Gutenberg








                       Department of the Interior

                    Ethnological Survey Publications

                           Volume IV, Part II

                          THE HISTORY OF SULU


                                   By

                           NAJEEB M. SALEEBY

                                 Manila
                       Bureau of Public Printing
                                  1908







CONTENTS


PART II

                                                             Page.

Preface                                                        117

Chapter I

Geographical Description of the Sulu Archipelago               121

    In general                                                 121
    Island of Sulu                                             127
        Geographical features                                  127
        Principal coast settlements                            129
        Districts of the island                                131
    Town of Jolo                                               133
        General plan, buildings and streets                    133
        Trade                                                  137
        Population                                             144


Chapter II

Genealogy of Sulu                                              147

    Translator's introduction                                  147
    Sulu author's introduction                                 147
    Descendants of Asip                                        148
    Descendants of Tuan Masha'ika                              149
    Original and later settlers of Sulu                        149
    Sulu historical notes                                      151
        Introduction                                           151
        Sulu notes                                             152


Chapter III

Rise and Prosperity of Sulu                                    155

    Sulu before Islam                                          155
    Introduction of Islam and the rise of a Mohammedan
    dynasty in Sulu                                            158
    Establishment of the Mohammedan Church in Sulu and the
    reign of Abu Bakr                                          161
    Early days of the sultanate                                163
        Successors of Abu Bakr                                 163
        Figueroa's expedition against Sulu                     164
        Reasons for hostilities                                168
        Rule of Batara Shah Tangah                             171
        Figueroa's expedition against Mindanao                 172
        Moro raids                                             175
    First Spanish conquest and occupation of Sulu              177
    Sulu supremacy in the Archipelago                          179
        Successors of Bungsu                                   179
        Reign of Sultan Alimud Din I                           180
        Reign of Sultan Israel                                 187
        Moro pirates                                           191
    Treaty of 1836 with the Sultan of Sulu                     194
        Text of the treaty                                     194
        Ratification of the treaty by the Queen Regent
        of Spain                                               196
    Expedition of Governor Claveria                            199
    Visits to Jolo of Captain Henry Keppel and Sir
    James Brooke                                               201


Chapter IV

Decline of Sulu                                                205

    Expedition against Jolo                                    205
    Treaty of April 30, 1851                                   209
        Translation of the Sulu text of the treaty of 1851     212
    Politico-military government of Mindanao and adjacent
    islands                                                    214


Chapter V

Sulu Under Spanish Sovereignty                                 221

    Occupation of Jolo                                         221
    Rule of Sultan Jamalul A'lam                               224
        Cession of possessions in Borneo to British North
        Borneo Company                                         225
        Treaty of July, 1878                                   226
            Translation of the Spanish copy of the treaty      227
            Translation of the Sulu text of the treaty         229
        Rule of Sultan Badarud Din II                          233
        Struggle for the sultanate                             237
        Rule of Sultan Harun                                   240
        Rule of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II                        244


Chapter VI

Conclusion                                                     247

    Political status of Sulu at the time of Spanish
    evacuation                                                 247
    Spanish policy                                             249
        Attitude of the Moros                                  249
        Mistakes and difficulties of Spanish rule              251
        Report of Baltasar Giraudier                           254
        Views of Espina                                        255
        Purpose of Spain                                       256
        Resources of Spain                                     260


Appendixes

    Appendix I. The pacification of Mindanao by Ronquillo      269
            II. The pacification of Mindanao                   275
           III. The Moro raids of 1599 and 1600                279
            IV. Gallinato's expedition to Jolo                 283
             V. Olaso's expedition in 1629                     289
            VI. Corcuera's campaign in Jolo                    291
           VII. Obando's report on the preparations to be
                undertaken to return Alimud Din to Sulu        305
          VIII. Obando's report on the circumstances
                attending the attempt to return Alimud
                Din to Sulu                                    307
            IX. Report on the occupation of Palawan and
                Balabak                                        313
             X. A brief report on the expedition to take
                possession of Palawan                          317
            XI. The letter of the King of Spain to Sultan
                Israel                                         319
           XII. Letter from the captain-general of the
                Philippines forwarding a copy of the treaty
                of peace, protection, and commerce with Sulu   321
          XIII. Royal directions relative to commerce with
                Sulu, and the advisability of making
                Zamboanga a free port                          325
           XIV. Camba's report on the circumstances
                attending the treaty of 1836 and its bases     333
            XV. Camba's report on commerce with Sulu and
                the advisability of making Zamboanga a free
                port                                           339
           XVI. Communication from the governor of Zamboanga
                to the supreme government of the Philippines,
                relative to the treaty of Sir James Brooke
                with the Sultan of Sulu                        345
          XVII. Communication from the supreme government of
                the Philippines to the secretary of state,
                relative to the treaty of Sir James Brooke
                with the Sultan of Sulu                        355
         XVIII. Regulations relative to taxes and imposts
                on natives and immigrants in Sulu              359
           XIX. The protocol of Sulu, of 1877, between
                Spain, Germany, and Great Britain              367
            XX. The protocol of Sulu of 1885, between Spain,
                Germany, and Great Britain                     371
           XXI. Decree of the general government in regard
                to payment of tribute by Sulus                 375
          XXII. Royal communications relative to the rights
                of foreigners to the pearl fisheries of Sulu   377
         XXIII. Royal directions relative to the treatment
                of foreigners engaged in pearl fishing in
                the Sulu waters                                383
          XXIV. La Torre's views on the policy that should
                be adopted in Mindanao and Sulu                385


Maps and Diagrams

    Map I. The Sulu Archipelago                      Frontispiece
                                                    Facing page--
       II. Sulu Island                                        128
      III. Sketch of Jolo before 1888                         134
       IV. Sketch of Jolo at the present time                 134
    Diagram 1. Sultans and royal datus of Sulu                158
            2. Datus of Sulu not descended from Abu Bakr      158







PREFACE


The first object sought in the search for the Genealogy of Sulu was
a knowledge of those significant historical events of Sulu which
antedated the Spanish discovery and conquest of the Philippine
Islands, the connection which those events might have had with the
earlier history of the other islands and the light that they might
throw upon the subject of prehistoric Malayan immigration to the
Archipelago. The tarsila (genealogies) [1] of Mindanao show that
events of considerable importance had occurred in the Archipelago,
especially in the south, long before the Portuguese or the Spaniards
reached Malaysia. Some tribes, such as the Samals, we were told, had
emigrated from western Malaysia to the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao,
and indications were not wanting that probably other tribes, now
inhabiting the Philippine Islands, came from the same place. Further,
information was desired relative to the mohammedanization of Sulu and
the possible connection that such a movement might have had with the
introduction of Islam into Sumatra and Malacca.

The research so conducted was well rewarded. The history of Sulu
was traced as far back as the early days of its oldest settlements,
and the organization of the nation was followed back to the primitive
communities out of which the Sulu nation has grown. Records of early
Malayan expeditions and of communication between Sulu and Mindanao
were traced to the earliest missionaries who reached these Islands
by the way of Malacca, and through whom the sultanates of Mindanao
and Sulu were organized on plans similar to those of Malacca and
Palembang. A fuller account of the life history and work of these
missionaries will be given in a later paper of this series. We here
give only a narrative of the events in which they participated and
the part they played in making the history of Sulu proper.

Many difficulties were encountered in the effort to secure an authentic
copy of the Genealogy of Sulu. Several trips of 20 to 40 miles were
made in small Moro sailing craft to visit datus who were said to have
copies of this document. The Sulu authorities who had the manuscript
or copies of it denied this fact from time to time, but after two
years and a half of persistent endeavor and inquiry, the original
manuscript was procured from the prime minister of the Sultan of Sulu,
whose confidence was gained by a long period of intimate acquaintance
and frequent communication. Soon after that, the Annals of Sulu (the
Luntar) were obtained from the sultan and some facts of importance were
learned and made use of in the course of this work. Diligent effort was
further made to collect all interesting Sulu traditions and documents,
and most of the best informed Sulus living were interviewed. Of these
the author feels under special obligation to mention Sheikh Mustafa
bin Ahmad, formerly prime minister to Sultan Harun; Hadji Butu, prime
minister of the present Sultan of Sulu; Datu Pangiran; and Hadji
Mohammed Tayib, one of the principal advisers of the present sultan.

After the first object sought had been gained, it became apparent
that a general public interest in Sulu and Mindanao had been growing
rapidly. It therefore seemed advisable to complete the history of
Sulu up to the date of Spanish evacuation, for no such work has as
yet been published in the English language. It is of special interest
to Americans living in Mindanao and Sulu and of general interest to
Americans and others elsewhere to have a better understanding of the
Moros in general and to acquire some idea of the history of Islam
in the Philippine Islands. This the history of Sulu makes possible
for the reader in a most vivid and realistic manner. The history is
written without prejudice or bias, and events are related as they
appear in the light of facts, and by one capable of seeing things
from the standpoint of a Sulu as well as of a Spaniard.

Nothing reveals the true character of a nation, its capabilities,
tendencies, and resources, better than its history. There is no time
when such general intimate knowledge of a people is more interesting
and more needed than during the period of their regeneration, and
there can be no time when the history of the Sulus will be more
interesting than at present.

Besides the Moro sources above referred to, several authors in Spanish
and English have been consulted and quoted with due credit. Special
indebtedness must however be expressed to Col. Miguel S. Espina,
author of "Apuntes sobre Jolo," whose admirable work has been our
chief authority for the majority of the events which occurred after
the Spanish invasion of Sulu in 1578. Espina saw considerable service
in Sulu, was intimately acquainted with the Spanish administration of
Sulu affairs, and most of his information was derived from official
documents and other sources of equal authenticity. Most of the events
relating to the late period of Spanish occupation of Sulu have been
confirmed by personal investigation, and the Sulu view of every matter
of significance has been studied and understood.

A chapter on the geography of the Archipelago is presented first to
give a general idea of the geographical relations of the Archipelago
of Sulu, the location of its various islands and settlements, and its
commercial resources. Special attention has been given to accurate
spelling of names and the correct location of settlements and small
islands. Unusual pains have been taken to get satisfactory maps of the
Archipelago and Island of Sulu and sketches of the town of Jolo. These
will help the reader and add interest to the succeeding chapters.

In the Appendixes will be seen reprints of various documents, reports,
quotations and letters of direct and significant bearing on the history
of Sulu and Mindanao. They are arranged in chronological order and
are intended to complete the record and description of important
events in Moro history so as to throw light on the actual conditions
of life among the Moros, the political motives of the interested
powers, and the real state of affairs in Mindanao at the time of the
Spanish evacuation. The source from which each article is derived is
given in connection therewith. A considerable number of quotations or
chapters have been taken from "The Philippine Islands," by Blair and
Robertson, for which special obligation is hereby expressed. Many of
the official documents given could not be conveniently incorporated
in the text of the history proper, and are herein published, probably
for the first time. They include protocols, capitulations, official
letters, decrees, and correspondence relative to Sulu obtained from
the Division of Archives of the Philippine Islands. The originals of
the copies can be seen in Spain in the Indies Archives.

Some liberty has been taken in correcting the spelling of geographical
and other proper names in order to render the history uniform in
its orthography and to avoid confusion and misconnection of events,
persons, and places. The same system of orthography has been used here
as that used and described in Part 1 of Volume IV, Ethnological Survey
Publications. Diacritical signs to denote the long sounds of vowels
have, however, been very rarely used. The Arabic "hamzat," occurring
in Moro words has been expressed by an apostrophe; while an inverted
apostrophe has been used to represent the Arabic sound or character
"`ain," the eighteenth letter of the Arabic alphabet. Annotations
which occur in the original documents have generally been indicated
by letters, while those made by the author are denoted by figures.


Manila, January, 1907.







CHAPTER I

GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO [2]


IN GENERAL

The Sulu Archipelago is a series of small volcanic islands which
extends in a northeast and southwest direction between the meridians
of 119° 10' and 122° 25' east, and the parallels of 4° 30' and 6°
50' north. It forms a continuous chain of islands, islets, and coral
reefs, which connects the peninsula of Zamboanga with the northeastern
extremity of Borneo and separates the Sulu Sea from the Celebes Sea. It
marks the southern line of communication between the Philippine Islands
and Borneo and is probably the chief route of former emigrations and
travel from Borneo to Mindanao and the southern Bisayan Islands.

The islands of the Archipelago are so disposed as to form several
smaller groups, the most important of which are the following: The
Basilan Group, the Balangingi or Samal Group, the Sulu Group, the
Pangutaran Group, the Tapul or Siasi Group, and the Tawi-tawi Group.

The Basilan Group is the first on the north and includes the Island
of Basilan and fifty-six small adjacent islands, all of which lie
north of the parallel of 6° 15' north and east of the meridian of
121° 19' east. This group, under the name of Basilan, constituted
the sixth district of the politico-military government of Mindanao,
organized by the Spanish Government in 1861. Since that date the
islands forming this group have not been recognized politically as
a part of the Sulu Archipelago.

Basilan is the largest island in the Archipelago. Its northernmost
point is about 10 miles directly south of Zamboanga. The island is more
or less circular in outline and has a radius approximately 11 miles
long. Its area is about 400 square miles. Two prominent headlands
projecting, one on the east and one on the west, give the island a
maximum length of 36 miles. The greatest width, north and south,
is 24 miles. The eastern headland is long and has a picturesque,
conical peak, called Mount Matangal, which rises about 648 meters
above sea level. This peak is a very prominent landmark, visible
to a great distance from all points in the Celebes Sea and in the
Straits of Basilan. The western headland is less prominent. It has
an isolated peak about 287 meters above the sea, immediately north
of the settlement of Pangasa'an. The position of this peak makes it a
conspicuous landmark to vessels entering the Straits of Basilan from
the Sulu Sea.

The surface of the island is high and hilly. Twenty-three peaks
are recognized, forming two distinct series or ranges, central and
peripheral. The central region of the island is an elevated tableland,
out of which rise a number of peaks forming the central series and
ranging from 609 to 1,019 meters above sea level. A thick forest covers
this region. The rivers are small and dry up in the dry season. Few
Yakans are to be found there, and their houses are isolated and far
apart. No cultivation is carried on in the interior. On the outside
of this region rises the peripheral series of hills or peaks which
lies parallel and near to the coast. With the exception of two,
all of these peaks are below 304 meters in height. The drop from
this line of hills to the coast is rapid in some places, and in
general the shore line is low and swampy and covered with mangrove
trees. The three largest valleys in the island are those of Gubawan
or Lamitan on the northeast, Kumalarang on the northwest, and Malusu
on the west. This region is generally considered fertile, but it has
a marked dry season and droughts are not rare.

The island is very rich in timber; all its hills and mountains are
forest-clad to their summits. Excellent boats are constructed on the
south and west coasts of the island which rival the Tawi-tawi boats
in every particular. A few Americans have started hemp and coconut
plantations on the north coast, but native cultivation is not extensive
and compares very poorly with that of the Islands of Sulu, Tapul, and
Siasi. Most of the cultivation on the island is carried on by Yakans,
the Samals living chiefly on the products of the sea. The staple
products of the soil are rice, tapioca, and corn. Ubi (a kind of tuber
used as food), camotes (sweet potatoes), and wild fruits abound. The
number of cattle is not inconsiderable, but horses are few. Most of
the settlements on the island are on the sea coast and lie on the north
and west coasts. The larger ones, beginning at Isabela and going east,
are, on the north, Isabela, Patasan or Balaktasan, Malu'ung, Nipa,
Lamitan, Tagima, and Kandi'is; on the east, Tambunan, Buhi-lubung,
and Ubung; on the south, Amalwi, Giyung, and Mangal; on the west,
Libuk, Kabkaban, Kanas, Malusu, and Pangasa'an; on the north, Bulansa,
Atung-atung, Batanay, and Panigayan. [3] The prominent chiefs of the
island live at Lamitan, Ubung, and Malusu, which form the principal
centers of native power. The old name of Basilan was Tagima, so called
after the name of the old settlement of Tagima mentioned above.

Isabela may be considered as the capital of Basilan. Its old name is
Pasangan, which is still the name of the stream at the mouth of which
it is built. The town is situated 4 miles inland, on the narrow channel
which separates Basilan from the small island of Malamawi. The channel
widens a little at this point and forms an excellent harbor. Under
Spanish jurisdiction it was a naval station with a dry dock for
gunboats. An aqueduct furnishes the town with fresh water brought
from a small stream in the neighborhood. The stone fort Isabel II,
built on the hill in 1842, commands both entrances of the channel. It
was designed to defend the town against the Moros. The abandonment
of the town as a naval station has led to its present decline. An
American sawmill planted there has been the chief source of lumber
supply for the town of Zamboanga and neighborhood.

The largest islands in this group, excepting Basilan, are Baluk-baluk
and Pilas, both of which lie west of Basilan. A narrow channel which
lies in the direct route leading from Zamboanga to Jolo separates
these two islands. Tapiantana, Salupin, Bubwan, and Lanawan are the
largest islands of the group south of Basilan.

The population of this whole group is generally estimated at 25,000. Of
these, 15,000 live in Basilan itself. The inhabitants of Basilan proper
are Yakans and Samals, while the adjacent islands are occupied entirely
by Samals. The Yakans are the aborigines of Basilan and extend farther
into the interior than the Samals.

Basilan never enjoyed political independence. Before Spanish rule
it was governed by Sulu datus and paid tribute to the Sultan of
Sulu. Under the datus, subordinate Samal panglimas [4] and maharajas
[5] had charge of the various communities or settlements. The Samals
of Basilan are at present stronger than other Samals and enjoy a
greater degree of liberty and self-government than their brothers in
the Tawi-tawi Group.

The Balangingi Group lies east of the meridian of 121° 28' east, and to
the south of the Basilan Group. It has nineteen islands, the principal
ones of which are Tonkil, Balangingi, Simisa, Tatalan, Bukutwa, Bulim,
Bangalaw. The islands of this group are small and low and do not exceed
38 square miles in area. Their inhabitants are Samals. The people of
Balangingi and Tonkil were notorious pirates. They built strong forts
and once surpassed all other Samals in power, political organization,
and prosperity.

The Sulu Group lies west of the Balangingi Group and north of the
parallel of 5° 46' north. Its western boundary may be sent at the
meridian of 120° 46' east. It consists of about twenty-nine islands
with a total area of 380 square miles. The principal island of this
group is Sulu. To the north of Sulu lie Pangasinan, Marongas, Kabukan,
Bubwan, Minis, Hegad, and a few others; to the east lie Tulayan,
Kapwal, and Bitinan; to the south, Pata and Patyan.

Tulayan lies north of Tandu and is separated from it by a narrow
strait. It has a good harbor on the southern side. It was ceded to the
English in 1763 by Sultan Alimud Din I out of appreciation of the favor
done in releasing him from prison in Manila and reinstating him as
Sultan of Sulu. The English, however, never made any use of the island.

Pata is, next to Sulu, the largest island of the group. It is
mountainous and well populated. The description of the Island of Sulu
is given separately at the end of this chapter.

The Pangutaran Group lies west of the Sulu Group and north of the sixth
parallel. It has fourteen islands and an area of 72 square miles. The
principal members of the group are Pangutaran, Pandukan, North Ubian,
Laparan, and Tababas or Cap. They are all low and flat with little more
than trees visible from the sea. They are surrounded by coral reefs
and sand banks, which in places form lagoons which can be entered only
at high water. The drinking water in these islands is brackish in the
hot season and has a black color during rains. Very often the people
go as far as the Island of Sulu to get good water. Pangutaran is the
fifth island in the Archipelago in size, being 11 miles long, north
and south, and 8 miles wide, from east to west. Its chief settlement is
Maglakub. Its northern and eastern coasts are the best populated. The
inhabitants of this group are chiefly Samals; few Sulus are found
mixed with them. Coconut trees and tapioca plants grow well in places.

The Siasi Group lies to the south and west of the Sulu Group, east
of the meridian of 120° 33' east, and north of the parallel of 5°
24' north. It has thirty-eight islands with an aggregate area of 77
square miles. Its population is estimated at 20,000. The principal
islands of this group are Siasi, Pandami, Lugus, Tapul, Laminusa,
and Kabinga'an. The first four are volcanic islands of some size;
the last two are low and flat. Tapul is the nearest island of the
group to Sulu. It is more or less round in circumference and rises
in the middle to a picturesque conical peak 505 meters above the
sea. It is about 5 miles in diameter and is separated from Lugus by
a very narrow channel. The island is 8 miles south of Sulu Island,
is well cultivated, and appears very attractive from the sea. It
supports a considerable population and has several fairly prosperous
settlements. The people are mostly Sulus; they are very warlike and
take great pride in their traditions.

The chief settlement of this island is Kanawi, where lives Sharif
Alawi, the strongest chief on the island. Buhangin Hawpu, Pangpang, and
Pagatpat lie on the southern coast, east of Kanawi. The settlements on
the western coast are, beginning at the south, Suba Pukul, Kawimpang,
Tigbas, Banting, Kutabatu, Bagus; on the northern coast, Kawimpang,
Pangdan; on the eastern coast, Sampunay, Tulakan.

Lugus is a larger island. Its long diameter extends 9 miles east and
west, and it has an area of 18 square miles. It is hilly and rough;
but the northern shore is fairly well cultivated.

The chief settlements are on the western coast. They are Basbas,
where Datu Amilusin used to live, and Bulipungpung. On the north lie,
beginning at the east, Gapas, Ba'it-ba'it, and Hawit, the place of
Maharaja Sharafud Din; on the east Kalu'ukan, the residence of Panglima
Salahud Din; and on the south Aluduyung, and the Island of Munupunu.

Siasi and Pandami are separated by a narrow channel which forms a
good anchorage for vessels. Siasi is prettier than Tapul in form
and is larger, but not equally wooded. It has an isolated, conical,
and beautiful peak in the center rising to a height of 509 meters
above sea level. The island is about 7 miles in diameter and has an
area of 39 square miles. Reefs and numerous islets form a fringe off
the east and south coasts and these teem with Samal houses. It is
thickly settled, fairly well cultivated, and has, in proportion to
its size, a considerable number of horses and cattle. The majority
of the people are Samals, but the chief rulers and some of their
retinues are Sulus. In this respect this island follows the general
rule governing all the larger islands of the Archipelago outside of
Sulu Island. The town of Siasi is on the western side. It lies on the
Pandami Channel and has a good harbor. A spring rising at the base of
the western slope of the mountain supplies the town with fresh water.

A detachment of Spanish troops occupied the town in 1882 and built
a stone fort and barracks. American troops were there from 1900 to
1904, when they were relieved by a detachment of the Philippine
Constabulary. An effort was made in 1899 by the present sultan,
Jamalul Kiram II, to retain Siasi under his own jurisdiction for
the establishment of a custom-house where he could collect duties
on foreign goods, as was formerly done by his father; but no such
rights were conceded to him. Siasi is a closed port at present. The
residents of the town are Samals and Chinese traders. They vary from
500 to 700 in number. The other settlements on the island are, on the
north, Siyundu, Pagatpat, and Manta; on the east, Pamungunan, Tanjun,
Sipanding, and Bulikulul; on the south, Dugu, Latung, and Musu; on
the west, Nipanipa, Jambanganan, Dungus, and Sablay; in the interior,
Kabubu, Ju, and Kungatad. Siasi and Laminusa are important centers
of pearl and shell fishing. About 2,000 Samals live on Laminusa.

Pandami is an attractive island. Its long diameter runs north
and south. Two round peaks, one at each end of the island, give
it the shape of a saddle and make a picturesque sight from the
sea. The people are chiefly Samals ruled by Sulu datus. Its best
settlements are on the west and south. The name given to this island
on Spanish maps is Lapak, which is the name of one of its southern
settlements. The northern extremity of the island is Diadia Point,
the northeast projection is Butun Point. The chief settlements on
the west are, beginning at the north, Subasuba, Tabunan, Pari'an
Pandami, Tubig-shina, Lahi, and Sibawud, which lies on a reef off
the southern point of the island. On the east lie Ambilan, Bakal,
and Lapak. Laminusa and Kabinga'an lie to the east of Siasi. They
are small but thickly populated by Samals. The chief settlements of
Laminusa are Tampan on the north and Kungkung on the south.

The Tawi-tawi Group lies to the south and west of the Tapul Group and
extends as far west as the Sibutu Passage. This is the largest group
in number and area, including eighty-eight islands with a combined
area of 462 square miles. Its population is estimated at 25,000. These
islands form two distinct divisions or subgroups, differing in both
extent and population.

The first or northern division includes Bangao, Sangasanga, Tawi-tawi,
Tandu-batu, and a large number of smaller islands, all of which
are rough, volcanic, mountainous, and very sparsely populated. The
second or southern division is a series of low, flat islands which
are smaller in area but more thickly populated than those of the
northern division. The principal names, beginning at the east, are
the following: Kinapusan, Bintulan, Tabawan, South Ubian, Tandubas,
Sikubun, Lata'an, Mantabwan, Banaran, Bilatan, Manuk-manka, and
Simunul. Extensive reefs and narrow channels and shoals separate these
islands from one another and from those of the northern division,
rendering navigation between them impossible except in vessels of
very light draft.

Bangao, Sanga-sanga, and Tawi-tawi are separated by very
narrow channels and are practically one island. Bangao forms the
southwest extremity and is substantially one solid rock which rises
perpendicularly to a height of 228 meters. It is a conspicuous landmark
to vessels going through the Sibutu Passage. The town of Bangao is
a military station and an open port; it has an excellent landlocked
harbor and a very poor water supply. The town has been occupied by
troops since 1882, but it has never attained any size or importance.

Tawi-tawi Island is a continuous range of hills covered by thick and
rich forests. The highest points in the range are the Dromedary peaks
(591 meters) lying about the center of the island. The length of the
island is about 34 miles and its greatest width 14 miles. It is next
in size to the Island of Sulu, but it is very sparsely populated. Its
chief settlements are Tungpatung, Balimbang, Lissum, and Bu'an on the
south coast, and Tawi-tawi, Tata'an, Butung, Tumhubung, Tumbaga'an,
Languyan, and Bas on the north. At Balimbang are built the best types
of Sulu and Samal boats. Good timber abounds in the neighboring hills,
and the little bay is transformed into a shipyard. The town used
to be a famous rendezvous for Samal pirates. Tata'an had formerly a
Spanish garrison; the present Moro town is a little distance to the
south of the ruins of the fort and is called Butung. It is built on
the hillside and commands a pretty view of the sea. It lies 100 miles
east of Lahat Datu, East Borneo. The anchorage is deep and safe,
being well protected by a large semicircle of reefs. A boa 30 feet
long was killed on the island in 1903. Rubber and gutta-percha are
found on this island. Tapioca and ubi are the staple products.

Sibutu lies in a little group of the same name, situated between
the Tawi-tawi Group and Borneo and at a distance of about 15 miles
from each. The Sibutu Passage separates it from Manuk-manka, the
southernmost island of the Tawi-tawi Group, and the Alice Channel from
Borneo. This island did not lie within the limits of the Philippine
Islands as defined in the Treaty of Peace of December 10, 1898. It was
ceded by Spain with Kagayan Sulu, by a separate treaty in November,
1900. Its close proximity to Borneo renders it a convenient stopping
place for small Moro boats navigating between Borneo and Sulu. Sitanki,
an island and town, is the trade center of this group, and has just
lately been made an open port.



ISLAND OF SULU


GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES

Sulu is an island of irregular shape and among the islands of the
Archipelago is next in size to Basilan. Its longest diameter runs east
and west and approximates 37 miles, while its average length does not
exceed 32 miles. Its greatest width is 14 miles and its average width
about 10 miles. The main structure of the island is volcanic, but it
is surrounded with a coral reef formation, which is most extensive
in the bays and on the south.

Two indentations of the northern shore at Jolo and Si'it and two
corresponding indentations of the southern shore at Maymbung and
Tu'tu', divide the island into three parts--western, middle, and
eastern.

The Bay of Jolo is quite open and faces the northwest. It is very
shallow near the shore and its head constitutes the roadstead of
Jolo. The Bay of Maymbung is a deeper indentation, but it is narrower
and shallower than the Bay of Jolo. The town of Maymbung lies at the
head of the bay and is about 9 miles south of Jolo in a direct line.

The Bays of Si'it and Tu'tu' indent the island to such an extent as
to leave only a neck of land, less than 4 miles wide, connecting the
middle and eastern parts of the island. The settlement of Si'it lies
at the head of the bay and in the immediate vicinity of a small lake
of the same name. The shores of the Bay of Tu'tu' are marshy and are
covered with mangrove trees. The bay is very shallow to a considerable
distance from shore. Tu'tu' is the principal settlement near the head
of the bay.

The backbone of the island is a mountain range which runs east and
west and lies nearer to the northern shore. The highest point is Mount
Tumangtangis, at the western extremity of the range. This mountain
reaches a height of 853 meters above sea level and descends very
rapidly to the western coast near Timahu. A spur of the mountain
terminates in Point Pugut at the northwestern extremity of the
island. [6]

Toward the east, the ridge descends to a much lower level at Bud Datu,
Bud Agad, and Bud Pula, which lie immediately to the south of Jolo. It
rises again in Mount Dahu to an altitude of 716 meters. Mount Dahu is
a prominent landmark and forms the most picturesque landscape in the
background of Jolo. It is a steep and conical extinct volcano, similar
to, but smaller and more regular in form than Mount Tumangtangis. East
of Mount Dahu is another gap in which lies Tambang Pass. Beyond this
the range rises again at Mount Tambang and continues uninterrupted to
Mount Sinuma'an, at the extreme end of Lati, and Mount Bagshag. After
Mount Bagshag the range descends gradually toward Su' and Si'it. The
northern slopes of Mount Tumangtangis and Mount Dahu, and the crest of
Bud Datu are covered with grand forests, while the crests and lower
slopes of Bud Agad and Bud Pula are partly cultivated and partly
covered with tall grass.

From the shores of the Bay of Jolo the land rises gradually and
presents a beautiful green appearance. The northern aspect of this
whole range and its beauty were appropriately described by Mr. Hunt,
as follows:


    There are few landscapes in the world that exhibit a more
    delightful appearance than the seacoasts of Sulu; the luxuriant
    variety of the enchanting hills exhibits a scenery hardly ever
    equaled and certainly never surpassed by the pencil of the
    artist. Some with majestic woods that wave their lofty heads
    to the very summits; others with rich pasturage delightfully
    verdant, with here and there patches burnt for cultivation,
    which form an agreeable contrast with enameled meads; others,
    again, exhibit cultivation to the mountain top, checkered with
    groves affording a grateful variety to the eye--in a word, it
    only requires the decorations of art and civilized life to form
    a terrestrial paradise. [7]


To the south of Bagshag [8] lies a small extinct volcano called Panamaw
or Pandakan, whose crater is now a lake. East of Si'it rise the Lu'uk
mountains of Urut, Upao, and Tayungan. From these the range extends
to Bud Tandu at the eastern extremity of the island.

The highlands near the southern coast of the island divide into three
separate regions. The first and westernmost lies west of Maymbung
and forms the principal highlands of Parang. The highest points in
this region are Mount Tukay, east of the town of Parang, and Mount
Mabingkang, east of Tukay. To the east of Maymbung rise Mount Talipao
and Mount Kumaputkut, which form the middle and second region. The
third region is the southern part of the Lu'uk country. Its highest
point is Mount Bulag, to the north of Tandu-Panu'an.

Between Mount Tukay and Mount Tumangtangis lies Bud Gapang. Midway
between Mount Talipao and Bud Datu is Mount Kumuray, in the
neighborhood of Langhub.

The largest streams on the island are Tubig Palag and Bina'an. The
first is generally known as the Maymbung River. It passes through
the settlement of Maymbung and empties into the head of the bay of
the same name. It drains the southern slopes of Mounts Tumangtangis,
Pula, Dahu, and Kumuray. The Bina'an stream drains the southern
slopes of Mount Sinuma'an and the northern slopes of Mounts Talipao
and Kumaputkut and empties into the Bay of Tu'tu'.



PRINCIPAL COAST SETTLEMENTS

Beginning at Jolo and going west along the northern coast we pass
the following points of interest: The first is Point Baylam, the
western limit of the Bay of Jolo. At the head of the small bay that
follows lies the settlement of Matanda, where a Spanish blockhouse
marks the western limit of the Jolo line of fortifications. Next
comes Point Mangalis and the receding beach of Bwansa, the old
capital of Sulu. Here and in the next bay, at Malimbay and Kansaya,
Samal boats assemble in favorable weather for fishing. Back of these
settlements the land rises rapidly to Mount Tumangtangis. A teak
forest of considerable size lies between Tumangtangis and Jolo.

Outside of the wall of Jolo and to the east lies the settlement of
Busbus, where criminals formerly were chopped to death after being tied
to a tree. A mile beyond is Mubu, where the old residence of Sultan
Harun stands out prominently. Copious springs of fresh water issue at
this place at a point near the high-water mark. A mile farther east we
come to Tandu (point or cape), where Datu Kalbi lives. This point is
generally known as Tandu Dayang Ipil [9] and marks the eastern limit
of the Bay of Jolo. The isolated hill of Patikul rises immediately
behind Tandu. The settlement of Patikul lies still farther away on
the beach. Here lives Datu Julkarnayn (Alexander the Great), the
brother of Datu Kalbi. The beautiful region lying between Patikul
and the mountains of Tambang and Sinuma'an is called Lati.

Buhanginan lies about midway between Patikul and Higasan. At the
latter place or Tandu Manuk-manuk the shore line recedes toward the
south. Opposite this point lies the Island of Bakungan. Next comes
the larger settlement of Taglibi, above which rises Mount Ta'ung; then
Bunbun, near a point which marks the western entrance into the Bay of
Si'it. Midway between Bunbun and the head of the bay is Su', which may
be said to mark the boundary line between Lati and Lu'uk. Si'it is
a small settlement near the head of the bay. Beyond Si'it the shore
line turns north until it reaches Kansipat. About 2 miles farther, a
semicircular reef off the shore makes the excellent and well-protected
small harbor of Bwal. A large spring of pure, fresh water adds to this
place another natural advantage, one which gave it the prominence it
had in former days. The entrance into the harbor is very shallow and
allows only sailboats of light draft. The channel lies close to the
shore on the west side. Opposite the Island of Tulayan lie Tandu-batu
and a little farther inland Kuta Makis. Limawa lies about 3 miles
farther on near a point opposite the Island of Buli Kuting. Behind
this island and at the head of a shallow cove lies Patutul, the chief
settlement of Tandu. East of Bud Tandu is Tandu Pansan, the easternmost
point of the island. The eastern coast is exposed to storms and appears
rocky and barren, though the hills behind it are well cultivated.

The first point on the southern coast is Tandu Panu'an, behind which
lies the settlement of Sukuban. This marks the southern extremity of
the boundary line between Tandu and Lu'uk. The country behind Kuta
Sihi' and Pitugu appears rich and well tilled. The hills come down
to the beach. Near the point at the eastern limit of Tu'tu' Bay lies
Kambing. The neighboring country is rich and prosperous. It is governed
by Maharaja Bayrula, one of the wisest and best chiefs of Sulu. West
of Kambing lie Pandang-pandang, Tubu-manuk, and Tu'tu'. The shore is
a continuous mangrove marsh, while the country behind is about the
richest and best tilled land on the whole island. The western side
of Tu'tu' Bay has few places of importance. The country behind is
picturesque and hilly, but not as well populated as other parts of
the island. Lubuk, Kabungkul, and Lumapit are the chief settlements.

Beyond the point of Buhangin Puti', the shore line bends again north
and the Bay of Maymbung begins. Here mangrove swamps are extensive and
extend a good distance inland. The greater part of Maymbung is built on
piles over the water. It is surrounded by swamps on all sides. After
the tide recedes, strong odors arise from the muddy bottom to such
an extraordinary degree as to render the atmosphere of the place
very disagreeable and often unbearable to strangers. The center of
the town is a small, open square of reclaimed land filled with coral
rocks. Around this square were built the houses of Sultan Jamalul
A`lam and his ministers of state. The present sultan lives on a hill
about half a mile inland from the town. The square was probably the
site of the Maymbung fort which was destroyed by General Arolas in
1887. Some Chinese traders live in the town and export hemp, pearls,
pearl shells, etc., through Jolo. The population of the town and its
immediate suburbs varies considerably, but it is generally estimated
at 1,000. Beyond Maymbung the coast bends sharply to the south. In
the immediate vicinity of Maymbung lies Bwalu. A mile west of this
place begins the district of Parang. After Lipid and Lapa comes
Kabali'an, the western limit of the Bay of Maymbung. The shore line
then takes a more westerly direction. Passing Dandulit and Lakasan,
we reach Tandu Put, where the western coast of the island begins. This
southern region of Parang is well populated and is very pretty and
productive. Cultivated areas are seen on the side of the mountains
everywhere and they reach the very summit of Mount Tukay.

The town of Parang is one of the largest settlements on the island
and has, at present, an estimated population of 1,000. It is situated
at the head of a small open bay facing the southwest and commands
a beautiful view of Tapul and Lugus and the intervening sheet of
water. It is the capital of the district and has one of the best
markets in the Archipelago for fish, shells, and pearls. The drinking
water in this neighborhood is brackish.

An islet lies off the shore near Tandu Bunga. Beyond this point the
shore line turns north to Bwisan, which is one of the most prosperous
settlements in the district. Beyond Alu Pangku' the coast inclines a
little east and runs to Silankan and Timahu. Extensive coconut groves
and well-cultivated fields and fruit trees of various kinds abound
all along the coast from Parang to Timahu.



DISTRICTS OF THE ISLAND

The districts of the island conform in a great measure to its natural
divisions. However, political reasons have modified the natural
boundaries and increased the districts to six by division. These
districts are Parang, Pansul, Lati, Gi'tung, Lu'uk and Tandu. The first
district on the west is Parang. A line joining the western limit of
Bwalu on the south coast, with a point slightly east of the summit of
Mount Tumantangis, and projected to the sea on the north, delimits
this district on the east and carves out of the western natural
division the district of Pansul. The eastern boundary of Pansul is a
line running from a point 2 or 3 miles east of Maymbung to Mount Pula
and Busbus. The chief reason for separating Pansul from Parang was
to reserve for the sultan direct control over Jolo and Maymbung. This
district has more foreigners residing in it than any other.

A line joining Su' and Lubuk marks the eastern limit of both Lati and
Gi'tung, the third and fourth districts. The watershed line joining
the summits of Mounts Dahu, Tambang, and Sinuma'an and falling on
the east to the vicinity of Su', divides Lati on the north from
Gi'tung on the south. For all practical purposes the district of
Lati may be said to lie between Jolo and Su', and the district of
Gi'tung or Talipao between Maymbung and Tu'tu'. The land joining
Si'it and Tu'tu' is low. Sulu traditions say that when the Samals
arrived in the island this neck of land was submerged and the island
was divided by a channel of water. The extinct volcano of Pandakan,
generally spoken of as the "Crater Lake," which lies in this vicinity,
may be of late origin and may have been the source of the geologic
deposits which helped to fill the channel. Spanish records speak of
a volcanic eruption in the vicinity of Jolo as late as 1840, and it
is very likely that other volcanic action occurred prior to that date
and after the arrival of the Samals in the fourteenth century.

A line joining Limawa on the north and Sukuban or Tandu Panu'an on
the south, divides Lu'uk from Tandu, thus forming the fifth and sixth
districts respectively. A line joining Mount Tayungan and Bud Tandu
divides both Lu'uk and Tandu into a northern and a southern part. In
both cases the southern parts are more fertile and better cultivated
and probably more thickly populated than the northern.

The Sulus are principally agriculturists. The greater part of the
people are farmers and a considerable portion of the interior of the
island is under cultivation. They raise a good number of cattle,
carabaos, and horses, which they utilize for tilling the soil and
transporting its products. Trails cross the island in all directions
and the interior is in easy communication with the sea. Fruits are
good and abundant. The forests are rich in jungle products and in
timber. Some copra and hemp is raised and the amount is being increased
annually. The staples are tapioca, rice, and corn. Sugar cane is raised
in small quantities. Ubi and taro are fairly abundant. Some coffee is
produced, but disease destroyed most of the plantations. Some tobacco
and vegetables are raised for home consumption only.

Jolo is one of the best fish markets in the Philippine Islands. The
varieties of fish in Sulu waters are innumerable and of excellent
quality. The Island of Sulu surpasses Mindanao in the quality and
proportional amount of its fruit. There is an abundance of mangostins,
durians, nangkas (jack-fruit), lançones, [10] marangs, [10] mangos
of several varieties (mampalam, bawnu, and wanni), oranges, custard
apples, pineapples, bananas, etc.

In the extent and quality of cultivation the district of Lu'uk
ranks first, Parang second, and Lati third. Good fresh water abounds
everywhere except on the western coast. Considerable irrigation is
possible in many localities.



TOWN OF JOLO.


GENERAL PLAN, BUILDINGS AND STREETS

Jolo is the Spanish representation (or rather misrepresentation) of
the word Sulu, sometimes written Sooloo. The early Spaniards wrote it
"Xolo," which later changed to Joló. The complete form of the word is
Sulug, as it is rendered in Magindanao. The Sulus pronounce it and
write it Sug. Sug means a sea current. The flow of the tide through
the innumerable narrow channels separating the numerous islands of
the Archipelago gives rise to unusually strong currents which figure
prominently in the seafaring life of the people. Therefore the term
is an appropriate designation for the Archipelago as a whole.

The rulers of the island state have changed their capital four
times. The most ancient capital was Maymbung, the second was Bwansa,
which lies on the north coast of the island about 3 miles west of
Jolo. Here ruled Raja Baginda and the first three sultans of Sulu. The
fourth sultan moved to Sug, the third capital, and the town remained
the capital of the sultanate until 1876, the date of the Spanish
conquest and occupation. Sultan Jamalul A`lam then moved to Maymbung
and the Spaniards occupied the town. Since then the term Jolo has
become so intimately associated with it, that it is deemed preferable
to use it as a name for the town, while the term Sulu, which is more
correct and more commonly used, is retained in all other applications.

The town of Jolo has been so closely identified with the history
of the sultanate as to claim considerable attention. The Spanish
buildings and improvements were sufficiently extensive to obscure
the ancient landmarks of the town and to render a complete and
intelligent understanding of the early history and traditions of the
place impracticable. A few words describing the location of Jolo,
its ancient landmarks, and the Spanish improvements will therefore
be of primary interest.

The town as it stands at present is divided into four distinct
parts. The main or central part is Jolo proper or the "walled
town." This is known to the Moros as Tiyangi Sug meaning the "shops
or market of Sulu." The western half of this part bordering on Suba'
Bawang formerly was termed Luway. The second part, called San Remondo,
lies back and south of the walled town and is separated from it by a
little stream called Tubig Hasa'an. The third part is Tulay and lies
on the west side; the fourth is Busbus, on the east side.

At the head of the roadstead separating the Pueblo nuevo or Tulay from
Jolo proper or Luway is a small tidal stream formerly called Suba'
Bawang. Some maps designate it as Rio del Sultan. This stream extends
back into a swamp and divides into two branches. The main or direct
branch extends in a more or less southerly direction to a point about
700 meters from the mouth of the stream, where it rises in copious
springs of fresh water at the edge of the swamp. The other branch
is formed by the junction of the rivulet that rises in the springs
of San Remondo with Tubig Hasa'an. The latter has its origin at the
foot of the hills above the cemetery and Blockhouse No. 2. Hasa'an
means grindstone, and the springs are said to have burst out of the
spot where a grindstone was set for use. Another stream, termed Suba'
Ligayan, drains the northern slopes of Buds Datu and Agad, and running
north, passes by Fort Asturias and through Tulay, and empties into
the roadstead of Jolo at a point about 250 meters west of the mouth
of Suba' Bawang. A branch of this stream formerly issued at Asturias
and connected with the main stream of Suba' Bawang. The land which
thus lay between Suba' Bawang and Suba' Ligayan was a delta. It was
called by the Moros u-laya (that is, the head of the net) because
of its triangular shape. It was mostly marshy, but it had a central
longitudinal strip of dry land which practically connected Tulay with
the base of the hills, at Asturias. At the upper end of this strip
there existed at one time a well-defined, sandy spot, different in
formation from the surrounding land, which was considered sacred and
was supposed to be the first land formed on the island. This spot was
Sug proper; after it was named the whole settlement which was built
along the banks of Suba' Bawang and at the head of the roadstead.

The Sultan's palace, termed istana, his kuta (fort) and stockades
were built along the lower left bank of the stream Bawang; hence the
name Rio del Sultan. On the right bank lay the houses and stockades
of the other datus of high rank. Two bridges connected one side of
the stream with the other.

On the outskirts of the town lay various kuta belonging to subordinate
datus, which defended the approaches to the town. The most famous of
these kuta was Daniel's Fort, the best stronghold of Sulu. On the
site of this fort was built in 1878 the fort or redoubt of Alfonso
XII, which was lately replaced by the present headquarters building
of the military post of Jolo. Another strong fort was built at the
foot of the hills just above the head of the delta above described;
it defended the inland approach to the town. This was Panglima Arabi's
kuta, on the site of which Fort Asturias was erected. Another kuta
was located on Point Baylam.

The principal part of the town was formerly built over the shoal and
beach at the head of the bay. Extensive rows of buildings stretched
out into the roadstead and in front of the buildings now occupied as
the clubhouse and military hospital. The present "Chinese pier" is
constructed on the same plan. This extensive row of houses and shops
begins at the lower point of the Tulay delta and stretches straight out
into the sea. The bay is very shallow here and appears to be fairly
well protected from severe storms. A variety of fish called tulay,
after which the Moro town of Tulay is named, is caught in the bay. A
swamp bounds the town on the south and west, affording it considerable
protection from assault. However, it is open to attack from the sea
and from the east. The land on the east is high and affords the only
desirable site for residences. Here the strongest forts and defenses
were erected.

The Spaniards built the central part of Jolo first. They raised it
considerably above sea level by extensive fillings, and surrounded it
by a loop-holed wall, 8 feet high and 1 1/2 feet thick, for protection
from Moro assaults. The new town was beautifully laid out with broad,
clean streets lined with double rows of arbol de fuego (fire trees),
ylang-ylang, [11] acacia, and other varieties of trees, some of
which are large and magnificent. Three parks, each one block in
size, added considerable picturesqueness to the place. Substantial
quarters were built for the officers, all houses were painted white
or whitewashed, and none of them had the nipa roofs so common in the
Archipelago. Business places, storehouses, a large market place, a
church, a theater, two schoolhouses, and a hospital were erected and
a public water supply provided. A stone pier was built extending 120
meters into the sea, and provided with a light-house at its outer end.

The town wall had five gates, two of which lay on the northwest or sea
front, one at the foot of the pier, and the other close to it. Through
the latter gate cargo was admitted from small boats, which can always
come up to this point at high water. The three other gates lay on the
land side, one at the south end of the town toward Tulay, another at
the opposite extremity facing Busbus, and a third one at the southern
end of Calle [12] Buyon, directly facing San Remondo. This last is the
only gate of the three kept open at present and is the only entrance
into the town from the land side. A tower called Torre de la Farola
surmounts the gate. Near the Busbus gate and forming the northeast
angle of the town was the fort or redoubt termed Alfonso XII. It was
built on a prominent eminence and commanded an extensive view of the
bay, the town, and the surrounding country.

In the immediate vicinity lay the Cuartel España, which was a large
and substantial building occupying the northern extremity of the
town, facing the bay on the side of Busbus. At the extreme end of
the wall beyond the barracks was the tower or blockhouse called Torre
Norte. Another similar tower at the south gate was termed Torre Sur. At
the intersection of the south wall and the beach line was a strong
building called Cuartel Defensivo de las Victorias. The block lying
diagonally between this cuartel and the market had eight buildings
which were known as Casas de la Colonia para Deportados.

Two roads and two bridges connected the south and southeast gates
with San Remondo. The continuation of these roads formed the two
main streets of this part of the town. San Remondo has six small town
blocks, nearly all of which are on reclaimed swamp land. The buildings
here are mere nipa huts and the streets are muddy and narrow, unlike
those of the walled town. Back of the town lies a large coconut grove
which extends to Blockhouse No. 2 on one side and Asturias on the
other. A straight and well laid out road directly connects these two
latter points and marks the southern limit of the town.

A good road runs outside the wall connecting Busbus and Tulay. Later
usage has applied the term Tulay to all parts of the town lying west
of Suba' Bawang. Formerly the name Tulay was applied only to that
part lying west of Suba' Ligayan, while the intermediate section was
known as Pueblo nuevo. The bridge across the mouth of Suba' Bawang was
termed puente del sultan. On the other side of the bridge this street
extends through Pueblo nuevo and along the central strip of u-laya,
or the delta, to Fort Asturias, thus separating the waters of Suba'
Bawang from Suba' Ligayan. Midway between Tulay and Asturias stands an
obelisk-like monument erected by General Arolas and bearing the date
1892. Further fillings in Tulay have provided for several streets,
the chief one of which is the direct street running to the Chinese
pier and then on to the blockhouse of the playa [13] and the Ligayan
River. A large bridge crosses this river to Tulay proper. The road
ends at the beach a little beyond the bridge. In the central plaza at
Tulay stands a monument erected by General Arolas in 1891 in memory of
the three renowned conquerors of Jolo. On one side the monument bears
the inscription "A la gloria de los que con su esfuerzo hicieron esta
tierra Española;" the second side bears the inscription "Corcuera,
17 de Abril de 1638;" the third side, "Urbistondo, 28 de Febrero
de 1851;" the fourth side, "Malcampo, 29 de Febrero de 1876." A
straight road about three-fourths of a mile long called the Asturias
Road directly connects Asturias with the main entrance of the walled
town. Another road starts at this latter point and running along the
right bank of Tubig Hasa'an reaches the cemetery on the opposite side
of Blockhouse No. 2. The old bridge connecting a branch of this road
with the one running from Asturias to Blockhouse No. 2 was washed
away by a severe freshet in 1904, thus breaking what had formerly
been a complete circle of roads around the town.

Busbus is wholly occupied by Moros. Its houses are dilapidated
nipa huts built on piles over the water. Back of the town is a
marsh which extends a little way toward the base of the hills. The
water from the marsh escapes into the bay by two rivulets, the first
of which runs through the settlement and is known as Tubig Uhang;
the other is artificial, forms the outer limit of the town, and is
called Buyung Canal. Persons convicted of capital crimes in the days
of the independent sultanate were tied to a tree at this place and
there their bodies were chopped to pieces; hence the name "Busbus"
which means to "chop up" or "dress wood."



TRADE

Jolo lies about 4 miles from the point of intersection of latitude 6°
north and longitude 121° east. It is about 540 nautical miles due
south from Manila and 81 nautical miles distant from Zamboanga. The
harbor is deep and free from currents. The bay is well protected on
the north by the Islands of Pangasinan and Marongas and is safe from
all storms except those from the northwest.

Sulu occupies the most nearly central position of any island in eastern
Malaysia. It lies between Mindanao on the east and Borneo on the
west, and separates the Sulu Sea from the Celebes Sea. The commercial
advantages of this position are unique. To the north lie the Bisayas,
Palawan, Luzon, Formosa, China, and Japan; to the east Mindanao and
Basilan; to the south, the Moluccas, Celebes, and Java; to the west,
Borneo, Sumatra, and the Malay Peninsula. Besides, the Sulus are
natural-born sailors, and their famous pearl industry has prompted
them to trade since time immemorial. Their boats brought silk, amber,
silver, scented woods, and porcelain from China and Japan; gold dust,
wax, dyes, saltpeter, slaves, and food stuffs from Luzon, the Bisayas,
and Mindanao; gunpowder, cannon, brass, copper, iron, rubies, and
diamonds from Malacca and Bruney; [14] pepper and spices from Java,
the Moluccas, and Celebes. Chinese merchants traded with Sulu long
before the arrival of Legaspi, and while Manila and Cebu were still
small and insignificant settlements Jolo had reached the proportions of
a city and was, without exception, the richest and foremost settlement
in the Philippine Islands. Jolo, with the exception of Bruney, had
no rival in northeast Malaysia prior to the seventeenth century.

Such commercial importance naturally attracted the attention of
the early Spanish Governors-General and was one of the causes which
led to the early invasion of Sulu. The long period of warfare which
followed this invasion retarded the progress of Jolo and reduced its
trade. Again, the rise of Spanish commerce in the north tended to
restrict the trade of Jolo. The growth of Manila, Cebu, and Iloilo
naturally diverted the commerce of Luzon and the Bisayas and the north
coast of Mindanao to those cities. The later commercial decline of
Jolo was probably brought about more in this way than as a result of
actual clash of arms. Jolo, however, remained an important port and
a transshipping station to Mindanao until a late date.

At present trade has assumed new proportions and is following new
routes. Zamboanga, Kotabato, and Davao are directly connected with
Manila by regular steamship lines, and Jolo is fast losing its
importance as a transshipping port. Zamboanga, on the other hand,
is rising in importance and seems destined to become the port of
Mindanao. It is the capital of the Moro Province and lies in the
direct route connecting China, Manila, and Australia. It has direct
communication with Manila, Hongkong, Singapore, and Australia, and
is gradually diverting the trade of Mindanao from Jolo.

In spite of overwhelming odds, however, Jolo will maintain considerable
commercial importance. It has well-established trade relations with
Borneo, the Malay Peninsula, China, and Luzon, and is connected
by regular steamship lines with Sandakan, Singapore, Manila, and
Zamboanga. Practically the whole trade of the Sulu Archipelago passes
through this port, and it stands now, as ever before, as the center
of business, power, and importance of the whole district of Sulu.

In the early days the trade of Sulu was carried on by Moros and
Chinese. The Chinese appear to have entered the Archipelago prior
to its mohammedanization, and the commercial relations of China
and Sulu are really prehistoric. As hostilities between Spain and
Sulu increased, Sulu traders became less daring and grew fewer and
fewer. Chinese traders, on the other hand, were less molested and
conditions encouraged their increase. The "Chinese pier" is a very
old business establishment, and Chinese traders and merchants have
resided in Jolo for many generations. Their number, in 1851, exceeded
500. At present Chinese merchants have complete control of the trade
of the Sulu Archipelago. They are found everywhere and command all the
avenues of commerce. The Sulus have abandoned commerce as a trade and
apparently have no inclination to resume it on any large scale. This
is due mainly to the decline of their power and the present abeyance
of their national life. A new political revival will no doubt change
their attitude and may bring about a surprising development in arts
and trades as well as of commerce.

The trade between Jolo and various islands and settlements of the
Archipelago is carried on by means of innumerable small Moro boats and
sloops termed sapits. Formerly such boats traded with Bruney, Sandakan,
the Celebes, Java, and all the various islands of the Philippine
Archipelago, but the stricter enforcement of the customs regulations,
which followed the establishment of open ports at Sitanki, Bangao, and
Kagayan Sulu, had the effect of checking trade with foreign countries
in such small boats and tended to concentrate the whole trade of the
Archipelago at Jolo. A review of the imports and exports of the port of
Jolo will therefore throw considerable light on the material resources
of the Archipelago, its industries, and the enterprise of the natives.




Port of Jolo

IMPORTS

====================================================================
|                                          |     Fiscal year--     |
|                Commodity                 |-----------------------|
|                                          |   1905    |   1906    |
|------------------------------------------|-----------+-----------|
| Animals, etc                             |      $214 |       $71 |
| Brass, manufactures of                   |     6,402 |     2,548 |
| Breadstuffs                              |     4,881 |     3,870 |
| Cement                                   |       745 |       989 |
| Coal                                     |     4,208 |           |
| Coffee                                   |       621 |       872 |
| Cotton cloths, close woven               |    82,999 |    80,381 |
| Cotton cloths, loose woven               |    14,053 |    14,338 |
| Carpets                                  |     5,379 |           |
| Yarn and thread                          |    18,059 |    19,594 |
| Knit fabrics                             |     2,688 |     3,564 |
| Cotton cloths, all other manufactures of |       949 |     2,079 |
| Dyes                                     |     2,691 |     3,807 |
| Opium                                    |    14,578 |     6,601 |
| Earthen and stone ware                   |     1,494 |     2,419 |
| Fibers, vegetable                        |       308 |       153 |
| Dried fish                               |       216 |       456 |
| Shell fish                               |       375 |       497 |
| Fruits, canned                           |       272 |       254 |
| Fruits, not canned                       |       362 |       407 |
| Glass and glassware                      |       694 |       415 |
| Iron, steel, and manufactures of         |     3,640 |     2,916 |
| Malt liquors                             |     2,020 |       822 |
| Matches                                  |       956 |       372 |
| Mineral oils                             |       742 |     1,339 |
| Vegetable oils                           |       536 |       503 |
| Paints                                   |       979 |       299 |
| Paper and manufactures of                |     2,123 |     1,816 |
| Condensed milk                           |     1,516 |     1,363 |
| Rice                                     |    76,172 |    57,416 |
| Silk and manufactures of                 |     1,614 |     1,318 |
| Soap                                     |       724 |       610 |
| Spirits, distilled                       |     1,643 |     1,108 |
| Sugar, refined                           |     4,314 |     2,987 |
| Tea                                      |       646 |       489 |
| Tobacco and manufactures of              |       586 |       367 |
| Vegetables                               |     1,204 |     1,919 |
| Wearing apparel                          |           |     3,699 |
| Wood and manufactures of                 |     2,270 |     1,646 |
| Wool and manufactures of                 |     2,282 |       206 |
| All others                               |     8,126 |     7,262 |
|                                          |-----------+-----------|
|     Total in U. S. currency              |  $274,281 |  $231,772 |
|     Total in Philippine currency         |  P548,562 |  P463,544 |
====================================================================


EXPORTS

==========================================================
|                                |     Fiscal year--     |
|            Commodity           |-----------------------|
|                                |   1905    |   1906    |
|--------------------------------+-----------+-----------|
| Animals                        |       $42 |       $70 |
| Hemp                           |       486 |     5,561 |
| Cordage                        |     5,084 |     5,054 |
| Fish                           |     7,893 |    13,151 |
| Copra                          |    17,870 |    30,052 |
| Copal                          |     3,793 |     4,458 |
| Gutta-percha                   |       108 |     3,939 |
| Hides                          |       839 |       867 |
| Mother-of-pearl (shells)       |    88,516 |    60,051 |
| Tortoise shell                 |     1,971 |     2,856 |
| Shells, all others             |     4,249 |    11,864 |
| All others                     |     8,033 |     4,610 |
|                                |-----------+-----------|
|   Total in U. S. currency      |  $138,884 |  $142,533 |
|   Total in Philippine currency |  P277,768 |  P285,066 |
==========================================================



Port of Zamboanga [15]

IMPORTS

============================================================
| Agricultural imports           |       P250 |        P40 |
| Wheat flour                    |      6,048 |     18,378 |
| Cement                         |      3,088 |     12,966 |
| Coffee                         |      5,656 |     10,646 |
| Copper, manufactures of        |        838 |        686 |
| Cotton cloths, close woven     |     92,254 |     97,866 |
| Cotton cloths, loose woven     |      9,628 |     33,714 |
| Cotton wearing apparel         |      2,136 |      5,152 |
| Cotton yarn and thread         |     25,032 |     34,862 |
| Cotton, knit fabrics           |      6,278 |      4,380 |
| Cotton, all other manufactures |      1,840 |      5,118 |
| Opium                          |      8,928 |     26,254 |
| Earthen and stone ware         |      1,406 |      5,016 |
| China ware                     |        262 |        388 |
| Hats and caps                  |      1,164 |        598 |
| Iron, sheet                    |      6,470 |     12,786 |
| Cutlery, table                 |         76 |        142 |
| Cutlery, all other             |        120 |         96 |
| Nails, wire                    |        500 |        530 |
| Boots and shoes                |        762 |      2,884 |
| Beer in wood                   |      None. |        198 |
| Beer in bottles                |      8,410 |     42,618 |
| Other malt liquors             |      1,902 |        548 |
| Matches                        |         60 |        988 |
| Tin, manufactures of           |        188 |         40 |
| Oil, petroleum                 |      4,850 |      8,600 |
| Milk, condensed                |      3,200 |      5,972 |
| Rice, husked                   |    119,572 |    161,642 |
| Brandy                         |        814 |      3,212 |
| Whiskey, bourbon               |        822 |      1,240 |
| Whiskey, rye                   |      1,030 |        376 |
| Whiskey, all other             |      6,668 |     19,566 |
| Sugar, refined                 |      3,566 |      5,488 |
| Tea                            |      1,346 |      2,484 |
| Zinc, manufactures of          |        880 |        834 |
| All other imports              |     49,712 |     86,807 |
|                                |------------+------------|
|   Total in Philippine currency |    375,756 |    613,115 |
============================================================


EXPORTS

======================================================
|                              |    Fiscal year--    |
|          Commodity           |---------------------|
|                              |   1905   |   1906   |
|------------------------------+----------+----------|
| Bejuco (rattan)              |     P700 |   P1,594 |
| Fish                         |       60 |    1,886 |
| Coconuts                     |    None. |    2,258 |
| Copra                        |  125,734 |  157,398 |
| Almaciga [16]                |      632 |      288 |
| Copal                        |   19,906 |   31,582 |
| Gutta-percha                 |    2,282 |   28,370 |
| Rubber                       |    None. |    None. |
| All other gums and resins    |      910 |    None. |
| Hides, carabao               |      362 |      316 |
| Beeswax                      |    None. |    3,024 |
| Shells, mother-of-pearl      |    2,440 |    2,420 |
| Shells, tortoise             |    8,708 |    7,638 |
| Shells, all other            |    2,224 |   10,320 |
| Salt                         |    None. |    1,508 |
| Wood, all kinds              |    1,346 |    1,076 |
| All other exports            |    9,590 |    9,860 |
|                              |----------|----------|
| Total in Philippine currency |  174,894 |  259,538 |
======================================================


The above statements of the imports and exports of the port of Jolo for
the fiscal years 1905 and 1906 have been obtained through the kindness
and help of Mr. E. B. Cook, collector of customs for Jolo. They
represent the total value of the imports and exports of the town to
and from foreign ports only. They do not, however, give an idea of the
grand total of the imports and exports of the Archipelago. Account
must also be taken of the large amount of commodities smuggled into
the country by means of small boats which continually run between
the Tawi-tawi Group and Kagayan Sulu on the one side and Borneo and
Palawan on the other. Moreover, it is difficult to tell what part of
the trade of Basilan and the Samal group of islands is retained by Jolo
and what part has lately been drawn away by Zamboanga. Besides, some
trade between Sulu and Basilan, on one side, and Mindanao, Negros,
and Cebu on the other, is carried on by sailing craft; no account
of this is taken either at Jolo or Zamboanga. Since July 1, 1905,
all boats under 15 tons register have not been required to present at
the custom-house manifests of goods carried. It is clear, therefore,
that no correct estimate or opinion can be rendered on the strength
of these figures, unless one is aided by personal observation and
knowledge of actual conditions previous to July 1, 1903.

