The power of kings, and in particular of the King of England learnedly asserted by Sir Robert Filmer, Kt. ; with a preface of a friend, giving an account of the author and his works.
Filmer, Robert, Sir, d. 1653.
1680
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The power of kings, and in particular of the King of England learnedly asserted by Sir Robert Filmer, Kt. ; with a preface of a friend, giving an account of the author and his works.
Filmer, Robert, Sir, d. 1653.
[4], 12 p.
Printed for W.H. & T.F. and are to be sold by Walter Davis ...,
London :
1680.
Reproduction of original in Yale University Library.
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Monarchy.
Monarchy -- Great Britain.
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THE
POWER
OF
KINGS
:
And
in
Particular
,
OF
THE
King
of
ENGLAND
.
Learnedly
Asserted
,
By
Sir
ROBERT
FILMER
,
Kt.
WITH
A
PREFACE
of
a
Friend
:
Giving
an
Account
Of
the
AUTHOR
and
his
WORKS
.
In
Magnis
voluisse
sat
est
—
LONDON
:
Printed
for
W.
H.
&
T.
F.
and
are
to
be
sold
by
Walter
Davis
in
Amen-Corner
,
near
Paternoster-row
.
1680.
THE
PREFACE
.
WHoso
would
go
about
to
speak
Sir
Robert
Filmer's
worth
,
hath
no
more
to
do
but
onely
to
Number
and
to
Name
his
Writings
,
as
they
were
written
in
the
following
Order
.
Questio
Quodlibetica
,
or
a
Discourse
of
Usury
,
written
about
1630.
and
first
published
in
the
year
1656.
Patriarcha
,
or
the
Natural
Right
of
Kings
maintained
,
against
the
Unnatural
Right
of
the
People
to
Govern
,
or
chuse
themselves
Governours
.
Written
about
the
year
1642.
and
never
Published
till
of
late
.
Of
the
Blasphemy
against
the
Holy
Ghost
.
Published
in
the
year
1656.
The
Anarchy
of
a
Limited
and
Mixed
Monarchy
,
or
Observations
upon
Mr.
Hunton's
Treatise
on
that
Subject
.
First
Published
in
the
year
1646.
The
Free-holders
grand
Inquest
,
touching
our
Soveraign
Lord
the
King
,
and
his
Parliament
.
In
the
year
1648.
Of
the
Power
of
Kings
:
and
in
particular
,
of
the
King
of
England
.
First
Published
in
the
same
year
.
Observations
upon
Mr.
Hobbes
'
s
Leviathan
,
Mr.
Milton
against
Salmasius
,
and
H.
Grotius
De
Jure
Belli
&
Pacis
,
concerning
the
Original
of
Government
.
To
which
those
upon
Mr.
Huntons
Book
being
re-printed
,
were
annexed
in
the
year
1652.
Observations
upon
Aristotle's
Politicks
,
touching
Forms
of
Government
.
Published
in
the
same
year
.
And
the
Advertisement
to
the
Jury-men
of
England
touching
Witches
,
with
the
difference
between
an
English
and
an
Hebrew
Witch
.
In
the
year
1653.
Whoso
would
give
his
Writings
their
due
,
hath
done
it
already
,
in
saying
that
they
are
His.
Of
which
,
who
reads
any
one
,
may
have
some
cause
to
wonder
how
he
came
to
be
sufficiently
furnished
to
write
that
;
but
who
proceeds
yet
farther
to
read
them
all
,
will
have
more
abundant
cause
to
wonder
,
should
any
else
but
he
have
wrote
the
rest
.
His
Political
Writings
are
chiefly
levell'd
against
a
Doctrine
but
too
generally
embrac'd
of
late
That
,
all
men
are
born
equal
.
To
disprove
which
,
though
it
might
be
sufficient
to
appeal
to
the
Practice
and
Experience
of
Mankinde
,
whether
all
Nations
have
not
still
with
one
Consent
mounted
their
Kings
upon
Thrones
;
and
whether
all
the
Masters
of
Philosophies
and
Religions
have
not
constantly
appeared
in
their
Chairs
,
and
in
their
Pulpits
,
while
their
Disciples
have
humbly
presented
themselves
at
their
Feet
?
Not
to
speak
of
all
the
several
Heights
of
Authority
,
or
extents
of
Command
,
which
either
Popular
Oratory
have
attained
to
by
their
Wit
,
or
Conquerours
have
raised
themselves
to
by
their
Arms.
Our
Author
himself
is
an
undeniable
proof
of
his
own
Assertion
,
and
has
given
us
the
best
evidence
that
all
men
are
not
equal
by
Birth
,
while
he
himself
hath
no
equal
in
Writing
.
So
impossible
is
it
for
him
to
treat
either
of
the
means
of
Acquiring
,
or
the
Rights
of
exercising
Soveraignty
,
without
acquiring
and
exercising
a
new
Soveraignty
over
his
Readers
.
For
does
he
overcome
others
?
even
we
at
the
same
time
are
made
Captives
without
resistance
,
and
are
his
by
right
of
Conquest
.
