer, certainly, either in ancient or in modern times, has ever united, in a more remarkable degree, a greater variety of the most dissimilar and seemingly the most discordant gifts and attainments.--to his maxims the royal defenders of the catholic faith have been indebted for the spirit of that policy which they have uniformly opposed to the innovations of the reformers." hallam indeed has said: "we continually find a more flagitious and undisguised abandonment of moral rules for the sake of some idol of a general principle than can be imputed to _the prince_ of machiavel." but the unaccustomed hyperbole had been hazarded a century before in the obscurity of a latin dissertation by feuerlein: "longe detestabiliores errores apud alios doctores politicos facile invenias, si eidem rigorosae censurae eorum scripta subiicienda essent." what has been, with us, the occasional aphorism of a masterful mind, encountered support abroad in accredited systems, and in a vast and successful political movement. the recovery of machiavelli has been essentially the product of causes operating on the continent. when hegel was dominant to the rhine, and cousin beyond it, the circumstances favoured his reputation. for hegel taught: "der gang der weltgeschichte steht ausserhalb der tugend, des lasters, und der gerechtigkeit." and the great eclectic renewed, in explicit language, the worst maxim of the _istorie fiorentine_: "l'apologie d'un siècle est dans son existence, car son existence est un arrêt et un jugement de dieu même, ou l'histoire n'est qu'une fastasmagorie insignifiante.--le caractère propre, le signe d'un grand homme, c'est qu'il réussit.--ou nul guerrier ne doit être appelé grand homme, ou, s'il est grand, il faut l'absoudre, et absoudre en masse tout ce qu'il a fait.--il faut prouver que le vainqueur non seulement sert la civilisation, mais qu'il est meilleur, plus moral, et que c'est pour cela qu'il est vainqueur. maudire la puissance (j'entends une puissance longue et durable) c'est blasphémer l'humanité." this primitive and everlasting problem assumed a peculiar shape in theological controversy. the catholic divines urged that prosperity is a sign by which, even in the militant period, the true church may be known; coupling _felicitas temporalis illis collata qui ecclesiam defenderunt_ with _infelix exitus eorum qui ecclesiam oppugnant_. le blanc de beaulieu, a name famous in the history of pacific disputation, holds the opposite opinion: "crucem et perpessiones esse potius ecclesiae notam, nam denunciatum piis in verbo dei fore ut in hoc mundo persecutionem patiantur, non vero ut armis sint adversariis suis superiores." renan, outbidding all, finds that honesty is the worst policy: "en général, dans l'histoire, l'homme est puni de ce qu'il fait de bien, et récompensée de ce qu'il fait de mal.--l'histoire est tout le contraire de la vertu récompensée." the national movement which united, first italy and then germany, opened a new era for machiavelli. he had come down, laden with the distinctive reproach of abetting despotism; and the men who, in the seventeenth century, levelled the course of absolute monarchy, were commonly known as _novi politici et machiavellistae_. in the days of grotius they are denounced by besold: "novi politici, ex italia redeuntes qui quavis fraude principibus a subditis pecuniam extorquere fas licitumque esse putant, machiavelli plerumque praeceptis et exemplis principum, quorum rationes non capiunt, ad id abutentes." but the immediate purpose with which italians and germans effected the great change in the european constitution was unity, not liberty. they constructed, not securities, but forces. machiavelli's time had come. the problems once more were his own: and in many forward and resolute minds the spirit also was his, and displayed itself in an ascending scale of praise. he was simply a faithful observer of facts, who described the fell necessity that governs narrow territories and unstable fortunes; he discovered the true line of progress and the law of future society; he was a patriot, a republican, a liberal, but above all this, a man sagacious enough to know that politics is an inductive science. a sublime purpose justifies him, and he has been wronged by dupes and fanatics, by irresponsible dreamers and interested hypocrites. the italian revolution, passing from the liberal to the national stage, at once adopted his name and placed itself under his invocation. count sclopis, though he declared him _penseur profond, écrivain admirable_, deplored this untimely preference: "il m'a été pénible de voir le gouvernement provisoire de la tuscane, en 1859, le lendemain du jour où ce pays recouvrait sa liberté, publier un décret, portant qu'une édition complète des oeuvres de machiavel serait faite aux frais de l'état." the research even of our best masters, villari and tommasini, is prompted by admiration. ferrari, who comes so near him in many qualities of the intellect, proclaims him the recorder of fate: "il décrit les rôles que la fatalité distribue aux individus et aux masses dans ces moments funestes et glorieux où ils sont appelés à changer la loi et la foi des nations." his advice, says la farina, would have saved italy. canello believes that he is disliked because he is mistaken for a courtier: "l'orrore e l' antipatia che molti critici hanno provato per il machiavelli son derivati dal pensare che tutti i suoi crudi insegnamenti fossero solo a vantaggio del principe." one biographer, mordenti, exalts him as the very champion of conscience: "risuscitando la dignità dell' umana coscienza, ne affermò l' esistenza in faccia alla ragione." he adds, more truly, "è uno dei personaggi del dramma che si va svolgendo nell' età nostra." that is the meaning of laurent when he says that he has imitators but no defenders: "machiavel ne trouve plus un seul partisan au xixe siècle.--la postérité a voué son nom à l'infamie, tout en pratiquant sa doctrine." his characteristic universality has been recognised by baudrillart: "en exprimant ce mauvais côté, mais ce mauvais côté, hélas, éternel! machiavel n'est plus seulement le publiciste de son pays et de son temps; it est le politique de tous les siècles.--s'il fait tout dépendre de la puissance individuelle, et de ses facultés de force, d'habileté de ruse, c'est que, plus le théâtre se rétrécit, plus l'homme influe sur la marche des évènements." matter finds the same merits which are applauded by the italians: "il a plus innové pour la liberté que pour le despotisme, car autour de lui la liberté était inconnue, tandis que le despotisme lui posait partout." and his reviewer, longpérier, pronounces the doctrine "parfaitement appropriée aux états d'italie." nourrisson, with fehr, one of the few religious men who still have a good word for the secretary, admires his sincerity: "_le prince_ est un livre de bonne foi, où l'auteur, sans songer à mal, n'a fait que traduire en maximes les pratiques habituelles à ses contemporains." thiers, though he surrendered _the prince_, clung to the _discorsi_--the _discorsi_, with the pointed and culminating text produced by mr. burd. in the archives of the ministry he might have found how the idea struck his successful predecessor, vergennes: "il est des choses plus fortes que les hommes, et les grands intérêts des nations sont de ce genre, et doivent par conséquent l'emporter sur la façon de penser de quelques particuliers." loyalty to frederic the great has not restrained german opinion, and philosophers unite with historians in rejecting his youthful moralities. zimmerman wonders what would have become of prussia if the king had practised the maxims of the crown prince; and zeller testifies that the _anti-machiavel_ was not permitted to influence his reign: "wird man doch weder in seiner staatsleitung noch in seinen politischen grundsätzen etwas von dem vermissen, worauf die ueberlegenheit einer gesunden realpolitik allem liberalen oder conservativen, radikalen oder legitimistischen, doktrinarismus gegenüber beruht." ahrens and windelband insist on the virtue of a national government: "der staat ist sich selbst genug, wenn er in einer nation wurzelt,--das ist der grundgedanke machiavelli's." kirchmann celebrates the emancipation of the state from the moral yoke: "man hat machiavelli zwar in der theorie bekämpft, allein die praxis der staaten hat seine lehren immer eingehalten.--wenn seine lehre verletzt, so kommt diess nur von der kleinheit der staaten und fürsten, auf die er sie verwendet.--es spricht nur für seine tiefe erkenntniss des staatswesens, dass er die staatsgewalt nicht den regeln der privatmoral unterwirft, sondern selbst vor groben verletzungen dieser moral durch den fürsten nicht zurückschreckt, wenn das wohl des ganzen und die freiheit des vaterlandes nicht anders vorbereitet und vermittelt werden kann." in kuno fischer's progress through the systems of metaphysics machiavelli appears at almost every step; his influence is manifest to dr. abbott throughout the whole of bacon's political writings; hobbes followed up his theory to the conclusions which he abstained from; spinoza gave him the benefit of a liberal interpretation; leibniz, the inventor of the acquiescent doctrine which bolingbroke transmitted to the _essay on man_, said that he drew a good likeness of a bad prince; herder reports him to mean that a rogue need not be a fool; fichte frankly set himself to rehabilitate him. in the end, the great master of modern philosophy pronounces in his favour, and declares it absurd to robe a prince in the cowl of a monk: "ein politischer denker und künstler dessen erfahrener und tiefer verstand aus den geschichtlich gegebenen verhältnissen besser, als aus den grundsätzen der metaphysik, die politischen nothwendigkeiten, den charakter, die bildung und aufgabe weltlicher herrschaft zu begreifen wusste.--da man weiss, dass politische machtfragen nie, am wenigsten in einem verderbten volke, mit den mitteln der moral zu lösen sind, so ist es unverständig, das buch vom fürsten zu verschreien. machiavelli hatte einen herrscher zu schildern, keinen klosterbruder." ranke was a grateful student of fichte when he spoke of machiavelli as a meritorious writer, maligned by people who could not understand him: "einem autor von höchstem verdienst, und der keineswegs ein böser mensch war.--die falsche auffassung des _principe_ beruht eben darauf, dass man die lehren machiavells als allgemeine betrachtet, während sie bloss anweisungen für einen bestimmten zweck sind." to gervinus, in 1853, he is "der grosse seher," the prophet of the modern world: "er errieth den geist der neuern geschichte." gervinus was a democratic liberal, and, taken with gentz from another quarter, he shows how widely the elements of the machiavellian restoration were spread over europe. gentz had not forgotten his classics in the service of austria when he wrote to a friend: "wenn selbst das recht je verletzt werden darf, so geschehe es, um die rechtmässige macht zu erhalten; in allem uebrigen herrsche es unbedingt" twesten is as well persuaded as machiavelli that the world cannot be governed "con pater nostri in mano," and he deemed that patriotism atoned for his errors: "dass der weltgeschichtliche fortschritt nicht mit schonung und gelindigkeit, nicht in den formen des rechts vollzogen werden könnte, hat die geschichte aller länder bestätigt.--auch machiavellis sünden mögen wir als gesühnt betrachten, durch das hochsinnige streben für das grosse und das ansehen seines volkes." one censor of frederic, boretius, makes him answerable for a great deal of presuming criticism: "die gelehrten sind bis heute in ihrem urtheil über machiavelli nicht einig, die öffentliche meinung ist hierin glücklicher.--die öffentliche meinung kann sich für alle diese weisheit beim alten fritz bedanken." on the eve of the campaign in bohemia, herbst pointed out that machiavelli, though previously a republican, sacrificed liberty to unity: "der einheit soll die innere freiheit--machiavelli war kurz zuvor noch begeisterter anhänger der republik--geopfert werden." according to feuerlein the heart of the writer was loyal, but the conditions of the problem were inexorable; and klein detects in _the prince_, and even in the _mandragola_, "die reformatorische absicht eines sittenspiegels." chowanetz wrote a book to hold up machiavelli as a teacher of all ages, but especially of our own: "die absicht aber, welche machiavel mit seinem buche verband, ist trefflich für alle zeiten." and weitzel hardly knows a better writer, or one less worthy of an evil name: "im interesse der menschheit und gesetzmässiger verfassungen kann kaum ein besseres werk geschrieben werden.--wohl ist mancher in der geschichte, wie in der tradition der völker, auf eine unschuldige weise um seinen verdienten, oder zu einem unverdienten rufe gekommen, aber keiner vielleicht unschuldiger als machiavelli." these are remote and forgotten names. stronger men of the imperial epoch have resumed the theme with better means of judging, and yet with no harsher judgment. hartwig sums up his penetrating and severe analysis by confessing that the world as machiavelli saw it, without a conscience, is the real world of history as it is: "die thatsachen selbst scheinen uns das geheimniss ihrer existenz zu verrathen; wir glauben vor uns die fäden sich verknüpfen und verschlingen zu sehen, deren gewebe die weltgeschichte ist." gaspary thinks that he hated iniquity, but that he knew of no righteousness apart from the state: "er lobte mit wärme das gute und tadelte mit abscheu das böse; aber er studirte auch dieses mit interesse.--er erkennt eben keine moral, wie keine religion, über dem staate, sondern nur in demselben; die menschen sind von natur schlecht, die gesetze machen sie gut.--wo es kein gericht giebt, bei dem man klagen könnte, wie in den handlungen der fürsten, betrachtet man immer das ende." the common opinion is expressed by baumgarten in his _charles the fifth_, that the grandeur of the purpose assures indulgence to the means proposed: "wenn die umstände zum wortbruch, zur grausamkeit, habgier, lüge treiben, so hat man sich nicht etwa mit bedauern, dass die not dazu zwinge, sondern schlechtweg, weil es eben politisch zweckmässig ist und ohne alles bedenken so zu verhalten.--ihre deduktionen sind uns unerträglich, wenn wir nicht sagen können: alle diese schrecklichen dinge empfahl machiavelli, weil er nur durch sie die befreiung seines vaterlandes zu erreichen hoffte. dieses erhabene ziel macht uns die fürchterlichen mittel annehmbar, welche machiavelli seinem fürsten empfiehlt." hillebrand was a more international german; he had swum in many european waters, and wrote in three languages. he is scarcely less favourable in his interpretation: "cette dictature, il ne faut jamais le perdre de vue, ne serait jamais que transitoire, et devrait faire place à un gouvernement libre dès que la grande réforme nationale et sociale serait accomplie.--il a parfaitement conscience du mal. l'atmosphère ambiante de son siècle et de son pays n'a nullement oblitéré son sens moral--il a si bien conscience de l'énormité de ces crimes, qu'il la condamne hautement lorsque la dernière nécessité ne les impose pas." among these utterances of capable and distinguished men, it will be seen that some are partially true, and others, without a particle of truth, are at least representative and significant, and serve to bring machiavelli within fathomable depth. he is the earliest conscious and articulate exponent of certain living forces in the present world. religion, progressive enlightenment, the perpetual vigilance of public opinion, have not reduced his empire, or disproved the justice of his conception of mankind. he obtains a new lease of life from causes that are still prevailing, and from doctrines that are apparent in politics, philosophy, and science. without sparing censure, or employing for comparison the grosser symptoms of the age, we find him near our common level, and perceive that he is not a vanishing type, but a constant and contemporary influence. where it is impossible to praise, to defend, or to excuse, the burden of blame may yet be lightened by adjustment and distribution, and he is more rationally intelligible when illustrated by lights falling not only from the century he wrote in, but from our own, which has seen the course of its history twenty-five times diverted by actual or attempted crime. viii mr. goldwin smith's irish history[322] when macaulay republished his essays from the _edinburgh review_, he had already commenced the great work by which his name will be remembered; and he had the prudence to exclude from the collection his early paper on the art of historical writing. in the maturity of his powers, he was rightly unwilling to bring into notice the theories of his youth. at a time when he was about to claim a place among the first historians, it would have been injudicious to remind men of the manner in which he had described the objects of his emulation or of his rivalry--how in his judgment the speeches of thucydides violate the decencies of fiction, and give to his book something of the character of the chinese pleasure-grounds, whilst his political observations are very superficial; how polybius has no other merit than that of a faithful narrator of facts; and how in the nineteenth century, from the practice of distorting narrative in conformity with theory, "history proper is disappearing." but in that essay, although the judgments are puerile, the ideal at which the writer afterwards aimed is distinctly drawn, and his own character is prefigured in the description of the author of a history of england as it ought to be, who "gives to truth those attractions which have been usurped by fiction," "intersperses the details which are the charm of historical romances," and "reclaims those materials which the novelist has appropriated." mr. goldwin smith, like macaulay, has written on the study of history, and he has been a keen critic of other historians before becoming one himself. it is a bold thing for a man to bring theory so near to execution, and, amidst dispute on his principles and resentment at his criticism, to give an opportunity of testing his theories by his own practice, and of applying his own canons to his performance. it reminds us of the professor of cologne, who wrote the best latin poem of modern times, as a model for his pupils; and of the author of an attack on dryden's _virgil_, who is styled by pope the "fairest of critics," "because," says johnson, "he exhibited his own version to be compared with that which he condemned." the work in which the professor of history and critic of historians teaches by example is not unworthy of his theory, whilst some of its defects may be explained by it. the point which most closely connects mr. goldwin smith's previous writings with his _irish history_ is his vindication of a moral code against those who identify moral with physical laws, who consider the outward regularity with which actions are done to be the inward reason why they must be done, and who conceive that all laws are opposed to freedom. in his opposition to this materialism, he goes in one respect too far, in another not far enough. on the one hand, whilst defending liberty and morality, he has not sufficient perception of the spiritual element; and on the other, he seems to fear that it would be a concession to his antagonists to dwell on the constant laws by which nature asserts herself, and on the regularity with which like causes produce like effects. yet it is on the observation of these laws that political, social, and economical science rests; and it is by the knowledge of them that a scientific historian is guided in grouping his matter. in this he differs from the artist, whose principle of arrangement is drawn from himself, not from external nature; and from the annalist, who has no arrangement, since he sees, not the connection, but the succession of events. facts are intelligible and instructive,--or, in other words, history exhibits truths as well as facts,--when they are seen not merely as they follow, but as they correspond; not merely as they have happened, but as they are paralleled. the fate of ireland is to be understood not simply from the light of english and irish history, but by the general history of other conquests, colonies, dependencies, and establishments. in this sort of illustration by analogy and contrast mr. goldwin smith is particularly infelicitous. nor does providence gain what science loses by his treatment of history. he rejects materialism, but he confines his view to motives and forces which are purely human. the catholic church receives, therefore, very imperfect measure at his hands. her spiritual character and purpose he cannot discern behind the temporal instruments and appendages of her existence; he confounds authority with influence, devotion with bigotry, power with force of arms, and estimates the vigour and durability of catholicism by criterions as material as those of the philosophers he has so vehemently and so ably refuted. most protestant writers fail in approbation; he fails in appreciation. it is not so much a religious feeling that makes him unjust, as a way of thinking which, in great measure, ignores the supernatural, and therefore precludes a just estimate of religion in general, and of catholicism in particular. hence he is unjust rather to the nature than to the actions of the church. he caricatures more than he libels her. he is much less given to misrepresentation and calumny than macaulay, but he has a less exalted idea of the history and character of catholicism. as he underrates what is divine, so he has no very high standard for the actions of men, and he is liberal in admitting extenuating circumstances. though he never suspends the severity of his moral judgment in consideration of the purpose or the result, yet he is induced by a variety of arguments to mitigate its rigour. in accordance with the theory he has formerly developed, he is constantly sitting in judgment; and he discusses the morality of men and actions far oftener than history--which has very different problems to solve--either requires or tolerates. de maistre says that in our time compassion is reserved for the guilty. mr. goldwin smith is a merciful judge, whose compassion generally increases in proportion to the greatness of the culprit; and he has a sympathy for what is done in the grand style, which balances his hatred of what is wrongly done. it would not be fair to judge of an author's notion and powers of research by a hasty and popular production. mr. goldwin smith has collected quite enough information for the purpose for which he has used it, and he has not failed through want of industry. the test of solidity is not the quantity read, but the mode in which the knowledge has been collected and used. method, not genius, or eloquence, or erudition, makes the historian. he may be discovered most easily by his use of authorities. the first question is, whether the writer understands the comparative value of sources of information, and has the habit of giving precedence to the most trustworthy informant. there are some vague indications that mr. goldwin smith does not understand the importance of this fundamental rule. in his inaugural lecture, published two years ago, the following extravagant sentence occurs: "before the revolution, the fervour and the austerity of rousseau had cast out from good society the levity and sensuality of voltaire" (p. 15). this view--which he appears to have abandoned, for in his _irish history_ he tells us that france "has now become the eldest daughter of voltaire"--he supports by a reference to an abridgment of french history, much and justly esteemed in french schools, but, like all abridgments, not founded on original knowledge, and disfigured by exaggeration in the colouring. moreover, the passage he refers to has been misinterpreted. in the _irish history_ mr. goldwin smith quotes, for the character of the early celts, without any sufficient reason, another french historian, martin, who has no great authority, and the younger thierry, who has none at all. this is a point of very little weight by itself; but until our author vindicates his research by other writings, it is not in his favour. the defects of mr. goldwin smith's historic art, his lax criticism, his superficial acquaintance with foreign countries, his occasional proneness to sacrifice accuracy for the sake of rhetorical effect, his aversion for spiritual things, are all covered by one transcendent merit, which, in a man of so much ability, promises great results. writers the most learned, the most accurate in details, and the soundest in tendency, frequently fall into a habit which can neither be cured nor pardoned,--the habit of making history into the proof of their theories. the absence of a definite didactic purpose is the only security for the good faith of a historian. this most rare virtue mr. goldwin smith possesses in a high degree. he writes to tell the truths he finds, not to prove the truths which he believes. in character and design he is eminently truthful and fair, though not equally so in execution. his candour never fails him, and he is never betrayed by his temper; yet his defective knowledge of general history, and his crude notions of the church, have made him write many things which are untrue, and some which are unjust. prejudice is in all men of such early growth, and so difficult to eradicate, that it becomes a misfortune rather than a reproach, especially if it is due to ignorance and not to passion, and if it has not its seat in the will. in the case of mr. goldwin smith it is of the curable and harmless kind. the fairness of his intention is far beyond his knowledge. when he is unjust, it is not from hatred; where he is impartial, it is not always from the copiousness of his information. his prejudices are of a nature which his ability and honesty will in time inevitably overcome. the general result and moral of his book is excellent. he shows that the land-question has been from the beginning the great difficulty in ireland; and he concludes with a condemnation of the established church, and a prophecy of its approaching fall. the weakness of ireland and the guilt of england are not disguised; and the author has not written to stimulate the anger of one nation or to attenuate the remorse of the other. to both he gives wise and statesman-like advice, that may soon be very opportune. the first american war was the commencement of the deliverance of ireland, and it may be that a new american war will complete the work of regeneration which the first began. agreeing as we do with the policy of the author, and admiring the spirit of his book, we shall not attempt either to enforce or to dispute his conclusions, and we shall confine our remarks to less essential points on which he appears to us in the wrong. there are several instances of inaccuracy and negligence which, however trivial in themselves, tend to prove that the author is not always very scrupulous in speaking of things he has not studied. a purist so severe as to write "kelt" for "celt" ought not to call mercury, originally a very different personage from hermes, one of "the legendary authors of greek civilisation" (p. 43); and we do not believe that anybody who had read the writings of the two primates could call bramhall "an inferior counterpart of laud" (p. 105). in a loftier mood, and therefore apparently with still greater license, mr. goldwin smith declares that "the glorious blood of orange could scarcely have run in a low persecutor's veins" (p. 123). the blood of orange ran in the veins of william the silent, the threefold hypocrite, who confessed catholicism whilst he hoped to retain his influence at court, lutheranism when there was a chance of obtaining assistance from the german princes, calvinism when he was forced to resort to religion in order to excite the people against the crown, and who persecuted the protestants in orange and the catholics in holland. these, however, are matters of no consequence whatever in a political history of ireland; but we find ourselves at issue with the author on the important question of political freedom. "even the highly civilised kelt of france, familiar as he is with theories of political liberty, seems almost incapable of sustaining free institutions. after a moment of constitutional government, he reverts, with a bias which the fatalist might call irresistible, to despotism in some form" (p. 18). the warning so frequently uttered by burke in his last years, to fly from the liberty of france, is still more needful now that french liberty has exhibited itself in a far more seductive light. the danger is more subtle, when able men confound political forms with popular rights. france has never been governed by a constitution since 1792, if by a constitution is meant a definite rule and limitation of the governing power. it is not that the french failed to preserve the forms of parliamentary government, but that those forms no more implied freedom than the glory which the empire has twice given in their stead. it is a serious fault in our author that he has not understood so essential a distinction. has he not read the _rights of man_, by tom paine?- it is not because a part of the government is elective that makes it less a despotism, if the persons so elected possess afterwards, as a parliament, unlimited powers. election, in this case, becomes separated from representation, and the candidates are candidates for despotism.[323] napoleon once consulted the cleverest among the politicians who served him, respecting the durability of some of his institutions. "ask yourself," was the answer, "what it would cost you to destroy them. if the destruction would cost no effort, you have created nothing; for politically, as well as physically, only that which resists endures." in the year 1802 the same great writer said: "nothing is more pernicious in a monarchy than the principles and the forms of democracy, for they allow no alternative, but despotism and revolutions." with the additional experience of half a century, a writer not inferior to the last repeats exactly the same idea:- of all societies in the world, those which will always have most difficulty in permanently escaping absolute government will be precisely those societies in which aristocracy is no more, and can no more be.[324] french constitutionalism was but a form by which the absence of self-government was concealed. the state was as despotic under villèle or guizot as under either of the bonapartes. the restoration fenced itself round with artificial creations, having no root in the condition or in the sympathies of the people; these creations simply weakened it by making it unpopular. the hereditary peerage was an anomaly in a country unused to primogeniture, and so was the revival, in a nation of sceptics, of the gallican union between church and state. the monarchy of july, which was more suited to the nature of french society, and was thus enabled to crush a series of insurrections, was at last forced, by its position and by the necessity of self-preservation, to assume a very despotic character. after the fortifications of paris were begun, a tendency set in which, under a younger sovereign, would have led to a system hardly distinguishable from that which now prevails; and there are princes in the house of orleans whose government would develop the principle of democracy in a manner not very remote from the institutions of the second empire. it is liberalism more than despotism that is opposed to liberty in france; and it is a most dangerous error to imagine that the governments of the french charter really resemble ours. there are states without any parliament at all, whose principles and fundamental institutions are in much closer harmony with our system of autonomy. mr. goldwin smith sees half the truth, that there is something in the french nation which incapacitates it for liberty; but he does not see that what they have always sought, and sometimes enjoyed, is not freedom; that their liberty must diminish in proportion as their ideal is attained; and that they are not yet familiar with the theory of political rights. with this false notion of what constitutes liberty, it is not surprising that he should repeatedly dwell on its connection with protestantism, and talk of "the political liberty which protestantism brought in its train" (p. 120). such phrases may console a protestant reader of a book fatal to the protestant ascendency in ireland; but as there are no arguments in support of them, and as they are strangely contradicted by the facts in the context, mr. goldwin smith resorts to the ingenious artifice of calling to mind as many ugly stories about catholics as he can. the notion constantly recurs that, though the protestants were very wicked in ireland, it was against their principles and general practice, and is due to the catholics, whose system naturally led them to be tyrannical and cruel, and thus provoked retaliation. mr. smith might have been reminded by peter plymley that when protestantism has had its own way it has uniformly been averse to freedom: "what has protestantism done for liberty in denmark, in sweden, throughout the north of germany, and in prussia?"--not much less than democracy has done in france. an admirer of the constitutions of 1791, 1814, or 1830 may be excused if he is not very severe on the absolutism of protestant countries. mr. goldwin smith mistakes the character of the invasion of ireland because he has not understood the relative position of the civilisation of the two countries at the time when it occurred. that of the celts was in many respects more refined than that of the normans. the celts are not among the progressive, initiative races, but among those which supply the materials rather than the impulse of history, and are either stationary or retrogressive. the persians, the greeks, the romans, and the teutons are the only makers of history, the only authors of advancement. other races possessing a highly developed language, a copious literature, a speculative religion, enjoying luxury and art, attain to a certain pitch of cultivation which they are unable either to communicate or to increase. they are a negative element in the world; sometimes the barrier, sometimes the instrument, sometimes the material of those races to whom it is given to originate and to advance. their existence is either passive, or reactionary and destructive, when, after intervening like the blind forces of nature, they speedily exhibit their uncreative character, and leave others to pursue the course to which they have pointed. the chinese are a people of this kind. they have long remained stationary, and succeeded in excluding the influences of general history. so the hindoos; being pantheists, they have no history of their own, but supply objects for commerce and for conquest. so the huns, whose appearance gave a sudden impetus to a stagnant world. so the slavonians, who tell only in the mass, and whose influence is ascertainable sometimes by adding to the momentum of active forces, sometimes by impeding through inertness the progress of mankind. to this class of nations also belong the celts of gaul. the roman and the german conquerors have not altered their character as it was drawn two thousand years ago. they have a history, but it is not theirs; their nature remains unchanged, their history is the history of the invaders. the revolution was the revival of the conquered race, and their reaction against the creations of their masters. but it has been cunning only to destroy; it has not given life to one constructive idea, or durability to one new institution; and it has exhibited to the world an unparalleled political incapacity, which was announced by burke, and analysed by tocqueville, in works which are the crowning pieces of two great literatures. the celts of these islands, in like manner, waited for a foreign influence to set in action the rich treasure which in their own hands could be of no avail. their language was more flexible, their poetry and music more copious, than those of the anglo-normans. their laws, if we may judge from those of wales, display a society in some respects highly cultivated. but, like the rest of that group of nations to which they belong, there was not in them the incentive to action and progress which is given by the consciousness of a part in human destiny, by the inspiration of a high idea, or even by the natural development of institutions. their life and literature were aimless and wasteful. without combination or concentration, they had no star to guide them in an onward course; and the progress of dawn into day was no more to them than to the flocks and to the forests. before the danish wars, and the decay, which is described by st. bernard in terms which must not be taken quite literally, had led to the english invasion, there was probably as much material, certainly as much spiritual, culture in ireland as in any country in the west; but there was not that by whose sustaining force alone these things endure, by which alone the place of nations in history is determined--there was no political civilisation. the state did not keep pace with the progress of society. this is the essential and decisive inferiority of the celtic race, as conspicuous among the irish in the twelfth century as among the french in our own. they gave way before the higher political aptitude of the english. the issue of an invasion is generally decided by this political aptitude, and the consequences of conquest always depend on it. subjection to a people of a higher capacity for government is of itself no misfortune; and it is to most countries the condition of their political advancement. the greeks were more highly cultivated than the romans, the gauls than the franks; yet in both cases the higher political intelligence prevailed. for a long time the english had, perhaps, no other superiority over the irish; yet this alone would have made the conquest a great blessing to ireland, but for the separation of the races. conquering races necessarily bring with them their own system of government, and there is no other way of introducing it. a nation can obtain political education only by dependence on another. art, literature, and science may be communicated by the conquered to the conqueror; but government can be taught only by governing, therefore only by the governors; politics can only be learnt in this school. the most uncivilised of the barbarians, whilst they slowly and imperfectly learned the arts of rome, at once remodelled its laws. the two kinds of civilisation, social and political, are wholly unconnected with each other. either may subsist, in high perfection, alone. polity grows like language, and is part of a people's nature, not dependent on its will. one or the other can be developed, modified, corrected; but they cannot be subverted or changed by the people itself without an act of suicide. organic change, if it comes at all, must come from abroad. revolution is a malady, a frenzy, an interruption of the nation's growth, sometimes fatal to its existence, often to its independence. in this case revolution, by making the nation subject to others, may be the occasion of a new development. but it is not conceivable that a nation should arbitrarily and spontaneously cast off its history, reject its traditions, abrogate its law and government, and commence a new political existence. nothing in the experience of ages, or in the nature of man, allows us to believe that the attempt of france to establish a durable edifice on the ruins of 1789, without using the old materials, can ever succeed, or that she can ever emerge from the vicious circle of the last seventy years, except by returning to the principle which she then repudiated, and by admitting, that if states would live, they must preserve their organic connection with their origin and history, which are their root and their stem; that they are not voluntary creations of human wisdom; and that men labour in vain who would construct them without acknowledging god as the artificer. theorists who hold it to be a wrong that a nation should belong to a foreign state are therefore in contradiction with the law of civil progress. this law, or rather necessity, which is as absolute as the law that binds society together, is the force which makes us need one another, and only enables us to obtain what we need on terms, not of equality, but of dominion and subjection, in domestic, economic, or political relations. the political theory of nationality is in contradiction with the historic nation. since a nation derives its ideas and instincts of government, as much as its temperament and its language, from god, acting through the influences of nature and of history, these ideas and instincts are originally and essentially peculiar to it, and not separable from it; they have no practical value in themselves when divided from the capacity which corresponds to them. national qualities are the incarnations of political ideas. no people can receive its government from another without receiving at the same time the ministers of government. the workman must travel with the work. such changes can only be accomplished by submission to a foreign state, or to another race. europe has seen two great instances of such conquests, extending over centuries,--the roman empire, and the settlement of the barbarians in the west. this it is which gives unity to the history of the middle ages. the romans established a universal empire by subjecting all countries to the authority of a single power. the barbarians introduced into all a single system of law, and thus became the instrument of a universal church. the same spirit of freedom, the same notions of the state, pervade all the _leges barbarorum_, and all the polities they founded in europe and asia. they differ widely in the surrounding conditions, in the state of society, in the degree of advancement, in almost all external things. the principle common to them all is to acknowledge the freedom of the church as a corporation and a proprietor, and in virtue of the principle of self-government to allow religion to develop her influence in the state. the great migration which terminated in the norman conquests and in the crusades gave the dominion of the latin world to the teutonic chivalry, and to the church her proper place. all other countries sank into despotism, into schism, and at last into barbarism, under the tartars or the turks. the union between the teutonic races and the holy see was founded on their political qualities more than on their religious fervour. in modern times, the most pious catholics have often tyrannised over the church. in the middle ages her liberty was often secured and respected where her spiritual injunctions were least obeyed. the growth of the feudal system coinciding with the general decay of morals led, in the eleventh century, to new efforts of the church to preserve her freedom. the holy see was delivered from the roman factions by the most illustrious of the emperors, and a series of german popes commenced the great reform. other princes were unwilling to submit to the authority of the imperial nominees, and the kings of france and castile showed symptoms of resistance, in which they were supported by the heresy of berengarius. the conduct of henry iv. delivered the church from the patronage of the empire, whilst the normans defended her against the gallican tendencies and the feudal tyranny. in sicily, the normans consented to hold their power from the pope; and in normandy, berengarius found a successful adversary, and the king of france a vassal who compelled him to abandon his designs. the chaplain of the conqueror describes his government in terms which show how singularly it fulfilled the conditions which the church requires. he tells us that william established in normandy a truly christian order; that every village, town, and castle enjoyed its own privileges; and that, while other princes either forbade the erection of churches or seized their endowments, he left his subjects free to make pious gifts. in his reign and by his conduct the word "bigot" ceased to be a term of reproach, and came to signify what we now should call "ultramontane." he was the foremost of those normans who were called by the holy see to reclaim what was degenerate, and to renovate the declining states of the north. where the church addressed herself to the conversion of races of purely teutonic origin, as in scandinavia, her missionaries achieved the work. in other countries, as in poland and hungary, political dependence on the empire was the channel and safeguard of her influence. the norman conquest of england and of ireland differs from all of these. in both islands the faith had been freely preached, adopted, and preserved. the rulers and the people were catholic. the last saxon king who died before the conquest was a saint. the last archbishop of dublin appointed before the invasion was a saint. neither of the invasions can be explained simply by the demoralisation of the clergy, or by the spiritual destitution of the people. catholicism spreads among the nations, not only as a doctrine, but as an institution. "the church," says mr. goldwin smith, "is not a disembodied spirit, but a spirit embodied in human society." her teaching is directed to the inner man, and is confined to the social order; but her discipline touches on the political. she cannot permanently ignore the acts and character of the state, or escape its notice. whilst she preaches submission to authorities ordained by god, her nature, not her interest, compels her to exert an involuntary influence upon them. the jealousy so often exhibited by governments is not without reason, for the free action of the church is the test of the free constitution of the state; and without such free constitution there must necessarily ensue either persecution or revolution. between the settled organisation of catholicism and every form of arbitrary power, there is an incompatibility which must terminate in conflict. in a state which possesses no security for authority or freedom, the church must either fight or succumb. now, as authority and freedom, the conditions of her existence, can only be obtained through the instrumentality of certain nations, she depends on the aid of these nations. religion alone cannot civilise men, or secure its own conquest. it promotes civilisation where it has power; but it has not power where its way is not prepared. its civilising influence is chiefly indirect, and acts by its needs and wants as much as by the fulness of its ideas. so christianity extends itself by the aid of the secular power, relying, not on the victories of christian arms, but on the progress of institutions and ideas that harmonise with ecclesiastical freedom. hence, those who have most actively served the interests of the church are not always those who have been most faithful to her doctrines. the work which the goth and the frank had done on the continent of europe the normans came to do in england, where it had been done before but had failed, and in ireland, where neither roman nor german influences had entered. thus the theory of nationality, unknown to catholic ages, is inconsistent both with political reason and with christianity, which requires the dominion of race over race, and whose path was made straight by two universal empires. the missionary may outstrip, in his devoted zeal, the progress of trade or of arms; but the seed that he plants will not take root, unprotected by those ideas of right and duty which first came into the world with the tribes who destroyed the civilisation of antiquity, and whose descendants are in our day carrying those ideas to every quarter of the world. it was as impossible to realise in ireland the mediæval notions of ecclesiastical liberty without a great political reform, as to put an end to the dissolution of society and the feuds of princes without the authority of a supreme lord. there is one institution of those days to which mr. goldwin smith has not done entire justice. it is needless to say that the eric, or pecuniary composition for blood, in place of capital or other punishment, which the brehon law sanctioned, is the reproach of all primitive codes, and of none. it is the first step from the license of savage revenge to the ordered justice of a regular law (p. 41). pecuniary composition for blood belongs to an advanced period of defined and regular criminal jurisprudence. in the lowest form of civil society, when the state is not yet distinct from the family, the family is compelled to defend itself; and the only protection of society is the vendetta. it is the private right of self-defence combined with the public office of punishment, and therefore not only a privilege but an obligation. the whole family is bound to avenge the injury; but the duty rests first of all with the heir. precedency in the office of avenger is naturally connected with a first claim in inheritance; and the succession to property is determined by the law of revenge. this leads both to primogeniture, because the eldest son is most likely to be capable of punishing the culprit; and, for the same reason, to modifications of primogeniture, by the preference of the brother before the grandson, and of the male line before the female. a practice which appears barbarous is, therefore, one of the foundations of civilisation, and the origin of some of the refinements of law. in this state of society there is no distinction between civil and criminal law; an injury is looked upon as a private wrong, not, as religion considers it, a sin, or, as the state considers it, a crime. something very similar occurs in feudal society. here all the barons were virtually equal to each other, and without any superior to punish their crimes or to avenge their wrongs. they were, therefore, compelled to obtain safety or reparation, like sovereigns, by force of arms. what war is among states, the feud is in feudal society, and the vengeance of blood in societies not yet matured into states--a substitute for the fixed administration of justice. the assumption of this duty by the state begins with the recognisance of acts done against the state itself. at first, political crimes alone are visited with a public penalty; private injuries demand no public expiation, but only satisfaction of the injured party. this appears in its most rudimentary form in the _lex talionis_. society requires that punishment should be inflicted by the state, in order to prevent continual disorders. if the injured party could be satisfied, and his duty fulfilled without inflicting on the criminal an injury corresponding to that which he had done, society was obviously the gainer. at first it was optional to accept or to refuse satisfaction; afterwards it was made obligatory. where property was so valuable that its loss was visited on the life or limb of the robber, and injuries against property were made a question of life and death, it soon followed that injury to life could be made a question of payment. to expiate robbery by death, and to expiate murder by the payment of a fine, are correlative ideas. practically this custom often told with a barbarous inequality against those who were too poor to purchase forgiveness; but it was otherwise both just and humane in principle, and it was generally encouraged by the church. for in her eyes the criminal was guilty of an act of which it was necessary that he should repent; this made her desire, not his destruction, but his conversion. she tried, therefore, to save his life, and to put an end to revenge, mutilation, and servitude; and for all this the alternative was compensation. this purpose was served by the right of asylum. the church surrendered the fugitive only on condition that his life and person should be spared in consideration of a lawful fine, which she often paid for him herself. "concedatur ei vita et omnia membra. emendat autem causam in quantum potuerit," says a law of charlemagne, given in the year 785, when the influence of religion on legislation was most powerful in europe. no idea occurs more frequently in the work we are reviewing than that of the persecuting character of the catholic church; it is used as a perpetual apology for the penal laws in ireland:- "when the catholics writhe under this wrong, let them turn their eyes to the history of catholic countries, and remember that, while the catholic church was stripped of her endowments and doomed to political degradation by protestant persecutors in ireland, the protestant churches were exterminated with fire and sword by catholic persecutors in france, austria, flanders, italy, and spain" (p. 92). he speaks of catholicism as "a religion which all protestants believed to be idolatrous, and knew by fearful experience to be persecuting" (p. 113). "it would not be difficult to point to persecuting laws more sanguinary than these. spain, france, and austria will at once supply signal examples.... that persecution was the vice of an age and not only of a particular religion, that it disgraced protestantism as well as catholicism, is true. but no one who reads the religious history of europe with an open mind can fail to perceive that the persecutions carried on by protestants were far less bloody and less extensive than those carried on by catholics; that they were more frequently excusable as acts of retaliation; that they arose more from political alarm, and less from the spirit of the religion; and that the temper of their authors yielded more rapidly to the advancing influence of humanity and civilisation" (pp. 127. 129). all these arguments are fallacies; but as the statements at the same time are full of error, we believe that the author is wrong because he has not studied the question, not because he has designed to misrepresent it. the fact that he does not distinguish from each other the various kinds and occasions of persecution, proves that he is wholly ignorant of the things with which it is connected. persecution is the vice of particular religions, and the misfortune of particular stages of political society. it is the resource by which states that would be subverted by religious liberty escape the more dangerous alternative of imposing religious disabilities. the exclusion of a part of the community by reason of its faith from the full benefit of the law is a danger and disadvantage to every state, however highly organised its constitution may otherwise be. but the actual existence of a religious party differing in faith from the majority is dangerous only to a state very imperfectly organised. disabilities are always a danger. multiplicity of religions is only dangerous to states of an inferior type. by persecution they rid themselves of the peculiar danger which threatens them, without involving themselves in a system universally bad. persecution comes naturally in a certain period of the progress of society, before a more flexible and comprehensive system has been introduced by that advance of religion and civilisation whereby catholicism gradually penetrates into hostile countries, and christian powers acquire dominion over infidel populations. thus it is the token of an epoch in the political, religious, and intellectual life of mankind, and it disappears with its epoch, and with the advance of the church militant in her catholic vocation. intolerance of dissent and impatience of contradiction are a characteristic of youth. those that have no knowledge of the truth that underlies opposite opinions, and no experience of their consequent force, cannot believe that men are sincere in holding them. at a certain point of mental growth, tolerance implies indifference, and intolerance is inseparable from sincerity. thus intolerance, in itself a defect, becomes in this case a merit. again, although the political conditions of intolerance belong to the youth and immaturity of nations, the motives of intolerance may at any time be just and the principle high. for the theory of religious unity is founded on the most elevated and truest view of the character and function of the state, on the perception that its ultimate purpose is not distinct from that of the church. in the pagan state they were identified; in the christian world the end remains the same, but the means are different. the state aims at the things of another life but indirectly. its course runs parallel to that of the church; they do not converge. the direct subservience of the state to religious ends would imply despotism and persecution just as much as the pagan supremacy of civil over religious authority. the similarity of the end demands harmony in the principles, and creates a decided antagonism between the state and a religious community whose character is in total contradiction with it. with such religions there is no possibility of reconciliation. a state must be at open war with any system which it sees would prevent it from fulfilling its legitimate duties. the danger, therefore, lies not in the doctrine, but in the practice. but to the pagan and to the mediæval state, the danger was in the doctrine. the christians were the best subjects of the emperor, but christianity was really subversive of the fundamental institutions of the roman empire. in the infancy of the modern states, the civil power required all the help that religion could give in order to establish itself against the lawlessness of barbarism and feudal dissolution. the existence of the state at that time depended on the power of the church. when, in the thirteenth century, the empire renounced this support, and made war on the church, it fell at once into a number of small sovereignties. in those cases persecution was self-defence. it was wrongly defended as an absolute, not as a conditional principle; but such a principle was false only as the modern theory of religious liberty is false. one was a wrong generalisation from the true character of the state; the other is a true conclusion from a false notion of the state. to say that because of the union between church and state it is right to persecute would condemn all toleration; and to say that the objects of the state have nothing to do with religion, would condemn all persecution. but persecution and toleration are equally true in principle, considered politically; only one belongs to a more highly developed civilisation than the other. at one period toleration would destroy society; at another, persecution is fatal to liberty. the theory of intolerance is wrong only if founded absolutely upon religious motives; but even then the practice of it is not necessarily censurable. it is opposed to the christian spirit, in the same manner as slavery is opposed to it. the church prohibits neither intolerance nor slavery, though in proportion as her influence extends, and civilisation advances, both gradually disappear. unity and liberty are the only legitimate principles on which the position of a church in a state can be regulated, but the distance between them is immeasurable, and the transition extremely difficult. to pass from religious unity to religious liberty is to effect a complete inversion in the character of the state, a change in the whole spirit of legislation, and a still greater revolution in the minds and habits of men. so great a change seldom happens all at once. the law naturally follows the condition of society, which does not suddenly change. an intervening stage from unity to liberty, a compromise between toleration and persecution, is a common but irrational, tyrannical, and impolitic arrangement. it is idle to talk of the guilt of persecution, if we do not distinguish the various principles on which religious dissent can be treated by the state. the exclusion of other religions--the system of spain, of sweden, of mecklenburg, holstein, and tyrol--is reasonable in principle, though practically untenable in the present state of european society. the system of expulsion or compulsory conformity, adopted by lewis xiv. and the emperor nicholas, is defensible neither on religious nor political grounds. but the system applied to ireland, which uses religious disabilities for the purpose of political oppression,[325] stands alone in solitary infamy among the crimes and follies of the rulers of men. the acquisition of real definite freedom is a very slow and tardy process. the great social independence enjoyed in the early periods of national history is not yet political freedom. the state has not yet developed its authority, or assumed the functions of government. a period follows when all the action of society is absorbed by the ruling power, when the license of early times is gone, and the liberties of a riper age are not yet acquired. these liberties are the product of a long conflict with absolutism, and of a gradual development, which, by establishing definite rights revives in positive form the negative liberty of an unformed society. the object and the result of this process is the organisation of self-government, the substitution of right for force, of authority for power, of duty for necessity, and of a moral for a physical relation between government and people. until this point is reached, religious liberty is an anomaly. in a state which possesses all power and all authority there is no room for the autonomy of religious communities. those states, therefore, not only refuse liberty of conscience, but deprive the favoured church of ecclesiastical freedom. the principles of religious unity and liberty are so opposed that no modern state has at once denied toleration and allowed freedom to its established church. both of these are unnatural in a state which rejects self-government, the only secure basis of all freedom, whether religious or political. for religious freedom is based on political liberty; intolerance, therefore, is a political necessity against all religions which threaten the unity of faith in a state that is not free, and in every state against those religions which threaten its existence. absolute intolerance belongs to the absolute state; special persecution may be justified by special causes in any state. all mediæval persecution is of the latter kind, for the sects against which it was directed were revolutionary parties. the state really defended, not its religious unity, but its political existence. if the catholic church was naturally inclined to persecute, she would persecute in all cases alike, when there was no interest to serve but her own. instead of adapting her conduct to circumstances, and accepting theories according to the character of the time, she would have developed a consistent theory out of her own system, and would have been most severe when she was most free from external influences, from political objects, or from temporary or national prejudices. she would have imposed a common rule of conduct in different countries in different ages, instead of submitting to the exigencies of each time and place. her own rule of conduct never changed. she treats it as a crime to abandon her, not to be outside her. an apostate who returns to her has a penance for his apostasy; a heretic who is converted has no penance for his heresy. severity against those who are outside her fold is against her principles. persecution is contrary to the nature of a universal church; it is peculiar to the national churches. while the catholic church by her progress in freedom naturally tends to push the development of states beyond the sphere where they are still obliged to preserve the unity of religion, and whilst she extends over states in all degrees of advancement, protestantism, which belongs to a particular age and state of society, which makes no claim to universality, and which is dependent on political connection, regards persecution, not as an accident, but as a duty. wherever protestantism prevailed, intolerance became a principle of state, and was proclaimed in theory even where the protestants were in a minority, and where the theory supplied a weapon against themselves. the reformation made it a general law, not only against catholics by way of self-defence or retaliation, but against all who dissented from the reformed doctrines, whom it treated, not as enemies, but as criminals,--against the protestant sects, against socinians, and against atheists. it was not a right, but a duty; its object was to avenge god, not to preserve order. there is no analogy between the persecution which preserves and the persecution which attacks; or between intolerance as a religious duty, and intolerance as a necessity of state. the reformers unanimously declared persecution to be incumbent on the civil power; and the protestant governments universally acted upon their injunctions, until scepticism escaped the infliction of penal laws and condemned their spirit. doubtless, in the interest of their religion, they acted wisely. freedom is not more decidedly the natural condition of catholicism than intolerance is of protestantism; which by the help of persecution succeeded in establishing itself in countries where it had no root in the affections of the people, and in preserving itself from the internal divisions which follow free inquiry. toleration has been at once a cause and an effect of its decline. the catholic church, on the other hand, supported the mediæval state by religious unity, and has saved herself in the modern state by religious freedom. no longer compelled to devise theories in justification of a system imposed on her by the exigencies of half-organised societies, she is enabled to revert to a policy more suited to her nature and to her most venerable traditions; and the principle of liberty has already restored to her much of that which the principle of unity took away. it was not, as our author imagines (p. 119), by the protection of lewis xiv. that she was formidable; nor is it true that in consequence of the loss of temporalities, "the chill of death is gathering round the heart of the great theocracy" (p. 94); nor that "the visible decline of the papacy" is at hand because it no longer wields "the more efficacious arms of the great catholic monarchies" (p. 190). the same appeal to force, the same principles of intolerance which expelled catholicism from protestant countries, gave rise in catholic countries to the growth of infidelity. the revolutions of 1789 in france, and of 1859 in italy, attest the danger of a practice which requires for its support the doctrines of another religion, or the circumstances of a different age. not till the church had lost those props in which mr. goldwin smith sees the secret of her power, did she recover her elasticity and her expansive vigour. catholics may have learnt this truth late, but protestants, it appears, have yet to learn it. in one point mr. goldwin smith is not so very far from the views of the orange party. he thinks, indeed, that the church is no longer dangerous, and would not therefore have catholics maltreated; but this is due, not to her merits, but to her weakness. popes might now be as willing as ever, if they had the power, to step between a protestant state and the allegiance of its subjects (p. 190). mr. smith seems to think that the popes claim the same authority over the rulers of a protestant state that they formerly possessed over the princes of catholic countries. yet this political power of the holy see was never a universal right of jurisdiction over states, but a special and positive right, which it is as absurd to censure as to fear or to regret at the present time. directly, it extended only over territories which were held by feudal tenure of the pope, like the sicilian monarchy. elsewhere the authority was indirect, not political but religious, and its political consequences were due to the laws of the land. the catholic countries would no more submit to a king not of their communion than protestant countries, england for instance, or denmark. this is as natural and inevitable in a country where the whole population is of one religion, as it is artificial and unjust in a country where no sort of religious unity prevails, and where such a law might compel the sovereign to be of the religion of the minority. at any rate, nobody who thinks it reasonable that any prince abandoning the established church should forfeit the english throne, can complain of a law which compelled the sovereign to be of the religion, not of a majority, but of the whole of his subjects. the idea of the pope stepping between a state and the allegiance of its subjects is a mere misapprehension. the instrument of his authority is the law, and the law resides in the state. the pope could intervene, therefore, only between the state and the occupant of the throne; and his intervention suspended, not the duty of obeying, but the right of governing. the line on which his sentence ran separated, not the subjects from the state, but the sovereign from the other authorities. it was addressed to the nation politically organised against the head of the organism, not to the mass of individual subjects against the constituted authorities. that such a power was inconsistent with the modern notion of sovereignty is true; but it is also true that this notion is as much at variance with the nature of ecclesiastical authority as with civil liberty. the roman maxim, _princeps legibus solutus_, could not be admitted by the church; and an absolute prince could not properly be invested in her eyes with the sanctity of authority, or protected by the duty of submission. a moral, and _à fortiori_ a spiritual, authority moves and lives only in an atmosphere of freedom. there are, however, two things to be considered in explanation of the error into which our author and so many others have fallen. law follows life, but not with an equal pace. there is a time when it ceases to correspond to the existing order of things, and meets an invincible obstacle in a new society. the exercise of the mediæval authority of the popes was founded on the religious unity of the state, and had no basis in a divided community. it was not easy in the period of transition to tell when the change took place, and at what moment the old power lost its efficacy; no one could foresee its failure, and it still remained the legal and recognised means of preventing the change. accordingly, it was twice tried during the wars of religion, in france with success, in england with disastrous effects. it is a universal rule that a right is not given up until the necessity of its surrender is proved. but the real difficulty arises, not from the mode in which the power was exercised, but from the way in which it was defended. the mediæval writers were accustomed to generalise; they disregarded particular circumstances, and they were generally ignorant of the habits and ideas of their age. living in the cloister, and writing for the school, they were unacquainted with the polity and institutions around them, and sought their authorities and examples in antiquity, in the speculations of aristotle, and the maxims of the civil law. they gave to their political doctrines as abstract a form, and attributed to them as universal an application, as the modern absolutists or the more recent liberals. so regardless were they of the difference between ancient times and their own, that the jewish chronicles, the grecian legislators, and the roman code supplied them indifferently with rules and instances; they could not imagine that a new state of things would one day arise in which their theories would be completely obsolete. their definitions of right and law are absolute in the extreme, and seem often to admit of no qualification. hence their character is essentially revolutionary, and they contradict both the authority of law and the security of freedom. it is on this contradiction that the common notion of the danger of ecclesiastical pretensions is founded. but the men who take alarm at the tone of the mediæval claims judge them with a theory just as absolute and as excessive. no man can fairly denounce imaginary pretensions in the church of the nineteenth century, who does not understand that rights which are now impossible may have been reasonable and legitimate in the days when they were actually exercised. the zeal with which mr. goldwin smith condemns the irish establishment and the policy of the ascendency is all the more meritorious because he has no conception of the amount of iniquity involved in them. the state church of ireland, however anomalous and even scandalous its position may be as the church of a dominant minority upheld by force in the midst of a hostile people, does not, in truth, rest on a principle different from that of other state churches. to justify the existence of any state church, it must be assumed as an axiom that the state is the judge of religious truth; and that it is bound to impose upon its subjects, or at least to require them as a community to maintain, the religion which it judges to be true (p. 91). no such analogy in reality subsists as is here assumed. there is a great difference between the irish and the english establishment; but even the latter has no similarity of principle with the catholic establishments of the continent. the fundamental distinction is, that in one case the religion of the people is adopted by the state, whilst in the other the state imposes a religion on the people. for the political justification of catholic establishments, no more is required than the theory that it is just that the religion of a country should be represented in, and protected by, its government. this is evidently and universally true; for the moral basis which human laws require can only be derived from an influence which was originally religious as well as moral. the unity of moral consciousness must be founded on a precedent unity of spiritual belief. according to this theory, the character of the nation determines the forms of the state. consequently it is a theory consistent with freedom. but protestant establishments, according to our author's definition, which applies to them, and to them alone, rest on the opposite theory, that the will of the state is independent of the condition of the community; and that it may, or indeed must, impose on the nation a faith which may be that of a minority, and which in some cases has been that of the sovereign alone. according to the catholic view, government may preserve in its laws, and by its authority, the religion of the community; according to the protestant view it may be bound to change it. a government which has power to change the faith of its subjects must be absolute in other things; so that one theory is as favourable to tyranny as the other is opposed to it. the safeguard of the catholic system of church and state, as contrasted with the protestant, was that very authority which the holy see used to prevent the sovereign from changing the religion of the people, by deposing him if he departed from it himself. in most catholic countries the church preceded the state; some she assisted to form; all she contributed to sustain. throughout western europe catholicism was the religion of the inhabitants before the new monarchies were founded. the invaders, who became the dominant race and the architects of a new system of states, were sooner or later compelled, in order to preserve their dominion, to abandon their pagan or their arian religion, and to adopt the common faith of the immense majority of the people. the connection between church and state was therefore a natural, not an arbitrary, institution; the result of the submission of the government to popular influence, and the means by which that influence was perpetuated. no catholic government ever imposed a catholic establishment on a protestant community, or destroyed a protestant establishment. even the revocation of the edict of nantes, the greatest wrong ever inflicted on the protestant subjects of a catholic state, will bear no comparison with the establishment of the religion of a minority. it is a far greater wrong than the most severe persecution, because persecution may be necessary for the preservation of an existing society, as in the case of the early christians and of the albigenses; but a state church can only be justified by the acquiescence of the nation. in every other case it is a great social danger, and is inseparable from political oppression. mr. goldwin smith's vision is bounded by the protestant horizon. the irish establishment has one great mark in common with the other protestant establishments,--that it is the creature of the state, and an instrument of political influence. they were all imposed on the nation by the state power, sometimes against the will of the people, sometimes against that of the crown. by the help of military power and of penal laws, the state strove to provide that the established church should not be the religion of the minority. but in ireland the establishment was introduced too late--when protestantism had spent its expansive force, and the attraction of its doctrine no longer aided the efforts of the civil power. its position was false from the beginning, and obliged it to resort to persecution and official proselytism in order to put an end to the anomaly. whilst, therefore, in all cases, protestantism became the established church by an exercise of authority tyrannical in itself, and possible only from the absolutism of the ruling power, in ireland the tyranny of its institution was perpetuated in the system by which it was upheld, and in the violence with which it was introduced; and this tyranny continues through all its existence. it is the religion of the minority, the church of an alien state, the cause of suffering and of disturbance, an instrument, a creature, and a monument of conquest and of tyranny. it has nothing in common with catholic establishments, and none of those qualities which, in the anglican church, redeem in part the guilt of its origin. this is not, however, the only point on which our author has mistaken the peculiar and enormous character of the evils of ireland. with the injustice which generally attends his historical parallels, he compares the policy of the orange faction to that of the jacobins in france. the ferocity of the jacobins was in a slight degree redeemed by their fanaticism. their objects were not entirely selfish. they murdered aristocrats, not only because they hated and feared them, but because they wildly imagined them to stand in the way of the social and political millennium, which, according to rousseau, awaited the acceptance of mankind (p. 175). no comparison can be more unfair than one which places the pitiless fanaticism of an idea in the same line with the cruelty inspired by a selfish interest. the reign of terror is one of the most portentous events in history, because it was the consistent result of the simplest and most acceptable principle of the revolution; it saved france from the coalition, and it was the greatest attempt ever made to mould the form of a society by force into harmony with a speculative form of government. an explanation which treats self-interest as its primary motive, and judges other elements as merely qualifying it, is ludicrously inadequate. the terrorism of robespierre was produced by the theory of equality, which was not a mere passion, but a political doctrine, and at the same time a national necessity. political philosophers who, since the time of hobbes, derive the state from a social compact, necessarily assume that the contracting parties were equal among themselves. by nature, therefore, all men possess equal rights, and a right to equality. the introduction of the civil power and of private property brought inequality into the world. this is opposed to the condition and to the rights of the natural state. the writers of the eighteenth century attributed to this circumstance the evils and sufferings of society. in france, the ruin of the public finances and the misery of the lower orders were both laid at the door of the classes whose property was exempt from taxation. the endeavours of successive ministers--of turgot, necker, and calonne--to break down the privileges of the aristocracy and of the clergy were defeated by the resistance of the old society. the government attempted to save itself by obtaining concessions from the notables, but without success, and then the great reform which the state was impotent to carry into execution was effected by the people. the destruction of the aristocratic society, which the absolute monarchy had failed to reform, was the object and the triumph of the revolution; and the constitution of 1791 declared all men equal, and withdrew the sanction of the law from every privilege. this system gave only an equality in civil rights, a political equality such as already subsisted in america; but it did not provide against the existence or the growth of those social inequalities by which the distribution of political power might be affected. but the theory of the natural equality of mankind understands equal rights as rights to equal things in the state, and requires not only an abstract equality of rights, but a positive equality of power. the varieties of condition caused by civilisation were so objectionable in the eyes of this school, that rousseau wrote earnest vindications of natural society, and condemned the whole social fabric of europe as artificial, unnatural, and monstrous. his followers laboured to destroy the work of history and the influence of the past, and to institute a natural, reasonable order of things which should dispose all men on an equal level, which no disparity of wealth or education should be permitted to disturb. there were, therefore, two opinions in the revolutionary party. those who overthrew the monarchy, established the republic, and commenced the war, were content with having secured political and legal equality, and wished to leave the nation in the enjoyment of those advantages which fortune distributes unequally. but the consistent partisans of equality required that nothing should be allowed to raise one man above another. the girondists wished to preserve liberty, education, and property; but the jacobins, who held that an absolute equality should be maintained by the despotism of the government over the people, interpreted more justly the democratic principles which were common to both parties; and, fortunately for their country, they triumphed over their illogical and irresolute adversaries. "when the revolutionary movement was once established," says de maistre, "nothing but jacobinism could save france." three weeks after the fall of the gironde, the constitution of 1793, by which a purely ideal democracy was instituted, was presented to the french people. its adoption exactly coincides with the supremacy of robespierre in the committee of public safety, and with the inauguration of the reign of terror. the danger of invasion made the new tyranny possible, but the political doctrine of the jacobins made it necessary. robespierre explains the system in his report on the principles of political morality, presented to the convention at the moment of his greatest power:- if the principle of a popular government in time of peace is virtue, its principle during revolution is virtue and terror combined: virtue, without which terror is pernicious; terror, without which virtue is powerless. terror is nothing but rapid, severe, inflexible justice; therefore a product of virtue. it is not so much a principle in itself, as a consequence of the universal principle of democracy in its application to the urgent necessities of the country. this is perfectly true. envy, revenge, fear, were motives by which individuals were induced or enabled to take part in the administration of such a system; but its introduction was not the work of passion, but the inevitable result of a doctrine. the democratic constitution required to be upheld by violence, not only against foreign arms, but against the state of society and the nature of things. the army could not be made its instrument, because the rulers were civilians, and feared, beyond all things, the influence of military officers in the state. officers were frequently arrested and condemned as traitors, compelled to seek safety in treason, watched and controlled by members of the convention. in the absence of a military despotism, the revolutionary tribunal was the only resource. the same theory of an original state of nature, from which the principle of equality was deduced, also taught men where they might find the standard of equality; as civilisation, by means of civil power, education, and wealth, was the source of corruption, the purity of virtue was to be found in the classes which had been least exposed to those disturbing causes. those who were least tainted by the temptations of civilised society remained in the natural state. this was the definition of the new notion of the people, which became the measure of virtue and of equality. the democratic theory required that the whole nation should be reduced to the level of the lower orders in all those things in which society creates disparity, in order to be raised to the level of that republican virtue which resides among those who have retained a primitive simplicity by escaping the influence of civilisation. the form of government and the condition of society must always correspond. social equality is therefore a postulate of pure democracy. it was necessary that it should exist if the constitution was to stand, and if the great ideal of popular enthusiasm was ever to be realised. the revolution had begun by altering the social condition of the country; the correction of society by the state had already commenced. it did not, therefore, seem impossible to continue it until the nation should be completely remodelled in conformity with the new principles. the system before which the ancient monarchy had fallen, which was so fruitful of marvels, which was victorious over a more formidable coalition than that which had humbled lewis xiv., was deemed equal to the task of completing the social changes which had been so extensively begun, and of moulding france according to the new and simple pattern. the equality which was essential to the existence of the new form of government did not in fact exist. privilege was abolished, but influence remained. all the inequality founded on wealth, education, ability, reputation, even on the virtues of a code different from that of republican morality, presented obstacles to the establishment of the new _régime_, and those who were thus distinguished were necessarily enemies of the state. with perfect reason, all that rose above the common level, or did not conform to the universal rule, was deemed treasonable. the difference between the actual society and the ideal equality was so great that it could be removed only by violence. the great mass of those who perished were really, either by attachment or by their condition, in antagonism with the state. they were condemned, not for particular acts, but for their position, or for acts which denoted, not so much a hostile design, as an incompatible habit. by the _loi des suspects_, which was provoked by this conflict between the form of government and the real state of the country, whole classes, rather than ill-disposed individuals, were declared objects of alarm. hence the proscription was wholesale. criminals were judged and executed in categories; and the merits of individual cases were, therefore, of little account. for this reason, leading men of ability, bitterly hostile to the new system, were saved by danton; for it was often indifferent who were the victims, provided the group to which they belonged was struck down. the question was not, what crimes has the prisoner committed? but, does he belong to one of those classes whose existence the republic cannot tolerate? from this point of view, there were not so many unjust judgments pronounced, at least in paris, as is generally believed. it was necessary to be prodigal of blood, or to abandon the theory of liberty and equality, which had commanded, for a whole generation, the enthusiastic devotion of educated men, and for the truth of which thousands of its believers were ready to die. the truth of that doctrine was tested by a terrible alternative; but the fault lay with those who believed it, not exclusively with those who practised it. there were few who could administer such a system without any other motive but devotion to the idea, or who could retain the coolness and indifference of which st. just is an extraordinary example. most of the terrorists were swayed by fear for themselves, or by the frenzy which is produced by familiarity with slaughter. but this is of small account. the significance of that sanguinary drama lies in the fact, that a political abstraction was powerful enough to make men think themselves right in destroying masses of their countrymen in the attempt to impose it on their country. the horror of that system and its failure have given vitality to the communistic theory. it was unreasonable to attack the effect instead of the cause, and cruel to destroy the proprietor, while the danger lay in the property. for private property necessarily produces that inequality which the jacobin theory condemned; and the constitution of 1793 could not be maintained by terrorism without communism, by proscribing the rich while riches were tolerated. the jacobins were guilty of inconsistency in omitting to attack inequality in its source. yet no man who admits their theory has a right to complain of their acts. the one proceeded from the other with the inflexible logic of history. the reign of terror was nothing else than the reign of those who conceive that liberty and equality can coexist. one more quotation will sufficiently justify what we have said of the sincerity and ignorance which mr. goldwin smith shows in his remarks on catholic subjects. after calling the bull of adrian iv. "the stumbling-block and the despair of catholic historians," he proceeded to say:- are catholics filled with perplexity at the sight of infallibility sanctioning rapine? they can scarcely be less perplexed by the title which infallibility puts forward to the dominion of ireland.... but this perplexity arises entirely from the assumption, which may be an article of faith, but is not an article of history, that the infallible morality of the pope has never changed (pp. 46, 47). it is hard to understand how a man of honour and ability can entertain such notions of the character of the papacy as these words imply, or where he can have found authorities for so monstrous a caricature. we will only say that infallibility is no attribute of the political system of the popes, and that the bulls of adrian and alexander are not instances of infallible morality. great as the errors which we have pointed out undoubtedly are, the book itself is of real value, and encourages us to form sanguine hopes of the future services of its author to historical science, and ultimately to religion. we are hardly just in complaining of protestant writers who fail to do justice to the church. there are not very many amongst ourselves who take the trouble to ascertain her real character as a visible institution, or to know how her nature has been shown in her history. we know the doctrine which she teaches; we are familiar with the outlines of her discipline. we know that sanctity is one of her marks, and that beneficence has characterised her influence. in a general way we are confident that historical accusations are as false as dogmatic attacks, and most of us have some notion of the way in which the current imputations are to be met. but as to her principles of action in many important things, how they have varied in course of time, what changes have been effected by circumstances, and what rules have never been broken,--few are at the pains to inquire. as adversaries imagine that in exposing a catholic they strike catholicism, and that the defects of the men are imperfections in the institution and a proof that it is not divine, so we grow accustomed to confound in our defence that which is defective and that which is indefectible, and to discover in the church merits as self-contradictory as are the accusations of her different foes. at one moment we are told that catholicism teaches contempt, and therefore neglect of wealth; at another, that it is false to say that the church does not promote temporal prosperity. if a great point is made against persecution, it will be denied that she is intolerant, whilst at another time it will be argued that heresy and unbelief deserve to be punished. we cannot be surprised that protestants do not know the church better than we do ourselves, or that, while we allow no evil to be spoken of her human elements, those who deem her altogether human should discover in her the defects of human institutions. it is intensely difficult to enter into the spirit of a system not our own. particular principles and doctrines are easily mastered; but a system answering all the spiritual cravings, all the intellectual capabilities of man, demands more than a mere mental effort,--a submission of the intellect, an act of faith, a temporary suspension of the critical faculty. this applies not merely to the christian religion, with its unfathomable mysteries and its inexhaustible fund of truth, but to the fruits of human speculation. nobody has ever succeeded in writing a history of philosophy without incurring either the reproach that he is a mere historian, incapable of entering into the genius of any system, or a mere metaphysician, who can discern in all other philosophies only the relation they bear to his own. in religion the difficulty is greater still, and greatest of all with catholicism. for the church is to be seen, not in books, but in life. no divine can put together the whole body of her doctrine; no canonist the whole fabric of her law; no historian the infinite vicissitudes of her career. the protestant who wishes to be informed on all these things can be advised to rely on no one manual, on no encyclopædia of her deeds and of her ideas; if he seeks to know what these have been, he must be told to look around. and to one who surveys her teaching and her fortunes through all ages and all lands, ignorant or careless of that which is essential, changeless, and immortal in her, it will not be easy to discern through so much outward change a regular development, amid such variety of forms the unchanging substance, in so many modifications fidelity to constant laws; or to recognise, in a career so chequered with failure, disaster, and suffering, with the apostasy of heroes, the weakness of rulers, and the errors of doctors, the unfailing hand of a heavenly guide. footnotes: [footnote 322: _the rambler_, march 1862.] [footnote 323: _works_, ii. 47. this is one of the passages which, seventy years ago, were declared to be treasonable. we trust we run no risk in confessing that we entirely agree with it.] [footnote 324: tocqueville, _l'ancien régime et la révolution_, préface, p. xvi.] [footnote 325: "from what i have observed, it is pride, arrogance, and a spirit of domination, and not a bigoted spirit of religion, that has caused and kept up those oppressive statutes. i am sure i have known those who have oppressed papists in their civil rights exceedingly indulgent to them in their religious ceremonies, and who really wished them to continue catholics, in order to furnish pretences for oppression. these persons never saw a man (by converting) escape out of their power but with grudging and regret" (burke. "on the penal laws against irish catholics," _works_, iv. 505). "i vow to god, i would sooner bring myself to put a man to immediate death for opinions i disliked, and so to get rid of the man and his opinions at once, than to fret him into a feverish being tainted with the jail-distemper of a contagious servitude, to keep him above ground, an animated mass of putrefaction, corrupted himself, and corrupting all about him" (speech at bristol, _ibid._ iii. 427).] ix nationality[326] whenever great intellectual cultivation has been combined with that suffering which is inseparable from extensive changes in the condition of the people, men of speculative or imaginative genius have sought in the contemplation of an ideal society a remedy, or at least a consolation, for evils which they were practically unable to remove. poetry has always preserved the idea, that at some distant time or place, in the western islands or the arcadian region, an innocent and contented people, free from the corruption and restraint of civilised life, have realised the legends of the golden age. the office of the poets is always nearly the same, and there is little variation in the features of their ideal world; but when philosophers attempt to admonish or reform mankind by devising an imaginary state, their motive is more definite and immediate, and their commonwealth is a satire as well as a model. plato and plotinus, more and campanella, constructed their fanciful societies with those materials which were omitted from the fabric of the actual communities, by the defects of which they were inspired. the republic, the utopia, and the city of the sun were protests against a state of things which the experience of their authors taught them to condemn, and from the faults of which they took refuge in the opposite extremes. they remained without influence, and have never passed from literary into political history, because something more than discontent and speculative ingenuity is needed in order to invest a political idea with power over the masses of mankind. the scheme of a philosopher can command the practical allegiance of fanatics only, not of nations; and though oppression may give rise to violent and repeated outbreaks, like the convulsions of a man in pain, it cannot mature a settled purpose and plan of regeneration, unless a new notion of happiness is joined to the sense of present evil. the history of religion furnishes a complete illustration. between the later mediæval sects and protestantism there is an essential difference, that outweighs the points of analogy found in those systems which are regarded as heralds of the reformation, and is enough to explain the vitality of the last in comparison with the others. whilst wycliffe and hus contradicted certain particulars of the catholic teaching, luther rejected the authority of the church, and gave to the individual conscience an independence which was sure to lead to an incessant resistance. there is a similar difference between the revolt of the netherlands, the great rebellion, the war of independence, or the rising of brabant, on the one hand, and the french revolution on the other. before 1789, insurrections were provoked by particular wrongs, and were justified by definite complaints and by an appeal to principles which all men acknowledged. new theories were sometimes advanced in the cause of controversy, but they were accidental, and the great argument against tyranny was fidelity to the ancient laws. since the change produced by the french revolution, those aspirations which are awakened by the evils and defects of the social state have come to act as permanent and energetic forces throughout the civilised world. they are spontaneous and aggressive, needing no prophet to proclaim, no champion to defend them, but popular, unreasoning, and almost irresistible. the revolution effected this change, partly by its doctrines, partly by the indirect influence of events. it taught the people to regard their wishes and wants as the supreme criterion of right. the rapid vicissitudes of power, in which each party successively appealed to the favour of the masses as the arbiter of success, accustomed the masses to be arbitrary as well as insubordinate. the fall of many governments, and the frequent redistribution of territory, deprived all settlements of the dignity of permanence. tradition and prescription ceased to be guardians of authority; and the arrangements which proceeded from revolutions, from the triumphs of war, and from treaties of peace, were equally regardless of established rights. duty cannot be dissociated from right, and nations refuse to be controlled by laws which are no protection. in this condition of the world, theory and action follow close upon each other, and practical evils easily give birth to opposite systems. in the realms of free-will, the regularity of natural progress is preserved by the conflict of extremes. the impulse of the reaction carries men from one extremity towards another. the pursuit of a remote and ideal object, which captivates the imagination by its splendour and the reason by its simplicity, evokes an energy which would not be inspired by a rational, possible end, limited by many antagonistic claims, and confined to what is reasonable, practicable, and just. one excess or exaggeration is the corrective of the other, and error promotes truth, where the masses are concerned, by counterbalancing a contrary error. the few have not strength to achieve great changes unaided; the many have not wisdom to be moved by truth unmixed. where the disease is various, no particular definite remedy can meet the wants of all. only the attraction of an abstract idea, or of an ideal state, can unite in a common action multitudes who seek a universal cure for many special evils, and a common restorative applicable to many different conditions. and hence false principles, which correspond with the bad as well as with the just aspirations of mankind, are a normal and necessary element in the social life of nations. theories of this kind are just, inasmuch as they are provoked by definite ascertained evils, and undertake their removal. they are useful in opposition, as a warning or a threat, to modify existing things, and keep awake the consciousness of wrong. they cannot serve as a basis for the reconstruction of civil society, as medicine cannot serve for food; but they may influence it with advantage, because they point out the direction, though not the measure, in which reform is needed. they oppose an order of things which is the result of a selfish and violent abuse of power by the ruling classes, and of artificial restriction on the natural progress of the world, destitute of an ideal element or a moral purpose. practical extremes differ from the theoretical extremes they provoke, because the first are both arbitrary and violent, whilst the last, though also revolutionary, are at the same time remedial. in one case the wrong is voluntary, in the other it is inevitable. this is the general character of the contest between the existing order and the subversive theories that deny its legitimacy. there are three principal theories of this kind, impugning the present distribution of power, of property, and of territory, and attacking respectively the aristocracy, the middle class, and the sovereignty. they are the theories of equality, communism, and nationality. though sprung from a common origin, opposing cognate evils, and connected by many links, they did not appear simultaneously. rousseau proclaimed the first, baboeuf the second, mazzini the third; and the third is the most recent in its appearance, the most attractive at the present time, and the richest in promise of future power. in the old european system, the rights of nationalities were neither recognised by governments nor asserted by the people. the interest of the reigning families, not those of the nations, regulated the frontiers; and the administration was conducted generally without any reference to popular desires. where all liberties were suppressed, the claims of national independence were necessarily ignored, and a princess, in the words of fénelon, carried a monarchy in her wedding portion. the eighteenth century acquiesced in this oblivion of corporate rights on the continent, for the absolutists cared only for the state, and the liberals only for the individual. the church, the nobles, and the nation had no place in the popular theories of the age; and they devised none in their own defence, for they were not openly attacked. the aristocracy retained its privileges, and the church her property; and the dynastic interest, which overruled the natural inclination of the nations and destroyed their independence, nevertheless maintained their integrity. the national sentiment was not wounded in its most sensitive part. to dispossess a sovereign of his hereditary crown, and to annex his dominions, would have been held to inflict an injury upon all monarchies, and to furnish their subjects with a dangerous example, by depriving royalty of its inviolable character. in time of war, as there was no national cause at stake, there was no attempt to rouse national feeling. the courtesy of the rulers towards each other was proportionate to the contempt for the lower orders. compliments passed between the commanders of hostile armies; there was no bitterness, and no excitement; battles were fought with the pomp and pride of a parade. the art of war became a slow and learned game. the monarchies were united not only by a natural community of interests, but by family alliances. a marriage contract sometimes became the signal for an interminable war, whilst family connections often set a barrier to ambition. after the wars of religion came to an end in 1648, the only wars were those which were waged for an inheritance or a dependency, or against countries whose system of government exempted them from the common law of dynastic states, and made them not only unprotected but obnoxious. these countries were england and holland, until holland ceased to be a republic, and until, in england, the defeat of the jacobites in the forty-five terminated the struggle for the crown. there was one country, however, which still continued to be an exception; one monarch whose place was not admitted in the comity of kings. poland did not possess those securities for stability which were supplied by dynastic connections and the theory of legitimacy, wherever a crown could be obtained by marriage or inheritance. a monarch without royal blood, a crown bestowed by the nation, were an anomaly and an outrage in that age of dynastic absolutism. the country was excluded from the european system by the nature of its institutions. it excited a cupidity which could not be satisfied. it gave the reigning families of europe no hope of permanently strengthening themselves by intermarriage with its rulers, or of obtaining it by bequest or by inheritance. the habsburgs had contested the possession of spain and the indies with the french bourbons, of italy with the spanish bourbons, of the empire with the house of wittelsbach, of silesia with the house of hohenzollern. there had been wars between rival houses for half the territories of italy and germany. but none could hope to redeem their losses or increase their power in a country to which marriage and descent gave no claim. where they could not permanently inherit they endeavoured, by intrigues, to prevail at each election, and after contending in support of candidates who were their partisans, the neighbours at last appointed an instrument for the final demolition of the polish state. till then no nation had been deprived of its political existence by the christian powers, and whatever disregard had been shown for national interests and sympathies, some care had been taken to conceal the wrong by a hypocritical perversion of law. but the partition of poland was an act of wanton violence, committed in open defiance not only of popular feeling but of public law. for the first time in modern history a great state was suppressed, and a whole nation divided among its enemies. this famous measure, the most revolutionary act of the old absolutism, awakened the theory of nationality in europe, converting a dormant right into an aspiration, and a sentiment into a political claim. "no wise or honest man," wrote edmund burke, "can approve of that partition, or can contemplate it without prognosticating great mischief from it to all countries at some future time."