Estimating the population affected by the trade of Jolo, at 100,000,
we note that the importation of cloths and woven materials amounted
to P204,431 in 1905 and P196,836 in 1906, or 37 per cent and 42
per cent of total imports, respectively. There is no doubt that the
weaving industry among Sulus and Samals is far from being adequate to
furnish clothing material, and European cotton cloths are therefore
extensively used throughout the Archipelago.

The importation of rice amounted to P152,344 in 1905 and P114,832 in
1906, or 27 and 24 per cent of the total imports, respectively. The
Sulus are agriculturists and should be able to raise sufficient rice
for themselves and the Samals. The islands most fitted for this
purpose are Sulu, Basilan, Tapul, Siasi, Pata, and Pandami. The
Samals are not agriculturists as a rule and seldom raise anything
except tapioca and corn. They generally live on flat, low islands,
unfit for the cultivation of rice. The Archipelago as a whole should
produce sufficient rice, tapioca, corn, and camotes to feed the whole
population. The importation of rice in 1905 was probably in excess
of the average amount; less rice was raised that year because of war
and general disturbances.

The commodities of next importance are yarn and thread for weaving
purposes. Importation of these articles amounted to P36,118 in 1905
and P39,188 in 1906, or 7 and 8 per cent, respectively. The country
does not produce silk, cotton, or wool.

All other imports may be regarded as accessories. Of these opium
comes first, then dyes, breadstuffs, sugar, iron, steel, brass, paper,
and earthenware. A considerable amount of tobacco is imported by the
government free of duty, and quantities of tobacco, opium, and cloths
formerly were smuggled in. The reduction of imports in 1906 may be
due to increased production, to the depression that followed the
disturbances of 1904 and 1905, and to a diversion of certain parts
of the trade to Zamboanga.

The exports, on the other hand, show a light increase in 1906. They
distinctly represent those resources of the country which are most
capable of development. At the head of the list stands the shell
industry, particularly the pearl shell, which amounted to P189,472 in
1905 and P149,542 in 1906, or 64 and 52 per cent of total exports,
respectively. The exportation of shell has lately been greatly
affected by the falling of the price of pearl shell in the market of
Singapore. The exportation of other shells seems, on the contrary,
to have increased. Pearl fishing is the principal industry of the
country and forms the main source of its riches. The fishing is done
exclusively by natives, but the trade seems to be wholly in the hands
of Chinese. The figures given above do not include pearls. It is
very difficult to obtain any statistics for this valuable product,
but on the whole it is reckoned by merchants as equivalent to the
whole output of shell.

Second in importance comes copra, which amounted to P35,740 in
1905 and P60,104 in 1906, or 12 and 21 per cent of total exports,
respectively. The marked increase of this export in 1906 may
be explained partly by increased production and partly by the
general damage done to the trees in 1905 by locusts. Increase in the
cultivation of coconut trees is not perceptible and can not account
for the increase in exportation.

Dried fish comes third in order, amounting to P15,786 in 1905
and P26,302 in 1906. This industry is capable of unlimited
development. The fertility of the Sulu Sea is unusual and can hardly
be surpassed. Nothing but enterprise and organized effort is needed
to render this trade a source of enormous wealth to the country. The
natives are exceedingly skillful in fishing, but lack ambition and
initiative. The trade in fish is mostly in the hands of Chinese
merchants.

Fourth in importance comes hemp. Both in fiber and cordage its exports
amounted to P11,140 in 1905 and P21,230 in 1906. Hemp culture has
markedly improved during the last year, and the increased production
is sufficient to explain the increase in exportation. Coconut trees
and hemp grow splendidly on all the larger islands of the Archipelago,
and their cultivation is capable of extensive development.

Copal and gutta-percha are the products of Sulu, Basilan, and the
Tawi-tawi Islands. Although sufficiently important in themselves,
they sink into insignificance when compared with the four primary
staple products and the immense possibilities that lie in the line
of their development.

The greater part of the trade of Jolo is handled by the Jolo Trading
Company, the firm of Hernandez & Co., and the commercial houses of
Chaun Lee and Ban Guan, all of which are controlled and managed by
Chinese merchants. The following list compiled in the office of the
Jolo Trading Company, for the Far Eastern Review, is a fair estimate
of the prospective exports of the town for the coming two years:


===================================================================
|                 Article         |  Amount   | Price |   Total   |
|---------------------------------+-----------+-------+-----------|
|                                 |  Piculs.  |       |           |
| Hemp                            | 1,000     |   P21 |   P21,000 |
| Pearl shells                    |   150     |    45 |     6,750 |
| Trepang or beche-de-mar         |    50     |    30 |     1,500 |
| Shark fins                      |    20     |    45 |       900 |
| Hemp rope                       |    30     |    25 |       750 |
| Caracoles (sea shells           |           |       |           |
| for buttons, etc.)              |    40     |    12 |       480 |
| Black shells                    |    10     |     8 |        80 |
| Copra                           |   500     |     7 |     3,500 |
| Seaweeds                        |    40     |     4 |       160 |
| Hides                           |    10     |    20 |       200 |
| Cacao                           |    10     |    50 |       500 |
| Tortoise shells                 |     1-1/2 | 1,800 |     2,700 |
| Sea horses                      |           |       |       240 |
|---------------------------------+-----------+-------+-----------|
|       Grand total               |           |       |    38,760 |
|=================================================================|


Hemp is generally exported to Manila, while the other articles
mentioned in the above table are generally exported to Singapore.

Trepang, shark fins, seaweed, and sea horses are foods highly prized
by the Chinese.

If the value of pearls taken is estimated on the basis suggested by
the president of the Jolo Trading Company, it will bring the total
up to P58,760 per month.



POPULATION

The present population of Jolo is less than 2,000. This includes
all the natives and foreigners living in Tulay and Busbus; but the
United States troops are excepted. The bulk of the inhabitants is
made up of Filipinos, Chinese, and Moros. The census report of 1903
gives the following statistics, which include Tulay and San Remondo,
but not Busbus:


        ====================================
        |     Color      | Males | Females |
        |================+=======+=========|
        | Brown          |   309 |     306 |
        |                |=================|
        |   Ilokano      |    10 |       4 |
        |   Moro         |     9 |      98 |
        |   Tagalog      |   103 |      66 |
        |   Bisayan      |   161 |     132 |
        |   Foreign born |    26 |       6 |
        | Mixed          |    74 |      48 |
        | Yellow         |   429 |      56 |
        | White          |    31 |      17 |
        |                |=======+=========|
        |     Total      |   843 |     427 |
        ====================================


          Walled town                    541
          Tulay                          615
          San Remondo                    114
                                       -----
                Total                  1,270


Males of voting age

        Brown:
            Filipino               189
                Ilokano        9
                Moro           4
                Tagalog       75
                Bisayan      101
        English                     14
        French                       1
        All others                   5
        Mixed:
                  Filipino           1
                  Chinese            8
                  English            2
        Yellow:
                  Chinese          392
                  Japanese           1
                  English            3
        White:
                  American          22
                  Spanish            2
                  All others         1
                                   ---
                         Total     641


As the great majority of the "mixed" population have Chinese fathers,
they, as a rule, follow Chinese custom and trade and may be regarded
as Chinese. The Chinese element may therefore be classified as follows:


        =======================================
        |  Chinese  | Males | Females | Total |
        |-----------+-------+---------+-------|
        | Pure      |   429 |      56 |   485 |
        | Mixed     |    70 |      45 |   115 |
        |           |-------+---------+-------|
        |     Total |   499 |     101 |   600 |
        =======================================


The Filipinos may be classified as follows:


        =======================================
        | Filipinos | Males | Females | Total |
        |-----------+-------+---------+-------|
        | Brown     |   274 |     202 |   476 |
        | Mixed     |     4 |       3 |     7 |
        |           |-------+---------+-------|
        |     Total |   278 |     205 |   483 |
        =======================================


The census statistics give a full and clear idea of the composition
of the resident population of the town in 1903. The Chinese and
their offspring, amounting to 600, undoubtedly form the preponderant
element. The Filipinos come next, amounting to 483 only. Considerable
change has, however, occurred since the census was taken, and
necessitates a revision of the above figures. The increase of the
garrison and the construction of many new buildings for the military
post has caused an influx of Filipinos from Zamboanga and Kotabato,
and more Chinese have undoubtedly come in since 1903. The census
figures again do not include Moros, some hundreds of whom live at
present in Tulay and Busbus.

The following, based on close personal observation, is considered a
fair estimate of the present population:


    ==============================================================
    |           |  Walled | San Remondo | Tulay | Busbus |  Jolo |
    |           |    town |             |       |        |       |
    |-----------+---------+-------------+-------+--------+-------|
    | Moros     | [17] 30 |          30 |   300 |    350 |   710 |
    | Chinese   |     250 |          10 |   400 |     20 |   680 |
    | Filipinos |     170 |         100 |   250 |        |   520 |
    |           |---------+-------------+-------+--------+-------|
    |     Total |     450 |         140 |   950 |    370 | 1,910 |
    ==============================================================


The inhabitants of the town are more or less migratory
in character. The population is constantly changing. Few are
property owners. The majority are traders, carpenters, and domestic
servants. The Filipinos were originally "camp followers" and still
feel as strangers in the land. Many of the Moros living at Tulay
and Busbus are of mixed origin. The mixture is chiefly of Sulus and
Samals, with each other and with Chinese. The Jolo type of Moros is
by no means pure Sulu and has consequently misled many authors and
ethnologists. A large number of Samals frequent Tulay and Busbus and
often temporarily reside there, but because of their strong migratory
habits no estimate has been made of them.

A few Arabians, Malays, and Indian traders are married in the country,
but their proportion is small and insignificant at present.







CHAPTER II

GENEALOGY OF SULU


TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

The manuscript of which a translation follows is an exact copy of
the original, which is in the possession of Hadji Butu Abdul Baqi,
the prime minister of the Sultan of Sulu. The genealogy proper begins
on page 6 of the manuscript and is written entirely in Malay. This
was the rule among all old Moro writers and is a decided indication
of the authenticity of the document.

Hadji Butu maintains that his ancestry goes back to Mantiri [18]
Asip, one of the ministers of Raja Baginda, the Sumatra prince who
emigrated to Sulu prior to the establishment of Mohammedanism in the
island. The Sulu ministry seems to have remained in Asip's lineage
down to the present time.

The first five pages of the original manuscript are the genealogy of
Asip's descendants. This part is written in Sulu and was probably
composed at a later period than the Malay part of the book. It is
written by Utu Abdur Rakman, the nephew of Imam Halipa, who is the
son of Nakib Adak, the last person mentioned in the genealogy. Abdur
Rakman is a cousin of Hadji Butu.

The addition of these five pages to the Genealogy of Sulu is for the
purpose of giving prominence and recognition to the sons of Asip,
who have been the right-hand men of the Sultans of Sulu since the
organization of the sultanate.



SULU AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION

This is the genealogy of the sultans and their descendants, who lived
in the land of Sulu.

The writing of this book was finished at 8 o'clock, Friday the 28th
of Thul-Qa`idat, [19] 1285 A. H.

It belongs to Utu [20] Abdur Rakman, [21] the son of Abu Bakr. It
was given to him by his uncle Tuan [22] Imam [23] Halipa [24]
Abdur Rakman. This is the genealogy of the Sulu sultans and their
descendants.



DESCENDANTS OF ASIP

This is the genealogy of Mantiri [25] Asip, the hero and learned man of
Menangkabaw. [26] Mantiri Asip had the title of Orangkaya [27] at the
time he came to Sulu with Raja [28] Baginda. [29] He married a woman
from Purul [30] called Sandayli and begot Orangkaya Sumandak. Sumandak
begot Orangkaya Manuk [31] and Orangkaya Hamba. [32] Manuk begot
Orangkaya Buddiman [33] and Orangkaya Akal [34] and Orangkaya Layu
and Satya [35] Akum. His daughters were Santan, Satan, Ambang, Duwi,
Sitti, [36] and Tamwan. Orangkaya Buddiman begot Orangkaya Salimin [37]
and Dayang [38] Saliha. [39] The former begot Hinda Da'ar Maputra and
Utu Undik, Dayang [40] Patima, [41] Dayang Bahira, [42] and Dayang
Sawira. Dayang Saliha bore Idda. Akal begot Orangkaya Muhaddi, who
begot Hinda Human. Orangkaya Layu begot Dayang Jawsul [43]-Manalum,
who became famous. Manalum bore Ma'asum, Bulaying and Jamila. [44]
Jamila bore Itang. Ma'asum begot Bayi. Bulayin begot Inda and Duwalang.

Jawsul begot Na'ika and Rajiya. [45] The former begot Orangkaya
Sila. Rajiya bore Tuan Aminud [46] Din. [47] Santan bore Ma'mun. [48]
Ma'mun begot Orangkayas Utung and Amang. Satan bore Palas and
Bahatul. Bahatul begot Abdul Hadi. [49] Ambang bore Orankayas
Amin and Bunga. [50] Orangkaya Amin begot Rajiya and Zakiya. [51]
Zakiya is the mother of Orangkaya Sila. Rajiya is the mother of Tuan
Aminud-Din. Bunga begot Aliya and Salima. [52] Salima bore Hinda
Baying Gumantung.

Duwi bore Manduli and Immang. Manduli is the mother of Tuan Iman Anda
and Na'ima. [53] Immang bore Mali. Sitti bore Orangkayas Ugu, Garu,
Abu Bakr, Abu Samma, Manawun, Sayda, and Suda. Allak begot Ila and
Malum. [54] Ila bore Andungayi. Malum is the father of Imming. Tamwan
bore Ima. Ima begot Angkala. Angkala begot Inung. Inung begot Hinda
Nakib [55] Adak.



DESCENDANTS OF TUAN MASHA'IKA

This is the genealogy of Tuan Masha'ika. It was said by the men
of old that he was a prophet who was not descended from Adam. He
was born out of a bamboo and was esteemed and respected by all the
people. The people were ignorant and simple-minded in those days and
were not Mohammedans of the Sunni sect. Some of them worshiped tombs,
and some worshiped stones of various kinds.

Masha'ika married the daughter of Raja Sipad the Younger, who was a
descendant of Sipad the Older. His wife's name was Idda [56] Indira
[57] Suga. [58] She bore three children, Tuan Hakim, [59] Tuan Pam,
and 'Aisha. [60] Tuan Hakim begot Tuan Da'im, [61] Tuan Buda, Tuan
Bujang, Tuan Muku, and a girl. Da'im begot Saykaba. Saykaba begot
Angkan. Angkan begot Kamalud [62] Din, and Katib [63] Mu`allam [64]
Apipud [65] Din, and Pakrud [66] Din, and many girls.

Tuan May begot Datu Tka, who was surnamed Dina, Lama and Timwan. Dina
begot Abi [67] Abdul Wakid [68] and Maryam. [69]



ORIGINAL AND LATER SETTLERS OF SULU

This chapter treats of the original inhabitants of the Island of
Sulu. The first dwellers of the land of Sulu were the people of
Maymbung, whose rulers were the two brothers, Datu Sipad and Datu
Narwangsa. After them came the people of Tagimaha, who formed another
party. After these came the Bajaw (Samals) from Juhur. These were
driven here by the tempest (monsoon) and were divided between both
parties. Some of the Bajaw were driven by the tempest to Bruney and
some to Mindanao. After the arrival of the Bajaw, the people of Sulu
became four parties. [70] Some time after that there came Karimul
[71] Makdum. [72] He crossed the sea in a vase or pot of iron and
was called Sarip. [73] He settled at Bwansa, [74] the place where
the Tagimaha nobles lived. There the people flocked to him from all
directions, and he built a house for religious worship.

Ten years later Raja Baginda [75] came from Menangkabaw to
Sambuwangan. [76] From there he moved to Basilan and later to
Sulu. When he arrived at Sulu the chiefs of Bwansa tried to sink
his boats and drown him in the sea. He therefore resisted and fought
them. During the fight he inquired as to the reason why they wanted to
sink his boats and drown him. He told them that he had committed no
crime against them and that he was not driven there by the tempest,
but that he was simply traveling, and came to Sulu to live among
them because they were Mohammedans. When they learned that he was a
Mohammedan, they respected him and received him hospitably. The chiefs
of Sulu who were living at that time were Datu Layla [77] Ujan, Datu
Sana, Datu Amu, Datu Sultan, [78] Datu Basa, and Datu Ung. Another
class of chiefs called Mantiri were Tuan Jalal, [79] Tuan Akmat, [80]
Tuan Saylama, Tuan Hakim, Tuan Buda, Tuan Da'im, and Tuan Bujang. The
Tagimaha chiefs were Sayk [81] Ladun, Sayk Sahdu, and Sayk Bajsala. The
Baklaya chiefs were Orangkaya Simtu and Orangkaya Ingsa. All the
above chiefs were living at the time Raja Baginda came to Sulu.

There also came to Sulu from Bwayan, [82] Sangilaya Bakti and Sangilaya
Mansalah. The latter's wife was Baliya'an Ñyaga.

Five years after Raja Baginda's arrival at Sulu the Raja of Jawa
[83] sent a messenger to Sulu with a present of wild elephants. The
messenger's name was Jaya. He died at Ansang, and two elephants only
arrived at Sulu.

After that time there came Sayid [84] Abu Bakr from Palembang [85]
to Bruney and from there to Sulu. When he arrived near the latter
place he met some people and asked them: "Where is your town and where
is your place of worship?" They said, "At Bwansa." He then came to
Bwansa and lived with Raja Baginda. The people respected him, and
he established a religion for Sulu. They accepted the new religion
and declared their faith in it. After that Sayid Abu Bakr married
Paramisuli, the daughter of Raja Baginda, and he received the title
of Sultan Sharif. [86] He begot children, and his descendants are
living to the present day. He lived about thirty years in Bwansa.

After Abu Bakr, his son Kamalud Din succeeded to the sultanate. Alawad
[87] Din did not become sultan. Putri [88] Sarip lived with her
brother Alawad Din. Alawad Din married Tuan Mayin, the daughter of
Tuan Layla. After the death of Sultan Kamalud Din, Maharaja [89]
Upu succeeded to the sultanate. After the death of Upu, Pangiran [90]
Buddiman became sultan. He was succeeded by Sultan Tanga. The sultans
who followed are, in the order of their succession, Sultan Bungsu,
[91] Sultan Nasirud [92] Din, Sultan Karamat, [93] Sultan Shahabud
[94] Din, Sultan Mustafa [95] called Shapiud [96] Din, Sultan Mohammed
Nasarud [97] Din, Sultan Alimud [98] Din I, Sultan Mohammed Mu`izzid
[99] Din, Sultan Isra'il, [100] Sultan Mohammed Alimud Din II, Sultan
Mohammed Sarapud [101] Din, Sultan Mohammed Alimud Din III.



SULU HISTORICAL NOTES


INTRODUCTION

These notes were copied by the author from a book in the possession
of Hadji Butu, prime minister to the Sultan of Sulu. Pages 1, 2,
and 3 form a separate article. They appear to be a supplement to the
Genealogy of Sulu, but they were undoubtedly derived from a different
source. Their contents are well known to the public and are probably
an attempt on the part of Hadji Butu to register what seemed to him
a true and interesting tradition of his people.

Page 4 was copied by the author from an old, dilapidated document
which was torn in many places. It no doubt formed part of an authentic
genealogy of Sulu, older and more reliable than that of the manuscripts
on pages 148 and 149. It is written in Malay.

Page 5 is a copy of a Sulu document issued by Sultan Jamalul-Kiram I
in the year 1251 A. H., or about seventy-three years ago. It confers
the title of Khatib or Katib [102] on a Sulu pandita [103] named
Adak. In conferring a title of this sort it is customary among the
Sulus to give the person so honored a new name, generally an Arabic
one, such as Abdur Razzak. [104] The same custom is observed in the
case of accession to the sultanate and other high offices.

The writing at the top of the page is the seal of Jamalul Kiram. The
date given in the seal is the date of his sultanate. The flourish at
the end of the signature below is the mark of the writer.



SULU NOTES

Translation of page 1 of the original manuscript.--The first person
who lived on the Island of Sulu is Jamiyun Kulisa. [105] His wife
was Indira [106] Suga. [107] They were sent here by Alexander the
Great. [108] Jamiyun Kulisa begot Tuan Masha'ika. [109] Masha'ika
begot Mawmin. [110] Mawmin's descendants multiplied greatly. They
are the original inhabitants of Sulu and chief ancestors of the
present generation.

Translation of page 2 of the original manuscript.--In the days of
the Timway [111] Orangkaya Su'il the Sulus received from Manila four
Bisayan captives, one silver agong, [112] one gold hat, one gold
cane, and one silver vase, as a sign of friendship between the two
countries. One of the captives had red eyes, one had black eyes; one,
blue eyes; and one, white eyes.

Translation of page 3 of the original manuscript.--The red-eyed
man was stationed at Parang, [113] and is the forefather of all the
people of Parang. The white-eyed man was stationed at Lati, [114]
and is the forefather of all the people of Lati. The black-eyed man
was stationed at Gi'tung, [115] and is the forefather of the people
of Gi'tung. The blue-eyed man was stationed at Lu'uk, [116] and is
the forefather of the people of Lu'uk. At that time the religion of
Mohammed had not come to Sulu.

Translation of page 4 of the original manuscript.--The first
inhabitants of the Island of Sulu were the people of Maymbung. [117]
They were followed by the Tagimaha [118] and the Baklaya. [119] Later
came the Bajaw (Samals) from Juhur. Some Bajaws were taken by the
Sulus and were distributed among the three divisions of the island,
while others drifted to Bruney and Magindanao. Some time after that
there came Karimul [120] Makdum. [121] He sailed in a pot of iron and
the ancients called him Sharif [122] Awliya. [123] The Sulus adopted
the Mohammedan religion and brought Makdum to Bwansa. [124] There
the Tagimaha chiefs built a mosque. Ten years later there arrived
Raja Baginda, who emigrated from Menangkabaw. [125] Baginda came to
Zamboanga first. From there he moved to Basilan and Sulu. The natives
met him on the sea for the purpose of fighting him. He asked them,
"Why do you wish to fight a Mohammedan who is coming to live with
you?" He married there.


The commission of Khatib Abdur Razzak.

The Conqueror. By the order of the Omniscient King, The Sultan
Mohammed Jamalul Kiram. The year 1239.



Translation of page 5 of the original manuscript.--Dated Wednesday,
the tenth of Ramadan, in the year "D," the first, which corresponds
to the year 1251 of the Hegirah of the Prophet Mohammed, may the best
of God's mercy and blessing be his. This day his majesty our master,
the Sultan Jamalul [126] Kiram [127] has granted Adak an official
title by virtue of which he will be known as Khatib [128] Abdur [129]
Razzak. [130] This is done in conference and consultation and with
the consent of all the people, without dissent.


By the will of God the most High.

(Signed)      The Sultan Jamaul Kiram.


                               [The End.]







CHAPTER III

RISE AND PROSPERITY OF SULU


SULU BEFORE ISLAM

The Genealogy of Sulu is a succinct analysis of the tribes or elements
which constituted the bulk of the early inhabitants of the island and
is the most reliable record we have of the historical events which
antedated Islam.

The original inhabitants of the island are commonly referred to as
Buranun or Budanun, which means "mountaineers" or "hill people." This
term is occasionally used synonymously with Gimbahanun, which means
"people of the interior," and with Manubus in the sense of "savage
hill people" or "aborigines." Some of the old foreign residents of
Sulu maintain that they recognize considerable similarity between the
Buranun and the Dayaks of Borneo, and say that the home utensils and
clothes of the Sulus in the earlier days closely resembled those of
the Dayaks.

The capital of the Buranun was Maymbung. The earliest known ruler of
Maymbung was Raja Sipad the Older, of whom nothing is related except
that he was the ancestor of Raja Sipad the Younger. In the days of the
latter there appeared Tuan Masha'ika, about whose ancestry there seems
to be considerable ambiguity and difference of opinion. According to
the Genealogy of Sulu he was supposed to have issued out of a stalk
of bamboo, and was held by the people as a prophet. The traditions
state that Tuan Masha'ika was the son of Jamiyun Kulisa and Indira
Suga, who came to Sulu with Alexander the Great.

Jamiyun Kulisa and Indira Suga are mythological names [131] and in all
probability represent male and female gods related to the thunderbolt
and the sun, respectively. The former religion of the Sulus was of
Hindu origin. It deified the various phenomena of nature and assigned
the highest places in its pantheon to Indra, the sky; Agni, the fire;
Vayu, the wind; Surya, the sun. The ancient Sulus no doubt had many
myths relating to the marriages and heroic deeds of their gods by
which natural phenomena were explained, and it is not unlikely that
the above story of Jamiyun Kulisa was one of those myths. Taken in
this light, the above legend may express the belief of the ancient
Sulus that, by the marriage of the gods, Jamiyun Kulisa and Indira,
rain fell and life was so imparted to the soil that plants grew.

The word Masha'ika is so written in the Malay text as to suggest its
probable formation from two words Masha and ika. The Sanskrit word
Masha means "pulse" or "plant." Ika or eka means "one." On the other
hand masha-ika may represent the two parts of the Sanskrit mashika
which means "five mashas." It may not therefore be improbable that
masha-ika refers to the subordinate deity which assumes the form of
a plant or signifies the first man, whom the deity created from a
plant. It is not an uncommon feature of Malay legends to ascribe a
supernatural origin to the ancestor of the tribe, and Tuan Masha'ika
probably represents the admission into the Buranun stock of foreign
blood and the rise of a chief not descended from Rajah Sipad the
Older. The tarsila [132] adds that he married the daughter of Raja
Sipad the Younger, Iddha, [133] and became the forefather of the
principal people of Sulu.

The common belief among the Sulus that Alexander the Great invaded
their island is one of many indications which lead one to think that
most of their knowledge and traditions came by the way of Malacca or
Juhur, and possibly Tuan Masha'ika came from the same direction. It
does seem therefore as if the dynasty of Sipad was supplanted by a
foreign element represented by Tuan Masha'ika.

These two elements were later augmented by the Tagimaha who settled
at Bwansa and along the coast west of that point, and by the Baklaya
who settled on the same coast east of the present site of Jolo. The
four tribes thus brought so closely together mixed very intimately
and later lost their identity in the development of a single nation,
which reached its maturity under the guiding hand of a Mohammedan
master. In spite of later immigrations to the island and in spite of
conquest and defeat, the national character thus formed has remained
unchanged throughout history and the Sulu of to-day still maintains
that same individuality which he acquired in his earlier days.

The noted emigration of the Bajaws or Samals of Juhur must have begun
in the earlier parts of the fourteenth century, if not earlier. These
sea nomads came in such large numbers and in such quick succession as
to people the whole Tawi-tawi Group, the Pangutaran and Siasi Groups,
all available space on the coast of Sulu proper, the Balangingi Group,
and the coasts of Basilan and Zamboanga, before the close of the
century and before the arrival of the first Mohammedan pioneers.

The Samals exceeded the Sulus in number, and the effect of
such overwhelming immigration must have been considerable; but,
nevertheless, the Sulu maintained his nationality and rose to the
occasion in a most remarkable manner. The newcomers were taken into his
fold and were given his protection, for which they rendered noteworthy
service; but their relation was never allowed to exceed that of a
slave to his master or that of a subject to his ruler, and the Samals
thus remained like strangers or guests in the land until a late date.

Besides the Samals, some Bugis [134] and Ilanun emigrants gained
a foothold on the northern and northeastern coast of Sulu. The
Bugis appear to have lost their identity, but the Ilanun are still
recognizable in many localities, and some of the principal datus of
Sulu still trace their origin to Mindanao.

The numerous and extensive piratical expeditions undertaken by the
Sulus from time immemorial must have been a great source of further
influx of foreign blood. The earliest traditions say that, in the days
of the Timway, [135] Orangkaya Su'il, slaves or hostages were sent
by the raja of Manila to secure the friendship of the Sulus. These
slaves were, according to some accounts, of six colors, but the
written records give them as four--red-eyed, white-eyed, blue-eyed,
and black-eyed. The people do not entertain any doubt relative to the
truth of these statements, and the custom is current even among the
Samals of referring to the origin of some person as descended from
the red-eyed slave, in making distinction as to whether he comes from
a noble or is of low birth and as to the part of the country to which
he belongs. According to general opinion the red-eyed slaves lived at
Parang, the western section of the island; the white-eyed at Lati,
the northern section lying to the east of Jolo; the black-eyed at
Gi'tung, the middle and southern section; the blue-eyed at Lu'uk,
the eastern section.

This color distinction is difficult to explain, but it must have arisen
out of the established custom of dividing slaves and captives, after
returning from a piratical expedition, among the great chiefs of the
various parties which composed the expedition. These parties as a rule
belonged to four sections representing the four great districts of the
island, over each of which one chief formerly was in authority. [136]

The number of elements which have thus entered into the constitution of
the Sulu people must be great, for there was not a single island in the
Philippine Archipelago which was spared by these marauders. Indeed,
the nation owes its origin and its chief characters to piracy. As
pirates these people took refuge in this island and lived in it, and
as pirates they have stamped their reputation on the annals of history.

However, the Sulus do not differ in this particular point from
the Malays of other countries. All Malays were equally addicted to
piracy. "It is in the Malay's nature," says an intelligent Dutch
writer, "to rove on the seas in his prau, as it is in that of the
Arab to wander with his steed on the sands of the desert. It is as
impossible to limit the adventurous life of a Malay to fishing and
trading as to retain a Bedouin in a village or in a habitation. * * *
This is not merely their habit; it may be termed their instinct." [137]

"As surely as spiders abound where there are nooks and corners,"
says another, "so have pirates sprung up wherever there is a nest
of islands offering creeks and shallows, headlands, rocks, and
reefs--facilities, in short, for lurking, for surprise, for attack,
and for escape. The semibarbarous inhabitant of the Archipelago,
born and bred in this position, naturally becomes a pirate. It is as
natural to him to consider any well-freighted, ill-protected boat
his property as it is to the fishing eagle above his head to sweep
down upon the weaker but more hardworking bird and swallow what he
has not had the trouble of catching."

So we are told that before the days of Makdum and Raja Baginda,
Sulu had long been an emporium not only of regular traders from most
nations, but the headquarters of those piratical marauders who there
found a ready market for enslaved victims.



INTRODUCTION OF ISLAM AND THE RISE OF A MOHAMMEDAN DYNASTY IN SULU,
1380-1450

To this period belongs the Mohammedan invasion of the Archipelago. If
the Buranun [138] were Dayaks in origin, they certainly did not
keep their Dayak characteristics very long. For in all probability
Tuan Masha'ika, the Tagimahas, and the Baklayas were Malays [139]
who came into Sulu from the west, and the dynasty established by
Masha'ika must have exercised due influence on the Buranun. Whatever
religion or customs these Malay conquerors had in their original land,
they no doubt continued to practise in their new home. It does not
appear that the Samals produced any change in this respect, and the
same worship and social organization which the Sulus had remained
unchanged until the Mohammedans reached the Archipelago.

The two prominent characters who mark this era are Makdum and Raja
Baginda. Makdum was a noted Arabian judge or scholar who arrived at
Malacca about the middle of the fourteenth century, converted Sultan
Mohammed Shah, the ruler, to Islam and established this religion
throughout the state of Malacca. He evidently practised magic and
medicine and exerted an unusually strong influence on the people
of Malacca. Continuing farther east, he reached Sulu and Mindanao
about the year 1380. [140] In Sulu, it is said, he visited almost
every island of the Archipelago and made converts to Islam in many
places. The Island of Sibutu claims his grave, but the places at
which he was most successful are Bwansa, the old capital of Sulu,
and the Island of Tapul. It is said that the people of Bwansa built
a mosque for him, and some of the chiefs of the town accepted his
teachings and faith. The Tapul people claim descent from him, and
some of them still regard him as a prophet.

Makdum's success in preaching a new faith to people as independent
in their individual views and as pertinacious in their religious
practices, beliefs, and customs as the Sulus must have been in his
time, is certainly remarkable and creditable to a high degree. The
results of his mission to Malacca and Sulu throw a new light on the
history of Islam in the Philippine Islands and modify the opinion
formerly held relative to its introduction by the sword. How much of
a lasting effect the teachings of Makdum could have had on Sulu is
very difficult of estimation, but in all probability the new sapling
planted in the soil of Sulu would have withered before long had it
not been for the future current of events which watered it and reared
it to maturity.

Some time after Makdum (the Genealogy of Sulu says ten years)
there came into Sulu a prince from Menangkabaw called Raja
Baginda. Menangkabaw [141] is a rich, high region in central Sumatra,
from which many Malayan dynasties seem to have come. Raja was the usual
title applied to all Malayan kings. Baginda is said to have touched at
Sambuwangan (Zamboanga) and Basilan before reaching Sulu. The nature
of such a move can not be explained unless he followed the northern
route leading from Borneo to Kagayan Sulu, Pangutaran, and Zamboanga,
which route seems to have been taken by all Mohammedan missionaries
and invaders mentioned in the tarsila.

The written records of Baginda's arrival and his later history are
exceedingly brief. When he arrived at Bwansa, the Sulus came out to
engage him in battle, as we would naturally expect; but, the tarsila
continues, on learning that he was a Mohammedan, they desisted from
fighting, invited him to stay with them, and seem to have entertained
him very hospitably. Such an account is absurd on the face of it. Raja
Baginda was not a trader nor a traveler touring the Archipelago. He
was accompanied by ministers and no doubt came to Bwansa to stay
and rule. His coming was an ordinary kind of invasion, which proved
successful. When Abu Bakr reached Bwansa, as we will learn later, he
was directed to Raja Baginda, who must have been the supreme ruler
of Bwansa. Accordingly we find all the chiefs of Sulu enumerated
in the tarsila at the day of Baginda's arrival subordinate in rank,
having no "rajas" among them.

The Genealogy of Sulu is as misleading as the tarsila of Magindanao
in that it pictures the arrival of Baginda as peaceful as that
of Kabungsuwan. Some of the chiefs who were Mohammedans possibly
intrigued against their former overlords, and, joining Baginda's
forces, defeated their opponents; but the dearth of information
relative to this early Philippine history renders it impracticable to
secure any more light on the subject. It may not, however, be out of
place to remind the reader that the fourteenth century was marked by
unusual activity in methods of warfare. Gunpowder, which was known and
used as an explosive long before that date, had not been made use of in
throwing projectiles in battle. The Arabs, we know, used firearms early
in the fourteenth century, and we may conjecture that they introduced
such weapons into Malacca and other parts of Malaysia as they moved
east. It is not improbable then that a prince coming from Sumatra
was provided with firearms which overawed the ignorant inhabitants of
Bwansa and subdued the valor and courage of the Sulu and Samal pirates
of those days. The statement made in the tarsila of Magindanao that,
after the people of Slangan came down the river to where Kabungsuwan
was anchored, "He beckoned (or pointed his finger) to them, but one
of them died on that account, and they were frightened and returned,"
is the only kind of evidence found which can possibly be interpreted to
indicate that a firearm was used. Lacking confirmation as this may be,
yet we positively know that when the Spaniards reached these Islands,
these people had an abundance of firearms, muskets, lantaka [142]
and other cannon, and we may be justified in saying that probably
firearms existed in the land in the century preceding the arrival of
the Spaniards. This brings us approximately down to Baginda's days.

In considering the etymology of the titles of the Sulu chiefs mentioned
in the time of Baginda, we observe that they are of three classes. The
first class were the datus. These had mantiri or ministers and probably
represented the descendants of Raja Sipad and Tuan Masha'ika. The
second class were the sayk. "Sayk" is probably derived from the Arabic
"Sheikh" meaning "chief." These were the Tagimaha chiefs, and their
rank was evidently subordinate to that of datu. The third class were
the orangkaya, the Baklaya chiefs. These are also subordinate in
grade and could not have been higher than the sayk. The words datu
and orangkaya it must be remembered are of Malay origin, while raja
and baginda are Sanskrit, baginda being the highest and being often
used as equivalent to emperor, while raja means only king.

Jawa is the Malay term for Java. The incident related in the tarsila
relative to the gift of two elephants sent by the raja of Java to the
raja of Sulu is interesting, in that it explains the existence in Jolo
of the elephants found there during the earlier Spanish invasions. It
further indicates that Raja Baginda was not an insignificant chief
and that he kept up some kind of communication with the rajas of
western Malaysia.

The elephants received by Baginda were let loose, the story says,
and they lived and multiplied on Mount Tumangtangis. On the declivity
of this mountain there is a place still called lubluban-gaja, which
means the "habitat or lying-place of the elephant." The people relate
several stories which make mention of the elephant, one of which
declares that the chief who killed the last wild elephant was given
the hand of the sultan's daughter in marriage, in admiration of his
strength and bravery.



ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MOHAMMEDAN CHURCH IN SULU AND THE REIGN OF ABU
BAKR, 1450-1480

Brevity is without exception a marked characteristic of all Moro
writings. Their letters, unlike those of the Malays and Arabs, are
brief and devoid of compliment or detail.

It is very difficult to pick out a superfluous word or phrase from the
text of the Sulu tarsila. In fact, the narrative of events throughout
the manuscript is so curtailed as to be reduced to a mere synopsis of
headlines. It gives a very dim view of the general subject and leaves
out much that is desired. Thus, the whole question of establishing
Islam in Sulu and organizing its sultanate is dispensed with in one
short paragraph briefly enumerating the following facts: That Sayid
Abu Bakr came to Bwansa from Palembang by the way of Bruney; that he
lived with Raja Baginda and taught and established a new religion
for Sulu; that he was greatly respected by the people; and that he
married Paramisuli, the daughter of Baginda, and became sultan.

The traditions of the country, notwithstanding their brevity, add
some further but less reliable information. It is the common belief
that Abu Bakr was born in Mecca and that he lived some time at Juhur
(or Malacca). Others state that it was his father, Zaynul Abidin,
who came from Mecca and that Abu Bakr was born of the daughter of
the Sultan of Juhur at Malacca. He came to Pangutaran first, the
narrative continues, then to Zamboanga and Basilan. His younger
brother, who had accompanied him, continued eastward to Mindanao,
while he remained at Basilan for a short while. Having heard of Abu
Bakr, the people of Sulu sent Orangkaya Su'il to Basilan to invite
him to Bwansa to rule over them. This invitation was accepted and
Abu Bakr was inaugurated sultan over Sulu soon after his arrival there.

From the annals of Malacca we know that Abu Bakr was a famous authority
on law and religion and that his mission to Malaysia was prompted by
enthusiasm for the promulgation of the doctrines of Abu Ishaq, which
were embodied in a book entitled "Darul-Mazlum, or The House of the
Oppressed or Ignorant." After preaching these doctrines in Malacca with
success, he evidently proceeded farther east, stopping at Palembang
and Bruney and reaching Sulu about 1450. The hospitality with which
he was received at Bwansa points to success in his mission to a degree
that enabled him later to marry the Princess Paramisuli, the daughter
of Raja Baginda. He established mosques there and taught religion and
law; and the people and chiefs actually abandoned their former gods
and practiced the new religion and observed its commandments. This
process of reformation and conversion was no doubt slow and gradual,
but it was real and sure.

There is no evidence to show that Abu Bakr had any military forces
by virtue of which he could assume military authority and rule after
Baginda's death. But it is perfectly credible that Raja Baginda,
being without a male heir, appointed Abu Bakr, his son-in-law and
chief judge and priest, as his heir, and delegated to him all the
authority he exercised over Bwansa and the Island of Sulu. This
it appears was acquiesced in by the native chiefs who accepted
Abu Bakr as their temporal overlord, as well as their spiritual
master. Claiming descent from Mohammed, he assumed the powers of a
caliph and entitled himself sultan. The Sulus as a rule refer to him
as As-Sultan ash-Sharif al-Hashimi, meaning the Sultan, the Hashimite
Sharif or noble. The words Mohammed and Abu Bakr are generally left
out when he is mentioned in prayer or in ordinary discourse.

Having established the church, his next aim, after ascending the throne
of Sulu, was the political reorganization of the government. This he
undertook to frame on the same principles as those of an Arabian
sultanate, giving himself all the power and prerogatives of a
caliph. In enforcing such claims of absolute sovereignty, Abu Bakr
declared to the people and their local chiefs that the widows, the
orphans, and the land were his by right. This the people hesitated
to submit to, and another measure was adopted which reconciled the
interests of all parties. They agreed that all the shores of the
island and all that territory within which the royal gong or drum
could be heard should be the sultan's personal property, and that
the rest of the island should be divided among the subordinate
chiefs and their people. The island was accordingly divided into
five administrative districts, over each one of which one panglima
exercised power subject to the supervision and superior authority of
the sultan. These districts were again divided into smaller divisions,
which were administered by subordinate officers or chiefs called
maharaja, orangkaya, laksamana, parukka, etc. The districts were
called Parang, Pansul, Lati, Gi'tung, and Lu'uk. The boundaries which
it seemed necessary at that time to define were marked by large trees,
none of which is living at present. Thus a sangay [143] tree separated
Parang from Pansul. The location of this tree was at a point near Bud
Agad and the stream Agahun, which runs down from Tumangtangis toward
Maymbung. A bawnu [143] tree separated Pansul from Lati. This tree was
located at a place called Indung, intermediate between Asturias and
the walled town of Jolo. A mampalam [143] tree called Tarak separated
Lati from Lu'uk. It was in the vicinity of the settlement of Su'. A
variety of durian tree named Siggal-saggal formed the boundary of
Lati and Gi'tung.

According to later usage, these districts are defined as follows:
Parang is the western district lying west of a line passing through a
point east of the summit of Tumangtangis and a point on the southern
coast 3 miles west of Maymbung. A line passing through Mount Pula
and a point a little east of Maymbung marks the boundary between
Pansul on the west and Lati and Gi'tung on the east. The watershed is
generally considered as the dividing line between Lati and Gi'tung. A
line joining Su' on the north and Lubuk on the south separates Lati
and Gi'tung from Lu'uk. A sixth district has lately been carved out
and termed Tandu, forming the easternmost part of the island. A line
joining Sukuban on the south and Limawa on the north divides Tandu
and Lu'uk.

The government thus organized was conducted in conformity with local
customs and laws modified to such an extent as not to be repugnant
and contrary to Mohammedan laws and the precepts of the Quran. To
preserve this consistency, a code of laws was made and promulgated
by Abu Bakr. This, once established, became the guide of all the
subordinate officers of the state, who, as a rule, observed it and
carried out its instructions. The general lines on which Abu Bakr
conducted his government seem to have been followed very closely by all
his successors. Such an adventurous and aggressive man as he was could
not have stopped within the limits of the island. In all probability
he pushed out in various directions, but no records have so far been
found which give any account of the conquests he made or the limits
of his empire. Abu Bakr lived thirty years in Sulu and died about 1480.



EARLY DAYS OF THE SULTANATE, 1480-1635


SUCCESSORS OF ABU BAKR

The dynasty founded by Abu Bakr ruled with a firmer hand and attained
considerable power and fame. The new organization establishing
law and order, consolidated the forces of the state and increased
its influence on the outside world. Islam added a new element of
strength and another stimulus to campaign and conquest. The Sulus never
exceeded 60,000 in number, yet we learn that, prior to the arrival of
Magellan, their power was felt all over Luzon and the Bisayan Islands,
the Celebes Sea, Palawan, North Borneo, and the China Sea, and their
trade extended from China and Japan, at the one extreme, to Malacca,
Sumatra, and Java at the other.

Abu Bakr was succeeded by his second son, Kamalud-Din. Alawad-Din,
the elder son, was weak-minded and was evidently not supported by
the ministers of the state. The next three sultans who followed
were Diraja, Upu, and Digunung. Their full names are, the Sultan
Amirul Umara [144] Maharaja Diraja, the Sultan Mu`izzul Mutawadi`in
[145] Maharaja Upu, the Sultan Nasirud-Din Awal [146] Digunung [147]
(or Habud [148]).

The sixth sultan was Mohammedul Halim [149] Pangiran Buddiman. During
his reign Governor Sandé equipped and directed large expeditions to
Borneo and Sulu. The armada sent to Sulu was commanded by Capt. Esteban
Rodriguez de Figueroa and reached the town of Jolo in June, 1578. It
is asserted that Rodriguez defeated Pangiran and exacted tribute from
the Sulus. Rodriguez, however, did not occupy Jolo, and no permanent
advantage was derived from his victory.



FIGUEROA'S EXPEDITION AGAINST SULU

This invasion marked the beginning of a state of war between Sulu
and Spain, which covered a period of three hundred years and caused
considerable devastation and loss of life. It cost Spain an immense
loss of men and money and finally brought on the decline of Sulu
and its end as an independent state. The magnitude of this strife,
its far-reaching effects, and its bearing on the Spanish and American
occupation of Sulu, invites special attention to the causes of the
war and the Sulu character which it depicts.

The expedition to Jolo formed part of and immediately followed the
expedition which was directed by Governor Sandé against Borneo. There
is no doubt that, besides the reasons Sandé gave for the expedition
to Borneo, he was really actuated by jealousy of the Portuguese,
whose influence had reached Bruney and the Moluccas, and by a strong
desire to conquer Borneo, Sulu, Mindanao, and the Moluccas. His
reasons for sending the expedition against Sulu are best given in
his letter of instructions to Capt. Rodriguez de Figueroa, which is
extremely interesting and is herein quoted in full: [150]


    That which you, Capt. Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, shall
    observe on the expedition which you are about to make, God our
    Lord helping, is as follows:

    From this city and Island of Borneo, God willing, you shall go
    to the Islands of Sulu, where you shall endeavor to reduce that
    chief and his people to the obedience of his Majesty. You shall
    bargain with them as to what tribute they shall pay, which shall
    be in pearls, as they are wont to give to the King of Bruney. You
    shall exercise great care and, if possible, much mildness; for it
    is of importance that those islands should not become depopulated;
    therefore, in case they receive you peaceably, you shall treat
    them well. And, in addition to the above, you must order that,
    besides the tribute that they are to pay in pearls, they shall
    obtain as many of them as possible, so that we, the Spaniards or
    Castilians, may buy them; that they must trade with us from now on;
    that every year Castilians will go to their lands with cloths and
    merchandise from China, of whatever they shall declare that they
    may need. You shall inform yourself of their needs; and if they
    wish to come to our settlements you shall give them permission to
    go freely to Manila and to come to Borneo, although not to steal.

    Item: You shall find out from them the whereabouts of the artillery
    and anchors of a ship lost there some three years ago; and you
    shall seek it and see that it be brought you with all haste. You
    shall keep close watch over the artillery, ammunition, vessels,
    sails, and other like things pertaining to the armed fleet; and
    you shall deprive them of those supplies, for it is notorious
    that those people are common marauders.

    And because of my information that the chief who calls himself
    lord of Sulu is a Bornean, and owns houses in this city of Bruney;
    that he fought against us in the naval battle, and that he fled
    to Sulu, where he is now; and since I am told that he took two
    galleys and three small vessels, artillery and ammunition, you
    shall exercise the utmost despatch to obtain the said galleys,
    vessels, artillery, and ammunition. If he acquiesce, you shall
    give him a passport. You shall see whether he has any children;
    and if so, you shall take one, and tell him that he must come to
    see me in Bruney in February.

    And, as I have said, this must be done if possible gently,
    in order that no people may be killed. You shall tell him that
    it will be to their advantage to be vassals of his Majesty and
    our allies. If they do not act respectfully, and it shall be
    necessary to punish them in another manner, you shall do so. And
    inasmuch as the Sulus, as is well known, are open pirates, whose
    only ambition is to steal, and to assault men in order to sell
    them elsewhere--especially as they go annually for plunder among
    all the Pintados [151] Islands, which are under his Majesty's
    dominion--you shall try to ascertain the Pintados slaves among
    them, in order to return such to their homes, especially those
    who are Christians. And, as I have said, you shall deprive them
    of such vessels as seem to be used for raids, leaving them their
    fishing vessels, so that if the said lord of Sulu so desire, he
    can come to confer reasonably with me. Thus you shall ascertain
    who has vessels, and who can inflict injuries; and you shall
    command them expressly to settle down on their land, to cultivate,
    sow, and harvest, develop the pearl industry, and cease to be
    pirates. You shall order them to raise fowls and cattle. You shall
    try to ascertain their number, and bring it to me in writing, in
    order that I may see it, together with the distance from these
    islands to the Sulu Islands, information regarding the food,
    water, and healthfulness of that land, and other things that may
    occur to you. And you shall tell the people in my name that they
    shall tame for me a couple of elephants, and that I shall send
    for those animals and pay for them.

    After having finished affairs in Sulu, if time permits, you shall,
    God willing, go to the Island of Mindanao. There you shall try,
    by the most convenient methods and with friendliness, to reduce
    the chief of the river of Mindanao, and the other chiefs of that
    island, and of those near by, to the obedience of his Majesty,
    giving him to understand what they will gain in becoming his
    Majesty's vassals and our allies, and in having trade with us.

    And, in order that the tribute may not prevent them from making
    peace with us, you shall not ask them for any tribute; but you
    shall take what they give freely, and nothing more, and in such
    form as they are willing to give. Thus you shall suit their
    convenience in everything pertaining to them, and cause them to
    understand the great expenses of his Majesty in this land. You
    shall also tell them that the gain therefrom affects them chiefly,
    since we come to teach them our civilization, and most of all
    the service of God, our Lord, who created and redeemed them, and
    of whom they are ignorant; and how to live in accord with natural
    law, as is their obligation. For this purpose you shall tell them
    that you are going to their land for two principal reasons:

    The first is that they should cease to be pirates, who rob and
    harry the weak, and enslave wherever and whomsoever they can,
    selling their captives outside of their own island, and separating
    them from their wives and children; and that they must cease to
    commit other like cruelties and thefts, and must become good and
    virtuous men, who shall grow to merit the second and principal
    reason for going to their lands. You shall give them to understand
    that they are ignorant of God, our Lord, who created and redeemed
    them, so that when they know him they may serve him and become
    good. It is quite evident that they will gain very much in these
    things, and therefore it is right that they aid us and give us
    something. This shall be at their own will, as above said.

    Item: You shall order them not to admit any more preachers of
    the doctrine of Mohammed, since it is evil and false, and that
    of the Christians alone is good. And because we have been in
    these regions so short a time, the lord of Mindanao has been
    deceived by the preachers of Bruney, and the people have become
    Moros. You shall tell them that our object is that he be converted
    to Christianity; and that he must allow us freely to preach the
    law of the Christians, and the natives must be allowed to go to
    hear the preaching and to be converted, without receiving any
    harm from the chiefs.

    And you shall try to ascertain who are the preachers of the sect
    of Mohammed, and shall seize and bring them before me and you
    shall burn or destroy the house where that accursed doctrine has
    been preached, and you shall order that it be not rebuilt.

    Item: You shall order that the Indians [152] shall not go outside
    of their island to trade; and you shall seize those vessels used
    for plundering excursions, leaving them those which, in your
    judgment, are used for trade and fishing. You shall take also
    what artillery and ammunition they have.

    You shall ascertain the harvest seasons and products of the land;
    the gold mines and the places where they wash gold; the number
    of inhabitants and their settlements; and their customs. You
    must especially secure information regarding cinnamon, in order
    to ascertain if it is found along the river, or if one must go
    to Cavite for it, and why it is not as good as that which the
    Portuguese take to Castilla. You shall ascertain how they cut
    and strip it from the tree, and if it be of importance that it
    dry on the tree, or in what other manner it should be treated,
    for I have been told that that obtained from these districts in
    the past has not been good and has not a good sale in Spain.

    And, since it might happen that the people will not make peace,
    and may offer fight, and show disrespect, then you shall punish
    them as you deem best, taking special care not to trust them;
    for it is evident that before all else they will, if possible,
    commit some treachery. You must not await such an occasion,
    for we know already their treachery against his Majesty's fleet
    commanded by Villalobos, certain of whose men they killed under
    assurances of safety; and they seized a boat. In that treachery
    all the inhabitants of the islands were participants; for four
    or five thousand of the said natives attacked one small boat,
    which contained four or five Spaniards. Likewise many people
    took part in the killing of the said Villalobos's master-of-camp,
    and other soldiers, in that same year. You shall remind them of
    these things, and warn them; for, from now on, we shall destroy
    them and their generation.

    And, since it might happen that, without any occasion of war
    or peace, the said natives flee to the mountains, you shall
    order that certain of the said natives summon them; and, when
    they have come, you shall discuss the matter with them. If they
    refuse to come, you shall, in conformity with your orders, remain
    there a given time. And if they continue to refuse to come down,
    you shall leave them, and shall return, without permitting their
    houses to be burned or their palm trees to be cut down. Neither
    shall anything be stolen from them; but you shall take only what
    is absolutely necessary for food and the food and other things
    necessary to provision your vessels for the return trip.

    You shall try to secure information of the Island of Linboton,
    as well as of Batachina and Celebes, so as to advise me thereof;
    and you shall do this in accord with the time limit I have set
    for you to make this exploration, and you shall observe the same
    rule as in that of Mindanao.

    In order that we may allot in encomiendas [153] whatever people
    are found in these districts, you shall bring me a signed
    notarial writ. Thus, as those lands have no other owner, the
    natives thereof may be reduced to the obedience of his Majesty,
    according to his will--and by war, if the natives begin it, so
    that war on our part may be just, and that the same justice may
    continue, so that we can compel them to obey, and impose tributes
    upon them. You shall exercise much diligence in this and see to
    it that these orders be carried out carefully and intelligently.

    God willing, I shall be in Bruney by the end of the month of
    January next--or, at the latest, by the eighth of February--with
    the fleet and all the necessaries that must be brought from Manila,
    and that which is here. And at that time your grace shall come to
    Bruney with the fleet that you have, and with all the people that
    you have or shall have in the Pintados, so that we may do here
    whatever is proper for the service of his Majesty, to which we are
    bound. These instructions must not be disregarded in any point,
    unless I advise you to the contrary by letter. And to this end
    you shall see that all who live and dwell there be commissioned
    for the above, in addition to their own duties. Given at Bruney,
    May twenty-three, one thousand five hundred and seventy-eight.

    If the natives of Mindanao or of any other place shall give
    tribute according to the above, you shall act according to the
    usual custom in these islands--namely, you shall take one-half
    and place it to the account of his Majesty, while the other half
    shall be distributed among the soldiers. Given ut supra.


    Doctor Francisco de Sandé.

        Before me:
            Alonso Beltran,
              His Majesty's notary.



REASONS FOR HOSTILITIES

The above shows clearly that Governor Sandé intended, first, to reduce
Sulu to a vassal state; second, to exact tribute in pearls; third,
to secure the trade of Sulu for the Spaniards; fourth, to punish the
Sultan of Sulu for the help he rendered the Sultan of Bruney against
the Spanish forces; fifth, to rescue the Christian slaves in Sulu;
sixth, to deprive the Sulus of their artillery and ammunition and of
all vessels except fishing vessels, in order to stop their piracy;
seventh, to compel the Sulus to become peaceful agriculturists;
eighth, to uproot the "accursed doctrine" of Mohammed and to convert
the Sulus to the Christian religion.

The leader of the expedition was directed to carry out these
instructions as carefully and as gently as possible; and there is
no reason to think that he failed to comply with his orders to the
letter. But no matter how careful and faithful Captain Rodriguez could
have been, it was not difficult for the Sulus to understand the purpose
of the expedition and the motives of the Spanish Government, and it
does not stand to reason that such people would yield to vassalage
and receive a direct insult to their religion without resentment
and without a struggle. Governor Sandé knew the reputation of the
Sulus, but he must have underestimated their strength and failed to
provide garrisons for the occupation of the conquered territory and
the protection of peaceful natives.

In January, 1579, Governor Sandé sent an expedition to Mindanao,
commanded by Capt. Gabriel de Ribera, under instructions similar to
those given to Captain Rodriguez. Ribera had additional orders to
visit Jolo and collect the tribute for that year, and special stress
was laid on procuring from the Sultan of Sulu "two or three tame
elephants." Ribera accomplished nothing in Mindanao; the natives
abandoned their villages and fled to the interior. On his return
to Kawite or Caldera, he met a deputation from Jolo, which brought
insignificant tribute and informed him of the existence of famine in
Sulu and the extreme distress of the people. He returned their tribute,
receiving in its place a cannon, which the Sulus had obtained from
a wrecked Portuguese galley. Ribera then returned to Cebu, without
producing any significant effect on conditions in Sulu.

In April, 1580, Governor Sandé was relieved by Governor Gonzalo
Ronquillo, who did not take the same interest in Borneo and
Sulu. In the same year the kingdom of Portugal and its rich eastern
colonies were annexed to the Spanish domain. No danger could then be
expected from the direction of Borneo and Sulu, and the ambitious
new Governor-General turned his attention to more desirable fields
of conquest.

Piracy was not the primary cause of this invasion of Sulu. Public
sentiment was not so strong against slavery in those days as it
is now; for the Spaniards and other leading civilized nations were
then diligently pursuing a profitable trade in it between the west
coast of Africa and the West Indies and America. Piracy is always a
crime among nations, but it can not be urged as the principal and
leading cause of this war or as sufficient reason in itself for
the early precipitation of such a deadly conflict between Sulu and
Spain. Religion, on the other hand, was declared by Governor Sandé
to be the "principal reason for going to their lands." He ordered
the Sulus not to admit any more preachers of Islam, but to allow
the Spanish priests to preach Christianity to them. The Mohammedan
preachers he directed to be arrested and brought to him, and the
mosques to be burned or destroyed and not to be rebuilt.