Or
does
he
govern
in
their
stead
?
even
then
all
Readers
are
insensibly
under
his
Command
,
as
much
as
if
they
were
his
Subjects
,
and
are
his
by
right
of
natural
Soveraignty
.
A
Reason
so
far
exalted
above
ours
as
his
,
makes
him
appear
like
those
Kings
of
old
,
who
were
in
Stature
much
superiour
to
their
Subjects
,
and
seemed
so
far
to
overtop
the
rest
,
as
if
Nature
it self
had
marked
them
out
for
Heads
of
all
.
To
be
short
,
no
Power
,
whose
Cause
our
Author
pleads
,
can
be
so
absolute
,
as
what
he
obtains
over
us
at
the
same
time
himself
.
And
yet
of
so
sweet
a
Tyranny
,
who
that
are
under
it
can
complain
?
Arguments
so
prevailing
,
who
is
able
to
withstand
?
And
where
the
Mastery
is
gained
over
us
by
no
other
force
than
that
of
Perswasion
,
who
would
forego
the
pleasure
of
Obedience
?
The
Empire
which
Wit
and
Eloquence
have
over
men
,
seems
to
be
like
that
Command
which
Musick
hath
over
the
Wilde
Beasts
,
that
civilizes
and
subdues
them
at
one
and
the
same
time
.
And
we
,
while
we
read
this
Author
,
feel
the
highest
of
rational
Pleasures
,
even
then
when
we
are
made
at
once
both
Better
Subjects
,
and
Wiser
Men.
The
Power
of
Kings
:
And
in
Particular
,
Of
the
KING
of
ENGLAND
.
TO
Majestie
or
Soveraignty
belongeth
an
Absolute
Power
not
subject
to
any
Law.
It
behoveth
him
that
is
a
Soveraign
,
not
to
be
in
any
sort
Subject
to
the
Command
of
Another
;
whose
Office
is
to
give
Laws
unto
his
Subjects
,
to
Abrogate
Laws
unprofitable
,
and
in
their
stead
to
Establish
other
;
which
he
cannot
do
,
that
is
himself
Subject
to
Laws
,
or
to
Others
which
have
Command
over
him
:
And
this
is
that
which
the
Law
saith
,
that
The
Prince
is
acquitted
from
the
Power
of
the
Laws
.
The
Laws
,
Ordinances
,
Letters-Patents
,
Priviledges
,
and
Grants
of
Princes
,
have
no
force
but
during
their
Life
;
if
they
be
not
ratified
by
the
express
Consent
,
or
at
least
by
Sufferance
of
the
Prince
following
,
who
had
knowledge
thereof
.
If
the
Soveraign
Prince
be
exempted
from
the
Laws
of
his
Predecessors
,
much
less
shall
he
be
bound
unto
the
Laws
he
maketh
Himself
;
for
a
man
may
well
receive
a
Law
from
Another
man
,
but
impossible
it
is
in
Nature
for
to
give
a
Law
unto
Himself
,
no
more
than
it
is
to
Command
a
mans
self
in
a
matter
depending
of
his
Own
Will
:
There
can
be
no
Obligation
which
taketh
State
from
the
meer
Will
of
him
that
promiseth
the
same
;
which
is
a
necessary
Reason
to
prove
evidently
,
that
a
King
cannot
binde
his
Own
Hands
,
albeit
that
he
would
:
We
see
also
in
the
end
of
all
Laws
these
words
,
Because
it
hath
so
Pleased
us
;
to
give
us
to
understand
,
that
the
Laws
of
a
Sovereign
Prince
,
although
they
be
grounded
upon
Reason
,
yet
depend
upon
nothing
but
his
meer
and
frank
good
Will.
But
as
for
the
Laws
of
God
,
all
Princes
and
People
are
unto
them
subject
;
neither
is
it
in
their
power
to
impugne
them
,
if
they
will
not
be
guilty
of
High
Treason
against
God
;
under
the
greatness
of
whom
,
all
Monarchs
of
the
world
ought
to
bow
their
Heads
,
in
all
fear
and
reverence
.
A
Question
may
be
,
Whether
a
Prince
be
subject
to
the
Laws
of
his
Countrey
that
he
hath
sworn
to
keep
,
or
not
?
If
a
Soveraign
Prince
promise
by
Oath
to
his
Subjects
to
keep
the
Laws
,
he
is
bound
to
keep
them
;
not
for
that
a
Prince
is
bound
to
keep
his
Laws
by
himself
or
by
his
Predecessors
,
but
by
the
just
Conventions
and
Promises
which
he
hath
made
himself
;
be
it
by
Oath
,
or
without
any
Oath
at
all
,
as
should
a
private
man
be
:
and
for
the
same
causes
that
a
Private
man
may
be
relieved
from
his
unjust
and
unreasonable
Promise
,
as
for
that
it
was
so
grievous
,
or
for
that
he
was
by
deceit
or
fraud
Circumvented
,
or
induced
thereunto
by
Errour
,
or
Force
,
or
just
Fear
,
or
by
some
great
Hurt
;
even
for
the
same
causes
the
Prince
may
be
restored
in
that
which
toucheth
the
diminishing
of
his
Majesty
:
And
so
our
Maxime
resteth
,
That
the
Prince
is
not
subject
to
His
Laws
,
nor
to
the
Laws
of
his
Predecessors
,
but
well
to
his
Own
just
and
reasonable
Conventions
.