[327] thenceforward there was a nation demanding to be united in a state,--a soul, as it were, wandering in search of a body in which to begin life over again; and, for the first time, a cry was heard that the arrangement of states was unjust--that their limits were unnatural, and that a whole people was deprived of its right to constitute an independent community. before that claim could be efficiently asserted against the overwhelming power of its opponents,--before it gained energy, after the last partition, to overcome the influence of long habits of submission, and of the contempt which previous disorders had brought upon poland,--the ancient european system was in ruins, and a new world was rising in its place. the old despotic policy which made the poles its prey had two adversaries,--the spirit of english liberty, and the doctrines of that revolution which destroyed the french monarchy with its own weapons; and these two contradicted in contrary ways the theory that nations have no collective rights. at the present day, the theory of nationality is not only the most powerful auxiliary of revolution, but its actual substance in the movements of the last three years. this, however, is a recent alliance, unknown to the first french revolution. the modern theory of nationality arose partly as a legitimate consequence, partly as a reaction against it. as the system which overlooked national division was opposed by liberalism in two forms, the french and the english, so the system which insists upon them proceeds from two distinct sources, and exhibits the character either of 1688 or of 1789. when the french people abolished the authorities under which it lived, and became its own master, france was in danger of dissolution: for the common will is difficult to ascertain, and does not readily agree. "the laws," said vergniaud, in the debate on the sentence of the king, "are obligatory only as the presumptive will of the people, which retains the right of approving or condemning them. the instant it manifests its wish the work of the national representation, the law, must disappear." this doctrine resolved society into its natural elements, and threatened to break up the country into as many republics as there were communes. for true republicanism is the principle of self-government in the whole and in all the parts. in an extensive country, it can prevail only by the union of several independent communities in a single confederacy, as in greece, in switzerland, in the netherlands, and in america; so that a large republic not founded on the federal principle must result in the government of a single city, like rome and paris, and, in a less degree, athens, berne, and amsterdam; or, in other words, a great democracy must either sacrifice self-government to unity, or preserve it by federalism. the france of history fell together with the french state, which was the growth of centuries. the old sovereignty was destroyed. the local authorities were looked upon with aversion and alarm. the new central authority needed to be established on a new principle of unity. the state of nature, which was the ideal of society, was made the basis of the nation; descent was put in the place of tradition, and the french people was regarded as a physical product: an ethnological, not historic, unit. it was assumed that a unity existed separate from the representation and the government, wholly independent of the past, and capable at any moment of expressing or of changing its mind. in the words of sieyès, it was no longer france, but some unknown country to which the nation was transported. the central power possessed authority, inasmuch as it obeyed the whole, and no divergence was permitted from the universal sentiment. this power, endowed with volition, was personified in the republic one and indivisible. the title signified that a part could not speak or act for the whole,--that there was a power supreme over the state, distinct from, and independent of, its members; and it expressed, for the first time in history, the notion of an abstract nationality. in this manner the idea of the sovereignty of the people, uncontrolled by the past, gave birth to the idea of nationality independent of the political influence of history. it sprang from the rejection of the two authorities,--of the state and of the past. the kingdom of france was, geographically as well as politically, the product of a long series of events, and the same influences which built up the state formed the territory. the revolution repudiated alike the agencies to which france owed her boundaries and those to which she owed her government. every effaceable trace and relic of national history was carefully wiped away,--the system of administration, the physical divisions of the country, the classes of society, the corporations, the weights and measures, the calendar. france was no longer bounded by the limits she had received from the condemned influence of her history; she could recognise only those which were set by nature. the definition of the nation was borrowed from the material world, and, in order to avoid a loss of territory, it became not only an abstraction but a fiction. there was a principle of nationality in the ethnological character of the movement, which is the source of the common observation that revolution is more frequent in catholic than in protestant countries. it is, in fact, more frequent in the latin than in the teutonic world, because it depends partly on a national impulse, which is only awakened where there is an alien element, the vestige of a foreign dominion, to expel. western europe has undergone two conquests--one by the romans and one by the germans, and twice received laws from the invaders. each time it rose again against the victorious race; and the two great reactions, while they differ according to the different characters of the two conquests, have the phenomenon of imperialism in common. the roman republic laboured to crush the subjugated nations into a homogeneous and obedient mass; but the increase which the proconsular authority obtained in the process subverted the republican government, and the reaction of the provinces against rome assisted in establishing the empire the cæsarean system gave an unprecedented freedom to the dependencies, and raised them to a civil equality which put an end to the dominion of race over race and of class over class. the monarchy was hailed as a refuge from the pride and cupidity of the roman people; and the love of equality, the hatred of nobility, and the tolerance of despotism implanted by rome became, at least in gaul, the chief feature of the national character. but among the nations whose vitality had been broken down by the stern republic, not one retained the materials necessary to enjoy independence, or to develop a new history. the political faculty which organises states and finds society in a moral order was exhausted, and the christian doctors looked in vain over the waste of ruins for a people by whose aid the church might survive the decay of rome. a new element of national life was brought to that declining world by the enemies who destroyed it. the flood of barbarians settled over it for a season, and then subsided; and when the landmarks of civilisation appeared once more, it was found that the soil had been impregnated with a fertilising and regenerating influence, and that the inundation had laid the germs of future states and of a new society. the political sense and energy came with the new blood, and was exhibited in the power exercised by the younger race upon the old, and in the establishment of a graduated freedom. instead of universal equal rights, the actual enjoyment of which is necessarily contingent on, and commensurate with, power, the rights of the people were made dependent on a variety of conditions, the first of which was the distribution of property. civil society became a classified organism instead of a formless combination of atoms, and the feudal system gradually arose. roman gaul had so thoroughly adopted the ideas of absolute authority and undistinguished equality during the five centuries between cæsar and clovis, that the people could never be reconciled to the new system. feudalism remained a foreign importation, and the feudal aristocracy an alien race, and the common people of france sought protection against both in the roman jurisprudence and the power of the crown. the development of absolute monarchy by the help of democracy is the one constant character of french history. the royal power, feudal at first, and limited by the immunities and the great vassals, became more popular as it grew more absolute; while the suppression of aristocracy, the removal of the intermediate authorities, was so particularly the object of the nation, that it was more energetically accomplished after the fall of the throne. the monarchy which had been engaged from the thirteenth century in curbing the nobles, was at last thrust aside by the democracy, because it was too dilatory in the work, and was unable to deny its own origin and effectually ruin the class from which it sprang. all those things which constitute the peculiar character of the french revolution,--the demand for equality, the hatred of nobility and feudalism, and of the church which was connected with them, the constant reference to pagan examples, the suppression of monarchy, the new code of law, the breach with tradition, and the substitution of an ideal system for everything that had proceeded from the mixture and mutual action of the races,--all these exhibit the common type of a reaction against the effects of the frankish invasion. the hatred of royalty was less than the hatred of aristocracy; privileges were more detested than tyranny; and the king perished because of the origin of his authority rather than because of its abuse. monarchy unconnected with aristocracy became popular in france, even when most uncontrolled; whilst the attempt to reconstitute the throne, and to limit and fence it with its peers, broke down, because the old teutonic elements on which it relied--hereditary nobility, primogeniture, and privilege--were no longer tolerated. the substance of the ideas of 1789 is not the limitation of the sovereign power, but the abrogation of intermediate powers. these powers, and the classes which enjoyed them, come in latin europe from a barbarian origin; and the movement which calls itself liberal is essentially national. if liberty were its object, its means would be the establishment of great independent authorities not derived from the state, and its model would be england. but its object is equality; and it seeks, like france in 1789, to cast out the elements of inequality which were introduced by the teutonic race. this is the object which italy and spain have had in common with france, and herein consists the natural league of the latin nations. this national element in the movement was not understood by the revolutionary leaders. at first, their doctrine appeared entirely contrary to the idea of nationality. they taught that certain general principles of government were absolutely right in all states; and they asserted in theory the unrestricted freedom of the individual, and the supremacy of the will over every external necessity or obligation. this is in apparent contradiction to the national theory, that certain natural forces ought to determine the character, the form, and the policy of the state, by which a kind of fate is put in the place of freedom. accordingly the national sentiment was not developed directly out of the revolution in which it was involved, but was exhibited first in resistance to it, when the attempt to emancipate had been absorbed in the desire to subjugate, and the republic had been succeeded by the empire. napoleon called a new power into existence by attacking nationality in russia, by delivering it in italy, by governing in defiance of it in germany and spain. the sovereigns of these countries were deposed or degraded; and a system of administration was introduced which was french in its origin, its spirit, and its instruments. the people resisted the change. the movement against it was popular and spontaneous, because the rulers were absent or helpless; and it was national, because it was directed against foreign institutions. in tyrol, in spain, and afterwards in prussia, the people did not receive the impulse from the government, but undertook of their own accord to cast out the armies and the ideas of revolutionised france. men were made conscious of the national element of the revolution by its conquests, not in its rise. the three things which the empire most openly oppressed--religion, national independence, and political liberty--united in a short-lived league to animate the great uprising by which napoleon fell. under the influence of that memorable alliance a political spirit was called forth on the continent, which clung to freedom and abhorred revolution, and sought to restore, to develop, and to reform the decayed national institutions. the men who proclaimed these ideas, stein and görres, humboldt, müller, and de maistre,[328] were as hostile to bonapartism as to the absolutism of the old governments, and insisted on the national rights, which had been invaded equally by both, and which they hoped to restore by the destruction of the french supremacy. with the cause that triumphed at waterloo the friends of the revolution had no sympathy, for they had learned to identify their doctrine with the cause of france. the holland house whigs in england, the afrancesados in spain, the muratists in italy, and the partisans of the confederation of the rhine, merging patriotism in their revolutionary affections, regretted the fall of the french power, and looked with alarm at those new and unknown forces which the war of deliverance had evoked, and which were as menacing to french liberalism as to french supremacy. but the new aspirations for national and popular rights were crushed at the restoration. the liberals of those days cared for freedom, not in the shape of national independence, but of french institutions; and they combined against the nations with the ambition of the governments. they were as ready to sacrifice nationality to their ideal as the holy alliance was to the interests of absolutism. talleyrand indeed declared at vienna that the polish question ought to have precedence over all other questions, because the partition of poland had been one of the first and greatest causes of the evils which europe had suffered; but dynastic interests prevailed. all the sovereigns represented at vienna recovered their dominions, except the king of saxony, who was punished for his fidelity to napoleon; but the states that were unrepresented in the reigning families--poland, venice, and genoa--were not revived, and even the pope had great difficulty in recovering the legations from the grasp of austria. nationality, which the old _régime_ had ignored, which had been outraged by the revolution and the empire, received, after its first open demonstration, the hardest blow at the congress of vienna. the principle which the first partition had generated, to which the revolution had given a basis of theory, which had been lashed by the empire into a momentary convulsive effort, was matured by the long error of the restoration into a consistent doctrine, nourished and justified by the situation of europe. the governments of the holy alliance devoted themselves to suppress with equal care the revolutionary spirit by which they had been threatened, and the national spirit by which they had been restored. austria, which owed nothing to the national movement, and had prevented its revival after 1809, naturally took the lead in repressing it. every disturbance of the final settlements of 1815, every aspiration for changes or reforms, was condemned as sedition. this system repressed the good with the evil tendencies of the age; and the resistance which it provoked, during the generation that passed away from the restoration to the fall of metternich, and again under the reaction which commenced with schwarzenberg and ended with the administrations of bach and manteuffel, proceeded from various combinations of the opposite forms of liberalism. in the successive phases of that struggle, the idea that national claims are above all other rights gradually rose to the supremacy which it now possesses among the revolutionary agencies. the first liberal movement, that of the carbonari in the south of europe, had no specific national character, but was supported by the bonapartists both in spain and italy. in the following years the opposite ideas of 1813 came to the front, and a revolutionary movement, in many respects hostile to the principles of revolution, began in defence of liberty, religion, and nationality. all these causes were united in the irish agitation, and in the greek, belgian, and polish revolutions. those sentiments which had been insulted by napoleon, and had risen against him, rose against the governments of the restoration. they had been oppressed by the sword, and then by the treaties. the national principle added force, but not justice, to this movement, which, in every case but poland, was successful. a period followed in which it degenerated into a purely national idea, as the agitation for repeal succeeded emancipation, and panslavism and panhellenism arose under the auspices of the eastern church. this was the third phase of the resistance to the settlement of vienna, which was weak, because it failed to satisfy national or constitutional aspirations, either of which would have been a safeguard against the other, by a moral if not by a popular justification. at first, in 1813, the people rose against their conquerors, in defence of their legitimate rulers. they refused to be governed by usurpers. in the period between 1825 and 1831, they resolved that they would not be misgoverned by strangers. the french administration was often better than that which it displaced, but there were prior claimants for the authority exercised by the french, and at first the national contest was a contest for legitimacy. in the second period this element was wanting. no dispossessed princes led the greeks, the belgians, or the poles. the turks, the dutch, and the russians were attacked, not as usurpers, but as oppressors,--because they misgoverned, not because they were of a different race. then began a time when the text simply was, that nations would not be governed by foreigners. power legitimately obtained, and exercised with moderation, was declared invalid. national rights, like religion, had borne part in the previous combinations, and had been auxiliaries in the struggles for freedom, but now nationality became a paramount claim, which was to assert itself alone, which might put forward as pretexts the rights of rulers, the liberties of the people, the safety of religion, but which, if no such union could be formed, was to prevail at the expense of every other cause for which nations make sacrifices. metternich is, next to napoleon, the chief promoter of this theory; for the anti-national character of the restoration was most distinct in austria, and it is in opposition to the austrian government that nationality grew into a system. napoleon, who, trusting to his armies, despised moral forces in politics, was overthrown by their rising. austria committed the same fault in the government of her italian provinces. the kingdom of italy had united all the northern part of the peninsula in a single state; and the national feelings, which the french repressed elsewhere, were encouraged as a safeguard of their power in italy and in poland. when the tide of victory turned, austria invoked against the french the aid of the new sentiment they had fostered. nugent announced, in his proclamation to the italians, that they should become an independent nation. the same spirit served different masters, and contributed first to the destruction of the old states, then to the expulsion of the french, and again, under charles albert, to a new revolution. it was appealed to in the name of the most contradictory principles of government, and served all parties in succession, because it was one in which all could unite. beginning by a protest against the dominion of race over race, its mildest and least-developed form, it grew into a condemnation of every state that included different races, and finally became the complete and consistent theory, that the state and the nation must be co-extensive. "it is," says mr. mill, "in general a necessary condition of free institutions, that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities."[329] the outward historical progress of this idea from an indefinite aspiration to be the keystone of a political system, may be traced in the life of the man who gave to it the element in which its strength resides,--giuseppe mazzini. he found carbonarism impotent against the measures of the governments, and resolved to give new life to the liberal movement by transferring it to the ground of nationality. exile is the nursery of nationality, as oppression is the school of liberalism; and mazzini conceived the idea of young italy when he was a refugee at marseilles. in the same way, the polish exiles are the champions of every national movement; for to them all political rights are absorbed in the idea of independence, which, however they may differ with each other, is the one aspiration common to them all. towards the year 1830 literature also contributed to the national idea. "it was the time," says mazzini, "of the great conflict between the romantic and the classical school, which might with equal truth be called a conflict between the partisans of freedom and of authority." the romantic school was infidel in italy, and catholic in germany; but in both it had the common effect of encouraging national history and literature, and dante was as great an authority with the italian democrats as with the leaders of the mediæval revival at vienna, munich, and berlin. but neither the influence of the exiles, nor that of the poets and critics of the new party, extended over the masses. it was a sect without popular sympathy or encouragement, a conspiracy founded not on a grievance, but on a doctrine; and when the attempt to rise was made in savoy, in 1834, under a banner with the motto "unity, independence, god and humanity," the people were puzzled at its object, and indifferent to its failure. but mazzini continued his propaganda, developed his _giovine italia_ into a _giovine europa_, and established in 1847 the international league of nations. "the people," he said, in his opening address, "is penetrated with only one idea, that of unity and nationality.... there is no international question as to forms of government, but only a national question." the revolution of 1848, unsuccessful in its national purpose, prepared the subsequent victories of nationality in two ways. the first of these was the restoration of the austrian power in italy, with a new and more energetic centralisation, which gave no promise of freedom. whilst that system prevailed, the right was on the side of the national aspirations, and they were revived in a more complete and cultivated form by manin. the policy of the austrian government, which failed during the ten years of the reaction to convert the tenure by force into a tenure by right, and to establish with free institutions the condition of allegiance, gave a negative encouragement to the theory. it deprived francis joseph of all active support and sympathy in 1859, for he was more clearly wrong in his conduct than his enemies in their doctrines. the real cause of the energy which the national theory has acquired is, however, the triumph of the democratic principle in france, and its recognition by the european powers. the theory of nationality is involved in the democratic theory of the sovereignty of the general will. "one hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do, if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves."[330] it is by this act that a nation constitutes itself. to have a collective will, unity is necessary, and independence is requisite in order to assert it. unity and nationality are still more essential to the notion of the sovereignty of the people than the cashiering of monarchs, or the revocation of laws. arbitrary acts of this kind may be prevented by the happiness of the people or the popularity of the king, but a nation inspired by the democratic idea cannot with consistency allow a part of itself to belong to a foreign state, or the whole to be divided into several native states. the theory of nationality therefore proceeds from both the principles which divide the political world,--from legitimacy, which ignores its claims, and from the revolution, which assumes them; and for the same reason it is the chief weapon of the last against the first. in pursuing the outward and visible growth of the national theory we are prepared for an examination of its political character and value. the absolutism which has created it denies equally that absolute right of national unity which is a product of democracy, and that claim of national liberty which belongs to the theory of freedom. these two views of nationality, corresponding to the french and to the english systems, are connected in name only, and are in reality the opposite extremes of political thought. in one case, nationality is founded on the perpetual supremacy of the collective will, of which the unity of the nation is the necessary condition, to which every other influence must defer, and against which no obligation enjoys authority, and all resistance is tyrannical. the nation is here an ideal unit founded on the race, in defiance of the modifying action of external causes, of tradition, and of existing rights. it overrules the rights and wishes of the inhabitants, absorbing their divergent interests in a fictitious unity; sacrifices their several inclinations and duties to the higher claim of nationality, and crushes all natural rights and all established liberties for the purpose of vindicating itself.[331] whenever a single definite object is made the supreme end of the state, be it the advantage of a class, the safety or the power of the country, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or the support of any speculative idea, the state becomes for the time inevitably absolute. liberty alone demands for its realisation the limitation of the public authority, for liberty is the only object which benefits all alike, and provokes no sincere opposition. in supporting the claims of national unity, governments must be subverted in whose title there is no flaw, and whose policy is beneficent and equitable, and subjects must be compelled to transfer their allegiance to an authority for which they have no attachment, and which may be practically a foreign domination. connected with this theory in nothing except in the common enmity of the absolute state, is the theory which represents nationality as an essential, but not a supreme element in determining the forms of the state. it is distinguished from the other, because it tends to diversity and not to uniformity, to harmony and not to unity; because it aims not at an arbitrary change, but at careful respect for the existing conditions of political life, and because it obeys the laws and results of history, not the aspirations of an ideal future. while the theory of unity makes the nation a source of despotism and revolution, the theory of liberty regards it as the bulwark of self-government, and the foremost limit to the excessive power of the state. private rights, which are sacrificed to the unity, are preserved by the union of nations. no power can so efficiently resist the tendencies of centralisation, of corruption, and of absolutism, as that community which is the vastest that can be included in a state, which imposes on its members a consistent similarity of character, interest, and opinion, and which arrests the action of the sovereign by the influence of a divided patriotism. the presence of different nations under the same sovereignty is similar in its effect to the independence of the church in the state. it provides against the servility which flourishes under the shadow of a single authority, by balancing interests, multiplying associations, and giving to the subject the restraint and support of a combined opinion. in the same way it promotes independence by forming definite groups of public opinion, and by affording a great source and centre of political sentiments, and of notions of duty not derived from the sovereign will. liberty provokes diversity, and diversity preserves liberty by supplying the means of organisation. all those portions of law which govern the relations of men with each other, and regulate social life, are the varying result of national custom and the creation of private society. in these things, therefore, the several nations will differ from each other; for they themselves have produced them, and they do not owe them to the state which rules them all. this diversity in the same state is a firm barrier against the intrusion of the government beyond the political sphere which is common to all into the social department which escapes legislation and is ruled by spontaneous laws. this sort of interference is characteristic of an absolute government, and is sure to provoke a reaction, and finally a remedy. that intolerance of social freedom which is natural to absolutism is sure to find a corrective in the national diversities, which no other force could so efficiently provide. the co-existence of several nations under the same state is a test, as well as the best security of its freedom. it is also one of the chief instruments of civilisation; and, as such, it is in the natural and providential order, and indicates a state of greater advancement than the national unity which is the ideal of modern liberalism. the combination of different nations in one state is as necessary a condition of civilised life as the combination of men in society. inferior races are raised by living in political union with races intellectually superior. exhausted and decaying nations are revived by the contact of a younger vitality. nations in which the elements of organisation and the capacity for government have been lost, either through the demoralising influence of despotism, or the disintegrating action of democracy, are restored and educated anew under the discipline of a stronger and less corrupted race. this fertilising and regenerating process can only be obtained by living under one government. it is in the cauldron of the state that the fusion takes place by which the vigour, the knowledge, and the capacity of one portion of mankind may be communicated to another. where political and national boundaries coincide, society ceases to advance, and nations relapse into a condition corresponding to that of men who renounce intercourse with their fellow-men. the difference between the two unites mankind not only by the benefits it confers on those who live together, but because it connects society either by a political or a national bond, gives to every people an interest in its neighbours, either because they are under the same government or because they are of the same race, and thus promotes the interests of humanity, of civilisation, and of religion. christianity rejoices at the mixture of races, as paganism identifies itself with their differences, because truth is universal, and errors various and particular. in the ancient world idolatry and nationality went together, and the same term is applied in scripture to both. it was the mission of the church to overcome national differences. the period of her undisputed supremacy was that in which all western europe obeyed the same laws, all literature was contained in one language, and the political unity of christendom was personified in a single potentate, while its intellectual unity was represented in one university. as the ancient romans concluded their conquests by carrying away the gods of the conquered people, charlemagne overcame the national resistance of the saxons only by the forcible destruction of their pagan rites. out of the mediæval period, and the combined action of the german race and the church, came forth a new system of nations and a new conception of nationality. nature was overcome in the nation as well as in the individual. in pagan and uncultivated times, nations were distinguished from each other by the widest diversity, not only in religion, but in customs, language, and character. under the new law they had many things in common; the old barriers which separated them were removed, and the new principle of self-government, which christianity imposed, enabled them to live together under the same authority, without necessarily losing their cherished habits, their customs, or their laws. the new idea of freedom made room for different races in one state. a nation was no longer what it had been to the ancient world,--the progeny of a common ancestor, or the aboriginal product of a particular region,--a result of merely physical and material causes,--but a moral and political being; not the creation of geographical or physiological unity, but developed in the course of history by the action of the state. it is derived from the state, not supreme over it. a state may in course of time produce a nationality; but that a nationality should constitute a state is contrary to the nature of modern civilisation. the nation derives its rights and its power from the memory of a former independence. the church has agreed in this respect with the tendency of political progress, and discouraged wherever she could the isolation of nations; admonishing them of their duties to each other, and regarding conquest and feudal investiture as the natural means of raising barbarous or sunken nations to a higher level. but though she has never attributed to national independence an immunity from the accidental consequences of feudal law, of hereditary claims, or of testamentary arrangements, she defends national liberty against uniformity and centralisation with an energy inspired by perfect community of interests. for the same enemy threatens both; and the state which is reluctant to tolerate differences, and to do justice to the peculiar character of various races, must from the same cause interfere in the internal government of religion. the connection of religious liberty with the emancipation of poland or ireland is not merely the accidental result of local causes; and the failure of the concordat to unite the subjects of austria is the natural consequence of a policy which did not desire to protect the provinces in their diversity and autonomy, and sought to bribe the church by favours instead of strengthening her by independence. from this influence of religion in modern history has proceeded a new definition of patriotism. the difference between nationality and the state is exhibited in the nature of patriotic attachment. our connection with the race is merely natural or physical, whilst our duties to the political nation are ethical. one is a community of affections and instincts infinitely important and powerful in savage life, but pertaining more to the animal than to the civilised man; the other is an authority governing by laws, imposing obligations, and giving a moral sanction and character to the natural relations of society. patriotism is in political life what faith is in religion, and it stands to the domestic feelings and to home-sickness as faith to fanaticism and to superstition. it has one aspect derived from private life and nature, for it is an extension of the family affections, as the tribe is an extension of the family. but in its real political character, patriotism consists in the development of the instinct of self-preservation into a moral duty which may involve self-sacrifice. self-preservation is both an instinct and a duty, natural and involuntary in one respect, and at the same time a moral obligation. by the first it produces the family; by the last the state. if the nation could exist without the state, subject only to the instinct of self-preservation, it would be incapable of denying, controlling, or sacrificing itself; it would be an end and a rule to itself. but in the political order moral purposes are realised and public ends are pursued to which private interests and even existence must be sacrificed. the great sign of true patriotism, the development of selfishness into sacrifice, is the product of political life. that sense of duty which is supplied by race is not entirely separated from its selfish and instinctive basis; and the love of country, like married love, stands at the same time on a material and a moral foundation. the patriot must distinguish between the two causes or objects of his devotion. the attachment which is given only to the country is like obedience given only to the state--a submission to physical influences. the man who prefers his country before every other duty shows the same spirit as the man who surrenders every right to the state. they both deny that right is superior to authority. there is a moral and political country, in the language of burke, distinct from the geographical, which may be possibly in collision with it the frenchmen who bore arms against the convention were as patriotic as the englishmen who bore arms against king charles, for they recognised a higher duty than that of obedience to the actual sovereign. "in an address to france," said burke, "in an attempt to treat with it, or in considering any scheme at all relative to it, it is impossible we should mean the geographical, we must always mean the moral and political, country.... the truth is, that france is out of itself--the moral france is separated from the geographical. the master of the house is expelled, and the robbers are in possession. if we look for the corporate people of france, existing as corporate in the eye and intention of public law (that corporate people, i mean, who are free to deliberate and to decide, and who have a capacity to treat and conclude), they are in flanders and germany, in switzerland, spain, italy, and england. there are all the princes of the blood, there are all the orders of the state, there are all the parliaments of the kingdom.... i am sure that if half that number of the same description were taken out of this country, it would leave hardly anything that i should call the people of england."[332] rousseau draws nearly the same distinction between the country to which we happen to belong and that which fulfils towards us the political functions of the state. in the _emile_ he has a sentence of which it is not easy in a translation to convey the point: "qui n'a pas une patrie a du moins un pays." and in his tract on political economy he writes: "how shall men love their country if it is nothing more for them than for strangers, and bestows on them only that which it can refuse to none?" it is in the same sense he says, further on, "la patrie ne peut subsister sans la liberté."[333] the nationality formed by the state, then, is the only one to which we owe political duties, and it is, therefore, the only one which has political rights. the swiss are ethnologically either french, italian, or german; but no nationality has the slightest claim upon them, except the purely political nationality of switzerland. the tuscan or the neapolitan state has formed a nationality, but the citizens of florence and of naples have no political community with each other. there are other states which have neither succeeded in absorbing distinct races in a political nationality, nor in separating a particular district from a larger nation. austria and mexico are instances on the one hand, parma and baden on the other. the progress of civilisation deals hardly with the last description of states. in order to maintain their integrity they must attach themselves by confederations, or family alliances, to greater powers, and thus lose something of their independence. their tendency is to isolate and shut off their inhabitants, to narrow the horizon of their views, and to dwarf in some degree the proportions of their ideas. public opinion cannot maintain its liberty and purity in such small dimensions, and the currents that come from larger communities sweep over a contracted territory. in a small and homogeneous population there is hardly room for a natural classification of society, or for inner groups of interests that set bounds to sovereign power. the government and the subjects contend with borrowed weapons. the resources of the one and the aspirations of the other are derived from some external source, and the consequence is that the country becomes the instrument and the scene of contests in which it is not interested. these states, like the minuter communities of the middle ages, serve a purpose, by constituting partitions and securities of self-government in the larger states; but they are impediments to the progress of society, which depends on the mixture of races under the same governments. the vanity and peril of national claims founded on no political tradition, but on race alone, appear in mexico. there the races are divided by blood, without being grouped together in different regions. it is, therefore, neither possible to unite them nor to convert them into the elements of an organised state. they are fluid, shapeless, and unconnected, and cannot be precipitated, or formed into the basis of political institutions. as they cannot be used by the state, they cannot be recognised by it; and their peculiar qualities, capabilities, passions, and attachments are of no service, and therefore obtain no regard. they are necessarily ignored, and are therefore perpetually outraged. from this difficulty of races with political pretensions, but without political position, the eastern world escaped by the institution of castes. where there are only two races there is the resource of slavery; but when different races inhabit the different territories of one empire composed of several smaller states, it is of all possible combinations the most favourable to the establishment of a highly developed system of freedom. in austria there are two circumstances which add to the difficulty of the problem, but also increase its importance. the several nationalities are at very unequal degrees of advancement, and there is no single nation which is so predominant as to overwhelm or absorb the others. these are the conditions necessary for the very highest degree of organisation which government is capable of receiving. they supply the greatest variety of intellectual resource; the perpetual incentive to progress, which is afforded not merely by competition, but by the spectacle of a more advanced people; the most abundant elements of self-government, combined with the impossibility for the state to rule all by its own will; and the fullest security for the preservation of local customs and ancient rights. in such a country as this, liberty would achieve its most glorious results, while centralisation and absolutism would be destruction. the problem presented to the government of austria is higher than that which is solved in england, because of the necessity of admitting the national claims. the parliamentary system fails to provide for them, as it presupposes the unity of the people. hence in those countries in which different races dwell together, it has not satisfied their desires, and is regarded as an imperfect form of freedom. it brings out more clearly than before the differences it does not recognise, and thus continues the work of the old absolutism, and appears as a new phase of centralisation. in those countries, therefore, the power of the imperial parliament must be limited as jealously as the power of the crown, and many of its functions must be discharged by provincial diets, and a descending series of local authorities. the great importance of nationality in the state consists in the fact that it is the basis of political capacity. the character of a nation determines in great measure the form and vitality of the state. certain political habits and ideas belong to particular nations, and they vary with the course of the national history. a people just emerging from barbarism, a people effete from the excesses of a luxurious civilisation, cannot possess the means of governing itself; a people devoted to equality, or to absolute monarchy, is incapable of producing an aristocracy; a people averse to the institution of private property is without the first element of freedom. each of these can be converted into efficient members of a free community only by the contact of a superior race, in whose power will lie the future prospects of the state. a system which ignores these things, and does not rely for its support on the character and aptitude of the people, does not intend that they should administer their own affairs, but that they should simply be obedient to the supreme command. the denial of nationality, therefore, implies the denial of political liberty. the greatest adversary of the rights of nationality is the modern theory of nationality. by making the state and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, it reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the boundary. it cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the state, because the state would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence. according, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilisation in that dominant body which claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exterminated, or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence. if we take the establishment of liberty for the realisation of moral duties to be the end of civil society, we must conclude that those states are substantially the most perfect which, like the british and austrian empires, include various distinct nationalities without oppressing them. those in which no mixture of races has occurred are imperfect; and those in which its effects have disappeared are decrepit. a state which is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself; a state which labours to neutralise, to absorb, or to expel them, destroys its own vitality; a state which does not include them is destitute of the chief basis of self-government the theory of nationality, therefore, is a retrograde step in history. it is the most advanced form of the revolution, and must retain its power to the end of the revolutionary period, of which it announces the approach. its great historical importance depends on two chief causes. first, it is a chimera. the settlement at which it aims is impossible. as it can never be satisfied and exhausted, and always continues to assert itself, it prevents the government from ever relapsing into the condition which provoked its rise. the danger is too threatening, and the power over men's minds too great, to allow any system to endure which justifies the resistance of nationality. it must contribute, therefore, to obtain that which in theory it condemns,--the liberty of different nationalities as members of one sovereign community. this is a service which no other force could accomplish; for it is a corrective alike of absolute monarchy, of democracy, and of constitutionalism, as well as of the centralisation which is common to all three. neither the monarchical, nor the revolutionary, nor the parliamentary system can do this; and all the ideas which have excited enthusiasm in past times are impotent for the purpose except nationality alone. and secondly, the national theory marks the end of the revolutionary doctrine and its logical exhaustion. in proclaiming the supremacy of the rights of nationality, the system of democratic equality goes beyond its own extreme boundary, and falls into contradiction with itself. between the democratic and the national phase of the revolution, socialism had intervened, and had already carried the consequences of the principle to an absurdity. but that phase was passed. the revolution survived its offspring, and produced another further result. nationality is more advanced than socialism, because it is a more arbitrary system. the social theory endeavours to provide for the existence of the individual beneath the terrible burdens which modern society heaps upon labour. it is not merely a development of the notion of equality, but a refuge from real misery and starvation. however false the solution, it was a reasonable demand that the poor should be saved from destruction; and if the freedom of the state was sacrificed to the safety of the individual, the more immediate object was, at least in theory, attained. but nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the state. its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of god and the interests of mankind. there is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehensive, more subversive, or more arbitrary than this. it is a confutation of democracy, because it sets limits to the exercise of the popular will, and substitutes for it a higher principle. it prevents not only the division, but the extension of the state, and forbids to terminate war by conquest, and to obtain a security for peace. thus, after surrendering the individual to the collective will, the revolutionary system makes the collective will subject to conditions which are independent of it, and rejects all law, only to be controlled by an accident. although, therefore, the theory of nationality is more absurd and more criminal than the theory of socialism, it has an important mission in the world, and marks the final conflict, and therefore the end, of two forces which are the worst enemies of civil freedom,--the absolute monarchy and the revolution. footnotes: [footnote 326: _home and foreign review_, july 1862.] [footnote 327: "observations on the conduct of the minority," _works_, v. 112.] [footnote 328: there are some remarkable thoughts on nationality in the state papers of the count de maistre: "en premier lieu les nations sont quelque chose dans le monde, il n'est pas permis de les compter pour rien, de les affliger dans leurs convenances, dans leurs affections, dans leurs intérêts les plus chers.... or le traité du 30 mai anéantit complétement la savoie; il divise l'indivisible; il partage en trois portions une malheureuse nation de 400,000 hommes, une par la langue, une par la religion, une par le caractère, une par l'habitude invétérée, une enfin par les limites naturelles.... l'union des nations ne souffre pas de difficultés sur la carte géographique; mais dans la réalité, c'est autre chose; il y a des nations _immiscibles_.... je lui parlai par occasion de l'esprit italien qui s'agite dans ce moment; il (count nesselrode) me répondit: 'oui, monsieur; mais cet esprit est un grand mal, car il peut gêner les arrangements de l'italie.'" (_correspondance diplomatique de j. de maistre_, ii. 7, 8, 21, 25). in the same year, 1815, görres wrote: "in italien wie allerwärts ist das volk gewecht; es will etwas grossartiges, es will ideen haben, die, wenn es sie auch nicht ganz begreift, doch einen freien unendlichen gesichtskreis seiner einbildung eröffnen. ... es ist reiner naturtrieb, dass ein volk, also scharf und deutlich in seine natürlichen gränzen eingeschlossen, aus der zerstreuung in die einheit sich zu sammeln sucht." (_werke_, ii. 20).] [footnote 329: _considerations on representative government_, p. 298.] [footnote 330: mill's _considerations_, p. 296.] [footnote 331: "le sentiment d'indépendance nationale est encore plus général et plus profondément gravé dans le coeur des peuples que l'amour d'une liberté constitutionnelle. les nations les plus soumises au despotisme éprouvent ce sentiment avec autant de vivacité que les nations libres; les peuples les plus barbares le sentent même encore plus vivement que les nations policées" (_l'italie au dix-neuvième siècle_, p. 148, paris, 1821).] [footnote 332: burke's "remarks on the policy of the allies" (_works_, v. 26, 29, 30).] [footnote 333: _oeuvres_, i. 593, 595, ii. 717. bossuet, in a passage of great beauty on the love of country, does not attain to the political definition of the word: "la société humaine demande qu'on aime la terre où l'on habite ensemble, ou la regarde comme une mère et une nourrice commune.... les hommes en effet se sentent liés par quelque chose de fort, lorsqu'ils songent, que la même terre qui les a portés et nourris étant vivants, les recevra dans son sein quand ils seront morts" ("politique tirée de l'ecriture sainte," _oeuvres_, x. 317).] x döllinger on the temporal power[334] after half a year's delay, dr. döllinger has redeemed his promise to publish the text of those lectures which made so profound a sensation in the catholic world.[335] we are sorry to find that the report which fell into our hands at the time, and from which we gave the account that appeared in our may number, was both defective and incorrect; and we should further regret that we did not follow the example of those journals which abstained from comment so long as no authentic copy was accessible, if it did not appear that, although the argument of the lecturer was lost, his meaning was not, on the whole, seriously misrepresented. excepting for the sake of the author, who became the object, and of those who unfortunately made themselves the organs, of so much calumny, it is impossible to lament the existence of the erroneous statements which have caused the present publication. intending at first to prefix an introduction to the text of his lectures, the professor has been led on by the gravity of the occasion, the extent of his subject, and the abundance of materials, to compose a book of 700 pages. written with all the author's perspicuity of style, though without his usual compression; with the exhaustless information which never fails him, but with an economy of quotation suited to the general public for whom it is designed, it betrays the circumstances of its origin. subjects are sometimes introduced out of their proper place and order; and there are occasional repetitions, which show that he had not at starting fixed the proportions of the different parts of his work. this does not, however, affect the logical sequence of the ideas, or the accuracy of the induction. no other book contains--no other writer probably could supply--so comprehensive and so suggestive a description of the state of the protestant religion, or so impartial an account of the causes which have brought on the crisis of the temporal power. the _symbolik_ of möhler was suggested by the beginning of that movement of revival and resuscitation amongst the protestants, of which döllinger now surveys the fortunes and the result. the interval of thirty years has greatly altered the position of the catholic divines towards their antagonists. möhler had to deal with the ideas of the reformation, the works of the reformers, and the teaching of the confessions; he had to answer in the nineteenth century the theology of the sixteenth. the protestantism for which he wrote was a complete system, antagonistic to the whole of catholic theology, and he confuted the one by comparing it with the other, dogma for dogma. but that of which döllinger treats has lost, for the most part, those distinctive doctrines, not by the growth of unbelief, but in consequence of the very efforts which its most zealous and religious professors have made to defend and to redeem it. the contradictions and errors of the protestant belief were formerly the subject of controversy with its catholic opponents, but now the controversy is anticipated and prevented by the undisguised admissions of its desponding friends. it stands no longer as a system consistent, complete, satisfying the judgment and commanding the unconditional allegiance of its followers, and fortified at all points against catholicism; but disorganised as a church, its doctrines in a state of dissolution, despaired of by its divines, strong and compact only in its hostility to rome, but with no positive principle of unity, no ground of resistance, nothing to have faith in but the determination to reject authority. this, therefore, is the point which döllinger takes up. reducing the chief phenomena of religious and social decline to the one head of failing authority, he founds on the state of protestantism the apology of the papacy. he abandons to the protestant theology the destruction of the protestant church, and leaves its divines to confute and abjure its principles in detail, and to arrive by the exhaustion of the modes of error, through a painful but honourable process, at the gates of truth; he meets their arguments simply by a chapter of ecclesiastical history, of which experience teaches them the force; and he opposes to their theories, not the discussions of controversial theology, but the character of a single institution. the opportunity he has taken to do this, the assumed coincidence between the process of dissolution among the protestants and the process of regeneration in the court of rome, is the characteristic peculiarity of the book. before we proceed to give an analysis of its contents, we will give some extracts from the preface, which explains the purpose of the whole, and which is alone one of the most important contributions to the religious discussions of the day. this book arose from two out of four lectures which were delivered in april this year. how i came to discuss the most difficult and complicated question of our time before a very mixed audience, and in a manner widely different from that usually adopted, i deem myself bound to explain. it was my intention, when i was first requested to lecture, only to speak of the present state of religion in general, with a comprehensive view extending over all mankind. it happened, however, that from those circles which had given the impulse to the lectures, the question was frequently put to me, how the position of the holy see, the partly consummated, partly threatening, loss of its secular power is to be explained. what answer, i was repeatedly asked, is to be given to those out of the church who point with triumphant scorn to the numerous episcopal manifestoes, in which the states of the church are declared essential and necessary to her existence although the events of the last thirty years appear with increasing distinctness to announce their downfall? i had found the hope often expressed in newspapers, books, and periodicals, that after the destruction of the temporal power of the popes, the church herself would not escape dissolution. at the same time, i was struck by finding in the memoirs of chateaubriand that cardinal bernetti, secretary of state to leo xii., had said, that if he lived long, there was a chance of his beholding the fall of the temporal power of the papacy. i had also read, in the letter of a well-informed and trustworthy correspondent from paris, that the archbishop of rheims had related on his return from rome that pius ix. had said to him, "i am under no illusions, the temporal power must fall. goyon will abandon me; i shall then disband my remaining troops. i shall excommunicate the king when he enters the city; and shall calmly await my death." i thought already, in april, that i could perceive, what has become still more clear in october, that the enemies of the secular power of the papacy are determined, united, predominant, and that there is nowhere a protecting power which possesses the will, and at the same time the means, of averting the catastrophe. i considered it therefore probable that an interruption of the temporal dominion would soon ensue--an interruption which, like others before it, would also come to an end, and would be followed by a restoration. i resolved, therefore, to take the opportunity, which the lectures gave me, to prepare the public for the coming events, which already cast their shadows upon us, and thus to prevent the scandals, the doubt, and the offence which must inevitably arise if the states of the church should pass into other hands, although the pastorals of the bishops had so energetically asserted that they belonged to the integrity of the church. i meant, therefore, to say, the church by her nature can very well exist, and did exist for seven centuries, without the territorial possessions of the popes; afterwards this possession became necessary, and, in spite of great changes and vicissitudes, has discharged in most cases its function of serving as a foundation for the independence and freedom of the popes. as long as the present state and arrangement of europe endures, we can discover no other means to secure to the holy see its freedom, and with it the confidence of all. but the knowledge and the power of god reach farther than ours, and we must not presume to set bounds to the divine wisdom and omnipotence, or to say to it, in this way and no other! should, nevertheless, the threatening consummation ensue, and should the pope be robbed of his land, one of three eventualities will assuredly come to pass. either the loss of the state is only temporary, and the territory will revert, after some intervening casualties, either whole or in part, to its legitimate sovereign; or providence will bring about, by ways unknown to us, and combinations which we cannot divine, a state of things in which the object, namely, the independence and free action of the holy see, will be attained without the means which have hitherto served; or else we are approaching great catastrophes in europe, the doom of the whole edifice of the present social order,--events of which the ruin of the roman state is only the precursor and the herald. the reasons for which, of these three possibilities, i think the first the most probable, i have developed in this book. concerning the second alternative, there is nothing to be said; it is an unknown, and therefore, indescribable, quantity. only we must retain it against certain over-confident assertions which profess to know the secret things to come, and, trespassing on the divine domain, wish to subject the future absolutely to the laws of the immediate past. that the third possibility must also be admitted, few of those who studiously observe the signs of the time will dispute. one of the ablest historians and statesmen--niebuhr--wrote on the 5th october 1830: "if god does not miraculously aid, a destruction is in store for us such as the roman world underwent in the middle of the third century--destruction of prosperity, of freedom, of civilisation, and of literature." and we have proceeded much farther on the inclined plane since then. the european powers have overturned, or have allowed to be overturned, the two pillars of their existence,--the principle of legitimacy, and the public law of nations. those monarchs who have made themselves the slaves of the revolution, to do its work, are the active agents in the historical drama; the others stand aside as quiet spectators, in expectation of inheriting something, like prussia and russia, or bestowing encouragement and assistance, like england; or as passive invalids, like austria and the sinking empire of turkey. but the revolution is a permanent chronic disease, breaking out now in one place, now in another, sometimes seizing several members together. the pentarchy is dissolved; the holy alliance, which, however defective or open to abuse, was one form of political order, is buried; the right of might prevails in europe. is it a process of renovation or a process of dissolution in which european society is plunged? i still think the former; but i must, as i have said, admit the possibility of the other alternative. if it occurs, then, when the powers of destruction have done their work, it will be the business of the church at once to co-operate actively in the reconstruction of social order out of the ruins, both as a connecting civilising power, and as the preserver and dispenser of moral and religious tradition. and thus the papacy, with or without territory, has its own function and its appointed mission. these, then, were the ideas from which i started; and it may be supposed that my language concerning the immediate fate of the temporal power of the pope necessarily sounded ambiguous, that i could not well come with the confidence which is given to other--perhaps more far-sighted--men before my audience, and say, rely upon it, the states of the church--the land from radicofani to ceperano, from ravenna to cività vecchia, shall and must and will invariably remain to the popes. heaven and earth shall pass away before the roman state shall pass away. i could not do this, because i did not at that time believe it, nor do i now; but am only confident that the holy see will not be permanently deprived of the conditions necessary for the fulfilment of its mission. thus the substance of my words was this: let no one lose faith in the church if the secular principality of the pope should disappear for a season, or for ever. it is not essence, but accident; not end, but means; it began late; it was formerly something quite different from what it is now. it justly appears to us indispensable, and as long as the existing order lasts in europe, it must be maintained at any price; or if it is violently interrupted, it must be restored. but a political settlement of europe is conceivable in which it would be superfluous, and then it would be an oppressive burden. at the same time i wished to defend pope pius ix. and his government against many accusations, and to point out that the inward infirmities and deficiencies which undeniably exist in the country, by which the state has been reduced to so deplorable a condition of weakness and helplessness, were not attributable to him: that, on the contrary, he has shown, both before and since 1848, the best will to reform; and that by him, and under him, much has been really improved. the newspaper reports, written down at home from memory, gave but an inaccurate representation of a discourse which did not attempt in the usual way to cut the knot, but which, with buts and ifs, and referring to certain elements in the decision which are generally left out of the calculation, spoke of an uncertain future, and of various possibilities. this was not to be avoided. any reproduction which was not quite literal must, in spite of the good intentions of the reporter, have given rise to false interpretations. when, therefore, one of the most widely read papers reported the first lecture, without any intentional falsification, but with omissions which altered the sense and the tendency of my words, i immediately proposed to the conductors to print my manuscript; but this offer was declined. in other accounts in the daily press, i was often unable to recognise my ideas; and words were put into my mouth which i had never uttered. and here i will admit that, when i gave the lectures, i did not think that they would be discussed by the press, but expected that, like others of the same kind, they would at most be mentioned in a couple of words, _in futuram oblivionem_. of the controversy which sprang up at once, in separate works and in newspaper articles, in germany, france, england, italy, and even in america, i shall not speak. much of it i have not read. the writers often did not even ask themselves whether the report which accident put into their hands, and which they carelessly adopted, was at all accurate. but i must refer to an account in one of the most popular english periodicals, because i am there brought into a society to which i do not belong. the author of an article in the july number of the _edinburgh review_ ... appeals to me, misunderstanding the drift of my words, and erroneously believing that i had already published an apology of my orthodoxy.... a sharp attack upon me in the _dublin review_ i know only from extracts in english papers; but i can see from the vehemence with which the writer pronounces himself against liberal institutions, that, even after the appearance of this book, i cannot reckon on coming to an understanding with him, ... the excitement which was caused by my lectures, or rather by the accounts of them in the papers, had this advantage, that it brought to light, in a way which to many was unexpected, how widely, how deeply, and how firmly the attachment of the people to the see of st peter is rooted. for the sake of this i was glad to accept all the attacks and animosity which fell on me in consequence. but why, it will be asked--and i have been asked innumerable times--why not cut short misunderstandings by the immediate publication of the lectures, which must, as a whole, have been written beforehand? why wait for five months? for this i had two reasons: first, it was not merely a question of misunderstanding. much of what i had actually said had made an unpleasant impression in many quarters, especially among our optimists. i should, therefore, with my bare statements, have become involved in an agitating discussion in pamphlets and newspapers, and that was not an attractive prospect. the second reason was this: i expected that the further progress of events in italy, the irresistible logic of facts, would dispose minds to receive certain truths. i hoped that people would learn by degrees, in the school of events, that it is not enough always to be reckoning with the figures "revolution," "secret societies," "mazzinism," "atheism," or to estimate things only by the standard supplied by the "jew of verona," but that other factors must be admitted into the calculation; for instance, the condition of the italian clergy, and its position towards the laity, i wished, therefore, to let a few months go by before i came before the public. whether i judged rightly, the reception of this book will show. i thoroughly understand those who think it censurable that i should have spoken in detail of situations and facts which are gladly ignored, or touched with a light and hasty hand, and that especially at the present crisis. i myself was restrained for ten years by these considerations, in spite of the feeling which urged me to speak on the question of the roman government, and it required the circumstances i have described, i may almost say, to compel me to speak publicly on the subject. i beg of these persons to weigh the following points. first, when an author openly exposes a state of things already abundantly discussed in the press, if he draws away the necessarily very transparent covering from the gaping wounds which are not on the church herself, but on an institution nearly connected with her, and whose infirmities she is made to feel, it may fairly be supposed that he does it, in agreement with the example of earlier friends and great men of the church, only to show the possibility and the necessity of the cure, in order, so far as in him lies, to weaken the reproach that the defenders of the church see only the mote in the eyes of others, not the beam in their own, and with narrow-hearted prejudice endeavour to soften, or to dissimulate, or to deny every fact which is or which appears unfavourable to their cause. he does it in order that it may be understood that where the powerlessness of men to effect a cure becomes manifest, god interposes in order to sift on his threshing-floor the chaff from the wheat, and to consume it with the fire of the catastrophes which are only his judgments and remedies. secondly, i could not, as a historian, present the effects without going back to their causes; and it was therefore my duty, as it is that of every religious inquirer and observer, to try to contribute something to the _theodicée_. he that undertakes to write on such lofty interests, which nearly affect the weal and woe of the church, cannot avoid examining and displaying the wisdom and justice of god in the conduct of terrestrial events regarding them. the fate which has overtaken the roman states must above all be considered in the light of a divine ordinance for the advantage of the church. seen by that light, it assumes the character of a trial, which will continue until the object is attained, and the welfare of the church so far secured. it seemed evident to me, that as a new order of things in europe lies in the design of providence, the disease, through which for the last half-century the states of the church unquestionably have passed, might be the transition to a new form. to describe this malady without overlooking or concealing any of the symptoms was, therefore, an undertaking which i could not avoid. the disease has its source in the inward contradiction and discord of the institutions and conditions of the government; for the modern french institutions stand there, without any reconciling qualifications, besides those of the mediæval hierarchy. neither of these elements is strong enough to expel the other; and either of them would, if it prevailed alone, be again a form of disease. yet, in the history of the last few years i recognise symptoms of convalescence, however feeble, obscure, and equivocal its traces may appear. what we behold is not death or hopeless decay, it is a purifying process, painful, consuming, penetrating bone and marrow,--such as god inflicts on his chosen persons and institutions. there is abundance of dross, and time is necessary before the gold can come pure out of the furnace. in the course of this process it may happen that the territorial dominion will be interrupted, that the state may be broken up or pass into other hands; but it will revive, though perhaps in another form, and with a different kind of government. in a word, _sanabilibus laboramus malis_--that is what i wished to show; that, i believe, i have shown. now, and for the last forty years, the condition of the roman states is the heel of achilles of the catholic church, the standing reproach for adversaries throughout the world, and a stumbling-block for thousands. not as though the objections, which are founded on the fact of this transitory disturbance and discord in the social and political sphere, possessed any weight in a theological point of view, but it cannot be denied that they are of incalculable influence on the disposition of the world external to the church. whenever a state of disease has appeared in the church, there has been but one method of cure,--that of an awakened, renovated, healthy consciousness and of an enlightened public opinion in the church. the goodwill of the ecclesiastical rulers and heads has not been able to accomplish the cure, unless sustained by the general sense and conviction of the clergy and of the laity. the healing of the great malady of the sixteenth century, the true internal reformation of the church, only became possible when people ceased to disguise or to deny the evil, and to pass it by with silence and concealment,--when so powerful and irresistible a public opinion had formed itself in the church, that its commanding influence could no longer be evaded. at the present day, what we want is the whole truth, not merely the perception that the temporal power of the pope is required by the church,--for that is obvious to everybody, at least out of italy, and everything has been said that can be said about it; but also the knowledge of the conditions under which this power is possible for the future. the history of the popes is full of instances where their best intentions were not fulfilled, and their strongest resolutions broke down, because the interests of a firmly compacted class resisted like an impenetrable hedge of thorns. hadrian vi. was fully resolved to set about the reformation in earnest; and yet he achieved virtually nothing, and felt himself, though in possession of supreme power, altogether powerless against the passive resistance of all those who should have been his instruments in the work. only when public opinion, even in italy, and in rome itself, was awakened, purified, and strengthened; when the cry for reform resounded imperatively on every side,--then only was it possible for the popes to overcome the resistance in the inferior spheres, and gradually, and step by step, to open the way for a more healthy state. may, therefore, a powerful, healthy, unanimous public opinion in catholic europe come to the aid of pius ix.!... concerning another part of this book i have a few words to say. i have given a survey of all the churches and ecclesiastical communities now existing. the obligation of attempting this presented itself to me, because i had to explain both the universal importance of the papacy as a power for all the world, and the things which it actually performs. this could not be done fully without exhibiting the internal condition of the churches which have rejected it, and withdrawn from its influence. it is true that the plan increased under my hands, and i endeavoured to give as clear a picture as possible of the development which has accomplished itself in the separated churches since the reformation, and through it, in consequence of the views and principles which had been once for all adopted. i have, therefore, admitted into my description no feature which is not, in my opinion, an effect, a result, however remote, of those principles and doctrines. there is doubtless room for discussion in detail upon this point, and there will unavoidably be a decided opposition to this book, if it should be noticed beyond the limits of the church to which i belong. i hope that there also the justice will be done me of believing that i was far from having any intention of offending; that i have only said what must be said, if we would go to the bottom of these questions; that i had to do with institutions which, because of the dogmas and principles from which they spring, must, like a tree that is nailed to a wall, remain in one position, however unnatural it may be. i am quite ready to admit that, on the opposite side, the men are often better than the system to which they are, or deem themselves, attached; and that, on the contrary, in the church the individuals are, on the average, inferior in theory and in practice to the system under which they live.... the union of the two religions, which would be socially and politically the salvation of germany and of europe, is not possible at present; first because the greater, more active, and more influential portion of the german protestants do not desire it, for political or religious reasons, in any form or under any practicable conditions. it is impossible, secondly, because negotiations concerning the mode and the conditions of union can no longer be carried on. for this, plenipotentiaries on both sides are required; and these only the catholic church is able to appoint, by virtue of her ecclesiastical organisation, not the protestants.... nevertheless, theologically, protestants and catholics have come nearer each other; for those capital doctrines, those articles with which the church was to stand or fall, for the sake of which the reformers declared separation from the catholic church to be necessary, are now confuted and given up by protestant theology, or are retained only nominally, whilst other notions are connected with the words.... protestant theology is at the present day less hostile, so to speak, than the theologians. for whilst theology has levelled the strongest bulwarks and doctrinal barriers which the reformation had set up to confirm the separation, the divines, instead of viewing favourably the consequent facilities for union, often labour, on the contrary, to conceal the fact, or to provide new points of difference. many of them probably agree with stahl of berlin, who said, shortly before his death, "far from supposing that the breach of the sixteenth century can be healed, we ought, if it had not already occurred, to make it now." this, however, will not continue; and a future generation, perhaps that which is even now growing up, will rather adopt the recent declaration of heinrich leo, "in the roman catholic church a process of purification has taken place since luther's day; and if the church had been in the days of luther what the roman catholic church in germany actually is at present, it would never have occurred to him to assert his opposition so energetically as to bring about a separation." those who think thus will then be the right men and the chosen instruments for the acceptable work of the reconciliation of the churches, and the true unity of germany. upon the day when, on both sides, the conviction shall arise vivid and strong that christ really desires the unity of his church, that the division of christendom, the multiplicity of churches, is displeasing to god, that he who helps to prolong the situation must answer for it to the lord,--on that day four-fifths of the traditional polemics of the protestants against the church will with one blow be set aside, like chaff and rubbish; for four-fifths consist of misunderstandings, logomachies, and wilful falsifications, or relate to personal, and therefore accidental, things, which are utterly insignificant where only principles and dogmas are at stake. on that day, also, much will be changed on the catholic side. thenceforward the character of luther and the reformers will no more be dragged forward in the pulpit. the clergy, mindful of the saying, _interficite errores, diligite homines_, will always conduct themselves towards members of other churches in conformity with the rules of charity, and will therefore assume, in all cases where there are no clear proofs to the contrary, the _bona fides_ of opponents. they will never forget that no man is convinced and won over by bitter words and violent attacks, but that every one is rather repelled by them. warned by the words of the epistle to the romans (xiv, 13), they will be more careful than heretofore to give to their separate brethren no scandal, no grounds of accusation against the church. accordingly, in popular instruction and in religious life, they will always make the great truths of salvation the centre of all their teaching: they will not treat secondary things in life and doctrine as though they were of the first importance; but, on the contrary, they will keep alive in the people the consciousness that such things are but means to an end, and are only of inferior consequence and subsidiary value. until that day shall dawn upon germany, it is our duty as catholics, in the words of cardinal diepenbrock, "to bear the religious separation in a spirit of penance for guilt incurred in common." we must acknowledge that here also god has caused much good as well as much evil to proceed from the errors of men, from the contests and passions of the sixteenth century; that the anxiety of the german nation to see the intolerable abuses and scandals in the church removed was fully justified, and sprang from the better qualities of our people, and from their moral indignation at the desecration and corruption of holy things, which were degraded to selfish and hypocritical purposes. we do not refuse to admit that the great separation, and the storms and sufferings connected with it, was an awful judgment upon catholic christendom, which clergy and laity had but too well deserved--a judgment which has had an improving and salutary effect. the great conflict of intellects has purified the european atmosphere, has impelled the human mind on to new courses, and has promoted a rich scientific and literary life. protestant theology, with its restless spirit of inquiry, has gone along by the side of the catholic, exciting and awakening, warning and vivifying; and every eminent catholic divine in germany will gladly admit that he owes much to the writings of protestant scholars. we must also acknowledge that in the church the rust of abuses and of a mechanical superstition is always forming afresh; that the spiritual in religion is sometimes materialised, and therefore degraded, deformed, and applied to their own loss, by the servants of the church, through their indolence and want of intelligence, and by the people, through their ignorance. the true spirit of reform most, therefore, never depart from the church, but must periodically break out with renovating strength, and penetrate the mind and the will of the clergy. in this sense we do not refuse to admit the justice of a call to penance, when it proceeds from those who are not of us,--that is, of a warning carefully to examine our religious life and pastoral conduct, and to remedy what is found defective. at the same time it must not be forgotten that the separation did not ensue in consequence of the abuses of the church. for the duty and necessity of removing these abuses has always been recognised; and only the difficulty of the thing, the not always unjustifiable fear lest the wheat should be pulled up with the tares, prevented for a time the reformation, which was accomplished in the church and through her. separation on account merely of abuses in ecclesiastical life, when the doctrine is the same, is rejected as criminal by the protestants as well as by us. it is, therefore, for doctrine's sake that the separation occurred; and the general discontent of the people, the weakening of ecclesiastical authority by the existence of abuses, only facilitated the adoption of the new doctrines. but now on one side some of these defects and evils in the life of the church have disappeared; the others have greatly diminished since the reforming movement; and on the other side, the principal doctrines for which they separated, and on the truth of which, and their necessity for salvation, the right and duty of secession was based, are given up by protestant science, deprived of their scriptural basis by exegesis, or at least made very uncertain by the opposition of the most eminent protestant divines. meanwhile we live in hopes, comforting ourselves with the conviction that history, or that process of development in europe which is being accomplished before our eyes, as well in society and politics as in religion, is the powerful ally of the friends of ecclesiastical union; and we hold out our hands to christians on the other side for a combined war of resistance against the destructive movements of the age. there are two circumstances which make us fear that the work will not be received in the spirit in which it is written, and that its object will not immediately be attained. the first of these is the extraordinary effect which was produced by the declaration which the author made on the occasion of the late assembly of the catholic associations of germany at munich. he stated simply, what is understood by every catholic out of italy, and intelligible to every reasonable protestant, that the freedom of the church imperatively requires that, in order to protect the pope from the perils which menace him, particularly in our age, he should possess a sovereignty not merely nominal, and that his right to his dominions is as good as that of all other legitimate sovereigns. in point of fact, this expression of opinion, which occurs even in the garbled reports of the lectures, leaves all those questions on which it is possible for serious and dispassionate men to be divided entirely open. it does not determine whether there was any excuse for the disaffection of the papal subjects; whether the security afforded by a more extensive dominion is greater than the increased difficulty of administration under the conditions inherited from the french occupation; whether an organised system of tribute or domains might be sufficient, in conjunction with a more restricted territory; whether the actual loss of power is or is not likely to improve a misfortune for religion. the storm of applause with which these words, simply expressing that in which all agree, were received, must have suggested to the speaker that his countrymen in general are unprepared to believe that one, who has no other aspiration in his life and his works than the advancement of the catholic religion, can speak without a reverent awe of the temporal government, or can witness without dismay its impending fall. they must have persuaded themselves that not only the details, but the substance of his lectures had been entirely misreported, and that his views were as free from novelty as destitute of offence. it is hard to believe that such persons will be able to reconcile themselves to the fearless and straightforward spirit in which the first of church historians discusses the history of his own age. another consideration, almost equally significant with the attitude of the great mass of catholics, is the silence of the minority who agree with döllinger. those earnest catholics who, in their italian patriotism, insist on the possibility of reconciling the liberty of the holy see with the establishment of an ideal unity, passaglia, tosti, the followers of gioberti, and the disciples of rosmini, have not hesitated to utter openly their honest but most inconceivable persuasion. but on the german side of the alps, where no political agitation affects the religious judgment, or drives men into disputes, those eminent thinkers who agree with döllinger are withheld by various considerations from publishing their views. sometimes it is the hopelessness of making an impression, sometimes the grave inconvenience of withstanding the current of opinion that makes them keep silence; and their silence leaves those who habitually follow them not only without means of expressing their views, but often without decided views to express. the same influences which deprive döllinger of the open support of these natural allies will impede the success of his work, until events have outstripped ideas, and until men awake to the discovery that what they refused to anticipate or to prepare for, is already accomplished. piety sometimes gives birth to scruples, and faith to superstition, when they are not directed by wisdom and knowledge. one source of the difficulty of which we are speaking is as much a defect of faith as a defect of knowledge. just as it is difficult for some catholics to believe that the supreme spiritual authority on earth could ever be in unworthy hands, so they find it hard to reconcile the reverence due to the vicar of christ, and the promises made to him, with the acknowledgment of intolerable abuses in his temporal administration. it is a comfort to make the best of the case, to draw conclusions from the exaggerations, the inventions, and the malice of the accusers against the justice of the accusation, and in favour of the accused. it is a temptation to our weakness and to our consciences to defend the pope as we would defend ourselves--with the same care and zeal, with the same uneasy secret consciousness that there are weak points in the case which can best be concealed by diverting attention from them. what the defence gains in energy it loses in sincerity; the cause of the church, which is the cause of truth, is mixed up and confused with human elements, and is injured by a degrading alliance. in this way even piety may lead to immorality, and devotion to the pope may lead away from god. the position of perpetual antagonism to a spirit which we abhor; the knowledge that the clamour against the temporal power is, in very many instances, inspired by hatred of the spiritual authority; the indignation at the impure motives mixed up with the movement--all these things easily blind catholics to the fact that our attachment to the pope as our spiritual head, our notion that his civil sovereignty is a safeguard of his freedom, are the real motives of our disposition to deny the truth of the accusations made against his government. it is hard to believe that imputations which take the form of insults, and which strike at the church through the state, are well founded, and to distinguish the design and the occasion from the facts. it is, perhaps, more than we can expect of men, that, after defending the pope as a sovereign, because he is a pontiff, and adopting against his enemies the policy of unconditional defence, they will consent to adopt a view which corroborates to a great extent the assertions they have combated, and implicitly condemns their tactics. it is natural to oppose one extreme by another; and those who avoid both easily appear to be capitulating with error. the effects of this spirit of opposition are not confined to those who are engaged in resisting the no-popery party in england, or the revolution in italy. the fate of the temporal power hangs neither on the italian ministry nor on english influence, but on the decision of the emperor of the french; and the loudest maintainers of the rights of the holy see are among that party who have been the most zealous adversaries of the imperial system. the french catholics behold in the roman policy of the emperor a scheme for obtaining over the church a power of which they would be the first victims. their religious freedom is in jeopardy while he has the fate of the pope in his hands. that which is elsewhere simply a manifestation of opinion and a moral influence is in france an active interference and a political power. they alone among catholic subjects can bring a pressure to bear on him who has had the initiative in the italian movement. they fear by silence to incur a responsibility for criminal acts. for them it is a season for action, and the time has not yet come when they can speak with judicial impartiality, or with the freedom of history, or determine how far, in the pursuit of his ambitious ends, napoleon iii. is the instrument of providence, or how far, without any merit of his own, he is likely to fulfil the expectations of those who see in him a new constantine. whilst they maintain this unequal war, they naturally identify the rights of the church with her interests; and the wrongs of the pope are before their eyes so as to eclipse the realities of the roman government. the most vehement and one-sided of those who have dwelt exclusively on the crimes of the revolution and the justice of the papal cause, the bishop of orleans for instance, or count de montalembert, might without inconsistency, and doubtless would without hesitation, subscribe to almost every word in döllinger's work; but in the position they have taken they would probably deem such adhesion a great rhetorical error, and fatal to the effect of their own writings. there is, therefore, an allowance to be made, which is by no means a reproach, for the peculiar situation of the catholics in france. when christine of sweden was observed to gaze long and intently at the statue of truth in rome, a court-like prelate observed that this admiration for truth did her honour, as it was seldom shared by persons in her station. "that," said the queen, "is because truths are not all made of marble." men are seldom zealous for an idea in which they do not perceive some reflection of themselves, in which they have not embarked some portion of their individuality, or which they cannot connect with some subjective purpose of their own. it is often more easy to sympathise with a person in whose opposite views we discern a weakness corresponding to our own, than with one who unsympathetically avoids to colour the objectivity of truth, and is guided in his judgment by facts, not by wishes. we endeavoured not many months ago to show how remote the theology of catholic germany is in its scientific spirit from that of other countries, and how far asunder are science and policy. the same method applied to the events of our own day must be yet more startling, and for a time we can scarcely anticipate that the author of this work will escape an apparent isolation between the reserve of those who share his views, but are not free to speak, and the foregone conclusions of most of those who have already spoken. but a book which treats of contemporary events in accordance with the signs of the time, not with the aspirations of men, possesses in time itself an invincible auxiliary. when the lesson which this great writer draws from the example of the mediæval popes has borne its fruit; when the purpose for which he has written is attained, and the freedom of the holy see from revolutionary aggression and arbitrary protection is recovered by the heroic determination to abandon that which in the course of events has ceased to be a basis of independence--he will be the first, but no longer the only, proclaimer of new ideas, and he will not have written in vain. the christian religion, as it addresses and adapts itself to all mankind, bears towards the varieties of national character a relation of which there was no example in the religions of antiquity, and which heresy repudiates and inevitably seeks to destroy. for heresy, like paganism, is national, and dependent both on the particular disposition of the people and on the government of the state. it is identified with definite local conditions, and moulded by national and political peculiarities. catholicity alone is universal in its character and mission, and independent of those circumstances by which states are established, and nations are distinguished from each other. even rome had not so far extended her limits, nor so thoroughly subjugated and amalgamated the races that obeyed her, as to secure the church from the natural reaction of national spirit against a religion which claimed a universality beyond even that of the imperial power. the first and most terrible assault of ethnicism was in persia, where christianity appeared as a roman, and therefore a foreign and a hostile, system. as the empire gradually declined, and the nationalities, no longer oppressed beneath a vigorous central force, began to revive, the heresies, by a natural affinity, associated themselves with them. the donatist schism, in which no other country joined, was an attempt of the african people to establish a separate national church. later on, the egyptians adopted the monophysite heresy as the national faith, which has survived to this day in the coptic church. in armenia similar causes produced like effects. in the twelfth century--not, as is commonly supposed, in the time of photius and cerularius, for religious communion continued to subsist between the latins and the greeks at constantinople till about the time of innocent iii., but after the crusades had embittered the antagonism between east and west--another great national separation occurred. in the eastern empire the communion with rome was hateful to the two chief authorities. the patriarch was ambitious to extend his own absolute jurisdiction over the whole empire, the emperor wished to increase that power as the instrument of his own: out of this threefold combination of interests sprang the byzantine system. it was founded on the ecclesiastical as well as civil despotism of the emperor, and on the exclusive pride of the people in its nationality; that is, on those things which are most essentially opposed to the catholic spirit, and to the nature of a universal church. in consequence of the schism, the sovereign became supreme over the canons of the church and the laws of the state; and to this imperial papacy the archbishop of thessalonica, in the beginning of the fifteenth century, justly attributes the ruin and degradation of the empire. like the eastern schism, the schism of the west in the fourteenth century arose from the predominance of national interests in the church: it proceeded from the endeavour to convert the holy see into a possession of the french people and a subject of the french crown. again, not long after, the hussite revolution sprang from the union of a new doctrine with the old antipathy of the bohemians for the germans, which had begun in times when the boundaries of christianity ran between the two nations, and which led to a strictly national separation, which has not yet exhausted its political effects. though the reformation had not its origin in national feelings, yet they became a powerful instrument in the hands of luther, and ultimately prevailed over the purely theological elements of the movement. the lutheran system was looked on by the germans with patriotic pride as the native fruit, and especial achievement of the genius of their country, and it was adopted out of germany only by the kindred races of scandinavia. in every other land to which it has been transplanted by the migrations of this century, lutheranism appears as eradicated from its congenial soil, loses gradually its distinctive features, and becomes assimilated to the more consolatory system of geneva. calvinism exhibited from the first no traces of the influence of national character, and to this it owes its greater extension; whilst in the third form of protestantism, the anglican church, nationality is the predominant characteristic. in whatever country and in whatever form protestantism has prevailed, it has always carried out the principle of separation and local limitation by seeking to subject itself to the civil power, and to confine the church within the jurisdiction of the state. it is dependent not so much on national character as on political authority, and has grafted itself rather on the state than on the people. but the institution which christ founded in order to collect all nations together in one fold under one shepherd, while tolerating and respecting the natural historical distinctions of nations and of states, endeavours to reconcile antagonism, and to smooth away barriers between them, instead of estranging them by artificial differences, and erecting new obstacles to their harmony. the church can neither submit as a whole to the influence of a particular people, nor impose on one the features or the habits of another; for she is exalted in her catholicity above the differences of race, and above the claims of political power. at once the most firm and the most flexible institution in the world, she is all things to all nations--educating each in her own spirit, without violence to its nature, and assimilating it to herself without prejudice to the originality of its native character. whilst she thus transforms them, not by reducing them to a uniform type, but by raising them towards a common elevation, she receives from them services in return. each healthy and vigorous nation that is converted is a dynamic as well as a numerical increase in the resources of the church, by bringing an accession of new and peculiar qualities, as well as of quantity and numbers. so far from seeking sameness, or flourishing only in one atmosphere, she is enriched and strengthened by all the varieties of national character and intellect. in the mission of the catholic church, each nation has its function, which its own position and nature indicate and enable it to fulfil. thus the extinct nations of antiquity survive in the beneficial action they continue to exert within her, and she still feels and acknowledges the influence of the african or of the cappadocian mind. the condition of this immunity from the predominant influence of national and political divisions, and of this indifference to the attachment of particular states and races,--the security of unity and universality,--consists in the existence of a single, supreme, independent head. the primacy is the bulwark, or rather the corner-stone, of catholicism; without it, there would be as many churches as there are nations or states. not one of those who have denounced the papacy as a usurpation has ever attempted to show that the condition which its absence necessarily involves is theologically desirable, or that it is the will of god. it remains the most radical and conspicuous distinction between the catholic church and the sects. those who attempt to do without it are compelled to argue that there is no earthly office divinely appointed for the government of the church, and that nobody has received the mission to conduct ecclesiastical affairs, and to preserve the divine order in religion. the several local churches may have an earthly ruler, but for the whole church of christ there is no such protection. christ, therefore, is the only head they acknowledge, and they must necessarily declare separation, isolation, and discord to be a principle and the normal condition of his church. the rejection of the primacy of st. peter has driven men on to a slippery course, where all the steps are downwards. the greeks first proclaimed that they recognised no pope, that each patriarch ruled over a portion of the church. the anglicans rejected both pope and patriarch, and admitted no ecclesiastical order higher than the episcopate. foreign protestanism refused to tolerate even bishops, or any authority but the parish clergy under the supremacy of the ruler of the land. then the sects abolished the local jurisdiction of the parish clergy, and retained only preachers. at length the ministry was rejected as an office altogether, and the quakers made each individual his own prophet, priest, and doctor. the papacy, that unique institution, the crown of the catholic system, exhibits in its history the constant working of that law which is at the foundation of the life of the church, the law of continuous organic development. it shared the vicissitudes of the church, and had its part in everything which influences the course and mode of her existence. in early times it grew in silence and obscurity, its features were rarely and imperfectly distinguishable; but even then the popes exerted their authority in all directions, and while the wisdom with which it was exercised was often questioned, the right itself was undisputed. so long as the roman empire upheld in its strong framework and kept together the church, which was confined mostly within its bounds, and checked with the stern discipline of a uniform law the manifestations of national and local divergence, the interference of the holy see was less frequently required, and the reins of church government did not need to be tightly drawn. when a new order of states emerged from the chaos of the great migration, the papacy, which alone stood erect amid the ruins of the empire, became the centre of a new system and the moderator of a new code. the long contest with the germanic empire exhausted the political power both of the empire and of the papacy, and the position of the holy see, in the midst of a multitude of equal states, became more difficult and more unfavourable. the popes were forced to rely on the protection of france, their supremacy over the states was at an end, and the resistance of the nations commenced. the schism, the opposition of the general councils, the circumstances which plunged the holy see into the intrigues of italian politics, and at last the reformation, hastened the decline of that extensive social and political power, the echoes and reminiscences of which occasioned disaster and repulse whenever an attempt was made to exercise it ever since the tridentine age, the popes have confined themselves more and more exclusively to the religious domain; and here the holy see is as powerful and as free at the present day as at any previous period of its history. the perils and the difficulties which surround it arise from temporal concerns,--from the state of italy, and from the possessions of the pontifical dominions. as the church advances towards fulness and maturity in her forms, bringing forward her exhaustless resources, and calling into existence a wealth of new elements,--societies, corporations, and institutions,--so is the need more deeply felt for a powerful supreme guide to keep them all in health and harmony, to direct them in their various spheres, and in their several ways towards the common ends and purposes of all, and thus to provide against decay, variance, and confusion. such an office the primacy alone can discharge, and the importance of the papacy increases as the organisation of the church is more complete. one of its most important but most delicate duties is to act as an independent, impartial, and dispassionate mediator between the churches and the governments of the different states, and between the conflicting claims and contradictory idiosyncrasies of the various nations. yet, though the papacy is so obviously an essential part of a church whose mission is to all mankind, it is the chosen object of attack both to enemies of catholicism and to discontented catholics. serious and learned men complain of its tyranny, and say that it claims universal dominion, and watches for an opportunity of obtaining it; and yet, in reality, there is no power on earth whose action is restricted by more sacred and irresistible bonds than that of the holy see. it is only by the closest fidelity to the laws and tradition of the church that the popes are able to secure the obedience and the confidence of catholics. pius vii., who, by sweeping away the ancient church of france, and depriving thirty-seven protesting bishops of their sees, committed the most arbitrary act ever done by a pope, has himself described the rules which guided the exercise of his authority:- the nature and constitution of the catholic church impose on the pope, who is the head of the church, certain limits which he cannot transgress.... the bishops of rome have never believed that they could tolerate any alteration in those portions of the discipline which are directly ordained by jesus christ; or in those which, by their nature, are connected with dogma, or in those which heretics assail in support of their innovations. the chief points urged against the ambition of rome are the claim of the deposing power, according to the theory that all kinds of power are united in the church, and the protest against the peace of westphalia, the basis of the public law and political order of modern europe. it is enough to cite one of the many authorities which may be cited in refutation of the first objection. cardinal antonelli, prefect of propaganda, states in his letter to the irish bishops, 1791, that "the see of rome has never taught that faith is not to be kept with those of another religion, or that an oath sworn to kings who are separated from the catholic communion may be broken, or that the pope is permitted to touch their temporal rights and possessions." the bull in which boniface viii. set up the theory of the supremacy of the spiritual over the secular power was retracted soon after his death. the protest of innocent x. against the peace of westphalia is one of the glories of the papacy. that peace was concluded on an unchristian and tyrannical principle, introduced by the reformation, that the subjects may be compelled to follow the religion of the ruler. this was very different in principle and in effect from the intolerance of the ages of faith, when prince and people were members of one religion, and all were agreed that no other could be permitted in the state. every heresy that arose in the middle ages involved revolutionary consequences, and would inevitably have overthrown state and society, as well as church, wherever it prevailed. the albigenses, who provoked the cruel legislation against heretics, and who were exterminated by fire and sword, were the socialists of those days. they assailed the fundamental institutions of society, marriage, family, and property, and their triumph would have plunged europe into the barbarism and licence of pagan times. the principles of the waldenses and the lollards were likewise incompatible with european civilisation. in those days the law relating to religion was the same for all. the pope as well as the king would have lost his crown if he had fallen into heresy. during a thousand years, from the fall of rome to the appearance of luther, no catholic prince ever made an attempt to introduce a new religion into his dominions, or to abandon the old. but the reformation taught that this was the supreme duty of princes; whilst luther declared that in matters of faith the individual is above every authority, and that a child could understand the scriptures better than popes or councils, he taught at the same time, with an inconsistency which he never attempted to remove, that it is the duty of the civil power to exterminate popery, to set up the gospel, and to suppress every other religion. the result was a despotism such as the world had never seen. it was worse than the byzantine system; for there no attempt was made to change the faith of the people. the protestant princes exercised an ecclesiastical authority more arbitrary than the pope had ever possessed; for the papal authority can only be used to maintain an existing doctrine, whilst theirs was aggressive and wholly unlimited. possessing the power to command, and to alter in religion, they naturally acquired by degrees a corresponding absolutism in the civil order. the consistories, the office by which the sovereign ruled the church, were the commencement of bureaucratic centralisation. a great lawyer of those days says, that after the treaties of westphalia had recognised the territorial supremacy over religion, the business of administration in the german states increased tenfold. whilst that system remained in its integrity, there could be no peaceful neighbourhood between catholics and protestants. from this point of view, the protest of the pope was entirely justified. so far from having been made in the spirit of the mediæval authority, which would have been fatal to the work of the congress, it was never used by any catholic prince to invalidate the treaties. they took advantage of the law in their own territories to exercise the _jus reformandi_. it was not possible for them to tolerate a body which still refused to tolerate the catholic religion by the side of its own, which accordingly eradicated it wherever it had the means, and whose theory made the existence of every religion depend on the power and the will of the sovereign. a system which so resolutely denied that two religions could coexist in the same state, put every attempt at mutual toleration out of the question. the reformation was a great movement against the freedom of conscience--an effort to subject it to a new authority, the arbitrary initiative of a prince who might differ in religion from all his subjects. the extermination of obstinate catholics was a matter of course; melanchthon insisted that the anabaptists should be put to death, and beza was of opinion that anti-trinitarians ought to be executed, even after recantation. but no lutheran could complain when the secular arm converted him into a calvinist. "your conscience is in error," he would say, "but under the circumstances you are not only justified, but compelled, on my own principles, to act as you do."