Part of the instructions the Adelantado [154] Miguel Lopez de Legaspi
received before embarking on his expedition to the Philippines read
as follows:


    And you shall have especial care that, in all your negotiations
    with the natives of those regions some of the religious
    accompanying you be present, both in order to avail yourself of
    their good counsel and advice, and so that the natives may see and
    understand your high estimation of them; for seeing this, and the
    great reverence of the soldiers toward them, they themselves will
    hold the religious in great respect. This will be of great moment,
    so that, when the religious shall understand their language,
    or have interpreters through whom they may make them understand
    our holy Catholic faith, the Indians shall put entire faith in
    them; since you are aware that the chief thing sought after by
    his Majesty is the increase of our holy Catholic faith, and the
    salvation of the souls of those infidels. [155]


In 1566, a petition was sent from Cebu to the King of Spain, bearing
the signatures of Martin de Goiti, Guido de Labezari, and the other
leading officers under Legaspi, setting forth, among other requests,
the following:


    That the Moros, "because they try to prevent our trade with the
    natives and preach to them the religion of Mohammed," may be
    enslaved and lose their property. That slave traffic be allowed,
    "that the Spaniards may make use of them, as do the chiefs and
    natives of those regions, both in mines and other works that
    offer themselves." [156]


In a letter addressed to Legaspi King Philip II said:


    We have also been petitioned in your behalf concerning the Moro
    Islands in that land, and how those men come to trade and carry on
    commerce, hindering the preaching of the holy gospel and disturbing
    you. We give you permission to make such Moros slaves and to seize
    their property. You are warned that you can make them slaves only
    if the said Moros are such by birth and choice, and if they come
    to preach their Mohammedan doctrine or to make war against you or
    against the Indians, who are our subjects and in our royal service.


In a letter addressed to King Philip II Bishop Salazar writes, June
27, 1588, as follows:


    The second point is that, in the Island of Mindanao, which is
    subject to your Majesty, and for many years has paid you tribute,
    the law of Mohammed has been publicly proclaimed, for somewhat more
    than three years, by preachers from Bruney and Ternate who have
    come there--some of them even, it is believed, having come from
    Mecca. They have erected and are now building mosques, and the
    boys are being circumcised, and there is a school where they are
    taught the Quran. I was promptly informed of this, and urged the
    president to supply a remedy therefor at once, in order that that
    pestilential fire should not spread in these islands. I could not
    persuade them to go, and thus the hatred of Christianity is there;
    and we are striving no more to remedy this than if the matter did
    not concern us. Such are the calamities and miseries to which we
    have come, and the punishments which God inflicts upon us. [157]


In drawing a contract with Capt. Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, in
1591, for the pacification and conquest of Mindanao, the Governor
and Captain-General Gomez Perez Dasmariñas makes the following
declarations:


    His Majesty orders and charges me, by his royal instructions and
    decrees, as the most worthy and important thing in these islands,
    to strive for the propagation of our holy faith among the natives
    herein, their conversion to the knowledge of the true God, and
    their reduction to the obedience of His holy church and of the
    king, our sovereign. * * *

    Moreover, the Island of Mindanao is so fertile and well inhabited,
    and teeming with Indian settlements, wherein to plant the faith, *
     * * and is rich in gold mines and placers, and in wax, cinnamon,
    and other valuable drugs. And although the said island has been
    seen, discussed, and explored, * * * no effort has been made
    to enter and reduce it, nor has it been pacified or furnished
    with instruction or justice--quite to the contrary being, at
    the present time, hostile and refusing obedience to his Majesty;
    and no tribute, or very little, is being collected. * * *

    Besides the above facts, by delaying the pacification of the said
    island greater wrongs, to the offense and displeasure of God and
    of his Majesty, are resulting daily; for I am informed that the
    king of that island has made all who were paying tribute to his
    Majesty tributary to himself by force of arms, and after putting
    many of them to death while doing it; so that now each Indian pays
    him one tae [158] of gold. I am also told that he destroyed and
    broke into pieces, with many insults, a cross that he found, when
    told that it was adored by the Christians; and that in Magindanao,
    the capital and residence of the said king, are Bornean Indians
    who teach and preach publicly the false doctrine of Mohammed,
    and have mosques; besides these, there are also people from
    Ternate--gunners, armorers, and powder-makers, all engaged in
    their trades--who at divers times have killed many Spaniards when
    the latter were going to collect the tribute, * * * without our
    being able to mete out punishment, because of lack of troops. By
    reason of the facts above recited, and because all of the said
    wrongs and troubles will cease with the said pacification; and,
    when it is made, we are sure that the surrounding kingdoms of
    Bruney, Sulu, Java, and other provinces, will become obedient
    to his Majesty: therefore, in order that the said island may be
    pacified, subdued, and settled, and the gospel preached to the
    natives; and that justice may be established among them, and they
    be taught to live in a civilized manner, and to recognize God and
    His holy law, I have tried to entrust the said pacification to
    a person of such character that he may be entrusted with it. [159]


It is plain, therefore, that the sentiment of the times justified war
on the Moros for the cause of religion alone, and that, though the
primary object was conquest, no doubt the religious motives of the
Spaniards were stronger than their desire to check piracy. But, of all
the Christian nations, the Spaniards should have been most aware of the
tenacity, determination, and courage with which the Mohammedans defend
their faith, and the Sulus were no exception to the rule, for they had
been born and reared in that religion for more than four generations.

A wiser policy on the part of Governor Sandé would have either let the
Moros of Sulu and Mindanao alone, or effected a complete reduction of
the state of Sulu and immediate occupation of the coasts of Mindanao
with strong forces; for it appears from all accounts that neither
the Sulus nor the Magindanaos were as strongly organized then as they
were a generation later, and either alliance or war should have been
easier then than afterwards.

The Spaniards at that time were excellent warriors. Their conquests
of the Bisayan Islands and Luzon were rapid and brilliant, but it
appears that the system of government which they inaugurated there
met with distinct failure the minute it was extended to the more
organized communities and the greater forces they encountered in the
south. The Sulus, on the other hand, fought in the defense of their
national independence and religion, and never found life too dear
to sacrifice in that cause. They resented the treatment of Spain,
and in their rage and desire for revenge built stronger forts and
fleets and became fiercer pirates.



RULE OF BATARA SHAH TANGAH

Pangiran must have died about 1579 and was followed by Sultan
Batara Shah Tangah, who is in all probability the Paquian or Paguian
Tindig of the Spanish writers. Tangah's claim to the sultanate was
strongly contested by his cousin, Abdasaolan [160] who ruled over
Basilan. The latter attacked Jolo with a strong force, but failed
to reduce its forts. Tangah, however, felt insecure and went to
Manila to request Governor Sandé's aid and returned to Sulu with
two Spanish armed boats (caracoas). [161] Abdasaolan, whose power
had in the meantime increased, prepared for defense and watched for
the advance of the Sultan's boat. Finding that the caracoas were at
a considerable distance from the Sultan's boat he manned two light
salisipans [162] with a strong force and dispatched them, with speed
to intercept Tangah. The Sultan's party was completely surprised,
and in the fight that resulted Tangah was killed. On reaching Jolo
the Spanish forces attacked the town. The Sulus fought valiantly,
but their fort was reduced. The officers in command of the caracoas
assembled the people and had Raja Bungsu, who was wounded in the fight,
elected sultan to succeed Tangah. The full title of Bungsu was "The
Sultan Muwallil Wasit Bungsu." [163]



FIGUEROA'S EXPEDITION AGAINST MINDANAO

In 1596 Capt. Esteban Rodriguez led an expedition into Mindanao,
for its conquest and pacification.

It is maintained that he proceeded up the Mindanao River as far as
Bwayan, the capital of the upper Mindanao Valley.


    Don Esteban Rodriguez prepared men and ships, and what else was
    necessary for the enterprise, and with some galleys, galleots,
    frigates, vireys, [164] barangays, [164] and lapis, [165] set out
    with two hundred and fourteen Spaniards for the Island of Mindanao,
    in February of the same year, of 1596. He took Capt. Juan de la
    Xara as his master-of-camp, and some religious of the Society
    of Jesus to give instruction, as well as many natives for the
    service of the camp and fleet.

    He reached Mindanao River after a good voyage, where the first
    settlements, named Tampakan and Lumakan, both hostile to the
    people of Bwayan, received him peacefully and in a friendly
    manner, and joined his fleet. They were altogether about six
    thousand men. Without delay they advanced about 8 leagues
    farther up the river against Bwayan, the principal settlement
    of the island, where its greatest chief had fortified himself
    on many sides. Arrived at the settlement, the fleet cast anchor
    and immediately landed a large proportion of the troops with
    their arms. But before reaching the houses and fort, and while
    going through some thickets [cacatal] [166] near the shore, they
    encountered some of the men of Bwayan, who were coming to meet
    them with their kampilan, [167] carazas [168] and other weapons,
    and who attacked them on various sides. The latter [i.e., the
    Spaniards and their allies], on account of the swampiness of the
    place and the denseness of the thickets [cacatal], could not act
    unitedly as the occasion demanded, although the master-of-camp and
    the captains that led them exerted themselves to keep the troops
    together and to encourage them to face the natives. Meanwhile
    Governor Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa was watching events from
    his flagship, but not being able to endure the confusion of his
    men, seized his weapons and hastened ashore with three or four
    companions and a servant who carried his helmet in order that he
    might be less impeded in his movements. But as he was crossing
    a part of the thickets [cacatal] where the fight was waging,
    a hostile Indian stepped out unseen from one side and dealt the
    governor a blow on the head with his kampilan that stretched
    him on the ground badly wounded. [169] The governor's followers
    cut the Mindanao to pieces and carried the governor back to the
    camp. Shortly after the master-of-camp, Juan de la Xara, withdrew
    his troops to the fleet, leaving behind several Spaniards who had
    fallen in the encounter. The governor did not regain consciousness,
    for the wound was very severe, and died next day. The fleet after
    that loss and failure left that place, and descended the river
    to Tampakan, where it anchored among the friendly inhabitants
    and their settlements.

    The master-of-camp, Juan de la Xara, had himself chosen by the
    fleet as successor in the government and enterprise. He built a
    fort with arigues [170] and palms near Tampakan, and founded a
    Spanish settlement to which he gave the name of Murcia. He began
    to make what arrangements he deemed best, in order to establish
    himself and run things independently of, and without acknowledging
    the governor of Manila, without whose intervention and assistance
    this enterprise could not be continued. [171]


Bwayan was 30 miles up the river and 25 miles above Magindanao
or Kotabato where Bwisan, the Sultan of Magindanao, was strongly
fortified. It is difficult to believe that Rodriguez could advance so
far even with a small scouting party. A careful review of the Spanish
reports referring to these early campaigns in Mindanao indicates that
Bwayan has been erroneously used in place of Magindanao, the ancient
capital of the sultanate of Magindanao.

Bent on the conquest of Mindanao, Governor Tello prepared another
expedition under Gen. Juan Ronquillo [172] and dispatched it by the
way of Cebu. At Caldera, it was joined by the fleet of Mindanao and
the whole force proceeded east in the direction of the Mindanao River,
on the 6th of February, 1597. Captain Chaves arrived with his frigates
at the river on the 8th of January. In a battle fought at Simway
to capture Moro vessels going to seek aid from Ternate he had a leg
cut off and received a shot in the helmet above the ear. Ronquillo
arrived at the mouth of the river on February 21, and on the 17th of
April he engaged a Moro fleet with 40 arquebusiers and defeated them,
killing a number of their brave men and some Ternatans without losing
any of his men except 5 Bisayans. Leaving a guard of 34 men under
Chaves at the fort of Tampakan he advanced up the river with a force
of 230 sailors and gunners. The enemy retired behind some parapets as
soon as the artillery opened upon them, and brought some artillery
to bear on the flagship (one of the galleys), but could not retard
the Spanish advance.


    "I answered their fire with so great readiness," said Ronquillo in
    his report, "that I forced them to withdraw their artillery. But,
    as if they were goblins, they remained here behind a bush or a
    tree, firing at us without being seen." Reinforced by the chief
    of the hill tribes, Lumakan, with 500 natives, Ronquillo resumed
    the fighting after the delay of a few days. "Finally," continued
    Ronquillo, "I planted my battery of eight pieces somewhat over
    100 paces from the fort. Although I battered the fort hotly, I
    could not effect a breach through which to make an assault. All
    the damage that I did them by day, they repaired by night. * * *

    "I was very short of ammunition, for I had only 3,000 arquebus
    bullets left, and very few cannon balls; and both would be spent
    in one day's fighting, during which, should we not gain the fort,
    we would be lost--and with no power to defend ourselves while
    withdrawing our artillery and camp. * * *

    "I reconnoitered the fort and its situation, for it is located
    at the entrance of a lagoon, thus having only water at the back,
    and swampy and marshy ground at the sides. It has a frontage of
    more than 1,000 paces, is furnished with very good transversals,
    and is well supplied with artillery and arquebuses. Moreover it
    has a ditch of water more than 4 brazas [173] wide and 2 deep,
    and thus there was a space of dry ground of only 15 paces where it
    was possible to attack; and this space was bravely defended, and
    with the greatest force of the enemy. The inner parts were water,
    where they sailed in vessels, while we had no footing at all."

    "Again, I reflected that those who had awaited us so long, had
    waited with the determination to die in defense of the fort; and
    if they should see the contest ending unfavorably for them, no one
    would prevent their flight. Further, if they awaited the assault
    it would cost me the greater part of my remaining ammunition,
    and my best men; while, if the enemy fled, nothing would be
    accomplished, but on the contrary a long, tedious, and costly
    war would be entered upon. Hence, with the opinion and advice of
    the captains, I negotiated for peace, and told them that I would
    admit them to friendship under the following conditions:

    "First, that first and foremost they must offer homage to his
    Majesty, and pay something as recognition" (a gold chain). Second,
    "that all the natives who had been taken from the Pintados Islands
    [Bisayan Islands] last year, must be restored." Third, "that they
    must break the peace and confederation made with the people of
    Ternate, and must not admit the latter into their country." Fourth,
    "that they must be friends with Danganlibor and Lumakan, * * *
    and must not make war on their vassals." Fifth, "that all the
    chiefs must go to live in their old villages." [174]


Ronquillo later reported the place indefensible and was authorized
to retire to Caldera.

Ronquillo must have advanced as far as the settlement of Kalangnan
or possibly Magindanao (Kotabato), the capital of Sultan Bwisan. The
report he rendered relative to the country, its people and chiefs,
is very interesting and an excerpt of the same is herewith quoted
because of its bearing on conditions throughout Moroland:


    The leading chiefs collect tribute from their vassals. * * * These
    Indians are not like those in Luzon, but are accustomed to power
    and sovereignty. Some collect five or six thousand tributes. * * *

    Hitherto it has not been possible to tell your lordship anything
    certain of this country except that it will be of but little
    advantage to his Majesty, but a source of great expense. It has
    far fewer inhabitants than was reported, and all are very poor,
    so that their breakfast consists only in cleaning their arms,
    and their work in using them, and not in cultivating the land,
    which is low and swampy in this river. There is no chief who can
    raise 20 taes of gold. Rice is very scarce; in the hills is found
    a small amount, which is used for food by the chiefs only. There
    are some swine, and a few fowls that are very cunning, and less
    fruit. [175]


These early expeditions of the Spaniards against the Moros undoubtedly
aroused in the latter a great desire for vengeance. The forces the
Spaniards sent to conquer Mindanao and Sulu were very small. Such
forces would have been strong enough to reduce any island of the
Bisayan group, or even Luzon, but against the Moros they proved
insufficient and inadequate. They however succeeded in provoking
bitter hostilities and marked the beginning of a long period of terror
and bloodshed.



MORO RAIDS [176]

In 1599 combined Moro fleets invaded and plundered the coasts of the
Bisayan Islands, Cebu, Negros, and Panay.

Captain Paches, who was in command of the fort of Caldera, attacked
the northern coast of the Island of Sulu. After landing at some point,
it was observed by the Sulus that his fuses were wet and that his
guns could not fire well. They then rushed his position, killed him,
and dispersed his forces.


    The following year saw the return of a larger and still more
    dreadful expedition. The people of Panay abandoned their towns
    and fled into the mountains under the belief that these terrible
    attacks had been inspired by the Spaniards. To check these
    pirates, Juan Gallinato, with a force of 200 Spaniards, was sent
    against Sulu, but like so many expeditions that followed his,
    he accomplished nothing. * * * "From this time until the present
    day" (about the year 1800), wrote Zuñiga, "these Moros have not
    ceased to infest our colonies; innumerable are the Indians they
    have captured, the towns they have looted, the rancherias they
    have destroyed, and the vessels they have taken. It seems as
    if God has preserved them for vengeance on the Spaniards that
    they have not been able to subject them in two hundred years,
    in spite of the expeditions sent against them, the armaments
    sent almost every year to pursue them. In a very little while
    we conquered all the islands of the Philippines, but the little
    Island of Sulu, a part of Mindanao, and the other islands nearby,
    we have not been able to subjugate to this day." [177]


Gallinatos's expedition occurred in 1602. [178] After three months of
protracted fighting at Jolo, he was unable to reduce the fortifications
of the town and retired to Panay.

In 1616 a large Sulu fleet destroyed Pantao in the Camarines and the
shipyards of Cavite and exacted large sums for the ransom of Spanish
prisoners. Moro fleets in 1625 sacked Katbalogan in Samar.

In 1628 Governor Tavora sent an expedition to Sulu under Cristobol
de Lugo. Cristobol disembarked half of his infantry, sacked the town
of Jolo, set part of it on fire and sailed back to Cebu.

In 1629 the Moros raided Samar and Leyte. In 1630 an armada composed
of 70 vessels and having 350 Spanish and 2,000 native soldiers, under
Lorenzo de Olaso Ochotegui, arrived at Jolo. Olaso misdirected his
forces and, advancing too near to the wall of the fort, was wounded
in his side and fell. He was rescued by the officers who followed him,
but the troops were demoralized and retired. The expedition, however,
landed at various points on the coast and burned and pillaged small
settlements. [179]

In the same year P. Gutierrez came to Mindanao on a mission to
Corralat. [180] On his return he met Tuan Baluka, wife of Raja Bungsu,
at Zamboanga. Baluka urged P. Gutierrez to delay his departure from
Zamboanga and warned him of the danger of meeting the Sulu expedition
under Datu Ache. He, however, continued on his way and was overtaken by
Datu Ache's force, but on account of the message and flag he delivered
to Ache from Tuan Baluka, he was allowed to proceed safely.

For some time the Jesuits had been urging upon the Philippine
Government the occupation of the southern coast of Mindanao. This
meant an advance into the enemy's camp and a bloody struggle for
supremacy in the southern seas. The consequences of such a step
were foreseen by the Government and very few governors would have
dared undertake such a grave responsibility. In 1635, Governor Juan
Cerezo de Salamanca was petitioned by the Jesuits to establish an
advance post of the Spanish forces at Zamboanga for the protection of
missionaries and the Christians who had to navigate in the southern
seas. Salamanca granted their request and sent Capt. Juan de Chaves,
who disembarked at Zamboanga on the 6th of April, 1635. The force under
Captain Chaves consisted of 300 Spanish and 1,000 native soldiers. In
June they began the construction of a stone fort on a plan designed by
the Jesuit missionary P. Melchor de Vera, who was an expert engineer.

The advantages to be derived from the position of this garrison
were demonstrated before the year was over. As a piratical fleet
was returning from Cuyo, Mindoro, and the Kalamian Islands, the
favorable opportunity was watched for, and as the two divisions of
the fleet separated, the Spanish forces pursued Corralat's pirates
and dealt them a deadly blow in the neighborhood of Point Flechas,
killing about 300 Moros and saving 120 Christian captives. [181]



FIRST SPANISH CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION OF SULU, 1635-1646

Gen. Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera relieved Salamanca before the end
of the year 1635 and continued the same policy with additional vigor
and great ability. He quickly resolved upon attacking the Moros in
their own strongholds, and thought that by crushing their power at
home he would be able to put an end to their piratical raids.

He arrived at Zamboanga February 22, 1636, proceeded first to Mindanao,
fought Corralat and destroyed some of his forts and sailed back to
Manila. [182] Corcuera returned to Zamboanga in December, 1637,
and prepared for an expedition against Sulu. On January 1, 1638,
he embarked for Sulu with 600 Spanish soldiers, 1,000 native troops,
and many volunteers and adventurers. He had 80 vessels all told and
arrived at Jolo on the 4th. [183]

Anticipating an invasion, Sultan Bungsu had strengthened his
garrisons and called for aid and reënforcements from Basilan, Tapul,
and Tawi-tawi. On his arrival Corcuera found the town well fortified
and the enemy strongly intrenched. The Moros were well disciplined
and had a well organized guard. The forts occupied strategic points
and were strongly defended; the trenches were well laid, and the
Moros shot well and fought fearlessly.

Corcuera besieged the town with all his forces and attacked it
repeatedly and valiantly using powerful artillery, but he could not
reduce it. Several efforts to tunnel the walls or effect a breach in
them by mines were frustrated by the vigilance and intrepidity of
the Sulus. The siege lasted three months and a half, at the end of
which time the Sulus evacuated the town and retired to the neighboring
hills, where they intended to make the next stand. Corcuera, taking
possession of the town, reconstructed its forts and established three
posts, one on the hill, one at the river, and one on the sandbank in
front of the town. The garrison he established there consisted of 200
Spanish soldiers and an equal number of Pampangans, under the command
of Capt. Ginés Ros and Gaspar de Morales. In May Corcuera returned to
Manila with all the triumph of a conqueror, leaving Gen. Pedro Almonte,
the senior officer next to himself in command of the expedition, as
governor of Zamboanga and Ternate and chief of the forces in the south.

Soon after the establishment of the Jolo garrison, the Sulus under Datu
Ache attacked the soldiers in the quarry and killed a few Spaniards
and captured 40 Chinese and Negroes (galley slaves). This and other
depredations committed by the Sulus from time to time, some of which
were provoked by the ill behavior of the Spanish officers and troops,
forced Almonte in June, 1639, to come over to Sulu and take the field
a second time. With 3 captains and 1,200 Spanish and native soldiers,
he marched over the island, attacked the Sulus in their homes, burned
their houses and killed every man he could reach. It is said that he
hung 500 heads on the trees, liberated 112 Christian captives, and
captured quantities of arms. When he asked the Gimbaha Sulus (at one
of the settlements of Parang) to submit to the sovereignty of Spain,
they refused to recognize his authority, challenged his forces,
and fought him desperately. They wore helmets and armor and used
spears and swords. On one occasion, Captain Cepeda engaged them in
battle and returned with 300 captives, leaving on the field 400 dead,
a fearful lesson to those who survived. Cepeda lost 7 Spaniards and
20 natives only, but he had a large number wounded.

Not satisfied with the havoc he wrought on the Island of Sulu, and
desiring to follow and catch the fugitive sultan, Almonte invaded
the other large islands and followed the sultan and the datus all
over the Archipelago. At Tawi-tawi, however, he met with a reverse,
and the captain who led the expedition returned with considerable loss.

Soon after Almonte's departure, the Sulus who had fled returned
and lost no time or opportunity in harassing the garrison. Several
piratical excursions invaded the Bisayas and Camarines. Soon Dutch
vessels, invited by Sulu emissaries sent to Java, appeared in the
vicinity of Zamboanga and Jolo and threatened the Spanish garrison
and incited the Moros to resist the Spaniards and attack their
forces. Anticipating trouble with the Dutch, and foreseeing the
danger of maintaining a garrison at Jolo under the circumstances,
the Spaniards planned to evacuate the town. Accordingly on the 14th
of April, 1646, they left Jolo. Before withdrawing their troops,
they managed to make a treaty with the Sulus, which took the form of
an alliance both offensive and defensive. The purpose of the treaty
was declared to be the maintenance of peace between both parties and
mutual aid against foreign enemies. In case of assistance against a
foreign nation, the expenses of the war were to be defrayed by the
party requesting aid. The Spanish Government recognized the supreme
authority of the Sultan of Sulu from Tawi-tawi to Tutup and Pagahak,
reserving sovereignty rights for the King of Spain over Tapul, Siasi,
Balangingi, and Pangutaran only. In return for the evacuation of Jolo,
and as a sign of brotherhood, the Sultan of Sulu promised to send
yearly to Zamboanga three boats, 8 fathoms long, full of rice, and to
allow the Jesuit priests to come to Jolo unmolested. Other provisions
were inserted in the treaty for the exchange and redemption of slaves,
criminals, or others who happened to run away from Zamboanga to Sulu
and vice versa.

This treaty did not remain in force for any great length of time,
for we hear again in 1647 that the Sulus invaded the Bisayas and
harassed the vicinity of Zamboanga.



SULU SUPREMACY IN THE ARCHIPELAGO, 1647-1850


SUCCESSORS OF BUNGSU

Bungsu had a very long reign marked with reverses and misfortunes. He
died before 1640, and was succeeded by Sultan Nasirud Din II and Sultan
Salahud Din Karamat. The latter was known to the Spanish writers as
Baktial, which was his Sulu name before the sultanate. During the
reign of Karamat the Philippines were threatened by a Chinese invasion
from the north and by war with Holland, and the government, under the
circumstances, decided to abandon Zamboanga and the Moluccas. This
purpose they carried out in 1663. In the days of Karamat the Sulus
became very active and made many raids in various directions. The
decline of Spain's political power and her inactivity in the century
that followed the evacuation of Zamboanga caused obscurity in the
Spanish records of the history of Sulu and Mindanao. The events of
this century are, with few exceptions, lacking in significance and
interest. [184]

The sultans who followed Karamat are, in the order of their succession,
Shahabud Din, Mustafa Shafi`ud Din, Badarud Din I, Nasarud Din,
and Alimud Din I, better known as Amirul Mu'minin (Ferdinand I of
Sulu). The first three were brothers, the sons of Karamat, while the
last two were the sons of Badarud Din.

In 1718 Governor Bustamante reoccupied Zamboanga for the purpose
of waging war against piracy. "The citadel (Fuerza del Pilar) was
rebuilt on an elaborate plan under the direction of the engineer, Juan
Sicarra. Besides the usual barracks, storehouses, and arsenals, there
were, within the walls, a church, a hospital, and quarters for the
Pampangan soldiers. Sixty-one cannon were mounted upon the defenses."

In 1725, a Chinese named Ki Kuan was sent to Manila to arrange for
peace and returned with two Spanish commissioners, who made a treaty
with the sultan of Sulu providing for trade between Manila and Jolo,
the return or ransom of captives, and the ceding to Spain of the
Island of Basilan. Notwithstanding this treaty Moro raids continued
either by toleration of the sultan and datus or at their instigation.

In 1730 a brother of the sultan commanded an expedition of 31
vessels, which attacked the fort of Taytay and ravaged the coast of
Palawan. Another expedition spent nearly a whole year cruising and
destroying among the Bisayas.

In retaliation a large Spanish fleet united at Zamboanga and, under
Ignacio de Irebri and Manuel del Rosal, invaded the shores of Sulu and
ravaged and burned some settlements. At Bwal they found the settlement
well protected and extensively fortified, so they contented themselves
with destroying some plantations and burning outlying houses. At
Tapul considerable damage was inflicted. A force of 600 disembarked,
dispersed the Sulus, burned their settlements, destroyed many farms,
the salt works, and many boats, and returned to Zamboanga. In 1732
similar raids were made and hostilities continued until 1737.



REIGN OF SULTAN ALIMUD DIN I

One of the earliest events in the reign of Alimud Din I was his
ratification of the treaty of 1737. The sultan was represented
in Manila by Datu Mohammed Ismael and Datu Ja`far, who signed the
document. The treaty was drawn in January, 1737, by Governor-General
Fernando Valdés y Tamon and contained five articles.

The first article declared the determination of both parties to
preserve permanent peace between the two states, all differences or
grievances to be settled amicably, and hostilities between subjects
or vassals to be strictly prohibited and punished; the second provided
for alliance and mutual aid against any foreign foe. European nations
were, however, excluded from the provisions of this article; the third
provided for free trade between the two states, restricted by the use
of passports to be issued by superior authority; the fourth provided
that each state should be held responsible for all infractions of
the peace committed by its subjects and should be bound to punish the
same and make proper amends to the proper party; the fifth provided
for the exchange of captives and return of all church images and
ornaments in the possession of the Sulus.

To all appearances Alimud Din I was a man of peace and a reformer. He
kept his part of the treaty faithfully and piracy was actually
suppressed during the whole period in which he held the reins of
government. He revised the Sulu code of laws and system of justice. He
caused to be translated into Sulu parts of the Quran and several Arabic
texts on law and religion. He strongly urged the people to observe
faithfully their religion and the ordained five daily prayers. He even
went so far as to prescribe punishment for failure to observe this
rule. He wanted all pandita to learn Arabic and prepared Arabic-Sulu
vocabularies as a preliminary step to making the Arabic the official
language of the state. He coined money, organized a small army,
and tried to establish a navy. His name is foremost in the memory
of the Sulus, partly because of his able administration and partly
on account of the fact that he is the grandfather of all the present
principal datus of the Sulus.

In September, 1746, a special commission from Manila carried to
Alimud Din a letter written by King Philip V in 1744, requesting the
admission of Jesuit missionaries to Jolo with permission to preach
the Christian religion to the Sulus. The sultan entertained the
commission very hospitably and gave in their honor a royal reception
and a review of the troops. A council was held in which the sultan
conferred with the leading datus of Sulu and granted the request of
King Philip V. He further authorized the building of a church and
recommended the erection of a fort at some convenient locality for
the safe protection of the missionaries. In return for this favor he
requested that the Spanish Government give him, as an aid in building
a navy, the sum of P6,000, 12 piculs [185] of gunpowder, 12 piculs
of nails, and 1 picul of steel. This, he represented, was needed to
enable him to suppress piracy and to check the depredations of his
enemies in Borneo. This request the Spanish Government granted, and
Jesuit missionaries entered Jolo, translated the catechism into Sulu,
and distributed it freely among the people.

The liberties exercised by the Jesuits in their endeavor to proselyte
the Sulus and the strong friendship the sultan manifested toward them
created great dissatisfaction among the people, and an opposition party
was formed, under the leadership of Prince Bantilan, for the purpose of
expelling the missionaries and deposing Alimud Din. Bantilan was the
son of Sultan Shahabud Din and had as much right to the sultanate of
Sulu as any son of Sultan Badarud Din. After the death of the latter
the sultanate should have reverted to the line of Shahabud Din; but it
happens very often that the sons of the last sultan are either older
than those of the former or meet with more favor and are, as a rule,
supported by the majority of the council of datus; thus the regular
order of descent changes in favor of the stronger person. Probably
Bantilan was preceded by both Nasarud Din and Alimud Din for some
such reason as the above. This he resented at heart, but suppressed
his resentment until this favorable opportunity offered itself. He
then headed the opposition to the sultan and the missionaries and won
the majority of the datus and panditas to his side. Hostilities soon
increased and civil war was imminent. In an effort to assassinate
the sultan, Bantilan thrust a spear at Alimud Din and inflicted
a severe wound in his side or thigh. During the disturbances and
confusion which followed it became dangerous for the missionaries
to remain at Jolo. One of the ministers of the sultan provided them
with a salisipan in which they escaped without harm and withdrew to
Zamboanga. This occurred late in 1748. Overpowered, disheartened,
and grieved, Alimud Din left Jolo with his family and numerous escort
and came to Zamboanga, seeking the aid of Spain against Bantilan. The
latter proclaimed himself sultan with the title of Mu`izzud Din,
[186] strengthened the defenses of his capital, and waged war on all
the datus who had supported Alimud Din. His power soon became supreme,
and he reigned with a strong hand.

At Zamboanga Alimud Din is said to have given the officers many
presents and offered the Governor Zacharias 40 male Papuan slaves, who
were well dressed. Zacharias, unreasonably prejudiced and distrustful,
suspected some ill design and refused the present. Not receiving
sufficient attention and consideration at Zamboanga, Alimud Din asked
leave to go to Manila. This granted, he sailed and arrived at Cavite
January 2, 1749. At Manila "he was received with all the pomp and
honor due to a prince of high rank. A house for his entertainment
and his retinue of seventy persons was prepared in Binondo. A public
entrance was arranged which took place some fifteen days after he
reached the city. Triumphal arches were erected across the streets,
which were lined with more than 2,000 native militia under arms. The
sultan was publicly received in the hall of the Audiencia, where
the governor promised to lay his case before the King of Spain. The
sultan was showered with presents, which included chains of gold,
fine garments, precious gems, and gold canes, while the Government
sustained the expense of his household." [187]

Following this reception, steps were taken for his conversion. His
spiritual advisers cited to him the example of the Emperor Constantine
whose conversion enabled him to effect triumphant conquests over
his enemies. Under these representations Alimud Din expressed his
desire for baptism. The governor-general, who at this time was a
priest, the bishop of Nueva Segovia, was very anxious that the rite
should take place; but this was opposed by his spiritual superior,
the archbishop of Manila, who, with some others, entertained doubts
as to the sincerity of the Sultan's profession.

"In order to accomplish his baptism, the governor sent him to his own
diocese, where at Paniki, on the 29th of April, 1750, the ceremony
took place with great solemnity. On the return of the party to Manila,
the sultan was received with great pomp, and in his honor were held
games, theatrical representations, fireworks, and bull fights. This
was the high-water mark of the sultan's popularity. [188]

At his baptism the sultan received the name of Ferdinand, and Spanish
authors often referred to him as "Don Fernando de Alimud Din I,
Catholic Sultan of Joló." It is further stated that two datus and
five of his principal followers were baptized. The crown prince,
Raja Muda Mohammed Israel and his sister Fatimah attended school in
Manila and learned Spanish manners and customs.

A year and a half passed and no action was taken by the authorities
to restore Alimud Din. In the meantime Bantilan's fleets were busy
ravaging and pillaging the Bisayas. In July, 1750, a new governor, the
marquis of Obando (Francisco José de Obando) arrived in Manila. After
some deliberation he resolved to reinstate Alimud Din and punish
Bantilan and his pirates. [189] Accordingly, on May 19, 1751, the
sultan and his retinue were sent on board the Spanish frigate San
Fernando and were convoyed by a squadron composed of seven war vessels
under the command of Field Marshal Ramon de Abad. Falling in with
bad weather off the shore of Mindoro, the San Fernando was disabled
and made for Kalapan. The squadron, however, continued its voyage
uninterrupted to Jolo, arriving there on the 26th of June. After some
desultory fighting, Abad arrived at an understanding with the Sulus
and arranged for Datu Asin to come to Zamboanga with sufficient boats
to escort the sultan back to Jolo.

The sultan in the meantime stopped at Iloilo where he changed
boats. Meeting with contrary winds he was carried off his course to
Dapitan, and from there he set sail again for Zamboanga, which he
reached on July 12.


    Before Ferdinand I left Manila, he had addressed a letter
    to the sultan of Mindanao, at the instance of the Spanish
    Governor-General. The original was written by Ferdinand I in Moro;
    a version in Spanish was dictated by him, and both were signed by
    him. These documents reached the governor of Zamboanga, but he
    had the original in Moro retranslated and found that it did not
    at all agree with the sultan's Spanish rendering. The translation
    of the Moro text runs thus:

    "I shall be glad to know that the Sultan Mohammed Amirud Din
    and all his chiefs, male and female, are well. I do not write
    a lengthy letter, as I intended, because I simply wish to give
    you to understand, in case the sultan or his chiefs and others
    should feel aggrieved at my writing this letter in this manner,
    that I do so under pressure, being under foreign dominion, and
    I am compelled to obey whatever they tell me to do, and I have
    to say what they tell me to say. Thus the governor has ordered
    me to write to you in our style and language; therefore, do not
    understand that I am writing you on my own behalf, but because
    I am ordered to do so, and I have nothing more to add. Written
    in the year 1164 in the month Rabi`-ul Akir. Ferdinand I, King
    of Sulu, who seals with his own seal."

    This letter was pronounced treasonable. Impressed with, or feigning
    this idea, Governor Zacharias saw real or imaginary indications
    of a design on the part of the sultan to throw off the foreign
    yoke at the first opportunity. [190]


After the landing of Datu Asin and his followers at Zamboanga, the
governor found out by his spies that they had many arms and quantities
of ammunition in their boats which lay in the roadstead opposite
the town and fort. Suspicious and distrustful from the beginning,
Zacharias interpreted these facts as positive proof of an intention
on the part of the sultan and Datu Asin treacherously to attack the
town when an opportunity offered itself. He then at once confiscated
part of the arms, ordered the boats to leave the port, imprisoned
the sultan and Datu Asin and all their retinue, and communicated his
suspicions and the action taken to Manila. Among the prisoners were
the sons and daughters of the sultan, several datus and dignitaries
and panditas, and many male and female followers and servants. In
all 217 persons entered the prisons of the fort, most of whom were
later transferred to Manila and confined in Fort Santiago.

Zacharias's interpretation of the action of the sultan and Datu Asin
was simply absurd and his behavior reflected considerable discredit
on his ability as an officer and administrator. It was further most
regrettable that his views were accepted as true by higher authority
in Manila where no clemency or redress was extended to the unfortunate
sultan and datus.

By a degree of the Governor-General, the following accusations were
set forth against the sultan and Datu Asin, viz:


    1. That Prince Asin had not surrendered captives; 2. That whilst
    the sultan was in Manila, new captives were made by the party who
    expelled him from the throne; 3. That the number of arms brought
    to Zamboanga by Sulu chiefs was excessive; 4. That the letter to
    Sultan Mohammed Amirud Din insinuated help wanted against the
    Spaniards; 5. That several Mohammedan, but no Christian books,
    were found in the sultan's baggage; 6. That during the journey to
    Zamboanga he had refused to pray in Christian form; 7. That he had
    only attended mass twice; 8. That he had celebrated Mohammedan
    rites, sacrificing a goat, and had given evidence in a hundred
    ways of being a Mohammedan; 9. That his conversation generally
    denoted a want of attachment to the Spaniards, and a contempt for
    their treatment of him in Manila, [191] and, 10. That he still
    cohabited with his concubines.

    The greatest stress was laid on the recovery of the captive
    Christians, and the governor added, that although the mission
    of the fleet was to restore the sultan to the throne (which,
    by the way, he does not appear to have attempted), the principal
    object was the rescue of Christian slaves. He therefore proposed
    that the liberty of the imprisoned nobles and chiefs should be
    bartered at the rate of 500 Christian slaves for each one of the
    chiefs and nobles, and the balance of the captives for Prince
    Asin and the clergy. [192]


It is not therefore surprising to hear of the extraordinarily
revengeful activity which the Sulus exhibited during the period of
humiliation to which their sultan and nobles were subjected in Manila.

Bantilan was a man of strong personality, a warrior, and a leader. The
expeditions which he organized against his enemies were unusually
strong and left havoc everywhere. The towns he pillaged and the
captives he carried away alarmed the Spanish Government to a high
degree. A high council of war was convened in Manila in 1752, which
declared for an unmerciful campaign and a war of extermination to
be conducted with the utmost conceivable cruelty. Volunteers and
Bisayan corsairs were called to aid the regular troops. Unlimited
authority was granted them to annihilate the foe, burn his villages,
destroy his crops, and desolate his lands. The corsairs were exempted
from all taxes. They were allowed to keep or sell all female captives
and all males under 12 and over 30 years of age. Old men and crippled
persons were to be killed. Male captives between 12 and 30 years of
age were to be turned in to the government; the captors to receive
in compensation from P4 to P6 per man. Nursing children were ordered
to be baptized. At first the corsairs were required to turn in to
the government one-fifth of all valuables looted, but this was soon
afterwards revoked and all corsairs who equipped themselves retained
all their booty.

As part of the general campaign, Field Marshal Abad made another attack
on Jolo with a force amounting to 1,900 men. The fleet cannonaded
the forts for seventy-two continuous hours. A division of the troops
landed and engaged the Sulus, but after suffering considerable loss
retreated disastrously.

The raids of the Spaniards and Bisayans helped to increase the
vigilance of the Sulus and excited them to extreme cruelty and an
abnormal degree of revenge. [193]


    The year 1753 is stated to have been the bloodiest in the history
    of Moro piracy. No part of the Bisayas escaped ravaging in this
    year, while the Camarines, Batangas, and Albay suffered equally
    with the rest. The conduct of the pirates was more than ordinarily
    cruel. Priests were slain, towns wholly destroyed, and thousands
    of captives carried south into Moro slavery. The condition of the
    Islands at the end of this year was probably the most deplorable
    in their history. [194]


In the meantime Prince Asin died of grief in his prison.

Early in 1753 Alimud Din petitioned the governor to allow Princess
Fatimah to go to Jolo for the purpose of arranging a peace with
Bantilan. This request was granted on condition that she deliver
50 slaves to the Spanish Government on her arrival at Jolo. This
she complied with faithfully, adding one Spanish captive to the 50
Christian slaves wanted. Her mission was apparently successful and she
returned to Manila with Datu Mohammed Ismael and Datu Maharaja-Layla,
a commission sent by Bantilan. They brought a letter from Bantilan,
which was transmitted to the governor by Alimud Din together with
a draft of a treaty for the restoration of peace between Spain and
Sulu. Bantilan expressed deep regret for Alimud Din and the existing
condition of hostility and gave strong assurance of his desire for
the return of the sultan and the reëstablishment of peace with Spain.

The governor acceded to the petition of the sultan and sent a letter
to Bantilan with the commission, requesting that all hostilities stop
for the period of one year pending the consideration and completion
of the new treaty. In 1754 Governor Arandia assumed command and
approved of the proposed treaty. To expedite matters he sent the
commanding officer of the southern forces to find out what had been
done by Bantilan toward the fulfilment of the conditions agreed
upon. Bantilan met the commanding officer in a most friendly manner
and discussed the questions frankly and ably. He explained in clear
and impressive manner the principal causes of hostility and strongly
blamed the governor of Zamboanga for his unjust imprisonment of the
sultan and Datu Asin and his unbearable treatment of the messengers
and representatives of the Sulu authorities. He declared his wish
and true desire for peace and delivered to the commanding officer 68
Christian captives and two Spanish sloops. The officer was strongly
impressed with the integrity of Bantilan and with the honesty of his
intentions, and gave to the governor a very favorable report of both
Alimud Din and Bantilan. He assured him that the sultan was not a
traitor at all, but a man of good intentions, who was simply unable
to carry out some of his plans and promises because of the determined
resistance of many of the principal datus.

A general council was held in Manila early in 1755, in which it was
resolved to set the sultan free and return him to Jolo if the Sulu
authorities carried out the terms of the following conditions:

1. That all captives within the sultanate of Sulu be delivered within
one year.

2. That all valuable property and ornaments looted from the churches
be returned within one year.

General Zacharias who had attended the council set out from Manila in
September to take charge of the government of Mindanao. He brought back
to Jolo 6 princes, 5 princesses, 20 women, and 130 men of the sultan's
retinue. He had letters from Alimud Din and the Governor-General to
Bantilan and was authorized to conduct the preliminaries of a peace
treaty. Other ambassadors who accompanied Zacharias were empowered
to ratify the same. The ships arrived at Jolo on October 4, and the
ambassadors were well received by Bantilan. The latter agreed to all
the conditions imposed in as far as it was in his power to carry them
out. But he stated that many captives were bought from Mindanao chiefs
and were owned by datus on Basilan and other inaccessible places, who
were unwilling to give them up unless they were justly compensated. He
added that many such datus were in alliance with datus in Mindanao
and were planning to attack Zamboanga, and that the time was very
inopportune for him to force them to deliver all captives.

The terms were actually impossible of execution and the endeavor to
make the treaty and ratify it proved fruitless.

Alimud Din remained in prison until 1763, when the English, after their
conquest and occupation of Manila, reinstated him on the throne of
Sulu. During the period of his imprisonment he felt greatly humiliated,
but lived as a Christian and with one wife only. At the death of his
wife, in 1755, he was allowed to marry a Sulu woman who had been his
concubine, but who had professed Christianity and was living at the
College of Santa Potenciana.

The Sulus received their former sultan with a good heart and Alimud
Din resumed his former authority as Sultan of Sulu. The people had
evidently acquired strong sympathy for him and Bantilan had either
undergone a change of heart or felt convinced that it was of no avail
to go against such strong popular sentiment and fight the English
forces. Withdrawing from Jolo he moved to Kuta Gubang near Parang,
where, a few years later, he died.

In return for the favors which he received from the English, Alimud Din
ceded to them that part of North Borneo lying between Cape Inarstang
and the River Frimanis with the adjacent Island of Balambangan and
the Island of Tulayan. Balambangan was soon after that occupied and
garrisoned by English forces.

In the later days of his reign, Alimud Din was addressed as Amirul
Mu'minin (The Prince of the Faithful) by which name he is better known
to the Sulus. Moro incursions increased at that time and the Sulus
became so daring as to invade the Bay of Manila in 1769, carry away
captives from the wharves of the city, and appear at the Plaza del
Palacio at retreat before they were repulsed or even detected. Becoming
old and weak, Amirul Mu'minin abdicated the sultanate in favor of
his son Israel, in November, 1773.



REIGN OF SULTAN ISRAEL

Sultan Israel followed the same progressive policy which characterized
his father's administration. However, his succession was contested
by rivals, and the people were not unanimous in his support. In
his foreign relations with the English and Spaniards he was at the
beginning uncertain as to the side toward which to lean. Both powers
had an eye on Sulu and appeared interested in its affairs. However,
before long he refused the request of the English to be allowed to move
their factory from Balambangan to Tandu-dayang, in the neighborhood
of Jolo, and exchanged messages of friendship with King Carlos III,
who congratulated Israel on his succession to the sultanate and thanked
him for his action relative to the removal of the Balambangan factory
to Sulu Island. [195] The early education Israel received in Manila,
together with the consideration with which the Spanish authorities
treated him at that time, helped to win his sympathies to the Spanish
side and to form a sort of an alliance between Sulu and Spain against
Great Britain. Such an alliance was further needed to strengthen his
hand in Sulu, for the purpose of checking any insurrection that might
be fomented by rival datus or unfriendly chiefs. The Spaniards promised
to help him in his endeavors to organize an army and a navy; and, he on
his part, agreed to open the ports of Sulu for free commerce with the
Philippine Islands. He further asked the Spanish Government for capital
to work his mines, promising to pay back one-fifth of the output.

In 1774 and 1776, Jolo was visited by Captain Thomas Forrest, who in
his "Voyage to New Guinea" described the town and country as he saw
them. His account is so interesting and so clear that the following
extracts [196] are quoted therefrom:


    They have a great variety of fine tropical fruits; the oranges
    are fully as good as those of China. They have also a variety
    of the fruit called jack, or nangka, durians, a kind of large
    custard apple named madang, mangos, mangustines * * *. The Sulus
    having great connection with China, and many Chineses being
    settled amongst them, they have learned the art of ingrafting
    and improving their fruits * * *.

    The capital town is called Bawang, [197] situated by the seacoast,
    on the northwest part of the island, and containing about 6,000
    inhabitants. Many of them were Ilanun * * *.

    This island * * * is well cultivated, affording a fine prospect
    from the sea, on every side far superior to that of Malay countries
    in general * * *.

    Here are wild elephants, the offspring, doubtless, of those sent
    in former days, from the continent of India [198] as presents to
    the kings of Sulu. Those animals avoid meeting with horned cattle,
    though they are not shy of horses. After harvest the Sulus hunt
    the elephants and wild hog, endeavoring to destroy them * * *.
    Sulu has spotted deer, abundance of goats, and black cattle.

    The pearl fishery * * * proves also to the Sulus the cause of
    their consequence amongst their neighbors, as being a nursery
    for seamen, ready to man a fleet of praus upon an emergency * * *.
    The praus [boats] of the Sulus are very neatly built, from 6 to
    40 tons burden, sail well, and are all fitted with the tripod
    mast. [199] * * *

    The arts are in greater forwardness here than at Mindanao. * * *
    In the common market is also a copper currency, a convenience much
    wanted at Mindanao, where, as has been said, the market currency
    is rice.

    The Sulus have in their families many Bisayan, some Spanish
    slaves, whom they purchase from the Ilanun and Magindanao
    cruisers. Sometimes they purchase whole cargoes, which they carry
    to Passir, on Borneo, where, if the females are handsome, they
    are bought up for the Batavia market. The masters sometimes use
    their slaves cruelly, assuming the power of life and death over
    them. Many are put to death for trifling offenses, and their bodies
    left above the ground. An attempt of elopement is here seldom
    pardoned, or indeed at Magindanao. Yet, the distance being so
    small from either Sulu or Slangan, [200] to the Spanish settlement,
    I have wondered how any stay, as they are not closely confined.

    The Bisayan slaves play often on the violin, and the Sulus are
    fond of European music. [201] I have seen the Sultan Israel, who
    was educated in Manila, and his niece, * * * dance a tolerable
    minuet. I have also seen the datus go down a country dance,
    but as they wore heavy slippers, they did it clumsily.

    The Sulus are not only neat in their clothes, but dress gaily. The
    men go generally in white waistcoats, buttoned down to the wrist;
    with white breeches, sometimes strait, sometimes wide. * * *
    Both sexes are fond of gaming. * * *

    In the cool of the evening, I had the pleasure of seeing the
    Sultan's niece and another princess. They wore waistcoats of
    fine muslin close fitted to their bodies; their necks to the
    upper part of the breasts being bare. From the waist downward
    they wore a loose robe, girt with an embroidered zone or belt
    about the middle, with a large clasp of gold, and a precious
    stone. This loose robe like a petticoat came over their drawers,
    and reached to the middle of the leg; the drawers of fine muslin
    reaching to the ankle. They rode across with very short stirrups,
    and wore their hair clubbed atop, Chinese fashion. They often
    put sweet oils on their hair which give it a gloss. The ladies
    sat their horses remarkably well; and this is an exercise women
    of fashion indulge all over the island.

    "The Island Sulu is far from being large; but its situation
    between Mindanao and Borneo makes it the mart of all the Moorish
    kingdoms. I do not find that the Portuguese ever pretended to
    settle, much less to conquer these islands; but they visited them
    frequently for the sake of trade; and in those days, there was
    greater commerce in these parts than can well be imagined. For,
    while the trade was open to Japan, there came from thence two or
    three ships laden with silver, amber, silks, chests, cabinets,
    and other curiosities made of sweet-scented woods, with vast
    quantities of silks, quilts, and earthenware, from China. For
    these the merchants of Golconda exchanged their diamonds, those
    of Ceylon their rubies, topazes, and sapphires; from Java and
    Sumatra came pepper, and spices from the Moluccas." (Harris'
    History of the Portuguese Empire, p. 685.)

    About fifteen datus * * * make the greater part of the
    legislature. * * * They sit in council with the Sultan. The
    sultan has two votes in this assembly, and each datu has one. The
    heir apparent, * * * if he side with the sultan, has two votes;
    but, if against him, only one. There are two representatives of
    the people, called mantiris, like the military tribunes of the
    Romans. The common people of Sulu * * * enjoy much real freedom,
    owing to the above representation.

    The state of Sulu is small, * * * containing scarce above 60,000
    inhabitants; yet are these powerful, and have under them, not only
    most of the islands that compose that Archipelago, but a great part
    of Borneo, some of which they have granted to the English. They
    have the character of being treacherous, and of endeavoring always
    to supply by fraud what they can not effect by force. * * *

    Only seven years have elapsed since the Sultan of Kulan * *
     * on the northeast of Borneo, was at war with the Sultan of
    Buru, on the same coast. One of them applied to the Sulus for
    assistance. The datus Alimud Din and Nukila went; and watching
    their opportunity, attacked both the sultans, plundered them,
    and carried them with their wives, children, and many of their
    headmen to Sulu. They were sometime after sent back, on condition
    that they should become tributary, which they are at this day.


The intentions of the East India Company in fortifying Balambangan
were regarded with suspicion by the Spaniards, who employed every
method possible to incite hostilities between the Sulus and the
English. The English agents at Jolo won the sympathy of a party
headed by the strong datus in chief command of the Sulu forces. The
Spaniards had the sultan and his party on their side. This question
of national policy was a matter of serious and important concern to
the people. It stirred up the whole Sulu community, and party issues
were ardently and publicly discussed.

The jealousy which the English and Spaniards exhibited toward
each other and the methods they used to secure alliance with Sulu,
had the effect of exciting the suspicion of the Sulus toward both
nations. Besides that, the Spanish officials at Zamboanga showed
exceedingly poor judgment, and their action aroused the indignation
of all parties in Sulu, and led to the renewal of hostilities.

In 1773 a majority of the leading datus favored an alliance with
England against Spain. In 1775 the English party weakened and the
garrison of Balambangan was treacherously attacked and destroyed
by Sulu agents and forces secretly sent there by Sultan Israel and
his council. The conduct of the Sulus in this incident depicts very
clearly a marked trait of the Sulu character. A full description
of this incident is given herewith in the words of Captain Forrest,
who had an intimate knowledge of the conditions at Balambangan and
the causes leading to the massacre.


    When John Herbert, esq. went to Balambangan early in the preceding
    year [1774], he found great want of buildings to accommodate the
    company's servants, civil and military; those gentlemen who had
    just been saved from the shipwreck of the Royal Captain on the
    shoals of Palawan, as well as the crew of that ship. About this
    time, one Tating, a Sulu datu, and first cousin to Sultan Israel,
    came with many of his vassals to Balambangan, offered his service
    as a builder, was employed by Mr. Herbert, and, in the whole of his
    behavior, gave satisfaction. The datu, falling sick, went home to
    Sulu for the recovery of his health. This blessing soon obtained,
    he returned to the prosecution of his task at Balambangan.

    He now brought from the sultan and council letters recommending
    him as a trustworthy person, to erect whatever warehouses or
    buildings might be wanted. With him came two other datus, Muluk
    and Nukila. But Datu Tating took care to show only part of his
    numerous followers, concealing the rest in the Island of Banguey,
    and even in some recesses of Balambangan, which, being covered
    with wood, as those islands generally are, there was no great
    fear of discovery.

    Surmises, however, had some days begun to spread reports of a
    plot, while Tating proceeded with such address, that the chief
    and council, who were not without their suspicions, apprehended
    no danger very nigh.

    During the night strict watch was kept all over the settlement. At
    dawn, the gun, as usual, announced the morning, and for a few
    moments tranquillity reigned. A house at some small distance
    suddenly fired proved the signal to the Sulus. They rushed into
    the fort, killed the sentries, and turned the guns against the
    Bugis guard. The few settlers, lately rendered fewer by death, were
    fain to make their escape in what vessels they could find. [202]


The governor and five others escaped on board a vessel, leaving behind
a great quantity of arms and wealth. The English factors who were
at Jolo fled in a Chinese junk. In the same year Tating attempted a
similar attack on Zamboanga, but failed. During 1776 and 1777 he and
other Sulus harassed the Bisayas and ravaged the coast of Cebu.



MORO PIRATES

Sultan Israel was poisoned in 1778 by his cousin Alimud Din II,
the son of Bantilan. During the reign of Sultan Alimud Din II,
hostilities between Sulus and Spaniards increased, and for the period
of ten years or more traffic between Luzon and the southern islands
was paralyzed. About 500 Spanish and native Christians were every
year carried into captivity by the Moros. The government was greatly
exercised over this grave situation, and in 1789 the Captain-General
Mariquina reported to the King that "war with the Moros was an evil
without remedy."

In the latter part of 1789 Sharapud Din, the son of Alimud Din I,
ascended the throne of Sulu. While a youth he was imprisoned with
his father in Zamboanga and accompanied the latter to Manila. Very
little is known of his reign except that he was animated by the same
spirit and principles which characterized his father's reign and that
of his brother Israel. He coined money, and one of his coins which
was obtained from Jolo bears the date 1204 A. H., which was probably
the date of his succession. Sultan Sharapud Din was followed by his
sons Alimud Din III and Aliyud Din I.


    The continued presence of the Moros in Mindoro, where they haunted
    the bays and rivers of both east and west coasts for months at a
    time, stealing out from this island for attack in every direction,
    was specially noted by Padre Zuñiga, and indicated how feebly
    the Spaniards repulsed these pirates a hundred years ago.

    It was the last severe phase of Malay piracy, when even the
    strong merchant ships of England and America dreaded the Straits
    of Borneo and passed with caution through the China Sea. Northern
    Borneo, the Sulu Archipelago, and the southern coasts of Mindanao
    were the centers from which came these fierce sea wolves, whose
    cruel exploits have left their many traditions in the American
    and British merchant navies, just as they periodically appear in
    the chronicles of the Philippines.

    Five hundred captives annually seem to have been the spoils taken
    by these Moros in the Philippine Islands, and as far south as
    Batavia and Macassar captive Filipinos were sold in the slave
    marts of the Malays. The aged and infirm were inhumanly bartered
    to the savage tribes of Borneo, who offered them up in their
    ceremonial sacrifices. The measures of the Spanish Government,
    though constant and expensive, were ineffective. Between 1778 and
    1793 a million and a half of pesos were expended on the fleets
    and expeditions to drive back or punish the Moros, but at the
    end of the century a veritable climax of piracy was attained.

    Pirates swarmed continually about the coasts of Mindoro,
    Burias, and Masbate, and even frequented the esteros [203] of
    Manila Bay. Some sort of peace seems to have been established
    with Jolo and a friendly commerce was engaged in toward the
    end of the century, but the Moros of Mindanao and Borneo were
    increasing enemies. In 1798 a fleet of 25 Moro bancas passed up
    the Pacific coast of Luzon and fell upon the isolated towns of
    Baler, Kasiguran, and Palanan, destroying the pueblos and taking
    450 captives. The cura of Kasiguran was ransomed in Binangonan
    for the sum of 2,500 pesos. For four years this pirate fleet had
    its rendezvous on Burias, whence it raided the adjacent coasts
    and Katanduan Island. [204]


Governor Aguilar assumed command in 1793 and made every effort to
remedy this condition of affairs. He divided the Archipelago into six
divisions, each of which was provided with a fleet of six gunboats. He
repaired the forts of the Bisayas, Mindoro, Tayabas, Batangas, and
Zamboanga. While preparing for defence, he negotiated with the Sulu
and Mindanao Moros for peace and partially succeeded in establishing
a condition of truce with Sulu.

In 1798 he convened a council to consider further measures for the
suppression of piracy. All records pertaining to Moro affairs were
submitted to Rufino Suarez, "Asesor del Gobierno," who was directed
to report on this subject. The report was rendered in April, 1800,
and contained full information and recommendations as to the best
measures and methods that the government could undertake for that
purpose. Aguilar, however, did not act on the recommendations of
Suarez, but continued his negotiations with the Moros who became
peaceful and remained so until 1803. In this year the English attacked
Zamboanga unsuccessfully, instigated hostility between Sulu and Spain,
and reoccupied the Island of Balambangan, which they held for three
years only.

In 1805 a treaty was made between Sulu and Spain whereby it was agreed
that no foreign resident would be permitted in Sulu without the
consent of the Spanish Government, and that in case of war between
Spain and any foreign country, the Sultan's ports would be closed
against Spain's enemies. Between 1805 and 1815 detailed accounts of
piratical raids are infrequent.

Sultan Aliyud Din died in 1808 and was succeeded by his pious brother
Shakirul Lah. It is related that Shakirul Lah slept on boards and
covered himself with sarongs only. He used to leave his home at night,
search for the poor and needy and feed them.

In 1815, the raiders took 1,000 native prisoners and captured several
Spanish, British, and Dutch vessels. In October, 1818, a Spanish fleet
under Pedro Esteban encountered 25 Moro vessels in the vicinity of
Albay, seized nine of them and sank the rest.

Sultan Shakirul Lah was succeeded in 1823 by Sultan Jamalul Kiram
I, the son of Alimud Din III. In the same year, Governor Antonio
Martinez, impressed by the superior policy and success of Corcuera,
organized an expedition under Alonso Morgado and attacked the pirates
in their home lairs, at Basilan, Pilas, Sulu, and Mindanao. The Spanish
fleet consisted of 2 schooners, 4 gunboats, 6 tenders, 2 junks, and
1 transport schooner. The expedition reached Pilas in March, 1825,
took the fort by assault and killed 50 Moros. At Jolo it cannonaded
the town for ten hours and then left for Mindanao, where it inflicted
considerable damage. It destroyed Moro boats at Illana Bay, Pollok,
and Dumankilis Bay.

General Ricafort sent another expedition, in 1827, to Jolo, consisting
of 20 vessels and 500 troops; but Jolo was so well fortified and the
Moro forces so numerous that the Spanish soldiers could not disembark,
and the expedition returned without accomplishing any results.

The seal of Sultan Jamalul Kiram I bears the date 1239 A. H., or
about 1823 A. D., which in all probability indicates the year of his
succession. He issued regular appointment forms for his subordinate
officers of state and dated his communications, using the current
Malay and Mohammedan dates combined. In the estimation of the Sulus
he was a strong and very prosperous sultan.