The
Soveraign
Prince
may
derogate
from
the
Laws
that
he
hath
promised
and
sworn
to
keep
,
if
the
Equity
thereof
cease
,
and
that
of
himself
,
without
Consent
of
his
Subjects
;
which
his
Subjects
cannot
do
among
Themselves
,
if
they
be
not
by
the
Prince
relieved
.
The
Forraign
Princes
well-advised
,
will
never
take
Oath
to
keep
the
Laws
of
their
Predecessors
;
for
otherwise
they
are
not
Sovereigns
.
Notwithstanding
all
Oaths
,
the
Prince
may
Derogate
from
the
Laws
,
or
Frustrate
or
Disanul
the
same
,
the
Reason
and
Equity
of
them
ceasing
.
There
is
not
any
Bond
for
the
Soveraign
Prince
to
keep
the
Laws
,
more
than
so
far
as
Right
and
Justice
requireth
.
Neither
is
it
to
be
found
,
that
the
Antient
Kings
of
the
Hebrews
took
any
Oaths
,
no
not
they
which
were
Anointed
by
Samuel
,
Elias
,
and
others
.
As
for
General
and
Particular
,
which
concern
the
Right
of
men
in
Private
,
they
have
not
used
to
be
otherwise
Changed
,
but
after
General
Assemblies
of
the
Three
Estates
in
France
;
not
for
that
it
is
necessary
for
the
Kings
to
rest
on
their
Advice
,
or
that
he
may
not
do
the
Contrary
to
that
they
demand
,
if
natural
Reason
and
Justice
do
so
require
.
And
in
that
the
Greatness
and
Majesty
of
a
true
Soveraign
Prince
is
to
be
known
,
when
the
Estates
of
all
the
People
assembled
together
in
all
Humility
present
their
Requests
and
Supplications
to
their
Prince
,
without
having
any
Power
in
any
thing
to
Command
,
or
Determine
,
or
to
give
Voice
;
but
that
that
which
it
pleaseth
the
King
to
Like
or
Dislike
,
to
Command
or
Forbid
,
is
holden
for
Law.
Wherein
they
which
have
written
of
the
Duty
of
Magistrates
,
have
deceived
themselves
,
in
maintaining
that
the
Power
of
the
People
is
greater
than
the
Prince
;
a
thing
which
oft-times
causeth
the
true
Subjects
to
revolt
from
the
Obedience
which
they
owe
unto
their
Soveraign
Prince
,
aud
ministreth
matter
of
great
Troubles
in
Commonwealths
;
of
which
their
Opinion
,
there
is
neither
reason
nor
ground
.
If
the
King
should
be
Subject
unto
the
Assemblies
and
Decrees
of
the
People
,
he
should
neither
be
King
nor
Soveraign
,
and
the
Commonwealth
neither
Realm
nor
Monarchy
;
but
a
meer
Aristocracy
of
many
Lords
in
Power
equal
,
where
the
Greater
part
commandeth
the
less
;
and
whereon
the
Laws
are
not
to
be
published
in
the
Name
of
him
that
Ruleth
,
but
in
the
Name
and
Authority
of
the
Estates
;
as
in
an
Aristocratical
Seignory
,
where
he
that
is
Chief
hath
no
Power
,
but
oweth
Obeisance
to
the
Seignory
;
unto
whom
yet
they
every
one
of
them
feign
themselves
to
owe
their
Faith
and
Obedience
:
which
are
all
things
so
absurd
,
as
hard
it
is
to
see
which
is
furthest
from
Reason
.
When
Charles
the
eighth
,
the
French
King
,
then
but
Fourteen
years
old
,
held
a
Parliament
at
Tours
,
although
the
Power
of
the
Parliament
was
never
Before
nor
After
so
great
,
as
in
those
Times
;
yet
Relli
then
the
Speaker
for
the
People
,
turning
himself
to
the
King
,
thus
beginneth
:
Most
High
,
most
Mighty
,
and
most
Christian
King
,
our
Natural
and
Onely
Lord
;
we
poor
,
humble
,
and
obedient
Subjects
,
&c.
which
are
come
hither
by
your
Command
,
in
all
Humility
,
Reverence
,
and
Subjection
,
present
our selves
before
you
,
&c.
And
have
given
me
in
charge
from
all
this
Noble
Assembly
to
declare
unto
You
,
the
good
Will
and
hearty
desire
they
have
,
with
a
most
fervent
Resolution
to
Serve
,
Obey
,
and
Aid
You
in
all
your
Affairs
,
Commandments
,
and
Pleasures
.