[336] the resistance of the catholic governments to the progress of a religion which announced that it would destroy them as soon as it had the power, was an instinct of self-preservation. no protestant divine denied or disguised the truth that his party sought the destruction of catholicism, and would accomplish it whenever they could. the calvinists, with their usual fearless consistency, held that as civil and ecclesiastical power must be in the same hands, no prince had any right to govern who did not belong to them. even in the low countries, where other sects were free, and the notion of unity abandoned, the catholics were oppressed. this new and aggressive intolerance infected even catholic countries, where there was neither, as in spain, religious unity to be preserved; nor, as in austria, a menacing danger to be resisted. for in spain the persecution of the protestants might be defended on the mediæval principle of unity, whilst under ferdinand ii. it was provoked in the hereditary dominions by the imminent peril which threatened to dethrone the monarch, and to ruin every faithful catholic. but in france the protestant doctrine that every good subject must follow the religion of his king grew out of the intensity of personal absolutism. at the revocation of the edict of nantes, the official argument was the will of the sovereign--an argument which in germany had reigned so triumphantly that a single town, which had ten times changed masters, changed its religion ten times in a century. bayle justly reproaches the catholic clergy of france with having permitted, and even approved, a proceeding so directly contrary to the spirit of their religion, and to the wishes of the pope. a convert, who wrote a book to prove that huguenots were in conscience bound to obey the royal edict which proscribed their worship, met with applause a hundred years later. this fault of the french clergy was expiated in the blood of their successors. the excess of evil led to its gradual cure. in england protestantism lost its vigour after the victory over the catholic dynasty; religion faded away, and with it that religious zeal which leads to persecution: when the religious antagonism was no longer kept alive by a political controversy, the sense of right and the spirit of freedom which belongs to the anglo-saxon race accomplished the work which indifference had begun. in germany the vitality of the lutheran theology expired after it had lasted for about two hundred years. the intellectual contradictions and the social consequences of the system had become intolerable to the german mind. rationalism had begun to prevail, when frederick ii. declared that his subjects should work out their salvation in their own way. that generation of men, who looked with contempt on religious zeal, looked with horror on religious persecution. the catholic church, which had never taught that princes are supreme over the religion of their subjects, could have no difficulty in going along with public opinion when it disapproved of compulsion in matters of conscience. it was natural that in the new order of things, when christendom had lost its unity, and protestantism its violence, she should revert to the position she occupied of old, when she admitted other religions to equal rights with herself, and when men like st. ambrose, st. martin, and st. leo deprecated the use of violence against heretics. nevertheless, as the preservation of morality depends on the preservation of faith, both alike are in the interest and within the competence of the state. the church of her own strength is not strong enough to resist the advance of heresy and unbelief. those enemies find an auxiliary in the breast of every man whose weakness and whose passions repel him from a church which imposes such onerous duties on her members. but it is neither possible to define the conditions without which liberty must be fatal to the state, nor the limits beyond which protection and repression become tyrannical, and provoke a reaction more terrible than the indifference of the civil power. the events of the last hundred years have tended in most places to mingle protestants and catholics together, and to break down the social and political lines of demarcation between them; and time will show the providential design which has brought about this great change. these are the subjects treated in the first two chapters on "the church and the nations," and on the papacy in connection with the universality of catholicism, as contrasted with the national and political dependence of heresy. the two following chapters pursue the topic farther in a general historical retrospect, which increases in interest and importance as it proceeds from the social to the religious purpose and influence of the papacy, and from the past to the present time. the third chapter, "the churches and civil liberty," examines the effects of protestantism on civil society. the fourth, entitled "the churches without a pope," considers the actual theological and religious fruits of separation from the visible head of the church. the independence of the church, through that of her supreme pontiff, is as nearly connected with political as with religious liberty, since the ecclesiastical system which rejects the pope logically leads to arbitrary power. throughout the north of europe--in sweden and denmark, in mecklenburg and pomerania, in prussia, saxony, and brunswick--the power which the reformation gave to the state introduced an unmitigated despotism. every security was removed which protected the people against the abuse of the sovereign power, and the lower against the oppression of the upper class. the crown became, sooner or later, despotic; the peasantry, by a long series of enactments, extending to the end of the seventeenth century, was reduced to servitude; the population grew scanty, and much of the land went out of cultivation. all this is related by the protestant historians and divines, not in the tone of reluctant admission, but with patriotic indignation, commensurate with the horrors of the truth. in all these countries lutheran unity subsisted. if calvinism had ever succeeded in obtaining an equal predominance in the netherlands, the power of the house of orange would have become as despotic as that of the danish or the prussian sovereigns. but its triumph was impeded by sects, and by the presence of a large catholic minority, destitute indeed of political rights or religious freedom, but for that very reason removed from the conflicts of parties, and therefore an element of conservatism, and a natural ally of those who resisted the ambition of the stadtholders. the absence of religious unity baffled their attempts to establish arbitrary power on the victory of calvinism, and upheld, in conjunction with the brilliant policy abroad, a portion of the ancient freedom. in scotland, the other home of pure calvinism, where intolerance and religious tyranny reached a pitch equalled only among the puritans in america, the perpetual troubles hindered the settlement of a fixed political system, and the restoration of order after the union with england stripped the presbyterian system of its exclusive supremacy, and opened the way for tolerance and freedom. although the political spirit of anglicanism was as despotic as that of every other protestant system, circumstances prevented its full development. the catholic church had bestowed on the english the great elements of their political prosperity,--the charter of their liberties, the fusion of the races, and the abolition of villeinage,--that is, personal and general freedom, and national unity. hence the people were so thoroughly impregnated with catholicism that the reformation was imposed on them by foreign troops in spite of an armed resistance; and the imported manufacture of geneva remained so strange and foreign to them, that no english divine of the sixteenth century enriched it with a single original idea. the new church, unlike those of the continent, was the result of an endeavour to conciliate the catholic disposition of the people, by preserving as far as possible the externals to which they were attached; whilst the queen--who was a protestant rather by policy than by conviction--desired no greater change than was necessary for her purpose. but the divines whom she placed at the head of the new church were strict calvinists, and differed from the puritans only in their submission to the court. the rapidly declining catholic party accepted anglicanism as the lesser evil; while zealous protestants deemed that the outward forms ought to correspond to the inward substance, and that calvinistic doctrines required a calvinistic constitution. until the end of the century there was no anglican theology; and the attempt to devise a system in harmony with the peculiar scheme and design of the institution, began with hooker. the monarch was absolute master in the church, which had been established as an instrument of royal influence; and the divines acknowledged his right by the theory of passive obedience. the consistent section of the calvinists was won over, for a time, by the share which the gentry obtained in the spoils of the church, and by the welcome concession of the penal laws against her, until at last they found that they had in their intolerance been forging chains for themselves. one thing alone, which our national jurists had recognised in the fifteenth century as the cause and the sign of our superiority over foreign states--the exclusion of the roman code, and the unbroken preservation of the common law--kept england from sinking beneath a despotism as oppressive as that of france or sweden. as the anglican church under james and charles was the bulwark of arbitrary power, the popular resistance took the form of ecclesiastical opposition. the church continued to be so thoroughly committed to the principle of unconditional submission to the power from which it derived its existence, that james ii. could reckon on this servile spirit as a means of effecting the subversion of the establishment; and defoe reproached the bishops with having by their flattery led on the king, whom they abandoned in the moment of his need. the revolution, which reduced the royal prerogative, removed the oppressiveness of the royal supremacy. the established church was not emancipated from the crown, but the nonconformists were emancipated from the tyranny of the established church. protestantism, which in the period of its power dragged down by its servility the liberties of the nation, did afterwards, in its decay and disorganisation, by the surrender of its dogmatic as well as of its political principle, promote their recovery and development. it lost its oppressiveness in proportion as it lost its strength, and it ceased to be tyrannical when divines had been forced to give up its fundamental doctrine, and when its unity had been dissolved by the sects. the revival of those liberties which, in the middle ages, had taken root under the influence of the church, coincided with the progress of the protestant sects, and with the decay of the penal laws. the contrast between the political character of those countries in which protestantism integrally prevailed, and that of those in which it was divided against itself, and could neither establish its system nor work out its consequences, is as strongly marked as the contrast between the politics of catholic times and those which were introduced by the reformation. the evil which it wrought in its strength was turned to good by its decline. such is the sketch of the effects of the protestant apostasy in the political order, considered chiefly in relation to the absence of a supreme ecclesiastical authority independent of political control. it would require far more space to exhibit the positive influence of heretical principles on the social foundations of political life; and the picture would not be complete without showing the contrast exhibited by catholic states, and tracing their passage from the mediæval system under the influence of the reaction against the reformation. the third chapter covers only a portion of this extensive subject; but it shows the action of the new mode of ecclesiastical government upon the civil order, and proves that the importance of the papacy is not confined to its religious sphere. it thus prepares the way for the subject discussed in the fourth chapter,--the most comprehensive and elaborate in the book. dr. döllinger begins his survey of the churches that have renounced the pope with those of the eastern schism. the patriarch of constantinople, whose ecclesiastical authority is enormous, and whose opportunities of extorting money are so great that he is generally deposed at the end of two or three years, in order that many may succeed each other in the enjoyment of such advantages, serves not as a protection, but as an instrument for the oppression of the christians. the greek clergy have been the chief means by which the turks have kept down both the greek and the slavonic population, and the slavs are by degrees throwing off their influence. submission to the civil power is so natural in communities separated from the universal church, that the greeks look up to the turkish authorities as arbiters in ecclesiastical matters. when there was a dispute between greeks and armenians respecting the mixture of water with the wine in the chalice, the question was referred for decision to the proper quarter, and the reis effendi decided that, wine being condemned by the koran, water alone might be used. yet to this pusillanimous and degenerate church belong the future of european turkey, and the inheritance of the sinking power of the turks. the vitality of the dominant race is nearly exhausted, and the christians--on whose pillage they live--exceed them, in increasing proportions, in numbers, prosperity, intelligence, and enterprise. the hellenic church, obeying the general law of schismatical communities, has exchanged the authority of the patriarch for that of the crown, exercised through a synod, which is appointed on the russian model by the government. the clergy, disabled for religious purposes by the necessity of providing for their families, have little education and little influence, and have no part in the revival of the grecian intellect. but the people are attached to their ecclesiastical system, not for religion's sake, for infidelity generally accompanies education, but as the defence of their nationality. in russia the catholic church is considered heretical because of her teaching on the procession of the holy ghost, and schismatical in consequence of the claims of the pope. in the doctrine of purgatory there is no essential difference; and on this point an understanding could easily be arrived at, if none had an interest in widening the breach. in the seventeenth century, the russian church retained so much independence that the metropolitan of kiev could hold in check the power of the czar, and the clergy were the mediators between the people and the nobles or the crown. this influence was swept away by the despotism of peter the great; and under catherine ii. the property of the church was annexed to the crown lands, in order, it was said, to relieve the clergy of the burden of administration. yet even now the protestant doctrine that the sovereign is supreme in all matters of religion has not penetrated among the russians. but though the czar does not possess this authority over the national church, of which he is a member, the protestant system has conceded it to him in the baltic provinces. not only are all children of mixed marriages between protestants and schismatics brought up in the religion of the latter, by which the gradual decline of protestanism is provided for, but conversions to protestanism, even of jews, mohammedans, and heathens, are forbidden; and, in all questions of doctrine or of liturgy, the last appeal is to the emperor. the religious despotism usually associated with the russian monarchy subsists only for the protestants. the russian church is dumb; the congregation does not sing, the priest does not preach. the people have no prayer-books, and are therefore confined to the narrow circle of their own religious ideas. against the cloud of superstition which naturally gathers in a religion of ceremonies, destitute of the means of keeping alive or cultivating the religious sentiments of the people, there is no resource. in spite of the degeneracy of their clergy, which they are unable to feel, the russians cling with patriotic affection to their church, and identify its progress and prosperity with the increase of their empire. as it is an exclusively national institution, every war may become a war of religion, and it is the attachment to the church which creates the longing and the claim to possess the city from which it came. from the church the empire derives its tendency to expand, and the czar the hopes of that universal dominion which was promised to him by the synod of moscow in 1619, and for which a prayer was then appointed. the schismatical clergy of eastern europe are the channel of russian influence, the pioneers of russian aggression. the political dependence of the church corresponds to its political influence; subserviency is the condition of the power it possesses. the certificate of easter confession and communion is required for every civil act, and is consequently an object of traffic. in like manner, the confessor is bound to betray to the police all the secrets of confession which affect the interest of the government. in this deplorable state of corruption, servitude, and decay within, and of threatening hostility to christian civilisation abroad, the russian church pays the penalty of its byzantine descent. the established church and the sects in england furnish few opportunities of treating points which would be new to our readers. perhaps the most suggestive portion is the description of the effects of protestantism on the character and condition of the people. the plunder and oppression of the poor has everywhere followed the plunder of the church, which was the guardian and refuge of the poor. the charity of the catholic clergy aimed not merely at relieving, but at preventing poverty. it was their object not only to give alms, but to give to the lower orders the means of obtaining a livelihood. the reformation at once checked alms-giving; so that, selden says, in places where twenty pounds a year had been distributed formerly, not a handful of meal was given away in his time, for the wedded clergy could not afford it. the confiscation of the lands where thousands had tilled the soil under the shadow of the monastery or the church, was followed by a new system of cultivation, which deprived the peasants of their homes. the sheep, men said, were the cause of all the woe; and whole towns were pulled down to make room for them. the prelates of the sixteenth century lament the decline of charity since the catholic times; and a divine attributed the growing selfishness and harshness to the doctrine of justification by faith. the alteration in the condition of the poor was followed by severe enactments against vagrancy; and the protestant legislature, after creating a proletariate, treated it as a crime. the conversion of sunday into a jewish sabbath cut off the holiday amusements and soured the cheerfulness of the population. music, singing, and dancing, the favourite relaxation of a contented people, disappeared, and, especially after the war in the low countries, drunkenness began to prevail among a nation which in earlier times had been reckoned the most sober of northern europe. the institution which introduced these changes has become a state, not a national church, whose services are more attended by the rich than by the poor. after describing the various parties in the anglican system, the decay of its divinity, and the general aversion to theological research, döllinger concludes that its dissolution is a question of time. no state church can long subsist in modern society which professes the religion of the minority. whilst the want of a definite system of doctrine, allowing every clergyman to be the mouthpiece, not of a church, but of a party, drives an increasing portion of the people to join the sects which have a fixed doctrine and allow less independence to their preachers, the great danger which menaces the church comes from the state itself. the progress of dissent and of democracy in the legislature will make the church more and more entirely dependent on the will of the majority, and will drive the best men from the communion of a servile establishment. the rise and fortunes of methodism are related with peculiar predilection by the author, who speaks of john wesley as the greatest intellect english protestantism has produced, next to baxter. the first characteristic of scottish presbyterianism is the absence of a theology. the only considerable divines that have appeared in scotland since the reformation, leighton and forbes, were prelates of the episcopal church. calvinism was unable to produce a theological literature, in spite of the influence of english writers, of the example of holland, and of the great natural intelligence of the scots. "their theology," says a distinguished lutheran divine, "possesses no system of christian ethics." this döllinger attributes to the strictness with which they have held to the doctrine of imputation, which is incompatible with any system of moral theology. in other countries it was the same; where that doctrine prevailed, there was no ethical system, and where ethics were cultivated, the doctrine was abandoned. for a century after luther, no moral theology was written in germany. the first who attempted it, calixtus, gave up the lutheran doctrine. the dutch historians of calvinism in the netherlands record, in like manner, that there the dread of a collision with the dogma silenced the teaching of ethics both in literature and at the universities. accordingly, all the great protestant moralists were opposed to the protestant doctrine of justification. in scotland the intellectual lethargy of churchmen is not confined to the department of ethics; and presbyterianism only prolongs its existence by suppressing theological writing, and by concealing the contradictions which would otherwise bring down on the clergy the contempt of their flocks. whilst scotland has clung to the original dogma of calvin, at the price of complete theological stagnation, the dutch church has lost its primitive orthodoxy in the progress of theological learning. not one of the several schools into which the clergy of the netherlands are divided has remained faithful to the five articles of the synod of dortrecht, which still command so extensive an allegiance in great britain and america. the conservative party, headed by the statesman and historian, groen van prinsterer, who holds fast to the theology which is so closely interwoven with the history of his country and with the fortunes of the reigning house, and who invokes the aid of the secular arm in support of pure calvinism, is not represented at the universities. for all the dutch divines know that the system cannot be revived without sacrificing the theological activity by which it has been extinguished. the old confessional writings have lost their authority; and the general synod of 1854 decided that, "as it is impossible to reconcile all opinions and wishes, even in the shortest confession, the church tolerates divergence from the symbolical books." the only unity, says groen, consists in this, that all the preachers are paid out of the same fund. the bulk of the clergy are arminians or socinians. from the spectacle of the dutch church, dr. döllinger comes to the following result: first, that without a code of doctrine laid down in authoritative confessions of faith, the church cannot endure; secondly, that the old confessional writings cannot be maintained, and are universally given up; and thirdly, that it is impossible to draw up new ones. french protestantism suffered less from the revolution than the catholic church, and was treated with tenderness, and sometimes with favour. the dissolution of continental protestantism began in france. before their expulsion in 1685, the french divines had cast off the yoke of the dortrecht articles, and in their exile they afterwards promoted the decline of calvinism in the netherlands. the old calvinistic tradition has never been restored, the works of the early writers are forgotten, no new theological literature has arisen, and the influence of germany has borne no considerable fruit. the evangelical party, or methodists, as they are called, are accused by the rest of being the cause of their present melancholy state. the rationalism of the _indifférens_ generally prevails among the clergy, either in the shape of the naturalism of the eighteenth century (coquerel), or in the more advanced form of modern criticism, as it is carried out by the faculty of strasburg, with the aid of german infidelity. payment by the state and hatred of catholicism are the only common marks of french protestant divines. they have no doctrine, no discipline, no symbol, no theology. nobody can define the principle or the limits of their community. the calvinism of switzerland has been ruined in its doctrine by the progress of theology, and in its constitution by the progress of democracy. in geneva the church of calvin fell in the revolutions of 1841 and 1846. the symbolical books are abolished; the doctrine is based on the bible; but the right of free inquiry is granted to all; the ruling body consists of laymen. "the faith of our fathers," says merle d'aubigné, "counts but a small group of adherents amongst us." in the canton of vaud, where the whole ecclesiastical power was in the hands of the government, the yoke of the democracy became insupportable, and the excellent writer, vinet, seceded with 180 ministers out of 250. the people of berne are among the most bitter enemies of catholicism in europe. their fanaticism crushed the sonderbund; but the recoil drove them towards infidelity, and hastened the decrease of devotion and of the influence of the clergy. none of the german swiss, and few of the french, retain in its purity the system of calvin. the unbelief of the clergy lays the church open to the attacks of a cæsaro-papistic democracy. a swiss protestant divine said recently: "only a church with a catholic organisation could have maintained itself without a most extraordinary descent of the holy spirit against the assaults of rationalism." "what we want," says another, "in order to have a free church, is pastors and flocks; dogs and wolves there are in plenty." in america it is rare to find people who are openly irreligious. except some of the germans, all protestants generally admit the truth of christianity and the authority of scripture. but above half of the american population belongs to no particular sect, and performs no religious functions. this is the result of the voluntary principle, of the dominion of the sects, and of the absence of an established church, to receive each individual from his birth, to adopt him by baptism, and to bring him up in the atmosphere of a religious life. the majority of men will naturally take refuge in indifference and neutrality from the conflict of opinions, and will persuade themselves that where there are so many competitors, none can be the lawful spouse. yet there is a blessing on everything that is christian, which can never be entirely effaced or converted into a curse. whatever the imperfections of the form in which it exists, the errors mixed up with it, or the degrading influence of human passion, christianity never ceases to work immeasurable social good. but the great theological characteristic of american protestantism is the absence of the notion of the church. the prevailing belief is, that in times past there was always a war of opinions and of parties, that there never was one unbroken vessel, and that it is necessary, therefore, to put up with fragments, one of which is nearly as good as another. sectarianism, it is vaguely supposed, is the normal condition of religion. now a sect is, by its very nature, instinctively adverse to a scientific theology; it feels that it is short-lived, without a history, and unconnected with the main stream of ecclesiastical progress, and it is inspired with hatred and with contempt for the past, for its teaching and its writings. practically, sectaries hold that a tradition is the more surely to be rejected the older it is, and the more valuable in proportion to the lateness of its origin. as a consequence of the want of roots in the past, and of the thirst for novelty, the history of those sects which are not sunk in lethargy consists in sudden transitions to opposite extremes. in the religious world ill weeds grow apace; and those communities which strike root, spring up, and extend most rapidly are the least durable and the least respectable. the sects of europe were transplanted into america: but there the impatience of authority, which is the basis of social and political life, has produced in religion a variety and a multiplicity, of which europe has no experience. whilst these are the fruits of religious liberty and ecclesiastical independence among a people generally educated, the danish monarchy exhibits unity of faith strictly maintained by keeping the people under the absolute control of the upper class, on whose behalf the reformation was introduced, and in a state of ignorance corresponding to their oppression. care was taken that they should not obtain religious instruction, and in the beginning of the eighteenth century the celebrated bishop pontoppidan says, "an almost heathen blindness pervades the land." about the same time the norwegian prelates declared, in a petition to the king of denmark: "if we except a few children of god, there is only this difference between us and our heathen ancestors, that we bear the name of christians." the danish church has given no signs of life, and has shown no desire for independence since the reformation; and in return for this submissiveness, the government suppressed every tendency towards dissent. things were not altered when the tyranny of the nobles gave way to the tyranny of the crown; but when the revolution of 1848 had given the state a democratic basis, its confessional character was abrogated, and whilst lutheranism was declared the national religion, conformity was no longer exacted. the king is still the head of the church, and is the only man in denmark who must be a lutheran. no form of ecclesiastical government suitable to the new order of things has yet been devised, and the majority prefer to remain in the present provisional state, subject to the will of a parliament, not one member of which need belong to the church which it governs. among the clergy, those who are not rationalists follow the lead of grundtvig. during many years this able man has conducted an incessant resistance against the progress of unbelief and of the german influence, and against the lutheran system, the royal supremacy, and the parochial constitution. not unlike the tractarians, he desires the liberty of establishing a system which shall exclude lutheranism, rationalism, and erastianism; and he has united in his school nearly all who profess positive christianity in denmark. in copenhagen, out of 150,000 inhabitants, only 6000 go regularly to church. in altona, there is but one church for 45,000 people. in schleswig the churches are few and empty. "the great evil," says a schleswig divine, "is not the oppression which falls on the german tongue, but the irreligion and consequent demoralisation which denmark has imported into schleswig. a moral and religious tone is the exception, not the rule, among the danish clergy." the theological literature of sweden consists almost entirely of translations from the german. the clergy, by renouncing study, have escaped rationalism, and remain faithful to the lutheran system. the king is supreme in spirituals, and the diet discusses and determines religious questions. the clergy, as one of the estates, has great political influence, but no ecclesiastical independence. no other protestant clergy possesses equal privileges or less freedom. it is usual for the minister after the sermon to read out a number of trivial local announcements, sometimes half an hour long; and in a late assembly the majority of the bishops pronounced in favour of retaining this custom, as none but old women and children would come to church for the service alone. in no other country in europe is the strict lutheran system preached but in sweden. the doctrine is preserved, but religion is dead, and the church is as silent and as peaceful as the churchyard. the church is richly endowed; there are great universities, and swedes are among the foremost in almost every branch of science, but no swedish writer has ever done anything for religious thought. the example of denmark and its rationalist clergy brought home to them the consequences of theological study. in one place the old system has been preserved, like a frail and delicate curiosity, by excluding the air of scientific inquiry, whilst in the other lutheranism is decomposing under its influence. in norway, where the clergy have no political representation, religious liberty was established in 1844. throughout the north of europe the helpless decline of protestantism is betrayed by the numerical disproportion of preachers to the people. norway, with a population of 1,500,000, thinly scattered over a very large territory, has 485 parishes, with an average of 3600 souls apiece. but the clergy are pluralists, and as many as five parishes are often united under a single incumbent. holstein has only 192 preachers for an almost exclusively lutheran population of 544,000. in schleswig many parishes have been deserted because they were too poor to maintain a clergyman's family. sometimes there are only two ministers for 13,000 persons. in the baltic provinces the proportion is one to 4394. in this way the people have to bear the burden of a clergy with families to support. the most brilliant and important part of this chapter is devoted to the state of protestantism in the author's native country. he speaks with the greatest authority and effect when he comes near home, describes the opinions of men who have been his rivals in literature, or his adversaries in controversy, and touches on discussions which his own writings have influenced. there is a difference also in the tone. when he speaks of the state of other countries, with which he has made himself acquainted as a traveller, or through the writings of others, he preserves the calmness and objectivity of a historian, and adds few reflections to the simple description of facts. but in approaching the scenes and the thoughts of his own country, the interests and the most immediate occupations of his own life, the familiarity of long experience gives greater confidence, warmth, and vigour to his touch; the historian gives way to the divine, and the narrative sometimes slides into theology. besides the position of the author, the difference of the subject justifies a change in the treatment. the examination of protestantism in the rest of the world pointed with monotonous uniformity to a single conclusion. everywhere there was the same spectacle and the same alternative: either religion sacrificed to the advancement of learning, or learning relinquished for the preservation of religion. everywhere the same antagonism between intellectual progress and fidelity to the fundamental doctrines of protestantism: either religion has become stark and stagnant in states which protect unity by the proscription of knowledge, or the progress of thought and inquiry has undermined belief in the protestant system, and driven its professors from one untenable position to another, or the ascendency of the sectarian spirit has been equally fatal to its dogmatic integrity and to its intellectual development. but in the home of the reformation a league has been concluded in our time between theology and religion, and many schools of protestant divines are labouring, with a vast expenditure of ability and learning, to devise, or to restore, with the aid of theological science, a system of positive christianity. into this great scene of intellectual exertion and doctrinal confusion the leading adversary of protestantism in germany conducts his readers, not without sympathy for the high aims which inspire the movement, but with the almost triumphant security which belongs to a church possessing an acknowledged authority, a definite organisation, and a system brought down by tradition from the apostolic age. passing by the schools of infidelity, which have no bearing on the topic of his work, he addresses himself to the believing protestantism of germany, and considers its efforts to obtain a position which may enable it to resist unbelief without involving submission to the church. the character of luther separates the german protestants from those of other countries. his was the master-spirit, in whom his contemporaries beheld the incarnation of the genius of their nation. in the strong lineaments of his character they recognised, in heroic proportions, the reflection of their own; and thus his name has survived, not merely as that of a great man, the mightiest of his age, but as the type of a whole period in the history of the german people, the centre of a new world of ideas, the personification of those religious and ethical opinions which the country followed, and whose influence even their adversaries could not escape. his writings have long ceased to be popular, and are read only as monuments of history; but the memory of his person has not yet grown dim. his name is still a power in his own country, and from its magic the protestant doctrine derives a portion of its life. in other countries men dislike to be described by the name of the founder of their religious system, but in germany and sweden there are thousands who are proud of the name of lutheran. the results of his system prevail in the more influential and intelligent classes, and penetrate the mass of the modern literature of germany. the reformation had introduced the notion that christianity was a failure, and had brought far more suffering than blessings on mankind; and the consequences of that movement were not calculated to impress educated men with the belief that things were changed for the better, or that the reformers had achieved the work in which the apostles were unsuccessful. thus an atmosphere of unbelief and of contempt for everything christian gradually arose, and paganism appeared more cheerful, more human, and more poetical than the repulsive galilean doctrine of holiness and privation. this spirit still governs the educated class. christianity is abominated both in life and in literature, even under the form of believing protestantism. in germany theological study and the lutheran system subsisted for two centuries together. the controversies that arose from time to time developed the theory, but brought out by degrees its inward contradictions. the danger of biblical studies was well understood, and the scriptures were almost universally excluded from the universities in the seventeenth century; but in the middle of the eighteenth bengel revived the study of the bible, and the dissolution of the lutheran doctrine began. the rise of historical learning hastened the process. frederic the great says of himself, that the notion that the history of the church is a drama, conducted by rogues and hypocrites, at the expense of the deceived masses, was the real cause of his contempt for the christian religion. the lutheran theology taught, that after the apostolic age god withdrew from the church, and abandoned to the devil the office which, according to the gospel, was reserved for the holy spirit. this diabolical millennium lasted till the appearance of luther. as soon, therefore, as the reverence for the symbolical books began to wane, the belief in the divine foundation departed with the belief in the divine guidance of the church, and the root was judged by the stem, the beginning by the continuation. as research went on, unfettered now by the authorities of the sixteenth century, the clergy became rationalists, and stone after stone of the temple was carried away by its own priests. the infidelity which at the same time flourished in france, did not, on the whole, infect the priesthood. but in germany it was the divines who destroyed religion, the pastors who impelled their flocks to renounce the christian faith. in 1817 the prussian union added a new church to the two original forms of protestantism. but strict calvinism is nearly extinct in germany, and the old lutheran church itself has almost disappeared. it subsists, not in any definite reality, but only in the aspirations of certain divines and jurists. the purpose of the union was to bring together, in religious communion, the reigning family of prussia, which had adopted calvinism in 1613, and the vast lutheran majority among the people. it was to be, in the words of the king, a merely ritual union, not an amalgamation of dogmas. in some places there was resistance, which was put down by military execution. some thousands emigrated to america; but the public press applauded the measures, and there was no general indignation at their severity. the lutherans justly perceived that the union would promote religious indifference; but at the accession of the late king there came a change; religious faith was once more sought after, believing professors were appointed in almost all the german universities, after the example of prussia; jena and giessen alone continued to be seats of rationalism. as soon as theology had begun to recover a more religious and christian character, two very divergent tendencies manifested themselves. among the disciples of schleiermacher and of neander a school of unionists arose who attempted a conciliatory intermediate theology. at the same time a strictly lutheran theology flourished at the universities of erlangen, leipzig, rostock, and dorpat, which sought to revive the doctrine of the sixteenth century, clothed in the language of the nineteenth. but for men versed in scripture theology this was an impossible enterprise, and it was abandoned by the divines to a number of parochial clergymen, who are represented in literature by rudelbach, and who claim to be the only surviving protestants whom luther would acknowledge as his sons and the heirs of his spirit. the lutheran divines and scholars formed the new lutheran party,[337] whose most illustrious lay champion was the celebrated stahl. they profess the lutheran doctrine of justification, but reject the notion of the invisible church and the universal priesthood. holding to the divine institution of the offices of the church, in opposition to the view which refers them to the congregation, they are led to assume a sacrament of orders, and to express opinions on ordination, sacraments, and sacrifice, which involve them in the imputation of puseyism, or even of catholicism. as they remain for the most part in the state church, there is an open war between their confessional spirit and the syncretism of the union. in 1857 the evangelical alliance met at berlin in order to strengthen the unionist principles, and to testify against these pharisees. baptists, methodists, and presbyterians--sects connected by nothing but a common hatred of catholicism--were greeted by the union divines as bone of their bone, and welcome allies in the contest with an exclusive lutheranism and with rome. the confusion in the minds of the people was increased by this spectacle. the union already implied that the dogma of the lord's supper, on which lutherans and calvinists disagree, was uncertain, and therefore not essential. the alliance of so many denominations added baptism to the list of things about which nothing is positively known. the author of this measure was bunsen, who was full of the idea of uniting all protestant sects in a union against the catholic church and catholicising tendencies. for the last fifteen years there has been an active agitation for the improvement of the church among the protestant divines. the first question that occupies and divides them is that of church government and the royal episcopate, which many deem the chief cause of the ecclesiastical decay. the late king of prussia, a zealous and enlightened friend of the protestant church, declared that "the territorial system and the episcopal authority of the sovereign are of such a nature that either of them would alone be enough to kill the church if the church was mortal," and that he longed to be able to abdicate his rights into the hands of the bishops. in other countries, as in baden, a new system has been devised, which transfers political constitutionalism to the church, and makes it a community, not of those who believe in christ, but, in the words of the government organ, of those who believe in a moral order. hopes were entertained that the introduction of synods would be an improvement, and in 1856 and 1857 a beginning was made at berlin; but it was found that the existence of great evils and disorders in the church, which had been a secret of the initiated, would be published to the world, and that government by majorities, the ecclesiastical democracy which was bunsen's ideal, would soon destroy every vestige of christianity. in their doctrinal and theological literature resides at the present day the strength and the renown of the protestants; for a scientific protestant theology exists only in germany. the german protestant church is emphatically a church of theologians; they are its only authority, and, through the princes, its supreme rulers. its founder never really divested himself of the character of a professor, and the church has never emancipated itself from the lecture-room: it teaches, and then disappears. its hymns are not real hymns, but versified theological dissertations, or sermons in rhyme. born of the union of princes with professors, it retains the distinct likeness of both its parents, not altogether harmoniously blended; and when it is accused of worldliness, of paleness of thought, of being a police institution rather than a church, that is no more than to say that the child cannot deny its parentage. theology has become believing in germany, but it is very far from being orthodox. no writer is true to the literal teaching of the symbolical books, and for a hundred years the pure doctrine of the sixteenth century has never been heard. no german divine could submit to the authority of the early articles and formulas without hypocrisy and violence to his conscience, and yet they have nothing else to appeal to. that the doctrine of justification by faith only is the principal substance of the symbolical writings, the centre of the antagonism against the catholic church, all are agreed. the neo-lutherans proclaim it "the essence and treasure of the reformation," "the doctrine of which every man must have a clear and vivid comprehension who would know anything of christianity," "the banner which must be unfurled at least once in every sermon," "the permanent death that gnaws the bones of catholics," "the standard by which the whole of the gospel must be interpreted, and every obscure passage explained," and yet this article of a standing or falling church, on the strength of which protestants call themselves evangelical, is accepted by scarcely one of their more eminent divines, even among the lutherans. the progress of biblical studies is too great to admit of a return to the doctrine which has been exploded by the advancement of religious learning. dr. döllinger gives a list (p. 430) of the names of the leading theologians, by all of whom it has been abandoned. yet it was for the sake of this fundamental and essential doctrine that the epistle of st. james was pronounced an epistle of straw, that the augsburg confession declared it to have been the belief of st augustine, and that when the author of the confession had for very shame omitted this falsehood in the published edition, the passage was restored after his death. for its sake luther deliberately altered the sense of several passages in the bible, especially in the writings of st. paul. to save this doctrine, which was unknown to all christian antiquity, the breach was made with all ecclesiastical tradition, and the authority of the dogmatic testimony of the church in every age was rejected. while the contradiction between the lutheran doctrine and that of the first centuries was disguised before the laity, it was no secret among the reformers. melanchthon confessed to brenz that in the augsburg confession he had lied. luther admitted that his theory was new, and sought in consequence to destroy the authority of the early fathers and councils. calvin declared that the system was unknown to tradition. all these men and their disciples, and the whole of the lutheran and calvinistic theology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, professed to find their doctrine of imputation laid down distinctly in the bible. the whole modern scientific theology of the protestants rejects both the doctrine and the lutheran exegesis of the passages in question. but it is the supreme evangelical principle, that the scripture is perfectly clear and sufficient on all fundamental points. yet the point on which this great divergence subsists is a doctrine which is decisive for the existence of the church, and most important in its practical influence on life. the whole edifice of the protestant church and theology reposes therefore on two principles, one material, the other formal--the doctrine of imputation, and the sufficiency of the bible. but the material principle is given up by exegesis and by dogmatic theology; and as to the formal principle, for the sufficiency of the bible, or even for the inspiration of the writings of the disciples of the apostles, not the shadow of a scriptural argument can be adduced. the significance of this great fact is beginning to make its way. "whilst rationalism prevailed," says a famous lutheran divine, "we could impute to its action that our churches were deserted and empty. but now that christ crucified is everywhere preached, and no serious effect is to be observed, it is necessary to abandon this mistake, and not to conceal from ourselves that preaching is unable to revive religious life." the religious indifference of the educated classes is the chief security for the existence of the protestant church. if they were to take an interest in matters of worship and doctrine, and to inform themselves as to the present relation of theological science to the teaching of the pulpit, the day of discovery and exposure would come, and confidence in the church would be at an end. the dishonesty of luther in those very things on which the reformation depended could not be concealed from them. in prussia there was a conscientious clergyman who taught his parishioners greek, and then showed them all the passages, especially in the epistles of st. paul, which were intentionally altered in the translation. but one of the protestant leaders impresses on the clergy the danger of allowing the people to know that which ought to be kept a secret among the learned. at most, he says, it may be necessary to admit that the translation is not perspicuous. the danger of this discovery does not, however, appear to be immediate, for no book is less familiar to the laity than the bible. "there is scarcely one christian family in a hundred," says tholuck, "in which the holy scriptures are read." in the midst of this general downfall of christianity, in spite of the great efforts of protestants, some take refuge in the phrase of an invisible church, some in a church of the future. whilst there exists a real, living, universal church, with a settled system and means of salvation, the invisible church is offered in her stead, wrapped up in the swaddling clothes of rhetoric, like the stone which rhea gave her husband instead of the child. in a novel of jean paul, a swedish clergyman is advised in the middle of winter to walk about with a bit of orange-sugar in his mouth, in order to realise with all his senses the sunny climes of the south. it requires as much imagination to realise the church by taking a "spiritual league" into one's mouth. another acknowledgment, that the church has become estranged from the people, and subsists only as a ruin of a past age, is the widely spread hope of a new pentecost. eminent theologians speak of it as the only conceivable salvation, though there is no such promise in scripture, no example in history of a similar desire. they rest their only hope in a miracle, such as has not happened since the apostles, and thereby confess that, in the normal process of religious life by which christ has guided his church till now, their cause is lost. a symptom of the same despair is the rise of chiliastic aspirations, and the belief in the approaching end of the world. to this party belongs the present minister of public worship and education in berlin. shortly before his appointment he wrote: "both church and state must perish in their earthly forms, that the kingdom of christ may be set up over all nations, that the bride of the lamb, the perfect community, the new jerusalem, may descend from heaven." not long before this was published another prussian statesman, bunsen, had warned his protestant readers to turn away from false prophets, who announce the end of the world because they have come to the end of their own wisdom. in the midst of this desperate weakness, although catholics and protestants are so mixed up with each other that toleration must soon be universal throughout germany, the thoughts of the protestants are yet not turned towards the catholic church; they still show a bitter animosity against her, and the reproach of catholic tendencies has for twenty years been the strongest argument against every attempt to revive religion and worship. the attitude of protestantism towards rome, says stahl, is that of the borghese gladiator. to soften this spirit of animosity the only possible resource is to make it clear to all protestants who still hold to christianity, what their own internal condition is, and what they have come to by their rejection of the unity and the authority which the catholic church possesses in the holy see. having shown the value of the papacy by the results which have ensued on its rejection, döllinger proceeds, with the same truth and impartiality, to trace the events which have injured the influence and diminished the glory and attractiveness of the holy see, and have converted that which should be the safeguard of its spiritual freedom into a calamity and a dishonour in the eyes of mankind. it seems as though he wished to point out, as the moral to be learnt from the present condition of the religious world, that there is a coincidence in time and in providential purpose between the exhaustion and the despair at which enlightened protestantism has arrived, from the failure of every attempt to organise a form of church government, to save the people from infidelity, and to reconcile theological knowledge with their religious faith,--between this and that great drama which, by destroying the bonds which linked the church to an untenable system, is preparing the restoration of the holy see to its former independence, and to its just influence over the minds of men. the popes, after obtaining a virtual independence under the byzantine sceptre, transferred their allegiance to the revived empire of the west. the line between their authority and that of the emperor in rome was never clearly drawn. it was a security for the freedom and regularity of the election, which was made by the lay as well as ecclesiastical dignitaries of the city, that it should be subject to the imperial ratification; but the remoteness of the emperors, and the inconvenience of delay, caused this rule to be often broken. this prosperous period did not long continue. when the dynasty of charlemagne came to an end, the roman clergy had no defence against the nobles, and the romans did all that men could do to ruin the papacy. there was little remaining of the state which the popes had formed in conjunction with the emperors. in the middle of the tenth century the exarchate and the pentapolis were in the power of berengarius, and rome in the hands of the senator alberic. alberic, understanding that a secular principality could not last long, obtained the election of his son octavian, who became pope john xii. otho the great, who had restored the empire, and claimed to exercise its old prerogative, deposed the new pope; and when the romans elected another, sent him also into exile beyond the alps. for a whole century after this time there was no trace of freedom of election. without the emperor, the popes were in the hands of the roman factions, and dependence on the emperor was better for the church than dependence on the nobles. the popes appointed under the influence of the prelates, who were the ecclesiastical advisers of the imperial government, were preferable to the nominees of the roman chiefs, who had no object or consideration but their own ambition, and were inclined to speculate on the worthlessness of their candidates. during the first half of the eleventh century they recovered their predominance, and the deliverance of the church came once more from germany. a succession of german popes, named by the emperor, opened the way for the permanent reform which is associated with the name of gregory vii. up to this period the security of the freedom of the holy see was the protection of the emperor, and gregory was the last pope who asked for the imperial confirmation. between the middle of the ninth century and the middle of the eleventh the greater part of the roman territory had passed into the hands of laymen. some portions were possessed by the emperor, some by the great italian families, and the revenues of the pope were derived from the tribute of his vassals. sylvester ii. complains that this was very small, as the possessions of the church had been given away for very little. besides the tribute, the vassals owed feudal service to the pope; but the government was not in his hands, and the imperial suzerainty remained. the great families had obtained from the popes of their making such extensive grants that there was little remaining, and otho iii. tried to make up for it by a new donation. the loss of the patrimonies in southern italy established a claim on the norman conquerors, and they became papal vassals for the kingdom of sicily. but throughout the twelfth century the popes had no firm basis of their power in italy. they were not always masters of rome, and there was not a single provincial town they could reckon on. seven popes in a hundred years sought a refuge in france; two remained at verona. the donation of matilda was disputed by the emperors, and brought no material accession of territory, until innocent iii., with his usual energy, secured to the roman church the south of tuscany. he was the first pope who governed a considerable territory, and became the real founder of the states of the church. before him, the popes had possessions for which they claimed tribute and service, but no state that they administered. innocent obtained the submission of benevento and romagna. he left the towns to govern themselves by their own laws, demanding only military aid in case of need, and a small tribute, which was not always exacted; viterbo, for instance, paid nothing until the fifteenth century. the contest with frederic ii. stripped the holy see of most of these acquisitions. in many cases its civil authority was no longer acknowledged; in many it became a mere title of honour, while the real power had passed into the hands of the towns or of the nobles, sometimes into those of the bishops. rudolph of habsburg restored all that had been lost, and surrendered the imperial claims. but while the german influence was suspended, the influence of france prevailed over the papacy; and during the exile at avignon the popes were as helpless as if they had possessed not an acre of their own in italy. it was during their absence that the italian republics fell under the tyrannies, and their dominions were divided among a swarm of petty princes. the famous expedition of cardinal albornoz put an end to these disorders. he recovered the territories of the church, and became, by the ægidian constitutions, which survived for ages, the legislator of romagna. in 1376 eighty towns rose up in the space of three days, declared themselves free, or recalled the princes whom albornoz had expelled. before they could be reduced, the schism broke out, and the church learnt the consequences of the decline of the empire, and the disappearance of its advocacy and protectorate over the holy see. boniface ix. sold to the republics and the princes, for a sum of money and an annual tribute, the ratification of the rights which they had seized. the first great epoch in the history of the temporal power after the schism is the election of eugenius iv. he swore to observe a statute which had been drawn up in conclave, by which all vassals and officers of state were to swear allegiance to the college of cardinals in conjunction with the pope. as he also undertook to abandon to the cardinals half the revenue, he shared in fact his authority with them. this was a new form of government, and a great restriction of the papal power; but it did not long endure. the centrifugal tendency, which broke up italy into small principalities, had long prevailed, when at last the popes gave way to it. the first was sixtus iv., who made one of his nephews lord of imola, and another of sinigaglia. alexander vi. subdued all the princes in the states of the church except the duke of montefeltro, and intended to make the whole an hereditary monarchy for his son. but julius ii. recovered all these conquests for the church, added new ones to them, and thus became, after innocent iii. and albornoz, the third founder of the roman state. the age which beheld this restoration was marked in almost every country by the establishment of political unity on the ruins of the mediæval independence, and of monarchical absolutism at the expense of mediæval freedom. both of these tendencies asserted themselves in the states of the church. the liberties of the towns were gradually destroyed. this was accomplished by clement vii. in ancona, in 1532; by paul iii. in perugia, in 1540. ravenna, faenza, jesi had, under various pretexts, undergone the same fate. by the middle of the sixteenth century all resistance was subdued. in opposition, however, to this centralising policy, the nepotism introduced by sixtus iv. led to dismemberment. paul iii. gave parma and piacenza to his son pier luigi farnese, and the duchy was lost to the holy see for good. paul iv. made a similar attempt in favour of his nephew caraffa, but he was put to death under pius iv.; and this species of nepotism, which subsisted at the expense of the papal territory, came to an end. pius v. forbade, under pain of excommunication, to invest any one with a possession of the holy see, and this law was extended even to temporary concessions. in the eighteenth century a time came when the temporal power was a source of weakness, and a weapon by which the courts compelled the pope to consent to measures he would otherwise never have approved. it was thus that the suppression of the jesuits was obtained from clement xiv. under his successors the world had an opportunity of comparing the times when popes like alexander iii. or innocent iv. governed the church from their exile, and now, when men of the greatest piety and conscientiousness virtually postponed their duty as head of the church to their rights as temporal sovereigns, and, like the senators of old, awaited the gauls upon their throne. there is a lesson not to be forgotten in the contrast between the policy and the fate of the great mediæval pontiffs, who preserved their liberty by abandoning their dominions, and that of pius vi. and pius vii., who preferred captivity to flight. the nepotism of urban viii. brought on the war of castro, and in its train increase of debt, of taxes, impoverishment of the state, and the odious union of spiritual with temporal arms, which became a permanent calamity for the holy see. this attachment to the interest of their families threw great discredit on the popes, who were dishonoured by the faults, the crimes, and the punishment of their relatives. but since the death of alexander viii., in 1691, even that later form of nepotism which aimed at wealth only, not at political power, came to an end, and has never reappeared except in the case of the braschi. the nepotism of the cardinals and prelates has survived that of the popes. if the statute of eugenius iv. had remained in force, the college of cardinals would have formed a wholesome restraint in the temporal government, and the favouritism of the papal relations would have been prevented. but the popes acted with the absolute power which was in the spirit of the monarchies of that age. when paul iv. announced to the sacred college that he had stripped the house of colonna of its possessions to enrich his nephew, and that he was at war with spain, they listened in silence, and have been passive ever since. no european sovereignty enjoyed so arbitrary an authority. under julius ii. the towns retained considerable privileges, and looked on their annexation to the papal state as a deliverance from their former oppressors. machiavelli and guicciardini say that the popes required neither to defend nor to administer their dominions, and that the people were content in the enjoyment of their autonomy. in the course of the sixteenth century the administration was gradually centralised in rome, and placed in the hands of ecclesiastics. before 1550 the governors were ordinarily laymen, but the towns themselves preferred to be governed by prelates. by the close of the century the independence of the corporations had disappeared; but the centralisation, though complete, was not vigorous, and practically the towns and the barons, though not free, were not oppressed. the modern system of government in the roman states originated with sixtus v. he introduced stability and regularity in the administration, and checked the growth of nepotism, favouritism, and arbitrary power, by the creation of permanent congregations. in connection with this measure the prelates became the upper class of official persons in the state, and were always expected to be men of fortune. a great burden for the country was the increase of offices, which were created only to be sold. no important duties and no fixed salary were attached to them, and the incumbent had to rely on fees and extortion. in the year 1470 there were 650 places of this kind. in eighty years they had increased to 3500. the theory was, that the money raised by the sale of places saved the people from the imposition of new taxes. innocent xii., in 1693, put an end to this traffic; but it had continued so long that the ill-effects survived. there was a great contrast between the ecclesiastical administration, which exhibited a dignified stability, resting on fixed rules and ancient traditions, and the civil government, which was exposed to continual fluctuation by the change of persons, of measures, and of systems; for few popes continued the plans of their predecessors. the new pontiff commenced his reign generally with a profound sense of the abuses and of the discontent which prevailed before his elevation, and naturally sought to obtain favour and improvement by opposite measures. in the cultivation of the roman campagna, for instance, it was observed that each pope followed a different system, so that little was accomplished. the persons were almost always changed by the new pope, so that great offices rarely remained long in the same hands. the popes themselves were seldom versed in affairs of state, and therefore required the assistance of statesmen of long experience. in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, when the election was free from outward influence, men were generally chosen who had held under one or two popes the highest office of state,--gregory vii., urban ii., gelasius ii., lucius ii., alexander iii., gregory viii., gregory ix., alexander iv. but in modern times it has been the rule that the secretary of state should not be elected, and that the new pope should dismiss the heads of the administration. clement ix. was the first who gave up this practice, and retained almost all those who had been employed under his predecessor. the burdens of the state increased far beyond its resources from the aid which the popes gave to the catholic powers, especially in the turkish wars. at the beginning of the seventeenth century the debt amounted to 12,242,620 _scudi_, and the interest absorbed three-fourths of the whole income. in 1655 it had risen to 48,000,000 _scudi_. the financial administration was secret, free from the control of public accounts, and the _tesoriere_, being necessarily a cardinal, was irresponsible. there was no industry in the towns; they remained for the most part small and poor; almost all articles of common use were imported, and the country had little to give in exchange. all the interest of the public debt went to foreign creditors. as early as 1595 the discontent was very great, and so many emigrated, in order to escape the heavy burdens, that cardinal sacchetti said, in 1664, that the population was reduced by one-half. in the year 1740 the president de brosses found the roman government the most defective but the mildest in europe. becattini, in his panegyrical biography of pius vi., declares that it was the worst after that of turkey. there were none of those limitations which in other countries restrained the power of the monarch, no fundamental laws, no coronation oath, no binding decrees of predecessors, no provincial estates, no powerful corporations. but, in reality, this unlimited absolutism was softened by custom, and by great indulgence towards individuals. when consalvi adopted the french institutions, he did not understand that an absolute government is intolerable, and must sink under the weight of its responsibility, unless it recognises the restraint of custom and tradition, and of subordinate, but not dependent forces. the unity and uniformity he introduced were destructive. he restored none of the liberties of the towns, and confided the administration to ecclesiastics superficially acquainted with law, and without knowledge of politics or of public economy. in the ecclesiastical states of germany, the civil and religious departments were separate; and it is as wrong to say that the double position of the head must repeat itself throughout the administration, as to say that a king, because he is the head of the army as well as of the civil government, ought to mix the two spheres throughout the state. it would, in reality, be perfectly possible to separate the political and ecclesiastical authorities. leo xii. attempted to satisfy the _zelanti_, the adversaries of consalvi, by restoring the old system. he abolished the provincial councils, revived the inquisition, and subjected official honesty and public morality to a strict espionage. leo saw the error of consalvi, but mistook the remedy; and his government was the most unpopular that had been seen for a century. where the laity are excluded from the higher offices, and the clergy enjoy the monopoly of them, that moral power which modern bureaucracy derives from the corporate spirit, and the feelings of honour which it inspires, cannot subsist. one class becomes demoralised by its privileged position, the other by its limited prospects and insufficient pay. leo tried to control them by the _congregazione di vigilanze_, which received and examined all charges against official persons; but it was suppressed by his successor. the famous memorandum of the powers, 31st may 1831, recommended the admission of the laity to all secular offices, the restoration of the provincial councils, and the introduction of elective communal councils with the power of local government; and finally, a security against the changes incident to an elective sovereignty. the historian coppi, who was charged to draw up a plan of reform in reply to these demands, relates that the pope and the majority of the cardinals rejected every serious change, and were resolved to uphold the old principles, and to concede nothing to the lay party, "because, if anything was voluntarily conceded, there would be no right of recalling it afterwards." two things in particular it was determined not to grant--elective councils in the towns and provinces, and a lay council of state beside the sacred college. in a general way, vague reforms were promised; but the promise was not redeemed. austria would not tolerate any liberal concessions in italy which were in contradiction with her own system and her own interests; thus all italian aspirations for reforms were concentrated in the wish to get rid of the foreign yoke, and austria never succeeded in forming a party amongst the italians favourable to her power. yet gregory xvi. knew that great changes were needed. in 1843 he said:- the civil administration requires a great reform. i was too old when i was elected; i did not expect to live so long, and had not the courage to begin the undertaking. for whoever begins, must accomplish it. i have now only a few more years to live; perhaps only a few days. after me they will choose a young pope, whose mission it will be to perform the act, without which it is impossible to go on. the austrian occupation caused the roman government to be identified with the foreign supremacy, and transferred to it the hatred of the patriots. the disaffection of the subjects of the pope had deeper motives. except the clergy, that overshadows all, there are no distinct orders in the society of the roman state; no country nobility, no wealthy class of peasant proprietors; nothing but the population of the towns, and a degenerate class of patricians. these were generally hostile to the ecclesiastical system. the offices are so distributed, that the clergy govern, and the laity are their instruments. in the principal departments, no amount of services or ability could raise a layman above a certain level, beyond which younger and less competent ecclesiastics were promoted over his head. this subordination, which led to a regular dependence of the lay officials on the prelates, drove the best men away from the service of the state, and disposed the rest to long for a government which should throw open to them the higher prizes of their career. even the country people, who were never tainted with the ideas of the secret societies, were not always well affected. it is more difficult for a priest than for a layman to put aside his private views and feelings in the administration of justice. he is the servant and herald of grace, of forgiveness, of indulgence, and easily forgets that in human concerns the law is inexorable, that favour to one is often injury to many or to all, and that he has no right to place his own will above the law. he is still more disqualified for the direction of the police, which, in an absolute state and in troubled times, uses its unlimited power without reference to christian ideas, leaves unpunished acts which are grievous sins, and punishes others which in a religious point of view are innocent. it is hard for the people to distinguish clearly the priestly character from the action of its bearer in the administration of police. the same indifference to the strict letter of the law, the same confusion between breaches of divine and of human ordinances, led to a practice of arbitrary imprisonment, which contrasts painfully with the natural gentleness of a priestly government. hundreds of persons were cast into prison without a trial or even an examination; only on suspicion, and kept there more than a year for greater security. the immunities of the clergy were as unpopular as their power. the laws and decrees of the pope as a temporal sovereign were not held to be binding on them unless it was expressly said, or was clear from the context, that they were given also in his character of head of the church. ecclesiastics were tried before their own tribunals, and had the right to be more lightly punished than laymen for the same delinquency. those events in the life of achilli, which came out at his trial, had not only brought down on him no severe punishment, but did not stand in the way of his promotion. with all these privileges, the bulk of the roman clergy had little to do; little was expected of them, and their instruction was extremely deficient. at the end of the pontificate of gregory xvi. the demand for reforms was loud and universal, and men began to perceive that the defects of the civil government were undermining the religious attachment of the people. the conclave which raised pius ix. to the papal throne was the shortest that had occurred for near three hundred years. the necessity of choosing a pontiff disposed to understand and to satisfy the pressing requirements of the time, made it important to hasten matters in order to escape the interference of austria. it was expected that cardinal gizzi or cardinal mastai would be elected. the latter had been pointed out by gregory xvi. as his fittest successor, and he made gizzi secretary of state. the first measure of the new reign, the amnesty, which, as metternich said, threw open the doors of the house to the professional robbers, was taken not so much as an act of policy, as because the pope was resolved to undo an accumulation of injustice. the reforms which followed soon made pius the most popular of italian princes, and all catholics rejoiced that the reconciliation of the papacy with modern freedom was at length accomplished, and that the shadow which had fallen on the priesthood throughout the world was removed with the abuses in the roman government. the constitution was, perhaps, an inevitable though a fatal necessity. "the holy father must fall," said his minister, "but at least he will fall with honour." the preliminary conditions of constitutional life were wanting--habits of self-government in the towns and provinces, security from the vexations of the police, separation of spiritual and temporal jurisdiction. it could not be but that the existence of an elective chamber must give to the lay element a preponderance in the state, whilst in the administration the contrary position was maintained. there could be no peaceful solution of this contradiction, and it is strange that the cardinals, who were unanimously in favour of the statute, should not have seen that it would lead to the destruction of the privileges of the clergy. but in the allocution of 20th april 1849, the pope declared that he had never intended to alter the character of his government; so that he must have thought the old system of administration by ecclesiastics compatible with the working of the new constitution. at his return from exile all his advisers were in favour of abrogating all the concessions of the first years of his reign. balbo and rosmini visited him at gaeta, to plead for the constitution, but they obtained nothing. pius ix. was persuaded that every concession would be a weapon in the hands of the radicals. a lay _consulta_ gave to the laity a share of the supreme government; but the chief offices and the last decision remained, as before, in the hands of the prelates. municipal reforms were promised. in general the old defects continued, and the old discontent was not conciliated. it is manifest that constitutionalism, as it is ordinarily understood, is not a system which can be applied to the states of the church. it could not be tolerated that a warlike faction, by refusing supplies, should compel the pope to go to war with a christian nation, as they sought to compel him to declare war against austria in 1848. his sovereignty must be real, not merely nominal. it makes no difference whether he is in the power of a foreign state or of a parliamentary majority. but real sovereignty is compatible with a participation of the people in legislation, the autonomy of corporations, a moderate freedom of the press, and the separation of religion and police. recent events would induce one to suppose that the enormous power of the press and of public opinion, which it forms and reflects, is not understood in rome. in 1856 the inquisitor at ancona issued an edict, threatening with the heaviest censures all who should omit to denounce the religious or ecclesiastical faults of their neighbours, relatives, or superiors; and in defiance of the general indignation, and of the despondency of those who, for the sake of religion, desired reforms in the states of the church, the _civilta cattolica_ declared that the inquisitor had done his duty. such cases as this, and those of achilli and mortara, weighed more heavily in the scale in which the roman state is weighed than a lost battle. without discussing the cases themselves, it is clear what their influence has been on public opinion, with which it is more important at the present day to treat than with the governments which depend on it. this branch of diplomacy has been unfortunately neglected, and hence the roman government cannot rely on lay support. after describing the evils and disorders of the state, which the pope so deeply felt that he put his own existence in peril, and inflamed half of europe with the spirit of radical change in the attempt to remove them, dr. döllinger contrasts, with the gloomy picture of decay and failure, the character of the pontiff who attempted the great work of reform. nevertheless, the administration of pius ix. is wise, benevolent, indulgent, thrifty, attentive to useful institutions and improvements. all that proceeds from pius ix. personally is worthy of a head of the church--elevated, liberal in the best sense of the term. no sovereign spends less on his court and his own private wants. if all thought and acted as he does, his would be a model state. both the french and the english envoys affirm that the financial administration had improved, that the value of the land was increasing, agriculture flourishing, and that many symptoms of progress might be observed. whatever can be expected of a monarch full of affection for his people, and seeking his sole recreation in works of beneficence, pius richly performs. _pertransiit benefaciendo_,--words used of one far greater,--are simply the truth applied to him. in him we can clearly perceive how the papacy, even as a temporal state, might, so far as the character of the prince is concerned, through judicious elections, be the most admirable of human institutions. a man in the prime of life, after an irreproachable youth and a conscientious discharge of episcopal duties, is elevated to the highest dignity and to sovereign power. he knows nothing of expensive amusements; he has no other passion but that of doing good, no other ambition but to be beloved by his subjects. his day is divided between prayer and the labours of government; his relaxation is a walk in the garden, a visit to a church, a prison, or a charitable institution. free from personal desires and from terrestrial bonds, he has no relatives, no favourites to provide for. for him the rights and powers of his office exist only for the sake of its duties.... grievously outraged, injured, rewarded with ingratitude, he has never harboured a thought of revenge, never committed an act of severity, but ever forgiven and ever pardoned. the cup of sweetness and of bitterness, the cup of human favour and of human aversion, he has not only tasted, but emptied to the dregs; he heard them cry "hosannah!" and soon after "crucifige!" the man of his confidence, the first intellectual power of his nation, fell beneath the murderer's knife; the bullet of an insurgent struck down the friend by his side. and yet no feeling of hatred, no breath of anger could ever obscure, even for a moment, the spotless mirror of his soul. untouched by human folly, unmoved by human malice, he proceeds with a firm and regular step on his way, like the stars of heaven. such i have seen the action of this pope in rome, such it has been described to me by all, whether near him or afar; and if he now seems to be appointed to pass through all the painful and discouraging experience which can befall a monarch, and to continue to the end the course of a prolonged martyrdom, he resembles in this, as in so many other things, the sixteenth louis; or rather; to go up higher, he knows that the disciple is not above the master, and that the pastor of a church, whose lord and founder died upon the cross, cannot wonder and cannot refuse that the cross should be laid also upon him (pp. 624-627). it is a common opinion, that the pope, as a sovereign, is bound by the common law to the forms and ideas of the middle ages; and that in consequence of the progress of society, of the difference between the thirteenth century and the nineteenth, there is an irreconcilable discord between the papacy and the necessities of civil government. all catholics are bound to oppose this opinion. only that which is of divine institution is unchangeable through all time. but the sovereignty of the popes is extremely elastic, and has already gone through many forms. no contrast can be stronger than that between the use which the popes made of their power in the thirteenth or the fifteenth century, and the system of consalvi. there is no reason, therefore, to doubt, that it will now, after a violent interruption, assume the form best adapted to the character of the age and the requirements of the italian people. there is nothing chimerical in the vision of a new order of things, in which the election shall fall on men in the prime of their years and their strength; in which the people shall be reconciled to their government by free institutions and a share in the conduct of their own concerns, and the upper classes satisfied by the opening of a suitable career in public affairs. justice publicly and speedily administered would obtain the confidence of the people; the public service would be sustained by an honourable _esprit de corps_; the chasm between laity and priesthood would be closed by equality in rights and duties; the police would not rely on the help of religion, and religion would no longer drag itself along on the crutches of the police. the integrity of the papal states would be under the joint guardianship of the powers, who have guaranteed even the dominions of the sultan; and the pope would have no enemies to fear, and his subjects would be delivered from the burden of military service and of a military budget. religious liberty is not, as the enemies of the holy see declare, and some even of its friends believe, an insurmountable difficulty. events often cut the knots which appear insoluble to theory. attempts at proselytising have not hitherto succeeded among the subjects of the pope; but if it had been otherwise, would it have been possible for the inquisition to proceed against a protestant? the agitation that must have ensued would be a welcome opportunity to put an end to what remains of the temporal power. it is true that the advance of protestantism in italy would raise up a barrier between the pope and his subjects; but no such danger is to be apprehended. at the time when the doctrines of the reformation exercised an almost magical power over mankind, they never took root in italy beyond a few men of letters; and now that their power of attraction and expansion has long been exhausted, neither sardinian policy nor english gold will succeed in seducing the italians to them. the present position of helpless and humiliating dependence will not long endure. the determination of the piedmontese government to annex rome is not more certain than the determination of the emperor napoleon to abrogate the temporal power. pius ix. would enjoy greater security in turkey than in the hands of a state which combines the tyranny of the convention, the impudent sophistry of a government of advocates, and the ruthless brutality of military despotism. rather than trust to piedmont, may pius ix. remember the example of his greatest predecessors, who, relying on the spiritual might of the papacy, sought beyond the alps the freedom which italy denied to them. the papacy has beheld the rise and the destruction of many thrones, and will assuredly outlive the kingdom of italy, and other monarchies besides. it can afford to wait; _patiens quia æternus_. the romans need the pope more than the pope needs rome. above the catacombs, among the basilicas, beside the vatican, there is no place for a tribune or for a king. we shall see what was seen in the fourteenth century: envoys will come from rome to entreat the pope to return to his faithful city. whilst things continue as they are, the emperor can, by threatening to withdraw his troops, compel the pope to consent to anything not actually sinful. such a situation is alarming in the highest degree for other countries. but for the absolute confidence that all men have in the fidelity and conscientiousness of the present pope, and for the providential circumstance that there is no ecclesiastical complication which the french government could use for its own ends, it would not be tolerated by the rest of the catholic world. sooner or later these conditions of security will disappear, and the interest of the church demands that before that happens, the peril should be averted, even by a catastrophe. the hostility of the italians themselves to the holy see is the tragic symptom of the present malady. in other ages, when it was assailed, the italians were on its side, or at least were neutral. now they require the destruction of the temporal power, either as a necessary sacrifice for the unity and greatness of their country, or as a just consequence of incurable defects. the time will come, however, when they will be reconciled with the papacy, and with its presence as a power among them. it was the dependence of the pope on the austrian arms, and his identification in popular opinion with the cause of the detested foreigner, that obscured his lofty position as the moral bulwark and protector of the nation. for 1500 years the holy see was the pivot of italian history, and the source of the italian influence in europe. the nation and the see shared the same fortunes, and grew powerful or feeble together. it was not until the vices of alexander vi. and his predecessors had destroyed the reverence which was the protection of italy, that she became the prey of the invaders. none of the great italian historians has failed to see that they would ruin themselves in raising their hands against rome. the old prophecy of the _papa angelico_, of an angel pope, who was to rise up to put an end to discord and disorder, and to restore piety and peace and happiness in italy, was but the significant token of the popular belief that the papacy and the nation were bound up together, and that one was the guardian of the other. that belief slumbers, now that the idea of unity prevails, whilst the italians are attempting to put the roof on a building without walls and without foundations, but it will revive again, when centralisation is compelled to yield to federalism, and the road to the practicable has been found in the search after impossibilities. the tyrannical character of the piedmontese government, its contempt for the sanctity of public law, the principles on which it treats the clergy at home, and the manner in which it has trampled on the rights of the pope and the interests of religion, the perfidy and despotism it exhibits, render it impossible that any securities it may offer to the pope can possess a real value. moreover, in the unsettled state of the kingdom, the uncertain succession of parties, and the fluctuation of power, whatever guarantee is proposed by the ministry, there is nobody to guarantee the guarantor. it is a system without liberty and without stability; and the pope can never be reconciled to it, or become a dweller in the new italian kingdom. if he must choose between the position of a subject and of an exile, he is at home in the whole catholic world, and wherever he goes he will be surrounded by children who will greet him as their father. it may become an inevitable, but it must always be a heroic resolution. the court and the various congregations for the administration of the affairs of the church are too numerous to be easily moved. in former times the machinery was more simple, and the whole body of the pontifical government could be lodged in a single french monastery. the absence of the pope from rome will involve great difficulties and annoyance; but it is a lesser evil than a surrender of principle, which cannot be recalled. to remove the holy see to france would, under present circumstances, be an open challenge to a schism, and would afford to all who wish to curtail the papal rights, or to interrupt the communication between the pope and the several churches, the most welcome pretexts, and it would put arms in the hands of governments that wish to impede the action of his authority within their states. the conclusion of the book is as follows:- if the court of rome should reside for a time in germany, the roman prelates will doubtless be agreeably surprised to discover that our people is able to remain catholic and religious without the leading-strings of a police, and that its religious sentiments are a better protection to the church than the episcopal _carceri_, which, thank god, do not exist. they will learn that the church in germany is able to maintain herself without the holy office; that our bishops, although, or because, they use no physical compulsion, are reverenced like princes by the people, that they are received with triumphal arches, that their arrival in a place is a festival for the inhabitants. they will see how the church with us rests on the broad, strong, and healthy basis of a well-organised system of pastoral administration and of popular religious instruction. they will perceive that we catholics have maintained for years the struggle for the deliverance of the church from the bonds of bureaucracy straightforwardly and without reservation; that we cannot entertain the idea of denying to the italians what we have claimed for ourselves; and that therefore we are far from thinking that it is anywhere an advantage to fortify the church with the authority of the police and with the power of the secular arm. throughout germany we have been taught by experience the truth of fénelon's saying, that the spiritual power must be carefully kept separate from the civil, because their union is pernicious. they will find, further, that the whole of the german clergy is prepared to bless the day when it shall learn that the free sovereignty of the pope is assured, without sentence of death being still pronounced by ecclesiastics, without priests continuing to discharge the functions of treasury-clerks or police directors, or to conduct the business of the lottery. and, finally, they will convince themselves that all the catholics of germany will stand up as one man for the independence of the holy see, and the legitimate rights of the pope; but that they are no admirers of a form of government of very recent date, which is, in fact, nothing else than the product of the mechanical polity of napoleon combined with a clerical administration. and this information will bear good fruit when the hour shall strike for the return, and restitution shall be made.... meanwhile pius ix. and the men of his council will "think upon the days of old, and have in their minds the eternal years." they will read the future in the earlier history of the papacy, which has already seen many an exile and many a restoration. the example of the resolute, courageous popes of the middle ages will light the way. it is no question now of suffering martyrdom, of clinging to the tombs of the apostles, or of descending into the catacombs; but of quitting the land of bondage, in order to exclaim on a free soil, "our bonds are broken, and we are free!" for the rest god will provide, and the unceasing gifts and sympathies of the catholic world. and the parties in italy, when they have torn and exhausted the land which has become a battle-field; when the sobered and saddened people, tired of the rule of lawyers and of soldiers, has understood the worth of a moral and spiritual authority, then will be the time to think of returning to the eternal city. in the interval, the things will have disappeared for whose preservation such pains are taken; and then there will be better reason than consalvi had, in the preface to the _motu proprio_ of 6th july 1816, to say: "divine providence, which so conducts human affairs that out of the greatest calamity innumerable benefits proceed, seems to have intended that the interruption of the papal government should prepare the way for a more perfect form of it." we have written at a length for which we must apologise to our readers; and yet this is but a meagre sketch of the contents of a book which deals with a very large proportion of the subjects that occupy the thoughts and move the feelings of religious men. we will attempt to sum up in a few words the leading ideas of the author. addressing a mixed audience, he undertakes to controvert two different interpretations of the events which are being fulfilled in rome. to the protestants, who triumph in the expected downfall of the papacy, he shows the consequences of being without it. to the catholics, who see in the roman question a great peril to the church, he explains how the possession of the temporal sovereignty had become a greater misfortune than its loss for a time would be. from the opposite aspects of the religious camps of our age he endeavours to awaken the misgivings of one party, and to strengthen the confidence of the other. there is an inconsistency between the protestant system and the progress of modern learning; there is none between the authority of the holy see and the progress of modern society. the events which are tending to deprive the pope of his territory are not to be, therefore, deplored, if we consider the preceding causes, because they made this catastrophe inevitable; still less if, looking to the future, we consider the state of protestantism, because they remove an obstacle to union which is humanly almost insurmountable. in a former work döllinger exhibited the moral and intellectual exhaustion of paganism as the prelude to christianity. in like manner he now confronts the dissolution and spiritual decay of protestantism with the papacy. but in order to complete the contrast, and give force to the vindication, it was requisite that the true function and character of the holy see should not be concealed from the unpractised vision of strangers by the mask of that system of government which has grown up around it in modern times. the importance of this violent disruption of the two authorities consists in the state of religion throughout the world. its cause lies in the deficiences of the temporal power; its end in the mission of the spiritual. the interruption of the temporal sovereignty is the only way we can discern in which these deficiences can be remedied and these ends obtained. but this interruption cannot be prolonged. in an age in which the state throughout the continent is absolute, and tolerates no immunities; when corporations have therefore less freedom than individuals, and the disposition to restrict their action increases in proportion to their power, the pope cannot be independent as a subject. he must, therefore, be a sovereign, the free ruler of an actual territory, protected by international law and a european guarantee. the restoration consequently is necessary, though not as an immediate consequence of the revolution. in this revolutionary age the protection of the catholic powers is required against outward attack. they must also be our security that no disaffection is provoked within; that there shall be no recurrence of the dilemma between the right of insurrection against an arbitrary government and the duty of obedience to the pope; and that civil society shall not again be convulsed, nor the pillars of law and order throughout europe shaken, by a revolution against the church, of which, in the present instance, the conservative powers share the blame, and have already felt the consequences. in the earnest and impressive language of the conclusion, in which döllinger conveys the warnings which all transalpine catholicism owes to its head as an italian sovereign, it seems to us that something more definite is intended than the expression of the wish, which almost every catholic feels, to receive the pope in his own country. the anxiety for his freedom which would be felt if he took refuge in france, would be almost equally justified by his presence in austria. a residence in an exclusively catholic country, such as spain, would be contrary to the whole spirit of this book, and to the moral which it inculcates, that the great significance of the crisis is in the state of german protestantism. if the position of the catholics in germany would supply useful lessons and examples to the roman court, it is also from the vicinity of the protestant world that the full benefit can best be drawn from its trials, and that the crimes of the italians, which have begun as calamities, may be turned to the advantage of the church. but against such counsels there is a powerful influence at work. napoleon has declared his determination to sweep away the temporal power. the continuance of the occupation of rome, and his express prohibition to the piedmontese government to proceed with the annexation during the life of the present pope, signify that he calculates on greater advantages in a conclave than from the patient resolution of pius ix. this policy is supported by the events in italy in a formidable manner. the more the piedmontese appear as enemies and persecutors, the more the emperor will appear as the only saviour; and the dread of a prolonged exile in any catholic country, and of dependence for subsistence on the contributions of the faithful, must exhibit in a fascinating light the enjoyment of the splendid hospitality and powerful protection of france. on these hopes and fears, and on the difficulties which are pressing on the cardinals from the loss of their revenues, the emperor speculates, and persuades himself that he will be master of the next election. on the immovable constancy of her supreme pontiff the catholic church unconditionally relies; and we are justified in believing that, in an almost unparalleled emergency, he will not tremble before a resolution of which no pope has given an example since the consolidation of the temporal power. footnotes: [footnote 334: _the rambler_, november 1861.] [footnote 335: _kirche und kirchen_, munich, 1861 ("papstum und kirchenstaat").] [footnote 336: so late as 1791 pius vi. wrote: "discrimen intercedit inter homines, qui extra gremium ecclesiae semper fuerunt, quales sunt infideles atque judaei, atque inter illos qui se ecclesiae ipsi per susceptum baptismi sacramentum subjecerunt. primi enim constringi ad catholicam obedientiam non debent, contra vero alteri sunt cogendi." if this theory had, like that of the protestants, been put in practice by the government, it would have furnished the protestants with an argument precisely similar to that by which the catholics justified the severity they exercised towards them.] [footnote 337: the works contained in clark's library of translations are chiefly of this school.] xi döllinger's historical work[338] when first seen, at würzburg, in the diaries of platen the poet, dr. döllinger was an eager student of general literature, and especially of schlegel and the romantic philosophy. it was an epoch in which the layman and the _dilettante_ prevailed. in other days a divine had half a dozen distinct schools of religious thought before him, each able to develop and to satisfy a receptive mind; but the best traditions of western scholarship had died away when the young franconian obtained a chair in the reorganised university of munich. his own country, bavaria, his time, the third decade of the century, furnished no guide, no master, and no model to the new professor. exempt, by date and position, from the discipline of a theological party, he so continued, and never turned elsewhere for the dependence he escaped at home. no german theologian, of his own or other churches, bent his course; and he derived nothing from the powerful writer then dominant in the north. to a friend describing herder as the one unprofitable classic, he replied, "did you ever learn anything from schleiermacher?" and if it is doubtful which way this stroke was aimed, it is certain that he saw less than others in the berlin teacher. very young he knew modern languages well, though with a defective ear, and having no local or contemporary attachments he devoted himself systematically to the study of foreign divines. the characteristic universality of his later years was not the mere result of untiring energy and an unlimited command of books. his international habit sprang from the inadequacy of the national supply, and the search for truth in every century naturally became a lecturer whose function it was to unfold from first to last the entire life of the church, whose range extended over all christian ages, and who felt the inferiority of his own. döllinger's conception of the science which he was appointed to carry forward, in conformity with new requirements and new resources, differed from the average chiefly by being more thorough and comprehensive. at two points he was touched by currents of the day. savigny, the legal expert of a school recruited from both denominations and gravitating towards catholicism, had expounded law and society in that historic spirit which soon pervaded other sciences, and restored the significance of national custom and character. by his writings protestant literature overlapped. the example of the conspicuous jurist served as a suggestion for divines to realise the patient process of history; and döllinger continued to recognise him as a master and originator of true scientific methods when his influence on jurisprudence was on the wane. on the same track, drey, in 1819, defended the theory of development as the vital prerogative of rome over the fixity of other churches. möhler was the pupil of drey, and they made tübingen the seat of a positive theology, broader and more progressive than that of munich. the first eminent thinker whom he saw and heard was baader, the poorest of writers, but the most instructive and impressive talker in germany, and the one man who appears to have influenced the direction of his mind. bishop martensen has described his amazing powers; and döllinger, who remembered him with more scant esteem, bore equal testimony to the wealth and worth of his religious philosophy. he probably owed to him his persistent disparagement of hegel, and more certainly that familiarity with the abstruse literature of mysticism which made him as clear and sure of vision in the twilight of petrucci and st. martin as in the congenial company of duperron. baader is remembered by those who abstain from sixteen volumes of discordant thought, as the inventor of that system of political insurance which became the holy alliance. that authority is as sacred and sovereignty as absolute in the church as in the state, was an easy and obvious inference, and it had been lately drawn with an energy and literary point to which baader was a stranger, by the count de maistre, who was moreover a student of st. martin. when the ancient mystic welcomed his new friend, he was full of the praises of de maistre. he impressed upon his earnest listener the importance of the books on the pope and on the gallican church, and assured him that the spirit which animates them is the genuine catholicism. these conversations were the origin of döllinger's specific ultramontanism. it governed one half of his life, and his interest in de maistre outlasted the assent which he once gave to some of his opinions. questions arising from the savoyard's indictment against bacon, which he proposed to liebig, formed the connection between the two laboured attacks on the founder of english philosophy. much of that which at any time was unhistoric or presumptive in his mind may be ascribed to this influence; and it divided him from möhler, who was far before him in the fulness of the enjoyment of his powers and his fame, whom he survived half a century, and never ceased to venerate as the finest theological intellect he had known. the publication of the _symbolik_ made it difficult for the author to remain in wirtemberg; tübingen, he said, was a place where he could neither live nor die happy; and having made döllinger's acquaintance, he conceived an ardent wish to become his colleague at munich. im verkehre mit ihnen, und dem kreise in dem sie leben, habe ich mich aufs anmuthigste erheitert, sittlich gestärkt, und religiös getröstet und ermuthigt gefunden; ein verein von einwirkungen auf mich würde mir gewährt, deren aller ich in fast gleichein grade bedürftig war. döllinger negotiated his appointment, overcame the resisting ministerial medium through the intervention of the king, and surrendered his own department of theology, which they both regarded as the most powerful agency in religious instruction. möhler had visited göttingen and berlin, and recognised their superiority. a public address to planck, praising the protestant treatment of history, was omitted by döllinger from the edition of his miscellaneous writings. they differed so widely that one of them hesitated to read bossuet's _defensio_, and generally kept the stronger gallicans out of sight, whilst the other warmly recommended richer, and launoy, and dupin, and cautioned his pupils against baronius, as a forger and a cheat, who dishonestly attributed to the primitive church ideas quite foreign to its constitution. he found fault with his friend for undue favour to the jesuits, and undue severity towards jansenism. the other advised him to read fênelon, and succeeded in modifying this opinion. sie werden vielleicht um so geneigter sein, mir zu verzeihen, wenn ich ihnen melde, dass ich inzwischen recht fleissig die jansenistischen streitigkeiten, durch ihre freundliche zuschrift angeregt, studirt habe, und ihrer darstellung ohne zweifel jetzt weit näher stehe als früher. selbst die bulle unigenitus erscheint mir in einem weit günstigeren lichte als früher, obschon ich die censur mancher quesnel'scher sätze immer noch nicht begreifen kann. sie schrieben mir, dass die fénelon'sche correspondenz einen grossen einfluss auf ihre betrachtungsweise ausgeübt habe. auch bei mir ist dieses der fall. but in describing the failure of scholastic theology, the exaggeration of de maistre, the incompetence of the roman censorship, the irreligion of leo x., and the strength of luther's case against the papacy, the sensitive suabian made a contrast, then, and long after, with döllinger's disciplined coolness and reserve. dann war wirklich die bestehende form der kirche im höchsten grade tadelhaft, und bedurfte der reinigung. die päpste waren despoten, willkührliche herrscher geworden. gebräuche hatten sich angehäuft, die im höchsten grade dem glauben und der christlichen frömmigkeit entgegen waren. in vielen punkten hatte luther immer recht, wenn er von missbräuchen der römischen gewalt spricht, dass dort alles feil sei.