On the 23d of September, 1836 A. D. or 1252 A. H., he signed a
commercial treaty with Capt. José M. Halcon as the representative of
Captain-General Salazar. [205] The principal part of the treaty was
an agreement regulating boat licenses and the duties to be paid by
Sulu boats in Manila and Zamboanga and by Spanish vessels in Jolo. In
another document bearing the same date and signed by the same parties,
an alliance was declared guaranteeing general peace and safety to
Sulu boats in Philippine waters and to Spanish and Filipino craft in
the Sulu Sea. The sultan further consented to have a Spanish trading
house constructed at Jolo for the safe storage of merchandise under
the charge of a Spanish resident agent.



TREATY OF 1836 WITH THE SULTAN OF SULU


TEXT OF THE TREATY

Articles of agreement arranging the duties to be paid by Sulu craft
in Manila and Zamboanga, and by Spanish craft in Jolo, which schedule
can not be changed except by a new agreement.

Article 1. Sulu craft which, with proper license, go to Manila, may
import products of the Islands subject to the Sultan, by paying a
consumption duty of 2 1/2%.

Article 2. Wax and cacao may be deposited in the Manila Custom-House
by paying 1%; but if these articles are imported the established 14%
will be paid.

Article 3. Sulu craft that trade in Zamboanga will pay a duty of 1%
on products of the islands subject to the Sultan.

Article 4. All these duties will be paid in silver to the Protecting
Spanish Government on the basis of one-half the appraised value.

Article 5. Spanish craft in Jolo will pay the following duties in kind:


                                                                Pesos
Ships of three masts from Manila, with Chinese passengers       2,000
The same, without passengers                                    1,800
Brigantine from Manila, with Chinese passengers                 1,500
The same, without passengers                                    1,300
Schooner from Manila, with Chinese passengers                   1,400
The same, without passengers                                    1,200
Pontin (small trading boat) from Manila, with Chinese
    passengers                                                  1,400
The same, without passengers                                    1,200
Galley from Manila or other ports of the Philippines, with
    cargo of rice (palay), sugar and saguranes [206]              300
The same for the Philippine Islands with cargo of merchandise     500


Article 6. These duties fixed for Spanish craft will be paid in kind
in accordance with the values laid down in the following schedule,
one-half of which will be selected by the Sultan's government officials
from the cargo and the other half shall consist of such articles as
the captain of the boat may select, valuation to be  in accordance
with the schedule. Articles not in the schedule can not be exacted
from the captain, nor will he give such payment:


    =================================================================
    |               Articles               |   Quantity   |  Value  |
    |                                      |              | (pesos) |
    |======================================+==============+=========|
    | Rice                                 | One laga     |    2.00 |
    | Sugar                                | One pilon    |    5.00 |
    | Coconut oil                          | One tinaja   |    6.50 |
    | Chapas (plates)                      | Per thousand |    1.00 |
    | Cambayas ordinarias (cloth)          | Per thousand |    9.00 |
    | Carancali (cloth)                    | Per piece    |   11.00 |
    | Coco, black and blue, (cloth)        | 11 yards     |    4.50 |
    | Coquillo blanco, (cloth), 6 brazas   |              |         |
    |   (12 yards)                         | 1 piece      |    6.50 |
    | Coco blanco, (cloth), 22 brazas      |              |         |
    |   (44 yards)                         | 1 piece      |   16.50 |
    | Javal de caranclan (cloth)           | 1 piece      |   26.00 |
    | Cacha (cloth)                        | 1 piece      |    4.00 |
    | Manta coleta (shirting)              | 1 piece      |    1.00 |
    | Plain muslin, 12 varas               | 1 piece      |   10.00 |
    | Fancy muslin                         | 1 piece      |    5.00 |
    | Colored muslin, 12 varas             | 1 piece      |   15.00 |
    | Unhusked rice                        | One laga     |    1.00 |
    | Paños de Costa (cloth)               | 1 piece      |   11.00 |
    | Ordinary cambric kerchiefs           | 1 kerchief   |     .50 |
    | Ordinary stamped kerchiefs           | Per dozen    |    3.00 |
    | Woolens                              | 1 piece      |    6.00 |
    | Common woolens                       | 1 piece      |    5.00 |
    | Printed cotton with flowers          | 1 piece      |    9.00 |
    =================================================================


Article 7. Sulu ships found trading in ports without a license or
passing contraband will be treated as smugglers in accordance with the
Spanish laws laid down for such. Spanish schooners and small trading
craft (galeras) that show by manifest in Jolo that they carry a cargo
of Philippine produce, and are afterward discovered to have, in place
thereof, a cargo of merchandise (géneros), and to have discharged
such cargo in the port to be sold therein, will be fined 500 pesos as
per values in Jolo, two-thirds of said sum to go to the Sultan, and
one-third to the Royal Treasury of the Protecting Spanish Government.

Article 8. Should the import duties on any articles of commerce
produced in the Sulu Islands be reduced in Manila or Zamboanga to
a lower rate than that now established, the Spanish Government will
also make a reduction so that Sulu ships may always pay less, as has
been agreed.

Should the Sultan of Sulu collect smaller duties from any foreign
ship than those established for Spaniards, either as a tax or by
a reduction of the valuation of the dutiable articles, he will be
obliged to make such a reduction in duties for Spanish craft as will
give the advantage to the flag of His Catholic Majesty as stipulated.

Last Article. Should the text of these articles of agreement differ
in the two languages, the Spanish text will be literally adhered to.

Palace of Jolo, September 23, 1836, which is the 14th of the moon
Jamadul Akir, 1252.--José M. Harun,--Rubric,--Sultan Mohammed
Jamalul Kiram,--Datu Mohammed Harun,--Datu Mohammed Buyuk,--Datu
Bandahala,--Datu Muluk,--Datu Sabalmar,--Datu Mamancha,--Datu
Juhan,--Datu Maharaja-Layla,--Datu Sabuwayan,--Datu Muluk Kahar,--Datu
Nay.

I, Don José María Halcon y Mendoza, Frigate Captain of the Royal Navy,
etc., Special Commissioner appointed by the Captain General of the
Philippines to establish these articles of agreement (capitulaciones),

Certify that when I received from the hands of the Sultan of Sulu the
copy herewith, in the act of the exchange, by which I handed him the
duplicate with the ratification of the Governor General, I remarked
at the end of the present a writing in Malay, on the page following
that of the seals and signatures which is the reverse of folio six,
on which it can be seen.

I also certify that having examined the contents of said improper
addition which, although unauthorized, appears in writing in the
present document, it was found to be the text of the circular of the
Sultan to his people, in four articles, whose translation, made by
the Datu Muluk-Bandarasa, and verified separately by several persons,
reads as follows:

Article 1. The people of Sulu who wish to go to Zamboanga or Mindanao
shall ask the Sultan of Sulu for a passport so that they may suffer
no harm if they meet ships belonging to the Navy.

Article 2. Passports shall be issued stating the number of people on
board and the cargo when requested.

Article 3. I give this order for the safety of those who travel by
sea, as instead of being pursued by the ships of the Navy, they shall
be helped.

Article 4. I give you the present patent so that when you meet the
ships of the Navy of the King of Spain, my brother, they may not harm,
but help you.

And in proof thereof, I make out the present certificate, written
of my hand and attached to the Articles of Agreement, of which it is
impossible to make a new copy, on account of the absence of some of
the Datus who were present when they were agreed to, and approved them.

Given on board her Majesty's schooner "Tirol" in the roadstead of
Jolo on the 29th of March 1837.


José Ma. Halcon, (His flourish).



RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF 1836 BY THE QUEEN REGENT OF SPAIN

Isabel II, Queen of Spain, by the Grace of God and the Constitution of
the Spanish Monarchy, and in her Royal name and during her minority,
the Queen Dowager her mother, Doña María Cristina of Bourbon, Regent
of the Kingdom:

Whereas on the twenty-third of September of last year, at the palace
of Jolo, a treaty of peace, protection and commerce having been drawn
up, concluded and signed by the frigate-captain of the national fleet,
Don José María Halcon, commander in chief of the naval forces anchored
in the roadstead of Jolo, representing the Captain General of the
Philippine Islands, and the Sultan Jamalul Kiram and Datus; which
said treaty, composed of six articles, word by word, is as follows:

Capitulations of Peace, Protection and Commerce, executed to the
most Excellent Sultan and Datus of Sulu, by his high Excellency the
Captain-General, Governor of the Philippine Islands, in the name of
the high and powerful Sovereignty of her Catholic Majesty, being drawn
up and agreed to by both parties, to wit: representing the Spanish
Government as plenipotentiary of his high Excellency the Captain
General, Don Pedro Antonio Salazar, Governor of the Philippines, the
frigate-captain of the royal fleet, Don José María Halcon, commander
in chief of the naval forces anchored in the roadstead of Jolo; and
upon the other part, the Sultan Jamalul Kiram, Raja of Sulu and Datus
who subscribe, which parties enacted as follows:


    Article 1

    His high Excellency the Captain-General, Governor, for her Catholic
    Majesty, of the Philippine Islands, assures the most excellent
    Sultan and Datus of Sulu, for the present and forever, of the most
    stable peace between the Spaniards and natives of all the islands
    subject to the Crown of Spain and the tributaries of the lands
    governed by the Sultan and Datus. He offers the protection of his
    Government and the aid of fleets and soldiers for the wars which
    the Sultan shall find necessary to wage against enemies who shall
    attack him, or in order to accomplish the subjection of the peoples
    who rebel in all the confines of the islands which are found
    within Spanish jurisdiction, and which extend from the western
    point of Mindanao as far as Borneo and Palawan, except Sandakan
    and the other lands tributary to the Sultan on the coast of Borneo.

    The Sultan of Sulu, upon his part, accepting the friendship of
    the Spanish Government, binds himself to keep peace with all the
    vassals of her Catholic Majesty, and further binds himself to
    consider as his enemies those who hereafter may be such to the
    Spanish nation, the Sulus proceeding with armed men to the wars
    which may arise, in the same manner as if they were Spaniards; in
    case of his furnishing such aid, the provisions for the support
    of the Sulus shall be supplied by the Royal exchequer of her
    Catholic Majesty, as they are for the other soldiers and people
    of her army and navy.

    The sense of the second clause of the Capitulations of one thousand
    seven hundred and thirty-seven, that they are not bound to furnish
    assistance for wars against European nations, is hereby renewed
    and affirmed.


    Article 2

    In accordance with the friendship and protection which unite
    Sulu with the Spanish provinces of the Philippines, the Sulu
    boats shall navigate and trade freely with the open ports of
    Manila and Zamboanga, and the Spanish vessels with Jolo, where
    not only will both be well received, but shall find protection
    and the same treatment as the natives.

    In a separate Capitulation are determined the duties which the
    Spanish vessels shall pay in Jolo, and those which the Sulus
    shall pay in Manila and Zamboanga; but by these Capitulations it
    is agreed that whenever the Sulus convey cargoes of products of
    the islands, they shall pay in Manila and Zamboanga less than
    foreign vessels, and the Spanish vessels shall not pay in Jolo
    as much as is charged the ships of other nations.


    Article 3

    In order that the traffic of Spanish vessels in Jolo shall not
    suffer the injuries and delays occasioned by the difficulties of
    their market, the Sultan and Datus consent to the construction of a
    factory or trading house, with safe warehouses, where merchandise
    may be stored without risk: and the Sultan and Datus agree always
    to respect this place, in which there will be a resident Spanish
    agent, who shall assume charge of all the business entrusted
    to him. If the Sulus should desire to do likewise in Manila,
    they shall be permitted; but the Spanish Government receives
    for storage merchandise from the Custom-house of that city upon
    payment of fees of but one per centum.

    The Sultan shall designate the proper place for the location
    of the warehouses, which shall be convenient for loading and
    unloading and the Government shall request the Sultan to furnish,
    and shall pay for, the materials and workmen that may be necessary.


    Article 4

    In order that the Spanish and Sulu vessels may navigate and trade
    with safety, free from the piracies of the Hanuns and Samals
    the Spanish Government will strengthen its fleets in Mindanao
    waters, which same will protect equally those of both nations;
    and in order that good may not be confused with evil persons,
    the following rules shall be observed:

    1st. All Spanish vessels arriving at Jolo shall show to the Sultan
    their permit upon anchoring, and the same shall be sealed upon
    sailing; without which the captain shall be punished at Manila.

    2d. All Sulu vessels which proceed to Manila or Zamboanga, shall
    carry the permit of the Sultan, and in possession of the same
    shall be free and unmolested.

    3d. All Spanish or Sulu vessels which shall proceed for trading
    to Mindanao, shall go first to Zamboanga to notify the Governor,
    who shall sign their permit without cost.

    4th. Every Spanish or Sulu vessel which shall be found by the
    fleets of Illana or Sindangan bays, without permit of the Governor
    and Sultan as aforesaid, shall be seized and shall lose all her
    merchandise, of which two-thirds shall be awarded to those making
    the capture and one-third to the Sultan of Sulu, if the vessel
    is Sulu, and to the Spanish Government if the vessel is Spanish.

    5th. The Governor of Zamboanga shall determine the procedure in
    the case of vintas [small sail boats] of the towns of Pilas and
    Basilan Islands friendly to said Plaza [Zamboanga].

    6th. Sulu merchant vessels proceeding outside the islands of the
    Sultan or to Mindanao with a permit, should not flee from the
    fleets which they encounter, because the latter are intended to
    defend them and run down evil-doers. Commanders of the fleets
    shall be ordered to receive and aid the advice-boats of the Sultan.


    Article 5

    The Sultan and Datus of Sulu pledge themselves to prevent the
    piracies of the Ilanuns and Samals in the Philippines, and if they
    are unable, the Sultan shall so report in order that the Spanish
    Government may afford assistance or undertake the task alone.


    Last Article

    If the sense of these Capitulations is not conformable in both
    languages, the same shall agree with the literal Spanish text.

    Palace of Jolo, September 23, 1836, which is the fourteenth of the
    moon Jamadul Akir of one thousand two hundred and fifty-two. The
    seals.--Sultan Mohammed Jamalul Kiram.--Seal--signed.--José
    María Halcon.--Datu Mohammed Harun.--Seal.--Datu Mohammed
    Buyuk.--Seal--Datu Bandahala.--Seal--Datu Amilbahar.--Datu
    Muluk.--Datu Sabalmar.--Datu Mamancha.--Datu Juhan.--Datu
    Maharajah-Layla.--Datu Sabuwayan.--Datu Muluk Kahar.--Datu Nay.

    Therefore, the Government of our August Daughter, having been duly
    authorized by the decree of the Cortes of the thirteenth of the
    present month, for the ratification of the inclosed treaty, and
    the same having been seen and examined by Us, we have approved and
    ratified and by these presents do hereby approve and ratify the
    contents thereof as a whole, in the best and most complete form
    possible, promising on the faith and the word of Queen Regent,
    in the name of our August Daughter, to comply with and observe
    the same, and compel wholly the compliance with and observance
    of the same. In witness whereof, we command the disposition of
    the same, signed with our hand, and sealed with our own private
    seal by the First Secretary of State. Done at Madrid, this October
    twenty-ninth, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven.


    I the Queen Regent.

    [A shield in wax.]

    Eusebio de Bandaxi y Azara.



EXPEDITION OF GOVERNOR CLAVERIA

In 1842 the Spanish Government built the stone fort at Isabela de
Basilan. The Balangingi and Basilan Moros appear about this time to
have become a menace to the peace and to the commerce of nations. To
punish Datu Usak of Malusu for depredations committed against French
vessels, Basilan was blockaded by a French fleet in 1843. Aspiring
for Chinese trade and for the possession of a port in the neighboring
seas the French in 1844 concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu
for the cession of the Island of Basilan for a considerable sum of
money. The terms of this treaty do not appear to have been carried
out, but this act and the frequent appearance of English, Dutch,
and French vessels in Sulu waters aroused the Spaniards to active
measures for the subjugation of the Sulu Archipelago.

This year Jamalul Kiram I died, and his son Mohammed Pulalun succeeded
to the sultanate. The "Luntar" or "Sulu Annals" begin January, 1844,
and appear to have been started by Sultan Pulalun.

In 1845 a frigate attacked the Island of Balangingi, but it was
repulsed and gained no advantage except that of ascertaining the
strength of the enemy. The shores of Basilan and the principal
islands lying between it and the Island of Sulu had numerous forts,
the strongest of which were on the island of Balangingi, the chief
stronghold and headquarters of the Samal pirates. Realizing the
seriousness of the situation Governor Claveria took the matter in
hand and with energy and enthusiasm made every effort to strengthen
the fleet and increase its efficiency.

In 1848 he secured three steam war vessels called Elcano, Magallanes,
and Reina de Castilla which were built by the English and were the
first steam gunboats the Philippine Government ever employed. Steam
was certainly destined to mark a new epoch, one which saw the beginning
of the end of Moro piracy.

With two additional pilot boats and three transport brigs the
expedition, headed by Governor Claveria in person, left Manila in
January and, coming by the way of Dapitan, reunited at Caldera Bay,
where it received additional troops from Zamboanga.

The Island of Balangingi is scarcely 6 square miles in area,
low, flat, surrounded by shoals, and covered to a great extent by
mangrove swamps. Most of its settlements had their houses built over
the water and little dry land could be seen in the vicinity. Part
of this land was covered with coconut trees. A labyrinth of small,
narrow channels led to the various settlements and divided the island
into four distinct parts. Four strong forts were built by the Moros
at points difficult of access and surrounded by swamps. These forts
were constructed of thick trunks of trees driven into the soil as
piles and set close to each other and in 3 rows of varying heights,
to afford suitable positions for the artillery, part of which was set
in covered inclosures commanding the channel leading to the fort. The
walls of these forts were 20 feet high and could not be scaled without
ladders. The immediate vicinity of the fort was set with sharpened
bamboo sticks and pits to hinder and trap the attacking forces. The
fort of Sipak, the strongest of the four, was provided with redoubts
and towers and showed considerable skill in its construction.

The Spanish troops consisted of three regular companies of infantry,
two of volunteers, and detachments of artillery, pikemen, engineers,
and laborers. They experienced some difficulty in landing and attacked
the most accessible fort first. The fighting was heroic and desperate
on both sides. The Moros, it is said, fought like fiends; but they were
completely overpowered in the end. In the fort of Sipak many women
and children were gathered and considerable property was stored. The
Moros had hoped to save all within its impregnable walls. When these
walls were entered, some of the defenders in their desperation thrust
their spears and krises into their wives and children, killed them
first, and then dashed themselves against sure death at the point of
Spanish bayonets. The Moros consider such action most valorous and
honorable and do it in order not to allow their wives and children
to fall into slavery or be killed by the hand of the enemy.

In the fight at the first fort 100 Moros perished and 14 pieces
of artillery were captured. The Spaniards lost 7 dead and 50
wounded. After the reduction of the second fort at Sipak 340 Moros were
burned in one pile and 150, mostly women and children, were taken as
prisoners; others, who sought refuge in the swamps or tried to swim
away, were killed by the fire of the fleet and their bodies were
washed ashore by the waves. The Spanish losses in this engagement
amounted to 17 dead, 4 officers and 13 men, and 155 wounded. Three
hundred slave captives were rescued and 66 pieces of artillery were
captured. Quantities of ammunition, silks, silver and gold vessels,
bracelets and other ornaments, jewels, utensils and arms of all sorts,
and books of prayer were found inside the fort.

The troops investing the third fortification at Sungap found the
fort evacuated, but the first Spaniard who scaled the wall fell dead
from a kampilan blow at the hand of the only Moro who refused to run
away and remained at his post to meet what he considered an honorable
death. Thirteen cannons of small caliber were found in this fort. The
Moros who had fled to the fourth fort at Bukutingal did not make any
determined stand, but soon fled leaving several cannons behind. The
Spaniards desolated the island, burned its forts and settlements,
and cut down more than 8,000 coconut trees.

The conquest of the Balangingi Samals was complete and the expedition
returned to Manila in triumph. Here great rejoicings, parades, and
festivities were held in honor of the event. Governor Claveria was
decorated and promoted by the Queen and many of the officers and men
were variously rewarded.

The Balangingi Samals rivaled the Sulus in power, bravery, and wealth,
but the signal victory of Claveria crushed them so completely that
they have never since had any considerable force. The Samals who were
carried away were transplanted to the Province of Kagayan in northern
Luzon, where they remained until a late date.



VISITS TO JOLO OF CAPTAIN HENRY KEPPEL AND SIR JAMES BROOKE

In December, 1848, Jolo was visited by Capt. Henry Keppel, in command
of the Maeander, and his description of the town contained in the
following extracts taken from his "Visit to the Indian Archipelago"
will be of unusual interest: [207]


    The town is built partly on land and partly on the sea. That
    part which is on the land, and which might almost be called the
    citadel, was at the time of our visit, strongly stockaded and
    flanked with batteries mounting heavy guns * * *. That portion
    of the town which is not within the stockades is built in regular
    Malay fashion, on piles. The houses run in rows, or streets; and
    outside of them is a platform about 6 feet wide to walk upon. This
    is supported underneath by a light scaffolding of bamboo. These
    rows of birdcage-looking buildings extend into the sea for half a
    mile over a shoal which is nearly dry at low water. The population
    is numerous, composed principally of fishermen and Chinese
    traders. The said platform runs the whole length of the rows:
    and its planks were so carelessly thrown across that it seemed
    wonderful how the children could escape, if they always did escape,
    falling through the yawning spaces which invited them to a watery,
    or a muddy grave; they were crawling about these rickety stages
    in vast numbers; if the tide was out when they fell, they would
    be received into 3 feet deep of soft mud, supposing always that
    they did not break their little backs across the gunwales of the
    canoes beneath, which were made fast to the scaffolding. * * *

    What we saw of the country [in the neighborhood of Jolo]
    was highly cultivated, consisting, with intervals of jungle,
    of pasture grounds and gardens, very flourishing and pretty,
    with abundance of cattle. * * *

    The day after we had commenced [watering] was a market day. The
    mountaineers came down in parties of from six to twelve, mounted
    on well-formed little horses, or oxen, according to their
    rank and means; on these they sat with graceful ease, spear in
    hand--they were all well armed besides, with shield and kris;
    in some instances also we observed the heavy two-handed Ilanun
    sword [kampilan]. They had a wild and independent bearing;
    and, when seen in groups, some standing, some squatting, the
    women all chattering, under the wide spreading tree, they much
    increased the interest of the already picturesque scene. They
    seemed indifferent as to the sale of their stock, which was
    conducted chiefly by the women, who freely accompanied them,
    and were by no means ill favored. The townspeople, who met and
    traded with these mountaineers, were dressed in gayer colors,
    but not so well armed. * * * Though the market on this occasion
    was well attended, the trade was slack; but I doubt not that,
    in the palmy days of active piracy, a considerable amount of
    business was transacted under this old banyan tree. * * *

    December 30 was the day appointed for Sir James Brooke's
    interview with the Sultan of Sulu. We landed in full costume at
    10 o'clock. Having walked over the sea suburbs, and arrived at
    the beach, we found a guard of honor and attendants waiting to
    conduct Sir James to the Sultan's presence; they were a motley
    group, but made themselves useful in clearing the way.

    Passing within the outer stockade, we arrived, after a few minute's
    walk, at the royal residence. It was walled in and fortified:
    a large space was inclosed by double rows of heavy piles driven
    into the earth, about 5 feet apart, and the space was filled up
    with large stones and earth, making a very solid wall of about
    15 feet in height, having embrasures, or rather portholes, in
    convenient places for cannon, out of which we noticed the rusty
    muzzles of some very heavy guns protruding. A great part of the
    town was stockaded in a similar way; and the country houses of
    the datus and mountain chiefs of any importance were also walled
    in and had guns mounted.

    Passing through a massive gateway, pretty well flanked with guns
    and loopholes, we entered a large court, in which some 2,000
    persons were assembled, armed and in their best apparel, but
    observing no sort of order; it was a wild and novel sight. Malays
    are always armed. The kris to them is what the sword was to
    an English gentleman in the feudal times. Every person who, by
    virtue of his rank or on any other pretext, could gain admittance
    was in attendance on this occasion; for our Rajah had become a
    justly celebrated man in the great Eastern Archipelago, and was
    an object of curiosity.

    We were conducted through the crowd to a corner of the courtyard,
    where a building inferior to a small English barn, was pointed
    out as the Sultan's palace. We entered it by a flight of broad
    wooden steps (for the palace was raised on piles), through a
    narrow passage thronged with guards * * * and we found ourselves
    in the royal presence.

    The audience chamber was not very large; a table, covered with
    green cloth, ran across the center of it; above the table, and
    around the upper end of the room sat a very brilliant semicircle of
    personages, the Sultan occupying a raised seat in the middle. The
    cortège consisted of his grand vizier, the members of the royal
    family, and the great datus and officers of state. Behind these
    stood the guards and attendants, dressed in silks, the colors
    being according to the fancy of their respective masters.

    The Sultan gave us a gracious reception, shaking hands with each
    officer as he was presented. This ceremony over, chairs were
    placed for Sir James and his suite; while those of our party,
    who could not get seats, formed a semicircle on the other side
    of the table. The scene was striking and gay.

    The Sultan is a young-looking man, but with a dull and vacant
    expression, produced by the too free use of opium: his lips
    were red with the mixture of betel nut and cere leaf, [208]
    which he chewed.

    He was dressed in rich silks, red and green the predominant
    colors. A large jewel sparkled in his turban, and he wore jewels
    also profusely on his person.

    The hilt of his kris, the great distinguishing ornament of all
    Malays, was beautifully decorated with gold wire, curiously
    twisted in. Immediately behind the Sultan, in closest attendance
    on his person, stood the cupbearer, a fine young man dressed in
    green silk, who held in his hand a purple finger glass, which
    was constantly held to his royal master's mouth, to receive
    the filthy-looking mixture which is in such favor with these
    people--composed of the juice of the betel leaf, with the areca
    nut and gambier. The other personages composing the circle were
    dressed with equal gaudiness, in bright silks; in the selection,
    however, of their colors they displayed considerable taste. Many
    of the guards were dressed in very ancient chain armor, consisting
    of skull caps and tunics, covering the arms and reaching from
    the throat to the knee.

    Those armed with sword, spear, and kris did not look amiss; but
    two sentries, placed to guard the entrance to this ancient hall of
    audience, each shouldering a very shabby-looking old Tower musket,
    of which they looked very proud, had an absurd effect.

    After a reasonable time passed by each party in admiration of
    the other, the conversation was opened by Sir James Brooke, who,
    as Her Majesty's commissioner in these regions, submitted to the
    Sultan certain propositions on matters of business.

    To these His Majesty expressed his willingness to accede; and
    he graciously reminded Sir James that the royal family of Sulu
    were under considerable obligations to the English; inasmuch as
    his great-grandfather, Sultan Amir, [209] having been once upon
    a time imprisoned by the Spaniards in the fortress of Manila,
    was delivered from durance vile and reinstated on the throne of
    his ancestors by Alexander Dalrymple----A. D. 1763. This was now
    the more liberal on the part of His Majesty, because his royal
    ancestor had not at the time allowed the service to be altogether
    unrequited; for he ceded to the English Government a fine island
    adjoining Sulu (of which, by the bye, no use appears to have been
    made), together with the north end of Borneo and the south end
    of Palawan, with the intervening islands.

    At length we took leave of his Majesty, retiring in much the
    same order as that in which we had entered. Although no actual
    treaty was concluded with the Sultan, Sir James paved the way for
    opening up commerce and for cultivating a better understanding
    with the natives.

    In the afternoon we visited one Datu Daniel, a powerful chief,
    very friendly, and well disposed toward the English. His stronghold
    was at a short distance in the country, at the foot of one of the
    mountain slopes, fortified in much the same way as the Sultan's,
    but on a smaller scale; his stockades were, however, quite as
    strong, and his guns in better order. His inclosed court, being
    likewise a farmyard with a good supply of live stock, looked as
    if he was better prepared than his royal master to stand a long
    siege; his wives looked happy, his children merry, and, on the
    whole, his domestic life appeared tolerably comfortable. * * *

    Considering that Sulu was the great commercial center of these
    seas, we were surprised at not seeing more large praus; there
    were none afloat, and very few hauled up; the number, however,
    of building sheds and blacksmith's forges showed that they have
    the means of starting into activity at short notice.


Who could have thought that, after such devastation and havoc as the
Spaniards wrought on Balangingi, another chief would have the courage
to settle on such a hateful spot again! Yet we learn that in spite
of the contrary advice of the Sultan and his council, Datu Tampang,
as early as December, 1848, stationed himself at Pa'at, Balangingi
Island, and constructed a fort with the intention of defying the
Spanish forces and fighting them again. An isolated case like this can
not be explained except on the ground of foolhardiness, for Tampang
was soon after that dislodged by the governor of Zamboanga. But it
appears that it was necessary again for the Spaniards to send another
squadron under Manuel Quesada, consisting of two steam gunboats and
other sloops and vessels, to clean up Balangingi once more and to
strike at the Moros of Basilan and Pilas. Nor was this sufficient, for
we learn that before the end of the same month of December, 3,000 Sulus
and Samals attacked the Spanish forces on Basilan, probably at Isabela,
and were repulsed. In 1849 the Spaniards retaliated and reduced to
ashes the settlements of Bwal, Samalang, and Gumbalang. Undaunted,
the Moros of Tonkil, together with others, in 1850 raided the Islands
of Samar and Kamigin and carried away more than 75 natives.







CHAPTER IV

DECLINE OF SULU, 1851-1896


EXPEDITION AGAINST JOLO

The fearlessness of the Moros in battle, their determination,
persistence, and fortitude must have disheartened the Spaniards
very often in their weary attempts to conquer and pacify Sulu. The
Sulus have never had any standing army. Every able-bodied male was
a soldier and a sailor. Thousands of Sulus and Samals stood ready
at a moment's notice to man a fleet and defend a fort. Every fort
the Spaniards reduced the Sulus could rebuild in a short time;
every fleet destroyed they could replace with little expense. They
had enough pearls to purchase guns and ammunition, and a few months
after a defeat they were ready to fight again, better prepared than
before. War with Sulu, in the way it was conducted, meant a war of
extermination and hostilities without end. Its worst evils befell the
helpless natives of the coast settlements of the Bisayas and southern
Luzon to whom Spain was unable to afford safe protection. The Moros
would slip through in the night or take advantage of a favorable wind
and attack the Spanish forces or the defenseless villages while they
were unaware of danger or unprepared for a fight. For a long while it
seemed beyond the power of the Philippine Government to reëstablish
peace or restrict hostilities to Sulu waters. The magnificent victory
of Claveria was hailed as marking the beginning of a new era of safety
and glory, but its effects did not last long, and the fear of the
Moros beset the hearts of the Bisayans once more.

In the light of such profound experience as the Philippine Government
had had with Moro affairs Governor Urbiztondo might have contented
himself with punishing the Moros of Tonkil and their abettors and
allies, but another element of serious concern entered into the
problem which threatened not only to render it more vexatious and
unsolvable, but dangerous in the extreme. It was not so much the evils
of disturbed relations with Sulu as the harm that would arise from
English occupation of or alliance with Sulu that Urbiztondo feared,
for in 1849, Sir James Brooke visited Jolo and made a treaty with the
Sultan of Sulu, [210] the seventh article of which declared a promise
made by the Sultan of Sulu not to make any cessions of territory within
his dominion nor recognize sovereignty rights nor promise fealty to any
nation without the consent of Great Britain. The overt object of this
treaty was "to keep open for the benefit of the mercantile world that
improvable field for commercial enterprise," but the ultimate purpose
of such an agreement was not difficult to foresee. The governor of
Zamboanga went to Jolo and protested strongly, declaring such a treaty
an act of disloyalty to Spain, for which the Sultan and his council
would be held responsible. The subject was debated with considerable
feeling on both sides. The governor remained at Jolo twenty-seven
days and returned without advantage.

The treaty was never ratified by Great Britain, but such endeavors on
the part of a strong maritime European power made it necessary for
Spain to act decisively and expeditiously. Urbiztondo then pressed
to the attention of Sultan Pulalun and his council the necessity of
punishing the Samals of Tonkil for their depredations on Samar and
Kamigin and requested the return of the captives whom they carried
away. Considerable controversy followed and the Sulus pretended that
they were unable to punish Tonkil, but offered no objection to its
castigation by the Philippine Government.

Aware of the seriousness of the situation, Urbiztondo made preparations
for war and decided to attack not Tonkil only, but Jolo also, repeating
there the example of Balangingi, and to bring Sulu under the control
of Spain. Referring to this cause, Captain Keppel, in his "Visit to
the Indian Archipelago," makes the following remarks:


    His [the Sultan's] fortified position gave him weight, which he
    had frequently thrown into the scale of humanity: and it must
    now be feared that many whom he was able to hold in check will
    again follow their evil propensities unrestrained, as they did
    under previous dynasties.

    The resentment of Spain, as visited upon the Sultan of Sulu, seems
    equally impolitic and unjust. The pretext was piracy, of which
    some solitary instance may very possibly have been established
    against a Sulu prahu; but the Sultan was certainly sincere in his
    wish to coöperate against that system. There is ground to fear
    that national jealousy was desirous of striking its puny blow
    at an European rival, through the degradation of the Sultan of
    Sulu--that he has incurred, in fact, the resentment of the Spanish
    colonial governors, by those commercial treaties with ourselves
    which were but lately concluded by Sir James Brooke. [211]


On the 11th day of December, 1850, Urbiztondo left Manila in command
of a force consisting of 100 troops of artillery, 500 of infantry, 2
mountain howitzers, and a number of irregular troops and workmen. Two
steamboats, one corvette, and one brigantine carried the troops
to Zamboanga, where they arrived on the 20th. Here 2 companies of
infantry and 102 volunteers and 6 tenders under the command of the
governor of Zamboanga joined the expedition. At Belun they burned
250 houses and 20 vintas. A small force of Moros was encountered,
of which they killed 3 and captured 17 prisoners, one of whom was a
panglima. The chief of Bukutwan surrendered and promised to remain
obedient to Spain. At Tonkil bad weather was encountered and the
whole expedition turned toward Jolo.

Jolo was well fortified. It had five forts on the sea front, the
strongest two of which were that of the Sultan on the right and that of
Datu Daniel on the hill. Three other forts were located on prominent
points at the base of the hills. The town was further defended by a
double line of trenches, other fortifications and much artillery. The
population was estimated at 6,000 Moros and 500 Chinese.

The fleet saluted the town and anchored in the roadstead. Two
officers were sent ashore to notify the Sultan of the presence of
the Governor-General and of his wish to have an interview with the
Sultan and two of his datus, on board. The people were excited to such
a high degree, that the mob grew violent and uncontrollable as the
officers drew near the shore. Insults and weapons were hurled at them
from every side, and the people shouted to them to return lest they be
killed. They, however, pushed on in the direction of the Sultan's fort,
where some datus came out to meet and protect them. Even then spears
were thrown at them, and one of the datus had to use his kampilan in
order to enforce his orders. The Sultan at last came out personally,
embraced the officers, and conducted them to the audience hall. There
the message was delivered to the Sultan and his council, but they
all refused to go on board. The officers met the same difficulty
in leaving the Sultan's house as in coming in, and as soon as they
embarked five shots were discharged at them by the mob. The officers
reported that the town had more than 10,000 fighting men and that
it was well provisioned and well defended, and that all the women
and children were removed to the mountains. Urbiztondo decided that
his forces and provisions were inadequate for the occasion and did
not risk a combat. On January 1, 1851, as the fleet was preparing to
sail away, the Sulus fired at it, killing seven, wounding four, and
damaging the hulls of some of the vessels. The fleet returned the fire,
but kept moving, and sailed away in the direction of Tonkil. Here
the expedition met no organized resistance. Six hundred men were
disembarked, fought some armed parties, caught 4 and killed 25 men,
and rescued 29 captives. About 1,000 houses and 106 boats were burned,
and the fleet then returned to Zamboanga.

Here Urbiztondo made further and extensive preparations to strengthen
his expedition. The commanding marine officer was sent to Manila
with special instructions to augment the fleet and bring sufficient
ammunition and provisions. The Augustinian friar Pascual Ibañez
raised a force of 750 Cebuans and 21 barangay, or large boats, and
volunteered his help. Lumber was cut at Basilan, and lankan, [212]
rafts, and ladders were constructed. Volunteers were further called
for, and a large fleet of war vessels and transports was assembled
at Zamboanga February 12, 1851.

Besides the staff, engineers, surgeons, and chaplains, the reënforced
expedition contained 11 officers and 253 privates of artillery, 1
officer and 30 privates of sappers, 123 officers and 2,593 privates
of infantry, 525 volunteers from Cebu, 100 from Iloilo, and 300 from
Zamboanga; in all 142 officers, 2,876 privates, and 925 volunteers,
besides rowers and other workmen. The vessels carrying the forces
were 1 corvette, 1 brigantine, 3 steamboats, 2 gunboats, 9 tenders,
9 transports, and 21 barangay, with various vintas, [213] lankan,
and rafts. On February 19 mass was celebrated and the expedition
started for the haughty and arrogant city.

Jolo was reached on the 27th and the fleet anchored in two divisions
opposite both sides of the town. The troops disembarked at dawn next
morning and engaged the enemy as both divisions of the fleet began
a simultaneous bombardment of the town and forts. The marksmanship
of the Sulus and Spaniards was splendid, and the guns of the forts
were very active. The spectacle was magnificent, the attack was most
valorous, and the defense most valiant. In the heat of battle one
friar was killed as he was scaling the wall and three officers fell
by his side and lay surrounded by 70 corpses of Sulus. After several
attempts one of the forts on the northeast side was taken by storm and
the escaping Sulus made for Daniel's fort. As they were admitted into
the latter, it was rushed by the Spanish troops who entered in spite
of the desperate resistance the Sulus made. As the inner inclosure was
gained the Sulus hurled themselves from the parapets and fled. The
fighting continued until next day, when every fort was reduced, and
the Sulus evacuated the town. The casualties of the attacking forces
were 36 dead and 92 wounded, while the Sulus lost 300 dead. The whole
town was burned to ashes and 112 pieces of artillery were taken. After
four days, the Governor-General and his council decided to evacuate
the town and sailed away, leaving it ungarrisoned. They evidently
thought that their purpose was accomplished and that they could not
afford to leave a force sufficiently strong to defend the place.

On April 30 a treaty was made with Sultan Pulalun by the
politico-military governor of Zamboanga, Col. José Maria de Carlos. The
treaty was declared to be "an act of incorporation of the sultanate
of Sulu to the Spanish Monarchy." The Sulus understood it to be a firm
agreement and friendly union with Spain. They, however, appear to have
recognized the supremacy of Spain and accepted her protectorate. They
agreed to use the Spanish flag and prohibit piracy. They further
bound themselves not to make any treaties with any nation other
than Spain nor to build forts nor to import firearms without her
permission. Spain promised to respect and recognize the ranks of
the Sultan and datus and to protect Sulu boats everywhere and to
the same extent as Spanish boats. Duties on foreign boats were to
be paid to the Sulus. Religious liberty was guaranteed. The Sultan
issued passports to the Sulus and countersigned Spanish passports
given to people entering the ports of Sulu.

It was agreed that Spain would build a trading post at Jolo and
establish a small garrison for its protection. The Sultan and the
datus resumed their residence in the town of Jolo, with apparently
very little change from former conditions.

In consideration of the losses incurred by the Sultan and datus
through the destruction of their houses and town, and on condition
that the Sulus aid in the construction and protection of the Jolo
trading post, annuities were granted to the Sultan, three datus,
and one subordinate chief.

The treaty was written in both Spanish and Sulu and was signed and
sealed by both parties. Complete and exact translations of the Spanish
and Sulu copies of this treaty have been carefully made and are here
given in full. The Sulu copy of the treaty appears to have been written
or dictated by interpreters not versed in Sulu, and the difference in
text is such as would easily explain the frequent misunderstandings
between the Spanish officials and the Sulu authorities in cases
pertaining to the application of the terms of this treaty.



TREATY OF APRIL 30, 1851


    SULTANATE OF SULU

    Act of Incorporation into the Spanish Monarchy, April 30, 1851


    Solemn declaration of incorporation and adhesion to the Sovereignty
    of Her Catholic Majesty Isabel II, Constitutional Queen of Spain,
    and of submission to the Supreme Government of the Nation, made
    by His High Excellency the Sultan of Sulu, Mohammed Pulalun,
    Datus Mohammed Buyuk, Muluk, Daniel Amil Bahar, Bandahala, Muluk
    Kahar, Amil Badar, Tumanggung, Juhan, Sanajahan, Na'ib, Mamancha
    and Sharif Mohammed Binsarin, in the name and in representation
    of the whole island of Sulu, to Colonel José María de Carlos y
    O'Doyle, Politico-Military Governor of the Province of Zamboanga,
    islands of Basilan, Pilas, Tonkil, and those adjacent thereto,
    as Plenipotentiary specially authorized by His Excellency Antonio
    de Urbiztondo, Marquis of Solana, Governor and Captain-General
    of the Philippine Islands.

    Article I. His Excellency the Sultan of Sulu, for himself, his
    heirs and descendants, Datus Mohammed Buyuk, Muluk, Daniel Amil
    Bahar, Bandahala, Muluk Kahar, Amil Badar, Tumanggung, Juhan,
    Sanajahan, Na'ib, Mamancha and Sharif Mohammed Binsarin, all of
    their own free will, declare: That, for the purpose of making
    amends to the Spanish Nation for the outrage committed against
    it on the first of January of this year, they desire and request
    that the island of Jolo and all its dependencies be incorporated
    with the Crown of Spain, which for several centuries has been
    their only sovereign and protectress, making on this day a new
    solemn declaration of adhesion and submission and recognizing
    Her Catholic Majesty Isabel II, Constitutional Queen of Spain,
    and those who may succeed her in this supreme dignity, as their
    rightful Sovereign Lords and Protectors, in virtue of the treaties
    made in old times, of the treaty of 1836 and the additions made
    thereto by the present governor of Zamboanga in August, and also
    and very particularly of the recent conquest of Jolo on the 28th of
    February of the present year by Captain-General Antonio Urbiztondo,
    Marquis of Solana and Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.

    Article 2. The Sultan and Datus solemnly promise to maintain the
    integrity of the territory of Sulu and all its dependencies as
    a part of the Archipelago belonging to the Spanish Government.

    Article 3. The island of Sulu and all its dependencies having been
    incorporated with the Crown of Spain, and the inhabitants thereof
    being part of the great Spanish family which lives in the vast
    Philippine Archipelago, the Sultan and Datus shall not be empowered
    to make or sign treaties, commercial agreements or alliances of
    any kind with European powers, companies, persons or corporations,
    and Malayan sultans or chiefs, under pain of nullity; they declare
    all treaties made with other powers to be null and void if they
    are prejudicial to the ancient and indisputable rights held by
    Spain over the entire Sulu Archipelago as part of the Philippine
    Islands, and they ratify, renew and leave in force all documents
    containing clauses favorable to the Spanish Government that may
    have been drawn up before this date, however old they may be.

    Article 4. They renew the solemn promise not to carry on piracy
    or allow anybody to carry on piracy within the dominions of Sulu,
    and to run down those who follow this infamous calling, declaring
    themselves enemies of all islands that are enemies of Spain and
    allies of all her friends.

    Article 5. From this day forth the island of Sulu shall fly the
    Spanish national flag in its towns and on its ships, and the Sultan
    and other constituted authorities shall use the Spanish war flag,
    under the principles in use in other Spanish possessions, and
    shall use no other either on land or on sea.

    Article 6. The island of Sulu and its dependencies having been
    declared an integral part of the Philippine Archipelago, which
    belongs to Spain, commerce under the Spanish flag in all the
    ports of the Sultanate shall be free and unmolested, as it is in
    all the ports belonging to the Nation.

    Article 7. The Sultan and Datus of Sulu, having recognized the
    sovereignty of Spain over their territory, which sovereignty is
    now strongly established, not only by right of conquest but by
    the clemency of the conqueror, they shall not erect fortifications
    of any kind in the territory under their command without express
    permission of His Excellency the Governor-General of these Islands;
    the purchase and use of all kinds of firearms shall be prohibited
    except with a license issued by the same supreme authority,
    and craft found with arms other than the edged weapons which
    have from time immemorial been in use in the country shall be
    considered as enemies.

    Article 8. The Spanish Government, as an unequivocal proof of
    the protection which it grants the Sulus, will give the Sultan
    and Datus adequate Royal titles establishing their authority and
    their rank.

    Article 9. The Spanish Government guarantees with all solemnity
    to the Sultan and other inhabitants of Sulu the free exercise of
    their religion, with which it will not interfere in the slightest
    way, and it will also respect their customs.

    Article 10. The Spanish Government also guarantees the right
    of succession to the present Sultan and his descendants in the
    order established and as long as they observe these agreements,
    and equally guarantees the rank and dignities of the privileged
    classes, which shall retain all their rights.

    Article 11. Sulu ships and goods shall enjoy in Spanish ports,
    without any distinction whatever, the same privileges and
    advantages granted the natives of the Philippine Islands.

    Article 12. Except in the case of Spanish ships, the duties that
    constitute the income with which the Sultan and Datus maintain
    their respective ranks shall remain in force, so that they may
    continue to keep up the proper splendor and decorum of their
    station; for this purpose said duties shall be paid by all ships
    coming to their ports; other measures will be taken later on to
    enhance their dignity and increase their prestige.

    Article 13. For the purpose of assuring and strengthening the
    authority of the Sultan, and also of promoting a regular trade
    which may enrich the island of Sulu, a trading post, garrisoned by
    Spanish forces, shall be established as soon as the Government so
    orders, and in accordance with Article 3 of the Treaty of 1836;
    for the building of the trading post the Sultan, Datus, and
    natives shall give all the assistance in their power and furnish
    native labor, which will be paid for, and all necessary materials,
    which they will charge at the regular market prices.

    Article 14. The trading post shall be established at the place
    called Daniel's Kuta, next to the roadstead, as it is the most
    suitable place; but care shall be taken not to encroach in any way
    on the native cemetery, which has to be religiously respected, and
    no buildings whatever shall be erected in said cemetery, so as to
    avoid the trouble that would ensue to those who might build there.

    Article 15. The Sultan of Sulu may issue passports to all persons
    within his dominions that may request them, and fix the amount
    of the fees; he is also authorized to countersign or place his
    seal on the passports of Spaniards visiting his place of residence.

    Article 16. In view of the Sultan's declarations regarding the
    losses suffered by him in the destruction by fire of his forts
    and palace, and convinced of the reality of the losses, the
    Spanish Government grants him an annuity of 1,500 pesos in order
    to indemnify him in a certain way for these losses and at the same
    time to help him to maintain, with proper splendor, the decorum due
    his person and his rank. The same considerations induce the Spanish
    Government to grant Datu Mohammed Buyuk, Muluk and Datu Daniel Amil
    Bahar 600 pesos per annum each, and 360 pesos to Sharif Mohammed
    Binsarin on account of his good services to the Spanish Government.

    Article 17. The articles contained in this solemn Act shall
    go this day into full effect, subject however to the superior
    approval of His Excellency the Governor-General of these Philippine
    Islands. Any doubt which may arise in regard to the text of this
    Act shall be resolved by adhering to the literal meaning of the
    Spanish text.

    Signed at Jolo on the 19th of April 1851.--Seal of the
    Sultan.--Seals of Datus Muluk Kahar; Tumanggung; Sanajahan;
    Mamancha; Muluk Bandahala; Amil-Badar; Juhan; Na'ib; and signature
    of Sharif Mohammed Binsarin.--The Politico-Military Governor of
    the province of Zamboanga etc.: José María de Carlos y O'Doyle.

    I, Don Antonio de Urbiztondo y Eguía, Marquis de la Solana, Knight
    Grand Cross of the Royal American Order of Isabel the Catholic,
    Knight of the Royal Order of San Fernando of the first and third
    class, and of that of San Hermanegildo, Lieutenant-General of the
    National Forces, Governor and Captain-General of the Philippine
    Islands, President of the Royal Audiencia of the Philippine
    Islands, Judge-Subdelegate of Post Office Revenues, Vice-Royal
    Patron, and Director-General of the troops, etc., approve, confirm
    and ratify this capitulation in the name of Her Majesty Isabel II.


    Manila, April 30, 1851.--Antonio de Urbiztondo.

    True copy.--Seal of the Captain-General of the Philippines.


    Royal order approving the salaries assigned to the Sultan and
    Datus of Sulu, December 14, 1851.

    The Queen (whom God save), in view of the letter of Your Excellency
    of May 3rd last, No. 1236, and of the report of the Secretary of
    State on the subject, has been pleased to approve the salaries
    assigned by Article 16 of the Capitulation to the Sultan and Datus
    of Sulu, and amounting to 1,500 pesos for the Sultan, 600 pesos
    for each of the Datus Mohammed Buyuk Muluk and Daniel Amil Bahar,
    and 360 for Sharif Binsarin.


    By Royal order etc.

    Madrid, December 14, 1851.

    The Intendant of the Philippines.



TRANSLATION OF THE SULU TEXT OF THE TREATY OF 1851

    A statement of firm agreement and union (in friendship) made by
    the Queen Spain Isabel II, Constitutional Queen of all Spain, and
    the honorable officers of her government, with the Mawlana Sultan
    Mohammed Pulalun and the Datus Mohammed Buyuk, Muluk, Amil Bahar,
    Bandahala, Muluk Kahar, Amil Badar, Tumanggung, Juhan, Sawja'an,
    Na'ib, Mamancha, and Tuan Sharif Mohammed Binsarin.

    The King was represented here by Colonel Don José María de Carlos
    y O'Doyle, Politico-Military Governor of the Province of Zamboanga
    and islands of Basilan, Pilas, Tonkil, and others, who was given
    power and authority by General Don Antonio de Urbiztondo, Marquis
    of Solana, Governor and Great Captain of the Philippine Islands.

    Article I. The Mahasari Mawlana Sultan of Sulu and his ministers
    together with the datus mentioned above have the great desire to
    state that they had good intentions toward the people of Spain,
    on January 1, of this year. They also state that the relation
    of Sulu and its dependencies to Spain has been one of intimate
    union from the first until now.

    They make anew, to-day, a firm agreement of union in friendship
    with the Queen of Spain Isabel II, Constitutional Queen of All
    Spain, and all her honorable officers, to reaffirm the previous
    agreement of 1836, as also the agreement of last year made with
    the governor of Zamboanga, in the month of August, which fully
    affirmed the "Kunkista" [214] of Sulu which was effected on the
    28th of February, this year, by Señor the excellent Don Antonio
    Urbiztondo, Marquis of Solana, Governor and great Captain of the
    Philippine Archipelago.

    Article II. The Sultan and Datus promise with firm intention and
    brotherhood not to revoke their agreement to the occupation of
    Sulu and its dependencies, regarding them as dependencies of Spain.

    Article III. Sulu and her dependencies alike use the Spanish flag;
    the people of Sulu and her dependencies are one with the people
    of Spain, and ally themselves to the Philippine Islands.

    It shall not be right for the Sultan and the Datus to make treaties
    with Malay datus or any nation other than Spain, whether that
    nation is Spain's ally or not. Should such treaties be made they
    would be null. So also they can not make any contracts with any
    persons other than Spaniards, nor any agreement contrary to the
    previous ones. Such agreements, if made, will not be binding
    because Spain is in all the islands of Sulu as she is in her
    Philippine Islands, and Sulu has previous friendship treaties
    with Spain.

    Article IV. New promise: Pirates shall not be allowed at all
    here in Sulu. Should they commit any crime they shall be punished
    wherever they may be.

    Article V. The subordinate rulers, and all boats, from this day
    on, shall use the Spanish flag, but the Sultan and the Datus can
    use a war flag like the Spanish officials. They will not use any
    other flag.

    Article VI. The Island of Sulu and all its dependencies large
    and small, being the same as the Philippine Islands in that they
    belong to Spain, all Spanish officers and all ships flying the
    Spanish flag may navigate through the Sulu Archipelago without
    any objection.

    Article VII. It is recognized by the Sultan and the Datus that
    the King of Spain is powerful these days and is just and merciful
    in acquiring "Kunkista," and that it is not right to build forts
    without informing the Spanish Government nor to buy arms without
    having also informed the Spanish Government, nor to have boats
    carry any arms except the kris and the spear, for other arms are
    signs of enmity.

    Article VIII. The Spanish Government, wishing to promote fellowship
    with the people of Sulu, gives the sultan and the datus titulu
    (titles) to increase their respect and honor.

    Article IX. The Spanish Government assures the Sultan and all
    the people that it will let their religion alone, and that it
    will not try to change their religion, nor object to the free
    exercise of their worship and the customs of their race.

    Article X. The Spanish Government does also promise the people and
    the Sultan that it will not break its word. It also promises to
    recognize the ranks of the Sultan and the Datus, and also those
    of subordinate rulers and the people.

    Article XI. Sulu boats and goods may go to Spanish countries
    without any objection, in the same manner as if they belonged to
    that country.

    Article XII. All ships that come to Sulu, except those of Spain,
    pay duties as previously, in order that the Sultan and the Datus
    may get a share of the income of their towns, and may adopt
    measures which will improve and benefit the town.

    Article XIII. If the power of the Sultan is well established and
    sustained, he may be able to secure other profits besides this,
    by helping the Spanish Government, in accordance with Article 3
    of the treaty of 1836, providing for the building of a trading
    post which would be guarded by Spain. It will be proper for the
    Sultan and the Datus to help in the erection of this trading post,
    and all labor and lumber shall be paid for according to the custom
    of the place.

    Article XIV. This trading post shall be built near the site of
    the fort of Amil Bahar. [215] It shall not encroach upon nor
    cause any injury to the cemetery of the Mohammedans, but out of
    due respect to their religion no house shall be erected there,
    and in case any be erected it shall be destroyed.

    Article XV. The Sultan of Sulu has the right to give passports
    to all of his people who request it, sign those which he issues,
    and countersign Spanish passports coming to Sulu.

    Article XVI. The Spanish Government, forgiving the previous
    offenses of the Sultan, and in consideration of the destruction by
    fire of his palace and his fort, grants the Sultan a yearly sum
    of P1,500 as a help and an indemnity for his losses. The Spanish
    Government also grants to each of the Datus Mohammed Buyuk, Muluk,
    and Amil Bahar, P600 a year, and to Tuan Sharif Mohammed Binsarin
    P360 on account of his good services to Spain.

    Article XVII. The articles of this treaty shall take effect
    to-day. They shall be shown to the Captain-General of the
    Philippine Islands lest he would not agree to them. They are also
    in Spanish.


This treaty gained its purpose in that it checkmated the agreement
of Sir James Brooke, but it certainly did not receive as much
consideration at Jolo and Zamboanga as it did at Madrid and London. Its
effect was temporary only. As early as 1854 a town on Kapul was burned
by the Spanish forces from Basilan. In 1855 the Sulus made a dash upon
Zamboanga and burned the best part of the town. The "Light Fleet"
issued from Isabela de Basilan in 1857, surprised Simisa, rescued
76 captives, and took 116 prisoners. The chiefs against whom the
expedition was directed presented themselves later to the governor of
Zamboanga and exchanged the Moro prisoners for 60 Christian captives,
1 priest, and 1 European woman. Many pirates continued to scour the
remote parts of the Archipelago. In 1858 Governor-General Norzagaray
published a proclamation calling the attention of chiefs of provinces
and municipalities to the approach of the season at which the pirates
appear, and invoking their aid to caution the people and to take proper
measures for the defense of their towns. Rewards were also offered for
catching or killing pirates and for seizing their boats wherever found,
but this had no important effect. In 1860 about 400 Moros raided the
Straits of San Bernardino and plundered several settlements.

The year 1861 marks a new era in the history of piracy and a new
step in the organization of government for Mindanao and Basilan. At
this time Spain and the Philippines were passing through a period of
progress. Alive to the truth that commerce and piracy can not coexist,
the government provided a competent naval force by which it was able
to maintain unquestionable supremacy in the Sulu Sea. It purchased
eighteen steam vessels in England and used them for chasing Moro
pirates and for blockading the port of Jolo. The operations conducted
by these vessels drove away hordes of pirates from Philippine waters,
and, in the course of a decade, terminated that long term of piracy
under which the Islands had suffered for three centuries.



POLITICO-MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF MINDANAO AND ADJACENT ISLANDS

Affairs in Mindanao had progressed so satisfactorily that Pollok,
Kotabato, and Davao were occupied by permanent garrisons, and peace
and tranquillity reigned over the Celebes Sea. A politico-military
government was then established for all the pacified territory
of Mindanao and Basilan, and was designated as the Government
of Mindanao. It comprised six districts, the first five of which
belonged entirely to the Island of Mindanao. The sixth was called the
district of Basilan and was defined as "comprising Basilan and the
Spanish possessions in the Archipelago of Sulu." Sulu was not brought
under this organization until 1878, when an additional district was
created for this purpose. The form of this government and its chief
characteristics are best described in the words of the royal order
creating it, which is herein given in full because of many points
of interest which are contained in the text and form of the decree,
and which can not be well illustrated otherwise:


    Superior Civil Government

    Office of the Deputy Superintendent of the Philippine Treasury

    CIRCULAR

    The Minister of War and Colonies communicated to this Superior
    Civil Government, on the 31st of July of last year, the following
    Royal order:

    Your Excellency: The Queen (whom God protect) has been pleased
    to issue the following Royal decree: Pursuant to the reasons laid
    before me by the Minister of War and Colonies, and in accordance
    with the opinion of the Council of Ministers, I hereby decree
    the following:

    Article I. A politico-military Government is hereby established
    for the island of Mindanao and adjacent islands.

    Article II. The Government of Mindanao shall be divided into six
    districts: 1. the Zamboanga District, formed of that part of the
    province of the same name which includes all of Sibugay Bay,
    and the west coast of the island as far as Murciélagos Point;
    2. the District of the North, including, in the northern part of
    the island, all the territory between the boundary line of the 1st
    District and Dapitan Point, on Tutwan Bay; 3. the Eastern District,
    between Dapitan Point, and Karaga Bay; 4. the Davao District,
    beginning on the boundary line of the 3d District and including
    the Bay of Davao and all the southern extremity of the island;
    5. the Central District, including Illana Bay, situated between the
    1st and 4th districts; 6. the District of Basilan, comprising the
    Spanish possessions in the Archipelagoes of Sulu and Basilan. The
    capital of the Government shall be in the Central District,
    the most advantageous place at the mouth of the Mindanao River
    being chosen. These districts shall be divided into two classes;
    to the first class shall belong the Northern, Central and Eastern
    districts, and to the second those of Zamboanga, Davao and Basilan.

    Article III. The Governor of Mindanao shall receive 6,000 pesos
    as salary, and 2,000 pesos as entertainment fund. The latter
    shall be supplied from the revenues from Government real estate
    and licenses. The Governor's residence shall also be supplied by
    the State.

    Article IV. This Governorship shall correspond to the class of
    brigadier generals; but the first Governor appointed may be a
    colonel, who will be entitled, as a reward, to an appointment as
    brigadier general after three years.

    Article V. The Governor of Mindanao shall be succeeded in
    his command by the officer of the highest rank in the island,
    pending the appointment of another Governor, or such action
    as the Captain General may deem advisable. In the districts,
    the Governor shall be succeeded by the officer next in rank,
    until the Governor of Mindanao appoints an Acting Governor and
    requests the Captain General to take such action as may be called
    for by the regulations in force.

    Article VI. The duties and powers of the Captain General in
    regard to the Government of Mindanao, and those of the Governor of
    the island, shall be the same as those provided for the Bisayas
    in my Royal decree of this date. As military authorities, they
    shall observe the usual relations between Captains General and
    Commanders General of Provinces. The Governor of Mindanao shall
    forward each month to the Captain General of the Philippines a
    tabulated record of the resolutions taken by him in the exercise
    of his authority, so that the latter may be able to exercise with
    efficiency the general supervision to which he is entitled. The
    Captain General shall forward to the Supreme Government, through
    the proper channels, both this tabulated record, and a statement
    of the action he has taken in the premises.

    Article VII. The districts of the first class shall be governed by
    lieutenant-colonels and those of the second class by senior majors.

    Article VIII. The duties of these district governors shall be
    those specified, up to the present time, for the politico-military
    Governors of the island.

    Article IX. The Governor of Mindanao shall have a Secretariate
    with the following personnel: a Secretary at 2,500 pesos per year;
    one clerk, class one, at 1,200; one clerk, class two, at 1,000,
    and one clerk, class three, at 800. 1,000 pesos are furthermore
    provided for the salaries of copyists, and 500 for office supplies.