All
this
Speech
is
nothing
else
but
a
Declaration
of
their
good
Will
towards
the
King
,
and
of
their
humble
Obedience
and
Loyalty
.
The
like
Speech
was
used
in
the
Parliament
at
Orleans
to
Charles
the
9th
,
when
he
was
scarce
Eleven
Years
old
.
Neither
are
the
Parliaments
in
Spain
otherwise
holden
,
but
that
even
a
greater
Obedience
of
all
the
People
is
given
to
the
King
;
as
is
to
be
seen
in
the
Acts
of
the
Parliament
at
Toledo
by
King
Philip
,
1552.
when
he
yet
was
scarce
Twenty
Five
Years
old
.
The
Answers
also
of
the
King
of
Spain
unto
the
Requests
and
humble
Supplications
of
his
People
,
are
given
in
these
words
:
We
will
,
or
else
,
We
Decree
or
Ordain
;
yea
,
the
Subsidies
that
the
Subjects
pay
unto
the
King
of
Spain
,
they
call
Service
.
In
the
Parliaments
of
England
,
which
have
commonly
been
holden
every
Third
Year
,
the
Estates
seem
to
have
a
great
Liberty
,
(
as
the
Northern
People
almost
all
breathe
thereafter
)
yet
so
it
is
,
that
in
effect
they
proceed
not
,
but
by
way
of
Supplications
and
Requests
to
the
King.
As
in
the
Parliament
holden
in
Octob.
1566.
when
the
Estates
by
a
common
Consent
had
resolved
(
as
they
gave
the
Queen
to
understand
)
not
to
Treat
of
any
thing
,
until
She
had
first
Appointed
who
should
Succeed
Her
in
the
Crown
;
She
gave
them
no
other
Answer
,
but
That
they
were
not
to
make
her
Grave
before
she
were
Dead
.
All
whose
Resolutions
were
to
no
purpose
without
Her
good
liking
,
neither
did
She
in
that
any
thing
that
they
requested
.
Albeit
by
the
Sufferance
of
the
King
of
England
,
Controversies
between
the
King
and
his
People
are
sometimes
determined
by
the
High
Court
of
Parliament
;
yet
all
the
Estates
remain
in
full
subjection
to
the
King
,
who
is
no
way
bound
to
follow
their
Advice
,
neither
to
consent
to
their
Requests
.
The
Estates
of
England
are
never
otherwise
Assembled
,
no
more
than
they
are
in
France
or
Spain
,
than
by
Parliament-Writs
and
express
Commandments
,
proceeding
from
the
King
;
which
sheweth
very
well
,
that
the
Estates
have
no
Power
of
themselves
to
Determine
,
Command
,
or
Decree
any
thing
;
seeing
they
cannot
so
much
as
Assemble
themselves
,
neither
being
Assembled
,
Depart
without
express
Commandment
from
the
King.
Yet
this
may
seem
one
special
thing
,
that
the
Laws
made
by
the
King
of
England
,
at
the
Request
of
the
Estates
,
cannot
be
again
repealed
,
but
by
calling
a
Parliament
;
though
we
see
Henry
the
eighth
to
have
always
used
his
Soveraign
Power
,
and
with
his
only
word
to
have
disannulled
the
Decrees
of
Parliament
.
We
conclude
the
Majesty
of
a
Prince
to
be
nothing
altered
or
diminished
by
the
Calling
together
,
or
Presence
of
the
Estates
:
But
to
the
contrary
,
His
Majesty
thereby
to
be
much
the
Greater
and
the
more
Honourable
,
seeing
all
His
People
to
acknowledge
Him
for
their
Soveraign
.
We
see
the
principal
Point
of
Soveraign
Majesty
and
Absolute
Power
to
consist
principally
in
giving
Laws
unto
the
Subjects
without
their
Consent
.
It
behoveth
,
that
the
Soveraign
Prince
should
have
the
Laws
in
his
Power
,
to
Change
and
Amend
them
according
as
Occasion
shall
require
.
In
a
Monarchy
,
every
one
in
particular
must
swear
to
the
Observation
of
the
Laws
,
and
their
Allegiance
to
One
Soveraign
Monarch
;
who
,
next
unto
God
,
(
of
whom
he
holds
his
Scepter
and
Power
)
is
bound
to
No
Man
:
For
an
Oath
carrieth
always
with
it
Reverence
unto
whom
,
and
in
whose
Name
it
is
made
,
as
still
given
to
a
Superiour
;
and
therefore
the
Vassal
gives
such
Oath
unto
his
Lord
,
but
receives
None
from
Him
again
,
though
they
be
mutually
Bound
,
the
One
of
them
to
the
Other
.
Trajan
swore
to
keep
the
Laws
,
although
he
under
the
name
of
a
Soveraign
Prince
was
exempted
;
but
never
any
of
the
Emperours
before
him
so
sware
:
Therefore
Pliny
the
Younger
,
in
a
Panegyrical
Oration
,
speaking
of
the
Oath
of
Trajan
,
gives
out
,
A
great
Novelty
,
saith
he
,
and
never
before
heard
of
,
He
sweareth
,
by
whom
we
swear
.