--tetzel verfuhr ohnediess auf die empörendste weise, und übertrieb, mit einer religiösen rohheit und einem stumpfsinn ohne gleichen, das bedenkliche der sache auf die äusserste spitze. the disagreement which made itself felt from time to time between the famous colleagues was not removed when one of them wished the other to change his confessor before his last illness. möhler claimed the supreme chair of ecclesiastical history as a matter of course, and by right of seniority. he apologised for venturing to supersede one who had gained distinction in that lecture-room, but he hinted that he himself was the least fit of the two for dogmatics. ich habe mich für die historischen fächer entschieden. ihr opfer, wenn sie dogmatik lesen, anerkenne ich, aber ich bitte das meinige nicht zu übersehen. welcher entschluss, ich möchte sagen, welche unverschämtheit ist es, nach ihnen und bei ihren lebzeiten, kirchengeschichte in münchen zu doziren? döllinger took that branch for the time, but he never afterwards taught theology proper. as möhler, who was essentially a theologian, deserted divinity to compose inferior treatises on the gnostics and the false decretals, döllinger, by choice and vocation a divine, having religion as the purpose of his life, judged that the loftier function, the more spiritual service, was historical teaching. the problem is to know how it came to pass that a man who was eminently intelligent and perspicuous in the exposition of doctrines, but who, in narrative, description, and knowledge of character, was neither first nor second, resolved that his mission was history. in early life he had picked up chance copies of baronius and petavius, the pillars of historic theology; but the motives of his choice lay deeper. church history had long been the weakest point and the cause of weakness among the catholics, and it was the rising strength of the german protestants. therefore it was the post of danger; and it gave to a theologian the command of a public of laymen. the restoration of history coincided with the euthanasia of metaphysic; when the foremost philosophic genius of the time led over to the historic treatment both of philosophy and religion, and hamilton, cousin, comte, severally converted the science into its history. many men better equipped for speculation than for erudition went the same way; the systematic theology was kept up in the universities by the influence of rome, where scholasticism went on untouched by the romantic transformation. writing of england, wiseman said: "there is still a scholastic hardness in our controversial theology, an unbendingness of outward forms in our explanations of catholic principles, which renders our theologians dry and unattractive to the most catholicly inclined portion of our protestants." the choice which these youths made, towards 1830, was, though they did not know it, the beginning of a rift that widened. döllinger was more in earnest than others in regarding christianity as history, and in pressing the affinity between catholic and historical thought. systems were to him nearly as codes to savigny, when he exhorted his contemporaries not to consolidate their law, lest, with their wisdom and knowledge, they should incorporate their delusions and their ignorance, and usurp for the state what belonged to the nation. he would send an inquiring student to the _historia congregationis de auxiliis_ and the _historia pelagiana_ rather than to molina or lemos, and often gave the advice which, coming from oriel, disconcerted morris of exeter: "i am afraid you will have to read the jesuit petavius." he dreaded the predominance of great names which stop the way, and everything that interposes the notions of an epoch, a region, or a school between the church and the observer. to an innsbruck professor, lamenting that there was no philosophy which he could heartily adopt, he replied that philosophies do not subsist in order to be adopted. a thomist or a cartesian seemed to him as a captive, or a one-armed combatant. prizing metaphysicians for the unstrung pearls which they drop beyond the seclusion of system, he loved the _disjecta membra_ of coleridge, and preferred the _pensieri_, and _parerga und paralipomena_ to the constructed work of gioberti and schopenhauer. he knew leibniz chiefly in his letters, and was perceptibly affected by his law of continuous progression, his general optimism, and his eclectic art of extracting from men and books only the good that is in them; but of monadology or pre-established harmony there was not a trace. his colleague, schelling, no friend to the friends of baader, stood aloof. the elder windischmann, whom he particularly esteemed, and who acted in germany as the interpreter of de maistre, had hailed hegel as a pioneer of sound philosophy, with whom he agreed both in thought and word. döllinger had no such condescension. hegel remained, in his _eyes_, the strongest of all the enemies of religion, the guide of tübingen in its aberrations, the reasoner whose abstract dialectics made a generation of clever men incapable of facing facts. he went on preferring former historians of dogma, who were untainted by the trail of pantheism, baumgarten-crusius, and even muenscher, and by no means admitted that baur was deeper than the early jesuits and oratorians, or gained more than he lost by constriction in the hegelian coil. he took pleasure in pointing out that the best recent book on the penitential system, kliefoth's fourth volume, owed its substance to morinus. the dogmas of pantheistic history offended him too much to give them deep study, and he was ill prepared with counsel for a wanderer lost in the pervading haze. hegelians said of him that he lacked the constructive unity of idea, and knew the way from effect to cause, but not from cause to law. his own lectures on the philosophy of religion, which have left no deep furrow, have been praised by ketteler, who was not an undiscriminating admirer. he sent on one of his pupils to rosmini, and set another to begin metaphysics with suarez; and when lady ashburton consulted him on the subject, he advised her to read norris and malebranche. he encouraged the study of remoter luminaries, such as cusa and raymundus, whose _natural theology_ he preferred to the _analogy_; and would not have men overlook some who are off the line, like postel. but although he deemed it the mark of inferiority to neglect a grain of the gold of obsolete and eccentric writers, he always assigned to original speculation a subordinate place, as a good servant but a bad master, without the certainty and authority of history. what one of his english friends writes of a divine they both admired, might fitly be applied to him: he was a disciple in the school of bishop butler, and had learned as a first principle to recognise the limitations of human knowledge, and the unphilosophical folly of trying to round off into finished and pretentious schemes our fragmentary yet certain notices of our own condition and of god's dealing with it. he alarmed archer gurney by saying that all hope of an understanding is at an end, if logic be applied for the rectification of dogma, and to dr. plummer, who acknowledged him as the most capable of modern theologians and historians, he spoke of the hopelessness of trying to discover the meaning of terms used in definitions. to his archbishop he wrote that men may discuss the mysteries of faith to the last day without avail; "we stand here on the solid ground of history, evidence, and fact." expressing his innermost thought, that religion exists to make men better, and that the ethical quality of dogma constitutes its value, he once said: "tantum valet quantum ad corrigendum, purgandum, sanctificandum hominem confert." in theology as an intellectual exercise, beyond its action on the soul, he felt less interest, and those disputes most satisfied him which can be decided by appeal to the historian. from his early reputation and his position at the outpost, confronting protestant science, he was expected to make up his mind over a large area of unsettled thought and disputed fact, and to be provided with an opinion--a freehold opinion of his own--and a reasoned answer to every difficulty. people had a right to know what he knew about the end of the sixteenth chapter of st. mark, and the beginning of the eighth chapter of st. john, the lives of st. patrick and the sources of erigena, the author of the _imitation_ and of the _twelve articles_, the _nag's head_ and the _casket letters_. the suspense and poise of the mind, which is the pride and privilege of the unprofessional scholar, was forbidden him. students could not wait for the master to complete his studies; they flocked for dry light of knowledge, for something defined and final, to their keen, grave, unemotional professor, who said sometimes more than he could be sure of, but who was not likely to abridge thought by oracular responses, or to give aphorism for argument. he accepted the necessity of the situation. a time came when everybody was invited, once a week, to put any imaginable question from the whole of church history, and he at once replied. if this was a stimulus to exertion during the years spent in mastering and pondering the immense materials, it served less to promote originality and care than premature certitude and the craving for quick returns. apart from the constant duty of teaching, his knowledge might not have been so extensive, but his views would have been less decided and therefore less liable to change. as an historian, döllinger regarded christianity as a force more than as a doctrine, and displayed it as it expanded and became the soul of later history. it was the mission and occupation of his life to discover and to disclose how this was accomplished, and to understand the history of civilised europe, religious and profane, mental and political, by the aid of sources which, being original and authentic, yielded certainty. in his vigorous prime, he thought that it would be within his powers to complete the narrative of the conquest of the world by christ in a single massive work. the separated churches, the centrifugal forces, were to have been treated apart, until he adopted the ampler title of a history of christianity. we who look back upon all that the combined and divided labour of a thousand earnest, gifted, and often instructed men has done and left undone in sixty years, can estimate the scientific level of an age where such a dream could be dreamed by such a man, misled neither by imagination nor ambition, but knowing his own limitations and the immeasurable world of books. experience slowly taught him that he who takes all history for his province is not the man to write a compendium. the four volumes of _church history_ which gave him a name in literature appeared between 1833 and 1838, and stopped short of the reformation. in writing mainly for the horizon of seminaries, it was desirable to eschew voyages of discovery and the pathless border-land. the materials were all in print, and were the daily bread of scholars. a celebrated anglican described döllinger at that time as more intentional than fleury; while catholics objected that he was a candid friend; and lutherans, probing deeper, observed that he resolutely held his ground wherever he could, and as resolutely abandoned every position that he found untenable. he has since said of himself that he always spoke sincerely, but that he spoke as an advocate--a sincere advocate who pleaded only for a cause which he had convinced himself was just. the cause he pleaded was the divine government of the church, the fulfilment of the promise that it would be preserved from error, though not from sin, the uninterrupted employment of the powers committed by christ for the salvation of man. by the absence of false arts he acquired that repute for superior integrity which caused a tyrolese divine to speak of him as the most chivalrous of the catholic celebrities; and the nuncio who was at munich during the first ten years called him the "professeur le plus éclaire, le plus religieux, en un mot le plus distingué de l'université." taking his survey from the elevation of general history, he gives less space to all the early heresies together than to the rise of mohammedanism. his way lies between neander, who cares for no institutions, and baur, who cares for no individuals. he was entirely exempt from that impersonal idealism which sybel laid down at the foundation of his review, which causes delbrück to complain that macaulay, who could see facts so well, could not see that they are revelations, which baur defines without disguise in his _dreieinigkeitslehre_: "alle geschichtlichen personen sind für uns blosse namen." the two posthumous works of hegel which turned events into theories had not then appeared. döllinger, setting life and action above theory, omitted the progress of doctrine. he proposed that möhler should take that share of their common topic, and the plan, entertained at first, was interrupted, with much besides, by death. he felt too deeply the overwhelming unity of force to yield to that atomic theory which was provoked by the hegelian excess: "l'histoire n'est pas un simple jeu d'abstractions, et les hommes y sont plus que les doctrines. ce n'est pas une certaine théorie sur la justification et la rédemption qui a fait la réforme: c'est luther, c'est calvin." but he allows a vast scope to the variable will and character of man. the object of religion upon earth is saintliness, and its success is shown in holy individuals. he leaves law and doctrine, moving in their appointed orbits, to hold up great men and examples of christian virtue. döllinger, who had in youth acted as secretary to hohenlohe, was always reserved in his use of the supernatural. in the vision of constantine and the rebuilding of the temple, he gives his reader both the natural explanation and the miraculous. he thought that the witness of the fathers to the continuance of miraculous powers could not be resisted without making history _a priori_, but later on, the more he sifted and compared authorities, the more severe he became. he deplored the uncritical credulity of the author of the _monks of the west_; and, in examining the stigmata, he cited the experience of a spanish convent where they were so common that it became a sign of reprobation to be without them. historians, he said, have to look for natural causes: enough will remain for the action of providence, where we cannot penetrate. in his unfinished book on _ecclesiastical prophecy_ he enumerates the illusions of mediæval saints when they spoke of the future, and describes them, as he once described carlyle and ruskin, as prophets having nothing to foretell. at frankfort, where he spoilt his watch by depositing it in unexpected holy water, and it was whispered that he had put it there to mend it, everybody knew that there was hardly a catholic in the parliament of whom such a fable could be told with more felicitous unfitness. for twenty years of his life at munich, görres was the impressive central figure of a group reputed far and wide, the most intellectual force in the catholic world. seeing things by the light of other days, nippold and maurenbrecher describe döllinger himself as its most eminent member. there was present gain and future peril in living amongst a clever but restricted set, sheltered, supported, and restrained by friends who were united in aims and studies, who cherished their sympathies and their enmities in common, and who therefore believed that they were divided by no deep cleft or ultimate principle. döllinger never outlived the glamour of the eloquence and ascendancy of görres, and spoke of him long after his death as a man of real knowledge, and of greater religious than political insight between the imaginative rhetorician and the measured, scrutinising scholar, the contrast was wide. one of the many pupils and rare disciples of the former complained that his friend supplied interminable matter for the sterile and unavailing _mystik_, in order to amuse him with ropes of sand: and the severest censure of döllinger's art as an historian was pronounced by görres when he said, "i always see analogies, and you always see differences." at all times, but in his early studies especially, he owed much to the italians, whose ecclesiastical literature was the first that he mastered, and predominates in his church history. several of his countrymen, such as savigny and raumer, had composed history on the shoulders of bolognese and lombard scholars, and some of their most conspicuous successors to the present day have lived under heavy obligations to modena and san marino. during the tranquil century before the revolution, italians studied the history of their country with diligence and success. even such places as parma, verona, brescia, became centres of obscure but faithful work. osimo possessed annals as bulky as rome. the story of the province of treviso was told in twenty volumes. the antiquities of picenum filled thirty-two folios. the best of all this national and municipal patriotism was given to the service of religion. popes and cardinals, dioceses and parish churches became the theme of untiring enthusiasts. there too were the stupendous records of the religious orders, their bulls and charters, their biography and their bibliography. in this immense world of patient, accurate, devoted research, döllinger laid the deep foundations of his historical knowledge. beginning like everybody with baronius and muratori, he gave a large portion of his life to noris, and to the solid and enlightened scholarship that surrounded benedict xiv., down to the compilers, borgia, fantuzzi, marini, with whom, in the evil days of regeneration by the french, the grand tradition died away. he has put on record his judgment that orsi and saccarelli were the best writers on the general history of the church. afterwards, when other layers had been superposed, and the course he took was his own, he relied much on the canonists, ballerini and berardi; and he commended bianchi, de bennettis, and the author of the anonymous _confutazione_, as the strongest roman antidote to blondel, buckeridge, and barrow. italy possessed the largest extant body of catholic learning; the whole sphere of church government was within its range, and it enjoyed something of the official prerogative. next to the italians he gave systematic attention to the french. the conspicuous gallicans, the jansenists, from whom at last he derived much support, richer, van espen, launoy, whom he regarded as the original of bossuet, arnauld, whom he thought his superior, are absent from his pages. he never overcame his distrust of pascal, for his methodical scepticism and his endeavour to dissociate religion from learning; and he rated high daniel's reply to the _provinciales_. he esteemed still more the french protestants of the seventeenth century, who transformed the system of geneva and dort. english theology did not come much in his way until he had made himself at home with the italians and the primary french. then it abounded. he gathered it in quantities on two journeys in 1851 and 1858, and he possessed the english divines in perfection, at least down to whitby, and the nonjurors. early acquaintance with sir edward vavasour and lord clifford had planted a lasting prejudice in favour of the english catholic families, which sometimes tinged his judgments. the neglected literature of the catholics in england held a place in his scheme of thought, which it never obtained in the eyes of any other scholar, native or foreign. this was the only considerable school of divines who wrote under persecution, and were reduced to an attitude of defence. in conflict with the most learned, intelligent, and conciliatory of controversialists, they developed a remarkable spirit of moderation, discriminating inferior elements from the original and genuine growth of catholic roots; and their several declarations and manifestoes, from the restoration onwards, were an inexhaustible supply for irenics. therefore they powerfully attracted one who took the words of st vincent of lérins not merely for a flash of illumination, but for a scientific formula and guiding principle. few writers interested him more deeply than stapleton, davenport, who anticipated number xc., irishmen, such as caron and walshe, and the scots, barclay, the adversary and friend of bellarmine, ramsay, the convert and recorder of fénelon. it may be that, to an intellect trained in the historic process, stability, continuity, and growth were terms of more vivid and exact significance than to the doctors of pont-à-mousson and lambspring. but when he came forward arrayed in the spoils of italian libraries and german universities, with the erudition of centuries and the criticism of to-day, he sometimes was content to follow where forgotten benedictines or franciscans had preceded, under the later stuarts. he seldom quotes contemporary germans, unless to dispute with them, prefers old books to new, and speaks of the necessary revision and renovation of history. he suspected imported views and foregone conclusions even in neander; and although he could not say, with macaulay, that gieseler was a rascal, of whom he had never heard, he missed no opportunity of showing his dislike for that accomplished artificer in mosaic. looking at the literature before him, at england, with gibbon for its one ecclesiastical historian; at germany, with the most profound of its divines expecting the church to merge in the state, he inferred that its historic and organic unity would only be recognised by catholic science, while the soundest protestant would understand it least. in later years, kliefoth, ritschl, gass, perhaps also dorner and uhlhorn, obliged him to modify an opinion which the entire school of schleiermacher, including the illustrious rothe, served only to confirm. germany, as he found it when he began to see the world, little resembled that of his old age, when the work he had pursued for seventy years was carried forward, with knowledge and power like his own, by the best of his countrymen. the proportion of things was changed. there was a religious literature to be proud of, to rely on: other nations, other epochs, had lost their superiority. as his own people advanced, and dominated in the branches of learning to which his life was given, in everything except literary history and epigraphies, and there was no more need to look abroad, döllinger's cosmopolitan characteristic diminished, he was more absorbed in the national thought and work, and did not object to be called the most german of the germans. the idea that religious science is not so much science as religion, that it should be treated differently from other matters, so that he who treats it may rightly display his soul, flourished in his vicinity, inspiring the lives of saint elizabeth and joan of arc, möhler's fine lectures on the early fathers, and the book which gratry chose to entitle a _commentary on st. matthew_. döllinger came early to the belief that history ought to be impersonal, that the historian does well to keep out of the way, to be humble and self-denying, making it a religious duty to prevent the intrusion of all that betrays his own position and quality, his hopes and wishes. without aspiring to the calm indifference of ranke, he was conscious that, in early life, he had been too positive, and too eager to persuade. the belgian scholar who, conversing with him in 1842, was reminded of fénelon, missed the acuter angles of his character. he, who in private intercourse sometimes allowed himself to persist, to contradict, and even to baffle a bore by frankly falling asleep, would have declined the evocation of versailles. but in reasonableness, moderation, and charity, in general culture of mind and the sense of the demands of the progress of civilisation, in the ideal church for which he lived, he was more in harmony with fénelon than with many others who resembled him in the character of their work. he deemed it catholic to take ideas from history, and heresy to take them into it. when men gave evidence for the opposite party, and against their own, he willingly took for impartiality what he could not always distinguish from indifference or subdivision. he felt that sincere history was the royal road to religious union, and he specially cultivated those who saw both sides. he would cite with complacency what clever jesuits, raynaud and faure, said for the reformation, mariana and cordara against their society. when a rhenish catholic and a genevese calvinist drew two portraits of calvin which were virtually the same, or when, in ficker's revision of böhmer, the catholic defended the emperor frederic ii. against the protestant, he rejoiced as over a sign of the advent of science. as the middle ages, rescued from polemics by the genial and uncritical sympathy of müller, became an object of popular study, and royer collard said of villemain, _il a fait, il fait, et il fera toujours son grégoire vii._, there were catholics who desired, by a prolonged _sorites_, to derive advantage from the new spirit. wiseman consulted döllinger for the purpose. "will you be kind enough to write me a list of what you consider the best books for the history of the reformation; menzel and buchholz i know; especially any exposing the characters of the leading reformers?" in the same frame of mind he asked him what pope there was whose good name had not been vindicated; and döllinger's reply, that boniface viii. wanted a friend, prompted both wiseman's article and tosti's book. in politics, as in religion, he made the past a law for the present, and resisted doctrines which are ready-made, and are not derived from experience. consequently, he undervalued work which would never have been done from disinterested motives; and there were three of his most eminent contemporaries whom he decidedly underestimated. having known thiers, and heard him speak, he felt profoundly the talent of the extraordinary man, before lanfrey or taine, häusser and bernhardt had so ruined his credit among germans that döllinger, disgusted by his advocacy, whether of the revolution, of napoleon, or of france, neglected his work. stahl claims to be accounted an historian by his incomparably able book on the church government of the reformation. as a professor at munich, and afterwards as a parliamentary leader at berlin, he was always an avowed partisan. döllinger depreciated him accordingly, and he had the mortification that certain remarks on the sovereign dialectician of european conservatism were on the point of appearing when he died. he so far made it good in his preface that the thing was forgotten when gerlach came to see the assailant of his friend. but once, when i spoke of stahl as the greatest man born of a jewish mother since titus, he thought me unjust to disraeli. most of all, he misjudged macaulay, whose german admirers are not always in the higher ranks of literature, and of whom ranke even said that he could hardly be called an historian at all, tried by the stricter test. he had no doubt seen how his unsuggestive fixity and assurance could cramp and close a mind; and he felt more beholden to the rivals who produced d'adda, barillon, and bonnet, than to the author of so many pictures and so much bootless decoration. he tendered a course of bacon's essays, or of butler's and newman's sermons, as a preservative against intemperate dogmatism. he denounced macaulay's indifference to the merits of the inferior cause, and desired more generous treatment of the jacobites and the french king. he deemed it hard that a science happily delivered from the toils of religious passion should be involved in political, and made to pass from the sacristy to the lobby, by the most brilliant example in literature. to the objection that one who celebrates the victory of parliaments over monarchs, of democracy over aristocracy, of liberty over authority, declares, not the tenets of a party, but manifest destiny and the irrevocable decree, he would reply that a narrow induction is the bane of philosophy, that the ways of providence are not inscribed on the surface of things, that religion, socialism, militarism, and revolution possibly reserve a store of cogent surprises for the economist, utilitarian, and whig. in 1865 he was invited to prepare a new edition of his church history. whilst he was mustering the close ranks of folios which had satisfied a century of historians, the world had moved, and there was an increase of raw material to be measured by thousands of volumes. the archives which had been sealed with seven seals had become as necessary to the serious student as his library. every part of his studies had suffered transformation, except the fathers, who had largely escaped the crucible, and the canon law, which had only just been caught by the historical current. he had begun when niebuhr was lecturing at bonn and hegel at berlin; before tischendorf unfolded his first manuscript; before baur discovered the tübingen hypothesis in the congregation of corinth; before rothe had planned his treatise on the primitive church, or ranke had begun to pluck the plums for his modern popes. guizot had not founded the _école des chartes_, and the school of method was not yet opened at berlin. the application of instruments of precision was just beginning, and what prynne calls the heroic study of records had scarcely molested the ancient reign of lives and chronicles. none had worked harder at his science and at himself than döllinger; and the change around him was not greater than the change within. in his early career as a teacher of religion he had often shrunk from books which bore no stamp of orthodoxy. it was long before he read sarpi or the _lettres provinciales_, or even ranke's _popes_, which appeared when he was thirty-five, and which astonished him by the serene ease with which a man who knew so much touched on such delicate ground. the book which he had written in that state of mind, and with that conception of science and religion, had only a prehistoric interest for its author. he refused to reprint it, and declared that there was hardly a sentence fit to stand unchanged. he lamented that he had lost ten years of life in getting his bearings, and in learning, unaided, the most difficult craft in the world. those years of apprenticeship without a master were the time spent on his _kirchengeschichte_. the want of training remained. he could impart knowledge better than the art of learning. thousands of his pupils have acquired connected views of religion passing through the ages, and gathered, if they were intelligent, some notion of the meaning of history; but nobody ever learnt from him the mechanism by which it is written. brougham advised the law-student to begin with dante; and a distinguished physician informs us that gibbon, grote, and mill made him what he is. the men to whom döllinger owed his historic insight and who mainly helped to develop and strengthen and direct his special faculty, were not all of his own cast, or remarkable in the common description of literary talent. the assistants were countless, but the masters were few, and he looked up with extraordinary gratitude to men like sigonius, antonius augustinus, blondel, petavius, leibniz, burke, and niebuhr, who had opened the passes for him as he struggled and groped in the illimitable forest. he interrupted his work because he found the materials too scanty for the later middle ages, and too copious for the reformation. the defective account of the albigensian theology, which he had sent to one of his translators, never appeared in german. at paris he searched the library for the missing information, and he asked rességuier to make inquiry for the records of the inquisition in languedoc, thus laying the foundations of that _sektengeschichte_ which he published fifty years later. munich offered such inexhaustible supplies for the reformation that his collections overran all bounds. he completed only that part of his plan which included lutheranism and the sixteenth century. the third volume, published in 1848, containing the theology of the reformation, is the most solid of his writings. he had miscalculated, not his resources, of which only a part had come into action, but the possibilities of concentration and compression. the book was left a fragment when he had to abandon his study for the frankfort barricades. the peculiarity of his treatment is that he contracts the reformation into a history of the doctrine of justification. he found that this and this alone was the essential point in luther's mind, that he made it the basis of his argument, the motive of his separation, the root and principle of his religion. he believed that luther was right in the cardinal importance he attributed to this doctrine in his system, and he in his turn recognised that it was the cause of all that followed, the source of the reformer's popularity and success, the sole insurmountable obstacle to every scheme of restoration. it was also, for him, the centre and the basis of his antagonism. that was the point that he attacked when he combated protestantism, and he held all other elements of conflict cheap in comparison, deeming that they are not invariable, or not incurable, or not supremely serious. apart from this, there was much in protestantism that he admired, much in its effects for which he was grateful. with the lutheran view of imputation, protestant and catholic were separated by an abyss. without it, there was no lasting reason why they should be separate at all. against the communities that hold it he stood in order of battle, and believed that he could scarcely hit too hard. but he distinguished very broadly the religion of the reformers from the religion of protestants. theological science had moved away from the symbolical books, the root dogma had been repudiated and contested by the most eminent protestants, and it was an english bishop who wrote: "fuit haec doctrina jam a multis annis ipsissimum reformatae ecclesiae opprobrium ac dedecus.--est error non levis, error putidissimus." since so many of the best writers resist or modify that which was the main cause, the sole ultimate cause, of disunion, it cannot be logically impossible to discover a reasonable basis for discussion. therefore conciliation was always in his thoughts; even his _reformation_ was a treatise on the conditions of reunion. he long purposed to continue it, in narrower limits, as a history of that central doctrine by which luther meant his church to stand or fall, of the reaction against it, and of its decline. in 1881, when ritschl, the author of the chief work upon the subject, spent some days with döllinger, he found him still full of these ideas, and possessing luther at his fingers' ends. this is the reason why protestants have found him so earnest an opponent and so warm a friend. it was this that attracted him towards anglicans, and made very many of them admire a roman dignitary who knew the anglo-catholic library better than de lugo or ripalda. in the same spirit he said to pusey: "tales cum sitis jam nostri estis," always spoke of newman's _justification_ as the greatest masterpiece of theology that england has produced in a hundred years, and described baxter and wesley as the most eminent of english protestants--meaning wesley as he was after 1st december 1767, and baxter as the life-long opponent of that theory which was the source and the soul of the reformation. several englishmen who went to consult him--hope scott and archdeacon wilberforce--became catholics. i know not whether he urged them. others there were, whom he did not urge, though his influence over them might have been decisive. in a later letter to pusey he wrote: "i am convinced by reading your _eirenicon_ that we are united inwardly in our religious convictions, although externally we belong to two separated churches." he followed attentively the parallel movements that went on in his own country, and welcomed with serious respect the overtures which came to him, after 1856, from eminent historians. when they were old men, he and ranke, whom, in hot youth, there was much to part, lived on terms of mutual goodwill. döllinger had pronounced the theology of the _deutsche reformation_ slack and trivial, and ranke at one moment was offended by what he took for an attack on the popes, his patrimony. in 1865, after a visit to munich, he allowed that in religion there was no dispute between them, that he had no fault to find with the church as döllinger understood it. he added that one of his colleagues, a divine whose learning filled him with unwonted awe, held the same opinion. döllinger's growing belief that an approximation of part of germany to sentiments of conciliation was only a question of time, had much to do with his attitude in church questions after the year 1860. if history cannot confer faith or virtue, it can clear away the misconceptions and misunderstandings that turn men against one another. with the progress of incessant study and meditation his judgment on many points underwent revision; but with regard to the reformation the change was less than he supposed. he learnt to think more favourably of the religious influence of protestantism, and of its efficacy in the defence of christianity; but he thought as before of the spiritual consequences of lutheranism proper. when people said of luther that he does not come well out of his matrimonial advice to certain potentates, to henry and to philip, of his exhortations to exterminate the revolted peasantry, of his passage from a confessor of toleration to a teacher of intolerance, he would not have the most powerful conductor of religion that christianity has produced in eighteen centuries condemned for two pages in a hundred volumes. but when he had refused the test of the weakest link, judging the man by his totals, he was not less severe on his theological ethics. meinerseits habe ich noch eine andre schwere anklage gegen ihn zu erheben, nämlich die, dass er durch seine falsche imputationslehre das sittlich-religiöse bewusstseyn der menschen auf zwei jahrhunderte hinaus verwirrt und corrumpirt hat (3rd july 1888). the revolution of 1848, during which he did not hold his professorship, brought him forward uncongenially in active public life, and gave him the means of telling the world his view of the constitution and policy of the church, and the sense and limits of liability in which he gave his advocacy. when lecturing on canon law he was accustomed to dwell on the strict limit of all ecclesiastical authority, admitting none but spiritual powers, and invoking the maxims of pontiffs who professed themselves guardians, not masters, of the established legislation--"canones ecclesiae solvere non possumus, qui custodes canonum sumus." acting on these principles, in the paulskirche, and at ratisbon, he vindicated rome against the reproach of oppression, argued that society can only gain by the emancipation of the church, as it claims no superiority over the state, and that both gallicans and jesuits are out of date. addressing the bishops of germany in secret session at würzburg, he exhorted them to avail themselves fully of an order of things which was better than the old, and to make no professions of unconditional allegiance. he told them that freedom is the breath of the catholic life, that it belongs to the church of god by right divine, and that whatever they claimed must be claimed for others. from these discourses, in which the scholar abandoned the details by which science advances for the general principles of the popular orator, the deductions of liberalism proceed as surely as the revolution from the title-page of sieyès. it should seem that the key to his career lies there. it was natural to associate him with the men whom the early promise of a reforming pope inspired to identify the cause of free societies with the papacy which had rosmini for an adviser, ventura for a preacher, gioberti for a prophet, and to conclude that he thus became a trusted representative, until the revolving years found him the champion of a vanished cause, and the syllabus exposed the illusion and bore away his ideal. harless once said of him that no good could be expected from a man surrounded by a ring of liberals. when döllinger made persecution answer both for the decline of spain and the fall of poland, he appeared to deliver the common creed of whigs; and he did not protest against the american who called him the acknowledged head of the liberal catholics. his hopefulness in the midst of the movement of 1848, his ready acquiescence in the fall of ancient powers and institutions, his trust in rome, and in the abstract rights of germans, suggested a reminiscence of the _avenir_ in 1830. lamennais, returning with montalembert after his appeal to rome, met lacordaire at munich, and during a banquet given in their honour he learnt, privately, that he was condemned. the three friends spent that afternoon in döllinger's company; and it was after he had left them that lamennais produced the encyclical and said: _dieu a parlé_. montalembert soon returned, attracted as much by munich art as by religion or literature. the fame of the bavarian school of catholic thought spread in france among those who belonged to the wider circles of the _avenir_; and priests and laymen followed, as to a scientific shrine. in the _memoires d'un royaliste_ falloux has preserved, with local colour, the spirit of that pilgrimage: munich lui fut indiqué comme le foyer d'une grande rénovation religieuse et artistique. quels nobles et ardents entretiens, quelle passion pour l'eglise et pour sa cause! rien n'a plus ressemblé aux discours d'un portique chrétien que les apologies enflammeés du vieux görres, les savantes déductions de döllinger, la verve originale de brentano. rio, who was the earliest of the travellers, describes döllinger as he found him in 1830: par un privilège dont il serait difficile de citer un autre exemple, il avait la passion des études théologiques comme s'il n'avait été que prêtre, et la passion des études littéraires appliquées aux auteurs anciens et modernes comme s'il n'avait été que littérateur; à quoi il faut ajouter un autre don qu'il y aurait ingratitude à oublier, celui d'une exposition lucide, patiente et presque affectueuse, comme s'il n'avait accumulé tant de connaissances que pour avoir le plaisir de les communiquer. for forty years he remained in correspondence with many of these early friends, who, in the educational struggle which ended with the ministry of falloux in 1850, revived the leading maxims of the rejected master. as lacordaire said, on his deathbed: "la parole de l'avenir avait germé de son tombeau comme une cendre féconde." döllinger used to visit his former visitors in various parts of france, and at paris he attended the salon of madame swetchine. one day, at the seminary, he inquired who were the most promising students; dupanloup pointed out a youth, who was the hope of the church, and whose name was ernest renan. although the men who were drawn to him in this way formed the largest and best-defined cluster with which he came in contact, there was more private friendship than mutual action or consultation between them. the unimpassioned german, who had no taste for ideas released from controlling fact, took little pleasure in the impetuous declamation of the breton, and afterwards pronounced him inferior to loyson. neither of the men who were in the confidence of both has intimated that he made any lasting impression on lamennais, who took leave of him without discussing the action of rome. döllinger never sought to renew acquaintance with lacordaire, when he had become the most important man in the church of france. he would have a prejudice to overcome against him whom circourt called the most ignorant man in the academy, who believed that erasmus ended his days at rotterdam, unable to choose between rome and wittemberg, and that the irish obtained through o'connell the right to worship in their own way. he saw more of dupanloup, without feeling, as deeply as renan, the rare charm of the combative prelate. to an exacting and reflective scholar, to whom even the large volume of heavy erudition in which rosmini defended the _cinque piaghe_ seemed superficial, there was incongruity in the attention paid to one of whom he heard that he promoted the council, that he took st. boniface for st wilfrid, and that he gave the memorable advice: _surtout méfiez-vous des sources_. after a visit from the bishop of orleans he sat down in dismay to compose the most elementary of his books. seeing the inferiority of falloux as a historian, he never appreciated the strong will and cool brain of the statesman who overawed tocqueville. eckstein, the obscure but thoughtful originator of much liberal feeling among his own set, encouraged him in the habit of depreciating the attainments of the french clergy, which was confirmed by the writings of the most eminent among them, darboy, and lasted until the appearance of duchesne. the politics of montalembert were so heavily charged with conservatism, that in defiance of such advisers as lacordaire, ravignan, and dupanloup, he pronounced in favour of the author of the _coup d'état_, saying: "je suis pour l'autorité contre la révolte"; and boasted that, in entering the academy he had attacked the revolution, not of '93 but '89, and that guizot, who received him, had nothing to say in reply. there were many things, human and divine, on which they could not feel alike; but as the most urgent, eloquent, and persevering of his catholic friends, gifted with knowledge and experience of affairs, and dwelling in the focus, it may be that on one critical occasion, when religion and politics intermingled, he influenced the working of döllinger's mind. but the plausible reading of his life which explains it by his connection with such public men as montalembert, de decker, and mr. gladstone is profoundly untrue; and those who deem him a liberal in any scientific use of the term, miss the keynote of his work. the political party question has to be considered here, because, in fact, it is decisive. a liberal who thinks his thought out to the end without flinching is forced to certain conclusions which colour to the root every phase and scene of universal history. he believes in upward progress, because it is only recent times that have striven deliberately, and with a zeal according to knowledge, for the increase and security of freedom. he is not only tolerant of error in religion, but is specially indulgent to the less dogmatic forms of christianity, to the sects which have restrained the churches. he is austere in judging the past, imputing not error and ignorance only, but guilt and crime, to those who, in the dark succession of ages, have resisted and retarded the growth of liberty, which he identifies with the cause of morality, and the condition of the reign of conscience. döllinger never subjected his mighty vision of the stream of time to correction according to the principles of this unsympathising philosophy, never reconstituted the providential economy in agreement with the whig théodicée. he could understand the zoroastrian simplicity of history in black and white, for he wrote: "obgleich man allerdings sagen kann, das tiefste thema der weltgeschichte sei der kampf der knechtschaft oder gebundenheit, mit der freiheit, auf dem intellectuellen, religiösen, politischen und socialen gebiet." but the scene which lay open before his mind was one of greater complexity, deeper design, and infinite intellect. he imagined a way to truth through error, and outside the church, not through unbelief and the diminished reign of christ. lacordaire in the cathedral pulpit offering his thanks to voltaire for the good gift of religious toleration, was a figure alien to his spirit. he never substituted politics for religion as the test of progress, and never admitted that they have anything like the dogmatic certainty and sovereignty of religious, or of physical, science. he had all the liberality that consists of common sense, justice, humanity, enlightenment, the wisdom of canning or guizot. but revolution, as the breach of continuity, as the renunciation of history, was odious to him, and he not only refused to see method in the madness of marat, or dignity in the end of robespierre, but believed that the best measures of leopold, the most intelligent reformer in the era of repentant monarchy, were vitiated and frustrated by want of adaptation to custom. common party divisions represented nothing scientific to his mind; and he was willing, like de quincey, to accept them as corresponding halves of a necessary whole. he wished that he knew half as much as his neighbour, mrs. somerville; but he possessed no natural philosophy, and never acquired the emancipating habit which comes from a life spent in securing progress by shutting one's eyes to the past. "alle wissenschaft steht und ruht auf ihrer historischen entwicklung, sie lebt von ihrer traditionellen vergangenheit, wie der baum von seiner wurzel." he was moved, not by the gleam of reform after the conclave of pius ix., but by pius vii. the impression made upon him by the character of that pope, and his resistance to napoleon, had much to do with his resolution to become a priest. he took orders in the church in the days of revival, as it issued from oppression and the eclipse of hierarchy; and he entered its service in the spirit of sailer, cheverus, and doyle. the mark of that time never left him. when newman asked him what he would say of the pope's journey to paris, for the coronation of the emperor, he hardly recognised the point of the question. he opposed, in 1853, the renewal of that precedent; but to the end he never felt what people mean when they remark on the proximity of notre-dame to vincennes. döllinger was too much absorbed in distant events to be always a close observer of what went on near him; and he was, therefore, not so much influenced by contact with contemporary history as men who were less entirely at home in other centuries. he knew about all that could be known of the ninth: in the nineteenth his superiority deserted him. though he informed himself assiduously his thoughts were not there. he collected from hormayr, radowitz, capponi, much secret matter of the last generation; and where brewer had told him about oxford, and plantier about louis philippe, there were landmarks, as when knoblecher, the missionary, set down krophi and mophi on his map of africa. he deferred, at once, to the competent authority. he consulted his able colleague hermann on all points of political economy, and used his advice when he wrote about england. having satisfied himself, he would not reopen these questions, when, after hermann's death, he spent some time in the society of roscher, a not less eminent economist, and of all men the one who most resembled himself in the historian's faculty of rethinking the thoughts and realising the knowledge, the ignorance, the experience, the illusions of a given time. he had lived in many cities, and had known many important men; he had sat in three parliamentary assemblies, had drawn constitutional amendments, had been consulted upon the policy and the making of ministries, and had declined political office; but as an authority on recent history he was scarcely equal to himself. once it became his duty to sketch the character of a prince whom he had known. there was a report that this sovereign had only been dissuaded from changing his religion and abolishing the constitution by the advice of an archbishop and of a famous parliamentary jurist; and the point of the story was that the protestant doctrinaire had prevented the change of religion, and the archbishop had preserved the constitution. it was too early to elucidate these court mysteries; instead of which there is a remarkable conversation about religion, wherein it is not always clear whether the prince is speaking, or the professor, or schelling. although he had been translated into several languages and was widely known in his own country, he had not yet built himself a european name. at oxford, in 1851, when james mozley asked whom he would like to see, he said, the men who had written in the _christian remembrancer_ on dante and luther. mozley was himself one of the two, and he introduced him to the other at oriel. after thirty-two years, when the writer on dante occupied a high position in the church and had narrowly escaped the highest, that visit was returned. but he had no idea that he had once received döllinger in his college rooms and hardly believed it when told. in germany, the serried learning of the _reformation_, the author's energy and decisiveness in public assemblies, caused him to stand forth as an accepted spokesman, and, for a season, threw back the reticent explorer, steering between the shallows of anger and affection. in that stage the _philosophumena_ found him, and induced him to write a book of controversy in the shape of history. here was an anonymous person who, as newman described it, "calls one pope a weak and venal dunce, and another a sacrilegious swindler, an infamous convict, and an heresiarch _ex cathedrâ_." in the munich faculty there was a divine who affirmed that the church would never get over it. döllinger undertook to vindicate the insulted see of rome; and he was glad of the opportunity to strike a blow at three conspicuous men of whom he thought ill in point both of science and religion. he spoke of gieseler as the flattest and most leathern of historians; he accused baur of frivolity and want of theological conviction; and he wished that he knew as many circumlocutions for untruth as there are arabian synonyms for a camel, that he might do justice to bunsen without violation of courtesy. the weight of the new testimony depended on the discovery of the author. adversaries had assigned it to hippolytus, the foremost european writer of the time, venerated as a saint and a father of the church. döllinger thought them right, and he justified his sincerity by giving further reasons for a conclusion which made his task formidable even for such dexterity as his own. having thus made a concession which was not absolutely inevitable, he resisted the inference with such richness of illustration that the fears of the doubting colleague were appeased. in france, by pitra's influence, the book was reviewed without making known that it supported the authorship of hippolytus, which is still disputed by some impartial critics, and was always rejected by newman. _hippolytus und kallistus_, the high-water mark of döllinger's official assent and concurrence, came out in 1853. his next book showed the ebb. he came originally from the romantic school, where history was honeycombed with imagination and conjecture; and the first important book he gave to a pupil in 1850 was creuzer's _mythology_. in 1845 he denounced the rationalism of lobeck in investigating the _mysteries_; but in 1857 he preferred him as a guide to those who proceed by analogy. with increase of knowledge had come increase of restraining caution and sagacity. the critical acumen was not greater in the _vorhalle_ that when he wrote on the _philosophumena_, but instead of being employed in a chosen cause, upon fixed lines, for welcome ends, it is applied impartially. ernst von lasaulx, a man of rich and noble intellect, was lecturing next door on the philosophy and religion of greece, and everybody heard about his indistinct mixture of dates and authorities, and the spell which his unchastened idealism cast over students. lasaulx, who brilliantly carried on the tradition of creuzer, who had tasted of the mythology of schelling, who was son-in-law to baader and nephew to görres, wrote a volume on the fall of hellenism which he brought in manuscript and read to döllinger at a sitting. the effect on the dissenting mind of the hearer was a warning; and there is reason to date from those two hours in 1853 a more severe use of materials, and a stricter notion of the influence which the end of an inquiry may lawfully exert on the pursuit of it. _heidenthum und judenthum_, which came out in 1857, gave lasaulx his revenge. it is the most positive and self-denying of histories, and owes nothing to the fancy. the author refused the aid of scandinavia to illustrate german mythology, and he was rewarded long after, when caspari of christiania and conrad maurer met at his table and confirmed the discoveries of bugge. but the account of paganism ends with a significant parallel. in december 69 a torch flung by a soldier burnt the temple on the capitol to the ground. in august 70 another roman soldier set fire to the temple on mount sion. the two sanctuaries perished within a year, making way for the faith of men still hidden in the back streets of rome. when the hellenist read this passage it struck him deeply. then he declared that it was hollow. all was over at jerusalem; but at rome the ruin was restored, and the smoke of sacrifice went up for centuries to come from the altar of capitoline jove. in this work, designed as an introduction to christian history, the apologist betrays himself when he says that no greek ever objected to slavery, and when, out of 730 pages on paganism, half a page is allotted to the moral system of aristotle. that his aristotelian chapter was weak, the author knew; but he said that it was not his text to make more of it. he did not mean that a christian divine may be better employed than in doing honour to a heathen; but, having to narrate events and the action of causes, he regarded christianity more as an organism employing sacramental powers than as a body of speculative ideas. to cast up the total of moral and religious knowledge attained by seneca, epictetus, and plutarch, to measure the line and rate of progress since socrates, to compare the point reached by hermas and justin, is an inquiry of the highest interest for writers yet to come. but the quantitative difference of acquired precept between the later pagan and the early christian is not the key to the future. the true problem is to expose the ills and errors which christ, the healer, came to remove. the measure must be taken from the depth of evil from which christianity had to rescue mankind, and its history is more than a continued history of philosophical theories. newman, who sometimes agreed with döllinger in the letter, but seldom in the spirit, and who distrusted him as a man in whom the divine lived at the mercy of the scholar, and whose burden of superfluous learning blunted the point and the edge of his mind, so much liked what he heard of this book that, being unable to read it, he had it translated at the oratory. the work thus heralded never went beyond the first volume, completed in the autumn of 1860, which was received by the _kirchenzeitung_ of berlin as the most acceptable narrative of the founding of christianity, and as the largest concession ever made by a catholic divine. the author, following the ancient ways, and taking, with reuss, the new testament as it stands, made no attempt to establish the position against modern criticism. up to this, prescription and tradition held the first place in his writings, and formed his vantage-ground in all controversy. his energy in upholding the past as the rule and measure of the future distinguished him even among writers of his own communion. in _christenthum und kirche_ he explained his theory of development, under which flag the notion of progress penetrates into theology, and which he held as firmly as the balancing element of perpetuity: "in dem maass als dogmenhistorische studien mehr getrieben werden, wird die absolute innere nothwendigkeit und wahrheit der sache immer allegingr einleuchten." he conceived no bounds to the unforeseen resources of christian thought and faith. a philosopher in whose works he would not have expected to find the scientific expression of his own idea, has a passage bearing close analogy to what he was putting forward in 1861: it is then in the change to a higher state of form or composition that development differs from growth. we must carefully distinguish development from mere increase; it is the acquiring, not of greater bulk, but of new forms and structures, which are adapted to higher conditions of existence. it is the distinction which uhhorn draws between the terms _entfaltung_ and _entwickelung_. just then, after sixteen years spent in the church of rome, newman was inclined to guard and narrow his theory. on the one hand he taught that the enactments and decisions of ecclesiastical law are made on principles and by virtue of prerogatives which _jam antea latitavere_ in the church of the apostles and fathers. but he thought that a divine of the second century on seeing the roman catechism, would have recognised his own belief in it, without surprise, as soon as he understood its meaning. he once wrote: "if i have said more than this, i think i have not worked out my meaning, and was confused--whether the minute facts of history will bear me out in this view, i leave to others to determine." döllinger would have feared to adopt a view for its own sake, without knowing how it would be borne out by the minute facts of history. his own theory of development had not the same ingenious simplicity, and he thought newman's brilliant book unsound in detail. but he took high ground in asserting the undeviating fidelity of catholicism to its principle. in this, his last book on the primitive church, as in his early lectures, he claims the unswerving unity of faith as a divine prerogative. in a memorable passage of the _symbolik_ möhler had stated that there is no better security than the law which pervades human society, which preserves harmony and consistency in national character, which makes lutheranism perpetually true to luther, and islamism to the koran. speaking in the name of his own university, the rector described him as a receptive genius. part of his career displays a quality of assimilation, acquiescence, and even adaptation, not always consistent with superior originality or intense force of character. his _reformation_, the strongest book, with the _symbolik_, which catholics had produced in the century, was laid down on known lines, and scarcely effected so much novelty and change as the writings of kampschulte and kolde. his book on the first age of the church takes the critical points as settled, without special discussion. he appeared to receive impulse and direction, limit and colour, from his outer life. his importance was achieved by the force within. circumstances only conspired to mould a giant of commonplace excellence and average ideas, and their influence on his view of history might long be traced. no man of like spirituality, of equal belief in the supreme dignity of conscience, systematically allowed as much as he did for the empire of chance surroundings and the action of home, and school, and place of worship upon conduct. he must have known that his own mind and character as an historian was not formed by effort and design. from early impressions, and a life spent, to his fiftieth year, in a rather unvaried professional circle, he contracted homely habits in estimating objects of the greater world; and his imagination was not prone to vast proportions and wide horizons. he inclined to apply the rules and observation of domestic life to public affairs, to reduce the level of the heroic and sublime; and history, in his hands, lost something both in terror and in grandeur. he acquired his art in the long study of earlier times, where materials are scanty. all that can be known of cæsar or charlemagne, or gregory vii., would hold in a dozen volumes; a library would not be sufficient for charles v. or lewis xvi. extremely few of the ancients are really known to us in detail, as we know socrates, or cicero, or st. augustine. but in modern times, since petrarca, there are at least two thousand actors on the public stage whom we see by the revelations of private correspondence. besides letters that were meant to be burnt, there are a man's secret diaries, his autobiography and table-talk, the recollections of his friends, self-betraying notes on the margins of books, the report of his trial if he is a culprit, and the evidence for beatification if he is a saint. here we are on a different footing, and we practise a different art when dealing with phocion or dunstan, or with richelieu or swift. in one case we remain perforce on the surface of character, which we have not the means of analysing: we have to be content with conjecture, with probable explanations and obvious motives. we must constantly allow the benefit of the doubt, and reserve sentence. the science of character comes in with modern history. döllinger had lived too long in the ages during which men are seen mostly in outline, and never applied an historical psychology distinct from that of private experience. great men are something different from an enlarged repetition of average and familiar types, and the working and motive of their minds is in many instances the exact contrary of ordinary men, living to avoid contingencies of danger, and pain, and sacrifice, and the weariness of constant thinking and far-seeing precaution. we are apt to judge extraordinary men by our own standard, that is to say, we often suppose them to possess, in an extraordinary degree, those qualities which we are conscious of in ourselves or others. this is the easiest way of conceiving their characters, but not the truest they differ in kind rather than in degree. we cannot understand cromwell or shaftesbury, sunderland or penn, by studies made in the parish. the study of intricate and subtle character was not habitual with döllinger, and the result was an extreme dread of unnecessary condemnation. he resented being told that ferdinand i. and ii., that henry iii. and lewis xiii. were, in the coarse terms of common life, assassins; that elizabeth tried to have mary made away with, and that mary, in matters of that kind, had no greater scruples; that william iii. ordered the extirpation of a clan, and rewarded the murderers as he had rewarded those of de witt; that lewis xiv. sent a man to kill him, and james ii. was privy to the assassination plot. when he met men less mercifully given than himself, he said that they were hanging judges with a malthusian propensity to repress the growth of population. this indefinite generosity did not disappear when he had long outgrown its early cause. it was revived, and his view of history was deeply modified, in the course of the great change in his attitude in the church which took place between the years 1861 and 1867. döllinger used to commemorate his visit to rome in 1857 as an epoch of emancipation. he had occasionally been denounced; and a keen eye had detected latent pantheism in his _vorhalle_, but he had not been formally censured. if he had once asserted the value of nationality in the church, he was vehement against it in religion; and if he had joined in deprecating the dogmatic decree in 1854, he was silent afterwards. by protestants he was still avoided as the head and front of offending ultramontanism; and when the historical commission was instituted at munich, by disciples of the berlin school, he was passed over at first, and afterwards opposed. when public matters took him to berlin in 1857, he sought no intercourse with the divines of the faculty. the common idea of his _reformation_ was expressed by kaulbach in a drawing which represented the four chief reformers riding on one horse, pursued by a scavenger with the unmistakable features of their historian. he was received with civility at rome, if not with cordiality. the pope sent to cesena for a manuscript which it was reported that he wished to consult; and his days were spent profitably between the minerva and the vatican, where he was initiated in the mysteries of galileo's tower. it was his fortune to have for pilot and instructor a prelate classified in the pigeon-holes of the wilhelmsstrasse as the chief agitator against the state, "dessen umfangreiches wissen noch durch dessen feinheit und geistige gewandtheit übertroffen wird." he was welcomed by passaglia and schrader at the collegio romano, and enjoyed the privilege of examining san callisto with de rossi for his guide. his personal experience was agreeable, though he strove unsuccessfully to prevent the condemnation of two of his colleagues by the index. there have been men connected with him who knew rome in his time, and whose knowledge moved them to indignation and despair. one bishop assured him that the christian religion was extinct there, and only survived in its forms; and an important ecclesiastic on the spot wrote: _delenda est carthago_. the archives of the culturkampf contain a despatch from a protestant statesman sometime his friend, urging his government to deal with the papacy as they would deal with dahomey. döllinger's impression on his journey was very different. he did not come away charged with visions of scandal in the spiritual order, of suffering in the temporal, or of tyranny in either. he was never in contact with the sinister side of things. theiner's _life of clement the fourteenth_ failed to convince him, and he listened incredulously to his indictment of the jesuits. eight years later theiner wrote to him that he hoped they would now agree better on that subject than when they discussed it in rome. "ich freue mich, dass sie jetzt erkennen, dass mein urtheil über die jesuiten und ihr wirken gerecht war.--im kommenden jahr, so gott will, werden wir uns hoffentlich besser verstehen als im jahr 1857." he thought the governing body unequal to the task of ruling both church and state; but it was the state that seemed to him to suffer from the combination. he was anxious about the political future, not about the future of religion. the persuasion that government by priests could not maintain itself in the world as it is, grew in force and definiteness as he meditated at home on the things he had seen and heard. he was despondent and apprehensive; but he had no suspicion of what was then so near. in the summer of 1859, as the sequel of solferino began to unfold itself, he thought of making his observations known. in november a friend wrote: "je ne me dissimule aucune des misères de tout ordre qui vous ont frappé à rome." for more than a year he remained silent and uncertain, watching the use france would make of the irresistible authority acquired by the defeat of austria and the collapse of government in central italy. the war of 1859, portending danger to the temporal power, disclosed divided counsels. the episcopate supported the papal sovereignty, and a voluntary tribute, which in a few years took shape in tens of millions, poured into the treasury of st. peter. a time followed during which the papacy endeavoured, by a series of connected measures, to preserve its political authority through the aid of its spiritual. some of the most enlightened catholics, dupanloup and montalembert, proclaimed a sort of holy war. some of the most enlightened protestants, guizot and leo, defended the roman government, as the most legitimate, venerable, and necessary of governments. in italy there were ecclesiastics like liverani, tosti, capecelatro, who believed with manzoni that there could be no deliverance without unity, or calculated that political loss might be religious gain. passaglia, the most celebrated jesuit living, and a confidential adviser of the pope, both in dogma and in the preparation of the syllabus, until perrone refused to meet him, quitted the society, and then fled from rome, leaving the inquisition in possession of his papers, in order to combat the use of theology in defence of the temporal power. forty thousand priests, he said, publicly or privately agreed with him; and the diplomatists reported the names of nine cardinals who were ready to make terms with italian unity, of which the pope himself said: "ce serait un beau rêve." in this country, newman did not share the animosity of conservatives against napoleon iii. and his action in italy. when the flood, rising, reached the papal throne, he preserved an embarrassed silence, refusing, in spite of much solicitation, to commit himself even in private. an impatient m.p. took the train down to edgbaston, and began, trying to draw him: "what times we live in, father newman! look at all that is going on in italy."--"yes, indeed! and look at china too, and new zealand!" lacordaire favoured the cause of the italians more openly, in spite of his paris associates. he hoped, by federation, to save the interests of the holy see, but he was reconciled to the loss of provinces, and he required religious liberty at rome. lamoricière was defeated in september 1860, and in february the fortress of gaëta, which had become the last roman outwork, fell. then lacordaire, disturbed in his reasoning by the logic of events, and by an earnest appeal to his priestly conscience, as his biographer says: "ébranlé un moment par une lettre éloquente," broke away from his friends:- que montalembert, notre ami commun, ne voie pas dans ce qui se passe en italie, sauf le mal, un progrès sensible dans ce que nous avons toujours cru le bien de l'église, cela tient à sa nature passionnée. ce qui le domine aujourd'hui c'est la haine du gouvernement français.--dieu se sert de tout, même du despotisme, même de l'égoïsme; et il y a même des choses qu'il ne peut accomplir par des mains tout à fait pures.--qu'y puis-je? me déclarer contre l'italie parce que ses chaînes tombent mal à propos? non assurément: je laisse à d'autres une passion aussi profonde, et j'aime mieux accepter ce que j'estime un bien de quelque part qu'il vienne.--il est vrai que la situation temporelle du pape souffre présentement de la libération de l'italie, et peut-être en souffrira-t-elle encore assez longtemps: mais c'est un malheur qui a aussi ses fins dans la politique mystérieuse de la providence. souffrir n'est pas mourir, c'est quelquefois expier et s'éclairer. this was written on 22nd february 1861. in april döllinger spoke on the roman question in the odeon at munich, and explained himself more fully in the autumn, in the most popular of all his books. the argument of _kirche und kirchen_ was, that the churches which are without the pope drift into many troubles, and maintain themselves at a manifest disadvantage, whereas the church which energetically preserves the principle of unity has a vast superiority which would prevail, but for its disabling and discrediting failure in civil government. that government seemed to him as legitimate as any in the world, and so needful to those for whose sake it was instituted, that if it should be overthrown, it would, by irresistible necessity, be restored. those for whose sake it was instituted were, not the roman people, but the catholic world. that interest, while it lasted, was so sacred, that no sacrifice was too great to preserve it, not even the exclusion of the clerical order from secular office. the book was an appeal to catholics to save the papal government by the only possible remedy, and to rescue the roman people from falling under what the author deemed a tyranny like that of the convention. he had acquired his politics in the atmosphere of 1847, from the potential liberality of men like radowitz, who declared that he would postpone every political or national interest to that of the church, capponi, the last italian federalist, and tocqueville, the minister who occupied rome. his object was not materially different from that of antonelli and mérode, but he sought it by exposing the faults of the papal government during several centuries, and the hopelessness of all efforts to save it from the revolution unless reformed. he wrote to an english minister that it could not be our policy that the head of the catholic church should be subject to a foreign potentate:- das harte wort, mit welchem sie im parlamente den stab über rom gebrochen haben--_hopelessly incurable_, oder _incorrigible_,--kann ich mir nicht aneignen; ich hoffe vielmehr, wie ich es in dem buche dargelegt habe, das gegentheil. an die dauerhaftigkeit eines ganz italien umfassenden piemontesisch-italiänischen reiches glaube ich nicht.--inzwischen tröste ich mich mit dem gedanken, dass in rom zuletzt doch _vexatio dabit intellectum_, und dann wird noch alles gut werden. to these grateful vaticinations his correspondent replied:- you have exhibited the gradual departure of the government in the states of the church from all those conditions which made it tolerable to the sense and reason of mankind, and have, i think, completely justified, in principle if not in all the facts, the conduct of those who have determined to do away with it. the policy of exalting the spiritual authority though at the expense of sacrifices in the temporal, the moderation even in the catalogue of faults, the side blow at the protestants, filling more than half the volume, disarmed for a moment the resentment of outraged rome. the pope, on a report from theiner, spoke of the book as one that might do good. others said that it was pointless, that its point was not where the author meant it to be, that the handle was sharper than the blade. it was made much more clear that the pope had governed badly than that russia or great britain would gain by his supremacy. the cold analysis, the diagnosis by the bedside of the sufferer, was not the work of an observer dazzled by admiration or blinded by affection. it was a step, a first unconscious, unpremeditated step, in the process of detachment. the historian here began to prevail over the divine, and to judge church matters by a law which was not given from the altar. it was the outcome of a spirit which had been in him from the beginning. his english translator had uttered a mild protest against his severe treatment of popes. his censure of the reformation had been not as that of bossuet, but as that of baxter and bull. in 1845 mr. gladstone remarked that he would answer every objection, but never proselytised. in 1848 he rested the claims of the church on the common law, and bade the hierarchy remember that national character is above free will: "die nationalität ist etwas der freiheit des menschlichen willens entrücktes, geheimnissvolles und in ihrem letzen grunde selbst etwas von gott gewolltes." in his _hippolytus_ he began by surrendering the main point, that a man who so vilified the papacy might yet be an undisputed saint. in the _vorhalle_ he flung away a favourite argument, by avowing that paganism developed by its own lines and laws, untouched by christianity, until the second century; and as with the gentiles, so with the sects; he taught, in the suppressed chapter of his history, that their doctrines followed a normal course. and he believed so far in the providential mission of protestantism, that it was idle to talk of reconciliation until it had borne all its fruit. he exasperated a munich colleague by refusing to pronounce whether gregory and innocent had the right to depose emperors, or otho and henry to depose popes; for he thought that historians should not fit theories to facts, but should be content with showing how things worked. much secret and suppressed antagonism found vent in 1858, when one who had been his assistant in writing the _reformation_ and was still his friend, declared that he would be a heretic whenever he found a backing. those with whom he actively coalesced felt at times that he was incalculable, that he pursued a separate line, and was always learning, whilst others busied themselves less with the unknown. this note of distinctness and solitude set him apart from those about him, during his intimacy with the most catholic of anglican prelates, forbes, and with the lamented liddon. and it appeared still more when the denominational barrier of his sympathy was no longer marked, and he, who had stood in the rank almost with de maistre and perrone, found himself acting for the same ends with their enemies, when he delivered a studied eulogy on mignet, exalted the authority of laurent in religious history and of ferrari in civil, and urged the bavarian academy to elect taine, as a writer who had but one rival in france, leaving it to uncertain conjecture whether the man he meant was renan. in theory it was his maxim that a man should guard against his friends. when he first addressed the university as rector, saying that as the opportunity might never come again, he would employ it to utter the thoughts closest to his heart, he exhorted the students to be always true to their convictions and not to yield to surroundings; and he invoked, rightly or wrongly, the example of burke, his favourite among public men, who, turning from his associates to obey the light within, carried the nation with him. a gap was apparent now between the spirit in which he devoted himself to the service of his church and that of the men whom he most esteemed. at that time he was nearly the only german who knew newman well and appreciated the grace and force of his mind. but newman, even when he was angry, assiduously distinguished the pontiff from his court: there will necessarily always be round the pope second-rate people, who are not subjects of that supernatural wisdom which is his prerogative. for myself, certainly i have found myself in a different atmosphere, when i have left the curia for the pope himself. montalembert protested that there were things in _kirche und kirchen_ which he would not have liked to say in public: il est certain que la seconde partie de votre livre déplaira beaucoup, non seulement à rome, mais encore à la très grande majorité des catholiques. je ne sais donc pas si, dans le cas où vous m'eussiez consulté préalablement, j'aurais eu le courage d'infliger cette blessure à mon père et à mes frères. döllinger judged that the prerogative even of natural wisdom was often wanting in the government of the church; and the sense of personal attachment, if he ever entertained it, had worn away in the friction and familiarity of centuries. after the disturbing interlude of the roman question he did not resume the history of christianity. the second century with its fragments of information, its scope for piercing and conjecture, he left to lightfoot. with increasing years he lost the disposition to travel on common ground, impregnably occupied by specialists, where he had nothing of his own to tell; and he preferred to work where he could be a pathfinder. problems of church government had come to the front, and he proposed to retraverse his subject, narrowing it into a history of the papacy. he began by securing his foundations and eliminating legend. he found so much that was legendary that his critical preliminaries took the shape of a history of fables relating to the papacy. many of these were harmless: others were devised for a purpose, and he fixed his attention more and more on those which were the work of design. the question, how far the persistent production of spurious matter had permanently affected the genuine constitution and theology of the church arose before his mind as he composed the _papstfabeln des mittelalters_. he indicated the problem without discussing it. the matter of the volume was generally neutral, but its threatening import was perceived, and twenty-one hostile critics sent reviews of it to one theological journal. since he first wrote on these matters, thirty years earlier, the advance of competitive learning had made it a necessity to revise statements by all accessible lights, and to subject authorities to a closer scrutiny. the increase in the rigour of the obligation might be measured by tischendorf, who, after renewing the text of the new testament in seven editions, had more than three thousand changes to make in the eighth. the old pacific superficial method yielded no longer what would be accepted as certain knowledge. having made himself master of the reconstructive process that was carried on a little apart from the main chain of durable literature, in academic transactions, in dissertations and periodicals, he submitted the materials he was about to use to the exigencies of the day. without it, he would have remained a man of the last generation, distanced by every disciple of the new learning. he went to work with nothing but his trained and organised common sense, starting from no theory, and aiming at no conclusion. if he was beyond his contemporaries in the mass of expedient knowledge, he was not before them in the strictness of his tests, or in sharpness or boldness in applying them. he was abreast as a critic, he was not ahead. he did not innovate. the parallel studies of the time kept pace with his; and his judgments are those which are accepted generally. his critical mind was pliant, to assent where he must, to reject where he must, and to doubt where he must. his submission to external testimony appeared in his panegyric of our indian empire, where he overstated the increase of population. informed of his error by one of his translators, he replied that the figures had seemed incredible also to him, but having verified, he found the statement so positively made that he did not venture to depart from it. if inclination ever swayed his judgment, it was in his despair of extracting a real available buddha from the fables of southern india, which was conquered at last by the ablest of mommsen's pupils. he was less apprehensive than most of his english friends in questions relating to the old testament; and in the new, he was disposed, at times, to allow some force to muratori's fragment as to the person of the evangelist who is least favourable to st. peter; and was puzzled at the zeal of the speaker's commentator as to the second epistle of the apostle. he held to the epistles of st. ignatius with the tenacity of a caroline prelate, and was grateful to de rossi for a chronological point in their favour. he rejected the attacks of lucius on the most valued passages in philo, and stood with gass against weingarten's argument on the life of st. anthony and the origin of monasticism. he resisted overbeck on the epistle to diognetus, and thought ebrard all astray as to the culdees. there was no conservative antiquarian whom he prized higher than le blant: yet he considered ruinart credulous in dealing with acts of early martyrs. a pupil on whose friendship he relied, made an effort to rescue the legends of the conversion of germany; but the master preferred the unsparing demolitions of rettberg. capponi and carl hegel were his particular friends; but he abandoned them without hesitation for scheffer boichorst, the iconoclast of early italian chronicles, and never consented to read the learned reply of da lungo. the _pope fables_ carried the critical inquiry a very little way; but he went on with the subject. after the donation of constantine came the forged decretals, which were just then printed for the first time in an accurate edition. döllinger began to be absorbed in the long train of hierarchical fictions, which had deceived men like gregory vii., st. thomas aquinas, and cardinal bellarmine, which he traced up to the false areopagite, and down to the laminæ granatenses. these studies became the chief occupation of his life; they led to his excommunication in 1871, and carried him away from his early system. for this, neither syllabus nor ecumenical council was needed; neither crimes nor scandals were its distant cause. the history of church government was the influence which so profoundly altered his position. some trace of his researches, at an early period of their progress, appears in what he wrote on the occasion of the vatican council, especially in the fragment of an ecclesiastical pathology which was published under the name of janus. but the history itself, which was the main and characteristic work of his life, and was pursued until the end, was never published or completed. he died without making it known to what extent, within what limit, the ideas with which he had been so long identified were changed by his later studies, and how wide a trench had opened between his earlier and his later life. twenty years of his historical work are lost for history. the revolution in method since he began to write was partly the better use of old authorities, partly the accession of new. döllinger had devoted himself to the one in 1863; he passed to the other in 1864. for definite objects he had often consulted manuscripts, but the harvest was stacked away, and had scarcely influenced his works. in the use and knowledge of unpublished matter he still belonged to the old school, and was on a level with neander. although, in later years, he printed six or seven volumes of inedita, like mai and theiner he did not excel as an editor: and this part of his labours is notable chiefly for its effect on himself. he never went over altogether to men like schottmüller, who said of him that he made no research--_er hat nicht geforscht_--meaning that he had made his mind up about the templars by the easy study of wilkins, michelet, schottmüller himself, and perhaps a hundred others, but had not gone underground to the mines they delved in. fustel de coulanges, at the time of his death, was promoting the election of the bishop of oxford to the institute, on the ground that he surpassed all other englishmen in his acquaintance with manuscripts. döllinger agreed with their french rival in his estimate of our english historian, but he ascribed less value to that part of his acquirements. he assured the bavarian academy that mr. freeman, who reads print, but nevertheless mixes his colours with brains, is the author of the most profound work on the middle ages ever written in this country, and is not only a brilliant writer and a sagacious critic, but the most learned of all our countrymen. ranke once drew a line at 1514, after which, he said, we still want help from unprinted sources. the world had moved a good deal since that cautious innovation, and after 1860, enormous and excessive masses of archive were brought into play. the italian revolution opened tempting horizons. in 1864 döllinger spent his vacation in the libraries of vienna and venice. at vienna, by an auspicious omen, sickel, who was not yet known to greater germany as the first of its mediæval palæographers, showed him the sheets of a work containing 247 carolingian acts unknown to böhmer, who had just died with the repute of being the best authority on imperial charters. during several years döllinger followed up the discoveries he now began. theiner sent him documents from the _archivio segreto_; one of his friends shut himself up at trent, and another at bergamo. strangers ministered to his requirements, and huge quantities of transcripts came to him from many countries. conventional history faded away; the studies of a lifetime suddenly underwent transformation; and his view of the last six centuries was made up from secret information gathered in thirty european libraries and archives. as many things remote from current knowledge grew to be certainties, he became more confident, more independent, and more isolated. the ecclesiastical history of his youth went to pieces against the new criticism of 1863, and the revelation of the unknown which began on a very large scale in 1864. during four years of transition occupied by this new stage of study, he abstained from writing books. whenever some local occasion called upon him to speak, he spoke of the independence and authority of history. in cases of collision with the church, he said that a man should seek the error in himself; but he spoke of the doctrine of the universal church, and it did not appear that he thought of any living voice or present instructor. he claimed no immunity for philosophy; but history, he affirmed, left to itself and pursued disinterestedly, will heal the ills it causes; and it was said of him that he set the university in the place of the hierarchy. some of his countrymen were deeply moved by the measures which were being taken to restore and to confirm the authority of rome; and he had impatient colleagues at the university who pressed him with sharp issues of uncompromising logic. he himself was reluctant to bring down serene research into troublesome disputation, and wished to keep history and controversy apart. his hand was forced at last by his friends abroad. whilst he pursued his isolating investigations he remained aloof from a question which in other countries and other days was a summary and effective test of impassioned controversy. persecution was a problem that had never troubled him. it was not a topic with theoretical germans; the necessary books were hardly available, and a man might read all the popular histories and theologies without getting much further than the spanish inquisition. ranke, averse from what is unpleasant, gave no details. the gravity of the question had never been brought home to döllinger in forty years of public teaching. when he approached it, as late as 1861, he touched lightly, representing the intolerance of protestants to their disadvantage, while that of catholics was a bequest of imperial rome, taken up in an emergency by secular powers, in no way involving the true spirit and practice of the church. with this light footfall the topic which has so powerful a leverage slipped into the current of his thought. the view found favour with ambrose de lisle, who, having read the _letters to a prebendary_, was indignant with those who commit the church to a principle often resisted or ignored. newman would admit to no such compromise: is not the miraculous infliction of judgments upon blasphemy, lying, profaneness, etc., in the apostles' day a sanction of infliction upon the same by a human hand in the times of the inquisition? ecclesiastical rulers may punish with the sword, if they can, and if it is expedient or necessary to do so. the church has a right to make laws and to enforce them with temporal punishments. the question came forward in france in the wake of the temporal power. liberal defenders of a government which made a principle of persecution had to decide whether they approved or condemned it. where was their liberality in one case, or their catholicity in the other? it was the simple art of their adversaries to press this point, and to make the most of it; and a french priest took upon him to declare that intolerance, far from being a hidden shame, was a pride and a glory: "l'eglise regarde l'inquisition comme l'apogée de la civilisation chrétienne, comme le fruit naturel des époques de foi et de catholicisme national." gratry took the other side so strongly that there would have been a tumult at the sorbonne, if he had said from his chair what he wrote in his book; and certain passages were struck out of the printed text by the cautious archbishop's reviser. he was one of those french divines who had taken in fuel at munich, and he welcomed _kirche und kirchen_: "quant au livre du docteur döllinger sur la papauté, c'est, selon moi, le livre décisif. c'est un chef-d'oeuvre admirable à plusieurs égards, et qui est destiné à produire un bien incalculable et à fixer l'opinion sur ce sujet; c'est ainsi que le juge aussi m. de montalembert. le docteur döllinger nous a rendu à tous un grand service." this was not the first impression of montalembert. he deplored the odeon lectures as usurping functions divinely assigned not to professors, but to the episcopate, as a grief for friends and a joy for enemies. when the volume came he still objected to the policy, to the chapter on england, and to the cold treatment of sixtus v. at last he admired without reserve. nothing better had been written since bossuet; the judgment on the roman government, though severe, was just, and contained no more than the truth. there was not a word which he would not be able to sign. a change was going on in his position and his affections, as he came to regard toleration as the supreme affair. at malines he solemnly declared that the inquisitor was as horrible as the terrorist, and made no distinction in favour of death inflicted for religion against death for political motives: "les bûchers allumés par une main catholique me font autant d'horreur que les échafauds où les protestants ont immolé tant de martyrs." wiseman, having heard him once, was not present on the second day; but the belgian cardinal assured him that he had spoken like a sound divine. he described dupanloup's defence of the syllabus as a masterpiece of eloquent subterfuge, and repudiated his _interprétations équivoques_. a journey to spain in 1865 made him more vehement than ever; although, from that time, the political opposition inflamed him less. he did not find imperialism intolerable. his wrath was fixed on the things of which spain had reminded him: "c'est là qu'il faut aller pour voir ce que le catholicisme exclusif a su faire d'une des plus grandes et des plus héroïques nations de la terre.--je rapporte un surcroît d'horreur pour les doctrines fanatiques et absolutistes qui ont cours aujourd'hui chez les catholiques du monde entier." in 1866 it became difficult, by the aid of others, to overcome falloux's resistance to the admission of an article in the _correspondant_, and by the end of the year his friends were unanimous to exclude him. an essay on spain, his last work--"dernier soupir de mon âme indignée et attristée"--was, by dupanloup's advice, not allowed to appear. repelled by those whom he now designated as spurious, servile, and prevaricating liberals, he turned to the powerful german with whom he thought himself in sympathy. he had applauded him for dealing with one thing at a time, in his book on rome: "vous avez bien fait de ne rien dire de l'absolutisme spirituel, quant à présent. _sat prata biberunt_. le reste viendra en son temps." he avowed that spiritual autocracy is worse than political; that evil passions which had triumphed in the state were triumphant in the church; that to send human beings to the stake, with a crucifix before them, was the act of a monster or a maniac. he was dying; but whilst he turned his face to the wall, lamenting that he had lived too long, he wished for one more conference with the old friend with whom, thirty-five years before, in a less anxious time, he had discussed the theme of religion and liberty. this was in february 1867; and for several years he had endeavoured to teach döllinger his clear-cut antagonism, and to kindle in him something of his gloomy and passionate fervour, on the one point on which all depended. döllinger arrived slowly at the contemplation of deeper issues than that of churchmen or laymen in political offices, of roman or german pupils in theological chairs. after seeing baron arnim, in 1865, he lost the hope of saving the papal government, and ceased to care about the things he had contended for in 1861; and a time came when he thought it difficult to give up the temporal power, and yet revere the holy see. he wrote to montalembert that his illusions were failing: "ich bin sehr ernüchtert.--es ist so vieles in der kirche anders gekommen, als ich es mir vor 20-30 jahren gedacht, und rosenfarbig ausgemalt hatte." he learnt to speak of spiritual despotism almost in the words of his friend. the point of junction between the two orders of ideas is the use of fire for the enforcement of religion on which the french were laying all their stress: "in frankreich bewegt sich der gegensatz blos auf dem socialpolitischen gebiete, nicht auf dem theologisch-wissenschaftlichen, weil es dort genau genommen eine theologische wissenschaft nicht gibt" (16th october 1865). the syllabus had not permanently fixed his attention upon it. two years later, the matter was put more definitely, and he found himself, with little real preparation, turning from antiquarian curiosities, and brought face to face with the radical question of life and death. if ever his literary career was influenced by his french alliances, by association with men in the throng, for whom politics decided, and all the learning of the schools did not avail, the moment was when he resolved to write on the inquisition. the popular account which he drew up appeared in the newspapers in the summer of 1867; and although he did not mean to burn his ships, his position as an official defender of the holy see was practically at an end. he wrote rapidly, at short notice, and not in the steady course of progressive acquisition. ficker and winkelmann have since given a different narrative of the step by which the inquisition came into existence; and the praise of gregory x., as a man sincerely religious who kept aloof, was a mark of haste. in the work which he was using, there was no act by that pontiff; but if he had had time to look deeper he would not have found him, in this respect, different from his contemporaries. there is no uncertainty as to the author's feeling towards the infliction of torture and death for religion, and the purpose of his treatise is to prevent the nailing of the catholic colours to the stake. the spirit is that of the early lectures, in which he said: "diese schutzgewalt der kirche ist rein geistlich. sie kann also auch einen solchen öffentlichen hartnäckigen und sonst unheilbaren gegner der kirche nur seiner rein geistlichen kirchlichen rechte berauben." compared with the sweeping vehemence of the frenchmen who preceded, the restrained moderation of language, the abstinence from the use of general terms, leaves us in doubt how far the condemnation extended, and whether he did more, in fact, than deplore a deviation from the doctrine of the first centuries. "kurz darauf trat ein umschwung ein, den man wohl einen abfall von der alten lehre nennen darf, und der sich ausnimmt, als ob die kaiser die lehrmeister der bischöfe geworden seien." he never entirely separated himself in principle from the promoters, the agents, the apologists. he did not believe, with hefele, that the spirit survives, that there are men, not content with eternal flames, who are ready to light up new smithfields. many of the defenders were his intimate friends. the most conspicuous was the only colleague who addressed him with the familiar german _du_. speaking of two or three men, of whom one, martens, had specially attacked the false liberalism which sees no good in the inquisition, he wrote: "sie werden sich noch erinnern ... wie hoch ich solche männer stelle." he differed from them widely, but he differed academically; and this was not the polish or precaution of a man who knows that to assail character is to degrade and to betray one's cause. the change in his own opinions was always before him. although convinced that he had been wrong in many of the ideas and facts with which he started, he was also satisfied that he had been as sincere and true to his lights in 1835 as in 1865. there was no secret about the inquisition, and its observances were published and republished in fifty books; but in his early days he had not read them, and there was not a german, from basel to königsberg, who could have faced a _viva voce_ in the _directorium_ or the _arsenale_, or who had ever read percin or paramo. if lacordaire disconnected st. dominic from the practice of persecution, döllinger had done the same thing before him. weit entfernt, wie man ihm wohl vorgeworfen hat, sich dabei gewalt und verfolgung zu erlauben, oder gar der stifter der inquisition zu werden, wirkte er, nicht den irrenden, sondern den irrthum befehdend, nur durch ruhige belehrung und erörterung. if newman, a much more cautious disputant, thought it substantial truth to say that rome never burnt heretics, there were things as false in his own early writings. if möhler, in the religious wars, diverted attention from catholic to protestant atrocities, he took the example from his friend's book, which he was reviewing. there may be startling matter in locatus and pegna, but they were officials writing under the strictest censorship, and nobody can tell when they express their own private thoughts. there is a copy of suarez on which a priest has written the marginal ejaculation: "mon dieu, ayez pitié de nous!" but suarez had to send the manuscript of his most aggressive book to rome for revision, and döllinger used to insist, on the testimony of his secretary, in walton's _lives_, that he disavowed and detested the interpolations that came back. the french group, unlike him in spirit and motive, but dealing with the same opponents, judged them freely, and gave imperative utterance to their judgments. while döllinger said of veuillot that he meant well, but did much good and much evil, montalembert called him a hypocrite: "l'univers, en déclarant tous les jours qu'il ne veut pas d'autre liberté que la sienne, justifie tout ce que nos pires ennemis ont jamais dit sur la mauvaise foi et l'hypocrisie des polémistes chrétiens." lacordaire wrote to a hostile bishop: "l'univers est à mes yeux la négation de tout esprit chrétien et de tout bon sens humain. ma consolation au milieu de si grandes misères morales est de vivre solitaire, occupé d'une oeuvre que dieu bénit, et de protester par mon silence, et de temps en temps par mes paroles, contre la plus grande insolence qui se soit encore autorisée au nom de jésus-christ." gratry was a man of more gentle nature, but his tone is the same: "esprits faux ou nuls, consciences intellectuelles faussées par l'habitude de l'apologie sans franchise: _partemque ejus cum hypocritis ponet_.--cette école est bien en vérité une école de mensonge.--c'est cette école qui est depuis des siècles, et surtout en ce siècle, l'opprobre de notre cause et le fléau de la religion. voilà notre ennemi commun; voilà l'ennemi de l'eglise." döllinger never understood party divisions in this tragic way. he was provided with religious explanations for the living and the dead; and his maxims in regard to contemporaries governed and attenuated his view of every historical problem. for the writers of his acquaintance who were unfaltering advocates of the holy office, for philips and gams, and for theiner, who expiated devious passages of early youth, amongst other penitential works, with large volumes in honour of gregory xiii., he had always the same mode of defence: "mir begegnet es noch jede woche, dass ich irgend einem irrthum, mitunter einem lange gepflegten, entsage, ihn mir gleichsam aus der brust herausreissen muss. da sollte man freilich höchst duldsam und nachsichtig gegen fremde irrthümer werden" (5th october 1866). he writes in the same terms to another correspondent sixteen years later: "mein ganzes leben ist ein successives abstreifen von irrthümern gewesen, von irrthümern, die ich mit zähigkeit festhielt, gewaltsam gegen die mir aufdämmernde bessere erkenntniss mich stemmend; und doch meine ich sagen zu dürfen, dass ich dabei nicht _dishonest_ war. darf ich andre verurtheilen _in eodem luto mecum haerentes_?" he regretted as he grew old the hardness and severity of early days, and applied the same inconclusive deduction from his own experience to the past. after comparing baronius and bellarmine with bossuet and arnauld he goes on: "wenn ich solche männer auf einem irrthum treffe, so sage ich mir: 'wenn du damals gelebt, und an seiner stelle gestanden wärest, hättest du nicht den allegingn wahn getheilt; und er, wenn er die dir zu theil gewordenen erkenntnissmittel besessen, würde er nicht besseren gebrauch davon gemacht haben, die wahrheit nicht früher erkannt und bekannt haben, als du?'" he sometimes distrusted his favourite argument of ignorance and early prepossessions, and felt that there was presumption and unreality in tendering such explanations to men like the bollandist de buck, de rossi, whom the institute elected in preference to mommsen, or windischmann, whom he himself had been accused of bringing forward as a rival to möhler. he would say that knowledge may be a burden and not a light, that the faculty of doing justice to the past is among the rarest of moral and intellectual gifts: "man kann viel wissen, viele notizen im kopf haben, ohne das rechte wissenschaftliche verständniss, ohne den historischen sinn. dieser ist, wie sie wohl wissen, gar nicht so häufig; und we er fehlt, da fehlt auch, scheint mir, die volle verantwortlichkeit für das gewusste." in 1879 he prepared materials for a paper on the massacre of st. bartholomew. here he was breaking new ground, and verging on that which it was the policy and the aspiration of his life to avoid. many a man who gives no tears to cranmer, servetus, or bruno, who thinks it just that the laws should be obeyed, who deems that actions done by order are excused, and that legality implies morality, will draw the line at midnight murder and wholesale extermination. the deed wrought at paris and in forty towns of france in 1572, the arguments which produced it, the arguments which justified it, left no room for the mists of mitigation and compromise. the passage from the age of gregory ix. to that of gregory xiii., from the crusades to the wars of religion, brought his whole system into jeopardy. the historian who was at the heels of the divine in 1861, and level with him in 1867, would have come to the front. the discourse was never delivered, never composed. but the subject of toleration was absent no more from his thoughts, filling space once occupied by julian of eclanum and duns scotus, the variata and the five propositions. to the last days of 1889 he was engaged in following the doctrines of intolerance back to their root, from innocent iii. to the council of rheims, from nicholas i. to st. augustine, narrowing the sphere of individual responsibility, defending agents, and multiplying degrees so as to make them imperceptible. before the writings of priscillian were published by the vienna academy the nature of their strange contents was disclosed. it then appeared that a copy of the _codex unicus_ had been sent to döllinger from würzburg years before; and that he had never adverted to the fact that the burning of heretics came, fully armed, from the brain of one man, and was the invention of a heretic who became its first victim. at rome he discussed the council of trent with theiner, and tried to obtain permission for him to publish the original acts. pius ix. objected that none of his predecessors had allowed it, and theiner answered that none of them had defined the immaculate conception. in a paper which döllinger drew up, he observed that pallavicini cannot convince; that far from proving the case against the artful servite, the pettiness of his charges indicates that he has no graver fault to find; so that nothing but the production of the official texts can enforce or disprove the imputation that trent was a scene of tyranny and intrigue. his private belief then was that the papers would disprove the imputation and vindicate the council. when theiner found it possible to publish his _acta authentica_, döllinger also printed several private diaries, chiefly from mendham's collection at the bodleian. but the correspondence between rome and the legates is still, in its integrity, kept back. the two friends had examined it; both were persuaded that it was decisive; but they judged that it decided in opposite ways. theiner, the official guardian of the records, had been forbidden to communicate them during the vatican council; and he deemed the concealment prudent. what passed in rome under pius ix. would, he averred, suffer by comparison. according to döllinger, the suppressed papers told against trent. wenn wir nicht allen unseren henotischen hoffnungen entsagen und uns nicht in schweren konflikt mit der alten (vormittel-alterigen) kirche bringen wollen, werden wir doch auch da das korrektiv des vincentianischen prinzips (_semper, ubique, ab omnibus_) zur anwendung bringen müssen. after his last visit to the marciana he thought more favourably of father paul, sharing the admiration which venetians feel for the greatest writer of the republic, and falling little short of the judgments which macaulay inscribed, after each perusal, in the copy at inveraray. apart from his chief work he thought him a great historian, and he rejected the suspicion that he professed a religion which he did not believe. he even fancied that the manuscript, which in fact was forwarded with much secrecy to archbishop abbot, was published against his will. the intermediate seekers, who seem to skirt the border, such as grotius, ussher, praetorius, and the other celebrated venetian, de dominis, interested him deeply, in connection with the subject of irenics, and the religious problem was part motive of his incessant study of shakespeare, both in early life, and when he meditated joining in the debate between simpson, rio, bernays, and the _edinburgh review_. his estimate of his own work was low. he wished to be remembered as a man who had written certain books, but who had not written many more. his collections constantly prompted new and attractive schemes, but his way was strewn with promise unperformed, and abandoned from want of concentration. he would not write with imperfect materials, and to him the materials were always imperfect. perpetually engaged in going over his own life and reconsidering his conclusions, he was not depressed by unfinished work. when a sanguine friend hoped that all the contents of his hundred note-books would come into use, he answered that perhaps they might, if he lived for a hundred and fifty years. he seldom wrote a book without compulsion, or the aid of energetic assistants. the account of mediæval sects, dated 1890, was on the stocks for half a century. the discourse on the templars, delivered at his last appearance in public, had been always before him since a conversation with michelet about the year 1841. fifty-six years lay between his text to the _paradiso_ of cornelius and his last return to dante. when he began to fix his mind on the constitutional history of the church, he proposed to write, first, on the times of innocent xi. it was the age he knew best, in which there was most interest, most material, most ability, when divines were national classics, and presented many distinct types of religious thought, when biblical and historical science was founded, and catholicism was presented in its most winning guise. the character of odescalchi impressed him, by his earnestness in sustaining a strict morality. fragments of this projected work reappeared in his lectures on louis xiv., and in his last publication on the casuists. the lectures betray the decline of the tranquil idealism which had been the admiration and despair of friends. opposition to rome had made him, like his ultramontane allies in france, more indulgent to the ancient gallican enemy. he now had to expose the vice of that system, which never roused the king's conscience, and served for sixty years, from the remonstrance of caussin to the anonymous warning of fénelon, as the convenient sanction of absolutism. in the work on seventeenth-century ethics, which is his farthest, the moral point of view prevails over every other, and conscience usurps the place of theology, canon law, and scholarship. this was his tribute to a new phase of literature, the last he was to see, which was beginning to put ethical knowledge above metaphysics and politics, as the central range of human progress. morality, veracity, the proper atmosphere of ideal history, became the paramount interest. when he was proposed for a degree, the most eloquent lips at oxford, silenced for ever whilst i write this page, pointed to his excellence in those things which are the merit of germans. "quaecunque in germanorum indole admiranda atque imitanda fere censemus, ea in doellingero maxime splendent." the patriotic quality was recognised in the address of the berlin professors, who say that by upholding the independence of the national thought, whilst he enriched it with the best treasure of other lands, he realised the ideal of the historian. he became more german in extreme old age, and less impressive in his idiomatic french and english than in his own language. the lamentations of men he thought good judges, mazade and taine, and the first of literary critics, montégut, diluted somewhat his admiration for the country of st. bernard and bossuet. in spite of politics, his feeling for english character, for the moral quality of english literature, never changed; and he told his own people that their faults are not only very near indeed to their virtues, but are sometimes more apparent to the observer. the belief in the fixity and influence of national type, confirmed by his authorities, ganganelli and möhler, continued to determine his judgments. in his last letter to mr. gladstone, he illustrated the irish question by means of a chronicle describing ireland a thousand years ago. everybody has felt that his power was out of proportion to his work, and that he knew too much to write. it was so much better to hear him than to read all his books, that the memory of what he was will pass away with the children whom he loved. hefele called him the first theologian in germany, and höfler said that he surpassed all men in the knowledge of historical literature; but hefele was the bishop of his predilection, and höfler had been fifty years his friend, and is the last survivor of the group which once made munich the capital of citramontane catholicity. martensen, the most brilliant of episcopalian divines, describes him as he talked with equal knowledge and certainty of every age, and understood all characters and all situations as if he had lived in the midst of them. the best ecclesiastical historian now living is the fittest judge of the great ecclesiastical historian who is dead. harnack has assigned causes which limited his greatness as a writer, perhaps even as a thinker; but he has declared that no man had the same knowledge and intelligence of history in general, and of religious history which is its most essential element, and he affirms, what some have doubted, that he possessed the rare faculty of entering into alien thought. none of those who knew professor döllinger best, who knew him in the third quarter of the century, to which he belonged by the full fruition of his powers and the completeness of his knowledge, will ever qualify these judgments. it is right to add that, in spite of boundless reading, there was no lumber in his mind, and in spite of his classical learning, little ornament. among the men to be commemorated here, he stands alone. throughout the measureless distance which he traversed, his movement was against his wishes, in pursuit of no purpose, in obedience to no theory, under no attraction but historical research alone. it was given to him to form his philosophy of history on the largest induction ever available to man; and whilst he owed more to divinity than any other historian, he owed more to history than any other divine. footnotes: [footnote 338: _english historical review_,1890.] xii cardinal wiseman and the home and foreign review[339] it is one of the conditions inseparable from a public career to be often misunderstood, and sometimes judged unfairly even when understood the best. no one who has watched the formation of public opinion will be disposed to attribute all the unjust judgments which assail him to the malice of individuals, or to imagine that he can prevent misconceptions or vindicate his good name by words alone. he knows that even where he has committed no errors he must pay tribute to the fallibility of mankind, and that where he is in fault he must also pay tribute to his own. this is a natural law; and the purer a man's conscience is, and the more single his aim, the less eager will he be to evade it, or to defend himself from its penalties. the man whose career is bound up with that of some school or party will estimate the value of his opponents' censures by the worth which he attributes to the undiscriminating praise of his friends; but he who has devoted himself to the development of principles which will not always bend to the dictates of expediency will have no such short way of dealing with objections. his independence will frequently and inexorably demand the sacrifice of interests to truth--of what is politic to what is right; and, whenever he makes that sacrifice, he will appear a traitor to those whom he is most anxious to serve, while his act will be hailed by those who are farthest from sharing his opinions as a proof of secret sympathy, and harbinger of future alliance. thus, the censure which he incurs will most often come from those whose views are essentially his own; and the very matter which calls it forth will be that which elicits the applause of adversaries who cannot bring themselves to believe either in the truth of his opinions, in the integrity of his motives, or in the sincerity of his aims. there are few men living whose career has been more persistently misinterpreted, more bitterly assailed, or more ignorantly judged, than the illustrious person who is the head in england of the church to which we belong, cardinal wiseman has been for many years the chief object of the attacks of those who have desired to injure or degrade our community. he is not only the canonical chief of english catholics, but his ability, and the devotion of his life to their cause, have made him their best representative and their most powerful champion. no prelate in christendom is more fully trusted by the holy see, or exercises a more extensive personal influence, or enjoys so wide a literary renown. upon him, therefore, intolerance and fanaticism have concentrated their malice. he has had to bear the brunt of that hatred which the holiness of catholicism inspires in its enemies; and the man who has never been found wanting when the cause of the church was at stake may boast, with a not unworthy pride, of the indifference with which he has encountered the personal slander of a hostile press. the catholics of this country are attached to cardinal wiseman by warmer feelings and more personal ties than those of merely ecclesiastical subordination. it has been his privilege to gather the spiritual fruits of the catholic emancipation act; and the history of english catholicism has been, for a whole generation, bound up with his name. that immense change in the internal condition of the church in england which distinguishes our days from the time of milner has grown up under his influence, and has been in great part his work. we owe it to him that we have been brought into closer intercourse with rome, and into contact with the rest of europe. by his preaching and his spiritual direction he has transformed the devotions of our people; while his lectures and writings have made protestants familiar with catholic ideas, and have given catholics a deeper insight into their own religion. as a controversialist he influenced the oxford movement more deeply than any other catholic. as director of the chief literary organ of catholics during a quarter of a century he rendered services to our literature, and overcame difficulties, which none are in a better position to appreciate than those who are engaged in a similar work. and as president of oscott, he acquired the enduring gratitude of hundreds who owed to his guidance the best portion of their training. these personal relations with english catholics, which have made him a stranger to none and a benefactor to all, have at the same time given him an authority of peculiar weight amongst them. with less unity of view and tradition than their brethren in other lands, they were accustomed, in common with the rest of englishmen, to judge more independently and to speak more freely than is often possible in countries more exclusively catholic. their minds are not all cast in the same mould, nor their ideas derived from the same stock; but all alike, from bishop to layman, identify their cause with that of the cardinal, and feel that, in the midst of a hostile people, no diversity of opinion ought to interfere with unity of action, no variety of interest with identity of feeling, no controversy with the universal reverence which is due to the position and character of the archbishop of westminster. in this spirit the catholic body have received cardinal wiseman's latest publication--his "reply to the address of his clergy on his return from rome." he speaks in it of the great assemblage of the episcopate, and of their address to the holy father. among the bishops there present he was the most conspicuous, and he was president of the commission to which the preparation of their address was intrusted. no account of it, therefore, can be more authentic than that which he is able to give. the reserve imposed by his office, and by the distinguished part he had to bear, has been to some extent neutralised by the necessity of refuting false and exaggerated rumours which were circulated soon after the meeting, and particularly two articles which appeared in _the patrie_ on the 4th and 5th of july, and in which it was stated that the address written by cardinal wiseman contained "most violent attacks on all the fundamental principles of modern society." after replying in detail to the untruths of this newspaper, the cardinal proceeds as follows:- with far greater pain i feel compelled to advert to a covert insinuation of the same charges, in a publication avowedly catholic, and edited in my own diocese, consequently canonically subject to my correction. should such a misstatement, made under my own eyes, be passed over by me, it might be surmised that it could not be contradicted; and whether chronologically it preceded or followed the french account it evidently becomes my duty to notice it, as french bishops have considered it theirs to correct the inaccuracies of their native writers. otherwise, in a few years, we might find reference made, as to a recognised catholic authority, for the current and unreproved statement of what occurred at rome, to _the home and foreign review_. and that in a matter on which reprehension would have been doubly expected, if merited. in its first number the address, which has, i believe, wonderfully escaped the censure of protestant and infidel journals, is thus spoken of: "this address is said to be a compromise between one which took the violent course of recommending that major excommunication should be at once pronounced against the chief enemies of the temporal power by name, and one still more moderate than the present" (_the home and foreign review_, p. 264). now this very charge about recommending excommunication is the one made by the french paper against my address. but, leaving to the writer the chance of an error, in this application of his words, i am bound to correct it, to whomever it refers. he speaks of only two addresses: the distinction between them implies severe censure on one. i assure you that neither contained the recommendation or the sentiment alluded to. my brethren, i repeat that it pains me to have to contradict the repetition, in my own diocese, of foreign accusations, without the smallest pains taken to verify or disprove them with means at hand. but this can hardly excite surprise in us who know the antecedents of that journal under another name, the absence for years of all reserve or reverence in its treatment of persons or of things deemed sacred, its grazing over the very edges of the most perilous abysses of error, and its habitual preferences of uncatholic to catholic instincts, tendencies, and motives. in uttering these sad thoughts, and entreating you to warn your people, and especially the young, against such dangerous leadership, believe me i am only obeying a higher direction than my own impulses, and acting under much more solemn sanctions. nor shall i stand alone in this unhappily necessary correction. but let us pass to more cheerful and consoling thoughts. if my connection with the preparation of the address, from my having held, though unworthy, office in its committee, enables and authorises me to rebut false charges against it, it has further bestowed upon me the privilege of personal contact with a body of men who justly represented the entire episcopate, and would have represented it with equal advantage in any other period of the church. i know not who selected them, nor do i venture to say that many other equal committees of eighteen could not have been extracted from the remainder. i think they might; but i must say that a singular wisdom seemed to me to have presided over the actual, whatever might have been any other possible, choice. deliberations more minute, more mutually respectful, more courteous, or at the same time more straightforward and unflinching, could hardly have been carried on. more learning in theology and canon law, more deep religious feeling, a graver sense of the responsibility laid upon the commission, or a more scrupulous regard to the claims of justice, and no less of mercy, could scarcely have been exhibited. its spirit was one of mildness, of gentleness, and of reverence to all who rightly claimed it. "violent courses," invitations to "draw the sword and rush on enemies," or to deal about "the major excommunication by name," i deliberately assure you, were never mentioned, never insinuated, and i think i may say, never thought of by any one in that council. in the sketches proposed by several, there was not a harsh or disrespectful word about any sovereign or government; in anything i ever humbly proposed, there was not a single allusion to "king or kaiser." our duty to the cardinal and our duty to our readers alike forbid us to pass by these remarks without notice. silence would imply either that we admitted the charge, or that we disregarded the censure; and each of these suppositions would probably be welcome to the enemies of our common cause, while both of them are, in fact, untrue. the impossibility of silence, however, involves the necessity of our stating