    Article X. There is hereby created for Mindanao a Revenue Office
    which shall serve as depositary of the revenues, and shall have
    charge of collecting all taxes, and of the administration of the
    Army. It shall have the following personnel: an Administrator at
    2,500 pesos; a Controller at 2,000; one clerk, class one, at 1,000;
    two clerks, class two, at 800, and a cashier at 800. 1,500 pesos
    are provided for the salaries of copyists and other auxiliary
    employees, and 600 for office supplies.

    Article XI. The chiefs of districts shall remain in charge of
    the collection of taxes in the manner hitherto established, and
    shall be entitled to the allowances provided for that purpose. The
    provisions of this article shall not interfere with those already
    made for the departments of the administration which exist at
    the present time in Mindanao and their dependencies.

    Article XII. For expediting their official business the district
    governors shall have a secretary at a salary of 800 pesos in
    districts of the first class, and 600 in those of the second
    class. To each secretary's office 75 pesos are assigned for office
    supplies, and 150 for a copyist.

    Article XIII. The mission of the Jesuits, which has already been
    sent to Mindanao, shall look after the spiritual wants of the
    island, and Jesuits shall take the place of the other priests as
    soon as the mission has a sufficient personnel, and in the manner
    which may be deemed most convenient.

    Article XIV. The first and principal object of the mission shall
    be to secure the conversion of the races which have not yet been
    subjected, and even after the parishes of the island are provided
    for it shall maintain a sufficient number of missionaries for
    that purpose; each missionary shall be aided to the extent of
    800 pesos a year from the Royal Treasury.

    Article XV. The War and Navy Departments, together with the
    Colonial Office, shall decide what forces of the army and navy are
    required for Mindanao; the Captain-General shall have authority
    to make such changes as the circumstances may require, but he
    shall always report such changes to the respective Ministers
    for approval.

    Article XVI. The Governor can use the naval forces whenever he
    finds it necessary, with the assent of the commanding officer
    thereof.

    Article XVII. It shall be the constant duty of the army to explore
    and to occupy the country; for that purpose, two columns at least
    shall be detached each year from each district, and go through
    said districts in different directions. The chiefs of these columns
    shall make out a report about the territory reconnoitered by them;
    said reports shall be included in a general report made by the
    Governor, which shall be forwarded to the Department of War and
    Colonies through the Captain-General of the Philippines; this
    information will allow the Governor to give, in the following
    years his instructions to the columns sent out to explore the
    country, without losing sight of the advantage of establishing
    friendly relations with the tribes which inhabit the island, and
    the necessity of maintaining communication between the different
    districts. These columns shall be provided with everything that may
    be required to overcome the obstacles they will find on their way;
    and during the expedition, officers and soldiers shall receive
    field rations, issued in kind, according to the advice of the
    Military Health Department. For this purpose 10,000 pesos shall
    be carried on the budget for the first year, and 100 pesos shall
    be given for each expedition to the officer commanding a column,
    for extraordinary expenses.

    Article XVIII. Two special agents shall be appointed by the
    government for the purpose of studying means of developing all
    the natural resources of the island of Mindanao.

    Article XIX. In order to encourage colonists to settle in such
    parts of the island as may be deemed best, they will be furnished,
    at their request, the tools and implements required for their
    work or trade. The Governor is furthermore authorized to pay
    the traveling expenses of colonists who may wish to settle in
    the island without exceeding the sum hereinafter provided, the
    expenditure of which shall be duly accounted for. The new settlers
    shall be entitled to the foregoing privileges for ten years,
    and 12,000 pesos shall be appropriated for that purpose during
    the first year, from the revenues accruing from government real
    estate and licenses. The new settlers shall be exempt from tribute;
    the same favor shall be granted all tribes that submit peacefully.

    Article XX. The laws and regulations in force in the other islands
    of the Philippines shall be observed in all the offices of the
    Treasury Department. The prohibitions mentioned in the tariff
    shall apply to the custom house of Zamboanga; articles imported
    into the island in Spanish bottoms, and for local consumption,
    shall pay, during the next ten years, 2 per cent ad valorem, if
    of Spanish origin and 5 per cent if of foreign origin. If brought
    under a foreign flag said articles shall pay double the amounts
    specified above. If, after importing an article for use in the
    island, it is reëxported to some other Spanish island, it shall
    pay, on arrival at the latter the difference between what has been
    paid in Mindanao and the regular duty established in the tariff.

    Article XXI. Lands now under cultivation, and those placed under
    cultivation during the next ten years, shall pay no other impost
    than that required by the regulations now in force, per quiñon
    of land, as an acknowledgment of ownership. [216]

    Article XXII. The Government shall always have on hand a reserve
    fund of 10,000 pesos to meet any urgent and unexpected need
    that may arise; in such cases only, the Governor shall assume
    the responsibility of using this sum, or part of the same, and
    shall account for the expenditure, in the usual manner.

    Article XXIII. A sum of 3,000 pesos per year is placed at the
    disposal of the Governor for presents to the independent tribes,
    for the purpose of gaining their friendship; the same amount
    is assigned to the mission of the Jesuits. These funds shall be
    expended and accounted for in the best possible form.

    Article XXIV. For the expenses of installation a special estimate
    shall be drawn up, and action shall be taken thereon as provided
    by the laws for urgent cases.

    Article XXV. No extra pay or allowances of any kind shall be
    given except such as are provided in the present decree, and the
    per diems usually granted military engineers when they are sent
    out on official business.

    Article XXVI. The War, Navy, and Colonies Departments shall execute
    the present Decree in the parts which respectively concern them,
    and shall work in common for the execution of such parts thereof
    as may belong to two or more Departments.

    Article XXVII. So many of the laws and orders in force as are
    inconsistent with the provisions of the present decree are hereby
    repealed.

    Given at San Ildefonso on the 30th of July, 1860.

    Rubric of Her Majesty.--The Minister of War and Colonies. Leopoldo
    O'Donnell.--Communicated to you by Royal order for your information
    and action.


Sultan Pulalun was regarded by the Sulus as an able administrator
and a just ruler. His influence and fame and that of his father
endeared the house of Jamalul Kiram to the people to such an extent
as to restrict the succession of the sultanate to their direct line
of descent for a considerable period of time. Following the steps of
his father, he published a revised code of Sulu laws and conducted
the affairs of his government with care. Pulalun died September 24,
1862, and was followed by his son, Jamalul A`lam.

The succession of Jamalul A`lam was contested by Datu Jamalul Kiram,
the grandson of Sultan Shakirul Lah. The wife of Datu Jamalul
Kiram was the daughter of Datu Daniel Amil Bahar, and the latter
was inclined to support his son-in-law. Jamalul A`lam, however, had
the majority of the council of the datus on his side, and a Spanish
commission sent to Jolo in November, confirmed his sultanate. Espina
states that at that time the sultan was living with Datu Asibi, and
that the portrait of Queen Isabel II was placed before the sultan
when he made his declaration before the commission to recognize the
authority and sovereignty of Spain over all the dominions of Sulu,
including her dependencies in Borneo.

It is noted in the Sulu Annals, under date of February 1, 1867, that
a Spanish war vessel arrived at Jolo and demanded the punishment and
delivery of three men, one of whom was called Imam Mindang. The sultan
arrested all these men and had them executed on February 9 in the
presence of the officer in command of the vessel. It appears that in
spite of the vigilance of the Spanish navy, piratical expeditions were
kept up by discontented Moros not fully submissive to the sultan. This
led to further activity on the part of Spanish gunboats, and war was
consequently carried into Sulu waters and territory.

Another note in the Sulu Annals, under date of March 5, 1872, states
that 13 Spanish vessels attacked Jolo, killed 3 men and 1 woman
and lost 2 officers and 100 soldiers. That same year the famous
warrior Datu Daniel Amil Bahar died; and Puerta Princesa, capital
of Palawan, was garrisoned by native troops. A naval blockade of
Jolo was established and hostilities between Sulu and Spain were
resumed. In 1873-1875 considerable damage was done by the fleet
throughout the Archipelago, and two German vessels were seized while
carrying contraband of war to the Sulus.

In the estimation of the Sulus, Jamalul A'lam was one of their best
rulers. He carried out many public improvements, built roads and
bridges and mosques, enforced public attendance at the Friday church
services, and executed the laws with justice and force. He was as
able a ruler as any sultan Sulu had since the days of Abu Bakr,
but the vicissitudes of fortune were certainty against him. Before
his reign ended, Spain's hand fell upon him strong and heavy, his
capital was wrested from him, and his power waned.







CHAPTER V.

SULU UNDER SPANISH SOVEREIGNTY


OCCUPATION OF JOLO

The Sulu sultanate remained practically independent for four hundred
and twenty-five years. Its decline was not caused by national
retrogression or political dissension, but by the hostility
and aggression of its adversary. Sulu's power arose through the
introduction of firearms into eastern Malaysia and began to decline
at the introduction of steam war vessels into the Philippine
Archipelago. The mobility and speed of steam war vessels put to
disadvantage all Moro sailing and rowing craft. Pirates were chased on
the sea and hunted in their lairs. The fear which steamboats struck in
the hearts of Moros made them run away from their homes and settlements
and hide in the jungles whenever they heard the whistle of a steamboat,
or saw it approaching from a distance. The steamboats purchased by
Governor Claveria in 1848, which crushed the power of the Balangingi
Samals, were referred to by Captain Keppel in the following words:


    "On the 14th of January [1849] we left Zamboanga, getting under
    weigh in company with such a fleet of gunboats as would have done
    credit to any nation."


The vessels purchased in 1861 increased the efficiency of the navy to
such a degree as to make it possible to carry war into Sulu territory,
attack many remote islands and settlements and blockade the port
of Jolo so effectively as to check the importation of firearms and
ammunition, and restore a condition of safety and peace on the sea.

The campaign of 1876 was a very significant event in the history
of Sulu. It decided the fate of this state and definitely fixed
its relation to the Philippine Archipelago. Spain's determination
to conquer Sulu never waned and seemed stronger then than ever
before. The Governor-General was a man of great ability and aspired
to the highest military honors. Moro raids recurred occasionally and
the strained relations of the two states became so tense that rupture
was inevitable.

In reviewing the history of Spanish campaigns in Sulu up to this
time, one is strongly impressed with the futility of conquest without
occupation. To invade a Moro settlement, defeat its forces, burn its
houses, kill some of its inhabitants, and carry some away as prisoners,
is not very different in character and effect from a Moro raid. Such
methods incited the Moros to revenge themselves by waging war on their
invaders. This they did by raiding, which is their established method
of warfare. Up to this time natural advantages remained on the side of
the Sulus and Spanish forces could accomplish no permanent results,
in spite of their superior methods of warfare and excellent military
organization.

Since the days of the great Corcuera, no Spanish general appears
to have recognized the importance of the occupation of Sulu as an
essential factor in its pacification. Their apparent inability to
comprehend the real solution of this question might have arisen from
consciousness of their inability to provide an adequate force for the
purpose. However that may have been, the honor of such an achievement
remained for Governor-General Malcampo, who carried it out with credit
to himself and to the government which he represented. With a clear
understanding of the task to be accomplished, he resolved to conquer
Sulu and occupy it, and then suppress piracy by striking the pirates at
home. He left Manila on the 5th of February, 1876, with a large force
composed of one battalion of the peninsular regiment of artillery, one
company of mountain artillery, five regiments of infantry, ordnance,
engineers, sanitary and prison detachments, and two companies of the
Guardia Civil. [217] At Zamboanga, the expedition was reinforced by
864 volunteers, 400 of whom were from Zamboanga and 464 from Kagayan
de Misamis commanded by the Augustinian friar, Ramon Zueco.

The whole expedition, estimated at 9,000 troops, left Zamboanga on
the 20th of February. They were conveyed in 10 steamboats and 11
transports, and were escorted by a fleet of 12 gunboats under the
admiral in command of the Philippine naval forces. The Island of
Sulu was reached on the 21st, and next morning a force disembarked
at Patikul, 4 miles east of Jolo. The Moros at this place offered
some resistance and caused some casualties, but later in the
day abandoned the place and fled. Here a considerable column was
detached to reconnoitre the interior and advance on Jolo from the land
side. This plan proved impracticable and the column suffered severely
from heat and thirst and returned next day to the beach at Tandu, 2
miles east of Jolo. On the 29th, a general advance was made on Jolo
by land and sea. The fleet opened fire on the town, while the land
forces rushed the forts and trenches on the sides. The main force
was directed against the fort of Daniel, which was captured after a
sharp fight. The Moros in the other forts made a fiercer resistance,
but were soon overcome by the fire of the Spanish artillery and the
whole town was taken by assault. On the 30th, the fort of Panglima
Adak, situated at the base of the hills, was taken. Not content
with this brilliant victory and intent upon striking a decisive and
deadly blow, Malcampo directed various expeditions against the other
strongholds of Sulu. A force of marines and volunteers destroyed 80
boats and burned 90 houses on Tapul. On March 16 an expedition to
Lapak destroyed its forts and reduced the settlement to ashes. On
March 22 the forts of Parang were reduced, the settlement was burned,
and many Sulus killed. On the 24th Maymbung was similarly destroyed.

A large garrison was established at Jolo, consisting of two regiments
of infantry, one company of artillery, one company of engineers,
and two companies of disciplinarios. [218] Capt. Pascual Cervera, a
captain of frigate of the navy was given command of the garrison, under
the title of politico-military governor of Sulu. General Malcampo was
given the title of "Count of Jolo," while many decorations were awarded
to gallant officers, and a medal was struck for each participant in
the campaign.

The step thus taken by the Philippine Government appears to have
been well planned and firmly resolved. No sooner was a footing
gained than measures were undertaken to quarter the troops and
fortify the place. Barracks were constructed on favorable spots on
the edge of the swamps, and the forts Alfonso XII and the Princess
of Asturias were erected on the site of Daniel's and Panglima Adak's
kuta, respectively. Plans were further laid out at this early time
for the building of a town and the founding of a colony. Governor
Cervera, to whom this task was first entrusted, was a vigorous,
prudent, and circumspect chief. He prosecuted the work with energy
and kept a vigilant watch on the movements of the enemy. He began
the construction of a military hospital and established the office
of captain of the port. Small expeditions were made to Bwan, Mapaid,
Balimbing, and South Ubian for the chastisement of pirates who took
refuge there. The kuta of the first three of these settlements were
destroyed and their armaments were taken. This year saw considerable
sickness in the garrison of Jolo; a large number of patients were
removed to Zamboanga and 318 to Cebu.

On October 1, Governor Cervera was temporarily relieved as governor
of Sulu by Col. Eduardo Fernandez Bremon, and on December 31, 1876,
Brig. Gen. José Paulin assumed permanent command of the garrison
as the second governor of Sulu. The latter continued the peace
negotiations which were commenced by Governor Cervera and expended
a good deal of energy in trying to conciliate some datus and their
followers. His measures were, however, resented by the Sulus and
hostilities increased. He left Jolo April 30, 1877, and the command
was temporarily held by Lieut. Lopez Nuño and José Marina, for three
months and one month and a half, respectively.



RULE OF SULTAN JAMALUL A'LAM

After the fall of Jolo and its destruction by General Malcampo,
Sultan Jamalul A'lam removed to Bud Datu and later to Likup. The datus
dispersed in all directions, but Datus Asibi and Pula, the strongest
chiefs after the sultan, remained in the neighborhood of Jolo, at
Tandu and Patikul. The Sulus were united at that time and formed one
party, which was faithful and loyal to the sultan. They regarded the
establishment of a Spanish garrison at Jolo as an intrusion upon their
soil and an intolerable humiliation and offense. The common people
resented the invasion as bitterly as the datus. A few years before
they regarded themselves the lords of the southern seas. The Bisayan
and the Kalamian Islands, Paláwan, and eastern Borneo were their
hunting grounds. They sailed proudly on the seas and had the dignity of
masters of innumerable vassals and slaves. But now like fierce tigers
driven back to their dens or packs of hungry wolves chased to their
haunts, they waited for no word of command or organized resistance,
but hurled themselves recklessly at the Spanish soldiers wherever
they encountered them. Individuals and small parties lost no chance of
firing a rifle from behind the bushes or throwing a lance from across
the ditches. Venders in the market who saw a chance to strike a blow at
the soldiers, could not resist the temptation, but recklessly darted
at the enemy with a kris or barong [219] brandished in hand. A vender
from Lu'uk who did not have a barong of his own snatched one from a
neighbor and rushed at the guard. The soldiers were attacked in the
forest while cutting lumber or firewood, at the river while getting
drinking water and at the beach while bathing. Juramentados [220]
crept on the sentinels in the dark and from ditches and the beach
and inflicted considerable loss and damage. Some desperate characters
entered the trenches and fought the soldiers on guard, while others
slipped into the barracks and caught soldiers and officers off their
guard and threw torches on the roofs of the warehouses.

Jamalul A'lam discouraged all overtures for peace, and for more
than two years could not be reconciled to the new conditions and
political status. Early in 1877 he encouraged hostilities of all
sorts. Juramentados and small attacking parties harassed the garrison
frequently. On the 25th of February a force of more than 2,000 Sulus
advanced against the garrison, but were easily repulsed. Small
parties surprised pickets and attacked laborers. On the 9th of
September about 800 Sulus charged the town from the land side and
from the sea and 300 attacked Fort Asturias. They were repulsed in
the afternoon, but resumed the attack at night and retreated with
great loss. Another general fight occurred on the 11th, but the Moros
were again overpowered and driven back. Undaunted by these failures,
the Sultan called a council of the datus and planned for another
attack in the future. The juramentados became more treacherous and
intrepid. They hid their barongs inside their trousers and in bundles
they pretended to be taking to the market and attacked the guard
unawares and after admission into the plaza. This state of affairs
continued until June, 1878.



CESSION OF POSSESSIONS IN BORNEO TO BRITISH NORTH BORNEO COMPANY

In January, 1878, Sultan Jamalul A`lam ceded the Sulu possessions
in Borneo to the Sabah or British North Borneo Company. He granted
the authorized representative of this company, Baron von Overbeck,
absolute ownership and dominion over that large territory for a
money consideration of $5,000, Mexican currency, per annum. The
Sabah Company was preceded in 1865 by an American company started
by Mr. Torrey on the Kimanis River. The concessions of the American
company were obtained from the Sultan of Bruney; but this enterprise
proved a financial failure and its rights were bought by the Austrian
Baron von Overbeck and the English merchant Mr. Alfred Dent.

"In spite of the opposition of Spain, which claimed that the Sultan of
Sulu being a Spanish vassal could not dispose of his territory without
her consent, the English company organized by Mr. Dent succeeded in
obtaining a charter of incorporation under Act of Parliament, 1st
November, 1881, as the 'British North Borneo Company' with right to
acquire other interests in, over, or affecting the territories or
property comprised in the several grants." Baron von Overbeck and
Mr. Dent obtained from the Sultans of Bruney and Sulu a series of
charters conferring on them sovereign authority in North Borneo under
the titles of Maharaja of Sabah, Raja of Gaya, Raja of Sandakan, and
Datu Bandahara. The territory governed by the British North Borneo
Company has a coast line of over 600 miles and an area of more than
30,000 square miles. The form and text of the commission granted by
Sultan Jamalul A`lam appointing Baron von Overbeck Datu Bandahara and
Raja of Sandakan is herein quoted as given in the annual report of
Gen. George W. Davis, commanding the Department of Mindanao, under
date of August 1, 1902:


    "To all nations on the face of the earth whom these matters may
    concern: We, Mahasari Padukka Mawlana as-Sultan Mohammed Jamalul
    A`lam bin al-Marhum Mahasari Padukka as-Sultan Mohammed Pulalun,
    Sultan of Sulu and its dependencies, send greeting:


"Whereas, we have seen fit to grant unto our trusty and well-beloved
friends, Gustavus Baron von Overbeck and Alfred Dent, esquire,
certain portions of the dominions owned by us, comprising all the
lands on the north and east coast of the Island of Borneo, from the
Pandasan River on the northwest to the Sibuco River on the east coast,
including amongst others the states of Paitan, Sugut, Bangaya, Labuk,
Sandakan, Kina Batangan, and Mumiang and all the lands and territories
in Darvel Bay as far as the Sibuco River, together with all the lands
belonging thereto, for certain considerations between us agreed, and,

"Whereas, the said Baron von Overbeck is the chief and only authorized
representative of his company in Borneo:

"Now, therefore, know ye that we, Mahasari Padukka Mawlana as-Sultan
Mohammed Jamalul A`lam bin al-Marhum Mahasari Padukka as-Sultan
Pulalun, Sultan of Sulu and its dependencies, have nominated and
appointed and do hereby nominate and appoint the said Baron von
Overbeck supreme and independent ruler of the above-named territories,
with the title of Datu Bandahara and Raja of Sandakan, with absolute
power over life and death of the inhabitants of the country, with all
the absolute rights of property over the soil of the country vested
in us and the right to dispose of the same as well as the rights
over the productions of the country, whether mineral, vegetable,
or animal, with the rights of making laws, coining money, creating
an army and navy, levying customs dues on home and foreign trade,
and shipping and other dues and taxes on the inhabitants as to him
may seem good or expedient, together with all other powers and rights
usually exercised by and belonging to sovereign rulers, and which we
hereby delegate to him of our own free and sovereign will.

"And we call upon all foreign nations with whom we have formed friendly
treaties or alliances, and we command all the datus, nobles, governors,
chiefs, and people owing allegiance to us in the said territories
to receive and acknowledge the said Datu Bandahara as the supreme
ruler over the said states and to obey his commands and respect his
authority therein as our own. And in case of the death or retirement
from office of the said Datu Bandahara then his duly appointed
successor in the office of supreme ruler and governor-in-chief of the
company's territories in Borneo shall likewise, if appointed thereto
by the company, succeed to the title of Datu Bandahara and Raja of
Sandakan, and all the powers enumerated above be vested in him.

"Done at the palace of the Sultan, at Likup, in the Island of Sulu, on
the nineteenth of Muharam, A. H. 1295, being the 22nd day of January,
A. D. 1878."



TREATY OF JULY, 1878

Col. Carlos Martinez became Governor of Sulu on the 28th of September,
1877. This distinguished commander applied himself to his work with
unusual enthusiasm and assiduity, and by tact and sagacity succeeded in
restoring order and peace, in the form of a treaty signed by him and
by Sultan Jamalul A`lam in July, 1878. Great credit for the success
of the negotiations belongs to Datu Harun ar-Rashid, who spared no
effort to convince the Sultan that peace and loyalty to Spain were
preferable to a condition of continued hostility, which meant ruin
to the state of Sulu. The treaty laid stress on the submission of
Sulu to Spanish sovereignty, and the terms of the Sulu text expressed
the same fairly well and without evasion. This being the last treaty
entered into by both states, it may be considered to define the final
relation that existed between them and the exact position which Sulu
occupied in the Philippine Archipelago during the last period of the
Spanish régime. The best account of this relation is given in the
words of the treaty itself, careful translations of which have been
prepared from both the Spanish and Sulu texts and are herein added
for full information:



TRANSLATION OF THE SPANISH COPY OF THE TREATY

    Decree

    Office of the Governor-General of the Philippines,

    Manila, August 19, 1878.

    The Supreme Government having approved the bases of pacification
    and capitulation which are submitted through me to his Majesty,
    the King, by the Sultan of Sulu and the Datus of Sulu, and the act
    to that effect, which I confirmed and ratified on the 15th instant,
    having been drafted and signed by the commission appointed for that
    purpose by me in representation of my authority, and the Sultan and
    Datus, in representation of the sultanate of Sulu, I hereby direct
    that a copy of said act be published in the Official Gazette of
    Manila, in order that said bases be officially and publicly known.


    Moriones.


[Copy referred to.]


    An Act drafted on the bases of pacification and capitulation
    presented by the Sultan of Sulu and the Datus to His Majesty the
    King Alfonso XII, through His Excellency the Governor-General of
    the Philippine Islands, acknowledging the sovereignty of Spain
    over the territory of this sultanate.


In the town of Likup, Sulu, and in the palace of His Excellency the
Sultan of this Archipelago, on the 20th of July 1878, 23rd day of
the month Rajab, year of the Hegira 1295:

Present: Carlos Martinez y Romero, Colonel of Infantry and
Politico-Military Governor of Jolo, Francisco Fernandez de Alarcon y
García, Colonel of Marine Corps, Frigate Captain and Commander of the
Naval Station of Jolo, and interpreters, Alejo Alvarez y Villasis and
Pedro Ortuoste y García, these constituting a commission representing
His Excellency, the Governor-General of the Philippines:

Also present: Padukka Mahasari Mawlana, Sultan Mohammed Jamalul A`lam
and the Datus Padukka Raja Muda, Mohammed Badarud Din, the Padukka
Mohammed Zaynul `Abidin Raja Lawut, the Padukka Datu Mohammed Harun
ar-Rashid and the Datu Padukka Muluk Bandarasa, in the name and
representation of the Sultanate of Sulu;

The object of the meeting was to read and sign the articles of
pacification and capitulation presented by the Sultan and Datus to
the Governor-General on February 24th, of this year, and approved by
His Majesty Alfonso XII, on May 3rd last; the reading of the articles
being proceeded with as follows: Bases of pacification and capitulation
presented by the Sultan and Datus of Sulu, to his Majesty the King of
Spain Don Alfonso XII, through His Excellency the Governor-General of
the Philippines, acknowledging the sovereignty of the King of Spain
over the territory of the said sultanate.

Article 1. We declare that the sovereignty to Spain over all the
Archipelago of Sulu and its dependencies is indisputable, and as a
natural consequence of this declaration we constitute ourselves loyal
subjects of His Majesty King Alfonso XII, and of his successors to
the power.

Article 2. The Spanish Government shall give the Sultan a yearly salary
of 2,400 pesos, 700 to the heir of the sultanate Datu Badarud-Din
and 600 to each of the Datus Padukka Raja Lawut Zaynul `Abidin,
Padukka Datu Harun ar-Rashid, Padukka Datu Muluk Bandarasa Pula,
members of the Sultan's Council, to compensate them in some way for
the losses they have suffered.

Article 3. Spain has the right to occupy such points in the Sulu
Archipelago and its dependencies as may seem necessary to the Spanish
authorities, respecting towns, families and property; in case of
forcible appropriation for the public good, compensation shall be
paid according to appraisement; we beg that exception be made for the
land extending from Sinungan Point to the south coast of Kadungdung,
which we would use for our residences; it could be occupied by the
Government in case of war with a foreign power.

Article 4. The Sultan shall be empowered to collect duties from foreign
merchants and ships trading with places not occupied by the Government.

Article 5. The Sultan shall be allowed to communicate directly with
the Governor-General whenever he has a complaint to make against the
Governor, or the commander of war ships.

Article 6. The Sultan shall be authorized to issue licenses to carry
muzzle-loading firearms when requested by Sulus, after presenting
two honorably known witnesses who will guarantee their proper use
both on land and sea.

Article 7. The Sultan shall be allowed to issue passports to Sulu
craft; but when any of said craft has to leave the Sulu Archipelago,
the owners will first have to go before the Governor; the principal
datus and some other persons serving under commissions from the Sultan
are to be excepted from this formality; but the Sultan shall report
all such cases to the Governor.

Article 8. We will use all our efforts to cause pirates and malefactors
to desist from their evil inclinations; and, if we can not prevent
them, we will inform the Governor of Jolo for him to take the
necessary measures, whenever we know the whereabouts of said pirates
and malefactors; but we will not be held responsible if we have
no information concerning them; we furthermore agree to render all
assistance in our power in running down such pirates and malefactors.

Article 9. We shall be allowed the free exercise of our religion and
customs. Catholic missionaries will have liberty to visit and reside
in any place in Sulu, and its dependencies, and will give us notice
before going, so that in case of danger we may furnish an escort;
failure to give us notice will relieve us from all responsibility
for any mishap that may befall them. The same caution applies to any
European or Christian Indian native who may wish to visit the interior.

Article 10. We pledge ourselves to deliver to the Spaniards all
Christian delinquents and criminals, and all Moros in the same case
shall be returned to us.

Article 11. Sulu and its dependencies shall raise the Spanish flag
on vessels and in towns; however, if a boat does not fly said flag
it shall not be held at fault if it has a passport; at the place of
the Sultan's residence he shall fly the Spanish war flag.

Article 12. All the articles of the foregoing capitulation shall be
observed without alteration, except by mutual agreement.

Both commissions unanimously agreeing to the foregoing articles as
read, said articles being identical with those whose copies were in
the hands of the Governor and of the Sultan of Sulu, the latter and
the persons with them signed this document on the spot, place, day,
month and year aforesaid.

The Sultan of Sulu,--His rubric and stamp,--the Governor of Sulu,
Carlos Martinez,--Mohammed Harun ar-Rashid,--the Commander of the
Naval Station, Francisco Fernandez de Alarcon y García,--Mohammed
Zaynul `Abidin,--Mohammed Badarud Din,--Mohammed Pula,--interpreters,
Alejo Alvarez, Pedro Ortuoste.

I, Don Domingo Moriones y Murillo, Lieutenant-General of the National
Army, Marquis de Oroquieta, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal and
Military Order of San Hermenegildo, of the Royal and Distinguished
Order of Carlos III, of that of Military Merit, Red and White, and
many others for feats of arms, Governor and Captain-General of the
Philippine Islands, etc., etc., in the name of His Majesty the King
of Spain, Alfonso XII, whom God keep, do confirm and ratify the above
act of pacification and capitulation, in all its parts.

Manila, August 15, 1878.--Domingo Moriones.--True copy.--Tomas Aguirre
de Mena.



TRANSLATION OF THE SULU TEXT OF THE TREATY OF 1878

    This document is intended to confirm the treaty which was agreed
    upon by Padukka Mahasari Mawlana Sultan Mohammed Jamalul A`lam
    and all the datus and chiefs of Sulu. These statements which
    we make shall be sent to His Majesty, the King of Spain, Don
    Alfonso XII, through His Excellency the Governor-General of the
    Philippines. All the country that the Sultan rules shall obey
    the orders of the King of Spain.

    This in Likup, in the palace of Padukka Mahasari Mawlana Sultan
    Mohammed Jamalul A`lam, on Monday the 22nd of July, 1878 A. D.,
    or the 23rd of Rajab, 1295 A. H.

    There met the Politico-Military Governor of Sulu, Señor Don Carlos
    Martinez y Romero, Colonel of Infantry; and the Commander of the
    Naval Station of Sulu, Colonel of Marine Infantry and Frigate
    Captain, Señor Don Francisco Fernandez de Alarcon y García and
    Señor Captain Alejo Alvarez, and Señor Don Pedro Ortuoste y García,
    the representatives of His Excellency the Governor-General of
    the Philippines.

    Also present: Padukka Mahasari Mawlana Sultan Mohammed Jamalul
    A`lam of Sulu, and Padukka Datu Mohammed Badarud Din, and Padukka
    Datu Raja Lawut Mohammed Zaynul `Abidin, and Padukka Datu Muluk
    Bandarasa Mohammed Pula, and Padukka Datu Mohammed Harun ar-Rashid
    who are properly obeyed by all their subjects.

    The object of the meeting was to read, confirm, and sign
    the agreement presented by Padukka Mahasari Mawlana Sultan
    Mohammed Jamalul A`lam and all the datus, to His Excellency the
    Governor-General, on the 22nd day of Safar, 1295 A. H., or the
    24th of February, 1878 A. D., which was approved by His Majesty
    the King of Spain, Alfonso XII, on the 3rd day of May, of this
    year, or the 2nd of Jamadil-Awal.

    The following is the copy of the statements that were read:

    This is the treaty of Spain with the Sultan and Datus of Sulu
    which was sent to His Majesty the King of Spain, Don Alfonso XII,
    through His Excellency the Governor-General of the Philippines.

    Article I. All the people of Sulu and its Archipelago shall obey
    only the King of Spain, Alfonso XII, or whosoever shall succeed
    him. This being our wish, we will not change or turn away to any
    other nation.

    Article II. The Spanish Government shall pay the Sultan an annual
    salary of 2,400 pesos, Mexican currency, and Padukka Datu Raja
    Muda Mohammed Badarud Din 700 pesos. It shall also pay 600 pesos
    to each of the three following datus, namely: Padukka Datu Raja
    Lawut Mohammed Zaynul `Abidin, Padukka Datu Muluk Bandarasa
    Mohammed Pula, and Padukka Datu Mohammed Harun ar-Rashid; this
    is to compensate them for the losses they suffered.

    Article III. The Spanish Government may occupy any place it chooses
    along the northern coast of the island, from Sinungan to Bwal and
    as far as Kadungdung, but the southern coast of the island from
    Kadungdung to Sinungan shall be left for the Sultan; on condition,
    however, that it may be occupied by the Spanish Government in
    case of trouble with foreigners, at any future time. In case
    the plantations or fields of the people are appropriated for
    such occupation, they shall be compensated for. Houses, however,
    shall not be removed.

    Article IV. The Sultan shall have the right to collect duties
    from all foreign merchants and ships of whatever nationality they
    may be, in case they come to our ports; but we have no right to
    collect duties from them when they come to ports occupied by the
    Spanish Government.

    Article V. In case of disagreement between us and the governor
    of Sulu, or the commanders of war ships, the Sultan shall have
    the right to communicate with the Captain-General direct.

    Article VI. All the people of Sulu can, if they choose, use
    muzzle-loading rifles and lantaka. [221] They will, however, be
    required to present a certificate from two or three free people, of
    good reputation, to the effect that they (who use the firearms) are
    good and well-behaving people and that they do not use such arms
    for mischief. Under such conditions the Sultan may give a license.

    Article VII. The Sultan has the right to give passports to Sulus
    wishing to travel for commercial purposes to whatever place they
    may go, on condition that they pass by Jolo to inform the Spanish
    governor of their destination. In case those of noble birth or
    the datus do not stop at Jolo, the Sultan himself shall inform the
    Governor, for they, as a rule, have the former's consent to travel.

    Article VIII. We will try to suppress all pirates; but in case
    we are unable to do so we will notify the Governor of their
    location. But in case we do not know where they are, we can not
    be held responsible for such information. We will also aid the
    Government with as many men as we can afford to bring together,
    and we shall be pleased to give guides who can tell the hiding
    places of such pirates.

    Article IX. Our customs and usages, including our religion, shall
    not be changed. If there is any priest who desires to travel around
    in this country, he ought to inform the Sultan, so that he may send
    a companion with him; but in case he fails to ask permission and
    travels around without obeying this rule and is killed, the Sultan
    can not be held responsible for such results. The same condition
    shall govern in the case of all Spaniards and soldiers or any
    one else who may desire to live outside of the places agreed upon.

    Article X. We guarantee to deliver all Christians who run away on
    account of crime; so also must the Spaniards treat us Mohammedans
    in case our servants and people run away to them. It would not
    be right for the Spaniards to hold or protect them.

    Article XI. The Sulus and all the Sultan's subjects have the right
    to trade in small or large boats whether they use flags or not;
    this on condition that they have passes; but in case they like to
    use a flag they must use the Spanish flag. The Sultan shall not
    use a flag of his own, but that of the King of Spain. All other
    datus and chiefs of the islands, whenever they use any flag,
    must use the Spanish commercial flag.

    Article XII. The Spaniards and the Sultan shall fully observe
    the articles of this agreement which has to be ratified by the
    Spanish Government. We sincerely beg that, whenever there is any
    disagreement between us and the Spanish Governor concerning some
    crime, careful and proper investigation be made, without any
    undue haste to fight. We have full trust and confidence in the
    Spanish Government and expect that the Spanish Government will
    have similar trust in us.

    Article XIII. It shall not be right to alter the articles of this
    agreement without the mutual consent of both parties.

    Both parties having understood all the articles of this treaty
    do hereby confirm it all and certify to it. Said articles being
    identical with those which were presented by Padukka Mahasari
    Mawlana Sultan Mohammed Jamalul A'lam, signed by us in the palace
    in Likup, on the day mentioned above in this document.

    I, Don Domingo Moriones y Murillo, Lieutenant-General of the
    National Army, Marquis de Oroquieta, Knight Grand Cross of the
    Royal and Military Order of San Hermenegildo, of the Royal and
    Distinguished Order of Carlos III, of that of Military Merit,
    Red and White, and many others for feats of arms, Governor and
    Captain-General of the Philippine Islands, etc., etc., in the name
    of His Majesty the King of Spain, Alfonso XII, whom God keep, do
    confirm and ratify the above act of pacification and capitulation,
    in all its parts.


    Manila, August 15, 1878 A. D.

    (18, Sha'ban, 1295 A. H.)


The status of Sulu as defined by this treaty resembled that of a
protectorate rather than a dependency. The internal administration
of Sulu, its customs, laws, and religion were fully respected and
were not subject to Spanish jurisdiction, confirmation, approval, or
interference of any sort, except in matters pertaining to regulations
for the use of firearms.

The foreign political relations of Sulu were made subject to the
full control of the Philippine Government. This control (or sovereign
right) was the chief motive for the war and was declared by the treaty
indisputable. On the strength of this both England and Germany, in
1885, concluded a treaty with Spain recognizing her full sovereignty
over the whole Sulu Archipelago, including Balabak and Kagayan
Sulu. In that same treaty Spain relinquished all claims to that
part of northeastern Borneo formerly ruled by the Sultans of Sulu;
this being the territory administered by the British North Borneo
Company. The commercial relations of Sulu with foreign countries
were not submitted to Spanish supervision or control outside of the
territory occupied by the garrisons, and the sultan was empowered to
collect duties from foreign merchants and ships trading with Maymbung,
Siasi, and other places not occupied by the Philippine Government.

The treaty on the whole secured for Spain the fruits of her conquest
and established a stable condition of peace and safety throughout
the whole Archipelago and in the neighboring southern seas. Foreign
interference ceased, commerce revived, and trading routes were resumed
without danger or risk.

Governor Martinez had a brilliant term of service marked by important
results and excellent public improvements. He began the titanic
labor of filling the swamps and brought the town of Jolo to its
present level. He laid out its streets, plazas, parks, and trees,
finished the tower of the Queen (blockhouse No. 2), and constructed
the blockhouse of the playa at Tulay, the military hospital, the
light-house and various bridges. A great part of this work was done
by prison labor, 400 prisoners having been transferred from Manila
to Jolo for this purpose. His administration marked the beginning
of a period of prosperity to the colony and temporary peace with the
Sulus. He reëstablished friendly relations with the sultan and datus
and had success in many undertakings. Early in 1880 he fell sick and
to the regret of all parties left Jolo for Manila.

Governor Martinez was relieved by Col. Rafael Gonzalez de Rivera, the
fourth governor of Sulu, on February 3, 1880. Rivera followed in the
steps of Martinez, but circumstances changed as the sultan's health
declined, and the sultana's political intrigues divided the state into
two hostile parties. On March 30 the scouts at the tower of the Queen
were attacked by a band of Sulus, who killed 2 privates, and wounded 1
sergeant and 6 privates. However, the Sulus were repulsed, losing 12
men dead. The sultan, when called upon to punish the transgressors,
responded promptly, went to Lu'uk and chastised them severely. In
December of the same year Datu Pula reported some juramentados in the
suburbs, two of whom were encountered by the troops; one was killed
and the other fled.

After the treaty of 1878, Jamalul A'lam established his official
residence at Maymbung and acted in a dignified and creditable
manner. He observed the terms of the treaty faithfully until his
death. He was intelligent, vigorous, and willing to learn. He received
Spanish and native visitors with befitting courtesy and was well
respected and endeared himself to everybody who knew him. Following
the example of his father, he published a code of laws which is said
to have been milder than that of his predecessors. It is no doubt
a modification or a reproduction of the code used by Pulalun and
Jamalul Kiram I. It was in current use in the country at the time of
the Spanish evacuation in 1899.

Jamalul A'lam lived an honorable life and kept one wife only for the
greater part of the time. He repudiated the mother of his eldest son,
Badarud Din, and loved tenderly Pangian Inchi Jamila, the mother
of his second, Amirul Kiram. Inchi Jamila was not very beautiful,
but she was attractive, intelligent, active, and comparatively
young. She associated with her husband in the administration of
affairs and wielded considerable influence on the chiefs and council of
state. She was very generous and entertaining, and won the respect of
the majority of the datus. Wishing to secure the sultanate for her son,
Amirul Kiram, she attempted to alienate Badarud Din from his father
and used her influence on the council to that end. Intrigues followed
and the state divided into two factions, partisans of Amirul Kiram
and Pangian Inchi Jamila and partisans of Badarud Din, the rightful
heir. Jamalul A'lam managed affairs with a strong hand and kept all
parties united, but early in 1881 his health began to decline rapidly
and his favorite wife meddled all the more with the affairs of the
state. The knowledge of her schemes soon spread, and as it became
known that Jamalul A'lam was actually failing, disorder arose and a
condition bordering on anarchy prevailed. On the 22d of February armed
Sulus attempted to force the gates of Jolo, but they were repulsed
and most of them were killed. The sultan grew worse and disturbances
increased. The front of the plaza of Jolo became an arena of war,
several attacks were made on the town, and conditions became so bad
that Rivera requested reënforcements from the Governor-General and
permission to take the field against the hostile parties. The request
was forwarded through the governor of Mindanao, who indorsed the
communication, recommending that he be empowered to decide whether
reënforcements were needed or not, and in case they were needed, to
lead the troops himself. This being granted, the governor of Mindanao
came to Jolo, reported unfavorably, and returned to Zamboanga.



RULE OF SULTAN BADARUD DIN II

Jamalul A'lam died April 8, 1881, but before his death he caused word
to be sent to the governor of Sulu informing him that an attack on
Jolo was imminent. At 3 a.m. on the 10th, the Sulus issued from the
woods and made a general attack on the garrison, which resulted in
failure and in the loss of 103 Sulus, who fell dead in the ditches.

The garrison of Jolo amounted, at that time, to 27 officers and 753
men. All that Colonel Rivera could do was to protect the plaza and keep
himself well informed about matters in general. On April 14, Panglima
Adak brought letters from Inchi Jamila relating to the succession to
the sultanate. She announced that the late Sultan directed in his will
that Amirul Kiram be elected sultan, and she endeavored to influence
the governor in his favor. Rivera expressed himself in favor of Badarud
Din, declaring this to be the only course he could take in conformity
with the terms and intentions of the treaty. This put a quietus on
the cause of dissension and the council of datus voted unanimously
in favor of Badarud Din II, who had just completed his nineteenth year.

In the meantime, disturbances in Sulu had caused some
alarm at Manila and prompt action was taken by the General
Government. Brigadier-General La Corte, who was intending to inspect
the fortifications of the south, was directed temporarily to assume
command of the government of Mindanao and personally to conduct
what operations it might be necessary to undertake on the Island of
Sulu. La Corte came by the way of Cebu and Zamboanga and brought the
Sixth Regiment of Infantry from Cebu and two companies of the Second
Regiment of Infantry from Zamboanga. Soon after his arrival at Jolo,
he addressed a strong letter to Sultan Badarud Din requesting the
punishment of the Sulus who attacked the Plaza of Jolo on April
10. Badarud Din responded promptly and commissioned Datu Pula to go
to Lu'uk and Taglibi and punish the transgressors. This, however,
was not carried out, for Panglima Sakandar of Lu'uk, who was loyal to
the Sultan, placed himself at the service of Badarud Din and promised
to bring the aggressors alive or dead. The Sultan's forces attacked
the rancheria of Maharaja Abdulla, the chief aggressor, and killed
nine men and one datu. The maharaja and the chiefs of seven other
rancherias of Lu'uk then surrendered themselves and swore allegiance
to Spain. The sultan and the chief datus later presented themselves
before General La Corte and reaffirmed their fealty to the Spanish
Government. The Governor-General subsequently wrote a letter to the
Sultan, expressing his pleasure and recognizing the sincere efforts
of the latter to reëstablish peace and tranquillity.

In June, 1881, General La Corte authorized the construction of the
loopholed wall with towers and embrasures to complete the defenses
of the town. He recommended frequent reconnaissances of the interior
and target practice for the forces of the garrison, and advised the
governor to strengthen the hand of the Sultan and to require from him
at the same time strict enforcement of all obligations that tended to
prove the loyalty of his people to the Spanish Government. General
La Corte left Jolo on the 29th of June, taking back the troops of
the Second Regiment of Infantry to Zamboanga.

Governor Rivera was relieved on November 15, 1881, by Col. Isidro
Gutierrez Soto. The new governor exhibited unusual coolness and
personal courage. He visited Maymbung without military escort and
attempted in every way to strengthen his friendship with the Sultan and
datus and to encourage them to have similar confidence in the Spanish
officials; but dissensions among the Sulus and the jealousy of Pangian
Inchi Jamila frustrated all his efforts. Without opposition Badarud
Din might have ruled fairly well, but the plotting of Inchi Jamila
and the unfriendliness of her party made a coward of him. He became
inconsistent and seemed at times to lack confidence in the Spanish
Government. He projected a secret trip to Sandakan and the Spaniards
notified him that in case he left Sulu without the permission of the
Government another sultan would be appointed in his place.

In January, 1882, Bangao was occupied by troops, and part of the
southern squadron was stationed there. In May Siasi was similarly
garrisoned. On April 29, 1882, Governor Soto became ill and left
for Manila. He was relieved temporarily by Brig.-Gen. José Paulin,
who was on a tour of inspection in the south and had come to Jolo to
conduct some official negotiations with the sultan.

On the 2d of June, Col. Eduardo Fernandez Bremon took office as
governor of Sulu. Soon after this time Sultan Badarud Din left
Jolo on a pilgrimage to Mecca and delegated his authority to Datu
Aliyud Din in conjunction with the Sultana Inchi Jamila. Governor
Bremon's command was very eventful and difficult. Cholera came from
Singapore and overran the whole Archipelago. Disturbances increased,
the turbulent inhabitants of Lu'uk became restless and hostile,
and juramentados came so frequently that they actually besieged the
town. The wall and towers and the defensive Barracks of Victory were
finished and these completely checked the entrance of hostile Sulus
into the town. Ladrones and wandering parties infested the suburbs and
hills and communication with Maymbung was broken. In August Governor
Bremon fell ill and asked to be relieved of his command. In September
a general attack on the plaza of Jolo was planned by the Sulus and
conditions assumed a very serious aspect. For one whole month, it is
said, the gates of Jolo were not opened.

The charge of Sulu affairs at this critical stage was intrusted to
General Paulin, who arrived at Jolo on October 1, accompanied by
Col. Julian Gonzalez Parrado, who was appointed to relieve Colonel
Bremon as governor of Sulu. The Sulu squadron was increased and the
garrison of Jolo reënforced. General Paulin conducted an expedition
to Lu'uk to chastise the rancherias of Tu'tu' and Bwal, which were
reported to be the chief centers of hostility and disturbance on the
island. He first called at Maymbung, and pressed upon Datu Aliyud Din
and the council the necessity of their doing their part toward the
punishment of the guilty parties, and Datu Aliyud Din at the head of
a small force accompanied the expedition. Troops were disembarked at
Pandang-pandang, Kadungdung, Tampukan, and Bwal; they burned parts
of these rancherias and made some advances inland. The fighting
was not severe and the Sulus harassed the troops to a considerable
extent. The navy coöperated with the troops, but the expedition was
small and accomplished no significant results.

In his report to the Governor-General, General Paulin recommended the
repetition of such expeditions in order to impress the Sulus with the
superiority of Spanish arms and to punish all transgressors. Commenting
upon the nature of the warfare the expedition experienced he considered
the natural difficulties attending campaigns in the island as being
difficult to overcome. The art of war, he said, has no application as
against Moros. The Sulus, he continued, are either treacherous wild
beasts or fanatical heroes, according to the sentiment which at the
time impels them to fight. They are savage warriors who hide in order
to attack and rise at the feet of the enemy when least expected. They
conceal themselves in clumps of trees and cliffs or ditches, and when
ready to fight, discharge their firearms or throw lances and bolos,
while howling and dancing frantic war dances. They flee after an
attack, but in their flight they attack the rear guard.

Governor Parrado was a man of considerable ability and tact. Confidence
and peace were reëstablished, the datus often came to town and the
people attended the market in large numbers. In December, 1882,
Tata'an, on the northwestern coast of Tawi-tawi, was occupied by
troops.

On his way back from Mecca, Sultan Badarud Din was met at Singapore
by a representative of the Philippine Government, who requested
that he return to Jolo by the way of Manila. The sultan declined,
stating that the recent death of his son made it imperative for him to
return directly to Maymbung, but he promised to visit Manila later. He
reached Sulu in January, 1883. After his arrival he exhibited vigor
and watchfulness and soon prepared to go to Manila. This project
seemed to excite unusual disturbance, bordering on panic at Parang
and Lu'uk, and for fear of undesirable consequences he changed his
mind and gave up the trip.

By his pilgrimage to Mecca, which was the first ever taken by a
Sultan of Sulu, Badarud Din gained respect and influence, but no
sagacity. Desiring to strengthen his authority and to imitate the
European nations by organizing a police force for the sultanate,
he brought 2 Egyptian officers and 30 Sikhs from Singapore and made
arrangements with an English house in Singapore for the purchase of
200 breech-loading rifles. The rifles caused the Spanish Government
some anxiety, but thorough investigation and inquiry proved that they
never went beyond Labuan. The Sikhs were not paid for two months after
arrival at Maymbung and left the service at once. Such organization
meant a first step toward reform, but Badarud Din had no education
worthy of the name and lacked the requisite ability, strength, and
character for carrying on such measures. Soon he acquired the opium
habit and methods of licentious living. He finally lost his hold on
affairs in general.

Datu Aliyud Din removed to Matanda, where a large house was built for
him by the governor of Sulu; and a village of 400 people soon arose
around his residence. The blockhouse of Jovellar was then built near
the beach for his protection and help.

So far the governor of Sulu addressed the sultan as his son, the
sultan addressed the governor as his father and relations were friendly
and pleasant. But in June, 1883, three juramentados slipped into the
post, killed two officers and wounded one officer and two soldiers
before they could be dispatched. Governor Parrado addressed a strong
letter to the sultan requesting the immediate and proper punishment
of the district from which the juramentados came. The sultan neither
responded nor did he send information relative to the place from
which the juramentados came. Governor Parrado then took matters into
his own hand, made an expedition to Taglibi and chastised its chief
Sahibud Din. Soon after, two soldiers were killed in the vicinity of
Jolo while cutting bamboo and another expedition was undertaken to
Buhanginan to punish the murderers. An expedition was also made to
South Ubian, where the pirate Panglima Jami was reported to have taken
refuge. Jami was not found at this place, but the local chiefs burned
Jami's kuta and house and promised to deliver him to the government
when he returned to Ubian.

Governor Parrado proved himself an efficient and able administrator. He
recognized the absurdity of a policy of extermination, and felt
conscious of the lack of a uniform, well-planned and settled policy on
the part of the General Government toward Sulu. He realized that the
Moros possessed a form of civilization and could not be treated like
savages. He used his influence for good in times of peace and employed
his forces to reëstablish peace with justice in times of hostility. He
was strong and sagacious in most of the measures he undertook.

Datu Pula, a strong chief worthy of trust and a man of prestige,
died before the expiration of the year 1883. Pula's influence always
tended toward peace with Spain and the support of Badarud Din against
his rival. His death was consequently a loss to both sides. The sultan
and the governor continued on good terms of friendship during January
and February, 1884, and the affairs of Sulu were conducted smoothly
and peacefully, but on the 22d of February, 1884, Badarud Din died;
the state was soon rent by dissension and another period of trouble
and disturbance followed.



STRUGGLE FOR THE SULTANATE

The question of a successor to Sultan Badarud Din II proved to be very
vexatious, both to the Sulus and to the Spanish Government. At that
date the eligibles to the sultanate belonged to three houses--that
of Sultan Jamalul Kiram I, the house of Sultan Shakirul Lah, and
that of Datu Putung, the son of Sultan Alimud Din I. These houses
were represented by the three candidates, Raja Muda Amirul Kiram,
Datu Aliyud Din, and Datu Harun ar-Rashid.

Amirul Kiram was the oldest brother of the three sons of Sultan
Jamalul A'lam from Pangian Inchi Jamila. He was born on the 27th of
March, 1868, and was at one time the rival of Badarud Din II, his
older brother. The sultanate remained in the line of Jamalul Kiram I
for four consecutive generations and the majority of Sulus had come
to consider the sons of Jamalul A'lam as the direct heirs to the
throne. The influence of Pangian Inchi Jamila was a strong factor
in itself and the claims of Raja Muda Amirul Kiram were vigorously
pressed upon the council of state.

Datu Aliyud Din was the son of Datu Israel, the son of Sultan Shakirul
Lah. He urged that the descendants of Sultan Shakirul Lah had an
equal right to the sultanate with the descendants of Jamalul Kiram I,
and protested against the injustice of electing a minor in preference
to older and maturer members of the family.

Datu Harun ar-Rashid had no sultan in his line for five generations and
consequently did not press his claim to the succession. He was a cousin
of Pangian Inchi Jamila and a close friend of Jamalul A'lam. He was the
only living signer of the treaty of 1878, but since that date he had
removed to Palawan, where the Spanish Government intrusted him with the
rule of the Moro population of Palawan, Balabak, and the neighboring
southern islands, and where he had rendered very creditable service.

Datu Aliyud Din and his party were so determined in their opposition
to Pangian Inchi Jamila and Raja Muda Amirul Kiram that they would not
entertain any proposals of compromise or attend the council of state at
Maymbung. The country was agitated and all datus and subordinate chiefs
took sides with one or the other of the two candidates. The majority
of datus and chiefs were in favor of Amirul Kiram. Datus Pula-pula,
Uyung, Marachak, Kalbi, and Julkarnayn, who were as a rule united,
and who wielded the strongest authority on the island next to that of
the sultan, remained almost neutral, but at heart indorsed the claim
of Aliyud Din. In general the southern and greater half of the island
supported Amirul Kiram of Maymbung, while the northern half favored
Aliyud Din, who had in the meantime moved his residence to Patikul.

Governor Parrado offered his good offices and tried to overcome the
difficulty by suggesting that Amirul Kiram be elected sultan, but that
Aliyud Din should act as regent during the minority of the former. He
went so far as to name a new and general council of state to meet at
Maymbung and decide the question. He submitted this proposition to
both parties threatening to leave them to their fate in case they
did not comply with his advice. The Maymbung party accepted the
governor's proposition, but the Patikul party did not; consequently
both candidates were proclaimed sultans, one at Patikul and one
at Maymbung, and both prepared to fight. Ambuscades, skirmishes,
surprises, robberies, and cattle stealing followed. Governor Parrado
remained neutral until July when he made friendly visits to Maymbung
and Patikul and again counseled concord and compromise. Datu Harun
arrived in Sulu on the 17th of November and both parties solicited his
support and consulted him; but he failed to effect any agreement. A
little later he accompanied the governor of Sulu to Manila where
he received much attention because of the success that attended
his services at Palawan. He remained in Manila about one month and
returned to live at Matanda, filled with a strong desire to better
himself and his country. A year passed and no agreement could be
reached, nor did the Spanish Government officially recognize any of
the claimants. Amirul Kiram indulged in licentiousness and Aliyud
Din took to opium.

Governor Parrado during his administration completed the Cuartel de
España and the market building and improved the forts Alfonso XII
and the Princess of Asturias. The majority of the nipa houses were
replaced by better structures of brick with iron roofs. A system of
waterworks was put in and Jolo was declared an open port. On July 23,
1885, Parrado was succeeded by Col. Francisco Castilla.

Governor Castilla followed the policy of his predecessor and remained
neutral. Amirul Kiram had in the meantime massed a large force and
attacked Aliyud Din. The latter's party had weakened and only 800
remained to defend Patikul and its kuta. The Maymbung forces greatly
outnumbered their adversaries, defeated them, destroyed the kuta,
and burned the settlement. Datu Aliyud Din fled to Basilan and lived
for a while with Sharif Aqil. Raja Muda Amirul Kiram then requested
the Spanish Government to recognize his succession to the sultanate
and a commission was sent from Manila to investigate the matter and
report on it. After five months' service as governor of Sulu Colonel
Castilla asked to be relieved at the end of the year and Col. Juan
Arolas succeeded him in January, 1886.

Governor Arolas devoted himself to his work with unusual enthusiasm
and exemplary energy. Public works and sanitation received his best
attention. Trees were planted, the streets were improved, the gutters
and sewers were repaired and renewed, and the town was kept thoroughly
clean. The death list of the garrison was reduced from 102 in 1885
to 51 in 1886. A good road was constructed outside the wall and a
beautiful street was extended from the southern gate of the town to
Tulay and Asturias on both sides of which coconut and shade trees were
planted. The streets of Tulay were planned on the same scale as those
of the walled town, and fillings on a large scale were commenced for
this purpose. Excellent waterworks were completed and iron pipes were
laid throughout the walled town and Tulay for the use of the garrison
and the public.

As a result of the report of the commission appointed to investigate
Sulu affairs and the subject of succession to the sultanate, directions
were received from Madrid and Manila to the effect that Datu Harun
should be appointed subsultan and Amirul Kiram sultan, and that both
be requested to go to Manila, take the oath of fidelity to Spain,
and be invested with authority by the Governor-General. Datu Harun
had made himself very agreeable to Governors Parrado and Castilla and
a strong friendship had grown up between them. Arolas soon learned to
like Harun and trusted him. Amirul Kiram was then 18 years old and his
age probably suggested the necessity of having a regent who would be
competent to take charge of affairs and who would be favorable to the
policy of the Spanish Government. The wish and opinion of the Sulu
nation and the desire of the ambitious sultana to be regent herself
were not fully respected and could not be approved, and the dictates
of the Spanish Government had to be complied with. Harun, as might
have been expected, obeyed the royal directions. Amirul Kiram refused
to go to Manila, considered it a humiliation for him to have a regent
and to be compelled to visit Manila for the approval of the Spanish
Government. He felt that he was the rightful heir and the choice of
the Sulus and that the treaty of 1878 well guarded his rights and
granted the Sulus the full privilege of electing their chiefs. The
Sulu character asserted itself in his action and the nation stood by
him and counseled noncompliance to directions prejudicial to their
own rights and national honor.



RULE OF SULTAN HARUN

Datu Harun went to Manila alone and Governor Arolas recommended his
appointment as sultan. Governor-General Terrero cabled to Madrid and
obtained authority for this action on September 11, 1886. Harun was
officially announced in Manila as Sultan of Sulu, and his appointment
on the 24th of September was made the occasion of some formality.


    Sultan Harun placed his hands upon the Quran, his Minister
    Sheikh Mustafa bin Ahmad officiating, and his high Excellency the
    Governor-General administered to him the oath in the following
    form: "Do ye swear to uphold steadfastly all the stipulations
    covenanted in the capitulations and to give faithful obedience
    to His Majesty, the King?" To this Sultan Harun answered: "I
    swear to comply with the terms of the capitulations and with the
    commands of His Majesty, the King." And His Excellency replied:
    "May God and men help ye if ye do this and if ye do not, then
    may God and the Government punish you!"


Sultan Harun arrived at Jolo in October, and, escorted by 200
Spanish soldiers, one gunboat, and one steam launch, he proceeded
to Parang where he expected the Sulus to declare their allegiance
to him. However, their reception was not as warm as he expected
and he soon found it to his advantage to retire to Jolo. The Sulu
chiefs appealed to arms and prepared to defend the rights of Amirul
Kiram at the cost of their lives. Desiring to support his nominee in
the sultanate Governor Arolas visited Parang in company with Sultan
Harun on the 2d day of November and an additional number of chiefs,
including Panglima Damang, swore allegiance to Sultan Harun.

Such measures aroused the activity of Amirul Kiram and his party and
several places in Parang were attacked by the Maymbung forces and
considerable unrest prevailed. Harun's sultanate seemed unacceptable
to the great majority of datus, and hostilities arose in many
localities. Murders and juramentado attacks occurred in the vicinity
of Jolo. The kuta of Bwisan and Timahu were attacked and reduced,
the settlements burned, and much blood was shed. Hostilities extended
to Siasi and the kuta of Datu Hiyang was attacked. In February, 1887,
a force of 3,000 Sulus started from Maymbung and attacked Jolo. The
garrison repulsed the attack, but juramentados and hostile bands
harassed the town. Small expeditions reconnoitered Tapul, Lugus,
and Siasi; but no active measures could be taken against Maymbung
until reënforcements could arrive from Zamboanga and Kotabato.