Of
these
two
things
the
one
must
come
to
pass
,
to
wit
,
the
Prince
that
swears
to
keep
the
Laws
of
his
Country
,
must
either
not
have
the
Soveraignty
,
or
else
become
a
Perjur'd
Man
,
if
he
should
but
Abrogate
but
one
Law
contrary
to
his
Oath
;
whereas
it
is
not
only
Profitable
that
a
Prince
should
sometimes
Abrogate
some
such
Laws
,
but
also
Necessary
for
him
to
Alter
or
Correct
them
,
as
the
infinite
Variety
of
Places
,
Times
and
Persons
shall
require
:
Or
if
we
shall
say
,
the
Prince
to
be
still
a
Soveraign
,
and
yet
nevertheless
with
such
conditions
,
that
he
can
make
no
Law
without
the
Advice
of
his
Councel
or
People
;
He
must
also
be
Dispensed
with
by
his
Subjects
,
for
the
Oath
which
he
hath
made
for
the
Observation
of
the
Laws
;
and
the
Subjects
again
which
are
obliged
to
the
Laws
,
have
also
need
to
be
Dispensed
withal
by
their
Prince
,
for
fear
they
should
be
Perjur'd
:
So
shall
it
come
to
pass
,
that
the
Majesty
of
the
Commonweal
enclining
now
to
this
side
,
now
to
that
side
;
sometimes
the
Prince
,
sometimes
the
People
bearing
sway
,
shall
have
no
Certainty
to
rest
upon
;
which
are
notable
Absurdities
,
and
altogether
incompatible
with
the
Majesty
of
Absolute
Soveraignty
,
and
contrary
both
to
Law
and
Reason
.
And
yet
we
see
many
men
,
that
think
they
see
more
in
the
matter
than
others
,
will
maintain
it
to
be
most
Necessary
,
that
Princes
should
be
bound
by
Oath
,
to
keep
the
Laws
and
Customs
of
their
Countreys
:
In
which
doing
,
they
weaken
and
overthrow
all
the
Rights
of
Soveraign
Majesty
,
which
ought
to
be
most
Sacred
and
Holy
,
and
confound
the
Soveraignty
of
One
Soveraign
Monarch
,
with
an
Aristocracy
or
Democracy
.
Publication
,
or
Approbation
of
Laws
,
in
the
Assembly
of
the
Estates
or
Parliament
,
is
with
us
of
great
importance
for
the
keeping
of
the
Laws
;
not
that
the
Prince
cannot
of
himself
make
a
Law
,
without
the
Consent
of
the
Estates
or
People
(
for
even
all
his
Declarations
of
War
,
Treaties
of
Peace
,
Valuations
of
the
Coin
,
Charters
to
enable
Towns
to
send
Burgesses
to
Parliament
,
and
his
Writ
of
Summons
to
both
Houses
to
Assemble
,
are
Laws
,
though
made
without
the
Consent
of
the
Estates
or
People
;
)
but
it
is
a
Courteous
part
to
do
it
by
the
good
liking
of
the
Senate
.
What
if
a
Prince
by
Law
forbid
to
Kill
or
Steal
,
is
he
not
Bound
to
obey
his
own
Laws
?
I
say
,
that
this
Law
is
not
His
,
but
the
Law
of
God
,
whereunto
all
Princes
are
more
straitly
bound
than
their
Subjects
;
God
taketh
a
stricter
account
of
Princes
than
others
,
as
Solomon
a
King
hath
said
;
whereto
agreeth
Marcus
Aurelius
,
saying
,
The
Magistrates
are
Judges
over
private
men
,
Princes
judge
the
Magistrates
,
and
God
the
Princes
.
It
is
not
only
a
Law
of
Nature
,
but
also
oftentimes
repeated
among
the
Laws
of
God
,
that
we
should
be
Obedient
unto
the
Laws
of
such
Princes
,
as
it
hath
pleased
God
to
set
to
Rule
and
Reign
over
us
;
if
their
Laws
be
not
directly
Repugnant
unto
the
Laws
of
God
,
whereunto
all
Princes
are
as
well
bound
as
their
Subjects
:
For
as
the
Vassal
oweth
his
Oath
of
Fidelity
unto
his
Lord
,
towards
and
against
all
men
,
except
his
Soveraign
Prince
:
So
the
Subject
oweth
his
Obedience
to
his
Soveraign
Prince
,
towards
and
against
all
,
the
Majesty
of
God
excepted
,
who
is
the
Absolute
Soveraign
of
All
the
Princes
in
the
World.
To
confound
the
state
of
Monarchy
,
with
the
Popular
or
Aristocratical
estate
,
is
a
thing
impossible
,
and
in
effect
incompatible
,
and
such
as
cannot
be
imagined
:
For
Soveraignty
being
of
it self
Indivisible
,
How
can
it
at
one
and
the
same
time
be
Divided
betwixt
One
Prince
,
the
Nobility
,
and
the
People
in
common
?