the facts on which charges so definite and so formidable have been founded. in doing so, we shall endeavour both to exhibit the true sequence of events, and to explain the origin of the cardinal's misapprehension; and in this way we shall reply to the charges made against us. but we must first explicitly declare, as we have already implied, that in the cardinal's support and approbation of our work we should recognise an aid more valuable to the cause we are engaged in than the utmost support which could be afforded to us by any other person; and that we cannot consider the terms he has used respecting us otherwise than as a misfortune to be profoundly regretted, and a blow which might seriously impair our power to do service to religion. a catholic review which is deprived of the countenance of the ecclesiastical authorities is placed in an abnormal position. a germ of distrust is planted in the ground where the good seed should grow; the support which the suspected organ endeavours to lend to the church is repudiated by the ecclesiastical rulers; and its influence in protestant society, as an expositor of catholic ideas, is in danger of being destroyed, because its exposition of them may be declared unsound and unfair, even when it represents them most faithfully and defends them most successfully. the most devoted efforts of its conductors are liable to be misconstrued, and perversely turned either against the church or against the _review_ itself; its best works are infected with the suspicion with which it is regarded, and its merits become almost more perilous than its faults. these considerations could not have been overlooked by the cardinal when he resolved to take a step which threatened to paralyse one of the few organs of catholic opinion in england. yet he took that step. if an enemy had done this, it would have been enough to vindicate ourselves, and to leave the burden of an unjust accusation to be borne by its author. but since it has been done by an ecclesiastical superior, with entire foresight of the grave consequences of the act, it has become necessary for us, in addition, to explain the circumstances by which he was led into a course we have so much reason to deplore, and to show how an erroneous and unjust opinion could arise in the mind of one whom obvious motives would have disposed to make the best use of a publication, the conductors of which are labouring to serve the community he governs, and desired and endeavoured to obtain his sanction for their work. if we were unable to reconcile these two necessities,--if we were compelled to choose between a forbearance dishonourable to ourselves, and a refutation injurious to the cardinal, we should be placed in a painful and almost inextricable difficulty. for a catholic who defends himself at the expense of an ecclesiastical superior sacrifices that which is generally of more public value than his own fair fame; and an english catholic who casts back on cardinal wiseman the blame unjustly thrown on himself, hurts a reputation which belongs to the whole body, and disgraces the entire community of catholics. by such a course, a review which exists only for public objects would stultify its own position and injure its own cause, and _the home and foreign review_ has no object to attain, and no views to advance, except objects and views in which the catholic church is interested. the ends for which it labours, according to its light and ability, are ends by which the church cannot but gain; the doctrine it receives, and the authority it obeys, are none other than those which command the acceptance and submission of the cardinal himself. it desires to enjoy his support; it has no end to gain by opposing him. but we are not in this painful dilemma. we can show that the accusations of the cardinal are unjust; and, at the same time, we can explain how naturally the suppositions on which they are founded have arisen, by giving a distinct and ample statement of our own principles and position. the complaint which the cardinal makes against us contains, substantially, five charges: (1) that we made a misstatement, affirming something historically false to be historically true; (2) that the falsehood consists in the statement that only two addresses were proposed in the commission--one violent, the other very moderate,--and that the address finally adopted was a compromise between these two; (3) that we insinuated that the cardinal himself was the author of the violent address; (4) that we cast, by implication, a severe censure on that address and its author; and (5) that our narrative was derived from the same sources, and inspired by the same motives, as that given in _the patrie_,--for the cardinal distinctly connects the two accounts, and quotes passages indifferently from both, in such a way that words which we never used might by a superficial reader be supposed to be ours. to these charges our reply is as follows: (1) we gave the statement of which the cardinal complains as a mere rumour current on any good authority at the time of our publication, and we employed every means in our power to test its accuracy, though the only other narratives which had then reached england were, as the cardinal says (p. 9), too "partial and perverted" to enable us to sift it to the bottom. we stated that a rumour was current, not that its purport was true. (2) we did not speak of "only two addresses" actually submitted to the commission. we supposed the report to mean, that of the three possible forms of address, two extreme and one mean, each of which actually had partisans in the commission, the middle or moderate form was the one finally adopted. (3) we had no suspicion that the cardinal had proposed any violent address at all; we did not know that such a proposal had been, or was about to be, attributed to him; and there was no connection whatever between him and it either in our mind or in our language. (4) we implied no censure either on the course proposed or on its proposer, still less on the cardinal personally. (5) the articles in _the patrie_ first appeared--and that in france--some days after our review was in the hands of the public; we know nothing of the authority on which their statements were founded, and we have not the least sympathy either with the politics or the motives of that newspaper. this reply would be enough for our own defence; but it is right that we should show, on the other side, how it came to pass that the cardinal was led to subject our words to that construction which we have so much reason to regret. reading them by the light of his own knowledge, and through the medium of the false reports which afterwards arose with regard to himself, his interpretation of them may easily have appeared both plausible and likely. for there were more draft addresses than one: one was his; the actual address was a compromise between them, and he had been falsely accused of, and severely censured for, proposing violent courses in his address. knowing this, he was tempted to suspect a covert allusion to himself under our words, and the chronological relation between our own article and those of _the patrie_ was easily forgotten, or made nugatory by the supposition of their both being derived from the same sources of information. but this will be made clearer by the following narrative of facts: a commission was appointed to draw up the address of the bishops; cardinal wiseman, its president, proposed a draft address, which was not obnoxious to any of the criticisms made on any other draft, and is, in substance, the basis of the address as it was ultimately settled. it was favourably received by the commission; but, after some deliberation, its final adoption was postponed. subsequently, a prelate who had been absent from the previous discussion presented another draft, not in competition with that proposed by the president, nor as an amendment to it, but simply as a basis for discussion. this second draft was also favourably received; and the commission, rather out of consideration for the great services and reputation of its author than from any dissatisfaction with the address proposed by the president, resolved to amalgamate the two drafts. all other projects were set aside; and, in particular, two proposals were deliberately rejected. one of these proposals was, to pay a tribute of acknowledgment for the services of the french nation to the holy see; the other was, to denounce the perfidious and oppressive policy of the court of turin in terms which we certainly should not think either exaggerated or undeserved. we have neither right nor inclination to complain of the ardent patriotism which has been exhibited by the illustrious bishop of orleans in the two publications he has put forth since his return to his see, or of the indignation which the system prevailing at turin must excite in every man who in his heart loves the church, or whose intelligence can appreciate the first principles of government. whatever may have been the censure proposed, it certainly did not surpass the measure of the offence. nevertheless, the impolicy of a violent course, which could not fail to cause irritation, and to aggravate the difficulties of the church, appears to have been fully recognised by the commission; and we believe that no one was more prompt in exposing the inutility of such a measure than the cardinal himself. the idea that anything imprudent or aggressive was to be found in his draft is contradicted by all the facts of the case, and has not a shadow of foundation in anything that is contained in the address as adopted. we need say no more to explain what has been very erroneously called our covert insinuation. from this narrative of facts our statement comes out, no longer as a mere report, but as a substantially accurate summary of events, questioned only on one point,--the extent of the censure which was proposed. so that in the account which the cardinal quoted from our pages there was no substantial statement to correct, as in fact no correction of any definite point but one has been attempted. how this innocent statement has come to be suspected of a hostile intent, and to be classed with the calumnies of _the patrie_, is another question. the disposition with which the cardinal sat in judgment upon our words was founded, not on anything they contained, but, as he declares, on the antecedents of the conductors of _the home and foreign review_, and on the character of a journal which no longer exists. that character he declares to consist in "the absence for years of all reserve or reverence in its treatment of persons or of things deemed sacred, its grazing over the very edges of the most perilous abysses of error, and its habitual preferences of uncatholic to catholic instincts, tendencies, and motives." in publishing this charge, which amounts to a declaration that we hold opinions and display a spirit not compatible with an entire attachment and submission of intellect and will to the doctrine and authority of the catholic church, the cardinal adds, "i am only obeying a higher direction than my own impulses, and acting under much more solemn sanctions. nor shall i stand alone in this unhappily necessary correction." there can be little doubt of the nature of the circumstances to which this announcement points. it is said that certain papers or propositions, which the report does not specify, have been extracted from the journal which the cardinal identifies with this review, and forwarded to rome for examination; that the prefect of propaganda has characterised these extracts, or some of them, in terms which correspond to the cardinal's language; and that the english bishops have deliberated whether they should issue similar declarations. we have no reason to doubt that the majority of them share the cardinal's view, which is also that of a large portion both of the rest of the clergy and also of the laity; and, whatever may be the precise action which has been taken in the matter, it is unquestionable that a very formidable mass of ecclesiastical authority and popular feeling is united against certain principles or opinions which, whether rightly or wrongly, are attributed to us. no one will suppose that an impression so general can be entirely founded on a mistake. those who admit the bare orthodoxy of our doctrine will, under the circumstances, naturally conclude that in our way of holding or expounding it there must be something new and strange, unfamiliar and bewildering, to those who are accustomed to the prevalent spirit of catholic literature; something which our fellow-catholics are not prepared to admit; something which can sufficiently explain misgivings so commonly and so sincerely entertained. others may perhaps imagine that we are unconsciously drifting away from the church, or that we only professedly and hypocritically remain with her. but the catholic critic will not forget that charity is a fruit of our religion, and that his anxiety to do justice to those from whom he must differ ought always to be in equal proportion with his zeal. relying, then, upon this spirit of fairness, convinced of the sincerity of the opposition we encounter, and in order that there may remain a distinct and intelligible record of the aim to which we dedicate our labours, we proceed to make that declaration which may be justly asked of nameless writers, as a testimony of the purpose which has inspired our undertaking, and an abiding pledge of our consistency. this review has been begun on a foundation which its conductors can never abandon without treason to their own convictions, and infidelity to the objects they have publicly avowed. that foundation is a humble faith in the infallible teaching of the catholic church, a devotion to her cause which controls every other interest, and an attachment to her authority which no other influence can supplant. if in anything published by us a passage can be found which is contrary to that doctrine, incompatible with that devotion, or disrespectful to that authority, we sincerely retract and lament it. no such passage was ever consciously admitted into the pages either of the late _rambler_ or of this review. but undoubtedly we may have committed errors in judgment, and admitted errors of fact; such mistakes are unavoidable in secular matters, and no one is exempt from them in spiritual things except by the constant assistance of divine grace. our wish and purpose are not to deny faults, but to repair them; to instruct, not to disturb our readers; to take down the barriers which shut out our protestant countrymen from the church, not to raise up divisions within her pale; and to confirm and deepen, not to weaken, alter, or circumscribe the faith of catholics. the most exalted methods of serving religion do not lie in the path of a periodical which addresses a general audience. the appliances of the spiritual life belong to a more retired sphere--that of the priesthood, of the sacraments, of religious offices; that of prayer, meditation, and self-examination. they are profaned by exposure, and choked by the distractions of public affairs. the world cannot be taken into the confidence of our inner life, nor can the discussion of ascetic morality be complicated with the secular questions of the day. to make the attempt would be to usurp and degrade a holier office. the function of the journalist is on another level. he may toil in the same service, but not in the same rank, as the master-workman. his tools are coarser, his method less refined, and if his range is more extended, his influence is less intense. literature, like government, assists religion, but it does so indirectly, and from without. the ends for which it works are distinct from those of the church, and yet subsidiary to them; and the more independently each force achieves its own end, the more complete will the ultimate agreement be found, and the more will religion profit. the course of a periodical publication in its relation to the church is defined by this distinction of ends; its sphere is limited by the difference and inferiority of the means which it employs, while the need for its existence and its independence is vindicated by the necessity there is for the service it performs. it is the peculiar mission of the church to be the channel of grace to each soul by her spiritual and pastoral action--she alone has this mission; but it is not her only work. she has also to govern and educate, so far as government and education are needful subsidiaries to her great work of the salvation of souls. by her discipline, her morality, her law, she strives to realise the divine order upon earth; while by her intellectual labour she seeks an even fuller knowledge of the works, the ideas, and the nature of god. but the ethical and intellectual offices of the church, as distinct from her spiritual office, are not hers exclusively or peculiarly. they were discharged, however imperfectly, before she was founded; and they are discharged still, independently of her, by two other authorities,--science and society; the church cannot perform all these functions by herself, nor, consequently, can she absorb their direction. the political and intellectual orders remain permanently distinct from the spiritual. they follow their own ends, they obey their own laws, and in doing so they support the cause of religion by the discovery of truth and the upholding of right. they render this service by fulfilling their own ends independently and unrestrictedly, not by surrendering them for the sake of spiritual interests. whatever diverts government and science from their own spheres, or leads religion to usurp their domains, confounds distinct authorities, and imperils not only political right and scientific truths, but also the cause of faith and morals. a government that, for the interests of religion, disregards political right, and a science that, for the sake of protecting faith, wavers and dissembles in the pursuit of knowledge, are instruments at least as well adapted to serve the cause of falsehood as to combat it, and never can be used in furtherance of the truth without that treachery to principle which is a sacrifice too costly to be made for the service of any interest whatever. again, the principles of religion, government, and science are in harmony, always and absolutely; but their interests are not. and though all other interests must yield to those of religion, no principle can succumb to any interest. a political law or a scientific truth may be perilous to the morals or the faith of individuals, but it cannot on this ground be resisted by the church. it may at times be a duty of the state to protect freedom of conscience, yet this freedom may be a temptation to apostasy. a discovery may be made in science which will shake the faith of thousands, yet religion cannot refute it or object to it. the difference in this respect between a true and a false religion is, that one judges all things by the standard of their truth, the other by the touchstone of its own interests. a false religion fears the progress of all truth; a true religion seeks and recognises truth wherever it can be found, and claims the power of regulating and controlling, not the progress, but the dispensation of knowledge. the church both accepts the truth and prepares the individual to receive it. the religious world has been long divided upon this great question: do we find principles in politics and in science? are their methods so rigorous that we may not bend them, their conclusions so certain that we may not dissemble them, in presence of the more rigorous necessity of the salvation of souls and the more certain truth of the dogmas of faith? this question divides protestants into rationalists and pietists. the church solves it in practice, by admitting the truths and the principles in the gross, and by dispensing them in detail as men can bear them. she admits the certainty of the mathematical method, and she uses the historical and critical method in establishing the documents of her own revelation and tradition. deny this method, and her recognised arguments are destroyed. but the church cannot and will not deny the validity of the methods upon which she is obliged to depend, not indeed for her existence, but for her demonstration. there is no opening for catholics to deny, in the gross, that political science may have absolute principles of right, or intellectual science of truth. during the last hundred years catholic literature has passed through three phases in relation to this question. at one time, when absolutism and infidelity were in the ascendant, and the church was oppressed by governments and reviled by the people, catholic writers imitated, and even caricatured the early christian apologists in endeavouring to represent their system in the light most acceptable to one side or the other, to disguise antagonism, to modify old claims, and to display only that side of their religion which was likely to attract toleration and good will. nothing which could give offence was allowed to appear. something of the fulness, if not of the truth, of religion was sacrificed for the sake of conciliation. the great catholic revival of the present century gave birth to an opposite school. the attitude of timidity and concession was succeeded by one of confidence and triumph. conciliation passed into defiance. the unscrupulous falsehoods of the eighteenth century had thrown suspicion on all that had ever been advanced by the adversaries of religion; and the belief that nothing could be said for the church gradually died away into the conviction that nothing which was said against her could be true. a school of writers arose strongly imbued with a horror of the calumnies of infidel philosophers and hostile controversialists, and animated by a sovereign desire to revive and fortify the spirit of catholics. they became literary advocates. their only object was to accomplish the great work before them; and they were often careless in statement, rhetorical and illogical in argument, too positive to be critical, and too confident to be precise. in this school the present generation of catholics was educated; to it they owe the ardour of their zeal, the steadfastness of their faith, and their catholic views of history, politics, and literature. the services of these writers have been very great. they restored the balance, which was leaning terribly against religion, both in politics and letters. they created a catholic opinion and a great catholic literature, and they conquered for the church a very powerful influence in european thought. the word "ultramontane" was revived to designate this school, and that restricted term was made to embrace men as different as de maistre and bonald, lamennais and montalembert, balmez and donoso cortes, stolberg and schlegel, phillips and tapparelli. there are two peculiarities by which we may test this whole group of eminent writers: their identification of catholicism with some secular cause, such as the interests of a particular political or philosophical system, and the use they make of protestant authorities. the views which they endeavoured to identify with the cause of the church, however various, agreed in giving them the air of partisans. like advocates, they were wont to defend their cause with the ingenuity of those who know that all points are not equally strong, and that nothing can be conceded except what they can defend. they did much for the cause of learning, though they took little interest in what did not immediately serve their turn. in their use of protestant writers they displayed the same partiality. they estimated a religious adversary, not by his knowledge, but by his concessions; and they took advantage of the progress of historical criticism, not to revise their opinions, but to obtain testimony to their truth. it was characteristic of the school to be eager in citing the favourable passages from protestant authors, and to be careless of those which were less serviceable for discussion. in the principal writers this tendency was counteracted by character and learning; but in the hands of men less competent or less suspicious of themselves, sore pressed by the necessities of controversy, and too obscure to challenge critical correction, the method became a snare for both the writer and his readers. thus the very qualities which we condemn in our opponents, as the natural defences of error and the significant emblems of a bad cause, came to taint both our literature and our policy. learning has passed on beyond the range of these men's vision. their greatest strength was in the weakness of their adversaries, and their own faults were eclipsed by the monstrous errors against which they fought. but scientific methods have now been so perfected, and have come to be applied in so cautious and so fair a spirit, that the apologists of the last generation have collapsed before them. investigations have become so impersonal, so colourless, so free from the prepossessions which distort truth, from predetermined aims and foregone conclusions, that their results can only be met by investigations in which the same methods are yet more completely and conscientiously applied. the sounder scholar is invincible by the brilliant rhetorician, and the eloquence and ingenuity of de maistre and schlegel would be of no avail against researches pursued with perfect mastery of science and singleness of purpose. the apologist's armour would be vulnerable at the point where his religion and his science were forced into artificial union. again, as science widens and deepens, it escapes from the grasp of dilettantism. such knowledge as existed formerly could be borrowed, or superficially acquired, by men whose lives were not devoted to its pursuit, and subjects as far apart as the controversies of scripture, history, and physical science might be respectably discussed by a single writer. no such shallow versatility is possible now. the new accuracy and certainty of criticism have made science unattainable except by those who devote themselves systematically to its study. the training of a skilled labourer has become indispensable for the scholar, and science yields its results to none but those who have mastered its methods. herein consists the distinction between the apologists we have described and that school of writers and thinkers which is now growing up in foreign countries, and on the triumph of which the position of the church in modern society depends. while she was surrounded with men whose learning was sold to the service of untruth, her defenders naturally adopted the artifices of the advocate, and wrote as if they were pleading for a human cause. it was their concern only to promote those precise kinds and portions of knowledge which would confound an adversary, or support a claim. but learning ceased to be hostile to christianity when it ceased to be pursued merely as an instrument of controversy--when facts came to be acknowledged, no longer because they were useful, but simply because they were true. religion had no occasion to rectify the results of learning when irreligion had ceased to pervert them, and the old weapons of controversy became repulsive as soon as they had ceased to be useful. by this means the authority of political right and of scientific truth has been re-established, and they have become, not tools to be used by religion for her own interests, but conditions which she must observe in her actions and arguments. within their respective spheres, politics can determine what rights are just, science what truths are certain. there are few political or scientific problems which affect the doctrines of religion, and none of them are hostile to it in their solution. but this is not the difficulty which is usually felt. a political principle or a scientific discovery is more commonly judged, not by its relation to religious truth, but by its bearings on some manifest or probable religious interests. a fact may be true, or a law may be just, and yet it may, under certain conditions, involve some spiritual loss. and here is the touchstone and the watershed of principles. some men argue that the object of government is to contribute to the salvation of souls; that certain measures may imperil this end, and that therefore they must be condemned. these men only look to interests; they cannot conceive the duty of sacrificing them to independent political principle or idea. or, again, they will say, "here is a scientific discovery calculated to overthrow many traditionary ideas, to undo a prevailing system of theology, to disprove a current interpretation, to cast discredit on eminent authorities, to compel men to revise their most settled opinions, to disturb the foundation on which the faith of others stands." these are sufficient reasons for care in the dispensation of truth; but the men we are describing will go on to say, "this is enough to throw suspicion on the discovery itself; even if it is true, its danger is greater than its value. let it, therefore, be carefully buried, and let all traces of it be swept away." a policy like this appears to us both wrong in itself and derogatory to the cause it is employed to serve. it argues either a timid faith which fears the light, or a false morality which would do evil that good might come. how often have catholics involved themselves in hopeless contradiction, sacrificed principle to opportunity, adapted their theories to their interests, and staggered the world's reliance on their sincerity by subterfuges which entangle the church in the shifting sands of party warfare, instead of establishing her cause on the solid rock of principles! how often have they clung to some plausible chimera which seemed to serve their cause, and nursed an artificial ignorance where they feared the discoveries of an impertinent curiosity! as ingenious in detraction as in silence and dissimulation, have they not too often answered imputations which they could not disprove with accusations which they could not prove, till the slanders they had invented rivalled in number and intensity the slanders which had been invented against them? for such men principles have had only temporary value and local currency. whatever force was the strongest in any place and at any time, with that they have sought to ally the cause of religion. they have, with equal zeal, identified her with freedom in one country and with absolutism in another; with conservatism where she had privileges to keep, and with reform where she had oppression to withstand. and for all this, what have they gained? they have betrayed duties more sacred than the privileges for which they fought; they have lied before god and man; they have been divided into fractions by the supposed interests of the church, when they ought to have been united by her principles and her doctrines; and against themselves they have justified those grave accusations of falsehood, insincerity, indifference to civil rights and contempt for civil authorities which are uttered with such profound injustice against the church. the present difficulties of the church--her internal dissensions and apparent weakness, the alienation of so much intellect, the strong prejudice which keeps many away from her altogether, and makes many who had approached her shrink back,--all draw nourishment from this rank soil. the antagonism of hostile doctrines and the enmity of governments count for little in comparison. it is in vain to point to her apostolic tradition, the unbroken unity of her doctrine, her missionary energy, or her triumphs in the region of spiritual life, if we fail to remove the accumulated prejudice which generations of her advocates have thrown up around her. the world can never know and recognise her divine perfection while the pleas of her defenders are scarcely nearer to the truth than the crimes which her enemies impute to her. how can the stranger understand where the children of the kingdom are deceived? against this policy a firm and unyielding stand is of supreme necessity. the evil is curable and the loss recoverable by a conscientious adherence to higher principles, and a patient pursuit of truth and right. political science can place the liberty of the church on principles so certain and unfailing, that intelligent and disinterested protestants will accept them; and in every branch of learning with which religion is in any way connected, the progressive discovery of truth will strengthen faith by promoting knowledge and correcting opinion, while it destroys prejudices and superstitions by dissipating the errors on which they are founded. this is a course which conscience must approve in the whole, though against each particular step of it conscience may itself be tempted to revolt. it does not always conduce to immediate advantage; it may lead across dangerous and scandalous ground. a rightful sovereign may exclude the church from his dominions, or persecute her members. is she therefore to say that his right is no right, or that all intolerance is necessarily wrong? a newly discovered truth may be a stumbling-block to perplex or to alienate the minds of men. is she therefore to deny or smother it? by no means. she must in every case do right. she must prefer the law of her own general spirit to the exigencies of immediate external occasion, and leave the issue in the hands of god. such is the substance of those principles which shut out _the home and foreign review_ from the sympathies of a large portion of the body to which we belong. in common with no small or insignificant section of our fellow-catholics, we hold that the time has gone by when defects in political or scientific education could be alleged as an excuse for depending upon expediency or mistrusting knowledge; and that the moment has come when the best service that can be done to religion is to be faithful to principle, to uphold the right in politics though it should require an apparent sacrifice, and to seek truth in science though it should involve a possible risk. modern society has developed no security for freedom, no instrument of progress, no means of arriving at truth, which we look upon with indifference or suspicion. we see no necessary gulf to separate our political or scientific convictions from those of the wisest and most intelligent men who may differ from us in religion. in pursuing those studies in which they can sympathise, starting from principles which they can accept, and using methods which are theirs as well as ours, we shall best attain the objects which alone can be aimed at in a review,--our own instruction, and the conciliation of opponents. there are two main considerations by which it is necessary that we should be guided in our pursuit of these objects. first, we have to remember that the scientific method is most clearly exhibited and recognised in connection with subjects about which there are no prepossessions to wound, no fears to excite, no interests to threaten. hence, not only do we exclude from our range all that concerns the ascetic life and the more intimate relations of religion, but we most willingly devote ourselves to the treatment of subjects quite remote from all religious bearing. secondly, we have to remember that the internal government of the church belongs to a sphere exclusively ecclesiastical, from the discussion of which we are shut out, not only by motives of propriety and reverence, but also by the necessary absence of any means for forming a judgment. so much ground is fenced off by these two considerations, that a secular sphere alone remains. the character of a scientific review is determined for it. it cannot enter on the domains of ecclesiastical government or of faith, and neither of them can possibly be affected by its conclusions or its mode of discussion. in asserting thus absolutely that all truth must render service to religion, we are saying what few perhaps will deny in the abstract, but what many are not prepared to admit in detail. it will be vaguely felt, that views which take so little account of present inconvenience and manifest danger are perilous and novel, though they may seem to spring from a more unquestioning faith, a more absolute confidence in truth, and a more perfect submission to the general laws of morality. there is no articulate theory, and no distinct view, but there is long habit, and there are strong inducements of another kind which support this sentiment. to understand the certainty of scientific truth, a man must have deeply studied scientific method; to understand the obligation of political principle requires a similar mental discipline. a man who is suddenly introduced from without into a society where this certainty and obligation are currently acknowledged is naturally bewildered. he cannot distinguish between the dubious impressions of his second-hand knowledge and the certainty of that primary direct information which those who possess it have no power to deny. to accept a criterion which may condemn some cherished opinion has hitherto seemed to him a mean surrender and a sacrifice of position. he feels it simple loss to give up an idea; and even if he is prepared to surrender it when compelled by controversy, still he thinks it quite unnecessary and gratuitous to engage voluntarily in researches which may lead to such an issue. to enter thus upon the discussion of questions which have been mixed up with religion, and made to contribute their support to piety, seems to the idle spectator, or to the person who is absorbed in defending religion, a mere useless and troublesome meddling, dictated by the pride of intellectual triumph, or by the moral cowardice which seeks unworthily to propitiate enemies. great consideration is due to those whose minds are not prepared for the full light of truth and the grave responsibilities of knowledge; who have not learned to distinguish what is divine from what is human--defined dogma from the atmosphere of opinion which surrounds it,--and who honour both with the same awful reverence. great allowances are also due to those who are constantly labouring to nourish the spark of belief in minds perplexed by difficulties, or darkened by ignorance and prejudice. these men have not always the results of research at command; they have no time to keep abreast with the constant progress of historical and critical science; and the solutions which they are obliged to give are consequently often imperfect, and adapted only to uninstructed and uncultivated minds. their reasoning cannot be the same as that of the scholar who has to meet error in its most vigorous, refined, and ingenious form. as knowledge advances, it must inevitably happen that they will find some of their hitherto accepted facts contradicted, and some arguments overturned which have done good service. they will find that some statements, which they have adopted under stress of controversy, to remove prejudice and doubt, turn out to be hasty and partial replies to the questions they were meant to answer, and that the true solutions would require more copious explanation than they can give. and thus will be brought home to their minds that, in the topics upon which popular controversy chiefly turns, the conditions of discussion and the resources of arguments are subject to gradual and constant change. a review, therefore, which undertakes to investigate political and scientific problems, without any direct subservience to the interests of a party or a cause, but with the belief that such investigation, by its very independence and straightforwardness, must give the most valuable indirect assistance to religion, cannot expect to enjoy at once the favour of those who have grown up in another school of ideas. men who are occupied in the special functions of ecclesiastical life, where the church is all-sufficient and requires no extraneous aid, will naturally see at first in the problems of public life, the demands of modern society, and the progress of human learning, nothing but new and unwelcome difficulties,--trial and distraction to themselves, temptation and danger to their flocks. in time they will learn that there is a higher and a nobler course for catholics than one which begins in fear and does not lead to security. they will come to see how vast a service they may render to the church by vindicating for themselves a place in every movement that promotes the study of god's works and the advancement of mankind. they will remember that, while the office of ecclesiastical authority is to tolerate, to warn, and to guide, that of religious intelligence and zeal is not to leave the great work of intellectual and social civilisation to be the monopoly and privilege of others, but to save it from debasement by giving to it for leaders the children, not the enemies, of the church. and at length, in the progress of political right and scientific knowledge, in the development of freedom in the state and of truth in literature, they will recognise one of the first among their human duties and the highest of their earthly rewards. footnotes: [footnote 339: "rome and the catholic episcopate. reply of his eminence cardinal wiseman to an address presented by the clergy, secular and regular, of the archdiocese of westminster, on tuesday, the 5th of august 1862." london: burns and lambert. (_home and foreign review_, 1862.)] xiii conflicts with rome[340] among the causes which have brought dishonour on the church in recent years, none have had a more fatal operation than those conflicts with science and literature which have led men to dispute the competence, or the justice, or the wisdom, of her authorities. rare as such conflicts have been, they have awakened a special hostility which the defenders of catholicism have not succeeded in allaying. they have induced a suspicion that the church, in her zeal for the prevention of error, represses that intellectual freedom which is essential to the progress of truth; that she allows an administrative interference with convictions to which she cannot attach the stigma of falsehood; and that she claims a right to restrain the growth of knowledge, to justify an acquiescence in ignorance, to promote error, and even to alter at her arbitrary will the dogmas that are proposed to faith. there are few faults or errors imputed to catholicism which individual catholics have not committed or held, and the instances on which these particular accusations are founded have sometimes been supplied by the acts of authority itself. dishonest controversy loves to confound the personal with the spiritual element in the church--to ignore the distinction between the sinful agents and the divine institution. and this confusion makes it easy to deny, what otherwise would be too evident to question, that knowledge has a freedom in the catholic church which it can find in no other religion; though there, as elsewhere, freedom degenerates unless it has to struggle in its own defence. nothing can better illustrate this truth than the actual course of events in the cases of lamennais and frohschammer. they are two of the most conspicuous instances in point; and they exemplify the opposite mistakes through which a haze of obscurity has gathered over the true notions of authority and freedom in the church. the correspondence of lamennais and the later writings of frohschammer furnish a revelation which ought to warn all those who, through ignorance, or timidity, or weakness of faith, are tempted to despair of the reconciliation between science and religion, and to acquiesce either in the subordination of one to the other, or in their complete separation and estrangement. of these alternatives lamennais chose the first, frohschammer the second; and the exaggeration of the claims of authority by the one and the extreme assertion of independence by the other have led them, by contrary paths, to nearly the same end. when lamennais surveyed the fluctuations of science, the multitude of opinions, the confusion and conflict of theories, he was led to doubt the efficacy of all human tests of truth. science seemed to him essentially tainted with hopeless uncertainty. in his ignorance of its methods he fancied them incapable of attaining to anything more than a greater or less degree of probability, and powerless to afford a strict demonstration, or to distinguish the deposit of real knowledge amidst the turbid current of opinion. he refused to admit that there is a sphere within which metaphysical philosophy speaks with absolute certainty, or that the landmarks set up by history and natural science may be such as neither authority nor prescription, neither the doctrine of the schools nor the interest of the church, has the power to disturb or the right to evade. these sciences presented to his eyes a chaos incapable of falling into order and harmony by any internal self-development, and requiring the action of an external director to clear up its darkness and remove its uncertainty. he thought that no research, however rigorous, could make sure of any fragment of knowledge worthy the name. he admitted no certainty but that which relied on the general tradition of mankind, recorded and sanctioned by the infallible judgment of the holy see. he would have all power committed, and every question referred, to that supreme and universal authority. by its means he would supply all the gaps in the horizon of the human intellect, settle every controversy, solve the problems of science, and regulate the policy of states. the extreme ultramontanism which seeks the safeguard of faith in the absolutism of rome he believed to be the keystone of the catholic system. in his eyes all who rejected it, the jesuits among them, were gallicans; and gallicanism was the corruption of the christian idea.[341] "if my principles are rejected," he wrote on the 1st of november 1820, "i see no means of defending religion effectually, no decisive answer to the objections of the unbelievers of our time. how could these principles be favourable to them? they are simply the development of the great catholic maxim, _quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus_." joubert said of him, with perfect justice, that when he destroyed all the bases of human certainty, in order to retain no foundation but authority, he destroyed authority itself. the confidence which led him to confound the human element with the divine in the holy see was destined to be tried by the severest of all tests; and his exaggeration of the infallibility of the pope proved fatal to his religious faith. in 1831 the roman breviary was not to be bought in paris. we may hence measure the amount of opposition with which lamennais's endeavours to exalt rome would be met by the majority of the french bishops and clergy, and by the school of st. sulpice. for him, on the other hand, no terms were too strong to express his animosity against those who rejected his teaching and thwarted his designs. the bishops he railed at as idiotic devotees, incredibly blind, supernaturally foolish. "the jesuits," he said, "were _grenadiers de la folie_, and united imbecility with the vilest passions."[342] he fancied that in many dioceses there was a conspiracy to destroy religion, that a schism was at hand, and that the resistance of the clergy to his principles threatened to destroy catholicism in france. rome, he was sure, would help him in his struggle against her faithless assailants, on behalf of her authority, and in his endeavour to make the clergy refer their disputes to her, so as to receive from the pope's mouth the infallible oracles of eternal truth.[343] whatever the pope might decide, would, he said, be right, for the pope alone was infallible. bishops might be sometimes resisted, but the pope never.[344] it was both absurd and blasphemous even to advise him. "i have read in the _diario di roma_," he said, "the advice of m. de chateaubriand to the holy ghost. at any rate, the holy ghost is fully warned; and if he makes a mistake this time, it will not be the ambassador's fault." three popes passed away, and still nothing was done against the traitors he was for ever denouncing. this reserve astounded him. was rome herself tainted with gallicanism, and in league with those who had conspired for her destruction? what but a schism could ensue from this inexplicable apathy? the silence was a grievous trial to his faith. "let us shut our eyes," he said, "let us invoke the holy spirit, let us collect all the powers of our soul, that our faith may not be shaken."[345] in his perplexity he began to make distinctions between the pope and the roman court. the advisers of the pope were traitors, dwellers in the outer darkness, blind and deaf; the pope himself and he alone was infallible, and would never act so as to injure the faith, though meanwhile he was not aware of the real state of things, and was evidently deceived by false reports.[346] a few months later came the necessity for a further distinction between the pontiff and the sovereign. if the doctrines of the _avenir_ had caused displeasure at rome, it was only on political grounds. if the pope was offended, he was offended not as vicar of christ, but as a temporal monarch implicated in the political system of europe. in his capacity of spiritual head of the church he could not condemn writers for sacrificing all human and political considerations to the supreme interests of the church, but must in reality agree with them.[347] as the polish revolution brought the political questions into greater prominence, lamennais became more and more convinced of the wickedness of those who surrounded gregory xvi., and of the political incompetence of the pope himself. he described him as weeping and praying, motionless, amidst the darkness which the ambitious, corrupt, and frantic idiots around him were ever striving to thicken.[348] still he felt secure. when the foundations of the church were threatened, when an essential doctrine was at stake, though, for the first time in eighteen centuries, the supreme authority might refuse to speak,[349] at least it could not speak out against the truth. in this belief he made his last journey to rome. then came his condemnation. the staff on which he leaned with all his weight broke in his hands; the authority he had so grossly exaggerated turned against him, and his faith was left without support. his system supplied no resource for such an emergency. he submitted, not because he was in error, but because catholics had no right to defend the church against the supreme will even of an erring pontiff.[350] he was persuaded that his silence would injure religion, yet he deemed it his duty to be silent and to abandon theology. he had ceased to believe that the pope could not err, but he still believed that he could not lawfully be disobeyed. in the two years during which he still remained in the church his faith in her system fell rapidly to pieces. within two months after the publication of the encyclical he wrote that the pope, like the other princes, seemed careful not to omit any blunder that could secure his annihilation.[351] three weeks afterwards he denounced in the fiercest terms the corruption of rome. he predicted that the ecclesiastical hierarchy was about to depart with the old monarchies; and, though the church could not die, he would not undertake to say that she would revive in her old forms.[352] the pope, he said, had so zealously embraced the cause of antichristian despotism as to sacrifice to it the religion of which he was the chief. he no longer felt it possible to distinguish what was immutable in the external organisation of the church. he admitted the personal fallibility of the pope, and declared that, though it was impossible, without rome, to defend catholicism successfully, yet nothing could be hoped for from her, and that she seemed to have condemned catholicism to die.[353] the pope, he soon afterwards said, was in league with the kings in opposition to the eternal truths of religion, the hierarchy was out of court, and a transformation like that from which the church and papacy had sprung was about to bring them both to an end, after eighteen centuries, in gregory xvi.[354] before the following year was over he had ceased to be in communion with the catholic church. the fall of lamennais, however impressive as a warning, is of no great historical importance; for he carried no one with him, and his favourite disciples became the ablest defenders of catholicism in france. but it exemplifies one of the natural consequences of dissociating secular from religious truth, and denying that they hold in solution all the elements necessary for their reconciliation and union. in more recent times, the same error has led, by a contrary path, to still more lamentable results, and scepticism on the possibility of harmonising reason and faith has once more driven a philosopher into heresy. between the fall of lamennais and the conflict with frohschammer many metaphysical writers among the catholic clergy had incurred the censures of rome. it is enough to cite bautain in france, rosmini in italy, and günther in austria. but in these cases no scandal ensued, and the decrees were received with prompt and hearty submission. in the cases of lamennais and frohschammer no speculative question was originally at issue, but only the question of authority. a comparison between their theories will explain the similarity in the courses of the two men, and at the same time will account for the contrast between the isolation of lamennais and the influence of frohschammer, though the one was the most eloquent writer in france, and the head of a great school, and the other, before the late controversy, was not a writer of much name. this contrast is the more remarkable since religion had not revived in france when the french philosopher wrote, while for the last quarter of a century bavaria has been distinguished among catholic nations for the faith of her people. yet lamennais was powerless to injure a generation of comparatively ill-instructed catholics, while frohschammer, with inferior gifts of persuasion, has won educated followers even in the home of ultramontanism. the first obvious explanation of this difficulty is the narrowness of lamennais's philosophy. at the time of his dispute with the holy see he had somewhat lost sight of his traditionalist theory; and his attention, concentrated upon politics, was directed to the problem of reconciling religion with liberty,--a question with which the best minds in france are still occupied. but how can a view of policy constitute a philosophy? he began by thinking that it was expedient for the church to obtain the safeguards of freedom, and that she should renounce the losing cause of the old _régime_. but this was no more philosophy than the similar argument which had previously won her to the side of despotism when it was the stronger cause. as bonald, however, had erected absolute monarchy into a dogma, so lamennais proceeded to do with freedom. the church, he said, was on the side of freedom, because it was the just side, not because it was the stronger. as de maistre had seen the victory of catholic principles in the restoration, so lamennais saw it in the revolution of 1830. this was obviously too narrow and temporary a basis for a philosophy. the church is interested, not in the triumph of a principle or a cause which may be dated as that of 1789, or of 1815, or of 1830, but in the triumph of justice and the just cause, whether it be that of the people or of the crown, of a catholic party or of its opponents. she admits the tests of public law and political science. when these proclaim the existence of the conditions which justify an insurrection or a war, she cannot condemn that insurrection or that war. she is guided in her judgment on these causes by criteria which are not her own, but are borrowed from departments over which she has no supreme control. this is as true of science as it is of law and politics. other truths are as certain as those which natural or positive law embraces, and other obligations as imperative as those which regulate the relations of subjects and authorities. the principle which places right above expedience in the political action of the church has an equal application in history or in astronomy. the church can no more identify her cause with scientific error than with political wrong. her interests may be impaired by some measure of political justice, or by the admission of some fact or document. but in neither case can she guard her interests at the cost of denying the truth. this is the principle which has so much difficulty in obtaining recognition in an age when science is more or less irreligious, and when catholics more or less neglect its study. political and intellectual liberty have the same claims and the same conditions in the eyes of the church. the catholic judges the measures of governments and the discoveries of science in exactly the same manner. public law may make it imperative to overthrow a catholic monarch, like james ii., or to uphold a protestant monarch, like the king of prussia. the demonstrations of science may oblige us to believe that the earth revolves round the sun, or that the _donation of constantine_ is spurious. the apparent interests of religion have much to say against all this; but religion itself prevents those considerations from prevailing. this has not been seen by those writers who have done most in defence of the principle. they have usually considered it from the standing ground of their own practical aims, and have therefore failed to attain that general view which might have been suggested to them by the pursuit of truth as a whole. french writers have done much for political liberty, and germans for intellectual liberty; but the defenders of the one cause have generally had so little sympathy with the other, that they have neglected to defend their own on the grounds common to both. there is hardly a catholic writer who has penetrated to the common source from which they spring. and this is the greatest defect in catholic literature, even to the present day. in the majority of those who have afforded the chief examples of this error, and particularly in lamennais, the weakness of faith which it implies has been united with that looseness of thought which resolves all knowledge into opinion, and fails to appreciate methodical investigation or scientific evidence. but it is less easy to explain how a priest, fortified with the armour of german science, should have failed as completely in the same inquiry. in order to solve the difficulty, we must go back to the time when the theory of frohschammer arose, and review some of the circumstances out of which it sprang. for adjusting the relations between science and authority, the method of rome had long been that of economy and accommodation. in dealing with literature, her paramount consideration was the fear of scandal. books were forbidden, not merely because their statements were denied, but because they seemed injurious to morals, derogatory to authority, or dangerous to faith. to be so, it was not necessary that they should be untrue. for isolated truths separated from other known truths by an interval of conjecture, in which error might find room to construct its works, may offer perilous occasions to unprepared and unstable minds. the policy was therefore to allow such truths to be put forward only hypothetically, or altogether to suppress them. the latter alternative was especially appropriated to historical investigations, because they contained most elements of danger. in them the progress of knowledge has been for centuries constant, rapid, and sure; every generation has brought to light masses of information previously unknown, the successive publication of which furnished ever new incentives, and more and more ample means of inquiry into ecclesiastical history. this inquiry has gradually laid bare the whole policy and process of ecclesiastical authority, and has removed from the past that veil of mystery wherewith, like all other authorities, it tries to surround the present. the human element in ecclesiastical administration endeavours to keep itself out of sight, and to deny its own existence, in order that it may secure the unquestioning submission which authority naturally desires, and may preserve that halo of infallibility which the twilight of opinion enables it to assume. now the most severe exposure of the part played by this human element is found in histories which show the undeniable existence of sin, error, or fraud in the high places of the church. not, indeed, that any history furnishes, or can furnish, materials for undermining the authority which the dogmas of the church proclaim to be necessary for her existence. but the true limits of legitimate authority are one thing, and the area which authority may find it expedient to attempt to occupy is another. the interests of the church are not necessarily identical with those of the ecclesiastical government. a government does not desire its powers to be strictly defined, but the subjects require the line to be drawn with increasing precision. authority may be protected by its subjects being kept in ignorance of its faults, and by their holding it in superstitious admiration. but religion has no communion with any manner of error: and the conscience can only be injured by such arts, which, in reality, give a far more formidable measure of the influence of the human element in ecclesiastical government than any collection of detached cases of scandal can do. for these arts are simply those of all human governments which possess legislative power, fear attack, deny responsibility, and therefore shrink from scrutiny. one of the great instruments for preventing historical scrutiny had long been the index of prohibited books, which was accordingly directed, not against falsehood only, but particularly against certain departments of truth. through it an effort had been made to keep the knowledge of ecclesiastical history from the faithful, and to give currency to a fabulous and fictitious picture of the progress and action of the church. the means would have been found quite inadequate to the end, if it had not been for the fact that while society was absorbed by controversy, knowledge was only valued so far as it served a controversial purpose. every party in those days virtually had its own prohibitive index, to brand all inconvenient truths with the note of falsehood. no party cared for knowledge that could not be made available for argument. neutral and ambiguous science had no attractions for men engaged in perpetual combat. its spirit first won the naturalists, the mathematicians, and the philologists; then it vivified the otherwise aimless erudition of the benedictines; and at last it was carried into history, to give new life to those sciences which deal with the tradition, the law, and the action of the church. the home of this transformation was in the universities of germany, for there the catholic teacher was placed in circumstances altogether novel. he had to address men who had every opportunity of becoming familiar with the arguments of the enemies of the church, and with the discoveries and conclusions of those whose studies were without the bias of any religious object. whilst he lectured in one room, the next might be occupied by a pantheist, a rationalist, or a lutheran, descanting on the same topics. when he left the desk his place might be taken by some great original thinker or scholar, who would display all the results of his meditations without regard for their tendency, and without considering what effects they might have on the weak. he was obliged often to draw attention to books lacking the catholic spirit, but indispensable to the deeper student. here, therefore, the system of secrecy, economy, and accommodation was rendered impossible by the competition of knowledge, in which the most thorough exposition of the truth was sure of the victory, and the system itself became inapplicable as the scientific spirit penetrated ecclesiastical literature in germany. in rome, however, where the influences of competition were not felt, the reasons of the change could not be understood, nor its benefits experienced; and it was thought absurd that the germans of the nineteenth century should discard weapons which had been found efficacious with the germans of the sixteenth. while in rome it was still held that the truths of science need not be told, and ought not to be told, if, in the judgment of roman theologians, they were of a nature to offend faith, in germany catholics vied with protestants in publishing matter without being diverted by the consideration whether it might serve or injure their cause in controversy, or whether it was adverse or favourable to the views which it was the object of the index to protect. but though this great antagonism existed, there was no collision. a moderation was exhibited which contrasted remarkably with the aggressive spirit prevailing in france and italy. publications were suffered to pass unnoted in germany which would have been immediately censured if they had come forth beyond the alps or the rhine. in this way a certain laxity grew up side by side with an unmeasured distrust, and german theologians and historians escaped censure. this toleration gains significance from its contrast to the severity with which rome smote the german philosophers like hermes and günther when they erred. here, indeed, the case was very different. if rome had insisted upon suppressing documents, perverting facts, and resisting criticism, she would have been only opposing truth, and opposing it consciously, for fear of its inconveniences. but if she had refrained from denouncing a philosophy which denied creation or the personality of god, she would have failed to assert her own doctrines against her own children who contradicted them. the philosopher cannot claim the same exemption as the historian. god's handwriting exists in history independently of the church, and no ecclesiastical exigence can alter a fact. the divine lesson has been read, and it is the historian's duty to copy it faithfully without bias and without ulterior views. the catholic may be sure that as the church has lived in spite of the fact, she will also survive its publication. but philosophy has to deal with some facts which, although as absolute and objective in themselves, are not and cannot be known to us except through revelation, of which the church is the organ. a philosophy which requires the alteration of these facts is in patent contradiction against the church. both cannot coexist. one must destroy the other. two circumstances very naturally arose to disturb this equilibrium. there were divines who wished to extend to germany the old authority of the index, and to censure or prohibit books which, though not heretical, contained matter injurious to the reputation of ecclesiastical authority, or contrary to the common opinions of catholic theologians. on the other hand, there were philosophers of the schools of hermes and günther who would not retract the doctrines which the church condemned. one movement tended to repress even the knowledge of demonstrable truth, and the other aimed at destroying the dogmatic authority of the holy see. in this way a collision was prepared, which was eventually brought about by the writings of dr. frohschammer. ten years ago, when he was a very young lecturer on philosophy in the university of munich, he published a work on the origin of the soul, in which he argued against the theory of pre-existence, and against the common opinion that each soul is created directly by almighty god, defending the theory of generationism by the authority of several fathers, and quoting, among other modern divines, klee, the author of the most esteemed treatise of dogmatic theology in the german language. it was decided at rome that his book should be condemned, and he was informed of the intention, in order that he might announce his submission before the publication of the decree. his position was a difficult one, and it appears to be admitted that his conduct at this stage was not prompted by those opinions on the authority of the church in which he afterwards took refuge, but must be explained by the known facts of the case. his doctrine had been lately taught in a book generally read and approved. he was convinced that he had at least refuted the opposite theories, and yet it was apparently in behalf of one of these that he was condemned. whatever errors his book contained, he might fear that an act of submission would seem to imply his acceptance of an opinion he heartily believed to be wrong, and would therefore be an act of treason to truth. the decree conveyed no conviction to his mind. it is only the utterances of an infallible authority that men can believe without argument and explanation, and here was an authority not infallible, giving no reasons, and yet claiming a submission of the reason. dr. frohschammer found himself in a dilemma. to submit absolutely would either be a virtual acknowledgment of the infallibility of the authority, or a confession that an ecclesiastical decision necessarily bound the mind irrespectively of its truth or justice. in either case he would have contradicted the law of religion and of the church. to submit, while retaining his own opinion, to a disciplinary decree, in order to preserve peace and avoid scandal, and to make a general acknowledgment that his work contained various ill-considered and equivocal statements which might bear a bad construction,--such a conditional submission either would not have been that which the roman court desired and intended, or, if made without explicit statement of its meaning, would have been in some measure deceitful and hypocritical. in the first case it would not have been received, in the second case it could not have been made without loss of self-respect. moreover, as the writer was a public professor, bound to instruct his hearers according to his best knowledge, he could not change his teaching while his opinion remained unchanged. these considerations, and not any desire to defy authority, or introduce new opinions by a process more or less revolutionary, appear to have guided his conduct. at this period it might have been possible to arrive at an understanding, or to obtain satisfactory explanations, if the roman court would have told him what points were at issue, what passages in his book were impugned, and what were the grounds for suspecting them. if there was on both sides a peaceful and conciliatory spirit, and a desire to settle the problem, there was certainly a chance of effecting it by a candid interchange of explanations. it was a course which had proved efficacious on other occasions, and in the then recent discussion of günther's system it had been pursued with great patience and decided success. before giving a definite reply, therefore, dr. frohschammer asked for information about the incriminated articles. this would have given him an opportunity of seeing his error, and making a submission _in foro interno_. but the request was refused. it was a favour, he was told, sometimes extended to men whose great services to the church deserved such consideration, but not to one who was hardly known except by the very book which had incurred the censure. this answer instantly aroused a suspicion that the roman court was more anxious to assert its authority than to correct an alleged error, or to prevent a scandal. it was well known that the mistrust of german philosophy was very deep at rome; and it seemed far from impossible that an intention existed to put it under all possible restraint. this mistrust on the part of the roman divines was fully equalled, and so far justified, by a corresponding literary contempt on the part of many german catholic scholars. it is easy to understand the grounds of this feeling. the german writers were engaged in an arduous struggle, in which their antagonists were sustained by intellectual power, solid learning, and deep thought, such as the defenders of the church in catholic countries have never had to encounter. in this conflict the italian divines could render no assistance. they had shown themselves altogether incompetent to cope with modern science. the germans, therefore, unable to recognise them as auxiliaries, soon ceased to regard them as equals, or as scientific divines at all. without impeaching their orthodoxy, they learned to look on them as men incapable of understanding and mastering the ideas of a literature so very remote from their own, and to attach no more value to the unreasoned decrees of their organ than to the undefended _ipse dixit_ of a theologian of secondary rank. this opinion sprang, not from national prejudice or from the self-appreciation of individuals comparing their own works with those of the roman divines, but from a general view of the relation of those divines, among whom there are several distinguished germans, to the literature of germany. it was thus a corporate feeling, which might be shared even by one who was conscious of his own inferiority, or who had written nothing at all. such a man, weighing the opinion of the theologians of the gesù and the minerva, not in the scale of his own performance, but in that of the great achievements of his age, might well be reluctant to accept their verdict upon them without some aid of argument and explanation. on the other hand, it appeared that a blow which struck the catholic scholars of germany would assure to the victorious congregation of roman divines an easy supremacy over the writers of all other countries. the case of dr. frohschammer might be made to test what degree of control it would be possible to exercise over his countrymen, the only body of writers at whom alarm was felt, and who insisted, more than others, on their freedom. but the suspicion of such a possibility was likely only to confirm him in the idea that he was chosen to be the experimental body on which an important principle was to be decided, and that it was his duty, till his dogmatic error was proved, to resist a questionable encroachment of authority upon the rights of freedom. he therefore refused to make the preliminary submission which was required of him, and allowed the decree to go forth against him in the usual way. hereupon it was intimated to him--though not by rome--that he had incurred excommunication. this was the measure which raised the momentous question of the liberties of catholic science, and gave the impulse to that new theory on the limits of authority with which his name has become associated. in the civil affairs of mankind it is necessary to assume that the knowledge of the moral code and the traditions of law cannot perish in a christian nation. particular authorities may fall into error; decisions may be appealed against; laws may be repealed, but the political conscience of the whole people cannot be irrecoverably lost. the church possesses the same privilege, but in a much higher degree, for she exists expressly for the purpose of preserving a definite body of truths, the knowledge of which she can never lose. whatever authority, therefore, expresses that knowledge of which she is the keeper must be obeyed. but there is no institution from which this knowledge can be obtained with immediate certainty. a council is not _à priori_ oecumenical; the holy see is not separately infallible. the one has to await a sanction, the other has repeatedly erred. every decree, therefore, requires a preliminary examination. a writer who is censured may, in the first place, yield an external submission, either for the sake of discipline, or because his conviction is too weak to support him against the weight of authority. but if the question at issue is more important than the preservation of peace, and if his conviction is strong, he inquires whether the authority which condemns him utters the voice of the church. if he finds that it does, he yields to it, or ceases to profess the faith of catholics. if he finds that it does not, but is only the voice of authority, he owes it to his conscience, and to the supreme claims of truth, to remain constant to that which he believes, in spite of opposition. no authority has power to impose error, and, if it resists the truth, the truth must be upheld until it is admitted. now the adversaries of dr. frohschammer had fallen into the monstrous error of attributing to the congregation of the index a share in the infallibility of the church. he was placed in the position of a persecuted man, and the general sympathy was with him. in his defence he proceeded to state his theory of the rights of science, in order to vindicate the church from the imputation of restricting its freedom. hitherto his works had been written in defence of a christian philosophy against materialism and infidelity. their object had been thoroughly religious, and although he was not deeply read in ecclesiastical literature, and was often loose and incautious in the use of theological terms, his writings had not been wanting in catholicity of spirit; but after his condemnation by rome he undertook to pull down the power which had dealt the blow, and to make himself safe for the future. in this spirit of personal antagonism he commenced a long series of writings in defence of freedom and in defiance of authority. the following abstract marks, not so much the outline of his system, as the logical steps which carried him to the point where he passed beyond the limit of catholicism. religion, he taught, supplies materials but no criterion for philosophy; philosophy has nothing to rely on, in the last resort, but the unfailing veracity of our nature, which is not corrupt or weak, but normally healthy, and unable to deceive us.[355] there is not greater division or uncertainty in matters of speculation than on questions of faith.[356] if at any time error or doubt should arise, the science possesses in itself the means of correcting or removing it, and no other remedy is efficacious but that which it applies to itself.[357] there can be no free philosophy if we must always remember dogma.[358] philosophy includes in its sphere all the dogmas of revelation, as well as those of natural religion. it examines by its own independent light the substance of every christian doctrine, and determines in each case whether it be divine truth.[359] the conclusions and judgments at which it thus arrives must be maintained even when they contradict articles of faith.[360] as we accept the evidence of astronomy in opposition to the once settled opinion of divines, so we should not shrink from the evidence of chemistry if it should be adverse to transubstantiation.[361] the church, on the other hand, examines these conclusions by her standard of faith, and decides whether they can be taught in theology.[362] but she has no means of ascertaining the philosophical truth of an opinion, and cannot convict the philosopher of error. the two domains are as distinct as reason and faith; and we must not identify what we know with what we believe, but must separate the philosopher from his philosophy. the system may be utterly at variance with the whole teaching of christianity, and yet the philosopher, while he holds it to be philosophically true and certain, may continue to believe all catholic doctrine, and to perform all the spiritual duties of a layman or a priest. for discord cannot exist between the certain results of scientific investigation and the real doctrines of the church. both are true, and there is no conflict of truths. but while the teaching of science is distinct and definite, that of the church is subject to alteration. theology is at no time absolutely complete, but always liable to be modified, and cannot, therefore, be made a fixed test of truth.[363] consequently there is no reason against the union of the churches. for the liberty of private judgment, which is the formal principle of protestantism, belongs to catholics; and there is no actual catholic dogma which may not lose all that is objectionable to protestants by the transforming process of development.[364] the errors of dr. frohschammer in these passages are not exclusively his own. he has only drawn certain conclusions from premisses which are very commonly received. nothing is more usual than to confound religious truth with the voice of ecclesiastical authority. dr. frohschammer, having fallen into this vulgar mistake, argues that because the authority is fallible the truth must be uncertain. many catholics attribute to theological opinions which have prevailed for centuries without reproach a sacredness nearly approaching that which belongs to articles of faith: dr. frohschammer extends to defined dogmas the liability to change which belongs to opinions that yet await a final and conclusive investigation. thousands of zealous men are persuaded that a conflict may arise between defined doctrines of the church and conclusions which are certain according to all the tests of science; dr. frohschammer adopts this view, and argues that none of the decisions of the church are final, and that consequently in such a case they must give way. lastly, uninstructed men commonly impute to historical and natural science the uncertainty which is inseparable from pure speculation: dr. frohschammer accepts the equality, but claims for metaphysics the same certainty and independence which those sciences possess. having begun his course in company with many who have exactly opposite ends in view, dr. frohschammer, in a recent tract on the union of the churches, entirely separates himself from the catholic church in his theory of development. he had received the impulse to his new system from the opposition of those whom he considered the advocates of an excessive uniformity and the enemies of progress, and their contradiction has driven him to a point where he entirely sacrifices unity to change. he now affirms that our lord desired no unity or perfect conformity among his followers, except in morals and charity;[365] that he gave no definite system of doctrine; and that the form which christian faith may have assumed in a particular age has no validity for all future time, but is subject to continual modification.[366] the definitions, he says, which the church has made from time to time are not to be obstinately adhered to; and the advancement of religious knowledge is obtained by genius, not by learning, and is not regulated by traditions and fixed rules.[367] he maintains that not only the form but the substance varies; that the belief of one age may be not only extended but abandoned in another; and that it is impossible to draw the line which separates immutable dogma from undecided opinions.[368] the causes which drove dr. frohschammer into heresy would scarcely have deserved great attention from the mere merit of the man, for he cannot be acquitted of having, in the first instance, exhibited very superficial notions of theology. their instructiveness consists in the conspicuous example they afford of the effect of certain errors which at the present day are commonly held and rarely contradicted. when he found himself censured unjustly, as he thought, by the holy see, it should have been enough for him to believe in his conscience that he was in agreement with the true faith of the church. he would not then have proceeded to consider the whole church infected with the liability to err from which her rulers are not exempt, or to degrade the fundamental truths of christianity to the level of mere school opinions. authority appeared in his eyes to stand for the whole church; and therefore, in endeavouring to shield himself from its influence, he abandoned the first principles of the ecclesiastical system. far from having aided the cause of freedom, his errors have provoked a reaction against it, which must be looked upon with deep anxiety, and of which the first significant symptom remains to be described. on the 21st of december 1863, the pope addressed a brief to the archbishop of munich, which was published on the 5th of march. this document explains that the holy father had originally been led to suspect the recent congress at munich of a tendency similar to that of frohschammer, and had consequently viewed it with great distrust; but that these feelings were removed by the address which was adopted at the meeting, and by the report of the archbishop. and he expresses the consolation he has derived from the principles which prevailed in the assembly, and applauds the design of those by whom it was convened. he asked for the opinion of the german prelates, in order to be able to determine whether, in the present circumstances of their church, it is right that the congress should be renewed. besides the censure of the doctrines of frohschammer, and the approbation given to the acts of the munich congress, the brief contains passages of deeper and more general import, not directly touching the action of the german divines, but having an important bearing on the position of this _review_. the substance of these passages is as follows: in the present condition of society the supreme authority in the church is more than ever necessary, and must not surrender in the smallest degree the exclusive direction of ecclesiastical knowledge. an entire obedience to the decrees of the holy see and the roman congregations cannot be inconsistent with the freedom and progress of science. the disposition to find fault with the scholastic theology, and to dispute the conclusions and the method of its teachers, threatens the authority of the church, because the church has not only allowed theology to remain for centuries faithful to their system, but has urgently recommended it as the safest bulwark of the faith, and an efficient weapon against her enemies. catholic writers are not bound only by those decisions of the infallible church which regard articles of faith. they must also submit to the theological decisions of the roman congregations, and to the opinions which are commonly received in the schools. and it is wrong, though not heretical, to reject those decisions or opinions. in a word, therefore, the brief affirms that the common opinions and explanations of catholic divines ought not to yield to the progress of secular science, and that the course of theological knowledge ought to be controlled by the decrees of the index. there is no doubt that the letter of this document might be interpreted in a sense consistent with the habitual language of the _home and foreign review_. on the one hand, the censure is evidently aimed at that exaggerated claim of independence which would deny to the pope and the episcopate any right of interfering in literature, and would transfer the whole weight heretofore belonging to the traditions of the schools of theology to the incomplete, and therefore uncertain, conclusions of modern science. on the other hand, the _review_ has always maintained, in common with all catholics, that if the one church has an organ it is through that organ that she must speak; that her authority is not limited to the precise sphere of her infallibility; and that opinions which she has long tolerated or approved, and has for centuries found compatible with the secular as well as religious knowledge of the age, cannot be lightly supplanted by new hypotheses of scientific men, which have not yet had time to prove their consistency with dogmatic truth. but such a plausible accommodation, even if it were honest or dignified, would only disguise and obscure those ideas which it has been the chief object of the _review_ to proclaim. it is, therefore, not only more respectful to the holy see, but more serviceable to the principles of the _review_ itself, and more in accordance with the spirit in which it has been conducted, to interpret the words of the pope as they were really meant, than to elude their consequences by subtle distinctions, and to profess a formal adoption of maxims which no man who holds the principles of the _review_ can accept in their intended signification. one of these maxims is that theological and other opinions long held and allowed in the church gather truth from time, and an authority in some sort binding from the implied sanction of the holy see, so that they cannot be rejected without rashness; and that the decrees of the congregation of the index possess an authority quite independent of the acquirements of the men composing it. this is no new opinion; it is only expressed on the present occasion with unusual solemnity and distinctness. but one of the essential principles of this _review_ consists in a clear recognition, first, of the infinite gulf which in theology separates what is of faith from what is not of faith,--revealed dogmas from opinions unconnected with them by logical necessity, and therefore incapable of anything higher than a natural certainty--and next, of the practical difference which exists in ecclesiastical discipline between the acts of infallible authority and those which possess no higher sanction than that of canonical legality. that which is not decided with dogmatic infallibility is for the time susceptible only of a scientific determination, which advances with the progress of science, and becomes absolute only where science has attained its final results. on the one hand, this scientific progress is beneficial, and even necessary, to the church; on the other, it must inevitably be opposed by the guardians of traditional opinion, to whom, as such, no share in it belongs, and who, by their own acts and those of their predecessors, are committed to views which it menaces or destroys. the same principle which, in certain conjunctures, imposes the duty of surrendering received opinions imposes in equal extent, and under like conditions, the duty of disregarding the fallible authorities that uphold them. it is the design of the holy see not, of course, to deny the distinction between dogma and opinion, upon which this duty is founded, but to reduce the practical recognition of it among catholics to the smallest possible limits. a grave question therefore arises as to the position of a _review_ founded in great part for the purpose of exemplifying this distinction.[369] in considering the solution of this question two circumstances must be borne in mind: first, that the antagonism now so forcibly expressed has always been known and acknowledged; and secondly, that no part of the brief applies directly to the _review_. the _review_ was as distinctly opposed to the roman sentiment before the brief as since, and it is still as free from censure as before. it was at no time in virtual sympathy with authority on the points in question, and it is not now in formal conflict with authority. but the definiteness with which the holy see has pronounced its will, and the fact that it has taken the initiative, seem positively to invite adhesion, and to convey a special warning to all who have expressed opinions contrary to the maxims of the brief. a periodical which not only has done so, but exists in a measure for the purpose of doing so, cannot with propriety refuse to survey the new position in which it is placed by this important act. for the conduct of a _review_ involves more delicate relations with the government of the church than the authorship of an isolated book. when opinions which an author defends are rejected at rome, he either makes his submission, or, if his mind remains unaltered, silently leaves his book to take its chance, and to influence men according to its merits. but such passivity, however right and seemly in the author of a book, is inapplicable to the case of a _review_. the periodical iteration of rejected propositions would amount to insult and defiance, and would probably provoke more definite measures; and thus the result would be to commit authority yet more irrevocably to an opinion which otherwise might take no deep root, and might yield ultimately to the influence of time. for it is hard to surrender a cause on behalf of which a struggle has been sustained, and spiritual evils have been inflicted. in an isolated book, the author need discuss no more topics than he likes, and any want of agreement with ecclesiastical authority may receive so little prominence as to excite no attention. but a continuous _review_, which adopted this kind of reserve, would give a negative prominence to the topics it persistently avoided, and by thus keeping before the world the position it occupied would hold out a perpetual invitation to its readers to judge between the church and itself. whatever it gained of approbation and assent would be so much lost to the authority and dignity of the holy see. it could only hope to succeed by trading on the scandal it caused. but in reality its success could no longer advance the cause of truth. for what is the holy see in its relation to the masses of catholics, and where does its strength lie? it is the organ, the mouth, the head of the church. its strength consists in its agreement with the general conviction of the faithful. when it expresses the common knowledge and sense of the age, or of a large majority of catholics, its position is impregnable. the force it derives from this general support makes direct opposition hopeless, and therefore disedifying, tending only to division and promoting reaction rather than reform. the influence by which it is to be moved must be directed first on that which gives its strength, and must pervade the members in order that it may reach the head. while the general sentiment of catholics is unaltered, the course of the holy see remains unaltered too. as soon as that sentiment is modified, rome sympathises with the change. the ecclesiastical government, based upon the public opinion of the church, and acting through it, cannot separate itself from the mass of the faithful, and keep pace with the progress of the instructed minority. it follows slowly and warily, and sometimes begins by resisting and denouncing what in the end it thoroughly adopts. hence a direct controversy with rome holds out the prospect of great evils, and at best a barren and unprofitable victory. the victory that is fruitful springs from that gradual change in the knowledge, the ideas, and the convictions of the catholic body, which, in due time, overcomes the natural reluctance to forsake a beaten path, and by insensible degrees constrains the mouthpiece of tradition to conform itself to the new atmosphere with which it is surrounded. the slow, silent, indirect action of public opinion bears the holy see along, without any demoralising conflict or dishonourable capitulation. this action belongs essentially to the graver scientific literature to direct: and the inquiry what form that literature should assume at any given moment involves no question which affects its substance, though it may often involve questions of moral fitness sufficiently decisive for a particular occasion. it was never pretended that the _home and foreign review_ represented the opinions of the majority of catholics. the holy see has had their support in maintaining a view of the obligations of catholic literature very different from the one which has been upheld in these pages; nor could it explicitly abandon that view without taking up a new position in the church. all that could be hoped for on the other side was silence and forbearance, and for a time they have been conceded. but this is the case no longer. the toleration has now been pointedly withdrawn; and the adversaries of the roman theory have been challenged with the summons to submit. if the opinions for which submission is claimed were new, or if the opposition now signalised were one of which there had hitherto been any doubt, a question might have arisen as to the limits of the authority of the holy see over the conscience, and the necessity or possibility of accepting the view which it propounds. but no problem of this kind has in fact presented itself for consideration. the differences which are now proclaimed have all along been acknowledged to exist; and the conductors of this _review_ are unable to yield their assent to the opinions put forward in the brief. in these circumstances there are two courses which it is impossible to take. it would be wrong to abandon principles which have been well considered and are sincerely held, and it would also be wrong to assail the authority which contradicts them. the principles have not ceased to be true, nor the authority to be legitimate, because the two are in contradiction. to submit the intellect and conscience without examining the reasonableness and justice of this decree, or to reject the authority on the ground of its having been abused, would equally be a sin, on one side against morals, on the other against faith. the conscience cannot be relieved by casting on the administrators of ecclesiastical discipline the whole responsibility of preserving religious truth; nor can it be emancipated by a virtual apostasy. for the church is neither a despotism in which the convictions of the faithful possess no power of expressing themselves and no means of exercising legitimate control, nor is it an organised anarchy where the judicial and administrative powers are destitute of that authority which is conceded to them in civil society--the authority which commands submission even where it cannot impose a conviction of the righteousness of its acts. no catholic can contemplate without alarm the evil that would be caused by a catholic journal persistently labouring to thwart the published will of the holy see, and continuously defying its authority. the conductors of this _review_ refuse to take upon themselves the responsibility of such a position. and if it were accepted, the _review_ would represent no section of catholics. but the representative character is as essential to it as the opinions it professes, or the literary resources it commands. there is no lack of periodical publications representing science apart from religion, or religion apart from science. the distinctive feature of the _home and foreign review_ has been that it has attempted to exhibit the two in union; and the interest which has been attached to its views proceeded from the fact that they were put forward as essentially catholic in proportion to their scientific truth, and as expressing more faithfully than even the voice of authority the genuine spirit of the church in relation to intellect. its object has been to elucidate the harmony which exists between religion and the established conclusions of secular knowledge, and to exhibit the real amity and sympathy between the methods of science and the methods employed by the church. that amity and sympathy the enemies of the church refuse to admit, and her friends have not learned to understand. long disowned by a large part of our episcopate, they are now rejected by the holy see; and the issue is vital to a _review_ which, in ceasing to uphold them, would surrender the whole reason of its existence. warned, therefore, by the language of the brief, i will not provoke ecclesiastical authority to a more explicit repudiation of doctrines which are necessary to secure its influence upon the advance of modern science. i will not challenge a conflict which would only deceive the world into a belief that religion cannot be harmonised with all that is right and true in the progress of the present age. but i will sacrifice the existence of the _review_ to the defence of its principles, in order that i may combine the obedience which is due to legitimate ecclesiastical authority, with an equally conscientious maintenance of the rightful and necessary liberty of thought. a conjuncture like the present does not perplex the conscience of a catholic; for his obligation to refrain from wounding the peace of the church is neither more nor less real than that of professing nothing beside or against his convictions. if these duties have not been always understood, at least the _home and foreign review_ will not betray them; and the cause it has imperfectly expounded can be more efficiently served in future by means which will neither weaken the position of authority nor depend for their influence on its approval. if, as i have heard, but now am scarcely anxious to believe, there are those, both in the communion of the church and out of it, who have found comfort in the existence of this _review_, and have watched its straight short course with hopeful interest, trusting it as a sign that the knowledge deposited in their minds by study, and transformed by conscience into inviolable convictions, was not only tolerated among catholics, but might be reasonably held to be of the very essence of their system; who were willing to accept its principles as a possible solution of the difficulties they saw in catholicism, and were even prepared to make its fate the touchstone of the real spirit of our hierarchy; or who deemed that while it lasted it promised them some immunity from the overwhelming pressure of uniformity, some safeguard against resistance to the growth of knowledge and of freedom, and some protection for themselves, since, however weak its influence as an auxiliary, it would, by its position, encounter the first shock, and so divert from others the censures which they apprehended; who have found a welcome encouragement in its confidence, a satisfaction in its sincerity when they shrank from revealing their own thoughts, or a salutary restraint when its moderation failed to satisfy their ardour; whom, not being catholics, it has induced to think less hardly of the church, or, being catholics, has bound more strongly to her;--to all these i would say that the principles it has upheld will not die with it, but will find their destined advocates, and triumph in their appointed time. from the beginning of the church it has been a law of her nature, that the truths which eventually proved themselves the legitimate products of her doctrine, have had to make their slow way upwards through a phalanx of hostile habits and traditions, and to be rescued, not only from open enemies, but also from friendly hands that were not worthy to defend them. it is right that in every arduous enterprise some one who stakes no influence on the issue should make the first essay, whilst the true champions, like the triarii of the roman legions, are behind, and wait, without wavering, until the crisis calls them forward. and already it seems to have arrived. all that is being done for ecclesiastical learning by the priesthood of the continent bears testimony to the truths which are now called in question; and every work of real science written by a catholic adds to their force. the example of great writers aids their cause more powerfully than many theoretical discussions. indeed, when the principles of the antagonism which divides catholics have been brought clearly out, the part of theory is accomplished, and most of the work of a _review_ is done. it remains that the principles which have been made intelligible should be translated into practice, and should pass from the arena of discussion into the ethical code of literature. in that shape their efficacy will be acknowledged, and they will cease to be the object of alarm. those who have been indignant at hearing that their methods are obsolete and their labours vain, will be taught by experience to recognise in the works of another school services to religion more momentous than those which they themselves have aspired to perform; practice will compel the assent which is denied to theory; and men will learn to value in the fruit what the germ did not reveal to them. therefore it is to the prospect of that development of catholic learning which is too powerful to be arrested or repressed that i would direct the thoughts of those who are tempted to yield either to a malignant joy or an unjust despondency at the language of the holy see. if the spirit of the _home and foreign review_ really animates those whose sympathy it enjoyed, neither their principles, nor their confidence, nor their hopes will be shaken by its extinction. it was but a partial and temporary embodiment of an imperishable idea--the faint reflection of a light which still lives and burns in the hearts of the silent thinkers of the church. footnotes: [footnote 340: _home and foreign review_, april 1864.] [footnote 341: lamennais, _correspondence_, nouvelle édition (paris: didier).] [footnote 342: april 12 and june 25, 1830.] [footnote 343: feb. 27, 1831.] [footnote 344: march 30, 1831.] [footnote 345: may 8 and june 15, 1829.] [footnote 346: feb. 8, 1830.] [footnote 347: aug. 15, 1831.] [footnote 348: feb. 10, 1833.] [footnote 349: july 6, 1829.] [footnote 350: sept. 15, 1832.] [footnote 351: oct. 9, 1832.] [footnote 352: jan. 25, 1833.] [footnote 353: feb. 5, 1833.] [footnote 354: march 25, 1833.] [footnote 355: _naturphilosophie_, p. 115; _einleitung in die philosophie_, pp. 40, 54; _freiheit der wissenschaft_, pp. 4, 89; _athenäum_, i. 17.] [footnote 356: _athenäum_, i. 92.] [footnote 357: _freiheit der wissenschaft_, p. 32.] [footnote 358: _athenäum_, i. 167.] [footnote 359: _einleitung_, pp. 305, 317, 397.] [footnote 360: _athenäum_, i. 208.] [footnote 361: _ibid._ ii. 655.] [footnote 362: _ibid._ ii. 676.] [footnote 363: _ibid._ ii. 661.] [footnote 364: _wiedervereinigung der katholiken und protestanten_, pp. 26, 35.] [footnote 365: _wiedervereinigung_, pp. 8, 10.] [footnote 366: _ibid._ p. 15.] [footnote 367: _ibid._ p. 21.] [footnote 368: _ibid._ pp. 25, 26.] [footnote 369: the prospectus of the _review_ contained these words: "it will abstain from direct theological discussion, as far as external circumstances will allow; and in dealing with those mixed questions into which theology indirectly enters, its aim will be to combine devotion to the church with discrimination and candour in the treatment of her opponents: to reconcile freedom of inquiry with implicit faith, and to discountenance what is untenable and unreal, without forgetting the tenderness due to the weak, or the reverence rightly claimed for what is sacred. submitting without reserve to infallible authority, it will encourage a habit of manly investigation on subjects of scientific interest."] xiv the vatican council[370] the intention of pius ix. to convene a general council became known in the autumn of 1864, shortly before the appearance of the syllabus. they were the two principal measures which were designed to restore the spiritual and temporal power of the holy see. when the idea of the council was first put forward it met with no favour. the french bishops discouraged it; and the french bishops holding the talisman of the occupying army, spoke with authority. later on, when the position had been altered by the impulse which the syllabus gave to the ultramontane opinions, they revived the scheme they had first opposed. those who felt their influence injured by the change persuaded themselves that the court of rome was more prudent than some of its partisans, and that the episcopate was less given to extremes than the priesthood and laity. they conceived the hope that an assembly of bishops would curb the intemperance of a zeal which was largely directed against their own order, and would authentically sanction such an exposition of catholic ideas as would reconcile the animosity that feeds on things spoken in the heat of controversy, and on the errors of incompetent apologists. they had accepted the syllabus; but they wished to obtain canonicity for their own interpretation of it. if those who had succeeded in assigning an acceptable meaning to its censures could appear in a body to plead their cause before the pope, the pretensions which compromised the church might be permanently repressed. once, during the struggle for the temporal power, the question was pertinently asked, how it was that men so perspicacious and so enlightened as those who were its most conspicuous champions, could bring themselves to justify a system of government which their own principles condemned. the explanation then given was, that they were making a sacrifice which would be compensated hereafter, that those who succoured the pope in his utmost need were establishing a claim which would make them irresistible in better times, when they should demand great acts of conciliation and reform. it appeared to these men that the time had come to reap the harvest they had arduously sown. the council did not originate in the desire to exalt beyond measure the cause of rome. it was proposed in the interest of moderation; and the bishop of orleans was one of those who took the lead in promoting it. the cardinals were consulted, and pronounced against it the pope overruled their resistance. whatever embarrassments might be in store, and however difficult the enterprise, it was clear that it would evoke a force capable of accomplishing infinite good for religion. it was an instrument of unknown power that inspired little confidence, but awakened vague hopes of relief for the ills of society and the divisions of christendom. the guardians of immovable traditions, and the leaders of progress in religious knowledge, were not to share in the work. the schism of the east was widened by the angry quarrel between russia and the pope; and the letter to the protestants, whose orders are not recognised at rome, could not be more than a ceremonious challenge. there was no promise of sympathy in these invitations or in the answers they provoked; but the belief spread to many schools of thought, and was held by dr. pusey and by dean stanley, by professor hase and by m. guizot, that the auspicious issue of the council was an object of vital care to all denominations of christian men. the council of trent impressed on the church the stamp of an intolerant age, and perpetuated by its decrees the spirit of an austere immorality. the ideas embodied in the roman inquisition became characteristic of a system which obeyed expediency by submitting to indefinite modification, but underwent no change of principle. three centuries have so changed the world that the maxims with which the church resisted the reformation have become her weakness and her reproach, and that which arrested her decline now arrests her progress. to break effectually with that tradition and eradicate its influence, nothing less is required than an authority equal to that by which it was imposed. the vatican council was the first sufficient occasion which catholicism had enjoyed to reform, remodel, and adapt the work of trent. this idea was present among the motives which caused it to be summoned. it was apparent that two systems which cannot be reconciled were about to contend at the council; but the extent and force of the reforming spirit were unknown. seventeen questions submitted by the holy see to the bishops in 1867 concerned matters of discipline, the regulation of marriage and education, the policy of encouraging new monastic orders, and the means of making the parochial clergy more dependent on the bishops. they gave no indication of the deeper motives of the time. in the midst of many trivial proposals, the leading objects of reform grew more defined as the time approached, and men became conscious of distinct purposes based on a consistent notion of the church. they received systematic expression from a bohemian priest, whose work, _the reform of the church in its head and members_, is founded on practical experience, not only on literary theory, and is the most important manifesto of these ideas. the author exhorts the council to restrict centralisation, to reduce the office of the holy see to the ancient limits of its primacy, to restore to the episcopate the prerogatives which have been confiscated by rome, to abolish the temporal government, which is the prop of hierarchical despotism, to revise the matrimonial discipline, to suppress many religious orders and the solemn vows for all, to modify the absolute rule of celibacy for the clergy, to admit the use of the vernacular in the liturgy, to allow a larger share to the laity in the management of ecclesiastical affairs, to encourage the education of the clergy at universities, and to renounce the claims of mediæval theocracy, which are fruitful of suspicion between church and state. many catholics in many countries concurred in great part of this programme; but it was not the symbol of a connected party. few agreed with the author in all parts of his ideal church, or did not think that he had omitted essential points. among the inveterate abuses which the council of trent failed to extirpate was the very one which gave the first impulse to lutheranism. the belief is still retained in the superficial catholicism of southern europe that the pope can release the dead from purgatory; and money is obtained at rome on the assurance that every mass said at a particular altar opens heaven to the soul for which it is offered up. on the other hand, the index of prohibited books is an institution of tridentine origin, which has become so unwieldy and opprobrious that even men of strong roman sympathies, like the bishops of würzburg and st. pölten, recommended its reform. in france it was thought that the government would surrender the organic articles, if the rights of the bishops and the clergy were made secure under the canon law, if national and diocesan synods were introduced, and if a proportionate share was given to catholic countries in the sacred college and the roman congregations. the aspiration in which all the advocates of reform seemed to unite was that those customs should be changed which are connected with arbitrary power in the church. and all the interests threatened by this movement combined in the endeavour to maintain intact the papal prerogative. to proclaim the pope infallible was their compendious security against hostile states and churches, against human liberty and authority, against disintegrating tolerance and rationalising science, against error and sin. it became the common refuge of those who shunned what was called the liberal influence in catholicism. pius ix. constantly asserted that the desire of obtaining the recognition of papal infallibility was not originally his motive in convoking the council. he did not require that a privilege which was practically undisputed should be further defined. the bishops, especially those of the minority, were never tired of saying that the catholic world honoured and obeyed the pope as it had never done before. virtually he had exerted all the authority which the dogma could confer on him. in his first important utterance, the encyclical of november 1846, he announced that he was infallible; and the claim raised no commotion. later on he applied a more decisive test, and gained a more complete success, when the bishops summoned to rome, not as a council but as an audience, received from him an additional article of their faith. but apart from the dogma of infallibility he had a strong desire to establish certain cherished opinions of his own on a basis firm enough to outlast his time. they were collected in the syllabus, which contained the essence of what he had written during many years, and was an abridgment of the lessons which his life had taught him. he was anxious that they should not be lost. they were part of a coherent system. the syllabus was not rejected; but its edge was blunted and its point broken by the zeal which was spent in explaining it away; and the pope feared that it would be contested if he repudiated the soothing interpretations. in private he said that he wished to have no interpreter but himself. while the jesuit preachers proclaimed that the syllabus bore the full sanction of infallibility, higher functionaries of the court pointed out that it was an informal document, without definite official value. probably the pope would have been content that these his favourite ideas should be rescued from evasion by being incorporated in the canons of the council. papal infallibility was implied rather than included among them. whilst the authority of his acts was not resisted, he was not eager to disparage his right by exposing the need of a more exact definition. the opinions which pius ix. was anxiously promoting were not the mere fruit of his private meditations; they belonged to the doctrines of a great party, which was busily pursuing its own objects, and had not been always the party of the pope. in the days of his trouble he had employed an advocate; and the advocate had absorbed the client. during his exile a jesuit had asked his approbation for a review, to be conducted by the best talents of the order, and to be devoted to the papal cause; and he had warmly embraced the idea, less, it should seem, as a prince than as a divine. there were his sovereign rights to maintain; but there was also a doctrinaire interest, there were reminiscences of study as well as practical objects that recommended the project. in these personal views the pope was not quite consistent. he had made himself the idol of italian patriots, and of the liberal french catholics; he had set theiner to vindicate the suppresser of the jesuits; and rosmini, the most enlightened priest in italy, had been his trusted friend. after his restoration he submitted to other influences; and the writers of the _civiltà cattolica_, which followed him to rome and became his acknowledged organ, acquired power over his mind. these men were not identified with their order. their general, roothan, had disliked the plan of the review, foreseeing that the society would be held responsible for writings which it did not approve, and would forfeit the flexibility in adapting itself to the moods of different countries, which is one of the secrets of its prosperity. the pope arranged the matter by taking the writers under his own protection, and giving to them a sort of exemption and partial immunity under the rule of their order. they are set apart from other jesuits; they are assisted and supplied from the literary resources of the order, and are animated more than any of its other writers by its genuine and characteristic spirit; but they act on their own judgment under the guidance of the pope, and are a bodyguard, told off from the army, for the personal protection of the sovereign. it is their easy function to fuse into one system the interests and ideas of the pope and those of their society. the result has been, not to weaken by compromise and accommodation, but to intensify both. the prudence and sagacity which are sustained in the government of the jesuits by their complicated checks on power, and their consideration for the interests of the order under many various conditions, do not always restrain men who are partially emancipated from its rigorous discipline and subject to a more capricious rule. they were chosen in their capacity as jesuits, for the sake of the peculiar spirit which their system develops. the pope appointed them on account of that devotion to himself which is a quality of the order, and relieved them from some of the restraints which it imposes. he wished for something more papal than other jesuits; and he himself became more subject to the jesuits than other pontiffs. he made them a channel of his influence, and became an instrument of their own. the jesuits had continued to gain ground in rome ever since the pope's return. they had suffered more than others in the revolution that dethroned him; and they had their reward in the restoration. they had long been held in check by the dominicans; but the theology of the dominicans had been discountenanced and their spirit broken in 1854, when a doctrine which they had contested for centuries was proclaimed a dogma of faith. in the strife for the pope's temporal dominion the jesuits were most zealous; and they were busy in the preparation and in the defence of the syllabus. they were connected with every measure for which the pope most cared; and their divines became the oracles of the roman congregations. the papal infallibility had been always their favourite doctrine. its adoption by the council promised to give to their theology official warrant, and to their order the supremacy in the church. they were now in power; and they snatched their opportunity when the council was convoked. efforts to establish this doctrine had been going on for years. the dogmatic decree of 1854 involved it so distinctly that its formal recognition seemed to be only a question of time and zeal. people even said that it was the real object of that decree to create a precedent which should make it impossible afterwards to deny papal infallibility. the catechisms were altered, or new ones were substituted, in which it was taught. after 1852 the doctrine began to show itself in the acts of provincial synods, and it was afterwards supposed that the bishops of those provinces were committed to it. one of these synods was held at cologne; and three surviving members were in the council at rome, of whom two were in the minority, and the third had continued in his writings to oppose the doctrine of infallibility, after it had found its way into the cologne decree. the suspicion that the acts had been tampered with is suggested by what passed at the synod of baltimore in 1866. the archbishop of st. louis signed the acts of that synod under protest, and after obtaining a pledge that his protest would be inserted by the apostolic delegate. the pledge was not kept. "i complain," writes the archbishop, "that the promise which had been given was broken. the acts ought to have been published in their integrity, or not at all."