At that time General Terrero headed a campaign in the upper Mindanao
Valley against Datu Utu and forces were drawn from Zamboanga and Jolo
to coöperate at Kotabato. With the return of the troops in April the
war vessels which operated on the Mindanao River also came to Jolo and
Governor Arolas began preparations at once to fight Amirul Kiram who
was strongly intrenched in Maymbung. The gunboats, some marines, and
Sultan Harun's small force attacked the settlement by sea. Governor
Arolas led the land troops himself and marched against Maymbung at
night. The Moros of the interior harassed the advancing troops from
all sides, but everything that could be reached was burned and more
than 40 Sulus were disabled or killed before the fort of Maymbung was
reached. The latter was a square 75 meters on each side, built partly
on land and partly in the water. The walls on the land side were
constructed of coral rock, while those toward the sea were built of
double rows of piles filled behind with stone and earth. Large cannon
and breech-loading rifles were abundantly used by the Sulus and one
rapid-firing gun commanded the main approach on the land side. The
fighting was fierce and heroic on both sides. Out of a large force
of Sulus defending the fort and town 250 lay dead after the battle
was over. The Spaniards lost 17 dead and 96 wounded. The sea forces,
after caring for the Chinese population, set fire to the whole town
and reduced it to ashes. Governor Arolas was highly praised in Manila
and Madrid and was later promoted to be a brigadier-general.

If military operations, war, and death are efficient and suitable
measures to daunt the Sulus, coerce their will, and make them yield
to superior authority, this Maymbung campaign should certainly have
produced the desired result. Many thought that the moral effect of this
victory was excellent beyond measure and for that reason entertained
great hopes. Governor Arolas felt the cause of Spanish sovereignty
and suzerainty to be amply vindicated and Spanish honor strongly and
proudly upheld, but as early as the 9th of May another fight stared
him in the face. Arolas and Sultan Harun had to march against Parang
and invest the kuta of Panglima Damang. After the surrender of Damang
an expedition was sent to Lati and another to Tapul Island. This
latter campaign was extremely difficult and trying. The country was
rough, the forest thick, and the enemy fierce. Panglima Sayadi would
not recognize Harun's sultanate and would not obey the mandates of
the governor of Sulu, so his chastisement was decreed and Tapul was
attacked. Sayadi and his men fought like tigers at bay, and Governor
Arolas was compelled to lead his troops in person. Sayadi was defeated
after two days' fighting, 90 of his men were killed, and the fort was
demolished. The Spanish casualties were 13 dead and 155 wounded. Sultan
Harun reconnoitered the shores and interior of the island, destroyed
small forts, and obtained the surrender of several chiefs.

On the 29th of July, 1887, Pangian Inchi Jamila presented herself at
Jolo and expressed her submission and that of Raja Muda Amirul Kiram
to the governor of Sulu and to Sultan Harun. Governor Arolas insisted
that Amirul Kiram should come personally and express his surrender,
and allowed him ten days in which he could come with safety and
impunity. After her return Pangian Inchi Jamila sent Sultan Harun
the seal of the sultanate; but neither the chiefs nor Amirul Kiram
himself agreed to the personal surrender requested. Governor Arolas was
disposed to make Spanish sovereignty over Sulu a fact, absolute and
complete, and required implicit obedience. The Sulus had a different
view of the respective rights of the two governments and continued
their resistance. Another campaign was necessary on Siasi Island,
and Datu Hiyang and many Moros were killed.

Another expedition was directed against Kadungdung and southern Lu'uk
and another against the Island of Pata. Innumerable hardships were
sustained by the troops and many Sulus were killed. Sultan Harun
and his forces coöperated with the Spanish forces and reconnoitered
inaccessible places. The partisans of the young Raja Muda Amirul Kiram
were supposed to have been completely vanquished and the young prince
was expected to humiliate himself before Sultan Harun at any time. Such
hopes were, however, false, for on October 30 Bwal and the northern
Lu'uk district had to be punished. After some fighting the Sulus
evacuated Bwal and fled to the mountains and 53 houses were reduced to
ashes; nor was this sufficient, for in 1888 expeditions amounting in
some cases to 1,500 troops, comprising from two to four companies of
artillery, were conducted against Purul, Tambang, Patikul, Taglibi,
Buhanginan, Pandan, Sari`ul, and Pigi-Dahu. Hundreds and probably
thousands of Sulus were killed, but notwithstanding, Arolas's cruel
efforts to force Sultan Harun upon the people resulted in failure. The
Sulus scorned Sultan Harun and his apparent supremacy, persisted in
their resistance, and kept their allegiance to Amirul Kiram. True to
their traditions they remained faithful to the candidate whose right
to the succession was in their estimation and conviction stronger
than any other claim backed by the forces of General Arolas.

Before the end of the year 1886 Datu Uyung invited Datu Aliyud Din
back to Patikul, where he remained for about one year. Datus Kalbi
and Julkarnayn joined the party of Aliyud Din and defended him against
Amirul Kiram and Sultan Harun.

In 1887 Patikul and Lati were attacked by Governor Arolas and Datu
Aliyud Din fled to Siasi and Laminusa, from there he returned, late in
1888, to Bunbun and Patikul; there he lived quietly until his death,
about 1892.

The administration of Governor Arolas was the longest in duration,
the most eventful, the most interesting, and the most warlike
administration Sulu had under Spanish rule. The difficult situation
the governor found at his arrival, his misunderstanding of the Sulu
character and underestimation of Sulu public opinion, his integrity,
his exalted opinion of Spanish sovereignty and honor, his disregard of
treaties and precedent, his ability as a commander of troops, and his
warlike policy, all combine to make a picture vivid in its colors and
unique in its make-up. Governor Arolas can not be held responsible
for what had transpired prior to his appointment as governor, and
the policy he followed was probably dictated for him in general
from Manila; but it is difficult to conceive of a man executing
his duty with such vigor, earnestness, and thoroughness as General
Arolas did, unless his heart and soul approved of such a policy and
added enthusiasm and zest to the impetus of duty. Furthermore, there
are many reasons for believing that Governor Arolas recommended the
main lines of the policy he pursued. At all events he impersonates,
as far as the object of this work is concerned, that combined agency
of government which is responsible for the significant events of
his administration of Sulu affairs. In commenting upon his policy
it would therefore be proper to refer to him personally, without the
least intention of fixing the blame on anybody, or indeed of finding
fault at all, but with the sole intention of eliciting the facts and
showing the actual condition of affairs in their proper light.

In going over the long list of expeditions and campaigns conducted
by General Arolas and of the casualties on both sides, one can not
help but express admiration, surprise, or blame as to the justice
or advisability of the policy pursued, its motives, conduct, and
effect. For, if the treaty of 1878 was still in force--and there is
no reason to suppose that it was abrogated--why did Governor Arolas
institute new rules and conditions pertaining to the sultanate
and render compliance with them necessary for qualification and
confirmation? If by virtue of the prerogative of sovereignty it was
deemed necessary to interfere with Sulu internal affairs and customs
for a beneficial and good purpose, why was it not right then to
oppose and check Datu Aliyud Din as soon as it became evident that the
majority of the Sulus wanted Amirul Kiram as sultan and Aliyud Din had
refused to honor the governor's proposals and recommendations? Why was
it not considered right for the Government to object to war between
the contending parties from the beginning and to assume for itself
all the powers and prerogatives of a protector or arbitrator? If the
good of the Sulus was the ultimate object sought, why was not the
rightful heir supported from the beginning and advantage taken of
such an opportunity to enlist the sympathy of one party, at least,
on the side of the Government, strengthen the weak head of the nation,
and bring order and tranquillity out of chaos and anarchy?

Apparently the worthy cause of peace and Sulu welfare were
completely overlooked, while the main object of asserting power
and gaining supremacy was pressed and prosecuted at the expense
of a thousand souls and war with every strong chief throughout the
whole Archipelago. Governor Arolas trampled on the treaty, assumed
arbitrary and absolute authority, and treated noncompliance with
his wishes as disloyalty and insurrection. This attitude might have
been due to his peculiar military training and ideas, but it was
certainly unjust and overbearing. Nations can not be trampled under
foot without bringing about resentment and retaliation and people
can not be treated as privates in a company of disciplinarios or
deportados. The result of such coercion is hatred, and the effect
of abuse is enmity. Such methods do not tend to civilize a country
or better its chances of progress. They kill ambition, harden the
heart, and dull the senses. The first step toward the progress of
a subordinate nation is imitation of its superior; but imitation is
generally engendered by admiration and kindly influences, and cruel
warlike measures are certainly disposed to kill such good agencies.

Sulu military operations ceased soon after the arrival of
Governor-General Weyler in Manila, and some of the Jolo forces were
withdrawn.

General Arolas left Jolo in 1893 and was succeeded by Col. Cesar
Mattos, who was in turn followed by Gen. Venancio Hernandez before the
end of the same year. The successors of General Arolas did not have
similar motives for upholding Harun's sultanate against overwhelming
odds. They saw in him a weak and vacillating sultan who was a burden
to the state. Consequently Sultan Harun was relieved in 1894, and he
returned to his home in Palawan. During his incumbency Sultan Harun
lived at Mubu in the vicinity of Jolo. The house he occupied was the
best building ever occupied by a Sulu sultan. He was ambitious and
willing to reform his people, but he never had a strong following
and was very unfortunate in that he had to fight so hard and so often
for a nominal allegiance and false support from his people.



RULE OF SULTAN JAMALUL KIRAM II

Raja Muda Amirul Kiram, who fought and suffered so long for the throne
of his father and brother, succeeded Sultan Harun and assumed the
name of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II. He was not obliged to go to Manila
in order to be vested with proper authority by the Governor-General,
but it seems that he pledged himself in one way or another to pay some
tribute to the Spanish Government, and consequently a decree was issued
by Governor-General Blanco on March 1, 1894, directing a general census
of the Moros of the Sulu Archipelago and the collection of a tax of 1
real [222] from each individual. The proceeds of this tribute, after
deducting the allowances made for the interpreters and collectors,
were to be devoted to the development of the institutions of Jolo, and
especially to the construction of roads. It is said that the sultan
was unable and unwilling to collect the tribute so decreed, but that
he paid from his own purse the sum of P10,000 or its equivalent on
the basis of a population of 100,000 and at the rate of 1 real per
person. The collection of this tax was abandoned in the following
year and was never resumed.

The Sulus' adherence to the cause of Jamalul Kiram II was not based on
any personal influence he exerted on the people, but on the influence
of his mother and the people's devotion to the house of Jamalul Kiram
I. Datu Aliyud Din's claim was theoretically strong, but for various
reasons his party weakened; while Amirul Kiram, though a fugitive,
gradually gained in influence and rose to power.

The administration of Governor Hernandez was the longest in duration
next to that of Governor Arolas and was, on the whole, peaceful and
tranquil. On one occasion in 1895 hostilities broke out with Datus
Julkarnayn and Kalbi, and the Sulus of Lati and Patikul attacked
the town of Jolo causing several casualties. However, peace was
soon restored by Governor-General Blanco and no further hostilities
occurred. Governor Hernandez built the direct road, known as the
Asturias Road, which leads from the gate of the walled town to Fort
Asturias. About 1897 General Hernandez was relieved by Col. (later
Brig.-Gen.) Luis Huerta, the last Spanish governor of Sulu.

Spain evacuated Sulu in May, 1899, and Jolo was garrisoned by American
troops on the same day. On the 20th of August Gen. J. C. Bates
concluded a treaty with Sultan Jamalul Kiram II, generally known as
the "Bates Agreement," and the sovereignty of Sulu passed from Spain
to the United States of America. [223]







CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION


POLITICAL STATUS OF SULU AT THE TIME OF SPANISH EVACUATION

The cause for which Governor Arolas shed the blood of several
hundred Spanish soldiers and killed some thousands of Moros was
utterly defeated. The tenacity with which the Sulus resisted Spanish
domination, their obdurate opposition and bravery in battle, and their
obstinate passive resistance in peace, baffled all Spanish efforts
to subvert their political organization or gain a single point of
advantage without paying too dearly for it. The Sulus succeeded at
last in inaugurating their candidate as Sultan of Sulu. Their laws
and the administration of their internal affairs were not interfered
with. Their religion, social conditions, national usages and customs
were unaffected by any change whatsoever. Spanish influence and
jurisdiction did not extend beyond the limits of the garrison and no
material reform or progress reached the Moro community through that
channel. No effort was made by Spain to educate the Sulus and no
adequate measure was proposed by her governors which was applicable
to the needs of the Sulus and acceptable to their ideas. The Sulus
felt that there was a strong inclination on the part of the Spanish
Government or some of its recognized agents to change their religion
and destroy their national unity, and consequently they never had
complete confidence in Spanish officers and representatives and
repulsed every influence that tended to establish close relations
between them and the Christians of the Spanish garrison.

No tax or tribute was collected from the Sulus, and their territory was
exempted from the operation of the laws of the Philippine Islands. Sulu
imports could come in Sulu craft free of duty and unhampered by any
vexatious regulation. Duties could be collected by Sulus at all ports
unoccupied by Spain; and if hostilities could have been brought to an
end, the Sulus, in their pursuit of the peaceful vocations of life,
might have felt no appreciable difficulty or inconvenience from
Spanish occupation of Jolo, except the loss of the revenues of the
ports of Jolo and Siasi and some control over the trade of the Chinese.

Slavery remained an established institution of the land and its
continued practice among the Moros was neither denounced nor
restricted. The pearl industry remained in the hands of the Sulus
and pearl fishers and shell dealers paid a variable tax to the sultan
and local chiefs. Piracy was completely suppressed, and the invasion
of Christian communities and the capture of Christians as slaves by
Sulus terminated at the conquest of Jolo in 1876.

Before the campaign of 1876 the sultan ruled with a strong hand, lived
in state, was prosperous and had considerable wealth. The principal
datus lived at Jolo, and the Sulu forces were united. Jamalul A`lam
remained rich until his death, but subsequent wars and licentiousness
reduced the estate of his sons. The separation and dispersion of the
datus, however, weakened the Sulus more than any other cause. Each datu
began to feel more or less independent of the other, their jealousies
increased and became more intense and effectual; their forces were
disunited, and each chief relied solely upon his own fortifications and
following. United action was ignored or became impracticable. Soon the
subordinate chiefs began to feel their importance, gradually asserted
their rights, and assumed greater dignity and power in proportion to
their prosperity and the following they could command. Jamalul A`lam
ruled firmly, had every chief under his control, and held the state
intact. Three chiefs outside of his house were sufficient to sign the
treaty he made with Spain. These were Datu Harun, Datu Raja Lawut
Zaynul `Abidin (Asibi), the father of Datus Kalbi and Julkarnayn,
and Datu Muluk Bandarasa Pula, the son of the famous Datu Daniel,
and the father of the present Datu Pula-pula of Mubu or Tandu. No
maharajas or hadjis figured prominently in those days, and the
panglimas served as state messengers.

As soon as it became known that Jamalul A`lam was dying a condition
bordering on anarchy arose and disorder prevailed as in the days of
Badarud Din. Things grew worse during the regency of Datu Aliyud
Din, and worse still during the civil strife between the latter
and Raja Muda Amirul Kiram. General Arolas and Sultan Harun had to
fight every chief in his turn and every island by itself. Each chief
felt independent of the rest of the country and had his own ideas
as to who should be appointed sultan. Each datu was defended by
his own men only and each had to meet the Spanish forces by himself
unaided. Even Maymbung had to face the mighty foe with forces which
could be assembled from the immediate neighborhood only. Small
detachments did sometimes reënforce the forts of their neighbors,
but the proportion of help so extended to the actual strength of
the forces that could have been united was so insignificant that no
account can be taken of such coöperation.

Thus the total or combined strength of Sulu was reduced to small,
insignificant and disunited entities; the power of resistance
to outside invasion was diminished, but at the same time the
susceptibility of the country to foreign influence became nil. It
was an easy matter for General Arolas to defeat one party or chief
alone, but the necessity of fighting each chief by himself defeated
his purpose and efforts in the end. Unconsciously, Spain brought
on an abnormal condition of affairs in Sulu, extremely difficult to
manage and for which she never found the proper remedy. The ruling
sultan, though well supported by the greater mass of the people,
had neither the knowledge, the tact, nor the strength necessary to
correct the wrong done, and things in general tended rather to the
worse than to the better. The parties created by the civil strife of
1884 existed in 1899 with very little change, and their enmity had
become deeply rooted and ineradicable. The whole northern portion
of the island east of Jolo and eastern Tandu represented a distinct
party unfavorable to Jamalul Kiram II and at times seemed to be
wholly under the leadership of the two brothers, Datus Kalbi and
Julkarnayn. Similar parties existed in Tapul, Lugus, Siasi, and the
Tawi-tawi Group, many settlements having two chiefs, one representing
the sultan and the other the hostile party. To add evil to existing
wrong, the chiefs took advantage of this condition and vacillated in
their alliance from one party to another as it seemed to them more
advantageous for the time being. General Arolas fought both parties,
incurred the bitter enmity of all chiefs and gained for himself and
the cause of prosperity no advantage whatsoever. All the Sulus hated
Spain at heart and welcomed the end of her sovereignty, with the hope
of having more peace and better relations with her successor.



SPANISH POLICY


ATTITUDE OF THE MOROS

The vivid picture presented by the history of Sulu thrills the reader
with scenes of horror, cruelty, and misdirected energies. On one page
we read of how a rich and mighty sovereign stretched his hand across
the border of his domain into the territory of his weak neighbor and
coveted his jewels and treasure, and, being refused, struck terror,
desolation, and destruction in the home of the latter. On another
page we read how, as if possessed by a mighty demon, that weak and
petty king-neighbor summoned the powers of the wind and sea to his aid,
marched upon his strong enemy in the night, assailed him while unaware,
robbed his house, and carried his people away to work for his homely
sustenance. The mighty sovereign wakens in the morning, and in his
rage curses his wretched neighbor and swears vengeance upon him and
his wicked fellow nomads of the sea, but the rich and mighty lord of
the north has enemies and rivals in the west and far south and does
not dare leave his home unguarded. Part of his available warriors
he thought would be sufficient, and their valor and patriotism were
counted on as an additional asset and a sure guaranty of victory. The
sails of a gigantic fleet were unfurled and chariots and steeds were
provided for the triumphal march into the enemy's pearl land. But
the mighty sea rolled and the furious winds blew and the giant did
not prove a match for the weak, for man can not go against nature,
and valor is a poor aid against overwhelming odds. Yet some men's
hearts are made of stone and one or two experiences do not teach them
enough; so we see the same scene repeated time and time again, until
an opportune moment arrived and a new chapter was opened in which we
find the rich sovereign richer and mightier. This time nature takes
sides with might and turns the scales against the weak and petty king
of the south and leaves him wrecked and stranded on his coral reefs.

The Sulu is a Malayan of prominent type, reared in his infancy
by a Brahman priest and brought up to maturity under the care of a
Mohammedan instructor. He rejected his idols as early as 1450 and had
been for more than a century prior to the arrival of Legaspi at Cebu,
a faithful and devoted worshipper of "Allahu Ta'ala," the Almighty and
only God, according to the teaching of the prophet Mohammed and the
holy Quran. He had laws, an established government, an organized state,
an alphabet, and a system of education. By trade he was a planter and
fisher, and both land and sea yielded him plenty. He turned the timber
of his rich forests into boats and utilized the currents of the sea
and the movements of the wind. Navigation came natural to him, and he
sailed to distant lands and traded his pearls for silks and spices. He
had a wide range of experience, and his knowledge of the world was by
no means restricted to one island or to one limited group of islands.

The dominion of the Sultan of Sulu was complete and his power was
well respected throughout the Archipelago. Between Mindanao and
Borneo 150,000 people--Yakans, Samals, and Sulus--lived and obeyed
one man. True, the Sulus had no standing army or navy, but they had
innumerable boats, forts, and firearms, and every able-bodied man was
a soldier and a sailor, always armed, and always ready for a call to
arms. His immediate neighbors were pagans, or "infidels," who paid
him homage and tribute. He was the master of the land and the lord
of the southern seas. He was chivalrous in his manners and received
his friends with liberal hospitality; but he wasted no sympathy or
kindness on his enemy. The enemy of the state was also an enemy to
"Allahu Ta'ala," and no life was deemed too dear to sacrifice for
the cause of home and God. It was the idea of his home that started
the blood rushing through his veins, and religion fittingly fanned
the flame and heated his blood to the boiling point. There is honor
even among thieves, and a nation made up of fierce pirates need not
go begging for dignity, gallantry, and self-pride. Let the Sulu be
idolatrous or a fire worshiper and he will "go juramentado" on the
strength of his faith in wooden or fire gods before he yields to a
master or serves as a slave. He will die before he surrenders. Such
metal is what makes the Sulus brave, independent, and unyielding.

The Sulus watched the progress of Legaspi at Cebu, Panay, and Luzon,
saw how the pagan chiefs were subjugated, and witnessed the expulsion
of their brother Mohammedans from Manila. They had played this rôle
themselves, and when the enemy reached their shores they needed no
word of explanation or stimulus to resist, except that which they had
in their breeding and general make-up. Spain instigated hostilities
and coveted their domain; it was not their part to yield, but it was
Spain's clear duty to reëstablish peace before the evils resulting from
war outweighed the good obtained. This she failed to do, and the Sulus
were invaded repeatedly and harassed constantly. Bitter animosity
filled the hearts of the Sulus, and a desire for revenge prompted
them to retaliate; and what can be expected from people of their race
and civilization except cruelty and barbarity in war! We know that
"war is hell" among highly civilized nations and why should we expect
of the Sulus a moral conduct out of proportion to their intellectual
development and the influences of their civilization and religion? The
life of an "infidel" was not a matter of religious concern to them
at all. The Prophet himself led his people against nonconformists and
promised them reward instead of pardon or intercession before God. The
Quran taught them that patriotism is a part of their religion,
and love of home and family left no place for cowardice and no
patience with humiliation. They therefore fought well and fought
cruelly. They raided the enemy's country, robbed him, and carried
away many slaves. Slavery was also sanctioned by their religion and
formed an established custom or method of punishment which took the
place of imprisonment and saved the expense of jails and guards.

Humanity called for different action on both sides; but it evidently
made no impression on the Sulus. Not satisfied with just measures of
war and direct retaliation, they developed an abnormal propensity for
piracy, invaded the Spanish domain frequently for the procurement
of slaves and for other wicked purposes, and committed unspeakable
horrors and atrocities. But to treat evil with evil adds no virtue
to the credit of the other side. We rarely read of wounded Moros
after an engagement, and, strange to say, all wounds of Moros were
invariably immediately fatal. If few Moros were ever kindly treated
after battle, certainly many more were promptly dispatched in a manner
that terminated suffering and life at the same time.



MISTAKES AND DIFFICULTIES OF SPANISH RULE

Had Spain exerted more effort to increase the Jolo garrison in
1646 and trusted the charge of this garrison to an able and upright
administrator, the fruits of the brilliant conquest of General Corcuera
would not have been lost, and in all probability the trouble with
Sulu would have been ended before the termination of the seventeenth
century. However, instead of this course, weak characters were charged
with the management of affairs, and in place of permanent and strong
occupation of the land an insignificant treaty was made with the Sulus
with no intention on the part of Spain of keeping it permanently and
with no hope that it would be kept by the Sulus. Similar mistakes
were frequently repeated and a cruel inhuman strife marked with an
astounding profuseness of bloodshed and terrible loss of life and
evil of all sorts, was prolonged for the space of three hundred and
twenty years without any advantage that is worth considering.

In consequence of all this, the Sulu has been pictured to the outside
world as a black devil incarnate, borne in mischief and conceived
in iniquity; without a human characteristic, barbarous and savage as
his second cousin the orang-utan of Borneo. The Sulu had no means or
chance of pleading his cause before an international court, and his
cry could not be heard or registered by a foreign hand or press. He
was not met except with a predetermination to fight him. He was not
approached except with the intention of sharing his treasure. He
was not invited except to surrender his right of government and no
alternative was offered him except tribute or death. It is out of
reason to expect such people to abandon their customs, traditions,
government, and religion without a struggle. It is out of reason to
expect them to yield to threats and be daunted by a bombshell shot from
a distance. The jungle is thick and extensive, their boats and sails
are ready and light; they know the routes of the sea and can follow
the currents of the ocean in the dark as well as in the light. The
coasts of Borneo and the Celebes are not too far from them, and living
there is as cheap and easy as at home. It is beyond reason to expect
that all sultans, datus, and panglimas will resign their offices,
give up their rank and privileges, and be content to plant corn on
the hillside or catch fish along the beach. The laws of nature are
not ambiguous, and man is man whether his skin is white or brown.

The chief difficulties Spain had to contend with in the south arose
out of the natural weakness of her system of administration. Her
Governors-General changed frequently. The Moro question received
a secondary attention, and no definite policy or settled course
of action was ever systematically worked out and followed. What
Corcuera planned was not carried out by his successors, and measures
which were approved by General Terrero were disapproved by General
Weyler and ignored by General Blanco. Had Governor-General Urbiztondo
preceded Governor-General Claveria, Jolo might have been attacked and
conquered before 1851, and had Governor-General Malcampo preceded
Governor-General Urbiztondo, the garrison of Jolo might have been
established twenty-five years earlier.

The policy of Governor Parrado was not followed by Governor Arolas,
and the plans and pledges of the latter were not fully respected
by his successors. Treaties were made to be broken rather than
to be obeyed, and at the end of three hundred and twenty years of
protracted relations with Sulu, no satisfactory policy can be said to
have been decided upon at either Madrid or Manila. The treaty of 1878
was a temporary expedient. It was not intended to express a policy
nor did Spain intend to restrict her influence to the provisions of
a treaty nor to tie her hands so fast for any length of time. Spain
was intent on the complete conquest of Sulu, the assimilation of all
the Moro tribes, and the unification of government, religion, and
civilization throughout the Philippine Archipelago. This ideal was
the hope of all governors of Sulu and formed a concealed motive that
prompted their actions and guided their administration. The governors
of Sulu differed only in their ideas as to the length of time which
should pass before the Sulus should be denied their autonomy, and the
methods by which the change could be best brought around. There were
opportune and inopportune times to interfere, which were left for the
Governor-General to decide, and in the majority of cases his decision
was controlled not by the immediate needs of the occasion, but by
interests pertaining to the general administration of the Archipelago,
which left partial attention and inadequate means available for the
solution of the vexatious difficulties in the south. Generals who
were anxious to distinguish themselves, took the first opportunity
that offered itself, but satisfied themselves with the immediate
results of victory or the simple correction of the wrong calling
for military action, without bearing in mind the general situation
and the requirements of the next step that should be undertaken as
part of a course planned for the carrying out of a settled general
policy. Thus bound to observe the general provisions of the treaty
of 1878, and limited in the authority granted them from Manila and in
the strength of the garrison assigned to Jolo, the governors of Sulu
felt their hands completely tied, and consequently they could not
accomplish much and left matters to drift with the current of events.

During the governorship of General Terrero, Governor Arolas was
given a free hand and sufficient troops to carry out his plan; but
Arolas was not much more than a fighting man and an excellent post
commander, and the evils of his strenuous measures outweighed the good
he accomplished; and when the Jolo garrison was subsequently reduced
by Governor-General Weyler his policy could not be continued and was
necessarily doomed to utter failure.

However, nobody was quicker to note such mistakes and to observe the
needs of the situation than the Spanish officers themselves, especially
inspectors-general who were commissioned to investigate matters and
conditions in Sulu, and historians who made a study of Sulu affairs.



REPORT OF BALTASAR GIRAUDIER

Of works of this nature we give brief accounts of the estimable
report of Baltasar Giraudier, Director of the "Diario de Manila,"
which was presented to the Governor-General, Domingo Moriones, in
1880, and the noteworthy remarks and recommendations of the author of
"Apuntes sobre Jolo," Miguel A. Espina, colonel of infantry.

Baltasar Giraudier accompanied General Malcampo to Jolo in 1876 and
made special inquiry into the situation in the south. He clearly
stated that the terms of the treaty of 1851 could not be carried out
(to advantage). Failure to observe this treaty provoked the sultan and
Sulus to impatience, resistance, and a rebellious attitude. Referring
to the Jolo campaign of 1876 he estimated the strength of the attacking
army at approximately 11,000 troops, and described Jolo as an actual
churchyard, held in a constant state of siege, and a great cost
to the nation in men and money. Naked facts, he asserted, did not
justify former expeditions, and hostilities were often provoked for
ulterior motives. Considerable harm resulted from such misdirected
measures, while much good to both nations could have been derived from
a policy of attraction, frank, loyal, and disinterested. He called the
attention of the authorities to the necessity of a faithful observance
of the terms of treaties, in order to expect and demand with right
and respect a reciprocal observance of such treaties by the Moros;
to the advisability of honoring and strengthening the authority
of the sultan in order to secure his good will and coöperation in
maintaining peace and harmony and in repressing the evil tendencies
of rebellious datus and subchiefs; to the great advantages that may
arise from reëstablishing the salary of the sultan and promoting
those friendly relations which tend to strengthen the Sulu alliance
and render this state a stronghold and a protecting wall against
invasion from foreign countries. He condemned the treaty of 1878 as
limiting the government's freedom of action and checking the progress
and success of the nation's policy.

He reiterated that there is great need and necessity of defining
the policy of the nation relative to Sulu and the Moro country in
general. Such a grave question should be settled on a firm basis
and should not be subject to the caprice of an individual governor
or commander of a war vessel. No opportunity should be allowed for
ignorance, malice, false pretexts, and ulterior motives that defame
the national honor, weaken the policy of the government, or work to
the detriment of the people and the country. He pointed to several
incidents of wrong conduct or imprudence on the part of officials which
provoked trouble and war and left on the Moros an impression that the
Spaniards were acting deceitfully and in bad faith. The general policy
he outlined for the information of the government and for the uniform
conduct of all officials was submitted in the form of recommendations,
the most important of which are briefly noted as follows:


    1. The sultan and datus should be treated with respect and
    consideration.

    2. Immediate justice and impartiality should be strictly
    administered and practiced in all cases and under all conditions,
    especially when crime or outrage is committed against the Moros;
    for such action would demonstrate in an impressive manner an
    upright conduct which would command the fullest respect of the
    Moros and obedience to law and order.

    3. It is of the utmost importance that the belief, temples,
    and cemeteries of the people be respected.

    4. The speedy punishment of all Moro misconduct and aggression
    should be secured through the datu or chief.

    5. The fleet should make frequent visits to various islands to
    familiarize the people with the flag, to map the country, and to
    study conditions in general.

    6. Religion should be fully tolerated in the same manner as in
    India and Java. Proselytism should be prohibited.

    7. The sultan should be invited to live in Jolo; an edifice
    should be constructed for his residence which would increase his
    dignity in the eyes of his people; and he should be given a high
    office in connection with the government (as secretary) which
    would engender and promote his interest in the government and
    its welfare and secure needed and desirable coöperation between
    officers and chiefs.


In conclusion, Giraudier pointed to the wisdom of English and Dutch
policy in affording education to the sons of native princes and
chiefs at public expense, to the necessity of large sacrifices at
the beginning which would be amply compensated for by a general
pacification of the Archipelago in the end.



VIEWS OF ESPINA

Colonel Espina assumed that retrogression was out of the question
and that the flag which was waving over Sulu must be defended and
supported. Sulu could not be abandoned to her fate and Spanish
sovereignty had inevitably to be exercised. Extermination of Moros
he held to be absurd and impossible, and measures so directed he
regarded as injurious and unwise. He entertained strong hopes,
amounting to actual conviction, that Moros could become Spanish in
political organization, sympathy, and civilization, and that their
religion did not form an obstacle to their reformation and assimilation
unless conversion into the Christian religion was insisted upon and
rigorously kept up. He thought that the cause of religion alone was
sufficient to prolong the war indefinitely and lead the Government to
a policy of extermination and failure. Instead of that he advised a
prudent and tolerant policy declaring absolute noninterference with
religion and hearty coöperation with the Sulus in matters of general
concern and public welfare. He considered it of great importance to
occupy all the principal islands of the Archipelago with garrisons
and to establish colonies and agricultural stations at the most
desirable localities and harbors. He wrote at considerable length
on the organization of a rural police force to maintain order and
carry out the various measures of his policy. He pointed out the
advisability of strengthening the authority of the sultan over Sulus,
of rendering his appointment subject to the approval or choice of the
Spanish Government, and of selecting a council of state loyal to the
Spanish Government and serving under salary. The chief features of
the policy he outlined are as follows:


    1. The organization of the sultanate should be made or continued
    in accordance with the laws and customs of the country, but in a
    manner agreeable to the interests of the Spanish Government. Rank,
    order, and religion should not be interfered with.

    2. The sultan and members of the council of state should be
    appointed by the Governor-General and should have salaries.

    3. A new treaty should be made in order to rectify those clauses
    of the treaty of 1878 pertaining to the maintenance of peace and
    the guarantee of safety of life and property.

    4. Slavery should be abolished, radically and thoroughly.

    5. Compulsory tribunals of justice or courts should be established
    to relieve datus and chiefs of the exercise of such functions.

    6. Commerce should be encouraged and rendered free for all boats
    for a period of twenty-five years.

    7. Roads should be constructed to facilitate communication and
    transportation from the central region of the island to its
    principal harbors.

    8. Agriculture should be developed and colonies encouraged.

    9. Necessities should be created for the Moros, providing them
    at the same time with means for satisfying them. Children of the
    sultan and datus should be educated in Manila, and schools for
    the Moro dialect should be established and made accessible to
    the public.



PURPOSE OF SPAIN

A few closing remarks on the purpose and interests of Spain in Sulu and
the resources she had available for carrying out this purpose may not
be out of place in order to give the reader a clear idea of the final
policy which Spain had for Sulu and to enable him to grasp the scope,
complexity, and difficulties of this problem. However, in discussing
these subjects and the changes they were intended to bring about it
must be remembered that every project on the part of the sovereign
nation or Spain calls for consideration from two points of view--the
first is whether the agency employed was sufficient and adequate
to impose the change and carry it through; the second is the amount
of resistance such a project encountered on the part of the subject
nation or Sulu, and in case the resistance could be overcome, whether
or not a nation like that of the Sulus was developed sufficiently
for the requirements of the change and for subsequent adaptation to
the system it was proposed to inaugurate.

Inasmuch as the treaty of 1878 was not abrogated and no distinct
effort was actually made to disregard it, it should be regarded as the
official and most authentic expression of Spain's relation, rights,
and purpose in Sulu. The terms of this treaty gave Spain indisputable
sovereignty over Sulu, the right to occupy all necessary points and to
establish military garrisons wherever needed, the right to establish
custom-houses at occupied points, the right to limit or control the
importation of firearms, the right to suppress piracy and to demand
the Sultan's coöperation in its suppression.

The degree or amount of sovereignty Spain was to exercise over Sulu
was very indefinitely stated. The term "indisputable" does not signify
"complete," as some hasty reports on Moro affairs have expressed
it. The aim of the treaty was to exclude Great Britain, Germany, and
other foreign nations from the Spanish sphere of influence over Sulu,
and the word "indisputable" should be interpreted in this sense, which
is clearly expressed in the Sulu text of the treaty. At that time
there was no intention on the part of Spain to assume the control
of Sulu internal affairs and the Sulus endeavored to guard their
complete freedom and right to continue their political organization,
laws, and religion by specifying those powers which Spain had a right
to exercise over them and by declaring emphatically that all their
customs, usages, and religion should not be changed. The Sulu word for
"customs" signifies laws, organization, and administrative methods. It
is the political not the social sense of the word about which they were
so very particular. The treaty did not entitle Spain to interference,
or to institute any measure that tended toward political change or
reform in Sulu. The sultan was left supreme in the exercise of his
authority over Moros. The treaty simply secured undisputed Spanish
control over Sulu's foreign relations and commerce and incorporated
Sulu into the Philippine Archipelago in this sense only. It further
established peace within the Archipelago by checking any possible
revival of Sulu piracy. It appears that both distinguished governors,
Martinez and Parrado, interpreted the treaty in this sense, and the
Sulus certainly so understood it.

Two important steps were taken by Spain later than 1878 in order to
modify the relations established by the treaty. The first of these
steps was a resolution to appoint the Sultan of Sulu or control the
succession to this office. This occurred in 1886 when Sultan Harun
was declared by the Spanish Government, in answer to the requests
of Governor-General Terrero and Governor Arolas, as the legitimate
sultan. By this act the Madrid Government asserted its right to a
degree of actual sovereignty over Sulu internal affairs and backed its
assertion with the necessary force and partially carried it through
at the hands of Governor Arolas. Jamalul Kiram II finally recognized,
to a certain extent, Spain's authority in this matter and accepted
her right of approval or confirmation of the election.

The second step was an attempt to exact tribute from the Sulus. This
was done by a decree issued in 1894 by Governor-General Blanco
directing that a census be taken of Sulu and a poll tax of 1 "real"
per capita be collected. Advantage was taken at that time of the strong
desire of Raja Muda Amirul Kiram to become sultan. Sultan Harun was
persuaded to resign, and the measure adopted for the collection of the
tribute resulted in the payment of a sum of money or its equivalent by
Amirul Kiram and the latter's appointment as sultan. The scheme was a
compromise by which Spain attempted to assume more control over Sulu,
and Amirul Kiram secured his appointment as sultan without having
to go to Manila for this purpose. However, the attempt to impose a
tribute on the Sulus appears to have failed completely. No census
was taken and no tribute was asked in later years.

The purpose of Spain, in accordance with her official declarations,
may therefore be summed up as follows: 1. Complete control of Sulu
foreign relations; 2. Complete control of Sulu commerce; 3. The right
to appoint the sultan; 4. The right to impose tribute on the Sulus.

The first two propositions were legitimate and proper. Both could be
accomplished and retained by virtue of Spain's naval power, merchant
marine, and friendly foreign relations with the European nations. The
Sulus had no navy and no steam vessels. Their native boats could not
offer any significant resistance and were powerless to oppose the
Spanish navy. Ever since 1844 the latter was in the ascendant and by
1870 it had completely overpowered the Sulu naval forces. Both these
propositions were conceded to Spain in the treaty of 1878 and were
justly held ever since. They strengthened the unity of the Philippine
Archipelago and secured strength and permanent internal peace.

The third proposition, the right to appoint the sultan, was in effect
defeated. It was poor policy. At the end of the bloody struggle that
arose because if it, Spain retained only the right to confirm the
choice of the nation. Had Governor Arolas confined himself to this
point he would have won without a contest and without engendering
hostility and ill feeling toward his Government. Had a test of arms
been the sole arbiter of the question Governor Arolas might be said
to have won his point completely, for his forces defeated those of the
Sulus in every encounter; but the tenacity of purpose, persistence, and
patriotism of the Sulus outlived his determination, and what was won by
force and cruelty was given up in the end as inadvisable and impolitic.

The fourth proposition fell through. The best argument that can be
advanced in its favor is that a tribute was actually paid by the
Sultan Jamalul Kiram II in 1894 and that the tax was not imposed in
later years because of the extensive campaign conducted in Mindanao
and the frequent changes of Governor-General, and also because of
the Tagalog insurrection of 1896. Such argument is more in the nature
of an apology than a defense. There is some significance in exacting
tribute from the Sultan of Sulu, but the principal of the tribute was
utterly defeated. The sultan evidently evaded the question entirely as
soon as he felt secure in his office. Such a measure would certainly
have been opposed by the Sulus. They would have risen to a man and
sacrificed more life and treasure in this cause than in the previous
one of the appointment of their candidate for the sultanate. The nation
was somewhat divided in the former case, but in the matter of resisting
the payment of a tribute there was not a dissenting vote. They would
have fought most vigorously and unitedly. Governor Arolas did not
exhaust their fighting powers; they could have fought just as well in
1888 as in 1886-87. One party alone advanced against Jolo in 1895,
and a band attacked landing soldiers in 1897. To pay tribute to a
foreign power meant vassalage in their opinion, and this they could
not tolerate. They would fight, not on the strength of a careful and
intelligent estimate of their power as compared to that of Spain,
but because they would not tolerate the idea and their national honor
would prompt them to exhaust their strength before they would yield
to such a humiliating proposition. Their fighting power was only
one unit of their national resources; their national independence,
national character, unity and stability of organization were other
units which added considerable strength to their resistance. What
they could not defeat they would have left alone; what they could
not tolerate they would have evaded; what they could not evade they
would have run away from.

An exaggerated degree of honor and self-pride, uncontrolled by
a certain degree of intelligence, culture, and moral courage, is
dangerous. Courage unencumbered by prosperity or wealth and spurred
by abnormal religious sentiment, becomes desperate, reckless, and
fanatical. Moreover the treatment by a highly civilized nation of
another limited in culture and development is under moral restrictions
similar to those pertaining to the treatment by a man of mature age of
a minor. A minor can not be blamed for lack of mature reason, and no
more can be expected of him than he is able to do. He must further be
treated with equity and justice, though he is weak and helpless. It
was impossible for the Sulus to change their character at once. It
was absurd to expect of them any action contrary to their natural
disposition and national character. It was the duty of the sovereign
nation to recognize the national character of her inferior and treat
her wisely and justly. Tact might have been mightier than an army
and wise measures might have worked wonders. Nations can be educated
and can develop like individuals and force is a poor agent where the
carrying out of a certain measure is intended to bring about reform.

Spain imposed tribute upon the Sulus without being prepared to enforce
its collection and before the Sulus were ready for such a measure
and the relation it involved. Granting that the funds derived from
the tax were to be used for the benefit of the Sulus the principle
underlying the institution of the tax is repugnant to the people and
no means were used to remedy this feeling or train the people for
its tolerance. No savage or semicivilized nation can be reformed and
governed without initial expense, nor can reform be effected in a day,
although forces and funds are available in plenty.



RESOURCES OF SPAIN

In their bearing on the subject under consideration the resources of
Spain may be divided into three divisions--her fighting power, her
government machinery or system of government, and her racial influence.

Her fighting power includes all the forces of the army and navy which
she could bring to bear on Sulu and her ability to support them. The
largest Spanish force that ever assembled on the soil of Sulu was
that commanded by Governor-General Malcampo in the expedition of 1876;
this was estimated at from 9,000 to 11,000 troops. In January, 1888,
the military forces of the Philippine Islands numbered 12,800 men,
of whom 1,400 were Spaniards and the rest natives. Governor Arolas
never commanded more than 2,000 troops in his various expeditions
and never needed more than that number. A garrison force of 700 men
proved sufficient to repulse a general attack on Jolo in 1881. We may
therefore safely conclude that a force of 2,000 native troops stationed
in Sulu was sufficient for all purposes and considerations. Such a
force should have been kept in Sulu all the time. The moral effect
of maintaining it would be to suppress any attempt at opposition
and to check the tendency to mischief or rebellion. The fact that
there is a ready force behind an order or request prompts obedience
and conformity, before deceit or plots can have time to grow. Wise
measures are more effective and peace is assured. Besides, the honor
of the sovereign power is constantly maintained and no chances for
disregard or dishonor are allowed. Force back of a wise administrator
is a potent factor for good. It need not be used except rarely and
when absolutely necessary. Force is evil only when it is allowed to
rule the head of the administrator and, like every other agency, it is
good only when it is wisely directed. It was therefore necessary and,
in as far as it was needed to back a competent administration, it
should have been provided. Spain could have easily kept such a force
in Sulu all of the time. She had the troops and the means to support
them. She, however, did not do this, and only part of the time did
the Sulu garrison have the required strength. However, the facility
of transporting troops from Zamboanga to Jolo and the preponderance
of her naval forces reduced this deficiency to a minimum and the
fighting power of Spain may, as far as our purpose is concerned,
be deemed to have been adequate to rule Sulu.

The chief weakness in the Spanish régime lay in her system of
government. Her government machinery proved ineffective and
inadequate. No competent men were educated into the needs of the
situation and given permanent charge of Sulu affairs. Temporary
military commanders were put in command without the necessary
preparation for the requirements of the office. No special ability was
needed to conduct an office already organized, to execute laws already
established, or to carry out a system of government already laid out;
but it required higher abilities to establish sovereignty over a
new state like Sulu, lay down a definite, settled, and wise policy,
and carry out the regeneration and reform of a nation. Besides too
frequent changes in the office of Governor-General, the governors of
Sulu were also allowed too short terms. More than thirteen governors
ruled Sulu in the course of twenty-three years, from 1876 to 1899. Not
one of these felt that it was his duty to institute a permanent policy
for Sulu, or believed that he was going to stay long enough to carry it
through, and that he was going to be held responsible for its conduct,
whether it failed or succeeded.

The government of a state is entitled to as much consideration as
any business undertaking and there is no reason why it should not
be conducted on sound and businesslike principles. Such methods as
characterized the government of Sulu would have ruined any business
establishment and could not have done justice to any nation or body
of men it represented. The men in responsible positions trusted the
transmission of all official actions and communications to interpreters
of limited capacity and strength of character. No governor could
speak Sulu and verify the translation of his letters and orders. His
knowledge of Sulu affairs and his ideas and opinions were necessarily
colored by the opinions or designs of his interpreters. The strength of
Spain's assertion and declaration of her rights to rule Sulu, exclude
foreign interests, appoint the Sultan of Sulu, and impose tribute
on the Sulus was based on the meaning of the word "sovereignty"
which does not appear at all in the Sulu text of the treaty of
1878. The Sulu copy of the treaty uses in this connection the word
"agad" which means "follow." In the translation of this document from
Sulu into English a point was stretched and "agad" was interpreted as
"obey." While the Sultans of Sulu felt that they were independent and
free in their administration of Sulu internal affairs, and that they
were only obliged to give Spain preference, and ally themselves on her
side when foreign nations interfered, governors like Arolas read the
word "sovereignty" in the Spanish text and tried to inforce its full
and actual sense. The Sulus felt that the Spanish governors were thus
transgressing the limits of their authority, and the Spanish governors
thought at the same time that the Sulus were unreliable and deceitful,
a most undesirable and unfortunate condition of affairs.

The missionaries in the northern islands acted differently. They talked
the language of the natives and performed their duties creditably
and with unquestionable success. They understood the people, knew
their real conditions, sympathized with them, and worked out their
religious regeneration admirably. The governors of Sulu did not take
any such view of their duties; they had some zeal, but they lacked that
understanding of human nature and the forces of regeneration that the
missionaries mastered. They had no idea of how a Sulu law or custom
could be modified and reformed, for they never acquainted themselves
sufficiently with the laws and customs of the people and never paid
much attention to the feelings and public opinion of the Sulus. They
trusted every measure to force and could not think of reform without
compulsion. A missionary who observed the intense fear of demons on the
part of some pagan Filipinos converted several of them by means of a
picture of hell and satan, and gradually taught them the principles
of Christianity. But the governors of Sulu could never detect any
relation between Sulu and Spanish laws and could never find a method of
approach from one side to the other. Their form of government failed to
adapt itself to the conditions of the country and could neither merge
into the Sulu organization nor adapt the Sulu organization to its
system. No sympathies bound the two races or the two organizations,
and no foundation for unification and subsequent assimilation could
be laid. Spanish jurisdiction remained within the garrison, and its
machinery could find no application outside the walls of Jolo.

The amount of force needed to reduce and reform Sulu varies in
accordance with the policy pursued. Considerable light can be thrown
on this subject by a study of the circumstances and causes which gave
rise to Datus Ayunan, Mandi, Piang, Ara, and Pedro Cuevas or Kalun.

Datu Ayunan lived at Taviran and was much lower in rank and influence
than either the Sultan of Bagumbayan or Datu Utu. Having grievances
against Datu Utu he shrewdly allied himself with the Spanish forces and
rendered them valuable assistance. In a short time he rose to power,
dignity, and fame and died greater in the estimation of the country
than his overlord, the Sultan of Bagumbayan.

Datu Piang married the daughter of Datu Ayunan and learned his
methods. As soon as Datu Utu's attitude toward him became unbearable
and hostile he offered his services to the Spanish authorities and won
their protection and support. By shrewd tactics he dispossessed his
former master Utu of his best lands, attracted most of his following
and caused his downfall. At the time of the Spanish evacuation he had
become the richest Moro in Mindanao and the most influential chief
in the island.

Datu Ara had Chinese blood in him. He married his daughter to the
Gugu [224] of Magindanao, won the favor of the governor of Kotabato,
and ruled over all Moros on the southern branch of the Mindanao River
below Tamontaka. He was strong and well respected.

Datu Mandi married the daughter of a Samal chief of Zamboanga and
through his tact and ability to speak Spanish established for himself
a respectable position over the Samals of Mindanao. He served the
interests of Spain faithfully and bore arms in her behalf against
Bisayans and Lanao Moros. The recognition and support he obtained from
the Spanish Government raised him to the rank of a datu and gave him
supremacy over all the chiefs of the peninsula of Zamboanga. A close
observation of Datu Mandi's ability and attitude toward the government
renders it clear that the influence this man could bring to bear on
his people was immense. It is no exaggeration to state that had his
influence been tactfully utilized, he could have easily, with the aid
of one company of Spanish troops, reduced to submission all Moros and
Subanuns living between Point Flechas and Sindangan on the outskirts
of Dapitan. There never existed a Moro chief more tactful, pliable,
forceful, and favorable to the reorganization of the Moro community
and its system of government along modern and civilized lines.

With little aid from the governor of Zamboanga, Pedro Cuevas made
himself the real lord of northern Basilan. His power was further well
respected throughout all the Basilan Group of islands. With no more
than two companies of troops at his disposal he could have acted as
the Spanish representative and subordinate ruler or governor of all
the Basilan and Balangingi Groups of islands and could have effected
any reform desired.

By tact and ability these men obtained Spanish influence and support
and rose from the lowest ranks of the people to positions of great
power and dignity. Had the Spanish Government employed such men to
further its influence by enlarging their following and extending
their territories and spheres of activity, there is no doubt that
a very significant step would have been taken which would have made
clear to the Spanish authorities successful methods of procedure and
new lines of policy that lead to success.

Similar lines of action could have been adopted in Sulu by taking
advantage of existing parties and factions. Once the sympathy of
one Sulu party was obtained and its forces bore arms on behalf of
or on the same side with Spain, the door would have been opened for
effective influence and wise measures directed along the line of
cleavage would have been bound to produce results. A minimum of force
would then be needed, and strained relations and discord would give
way to friendship and concord. The history of Sulu is not wanting
in proof that wise attractive methods have been more effective than
force and arbitrary rule, and, once we reflect upon Abu Bakr's rule
and the wonderful reformation he worked out, then we realize what
was and what was not a wise policy for Sulu.

Little attention has, as a rule, been given to race characteristics
as a potent factor in a nation's policy. The racial character of
the sovereign nation bears on the ruled nation in several ways--in
the conduct and demeanor of officials in their official and social
relations with the chiefs and common people, in the demeanor of
soldiers and civilians in their social intercourse with the mass of the
people, and in the industrial or business relations of the two nations.

The Sulu datus and chiefs are very courteous and polite and
are unusually keen to notice personal discourtesy. Impulsive and
unconciliatory methods are bitterly resented, and an abrupt manner
may in itself be sufficient to defeat any measure. The people in
general have no patience with an impetuous officer and hate to be
discourteously treated even by their datus. Treated with disrespect
by the authorities or disregarded by the ruling race, they become
exclusive, evasive, indifferent, unsympathetic, and discontented. The
ruling race can be polite, courteous, and civil in all its social
relations with those under it and yet retain its racial supremacy
and social position, and win the respect and submission of the ruled
race. If ordinary civil duties require good breeding and good manners,
the duties of the Spanish officer toward the native chiefs certainly
demanded the highest qualities of a gentleman and the most sympathetic,
upright, and firm disposition possible. Many Spanish officers possessed
these qualities and conducted their offices with full dignity and
credit, but it can not be said that all officers were so fully
qualified. Such facts in themselves are sufficient to determine the
quality of the person to whom state affairs in Sulu should be trusted.

Further, the reform of a nation can never be fully accomplished without
the aid of her chiefs and leaders. The coöperation of the natives is a
very potent factor for good, and a system of government which aims at
the elevation of a conquered nation must find a place in its machinery
for the activities of natives of ability and influence. Hence the
necessity of successful coöperation with natives and the importance
of securing higher qualifications in men holding the highest offices
of government. The fewer such officers are and the abler they are,
the better and safer the result will be. Such men can overcome racial
prejudices and national sentiments and grievances and by the manner in
which they discharge their duties, they can command the approval and
respect of the ruled nation, gain its sympathies to the side of the
government, and maintain peace, prosperity, and good relations between
the governing and the governed nations. However, these results were
not obtained by Spain in Sulu. The religion and racial prejudices of
the two nations were never overcome and the Sulus maintained a feeling
of revulsion and distrust toward Spaniards and Christian Filipinos.

Great aid is rendered the government when the ruling race is competent
and resourceful enough to utilize the services of the ruled race and
at the same time give it sufficient space and latitude for the exercise
of its energies and the satisfaction of its ambitions. A most favorable
industrial relation can be maintained, if the capital of the sovereign
nation can find opportunities to invest in the conquered territory,
buy up its crude products, and promote its natural resources. The
natives then find work to do, increase in prosperity, and look upon
the existence of the ruling race as favorable for their development
and progress, but in case the subjugated nation is crowded out of its
territories and robbed of its resources by keen competition, greed,
or undue domination on the part of the ruling race, hostilities are
bound to arise and disaffection extends from industrial relations to
politics and may lead to trouble and rebellion.

Many Spaniards seemed to regard Sulu as a very desirable country for
colonization and offered many suggestions as to the most favorable
sites for factories, the best industries that could be developed,
and the best methods and means of exploitation. Several farms were
started in the vicinity of Jolo, but they were abandoned even before
the evacuation of the islands, and no effective step can be said to
have been taken by Spain to colonize Sulu except the building up of the
town of Jolo itself. This subject has therefore played no important
part in the policy exercised by Spain in Sulu and very little can be
said in this connection. It must, however, be stated that the lands
of the Archipelago of Sulu are extremely limited in area and should
have been reserved for the Sulus. Perfect disinterestedness should
have been exhibited by the Spaniards in this regard. [225]







APPENDIXES TO PART II


APPENDIX I

THE PACIFICATION OF MINDANAO BY RONQUILLO


[Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, Dr. Antonio de Morga, Mexico,
1609.] [226]

Shortly after Don Francisco Tello had taken over the governorship,
news was brought of the death of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa in
Mindanao by Brother Gaspar Gomez of the Society of Jesus. The latter
brought the body for burial in the college of Manila, of which Don
Esteban was patron. Juan de la Xara wrote that he had charge of
affairs, that he had settled in Tampakan, [227] that he intended to
continue the pacification and conquest of the island as should seem
most advisable, and that reënforcements of men and other things should
be sent him. It was learned that he intended to make an ill use of
the government, and would not remain dependent on, and subordinate
to, the governor of the Philippines; and that he was depriving the
heirs of Esteban Rodriguez of what lawfully belonged to them. It
was learned that, in order to make himself safer in this respect,
he was sending his confidants to the town of Arévalo in Oton where
Don Esteban had left his wife, Doña Ana de Osseguera, and his two
small daughters, with his house and property, to persuade Doña Ana
to marry him. This resolution appeared injurious in many respects,
and the attempt was made to rectify matters. But in order not to
disturb the affairs of Mindanao, the matter was left alone for the
present, until time should show the course to be followed. And so it
happened that when Juan de la Xara left the camp and settlements of
Mindanao, and came hurriedly to Oton to negotiate his marriage in
person--although the widow of Don Esteban had never been favorable
to it--Don Francisco Tello sent men to arrest him. He was brought to
Manila, where he died while his trial was being conducted.

After the imprisonment of Juan de la Xara, Don Francisco Tello
immediately sent Captain Toribio de Miranda to Mindanao, with orders to
take command of the camp and to govern until some one should agree
to continue the enterprise. When he arrived at Mindanao and the
soldiers saw that Juan de la Xara's schemes had been defeated, and
that the latter was a prisoner in Manila, with no hope of returning,
they obeyed Toribio de Miranda and the orders that he brought.

In Manila the governor was considering carefully the necessary
measures for continuing the war, since the island of Mindanao was so
near the other pacified islands, and the island itself contained some
provinces that professed peace and were apportioned as encomiendas
and had Spanish magistrates, such as the rivers of Butuan, Dapitan,
and Karaga, so that it was desirable to pacify the whole island and
subject it to His Majesty. The royal treasury was spent and could
not bear the expense; and Esteban Rodriguez had bound himself by a
legal writ to carry the war to entire completion at his own expense,
in accordance with the terms of his agreement. The guardian of his
children and heirs brought the matter before the court, and refused
to fulfill this obligation on account of Esteban Rodriguez's death. In
order not to lose time, for what had been commenced had to be continued
in one way or another, the governor decided to prosecute it, drawing
the necessary funds from the royal treasury, either on its own account
or on the account of Esteban Rodriguez's heirs, if such should be
according to law. The governor then searched for a person to go to
Mindanao, and selected Don Juan Ronquillo, general of the galleys. The
latter was given the necessary reënforcements of men and other things,
with which he reached Mindanao. He took command of the Spanish camp and
fleet which he found in Tampakan. He confirmed the peace and friendship
with the chiefs and people of Tampakan and Lumagan, restored and set
in better order the Spanish settlement and fort, and began to make
preparation for the war against the people of Bwayan. [228] He spent
many days in making a few incursions into their land and attacks on
their forts, but without any notable result, for the enemy were many
and all good soldiers, with plenty of arquebuses and artillery, and
had fortified themselves in a strong position. They had many other
fortifications inland and went from one to the other with impunity,
whenever they wished, and greatly harassed the Spaniards, who were
little used to so swampy a country. The latter found themselves short
of provisions without the possibility of getting them in the country
on account of the war, inasmuch as the camp contained many men,
both Spaniards and the native servants and boatmen, and it was not
easy at all times to come and go from one part to another in order
to provide necessities.

Meanwhile Don Juan Ronquillo, seeing that the war was advancing very
slowly and with little result, and that the camp was suffering, drew up
a report of it, and sent letters in all haste to Governor Don Francisco
Tello, informing him of the condition of affairs. He wrote that it
would be better to withdraw the camp from Mindanao River, so that
it might not perish; and that a presidio could be established on the
same island in the port of La Caldera, which could be left fortified,
in order not to abandon this enterprise entirely, and so that their
friends of Tampakan and Lumagan might be kept hostile to the people of
Bwayan. Meanwhile he and the rest of the camp and fleet would return
to Manila, if permitted, for which he requested the governor to send
him an order quickly. Upon the receipt of this dispatch, Governor Don
Francisco Tello resolved to order Don Juan Ronquillo, since the above
was so and the camp could not be maintained, nor the war continued
advantageously, to withdraw with his whole camp from Mindanao River. He
was first to make a great effort to chastise the enemy in Bwayan, and
then to burn the Spanish settlement and fort and go to La Caldera,
fortify it, and leave there a sufficient garrison with artillery,
boats, and provisions for its maintenance and service. Then he was
to return to Manila with the rest of his men, after telling their
friends in Tampakan that the Spaniards would shortly return to the
river better equipped and in great numbers.

Silonga [229] and other chiefs of Bwayan were not neglecting their
defense, since, among other measures taken, they had sent a chief
to Ternate to ask assistance against the Spaniards who had brought
war into their homes. Thereupon the King of Ternate dispatched a
numerous fleet of caracoas and other boats to Mindanao with cachils
[230] and valiant soldiers--more than 1,000 fighting men in all--and
a quantity of small artillery, in order to force the Spaniards to
break camp and depart, even could they do nothing else. When the news
reached Bwayan that this fleet was coming to their defense and support,
they made ready and prepared to attack the Spaniards, who also having
heard the same news were not careless. Consequently the latter turned
their attention more to the main fort, and reduced the number of men
in the smaller forts on Butil [231] River and other posts, mouths,
and arms of the same river. These served to strengthen the garrison of
the main fort and the armed galleys and other smaller craft, in order
to use the latter to resist the expected attack of the enemy. The
enemy having gallantly advanced to the very fort of the Spaniards
with all their vessels and men, attacked and stormed it with great
courage and resolution, in order to effect an entrance. The Spaniards
within resisted valiantly, and those outside in the galleys on the
river assisted them so effectively that together, with artillery and
arquebuses, and at times in close combat with swords and kampilan,
they made a great slaughter and havoc among the men of Ternate and
those of Bwayan, who were aiding the former. They killed and wounded a
great number of them and captured almost all the caracoas and vessels
of the enemy, so that very few boats escaped, and they were pursued
and burned by the Spaniards, who made many prisoners and seized immense
booty and many weapons from the enemy. As soon as possible after this,
the Spaniards turned against the settlements and forts of Bwayan where
some of their results were of so great moment that the enemy, seeing
themselves hard pressed and without anyone to help them, sent messages
and proposals of peace to Don Juan Ronquillo, which were ended by their
rendering recognition and homage, and the renewal of friendship with
the people of Tampakan, their ancient enemy. In order to strengthen
the friendship, they sealed it by the marriage of the greatest chief
and lord of Bwayan with the daughter of another chief of Tampakan,
called Dungunlibur. Thereupon the war was apparently completely ended,
provisions were now to be had, and the Spaniards with little precaution
crossed and went about the country wherever they wished. The people of
Bwayan promised to dismantle all their forts immediately, for that was
one of the conditions of peace. Then the Spaniards returned to their
fort and settlements at Tampakan, whence Don Juan Ronquillo immediately
sent dispatches to Governor Don Francisco Tello, informing him of the
different turn that the enterprise had taken. In view of the present
condition he requested the governor to issue new instructions as to
his procedure, saying that he would wait without making any change,
notwithstanding the arrival of the answer which he expected to his
first report, for conditions had now become so much better than before
that the governor's decision would be different.