The
first
Mark
of
Sovereign
Majesty
is
,
to
be
of
Power
to
give
Laws
,
and
to
Command
over
them
unto
the
Subjects
:
And
who
should
those
Subjects
be
that
should
yield
their
Obedience
to
the
Law
,
if
they
should
have
also
Power
to
make
the
Laws
?
Who
should
He
be
that
could
Give
the
Law
,
being
he
himself
constrain'd
to
Receive
it
of
them
,
unto
whom
he
himself
Gave
it
?
So
that
of
necessity
we
must
conclude
,
that
as
no
One
in
particular
hath
the
Power
to
make
the
Law
in
such
a
State
,
that
there
the
State
must
needs
be
Popular
.
Never
any
Commonwealth
hath
been
made
of
an
Aristocracy
and
Popular
Estate
,
much
less
of
all
the
Three
Estates
of
a
Commonwealth
.
Such
States
,
wherein
the
Right
of
Soveraignty
is
Divided
are
not
rightly
to
be
called
Commonweals
,
but
rather
the
Corruption
of
Commonweals
;
as
Herodotus
hath
most
briefly
but
truely
written
.
Commonweals
which
change
their
State
,
the
Soveraign
Right
and
Power
of
them
being
Divided
,
finde
no
rest
from
Civil
Wars
.
If
the
Prince
be
an
Absolute
Soveraign
,
as
are
the
true
Monarchs
of
France
,
of
Spain
,
of
England
,
Scotland
,
Turkey
,
Moscovy
,
Tartary
,
Persia
,
Aethiopia
,
India
,
and
almost
of
all
the
Kingdoms
of
Africk
and
Asia
;
where
the
Kings
themselves
have
the
Soveraignty
,
without
all
doubt
or
question
,
not
Divided
with
their
Subjects
:
In
this
case
it
is
not
lawful
for
any
One
of
the
Subjects
in
particular
,
or
all
of
them
in
general
,
to
attempt
any
thing
,
either
by
way
of
Fact
or
of
Justice
,
against
the
Honour
,
Life
,
or
Dignity
of
the
Soveraign
,
albeit
he
had
committed
all
the
Wickedness
,
Impiety
,
and
Cruelty
that
could
be
spoke
.
For
as
to
proceed
against
Him
by
way
of
Justice
,
the
Subject
hath
not
such
Jurisdiction
over
his
Soveraign
Prince
,
of
whom
dependeth
all
Power
to
Command
,
and
who
may
not
only
Revoke
all
the
Power
of
his
Magistrates
,
but
even
in
whose
Presence
the
Power
of
all
Magistrates
,
Corporations
,
Estates
and
Communities
cease
.
Now
if
it
be
not
l●wful
for
the
Subject
by
the
way
of
Justice
to
proceed
against
a
King
,
How
should
it
then
be
lawful
to
proceed
against
him
by
way
of
Fact
or
Force
?
For
question
is
not
here
what
men
are
able
to
do
by
Strength
and
Force
,
but
what
they
ought
of
Right
to
do
;
as
not
whether
the
Subject
have
Power
and
Strength
,
but
whether
they
have
lawful
Power
to
Condemn
their
Soveraign
Prince
.
The
Subject
is
not
only
guilty
of
Treason
in
the
highest
Degree
,
who
hath
Slain
his
Soveraign
Prince
,
but
even
he
also
which
hath
Attempted
the
same
,
who
hath
given
Counsel
or
Consent
thereto
;
yea
,
if
he
have
Concealed
the
same
,
or
but
so
much
as
Thought
it
:
Which
Fact
the
Laws
have
in
such
Detestation
,
as
that
when
a
man
guilty
of
any
Offence
or
Crime
,
dyeth
before
he
be
condemned
thereof
,
he
is
deemed
to
have
died
in
whole
and
perfect
Estate
,
except
he
have
conspired
against
the
Life
and
Dignity
of
his
Soveraign
Prince
.
This
only
thing
they
have
thought
to
be
such
,
as
that
for
which
he
may
worthily
seem
to
have
been
now
already
Judged
and
Condemned
;
yea
,
even
before
he
was
thereof
Accused
.
And
albeit
the
Laws
inflict
no
Punishment
upon
the
Evil
Thoughts
of
men
,
but
on
those
only
which
by
Word
or
Deed
break
out
into
some
Enormity
;
yet
if
any
man
shall
so
much
as
conceit
a
Thought
for
the
Violating
of
the
Person
of
his
Soveraign
Prince
,
although
he
have
Attempted
nothing
,
they
have
yet
Judged
this
same
Thought
worthy
of
Death
,
notwithstanding
what
Repentance
soever
he
have
had
thereof
.
Lest
any
men
should
think
[
Kings
or
Princes
]
themselves
to
have
been
the
Authors
of
these
Laws
,
so
the
more
straitly
to
provide
for
their
own
Safety
and
Honour
;
let
us
fee
the
Laws
and
Examples
of
Holy
Scripture
.