[371] this process was carried on so boldly that men understood what was to come. protestants foretold that the catholics would not rest until the pope was formally declared infallible; and a prelate returning from the meeting of bishops at rome in 1862 was startled at being asked by a clear-sighted friend whether infallibility had not been brought forward. it was produced not then, but at the next great meeting, in 1867. the council had been announced; and the bishops wished to present an address to the pope. haynald, archbishop of colocza, held the pen, assisted by franchi, one of the clever roman prelates and by some bishops, among whom were the archbishop of westminster and the bishop of orleans. an attempt was made to get the papal infallibility acknowledged in the address. several bishops declared that they could not show themselves in their dioceses if they came back without having done anything for that doctrine. they were resisted in a way which made them complain that its very name irritated the french. haynald refused their demand, but agreed to insert the well-known words of the council of florence; and the bishops did not go away empty-handed. a few days before this attempt was made, the _civiltà cattolica_ had begun to agitate, by proposing that catholics should bind themselves to die, if need be, for the truth of the doctrine; and the article was printed on a separate sheet, bearing the papal _imprimatur_, and distributed widely. the check administered by haynald and his colleagues brought about a lull in the movement; but the french bishops had taken alarm, and maret, the most learned of them, set about the preparation of his book. during the winter of 1868-69 several commissions were created in rome to make ready the materials for the council. the dogmatic commission included the jesuits perrone, schrader, and franzelin. the question of infallibility was proposed to it by cardoni, archbishop of edessa, in a dissertation which, having been revised, was afterwards published, and accepted by the leading roman divines as an adequate exposition of their case. the dogma was approved unanimously, with the exception of one vote, alzog of freiberg being the only dissentient. when the other german divines who were in rome learned the scheme that was on foot in the dogmatic commission, they resolved to protest, but were prevented by some of their colleagues. they gave the alarm in germany. the intention to proclaim infallibility at the council was no longer a secret. the first bishop who made the wish public was fessler of st. pölten. his language was guarded, and he only prepared his readers for a probable contingency; but he was soon followed by the bishop of nîmes, who thought the discussion of the dogma superfluous, and foreshadowed a vote by acclamation. the _civiltà_ on the 6th of february gave utterance to the hope that the council would not hesitate to proclaim the dogma and confirm the syllabus in less than a month. five days later the pope wrote to some venetians who had taken a vow to uphold his infallibility, encouraging their noble resolution to defend his supreme authority and all his rights. until the month of may cardinal antonelli's confidential language to diplomatists was that the dogma was to be proclaimed, and that it would encounter no difficulty. cardinal reisach was to have been the president of the council. as archbishop of munich he had allowed himself and his diocese to be governed by the ablest of all the ultramontane divines. during his long residence in rome he rose to high estimation, because he was reputed to possess the secret, and to have discovered the vanity, of german science. he had amused himself with christian antiquities; and his friendship for the great explorer de' rossi brought him for a time under suspicion of liberality. but later he became unrelenting in his ardour for the objects of the _civiltà_, and regained the confidence of the pope. the german bishops complained that he betrayed their interests, and that their church had suffered mischief from his paramount influence. but in rome his easy temper and affable manners made him friends; and the court knew that there was no cardinal on whom it was so safe to rely. fessler, the first bishop who gave the signal of the intended definition, was appointed secretary. he was esteemed a learned man in austria, and he was wisely chosen to dispel the suspicion that the conduct of the council was to be jealously retained in roman hands, and to prove that there are qualities by which the confidence of the court could be won by men of a less favoured nation. besides the president and secretary, the most conspicuous of the pope's theological advisers was a german. at the time when passaglia's reputation was great in rome, his companion clement schrader shared the fame of his solid erudition. when passaglia fell into disgrace, his friend smote him with reproaches and intimated the belief that he would follow the footsteps of luther and debauch a nun. schrader is the most candid and consistent asserter of the papal claims. he does not shrink from the consequences of the persecuting theory; and he has given the most authentic and unvarnished exposition of the syllabus. he was the first who spoke out openly what others were variously attempting to compromise or to conceal. while the paris jesuits got into trouble for extenuating the roman doctrine, and had to be kept up to the mark by an abbé who reminded them that the pope, as a physical person, and without co-operation of the episcopate, is infallible, schrader proclaimed that his will is supreme even against the joint and several opinions of the bishops.[372] when the proceedings of the dogmatic commission, the acts of the pope, and the language of french and austrian bishops, and of the press serving the interests of rome, announced that the proclamation of infallibility had ceased to be merely the aspiration of a party and was the object of a design deliberately set on foot by those to whom the preparation and management of the council pertained, men became aware that an extraordinary crisis was impending, and that they needed to make themselves familiar with an unforeseen problem. the sense of its gravity made slow progress. the persuasion was strong among divines that the episcopate would not surrender to a party which was odious to many of them; and politicians were reluctant to believe that schemes were ripening such as fessler described, schemes intended to alter the relations between church and state. when the entire plan was made public by the _alleging zeitung_ in march 1869, many refused to be convinced. it happened that a statesman was in office who had occasion to know that the information was accurate. the prime minister of bavaria, prince hohenlohe, was the brother of a cardinal; the university of munich was represented on the roman commissions by an illustrious scholar; and the news of the thing that was preparing came through trustworthy channels. on the 9th of april prince hohenlohe sent out a diplomatic circular on the subject of the council. he pointed out that it was not called into existence by any purely theological emergency, and that the one dogma which was to be brought before it involved all those claims which cause collisions between church and state, and threaten the liberty and the security of governments. of the five roman commissions, one was appointed for the express purpose of dealing with the mixed topics common to religion and to politics. besides infallibility and politics, the council was to be occupied with the syllabus, which is in part directed against maxims of state. the avowed purpose of the council being so largely political, the governments could not remain indifferent to its action; lest they should be driven afterwards to adopt measures which would be hostile, it would be better at once to seek an understanding by friendly means and to obtain assurance that all irritating deliberations should be avoided, and no business touching the state transacted except in presence of its representatives. he proposed that the governments should hold a conference to arrange a plan for the protection of their common interest. important measures proposed by small states are subject to suspicion of being prompted by a greater power. prince hohenlohe, as a friend of the prussian alliance, was supposed to be acting in this matter in concert with berlin. this good understanding was suspected at vienna; for the austrian chancellor was more conspicuous as an enemy of prussia than hohenlohe as a friend. count beust traced the influence of count bismarck in the bavarian circular. he replied, on behalf of the catholic empire of austria, that there were no grounds to impute political objects to the council, and that repression and not prevention was the only policy compatible with free institutions. after the refusal of austria, the idea of a conference was dismissed by the other powers; and the first of the storm clouds that darkened the horizon of infallibility passed without breaking. although united action was abandoned, the idea of sending ambassadors to the council still offered the most inoffensive and amicable means of preventing the danger of subsequent conflict. its policy or impolicy was a question to be decided by france. several bishops, and cardinal bonnechose among the rest, urged the government to resume its ancient privilege, and send a representative. but two powerful parties, united in nothing else, agreed in demanding absolute neutrality. the democracy wished that no impediment should be put in the way of an enterprise which promised to sever the connection of the state with the church. m. ollivier set forth this opinion in july 1868, in a speech which was to serve him in his candidature for office; and in the autumn of 1869 it was certain that he would soon be in power. the ministers could not insist on being admitted to the council, where they were not invited, without making a violent demonstration in a direction they knew would not be followed. the ultramontanes were even more eager than their enemies to exclude an influence that might embarrass their policy. the archbishop of paris, by giving the same advice, settled the question. he probably reckoned on his own power of mediating between france and rome. the french court long imagined that the dogma would be set aside, and that the mass of the french bishops opposed it. at last they perceived that they were mistaken, and the emperor said to cardinal bonnechose, "you are going to give your signature to decrees already made." he ascertained the names of the bishops who would resist; and it was known that he was anxious for their success. but he was resolved that it should be gained by them, and not by the pressure of his diplomacy at the cost of displeasing the pope. the minister of foreign affairs and his chief secretary were counted by the court of rome among its friends; and the ordinary ambassador started for his post with instructions to conciliate, and to run no risk of a quarrel. he arrived at rome believing that there would be a speculative conflict between the extremes of roman and german theology, which would admit of being reconciled by the safer and more sober wisdom of the french bishops, backed by an impartial embassy. his credulity was an encumbrance to the cause which it was his mission and his wish to serve. in germany the plan of penetrating the council with lay influence took a strange form. it was proposed that the german catholics should be represented by king john of saxony. as a catholic and a scholar, who had shown, in his commentary on dante, that he had read st. thomas, and as a prince personally esteemed by the pope, it was conceived that his presence would be a salutary restraint. it was an impracticable idea; but letters which reached rome during the winter raised an impression that the king regretted that he could not be there. the opinion of germany would still have some weight if the north and south, which included more than thirteen millions of catholics, worked together. it was the policy of hohenlohe to use this united force, and the ultramontanes learned to regard him as a very formidable antagonist. when their first great triumph, in the election of the commission on doctrine, was accomplished, the commentary of a roman prelate was, "che colpo per il principe hohenlohe!" the bavarian envoy in rome did not share the views of his chief, and he was recalled in november. his successor had capacity to carry out the known policy of the prince; but early in the winter the ultramontanes drove hohenlohe from office, and their victory, though it was exercised with moderation, and was not followed by a total change of policy, neutralised the influence of bavaria in the council. the fall of hohenlohe and the abstention of france hampered the federal government of northern germany. for its catholic subjects, and ultimately in view of the rivalry with france, to retain the friendship of the papacy is a fixed maxim at berlin. count bismarck laid down the rule that prussia should display no definite purpose in a cause which was not her own, but should studiously keep abreast of the north german bishops. those bishops neither invoked, nor by their conduct invited, the co-operation of the state; and its influence would have been banished from the council but for the minister who represented it in rome. the vicissitudes of a general council are so far removed from the normal experience of statesmen that they could not well be studied or acted upon from a distance. a government that strictly controlled and dictated the conduct of its envoy was sure to go wrong, and to frustrate action by theory. a government that trusted the advice of its minister present on the spot enjoyed a great advantage. baron arnim was favourably situated. a catholic belonging to any but the ultramontane school would have been less willingly listened to in rome than a protestant who was a conservative in politics, and whose regard for the interests of religion was so undamaged by the sectarian taint that he was known to be sincere in the wish that catholics should have cause to rejoice in the prosperity of their church. the apathy of austria and the vacillation of france contributed to his influence, for he enjoyed the confidence of bishops from both countries; and he was able to guide his own government in its course towards the council. the english government was content to learn more and to speak less than the other powers at rome. the usual distrust of the roman court towards a liberal ministry in england was increased at the moment by the measure which the catholics had desired and applauded. it seemed improbable to men more solicitous for acquired rights than for general political principle, that protestant statesmen who disestablished their own church could feel a very sincere interest in the welfare of another. ministers so utopian as to give up solid goods for an imaginary righteousness seemed, as practical advisers, open to grave suspicion. mr. gladstone was feared as the apostle of those doctrines to which rome owes many losses. public opinion in england was not prepared to look on papal infallibility as a matter of national concern, more than other dogmas which make enemies to catholicism. even if the government could have admitted the prussian maxim of keeping in line with the bishops, it would have accomplished nothing. the english bishops were divided; but the irish bishops, who are the natural foes of the fenian plot, were by an immense majority on the ultramontane side. there was almost an ostentation of care on the part of the government to avoid the appearance of wishing to influence the bishops or the court of rome. when at length england publicly concurred in the remonstrances of france, events had happened which showed that the council was raising up dangers for both catholic and liberal interests. it was a result so easy to foresee, that the government had made it clear from the beginning that its extreme reserve was not due to indifference. the lesser catholic powers were almost unrepresented in rome. the government of the regent of spain possessed no moral authority over bishops appointed by the queen; and the revolution had proved so hostile to the clergy that they were forced to depend on the pope. diplomatic relations being interrupted, there was nothing to restrain them from seeking favour by unqualified obedience. portugal had appointed the count de lavradio ambassador to the council; but when he found that he was alone he retained only the character of envoy to the holy see. he had weight with the small group of portuguese bishops; but he died before he could be of use, and they drifted into submission. belgium was governed by m. frère orban, one of the most anxious and laborious enemies of the hierarchy, who had no inducement to interfere with an event which justified his enmity, and was, moreover, the unanimous wish of the belgian episcopate. when protestant and catholic powers joined in exhorting rome to moderation, belgium was left out. russia was the only power that treated the church with actual hostility during the council, and calculated the advantage to be derived from decrees which would intensify the schism. italy was more deeply interested in the events at rome than any other nation. the hostility of the clergy was felt both in the political and financial difficulties of the kingdom; and the prospect of conciliation would suffer equally from decrees confirming the roman claims, or from an invidious interposition of the state. public opinion watched the preparations for the council with frivolous disdain; but the course to be taken was carefully considered by the menabrea cabinet. the laws still subsisted which enabled the state to interfere in religious affairs; and the government was legally entitled to prohibit the attendance of the bishops at the council, or to recall them from it. the confiscated church property was retained by the state, and the claims of the episcopate were not yet settled. more than one hundred votes on which rome counted belonged to italian subjects. the means of applying administrative pressure were therefore great, though diplomatic action was impossible. the piedmontese wished that the resources of their ecclesiastical jurisprudence should be set in motion. but minghetti, who had lately joined the ministry, warmly advocated the opinion that the supreme principle of the liberty of the church ought to override the remains of the older legislation, in a state consistently free; and, with the disposition of the italians to confound catholicism with the hierarchy, the policy of abstention was a triumph of liberality. the idea of prince hohenlohe, that religion ought to be maintained in its integrity and not only in its independence, that society is interested in protecting the church even against herself, and that the enemies of her liberty are ecclesiastical as well as political, could find no favour in italy. during the session of 1869, menabrea gave no pledge to parliament as to the council; and the bishops who inquired whether they would be allowed to attend it were left unanswered until october. menabrea then explained in a circular that the right of the bishops to go to the council proceeded from the liberty of conscience, and was not conceded under the old privileges of the crown, or as a favour that could imply responsibility for what was to be done. if the church was molested in her freedom, excuse would be given for resisting the incorporation of rome. if the council came to decisions injurious to the safety of states, it would be attributed to the unnatural conditions created by the french occupation, and might be left to the enlightened judgment of catholics. it was proposed that the fund realised by the sale of the real property of the religious corporations should be administered for religious purposes by local boards of trustees representing the catholic population, and that the state should abdicate in their favour its ecclesiastical patronage, and proceed to discharge the unsettled claims of the clergy. so great a change in the plans by which sella and rattazzi had impoverished the church in 1866 and 1867 would, if frankly carried into execution, have encouraged an independent spirit among the italian bishops; and the reports of the prefects represented about thirty of them as being favourable to conciliation. but the ministry fell in november, and was succeeded by an administration whose leading members, lanza and sella, were enemies of religion. the court of rome was relieved from a serious peril. the only european country whose influence was felt in the attitude of its bishops was one whose government sent out no diplomatists. while the austrian chancellor regarded the issue of the council with a profane and supercilious eye, and so much indifference prevailed at vienna that it was said that the ambassador at rome did not read the decrees, and that count beust did not read his despatches, the catholic statesmen in hungary were intent on effecting a revolution in the church. the system which was about to culminate in the proclamation of infallibility, and which tended to absorb all power from the circumference into the centre, and to substitute authority for autonomy, had begun at the lower extremities of the hierarchical scale. the laity, which once had its share in the administration of church property and in the deliberations of the clergy, had been gradually compelled to give up its rights to the priesthood, the priests to the bishops, and the bishops to the pope. hungary undertook to redress the process, and to correct centralised absolutism by self-government. in a memorandum drawn up in april 1848, the bishops imputed the decay of religion to the exclusion of the people from the management of all church affairs, and proposed that whatever is not purely spiritual should be conducted by mixed boards, including lay representatives elected by the congregations. the war of the revolution and the reaction checked this design; and the concordat threw things more than ever into clerical hands. the triumph of the liberal party after the peace of prague revived the movements; and eötvös called on the bishops to devise means of giving to the laity a share and an interest in religious concerns. the bishops agreed unanimously to the proposal of deàk, that the laity should have the majority in the boards of administration; and the new constitution of the hungarian church was adopted by the catholic congress on the 17th of october 1869, and approved by the king on the 25th. the ruling idea of this great measure was to make the laity supreme in all that is not liturgy and dogma, in patronage, property, and education; to break down clerical exclusiveness and government control; to deliver the people from the usurpations of the hierarchy, and the church from the usurpations of the state. it was an attempt to reform the church by constitutional principles, and to crush ultramontanism by crushing gallicanism. the government, which had originated the scheme, was ready to surrender its privileges to the newly-constituted authorities; and the bishops acted in harmony with the ministers and with public opinion. whilst this good understanding lasted, and while the bishops were engaged in applying the impartial principles of self-government at home, there was a strong security that they would not accept decrees that would undo their work. infallibility would not only condemn their system, but destroy their position. as the winter advanced the influence of these things became apparent. the ascendency which the hungarian bishops acquired from the beginning was due to other causes. the political auspices under which the council opened were very favourable to the papal cause. the promoters of infallibility were able to coin resources of the enmity which was shown to the church. the danger which came to them from within was averted. the policy of hohenlohe, which was afterwards revived by daru, had been, for a time, completely abandoned by europe. the battle between the papal and the episcopal principle could come off undisturbed, in closed lists. political opposition there was none; but the council had to be governed under the glare of inevitable publicity, with a free press in europe, and hostile views prevalent in catholic theology. the causes which made religious science utterly powerless in the strife, and kept it from grappling with the forces arrayed against it, are of deeper import than the issue of the contest itself. while the voice of the bishops grew louder in praise of the roman designs, the bavarian government consulted the universities, and elicited from the majority of the munich faculty an opinion that the dogma of infallibility would be attended with serious danger to society. the author of the bohemian pamphlet affirmed that it had not the conditions which would enable it ever to become the object of a valid definition. janus compared the primacy, as it was known to the fathers of the church, with the ultramontane ideal, and traced the process of transformation through a long series of forgeries. maret published his book some weeks after janus and the reform. it had been revised by several french bishops and divines, and was to serve as a vindication of the sorbonne and the gallicans, and as the manifesto of men who were to be present at the council. it had not the merit of novelty or the fault of innovation, but renewed with as little offence as possible the language of the old french school.[373] while janus treated infallibility as the critical symptom of an ancient disease, maret restricted his argument to what was directly involved in the defence of the gallican position. janus held that the doctrine was so firmly rooted and so widely supported in the existing constitution of the church, that much must be modified before a genuine oecumenical council could be celebrated. maret clung to the belief that the real voice of the church would make itself heard at the vatican. in direct contradiction with janus, he kept before him the one practical object, to gain assent by making his views acceptable even to the unlearned. at the last moment a tract appeared which has been universally attributed to döllinger, which examined the evidences relied on by the infallibilists, and stated briefly the case against them. it pointed to the inference that their theory is not merely founded on an illogical and uncritical habit, but on unremitting dishonesty in the use of texts. this was coming near the secret of the whole controversy, and the point that made the interference of the powers appear the only availing resource. for the sentiment on which infallibility is founded could not be reached by argument, the weapon of human reason, but resided in conclusions transcending evidence, and was the inaccessible postulate rather than a demonstrable consequence of a system of religious faith. the two doctrines opposed, but never met each other. it was as much an instinct of the ultramontane theory to elude the tests of science as to resist the control of states. its opponents, baffled and perplexed by the serene vitality of a view which was impervious to proof, saw want of principle where there was really a consistent principle, and blamed the ultramontane divines for that which was of the essence of ultramontane divinity. how it came that no appeal to revelation or tradition, to reason or conscience, appeared to have any bearing whatever on the issue, is a mystery which janus and maret and döllinger's reflections left unexplained. the resources of mediæval learning were too slender to preserve an authentic record of the growth and settlement of catholic doctrine. many writings of the fathers were interpolated; others were unknown, and spurious matter was accepted in their place. books bearing venerable names--clement, dionysius, isidore--were forged for the purpose of supplying authorities for opinions that lacked the sanction of antiquity. when detection came, and it was found that fraud had been employed in sustaining doctrines bound up with the peculiar interests of rome and of the religious orders, there was an inducement to depreciate the evidences of antiquity, and to silence a voice that bore obnoxious testimony. the notion of tradition underwent a change; it was required to produce what it had not preserved. the fathers had spoken of the unwritten teaching of the apostles, which was to be sought in the churches they had founded, of esoteric doctrines, and views which must be of apostolic origin because they are universal, of the inspiration of general councils, and a revelation continued beyond the new testament. but the council of trent resisted the conclusions which this language seemed to countenance, and they were left to be pursued by private speculation. one divine deprecated the vain pretence of arguing from scripture, by which luther could not be confuted, and the catholics were losing ground;[374] and at trent a speaker averred that christian doctrine had been so completely determined by the schoolmen that there was no further need to recur to scripture. this idea is not extinct, and perrone uses it to explain the inferiority of catholics as biblical critics.[375] if the bible is inspired, says peresius, still more must its interpretation be inspired. it must be interpreted variously, says the cardinal of cusa, according to necessity; a change in the opinion of the church implies a change in the will of god.[376] one of the greatest tridentine divines declares that a doctrine must be true if the church believes it, without any warrant from scripture. according to petavius, the general belief of catholics at a given time is the work of god, and of higher authority than all antiquity and all the fathers. scripture may be silent, and tradition contradictory, but the church is independent of both. any doctrine which catholic divines commonly assert, without proof, to be revealed, must be taken as revealed. the testimony of rome, as the only remaining apostolic church, is equivalent to an unbroken chain of tradition.[377] in this way, after scripture had been subjugated, tradition itself was deposed; and the constant belief of the past yielded to the general conviction of the present. and, as antiquity had given way to universality, universality made way for authority. the word of god and the authority of the church came to be declared the two sources of religious knowledge. divines of this school, after preferring the church to the bible, preferred the modern church to the ancient, and ended by sacrificing both to the pope. "we have not the authority of scripture," wrote prierias in his defence of indulgences, "but we have the higher authority of the roman pontiffs."[378] a bishop who had been present at trent confesses that in matters of faith he would believe a single pope rather than a thousand fathers, saints, and doctors.[379] the divine training develops an orthodox instinct in the church, which shows itself in the lives of devout but ignorant men more than in the researches of the learned, and teaches authority not to need the help of science, and not to heed its opposition. all the arguments by which theology supports a doctrine may prove to be false, without diminishing the certainty of its truth. the church has not obtained, and is not bound to sustain it, by proof. she is supreme over fact as over doctrine, as fénelon argues, because she is the supreme expounder of tradition, which is a chain of facts.[380] accordingly, the organ of one ultramontane bishop lately declared that infallibility could be defined without arguments; and the bishop of nîmes thought that the decision need not be preceded by long and careful discussion. the dogmatic commission of the council proclaims that the existence of tradition has nothing to do with evidence, and that objections taken from history are not valid when contradicted by ecclesiastical decrees.[381] authority must conquer history. this inclination to get rid of evidence was specially associated with the doctrine of papal infallibility, because it is necessary that the popes themselves should not testify against their own claim. they may be declared superior to all other authorities, but not to that of their own see. their history is not irrelevant to the question of their rights. it could not be disregarded; and the provocation to alter or to deny its testimony was so urgent that men of piety and learning became a prey to the temptation of deceit. when it was discovered in the manuscript of the _liber diurnus_ that the popes had for centuries condemned honorius in their profession of faith, cardinal bona, the most eminent man in rome, advised that the book should be suppressed if the difficulty could not be got over; and it was suppressed accordingly.[382] men guilty of this kind of fraud would justify it by saying that their religion transcends the wisdom of philosophers, and cannot submit to the criticism of historians. if any fact manifestly contradicts a dogma, that is a warning to science to revise the evidence. there must be some defect in the materials or in the method. pending its discovery, the true believer is constrained humbly but confidently to deny the fact. the protest of conscience against this fraudulent piety grew loud and strong as the art of criticism became more certain. the use made of it by catholics in the literature of the present age, and their acceptance of the conditions of scientific controversy, seemed to ecclesiastical authorities a sacrifice of principle. a jealousy arose that ripened into antipathy. almost every writer who really served catholicism fell sooner or later under the disgrace or the suspicion of rome. but its censures had lost efficacy; and it was found that the progress of literature could only be brought under control by an increase of authority. this could be obtained if a general council declared the decisions of the roman congregations absolute, and the pope infallible. the division between the roman and the catholic elements in the church made it hopeless to mediate between them; and it is strange that men who must have regarded each other as insincere christians or as insincere catholics, should not have perceived that their meeting in council was an imposture. it may be that a portion, though only a small portion, of those who failed to attend, stayed away from that motive. but the view proscribed at rome was not largely represented in the episcopate; and it was doubtful whether it would be manifested at all. the opposition did not spring from it, but maintained itself by reducing to the utmost the distance that separated it from the strictly roman opinions, and striving to prevent the open conflict of principles. it was composed of ultramontanes in the mask of liberals, and of liberals in the mask of ultramontanes. therefore the victory or defeat of the minority was not the supreme issue of the council. besides and above the definition of infallibility arose the question how far the experience of the actual encounter would open the eyes and search the hearts of the reluctant bishops, and how far their language and their attitude would contribute to the impulse of future reform. there was a point of view from which the failure of all attempts to avert the result by false issues and foreign intrusion, and the success of the measures which repelled conciliation and brought on an open struggle and an overwhelming triumph, were means to another and a more importunate end. two events occurred in the autumn which portended trouble for the winter. on the 6th of september nineteen german bishops, assembled at fulda, published a pastoral letter in which they affirmed that the whole episcopate was perfectly unanimous, that the council would neither introduce new dogmas nor invade the civil province, and that the pope intended its deliberations to be free. the patent and direct meaning of this declaration was that the bishops repudiated the design announced by the _civiltà_ and the _alleging zeitung_, and it was received at rome with indignation. but it soon appeared that it was worded with studied ambiguity, to be signed by men of opposite opinions, and to conceal the truth. the bishop of mentz read a paper, written by a professor of würzburg, against the wisdom of raising the question, but expressed his own belief in the dogma of papal infallibility; and when another bishop stated his disbelief in it, the bishop of paderborn assured him that rome would soon strip him of his heretical skin. the majority wished to prevent the definition, if possible, without disputing the doctrine; and they wrote a private letter to the pope warning him of the danger, and entreating him to desist. several bishops who had signed the pastoral refused their signatures to the private letter. it caused so much dismay at rome that its nature was carefully concealed; and a diplomatist was able to report, on the authority of cardinal antonelli, that it did not exist. in the middle of november, the bishop of orleans took leave of his diocese in a letter which touched lightly on the learned questions connected with papal infallibility, but described the objections to the definition as of such a kind that they could not be removed. coming from a prelate who was so conspicuous as a champion of the papacy, who had saved the temporal power and justified the syllabus, this declaration unexpectedly altered the situation at rome. it was clear that the definition would be opposed, and that the opposition would have the support of illustrious names. the bishops who began to arrive early in november were received with the assurance that the alarm which had been raised was founded on phantoms. it appeared that nobody had dreamed of defining infallibility, or that, if the idea had been entertained at all, it had been abandoned. cardinals antonelli, berardi, and de luca, and the secretary fessler disavowed the _civiltà_. the ardent indiscretion that was displayed beyond the alps contrasted strangely with the moderation, the friendly candour, the majestic and impartial wisdom, which were found to reign in the higher sphere of the hierarchy. a bishop, afterwards noted among the opponents of the dogma, wrote home that the idea that infallibility was to be defined was entirely unfounded. it was represented as a mere fancy, got up in bavarian newspapers, with evil intent; and the bishop of sura had been its dupe. the insidious report would have deserved contempt if it had caused a revival of obsolete opinions. it was a challenge to the council to herald it with such demonstrations, and it unfortunately became difficult to leave it unnoticed. the decision must be left to the bishops. the holy see could not restrain their legitimate ardour, if they chose to express it; but it would take no initiative. whatever was done would require to be done with so much moderation as to satisfy everybody, and to avoid the offence of a party triumph. some suggested that there should be no anathema for those who questioned the doctrine; and one prelate imagined that a formula could be contrived which even janus could not dispute, and which yet would be found in reality to signify that the pope is infallible. there was a general assumption that no materials existed for contention among the bishops, and that they stood united against the world. cardinal antonelli openly refrained from connecting himself with the preparation of the council, and surrounded himself with divines who were not of the ruling party. he had never learned to doubt the dogma itself; but he was keenly alive to the troubles it would bring upon him, and thought that the pope was preparing a repetition of the difficulties which followed the beginning of his pontificate. he was not trusted as a divine, or consulted on questions of theology; but he was expected to ward off political complications, and he kept the ground with unflinching skill. the pope exhorted the diplomatic corps to aid him in allaying the alarm of the infatuated germans. he assured one diplomatist that the _civiltà_ did not speak in his name. he told another that he would sanction no proposition that could sow dissension among the bishops. he said to a third, "you come to be present at a scene of pacification." he described his object in summoning the council to be to obtain a remedy for old abuses and for recent errors. more than once, addressing a group of bishops, he said that he would do nothing to raise disputes among them, and would be content with a declaration in favour of intolerance. he wished of course that catholicism should have the benefit of toleration in england and russia, but the principle must be repudiated by a church holding the doctrine of exclusive salvation. the meaning of this intimation, that persecution would do as a substitute for infallibility, was that the most glaring obstacle to the definition would be removed if the inquisition was recognised as consistent with catholicism. indeed it seemed that infallibility was a means to an end which could be obtained in other ways, and that he would have been satisfied with a decree confirming the twenty-third article of the syllabus, and declaring that no pope has ever exceeded the just bounds of his authority in faith, in politics, or in morals.[383] most of the bishops had allowed themselves to be reassured, when the bull _multiplices inter_, regulating the procedure at the council, was put into circulation in the first days of december. the pope assumed to himself the sole initiative in proposing topics, and the exclusive nomination of the officers of the council. he invited the bishops to bring forward their own proposals, but required that they should submit them first of all to a commission which was appointed by himself, and consisted half of italians. if any proposal was allowed to pass by this commission, it had still to obtain the sanction of the pope, who could therefore exclude at will any topic, even if the whole council wished to discuss it. four elective commissions were to mediate between the council and the pope. when a decree had been discussed and opposed, it was to be referred, together with the amendments, to one of these commissions, where it was to be reconsidered, with the aid of divines. when it came back from the commission with corrections and remarks, it was to be put to the vote without further debate. what the council discussed was to be the work of unknown divines: what it voted was to be the work of a majority in a commission of twenty-four. it was in the election of these commissions that the episcopate obtained the chance of influencing the formation of its decrees. but the papal theologians retained their predominance, for they might be summoned to defend or alter their work in the commission, from which the bishops who had spoken or proposed amendments were excluded. practically, the right of initiative was the deciding point. even if the first regulation had remained in force, the bishops could never have recovered the surprises, and the difficulty of preparing for unforeseen debates. the regulation ultimately broke down under the mistake of allowing the decree to be debated only once, and that in its crude state, as it came from the hands of the divines. the authors of the measure had not contemplated any real discussion. it was so unlike the way in which business was conducted at trent, where the right of the episcopate was formally asserted, where the envoys were consulted, and the bishops discussed the questions in several groups before the general congregations, that the printed text of the tridentine regulation was rigidly suppressed. it was further provided that the reports of the speeches should not be communicated to the bishops; and the strictest secrecy was enjoined on all concerning the business of the council. the bishops, being under no obligation to observe this rule, were afterwards informed that it bound them under grievous sin. this important precept did not succeed in excluding the action of public opinion. it could be applied only to the debates; and many bishops spoke with greater energy and freedom before an assembly of their own order than they would have done if their words had been taken down by protestants, to be quoted against them at home. but printed documents, distributed in seven hundred copies, could not be kept secret. the rule was subject to exceptions which destroyed its efficacy; and the roman cause was discredited by systematic concealment, and advocacy that abounded in explanation and colour, but abstained from the substance of fact. documents couched in the usual official language, being dragged into the forbidden light of day, were supposed to reveal dark mysteries. the secrecy of the debates had a bad effect in exaggerating reports and giving wide scope to fancy. rome was not vividly interested in the discussions; but its cosmopolitan society was thronged with the several adherents of leading bishops, whose partiality compromised their dignity and envenomed their disputes. everything that was said was repeated, inflated, and distorted. whoever had a sharp word for an adversary, which could not be spoken in council, knew of an audience that would enjoy and carry the matter. the battles of the aula were fought over again, with anecdote, epigram, and fiction. a distinguished courtesy and nobleness of tone prevailed at the beginning. when the archbishop of halifax went down to his place on the 28th of december, after delivering the speech which taught the reality of the opposition, the presidents bowed to him as he passed them. the denunciations of the roman system by strossmayer and darboy were listened to in january without a murmur. adversaries paid exorbitant compliments to each other, like men whose disagreements were insignificant, and who were one at heart. as the plot thickened, fatigue, excitement, friends who fetched and carried, made the tone more bitter. in february the bishop of laval described dupanloup publicly as the centre of a conspiracy too shameful to be expressed in words, and professed that he would rather die than be associated with such iniquity. one of the minority described his opponents as having disported themselves on a certain occasion like a herd of cattle. by that time the whole temper of the council had been changed; the pope himself had gone into the arena; and violence of language and gesture had become an artifice adopted to hasten the end. when the council opened, many bishops were bewildered and dispirited by the bull _multiplices_. they feared that a struggle could not be averted, as, even if no dogmatic question was raised, their rights were cancelled in a way that would make the pope absolute in dogma. one of the cardinals caused him to be informed that the regulation would be resisted. but pius ix. knew that in all that procession of 750 bishops one idea prevailed. men whose word is powerful in the centres of civilisation, men who three months before were confronting martyrdom among barbarians, preachers at notre dame, professors from germany, republicans from western america, men with every sort of training and every sort of experience, had come together as confident and as eager as the prelates of rome itself, to hail the pope infallible. resistance was improbable, for it was hopeless. it was improbable that bishops who had refused no token of submission for twenty years would now combine to inflict dishonour on the pope. in their address of 1867 they had confessed that he is the father and teacher of all christians; that all the things he has spoken were spoken by st. peter through him; that they would believe and teach all that he believed and taught. in 1854 they had allowed him to proclaim a dogma, which some of them dreaded and some opposed, but to which all submitted when he had decreed without the intervention of a council. the recent display of opposition did not justify serious alarm. the fulda bishops feared the consequences in germany; but they affirmed that all were united, and that there would be no new dogma. they were perfectly informed of all that was being got ready in rome. the words of their pastoral meant nothing if they did not mean that infallibility was no new dogma, and that all the bishops believed in it. even the bishop of orleans avoided a direct attack on the doctrine, proclaimed his own devotion to the pope, and promised that the council would be a scene of concord.[384] it was certain that any real attempt that might be made to prevent the definition could be overwhelmed by the preponderance of those bishops whom the modern constitution of the church places in dependence on rome. the only bishops whose position made them capable of resisting were the germans and the french; and all that rome would have to contend with was the modern liberalism and decrepit gallicanism of france, and the science of germany. the gallican school was nearly extinct; it had no footing in other countries, and it was essentially odious to the liberals. the most serious minds of the liberal party were conscious that rome was as dangerous to ecclesiastical liberty as paris. but, since the syllabus made it impossible to pursue the liberal doctrines consistently without collision with rome, they had ceased to be professed with a robust and earnest confidence, and the party was disorganised. they set up the pretence that the real adversary of their opinions was not the pope, but a french newspaper; and they fought the king's troops in the king's name. when the bishop of orleans made his declaration, they fell back, and left him to mount the breach alone. montalembert, the most vigorous spirit among them, became isolated from his former friends, and accused them, with increasing vehemence, of being traitors to their principles. during the last disheartening year of his life he turned away from the clergy of his country, which was sunk in romanism, and felt that the real abode of his opinions was on the rhine.[385] it was only lately that the ideas of the coblentz address, which had so deeply touched the sympathies of montalembert, had spread widely in germany. they had their seat in the universities; and their transit from the interior of lecture-rooms to the outer world was laborious and slow. the invasion of roman doctrines had given vigour and popularity to those which opposed them, but the growing influence of the universities brought them into direct antagonism with the episcopate. the austrian bishops were generally beyond its reach, and the german bishops were generally at war with it. in december, one of the most illustrious of them said: "we bishops are absorbed in our work, and are not scholars. we sadly need the help of those that are. it is to be hoped that the council will raise only such questions as can be dealt with competently by practical experience and common sense." the force that germany wields in theology was only partially represented in its episcopate. at the opening of the council the known opposition consisted of four men. cardinal schwarzenberg had not published his opinion, but he made it known as soon as he came to rome. he brought with him a printed paper, entitled _desideria patribus concilii oecumenici proponenda_, in which he adopted the ideas of the divines and canonists who are the teachers of his bohemian clergy. he entreated the council not to multiply unnecessary articles of faith, and in particular to abstain from defining papal infallibility, which was beset with difficulties, and would make the foundations of faith to tremble even in the devoutest souls. he pointed out that the index could not continue on its present footing, and urged that the church should seek her strength in the cultivation of liberty and learning, not in privilege and coercion; that she should rely on popular institutions, and obtain popular support. he warmly advocated the system of autonomy that was springing up in hungary.[386] unlike schwarzenberg, dupanloup, and maret, the archbishop of paris had taken no hostile step in reference to the council, but he was feared the most of all the men expected at rome. the pope had refused to make him a cardinal, and had written to him a letter of reproof such as has seldom been received by a bishop. it was felt that he was hostile, not episodically, to a single measure, but to the peculiar spirit of this pontificate. he had none of the conventional prejudices and assumed antipathies which are congenial to the hierarchical mind. he was without passion or pathos or affectation; and he had good sense, a perfect temper, and an intolerable wit. it was characteristic of him that he made the syllabus an occasion to impress moderation on the pope: "your blame has power, o vicar of jesus christ; but your blessing is more potent still. god has raised you to the apostolic see between the two halves of this century, that you may absolve the one and inaugurate the other. be it yours to reconcile reason with faith, liberty with authority, politics with the church. from the height of that triple majesty with which religion, age, and misfortune adorn you, all that you do and all that you say reaches far, to disconcert or to encourage the nations. give them from your large priestly heart one word to amnesty the past, to reassure the present, and to open the horizons of the future." the security into which many unsuspecting bishops had been lulled quickly disappeared; and they understood that they were in presence of a conspiracy which would succeed at once if they did not provide against acclamation, and must succeed at last if they allowed themselves to be caught in the toils of the bull _multiplices_. it was necessary to make sure that no decree should be passed without reasonable discussion, and to make a stand against the regulation. the first congregation, held on the 10th of december, was a scene of confusion; but it appeared that a bishop from the turkish frontier had risen against the order of proceeding, and that the president had stopped him, saying that this was a matter decided by the pope, and not submitted to the council. the bishops perceived that they were in a snare. some began to think of going home. others argued that questions of divine right were affected by the regulation, and that they were bound to stake the existence of the council upon them. many were more eager on this point of law than on the point of dogma, and were brought under the influence of the more clear-sighted men, with whom they would not have come in contact through any sympathy on the question of infallibility. the desire of protesting against the violation of privileges was an imperfect bond. the bishops had not yet learned to know each other; and they had so strongly impressed upon their flocks at home the idea that rome ought to be trusted, that they were going to manifest the unity of the church and to confound the insinuations of her enemies, that they were not quick to admit all the significance of the facts they found. nothing vigorous was possible in a body of so loose a texture. the softer materials had to be eliminated, the stronger welded together by severe and constant pressure, before an opposition could be made capable of effective action. they signed protests that were of no effect. they petitioned; they did not resist. it was seen how much rome had gained by excluding the ambassadors; for this question of forms and regulations would have admitted the action of diplomacy. the idea of being represented at the council was revived in france; and a weary negotiation began, which lasted several months, and accomplished nothing but delay. it was not till the policy of intervention had ignominiously failed, and till its failure had left the roman court to cope with the bishops alone, that the real question was brought on for discussion. and as long as the chance remained that political considerations might keep infallibility out of the council, the opposition abstained from declaring its real sentiments. its union was precarious and delusive, but it lasted in this state long enough to enable secondary influences to do much towards supplying the place of principles. while the protesting bishops were not committed against infallibility, it would have been possible to prevent resistance to the bull from becoming resistance to the dogma. the bishop of grenoble, who was reputed a good divine among his countrymen, was sounded in order to discover how far he would go; and it was ascertained that he admitted the doctrine substantially. at the same time, the friends of the bishop of orleans were insisting that he had questioned not the dogma but the definition; and maret, in the defence of his book, declared that he attributed no infallibility to the episcopate apart from the pope. if the bishops had been consulted separately, without the terror of a decree, it is probable that the number of those who absolutely rejected the doctrine would have been extremely small. there were many who had never thought seriously about it, or imagined that it was true in a pious sense, though not capable of proof in controversy. the possibility of an understanding seemed so near that the archbishop of westminster, who held the pope infallible apart from the episcopate, required that the words should be translated into french in the sense of independence, and not of exclusion. an ambiguous formula embodying the view common to both parties, or founded on mutual concession, would have done more for the liberty than the unity of opinion, and would not have strengthened the authority of the pope. it was resolved to proceed with caution, putting in motion the strong machinery of rome, and exhausting the advantages of organisation and foreknowledge. the first act of the council was to elect the commission on dogma. a proposal was made on very high authority that the list should be drawn up so as to represent the different opinions fairly, and to include some of the chief opponents. they would have been subjected to other influences than those which sustain party leaders; they would have been separated from their friends and brought into frequent contact with adversaries; they would have felt the strain of official responsibility; and the opposition would have been decapitated. if these sagacious counsels had been followed, the harvest of july might have been gathered in january, and the reaction that was excited in the long struggle that ensued might have been prevented. cardinal de angelis, who ostensibly managed the elections, and was advised by archbishop manning, preferred the opposite and more prudent course. he caused a lithographed list to be sent to all the bishops open to influence, from which every name was excluded that was not on the side of infallibility. meantime the bishops of several nations selected those among their countrymen whom they recommended as candidates. the germans and hungarians, above forty in number, assembled for this purpose under the presidency of cardinal schwarzenberg; and their meetings were continued, and became more and more important, as those who did not sympathise with the opposition dropped away. the french were divided into two groups, and met partly at cardinal mathieu's, partly at cardinal bonnechose's. a fusion was proposed, but was resisted, in the roman interest, by bonnechose. he consulted cardinal antonelli, and reported that the pope disliked large meetings of bishops. moreover, if all the french had met in one place, the opposition would have had the majority, and would have determined the choice of the candidates. they voted separately; and the bonnechose list was represented to foreign bishops as the united choice of the french episcopate. the mathieu group believed that this had been done fraudulently, and resolved to make their complaint to the pope; but cardinal mathieu, seeing that a storm was rising, and that he would be called on to be the spokesman of his friends, hurried away to spend christmas at besançon. all the votes of his group were thrown away. even the bishop of grenoble, who had obtained twenty-nine votes at one meeting, and thirteen at the other, was excluded from the commission. it was constituted as the managers of the election desired, and the first trial of strength appeared to have annihilated the opposition. the force under entire control of the court could be estimated from the number of votes cast blindly for candidates not put forward by their own countrymen, and unknown to others, who had therefore no recommendation but that of the official list. according to this test rome could dispose of 550 votes. the moment of this triumph was chosen for the production of an act already two months old, by which many ancient censures were revoked, and many were renewed. the legislation of the middle ages and of the sixteenth century appointed nearly two hundred cases by which excommunication was incurred _ipso facto_, without inquiry or sentence. they had generally fallen into oblivion, or were remembered as instances of former extravagance; but they had not been abrogated, and, as they were in part defensible, they were a trouble to timorous consciences. there was reason to expect that this question, which had often occupied the attention of the bishops, would be brought before the council; and the demand for a reform could not have been withstood. the difficulty was anticipated by sweeping away as many censures as it was thought safe to abandon, and deciding, independently of the bishops, what must be retained. the pope reserved to himself alone the faculty of absolving from the sin of harbouring or defending the members of any sect, of causing priests to be tried by secular courts, of violating asylum or alienating the real property of the church. the prohibition of anonymous writing was restricted to works on theology, and the excommunication hitherto incurred by reading books which are on the index was confined to readers of heretical books. this constitution had no other immediate effect than to indicate the prevailing spirit, and to increase the difficulties of the partisans of rome. the organ of the archbishop of cologne justified the last provision by saying, that it does not forbid the works of jews, for jews are not heretics; nor the heretical tracts and newspapers, for they are not books; nor listening to heretical books read aloud, for hearing is not reading. at the same time, the serious work of the council was begun. a long dogmatic decree was distributed, in which the special theological, biblical, and philosophical opinions of the school now dominant in rome were proposed for ratification. it was so weak a composition that it was as severely criticised by the romans as by the foreigners; and there were germans whose attention was first called to its defects by an italian cardinal. the disgust with which the text of the first decree was received had not been foreseen. no real discussion had been expected. the council hall, admirable for occasions of ceremony, was extremely ill adapted for speaking, and nothing would induce the pope to give it up. a public session was fixed for the 6th of january, and the election of commissions was to last till christmas. it was evident that nothing would be ready for the session, unless the decree was accepted without debate, or infallibility adopted by acclamation. before the council had been assembled a fortnight, a store of discontent had accumulated which it would have been easy to avoid. every act of the pope, the bull _multiplices_, the declaration of censures, the text of the proposed decree, even the announcement that the council should be dissolved in case of his death, had seemed an injury or an insult to the episcopate. these measures undid the favourable effect of the caution with which the bishops had been received. they did what the dislike of infallibility alone would not have done. they broke the spell of veneration for pius ix. which fascinated the catholic episcopate. the jealousy with which he guarded his prerogative in the appointment of officers, and of the great commission, the pressure during the elections, the prohibition of national meetings, the refusal to hold the debates in a hall where they could be heard, irritated and alarmed many bishops. they suspected that they had been summoned for the very purpose they had indignantly denied, to make the papacy more absolute by abdicating in favour of the official prelature of rome. confidence gave way to a great despondency, and a state of feeling was aroused which prepared the way for actual opposition when the time should come. before christmas the germans and the french were grouped nearly as they remained to the end. after the flight of cardinal mathieu, and the refusal of cardinal bonnechose to coalesce, the friends of the latter gravitated towards the roman centre, and the friends of the former held their meetings at the house of the archbishop of paris. they became, with the austro-german meeting under cardinal schwarzenberg, the strength and substance of the party that opposed the new dogma; but there was little intercourse between the two, and their exclusive nationality made them useless as a nucleus for the few scattered american, english, and italian bishops whose sympathies were with them. to meet this object, and to centralise the deliberations, about a dozen of the leading men constituted an international meeting, which included the best talents, but also the most discordant views. they were too little united to act with vigour, and too few to exercise control. some months later they increased their numbers. they were the brain but not the will of the opposition. cardinal rauscher presided. rome honoured him as the author of the austrian concordat; but he feared that infallibility would bring destruction on his work, and he was the most constant, the most copious, and the most emphatic of its opponents. when the debate opened, on the 28th of december, the idea of proclaiming the dogma by acclamation had not been abandoned. the archbishop of paris exacted a promise that it should not be attempted. but he was warned that the promise held good for the first day only, and that there was no engagement for the future. then he made it known that one hundred bishops were ready, if a surprise was attempted, to depart from rome, and to carry away the council, as he said, in the soles of their shoes. the plan of carrying the measure by a sudden resolution was given up, and it was determined to introduce it with a demonstration of overwhelming effect. the debate on the dogmatic decree was begun by cardinal rauscher. the archbishop of st. louis spoke on the same day so briefly as not to reveal the force and the fire within him. the archbishop of halifax concluded a long speech by saying that the proposal laid before the council was only fit to be put decorously under ground. much praise was lavished on the bishops who had courage, knowledge, and latin enough to address the assembled fathers; and the council rose instantly in dignity and in esteem when it was seen that there was to be real discussion. on the 30th, rome was excited by the success of two speakers. one was the bishop of grenoble, the other was strossmayer, the bishop from the turkish frontier, who had again assailed the regulation, and had again been stopped by the presiding cardinal. the fame of his spirit and eloquence began to spread over the city and over the world. the ideas that animated these men in their attack on the proposed measure were most clearly shown a few days later in the speech of a swiss prelate. "what boots it," he exclaimed, "to condemn errors that have been long condemned, and tempt no catholic? the false beliefs of mankind are beyond the reach of your decrees. the best defence of catholicism is religious science. give to the pursuit of sound learning every encouragement and the widest field; and prove by deeds as well as words that the progress of nations in liberty and light is the mission of the church."[387] the tempest of criticism was weakly met; and the opponents established at once a superiority in debate. at the end of the first month nothing had been done; and the session imprudently fixed for the 6th of january had to be filled up with tedious ceremonies. everybody saw that there had been a great miscalculation. the council was slipping out of the grasp of the court, and the regulation was a manifest hindrance to the despatch of business. new resources were required. a new president was appointed. cardinal reisach had died at the end of december without having been able to take his seat, and cardinal de luca had presided in his stead. de angelis was now put into the place made vacant by the death of reisach. he had suffered imprisonment at turin, and the glory of his confessorship was enhanced by his services in the election of the commissions. he was not suited otherwise to be the moderator of a great assembly; and the effect of his elevation was to dethrone the accomplished and astute de luca, who had been found deficient in thoroughness, and to throw the management of the council into the hands of the junior presidents, capalti and bilio. bilio was a barnabite monk, innocent of court intrigues, a friend of the most enlightened scholars in rome, and a favourite of the pope. cardinal capalti had been distinguished as a canonist. like cardinal bilio, he was not reckoned among men of the extreme party; and they were not always in harmony with their colleagues, de angelis and bizarri. but they did not waver when the policy they had to execute was not their own. the first decree was withdrawn, and referred to the commission on doctrine. another, on the duties of the episcopate, was substituted; and that again was followed by others, of which the most important was on the catechism. while they were being discussed, a petition was prepared, demanding that the infallibility of the pope should be made the object of a decree. the majority undertook to put a strain on the prudence or the reluctance of the vatican. their zeal in the cause was warmer than that of the official advisers. among those who had the responsibility of conducting the spiritual and temporal government of the pope, the belief was strong that his infallibility did not need defining, and that the definition could not be obtained without needless obstruction to other papal interests. several cardinals were inopportunists at first, and afterwards promoted intermediate and conciliatory proposals. but the business of the council was not left to the ordinary advisers of the pope, and they were visibly compelled and driven by those who represented the majority. at times this pressure was no doubt convenient. but there were also times when there was no collusion, and the majority really led the authorities. the initiative was not taken by the great mass whose zeal was stimulated by personal allegiance to the pope. they added to the momentum, but the impulse came from men who were as independent as the chiefs of the opposition. the great petition, supported by others pointing to the same end, was kept back for several weeks, and was presented at the end of january. at that time the opposition had attained its full strength, and presented a counter-petition, praying that the question might not be introduced. it was written by cardinal rauscher, and was signed, with variations, by 137 bishops. to obtain that number the address avoided the doctrine itself, and spoke only of the difficulty and danger in defining it; so that this, their most imposing act, was a confession of inherent weakness, and a signal to the majority that they might force on the dogmatic discussion. the bishops stood on the negative. they showed no sense of their mission to renovate catholicism; and it seemed that they would compound for the concession they wanted, by yielding in all other matters, even those which would be a practical substitute for infallibility. that this was not to be, that the forces needed for a great revival were really present, was made manifest by the speech of strossmayer on the 24th of january, when he demanded the reformation of the court of rome, decentralisation in the government of the church, and decennial councils. that earnest spirit did not animate the bulk of the party. they were content to leave things as they were, to gain nothing if they lost nothing, to renounce all premature striving for reform if they could succeed in avoiding a doctrine which they were as unwilling to discuss as to define. the words of ginoulhiac to strossmayer, "you terrify me with your pitiless logic," expressed the inmost feelings of many who gloried in the grace and the splendour of his eloquence. no words were too strong for them if they prevented the necessity of action, and spared the bishops the distressing prospect of being brought to bay, and having to resist openly the wishes and the claims of rome. infallibility never ceased to overshadow every step of the council,[388] but it had already given birth to a deeper question. the church had less to fear from the violence of the majority than from the inertness of their opponents. no proclamation of false doctrines could be so great a disaster as the weakness of faith which would prove that the power of recovery, the vital force of catholicism, was extinct in the episcopate. it was better to be overcome after openly attesting their belief than to strangle both discussion and definition, and to disperse without having uttered a single word that could reinstate the authorities of the church in the respect of men. the future depended less on the outward struggle between two parties than on the process by which the stronger spirit within the minority leavened the mass. the opposition was as averse to the actual dogmatic discussion among themselves as in the council. they feared an inquiry which would divide them. at first the bishops who understood and resolutely contemplated their real mission in the council were exceedingly few. their influence was strengthened by the force of events, by the incessant pressure of the majority, and by the action of literary opinion. early in december the archbishop of mechlin brought out a reply to the letter of the bishop of orleans, who immediately prepared a rejoinder, but could not obtain permission to print it in rome. it appeared two months later at naples. whilst the minority were under the shock of this prohibition, gratry published at paris the first of four letters to the archbishop of mechlin, in which the case of honorius was discussed with so much perspicuity and effect that the profane public was interested, and the pamphlets were read with avidity in rome. they contained no new research, but they went deep into the causes which divided catholics. gratry showed that the roman theory is still propped by fables which were innocent once, but have become deliberate untruths since the excuse of mediæval ignorance was dispelled; and he declared that this school of lies was the cause of the weakness of the church, and called on catholics to look the scandal in the face, and cast out the religious forgers. his letters did much to clear the ground and to correct the confusion of ideas among the french. the bishop of st. brieuc wrote that the exposure was an excellent service to religion, for the evil had gone so far that silence would be complicity.[389] gratry was no sooner approved by one bishop than he was condemned by a great number of others. he had brought home to his countrymen the question whether they could be accomplices of a dishonest system, or would fairly attempt to root it out. while gratry's letters were disturbing the french, döllinger published some observations on the petition for infallibility, directing his attack clearly against the doctrine itself. during the excitement that ensued, he answered demonstrations of sympathy by saying that he had only defended the faith which was professed, substantially, by the majority of the episcopate in germany. these words dropped like an acid on the german bishops. they were writhing to escape the dire necessity of a conflict with the pope; and it was very painful to them to be called as compurgators by a man who was esteemed the foremost opponent of the roman system, whose hand was suspected in everything that had been done against it, and who had written many things on the sovereign obligations of truth and faith which seemed an unmerciful satire on the tactics to which they clung. the notion that the bishops were opposing the dogma itself was founded on their address against the regulation; but the petition against the definition of infallibility was so worded as to avoid that inference, and had accordingly obtained nearly twice as many german and hungarian signatures as the other. the bishop of mentz vehemently repudiated the supposition for himself, and invited his colleagues to do the same. some followed his example, others refused; and it became apparent that the german opposition was divided, and included men who accepted the doctrines of rome. the precarious alliance between incompatible elements was prevented from breaking up by the next act of the papal government. the defects in the mode of carrying on the business of the council were admitted on both sides. two months had been lost; and the demand for a radical change was publicly made in behalf of the minority by a letter communicated to the _moniteur_. on the 22nd of february a new regulation was introduced, with the avowed purpose of quickening progress. it gave the presidents power to cut short any speech, and provided that debate might be cut short at any moment when the majority pleased. it also declared that the decrees should be carried by majority--_id decernetur quod majori patrum numero placuerit_. the policy of leaving the decisive power in the hands of the council itself had this advantage, that its exercise would not raise the question of liberty and coercion in the same way as the interference of authority. by the bull _multiplices_, no bishop could introduce any matter not approved by the pope. by the new regulation he could not speak on any question before the council, if the majority chose to close the discussion, or if the presidents chose to abridge his speech. he could print nothing in rome, and what was printed elsewhere was liable to be treated as contraband. his written observations on any measure were submitted to the commission, without any security that they would be made known to the other bishops in their integrity. there was no longer an obstacle to the immediate definition of papal infallibility. the majority was omnipotent. the minority could not accept this regulation without admitting that the pope is infallible. their thesis was, that his decrees are not free from the risk of error unless they express the universal belief of the episcopate. the idea that particular virtue attaches to a certain number of bishops, or that infallibility depends on a few votes more or less, was defended by nobody. if the act of a majority of bishops in the council, possibly not representing a majority in the church, is infallible, it derives its infallibility from the pope. nobody held that the pope was bound to proclaim a dogma carried by a majority. the minority contested the principle of the new regulation, and declared that a dogmatic decree required virtual unanimity. the chief protest was drawn up by a french bishop. some of the hungarians added a paragraph asserting that the authority and oecumenicity of the council depended on the settlement of this question; and they proposed to add that they could not continue to act as though it were legitimate unless this point was given up. the author of the address declined this passage, urging that the time for actual menace was not yet come. from that day the minority agreed in rejecting as invalid any doctrine which should not be passed by unanimous consent. on this point the difference between the thorough and the simulated opposition was effaced, for ginoulhiac and ketteler were as positive as kenrick or hefele. but it was a point which rome could not surrender without giving up its whole position. to wait for unanimity was to wait for ever, and to admit that a minority could prevent or nullify the dogmatic action of the papacy was to renounce infallibility. no alternative remained to the opposing bishops but to break up the council. the most eminent among them accepted this conclusion, and stated it in a paper declaring that the absolute and indisputable law of the church had been violated by the regulation allowing articles of faith to be decreed on which the episcopate was not morally unanimous; and that the council, no longer possessing in the eyes of the bishops and of the world the indispensable condition of liberty and legality, would be inevitably rejected. to avert a public scandal, and to save the honour of the holy see, it was proposed that some unopposed decrees should be proclaimed in solemn session, and the council immediately prorogued. at the end of march a breach seemed unavoidable. the first part of the dogmatic decree had come back from the commission so profoundly altered that it was generally accepted by the bishops, but with a crudely expressed sentence in the preamble, which was intended to rebuke the notion of the reunion of protestant churches. several bishops looked upon this passage as an uncalled-for insult to protestants, and wished it changed; but there was danger that if they then joined in voting the decree they would commit themselves to the lawfulness of the regulation against which they had protested. on the 22nd of march strossmayer raised both questions. he said that it was neither just nor charitable to impute the progress of religious error to the protestants. the germ of modern unbelief existed among the catholics before the reformation, and afterwards bore its worst fruits in catholic countries. many of the ablest defenders of christian truth were protestants, and the day of reconciliation would have come already but for the violence and uncharitableness of the catholics. these words were greeted with execrations, and the remainder of the speech was delivered in the midst of a furious tumult. at length, when strossmayer declared that the council had forfeited its authority by the rule which abolished the necessity of unanimity, the presidents and the multitude refused to let him go on.[390] on the following day he drew up a protest, declaring that he could not acknowledge the validity of the council if dogmas were to be decided by a majority,[391] and sent it to the presidents after it had been approved at the meeting of the germans, and by bishops of other nations. the preamble was withdrawn, and another was inserted in its place, which had been written in great haste by the german jesuit kleutgen, and was received with general applause. several of the jesuits obtained credit for the ability and moderation with which the decree was drawn up. it was no less than a victory over extreme counsels. a unanimous vote was insured for the public session of 24th april; and harmony was restored. but the text proposed originally in the pope's name had undergone so many changes as to make it appear that his intentions had been thwarted. there was a supplement to the decree, which the bishops had understood would be withdrawn, in order that the festive concord and good feeling might not be disturbed. they were informed at the last moment that it would be put to the vote, as its withdrawal would be a confession of defeat for rome. the supplement was an admonition that the constitutions and decrees of the holy see must be observed even when they proscribe opinions not actually heretical.[392] extraordinary efforts were made in public and in private to prevent any open expression of dissent from this paragraph. the bishop of brixen assured his brethren, in the name of the commission, that it did not refer to questions of doctrine, and they could not dispute the general principle that obedience is due to lawful authority. the converse proposition, that the papal acts have no claim to be obeyed, was obviously untenable. the decree was adopted unanimously. there were some who gave their vote with a heavy heart, conscious of the snare.[393] strossmayer alone stayed away. the opposition was at an end. archbishop manning afterwards reminded them that by this vote they had implicitly accepted infallibility. they had done even more. they might conceivably contrive to bind and limit dogmatic infallibility with conditions so stringent as to evade many of the objections taken from the examples of history; but, in requiring submission to papal decrees on matters not articles of faith, they were approving that of which they knew the character, they were confirming without let or question a power they saw in daily exercise, they were investing with new authority the existing bulls, and giving unqualified sanction to the inquisition and the index, to the murder of heretics and the deposing of kings. they approved what they were called on to reform, and solemnly blessed with their lips what their hearts knew to be accursed. the court of rome became thenceforth reckless in its scorn of the opposition, and proceeded in the belief that there was no protest they would not forget, no principle they would not betray, rather than defy the pope in his wrath. it was at once determined to bring on the discussion of the dogma of infallibility. at first, when the minority knew that their prayers and their sacrifices had been vain, and that they must rely on their own resources, they took courage in extremity. rauscher, schwarzenberg, hefele, ketteler, kenrick, wrote pamphlets, or caused them to be written, against the dogma, and circulated them in the council. several english bishops protested that the denial of infallibility by the catholic episcopate had been an essential condition of emancipation, and that they could not revoke that assurance after it had served their purpose, without being dishonoured in the eyes of their countrymen.[394] the archbishop of st. louis, admitting the force of the argument, derived from the fact that a dogma was promulgated in 1854 which had long been disputed and denied, confessed that he could not prove the immaculate conception to be really an article of faith.[395] an incident occurred in june which showed that the experience of the council was working a change in the fundamental convictions of the bishops. döllinger had written in march that an article of faith required not only to be approved and accepted unanimously by the council, but that the bishops united with the pope are not infallible, and that the oecumenicity of their acts must be acknowledged and ratified by the whole church. father hötzl, a franciscan friar, having published a pamphlet in defence of this proposition, was summoned to rome, and required to sign a paper declaring that the confirmation of a council by the pope alone makes it oecumenical. he put his case into the hands of german bishops who were eminent in the opposition, asking first their opinion on the proposed declaration, and, secondly, their advice on his own conduct. the bishops whom he consulted replied that they believed the declaration to be erroneous; but they added that they had only lately arrived at the conviction, and had been shocked at first by döllinger's doctrine. they could not require him to suffer the consequences of being condemned at rome as a rebellious friar and obstinate heretic for a view which they themselves had doubted only three months before. he followed the advice, but he perceived that his advisers had considerately betrayed him. when the observations on infallibility which the bishops had sent in to the commission appeared in print it seemed that the minority had burnt their ships. they affirmed that the dogma would put an end to the conversion of protestants, that it would drive devout men out of the church and make catholicism indefensible in controversy, that it would give governments apparent reason to doubt the fidelity of catholics, and would give new authority to the theory of persecution and of the deposing power. they testified that it was unknown in many parts of the church, and was denied by the fathers, so that neither perpetuity nor universality could be pleaded in its favour; and they declared it an absurd contradiction, founded on ignoble deceit, and incapable of being made an article of faith by pope or council.[396] one bishop protested that he would die rather than proclaim it. another thought it would be an act of suicide for the church. what was said, during the two months' debate, by men perpetually liable to be interrupted by a majority acting less from conviction than by command,[397] could be of no practical account, and served for protest, not for persuasion. apart from the immediate purpose of the discussion, two speeches were memorable--that of archbishop conolly of halifax, for the uncompromising clearness with which he appealed to scripture and repudiated all dogmas extracted from the speculations of divines, and not distinctly founded on the recorded word of god,[398] and that of archbishop darboy, who foretold that a decree which increased authority without increasing power, and claimed for one man, whose infallibility was only now defined, the obedience which the world refused to the whole episcopate, whose right had been unquestioned in the church for 1800 years, would raise up new hatred and new suspicion, weaken the influence of religion over society, and wreak swift ruin on the temporal power.[399] the general debate had lasted three weeks, and forty-nine bishops were still to speak, when it was brought to a close by an abrupt division on the 3rd of june. for twenty-four hours the indignation of the minority was strong. it was the last decisive opportunity for them to reject the legitimacy of the council. there were some who had despaired of it from the beginning, and held that the bull _multiplices_ deprived it of legal validity. but it had not been possible to make a stand at a time when no man knew whether he could trust his neighbour, and when there was fair ground to hope that the worst rules would be relaxed. when the second regulation, interpreted according to the interruptors of strossmayer, claimed the right of proclaiming dogmas which part of the episcopate did not believe, it became doubtful whether the bishops could continue to sit without implicit submission. they restricted themselves to a protest, thinking that it was sufficient to meet words with words, and that it would be time to act when the new principle was actually applied. by the vote of the 3rd of june the obnoxious regulation was enforced in a way evidently injurious to the minority and their cause. the chiefs of the opposition were now convinced of the invalidity of the council, and advised that they should all abstain from speaking, and attend at st. peter's only to negative by their vote the decree which they disapproved. in this way they thought that the claim to oecumenicity would be abolished without breach or violence. the greater number were averse to so vigorous a demonstration; and hefele threw the great weight of his authority into their scale. he contended that they would be worse than their word if they proceeded to extremities on this occasion. they had announced that they would do it only to prevent the promulgation of a dogma which was opposed. if that were done the council would be revolutionary and tyrannical; and they ought to keep their strongest measure in reserve for that last contingency. the principle of unanimity was fundamental. it admitted no ambiguity, and was so clear, simple, and decisive, that there was no risk in fixing on it. the archbishops of paris, milan, halifax, the bishops of djakovar, orleans, marseilles, and most of the hungarians, yielded to these arguments, and accepted the policy of less strenuous colleagues, while retaining the opinion that the council was of no authority. but there were some who deemed it unworthy and inconsistent to attend an assembly which they had ceased to respect. the debate on the several paragraphs lasted till the beginning of july, and the decree passed at length with eighty-eight dissentient votes. it was made known that the infallibility of the pope would be promulgated in solemn session on the 18th, and that all who were present would be required to sign an act of submission. some bishops of the minority thereupon proposed that they should all attend, repeat their vote, and refuse their signature. they exhorted their brethren to set a conspicuous example of courage and fidelity, as the catholic world would not remain true to the faith if the bishops were believed to have faltered. but it was certain that there were men amongst them who would renounce their belief rather than incur the penalty of excommunication, who preferred authority to proof, and accepted the pope's declaration, "la tradizione son' io." it was resolved by a small majority that the opposition should renew its negative vote in writing, and should leave rome in a body before the session. some of the most conscientious and resolute adversaries of the dogma advised this course. looking to the immediate future, they were persuaded that an irresistible reaction was at hand, and that the decrees of the vatican council would fade away and be dissolved by a power mightier than the episcopate and a process less perilous than schism. their disbelief in the validity of its work was so profound that they were convinced that it would perish without violence, and they resolved to spare the pope and themselves the indignity of a rupture. their last manifesto, _la dernière heure_, is an appeal for patience, an exhortation to rely on the guiding, healing hand of god.[400] they deemed that they had assigned the course which was to save the church, by teaching the catholics to reject a council which was neither legitimate in constitution, free in action, nor unanimous in doctrine, but to observe moderation in contesting an authority over which great catastrophes impend. they conceived that it would thus be possible to save the peace and unity of the church without sacrifice of faith and reason. footnotes: [footnote 370: _the north british review_, october 1870.] [footnote 371: fidem mihi datam non servatam fuisse queror. acta supprimere, aut integra dare oportebat. he says also: omnia ad nutum delegati apostolici fiebant.] [footnote 372: citra et contra singulorum suffragia, imo praeter et supra omnium vota pontificis solius declarationi atque sententiae validam vim atque irreformabilem adesse potestatem.] [footnote 373: nous restons dans les doctrines de bossuet parce que nous les croyons généralement vraies; nous les défendons parce qu'elles sont attaquées, et qu'un parti puissant veut les faire condamner. ces doctrines de l'épiscopat français, de l'école de paris, de notre vieille sorbonne, se ramènent pour nous à trois propositions, à trois vérités fondamentales: 1o l'église est une monarchie efficacement tempérée d'aristocracie; 2o la souveraineté spirituelle est essentiellement composée de ces deux éléments quoique le second soit subordonné au premier; 3o le concours de ces éléments est nécessaire pour établir la règle absolue de la foi, c'est-à-dire, pour constituer l'acte par excellence de la souveraineté spirituelle.] [footnote 374: si hujus doctrinae memores fuissemus, haereticos seil cet non esse infirmandos vel convincendos ex scripturis, meliore sane loco essent res nostrae; sed dum ostentandi ingenii et eruditionis gratia cum luthero in certamen descenditur scripturarum, excitatum est hoc, quod, proh dolor! nunc videmus, incendium (pighius).] [footnote 375: catholici non admondum solliciti sunt de critica et hermeneutica biblica ... ipsi, ut verbo dicam, jam habent aedificium absolutum sane ac perfectum, in cujus possessione firme ac secure consistant.] [footnote 376: praxis ecclesiae uno tempore interpretatur scripturam uno modo et alio tempore alio modo, nam intellectus currit cum praxi.--mutato judicio ecclesiaemutatum est dei judicium.] [footnote 377: si viri ecclesiastici, sive in concilio oecumenico congregati, sive seorsim scribentes, aliquod dogma vel unamquamque consuetudinem uno ore ac diserte testantur ex traditione divina haberi, sine dubio certum argumentum est, uti ita esse credamus.--ex testimonio hujus solius ecclesiae sumi potest certum argumentum ad probandas apostolicas traditiones (bellarmine).] [footnote 378: veniae sive indulgentiae autoritate scripturae nobis non innotuere, sed autoritate ecclesiae romanae romanorumque pontificum, quae major est.] [footnote 379: ego, ut ingenue fatear, plus uni summo pontifici crederem, in his, quae fidei mysteria tangunt, quam mille augustinis, hieronymis, gregoriis (cornelius mussus).] [footnote 380: the two views contradict each other; but they are equally characteristic of the endeavour to emancipate the church from the obligation of proof. fénelon says: "oseroit-on soutenir que l'église après avoir mal raisonné sur tous les textes, et les avoir pris à contre-sens, est tout à coup saisie par un enthousiasme aveugle, pour juger bien, en raisonnant mal?" and möhler: "die ältesten ökumenischen synoden führten daher für ihre dogmatischen beschlüsse nicht einmal bestimmte biblische stellen an; und die katholischen theologen lehren mit allegingr uebereinstimmung und ganz aus dem geiste der kirche heraus, dass selbst die biblische beweisführung eines für untrüglich gehaltenen beschlusses nicht untrüglich sei, sondern eben nur das ausgesprochene dogma selbst."] [footnote 381: cujuscumque ergo scientiae, etiam historiae ecclesiasticae conclusiones, romanorum pontificum infallibiltati adversantes, quo manifestius haec ex revelationis fontibus infertur, eo certius veluti totidem errores habendas esse consequitur.] [footnote 382: cum in professione fidei electi pontificis damnetur honorius papa, ideo quia pravis haereticorum assertionibus fomentum impendit, si verba delineata sint vere in autographo, nec ex notis apparere possit, quomodo huic vulneri medelam offerat, praestat non divulgari opus.] [footnote 383: that article condemns the following proposition: "romani pontifices et concilia oecumenica a limitibus suae potestati recesserunt, jura principum usurparunt, atque etiam in rebus fidei et morum definiendis errarunt."] [footnote 384: j'en suis convaincu: à peine aurai-je touché la terre sacrée, à peine aurai-je baisé le tombeau des apôtres, que je me sentirai dans la paix, hors de la bataille, au sein d'une assemblée présidée par un père et composée de frères. là, tous les bruits expireront, toutes les ingérences téméraires cesseront, toutes les imprudences disparaitront, les flots et les vents seront apaisés.] [footnote 385: vous admirez sans doute beaucoup l'évêque d'orléans, mais vous l'admireriez bien plus encore, si vous pouviez vous figurer l'abime d'idolatrie où est tombé le clergé français. cela dépasse tout ce que l'on aurait jamais pu l'imaginer aux jours de ma jeunesse, au temps de frayssinous et de la mennais. le pauvre mgr. maret, pour avoir exposé des idées tres modérées dans un langage plein d'urbanité et de charité, est traité publiquement dans les journaux soi-disant religieux d'hérésiarque et d'apostat, par les derniers de nos curés. de tous les mystères que présente en si grand nombre l'histoire de l'église je n'en connais pas qui égale ou dépasse cette transformation si prompte et si complète de la france catholique en une basse-cour de _l'anticamera du vatican_. j'en serais encore plus désesperé qu'humilié, si là, comme partout dans les régions illuminées par la foi, la miséricorde et l'esperance ne se laissaient entrevoir à travers les ténèbres. "c'est du rhin aujourd'hui que nous vient la lumière." l'allemagne a été choisie pour opposer une digue à ce torrent de fanatisme servile que menaçait de tout englouter (nov. 7, 1869).] [footnote 386: non solum ea quae ad scholas theologicas pertinent scholis relinquantur, sed etiam doctrinae quae a fidelibus pie tenentur et coluntur, sine gravi causa in codicem dogmatum ne inferantur. in specie ne concilium declaret vel definiat infallibilitatem summi pontificis, a doctissimis et prudentissimis fidelibus sanctae sedi intime addictis, vehementer optatur. gravia enim mala exinde oritura timent tum fidelibus tum infidelibus. fideles enim, qui primatum magisterii et jurisdictionis in summo pontifice ultro agnoscunt, quorum pietas et obedientia erga sanctam sedem nullo certe tempore major fuit, corde turbarentur magis quam erigerentur, ac si nunc demum fundamentum ecclesiae et verae doctrinae stabiliendum sit; infideles vero novam calumniarum et derisionum materiam lucrarentur. neque desunt, qui ejusmodi definitionem logice impossibilem vocant.... nostris diebus defensio veritatis ac religionis tum praesertim efficax et fructuosa est, si sacerdotes a lege caeterorum civium minus recedunt, sed communibus omnium juribus utuntur, ita ut vis defensionis sit in veritate interna non per tutelam externae exemtionis.... praesertim ecclesia se scientiarum, quae hominem ornant perficiuntque, amicam et patronam exhibeat, probe noscens, omne verum a deo esse, et profunda ac seria literarum studia opitulari fidei.] [footnote 387: quid enim expedit damnare quae damnata jam sunt, quidve juvat errores proscribere quos novimus jam esse proscriptos?... falsa sophistarum dogmata, veluti cineres a turbine venti evanuerunt, corrupuerunt, fateor, permultos, infecerunt genium saeculi hujus, sed numquid credendum est, corruptionis contaginem non contigisse, si ejusmodi errores decretorum anathemate prostrati fuissent?... pro tuenda et tute servanda religione catholica praeter gemitus et preces ad deum aliud medium praesidiumque nobis datum non est nisi catholica scientia, cum recta fide per omnia concors. excolitur summopere apud heterodoxos fidei inimica scientia, excolatur ergo oportet et omni opere augeatur apud catholicos vera scientia. ecclesiae amica.... obmutescere faciamus ora obtrectantium qui falso nobis imputare non desistunt, catholicam ecclesiam opprimere scientiam, et quemcumque liberum cogitandi modum ita cohibere, ut neque scientia, nec ulla alia animi libertas in ea subsistere vel florescere possit.... propterea monstrandum hoc est, et scriptis et factis manifestandum, in catholica ecclesia veram pro populis esse libertatem, verum profectum, verum lumen, veramque prosperitatem.] [footnote 388: il n'y a au fond qu'une question devenue urgente et inévitable, dont la décision faciliterait le cours et la décision de toutes les autres, dont le retard paralyse tout. sans cela rien n'est commencé ni même abordable (_univers_, february 9).] [footnote 389: gratry had written: "cette apologétique sans franchise est l'une des causes de notre décadence religieuse depuis des siècles.... sommes-nous les prédicateurs du mensonge ou les apôtres de la vérité? le temps n'est-il pas venu de rejeter avec dégoût les fraudes, les interpolations, et les mutilations que les menteurs et les faussaires, nos plus cruels ennemis, ont pu introduire parmi nous?" the bishop wrote: "jamais parole plus puissante, inspirée par la conscience et le savoir, n'est arrivée plus à propos que la vôtre.... le mal est tel et le danger si effrayant que le silence deviendrait de la complicité."] [footnote 390: pace eruditissimorum virorum dictum esto: mihi haecce nec veritati congrua esse videntur, nec caritati. non veritati; verum quidem est protestantes gravissimam commisisse culpam, dum spreta et insuperhabita divina ecclesiae auctoritate, aeternas et immutabiles fidei veritates subjectivae rationis judicio et arbitrio subjecissent. hoc superbiae humanae fomentum gravissimis certe malis, rationalismo, criticismo, etc. occasionem dedit. ast hoc quoque respectu dici debet, protestantismi ejus qui cum eodem in nexu existit rationalismi germen saeculo xvi. praeextitisse in sic dicto humanismo et classicismo, quem in sanctuario ipso quidam summae auctoritatis viri incauto consilio fovebant et nutriebant; et nisi hoc germen praeextitisset concipi non posset quomodo tam parva scintilla tantum in medio europae excitare potuisset incendium, ut illud ad hodiernum usque diem restingui non potuerit. accedit et illud: fidei et religionis, ecclesiae et omnis auctoritatis contemptum absque ulla cum protestantismo cognatione et parentela in medio catholicae gentis saeculo xviii. temporibus voltarii et encyclopaedistarum enatum fuisse.... quidquid interim sit de rationalismo, puto venerabilem deputationem omnino falli dum texendo genealogiam naturalismi, materialismi, pantheismi, atheismi, etc., omnes omnino hos errores foetus protestantismi esse asserit.... errores superius enumerati non tantum nobis verum et ipsis protestantibus horrori sunt et abominationi, ut adeo ecclesiae et nobis catholicis in iis oppugnandis et refellendis auxilio sint et adjumento. ita leibnitius erat certe vir eruditus et omni sub respectu praestans; vir in dijudicandis ecclesiae catholicae institutis aequus; vir in debellandis sui temporis erroribus strenuus; vir in revehenda inter christianas communitates concordia optime animatus et meritus. [loud cries of "oh! oh!" the president de angelis rang the bell and said, "non est hicce locus laudandi protestantes."] ... hos viros quorum magna copia existit in germania, in anglia, item et in america septentrionali, magna hominum turba inter protestantes sequitur, quibus omnibus applicari potest illud magni augustini: "errant, sed bona fide errant; haeretici sunt, sed illi nos haereticos tenent. ipsi errorem non invenerunt, sed a perversis et in errorem inductis parentibus haereditaverunt, parati errorem deponere quamprimum convicti fuerint." [here there was a long interruption and ringing of the bell, with cries of "shame! shame!" "down with the heretic!"] hi omnes etiamsi non spectent ad ecclesiae corpus, spectant tamen ad ejus animam, et de muneribus redemptionis aliquatenus participant. hi omnes in amore quo erga iesum christum dominum nostrum feruntur, atque in illis positivis veritatibus quas ex fidei naufragio salvarunt, totidem gratiae divinae momenta possident, quibus misericordia dei utetur, ut eos ad priscam fidem et ecclesiam reducat, nisi nos exaggerationibus nostris et improvidis charitatis ipsis debitae laesionibus tempus misericordiae divinae elongaverimus. quantum autem ad charitatem, ei certe contrarium est vulnera aliena alio fine tangere quam ut ipsa sanentur; puto autem hac enumeratione errorum, quibus protestantismus occasionem dedisset, id non fieri.... decreto, quod in supplementum ordinis interioris nobis nuper communicatum est, statuitur res in concilio hocce suffragiorum majoritate decidendas fore. contra hoc principium, quod omnem praecedentium conciliorum praxim funditus evertit, multi episcopi reclamarunt, quin tamen aliquod responsum obtinuerint. responsum autem in re tanti momenti dari debuisset clarum, perspicuum et omnis ambiguitatis expers. hoc ad summas concilii hujus calamitates spectat, nam hoc certe et praesenti generationi et posteris praebebit ansam dicendi: huic concilio libertatem et veritatem defuisse. ego ipse convictus sum, aeternam ac immutabilem fidei et traditionis regulam semper fuisse semperque mansuram communem, adminus moraliter unanimem consensum. concilium, quod hac regula insuperhabita, fidei et morum dogmata majoritate numerica definire intenderet, juxta meam intimam convictionem eo ipso excideret jure conscientiam orbis catholici sub sanctione vitae ac mortis aeternae obligandi.] [footnote 391: dum autem ipse die hesterno ex suggestu hanc quaestionem posuissem et verba deconsensu moraliter unanimi in rebus fidei definiendis necessario protulissem, interruptus fui, mihique inter maximum tumultum et graves comminationes possibilitas sermonis continuandi adempta est. atque haec gravissima sane circumstantia magis adhuc comprobat necessitatem habendi responsi, quod clarum sit omnisque ambiguitatis expers. peto itaque humillime, ut hujusmodi responsum in proxima congregatione generali detur. nisi enim haec fierent anceps haererem an manere possem in concilio, ubi libertas episcoporum ita opprimitur, quemadmodum heri in me oppressa fuit, et ubi dogmata fidei definirentur novo et in ecclesia dei adusque inaudito modo.] [footnote 392: quoniam vero satis non est, haereticam pravitatem devitare, nisi ii quoque errores diligenter fugiantur, qui ad illam plus minusve accedunt, omnes officii monemus, servandi etiam constitutiones et decreta quibus pravae eiusmodi opiniones, quae isthic diserte non enumerantur, ab hac sancta sede proscriptae et prohibitae sunt.] [footnote 393: in the speech on infallibility which he prepared, but never delivered. archbishop kenrick thus expressed himself: "inter alia quae mihi stuporem injecerunt dixit westmonasteriensis, nos additamento facto sub finem decreti de fide, tertia sessione lati, ipsam pontificiam infallibilitatem, saltem implicite, jam agnovisse, nec ab ea recedere nunc nobis licere. si bene intellexerim rm relatorem, qui in congregatione generali hoc additamentum, prius oblatum, deinde abstractum, nobis mirantibus quid rei esset, illud iterum inopinato commendavit--dixit, verbis clarioribus, per illud nullam omnino doctrinam edoceri; sed earn quatuor capitibus ex quibus istud decretum compositum est imponi tanquam eis coronidem convenientem; eamque disciplinarem magis quam doctrinalem characterem habere. aut deceptus est ipse, si vera dixit westmonasteriensis; aut nos sciens in errorem induxit, quod de viro tam ingenuo minime supponere licet. utcumque fuerit, ejus declarationi fidentes, plures suffragia sua isti decreto haud deneganda censuerunt ob istam clausulam; aliis, inter quos egomet, doles parari metuentibus, et aliorum voluntati hac in re aegre cedentibus. in his omnibus non est mens mea aliquem ex reverendissimis patribus malae fidei incusare; quos omnes, ut par est, veneratione debita prosequor. sed extra concilium adesse dicuntur viri religiosi--forsan et pii--qui maxime in illud influunt; qui calliditati potius quam bonis artibus confisi, rem ecclesiae in maximum ex quo orta sit discrimen adduxerant; qui ab inito concilio effecerunt ut in deputationes conciliares ii soli eligerentur qui eorum placitis fovere aut noscerentur aut crederentur; qui nonnullorum ex eorum praedecessoribus vestigia prementes in schematibus nobis propositis, et ex eorum officina prodeuntibus, nihil magis cordi habuisse videntur quam episcopalem auctoritatem deprimere, pontificiam autem extollere; et verborum ambagibus incautos decipere velle videntur, dum alia ab aliis in eorum explicationem dicantur. isti grave hoc incendium in ecclesia excitarunt, et in illud insufflare non desinunt, scriptis eorum, pietatis speciem prae se ferentibus sed veritate ejus vacuis, in populos spargentibus."] [footnote 394: the author of the protest afterwards gave the substance of his argument as follows: "episcopi et theologi publice a parlamento interrogati fuerunt, utrum catholici angliae tenerent papam posse definitiones relativas ad fidem et mores populis imponere absque omni consensu expresso vel tacito ecclesiae. omnes episcopi et theologi responderunt catholicos hoc non tenere. hisce responsionibus confisum parlamentum angliae catholicos admisit ad participationem iurium civilium. quis protestantibus persuadebit catholicos contra honorem et bonam fidem non agere, qui quando agebatur de iuribus sibi acquirendis publice professi sunt ad fidem catholicam non pertinere doctrinam infallibilitatis romani pontificis, statim autem ac obtinuerint quod volebant, a professione publice facta recedunt et contrarium affirmant?"] [footnote 395: archbishop kenrick's remarkable statement is not reproduced accurately in his pamphlet _de pontificia infallibilitate_. it is given in full in the last pages of the _observationes_, and is abridged in his _concio habenda sed non habita_, where he concludes: "eam fidei doctrinam esse neganti, non video quomodo responderi possit, cum objiceret ecclesiam errorem contra fidem divinitus revelatam diu tolerare non potuisse, quin, aut quod ad fidei depositum pertineret non scivisse, aut errorem manifestum tolerasse videretur."] [footnote 396: certissimum ipsi esse fore ut infallibilitate ista dogmatice definita, in dioecesi sua, in qua ne vestigium quidem traditionis de infallibilitate s.p. hucusque inveniatur, et in aliis regionibus multi, et quidem non solum minoris, sed etiam optimae notae, a fide deficiant.