The governor had already answered Don Juan Ronquillo's first dispatch,
as we have said above, when the second dispatch arrived with news
of the successes in Mindanao. Suspicious of the men in the camp who
had constantly shown a desire to return to Manila, and little relish
for the hardships of war, and fearing lest they would return at the
arrival of the first order, executing that order and abandoning the
enterprise which had reached such a satisfactory stage; and thinking
that it would be unwise to abandon the river, the governor made haste
to send a second dispatch immediately by various roads, ordering them
to pay no attention to his first orders, but to remain in Mindanao, and
that he would soon send them what was necessary for further operations.

It seems that this message traveled slowly; for, the first having
arrived, they obeyed it without any further delay, and camp was
raised and the country abandoned. To their former enemy of Bwayan
they gave as a reason that the governor of Manila had summoned them;
and to their friends of Tampakan they said that they would leave
men in La Caldera for their security, and that assistance would be
sent them from Manila. This news caused as much sorrow and sadness
to the latter as joy to the people of Bwayan. Then, after burning
their fort and settlement, the Spaniards embarked all their forces as
soon as possible, left the river, and went to La Caldera, 24 leagues
farther down in the direction of Manila. Having entered port, they
built a fortress and left there a garrison of 100 Spaniards, with
some artillery, provisions, and boats for their use.

At this juncture the governor's second message to General Don Juan
Ronquillo arrived, to which the latter replied that he was already
in La Caldera, and could not return to the river. Then, without any
further delay, Don Juan Ronquillo went to Manila with the balance of
his fleet, by way of the Provinces of Oton and Panay. The governor,
having heard of his coming, sent to arrest him on the road before
he entered the city, and proceeded against him by law for having
withdrawn the camp and army from Mindanao River, without awaiting the
orders he should have expected after the favorable turn that affairs
had taken. Don Juan Ronquillo was set at liberty on showing a private
letter from the governor, which the latter had sent him separately
with the first instructions, to the effect that he should return
to Manila with his troops in any event, for they were needed in the
Islands for other purposes; and because of this letter Don Juan had
determined not to await the second order.






APPENDIX II

THE PACIFICATION OF MINDANAO [232]


[Concerning the pacification of the Island of Mindanao in the
year 1600.] [233]


In the relation of the last year you will have learned how occurred
the death, in the pacification of the Island of Mindanao, of Esteban
Rodriguez de Figueroa, who offered to carry out this pacification
under the conditions which he stipulated with Gomez Perez Dasmariñas,
formerly governor of these islands, copies of which were sent
to His Majesty and to Master-of-Camp Juan de Lajara, formerly of
the said expedition, who succeeded to his place when the camp was
abandoned, and came to Manila. Don Francisco Tello, Governor and
Captain-General of the said Philippine Islands, who at that time
had taken possession of the government, was considering how to aid
and stimulate the said pacification at the expense of the heirs
of Esteban Rodriguez, and with the agreement of the captains and
persons who were long resident and experienced in war in the said
islands. Don Juan Ronquillo was appointed commander of the galleys
to prosecute the said pacification, and in the meantime, in order to
be present and continue the expedition, Capt. Toribio de Miranda was
sent forward to encourage and animate the troops, under orders to
keep them in his charge; and in case the post should be abandoned,
and a retreat made to Manila, he should detain the troops and return
to Mindanao. The said Capt. Toribio de Miranda having arrived at the
Island [234] of La Caldera, which lies 40 leagues from the river of
Mindanao, there found the whole camp, which was returning from the said
islands. Conformably to the orders which he had, he turned back and
fortified the site where they had first been, which was on the river,
4 leagues from the forts of the enemy. Juan Ronquillo, having been
dispatched to Mindanao, had taken the camp in his charge, and begun
to achieve some success. He achieved a victory in the battle which he
fought with the Ternatans, who had entered with 800 men to give aid
to the people of Mindanao. Before these successes, he had written a
letter in disparagement of that country (a copy of which was sent to
His Majesty), on account of which, in a council of war which had been
held, the General Don Ronquillo had been ordered to make a last effort
against the Mindanaos, doing them all possible damage. He was then to
come to the Island [235] of La Caldera and there build a fort, to be
garrisoned with a hundred Spanish soldiers, with artillery, arms, and
munitions, and leave them there as a check upon Ternate and Mindanao,
in charge of a good soldier, one of the captains of the camp, and
with the rest return to Manila. Although Don Juan Ronquillo received
this order, after having won considerable victories, he again wrote
that he would not abandon that place, even if such were the order,
because it would not be expedient to retire from the camp and comply
with what had been ordered, when he was leaving the Island of Mindanao
already pacified, the chiefs, with whom he had used gentle means, that
they might all be more contented, having again rendered submission to
His Majesty, and likewise as the King of Sulu again rendered obedience
and submission. Confiding in this, Capt. Cristobal Villagra, whom Don
Juan Ronquillo had appointed commander of the garrison of La Caldera,
had sent 30 soldiers to the Island of Sulu for supplies. They found at
this time in Jolo a Mindanao chief, an uncle of the King of Mindanao
and a brother-in-law of the King of Sulu, who had been driven out
of Mindanao because he was rebellious. He treacherously killed 13
Spanish soldiers. When news of this was brought, Juan Pacho was
sent to take the troops of La Caldera in charge, and, when it should
seem best to him, to try to inflict punishment with 600 Spaniards;
the enemy unfortunately killed the said Juan Pacho and 29 Spaniards,
the rest of them retiring without any success. This news having come
to the governor, he sent in place of Juan Pacho, Capt. Toribio de
Miranda, a person in whom he had entire confidence, with an order not
to attempt any punishment until he had force enough for it. After
this Capt. Toribio de Miranda arrived at La Caldera on the 26th of
August, 1599. When the garrison was given into his charge he put
the defensive works in order, and with the arms which he brought,
and those which he found in the fort, he armed all the troops,
amounting to 114 soldiers. As directed by an order of the governor,
he sent a chief of the Pintados [Bisayans] to Mindanao with letters to
the chiefs of the island, in which he informed them that they would be
protected, favored, and upheld in justice, as vassals of His Majesty,
and that with this object a garrison had been placed in La Caldera;
and that to aid in maintaining it, and in covering the expenses which
they had caused in the war by their disobedience, the largest possible
quantity of tributes would be collected for His Majesty, and that he
would send for them shortly, which had not been done earlier because
the Mindanaos had been so spent and afflicted. Having arrived on the
2d of September at the river of Mindanao, and delivered his dispatch,
this chief was well received, and found the people in the settled
state in which Gen. Don Juan Ronquillo had left them. Raja Muda,
the main chief of Mindanao, in the name of them all, sent him back
on the 15th of the said month, offering to give to His Majesty all
the tribute which they could collect.

At this time news from the chief captain of Malacca having reached the
governor, to the effect that in the Sunda, [236] 150 leagues from that
port, there had been seen a number of English ships, whose designs were
not known; and, a little later, word from the commander of the fort of
Maluco that there were at Ternate, within the port, two English ships
with 400 men and 50 pieces of artillery; a council of war was held
as to what was best to do. The said council decided to withdraw the
garrison from La Caldera to Cebu, so that the enemy should not take
that place; and, if they should attempt to do damage to that province,
they would find it in a state of defense. Accordingly an order was
sent to Capt. Toribio de Miranda to withdraw with the troops, arms,
artillery, and munitions, dismantling the fort; he was also told that
he could return shortly to the island; with more troops and arms, in
order to assist in its defense. On the 9th of September Capt. Toribio
de Miranda arrived at Cebu, with all the troops, artillery, arms,
and munitions; and at the same time Gen. Don Juan Tello arrived at
Cebu with a hundred men, who came as reënforcement from the city
of Manila. Having spent six months there and commenced to build a
fort of stone, the governor, as they had no more news of the English
referred to, sent an order to the said Don Juan to come to the city
of Manila--which he did with the hundred men. leaving the Province
of Cebu in a prosperous condition, with the troops which are usually
kept there, and those of the garrison of La Caldera, which in all
amounted to 250 Spaniards.

After all this, in June of 1600, the governor received news, by way
of Malacca, that the ships which had passed to the South Sea belonged
to Dutch merchants, who had come to load with spices in the Maluco
Islands. Having transacted their business, they had returned to their
own country by way of India, without doing any damage to the islands
of the west; it therefore seems that we are safe, notwithstanding
the news received of those enemies.






APPENDIX III

THE MORO RAIDS OF 1599 AND 1600


[Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, Dr. Antonio de Morga, Mexico,
1609.] [237]


The Spanish garrison left in La Caldera, at the withdrawal of Don
Ronquillo's camp from the river of Mindanao, passed into command
of Captain Villagra at the death of Capt. Juan Pacho in Jolo, and
was suffering for lack of provisions; for neither the people of the
river could give them to the Spaniards, nor would the Sulus furnish
any on account of the war declared upon them. Therefore the garrison
urgently requested Governor Don Francisco Tello either to aid their
presidio with provisions, soldiers, and ammunition, or to allow them
to retire to Manila--a thing of which they were most desirous--since
there they gained no other special result than that of famine, and
of incarceration in that fort, and of no place wherein to seek their
sustenance. The governor, in view of their insistence in the matter,
and having but little money in the royal exchequer, with which to
provide for and maintain the said presidio and for the same reason
the punishment that was to be inflicted upon the Sulus for their
outrages upon the Spaniards, and their insurrection was deferred--and
thinking that the return to Mindanao matters would be a long question,
he was inclined to excuse the difficulty and anxiety of maintaining the
presidio of La Caldera. In order to do it with a reasonable excuse he
consulted the Audiencia and other intelligent persons, and requested
them to give him their opinion. But he first communicated his wishes
to them and gave them some reasons with which he tried to persuade
them to give him the answer that he desired. The Audiencia advised him
not to remove or raise the garrison of La Caldera, but to reënforce
and maintain it, and to attend to the affairs of Sulu and the river
of Mindanao as soon as possible, even if what was necessary for those
two places should be withdrawn from some other section. They said that
this was the most urgent need, and the one which required the greatest
attention in the islands, both in order to pacify those provinces and
to keep them curbed; lest, seeing the Spaniards totally withdrawn,
they should gain courage and boldly venture still farther and come
down to make captures among the Pintados [Bisayans] and carry the
war to the very doors of the Spaniards. Notwithstanding this reply
the governor resolved to raise and withdraw the garrison, and sent
orders to Captain Villagra immediately to burn the fort which had
been built in La Caldera, to withdraw with all his men and ships,
and return to Manila. This was quickly done, for the captain and the
soldiers of the garrison waited for nothing more than to dismantle
the fort and leave. When the Sulus saw the Spaniards abandoning the
country, they were persuaded that the latter would return to Mindanao
no more, and that they had not sufficient forces to do so. Thereupon
they gained fresh resolution and courage, and united with the people
of Bwayan on the river, and equipped a number of caracoas and other
craft, in order to descend upon the coast of Pintados (Bisayas)
to plunder them and make captives. The people of Tampakan, who
lost hope of receiving further help from the Spaniards, and of the
latter's return to the river, since they had also abandoned the fort
of La Caldera and left the country, came to terms with and joined
the people of Bwayan, their neighbors, in order to avoid the war and
injuries that they were suffering from the latter. Then all turned
their arms against the Spaniards, promising themselves to make many
incursions into their territory and gain much plunder. Accordingly
they prepared their fleet and appointed as leaders and commanders of
it two of the experienced chiefs of the river of Mindanao, called
Sali and Silungan. [238] They left the Mindanao River in the month
of July of the year 1599, in the season of the vendabals, [239]
with 50 caracoas, containing more than 3,000 soldiers armed with
arquebuses, kampilan, carasas, [240] other weapons with handles, and
many culverins, and steered toward the islands of Oton and Panay, and
neighboring islands. They passed Negros Island and went to the river
of Panay, which they ascended for 5 leagues to the chief settlement,
where the alcalde-mayor and some Spaniards were living. They sacked
the settlement, burned the houses and churches, captured many native
Christians--men, women, and children--upon whom they committed many
murders, cruelties, and outrages. They pursued these in boats more
than 10 leagues up the river, and destroyed all the crops. For the
alcalde-mayor, and those who could, fled inland among the mountains,
and accordingly the enemy had a better opportunity to do what they
pleased. After they had burned all the vessels in the river, they
left the river of Panay with their boats laden with pillaged goods
and captive Christians. They did the same in the other islands and
towns which they passed. Then they returned to Mindanao, without
any opposition being offered, with a quantity of gold and goods and
more than 800 captives, besides the people whom they had killed. In
Mindanao they divided the spoil, and agreed to get ready a larger
fleet for the next year, and return to make war better prepared. [241]

This daring attack of the Mindanaos worked great injury to the Pintado
Islands [Bisayas], both on account of their deeds there and also on
account of the fear and terror with which they inspired the natives;
because of the latter being in the power of the Spaniards, who kept
them subject, tributary, and disarmed, and neither protected them from
their enemies, nor left them the means to defend themselves, as they
used to do when there were no Spaniards in the country. Therefore many
towns of peaceful and subjected Indians revolted and withdrew to the
tingues, [242] and refused to descend to their houses, magistrates,
and encomenderos. [243] As was reported daily, they all had a great
desire to revolt and rebel, but they were appeased and reduced
again to subjection by a few promises and presents from their
encomenderos and religious who showed great pity and sadness over
their injuries. Although in Manila people regretted these injuries,
and still more those which were expected in the future from the enemy,
they did nothing but regret them--since the governor was ill provided
with ships and other necessities for the defense--and reckon them
with the loss which they had suffered for having raised the camp on
the river of Mindanao and dismantled the presidio of La Caldera.

As soon as the weather permitted, the Mindanaos and Sulus returned
with a large fleet of more than 70 well-equipped ships and more than
4,000 fighting men, led by the same Silungan and Sali, and other
Mindanao and Sulu chiefs, to the same Islands of Pintados [Bisayas],
with the determination of taking and sacking the Spanish town of
Arévalo, which is situated in Oton. Capt. Juan García de Sierra,
alcalde mayor of that province, having heard of this expedition and
of the designs entertained by the enemy, took the most necessary
precautions, and gathering into the town all the Spaniards who
lived there and in its neighborhood, shut himself up in it with
all of them. Then, having repaired, as well as possible, a wooden
fort there, he gathered there the women and their possessions. He
and the Spaniards--about 70 men--armed with arquebuses, awaited the
enemy. The latter, who intended to attack the river of Panay again,
passed Negros Island and made for the town of Arévalo, where they
anchored close to the native settlement. Then they landed 1,500 men
armed with arquebuses, kampilan, and carasas, and, without stopping
on the way marched against the Spanish town which was the object of
their attack. The Spaniards, divided into troops, sallied forth and
opened fire with their arquebuses upon the enemy with such vehemence
that they forced them to retreat and take refuge on board their
caracoas. So great was the enemy's confusion that many Mindanaos
were killed before they could embark. Capt. Juan García de Sierra,
who was on horseback, pursued the enemy so closely to the water's edge
that the latter cut off the legs of his mount with their kampilan and
brought him to the ground, where they killed him. The enemy embarked
with a heavy loss of men, and halted at the Island of Gimarás, [244]
in sight of Arévalo. There they counted their men, including the dead
and the wounded, who were not a few, and among whom was one of the
most noted chiefs and leaders. Then they sailed for Mindanao, making
a great show of grief and sorrow, and sounding their bells [245]
and tifas. [246] They made no further delay at Pintados [Bisayas],
deriving little profit or gain from the expedition but much injury,
and loss of men and reputation, which was felt more deeply upon their
arrival in Sulu and Mindanao. In order to remedy this disaster, it
was proposed to renew their expedition against the Pintados at the
first monsoon with more ships and men, and it was so decided.






APPENDIX IV

GALLINATO'S EXPEDITION TO JOLO


[Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, Dr. Antonio de Morga, Mexico,
1609.] [247]


The daring and audacity of the Mindanaos and Sulus in making incursions
with their fleets into the Islands of Pintados [Bisayas] had reached
such a state that it was now expected that they would come as far as
Manila, plundering and devastating. In order to check them, at the
beginning of the year 1602, Governor Don Francisco Tello, deriving
strength from weakness, determined that the expedition against Sulu
should be made at once, without more delay, in order to punish and
pacify it, with the forces and men whom Capt. and Sargento-mayor
Juan Xuarez Gallinato held in Cebu and in the Pintados [Bisayas]
together with more men, ships, and provisions, which were sent him,
accompanied by the necessary documents and instructions for him
to enter the island, chastise its king and inhabitants, and pacify
and reduce it to the obedience of his Majesty. By this means, until
there should be an opportunity to settle the affairs of Mindanao,
which is quite near Sulu, the audacity of the enemy would be checked;
and by bringing the war into his own country, he would not come out
to commit depredations. Captain Gallinato set out on this expedition
with 200 Spanish soldiers, ships, artillery, enough provisions for four
months--the time which it was thought the expedition would last--and
with Indians as rowers for the ships and for other services that might
arise. When he arrived at Sulu, at the bar of the river of this island,
which is 2 leagues from the principal town and dwellings of the king,
he landed his men, artillery, and the necessary provisions and left
his ships under a sufficient guard. The islanders were all in the town
and dwellings of the king, which are situated on a very high hill above
some cliffs, and have two roads of approach through paths and roads so
narrow that they can be reached only in single file. They had fortified
the whole place, intrenched it with palms and other woods and a number
of culverins. They had also collected provisions and water for their
sustenance, besides a supply of arquebuses and other weapons. They
had neither women nor children with them, for they had taken them out
of the island. They had requested aid from the people of Mindanao,
Bruney, and Ternate, and were awaiting the same, since they had been
informed of the fleet which was being prepared against them in the
Pintados [Bisayas]. Gallinato determined to pitch his camp near the
town before this aid should arrive, and to attack the fort. After he
had quartered himself at a distance of one-half league, in a plain
facing the ascent, he sent interpreters with messages to the king and
chiefs of the island, calling on them to surrender, and telling them
that good terms would be given them. While waiting for an answer,
he fortified his quarters in that spot, intrenching himself wherever
necessary. He mounted the artillery in the best position for use,
and kept his men ready for any emergency. A false and deceptive answer
was returned, making excuses for the excesses that had been committed,
and for not complying just then with what had been asked of them, and
making loud promises to do so later. All this was with the object of
detaining the captain in that place, which is very unhealthy, until the
rains should set in, his provisions run short, and the arrival of the
expected aid. After this answer had been received the Sulus, thinking
that the Spaniards had become more careless on account of it, swarmed
down quickly from the said fort in a large body of probably somewhat
over one thousand; and armed with arquebuses and other weapons with
handles, kampilan, and caraças, attacked and assaulted the quarters
and camp of the Spaniards. This could not be done so secretly as not
to be seen by the Spaniards and allow them opportunity to prepare
to receive the Sulus before their arrival. This the Spaniards did,
and having permitted the natives to come all together in a body to
the very inside of the quarters and trenches, as soon as the Sulus
had discharged their arquebuses the Spaniards opened fire upon them,
first with their artillery, and then with their arquebuses, killing
many, and forcing the rest to retire in flight to the fort. The
Spaniards pursued them, wounding and killing to the middle of the
hill. But seeing that farther on the paths were so narrow and rough,
they retreated before the heavy artillery fire from the heights
and the large stones hurled down upon them and returned to their
quarters. Upon many other days efforts were made to reach the fort,
but without any result. Thereupon Gallinato, in consideration of the
war being prolonged beyond what had been expected, built two forts,
one where he kept his ships in order to defend them and the port;
and the other one-half league farther on in a suitable place where
they could take refuge and communicate with the camp. The forts were
built of wood and fascines and fortified with the artillery from the
ships. The Spaniards shut themselves up in these forts, whence from
time to time they sallied, making incursions as far as the enemy's
fort. The latter always remained shut up in their fort without ever
choosing to come down or to yield; for he was convinced that the
Spaniards could not remain long in the island. When Gallinato saw that
the rains were fast setting in, that his men were becoming ill, and
that his provisions were failing without his having accomplished the
desired task, and that it could not be accomplished with his remaining
resources, and that the enemy from Mindanao with other allies of theirs
were boasting that they were gathering a large fleet in order to drive
the Spaniards from Jolo, he sent news of all that had occurred to the
governor of Manila, with a plan of the island and fort and a relation
of the difficulties which the enterprise presented. He sent this in a
vessel, by Capt. and Sargento-mayor Pedro Cotelo de Morales, toward the
end of May of the year 1602, in order to obtain instructions as to his
procedure, and the necessary reënforcement of men and provisions. The
captain was charged to return quickly with the answer. * * *

At the same time that Governor Don Pedro de Acuña entered upon
his administration, the captain and sargento-mayor, Pedro Cotelo
de Morales, arrived from Jolo with the advices and report of Juan
Xuarez Gallinato concerning the state of affairs in that island,
whither he had gone with the fleet at the beginning of that same
year. The governor, on account of the importance of the matter,
wished to make every effort possible, and determined to send him
supplies and a reënforcement of some men, which he did as soon as
possible. He was ordered to at least make an effort to punish that
enemy, even if he could do nothing more, and whenever the opportunity
presented itself, to go to do the same thing in the river of Mindanao,
and return to the Pintados [Bisayas]. When this commission reached
Jolo Gallinato was already so worn out, and his men so ill, that the
reënforcements only made it possible for him to get away from there;
accordingly without seeing to another thing, he broke camp, burned the
forts which he had built, embarked, and went to Pintados, leaving the
people of that Island of Sulu and their neighbors, those of Mindanao,
emboldened more than ever to make raids against the Pintados, and
the islands within, which they did.

The governor, without delaying any longer in Manila, hastily started
for the Island of Panay and the town of Arévalo, in a galliot and
other small vessels, to see their needs with his own eyes, in order to
provide for them. He left war matters in Manila, during his absence, in
charge of Licentiate Don Antonio de Ribera, auditor of the Audiencia.

As soon as the governor left Manila, the auditor had plenty to look
after, because a squadron of 20 caracoas and other vessels from
Mindanao entered the islands as far as the Island of Luzon and its
coasts, making captures. Having taken some ships bound from Cebu
to Manila, they captured 10 Spaniards in them, among them a woman
and a priest and Capt. Martin de Mandia, and they took them off with
them. They entered Calilaya, burned the church and all the town, and
captured many persons of all classes among the natives. Thence they
passed to the town of Balayan to do the same, but the auditor, having
received news of the enemy in Manila, had it already in a state of
defense with 50 Spaniards and a captain and some vessels. Consequently,
they did not dare to enter the town or its bay, but crossed over
to Mindoro, where, in the principal town, they captured many men,
women, and children among the natives, seizing their gold and
possessions, and burning their houses and church, where they captured
the prebendary Corral, curate of that doctrina. They filled their
own ships, and others which they seized there, with captives, gold,
and property, staying in the port of Mindoro as leisurely as though
in their own land, notwithstanding that it is but 24 leagues from
Manila. Capt. Martin de Mendia, prisoner of these pirates, offered,
for himself and the other Spanish captives that, if they would let
him go to Manila, he would get the ransom for all, and would take
it, or would send it within six months, to the river of Mindanao,
or otherwise he would return to their power. The chief in command of
the fleet agreed thereto, with certain provisions and conditions,
and caused the other captives to write to the effect that what had
been agreed upon might be fulfilled, and then he allowed the captain
to leave the fleet. The latter came to the city, and upon receiving his
report, the auditor sent munitions, ships, and more men to Balayan than
there were there already, with orders to go in pursuit of the enemy
without delay, saying that they would find him in Mindoro. Capt. Gaspar
Perez, who had charge of this in Balayan, did not start so quickly as
he should have done in order to find the enemy in Mindoro, for when
he arrived he found that he had left that port six days before, laden
with ships and booty, to return to Mindanao. Then he went in pursuit
of him, although somewhat slowly. The enemy put into the river of a
little uninhabited island to get water and wood. Just at that time
Governor Don Pedro de Acuña, who was hastily returning to Manila,
from the town of Arevalo, where he had learned of the incursion of
those pirates, passed. He passed so near the mouth of the river, in
two small champanes [248] and a virrey, [248] with very few men, that
it was a wonder that he was not seen and captured by the enemy. He
learned that the enemy was there, from a boat of natives which was
escaping therefrom, and then he met Gaspar Perez going in search of
the enemy with twelve vessels--caracoas and virreys and some large
champanes. The governor made him make more haste and gave him some
of his own men to guide him to where he had left the pirates the day
before, whereupon they went to attack them. But the latter espied
the fleet through their sentinels whom they had already stationed in
the sea, outside the river. Accordingly they left the river in haste,
and took to flight, throwing into the sea goods and slaves in order
to flee more lightly. Their flagship and almiranta caracoas protected
the ships which were dropping behind and made them throw overboard what
they could and work with all the strength of their paddles, assisted by
their sails. The Spanish fleet, the vessels of which were not so light,
could not put forth enough strength to overtake all of them, because,
furthermore, they went into the open without fear of the heavy seas
which were running, inasmuch as they were fleeing. Yet some of the
ships of Capt. Gaspar Perez, being lighter, got the enemy's fleet,
sunk some caracoas, and captured two, but the rest escaped, although
with great danger of being lost. Without accomplishing anything else,
the fleet returned to Manila where the governor had already entered,
very much disturbed that things should have come to such a pass that
these enemies, who had never dared to leave their houses, should have
been so daring and bold as to come to the very gates of the city,
doing great damage and making captures.






APPENDIX V

OLASO'S EXPEDITION IN 1629 [249]


[Relation of events in the Philippine Islands and other surrounding
regions, from the month of July, 1629, until that of 1630.] [250]


I shall commence the affairs of these islands with the expedition to
Jolo. It is an island of the Archipelago, rebellious for years past,
and its natives, who are Mohammedans, have made a thousand incursions
against us in these islands, pillaging whenever opportunity arises,
burning villages and churches, and capturing numerous people.

In order to remedy all these evils, Governor Don Juan Niño de Tabora
determined to equip a powerful fleet in order to destroy that enemy and
conquer a stronghold which nature has made in their island so lofty
and so difficult of approach that there is no better stone castle,
for the approach to it is by one path, and it has some artillery
which defends it. The people are courageous and warlike. For our
fleet were collected 1 galley, 3 brigantines, 12 freight champanes
(which are like small pataches) [251] and about 50 caracoas. The last
named are the usual craft of these islands, and generally have thirty
or forty oars on a side. All these vessels together carried about 400
Spaniards and 2,500 Indians, and they had considerable apparatus and
war supplies. It was quite sufficient for another conquest of greater
importance than the one on which they were going.

All that fleet departed, then, from the port of Dapitan on March
17. Dapitan is the port nearest to the enemy, and the Island of Sulu
was reached in [blank space in the Ventura del Arco MS.] days. At
dawn our men were landed, and began the ascent to the stronghold. The
master-of-camp, Don Lorenzo de Olaso, who was commander in chief
of the fleet, preceded the men. The Sulus defended their stronghold
with valor. They killed some of our men and wounded eight, among them
the master-of-camp himself. He was overthrown, as if dead, and went
rolling down the hill. However, he was not dead, but only wounded,
nothing more. Our men retired on the run, and to speak plainly, such
terror entered into them that they did not dare to attack again. They
skirted the island in their craft, entered the villages, burned,
wrecked, destroyed them, and killed a few people. They brought back
some captives with them whom the Sulus had taken from us. A violent
storm overtook them, which compelled them to weigh anchor, and they
retired stealthily. Thus so powerful a fleet as that was lost. It was
such a fleet that never has one like it been made for the Indies in
these islands. The Sulu enemy were left triumphant, and so insolent
that we fear that they will make an end of the Islands of the Pintados
[Bisayas] which are the nearest ones to them, and which they infest
and pillage with great facility.






APPENDIX VI

CORCUERA'S CAMPAIGN IN JOLO [252]


In my last letter I wrote to your Reverence of the result of the first
attack, which was unfortunate, because the Moros repulsed us, as I told
your Reverence. Not less unfortunate will be the news that I shall
now relate, [253] which it is yet necessary for me to tell, in order
to fulfil my duty and to remove the clouds arising from rumors and
letters that will go there. I am here and see everything; and there is
never a lack of those who tell many new things and exaggerate matters
that are not so great as they will relate and descant there, where
no one can report and declare what has happened. It is as follows:

Since that attack, we have made two others. The first was with five
mines which we had made, with which we expected to blow up a great
part of those walls. All of the mines were fired, and thinking that
they would cause the same effects as the others our men retired
farther than they ought to have done. Four of the mines exploded,
and did not a little damage among the enemy. They, full of fear,
fled down from their position; but, as the mines did not make the
noise that we expected, we did not, accordingly, get there in time,
as we were quite distant because of our fear lest the mines do us
harm. The Moros retook their position, so that we were repulsed this
time, as we had been the other, with the death of a captain, while some
men were wounded. The fifth mine was left, and did not explode that
time. Hence its mouth was looked for, and having found it, we tried
two days after that to make another assault. The assault was made after
the mine had exploded. That mine was larger than the others had been,
and caused much damage. But the Moros fortified themselves again,
with greater strength than they had the last two times, and defended
themselves in their trenches, which had been fortified with many
stockades and terrepleins, so that we could not enter. We lost some
soldiers on that occasion, who tried to show that they were bold and
valiant. Among them was the sargento-mayor, Melon, who was struck by
a ball which passed through him and carried him off in two days. May
God rest his soul! Thereupon, we retired to our posts and endeavored
to collect our men and carry away the wounded, who were many. We
have lost four captains of renown in these three assaults--namely,
Captain Pimienta, Captain Juan Nicolas, Captain Don Pedro de Mena, and
Sargento-mayor Gonzales de Caseres Melon. Besides these three assaults,
another misfortune happened to us on St. Matthew's day, which was as
follows: Captain Rafael Ome, going with forty-six men and two hundred
Indians to make a garo [254] (as we say here), and having taken up
quarters in a field, where there was a fortified house, arranged
his posts at intervals and ordered his men to be on their guard. But
since man proposes and God disposes, the posts were either careless,
or God ordained it thus; for suddenly the enemy rushed upon our men,
who could not unite, as they were by that time scattered through the
forest. The enemy, having caught them off their guard, made a pastime
of it, killing twenty-six men, and carrying off arms, powder, balls and
fuses. I regard that event as the greatest of all our losses. Among
those of our men killed there by the enemy was Captain Lopez Suarez,
a fine soldier. Our men were not disheartened by these reverses,
except such and such men. The governor well sustains the undertaking
with [all his powers of] mind and body. He has surrounded the entire
hill with a stockade and a ditch, and has sown the ground with sharp
stakes so that the enemy may neither receive aid nor sally out from
it. At intervals there are sentry-posts and towers, so close that they
almost touch. There were six barracks along it, so that if any tower
should be in need the soldiers in them could go to its defense. Some
of them have six men, others four, and those which have least three
men, as a guard. The enclosure is one league long and surrounds the
hill. I do not know which causes the more wonder, the fort of the
Moros or the enclosure of the Spaniards which restrains the Moros,
so that they issue but seldom, and then at their peril. We are day
by day making gradual advances. Today a rampart was completed which
is just even with their stockades, so that we shall command the hill
equally [with the enemy]. God helping, I hope that we shall reduce
their trenches, and then we shall advance from better to better. May
God aid us; and si Dominus a custodierit civitatem frustra vigilat qui
custodit eam. [255] Father, prayers and many of them are needed. Will
your Reverence have them said in your holy college, and excuse me and
all of us for what we can not do. I forward this letter, [hoping] for
its good fortune in the holy sacrifices of your Reverence, etc. Jolo,
March 31, 1638. To the father-prior of Manila.



PAX CHRISTI, ETC.

I would like to be the bearer of this letter, and to fulfil my desires
of seeing your Reverence and all the fathers and brothers of your
Reverence's holy college. That is a proposition for which credit
may be given me, but the time gives space only to suffer; and thus
do we have to accommodate ourselves to it, and to check our desires,
drawing strength from weakness. I must content myself with writing,
which would be a pleasant task, if I could do it at my leisure, and not
so hastily as I have made known in certain letters that I have sent
to your Reverence--not losing or neglecting any occasion at which I
could write. And so that this opportunity should not pass without a
letter from me, I have hastened my pen beyond my usual custom, and
have written very concisely and briefly--although I could write at
greater length, and give account of many things which I leave for a
better occasion. That will be when it is the Lord's pleasure for us
to see each other. Moreover, I have no pleasant news to write, since
that which I could write would all be to the effect that we have not
gained this enchanted hill; and that, at the times when we have tempted
fortune, we have retired with loss of some men and many wounded.

Continuing, then, in the same style as the last letter, I declare
that since the first assault, in which we were driven back with the
loss of Captain Don Pedro Mena Pando, Adjutant Oliva, and Alférez
Trigita, we have made two other assaults. One was on the twenty-fourth
of March, the eve of our Lady of the Assumption. The second was on
the twenty-eighth of the same month. In the first, we trusted to the
mines that had been made, by means of which we expected to make a safe
entrance. We would have made it had our fear of receiving harm from
them matched the little fear of the enemy--who, as barbarians, did not
prepare for flight, although they knew our designs. Of the five mines,
four blew up; and as was seen, and as we afterward learned here from
some captives, there was a great loss to the enemy. As soon as they
saw the fire, they took to flight; but our men, being at a distance,
could not come up to seize the posts that the enemy abandoned,
until very late. That gave the Moros time to take precautions, so
that when we had come up, it was impossible to gain a single thing
which the mines had given us. On that occasion both sides fought very
valiantly. The wounded on our side were not many, and our dead even
fewer; among the later was Captain Pimienta. We were forced to return
to our posts without having gained more than the damage wrought by
the mines. The loss of those people was considerable, while not few
of them perished because of the severity of our fire. But with the
opportunity of the fifth mine which remained (which could not have
its effect, because the fire-channel of the others choked it), the
third attack was made inside of two days, by first setting fire to
that mine, and by arranging the men better than on the day of the
previous assault. They were set in array by the governor, who in
person came up to these quarters on that occasion. They set fire to
the mine, and more was accomplished than on the preceding days. Many
of the enemy were killed; but, as the entrance was so deeply recessed,
it could not be forced so freely by us, for the Moros were able to
defend it from us, with so great valor that we could not take it. Our
men fought with so great spirit and courage that it was necessary for
the leaders to use force with them in order to get the men to retire,
when they saw the so superior force of the enemy. On that occasion
they killed seven of our men, besides wounding many. Among the latter
was Sargento-mayor Melon, who was shot through the lung by a ball. He
died on the second day, to the grief of all this army. Thereupon his
Lordship made his men retire to their quarters, and commanded that the
fort should not be attacked, but that they should proceed to gain it by
the complete blockade of the enemy, as we are doing. By this method,
I think that we shall make an entrance into the fort. Already we
have one bulwark, which we have made level with their entrenchments;
and we are raising our works one and one-half varas [256] above them,
so that we are dislodging them with our artillery. They are retiring
to the interior of their fort. By this means we hope to gain entrance
into all their forts; and, once masters of them, I trust by God's
help that we shall conquer their stronghold, and that they will humble
themselves to obey God and the king.

Before those assaults, on St. Matthew's day, Captain Raphael Ome went
out to make a garo, as they say here, and to overrun the country. In
this island the level country is heavily wooded as nearly all of it is
mountainous. He took in his company about fifty men (i.e., Spaniards)
and two hundred Karaga Indians. The captain reached a field, and having
lodged in a fortified house, such as nearly all those houses are
(for those Indians of the mountain, who are called Guimennos, [257]
build them for their defense), he placed his sentries and seized the
positions that he judged most dangerous. But since non est volentis
neque currentis, etc., either because of the great multitude and the
wiliness of the enemy, or (as is more certain) because the sentries
were careless, and the other men asleep, the enemy came suddenly and
attacked our soldiers--with so great fury that they killed twenty-six
men, among whom was Captain Lopez Suarez, a brave soldier. The leader
and captain, Ome, was in great danger. He fought in person with so
great valor that, although run through with a spear, he attacked and
defeated his opponent, laying him dead at his feet. Few of our men
aided him, and many of them retreated immediately, thus allowing
the enemy to capture from us twenty firearms, with fuses, powder,
and balls. That was a great loss, and it is certain that we have not
hitherto had a greater. And if any loss has occurred, it has been
due to the neglect and confidence of the Spaniard.

Today two Basilan Indians came down from the hill to ask for mercy,
and for passage to their own country. They say that they are sent by
the datus in the stronghold who came from that island of Basilan or
Tagima; and that, if permission and pardon were given to them by the
pari [i.e., Corcuera], one hundred and thirty of them would come down
in the morning. We regard this as a trick of that Moro; and, although
it may be as they say, we are taking precautions, and are watching for
whatever may happen. If they should come, they will be well received;
and that will not be a bad beginning to induce others to come from
the hill. I shall advise your Reverence of such event on the first
occasion. What we know that they are suffering within [the fort] is
the disease of smallpox and discharges of blood, together with great
famine; because we have surrounded the entire hill with ditches and
stockades, set with sharp stakes, which run around it for more than
one and one-half leagues, and within musket-shot [of their fort] is a
sentry-post [garita] or tower in which three men and three Bantayas
are staying. By that means the enemy cannot enter or go out without
being seen; and, when they do that, they are given such a bombardment
that scarcely does any one dare to go outside of their walls. The
hill is a beautiful sight, and if it were enjoying holy peace instead
of war, it would be no small matter of entertainment and recreation
to survey the landscape at times. The Moro does not like to see us,
and is looking at us continually from his stronghold and yelling and
scoffing at us--as they say sometimes that the Spaniards are chickens;
again, that they are sibabuyes, [258] and again, that they will come
to set fire to us all, and kill us. The Moro is a great rascal and
buffoon. I trust in God that in a little while He will be ready for
our thanksgivings [for the defeat of the Moros]. Will your Reverence
urge His servants to aid us with their sacrifices and prayers. Those,
I believe, it will be that must give us the victory, and that must
humble the arrogance of this Mohammedan. His Lordship is displaying
great firmness and patience, as he is so great a soldier. Already has
he almost raised a stone fort on the beach, for he intends to leave
a presidio here, and I think that it will be almost finished before
he leaves. Nothing else occurs to me. Of whatever else may happen,
your Reverence will be advised on the first occasion. If I have gone
to considerable length in this letter, it is because I have known,
one day ahead, of the departure of this champan. I commend myself
many times to the holy sacrifices of your Reverence. This letter
will also serve for our father provincial, etc. Jolo, April 5, one
thousand six hundred and thirty-eight.

The Moro has returned today with a letter from the queen and all the
stronghold, in which they beg pardon and humiliate themselves. May
God grant it, and bring them to His knowledge. I shall advise you of
the result. I hear that Datu Ache is dead. If that is so, then the
end has come. Today, the sixth of the above month.



PAX CHRISTI.

Deo gratias qui dedit nobis victoriam per Jesum Christum Dominum
nostrum. [259] I have written your Reverence another letter, by way of
Oton, telling you that it was our Lord's pleasure to give us a joyous
Easter-tide, the beginning of what has happened. His Divine Majesty
has chosen to bestow upon us an overflowing blessing, by the reduction
of these Moros so that they should come, abased and humiliated, to
beg His governor for mercy; for, whether it was the latter's plan
to go to treat for peace at Basilan for their men, or whether they
should send them all, that they might see how the governor viewed their
petition, the following day they came with letters from the queen [260]
for Father Pedro Gutierrez and his Lordship. Therein she begged the
father to protect her, for she wished to come to throw herself at the
feet of the hari of Manila, and to beg his pardon for the obstinacy
that they had shown hitherto. The father answered for his Lordship,
in regard to the pardon, that if they agreed to do what was right,
they would be very gladly pardoned; but that in regard to their coming
it was not time, until they would humbly give up the arms which they
had taken from us, and the captives, vessels, and holy ornaments;
and that, even though the queen had so great authority, so long
as the king did not come, he must declare and show his willingness
to accept what the queen had written. Accordingly, the king wrote
to the same father and to his Lordship next day, begging the same
thing and more earnestly. But he was not allowed to come--which he
urgently entreated--until they should have given up the arms and
other things of which they robbed us. Difficulties arose over this
point, as to which of the two things was to be done first. The Moro
declared that he wished to treat first of the peace, and the points
on which they were to agree; and therefore it was necessary to see
the hari of Manila first of all. But Don Sebastian, as he was so
experienced in these matters of war (in which God has inspired him
with so wise resolutions, and given him even better results) held firm
to his proposals. Two days passed, but at last the king agreed to the
terms, by giving up the pieces of artillery which he had captured from
us. There were four iron pieces; and, in place of one which had burst,
one of bronze was requested, which many mines had buried. Afterward
we found the broken piece, by opening the mouth of one of the mines:
and he gave it to us willingly--saying that he had thus brought the
broken piece, and that he ought not for that reason to give another in
its place; and that which had been asked from him had been bought for
forty basines of gold at Makassar. In order that the Spaniards might
see what an earnest desire for a permanent peace was in his heart,
and that he was greatly inclined to it, he sent also some muskets,
although few and poor ones. In what pertained to the captives, he
said that he would surrender those that he had, but that he could not
persuade his datus to give up theirs; still he would ask them to give
their captives. At most, he sent eleven Christian captives, counting
men, women, and children. He had already spent the holy vessels, for,
since it was so long a time since they had been brought, he had sold
them to the king of Makassar; but he said that he and all his property
were there, to satisfy the Spaniards for any injury that they had
received. The king petitioned his Lordship to allow him to visit him;
and his Lordship granted such permission for Quasimodo Sunday.

The datus [sic] were very angry that the king was so liberal, and
because he humbled himself so deeply; accordingly, they opposed his
leaving the hill to talk with the governor. They tried to prevent it,
but the king overruled by the reasons which he gave to the datus, and
which father Gregorio Belin gave to him. His Lordship gave hostages
for the king, and ordered Captain Marquez and Captain Raphael Ome to
remain as such. They asked for Admiral Don Pedro de Almonte and two
fathers, but that was not granted to them. Finally they were satisfied
with the two said captains, persons of great esteem and worth; and the
king came down to talk with his Lordship, accompanied by many chief
men. His Lordship received him with such display as he could arrange at
short notice, under a canopy of damask, and seated on a velvet chair,
with a cushion of the same at his feet. Another cushion was placed
at his side upon a rug. As the king entered the hall, his Lordship
rose from his seat, and advancing two steps, embraced the Moro king;
then he made him sit down on the cushion that had been prepared. Then
his Lordship also seated himself beside the king in his chair, while
at his right side was his confessor, and at his left stood a captain
of the guard and the sargento-mayor. Grouped behind the confessor
were the fathers who were in the quarters on that occasion. There
were two Augustinian Recollects, and one Franciscan Recollect, and
a secular priest. Then came Father Gutierrez, and Father Gregorio
Belin. The king requested permission to rest a little first, for he
came, one of his servants fanning him (haciendole paypay), lifting
up from time to time the chinina which he wore--open in front,
in order to catch the breeze, and to enable him to shelter himself
from the heat, or to get rid of the fears with which he had come. His
chief men seated themselves after him on that open floor, a seat very
suitable for such nobility, who esteemed it as a great favor. Then when
the king was rested, or reassured from his fears, they began their
discourses or bicharas, talking, after the manner of these people,
by the medium of interpreters--namely, Father Juan de Sant Joseph,
an Augustinian Recollect, and Alférez Mathias de Marmolejo, both good
interpreters. The governor set forth his conditions. The agreement
made was: first, that the banners of the king, our sovereign, were
to be hoisted on the stronghold; second, that the men from Basilan
were to be permitted to leave the stronghold and go to their country;
third, that the Macassars and Malays were also to leave and return to
their own lands; and fourth, in order that the first condition might
be fulfilled without the rattle of arms and the shedding of blood,
all the enemy were to come down to our quarters, while the king and
queen and their family could come to that of the governor. The Moro
king did not like this last point; but, as he saw that matters were
ill disposed for his defense, he had to assent to everything. But,
before its execution, he begged his Lordship to communicate the
terms with his men and datus, saying that he would endeavor to get
them all to agree to the fulfilment of what his Lordship ordered;
and that in a day and a half he would reply and, in what pertained
to the other conditions, they would be immediately executed. This
happened, for the Basilans descended in two days with all their men
and families--in all, one hundred and forty-seven. Some fifty or sixty
did not then descend, as they were unable to do so. The Macassars
refused to descend until they received pardon from his Lordship,
and a passport to their own country. Therefore their captain came to
talk with his Lordship, who discussed with him what was to be done
with him and his men. The latter are very humble and compliant to
whatever his Lordship should order. His Lordship answered that he
would pardon their insolent and evil actions, and they could descend
with security of life; and that he would give them boats, so that they
could go away. Thereupon the captain, giving a kris as security that
they would come, returned, and immediately began to bring down his
property and men. The Malays came with them, for all those peoples
had united against the Castilians. They are the ones who have done
us most harm with their firearms, and have furnished quantities of
ammunition for all the firearms of the Sulus. At the end of the time
assigned to the king for answering his Lordship in regard to the
matters which he had discussed with him, he was summoned, in order
that what had been recently concluded might not be hindered, as his
Lordship had many matters to which to attend. If he would not come,
his Lordship was resolved immediately to continue his bombardment
and fortifications, saying that he would make slaves of all whom he
captured. With this resolution, the queen determined to come to visit
his Lordship; and, so saying and doing, she summoned her chair, and
had herself carried down to the quarters of Don Pedro de Almonte,
which is the one located on their hill, and which has given them
so much to do. She sent a message to the governor, begging him to
grant her permission, as she wished to see him. His Lordship sent a
message to her, to the effect that he would be very glad to see her,
and that she would be coming at a seasonable time. She came to the
hall borne on the shoulders of her men, accompanied by some of her
ladies and by her kasis, who was coming with pale face. She alighted
at the door of his Lordship's hall. He went out to receive her,
and with marked indications of friendship and kindness led her to
her seat, which was a cushion of purple velvet; and his Lordship,
seated in his own chair, welcomed her through his interpreter,
Alférez Mathias de Marmolexo. She responded very courteously to the
courtesies of the governor; for the Moro woman is very intelligent,
and of great capacity. She did not speak directly to the interpreters,
but through two of her men, one of whom was the kasis; and often he,
without the queen speaking, answered to what was proposed. The queen
petitioned and entreated the governor to desist from entering the
stronghold, for the women, being timid creatures, feared the soldiers
greatly. And if his Lordship was doing it to oblige her and the king
her husband to descend, she said that they would descend immediately,
with all their people. Thus did she entreat from him whom his Lordship
represented; and I desired that she should obtain this favor. His
Lordship answered her that he would do so very willingly; but that he
had an express mandate for it [i.e., to gain the fort] from his king,
and that, if he did not obey it, he would lose his head. "I do not
wish," said Tuan Baluka (for such is the name of the queen), "that
the favor which I petition be at so great a price and danger to your
Lordship. Consequently, will you kindly grant me three days? and in
that time I, the king, and our people will descend without fail." His
Lordship thanked her anew, and added that with this she obliged him
to fulfil strictly what he had promised her. "Indeed," said the queen,
"I have no doubt of it; for, being in the gaze of so many nations that
your Lordship has to conquer, it is clear that you must fulfil what
you have promised me; for your Lordship's actions toward me would
be understood by all to be those that you would have to perform
toward all." This terminated the discussion. His Lordship ordered
a collation to be spread for the queen and her ladies; and then his
Lordship retired, so that they might refresh themselves without any
embarrassment. Then, having dined, the queen returned to her stronghold
with the retinue that she had brought. Before she left the quarters
she was saluted by the discharge of two large pieces of artillery,
which had been made ready for that purpose. She was greatly pleased
by that, and the next day began to carry out her promises, by sending
down a portion of her possessions. The Makassars and Malays also
brought down their property with her, and immediately embarked. I
had written up to this point to this day, Saturday, the seventeenth
of this month of April, hoping for the end of all these incipient
results and expected events regarding this stronghold; the issue has
been such as we could expect from Him who has also been pleased to
arrange and bring it to pass. Last night the queen came down to sleep
in our camp or quarters, with some of her ladies. In the morning she
went to report her good treatment to her people; for she was received
with a salute of musketry and large artillery, and a fine repast. All
that has been done to oblige her to encourage her people, for they
were very fearful, to descend immediately. More than two thousand
have now descended, and our banners are flying on the hill, and our
men are fortified on it. May God be praised, to whom be a thousand
thanks given; for He, without our knowledge or our expectations, has
disposed this matter thus--blinding this Moro and disheartening him,
so that, having been defeated, he should surrender to our governor, and
give himself up without more bloodshed. We are trying to secure Datu
Ache; if we succeed in this, I shall advise you. Now there is nothing
more to say, reverend Father, except to give God the thanks, for He
is the one who has prepared and given this victory to us; and to beg
all in your Reverence's holy college to give thanks that the college
has had (as I am very certain) so great a share in the achievements
[here]. The governor is very much pleased and we all regard him in the
proper light. The men are full of courage, and even what was carefully
done is now improved. I am the humble servant of your Reverence whom
I pray that God may preserve as I desire, and to whose sacrifices I
earnestly commend myself. Jolo, April 17, 1638.--Juan de Barrios.

All the Sulus descended, in number about four thousand six hundred,
to the sea. Finding themselves down and outside the enclosure, they
all fled, under cover of a very heavy shower of rain--leaving all
their possessions, in order not to be hindered in their flight. Many
mothers even abandoned their little children. One abandoned to us a
little girl who had received a dagger-stroke, who received the waters
of baptism and immediately died. There is much to say about this, and
many thanks to give to God, of which we shall speak when it pleases
God to let us see each other. Today, the nineteenth of this month of
April, 1638.--Barrios.

The governor sent messages to the king and queen by two kasis,
asking why they had fled. They replied that since all their people
had fled, they had gone after them for very shame, but that they
would try to bring them back and to come, and this was the end of the
matter. The result was exceedingly profitable for our soldiers and
Indians; for the Sulus, fearful because they thought that, if they
became scattered, they would all be killed, abandoned whatever they
were carrying--quantities of goods, and chests of drawers--which our
soldiers sacked. Above, in the stronghold, they found much plunder. It
is believed that the king and queen will return, but not Datu Ache;
but this is not considered certain.



LETTER FROM SANBOANGAN [261]

PAX CHRISTI

I am not writing to anyone [else], for the lack of time does not allow
me to do so. Therefore will your Reverence please communicate this to
the father provincial, Father Hernandez Perez, Father Juan de Bueras,
and the father rector of Cavite.

When our men were most disheartened at seeing that the fortress on
the hill was so extensive, and that it was becoming stronger daily;
that the mines and artillery had seemingly made no impression on it;
that we had been repulsed four times; and that our men were falling
sick very rapidly: in order that it might be very evident that it
was [all] the work of God, ambassadors came from the hill to beg his
Lordship for mercy. He received them gladly, and asked them for the
artillery that they had plundered from the Christians, etc. They
brought down four pieces, which they had taken from the shipyard,
and brought to us some Christians. Next day, more than one hundred
and fifty people from Basilan descended, who surrendered their arms,
and then about fifty Makassars, who did the same; and all were embarked
in the patache.

Next day the king and queen went down and slept in the camp of Don
Sebastian. On the following day (which was the day agreed upon when
all were to descend from the hill), seeing that it was already late,
the king and queen said that they would go to get their people. The
governor granted them permission, and went to a camp that was located
opposite the gate of the stronghold. All the Sulus descended, carrying
their goods, arms, etc., to the number of about four hundred soldiers,
and more than one thousand five hundred women, children, old men,
etc. They reached the governor's camp and Don Pedro de Francia told
the king that they must surrender their arms. The latter replied that
he would surrender them to none other than to the governor. Thereupon,
they went to summon his Lordship; but the Sulus, seeing that they were
going to summon him, fled, under a heavy shower that was falling,
and abandoned all their goods. A vast amount of riches, many pieces
of artillery, and versos, [262] falcons, muskets, arquebuses, etc.,
were found. The cause of the Moros fleeing was their great fear that
they were to be killed. On our part, since Don Sebastian Hurtado held
all their stronghold, and had left only thirty men in his quarters
(in order that Datu Ache might not escape), and as that number could
not resist so many people, the Sulus were, on the contrary, allowed
to go without any firearms being discharged.

More than two hundred and fifty of the Sulus have died, and they
were perishing in great numbers from dysentery because the women and
children were placed under ground for fear of the balls. That and the
fear of the mines caused their surrender; for it was impossible to
take their fort by assault. The interior strength of that stronghold
is so great that the Spaniards were surprised; and all recognize
that it has been totally the work of God, and [a result of] the
perseverance of Don Sebastian, who ever said that all must die or
capture the stronghold. Somewhat more than two hundred Christian and
more than one hundred Moro women have come from the stronghold during
this time. All the Moro women are fearful. Up to date eighty-three
Spaniards have died from wounds, and many of them from disease.


    THE KILLED

    Sargento-mayor Melon
    Captain Don Pedro de Mena
    Captain Don Juan Nicolas
    Captain Don Pimienta
    Captain Don Lope Suarez


    DIED OF DYSENTERY

    Captain Don Aregita Martin de Avila
    Adjutant Oliba
    Adjutant Calderon
    Alférez Concha
    Alférez Alonzo Gonzalez


I shall not name others, as they are not so well known, and it will be
known later. Up to date about two hundred Bisayan Indians have died,
most of them from diseases. Don Pedro Cotoan died while en route from
Jolo to Samboanga, in order to take back the Bisayans, who are a most
cowardly race. Those who have done deeds of valor are the Karagas,
and the Sulus tremble at sight of them. Don Pedro Almonte remains as
governor and lieutenant for the captain-general at Samboangan, with one
hundred and fifty Spaniards, as has been reported. Captain Jines Ros is
to stay as castellan in Jolo with one hundred and eighty men--Captain
Sarria being fortified in the stronghold with eighty men, and Jines
Ros on the beach in a stone tower that is already eight stones high,
with one hundred men. Captain Marquez is going to Buaren with fifty
Spaniards, although no succor had been sent to Don Sebastian from
Manila. All that has been supplied to excess is truly wonderful,
for the winds have brought (and it is incredible) many champanes,
with more than twenty thousand baskets of rice, innumerable fowls,
and pork, veal, beef, and cheeses from Cebu, which have made a very
excellent provision.

They ask for Father Martinez [and] Alexandro at Jolo [and] Father
Carrion at Buiaon, but without an associate. I say that, following
even to the end of the world, I do not know to what to compare these
Moros of Samboangan. They have paid all their tributes. This is a brief
relation. I pray your Reverence to pardon me and commend me to God,
for indeed what I desire is necessary.


Samboangan, April 23, 1638. [263]






APPENDIX VII

OBANDO'S REPORT ON THE PREPARATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN TO RETURN ALIMUD
DIN TO SULU, JULY 15, 1751 [264]


Sire: Your Majesty will find in the enclosed report the resolutions
adopted by the Committees of the War and Treasury Departments for
the purpose of reinstating the king of Sulu, Fernando the First,
whom I found in this capital, baptized and protected by Royal briefs
insuring him the continuation of the same Royal goodwill as long as
he remained a Christian and a friend of the nation, which seems to be
his intention hitherto, with the help of 3 galleys, 3 barges, 1 galiot,
2 large champanes and other craft for war and transportation, under the
orders of the Master-of-camp of your Majesty's infantry here, to whom
I have given the instructions and orders contained in said report,
to the effect that he should make port at Zamboanga, and from there
try to subdue the rebel vassals, blockade the island of Sulu by sea,
cut it off from all communication with its neighbors, prevent food from
being introduced, prevent and punish all depredations, acts of piracy
and insults on the part of that barbarous nation against the town and
vassals of your Majesty of which I receive pitiful complaints every
day, and see that the captives are returned and that due observance
is given the treaties of peace and other agreements which were made
by my predecessor but have not proved to be as satisfactory as might
have been hoped, on account of the inconstancy which characterizes
that nation.

Before undertaking such an important operation, I decided to order
the construction of three average sized galleys, and other small
vessels, of which there were none in these Islands; and to arm them
I ordered to be cast 100 perrier cannon of calibre 2, with three
chambers each, ordering the transfer to the province of Iloilo of
General Francisco Domingo Oscoti, as Lieutenant-Intendant-General,
with instructions to prepare provisions at the smallest cost for the
Treasury, and directing him to issue a proclamation (as he did) calling
for volunteers, who would be rewarded according to their merits on the
ships plying between Manila and Acapulco, and authorizing the natives
to arm boats at their expense, exempting them of all taxes during
the expedition. As I was in possession of a rescript of your Majesty
addressed to his Field Marshal my predecessor Gaspar de la Torre,
ordering him to reconnoiter the island of Balabak, and Ipolote Bay,
and other places of Palawan Island for the purpose of building a fort
for the protection of the inhabitants against the people of Sulu,
Tiron and Borneo, and to build six galleys with which to fight the
Moros, with a report on the same object presented by the Province
of Saint Nicholas of these Islands, [265] both of which have been
communicated to said Committees of the War and Treasury Departments
and to persons who had knowledge by experience of the said province
and regions; also, in view of the poor condition of the Royal treasury
which precluded the possibility of greater expenses it was decided,
in accordance with the opinion of your Majesty's Fiscal [Attorney
General] in regard to the above mentioned instruments, to incorporate
them to said report (or record), [266] as they are of the same nature,
to take, when there was a better opportunity, the proper measures for
reconnoitering the most favorable position for the intended fort,
and to await the result of the expedition for the reinstatement
of the king of Sulu, so as to request him, if the result should be
favorable, to withdraw his vassals from the fort of Ipolote, and,
if not, to secure the safety of the people of the said island by
driving them out; and having already ordered, as I have said, the
construction of the galleys, which were necessary and made more so
by your Royal order, to continue the work until the six were built,
said work being carried on with the utmost care and economy, which
I always bear in mind in my zeal for the service of your Majesty.

I will send your Majesty full reports on the progress of these
different undertakings, so that your Royal orders may let me know
your Royal pleasure, which will always meet with my humble obedience.

God give the Royal and Catholic Person of your Majesty the many years
of life which are required by Christendom for the happiness of your
vast dominions.


Manila, July 15, 1751.