Nabuchodonosor
King
of
Assyria
,
with
Fire
and
Sword
destroyed
all
the
Country
of
Palestina
,
besieged
Jerusalem
,
took
it
,
rob'd
and
razed
it
down
to
the
ground
,
burnt
the
Temple
,
and
defiled
the
Sanctuary
of
God
,
slew
the
King
,
with
the
greatest
part
of
the
people
,
carrying
away
the
rest
into
Captivity
into
Babylon
,
caused
the
Image
of
himself
made
in
Gold
to
be
set
up
in
Publick
place
,
commanding
all
men
to
Adore
and
Worship
the
same
,
upon
pain
of
being
Burnt
alive
,
and
caused
them
that
refused
so
to
do
,
to
be
cast
into
a
burning
Furnace
.
And
yet
for
all
that
,
the
holy
Prophets
[
Baruch
1.
Jeremy
29.
]
directing
their
Letters
unto
their
Brethren
the
Jews
,
then
in
Captivity
in
Babylon
,
will
them
to
pray
unto
God
for
the
good
and
happy
Life
of
Nabuchodonosor
and
his
Children
,
and
that
they
might
so
long
Rule
and
Reign
over
them
,
as
the
Heavens
should
endure
:
Yea
even
God
himself
doubted
not
to
call
Nabuchodonosor
his
Servant
,
saying
,
That
he
would
make
him
the
most
Mighty
Prince
of
the
world
;
and
yet
was
there
never
a
more
detestable
Tyrant
than
he
:
who
not
contented
to
be
Himself
Worshipped
,
but
caused
his
Image
also
to
be
Adored
,
and
that
upon
pain
of
being
burnt
quick
.
We
have
another
rare
Example
of
Saul
,
who
possessed
with
an
evil
Spirit
,
caused
the
Priests
of
the
Lord
to
be
without
iust
Cause
slain
,
for
that
one
of
them
had
received
David
flying
from
him
;
and
did
what
in
his
power
was
to
kill
,
or
cause
to
be
kill'd
,
the
same
David
,
a
most
innocent
Prince
,
by
whom
he
had
got
so
many
Victories
;
at
which
time
he
fell
twice
himself
into
David's
Hands
:
who
blamed
of
his
Souldiers
for
that
he
would
not
suffer
his
so
mortal
Enemy
,
then
in
his
power
,
to
be
Slain
,
being
in
assured
Hope
to
have
enjoyed
the
Kingdom
after
his
Death
;
he
detested
their
Counsel
,
saying
,
God
forbid
that
I
should
suffer
the
Person
of
a
King
,
the
Lords
Anointed
,
to
be
violated
.
Yea
,
he
himself
defended
the
same
King
persecuting
of
him
,
when
as
he
commanded
the
Souldiers
of
his
Guard
,
overcome
by
Wine
and
Sleep
,
to
be
wakened
.
And
at
such
time
as
Saul
was
slain
,
and
that
a
Souldier
,
thinking
to
do
David
a
pleasure
,
presented
him
with
Saul's
Head
;
David
caused
the
same
Souldier
to
be
Slain
,
which
had
brought
him
the
Head
,
saying
,
Go
thou
Wicked
;
How
durst
thou
lay
thy
impure
Hands
upon
the
Lords
Anointed
?
Thou
shalt
surely
Die
therefore
.
And
afterwards
,
without
all
Distimulation
,
mourned
Himself
for
the
dead
King.
All
which
is
worth
good
consideration
:
for
David
was
by
Saul
prosecuted
to
Death
,
and
yet
wanted
not
Power
to
have
revenged
Himself
,
being
become
Stronger
than
the
King
;
besides
,
he
was
the
Chosen
of
God
,
and
Anointed
by
Samuel
to
be
King
,
and
had
Married
the
King's
Daughter
:
And
yet
for
all
that
,
he
abhorred
to
take
upon
him
the
Title
of
a
King
,
and
much
more
to
Attempt
any
thing
against
the
Life
or
Honour
of
Saul
,
or
to
Rebel
against
him
;
but
chose
rather
to
Banish
himself
out
of
the
Realm
,
than
in
any
sort
to
seek
the
Kings
Destruction
.
We
doubt
not
but
David
,
a
King
and
a
Prophet
,
led
by
the
Spirit
of
God
,
had
always
before
his
Eyes
the
Law
of
God
,
Exod.
22.
28.
Thou
shalt
not
speak
Evil
of
thy
Prince
,
nor
detract
the
Magistrate
;
neither
is
there
any
thing
more
common
in
Holy
Scripture
,
than
the
forbidding
not
only
to
Kill
or
Attempt
the
Life
or
Honour
of
a
Prince
,
but
even
for
the
very
Magistrates
,
although
,
saith
the
Scripture
,
They
be
Wicked
and
Naught
.