--si edatur, omnis progressus conversionum in provinciis foederatis americae funditus extinguetur. episcopi et sacerdotes in disputationibus cum protestantibus quid respondere possent non haberent.--per eiusmodi definitionem acatholicis, inter quos haud pauci iique optimi hisce praesertim temporibus firmum fidei fundamentum desiderant, ad ecclesiam reditus redditur difficilis, imo impossibilis.--qui concilii decretis obsequi vellent, invenient se maximis in difficultatibus versari. gubernia civilia eos tanquam subditos minus fidos, haud sine verisimilitudinis specie, habebunt. hostes ecclesiae eos lacessere non verebuntur, nunc eis objicientes errores quos pontifices aut docuisse, aut sua agendi ratione probasse, dicuntur et risu excipient responsa quae sola afferri possint.--eo ipso definitur in globo quidquid per diplomata apostolica huc usque definitum est.... poterit, admissa tali definitione, statuere de dominio temporali, de eius mensura, de potestate deponendi reges, de usu coercendi haereticos.--doctrina de infallibilitate romani pontificis nec in scriptura sacra, nec in traditione ecclesiastica fundata mihi videtur. immo contrarian., ni fallor, christiana antiquitas tenuit doctrinam.--modus dicendi schematis supponit existere in ecclesia duplicem infallibilitatem, ipsius ecclesiae et romani pontificis, quod est absurdum et inauditum.--subterfugiis quibus theologi non pauci in honorii causa usi sunt, derisui me exponerem. sophismata adhibere et munere episcopali et natura rei, quae in timore domini pertractanda est, indignum mihi videtur.--plerique textus quibus eam comprobant etiam melioris notae theologi, quos ultramontanos vocant, mutilati sunt, falsificati, interpolati, circumtruncati, spurii, in sensum alienum detorti.--asserere audeo eam sententiam, ut in schemate jacet, non esse fidei doctrinam, nec talem devenire posse per quamcumque definitionem etiam conciliarem.] [footnote 397: this, at least, was the discouraging impression of archbishop kenrick: semper contigit ut patres surgendo assensum sententiae deputationis praebuerint. primo quidem die suffragiorum, cum quaestio esset de tertia parte primae emendationis, nondum adhibita indicatione a subsecretario, deinde semper facta, plures surrexerunt adeo ut necesse foret numerum surgentium capere, ut constaret de suffragiis. magna deinde confusio exorta est, et ista emendatio, quamvis majore forsan numero sic acceptata, in crastinum diem dilata est. postero die rms relator ex ambone patres monuit, deputationem emendationem istam admittere nolle. omnes fere eam rejiciendam surgendo statim dixerunt.] [footnote 398: quodcumque dominus noster non dixerit etiam si metaphysice aut physice certissimum nunquam basis esse poterit dogmatis divinae fidei. fides enim per auditum, auditus autem non per scientiam sed per verba christi.... non ipsa verba s. scripturae igitur, sed genuinus sensus, sive litteralis, sive metaphoricus, prout in mente dei revelantis fuit, atque ab ecclesiae patribus semper atque ubique concorditer expositus, et quem nos omnes juramento sequi abstringimur, hic tantummodo sensus vera dei revelatio dicendus est.... tota antiquitas silet vel contraria est.... verbum dei volo et hoc solum, quaeso et quidem indubitatum, ut dogma fiat.] [footnote 399: hanc de infallibilitate his conditionibus ortam et isto modo introductam aggredi et definire non possumus, ut arbitror, quin eo ipso tristem viam sternamus tum cavillationibus impiorum, tum etiam objectionibus moralem hujus concilii auctoritatem minuentibus. et hoc quidem eo magis cavendum est, quod jam prostent et pervulgentur scripta et acta quae vim ejus et rationem labefactare attentant; ita ut nedum animos sedare queat et quae pacis sunt afferre, e contra nova dissensionis et discordiarum semina inter christianos spargere videatur.... porro, quod in tantis ecclesiae angustiis laboranti mundo remedium affertur? iis omnibus qui ab humero indocili excutiunt onera antiquitus imposita, et consuetudine patrum veneranda, novum ideoque grave et odiosum onus imponi postulant schematis auctores. eos omnes qui infirmae fidei sunt novo et non satis opportuno dogmate quasi obruunt, doctrina scilicet hucusque nondum definita, praesentis discussionis vulnere nonnihil sauciata, et a concilio cujus libertatem minus aequo apparere plurimi autumant et dicunt pronuntianda.... mundus aut aeger est aut perit, non quod ignorat veritatem vel veritatis doctores, sed quod ab ea refugit eamque sibi non vult imperari. igitur, si eam respuit, quum a toto docentis ecclesiae corpore, id est ab 800 episcopis per totum orbem sparsis et simul cum s. pontifice infallibilibus praedicatur, quanto magis quum ab unico doctore infallibili, et quidem ut tali recenter declarato praedicabitur? ex altera parte, ut valeat et efficaciter agat auctoritas necesse est non tantum eam affirmari, sed insuper admitti.... syllabus totam europam pervasit at cui malo mederi potuit etiam ubi tanquam oraculum infallibile susceptus est? duo tantum restabant regna in quibus religio florebat, non de facto tantum, sed et de jure dominans: austria scilicet et hispania. atqui in his duobus regnis ruit iste catholicus ordo, quamvis ab infallibili auctoritate commendatus, imo forsan saltem in austria eo praecise quod ab hac commendatus. audeamus igitur res uti sunt considerare. nedum sanctissimi pontificis independens infallibilitas praejudicia et objectiones destruat quae permultos a fide avertunt, ea potius auget et aggravat.... nemo non videt si politicae gnarus, quae semina dissensionum schema nostrum contineat et quibus periculis exponatur ipsa temporalis sanctae sedis potestas.] [footnote 400: espérons que l'excès du mal provoquera le retour du bien. ce concile n'aura eu qu'un heureux résultat, celui d'en appeler un autre, réuni dans la liberté.... le concile du vatican demeurera stérile, comme tout ce qui n'est pas éclos sous le souffle de l'esprit saint. cependant il aura révélé non seulement jusqu'à quel point l'absolutisme peut abuser des meilleures institutions et des meilleurs instincts, mais aussi ce que vaut encore le droit, alors même qu'il n'a plus que le petit nombre pour le deféndre.... si la multitude passe quand même nous lui prédisons qu'elle n'ira pas loin. les spartiates, qui étaient tombés aux thermopyles pour défendre les terres de la liberté, avaient preparé au flot impitoyable au despotisme la défaite de salamis.] xv a history of the inquisition of the middle ages. by henry charles lea[401] a good many years ago, when bishop wilberforce was at winchester, and the earl of beaconsfield was a character in fiction, the bishop was interested in the proposal to bring over the utrecht psalter. mr. disraeli thought the scheme absurd. "of course," he said, "you won't get it." he was told that, nevertheless, such things are, that public manuscripts had even been sent across the atlantic in order that mr. lea might write a history of the inquisition. "yes," he replied, "but they never came back again." the work which has been awaited so long has come over at last, and will assuredly be accepted as the most important contribution of the new world to the religious history of the old. other books have shown the author as a thoughtful inquirer in the remunerative but perilous region where religion and politics conflict, where ideas and institutions are as much considered as persons and events, and history is charged with all the elements of fixity, development, and change. it is little to say, now, that he equals buckle in the extent, and surpasses him in the intelligent choice and regulation, of his reading. he is armed at all points. his information is comprehensive, minute, exact, and everywhere sufficient, if not everywhere complete. in this astonishing press of digested facts there is barely space to discuss the ideas which they exhibit and the law which they obey. m. molinier lately wrote that a work with this scope and title "serait, à notre sens, une entreprise à peu près chimérique." it will be interesting to learn whether the opinion of so good a judge has been altered or confirmed. the book begins with a survey of all that led to the growth of heresy, and to the creation, in the thirteenth century, of exceptional tribunals for its suppression. there can be no doubt that this is the least satisfactory portion of the whole. it is followed by a singularly careful account of the steps, legislative and administrative, by which church and state combined to organise the intermediate institution, and of the manner in which its methods were formed by practice. nothing in european literature can compete with this, the centre and substance of mr. lea's great history. in the remaining volumes he summons his witnesses, calls on the nations to declare their experience, and tells how the new force acted upon society to the end of the middle ages. history of this undefined and international cast, which shows the same wave breaking upon many shores, is always difficult, from the want of visible unity and progression, and has seldom succeeded so well as in this rich but unequal and disjointed narrative. on the most significant of all the trials, those of the templars and of hus, the author spends his best research; and the strife between avignon and the franciscans, thanks to the propitious aid of father ehrle, is better still. joan of arc prospers less than the disciples of perfect poverty; and after joan of arc many pages are allotted, rather profusely, to her companion in arms, who survives in the disguise of bluebeard. the series of dissolving scenes ends, in order of time, at savonarola; and with that limit the work is complete. the later inquisition, starting with the spanish and developing into the roman, is not so much a prolongation or a revival as a new creation. the mediæval inquisition strove to control states, and was an engine of government. the modern strove to coerce the protestants, and was an engine of war. one was subordinate, local, having a kind of headquarters in the house of saint dominic at toulouse. the other was sovereign, universal, centred in the pope, and exercising its domination, not against obscure men without a literature, but against bishop and archbishop, nuncio and legate, primate and professor; against the general of the capuchins and the imperial preacher; against the first candidate in the conclave, and the president of the oecumenical council. under altered conditions, the rules varied and even principles were modified. mr. lea is slow to take counsel of the voluminous moderns, fearing the confusion of dates. when he says that the laws he is describing are technically still in force, he makes too little of a fundamental distinction. in the eye of the polemic, the modern inquisition eclipses its predecessor, and stops the way. the origin of the inquisition is the topic of a lasting controversy. according to common report, innocent iii. founded it, and made saint dominic the first inquisitor; and this belief has been maintained by the dominicans against the cistercians, and by the jesuits against the dominicans themselves. they affirm that the saint, having done his work in languedoc, pursued it in lombardy: "per civitates et castella lombardiae circuibat, praedicans et evangelizans regnum dei, atque contra haereticos inquirens, quos ex odore et aspectu dignoscens, condignis suppliciis puniebat" (fontana, _monumenta dominicana_, 16). he transferred his powers to fra moneta, the brother in whose bed he died, and who is notable as having studied more seriously than any other divine the system which he assailed: "vicarium suum in munere inquisitionis delegerat dilectissimum sibi b. monetam, qui spiritu illius loricatus, tanquam leo rugiens contra haereticos surrexit.... iniquos cum haereticos ex corde insectaretur, illisque nullo modo parceret, sed igne ac ferro consumeret." moneta is succeeded by guala, who brings us down to historic times, when the inquisition flourished undisputed: "facta promotione guallae constitutus est in eius locum generalis inquisitor p.f. guidottus de sexto, a gregorio papa ix., qui innumeros propemodum haereticos igne consumpsit" (fontana, _sacrum theatrum dominicanum_, 595). sicilian inquisitors produce an imperial privilege of december 1224, which shows the tribunal in full action under honorius iii.: "sub nostrae indignationis fulmine praesenti edicto districtius praecipiendo mandamus, quatenus inquisitoribus haereticae pravitatis, ut suum libere officium prosequi et exercere valeant, prout decet, omne quod potestis impendatis auxilium" (franchina, _inquisizione di sicilia_, 1774, 8). this document may be a forgery of the fifteenth century; but the whole of the dominican version is dismissed by mr. lea with contempt. he has heard that their founder once rescued a heretic from the flames; "but dominic's project only looked to their peaceful conversion, and to performing the duties of instruction and exhortation." nothing is better authenticated in the life of the saint than the fact that he condemned heretics and exercised the right of deciding which of them should suffer and which should be spared. "contigit quosdam haereticos captos et per eum convictos, cum redire nollent ad fidem catholicam, tradi judicio saeculari. cumque essent incendio deputati, aspiciens inter alios quemdam raymundum de grossi nomine, ac si aliquem eo divinae praedestinationis radium fuisset intuitus, istum, inquit officialibus curiae, reservate, nec aliquo modo cum caeteris comburatur" (constantinus, _vita s. dominici_; echard, _scriptores o.p._, 1. 33). the transaction is memorable in dominican annals as the one link distinctly connecting saint dominic with the system of executions, and the only security possessed by the order that the most conspicuous of its actions is sanctioned by the spirit and example of the founder. the original authorities record it, and it is commemorated by bzovius and malvenda, by fontana and percin, by echard and mamachi, as well as in the _acta sanctorum_. those are exactly the authors to whom in the first instance a man betakes himself who desires to understand the inception and early growth of the inquisition. i cannot remember that any one of them appears in mr. lea's notes. he says indeed that saint dominic's inquisitorial activity "is affirmed by all the historians of the order," and he is a workman who knows his tools so well that we may hesitate to impute this grave omission to inacquaintance with necessary literature. it is one of his characteristics to be suspicious of the _histoire intime_ as the seat of fable and proper domain of those problems in psychology against which the certitude of history is always going to pieces. where motives are obscure, he prefers to contemplate causes in their effects, and to look abroad over his vast horizon of unquestioned reality. the difference between outward and interior history will be felt by any one who compares the story of dolcino here given with the account in neander. mr. lea knows more about him and has better materials than the ponderous professor of pectoral theology. but he has not all neander's patience and power to read significance and sense in the musings of a reckless erratic mind. he believes that pope gregory ix. is the intellectual originator, as well as the legislative imponent, of the terrific system which ripened gradually and experimentally in his pontificate. it does not appear whether he has read, or knows through havet the investigations which conducted ficker to a different hypothesis. the transition of 1231 from the saving of life to the taking of life by fire was nearly the sharpest that men can conceive, and in pursuance of it the subsequent legal forms are mere detail. the spirit and practice of centuries were renounced for the opposite extreme; and between the mercy of 1230 and the severity of 1231 there was no intervening stage of graduated rigour. therefore it is probable that the new idea of duty, foreign to italian and specifically to roman ways, was conveyed by a new man, that a new influence just then got possession of the pope. professor ficker signals guala as the real contriver of the _régime_ of terror, and the man who acquired the influence imported the idea and directed the policy. guala was a dominican prior whom the pope trusted in emergencies. in the year 1230 he negotiated the treaty of san germano between frederic ii. and the church, and was made bishop of brescia. in that year brescia, first among italian cities, inserted in its statutes the emperor's lombard law of 1224, which sent the heretic to the stake. the inference is that the dominican prelate caused its insertion, and that nobody is so likely to have expounded its available purport to the pontiff as the man who had so lately caused it to be adopted in his own see, and who stood high just then in merit and in favour. that guala was bishop-elect on 28th august, half a year before the first burnings at rome, we know; that he caused the adoption of frederic's law at brescia or at rome is not in evidence. of that abrupt and unexplained enactment little is told us, but this we are told, that it was inspired by honorius: "leges quoque imperiales per quondam fredericum olim romanorum imperatorem, tunc in devotione romane sedis persistentem, procurante eadem sede, fuerunt edite et padue promulgate" (bern. guidonis, _practica inquisitionis_, 173). at any rate, gregory, who had seen most things since the elevation of innocent, knew how montfort dealt with albigensian prisoners at minerve and lavaur, what penalties were in store at toulouse, and on what principles master conrad administered in germany the powers received from rome. the papacy which inspired the coronation laws of 1220, in which there is no mention of capital punishment, could not have been unobservant of the way in which its own provisions were transformed; and gregory, whom honorius had already called "magnum et speciale ecclesie romane membrum," who had required the university of bologna to adopt and to expound the new legislation, and who knew the archbishop of magdeburg, had little to learn from guala about the formidable weapon supplied to that prelate for the government of lombardy. there is room for further conjecture. in those days it was discovered that arragon was infested with heresy; and the king's confessor proposed that the holy see be applied to for means of active suppression. with that object, in 1230 he was sent to rome. the envoy's name was raymond, and his home was on the coast of catalonia in the town of pennaforte. he was a bolognese jurist, a dominican, and the author of the most celebrated treatise on morals made public in the generation preceding the scholastic theology. the five years of his abode in rome changed the face of the church. he won the confidence of gregory, became penitentiary, and was employed to codify the acts of the popes militant since the publication of gratian. very soon after saint raymond appeared at the papal court, the use of the stake became law, the inquisitorial machinery had been devised, and the management given to the priors of the order. when he departed he left behind him instructions for the treatment of heresy, which the pope adopted and sent out where they were wanted. he refused a mitre, rose to be general, it is said in opposition to albertus magnus, and retired early, to become, in his own country, the oracle of councils on the watch for heterodoxy. until he came, in spite of much violence and many laws, the popes had imagined no permanent security against religious error, and were not formally committed to death by burning. gregory himself, excelling all the priesthood in vigour and experience, had for four years laboured, vaguely and in vain, with the transmitted implements. of a sudden, in three successive measures, he finds his way, and builds up the institution which is to last for centuries. that this mighty change in the conditions of religious thought and life and in the functions of the order was suggested by dominicans is probable. and it is reasonable to suppose that it was the work of the foremost dominican then living, who at that very moment had risen to power and predominance at rome. no sane observer will allow himself to overdraw the influence of national character on events. yet there was that in the energetic race that dwell with the pyrenees above them and the ebro below that suited a leading part in the business of organised persecution. they are among the nations that have been inventors in politics, and both the constitution of arragon and that of the society of jesus prove their constructive science. while people in other lands were feeling their way, doubtful and debonair, arragon went straight to the end. before the first persecuting pope was elected, before the child of apulia, who was to be the first persecuting emperor, was born, alfonso proscribed the heretics. king and clergy were in such accord that three years later the council of girona decreed that they might be beaten while they remained, and should be burnt if they came back. it was under this government, amid these surroundings, that saint dominic grew up, whom sixtus v., speaking on authority which we do not possess, entitled the first inquisitor. saint raymond, who had more to do with it than saint dominic, was his countryman. eymerici, whose _directorium_ was the best authority until the _practica_ of guidonis appeared, presided during forty years over the arragonese tribunal; and his commentator pegna, the coke upon littleton of inquisitorial jurisprudence, came from the same stern region. the _histoire générale de languedoc_ in its new shape has supplied mr. lea with so good a basis that his obligations to the present editors bring him into something like dependence on french scholarship. he designates monarchs by the names they bear in france--louis le germanique, charles le sage, philippe le bon, and even philippe; and this habit, with foulques and berenger of tours, with aretino for arezzo, oldenburg for altenburg, torgau for zürich, imparts an exotic flavour which would be harmless but for a surviving preference for french books. compared with bouquet and vaissète, he is unfamiliar with böhmer and pertz. for matthew paris he gets little or no help from coxe, or madden, or luard, or liebermann, or huillard. in france few things of importance have escaped him. his account of marguerite porrette differs from that given by hauréau in the _histoire littéraire_, and the difference is left unexplained. no man can write about joan of arc without suspicion who discards the publications of quicherat, and even of wallon, beaucourt, and luce. etienne de bourbon was an inquisitor of long experience, who knew the original comrade and assistant of waldus. fragments of him scattered up and down in the works of learned men have caught the author's eye; but it is uncertain how much he knows of the fifty pages from stephanus printed in echard's book on saint thomas, or of the volume in which lecoy de la marche has collected all, and more than all, that deserves to live of his writings. the "historia pontificalis," attributed to john of salisbury, in the twentieth volume of the _monumenta_, should affect the account of arnold of brescia. the analogy with the waldenses, amongst whom his party seems to have merged, might be more strongly marked. "hominum sectam fecit que adhuc dicitur heresis lumbardorum.... episcopis non parcebat ob avariciam et turpem questum, et plerumque propter maculam vite, et quia ecclesiam dei in sanguinibus edificare nituntur." he was excommunicated and declared a heretic. he was reconciled and forgiven. therefore, when he resumed his agitation his portion was with the obstinate and relapsed. "ei populus romanus vicissim auxilium et consilium contra omnes homines et nominatim contra domnum papam repromisit, eum namque excommunicaverat ecclesia romana.... post mortem domni innocentii reversus est in italiam, et promissa satisfactione et obediencia romane ecclesie, a domno eugenio receptus est apud viterbum." and it is more likely that the fear of relics caused them to reduce his body to ashes than merely to throw the ashes into the tiber. the energy with which mr. lea beats up information is extraordinary even when imperfectly economised. he justly makes ample use of the _vitae paparum avenionensium_, which he takes apparently from the papal volume of muratori. these biographies were edited by baluze, with notes and documents of such value that avignon without him is like athenæus without casaubon, or the theodosian code without godefroy. but if he neglects him in print, he constantly quotes a certain paris manuscript in which i think i recognise the very one which baluze employed. together with guidonis and eymerici, the leading authority of the fourteenth century is zanchini, who became an inquisitor at rimini in 1300, and died in 1340. his book was published with a commentary by campeggio, one of the tridentine fathers; and campeggio was further annotated by simancas, who exposes the disparity between italian and spanish usage. it was reprinted, with other treatises of the same kind, in the eleventh volume of the _tractatus_. some of these treatises, and the notes of campeggio and simancas, are passed over by mr. lea without notice. but he appreciates zanchini so well that he has had him copied from a manuscript in france. very much against his habit, he prints one entire sentence, from which it appears that his copy does not agree to the letter with the published text. it is not clear in every case whether he is using print or manuscript. one of the most interesting directions for inquisitors, and one of the earliest, was written by cardinal fulcodius, better known as clement iv. mr. lea cites him a dozen times, always accurately, always telling us scrupulously which of the fifteen chapters to consult. the treatise of fulcodius occupies a few pages in carena, _de officio s.s. inquisitionis_, in which, besides other valuable matter, there are notes by carena himself, and a tract by pegna, the perpetual commentator of the inquisition. this is one of the first eight or ten books which occur to any one whose duty it is to lay in an inquisitor's library. not only we are never told where to find fulcodius, but when carena is mentioned it is so done as to defy verification. inartistic references are not, in this instance, a token of inadequate study. but a book designed only for readers who know at a glance where to lay their finger on _s. francis. collat. monasticae, collat. 20_, or _post constt. iv. xix. cod. i. v._ will be slow in recovering outlay. not his acquaintance with rare books only, which might be the curiosity of an epicurean, but with the right and appropriate book, amazes the reader. like most things attributed to abbot joachim, the vaticinia pontificum is a volume not in common use, and decent people may be found who never saw a copy. mr. lea says: "i have met with editions of venice issued in 1589, 1600, 1605, and 1646, of ferrara in 1591, of frankfort in 1608, of padua in 1625, and of naples in 1660, and there are doubtless numerous others." this is the general level throughout; the rare failures disappear in the imposing supererogation of knowledge. it could not be exceeded by the pupils of the göttingen seminary or the école des chartes. they have sometimes a vicious practice of overtopping sufficient proof with irrelevant testimony: but they transcribe all deciding words in full, and for the rest, quicken and abridge our toil by sending us, not to chapter and verse, but to volume and page, of the physical and concrete book. we would gladly give bluebeard and his wife--he had but one after all--in exchange for the best quotations from sources hard of access which mr. lea must have hoarded in the course of labours such as no man ever achieved before him, or will ever attempt hereafter. it would increase the usefulness of his volumes, and double their authority. there are indeed fifty pages of documentary matter not entirely new or very closely connected with the text. portions of this, besides, are derived from manuscripts explored in france and italy, but not it seems in rome, and in this way much curious and valuable material underlies the pages; but it is buried without opportunity of display or scrutiny. line upon line of references to the neapolitan archives only bewilder and exasperate. mr. lea, who dealt more generously with the readers of _sacerdotal celibacy_, has refused himself in these overcrowded volumes that protection against overstatement. the want of verifiable indication of authorities is annoying, especially at first; and it may be possible to find one or two references to saint bonaventure or to wattenbach which are incorrect. but he is exceedingly careful in rendering the sense of his informants, and neither strains the tether nor outsteps his guide. the original words in very many cases would add definiteness and a touch of surprise to his narrative. if there is anywhere the least infidelity in the statement of an author's meaning, it is in the denial that marsilius, the imperial theorist, and the creator with ockam of the ghibelline philosophy that has ruled the world, was a friend of religious liberty. marsilius assuredly was not a whig. quite as much as any guelph, he desired to concentrate power, not to limit or divide it. of the sacred immunities of conscience he had no clearer vision than dante. but he opposed persecution in the shape in which he knew it, and the patriarchs of european emancipation have not done more. he never says that there is no case in which a religion may be proscribed; but he speaks of none in which a religion may be imposed. he discusses, not intolerance, but the divine authority to persecute, and pleads for a secular law. it does not appear how he would deal with a thug. "nemo quantumcumque peccans contra disciplinas speculativas aut operativas quascumque punitur vel arcetur in hoc saeculo praecise in quantum huiusmodi, sed in quantum peccat contra praeceptum humanae legis.... si humana lege prohibitum fuerit haereticum aut aliter infidelem in regione manere, qui talis in ipsa repertus fuerit, tanquam legis humanae transgressor, poena vel supplicio huic transgressioni eadem lege statutis, in hoc saeculo debet arceri." the difference is slight between the two readings. one asserts that marsilius was tolerant in effect; the other denies that he was tolerant in principle. mr. lea does not love to recognise the existence of much traditional toleration. few lights are allowed to deepen his shadows. if a stream of tolerant thought descended from the early ages to the time when the companion of vespucci brought his improbable tale from utopia, then the views of bacon, of dante, of gerson cannot be accounted for by the ascendency of a unanimous persuasion. it is because all men were born to the same inheritance of enforced conformity that we glide so easily towards the studied increase of pain. if some men were able to perceive what lay in the other scale, if they made a free choice, after deliberation, between well-defined and well-argued opinions, then what happened is not assignable to invincible causes, and history must turn from general and easy explanation to track the sinuosities of a tangled thread. in mr. lea's acceptation of ecclesiastical history intolerance was handed down as a rule of life from the days of st. cyprian, and the few who shrank half-hearted from the gallows and the flames were exceptions, were men navigating craft of their own away from the track of st. peter. even in his own age he is not careful to show that the waldenses opposed persecution, not in self-defence, but in the necessary sequence of thought. and when he describes eutychius as an obscure man, who made a point at the fifth general council, for which he was rewarded with the patriarchate of constantinople--eutychius, who was already patriarch when the council assembled; and when he twice tears formosus from his grave to parade him in his vestments about rome,--we may suspect that the perfect grasp of documentary history from the twelfth century does not reach backwards in a like degree. if mr. lea stands aloft, in his own domain, as an accumulator, his credit as a judge of testimony is nearly as high. the deciding test of his critical sagacity is the masterly treatment of the case against the templars. they were condemned without mercy, by church and state, by priest and jurist, and down to the present day cautious examiners of evidence, like prutz and lavocat, give a faltering verdict. in the face of many credulous forerunners and of much concurrent testimony mr. lea pronounces positively that the monster trial was a conspiracy to murder, and every adverse proof a lie. his immediate predecessor, schottmüller, the first writer who ever knew the facts, has made this conclusion easy. but the american does not move in the retinue of the prussian scholar. he searches and judges for himself; and in his estimate of the chief actor in the tragedy, clement v., he judges differently. he rejects, as forgeries, a whole batch of unpublished confessions, and he points out that a bull disliked by inquisitors is not reproduced entire in the _bullarium dominicanum_. but he fails to give the collation, and is generally jealous about admitting readers to his confidence, taking them into consultation and producing the scales. in the case of delicieux, which nearly closes the drama of languedoc, he consults his own sources, independently of hauréau, and in the end adopts the marginal statement in limborch, that the pope aggravated the punishment. in other places, he puts his trust in the _historia tribulationum_, and he shows no reason for dismissing the different account there given of the death of delicieux: "ipsum fratrem bernardum sibi dari a summo pontifice petierunt. et videns summus pontifex quod secundum accusationes quas de eo fecerant fratres minores justitiam postularent, tradidit eis eum. qui, quum suscepissent eum in sua potestate, sicut canes, cum vehementer furiunt, lacerant quam capiunt bestiam, ita ipsi diversis afflictionibus et cruciatibus laniaverunt eum. et videntes quod neque inquisitionibus nec tormentis poterant pompam de eo facere in populo, quam quaerebant, in arctissimo carcere eum reduxerunt, ibidem eum taliter tractantes, quod infra paucos menses, quasi per ignem et aquam transiens, de carcere corporis et minorum et praedicatorum liberatus gloriose triumphans de mundi principe, migravit ad coelos." we obtain only a general assurance that the fate of cecco d' ascoli is related on the strength of unpublished documents at florence. it is not stated what they are. there is no mention of the epitaph pronounced by the pope who had made him his physician: "cucullati minores recentiorum peripateticorum principem perdiderunt." we do not learn that cecco reproached dante with the same fatalistic leaning for which he himself was to die: "non è fortuna cui ragion non vinca." or how they disputed: "an ars natura fortior ac potentior existeret," and argument was supplanted by experiment: "aligherius, qui opinionem oppositam mordicus tuebatur, felem domesticam stabili objiciebat, quam ea arte instituerat, ut ungulis candelabrum teneret, dum is noctu legeret, vel coenaret. cicchius igitur, ut in sententiam suam aligherium pertraheret, scutula assumpta, ubi duo musculi asservabantur inclusi, illos in conspectum felis dimisit; quae naturae ingenio inemendabili obsequens, muribus vix inspectis, illico in terram candelabrum abjecit, et ultro citroque cursare ac vestigiis praedam persequi instituit." either appiani's defence of cecco d' ascoli has escaped mr. lea, who nowhere mentions bernino's _historia di tutte l' heresie_ where it is printed; or he may distrust bernino for calling dante a schismatic; or it may be that he rejects all this as legend, beneath the certainty of history. but he does not disdain the legendary narrative of the execution: "tradition relates that he had learned by his art that he should die between africa and campo fiore, and so sure was he of this that on the way to the stake he mocked and ridiculed his guards; but when the pile was about to be lighted he asked whether there was any place named africa in the vicinage, and was told that that was the name of a neighbouring brook flowing from fiesole to the arno. then he recognised that florence was the field of flowers, and that he had been miserably deceived." the florentine document before me, whether the same or another i know not, says nothing about untimely mockery or miserable deception: "aveva inteso dal demonio dover lui morire di morte accidentale infra l'affrica e campo di fiore; per lo che cercando di conservare la reputazione sua, ordinò di non andar mai nelle parti d'affrica; e credendo tal fallacia è di potere sbeffare la gente, pubblicamente in italia esecutava l'arte della negromanzia, et essendo per questo preso in firenze e per la sua confessione essendo già giudicato al fuoco e legato al palo, nè vedendo alcun segno della sua liberazione, avendo prima fatto i soliti scongiuri, domandò alle persone che erano all'intorno, se quivi vicino era alcun luogo che si chiamasse affrica, et essendogli risposto di si, cioè un fiumicello che correva ivi presso, il quale discende da fiesole ed è chiamato affrica, considerando che il demonio per lo campo de' fiori aveva inteso fiorenza, e per l'affrica quel fiumicello, ostinato nella sua perfidia, disse al manigoldo che quanto prima attaccasse il fuoco." mr. lea thinks that the untenable conditions offered to the count of toulouse by the council of arles in 1211 are spurious. m. paul meyer has assigned reasons on the other side in his notes to the translation of the _chanson de la croisade_, pp. 75-77; and the editors of vaissète (vi. 347) are of the same opinion as m. paul meyer. it happens that mr. lea reads the _chanson_ in the _editio princeps_ of fauriel; and in this particular place he cites the _histoire du languedoc_ in the old and superseded edition. from a letter lately brought to light in the _archiv für geschichte des mittelalters_, he infers that the decree of clement v. affecting the privilege of inquisitors was tampered with before publication. a franciscan writes from avignon when the new canons were ready: "inquisitores etiam heretice pravitatis restinguuntur et supponuntur episcopis"--which he thinks would argue something much more decisive than the regulations as they finally appeared. ehrle, who publishes the letter, remarks that the writer exaggerated the import of the intended change; but he says it not of this sentence, but of the next preceding. mr. lea has acknowledged elsewhere the gravity of this clementine reform. as it stands, it was considered injurious by inquisitors, and elicited repeated protests from bernardus guidonis: "ex predicta autem ordinatione seu restrictione nonnulla inconvenientia consecuntur, que liberum et expeditum cursum officii inquisitoris tam in manibus dyocesanorum quam etiam inquisitorum diminuunt seu retardant.... que apostolice sedis circumspecta provisione ac provida circumspectione indigent, ut remedientur, aut moderentur in melius, seu pocius totaliter suspendantur propter nonnulla inconvenientia que consecuntur ex ipsis circa liberum et expeditum cursum officii inquisitoris." the feudal custom which supplied beaumarchais with the argument of his play recruits a stout believer in the historian of the inquisition, who assures us that the authorities may be found on a certain page of his _sacerdotal celibacy_. there, however, they may be sought in vain. some dubious instances are mentioned, and the dissatisfied inquirer is passed on to the fors de béarn, and to lagrèze, and is informed that m. louis veuillot raised an unprofitable dust upon the subject. i remember that m. veuillot, in his boastful scorn for book learning, made no secret that he took up the cause because the church was attacked, but got his facts from somebody else. graver men than veuillot have shared his conclusion. sir henry maine, having looked into the matter in his quick, decisive way, declared that an instance of the _droit du seigneur_ was as rare as the wandering jew. in resting his case on the pyrenees, mr. lea shows his usual judgment. but his very confident note is a too easy and contemptuous way of settling a controversy which is still wearily extant from spain to silesia, in which some new fact comes to light every year, and drops into obscurity, riddled with the shafts of critics. an instance of too facile use of authorities occurs at the siege of béziers. "a fervent cistercian contemporary informs us that when arnaud was asked whether the catholics should be spared, he feared the heretics would escape by feigning orthodoxy, and fiercely replied, 'kill them all, for god knows his own.'" caesarius, to whom we owe the _locus classicus_, was a cistercian and a contemporary, but he was not so fervent as that, for he tells it as a report, not as a fact, with a caution which ought not to have evaporated. "fertur dixisse: caedite eos. novit enim dominus qui sunt eius!" the catholic defenders had been summoned to separate from the cathari, and had replied that they were determined to share their fate. it was then resolved to make an example, which we are assured bore fruit afterwards. the hasty zeal of citeaux adopted the speech of the abbot and gave it currency. but its rejection by the french scholars, tamizey de larroque and auguste molinier, was a warning against presenting it with a smooth surface, as a thing tested and ascertained. mr. lea, in other passages, has shown his disbelief in caesarius of heisterbach, and knows that history written in reliance upon him would be history fit for the moon. words as ferocious are recorded of another legate at a different siege (langlois, _règne de philippe le hardi_, p. 156). their tragic significance for history is not in the mouth of an angry crusader at the storming of a fortress, but in the pen of an inoffensive monk, watching and praying under the peaceful summit of the seven mountains. mr. lea undertakes to dispute no doctrine and to propose no moral. he starts with an avowed desire not to say what may be construed injuriously to the character or feelings of men. he writes pure history, and is methodically oblivious of applied history. the broad and sufficient realm of fact is divided by a scientific frontier from the outer world of interested argument. beyond the frontier he has no cognisance, and neither aspires to inflame passions nor to compose the great eirenikon. those who approach with love or hatred are to go empty away; if indeed he does not try by turns to fill them both. he seeks his object not by standing aloof, as if the name that perplexed polyphemus was the proper name for historians, but by running successively on opposing lines. he conceives that civilised europe owes its preservation to the radiant centre of religious power at rome, and is grateful to innocent iii. for the vigour with which he recognised that force was the only cure for the pestiferous opinions of misguided zealots. one of his authorities is the inquisitor bernardus guidonis, and there is no writer whom, in various shapes, he quotes so often. but when guidonis says that dolcino and margarita suffered _per juditium ecclesie_, mr. lea is careful to vindicate the clergy from the blame of their sufferings. from a distinction which he draws between despotism and its abuse, and from a phrase, disparaging to elections, about rivers that cannot rise above the level of their source, it would appear that mr. lea is not under compulsion to that rigid liberalism which, by repressing the time-test and applying the main rules of morality all round, converts history into a frightful monument of sin. yet, in the wake of passages which push the praises of authority to the verge of irony, dire denunciations follow. when the author looks back upon his labours, he discerns "a scene of almost unrelieved blackness." he avers that "the deliberate burning alive of a human being simply for difference of belief, is an atrocity," and speaks of a "fiendish legislation," "an infernal curiosity," a "seemingly causeless ferocity which appears to persecute for the mere pleasure of persecuting." the inquisition is "energetic only in evil"; it is "a standing mockery of justice, perhaps the most iniquitous that the arbitrary cruelty of man has ever devised." this is not the protest of wounded humanity. the righteous resolve to beware of doctrine has not been strictly kept. in the private judgment of the writer, the thinking of the middle ages was sophistry and their belief superstition. for the erring and suffering mass of mankind he has an enlightened sympathy; for the intricacies of speculation he has none. he cherishes a disbelief, theological or inductive it matters not, in sinners rescued by repentance and in blessings obtained by prayer. between remitted guilt and remitted punishment he draws a vanishing line that makes it doubtful whether luther started from the limits of purgatory or the limits of hell. he finds that it was a universal precept to break faith with heretics, that it was no arbitrary or artificial innovation to destroy them, but the faithful outcome of the traditional spirit of the church. he hints that the horror of sensuality may be easily carried too far, and that saint francis of assisi was in truth not very much removed from a worshipper of the devil. prescott, i think, conceived a resemblance between the god of montezuma and the god of torquemada; but he saw and suspected less than his more learned countryman. if any life was left in the strappado and the samarra, no book would deserve better than this description of their vicissitudes to go the way of its author, and to fare with the flagrant volume, snatched from the burning at champel, which is still exhibited to unitarian pilgrims in the rue de richelieu. in other characteristic places we are taught to observe the agency of human passion, ambition, avarice, and pride; and wade through oceans of unvaried evil with that sense of dejection which comes from digby's _mores catholici_ or the _origines de la france contemporaine_, books which affect the mind by the pressure of repeated instances. the inquisition is not merely "the monstrous offspring of mistaken zeal," but it is "utilised by selfish greed and lust of power." no piling of secondary motives will confront us with the true cause. some of those who fleshed their swords with preliminary bloodshed on their way to the holy war may have owed their victims money; some who in 1348 shared the worst crime that christian nations have committed perhaps believed that jews spread the plague. but the problem is not there. neither credulity nor cupidity is equal to the burden. it needs no weighty scholar, pressed down and running over with the produce of immense research, to demonstrate how common men in a barbarous age were tempted and demoralised by the tremendous power over pain, and death, and hell. we have to learn by what reasoning process, by what ethical motive, men trained to charity and mercy came to forsake the ancient ways and made themselves cheerfully familiar with the mysteries of the torture-chamber, the perpetual prison, and the stake. and this cleared away, when it has been explained why the gentlest of women chose that the keeper of her conscience should be conrad of marburg, and, inversely, how that relentless slaughterer directed so pure a penitent as saint elizabeth, a larger problem follows. after the first generation, we find that the strongest, the most original, the most independent minds in europe--men born for opposition, who were neither awed nor dazzled by canon law and scholastic theology, by the master of sentences, the philosopher and the gloss--fully agreed with guala and raymond. and we ask how it came about that, as the rigour of official zeal relaxed, and there was no compulsion, the fallen cause was taken up by the council of constance, the university of paris, the states-general, the house of commons, and the first reformers; that ximenes outdid the early dominicans, while vives was teaching toleration; that fisher, with his friend's handy book of revolutionary liberalism in his pocket, declared that violence is the best argument with protestants; that luther, excommunicated for condemning persecution, became a persecutor? force of habit will not help us, nor love and fear of authority, nor the unperceived absorption of circumambient fumes. somewhere mr. lea, perhaps remembering maryland, rhode island, and pennsylvania, speaks of "what was universal public opinion from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century." the obstacle to this theory, as of a ship labouring on the bank, or an orb in the tail of a comet, is that the opinion is associated with no area of time, and remains unshaken. the dominican democrat who took his seat with the mountain in 1848 never swerved from the principles of his order. more often, and, i think, more deliberately, mr. lea urges that intolerance is implied in the definition of the mediæval church, that it sprang from the root and grew with "the very law of its being." it is no desperate expedient of authority at bay, for "the people were as eager as their pastors to send the heretic to the stake." therefore he does not blame the perpetrator, but his inherited creed. "no firm believer in the doctrine of exclusive salvation could doubt that the truest mercy lay in sweeping away the emissaries of satan with fire and sword." what we have here is the logic of history, constraining every system to utter its last word, to empty its wallets, and work its consequences out to the end. but this radical doctrine misguides its author to the anachronism that as early as the first leo "the final step had been taken, and the church was definitely pledged to the suppression of heresy at whatever cost." we do not demand that historians shall compose our opinions or relieve us from the purifying pains of thought. it is well if they discard dogmatising, if they defer judgment, or judge, with the philosopher, by precepts capable of being a guide for all. we may be content that they should deny themselves, and repress their sentiments and wishes. when these are contradictory, or such as evidently to tinge the medium, an unholy curiosity is engendered to learn distinctly not only what the writer knows, but what he thinks. mr. lea has a malicious pleasure in baffling inquiry into the principle of his judgments. having found, in the catechism of saint sulpice, that devout catholics are much on a par with the fanatics whose sympathy with satan made the holy office a requisite of civilisation, and having, by his exuberant censure, prepared us to hear that this requisite of civilisation "might well seem the invention of demons," he arrives at the inharmonious conclusion that it was wrought and worked, with benefit to their souls, by sincere and godly men. the condemnation of hus is the proper test, because it was the extreme case of all. the council was master of the situation, and was crowded with men accustomed to disparage the authority of the holy see and to denounce its acts. practically, there was no pope either of rome or avignon. the inquisition languished. there was the plausible plea of deference to the emperor and his passport; there was the imperative consideration for the religious future of bohemia. the reforming divines were free to pursue their own scheme of justice, of mercy, and of policy. the scheme they pursued has found an assiduous apologist in their new historian. "to accuse the good fathers of constance of conscious bad faith" is impossible. to observe the safe-conduct would have seemed absurd "to the most conscientious jurists of the council." in a nutshell, "if the result was inevitable, it was the fault of the system and not of the judges, and their conscience might well feel satisfied." there may be more in this than the oratorical precaution of a scholar wanting nothing, who chooses to be discreet rather than explicit, or the wavering utterance of a mind not always strung to the same pitch. it is not the craving to rescue a favourite or to clear a record, but a fusion of unsettled doctrines of retrospective contempt. there is a demonstration of progress in looking back without looking up, in finding that the old world was wrong in the grain, that the kosmos which is inexorable to folly is indifferent to sin. man is not an abstraction, but a manufactured product of the society with which he stands or falls, which is answerable for crimes that are the shadow and the echo of its own nobler vices, and has no right to hang the rogue it rears. before you lash the detected class, mulct the undetected. crime without a culprit, the unavenged victim who perishes by no man's fault, law without responsibility, the virtuous agent of a vicious cause--all these are the signs and pennons of a philosophy not recent, but rather inarticulate still and inchoate, which awaits analysis by professor flint. no propositions are simpler or more comprehensive than the two, that an incorrigible misbeliever ought to burn, or that the man who burns him ought to hang. the world as expanded on the liberal and on the hegemonic projection is patent to all men, and the alternatives, that lacordaire was bad and conrad good, are clear in all their bearings. they are too gross and palpable for mr. lea. he steers a subtler course. he does not sentence the heretic, but he will not protect him from his doom. he does not care for the inquisitor, but he will not resist him in the discharge of his duty. to establish a tenable footing on that narrow but needful platform is the epilogue these painful volumes want, that we may not be found with the traveller who discovered a precipice to the right of him, another to the left, and nothing between. their profound and admirable erudition leads up, like hellwald's _culturgeschichte_, to a great note of interrogation. when we find the carolina and the savage justice of tudor judges brought to bear on the exquisitely complex psychological revolution that proceeded, after the year 1200, about the gulf of lyons and the tyrrhene sea, we miss the historic question. when we learn that priscillian was murdered (i. 214), but that lechler has no business to call the sentence on john hus "ein wahrer justizmord" (ii. 494), and then again that the burning of a heretic is a judicial murder after all (i. 552), we feel bereft of the philosophic answer. although mr. lea gives little heed to pani and hefele, gams and du boys, and the others who write for the inquisition without pleading ignorance, he emphasises a belgian who lately wrote that the church never employed direct constraint against heretics. people who never heard of the belgian will wonder that so much is made of this conventional figleaf. nearly the same assertion may be found, with varieties of caution and of confidence, in a catena of divines, from bergier to newman. to appear unfamiliar with the defence exposes the writer to the thrust that you cannot know the strength or the weakness of a case until you have heard its advocates. the liberality of leo xiii., which has yielded a splendid and impartial harvest to ehrle, and schottmüller, and the école française, raises the question whether the abbé duchesne or father denifle supplied with all the resources of the archives which are no longer secret would produce a very different or more complete account. as a philosophy of religious persecution the book is inadequate. the derivation of sects, though resting always upon good supports, stands out from an indistinct background of dogmatic history. the intruding maxims, darkened by shadows of earth, fail to ensure at all times the objective and delicate handling of mediæval theory. but the vital parts are protected by a panoply of mail. from the albigensian crusade to the fall of the templars and to that franciscan movement wherein the key to dante lies, the design and organisation, the activity and decline of the inquisition constitute a sound and solid structure that will survive the censure of all critics. apart from surprises still in store at rome, and the manifest abundance of philadelphia, the knowledge which is common property, within reach of men who seriously invoke history as the final remedy for untruth and the sovereign arbiter of opinion, can add little to the searching labours of the american. footnotes: [footnote 401: _english historical review_, 1888.] xvi the american commonwealth. by james bryce[402] _the american commonwealth_ cancels that sentence of scaliger which bacon amplifies in his warning against bookish politicians: "nec ego nec alius doctus possumus scribere in politicis." the distinctive import of the book is its power of impressing american readers. mr. bryce is in a better position than the philosopher who said of another, "ich hoffe, wir werden uns recht gut verständigen können; und wenn auch keiner den andern ganz versteht, wird doch jeder dem andern dazu helfen, dass er sich selbst besser verstehe." he writes with so much familiarity and feeling--the national, political, social sympathy is so spontaneous and sincere--as to carry a very large measure indeed of quiet reproach. the perfect tone is enough to sweeten and lubricate a medicine such as no traveller since hippocrates has administered to contrite natives. facts, not comments, convey the lesson; and i know no better illustration of a recent saying: "si un livre porte un enseignement, ce doit être malgré son auteur, par la force même des faits qu'il raconte." if our countryman has not the chill sententiousness of his great french predecessor, his portable wisdom and detached thoughts, he has made a far deeper study of real life, apart from comparative politics and the european investment of transatlantic experience. one of the very few propositions which he has taken straight from tocqueville is also one of the few which a determined fault-finder would be able to contest. for they both say that the need for two chambers has become an axiom of political science. i will admit that the doctrine of paine and franklin and samuel adams, which the pennsylvanian example and the authority of turgot made so popular in france, is confuted by the argument of laboulaye: "la division du corps législatif est une condition essentielle de la liberté. c'est la seule garantie qui assure la nation contre l'usurpation de ses mandataires." but it may be urged that a truth which is disputed is not an axiom; and serious men still imagine a state of things in which an undivided legislature is necessary to resist a too powerful executive, whilst two chambers can be made to curb and neutralise each other. both tocqueville and turgot are said to have wavered on this point. it has been said that tocqueville never understood the federal constitution. he believed, to his last edition, that the opening words of the first section, "all legislative powers herein granted," meant "tous les pouvoirs législatifs déterminés par les représentants." story thought that he "has borrowed the greater part of his reflections from american works [meaning his own and lieber's] and little from his own observation." the french minister at washington described his book as "intéressant mais fort peu exact"; and even the _nation_ calls it "brilliant, superficial, and attractive." mr. bryce can never be accused of imperfect knowledge or penetration, of undue dependence upon others, or of writing up to a purpose. his fault is elsewhere. this scholar, distinguished not only as a successful writer of history, which is said to be frequent, but as a trained and professed historian, which is rare, altogether declines the jurisdiction of the historical review. his contumacy is in gross black and white: "i have had to resist another temptation, that of straying off into history." three stout volumes tell how things are, without telling how they came about. i should have no title to bring them before this tribunal, if it were not for an occasional glimpse at the past; if it were not for a strongly marked and personal philosophy of american history which looms behind the boss and the boom, the hoodlum and the mugwump. there is a valid excuse for preferring to address the unhistoric mind. the process of development by which the america of tocqueville became the america of lincoln has been lately described with a fulness of knowledge which no european can rival. readers who thirst for the running stream can plunge and struggle through several thousand pages of holst's _verfassungsgeschichte_, and it is better to accept the division of labour than to take up ground so recently covered by a work which, if not very well designed or well composed, is, by the prodigious digestion of material, the most instructive ever written on the natural history of federal democracy. the author, who has spent twenty years on american debates and newspapers, began during the pause between sadowa and wörth, when germany was in the throes of political concentration that made the empire. he explains with complacency how another irrepressible conflict between centre and circumference came and went, and how the welfare of mankind is better served by the gathering than by the balance or dispersion of forces. like gneist and tocqueville, he thinks of one country while he speaks of another; he knows nothing of reticence or economy in the revelation of private opinion; and he has none of mr. bryce's cheery indulgence for folly and error. but when the british author refuses to devote six months to the files of californian journalism, he leaves the german master of his allotted field. the actual predominates so much with mr. bryce that he has hardly a word on that extraordinary aspect of democracy, the union in time of war; and gives no more than a passing glance at the confederate scheme of government, of which a northern writer said: "the invaluable reforms enumerated should be adopted by the united states, with or without a reunion of the seceded states, and as soon as possible." there are points on which some additional light could be drawn from the roaring loom of time. in the chapter on spoils it is not stated that the idea belongs to the ministers of george iii. hamilton's argument against removals is mentioned, but not the new york edition of _the federalist_ with the marginal note that "mr. h. had changed his view of the constitution on that point." the french wars of speculation and plunder are spoken of; but, to give honour where honour is due, it should be added that they were an american suggestion. in may 1790, morris wrote to two of his friends at paris: "i see no means of extricating you from your troubles, but that which most men would consider as the means of plunging you into greater--i mean a war. and you should make it to yourselves a war of men, to your neighbours a war of money.... i hear you cry out that the finances are in a deplorable situation. this should be no obstacle. i think that they may be restored during war better than in peace. you want also something to turn men's attention from their present discontents." there is a long and impartial inquiry into parliamentary corruption as practised now; but one wishes to hear so good a judge on the report that money prevailed at some of the turning-points of american history; on the imputations cast by the younger adams upon his ablest contemporaries; on the story told by another president, of 223 representatives who received accommodation from the bank, at the rate of a thousand pounds apiece, during its struggle with jackson. america as known to the man in the cars, and america observed in the roll of the ages, do not always give the same totals. we learn that the best capacity of the country is withheld from politics, that there is what emerson calls a gradual withdrawal of tender consciences from the social organisation, so that the representatives approach the level of the constituents. yet it is in political science only that america occupies the first rank. there are six americans on a level with the foremost europeans, with smith and turgot, mill and humboldt. five of these were secretaries of state, and one was secretary of the treasury. we are told also that the american of to-day regards the national institutions with a confidence sometimes grotesque. but this is a sentiment which comes down, not from washington and jefferson, but from grant and sherman. the illustrious founders were not proud of their accomplished work; and men like clay and adams persisted in desponding to the second and third generation. we have to distinguish what the nation owes to madison and marshall, and what to the army of the potomac; for men's minds misgave them as to the constitution until it was cemented by the ordeal and the sacrifice of civil war. even the claim put forward for americans as the providers of humour for mankind seems to me subject to the same limitation. people used to know how often, or how seldom, washington laughed during the war; but who has numbered the jokes of lincoln? although mr. bryce has too much tact to speak as freely as the americans themselves in the criticism of their government, he insists that there is one defect which they insufficiently acknowledge. by law or custom no man can represent any district but the one he resides in. if ten statesmen live in the same street, nine will be thrown out of work. it is worth while to point out (though this may not be the right place for a purely political problem) that even in that piece of censure in which he believes himself unsupported by his friends in the states, mr. bryce says no more than intelligent americans have said before him. it chances that several of them have discussed this matter with me. one was governor of his state, and another is among the compurgators cited in the preface. both were strongly persuaded that the usage in question is an urgent evil; others, i am bound to add, judged differently, deeming it valuable as a security against boulangism--an object which can be attained by restricting the number of constituencies to be addressed by the same candidate. the two american presidents who agreed in saying that whig and tory belong to natural history, proposed a dilemma which mr. bryce wishes to elude. he prefers to stand half-way between the two, and to resolve general principles into questions of expediency, probability, and degree: "the wisest statesman is he who best holds the balance between liberty and order." the sentiment is nearly that of croker and de quincey, and it is plain that the author would discard the vulgar definition that liberty is the end of government, and that in politics things are to be valued as they minister to its security. he writes in the spirit of john adams when he said that the french and the american revolution had nothing in common, and of that eulogy of 1688 as the true restoration, on which burke and macaulay spent their finest prose. a sentence which he takes from judge cooley contains the brief abstract of his book: "america is not so much an example in her liberty as in the covenanted and enduring securities which are intended to prevent liberty degenerating into licence, and to establish a feeling of trust and repose under a beneficent government, whose excellence, so obvious in its freedom, is still more conspicuous in its careful provision for permanence and stability." mr. bryce declares his own point of view in the following significant terms: "the spirit of 1787 was an english spirit, and therefore a conservative spirit.... the american constitution is no exception to the rule that everything which has power to win the obedience and respect of men must have its roots deep in the past, and that the more slowly every institution has grown, so much the more enduring is it likely to prove.... there is a hearty puritanism in the view of human nature which pervades the instrument of 1787.... no men were less revolutionary in spirit than the heroes of the american revolution. they made a revolution in the name of magna charta and the bill of rights." i descry a bewildered whig emerging from the third volume with a reverent appreciation of ancestral wisdom, burke's _reflections_, and the eighteen canons of dort, and a growing belief in the function of ghosts to make laws for the quick. when the last valois consulted his dying mother, she advised him that anybody can cut off, but that the sewing on is an acquired art. mr. bryce feels strongly for the men who practised what catharine thought so difficult, and he stops for a moment in the midst of his very impersonal treatise to deliver a panegyric on alexander hamilton. _tanto nomini nullum par elogium._ his merits can hardly be overstated. talleyrand assured ticknor that he had never known his equal; seward calls him "the ablest and most effective statesman engaged in organising and establishing the union"; macmaster, the iconoclast, and holst, poorly endowed with the gift of praise, unite in saying that he was the foremost genius among public men in the new world; guizot told rush that _the federalist_ was the greatest work known to him, in the application of elementary principles of government to practical administration; his paradox in support of political corruption, so hard to reconcile with the character of an honest man, was repeated to the letter by niebuhr. in estimating hamilton we have to remember that he was in no sense the author of the constitution. in the convention he was isolated, and his plan was rejected. in _the federalist_, written before he was thirty, he pleaded for a form of government which he distrusted and disliked. he was out of sympathy with the spirit that prevailed, and was not the true representative of the cause, like madison, who said of him, "if his theory of government deviated from the republican standard, he had the candour to avow it, and the greater merit of co-operating faithfully in maturing and supporting a system which was not his choice." the development of the constitution, so far as it continued on his lines, was the work of marshall, barely known to us by the extracts in late editions of the _commentaries_. "_the federalist_," says story, "could do little more than state the objects and general bearing of these powers and functions. the masterly reasoning of the chief-justice has followed them out to their ultimate results and boundaries with a precision and clearness approaching, as near as may be, to mathematical demonstration." morris, who was as strong as hamilton on the side of federalism, testifies heavily against him as a leader: "more a theoretic than a practical man, he was not sufficiently convinced that a system may be good in itself, and bad in relation to particular circumstances. he well knew that his favourite form was inadmissible, unless as the result of civil war; and i suspect that his belief in that which he called an approaching crisis arose from a conviction that the kind of government most suitable, in his opinion, to this extensive country, could be established in no other way.... he trusted, moreover, that in the changes and chances of time we should be involved in some war, which might strengthen our union and nerve the executive. he was of all men the most indiscreet. he knew that a limited monarchy, even if established, could not preserve itself in this country.... he never failed, on every occasion, to advocate the excellence of, and avow his attachment to, monarchical government.... thus, meaning very well, he acted very ill, and approached the evils he apprehended by his very solicitude to keep them at a distance." the language of adams is more severe; but adams was an enemy. it has been justly said that "he wished good men, as he termed them, to rule; meaning the wealthy, the well-born, the socially eminent." the federalists have suffered somewhat from this imputation; for a prejudice against any group claiming to serve under that flag is among the bequests of the french revolution. "les honnêtes gens ont toujours peur: c'est leur nature," is a maxim of chateaubriand. a man most divergent and unlike him, menou, had drawn the same conclusion: "en révolution il ne faut jamais se mettre du côté des honnêtes gens: ils sont toujours balayés." and royer collard, with the candour one shows in describing friends, said: "c'est le parti des honnêtes gens qui est le moins honnête de tous les partis. tout le monde, même dans ses erreurs, était honnête à l'assemblée constituante, excepté le côté droit." hamilton stands higher as a political philosopher than as an american partisan. europeans are generally liberal for the sake of something that is not liberty, and conservative for an object to be conserved; and in a jungle of other motives besides the reason of state we cannot often eliminate unadulterated or disinterested conservatism. we think of land and capital, tradition and custom, the aristocracy and the services, the crown and the altar. it is the singular superiority of hamilton that he is really anxious about nothing but the exceeding difficulty of quelling the centrifugal forces, and that no kindred and coequal powers divide his attachment or intercept his view. therefore he is the most scientific of conservative thinkers, and there is not one in whom the doctrine that prefers the ship to the crew can be so profitably studied. in his scruple to do justice to conservative doctrine mr. bryce extracts a passage from a letter of canning to croker which, by itself, does not adequately represent that minister's views. "am i to understand, then, that you consider the king as completely in the hands of the tory aristocracy as his father, or rather as george ii. was in the hands of the whigs? if so, george iii. reigned, and mr. pitt (both father and son) administered the government, in vain. i have a better opinion of the real vigour of the crown when it chooses to put forth its own strength, and i am not without some reliance on the body of the people." the finest mind reared by many generations of english conservatism was not always so faithful to monarchical traditions, and in addressing the incessant polemist of toryism canning made himself out a trifle better than he really was. his intercourse with marcellus in 1823 exhibits a diluted orthodoxy: "le système britannique n'est que le butin des longues victoires remportées par les sujets contre le monarque. oubliez-vous que les rois ne doivent pas donner des institutions, mais que les institutions seules doivent donner des rois?... connaissez-vous un roi qui mérite d'être libre, dans le sens implicite du mot?... et george iv., croyez-vous que je serais son ministre, s'il avait été libre de choisir?... quand un roi dénie au peuple les institutions dont le peuple a besoin, quel est le procédé de l'angleterre? elle expulse ce roi, et met à sa place un roi d'une famille alliée sans doute, mais qui se trouve ainsi, non plus un fils de la royauté, confiant dans le droit de ses ancêtres, mais le fils des institutions nationales, tirant tous ses droits de cette seule origine.... le gouvernement représentatif est encore bon à une chose que sa majesté a oubliée. il fait que des ministres essuient sans répliquer les épigrammes d'un roi qui cherche à se venger ainsi de son impuissance." mr. bryce's work has received a hearty welcome in its proper hemisphere, and i know not that any critic has doubted whether the pious founder, with the dogma of unbroken continuity, strikes the just note or covers all the ground. at another angle, the origin of the greatest power and the grandest polity in the annals of mankind emits a different ray. it was a favourite doctrine with webster and tocqueville that the beliefs of the pilgrims inspired the revolution, which others deem a triumph of pelagianism; while j.q. adams affirms that "not one of the motives which stimulated the puritans of 1643 had the slightest influence in actuating the confederacy of 1774." the dutch statesman hogendorp, returning from the united states in 1784, had the following dialogue with the stadtholder: "la religion, monseigneur, a moins d'influence que jamais sur les esprits.... il y a toute une province de quakers?... depuis la révolution il semble que ces sortes de différences s'évanouissent.... les bostoniens ne sont-ils pas fort dévots?... ils l'étaient, monseigneur, mais à lire les descriptions faites il y a vingt ou même dix ans, on ne les reconnaît pas de ce côté-là." it is an old story that the federal constitution, unlike that of hérault de séchelles, makes no allusion to the deity; that there is none in the president's oath; and that in 1796 it was stated officially that the government of the united states is not in any sense founded on the christian religion. no three men had more to do with the new order than franklin, adams, and jefferson. franklin's irreligious tone was such that his manuscripts, like bentham's, were suppressed, to the present year. adams called the christian faith a horrid blasphemy. of jefferson we are assured that, if not an absolute atheist, he had no belief in a future existence; and he hoped that the french arms "would bring at length kings, nobles, and priests to the scaffolds which they have been so long deluging with human blood." if calvin prompted the revolution, it was after he had suffered from contact with tom paine; and we must make room for other influences which, in that generation, swayed the world from the rising to the setting sun. it was an age of faith in the secular sense described by guizot: "c'était un siècle ardent et sincère, un siècle plein de foi et d'enthousiasme. il a eu foi dans la vérité, car il lui a reconnu le droit de régner." in point both of principle and policy, mr. bryce does well to load the scale that is not his own, and to let the jurist within him sometimes mask the philosophic politician. i have to speak of him not as a political reasoner or as an observer of life in motion, but only in the character which he assiduously lays aside. if he had guarded less against his own historic faculty, and had allowed space to take up neglected threads, he would have had to expose the boundless innovation, the unfathomed gulf produced by american independence, and there would be no opening to back the jeffersonian shears against the darning-needle of the great chief-justice. my misgiving lies in the line of thought of riehl and the elder cherbuliez. the first of those eminent conservatives writes: "die extreme, nicht deren vermittelungen und abschwächungen, deuten die zukunft vor." the genevese has just the same remark: "les idées n'ont jamais plus de puissance que sous leur forme la plus abstraite. les idées abstraites ont plus remué le monde, elles ont causé plus de révolutions et laissé plus de traces durables que les idées pratiques." lassalle says, "kein einzelner denkt mit der consequenz eines volksgeistes." schelling may help us over the parting ways: "der erzeugte gedanke ist eine unabhängige macht, für sich fortwirkend, ja, in der menschlichen seele, so anwachsend, dass er seine eigene mutter bezwingt und unterwirft." after the philosopher, let us conclude with a divine: "c'est de révolte en révolte, si l'on veut employer ce mot, que les sociétés se perfectionnent, que la civilisation s'établit, que la justice règne, que la vérité fleurit." the anti-revolutionary temper of the revolution belongs to 1787, not to 1776. another element was at work, and it is the other element that is new, effective, characteristic, and added permanently to the experience of the world. the story of the revolted colonies impresses us first and most distinctly as the supreme manifestation of the law of resistance, as the abstract revolution in its purest and most perfect shape. no people was so free as the insurgents; no government less oppressive than the government which they overthrew. those who deem washington and hamilton honest can apply the term to few european statesmen. their example presents a thorn, not a cushion, and threatens all existing political forms, with the doubtful exception of the federal constitution of 1874. it teaches that men ought to be in arms even against a remote and constructive danger to their freedom; that even if the cloud is no bigger than a man's hand, it is their right and duty to stake the national existence, to sacrifice lives and fortunes, to cover the country with a lake of blood, to shatter crowns and sceptres and fling parliaments into the sea. on this principle of subversion they erected their commonwealth, and by its virtue lifted the world out of its orbit and assigned a new course to history. here or nowhere we have the broken chain, the rejected past, precedent and statute superseded by unwritten law, sons wiser than their fathers, ideas rooted in the future, reason cutting as clean as atropos. the wisest philosopher of the old world instructs us to take things as they are, and to adore god in the event: "il faut toujours être content de l'ordre du passé, parce qu'il est conforme à la volonté de dieu absolue, qu'on connoît par l'évènement." the contrary is the text of emerson: "institutions are not aboriginal, though they existed before we were born. they are not superior to the citizen. every law and usage was a man's expedient to meet a particular case. we may make as good; we may make better." more to the present point is the language of seward: "the rights asserted by our forefathers were not peculiar to themselves, they were the common rights of mankind. the basis of the constitution was laid broader by far than the superstructure which the conflicting interests and prejudices of the day suffered to be erected. the constitution and laws of the federal government did not practically extend those principles throughout the new system of government; but they were plainly promulgated in the declaration of independence. their complete development and reduction to practical operation constitute the progress which all liberal statesmen desire to promote, and the end of that progress will be complete political equality among ourselves, and the extension and perfection of institutions similar to our own throughout the world." a passage which hamilton's editor selects as the keynote of his system expresses well enough the spirit of the revolution: "the sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. they are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power. i consider civil liberty, in a genuine, unadulterated sense, as the greatest of terrestrial blessings. i am convinced that the whole human race is entitled to it, and that it can be wrested from no part of them without the blackest and most aggravated guilt." those were the days when a philosopher divided governments into two kinds, the bad and the good, that is, those which exist and those which do not exist; and when burke, in the fervour of early liberalism, proclaimed that a revolution was the only thing that could do the world any good: "nothing less than a convulsion that will shake the globe to its centre can ever restore the european nations to that liberty by which they were once so much distinguished." footnotes: [footnote 402: _english historical review_, 1889.] xvii historical philosophy in france and french belgium and switzerland. by robert flint[403] when dr. flint's former work appeared, a critic, who, it is true, was also a rival, objected that it was diffusely written. what then occupied three hundred and thirty pages has now expanded to seven hundred, and suggests a doubt as to the use of criticism. it must at once be said that the increase is nearly all material gain. the author does not cling to his main topic, and, as he insists that the science he is adumbrating flourishes on the study of facts only, and not on speculative ideas, he bestows some needless attention on historians who professed no philosophy, or who, like daniel and velly, were not the best of their kind. here and there, as in the account of condorcet, there may be an unprofitable or superfluous sentence. but on the whole the enlarged treatment of the philosophy of history in france is accomplished not by expansion, but by solid and essential addition. many writers are included whom the earlier volume passed over, and cousin occupies fewer pages now than in 1874, by the aid of smaller type and the omission of a passage injurious to schelling. many necessary corrections and improvements have been made, such as the transfer of ballanche from theocracy to the liberal catholicism of which he is supposed to be the founder. dr. flint's unchallenged superiority consists alike in his familiarity with obscure, but not irrelevant authors, whom he has brought into line, and in his scrupulous fairness towards all whose attempted systems he has analysed. he is hearty in appreciating talent of every kind, but he is discriminating in his judgment of ideas, and rarely sympathetic. where the best thoughts of the ablest men are to be displayed, it would be tempting to present an array of luminous points or a chaplet of polished gems. in the hands of such artists as stahl or cousin they would start into high relief with a convincing lucidity that would rouse the exhibited writers to confess that they had never known they were so clever. without transfiguration the effect might be attained by sometimes stringing the most significant words of the original. excepting one unduly favoured competitor, who fills two pages with untranslated french, there is little direct quotation. cournot is one of those who, having been overlooked at first, are here raised to prominence. he is urgently, and justly, recommended to the attention of students. "they will find that every page bears the impress of patient, independent, and sagacious thought. i believe i have not met with a more genuine thinker in the course of my investigations. he was a man of the finest intellectual qualities, of a powerful and absolutely truthful mind." but then we are warned that cournot never wrote a line for the general reader, and accordingly he is not permitted to speak for himself. yet it was this thoughtful frenchman who said: "aucune idée parmi celles qui se réfèrent à l'ordre des faits naturels ne tient de plus près à la famille des idées religieuses que l'idée du progrès, et n'est plus propre à devenir le principe d'une sorte de foi religieuse pour ceux qui n'en ont pas d'autres. elle a, comme la foi religieuse, la vertu de relever les âmes et les caractères." the successive theories gain neither in clearness nor in contrast by the order in which they stand. as other countries are reserved for other volumes, cousin precedes hegel, who was his master, whilst quetelet is barely mentioned in his own place, and has to wait for buckle, if not for oettingen and rümelin, before he comes on for discussion. the finer threads, the underground currents, are not carefully traced. the connection between the _juste milieu_ in politics and eclecticism in philosophy was already stated by the chief eclectic; but the subtler link between the catholic legitimists and democracy seems to have escaped the author's notice. he says that the republic proclaimed universal suffrage in 1848, and he considers it a triumph for the party of lafayette. in fact, it was the triumph of an opposite school--of those legitimists who appealed from the narrow franchise which sustained the orleans dynasty to the nation behind it. the chairman of the constitutional committee was a legitimist, and he, inspired by the abbé de genoude, of the _gazette de france_, and opposed by odilon barrot, insisted on the pure logic of absolute democracy. it is an old story now that the true history of philosophy is the true evolution of philosophy, and that when we have eliminated whatever has been damaged by contemporary criticism or by subsequent advance, and have assimilated all that has survived through the ages, we shall find in our possession not only a record of growth, but the full-grown fruit itself. this is not the way in which dr. flint understands the building up of his department of knowledge. instead of showing how far france has made a way towards the untrodden crest, he describes the many flowery paths, discovered by the french, which lead elsewhere, and i expect that in coming volumes it will appear that hegel and buckle, vico and ferrari, are scarcely better guides than laurent or littré. fatalism and retribution, race and nationality, the test of success and of duration, heredity and the reign of the invincible dead, the widening circle, the emancipation of the individual, the gradual triumph of the soul over the body, of mind over matter, reason over will, knowledge over ignorance, truth over error, right over might, liberty over authority, the law of progress and perfectibility, the constant intervention of providence, the sovereignty of the developed conscience--neither these nor other alluring theories are accepted as more than illusions or half-truths. dr. flint scarcely avails himself of them even for his foundations or his skeleton framework. his critical faculty, stronger than his gift of adaptation, levels obstructions and marks the earth with ruin. he is more anxious to expose the strange unreason of former writers, the inadequacy of their knowledge, their want of aptitude in induction, than their services in storing material for the use of successors. the result is not to be the sifted and verified wisdom of two centuries, but a future system, to be produced when the rest have failed by an exhaustive series of vain experiments. we may regret to abandon many brilliant laws and attractive generalisations that have given light and clearness and simplicity and symmetry to our thought; but it is certain that dr. flint is a close and powerful reasoner, equipped with satisfying information, and he establishes his contention that france has not produced a classic philosophy of history, and is still waiting for its adam smith or jacob grimm. the kindred topic of development recurs repeatedly, as an important factor in modern science. it is still a confused and unsettled chapter, and in one place dr. flint seems to attribute the idea to bossuet; in another he says that it was scarcely entertained in those days by protestants, and not at all by catholics; in a third he implies that its celebrity in the nineteenth century is owing in the first place to lamennais. the passage, taken from vinet, in which bossuet speaks of the development of religion is inaccurately rendered. his words are the same which, on another page, are rightly translated "the course of religion"--_la suite de la religion_. indeed, bossuet was the most powerful adversary the theory ever encountered. it was not so alien to catholic theology as is here stated, and before the time of jurieu is more often found among catholic than protestant writers. when it was put forward, in guarded, dubious, and evasive terms, by petavius, the indignation in england was as great as in 1846. the work which contained it, the most learned that christian theology had then produced, could not be reprinted over here, lest it should supply the socinians with inconvenient texts. nelson hints that the great jesuit may have been a secret arian, and bull stamped upon his theory amid the grateful applause of bossuet and his friends. petavius was not an innovator, for the idea had long found a home among the franciscan masters: "proficit fides secundum statum communem, quia secundum profectum temporum efficiebantur homines magis idonei ad percipienda et intelligenda sacramenta fidei.--sunt multae conclusiones necessario inclusae in articulis creditis, sed antequam sunt per ecclesiam declaratae et explicatae non oportet quemcumque eas credere. oportet tamen circa eas sobrie opinari, ut scilicet homo sit paratus eas tenere pro tempore, pro quo veritas fuerit declarata." cardinal duperron said nearly the same thing as petavius a generation before him: "l'arien trouvera dans sainct irénée, tertullien et autres qui nous sont restez en petit nombre de ces siècles-là, que le fils est l'instrument du père, que le père a commandé au fils lors qu'il a esté question de la création des choses, que le père et le fils sont _aliud et aliud_; choses que qui tiendroit aujourd'huy, que le langage de l'eglise est plus examiné, seroit estimé pour arien luy-mesme." all this does not serve to supply the pedigree which newman found it so difficult to trace. development, in those days, was an expedient, an hypothesis, and not even the thing so dear to the oxford probabilitarians, a working hypothesis. it was not more substantial than the gleam in robinson's farewell to the pilgrims: "i am very confident that the lord has more truth yet to break forth out of his holy word." the reason why it possessed no scientific basis is explained by duchesne: "ce n'est guère avant la seconde moitié du xviie siècle qu'il devint impossible de soutenir l'authenticité des fausses décrétales, des constitutions apostoliques, des 'récognitions clémentines,' du faux ignace, du pseudo-dionys et de l'immense fatras d'oeuvres anonymes ou pseudonymes qui grossissait souvent du tiers ou de la moitié l'héritage littéraire des auteurs les plus considérables. qui aurait pu même songer à un développement dogmatique?" that it was little understood, and lightly and loosely employed, is proved by bossuet himself, who alludes to it in one passage as if he did not know that it was the subversion of his theology: "quamvis ecclesia omnem veritatem funditus norit, ex haeresibus tamen discit, ut aiebat magni nominis vincentius lirinensis, aptius, distinctius, clariusque eandem exponere." the account of lamennais suffers from the defect of mixing him up too much with his early friends. no doubt he owed to them the theory that carried him through his career, for it may be found in bonald, and also in de maistre, though not, perhaps, in the volumes he had already published. it was less original than he at first imagined, for the english divines commonly held it from the seventeenth century, and its dirge was sung only the other day by the bishop of gloucester and bristol.[404] a scottish professor would even be justified in claiming it for reid. but of course it was lamennais who gave it most importance, in his programme and in his life. and his theory of the common sense, the theory that we can be certain of truth only by the agreement of mankind, though vigorously applied to sustain authority in state and church, gravitated towards multitudinism, and marked him off from his associates. when he said _quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus_, he was not thinking of the christian church, but of christianity as old as the creation; and the development he meant led up to the bible, and ended at the new testament instead of beginning there. that is the theory which he made so famous, which founded his fame and governed his fate, and to which dr. flint's words apply when he speaks of celebrity. in that sense it is a mistake to connect lamennais with möhler and newman; and i do not believe that he anticipated their teaching, in spite of one or two passages which do not, on the face of them, bear date b.c., and may, no doubt, be quoted for the opposite opinion. in the same group dr. flint represents de maistre as the teacher of savigny, and asserts that there could never be a doubt as to the liberalism of chateaubriand. there was none after his expulsion from office; but there was much reason for doubting in 1815, when he entreated the king to set bounds to his mercy; in 1819, when he was contributing to the _conservateur_; and in 1823, when he executed the mandate of the absolute monarchs against the spanish constitution. his zeal for legitimacy was at all times qualified with liberal elements, but they never became consistent or acquired the mastery until 1824. de maistre and savigny covered the same ground at one point; they both subjected the future to the past. this could serve as an argument for absolutism and theocracy, and on that account was lovely in the eyes of de maistre. if it had been an argument the other way he would have cast it off. savigny had no such ulterior purpose. his doctrine, that the living are not their own masters, could serve either cause. he rejected a mechanical fixity, and held that whatever has been made by process of growth shall continue to grow and suffer modification. his theory of continuity has this significance in political science, that it supplied a basis for conservatism apart from absolutism and compatible with freedom. and, as he believed that law depends on national tradition and character, he became indirectly and through friends a founder of the theory of nationality. the one writer whom dr. flint refuses to criticise, because he too nearly agrees with him, is renouvier. taking this avowal in conjunction with two or three indiscretions on other pages, we can make a guess, not at the system itself, which is to console us for so much deviation, but at its tendency and spirit the fundamental article is belief in divine government. as kant beheld god in the firmament of heaven, so too we can see him in history on earth. unless a man is determined to be an atheist, he must acknowledge that the experience of mankind is a decisive proof in favour of religion. as providence is not absolute, but reigns over men destined to freedom, its method is manifested in the law of progress. here, however, dr. flint, in his agreement with renouvier, is not eager to fight for his cause, and speaks with a less jubilant certitude. he is able to conceive that providence may attain its end without the condition of progress, that the divine scheme would not be frustrated if the world, governed by omnipotent wisdom, became steadily worse. assuming progress as a fact, if not a law, there comes the question wherein it consists, how it is measured, where is its goal. not religion, for the middle ages are an epoch of decline. catholicism has since lost so much ground as to nullify the theories of bossuet; whilst protestantism never succeeded in france, either after the reformation, when it ought to have prevailed, nor after the revolution, when it ought not. the failure to establish the protestant church on the ruins of the old _régime_, to which quinet attributes the breakdown of the revolution, and which napoleon regretted almost in the era of his concordat, is explained by mr. flint on the ground that protestants were in a minority. but so they were in and after the wars of religion; and it is not apparent why a philosopher who does not prefer orthodoxy to liberty should complain that they achieved nothing better than toleration. he disproves bossuet's view by that process of deliverance from the church which is the note of recent centuries, and from which there is no going back. on the future i will not enlarge, because i am writing at present in the historical, not the prophetical, review. but some things were not so clear in france in 1679 as they are now at edinburgh. the predominance of protestant power was not foreseen, except by those who disputed whether rome would perish in 1710 or about 1720. the destined power of science to act upon religion had not been proved by newton or simon. no man was able to forecast the future experience of america, or to be sure that observations made under the reign of authority would be confirmed by the reign of freedom. if the end be not religion, is it morality, humanity, civilisation, knowledge? in the german chapters of 1874 dr. flint was severe upon hegel, and refused his notion that the development of liberty is the soul of history, as crude, one-sided, and misunderstood. he is more lenient now, and affirms that liberty occupies the final summit, that it profits by all the good that is in the world, and suffers by all the evil, that it pervades strife and inspires endeavour, that it is almost, if not altogether, the sign, and the prize, and the motive in the onward and upward advance of the race for which christ was crucified. as that refined essence which draws sustenance from all good things it is clearly understood as the product of civilisation, with its complex problems and scientific appliances, not as the elementary possession of the noble savage, which has been traced so often to the primeval forest. on the other hand, if sin not only tends to impair, but does inevitably impair and hinder it, providence is excluded from its own mysterious sphere, which, as it is not the suppression of all evil and present punishment of wrong, should be the conversion of evil into an instrument to serve the higher purpose. but although dr. flint has come very near to hegel and michelet, and seemed about to elevate their teaching to a higher level and a wider view, he ends by treating it coldly, as a partial truth requiring supplement, and bids us wait until many more explorers have recorded their soundings. that, with the trained capacity for misunderstanding and the smouldering dissent proper to critics, i might not mislead any reader, or do less than justice to a profound though indecisive work, i should have wished to piece together the passages in which the author indicates, somewhat faintly, the promised but withheld philosophy which will crown his third or fourth volume. any one who compares pages 125, 135, 225, 226, 671, will understand better than i can explain it the view which is the master-key to the book. footnotes: [footnote 403: _english historical review_, 1895.] [footnote 404: [dr. ellicott.]] appendix by the kindness of the abbot gasquet we are enabled to supplement the bibliography of acton's writings published by the royal historical society with the following additional items:-in _the rambler_, 1858 april--burke. july--[with simpson] mr. buckle's thesis and method. short reviews. august--mr. buckle's philosophy of history. october--theiner's _documents inédits relatifs aux affaires religieuses de france 1790-1800_, pp. 265-267. december--the count de montalembert, pp. 421-428 and note, 432. carlyle's _history of frederick the great_, vols. i. and ii. p. 429. 1859 january--political thoughts on the church. february--the catholic press. september--contemporary events. 1860 september--national defence. irish education in current events. 1862 correspondence. the danger of the physical sciences. index abbot, archbishop, and father paul, 432 abbott, dr., on bacon and machiavelli, 228 absolutism, causes contributing to, 288 impulse given to, by teaching of machiavelli, 41 inherently present in france, 237-40 and the massacre of st. bartholomew, 121 the old, its most revolutionary act, 275 sanction of, 433 absolutists, eighteenth century, their care solely for the state, 273 _acta sanctorum_ authority on the inception and early growth of the inquisition, 554 acton, lord- character and characteristics of- absolutism detested by, xxxi, xxxiv admiration of, for george eliot and for gladstone, basis of, xxiii catholicism of, xii-xiv, xix, xx, xxvii, xxviii; attitude of, to doctrine of papal infallibility, xxv, xxvi; reality of his faith, xviii _et seq._ ideals cherished by, document embodying, xxxviii-ix; need of directing ideals practised by, xxii, xxiv individualistic tendencies of, xxviii intense individuality of, xvi objection of, to doctrine of moral relativity, xxxii, xxxiii personality of, as exhibited in present volume, xii; greatness of, xxii, xxxvii, xxxviii severity of his judgments, xxv, xxvii literary activity and tastes of- contributions of, to periodicals, light thrown by, on his erudition and critical faculty, ix _history of liberty_ projected by, xxxv as leader-writer, ix preference of, for matter rather than manner in literature, xxii literary activity, three chief periods in, xii-xiv writings of, planned, xxxv, xxxvi; and completed, ix _et passim_; why comparatively few, xxxv-vii; qualities in, iv, x, xvi; instance of, xi; the real inspiration of, and of his life, xxi; style of, xxxiv _et seq._ origin, birth, and environment of, xiv, xviii, xix, xxxiii political errors of, xxviii _et seq._; on freedom, xxxi; on liberalism, xxv, xxx on stahl, 391 adams, j.q., on the christian faith, 585 denying the influence of the pilgrims on the american revolution, 584 despondency of, as to american constitution, 579 discriminating between american and french revolutions, 580 on hamilton, 582 adams, the younger, 578 addison, j., inconsistent ideas of, regarding liberty, 53 address of the bishops at rome, wiseman's draft, the facts concerning, 444-5; attacks on, of the _patrie_, 439, 443, 444, 445; wiseman's reply, _and see home and foreign review_ ahrens, _cited_ on national government, 227 alamanni, forecasting the huguenot massacres, 109 albertus magnus, 557 albigenses, how dealt with by montfort, 556 why persecuted, 168 aldobrandini, cardinal hippolyto, _see_ clement viii. alessandria, cardinal of, michielli bonelli, legate of pius v. mission of, to spain, portugal, and france, 112; his famous companion, 113; his ostensible purpose, its failure, information given to, on the forthcoming massacre, 113-14 after the st. bartholomew 140 alfonso, king of aragon, proscription by, of heretics, 558 alva, duke of, catherine de' medici's message to, on the massacres, 122 failure of, in the low countries, 103 judgment of, on the st. bartholomew, 124 letter of, on the st. bartholomew. 