The
Protestant
Princes
of
Germany
,
before
they
entred
into
Arms
against
Charles
the
Emperour
,
demanded
of
Martin
Luther
,
if
it
were
Lawful
for
them
so
to
do
,
or
not
;
who
frankly
told
them
,
That
it
was
not
Lawful
,
whatsoever
Tyranny
or
Impiety
were
pretended
;
yet
was
he
not
therein
by
them
Believed
;
so
,
thereof
,
ensued
a
Deadly
and
most
Lamentable
War
,
the
End
whereof
was
most
Miserable
;
drawing
with
in
,
the
Ruine
of
many
great
and
noble
Houses
of
Germany
,
with
exceeding
slaughter
of
the
Subjects
.
The
Prince
,
whom
you
may
justly
call
the
Father
of
the
Country
,
ought
to
be
to
every
man
Dearer
and
more
Reverend
than
any
Father
,
as
one
Ordained
and
Sent
unto
us
by
God.
The
Subject
is
never
to
be
suffered
to
Attempt
any
thing
against
the
Prince
,
how
Naughty
and
Cruel
soever
he
be
:
lawful
it
is
,
not
to
obey
him
in
things
contrary
to
the
Laws
of
God
,
to
Flie
and
Hide
our selves
from
him
;
but
yet
to
suffer
Stripes
,
yea
,
and
Death
also
,
rather
than
to
Attempt
any
thing
against
his
Life
and
Honour
.
O
how
many
Tyrants
should
there
be
,
if
it
should
be
lawful
for
Subjects
to
kill
Tyrants
?
How
many
good
and
innocent
Princes
should
as
Tyrants
perish
by
the
Conspiracy
of
their
Subjects
against
them
?
He
that
should
of
his
Subjects
but
exact
Subsidies
,
should
be
then
,
as
the
Vulgar
People
esteem
him
,
a
Tyrant
:
He
that
should
Rule
and
Command
contrary
to
the
good
Liking
of
the
People
,
should
be
a
Tyrant
:
He
that
should
keep
strong
Guards
and
Garrisons
for
the
safety
of
his
Person
,
should
be
a
Tyrant
:
He
that
should
put
to
death
Traitors
and
Conspirators
against
his
State
,
should
be
also
counted
a
Tyrant
.
How
should
good
Princes
be
assured
of
their
Lives
,
if
under
colour
of
Tyranny
they
might
be
Slain
by
their
Subjects
,
by
whom
they
ought
to
be
Defended
?
In
a
well-ordered
State
,
the
Soveraign
Power
must
remain
in
One
onely
,
without
Communicating
any
part
thereof
unto
the
State
,
(
for
in
that
case
it
should
be
a
Popular
Government
,
and
no
Monarchy
.
)
Wise
Polititians
,
Philosophers
,
Divines
,
and
Historiographers
,
have
highly
commended
a
Monarchy
above
all
other
Common-weals
.
It
is
not
to
please
the
Prince
,
that
they
hold
this
Opinion
;
but
for
the
Safety
and
Happiness
of
the
Subjects
.
And
contrarywise
,
when
as
they
shall
Limit
and
Restrain
the
Soveraign
Power
of
a
Monarch
,
to
Subject
him
to
the
General
Estates
,
or
to
the
Council
;
the
Soveraignty
hath
no
firm
Foundation
,
but
they
frame
a
Popular
Confusion
,
or
a
miserable
Anarchy
,
which
is
the
Plague
of
all
Estates
and
Commonweals
:
The
which
must
be
duely
considered
,
not
giving
credit
to
their
goodly
Discourses
,
which
perswade
Subjects
,
that
it
is
necessary
to
subject
Monarchs
,
and
to
give
their
Prince
a
Law
;
for
that
is
not
only
the
Ruine
of
the
Monarch
,
but
also
of
the
Subjects
.
It
is
yet
more
strange
,
that
many
hold
Opinion
,
that
the
Prince
is
subject
to
his
Laws
,
that
is
to
say
,
subject
to
his
Will
,
whereon
the
Laws
which
he
hath
made
depend
;
a
thing
impossible
in
Nature
.
And
under
this
Colour
,
and
ill-digested
Opinion
,
they
make
a
mixture
and
confusion
of
Civil
Laws
,
with
the
Laws
of
Nature
and
of
God.
A
pure
Absolute
Monarchy
is
the
surest
Commonweal
,
and
without
Comparison
,
the
Best
of
all
.
Wherein
many
are
abused
,
who
maintain
that
an
Optimacy
is
the
best
kinde
of
Government
;
for
that
many
Commanders
have
more
Judgment
,
Wisdome
,
and
Counsel
,
than
One
alone
.
For
there
is
a
great
difference
betwixt
Councel
and
Commandment
.
The
Councel
of
Many
wise
men
may
be
better
than
of
One
;
But
to
Resolve
,
Determine
,
and
to
Command
,
One
will
always
perform
it
better
than
Many
:
He
which
hath
advisedly
digested
All
their
Opinions
,
will
soon
Resolve
without
Contention
;
the
which
Many
cannot
easily
perform
:
It
is
necessary
to
have
a
Soveraign
Prince
,
which
may
have
Power
to
Resolve
and
Determine
of
the
Opinions
of
his
Council
.
FINIS
.