108 & _note_ ordered to slay all huguenot prisoners, 141-2 america, colonists of, opposition of lords chatham and camden to, 55 early settlers in, catholic and protestant, contrasted action as to religious liberty, 187 doctrine of rights of man, originated from, 55 united states, democracy in, 64 government, based on burke's political philosophy, 56; how the value of this foundation was negatived, 56 humour in, 579 national institutions of, attitude to, of americans of to-day, not that of the founders, 579 place of, in political science, 578 presidency of monroe, "the era of good feeling," 56 progress of democracy in, 84 religion in, döllinger on, 339-40 representation in, defect concerning, 579 _american commonwealth the_, by james bryce, _review_, 575 american constitution, hamilton's position regarding, 581; its development due to marshall, _ib._ how cemented, 579 government, confederate scheme of, 577 judge cooley on, 580 liberty, judge cooley on, 580 revolution, the abstract revolution in perfection, 586 no point of comparison between it and the french, 580 not inspired by the beliefs of the pilgrim fathers, 584-5 spirit of, 580, 587 americans, attitude of the best towards politics, 578 anabaptists, destructive tendency of their teaching, 157, 169, 171, 174, 175, 178, 185; and its effect on luther, 155 intolerance of, 171-2 views of reformers as to their toleration, 157, 164, 167, 176 andreæ. lutheran divine, on the huguenots, 145 angelis, de cardinal, manager of elections to commission on dogma, 529 president of vatican council, 534 anglicanism, appreciation of döllinger for some exponents of, 395 and growth of other sects, 334-7 progress of, 329-32 anjou, confession of, on the st. bartholomew, 107 anjou, duke of (_see also_ henry iii.), and the crown of poland, 105, 120, 144 schemes for marriage of, with queen elizabeth, 105 guilt of, for the st. bartholomew, 110 orders of, for huguenot massacre in his lands, 119 annalists, method of, compared with that of scientific historians, 233 antiquity, authority of state excessive in, 4 of liberty proved by recent historians, 5 antonelli, cardinal, advice of, to bonnechose, 529 discussion of infallibilty by vatican council, denied by, 518-19 on temporal power of papacy, 414 apologists for the massacre of st. bartholomew, 147-8 apology of confession of augsburg on excommunication, 158 arianism among the teutonic tribes, 199 suggested, of petavius, and why, 592 aristides and democracy, 68 aristocracy, destruction of, in the reign of terror, 262 early eighteenth-century, 273-4 government by, advocated by pythagoras, 21; government by, danger of, 20 roman, struggle with plebeians, 13, 14 aristotle on class interests, 69 estimation of, by döllinger, 406 _ethics_ of, democracy condemned by, 71 _politics_ of, 22, 79; makes concession to democracy, 72 saying of, reflecting the illiberal sentiments of his age, 18 arles, council of, and the count of toulouse, 565 arnaud and the saying, "god knows his own," 567 arnauld, 429 arnim, baron, influence of, at vatican council, 506 interview of, with döllinger, 426 arnold of brescia, 559 arragon, constructive science of its people, 557 heresy in (1230), 556; lead of the country in persecution, 557 artists, method of, compared with that of scientific historians, 233 ascoli, cecco d', fate of, 564-5 ashburton, lady, 382 asoka (buddhist king), first to proclaim and establish representative government, 26 assassination, _see also_ murder and regicide catherine de' medici's plan, inspired by member of council of trent, 216 expediency of, view of swedish bishops, 217 as a political weapon, 213-14 religious, considered expedient, 325 the reward of heresy, a doctrine of the church in middle ages, 216 athenagoras _cited_, 70 athenians, character of, 11 athens, constitution of, rapid decline in career of, 11; revision of, provided for by solon with good results, 7, 8 democracy of, 66; tyranny manifested by, 12 government by consent superseded government by compulsion, under solon, 7 laws of, revised by solon, 6 political equality at, 68 republic of, causes of ruin of, 70 death of socrates crowning act of guilt of, 12 reform in, came too late, 12, 13 aubigné, merle d', and the charge against the bordeaux clergy, 127 _note_ auger, edmond, s.j., and the bordeaux massacres, 127 augsburg, confession of, axiom concerning importance of, in luther's system of politics, 159 apology of, on excommunication, 158 austria, concordat in, its failure, 292 opposition to vatican politics in, and to the council, 503, 506 policy of repression in, after waterloo, 283 representation of, on vatican council, 509 austria, don juan of, and the victory of lepanto, 104; effect of, marred by charles ix., 105 austrian empire, nationalities in, 295, 296; why substantial, one of the most perfect states, 298 austrian power in italy, effect of, on nationality, 287 rule in italy, error of, 285 authorities, use made of, revealing qualities of historians, 235 authority of the church questioned through frohschammer's excommunication, 477-8 authority, supreme, of the church, 192; attitude of _home and foreign review_ towards, 482-91 avaux, d', view of expedient political massacre, 218 avignon, removal of the papacy to, 370; strife between, and the franciscans, 552 ayamonte, spanish ambassador to paris, 123 baader, f.x. von, estimate of, by döllinger and martensen, 376; work of, 377; father-in-law of lasaulx, 405 schelling's coolness to, 381 baboeuf, proclaimer of communism, 273 bach, administration of, in austria, 283 bacon, francis, 562 advocate of passive obedience to kings, 48 modern attacks on, 377 on bookish politicians, 575 on st. thomas aquinas, 37 influence of machiavelli on, 228 _cited_ on political justification, 220 bacon, sir nicholas, 44 baden (1862), nationality in, 295 baglioni, family of, models for machiavelli, 212 bain, t., interpreter of locke, 220 ballanche and liberal catholicism, 588 ballerini, influence on döllinger, 387 balmez, classed as ultramontane, 451 baltimore, synod of, and infallibility, 499 baluze, 559 barbarians, the, become instrument of the church by introducing single system of law, 244 barberini, cardinal, on reason for condemning de thou's history, 147 baronius, 379, 429; döllinger's study of, 387 barrot, o., opposed to universal suffrage, 590 barrow, isaac, döllinger's roman antidote to, 387 basel, church government at, under oecolampadius, 176 baudrillart, cited on machiavelli's universality, 226 baumgarten, crusius, on political expediency, 230 works of, esteemed by döllinger, 381 baur, ferdinand, on historical facts, 385 work of, estimated by döllinger, 381, 404 bavaria, catholic stronghold (1572), 103 baxter, richard, 416 bayle, pierre, _cited_ on servetus, 185 bayonne, conference of, massacre of st. bartholomew the outcome of, 108, 109 & _note_, 124 beaconsfield, earl of, story of, 551; view of döllinger on, 391 beauville, bearer to rome of news of the st. bartholomew, 132-3 beccaria, on importance of success as result of action, 223 belgian revolution, causes united in, 284 belgium, representation of, on vatican council, 507 vigorous growth of municipal liberties in, 38 bellarmine, cardinal, deceived by hierarchical fictions, 420 "bellum haereticorum pax est ecclesiae," maxim utilised by polish bishops, 103 benedict xiv., pope, 148 scholarship under, 387 bennettis, de, appreciated by döllinger, 387 bentham, jeremy, pioneer in abolition of legal abuses, 3 principle of greatest happiness, 223 berardi, cardinal, influence of, on döllinger, 387 proposed announcement of discussion of infallibility at vatican council set aside, 518 bergier, 573 berlin, 378 bernard, brother, 564 bernays, 432 besold, followers of machiavelli denounced by, 225 beust, count, on vatican council, 503; indifference to, 509 beza, theodore, death of servetus approved by, 185 defence of calvin, 183 on the huguenot massacres, on toleration, and on the civil authority over religious crime, 146 on religious assassination, 326 beziers, siege of, 567 bianchi, recommended by döllinger, 387 bible, inspiration of, 513-15 as sole guide in all things, luther's principle, 154, 158, 159, 161 bigamy of the landgrave of hesse, how dealt with by luther, and why, 160 bilio, cardinal, junior president of vatican council, 534 biner, apologist of the st. bartholomew, 148 biran, maine de, _cited_ on political expediency, 220 bishops, the, address to pius, in preparation for vatican council, 494, 499 attitude of, towards bull _multiplices inter_, 520-25 and the papacy, 511 protesting, charge of sharing döllinger's views, repudiated by, 538 deception of, at vatican council, 518-526 hostility of, harm done by, 531 withdrawal of, from close of vatican council, 549 bismarck, count, on state participation in vatican council, 506 bizarri, policy of, on vatican council, 534 blanc, louis, a secret worker for overthrow of louis philippe, 92 blasphemy, reasons for its punishment by the reformers, 169, 175 blois, french court at, 112; coligny at, 1571., 115 blondel, döllinger's gratitude to, 393 blue laws of connecticut, 55 boccaccio, giovanni, revision of the _decamerone_, 215 boccapaduli, papal secretary, speech of, on the massacre of st. bartholomew, 136 bodin, _cited_ on _il principe_, 218 bohemia, religious future of, in relation to the case of hus, 571 bolingbroke, lord, slight knowledge of machiavelli's works, 218 bologna, university of, 556 bona, cardinal, urged suppression of _liber diurnus_, 516 bonald, and absolute monarchy, 467 and lamennais's theory, 593 ultramontanism of, 451 bonelli, michiel, _see_ alessandria, cardinal of boniface viii., pope, bull of, on supreme spiritual power, 324; vindications of, inspired by döllinger, 391 bonnechose, cardinal, share of, in elections to commission of dogma, 529, 532 urged french representation on vatican council, 504 bordeaux, the huguenot massacres of, 127 boretius, _cited_ on frederick the great and machiavelli, 229 borghese, cardinal, afterwards paul v., pope, his knowledge of the planned character of st. bartholomew, 114 borgia, compiler of history, 387 family, models for machiavelli, 212 francis, s.j., 113 borromeo, cardinal, 108 _& notes_, 108-9 bossuet, advocate of passive obedience to kings, 47, 429, 434 _defensio_ feared, 378 indignation of, 148 and the idea of development, 591, 592, 593, 595 on love of country, 20 _& note_ work of, compared to döllinger, 424 boucher, 45; on henry iii. of france and reliance on maxims of _il principe_, 215 bourbon, cardinal of, unguarded speech of, on coming huguenot massacre, 111 etienne de, inquisitor, works of, 558-9 house of, french and spanish, contests of the habsburgs with, 275 house of, upholders of supremacy of kingship over people, 47 bourges, massacre of huguenots commanded at, by charles ix. la chastre's refusal to obey, 115 boys, du, defender of the inquisition, 573 brandenburg, albrecht, margrave of, and the anabaptists, 157, _& see_ 156 _note_ brantôme on the death of elizabeth of valois, 104 brescia, bishop of, _see_ guala city, centre of historical work, 387 brewer, intercourse with döllinger, 402 brief of pius ix. to archbishop of munich, and attitude of _home and foreign review_ to supreme authority of the church, 482-491 brill, the, dutch maritime victory, its importance, 103 british empire, why substantially one of the most perfect states, 298 brittany, and the huguenot massacres, 119 brixen, bishop of, on papal authority, 543 brosch, on cardinal pole and _il principe_, 214 brougham, lord, advice to students, 393 bruce, house of, struggle with house of plantagenet, 35 bruno, 430 bryce, james, _the american commonwealth_, review, 575 bucer, martin, in favour of persecution, 172-73 buch, de, 430 buchanan, 44, 45 buckeridge, blondel, döllinger's roman antidote to, 387 buckle, h.t., 589, 590 bugge, discoveries of, 405 bull, censure of the reformation of, 416 bull of boniface viii., on supreme spiritual authority, 324 bull of gregory xiii. relating to the huguenot massacres, 134-45 & _note_; not admitted into official collections 101 bull _multiplices inter_, of vatican council, 520-22 _bullarium dominicanum_, the, referred to by lea, 563 bullinger, heinrich, death of servetus approved by, 185 _cited_ on persecution, 174-76 burd, l.a., edition of machiavelli's _il principe_, introduction to, 212-31; skill as exponent of machiavelli's political system, 212 text of the _discorsi_ produced by, 227 burgundy, refusal of its governors to massacre huguenots, 118 burke, edmund, 580; döllinger's political model, 393, 417 french revolution denounced by, 219 on the moral and political as distinct from the merely geographical, 294 on the partition of poland, 275 on revolution, 587 _cited_ on political oppression in ireland, 253, _note_ on the rights of mankind, 56 burning of heretics, lea's view on, 568 byzantine despotism, due to combined influence of church and state, 33 bzovius, authority on the inquisition, 554 cadiz constitution, 1812., 89; its overthrow the triumph of the restored monarchy of france, 89 cæsarius of heisterbach, authority of, distrusts by lea, 567 calhoun, j.c., indictment against democracy, 93 calvin, john, 176, 585 action of, with regard to servetus, 184; and his defence of the same, 181 attitude of, to the civil power, 179-81 hostility to, of lutherans, 145 republican views of, 42, 43 system of church government, 177-79 calvinism in germany, 345 calvinists, english, tolerated by melanchthon, 170 & _note_ camden, lord, _cited_ in disfavour of american taxation, 55 campanella, ideal society of, 270 campeggio, cardinal, commentary of, on zanchini, 559 canello, _cited_ on machiavelli's unpopularity, 226 canning, g., on the question as to who reigned, george iii. or his ministers, 583; his wisdom, 40 capalti, cardinal, junior president of vatican council, 534 capecelatro, 412 capilupi, camillo, author of _lo stratagemma di carlo ix._, 129; its bearing on the position of the cardinal of lorraine, 130; and others, on alessandria's information as to forthcoming massacre of huguenots, 114 family, glorification by, of charles ix. for the st. bartholomew, 128 _et seq._ hippolyto, bishop of fano, support given by, to charles ix., 128-9 capito, wolfgang fabricius, reformer, 172, 174 capponi, friend of döllinger, 420 as federalist, 414 döllinger's study of, 402 capuchins, general of, and the inquisition, 553 carbonari, supporters of, 284; their impotence, 286 carcassonne, no huguenot massacres at, 142 cardinal wiseman, 436 cardinals, approval by, of the st. bartholomew, 140 opposition of, to vatican council, 493 french, and absolute monarchy, 41 carena, "_de officio s.s. inquisitionis_," valuable matter in, on the inquisition, 560 carius, works of, edited by trent commissioners, 215 carlstadt, andreas, polygamy defended by, 159 carlyle, thomas, on truth as basis of success, 223 carneades, his infusion of greek ideas into minds of roman statesmen, 16 carouge, and the rouen massacre of huguenots, 119 caspari, at döllinger's house, 405 castagna, papal nuncio, 117 catechism of st. sulpice, lea's deductions from, 571 catherine de' medici, queen-mother of france, advisers urging, to destroy coligny and his party, 108-9 & _notes_ challenge of, to queen elizabeth, 122 children of, trained on machiavelli's principles, 215 hints of the intended massacre, 110, 111, 113-14 jealous for her merit in the st. bartholomew, 130 levity of her religious feelings, 122 long premeditation by, of the massacre, 115 methods of, to balance catholic and huguenot power, 103 wrath of, at gregory's demand for revocation of the edict of toleration, 137 on the death of her daughter, queen of spain, 104 & _note_ _cited_, 580-81 catholic attitude to huguenot massacres, 146-8; change in, how induced, 148 church, _see_ church countries, revolution more frequent in, than in protestant, and why, 278 emancipation act, spiritual fruits of, gathered by wiseman, 437 legitimists and democracy, link between, 590 literature, phases of, last hundred years as to principles in politics and science, 450-51 theory on the proper way to deal with heretics, discredit caused by, 140-41 use of subterfuge, 454 catholic and protestant intolerance, difference between, 165, 168-70, 186-7 catholicism, in the dark ages, 200 ground lost by, since the middle ages, 593 holiness of, hated by its enemies, 437 identification of, with some secular cause an ultramontane peculiarity, 451 liberal, supposed founder of, 588 spreads as an institution as well as a doctrine, 246 tendency of, 189 catholics, english, peculiarities of their position, 438; unity aimed at by them, _ib._ treatment of, by the reformers, 157, 162, 163, 168, 174, 178-9 cavalli, venetian ambassador, on the bad management of the st. bartholomew, 109 celts, gallic and british, why conquered, 241 the materials less than the impulse of history supplied by, 240 champel, half-burned book from, 569 _chanson de la croisade_, 565 character, national, influence of, on events, limits of, 557 charlemagne, 409 charles albert, king of piedmont, revolution under, 285 charles i., king of england, execution of, a triumph for royalism, 51 charles ii., king of england, secret treaty between him and louis xiv., 53 charles v., emperor, records of reign of, 409 charles ix., king of france, active conciliation by, of protestants, 105 alliances made by, with protestant rulers, 105 attempts of, to appease protestant powers after the massacre, 120 blamed for "leniency," "cruel clemency," etc., in the massacre, 126, 141, 143 cardinal lorraine's eulogy of, for the massacre, 112 civil war resulting from persecutions during his minority, 103 date when catherine suggested the massacre to him, 115 desirous of thwarting spain, his measures to that end, 104, 105 effect on his attitude to rome of his success in crushing huguenots, 137 explanations offered by, various, on the massacre, 118 hints dropped by, of the coming massacre, 111 letters of, to rome, fate of, 101 letter from, to the pope, announcing the massacre, 132; reasons alleged in, 133 massacre of huguenot prisoners ordered by, 141 methods of, in the provincial massacres, 118 _et seq._ naudé's apology for its basis, 147 negotiations of, for anjou's marriage with queen elizabeth, 105 nuncio on charles ix., tenacity of his authority, 137 panegyric on, by panigarola, 125 personal share of, in the massacre, approved by mendoça, 124 praised for his conduct as to the massacre, 112, 125, 128-9, 136, 140, 147 suppression by, of materials for history of the massacre, 121 & _note_ threats of pius v. to, 139 tracts on his danger from coligny, and on his joy at the massacre, 131 on his plan for the massacre, 117 death of, sorbin's account, 126-7 his wife and her parentage, 105 charron, on subordination to universal reason, 46 chastre, la, refuses to execute charles ix.'s orders as to huguenot massacre at bourges, 115 chateaubriand, marquis de, 464 liberalism of, discussed, 594 maxim of, on the timidity of the better sort of men, 582; endorsed by menou, _ib._ transcription by, of salviati's despatches, 102 chatham, lord, against taxation of american colonists, 55 châtillon, house of, feud of, with the guises, 112 chemnitz, lutheran divine, on calvinists, 145 cherbuliez, the elder, on the power of abstract ideas, 585 cheverus, 402 chinese, stationary national character of, 241 christ, his divine sanction the true definition of the authority of government, 29 christian states, constitution of the church as model for, 192 christianity, appeal to barbarian rulers, 33 considered as force, not doctrine, by döllinger, 383-7 in the dark ages, 200 as history, döllinger's view of, 380 how employed by constantine, 30, 31 influence of, on the human race, 200; and on popular government, 79 primitive, penetration of influence over state gradual, 27 progress of, must be supplemented by secular power, 246, 247 teaching of stoics nearest approach to that of, 24, 25 universality of, influence of nations on, 317-21 why romans opposed establishment of, 195, 198 freedom in, appeal of christianity to rulers, 33 effects on, of teutonic invasion, 32 influence on, of feudalism, 35 political influence of the reformation on, 43 supplying faculty of self-government in classical era, 31 political advances of middle ages due to, 39 rise of guelphs and ghibellines as affecting, 36 rise and progress of absolute monarchy as affecting, 41, 47, 48 rise of religious liberty and toleration as resulting from, 52, 53 rise and progress of political liberty due to, 56, 57, 58 sovereignty of people in middle ages acknowledged in consequence of, 35 christina, queen, of sweden, on truth, 316 _chronicle, the_, acton's leaders in, ix chrysippus, views of, 73 church, the, _see also_ catholicism, papacy, popes, _and_ rome attitude of, to isolation of nations, 292 attitude of, to wycliffe, hus, and luther, 271; difference in their attitude to her, _ib._ both accepting and preparing the individual to receive, 450; how she performs this, _ib._ censure of, ineffectual against machiavelli's political doctrines, 218 condemnation of frohschammer's book, and excommunication, 477 and the development of machiavelli's policy, 225 difficulties of, how nourished, 455 döllinger's vindication of, 404 effect on, of growth of feudalism, 245 fables of, döllinger's investigation of, in _papstfabeln des mittelalters_, 418-21 free action of, test of free constitution of state, 246 goldwin smith's unfair estimate of, 234 in ireland, goldwin smith's views on, 259 great work (salvation of souls) and its subsidiaries, 448-9 hostility to, roused by conflicts with science and literature, 461-91 indebted to the barbarians for corporate position, 244 manifestation of, how seen, 269 minority in, in agreement with döllinger, 313 not justified in resisting political law or scientific truth on grounds of peril in either to the faith, 449 _et seq._ not openly attacked, eighteenth century, 273-4 her peculiar mission to act as channel of grace not her sole mission, 448-9 political thoughts on, 188; authority, supreme, the church as, 192; catholicism in the "dark ages," 200; christianity, influence of, on human race, 200; divine order in the world, establishment of, 189; english race, christianity a cause of greatness of, 204; liberty, influence of christianity on, 203; religion, true, definition of, 197; romans, persecution of christians by, reasons for, 196, 198 position of, in state, regulation difficult, 252 struggle of feudalism with, 35 tolerance of, in early days, 186 view of, on government, 260 church discipline, bucer's system of, 172-3 government, under control in the modern state, 151 church of england, internal condition of, 437-8 establishment, english and irish, difference between, 259 church and state teutonic, quarrel between, cause of revival of democracy, 80 relations of, 150-52, 162, 163-4 union of, creating byzantine despotism, 33; effect of, on paganism, 33 views on, of anabaptists, 171-2; bucer, 172-3; calvin, 177 _et seq._; luther, 154, 156, 157-8, 159, 161-4, 180; melanchthon, 164 _et seq._; oecolampadius, 176-7; zwingli, 173-4; reformers in general, 181 cicero, 409 cienfuegos, cardinal and jesuit, view of, on charles ix., 148 _circumspice_, as motto for the catholic church, 269 citeaux, 567 citizenship in athens, 68 "city of the sun," an ideal society described by, 270 civil authority over religious crime (_see also_ passive obedience), beza's view, 146 liberty, point of unison of, with religious liberty, 151; its two worst enemies, 300 war of america, consolidating effects of, on the constitution, 579 society, its aim and end, 298 civilisation, despotism in relation to, 5, 6, 27 liberty the product of, 596 mature, liberty the fruit of, 1 social, unconnected with political civilisation, 243 in western europe retarded by five centuries owing to teutonic invasion and domination, 32, 33 _civilta cattolica_, organ of pius ix., 497 classical literature, subjects not found in, 25, 26 clay, h., despondency of, as to american institutions, 579 clement iv., pope, directions of, for inquisitors, 560 clement v., pope, decree of, on privilege of inquisitors, deductions on, of lea, 566 share of, in the trial of the templars, 563 _cited_ on political honesty, 214 publication of _il principe_ authorised by, 214 clement viii., pope (aldobrandini), testimony of, on premeditation of the st bartholomew, 114-15 & _notes_ clergy, immunities of, 34; unpopular in italy, 363 upholders of absolute monarchy, 41 clifford, lord, acquaintance of, with döllinger, 388 colbert, admirers of, in accord with helvetius, 220 coleridge, s.t., metaphysics of, döllinger's love for, 381 coligny, admiral de, 105; death of, origin and motives of, discussed, 101 _et seq._, 117-18; the story of, 106, 111 _et seq._, 118; the question of its premeditation discussed, 106-7 _et seq._ alleged plot to kill charles ix., 131, 135, 136 murderer of, 124; reward of, from philip ii., 123, and presented to the pope, 144 & _note_; nationality (alleged) of, 124 colocza, archbishop of, head of council of bishops, 1867., 499 cologne, archbishop of, loose reading of terms of the legal reform of index, 531 cologne, synod at, and infallibility, 499 commines, philip de, on levying of taxes, 39 _commonwealth, the american_, by james bryce, review, 575 commonwealths, founders of, 70 communism, a subversive theory, proclaimed by baboeuf, 273; theory of its antiquity due to critias, 17 comte, auguste, historic treatment of philosophy, 380 concordat, austrian, failure of, 292 confederacy essential to a great democracy, 277 confederate scheme of american government, 577 conference of bayonne, resolutions inimical to huguenots taken at, 108-9 & _notes_ confession of anjou, on the massacre of st. bartholomew, 107 confession of augsburg, apology of, on excommunication, 158 importance of, recognised by luther, 159 conflicts with rome, 461-91 connecticut, blue laws of, 55 conrad, master (of marburg), principles inspiring, 556; as confessor of st. elizabeth, 570 conscience, freedom of, a postulate of religious revolution, 153 in politics, expedient elasticity of, 212-14 _conservateur_, the, 594 conservatism, indirect elections not always a safeguard of, 2; restriction of suffrage in relation to, 96 conservatism of american revolutionists, 580 european, 583 constance, council of, support of, to the inquisition, 570 _constantine, donation of_, 469; political christianity of, 30, 31 constantinople, seat of roman empire transferred to, 30 patriarchs of, _see_ eutychius constitution, american, consolidated by the civil war, 579 despondency of its founders as to, 579 hamilton's views on, 581-3 not understood by tocqueville, 576 constitution of england, sir e. may on, 62 constitutions, evolution of, 58 growth of, nature of, 5 periclean, characteristic of, 10 view of guelph writers respecting, 36 how ancient, differ from modern, 19 mixed, difficulty of establishing and impossibility of maintaining, 20 contarini, gaspar, 214 contarini, venetian ambassador, on the expected change in france (as to the huguenots), 109 conti, story of priests and the st. bartholomew disproved, 126 cooley, judge, _cited_ by bryce, on american liberty and government, 580 copernican system, the, derided by luther, 160 corsica, 105 cortes, donoso, classed as ultramontane, 451 council of arles and the count of toulouse, 565 council of constance, support of, to the inquisition, 570 council of trent, 111, 138; döllinger's investigations of, 431; and tradition, 513 council of ten, molino on, 213 cournot, intellectual qualities of, 589 cousin, victor, 224, 588, 589 historic treatment of philosophy, 380 cranmer, 430 creuzer, 405 critias, _cited_, 70 originator of notion of original communism of mankind, 17 croker, _see_ canning cromwell, oliver, constitutions of, short-lived, 50 study of, 410 cromwell, thomas, acquaintance of, with _il principe_, 214 death of, a joy of melanchthon, 217 _culturgeschichte_ of hellwald, 573 cumberland, expositor of grotius, 46 cusa, cardinal of, on christian doctrine, 514 daniel, historian, 588 dante, döllinger's return to study of, 433 key to, where found, 574 views of, on conscience, 562 and cecco d'ascoli, on schism, 564 danton, his action in the reign of terror, 266 darboy, archbishop, on papal infallibility, 547 opposition of, at vatican council, 522 daru, revival by, of hohenlohe's policy, 511 darwin, charles, estimate of carlyle, 223 deàk on hungarian administration, 510 decree, the first, issued to vatican council, 531; withdrawn, 535 defoe, daniel, on want of principle among contemporary politicians, 53 "de haereticis," tract on toleration, 182 delbrück, criticism of macaulay's power of historical deduction, 385 delicieux, fall of, conclusions on, of lea, 563, 564 democracy (_see also_ will of the people), alliance of, with despotism, 238 alliance of, with socialism baneful, 92, 93, 98 attitude to, of aristotle, 71, 72 and catholic legitimists, link between, 590 curbing of, by ancient constitutions, 19 definition and tendencies of, 62 enlightened ideas of lilburne on, 83 essence of, 7 federalism most effective check on, 98 in fourteenth century, 80 government by, danger of, 20 a great, in relation to self-government, 277 modern mistakes in true conception of, 93, 94 in pennsylvania, 84 pervading evil of, 97 political writers against, 93 presbyterianism and, 81, 82 present aim, 95 principles of, advocated by pericles, 9 progress of, in europe, 85 revival of, to what due, 80 ancient, partial solution of, by popular government, 79 athenian, tyranny manifested by, 12 swiss, 90 _democracy in europe_, by sir erskine may, 61 democratic method of socrates, 71 principle, triumph of, in france, results of, 287 denifle, father, 574 denmark, religion in, döllinger on, 340-31 derby, lord, cited, 189 descartes, advocate of passive obedience to kings, 48 despotic spirit, old, its two adversaries, 276 despotism after peace of westphalia, 325 alliance of democracy with, 238 emancipation of mankind from, to what due, 24, 25 overpowering strength of, the doom of classical civilisation, 27 product of civilisation, 5, 6 _see also_ absolutism development, _see also_ progress and its earlier supporters, 592 flint on, topic discussed, 591, 592 diocletian's persecution of the christians due to attempt to transform roman government into despotism of eastern type, 30, 31 dispensation, the, for the navarre marriage long withheld, 128 & _note_; price, assumed, for, ib.; never granted, 131-2; charles ix.'s hope regarding, 133 divine right of freeholders established by revolution of 1688., 54 of kings, principle of, led to advocacy of passive obedience, 47 of the people, 36, _see also_ will of the people with respect to election of monarch, 35 divine order in the world, establishment of, 189 djakovar, bishop of, on validity of vatican council's decrees, 549 doctrine, danger from, motive for religious persecution in pagan and mediæval times, 251 dogma, commission on, at vatican council, election and proceedings of, 529-31 dolcino, two versions of the story of, 555, 568 döllinger, dr. j.j. ignatius von, his attacks on papal infallibility, 538, 545; on episcopal authority, in council, 545 character of, 403 declaration of, on papal necessity for temporal power, 312-13 fame of, 463 historical insight of, limitations of, 409-10 judgments of, compared to möhler's, 378; their gentleness, 410 influences acting upon, earlier and later studies, intercourse, literatures, etc.--evolution due to--375-6, 379-82, 383, 386-9, 392-3, 399; later views of, 396, 425-36 later life of, 399 and möhler in munich, views at variance, 377-80 politics and their interest for, 400-403 reliance of scholars on, in theological difficulties, 382-3 silence of followers of, 313-15 style of, 375-435; own estimate of, 432; views on, and methods of, 383, 385, 389-92 tract attributed to, on infallibility, 512, 513 value as historian of the church, 408-10 views of, compared to möhler's, 378-9; on temporal power, 301-74 visits of, to oxford, 403; to rome, 410-14 works by- _church history_, interpretations of, 379-435; source of, 386; new edition of, refused by, 392-3 _heidenthum und judenthum_, publication of, 405-7 _hippolytus und kallistus_, publication of, 404-5 _kirche und kirchen_, argument of, 414-18; description of, 384-6; source of, 386; preface to, _cited_ on temporal authority of the church, 303-12; purpose of, 371-4 _papstfabeln des mittetalters_, spurious authority of the church, 418-21 _philosophumena_, vindication of rome, after publication of, by, 404 _reformation_, preparation for, 392-4; publication of, 394; ridiculed in rome, 411; style of, 393-7 _cited on_ attitude of pius ix. and the council, 371 character of pius ix., 365-6 council of trent, 432 england's attitude to temporal power of pope, 415 german loyalty to the church, 370-71 luther, 397 mistaken judgments of youth, 429 st. dominic, 428 the temporal power of the pope, 414-15 dominicans, the, theology of, discountenanced, 498 dominis, de, 432 dorner, 389 dort, canons of, 580 doyle, 402 duchesne, abbé, 400, 574 on the idea of development, and what impeded its acceptance, 592-3 dupanloup, 400, 425; opposition of, at vatican council, 522, 526 defence of syllabus by, 424 opposition of, to papal temporal power, 412 duperron, cardinal, on arianism, apparent, in st. irenæus and tertullian, 592 duplessis-mornay, forebodings of, as to huguenot perils, 107 dutch independence due to maritime successes, 103 dynastic interest, dominant in old european system, 273 at the congress of vienna, 283 ebrard, döllinger's opinion of work of, 420 ecclesiastical authority, functions of its office, 460 echard, authority on the inquisition, 554 book by, on st. thomas, pages by another, printed in, 558-9 eckstein, character of, 400 école des chartes, pupils of, methods of, 561 école française, 574 edessa, archbishop of, at commission of preparation for vatican council, 500 edict of nantes, revocation of, an inconsistency, 170 not approved by innocent xi., 147 remarks on, 260 of pacification, 108 of toleration, deceitful, of charles ix., 117, 135 elections, indirect, 97; not always a safeguard of conservatism, 2 elizabeth, queen of england, catherine de' medici's challenge to a massacre of catholics, 122 döllinger's lenient view of, 410 murder of, sanctioned by pius v., 139 not alienated by charles ix.'s huguenot massacres, 120 proposed league of, for protestant defence, lutheran protest, 145 elizabeth of valois, first wife of philip ii. of spain, fate of, 104 & _note_ ellicott, dr., bishop of gloucester and bristol, on lamennais's theory, 593 emerson, r.w., on attitude of the best americans to politics, 578 encyclical, the, of 1846, infallibility proclaimed in, 496 england, an exception to the common law of dynastic states till 1745., 274 indignation in, at the idea of development in religion, 591 inquisition never admitted into, 59 status of kings in, canning on, 583-4 under the stuarts, church and liberty in, 208 english catholics, peculiarities of their position, 438; wiseman's personal relations with, 437, 438 legal system, pioneer work of jeremy bentham in reform of, 3 liberty, adversary of the despotic policy, 276 nation, endurance of, and supremacy of, in art of labour, 60 foremost in battle for liberty, 59 views of, on the huguenot massacres, 144 race, christianity a cause of greatness of, 204 writers, döllinger's acquaintance with, 388 entremont, countess, marriage of, with coligny, salviati's denunciation on, 110 eötvös on lay interest in religious government, 510 ephialtes and democracy, 68 epictetus, 406 epicurus on purpose of foundation of societies, 18 equality, passion for, in france, 57, 58 subversive theory proclaimed by rousseau, 273; making french revolution (1789) disastrous to liberty, 88 of fortune, and class interests, 69 political, observations on the right to, 262 erasmus, his idea of renovating society on the principles of self-sacrifice, 58 erhle, father, 552, 560, 574 essenes, disappearance of, 66 idea of renovating society on the principles of self-sacrifice, 58 slavery, both in principle and practice, rejected by, 26 ethical offices of the church not exclusively hers, 448-9 ethnology and geography united, in relation to security of free institutions, mill on, 286 eudæmon-johannes, praise given by, to the st. bartholomew, 147 eugenius iv., pope, election of, 355 euphemus, _cited_, 70 europe, attitude of, to the french massacre of huguenots, 120. 124-5; progress of democracy in, 85; theory of nationality in, how awakened, 275 civilised, to what its preservation is due according to lea, 568 latin, frequency in, of revolution, 278; its object, 280-81 western, retrogression in arts and sciences due to domination of teutons, 32, 33 the two conquests of, and their effects on social ideas, 278 _et seq._ european liberalism and conservatism, 582-3 system, the old, reigning families, not nationalities, dominant in, 273 eutychius, lea's remarks on, challenged, 563 excommunication, of frohschammer, 477 what it involves, according to the confession of schmalkald, etc., 158 eymeric, author of the _directorium_, president of arragonese tribunal against heretics, 558, 559 fables of the church (_papstfabeln des mittelalters_), döllinger's investigations of, 418-21 faenza, why menaced by pius v., 137 faith not to be kept with heretics, catholic theory on, 140-41 falloux, value of, as historian, 400 opposition of, to montalembert, 425 false principles, place of, in social life of nations, 272 fantuzzi, compiler of history, 387 farel, death of servetus approved by, 185 farnese, cardinal, _see_ paul iii., pope fatalism, philosophy of historians, 221 fauriel, 565 federal government, views on, of hamilton, 581-3 federalism, most effective check on democracy, 98; value of, 20 _federalist, the_, by alexander hamilton, various views on, 581 federal form of american constitution, said not to be understood by tocqueville, 576 fénelon, his idea of renovating society on the principles of self-sacrifice, 58 on absolutism, 433 on domains as dowries, 273 on national distress, 49 ferdinand i., döllinger's lenient estimate of, 410 ferdinand ii., döllinger's lenient estimate of, 410 ferralz, despatches of, on attitude of roman court to the st. bartholomew, unused, 102 quarrels of, with the cardinal of lorraine, 129 true particulars of the navarre marriage according to, 131-2 on the attitude of gregory xiii. on hearing of the st. bartholomew, 132-3 _note_ ferrara, alfonso, duke of, a massacre of huguenots advised by (1564), 108 & _note_ ferrari, 590; döllinger's tribute to, 417 on machiavelli's character, 226 ferrier, du, catherine de' medici's words to, on the death of the queen of spain and the massacre of st. bartholomew, 104 ferrières, 122 fessler, _see_ st. pölten, bishop of feudalism, alien to the sentiment of france, 279 growth of, 34; effect on church, 245 struggles of, with the church, 34, 35 feuerlein, machiavelli's loyalty upheld by, 229 on political expediency, 224 fichte, j.s., _cited_ in praise of machiavelli's policy, 228 ficker, prof., account by, of the inquisition, 426 on the real contriver of the inquisition's rule by terror, 555 first empire, the french, things most oppressed by, the causes of its downfall, 281 fischer, kuno, trace of machiavelli in metaphysics of, 228 fisher, john, bishop of rochester, on persecution, 570 flaminian gate, ancient custom connected with, 136 flaminius, works of, edited by trent commissioners, 215 fleury, style of, döllinger's compared to, 381 flint, professor robert, 572; _historical philosophy in france and french belgium and switzerland_, review, 588 critical faculty strong in, 591 nature of his superiority as writer, 588-9; some defects, 589-90 florence, prepared for the st. bartholomew, 109 fontana, authority on the inquisition, 554 forbes (bishop of brechin), döllinger's intimacy with, 416 force replaced by opinion as catholic tribunal, 148 foreign rulers, objection to, as third cause of popular risings, 284 forgery, church authority supported by 511, 513 formosus, 563 fors de béarn, the, 566 "fourth estate," rise of, 67 fox, charles james, 54 france, absolute monarchy in, 48; how built up, 41 the church in, and protestantism, döllinger on, 337 democratic principle in, its triumph the cause of the energy of the national theory, 287 feudalism alien to, 279 gallican theory in, with respect to reigning houses, 35 governed by paris during revolution of 1789., 88 of history, how, and why, it fell, 277 inherent absence of political freedom and presence of absolutism in, 237-40 kingdom of, how evolved, 278 opposition in, to lamennais's ultramontanism, 463-4 passion in, for equality, 57, 158 political ideas concerning, of charles ix., and of richelieu, 116 removal of papacy to, 370 and representation on vatican council, 504-5 "the slave of heretics" according to pius v., 105 restored monarchy of, _see_ restoration franchi at council of bishops in 1867., 499 francis joseph, emperor of austria, in 1859., 287 franciscan masters, the, and the idea of development in religion, 592 franciscans, general of, on the planned character of the st. bartholomew, 124 struggle of avignon with, 552 franklin, benjamin, irreligious tone of, 584 franks, preamble of the salic law of, 200 franzelin on commission of preparation for vatican council, 500 frederic the great and machiavelli's political schemes, 227 ignorant opposition of, to machiavelli's works, 218 frederic ii., emperor, treaty of, with the church, 555 lombard law of, 152; its provisions, 555, 556 free institutions, a generally necessary condition for securing, mill on, 286 freedom (_see also_ liberty) accorded to english catholics, 438 in antiquity- age of pericles, 9 antiquity of liberty, modernity of despotism, 5 cause of liberty benefited more under roman empire than under republic, 15 dangers of monarchy, of aristocracy and democracy, 19, 20 decline of athenian constitution, 11 definition of liberty, 3 early communism and utilitarianism, 17, 18 emancipation by stoics of mankind from despotic rule, 24 guiding principle of roman republic, 13 highest teaching of classical civilisation powerless to avert despotism, 27 history of institutions often deceptive and illusive, 2 implicit opposition of stoics to principle of slavery, 25, 26 influence of christianity over the state, gradual, 27 infusion of greek ideas of statesmanship among romans, 16 liberty, highest political end, 22, 23, 24 limitation and excess in duties of state, 4 method of growth of constitution, 5 nature of government of israelites, 4 object of constitutions, 10 reform in english legal system instituted by jeremy bentham, 3 representative government, emancipation of slaves, and liberty of conscience not a subject of classical literature, 25, 26 revision of laws of athens by solon, 6 sanction of christ the true definition of the authority of government, 29 teaching of plato and aristotle respecting politics, 22 teaching of pythagoras and heraclitus of ephesus, 21, 22 triumphs due to minorities, 1, 4 value of federalism, 20 vice of the classic state, 16 wisest minds among the ancients tainted with perverted morality, 18 freedom in christianity, history of- christianity employed by constantine to strengthen his empire, 30, 31 civil, its two worst enemies, 300 conscience, a postulate of religious revolution, 153 freeholders, "divine right of," established by revolution of 1688, 54 freeman, döllinger on, as a historian, 421 on mommsen's want of generous sentiment, 222 _french belgium_, see _historical philosophy in france and french belgium and switzerland_ french catholics, reasons of their confusion between piety and ferocity, 141 clergy, and the st. bartholomew, 126-7 & _notes_ monarchy, aid of the democracy in establishing and in demolishing, reasons for both, 278-80 people, attitude of, to and after the huguenot massacres, 143 _et seq._ how regarded after the revolution, 277 provincial massacres of huguenots, 118-19, 134 writers, influence of, on döllinger, 387 scholarship, dependence on, of mr. h.c. lea, 558 french republic of 1848, of what school the triumph, 590 french revolution, _see_ revolution, french frohschammer, 473-7 conflict with rome, 462, 467, 469, 473-483 fulcodius, cardinal, _see_ clement iv. fulda, council of bishops at, 517 funds of the church, proposed disposal of, in italy, 509 gallicanism, corruption of christianity, 463, 524 lamennais's crusade against, 464 theory of, on reigning houses in france, 35 gams, 429; defender of the inquisition, 573 ganganelli, cardinal, influence of, on döllinger, 434 gaspary, _cited_ on machiavelli's loyalty, 230 gass, on st. anthony's life and origin of monasticism, 420 gaul, roman, tolerance in, of absolutism, 279 _gazette de france_ and universal suffrage, 590 geneva, trial of servetus at, 184 genlis, huguenot commander, defeat of, the consequences to coligny, 116, 117, 141 genoa, extinction of, as state, 283 gentz _cited_ on machiavelli's policy, 229 george iii., king of england, 583 george iv., king of england, 583 german, or teutonic, conquest of europe, its consequences, 277 _et seq._ writers, as influencing döllinger, 389 germany, effect on, of the massacre of st. bartholomew, 124, 143 protestantism in (1572), 103 theology of, unique and scientific, 317, 347-351, 376, 471-482 union of, 225 and the vatican council- circular of german bishops to, 517 opposition in, 503; and to infallibility, 500; representation of, 505 gerson, 562; _cited_, 191 gervinus, g.g.. on machiavelli as prophet of modern politics, 229 ghibellines, political theory of, 37 gibbon, edward, 389 gieseler, döllinger's dislike of, 389, and estimate of, 404 ginoulhiac, on papal infallibility, 540 on strossmayer's influence, 536 gioberti, followers of, 314 metaphysics of, döllinger's love for, 381 girondists, objects of, 263 gladstone, w.e., acton's admiration for, xxiii; and döllinger, letter to, on the irish question, 434; estimate of historical judgment and style, 416; intercourse of, 400 policy of, feared in rome, 507 glencoe, massacre of, 218, 410 gneist, 377 gonzaga, lewis, _see_ nevers görres, joseph, 282, 405 centre of munich group of theologians, 386 göttingen, 378; seminary pupils of, methods of, 561 government, authority of, defined by divine sanction of christ, 29 catholic view of, 260 chief duty of, to maintain political right, 449 american, judge cooley on, 580 gracchus, opposition to octavius, 76 grant, general ulysses, 579 granvelle, cardinal, viceroy of naples, on the massacre of st. bartholomew, 125, 140; on alva's prisoners, 142 gratian, 557 gratry, letters of, to the archbishop of mechlin, on divisions in the church, 537-8 on the inquisition, 424 tribute from, to döllinger, 424 _cited_ on veuillot's school, 429 greece, national beliefs yielding to doubt during age of pericles, 8, 9 politics of, infused into minds of roman statesmen, 16 greek church, development of, 332-3 revolution, causes united in, 284 greeks, democracy of, 66 as makers of history, 240 slavery discouraged by, 63 gregory vii., pope, deception of, by hierarchical fictions, 420 and democracy, 80 his disparagement of civil authorities, 36 gregory ix., pope, 430 appointed guala as first inquisitor, 553 lea's view of, as intellectual originator of the inquisition, 555, 557 gregory x., pope, and the inquisition, 426 gregory xiii., pope, 430 and the massacre of st. bartholomew- bull of, on, 101, 134 complicity of, discussed, 128 fate of his letters to france, 101 previous knowledge of, 110, 116 receipt of the news by, his public and private attitude, and his reply, 132-5, 137 urges full and complete extirpation of huguenots, 142 conduct as viewed by french and by italians, 148 reply, 137 undue hatred of, consequent on his attitude to the matter, 138 and the navarre marriage, his steady opposition, 105, 111, 113, 128 on destruction as result of sedition, 216 gregory xvi., pope, personal fallibility of, admitted, and denounced by lamennais, 465, 466 grenoble, bishop of, doctrine of papal infallibility admitted by, 528 excluded from commission on dogma, 530 on dogmatic decrees of the vatican council, 533 grey, lord, 219 grotius, 432; days of, 225 founder of study of real political science, 46 on the principles of law, 46 guala, bishop of brescia, successor of moneta and st. dominic, 553 and the burning of heretics. 555-6 guelphs, political theory of, 36 guicciardini, francesco, abridged by trent commissioners, 215 guidonis, bernardus, frequently cited by lea, 568 leading authority of the fourteenth century, 559 _practitia_ of, 558 protests of, on clement v.'s decree on privilege of inquisitors, 566 guise, duke of, initiative of, in the massacre of st. bartholomew, 112 recalled to france, 213 slain by henry iii. of france, 121 guise, house of, 112, 118 guizot, 400 on the eighteenth century, 585 on hamilton's work _the federalist_, 581 on importance, to all denominations, of the vatican council, 493 wisdom of, 401 günther, 473 gurney, archer, alarm of, at döllinger's views, 382 guyon on the murder of heretics, 147 _habeas corpus_ act, principle originated in middle ages, 39 habsburg family, contests of, 274 halifax archbishop of (conolly), on the dogmatic decree, 533 opposition of, at vatican council, 522 on scriptural authority, 547 halifax, george savile, lord, 53 hallam, henry, favourable comparison of theory of _il principe_ with other political theories, 224 hamilton, alexander, eulogised, 581-3 history, treatment of philosophy, 380 political example of, 586 views of, as cited by bryce, 578 harnack, estimate of döllinger, 434 harrington, political writer in advance of his time, 51 hartwig, 230 hase, prof. k., _cited_ on political expediency, view of, on importance of vatican council to all denominations, 493 hauréau, _histoire littéraire_ by, divergence from, of lea, 558, 563 havet, 555 haynald, archbishop of colocza, at council of bishops, 1867, 499 hefele, defender of the inquisition, 573 estimate by, of döllinger, 434 on papal infallibility, 540, 544 on validity of dicta of vatican council, 548 hegel, carl, friend of döllinger, 420 hegel, g.w.f., 589, 590 definition by, of universal history, 224 as enemy of religion, döllinger's disparaging view of, 376, 381 master of cousin, 589 posthumous work of, 385 view of, on development of liberty, 596 henry iii., king of france (_see also_ anjou. duke of), 44, 580 döllinger's lenient estimate of, 410 hopes of his destroying the huguenots root and branch, 142; urged on him by muzio, 143 and the murder of the guises, 121, 213 reliance of, on _il principe_, 215 henry iv., king of france, _see_ navarre, king of heraclitus, of ephesus, on the supremacy of reason and divine origin of laws, 21, 22 herbert, _cited_ to show machiavelli's sacrifice to unity, 229 herder, j.g., 375 on _il principe_, 228 heresy (_see also_ intolerance, persecution, _and_ toleration), books on, definition of, by the archbishop of cologne, 531 calvin's views on punishment, 181; its famous refutation, 182 causes of, in frohschammer, 481 dependent on the state, 317 laws of frederic ii. on, 152, 555 punishable by death, doctrine of the church, 216-19 methods of dealing with the reformers _cited_ on, 154, 157, 163-164, 166, 167, 175, 181, 183 heretics, attitude towards, of st. dominic, 554 catholic theory on the proper way to deal with, 569; discredit incurred from, 140-41 a prominent dissentient, 144 divisions among, 103 first proscribed in aragon, 557-58 murder of, guyon on, 147 hermann, reliance of döllinger on authority of, 403 hermas, 406 hermes and followers denied the power of _the index_, 473 hesse, landgrave of, bigamy of, why condoned by luther, 160 & _note_ hindoos, stationary national character of, 241 historians, qualities of, revealed by use made of their authorities, 235 scientific, method of, how differing from that of artist and annalist, 233 _historical philosophy in france and french belgium and switzerland_, by robert flint, _review_, 588 history, deductions of, döllinger's theory, 389-92; not drawn from moral standards, 219-21 döllinger's work in, 375-435 equity of, deductions drawn from action, 219 god seen in, 594 no conscience in, hartwig's opinion of, 230 teaching of, döllinger's desertion of theology for, 379-83 theory of, döllinger's view, 385 _history, a, of the inquisition of the middle ages_, by henry charles lea, review, 551 hobbes, thomas, advocate of passive obedience to kings, 48 and machiavelli's policy, 228 höfler, 434 hogendorp, on the american revolution and the decline of religion in america (circ. 1784), 584 hohenlohe, prince, defeat of his policy, 511 defeated by ultramontanes, 505 döllinger secretary to, 385 opposed to discussion of infallibility at vatican council, 503-4 hohenzollern, house of, contests of silesia with, 275 holland, _see also_ low countries and netherlands, declares for the prince of orange, 103 republican, an exception to common law of dynastic states, 274 holst on hamilton's genius, 581 _verfassungsgeschichte_, by, 577 holy alliance, originated by baader, 377; the devotion of, to absolutist interests, 282; and to suppression of the revolution and national spirit, 283 _home and foreign review, the_, action concerning, of wiseman, 439-40; deprecated, 440 et seq.; his complaints investigated, 442-43; and replied to, 443-44; how wiseman came to misconceive the words of the review, 444 _et seq._; position on which the review was founded, 447, 457; sphere of such a publication delimited, 448-56; topics excluded from its purview, 457; its aid to religion indirect but valuable, 459; attitude of, on supreme authority of the church, 482-91 honorius iii., pope, characterisation by, of gregory ix., 556 the inquisition extant under, 554 and the lombard law for burning heretics, 556 hooker's _ecclesiastical polity_, 45 hosius, cardinal, opposition of, to beza, concerning the polish socinians, 146 hötzl, father, support of döllinger, 545 house of commons, the, and the inquisition, 570 huguenots, expulsion of from switzerland, 125 massacres of, in paris and the provinces, 106, _and see_ massacre of st. bartholomew _passim_ position of, in 1572, and apparent prospects, 102 views of, on the massacres of co-religionists, 145-46 humboldt, w. von, 282 hume, david, 54; _cited_ on _il principe_, 218 hungary, church constitution of 1869., 510 growing autonomy of, 526 huns, stationary national character of, 241 hus, john, difference between his teaching and luther's, 271 trial of, 552, 570; a test case, 572; lea's puzzling views on, 573 ideals, energy evoked by, why greater than in case of rational ends, 272 usefulness of, 272; how limited, 273 ideas, abstract, more powerful than practical, views on cited, 585 _il principe_ (machiavelli's), dedication of, 215 nourrisson's praise of, 227 pole's attention called to, 214 publication of, 214; interpretation of, by all later history, 213; known to pole and cromwell, 214 various criticisms of, 218 immaculate conception, doctrine of, archbishop of st. louis on, 545 income tax, known in middle ages, 39 independent congregations, advocacy of toleration by, 52 _index_, the church's instrument of preventing scandal by literature, 469-471 institution and origin of, 215, 495 permanent exclusion of _il principe_ by, 215 power of, in germany, 473 reform of, urged on and effected by the vatican council, 495, 525, 531 sanction of, 544 indifference, religious, of educated protestants, 350-51 indulgences granted by pius v., in connection with war against the heretics, 141 infallibility, papal- attitude to, of lamennais, 462-4, 465, 466 bavarian warning against adoption of, by vatican council, 511 _civiltà cattolica_ on, 500-501 continental discussions on, 518 debate on, at vatican council, 532-549 declaration of, urged on vatican council, 499 definition of, not to be made, by vatican council, 518 discussion and definition of, by vatican council, 525-49 doctrine of the jesuits, 498; establishment of, vatican council, 499 opinions in england, on discussion of, at vatican council, 507 opposition to, 502-4 origin of doctrine of, 513-515 to be presented at vatican council, 500-501 proposed by cardoni at commission of preparation for vatican council, 500 infidelity, growth of, due to intolerance, 256 innocent iii., commonly reported as founder of the inquisition, 553; intolerance of, 431 treatment of heretics, 568 innocent iv., pope, _cited_, 206 innocent x., pope, protest against peace of westphalia, 324-25 innocent xi., döllinger's proposed history of, 433 innocent xi., pope, and the revocation of the edict of nantes, 147 inquisition, the, earlier and later, distinction between aims and characteristics of, 552 lea's view on, 568 machiavelli denounced to, 214-15 never admitted into england, 59 origin of, controversy on, 553 period of its activity and decline, 574 problem of, 570 sanction of, 544 in spain, 152 supporters of, 570 tribunal of, appropriation by spanish kings leading to absolute monarchy, 41 at vienna, 184 writers defending, 573 _inquisition, the, of the middle ages, a history of_, by henry charles lea, review, 551 _institutes_, calvin's, on toleration, 182 insurrections previous to 1789, wherein differing from the french revolution, 271 intellectual offices of the church not exclusively hers, 448-9 international league of nations founded by mazzini, 286 intolerance carried to an extreme by the anabaptists, 172 catholic and protestant, distinguished, 165, 168-70, 186-7 cause of growth of infidelity, 256 inherent in the mediæval church, leas view, 571 motive and principle of, when justifiable, 251 of reformers, 184 as a rule of life, lea's view on, 562-3 ireland, church in, goldwin smith's views on, 259 celtic race in, yielding to higher political aptitude of the english, 242 failure of reformation in, 43 history of, comparative method of, study of, 234 land question, the great difficulty in, 236 question of, döllinger's views on, 434 religious disabilities in, an engine of political oppression, 253 and ultramontanism at vatican council, 507 irish agitation, causes united in, 284 israelites, democracy of the, 65 government of, exhibiting principle upon which freedom has been won, 4, 5 a federation held together by faith and race, 4 resistance of monarchy among, by prophet samuel, 4 italian states (1862), nationality in, 295 italy, austrian rule in, error of, 285 effect on, of the massacre of st. bartholomew, 124, 143 literature of, influence on döllinger, 386-7 policy of, under machiavelli and before, use of assassination, 213 politics of, influenced by vatican council, 508-511 reliance in, on machiavelli, 226 machiavelli's triumph, 225, 266 temporal power of papacy in, 355-62, 367-71 wisdom of huguenot massacres confessed, 125 ivan the terrible. czar of muscovy, protests of, on the st. bartholomew, 144 jackson, andrew, american president, 578 jacobins, policy of, criticism of, 261 james ii., king of england, 54, 410 overthrow imperative, 468 janus, 519; book on ultramontane ideal, 511, 513 jefferson, thomas, president, u.s.a., 579 irreligion of, 585 jesuit attitude to the massacre of st. bartholomew, 1, 127, 147, 148 jesuits, the, and infallibility, 498 and preparations for vatican council, 497-98 jews, _see also_ israelites treatment of, by catholics, 169; and by protestants, 164, 179 joachim, abbot, and his work, 560 joan of arc, 552; authorities on, not consulted by lea, 558 john of salisbury, 45; reputed author of the _historia pontificalis_, 559 joubert, on authority of the church, 463 judæ, leo, views of, as to persecution, 174 julian, apostate, reasons for persecution by, 196 julius cæsar, conversion by, of roman republic into monarchy, 15 jürgens, his estimate of luther, 161 justification by faith, dogma of, as test of orthodoxy, 158 justin, summit reached by, 406 justinian, code of, greatest obstacle to liberty next to feudalism, 79 on the absolute authority of the roman emperor, 31 kolde, effect of works of, 408 kampschulte, effect of works of, 408 kant, immanuel, 594 kaulbach, pictorial ridicule of döllinger's _reformation_, 411 kenrick, on papal infallibility, 540, 544 ketteler, w.e. von, döllinger's lectures praised by, 381 on papal infallibility, 540, 544 kings, status of, in england, canning on, 583-84 kirchmann on political ethics, 222 _cited_ on the adoption of machiavelli's policy, 227-28 klein. j.l., _cited_ on machiavelli's moral purpose, 229 kleutgen, garbled version of strossmayer's protest, 542 kliefoth, influence on döllinger, 389 work on penitential system, 381 knowledge, growth of, freedom of, in the church, 461 knox, john, 44 "monstrous regiment of women," 45 laboulaye, indictment against democracy, 93 labour, supremacy of english nation in art of, 60 lacordaire, henry, advice of, ignored by montalembert, 400 _cited_ on political honesty, 220 döllinger antagonistic to, 401 on st. dominic, 428 lafayette, 590 la farina, tribute to machiavelli, 226 lamennais and the church, condemnation and fall, and cause of the latter, 398, 465, 466-73 conflict with rome, 462-473 classed as ultramontane, 451 endeavours of, to exalt rome, 463-4 intercourse of, with döllinger, 398 and the idea of development, 591, 593 theory of common sense, 593 land question, the great difficulty in ireland, 236 languedoc, work in, of st. dominic, 553 lanza, 509 la roche-sur-yon, on the resolutions of the conference of bayonne, 108 & _notes_ larroque, tamizey de, rejection by, of arnaud's speech at beziers, 567 lasaulx, ernst von, estimation of, 405 lassalle, ferdinand, on collective thought, 585 laurent, 590; döllinger's praise of, 417 _cited_ on machiavelli's doctrines, followed by detractors, 226 laval, bishop of, opposition of, at vatican council, 522 lavradeo, count de, portuguese ambassador to vatican council, 507 lavaur, fate of albigenses at, 556 law, custom and national qualities, not will of government, makers of, 58 mediæval opinions on, 258 in relation to the will of the people, vergniaud on, 276 laws (_see also_ legal system), divine origin of, 22 of realm, socratic view that they were only sure guide of conduct, 18 view of ghibelline writers respecting, 37 view of guelph writers respecting, 36 lay representation on vatican council, plans for, 503-8 lea, henry charles, _a history of the inquisition of the middle ages_, review, 551 characteristics of, 555, 559, _passim_; as historical writer, 551 league, the, charles ix.'s refusal to join, 129 league, holy, attempts to bring france into, 113 le blanc de beaulieu on political expediency, 225 lecoy de la marche, collection, 559 lee, murder of, note on, 65 legal system, english, pioneer work in reform of, of jeremy bentham, 3 '_leges barbarorum_,' principle of, in respect to the church, 244 legislation, liberty independent of domain of, 2 legitimate ruler, defence of, first cause of popular risings, 1813., 284 leibniz, döllinger's gratitude to, 393 on _il principe_, 228 influence of, on döllinger, 381 leo i., pope, and the suppression of heresy at any cost, 571 leo x. (medici), pope, character of, 378 treatment of tyrant of perugia, 214 leo xiii., pope, literary fruits of his liberality, 573-4 leopold, 401 lepanto, naval battle of, 104; effect foiled by charles ix., 105 victory of, less dear to the pope than the massacre of st. bartholomew, 134 leti, _cited_, 140 lewis xii., king of france, extermination of vaudois of provence by, 217 lewis xiii., king of france, döllinger's lenient estimate of, 410 lewis xiv., king of france, death penalty by, indicted for disobedience to his will, 48 döllinger's lectures on, 433 ordinance against protestants, 50 as political assassin, 410 records of reign of, 409 secret treaty between, and charles ii., 53 supreme among tyrants for bad use of his power, 49; adulation bestowed on him sign of national subjection to absolutism, 49 l'hôpital, 126 liberal movement in latin europe, its objects, 280-81 liberalism, european, 582-3 liberals, eighteenth century, their care only for the individual, 273 of the french restoration, limitations of, 282 liberty (_see also_ freedom), change in constitution not effected by, in italy and germany, 225 definition of, 3 and democracy, 63 essential condition and guardian of, religion, 4 essential to the subsistence of a country, rousseau on, 294 failure of protestant systems to secure, 181 influences of christianity on, 203 luther's attitude to, 156 and property, connection between, 54 realisation of, on what depended, 288 reconciled to religion, dispute concerning, 467-9 theory of, as regards nationality, 289 religion and nationality, causes united in revolutions after 1815., 284 sacrificed to unity, by machiavelli, 229 views on, of hegel, and of flint, 596 vulgar definition of, 580 liberty, american, judge cooley on, 580 civil and religious, point of unison between, 151 english, adversary of old despotic policy, 276 english, adversary of former despotic power, 276 municipal, vigorous growth of, in belgium, 38 religious, definition of, 151-2 effect on, of state control, 151-3 in maryland, 187 necessary conditions of, 152-3 not impossible, 367 liddon, canon, intimacy with döllinger, 416 liebig, 377 lightfoot (bishop of durham), church history of, 418 lilburne, political writer in advance of his time, 50; his enlightened ideas on democracy, 83 limborch, 563 lipsius, r.a., study of machiavelli by, 215 lisle, ambrose de, 423 littré, 590 locke, john, 54 doctrine of resistance, 54 inconsistent ideas regarding liberty, 53 on rules of morality, 221 lombard law of frederick ii., as affecting heretics, 152, 555, 556 lombardy, the heresy of (waldensian), 559 work of st. dominic in, 553 longpérier, _cited_, on italy's adoption of machiavelli's policy, 227 lorraine, cardinal of (guise), on anjou's hatred of protestants and its consequences, 105 _& note_ approval expressed by, of the massacre of st. bartholomew, 140 high position of, 111; on his initiative in the huguenot massacre, his praise of charles ix., 112 _& note_; complicity of, in the massacre of st. bartholomew, 129-30 quarrels with, of ferralz, 129; its reason, the pope's attitude to him, 130 on the price of the navarre marriage, 128 slain by henry iii., attitude of the pope, 121 louis xvi., king of france, policy of, 57 powerlessness of, to effect reform, 85 why he perished, 280 louis philippe, king of the french, his good opinion of republican government, 56, 90 decline of his popularity, 92 love of country, bossuet on, 294 _note_ low countries (_see also_ holland _and_ netherlands), alva's failure in, 103 loyola, ignatius, founder of the society of jesus, 113 luca, cardinal de, proposed discussion of infallibility at vatican council denied by, 518 reisach's deputy as president, 534 lucchesini, sermon against machiavelli, 215 lucius, attack of, on philo, 419 luther, martin, 502 attitude of, to the marriage difficulties of henry viii., 160 and the bigamy of philip of hesse, 160 döllinger's estimate of, 397 early utterances of, on toleration, 153-5; his change of view, 155 influence of, on politics, 81 möhler on, 378 persecuting principles involved in his system, 164, 590 teaching of, wherein differing from that of wycliffe and of hus, 271 views of, on government, 42; on polygamy, 159, 162; on the relations of church and slate, 156, 157-58, 161-63, 173, 177, 180; logical outcome of his theory, 159; its inconsistency, 162; work of, on the civil power, 154 & _note_; _cited_ on toleration of anabaptists, 157 lutheran attitude to heretics, gradual change in, 154, 157 to huguenots, 145-6 theory of persecution, political element in, 172 lutheranism, decline of, 327-9 in denmark, 341 description of, 343-5 national character of, 319-320 roused by abuses in the church, 495 in sweden, 341 lyons, massacre of huguenots at, 119; news of, sent to rome, 132; horror aroused by, in provence, 144; letter from, on the massacres at that place, 131 macaulay, t.b., 580 historical limitation of, 385 injustice of döllinger to, 391-2 opinion of, on father paul, 432 on the study of history, 232 machiavelli, niccolo (_see also_ il principe), character of, 225-6; its complexity, 212-14 crime of catherine de' medici not instigated by, 216 denouncement of, to inquisition, by muzio, 214-15 doctrine of, 40, 41; impulse given by, to absolutism, 41 influence on succeeding generations, 40, 41; political, 49; held by rulers before and since, 216-19; estimated by early historians, 225-231 ignorance of, displayed by great men, 218-19 indulgent views taken of methods of, 224 medici patron and his daughter, 122 merits of, admitted by later historians, 230-231 methods of, 225-6 secret patriotism of, upheld by various historians, 229-230 in touch with reasoners and imitators, by theory of success, 223 zenith of power, 225-7 mackintosh, sir james, on constitutions, 581 macmaster, on hamilton's genius, 581 madison, james, 579 on hamilton's theory of government, 581 maffei, on regicide, 217 magdeburg, archbishop of, _temp._ gregory ix., 556 mai, cardinal, as an editor, 421 maimbourg, 215 maine, sir henry, on the _droit du seigneur_, 566-7 maistre, count de, ultramontane writer, 451, 468; on the authority of the church, 377 and lamennais's theory, 593 relation to savigny, 593 exaggerations of, 378 influence on döllinger, 377 interpreted by elder windischmann, 381 rank of, as writer, 417 thoughts of, on nationality, 282 & _note_ malebranche, 382 malvenda, authority on the inquisition, 554 mamachi, authority on the inquisition, 554 mandelot, governor of lyons, and the huguenot massacres, 119 manin, daniele, 287 manning, cardinal, archbishop of westminster, adviser of de angelis, 529 on admission of papal infallibility by acknowledgment of supreme authority, 543-4 manteuffel, administration of, 283 manzoni on temporal power of papacy, 512 marat, madness of, 401 outcome of rousseau's teaching on his policy, 57, 58 maret, book of, on vatican council plans, 512, 513 opposition of, at vatican council, 426 and papal infallibility, 528 mariana, rejoicing of, over the massacre of st. bartholomew, 124 _cited_ on death of henry iii., 217 marini, as a compiler of history, 387 occasional removal of, from _index_, 215 marlborough, duke of (the great), character of, 53 marseilles, bishop of, on validity of vatican council's decrees, 549 marsilius of padua, the ghibelline, views of, on power and persecution, 561-2 _cited_ on the relation of kings to the people, 37 marshall, john, 579; and the development of the american constitution, 581 martens, 427 martensen, bishop, estimate of döllinger, 434 tribute to baader's powers, 376 martineau, dr., and mill's opinion of results as test of actions, 223 mary tudor, queen of england, 410 maryland, religious history of, 187 massachusetts, history of, contrasted with that of maryland, 187 massacre, the, of st. bartholomew, 101 defects in plan and execution of, as judged by immediate results, 106; sources of the same, 117 defence of, on political grounds, 218 döllinger's work on, 430-31 evidence concerning, how dealt with, difficult of access, 101; best existing sources, 102 motive inspiring its chief author, 121 question of numbers slain in, 106, 137 question of premeditation of, contemporary view, 106; modern view, 107; evidence in support of the former, 107 _et seq._ results anticipated from, 69; philip ii., 123; view not stated by alva, 124 massillon, jean-baptiste, _cited_ on retribution, 220 mathieu, cardinal, share in elections to commission of dogma, 529, 530, 532 matter, cited on machiavelli's influence on liberty, 227 maurenbrecher, rank of döllinger estimated by, 386 maurer, conrad, at döllinger's house, 405 maximillian ii., emperor, information sent to, of the massacre of st. bartholomew, 107 opinion of, on the massacre of st. bartholomew, 144 toleration of, 105 urged to follow example of charles ix., 134 & _note_ may, sir erskine, _democracy in europe_, by, 61 mazade, influence on döllinger, 434 mazzini, giuseppe, association of, with the growth of the idea of nationality, 286 association of his revolutionary ideas with conservatism of niebuhr, 59 on machiavelli's politics, 219 proclaimer of nationality, 273 profane criticism by, 218 mazzuchelli, 114 mechlin, archbishop of, reply to the bishop of orleans by, 537 medici, cosmo de', patron of machiavelli, father of catherine, 122 family of, in disfavour under paul iii., 214 machiavelli not countenanced by followers of, 214 mediæval writers on law and right, 258 melanchthon, philip, his theory of persecution, 164-170 views of, on polygamy, and the bigamy of philip of hesse, 160 & _note_ on religious assassination, 325 _cited on_ cromwell's death, 217 memorandum of the powers, 183; on temporal power, 366 menabrea, circular of, on representation of vatican council, 509 mendoça, praise of those concerned in the massacre of st. bartholomew, 124 mentz, bishop of, belief in infallibility doctrine, 518 mérode, 414 metternich, prince, 283; attitude of, to nationality, 285 metz, bishop of, repudiation of döllinger's declaration, 538 mexico, nationality in, 245-46 meyer, paul, on the council of arles, 565 michelet, jules, flint compared to, 596 _cited_ on human action as interpreter of god's commands, 223 on machiavelli, 213 influence on döllinger, 433 döllinger's study of, 421 michiel, giovanni, venetian ambassador, 109; on premeditation of the massacre of st. bartholomew, 110 middle ages, authority of state inadequate in, 4 decline of religion in, 595 history of, reason for its unity, 244 political advances in, 39 persecution in, 152, 168 revival of study of, 390-91 _middle ages, the, a history of the_ _inquisition of_, by henry charles lea, review, 551 mignet, döllinger's praise of, 417 milan, archbishop of, on validity of vatican council's decrees, 549 mill, john stuart, indictment of democracy, 93 on results as tests of actions, 223 on states as coincident with nationalities, 285 milton, john, his justification of execution of charles i., 51 minerve, fate of albigenses at, 556 modena, 386 mohammedans, treatment of, by catholics, 169; by protestants, 179; their tolerance, 186 möhler, j.a., 593 influence on döllinger's views of fixity of national types, 434 publication of _symbolik_, 377 on the massacre of st. bartholomew, 149 suggested history of progress of doctrine of, 385 _cited_ on döllinger's rank as theologian, 379 _cited_ on intercourse with döllinger, 377 partiality as historian of religious wars, 428 rank of, 430 views of, compared to döllinger's, 378-9 _cited_ on luther, 378-9 möhler and döllinger in munich, views at variance, 377-380 molina, luis, 380 molinier, auguste, on a history of the inquisition, 551-2 rejection by, of arnaud's speech at béziers, 567 molino, francesco da, cited on the recall of the guises, 213 mommsen, theodor, cited on political expediency, 222 distinction of pupils of, 419 indifference of the public to, 430 monarchy- adulation manifested towards, after the middle ages, 48 danger of, 19, 20 and democracy, 64 limitation of powers, aim of modern constitutions, 19 resistance of, among israelites, justified in later ages, 4 restricted suffrage not always a safeguard of, 2 absolute- clergy upholders of, 41 development and destruction of, by the democracy in france, & _notes_, 279-80 france chief centre of, 48 one of the worst enemies of civil freedom, 300 monarchs, election and deposition of, divine right of people with respect to, 35 guelphic and ghibelline views respecting, 36, 37 subjection of, to public law, 35 mondoucet, french agent at brussels, charles ix.'s letter to, on the proposed massacre, 117 moneta, fra, successor of st. dominic, 553 monluc, bishop of valenca, dying speech of, its bitterness against huguenots, 141 on the effect of the huguenot massacres on poland, 120 view of, on st. bartholomew, 107 monroe, james, president, his term of office "the era of good feeling," 56 mons, fall of, 103; lewis of nassau at, 105 the garrison devoted to death by charles ix. and philip ii., 141-2 montaigne, michel de, view held by, on machiavelli's fame, 215 montalembert, count de, classed as ultramontane, 451 influence of, on döllinger, 400 intercourse unbroken, 463 unacknowledged agreement with döllinger, 316 and _kirche und kirchen_, views cited, 417; estimate of that work, 424 in munich, 398 opposition of, at vatican council, 524-5 politics of, 400 and the temporal power of the papacy, 412 montalto, cardinal, alleged dissent of from congratulation on the st. bartholomew, 140 montégut, influence on döllinger, 434 montesquieu, and his development of locke's teaching, 54 montezuma, and torquemada, resemblance between the gods of, 569 montferaud, sieur de, rumoured orders to, as to massacre of huguenots, 127 _note_ montfort and the albigenses, 556 montgomery and the massacre of st. bartholomew, 107, 122 montpensier, duke of, huguenot massacres ordered by, in brittany, 119 unguarded speech by, on coming massacre, 111 montpezat, lieutenant of guienne, and the bordeaux massacres, 127 morality, perverted ideas of, prevailing among classic sages, 18 public, how differing from private, 40 mordenti, _cited_ on machiavelli, as champion of conscience, 226 more, sir thomas, author of the utopia, 270 idea of renovating society on the principles of self-sacrifice, 58 _mores catholici_, digby's, 569 morinus _cited_, 194 basis of kliefoth's work in, 381 morley, john, on equity of history, 219 mornay, _see_ duplessis-mornay morris of exeter, and study of petavius, 380 morris, robert, an american, the suggester of the french wars of speculation and plunder, 578 _cited_ on hamilton as a leader, 582-3 morvilliers, bishop of orleans, attitude of, to the massacre of st. bartholomew, 126 mozley, james, visit of döllinger to, 403 muenscher, works of, esteemed by döllinger, 381 müller, 282 munich, archbishop of (reisach), brief from the pope to, denouncing frohschammer, 481-5 nominated as president of vatican council, 501; death of, before taking seat as, 534 munich, conference at, döllinger's declaration to, 312-13 döllinger at, 386; lectures in, 375 frohschammer's work in, 473 möhler with döllinger in, 377-80 school of theology at, 398-9, 434 municipal liberties, vigorous growth in belgium, 38 münster (westphalia), excesses of anabaptists at, 171 münzer, thomas, intolerance of, 171 muratori, döllinger's study of, 387 on evangelists, 419 papal biographies by, 559 and the massacre of st. bartholomew, 148 murder (_see also_ assassination, heretics, and persecution), on plea of religion, attitude to, of rome, 138, 139, 140, 147 muretus, 101; famous speech of, on the massacre of st. bartholomew, 130 muzio, the _decamerone_ recommended to students by, 215 in favour with pius v., 214-15 letter from, to henry iii. of france, urging unsparing extirpation of huguenots, 143 machiavelli denounced by, to the inquisition, 214-15 mylius, view of, on the massacre of st. bartholomew, 107 nantes, city, refusal of, to massacre huguenots, 119 edict of, revocation of, not approved by innocent xi., 147; inconsistency, 170; remarks on, 260 napoleon i., causes of his downfall, 281, 284 new power called into existence by, 281 question respecting the durability of his institutions, 238 _cited_ on importance of results, 221 _cited_ on quality of endurance in english nation, 66 napoleon iii., ambition of, 316 and discussion of infallibility doctrine at vatican council, 504 nassau, lewis of, at mons, french auxiliaries with, 105 national character, influence of, on events, units of, 557 claims, based on race only, futility of, an instance, 295 nationality, essay on, 270 auxiliary and substance of present-day revolution, 276 denial of, what it implies, 297 evolution of, three stages in, 284-5; and definition of, in its final form, 285 idea of, as influencing modern thought greater than that of liberty, 59 modern theory of, greatest advocate of rights of, 297 historical importance of, its two chief causes, 298, 299 how awakened in europe, 273, 275, 276; its parentage, 277, 286, 287; how first seen, 278, 281, 286 mission of, in the world, 300 more absurd and criminal than that of socialism, 300 political character and value of, discussed, 280 _et seq._ a retrograde step in history, 298 rights of, and greatest adversary of, 297 some of its first supporters, 281-2 a subversive theory, 273 summing up of, 287-8 political theory of, in contradiction with the historic nation, 243 the true, 294, 295 nations, different, in one state, considerations regarding, 289 _et seq._ naudé, basis of his apology for charles ix., 147 navarre, henry, king of, later henry iv., king of france, 44 marriage of, with margaret of valois, opposed by the popes, 105, 109, 111, 128; real facts regarding, 131-3; representations on, of charles ix. and his mother, 135; dissolution of, by paul v., 114 murder of, schemed as a good deed, 139 and the proposed league of protestant defence, 145 navarre, queen of (margaret of valois), death of, reckoned on in france, 109, and _see_ marriage, under navarre, henry, king of neander, rank of, 421 special gifts of, 555 unconventionally of, 384 nelson, 592 netherlands (_see also_ holland _and_ low countries), deposition of philip ii., and establishment of republic, 44 republic of, inaugurated reign of law through freedom of press, 50 nevers, duke of (lewis gonzaga), high station of, 128 share of, in the massacre of st. bartholomew, 110; his "ill-timed generosity" on this occasion, 122; praises of, by capilupi, 129 newman, john henry, cardinal, 573, 592, 593 distinction drawn between pope and court, 417 döllinger's early appreciation of, 395; intercourse with, 402 napoleon iii. not condemned by, 413 theory of development different from döllinger's, 407-8 _cited_ on papal authority, 423 nicholas i., 431 niebuhr, 581; association of his conservatism with revolutionary ideas of mazzini, 59 döllinger's gratitude to, 393 nimes, bishop of, on infallibility, 515; opposed to discussion of, 501 nimes (city), no huguenot massacres at, 143 nippold, rank of döllinger estimated by, 386 nourrison cited on machiavelli's sincerity, 227 nugent, count, proclamation by, on italian independence, 285 nuremberg, anabaptists at, 157 octavius, opposition of gracchus to, 76 odescalchi, character of, 433 oecolampadius, joannes, opinions of, on church government, 176-7 ollivier, opposition of, to french lay representation in vatican council, 504 orange, prince of (william the silent), 44 alliance made with, by charles ix., 105 declaration for (1572), of province of holland, 103 huguenot expedition to aid, failure of results, 116, 141 not alienated by charles ix.'s huguenot massacres, 120 _origines de la france contemporaine_, 569 orleans, bishop of, attitude of, to papal infallibility, 228, 316, 515, 523, 524 at council of bishops, 1867., 500 patriotism of (1862), 445 permission refused to, for publication of reply to the archbishop of mechlin, 537 promotion of vatican council by, 493 unacknowledged agreement with döllinger, 316 on validity of vatican council's decrees, 549 orleans, city of, horrors of huguenot massacre at, 124 orleans dynasty, result of appeal from, in 1848., 590 orsi, döllinger's tribute to, 387 orsini, cardinal, legatine mission of, to france, his instructions, 137; charles ix.'s representations to him, 138 oscott, wiseman's work as president of, 438 osiander, andreas, _cited_ on toleration, 157 ossat, d' 114 & _note_ overbeck, on epistle to diognetus, 420 oxford movement, döllinger told of, by brewer. 402 wiseman's influence on, 438 paderborn, bishop of, on infallibility of pope, 518 paine, thomas, 585; citation of, from _rights of man_, on the confusion of political forms with political liberty, 238 pallavicini, theiner on, 431 panhellenism, 284 panigarola, panegyric by, on charles ix., 125 panslavism, rise of, 284 papacy, the, acknowledgment of small principalities of italy, 355 based on organic development, 321-4 and the byzantine empire, 353 extraordinary notions of godwin smith on the, 267 future of, 367-70 government of, reform in, 363-5 reform of, attempted by pius ix., döllinger on, 365 removal to france, a challenge to schism, 370 temporal power of, _see_ temporal power papal legations rescued from austria at the congress of vienna, 283 see, confusion between direct and indirect authority of, 256 struggle with the franciscans, 552 papinian, _cited_ on political progress, 79 paramo, 428 paris, attitude hostile to the huguenots, 116, 117 attitude after the murder of coligny and massacre of st. bartholomew in, 106, 126, _and see both heads_ france governed by, during revolution of 1789, 88 mendoça's praise of its catholic inhabitants, 124 archbishop of, cardinals hat refused for, by pius ix., 526 career of, 526 character of, 326 french representation on vatican council urged by, 505 on papal infallibility, 532 on validity of vatican council's decrees, 549 university of, and the inquisition, 570 paris, matthew, lea's authorities on, 558 parliamentary corruption in america, past and present, 578 government, primitive republicanism the germ of, 32 parma, centre of historical work, 387 (1862) nationality in, 292 partition of poland, _see under_ poland pascal, blaise, advocate of passive obedience to kings, 48 _cited_ on varying standards of right and wrong, 220 passaglia, fame of, 413 on papal liberty, 313 reputation of, 502 passive obedience to the state, doctrine upheld by theologians and philosophers, 47, 48 taught by luther, 156, 161, 180; asserted by calvin, 180-81 _patrie_, french newspaper, criticism by, of wiseman's address at rome, 439, 443, 444, 445; his reply, 439 paul, father, 432 paul iii., pope (cardinal farnese), hatred of the medici family, 214; letter from sadolet, praising the extermination of the vaudois, 217 paul v., pope (borghese), aware of premeditated huguenot massacre, 114 peace of st. germains, as affecting french huguenots, 105; alarmist views on, held by salvati, 110 peasants' war, the, in germany, attitude of luther towards, 155, 156 & _note_, 162 pegna, arragonese origin of, 558, 560 character of works of, 428 pellevé, cardinal, archbishop of sens, on the premeditation of a massacre of huguenots, 111 peloponnesian war, influence of, on athens, 69 penn, william, 410; follower of doctrine of toleration, 84 pennaforte, home of st. raymond, 556 pennsylvania, democratic constitution of, 84 people, _see also_ democracy _and_ will of the people sovereignty of, idea of parent of idea of nationality, 277 wishes, etc., of, as criterion of right, teaching on, of the french revolution as to, 271 percin, authority on the inquisition, 554 german ignorance of, 428 peresius, on bible inspiration, 514 perez, antonio, accusation by, of philip ii. of spain, 104 pericles and democracy, 9, 68 effort to prevent predominance of any particular interest in politics, 10 perronne, on biblical critics, 514 on commission of preparation for vatican council, 500 hostility to passaglia, 413 rank of, 417 persecution, attitude to, of marsilius, 562 by catholics, principles of, 168-170, 186 by heathen rome, justified on political grounds, 186 mediæval, justification of, 254 method of escaping from imposition of religious disabilities, 250 natural stage in the progress of society, 250 protestant theory of, 150; the book by h.c. lea, review, inadequate as history of, 574 reasons for and against, as a political principle, 252 some noted supporters of, 570 spain and sweden contrasted, 170 two propositions regarding, 572-3 persian wars, influence of, 67 persians, makers of history, 240 petavius (s.j.) and the idea of development in religion, 591, 592 döllinger's early study of, 379 döllinger's gratitude to, 393 morris of exeter advised to read, 380 peter martyr, death of servetus approved by, 185 petrucci, communications of, forecasting the massacre of st. bartholomew, 109 mysticism of, 376 philip ii., king of spain, aid of, essential to crush french huguenots, 104 the st. bartholomew massacre urged by, 116-17 orders from, for slaughter of alva's huguenot prisoners, 142 revolt against, of the netherlands, 44 philo of alexandria, lucius's attacks on, 420 on customs of the essenes, 26 philosophers, doctrine of passive obedience, upheld by, 48 schemes of, for ideal societies, why never realised, 270-71 piatti, apologist of the massacre of st. bartholomew, 148 piedmontese government and the papacy, 368-9 pilgrim fathers, belief of, not influencing the american revolution, 584-5 pistoja, on treatment of heretics in rome under pius v., 138 pitra, influence of, in france, 404 pius iv., pope, bull _multiplices inter_, published by, 520-25 pius v., pope, blessing given by, to war against huguenots, 141 denunciatory letter from, to court of france, 110 patron of muzio, 214-15 previous information of the massacre of st. bartholomew supplied to, 130-31 strong anti-protestant views of, 138-9 on the peace of st. germains, 105 pius vii., pope, destruction of church of france by, 323 influence on döllinger, 402 _cited_ on papal authority, 323 pius ix., pope, alarm of dissenting bishops allayed by, 519 archbishop of paris rebuked by, 526 brief of, to the archbishop of munich, censuring frohschammer, 481-5 character of, described by döllinger, 365-6 confidence in the support of the bishops at the discussion of papal infallibility, 523-4 on döllinger's _kirche und kirchen_, 415 on the infallibility of the pope, 496 personal popularity of, 497 quarrel with russia, 493 reform of excommunication laws, 531 treatment of döllinger, 411 vatican council convened and prepared for by, 492-511 obstinacy in management of vatican council, 532 reforms of, 402 refusal of permission to theiner to publish acts of council of trent, 431 and vatican council, döllinger's estimate of, 431 veneration of, spell broken by protesting bishops, 531 planck, möhler's address to, 378 plantagenet, house of, claims backed by rome against house of bruce, 35 plantier, authority on louis philippe, 402 platen, diaries of, description of döllinger's early studies in, 375 plato, _laws_, 22 on class interests, 69, 71 opinions of, 71 not without perverted notions of morality, 18 _republic_ of, 270 plebeians, roman, struggle with aristocracy, 13, 14 plotinus, ideal society of, 270 plutarch, religious knowledge of, 406 poland, 105; anjou as candidate for throne of, 105; prospects of, after the massacre of st. bartholomew, 144 an exception to common law of dynastic states, 274; and why, 275; the consequence, the partition, 275 extinction of, 283 government of, and the reformation, 43 partition of, awakening theory of nationality in europe, 275 religious toleration in sixteenth century, 103 republic of, nature, 49 socinians in, beza's hostility to, 146 wrath in, at the huguenot massacres, 120 pole, cardinal, _il principe_ brought to notice of, 214 _cited_ on political scruples, 219 polish exiles, why always champions of national movements, 286 protestants, strength and unity of, 103 revolution, causes united in, 284 political corruption, hamilton's paradox on, 581 disorders, distribution supersedes concentration of power as remedy against, under solon, 7 equality at athens, 68 forms, confusion with popular rights, 238 freedom inherently absent in france, 237-40 habits and ideas special to particular nations, varying in the national history, 297 intelligence, not culture, the test of a conquering race, 242 liberty in modern times the fruit of self-government, 253 life a sign of true patriotism, 293 opposition to vatican council, absence of, 511 power should be in proportion to public service, 8 observance of this principle at athens, 8 principles, obligation of, essentials for understanding, 458 science, america's rank in, its exponents, 578 theory of nationality in contradiction with the historic notion, 243 thoughts on the church, 188 politics, attitude to, of the best americans, 578 conscience in, expedient elasticity of, 212-14 contemporary, döllinger's part in, 400-403 honesty in, approved by great men, 219-23; not always expedient, 219-21; opinions of pope clement, 214; machiavelli, 212; michelet, 213; molino, 213; sarpi, 213; soto, 213 laws of, rest on experience, 391 liberty highest end of, 22, 23, 24 machiavellian, tribute to, 219 principles of, high teaching regarding, in plato's _laws_ and aristotle's _polities_, 22 retribution in, 220-23 science of, impartial study, unknown in seventeenth century, 43-46; impartial study originated by grotius, 46 politics and science, authority of, now re-established, extent of, 453; discoveries and principles of, how generally judged, 454 polygamy, attitude of reformers to, 159, 160 pontiac, price on head of, 213 pope, the, and the court, lamennais's distinction between, 464-5 intervention of, between state and sovereign, 257 popes, the (medicean), unofficial countenance of machiavelli, 214 popular rights, confusion of political forms with, 238 population, masses of, not benefited by liberty of subject, 94 relief of, aim of modern democracy, 95 porrette, marguerite, 558, 568 portugal, lay representative of, on vatican council, 507 postel, 382 potomac, army of, 579 praetorius, 432 presbyterianism, democratic element in, 81, 82 döllinger's sketch of, 336-7 prescott, w., 569 press, freedom of, in netherlands republic inaugurated reign of law, 50 principles, false, place of, in social life of nations, 272 political, obligation of, essentials for understanding, 458 touchstone and watershed of, 454 principles and interests, relative importance of, 449 priscillian, fate of, lea's view on, 572 property, liberty and connection between, 54 protagoras _cited_, 70 protestant authorities, use made of, by the ultramontanes, 451-2 church government, agitation for reform in prussia, 347 establishment, its views on government, 260 reformers, _see_ reformers "protestant theory, the, of persecution," 150, & _see_ 254, 255, 576 involved in luther's teaching, 164 developed by melanchthon, 164 _et seq._ carried to an extreme by the anabaptists, 172 carried out by calvin, 178; and defended by beza, 183 continued in massachusetts, 187 characteristics of, 168-70 failure of, 187 zwinglian varieties of, 174 _et seq._ protestantism, aversion of, to freedom, 240 and the civil power, 150, 159, 161, 181 decline of, in northern europe, döllinger's description of, 342-51 döllinger's survey of, 302-303 final acceptance by, of toleration, 187 friendly feeling of döllinger towards, 396-7 growth of, 325-52 and the later mediæval sects, essential difference between, 271 never successful in france, 595 toleration as, cause and effect of its decline, 255 protestants, the, _see also_ huguenots and lutherans as cats' paws of france against spain, 105-16 ordinance of louis xiv. against, and their action, 50 position and apparent prospects of (1572), 102 english, unanimity amongst, 189 polish, unity and strength among, 103 provincial massacres of huguenots, 105 prussia, nationality shown in the opposition to napoleon i., 281 prynne, on study of records, 393 pufendorf, expositor of grotius' doctrines, 46 purgatory, release from (_see_ indulgences), obtainable from the pope, belief in, 495 puritans in america, intolerance of, 187 pusey, dr., döllinger's letters to, 395-6 in favour of vatican council, 493 puygaillard, mission of, to ensure provincial massacres of huguenots, 118 _note_, 119 pythagoras, an advocate of government by aristocracy, 21 quetelet, 589 quicherat and other authorities on joan of arc, 558 quinet, cause to which he attributes the breakdown of the french revolution, 595 radowitz, döllinger's debt to, 402 potential liberality of, 414 _rambler, the_, 447 rambouillet, french ambassador at rome, 136 ranke, leopold von, calm indifference of historical deductions of, 390 estimate of macaulay by, 391 old age of, friendship with döllinger, 396 style of, admiration of döllinger for, 393 _cited_ on judgment of time, 221; on luther's conservatism, 161; on machiavelli's merits, 228 rattazzi, impoverishing policy of, 509 raumer, source of historical work of, 386 rauscher, cardinal, opponent of papal infallibility, 532, 533, 535, 544 ravignan, 400 raymundus, döllinger's opinion of works of, 382 raynaud, account of machiavelli's death, 215 rebellion punished by death by the church in the middle ages, 216-19 reformation, the, discredited by the peasants' war, 155 döllinger on, 393-7 early character of, 153 effect of, on governments, 41, 42, 43 reformers, protestant, attitude of, to polygamy, 159, 160 common origin of their views on state policy, 150-51 intolerance of, exemplified, 184 saxon and swiss, reason of their political differences, 173, 177 on the treatment of heresy, 183 views of, on church and state, 181 writings of, 150 regicide (_see also_ assassination _and_ murder) urged by mediæval church to remove tyrants, 217-18 reid, 593 reisach, cardinal, _see_ munich, archbishop of religion in relation to the american government, 584-5 decay in belief of, among greeks, 8 development of, attitude to, of bossuet, 591 how it influences state policy, 150 principles of, non-sectarian study of, unknown in seventeenth century, 45-46 reconcilable to liberty, dispute on, 467-9 toleration in, early advocates of, 52 turned into engine of despotism after reformation, 44 true, definition of, 197 differentiation of, from false, standards for, 449 religions, multiplicity of, danger from, limited, 250 suppression of, due to danger from doctrine in pagan and mediæval times, 251; only necessary when practice of, dangerous to state, 251 religious crime, civil jurisdiction over, beza's views, 146 disabilities, danger of, greater than multiplicity of religions, 250 in ireland made an engine of political oppression, 253 intelligence and zeal, office of, 460 liberty, defined, 151-2 effect on, of state control, 151-3 incompatibility of, with unity frequent, 252 in maryland, 187 and political emancipation, connection of, not accidental, 292 persecution and slavery, 64 toleration, _see_ toleration renan, ernest, commendation by, of dishonesty in politics, 225 rank of, as writer in france, 417 renouvier, flint's agreement with, 594-5 representation separability from taxation, origin of this principle in middle ages, 39 in america, restrictions on, 579 representative assemblies, methods of strengthening, 97 government, earliest proclamation and enactment of, 26 not discussed in classical literature, 25, 26 origin of, in middle ages, 39 republic, french (the first), its title and what it signified, 277 republic of 1848 (france), of what school the triumph, 590 republican views of zwingli and calvin, 42 republicanism of athens, 68 primitive, germ of parliamentary government, 32 true, defined, 277 republics, government by, good opinion of louis philippe as to, 56, 90 of poland and venice, contrast between, 49 resistance, doctrine of, 54 law of, as manifested in the american revolution, 586 restoration, french (under louis xviii.), effects of, on nationality, 282 the true, that of 1688., 580 rettberg, 420 retz, cardinal de, opposed to, yet ignorant of, machiavelli's doctrines, 218 _cited_ on political adaptability, 219 revocation of the edict of nantes, an inconsistency, 170; not approved by innocent xi., 147; remarks on, 266 revolution, identity of, and difference from, passive obedience, 162 one of the worst enemies of civil freedom, 300 its most powerful auxiliary, present day, 276 protestantism favourable to, 181 american- not inspired by the belief of the pilgrim fathers, 584-5 nothing of, in common with the french, 580 spirit of, 580, 587 supreme manifestation of the law of resistance, 586 of 1848, double debt to, of nationality, 287 the french- abolition by, of traces of national history, 278 the (1789), causes leading up to, 85, 86, 87 change produced by, how effected, 271; consequences, 272 characteristics peculiar to, roots far back in history, 280 denounced by burke, 219 doctrines of, adversary of the old despotic policy, 276 essential difference between it and others, 271 injured by its religious policy, 86 ethnological character of, 277, 278 nothing in it in common with the american revolution, 580 revival of a conquered race, 241 no constructive idea given rise to by it, 241 substance of its ideas, 280 theory of equality disastrous to liberty, 88 of 1688, "divine right of freeholders" established by, 54 principles of, anticipated, 179 statesmen of, represented as ancestors of modern liberty, 53 revolutionary leaders of 1789, ideas of, contrary to idea of nationality, 281 revolutions, three phases of those subsequent to the congress of vienna, 284-5 rhode island, state of, rise of, 187 richelieu, cardinal, historical insight of, 409 method of dealing with protestants, its effect, 116 on subjection of nation, 48 _cited_ on historical deductions based on success, 221 riehl, on abstract ideas and their power, 585 rimini, 559 rio, 432; _cited_ on döllinger as a theologian, 399 ritschl, 389 robespierre, fate of, 401 terrorism of, causes of production of, 262 robinson _cited_ on progressive revelation, 592 rochelle, la, siege of, 113 _note_, 115, 118 roman conquest of europe and its consequences, 277 _et seq._ romans, as makers of history, 240 persecution of christians by, reasons for, 196, 198 rome, _see also_ church, the conflicts with, 461-91 attitude at, towards döllinger, 410-14 and the church at variance, 516-17 popularity of machiavelli in, 214 statesmen of, permeation of, with greek ideas, 16 court of, reformation demanded by strossmayer, 536 religious power of, as the preservation of civilised europe, lea's view, 568 and the massacre of st. bartholomew, its complicity (believed in), 128, 131; reception at, of the news of, 132, 134, 135 result of vatican council, scorn of opposition, 544 ties of english catholics with, tightened by wiseman, 438 wiseman's address at, criticised by _the patrie_, 439; his reply and rebuttal of "covert insinuations" in _the home and foreign review_, 439-40; reply of that publication, 440; statement of facts concerning the address, 444 emperors of, above legal restraint, 78, 79 pleasure of, force of law possessed by, 31 empire of, creation of the roman people, not by usurpation, 77, 78 better services rendered by, to cause of liberty than by the republic, 15 seat of, transferred from rome to constantinople, 30 heathen, persecution by, how justified, 186 republic of, conversion into monarchy by julius cæsar, 15 influenced by precept and example, 13, 14 ruined by its own vices, 74 roscher, intercourse of, with döllinger, 403 rosmini, 381; disciples of, 314 döllinger's pupils sent to, 381 erudition of, 400 rossi, de, 431; döllinger's guide in rome, 411 on epistles of st. ignatius, 419 friendship with cardinal reisach, 501 rouen, clergy of, desirous of huguenot extirpation, 142 reluctance of carouge to allow huguenot massacre at, 119 rousseau, jean jacques, cause of his power as a political writer, 84 definition of the social compact, 57 effects of his teaching on marat, 57, 58 proclaimer of equality, 273 vindication of natural society by, 263 on true sense of country, 294 royalism, execution of charles i., a triumph for, 51 royalty exalted into a religion (_see also_ divine right of kings _and_ passive obedience), 47 ruinart, credulous criticism of, 420 rümelin, 589; on political expediency, 222 russia, and its adoption of greek church, 333-4 attitude of, to vatican council, 508 quarrel of, with pius ix., 493 russian nationality attacked by napoleon i., 281 saccarelli, döllinger's tribute to, 387 "sacerdotal celibacy," 561; and the _droit du seigneur_, 566 sacred college, the, attitude of, on the st. bartholomew, 140 salviati's eminence at, 110 sadolet, paul, _cited_, on massacre of vaudois of provence, 217 sailer, 402 st. augustine, _cited_, 197; in praise of seneca, 25 st. bartholomew, the massacre of (_see_ massacre of st, bartholomew), 44, 101; not a crime of the people, 43 st. bernard, 434 st. brieuc, agreement with gratry's views, 537 st. cyprian, intolerance a rule of life from the days of, lea's view, 562 st. dominic as the first inquisitor, 553; so entitled by sixtus v. 558 attitude of, to heretics, 428, 554 house of, at toulouse, headquarters of the inquisition, 552 st. elizabeth of hungary, strange choice by, of a confessor, 570 st. francis of assisi, lea's view of, 569 st. germains, peace of, advantages of, to french huguenots, 105; alarmist views on, of salviati, 110 st. irenaeus, language of, which might be taken as arian, 592 st. louis, archbishop of, on the immaculate conception, 545 on papal infallibility, 533, 545; his protest against the doctrine, 499 st. martin, mysticism of, 376; study of, by de maistre, 377 st. pölten, bishop of (fessler), and the proposed discussion of papal infallibility at vatican council, 500-501, 513 reform urged by, 495 secretary of vatican council, 501 st. raymond and the inquisition, 556-7 st. sulpice, catechism of, lea's deductions from, 570 opposition of, to lamennais's ultramontanism, 463 st. thomas aquinas, later exponent of plato's _politics_, 72 _cited_ on the relation of kings to the people, 36, 37 sainte beuve, c.a., _cited_ on political fatalism, 221 ste. hilaire, barthélemy, _cited_ on machiavelli's politics, 219 salvianus on social virtues of pagans, 33 salviati, despatches of, on the massacre of st. bartholomew, 132, 133; as utilised by acton, and his predecessors, 102 on the "spirit of a christian," as shown by charles ix. at the massacre of st. bartholomew, 122 on the true reason for the navarre marriage, 135 samarra, the, 569 san callisto, döllinger's visit to, 411 san germano, treaty of, 555 san marino, 386 santa croce, nuncio, information derived from, on the massacre of st. bartholomew, 102; on the plans framed at bayonne against huguenots, 108 & _note_, 108-9 alleged report by, on the intended huguenot massacre, 131-2 sarpi, paolo, _cited_ on political honesty, 213 savigny, 380; influence of, on döllinger, 376 leading doctrines of, 594 source of historical works of, 386 savonarola, girolamo, 556 savoy, motto of its abortive rising in 1834., 286 not surprised by the massacre of st. bartholomew, 109 duke of, and the marriage of coligny, 110 say, j.b., _cited_ on political virtues, 219 schelling, 403 estrangement of, from döllinger, 381 mythology of, 405 _cited_ on collective thought, 585-6 scherer, edmond, _cited_ on progress, 221 schlegel, h.w.f. von, classed as ultramontane, 451 studied by döllinger, 375 schleiermacher, f.e.d., döllinger on, 375 schmalkald, confession of, on excommunication, 158 schomberg on charles ix. and the provincial massacres, 120 schopenhauer, metaphysics of, döllinger's love for, 381 schottmüller, 421, 574; conclusions of, on the trial of the templars, 563 schrader, clement, reputation of, 502 on commission of preparation for vatican council, 500 schwarzenberg, cardinal, manager of german elections to commission on dogma, 529, 532 cardinal, opposition of, at vatican council, 525-6 on papal infallibility, 544 schwenkfeld, kaspar von, his doctrines condemned by melanchthon, 167 science, demands of, on its students, 453 liberty of, in the church, 461-91 liberty in, questioned through frohschammer's excommunication, 477 power of, to act upon religion, not foreseen in 1679., 595 science and religion, reconciliation of, 462; denied by frohschammer, 462; accepted by lamennais, 462-3 science, truth essential in, 449 german, great services to intellectual liberty, 469 religious, definition of, 389 scientific truth, certainty of essentials for understanding, 458 sclopis, count, on character of machiavelli, 226 scotland, döllinger on presbyterianism of, 337 triumph of reformation in, over the state, 43 scott, hope, consulted by döllinger, 395 sega, bishop of piacenza and nuncio, attitude of, to murder for the glory of god, 139 self-government, faculty of, opposed to tradition of antiquity, 31 in a great democracy, how alone preservable, 277; that kind of, which constitutes true republicanism, 277 modern political liberty the result of, 253 self-sacrifice, renovation of society on principles of, 58 seneca, his elevated sentiments praised by st. augustine, 25 religious knowledge of, 406 views of, 73 sermoneta, 131 servetus, michael, 430; his condemnation approved by melanchthon, 167; and by other reformers, 175, 184-5; defended by calvin, 181-2; but not politically justified, 184-5 seward, w.h., on the rights sought by the revolting americans, 587 praise by, of hamilton's statesmanship, 581 shakespeare, study of, döllinger's motive for, 432 sherman, general, 579 sicily, the inquisition in, 1224., 553-4 sickel, 422 sidney, algernon, character of, 53 slight knowledge of machiavelli's works, 218 sieyès, 277; council suggested by, 96 doctrine of, 57 sigismund, king of poland, beza's advice to, on socinianism, 146 sigonius, döllinger's gratitude to, 393 simancas, annotations of, on campeggio's commentary, 559-60 simpson, 432 sixtine chapel, vasari's paintings in, illustrative of the massacre of st. bartholomew, 135 sixtus v., pope, attitude of, to the murder of the guises, 121-2 döllinger's estimate of, 424 st. dominic entitled by, the first inquisitor, 558 a strong pope, 138 slavery and democracy, 63 slavery, general extinction of, in europe in middle ages, 39 principle of, implicit opposition of stoics to, 25, 26 and practice of, rejected by essenes, 26 slavonic races, 245 stationary national character of, 241 smith, adam, doctrine of, 57 known in france, 219 smith, goldwin, on the catholic church in ireland, 259 on history, success only attribute acknowledged by, 223 smith, sir thomas, on english attitude to the french, after the huguenot massacres, 144 & _note_ socialism, baneful alliance of, with democracy, 92, 93, 98 and slavery, 63 societies, epicurean notion that they are founded on contract for mutual protection, 18 society and government, association and correspondence of, 265 society of jesus (_see also_ jesuits), arragonese influence in its constitution, 557 socinians, reason of their persecution, 169 socinus, partial advocate of toleration, 52 socrates, 406; on democracy, 71 death of, crowning act of guilt of athenian government, 12 method of, essentially democratic, 71 records of, 409 view of, on laws of country as sole guide of conduct, 18 solon, decentralisation of power advised by, to remedy social disorders, 7 doctrine of, that political power should be commensurate with public service, 8 influence of, on democracy, 66, 68 revision of laws of athens by, 6 good results of his forethought in providing for revision of athenian constitution, 7, 8 sophists, doctrine of, 70 their ideas of utilitarianism, 17 sorbin, confessor of charles ix., and the orleans massacres, 126; his account of the death of charles ix., 126-7 & _note_ on premeditation of the massacre of st. bartholomew, 112 soto, on political conscience, 216 _cited_ on assassination as a political resource, 213 spain (_see also_ cadiz constitution), abortive monarchy of (1812), 89 absolute monarchy in, due to appropriation of tribunal of inquisition, 41 designs against, of charles ix., utilisation in, of the protestants, 105, 116 effect on, of the massacre of st. bartholomew, 124, 143 and the inquisition, 152 montalembert's journey to, 425 national character of rejection of french forces and ideas, 281 parliamentary system of, origin, 34 reasons for persecution in, 170 and representation on vatican council, 507 view in, of the planned character of the massacre of st. bartholomew, 124 spinoza, advocate of passive obedience to the state, 48 interpreter of machiavelli, 228 spirit of the american revolution, what it was, 587; what it was not, 584-5 spondanus, bishop, on gregory xiii., reasons for permitting the navarre marriage, 128 stahl, j., 589; injustice of döllinger to, 391 stahr, a., _cited_ on historical deductions, 221 stanley, dean, considered vatican council important to all denominations, 493 state, the (_see also_ church and state), authority of, excessive in ancient times, insufficient in middle ages, 4 free constitution of, free action of church a test of, 246 limitations of its duties, 3 and religious liberty, 151-3 sole authority according to modern theory, 151 sole care of the absolutists, eighteenth century, 273 state church, its connection with the community, 260 of ireland, goldwin smith on, 259 states, boundaries of, as coincident with nationalities, j.s. mill on, 285 classic, taking from citizens more than they gave them. 17; vice of, 16 small, drawbacks of, 295 states-general, the, and the inquisition, 570 stein, 282 stenzel, g.a.h., _cited_ on political expediency, 222 stephen, leslie, _cited_ on philosophy of history based on truth, 223 stewart, dugald, praise of machiavelli, 224 stoics, their emancipation of mankind from subjugation to despotic rule, 24 their implied opposition to principle of slavery, 25, 26 their teaching nearest approach to that of christianity, 24, 25 views of, 73 stolberg, classed as ultramontane, 451 story, on tocqueville's views of the american constitution, 576 _cited_ on _the federalist_, 581 strappado, the, 569 strasburg, senate of, reluctance of, to act harshly to catholics, 172 _stratagemma, lo, di carlo ix._, and its author, 129 strossmayer, bishop (upon turkish frontier), 548; absence of, from vote on decree (involving acceptance of infallibility), 543 demand for reform made by, 536 opposition of, at vatican council, 522 protest of, to vatican council altered before presentation, harmony restored by, 542 on authority of vatican council, 541 on the dogmatic decree, 527, 533 on ungenerous treatment of protestants, 541 strozza, philip, 113 _note_ stuart, house of, misrule of, only temporarily foiled under cromwell, 50 upholders of supremacy of kingship over people, 47 suarez, revision of ms. of, in rome, 428 suffrage, limitations of, effects of, 96 restricted, not always a safeguard of monarchy, 2 universal, of what school the triumph, 590 sunderland, 410 sura, bishop of, 519 sweden, bishops of, and political assassinations, 217 religion in, döllinger on, 341-2 working of protestant theory of persecution in, 170 swift, jonathan, 409 swiss, the, true nationality of, 294-5 constitution (1874), significant work of modern democracy, 91 reformers, unlikenesses of, to the saxons, 173 switzerland, _see_ historical philosophy in france and french belgium and calvinism in, döllinger on, 338-9 cantons of, influence in days preceding french revolution, 50 progress and success of democracy in, 91 and the massacre of st. bartholomew, 120, 124-5 sybel, h. von, historical style of, 384 _cited_ on historical deduction, 221 sylla, invested with dangerous powers, 77 syllabus, the archbishop of paris led by, to urge moderation, 526 the, designed to restore authority to the church, 492 opinions of pius ix. collected in, 496-8 opposition controlled by, 524 prince hohenlohe opposed to discussing state maxims of, at vatican council, 503-4 symmachus, _cited_, 196 synods, acts of, alleged tampering with, as affecting doctrine of infallibility, 499 tacitus, confession of, respecting mixed constitutions, 20 taine, henri, döllinger's ambiguous praise of, 417 influence of, on döllinger, 434 talleyrand de perigord, charles maurice, 100 signs of sympathy with idea of nationality shown by, 282-3 _cited_ on hamilton, 581 tapparelli, classed as ultramontane, 451 taxation of american colonists, opposition of lords chatham and camden to, 55 exemption of clergy from, 34 inseparable from representation, origin of this principle in middle ages, 39 taylor, sir henry, on necessity for political subtlety, 219 téligny and the massacre of st. bartholomew, 107 tempesti on catherine de' medici and the massacre of st-bartholomew, 148 templars, döllinger's lecture on, 433 trial of, lea's conclusions on, 552, 563 temporal power of the papacy, 312-13, 352-62, 367-71, 412-16, 422-5 antagonism to, 315-16 döllinger on, 301-74 terror, the, _see_ reign of terror tertullian, language of, which might be taken as arian, 592 teutonic races, missionaries the channel of conversion to christianity, 245 union political more than religious, 244 state and the church, quarrel between, cause of revival of democracy, 80 tribes, christianity readily accepted by, 199 theiner, a., early views of, superseded, 429 _life of clement the fourteenth_, by, 411 permission to publish acts of council of trent, refused to, by the pope, 431 skill of, as editor, 421 as source of information on the massacre of st. bartholomew, 102 views of, on jesuits not in agreement with döllinger, 411-12 theognis on domination of oligarchies, 6 theology in germany, unique and scientific, 317, 347-51, 376, 471-82 schools of, at munich, 375, and tübingen, 376 theramenes as statesman, 70 thiers, adolphe, opinion of machiavelli's works, 227 thou, de, and the charge against the bordeaux clergy, 127 _note_ on the navarre marriage, 128 reproached for condemning huguenot massacres, 147 thucydides on reformed government at athens, 12 tocqueville, 400; indictment brought by, against democracy, 93 influence of, on döllinger's politics, 414 on the inspiration of the american revolution, 584 on the need for two chambers in a senate, 575-6 _cited_ on the american federal constitution, 576 on democracy and absolute government, 239 toledo, councils of, framework of parliamentary system of spain, 34 toleration, advocacy of, by william penn, 84 of anabaptists, varying views of reformers on, 157, 164, 176 anonymous tract on, against calvin, 182 calvinism a danger to, 180 cause and effect of decline of protestantism, 255 early attitude of reformers towards, 153-55, 168 in the early church, 186 edict of, deceitful, of charles ix., 117 maryland an example of, 187 as a political principle, reasons for and against, 252 religious, in poland, 103 forced upon protestantism, 187 protestant theory of, 151 and religious liberty, 152 traditional, attitude to, of lea, 562 views of beza on, 146 tommasini, praise of machiavelli, 226 torquemada, 569 tosti, on papal liberty, 313 on temporal power, 412 toulouse, and the albigenses, 556 count of, and the council of arles, 565 treitschke, _cited_ on political morality, 222 trent commissioners and prohibited works, 215 trent, council of, 111, 175 intolerance of, reformed by vatican council, 493-4 spirit of, 138 treviso (province), story of, 387 tridentine reformation, _see_ trent, council of tronchin, on voltaire's death, 215 tübingen, heresies of, 381 school of positive theology at, 376, 377 turgot, attempted reforms of, 85 _cited_ on political expediency, 220 views of, on single or double form of legislature, 576 turin, court of, policy of, 445 turks, charles ix.'s pourparlers with, 104 twesten, _cited_ in support of machiavelli's policy, 229 tyrol, movement in, against napoleonic institutions, a national one, 281 ultramontane school, eminent writers of, two peculiarities of, 451 supersession of, 452 ultramontanism, _see also_ döllinger extreme, considered to be keystone of the church, by lamennais, 462-3 united states, _see_ america unity, aimed at, by english catholics, 438 change of constitution effected by, in italy and germany, 225 of faith in france, enforcement of, aim of the court, 117 liberty sacrificed to, by machiavelli, 229 in relation to nationality, 287, 289 and religious liberty, incompatibility of, frequent, 252 necessity for, in church and state, 252 religious, in relation to religious freedom, 152 universal suffrage, of what school the triumph, 590 university of paris and the inquisition, 570 ussher, archbishop, advocate of passive obedience to kings, 47 utilitarianism in classical ages, 17 utrecht psalter, story of, 551 vaissète, 565 valois, margaret of, _see_ navarre, queen of vasari, paintings by, in the sixtine chapel, of the massacre of st. bartholomew, 135 vatican council, 431, 492-550 constitution of, 501-11 convened by pius ix., 492; approbation of pius ix.'s action in convening, 492-511 decree of, dissatisfaction with, 531 discussion on validity of dicta of, 548 infallibility, doctrine of, its victory over opposition, 543 letter from german bishops to, on doctrinal points, 517 methods of, reformed to involve admission of papal infallibility, 539 opening of, 511 opposition at, 492-511, 525-9 preparations for, 492-511 proceedings of, 527-50 programme of, discussed in _the reform of the church in its head and members_, 494-6 representation on:- by belgium, 507 by england, 506 by france, 504 by germany, 505 by italy, 508 by portugal, 507 by spain, 507 strossmayer prevented by, from protesting, 541 _vaticinia pontificum_, lea's knowledge of, 560 vauban, marshal, 48 vaudois, the, of provence, extermination of, by louis xii., 217 vavasour, sir edward, acquaintance of, with döllinger, 388 venice, extinction of, as state, 283 not surprised by the massacre of st. bartholomew, 109; the event celebrated at, 125 and political murders, 213, 214 withdrawal of, from the league, 105, 107 republic of, nature, 49 vergennes, _cited_ on political judgment, 227 vergniaud, on the laws in relation to the will of the people, 276 verona, centre of historical work, 387 vespucci, 562 veuillot, louis, döllinger on, 428 and the _droit du seigneur_, 566 montalembert, _cited_ on, 428 vico, 590 vienna, congress of, dynastic interests predominant at, 282-3 effects of, on ideas of nationality, 283 vienne, inquisition at, and servetus, 184 villari, admiration of machiavelli, 226 vinet, 591 virginia and maryland, 187 visconti family, models for machiavelli, 212 _vitae paparum avenionensium_, utilised by lea and others, 559 vives, toleration taught by, 570 voltaire, profane criticism of, 218 waldenses, analogy of arnold of brescia with, 559 why they opposed persecution, 563 waldus, 558 walpole, horace, _cited_ on political scruples, 219 walsingham, english ambassador in france, his reports on the massacre of st. bartholomew, 101, 107, 115-16 condemnation by french catholics as a whole, 143 war, art of, no national feeling in, till after 1789., 274 of deliverance, new forces evoked by, 282 of 1859, troubles of the papacy after, 412-14 wars of religion, end of, 274 washington, george, 579 political example of, 586 waterloo, 282 webster, 584 weingarten on st. anthony's life and origin of monasticism, 420 wesel, english calvinists at, 170 wesley, john, döllinger's tribute to, 395 westminster, archbishop of, at council of bishops, 1867., 500 on papal infallibility, 528 westphalia, peace of, and roman ambition, 323, 324 whigs, english, and their continental counterparts, attitude of, after waterloo, 282 wilberforce, archdeacon, döllinger consulted by, 395 samuel, bishop of winchester, story of, 551 wilkins, 421 will or sovereignty, the, of the people (_see also_ democracy), as criterion of right, 271; as above the law, 276; idea of, the parent of idea of nationality, 277 theory of nationality involved in, 287 william iii., king of england, and massacre of glencoe, 218, 410 windelband, _cited_ on national government, 227 windischmann (elder), döllinger's esteem for, 381 public indifference to, 430 winkelmann on the inquisition, 426 wirtemberg, left by möhler, after publication of _symbolik_, 377 duke of, and the huguenot refugees, 145 wiseman, cardinal, 424, 436 döllinger consulted by, on mediæval authorities, 390-91 influence of, on the church of england, and on the oxford movement, 437-8 literary standing of, 437, 438 position of, universal and local in catholicism, 437 relations of, with english catholics, 437, 438 view of, on english theology, 380 work of, at oscott, 438 on the "covert insinuations" of the _home and foreign review_, 439-40; the editor's defence of that publication, 440 _et seq._ witt, de, murder of, 410 wittelsbach, house of, contests of the empire in the, 275 würzburg, bishop of, reform urged by, 495 (city) döllinger and platen at, 375 wycliffe, john, difference between his teaching and luther's, 271 ximenes, cardinal, and the inquisition, 570 _young europe_, mazzini's evolution of _young italy_, 286 _young italy_ and mazzini, 286 zanchini, an inquisitor, leading authority of the fourteenth century, 559; _cited_ by lea, 560 zeller, _cited_ on anti-machiavel policy in prussia, 227 zimmerman, wilhelm, and machiavelli's policy, 227 zuñiga, juan and diego, 123 denunciation by, of french treachery even to heretics, etc., 144 zürich, the question of toleration in, 174, 175 zwickau, saxony, prophets of, melanchthon's attitude towards, 164 zwingli, ulrich, influence of, on politics, 81; influence of environment on him, 173, 177 theory of government, including persecution, 173-4 republican views of, 42 zwinglian schism, influence of, on luther, 155 zwinglians, the, condemned by melanchthon, 167, 170 _note_ _printed by_ r. & r. clark, limited, _edinburgh_. by the same author. _8vo. 10s. net._ historical essays and studies by the late lord acton, d.c.l., ll.d., etc. regius professor of modern history in the university of cambridge edited with an introduction by john neville figgis, m.a., and reginald vere laurence, m.a. contents i. wolsey and the divorce of henry viii. ii. the borgias and their latest historian. iii. secret history of charles ii. iv. the civil war in america. v. the rise and fall of the mexican empire. vi. cavour. vii. the causes of the franco-prussian war. viii. the war of 1870. ix. george eliot's "life." x. mr. buckle's "thesis and method." xi. german schools of history. xii. talleyrand's memoirs. xiii. the "life" of lord houghton. xiv. a history of the papacy during the period of the reformation. xv. a short history of napoleon i. the first napoleon: a sketch, political and military. xvi. mabillon et la société de l'abbaye de saint-germain-des-prés à la fin du xviie siècle. xvii. a history of england, 1837-1880. xviii. a history of the french revolution. xix. wilhelm von giesebrecht. macmillan and co., ltd., london. by the same author _8vo. 10s. net._ lectures on modern history by the late lord acton, d.c.l., ll.d., etc. regius professor of modern history in the university of cambridge edited with an introduction by john neville figgis, m.a., and reginald vere laurence, m.a. contents introduction. inaugural lecture on the study of history. lectures on modern history i. beginning of the modern state. ii. the new world. iii. the renaissance. iv. luther. v. the counter-reformation. vi. calvin and henry viii. vii. philip ii., mary stuart, and elizabeth. viii. the huguenots and the league. ix. henry the fourth and richelieu. x. the thirty years' war. xi. the puritan revolution. xii. the rise of the whigs. xiii. the english revolution. xiv. lewis xiv. xv. the war of the spanish succession. xvi. the hanoverian settlement. xvii. peter the great and the rise of prussia. xviii. frederic the great. xix. the american revolution. appendix i.--letter to contributors to the cambridge modern history. appendix ii.--notes to inaugural lecture. index. macmillan and co., ltd., london. 