APPENDIX VIII

OBANDO'S REPORT ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE ATTEMPT TO RETURN
ALIMUD DIN TO SULU, JUNE 18, 1752 [267]


Sire: In a letter addressed to your Majesty last year, 1751,
I forwarded a report and vouchers to the effect that I had sent,
with the King of Sulu, Fernando the First, to the fortified station
of Zamboanga, a fleet of 3 galleys, two feluccas, two galiots and two
large champanes, with other craft, under the Master-of-camp [268] of
the Royal troops here, for the purpose of restoring said king to his
throne and forcing his rebel vassals to submit, by means of a blockade
of the island of Sulu, which would cut it off from all communication
with its neighbors and prevent the importation of food to the island,
other provisions being made for the purpose of protecting the Christian
communities against any further harm on the part of the Sulu people
and the Tirons. [269] I have the honor to report now that the said
Master-of-camp arrived at Zamboanga with most of the fleet, ahead of
the Sultan of Sulu, who had been delayed by various accidents, and
sailed at once, in order to avoid the monsoon, for the Bay of Jolo,
where he anchored on the 26th of June of that year, at about one mile
from the forts. He formed a line of battle, and, noticing two Chinese
champanes without flags, that were stationed near the river mouth and
were stretching two lines to go up stream, he ordered two long-boats
to go and remove them from under the artillery of the enemy; the Jolo
forts, four in number, displayed red banners and opened fire with
cannon of calibre 8 to 18 on the boats towing the champanes; our fleet
answered, and the fire was kept up some time on both sides, until the
enemy hoisted the white flag in order to gain time for reënforcing his
trenches; the Master-of-camp sent a letter to Prince Asin, informing
him that his only purpose was to restore the legitimate king of Sulu
to his dominions, and to have the captives delivered; the prince
answered that he had no captives to deliver; that he was waiting for
the return of the king, who would do as he wished with them, that he
was begging the Prophet to send back the king * * *. Finding such an
answer vain and impertinent, our ships opened fire again; a suburb
was stormed and burned, and our men found out that the negotiations
were a pretext to gain time to place artillery behind the palisades;
the Moros accomplished this purpose and again requested a truce in
order to hold a meeting of their leaders and to deliberate as to
what should be done. This was granted, and in a second letter signed
by the Datus Prince Asin insisted that the Master-of-camp should
retire to Zamboanga, promising to bring over the captives; as the
south-west monsoon was blowing hard and he was short of provisions,
the latter decided to go back to Zamboanga; the Datus informed their
king Fernando in a letter addressed to him at Zamboanga of what had
been agreed; Prince Asin also stated verbally that he would bring to
Zamboanga some captives whom he was going to seek in the woods, and
asked the Master to leave the port, while he went after the wives and
children of the followers of King Fernando, who had been frightened and
scattered by the artillery. After a few more answers and objections
which showed an utter lack of sincerity, the Master-of-camp sailed
back to Zamboanga. The King of Sulu had arrived there on June 22,
and as soon as he heard about the truce requested by his brother
Asin, and other affairs of the fleet, he declared that the prince
was his enemy. This statement was believed at the time, but soon
afterwards good-sized boats began to arrive one after the other
with many of his principal people on the pretext of Prince Asin's
visit to the King, until there were 180 persons, including 32 women
between concubines and servants. When the Master-of-camp, Governor
of Zamboanga, remarked that all these boats were full of firearms,
powder, ball, coats of mail, helmets, and other warlike equipment,
that the King of Sulu had secretly sent to his brother Asin, at
Basilan, golden buckles and epaulets, and embroidered stockings to
make a brilliant appearance at landing in Zamboanga, while he feigned
to be his enemy; that Prince Asin had failed to keep his word, since
he said that he had been unable to get hold of the captives he was to
bring to Zamboanga, when it was known that he was keeping the said
captives in a secret place, six of them, including a woman, having
escaped by swimming over to the fleet when the latter was at Jolo,
and reported that the Moros had many captives concealed in the woods;
that Prince Asin had written to the King that all the captives seized
during the latter's stay in Manila were still in their power, not
one having been sold while awaiting the royal commands; and finally,
that the King and his brother were secretly dismissing the concubines
only, telling them that the Master-of-camp was sending them away with
contumely; he inferred that the King was preparing to surprise the
fort. This surmise was strengthened by the face that armed men were
steadily coming in each day, despite the Master-of-camp's friendly
admonition to the King that his followers enter the fort unarmed. The
lying and disingenuousness of the King, which all these indications
were making plainer every moment, were finally betrayed by a letter,
written in Arabic characters, to the King of Mindanao, in which he
stated that he had been compelled, by those in whose power he was,
to write the letter he had previously sent him from Manila,--whereas
he had enjoyed complete freedom in this capital, so complete, in
fact, that he did not perform, during the voyage hence to Zamboanga,
a single rite of the Christian religion, as far as known, while he
was seen to perform various Moro religious acts, and took with him
the Quran in his own language, instead of the numerous Catholic
books which had been given him for his instruction. In view of all
the foregoing evidence of bad faith, the Master-of-camp, Governor of
Zamboanga, and the captains of the fleet decided to arrest at the same
time the King, the datus and their men, to seize their boats, arms,
and concealed ammunition, and to keep the whole under careful guard,
the men being detained in decent quarters, pending the decision of
the Captain-General.

In reflecting on this important and critical change in the situation,
I bore in mind that the said King of Sulu had been a false friend
and a consummate Machiavellian, who had deceived your Majesty's
Governor Fernando Valdes Tamon with his feigned promises of peace,
which he never kept, and that, instead of releasing the captives and
preventing the cruel outrages of his vassals the Moros and Tirons,
he had used the considerable supply of arms, which he received
from the said Governor and Governor Gaspar de la Torre under the
pretence of suppressing supposed rebellions of his vassals, to keep
our forces busy in Sulu, so that his vassals the Tiron pirates might
ravage the provinces, while our forces were engaged in the Sulu
kingdom. He also deceived your Majesty's Governor and Bishop when
a fleet was sent against the Tirons; he went as an ally and a pilot
for the fleet among the shallows, and the small islands belonging to
the enemy, and prevented the destruction of the principal towns, by
misrepresenting to the commander of the expedition that said towns
belonged to peaceful people who were friends of his, and pledging
himself to have the prisoners returned, so that the fleet retired
after burning only nine villages without importance, thanks to the
cunning of the king. The trouble caused by all these Moros, thanks
to his influence, is really astounding, and has nearly drained the
Royal treasury, as, since the last peace agreement made by Governor
Tamon, 89,744 pesos have been spent from 1736 to 1740, and since then
the war expenses have far exceeded that amount. All these criminal
and astute antecedents fully justify my distrust in giving careful
instructions to the Master-of-camp to avoid a surprise of the fort
under the veil of feigned friendship; I really expected this new act
of treason on account of what I already knew about the said King of
Sulu, and was only held back by the fact that he had been baptized,
and the information about him which my predecessor had given me in
good faith. As it is, all the members of the Government were glad
that the treachery of the King had been foreseen and that he had been
arrested. * * *

In Zamboanga, after his arrest, 12 krises, each in six pieces,
were found hidden in two cushions belonging to him. * * * Urged
by the members of the ministry, I proceeded at once to explain to
the Real Acuerdo [270] and the council of war all the difficulty of
inflicting the condign punishment that was deserved, and, supported by
a majority of votes, I decided to declare war on all the Sulus, Tirons
and Kamukons, with the understanding that no capitulations or treaties
of peace would be considered, but that they would be treated as rebels,
in their persons, their property and their land, and put to the sword
in case of resistance; that all their towns would be destroyed and
burned; and that the mission of our fleet was not to make conquests,
but to punish the rebellion and to blockade the island of Sulu so as
to prevent any attempt to bring in food or any other help. I also
directed that the King of Sulu, who was under arrest at Zamboanga,
should be sent to Manila, there to be kept in confinement until the
pleasure of your Majesty be known. The Datus and other Moros were
declared to be slaves, and I ordered that they should be branded and
marked, not so much for the purpose of guaranteeing the ownership of
their masters or punishing their obstinacy, as for that of avoiding
all confusion between them and the numerous Indians of these Islands,
whom they resemble in color, bearing and language, of crushing their
pride, their daring and their evil spirit, experience having shown
that 8 Sulus suffice to subjugate a whole town, and principally
of preventing the clandestine introduction of the sect of Mohammed,
which would easily spread among the Indians, if the brand did not mark
them as enemies from Sulu, it being known that the sect of Mohammed
is daily extending its darkness over these regions. * * *

The declaration of war against the Moros was published in all the
provinces, which were instructed to be constantly ready for attack
or defense; to organize companies of militia, with their officers,
in all the pueblos, and have them frequently drilled and reviewed, so
as to become skilful in the use of their arms; to send a list of all
the arms and ammunition on hand to the Captain-General, who will thus
be able to supply them with all he may deem necessary. I furthermore
ordered that no boat should leave Manila or any other port without
being well provided with men and arms, and issued proclamations calling
for privateers, several of whom have already been given letters of
marque and have sailed with the hope of doing good service for your
Majesty; I issued new instructions on every subject, to be followed
in their respective parts according to circumstances; I reserved for
my future action the disposal of our prisoners at the best terms,
one fifth of the profits going to the Royal treasury; the right of
plundering was declared to be free for all, all privateers from the
Bisayas were exempted from tribute, and I promised them in the name
of your Majesty 6 pesos for each Moro, as an encouragement to pursue
and exterminate them. As soon as I heard the news from Zamboanga,
I sent there a supply boat with plenty of food, arms and soldiers,
in view of the next campaign; I took on myself the care of relieving
from time to time the officers and soldiers * * * and I can sincerely
assure your Majesty that I have been so provoked and exasperated
by the untamable fierceness and the bad faith of the Moros, that I
am decided to spare neither work nor efforts in order to punish them
thoroughly and to deliver from oppression the Christian communities, so
that the glorious name of your Majesty may be feared and respected all
through my Government, in compensation for the gross deceit practised
by said Moros upon my predecessors. I trust, with the help of God,
to punish them as they deserve, and will report to your Majesty the
progress of the expedition.

God keep the Catholic and Royal Person of your Majesty many years,
as Christendom and the Monarchy have need.


Manila, June 18, 1752.






APPENDIX IX

REPORT ON THE OCCUPATION OF PALAWAN AND BALABAK, APRIL 30, 1753 [271]


Sire: By letter forwarded to your Majesty through confidential channels
under date of * * * I reported that I had despatched an embassador to
the King of Bruney, informing him of the arrest of the King of Sulu for
his inveterate faithlessness, and pressing him to continue our long
standing friendship and to form a new alliance against the said king
as a usurper of part of his dominions, and against all his enemies,
and to cede to your Majesty the Island of Balabak and the territory
of Palawan, for the purpose of better waging war against the Sulus,
Tirons and Kamukons; and that, the desired end having been obtained,
I found it necessary to use the new rights acquired by the cession
referred to. Consequently, with the view of best promoting your
Majesty's interests, I resolved to put into execution the idea of
an armament composed of our galleys, a tender, three feluccas, and
two champanes, supplied with two Spanish companies of one hundred
men each, together with another company of Pampanga Indians, which,
with the crews, the convicts and the military officers, number nearly
a thousand persons, for the glorious object of taking possession of La
Pampanga in the ceded part of Balabak and the other adjacent islands,
forming this new district into a province called Trinidad, with a
separate government from that of the Kalamians; for I have appointed
a governor to take charge of nourishing this new plantation with the
political regulations and Royal ordinances which the prudent zeal of
your Majesty has provided for similar cases, and which, on my part,
have been furnished him in the form of brief and clear instructions
directed towards civilizing those barbarous natives, so as the better
to facilitate the spread of the holy Gospel.

With this in view I am sending two reverend Jesuit priests, persons
distinguished in politics and mathematical learning, and the military
engineer of this place, for the purpose of making an inspection of
the capital of Palawan, as well as of the Island of Balabak, and its
adjacent islands, and of examining their bays, ports, inlets, rivers,
anchorages and depths, in order to construct a fort--which will be
named after Our Lady of the Good End--in the most healthful location,
secure by land as well as by sea, for the garrisoning of which an
adequate force of artillery has been despatched. It will be kept
guarded for the present by a small galley, two feluccas, a company of
Spaniards, and another company of Pampanga Indians, besides the galley
slaves [272] and the suite of the governor, and officials--all rationed
for one year--who will number three hundred, the rest being returned to
this capital when possession is once established. And that the taking
of possession may be unopposed, useful, and lasting, I have planned for
the strengthening of the said fort, with the primary object of having
our troops sally from its walls to pacify the Sulu rebels who have
been dwelling in certain districts of Palawan, or to exterminate them
completely by fire and sword, preventing by means of the new fortress
and the little flying squadron, the Kamukons, Tirons, and others, from
laying waste the province of the Kalamians, and the adjacent islands;
for, there being access to the entire chain of places and all the
islands, facilitating attacks, and our vessels being on a constant
cruise through those regions, their expulsion will be secured. But
the greatest gain of all will lie in becoming acquainted with their
lands, rendezvous and places of refuge, in view of the fact that the
greatest defense which they have had up to the present time has been
our own ignorance and negligence in the premises, they scorning our
arms without fear, in the belief that they are unconquerable because
the places of their abode are unexplored; wherefore the King of Sulu,
pretending to serve us as a pilot among the Tiron Islands laughed at
our expedition under the command of your Majesty's Reverend Bishop of
Nueva Segovia, leading the Spaniards about with a halter wherever he
wished, and wherever he thought they would suffer most fatigue. In
view of all this, and of our present experience of the unbridled
audacity with which they ravage almost all the provinces, I felt
compelled to project this campaign of reconnaissance so as to test,
by the favorable results secured, the surest means of benefiting these
Christian communities, for I am in hopes of establishing, through this
new colony, an impregnable bulwark against the whole Moro power and
a source of reciprocal assistance to the fortress at Zamboanga. And
I likewise propose to introduce into those parts, by reason of their
proximity, commerce with Borneo, Siam, Cambodia, and Cochin-China,
so that, through intercourse, the inhabitants of Palawan may become
pacified and tractable and their towns become opulent; so that with
the families which in due time will be drafted from the outskirts
of this capital, a province of substantial usefulness may be formed,
having greater respect for both Majesties; for, by erecting churches
to God, a new gem will be added to the Royal crown, namely the glory
of giving many souls to the Lord, while the savings of the Royal
treasury will in time be appreciable.

Although I intended to make this journey personally, the noble city
[273] and the majority of the committee on war opposed this course,
and with the sanction of the Audiencia convened in executive session
I decided to delegate my authority for this act, in view of the
necessity of my remaining in the capital for the despatch of the
urgent and arduous affairs which frequently present themselves.

God guard the Royal Catholic Person of your Majesty the many years
that Christendom needs him.


Manila, April 30, 1753.






APPENDIX X

BRIEF REPORT ON THE EXPEDITION TO TAKE POSSESSION OF PALAWAN, JULY 17,
1753 [274]


Sire: When the galleon was on the point of sailing for New Spain,
the Palawan expedition returned to the port of Cavite, from where
the commander of the expedition informs me that he has made a careful
and exact survey of the Islands of Palawan and Balabak, beginning on
the outward coast, from 9 degrees to Labo. On all that coast he has
only found mangrove swamps and reefs, the inhabitants being hostile
to everyone and obeying no king; the land is miserably poor; there is
no drinking water from Balabak to Ipolote; the climate is so bad that
in two months and a half 116 men of the expedition died and 200 were
sick, and he finds that all that has been said about Palawan is false.

I have also been informed by the Alcalde Mayor of the Kalamians of the
arrival there of one galley, and three feluccas, which had left the
fleet since it sailed from Manila, as the Commander also now reports;
after the galley had been careened and food provided, one felucca
sailed on its course convoying the joanga [275] of the father prior
in charge of that district and two small vessels which had been sent
by the Alcalde of Komboy and had suffered the misfortune of being
captured by the Sulu Moros, most of the people, however, escaping,
as explained in the enclosed letter from the Alcalde.

The commander of the expedition has sent me from Cavite a report of
the councils of war held by him for the purpose of carrying out his
instructions, the most important of which was to take possession
of Palawan and adjacent islands in the name of your Majesty, said
islands having been ceded by the King of Bruney; accordingly, our
fleet took possession of the land with due solemnity, with the express
knowledge and consent of the inhabitants; I also received a log of
the whole route which seems to have been well kept, with maps and
a full explanation of the examination made of the said islands and
the operations in connection therewith. A new map of the islands is
being made, on account of the errors contained in the former one; as
the log and the report of the commander refer to the new map, which
is unfinished, and I cannot delay the departure of the galleon, I
cannot forward a full report to your Majesty; I wish to make a serious
and careful examination of all that has been done, so as to take
such action as may be the best for the benefit of the Royal service,
and to be able to send your Majesty a full report of the expedition,
with my opinion based on a complete knowledge of the facts. This is
all the information I can give your Majesty for the present.

God keep the Catholic Royal Person, of your Majesty many years,
as Christendom has need.


Manila, July 17, 1753.






APPENDIX XI

LETTER OF THE KING OF SPAIN TO SULTAN ISRAEL, DECEMBER 2, 1774 [276]


To the Captain-General of the Philippine Islands.


Most illustrious Sir: In letters Nos. 322 and 325, your Excellency sets
forth the ideas of the English settled in the island of Balambangan,
who are displeased with the unhealthfulness of the country and petition
that the Sultan of Sulu allow them to settle within his dominions.

With No. 325, the letter of the Sultan was received, and the King, thus
informed of the attempts of the Englishmen, and also of the favorable
inclination of the Sulu Sultan to establish with our nation friendship
and alliance, commands me to direct you to listen to his proposals,
to accede to them whenever they are reasonable, and to grant him aid
and favor as far as possible, assuring him of Royal protection, and
delivering to him the enclosed communication in answer to his own, in
which his Catholic Majesty declares his entire satisfaction with his
reasonable conduct and promises to reciprocate his friendship as you
may understand through the copy of that letter which I enclose. God
preserve your Excellency many years.


Madrid, December 5, 1774.

Dr. Julian de Biriaga.



[Copy of the communication referred to in the foregoing letter.]

Most illustrious and excellent prince Mohammed Israel, Sultan
of Sulu. Most gratifying has been to me the announcement, which
you conveyed to me in your letter of January 20th, of your happy
accession to the sovereignty of Sulu, on account of which I offer
you many congratulations, wishing you happiness in all things.

The disposition which inclines you to seek my friendship and
assistance, as also the friendly relations which you maintain with
my Governor of the Philippines, which you desire to establish and
perpetuate by means of a mutual agreement, which may secure for the
future firm peace and a perpetual alliance between your states and
mine, increase my just gratification, especially as my Governor has
informed me of the sublime natural gifts which are united in your
person, with many and most expressive eulogies thereof.

In view of this, and of the constant fidelity which you promise in
your letter, I command my good vassal, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar, to
listen to your proposals, to accede to them whenever reasonable, and to
grant you all the favor and assistance which the forces and facilities
to be found there may allow assuring you of my Royal protection, which
I extend to you from now on, confiding in your reciprocal friendship,
and noble conduct, and desirous of opportunities of favoring you and
of proving the interest which I feel in your good fortunes and the
earnestness with which I pray God to preserve you many years.


Madrid, December 2, 1774.

I, the King.






APPENDIX XII

LETTER FROM THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES FORWARDING A COPY
OF THE TREATY OF PEACE, PROTECTION, AND COMMERCE WITH SULU, DECEMBER
25, 1836 [277]


Superior Government of the Philippines

Most Excellent Sir: After having reported to your Excellency in my
three former communications, the opinion which I have formed with
regard to the countries in the vicinity of our possessions in the
southern part of the Philippines, of the relations which we ought
to sustain with their governments and the policy we should follow
until we shall obtain the immense advantages which our position
offers us, I have the honor to deliver to your Excellency a copy of
the Capitulations of the Treaty of Peace, Protection, and Commerce,
which I have concluded through the captain of frigate, Don José María
Halcon, with the Sultan and Datus of Sulu.

The articles which need some explanation, are the 1st, 3rd and
4th. With reference to the 3rd and 4th, I mention them in my former
communication and indicate their intent; and with respect to the 1st,
I copy herewith what has been reported to me by the commissioner,
D. José María Halcon, which is as follows:


    I must make clear an important point relating to the text of the
    Capitulations, in the wording of which your Excellency has noted
    perhaps some ambiguities and omissions in Article I, which while
    intended to make the Datus and Sultan of Sulu acknowledge and
    declare the extent of our rights, seems indefinite on certain
    points which many irresponsible writers have asserted with
    confidence.

    While considering the protection granted the Sultan, I recognized
    the inexpediency of making the same include the lands which he has
    lately acquired in Borneo, and of determining definitely the line
    of the boundary in Palawan, the title to which island, as also that
    to Balabak and Balambangan, is very disputable, though at present,
    the lands where we have not established our settlements of the
    province of Kalamians are included de facto in his possessions.

    Palawan was ceded to the Crown of Spain by the King of Bruney,
    and Balabak is likewise ceded by an instrument brought back by
    D. Antonio Fabean when he went there as Embassador under the
    administration of the Marquis of Obando, which should be in the
    archives of the Philippine Government; but since these cessions
    were made on an occasion when the Sultan of Sulu found himself
    in possession of the lands by virtue of a former cession made in
    his favor by another King of Bruney, such documentary testimony
    cannot serve as the basis of our arguments, especially since we
    did not proceed to found any settlements.

    This matter of the cession of Balabak occurred upon the occasion
    of a visit to Manila, of Sultan Mohammed Alimud Din (Fernando I)
    who, asserting his right to the island, executed and ratified upon
    his part the gift, at least in word, through D. Manuel Fernandez
    Toribio, afterward Governor of Zamboanga, and the Secretary of
    the Government.

    Our writers have misrepresented the subsequent conduct of the
    said Sultan, and concealed very important facts, but at any rate,
    the very concealment of the reasons for his fleeing from Manila
    betokens the lack of liberty in all of the instruments he granted
    during his stay in that place; moreover the facts in the case
    justify his later actions, which gave occasion for casting a doubt
    over the legitimacy of our title to the lands under consideration.

    The true reason for the actions of Mohammed Alimud Din, beginning
    with his flight from Manila, was the fact that he had purchased
    the secret in a copy of the confidential letter which the First
    Minister of the Monarchy, Marquis de la Ensenada, wrote to the
    Captain-General of the Philippines on August 28, 1751, discussing
    the states of Sulu; which document, when brought to his knowledge,
    could not fail to ruin all of our political moves, and to dispose
    him to take every defensive measure against our power, for Mohammed
    Alimud Din was a man of no mean understanding.

    This was the origin of the letters which, on September 17, 1763,
    the said Sultan wrote from Sulu to the King of England and to
    the English company, [278] ratifying in favor of the latter
    the concession of the lands which form the strait of Balabak,
    in which is comprised the southern part of Palawan from Point
    Kanipaan to Point Bulilaruan, and this was the origin of their
    settlements in Balabak and Balambangan which have been abandoned
    since later events.

    Such are the antecedents which induced me to draw up the said
    article with such ambiguity that it may be construed to the
    advantage of the Crown without giving occasion to embarrassing
    objections.

    My aim throughout, most illustrious Sir, has been to promote
    the national welfare by carrying out the high designs of your
    Excellency, who by promoting this enterprise has attempted to open
    up one of the most abundant sources of wealth in the Philippines.


I also deliver to your Excellency a copy of the Capitulations, in
which, in consequence of Article 2nd, it has been agreed to determine
the duties to be paid by the Sulu vessels in Zamboanga and Manila,
and ours in Sulu. For the better understanding of these stipulations,
I have thought it expedient to inclose a copy of the explanation with
which the said commissioner forwarded them to me.

The present tariff rates have served as a basis for the duties
imposed upon the Sulu vessels, it being beyond my authority to
alter them. With reference to those which shall be paid by our
vessels in Joló, although they may appear to be excessive, it will
be sufficient to inform your Excellency that all of the ship-owners
who are accustomed to make voyages to Joló, have been satisfied with
the very favorable terms we have secured in the agreement, not only
because of the high valuation set on the articles in which payment
will be made, but because of the regulation and reduction to fixed
rules of the charges, that until now have been arbitrary and never
less than the stipulated rates. It is true that they have desired not
only a greater reduction but still more their complete abolition,
as is natural, but it was necessary to conciliate the two parties,
as the commissioner says.

Above all, one of the advantages of importance which our merchants
recognize in the relations now established, the benefits of which
they have begun already to experience, is that the Sultan and Datus
together guarantee the credits left in Sulu as a result of commercial
operations, which advantage they have not heretofore enjoyed,
but waited on the will and good faith of the debtor, who paid if he
pleased and when he pleased, or perhaps never, and there existed no
means of compelling him as there now is by recourse to the Government.

Likewise through the preference they are now accorded, our merchants
have gained greatly, as your Excellency will comprehend. In short,
there is not one of them who is not well satisfied with the results
of the negotiations, and all appreciate the skill and prudence with
which Halcon has conducted himself upon a mission all the more delicate
and difficult since he has had to treat with a Government whose lack
of enlightenment and poorness of organization equal the barbarism of
its people.

Finally, in the answer given by the Chamber of Commerce of which I
inclose a copy, your Excellency will perceive the appreciation which
the Capitulations have brought him, by having settled the duties to be
paid by our vessels in Sulu, as also by having established relations
with the Government of that island.

I trust that your Excellency will condescend to bring all this to
the notice of her Majesty that she may grant her Royal approval.

God preserve your Excellency many years.


Manila, December 25, 1836.

Most excellent Sir,

(Sgd.) Pedro Antonio Salazar.--Rubricated.

The most excellent the Secretary of State and of the Office of
"Gobernación" of the Kingdom.






APPENDIX XIII

ROYAL DIRECTIONS RELATIVE TO A GENERAL POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF
COMMERCE WITH SULU, AND THE ADVISABILITY OF MAKING ZAMBOANGA A FREE
PORT, JUNE 23, 1837 [279]


Ministry of the Navy, Commerce, and Colonial Administration

Most Excellent Sir: Your Excellency's predecessor, Don Pedro Antonio
Salazar, when he reported in detail, in letters of last December,
all that he had done in the treaty of friendship and commerce
entered into with the Sultan of Sulu, of the mercantile relations
which it behooves us to maintain with the Mohammedan possessions to
the south of the Philippines, of the opinion which he had formed
concerning the war of enslavement, and other matters upon which
your Excellency will receive due instructions under Royal order
of this date, forwarded separately and privately, in a very secret
manner, a communication dated the 17th of the same month, in which
he set forth the policy, which, according to his belief, should be
adopted toward the said Kingdom of Sulu in consequence of the said
treaty. Her Majesty the Queen Regent, having been informed of all
this, and having in mind the remark made in the said communication,
that the Spanish possessions in the southern region are frequently
oppressed by the alcaldes, on account of the present defective system
of administration, has decided to direct your Excellency to suppress,
with strong hand, these excesses of the alcaldes, that they may not
disturb the peace happily established with Sulu; exhorting them to
moderation and peaceableness, in order that the odium which the Moro
race feels toward us may vanish. Noting also among his remarks, his
conclusion that while the war of enslavement is undoubtedly an evil,
it produces nevertheless the advantage that those provinces are united
more closely to the Government because of their greater need of the
same against their enemies; and that by becoming used to a life of
freedom and license, those people become also inured to captivity,
from which they could sometimes escape but do not, many preferring to
turn to piracy, Her Majesty holds these views erroneous and harmful,
since no just and paternal government should promote misfortunes among
its subjects in order to make itself more necessary, and thus keep
them dependent; and because, though there may be some who are content
with slavery in Sulu because it affords them a life of unrestraint,
it can not be ignored that their families and the Government suffer
a great injury from their situation, nor that morality would be
greatly outraged, if, for these reasons, countenance were given to
slavery, which should be attacked and exterminated at all costs. The
idea is advanced in the same communication, that in the countries
of the southern part of the Philippines, the system of protection,
carried to the point of establishing trading houses, will be almost
equivalent to possession and control, when once commercial interests
are held to be the chief interests, and there is set forth a plan to
diminish or even cut off the trade [280] with Mindanao, in order to
confine the commerce to our channels. Her Majesty, on being informed
of this policy of a protectorate, approves of the same, but desires
that it be carried out frankly and faithfully with the Sultan of Sulu,
in order that he be convinced, through experience, that the Spaniards
are his loyal friends, our authorities keeping it in mind that the
conquest of those countries is not to the interest of the nation, but
rather the acquisition of isolated military and mercantile stations,
which may control indirectly without the disadvantages of great expense
and of arousing the hatred of the natives. This alliance or friendship
with the Sultan should be such, that in whatever war he may be engaged
with his rebellious subjects, he shall be aided in good faith, unless
his adversary should be of such strength as to insure his triumph,
for then the useless defense of the vanquished would subject us
to the contempt of the conqueror and we should lose the benefits
already acquired. In such cases we should remain neutral, under some
plausible pretext of impracticableness or other honorable reason. In
other wars, waged by the Sultan with other princes, we should attempt
to mediate, with the purpose that, by settling new discords, we may
obtain advantages from the two or more belligerents, as rewards for
the services rendered them; but in the event of having to oppose some
one of them, it should be that one who offers us the least advantages,
and has the best chances of triumph, because with our ally victorious,
the latter may in the treaty of peace execute articles favorable to our
commerce,--trying always, above all things, so to act that the victor
shall not become too strong nor the vanquished brought too low. With
regard to the policy which it is best to adopt as a general rule in
regard to commerce, your Excellency should remember that the best
system consists in the greatest possible liberty for our merchandise,
and in securing, directly or indirectly, for our own merchandise,
or foreign goods carried by the national vessels, the enjoyment of
greater privileges than those of any other country, in order that
they may be preferred and produce greater profits on the markets.

In the same letter he submits the opinion that the lack of
communication of the countries to the south with the Philippines, is a
most favorable political measure for Spanish commerce, and recommends
that our relations with the Government of Sulu should be strengthened
in order to include the same under our dependence at some future
time, it being necessary to act with cunning in order to separate
it completely from the piratical warfare. Her Majesty commands me
to state to you concerning these matters, that the communication
of Sulu with the Philippines being purely commercial, should not
be restricted, but on the contrary, should be increased in every
way possible, encouragement should be given to the establishment of
traders and Spanish trading houses in Sulu, where our good conduct and
benevolence toward the natives may bring us profit. But it is always
to be borne in mind that the Government of Her Majesty does not desire
the subjection of other states to itself, but a sincere friendship
and a close and useful alliance, and that a just and discreet policy,
not crafty nor artful, will accomplish most in withdrawing the Sultan
from the interests of the leaders of the pirates.

Your Excellency will note in the draft of the communication from
your predecessor, to which I make answer, the proposal of various
schemes for establishing ourselves securely in Sulu. Such would be
the establishment of a trading house there, already agreed upon in
the treaty, and posting there a garrison, under the pretext that it
is for the safety and greater state of the person of the Sultan. Her
Majesty deems indispensable the establishment of the trading house,
but it should be done in such a manner as not to cause distrust,
and fortified and protected from any sudden attack, using in this the
greatest prudence, and remembering that a garrison there, though it
might be acceptable to the Sultan, might wound the self-love of the
people of the country, and so render odious both the Sultan and his
protectors. The most essential thing for the Spaniards, in order to
become firmly established, is to make themselves popular, to respect
the customs of the people, even with veneration, not offending any
one for any reason, treating all with courtesy and decorum; not
showing themselves domineering nor covetous, not insulting any one,
but being very respectful to women, the old and children, not scoffing
at anything in their public amusements, nor religious affairs, nor
in their meetings. It seems to her Majesty that through these means
would be secured a consistent friendship between both countries,
and that the most adequate plan for the support and defense of the
trading house would be to maintain in the safest harbor a permanent
maritime force, in which should be stored all arms and munitions,
and sufficient soldiers, in case it should be necessary to defend
the building, without arousing the suspicions that would be caused
by placing these preparations, concealed or openly, in the house
itself; and since for this purpose, for the defense of the country
against the pirates, and for maintaining the respect of the people
and Government of the protectorate, it is indispensable to keep a
well organized sea force, her Majesty had determined that you decide
the manner of organizing this maritime force, without losing sight
of the great economy which it is necessary to observe on account of
the embarrassed condition of the Peninsula, which needs now more than
ever before the assistance of her colonial provinces.

Finally, the predecessor of your Excellency further stated that
he was attempting to extend his efforts to the establishing of the
protectorate over the countries subject to the Sultan of Mindanao:
her Majesty approves this policy on condition that in its execution the
purposes and measures, which are mentioned above for Sulu, be adopted.

Her Majesty, by whose Royal order I communicate to your Excellency
the foregoing, trusts in your zeal to realize the importance of this
matter, and, regarding the principles of justice and right which
direct the resolutions of her Majesty, to direct all your efforts
to the accomplishment of the results desired; carefully reporting
your progress in the affair, for the information of her Majesty and
further action. God preserve your Excellency many years.


Madrid, June 23, 1837.

Mendizabal.--Rubricated.

The Governor Captain-General of the Philippines.



Ministry of the Navy, Commerce, and Colonial Administration

Most Excellent Sir: The predecessor of your Excellency, convinced of
the important advantages to be derived by the Philippines, in making
more intimate and more secure our few and doubtful relations with
the island of Sulu, determined immediately upon assuming command,
to negotiate with the Sultan of the said place, a treaty of peace
and commerce which he considered, in every respect, not only useful
but indispensable to the prosperity of the country. After having
announced this project in various of his communications, he reported
in December of last year, having accomplished the same, and furnished
in several communications, an exact and detailed account of the
history of his labors in the affair, the reasons which he had for
undertaking the same, the benefits which he expects as results, and
the measures whose adoption he deems necessary in order that these
results may be more certain, and at the same time profitable. There
were received from him seven letters, all marked with the letter "A,"
numbered from 14 to 23, and dated from the 15th to the 29th of the
said month; with so many points of analogy and similarity between
them, that they should be considered as one only. The first, number
14, is intended to furnish information and data relative to Sulu,
and the other Mohammedan islands of the south (without which it would
be impossible to know their importance) and to detail the relations
which we should have with them, considering them both in relation to
commerce and with respect to the war of enslavement. In the second, of
a confidential nature, he outlines the policy, which, in his opinion,
should be adopted in order to obtain all the advantages which our
position affords. In the third, number 16, he states the measures
which should be adopted for the benefit of the national commerce
in those countries. In the fourth, number 20, he transmits a copy
of the treaty of peace, protection and commerce concluded with the
Sultan of Sulu, and of the stipulations made for the determination
of the duties which our vessels should pay in Sulu, and the Sulus
in Manila and Zamboanga. In the fifth, number 21, he relates the
motives which have led him to direct these matters as he has done,
transmitting to her Majesty all the plans referring to it, through this
Ministry only. In the sixth, number 22, he gives account of some of
the advantages which have been derived from our expedition to Sulu,
and amongst others, a treaty of peace concluded between the pueblo
of Malusu and the Governor of Zamboanga. And finally, in the seventh,
number 23, he sets forth the necessity of retaining at that station,
the frigate-captain, Don José María Halcon, who performed the duty
of commissioner for the negotiation of the treaty.

I have informed her Majesty, the Queen Regent, of the contents of
all these communications, and in this knowledge she has seen fit
to approve, in a general manner, all the measures adopted by the
aforementioned predecessor of your Excellency, giving suitable orders,
that the proper Ministry provide the special approval which some of
them deserve, on account of their weight and importance, concerning
which your Excellency will soon be informed, and deigning to command
me to submit in a separate and particular communication the following
advice on the special subject of the letters referred to above.

Her Majesty, feeling assured that conquests in themselves, and later
their maintenance, absorb the profits which accrue from the countries
already acquired, prefers to any conquest advantageous trade and
commerce. Convinced, therefore, that the most profitable and lucrative
policy is to conquer or secure such places as on account of their
fortunate location may prove to be at the same time strong military and
mercantile posts and so both promote and protect commerce, she cannot
but approve the ideas your Excellency's predecessor expresses in his
communication numbered 14, and desires, that upon adopting the system
in accordance with those ideas, you confine yourself solely, in all
enterprises of conquest, to occupation of territory either abandoned
or uninhabited, or to that which, notwithstanding its being settled,
would cost little and would not give occasion for a costly war. In
order to increase our commercial advantages in Sulu, and to raise up
rivals to the Portuguese, it would be well to grant protection and
reduction in duties to the Chinese junks [281] under the specific
condition that they do not sail under the flag of any other nation
(without mentioning the Portuguese by name in order not to occasion
the resentment of this power) and to secure in Sulu for those who
adopt the Spanish flag, a reduction of duties although not as much
as that which should be granted to Spanish vessels. Thus it is the
will of her Majesty that you be directed, commanding, with the same
purpose in view, that your predecessor state to you explicitly, which
are the measures that he would have adopted, had he been authorized
to do so, in order to avoid the blow to our commerce threatened by
the Portuguese, depriving us with the double expedition from Macao and
Singapore to Sulu, of the advantage over all other nations which still
remained to us in this traffic; and that your Excellency obstruct,
by all the means in your power, the association of interests between
the commercial houses of Manila with those of Macao and Singapore,
if the same were intended to secure special privileges in the island
of Sulu to the products of the Philippines to the injury of the
national commerce.

With respect to the matter of the war against piracy, referred to also
in letter number 14, her Majesty approves all the purposes expressed
therein by the predecessor of your Excellency, and commands me to
direct your Excellency that, without ever recurring to war or the
interruption of traffic with Sulu as means of destroying or diminishing
piracy and traffic in slaves, you exert yourself to suppress the same
and remedy the evil which it inflicts on the Philippines, by the
various means at hand, to-wit; 1st, through negotiations with the
Sultan of Sulu; in which measures suitable for the accomplishment
of the purpose may be concerted; 2d, securing the increase, by the
Sultan, of import duties on slaves who are Spanish subjects, and the
lowering of duties on slaves of other countries; 3d, requesting of him
assistance in driving out the pirates from their haunts of Balangingi
and other places; 4th, watching the rendezvous of these pirates in
the Bisayas also, in order to destroy them. In this manner and with
hard lessons, with the energetic and continuous warfare spoken of by
the predecessor of your Excellency, the extermination of piracy will
be accomplished without the evils which would follow upon an unwise
and useless war against Sulu, and without the more serious result to
which the same would expose us, and which her Majesty desires your
Excellency to avoid at any cost, the result referred to being the
removal of the Sultan to some other point, which removal England and
Holland might turn to great advantage against our trade.

As to the measures proposed in letter number 16, for the benefit
of the national commerce, her Majesty will determine which is fit,
notifying your Excellency in due season. Meanwhile you should keep
in mind, that as long as the Sulus man their ships with slaves,
your Excellency should prohibit them from trading in Zamboanga and
all other places within the dominions of her Majesty, whenever the
ships which they use shall be manned in whole or in part with slaves
who are subjects of Spain.

Concerning the treaty of peace, protection and commerce, a copy of
which is inclosed in letter number 20, her Majesty has been pleased to
resolve, after careful examination, that it be forwarded with favorable
comment to the Ministry of State for the approval of the Cortes and
the ratification of her Majesty, all of which will be communicated
to your Excellency in due time, its policy being carried out and
its intent carefully observed in the meanwhile, for the purpose of
determining whether there is anything to amend or correct by means
of further negotiation, which would be considered as an appendix to
the treaty. In view of the explanations concerning the first article
of the aforementioned treaty furnished by the commissioner of the
negotiation, her Majesty commands me to repeat to your Excellency
the necessity for carrying out the policy which is prescribed to
your Excellency with regard to acquisition and conquest; in order to
claim those lands referred to in the explanations, if perchance such
claim should be advisable for the purpose of acquiring some point of
military or mercantile value: or in order to set up the claim of the
Kingdom of Spain to those countries, in order that by giving it up,
we may secure other things which may be of real importance to us, such
as reduction in duties, some exclusive privilege, or the possession
of some isolated point of great importance.

The predecessor of your Excellency by addressing to this Ministry all
communications bearing on this matter, has merited the approbation
of her Majesty, because he has avoided many unnecessary steps and
useless delay, and thus your Excellency will continue to do, in the
manner herein indicated.

And finally, her Majesty having noted with satisfaction the favorable
results produced already by the expedition to Sulu, and approving
the idea of not using the fifteen hundred dollars sent by the Bishop
of Nueva Segovia for the redemption of slaves, she commands me to
direct your Excellency to cultivate the friendship of all the chiefs
who, like the Orankaya of Malusu, abandon the pursuit of piracy,
and that suitable orders be issued by the Division of the Marine
of this Ministry, not only that the captain of frigate, Don José
María Halcon, who has so well discharged the duty of negotiating the
treaty, be assigned to that station, but that he also be duly rewarded
for his services as such commissioner; her Majesty not failing to
express the gratitude with which she declares her appreciation to the
predecessor of your Excellency, the aforementioned Don Pedro Antonio
Salazar. All of which is communicated to your Excellency, by Royal
order, for your due information and guidance, instructing you with
regard to the confidential letter, that you carry out the directions
forwarded you separately under this date. God preserve your Excellency.


Madrid, June 23, 1837.

Mendizabal.--Rubricated.

The Governor Captain-General of the Philippines.






APPENDIX XIV

CAMBA'S REPORT ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE TREATY OF 1836 AND
ITS BASES, NOVEMBER 16, 1837 [282]


Superior Government of the Philippines

Excellent Sir: In compliance with the provision of the Royal order of
the 24th of April last, requesting, for the information of her Majesty
the record of the correspondence exchanged in regard to the treaty
of commerce made by my predecessor with the Sultan of Sulu, and the
bases of said treaty, I forward the same to your Excellency, with a
few personal observations suggested by a reading of the said papers.

On the 31st of January, 1835, the Tribunal of Commerce forwarded to the
Captain-General, approved by it, a report presented by several business
men who traded with Sulu, setting forth the deceitful methods of the
Datus, or principal people of the island, in their agreements and
contracts, and requesting, in order to restrain and intimidate them,
that the naval division of Zamboanga, or part of it, be stationed in
the port of Jolo during the time the national merchant vessels remain
there for the purpose of making their sales and purchases. A decree was
issued on the 9th of March of the same year, concurring in the opinion
of the Assessor, and declaring that the request could not be granted at
that time, but that it would be taken into consideration as soon as the
circumstances allowed. This is a brief of the document marked Number 1.

On the 9th of February, 1836, José Dugiols, who had sold goods on
credit to the amount of 8000 pesos to the Jolo people, and despaired
of getting paid, presented a new petition, similar to that which
had been sent 11 months before. The Chamber of Commerce approved it,
and requested that a fleet of launches be stationed at Jolo during
the business season, there to gather information which would allow
the Government to take proper action in the matter; it also insisted
that the commander of the fleet be a capable person, who, without
compromising the flag, would know how to conciliate the purpose of
the naval demonstration with the spirit of peace and concord which he
ought to maintain between the crews of our ships and the people of
Jolo. This suggestion, which had already been made in the petition
presented the year before, was favorably endorsed one after the
other by all who intervened in the papers in the case and resulted
in the final resolution of May 31st, which contains 14 articles. The
first provides that it shall be one of the duties of the commander
of the naval division of Zamboanga to protect the Spanish ships while
they are at Jolo, and instructions are given him to that effect. The
second appoints captain of frigate José María Halcon to take charge,
temporarily, of the command of the Division of Zamboanga, and establish
relations of friendship and commerce with the Sulu people. The third
directs him to inform the Sulu Sultan of his visit in the way he may
deem most likely to convince him of the peaceful intentions of this
Government. The fourth directs him to make himself recognized by the
officers and men of our ships, as the commanding authority who shall
maintain them in peace and good order. The fifth charges him not to
allow his men to land, so as to avoid disorder. The sixth directs him
to take action in regard to any excess, as provided by the Code. The
seventh, to hold in check the crews of our ships, so as to give the
Sulus neither reason nor pretence for showing their bad faith. The
ninth forbids the commander of the division and all those under his
orders to enter into any business speculation whatsoever. The tenth
directs the commander to be ever careful to keep all his men within
the bounds of duty. By the eleventh he is directed to see that all
contracts are religiously fulfilled, and, if necessary, to complain
energetically to the Sultan, and by the twelfth to see that our people
fulfil their own. Articles thirteen and fourteen direct the commander
to obtain information about the political and civil conditions of
Sulu and its topographic situation.

After acquainting himself with the foregoing, Captain José María
Halcon inquired what would be the minimum importation duty in Manila
for articles proceeding from Sulu, and asked for instructions in
regard to the importation of arms and ammunition into Sulu by our
ships. In answer to the first question, the Board of Tariffs fixed
at 2 per cent the duty on all articles imported from Sulu to Manila
in its own vessels, [283] except wax and cacao, which would have to
pay 14 per cent under a foreign flag and half that amount under the
national flag; in regard to the second the importation of arms and
ammunition into Sulu by our ships was prohibited.

A letter to the Sultan of Sulu was furthermore given the commander,
accrediting him and explaining his mission, the petition presented by
Dugiols and endorsed by the Chamber of Commerce, requesting that our
business relations with Sulu be granted a protection which experience
made each day more necessary, being thus complied with.

On April 15, 1836, Halcon forwarded the capitulations of peace and
the commercial agreements made by him in the name of this Government
with the Sultan of Sulu. The first consists of 6 articles, by which
the Spanish Government grants the Sultan its protection, which is
accepted by the latter, with a mutual assurance of coöperation between
them against any nation not European. Spanish boats are to be admitted
freely in Sulu, and Sulu boats in Zamboanga and Manila. It is agreed
that a Spanish factory shall be established in Jolo, so as to avoid
damages and delays to our commerce, the same right being given the
Sulus in Manila. Certain rules are established in order to distinguish
friendly from hostile boats. The Sultan is pledged to prevent piracy on
the part of those who recognize his authority; and it is furthermore
agreed that in case of any doubt as to the meaning of any article,
the literal Spanish text shall be followed. In accordance with the
opinion of the Government assessor, these capitulations were approved
by decree of January 20 of this year. The commercial agreements
contain 9 articles. The first establishes a duty of 2 1/2 per cent on
all products brought by the Sulus. The second excepts wax and cacao,
as recommended by the Board of Tariffs. The third provides a duty of
1 per cent for the importation in Zamboanga of products brought by
the Sulus. The fourth provides that the payment of the duties shall
be made in cash in silver. The fifth establishes the dues to be
paid by our boats at Sulu. The sixth fixes the value, in products,
of those dues. The seventh, in its first part, declares, that all
Sulu boats trading without a license shall be treated as smugglers,
under the law of the Kingdom; in its second part it also requires
our boats to show a bill of lading in accordance with the cargo,
on pain of a fine of P500, two thirds to go to the Sultan and one
third to our exchequer. The eighth provides that if the duties are
reduced in Manila and Zamboanga on the articles coming from Sulu, the
same shall be done in Sulu, and that if the Sultan reduces the dues on
foreign ships, he shall do the same for ours. The ninth provides that
in case of doubt the literal Spanish text shall be followed. After
hearing the opinions of the Boards of Commerce and Tariffs, and in
accordance with that of the assessor, the foregoing was approved by
decree of the 20th of January of this year, with a small reduction
of 1/2 per cent on the duties to be paid by the Sulus in Manila, and
an explanation of the proceeding to be followed for the appraisement
of their cargoes in Zamboanga and in Manila.

Shortly before this ratification by the Government, it was decreed on
the 13th of January, at the request of Commissioner Halcon, that in
order to avoid trouble between this Government and that of Sulu, the
captains and supercargoes of the Spanish ships should give no credit
to the Sulus, except with the authorization of the Sultan, under the
penalty of being barred from claiming his protection or that of the
Spanish Government for the collection of such credits; and that all
settlements of the pay of the crews of our ships should be so made
as to avoid the abuse of paying them in kind, instead of currency.

Such is the information which I have found, and am forwarding to your
Excellency in regard to the treaties mentioned. The leading idea in
said treaties is one of distrust towards the people of Sulu, on account
of their treacherous, cruel and perfidious nature. As this is the
only idea which prevails in all our relations with the island, as well
as in the Royal order of August 28, 1751, and the documents attached
thereto, without referring to older time, I can not be persuaded that
the policy of peace and alliance adopted with the Sultan of Sulu can
give our shipping and commerce any substantial and permanent advantage.

Several Royal decrees find fault with such treaties and even order them
to be revoked in case they have been made; and to justify departure
from these sovereign instructions, given with a true knowledge of the
facts, and in accordance with the opinion of the illustrious members of
the Cabinet, there must now be some powerful political reason which I
can not discover. If we take into consideration the very weak authority
of the Sultan over his subjects, and the scarcity of his means in the
midst of datus or chieftains who, with their families and slaves,
constitute distinct communities which are haughty, ambitious and
dangerous to him, we find that there is in Sulu no moral force on
which to rely for the execution of a treaty, even should there be
the best faith and good will on the part of the Sultan.

Furthermore, Sulu and the small adjacent islands produce nothing; even
the rice and fish which the people use for their food come from our
neighboring possessions: what business reasons are there therefore,
capable of calling our attention, or whose profits would pay the
expenses of a fleet placed in observation there? All the produce of
the islands consists of bêche-de-mer and shell which are gathered by
the slaves; [284] the clothing and foodstuffs are furnished them,
on credit, by our own ships; gold, wax and edible nests come from
Mindanao. Hence commerce is confined to a season outside of which
our ships never go near Sulu.

There is therefore little advantage to be derived by our commerce
from these treaties, and this is confirmed by the communication just
received by me from the commander of the Zamboanga division, which I
enclose as number 6. It betrays complete disappointment, and shows the
wisdom of the instructions given in the above mentioned Royal decrees.

The policy which we ought to follow with the Sulus is one of continual
and perspicacious caution, with well conditioned, well situated and
well commanded naval forces, ready to obtain at once satisfaction
for any offense to our flag; and I believe that this could be done
without much trouble, by using steamships, as the Dutch have done
in their settlements in the Moluccas, where they suffered from the
piracy of the Moros much as we do in the Philippines.

The foregoing information covers, I believe, all the points mentioned
in the Royal order of April 24th, last, and which are the object
of the present communication and of the documents which I enclose
therewith. May God keep your Excellency many years.


Manila, November 16, 1837.

Andrés G. Camba.

His Excellency the Secretary of State and of the Department of the
Navy, Commerce, and Colonies.






APPENDIX XV

CAMBA'S REPORT TO THE COLONIAL OFFICE DISCUSSING THE DIFFICULTIES OF
COMMERCE WITH SULU AND THE ADVISABILITY OF MAKING ZAMBOANGA A FREE
PORT, FEBRUARY 23, 1838 [285]


Superior Government of the Philippines.

Excellent Sir: I acknowledge to your Excellency the receipt of two
Royal orders dated the 23d of June of last year, which, with reference
to the treaties made with the Sultan of Sulu, have been transmitted
by your ministry; one replying to the seven communications marked "A"
which my predecessor made in connection with the same subject; the
other confidential, and indicating the policy and measures that should
be carried out with the said Sultan of Sulu and the Sultan of Mindanao.

In communication numbered 5, and dated November 16th last, in
compliance with one of the provisions of Royal order of last April,
I made a minute report accompanied by documentary evidence, of the
antecedents which I encountered relative to Sulu affairs, and at the
same time, could not but intimate in this connection how little I
expected as a result of our treaties, because experience had already
caused me to be suspicious, and also because the various Royal orders
toward the close of the past century confirmed me in this idea;
[286] and indeed the losses which all our commercial expeditions
experienced during the first year of these treaties, the vexations
they suffered and the risks to which the crews as well as the vessels
and their cargoes were exposed during their stay in Jolo, have fully
borne out this view.

Many are the measures and documents which we have here, in which
this same fact is laid down; many are the Royal decrees in which,
in recognition of this fact, the Governors of the Philippines have
even been authorized, by every means in their power and without
counting cost or difficulty, to punish severely the intrepidity of
those infidel barbarians.

In order to arouse and interest the Royal conscience on that point,
it was requisite that there should be repeatedly presented through
various channels and at distinct times substantiated accounts,
non-conflicting and extremely painful, of the various piracies,
cruelties, and vexations, with which those barbarians have kept the
Philippine Islands in the south in a state of fear and depression;
and needful also was it that there should have been employed, in
vain, on account of the religion and the policy of our ancestors,
those gentle measures of peace and union which no civilized people
could resist; but which are ineffectual with barbarous nations who
know no other right than that of force.

From the 14th of April, 1646, when we abandoned possession of Sulu,
which our arms had so gloriously conquered, making a treaty of peace
whereby the Sulus bound themselves to pay us annually, as tribute,
three boatloads of unhulled rice, until the day the Government
again entered into a treaty with them, neither have the Filipinos
succeeded in freeing themselves from their harassments, nor has
the Government reaped any fruit other than continual menace. The
English have had the same experience with the perfidy and bad faith
of those islanders. After having formed, in the island of Balambangan
by a concession made by the Sulus, a settlement destined to be the
emporium for the products of the East in connection with their China
trade, for which this island offers two good ports, they were two
years afterwards surprised by the Sulus themselves, who, knowing the
English had despatched their vessels, took advantage of their absence
by taking possession of the island and the fort constructed therein,
also a great deal of booty, which cost the English East India Company
a loss of more than three hundred thousand dollars. In narrating
this event, Mr. J. H. Moor, who published last year a brief review
of interesting events concerning the islands and lands bordering on
the China Sea, agrees with the views I have expressed, namely, that
these acts of treachery and cruelty on the part of the Sulus are the
offspring of their innate love of robbery and their natural perfidy.

All these facts then will convince your Excellency that the
expectations based by my acting predecessor upon the latest treaties
referred to are too sanguine. They would produce no illusions on
my part, in view of the experience of the past, neither does it
seem to me that their results, looked at with calmness and in the
light of the most exact data, could be of any great advantage to
our commerce. Allowing that the treaties should be religiously
complied with, never would they be of any value, in themselves,
to improve the brutal condition of those islanders. This condition
will always constitute, not only for the Spaniards but also for all
civilized nations, a great drawback to mercantile relations, which,
although founded on principles of utility and mutual advantage,
cannot continue nor be developed except under the most favorable
guaranties. How would our merchants, or the foreign merchants of Sulu
obtain them, where there is neither good faith nor justice, and where
cunning fraud makes even the Chinese dangerous traders? Commerce
is the movement and circulation of wealth. The latter results from
production, and production from the full and unrestricted utilization
of property. Moreover, when property is insecure, when the laws do
not protect it, when the agents of the Government are the first to
disregard it, the mercantile spirit is the first to become alarmed
and, when defrauded, to flee as far as possible from the place where
it does not find that safe haven it requires to expand and to pursue
with skill and perseverance the objects of its calling. Thus it is
that during the period elapsed since the year cited, 1646, up to the
present time, no Spanish merchant has himself had direct dealings with
the inhabitants of Sulu, the Chinese alone being engaged in this trade,
they being the only charterers of our vessels, so that we do not obtain
from said commerce more than interest on the capital invested, subject
to great exposure and risk, which has made and always will make,
this commerce uncertain and of little value. While lack of security
still sets a limit to the extent of our speculation in commerce with
Sulu, lack of advantageous reciprocity adds another factor no less
appreciable. At the time the Spaniards came to the Philippines, Sulu
seems to have been rich in her own natural and industrial products,
and richer still through the large commerce which their exchange
enabled her to carry on with the Chinese vessels which in large numbers
frequented her coasts. Situated almost midway between the Philippines
and the Moluccas, close to two rich islands so fertile and densely
populated as Mindanao and Borneo, it seemed destined by nature to be
the emporium of the commerce of the south. Converted to Islamism by
the Arab Sayed Ali, [287] who landed there from Mecca, how much ought
this principle of civilization in the midst of barbarous nations
have tended to their advancement! But times have changed greatly
since then, and brought their always accompanying vicissitudes. As
Spanish dominion was extended in the Philippines and the Portuguese
penetrated into the Moluccas, they began attracting to their capitals
the wealth and traffic that was accumulating in Sulu, and here begins
a new era. War and desolation, which for a period of eighty years we
inflicted on them, followed, and put in our power this island and its
dependencies, and though independence was later restored, it could not
divert this rich commerce from the trend it had taken. Meanwhile, their
wars and internal dissensions resulted in corrupting their customs,
and there only remained for them the habit of piracy, which ever since
our appearance, they had embraced for the purpose of harassing us.

Since then Sulu has been converted into a refuge for pirates allured
by its favorable position, and these barbarians, being more solicitous
of carrying on their devastations than of cultivating their land,
have not ceased to be the greatest scourge of our inhabitants of
the south. This explains the impossibility of obtaining from them by
entreaty anything in the way of peace and tranquillity, which to them
as well as to us would be so beneficial.

For this reason, Sulu, which contains a population of pirates and
slaves, is nothing more than a shipping point where certain products
are collected from the other islands of the south. It is surrounded by
islands and islets, which form the archipelago bearing its name, and
has a length from east to west of about ten leagues, a width of four
and a half, and a circumference of thirty-two. The total population
credited to the Archipelago is from 149,000 to 150,000 souls, 6,800
of which inhabit Jolo, and in this number are included 800 Chinese.

The houses, or rather huts, of the principal place, are estimated to
number 3,500, and that of the petty king, called Sultan, cannot be
distinguished from the rest except for its greater size; all of bamboo
and nipa, weak and poor as their owners, but with cannons of various
calibers which mark the residences of the datus, descendants of the
petty kings, and who themselves constitute the oligarchy of their
Government. I have already stated that the Sultan can do nothing, all
matters being decreed by the convention, or Rum Bichara of the datus,
where the owner of the greatest number of slaves always decides the
questions. [288] Wealth, influence and power, are measured among
them solely by the number of slaves, and this is why they cannot
but be pirates, in order to acquire this wealth, nor can they offer
any guaranty, if it must be accompanied by the renunciation of this
pursuit.

By this picture, which is corroborated by the Englishman Moor in
his description of Sulu, it will be seen that we can expect nothing
from our present relations with Sulu in the way of securing the
tranquillity and prosperity of our islands of the south. Neither
is a system of continual hostility the best way of procuring these
precious gifts, but the promotion and throwing open of avenues of
commerce, directing it to one of our ports, which, in view of its
position, ought to be Zamboanga; and in this I coincide with the
views of my predecessor. Zamboanga, with a different organization,
the concession of a free port for all the products from the south and
those brought in champanes from China, and the free admission of the
exiles who seek refuge there as well as the Chinese traders, aiding
the former in establishing themselves, and exempting the latter from
all taxes for the first ten years, would be, in all probability, the
most suitable point to which to divert from Sulu the little transit
business which remains, to guard, from a shorter distance, against the
piracy of its inhabitants, and to bring them in the course of time,
perhaps, to a more humane mode of living.

But all this requires first the planning of a suitable and adequate
system which, bringing nearer to the islands of the south the
protection and vigilance of the Government of the capital by means
of a subordinate Government embracing its chief characteristics,
would relieve those precious islands from the calamities which up
to the present time they have suffered by reason of their remoteness
and possibly also because of our neglect.

This plan, which I desire to combine with a forward movement in the
great and rich island of Mindanao, a large part of whose coast is
surrounded by the districts of the corregidors [289] of Karaga and
Misamis, will bring about without doubt a new and happy era for the
Filipinos of the south, and place, without the sacrifice of people
or money, a large number of faithful subjects under the illustrious
Government of her Majesty, furnishing the same also with a greater
abundance of resources.

To this end I shall hold in view and faithfully observe the policy
which her Majesty outlines in her confidential Royal order, to which
I reply; its application will be the constant object of everything I
decree and execute. And very happy shall I be thus to make suitable
return for the many proofs of co-operation and esteem, which, for the
past thirteen years I have received from the Filipinos; infinitely
more so, because working at the same time for the better service of
her Majesty in accordance with her Royal plans in which these people
have always found their greatest and surest well-being.

Your Excellency being convinced, then, that these are the sentiments
which impel me and the plans I contemplate for the fulfillment of the
important duties her Majesty has deigned to confer upon me, can from
this reply assure her that as far as I am concerned, nothing shall be
left undone to carry out to the letter the policy she has been pleased
to outline to me, and to merit thereby her august confidence, which
I so earnestly desire. May God preserve your Excellency many years.


Manila, February 23, 1838.

Andrés G. Camba.

The most excellent, the Secretary, Office of Colonial Administration.






APPENDIX XVI

COMMUNICATION FROM THE GOVERNOR OF ZAMBOANGA TO THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES RELATIVE TO THE TREATY OF SIR JAMES BROOKE WITH
THE SULTAN OF SULU, TOGETHER WITH OTHER COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO
THE TREATY, 1849 [290]


Office of the Secretary of the Governor and Captain-General of the
Philippines.


Jolo, May 28th, 1849.

Sr. Don Cayetano Figueroa, Zamboanga.


Dear Sir:--I think proper to inform you that yesterday, at three
o'clock in the afternoon, the English war steamer "Nemesis" cast
anchor at this port, coming from Singapore. She brought on board Sir
James Brooke, commissioned to make a treaty of peace and friendship
between Great Britain and the Sultan. This treaty was presented to
the Sultan to-day in the presence of the Datus and a majority of
the people, and after being read in a loud voice it was immediately
approved and ratified. I do not think it necessary to inform you
as to the tenor of said treaty, as Mr. Brooke has told me that he
would go from here to your city for the purpose of communicating to
you everything regarding this matter so that you will be thoroughly
acquainted with all the details. I understand that they have hastened
this matter in view of the recent advices concerning the destruction
of Bali by the Dutch troops and their declared intention of taking
possession of the entire coast of North Borneo, Sulu, and all its
dependencies. In letters received from my partner at Singapore he
tells me that it is certain they are coming, and with a large force,
but it may be not for a month or two. The people here, in view of this
news, have carried everything they have to the interior, and are ready,
whenever the Dutch arrive, to leave the town. We shall see where these
things will stop. Possibly we shall have another case like that of
the French before you leave Zamboanga. Whatever you may decide to
do when you receive this communication, you know that my services
are always at your disposal, and in the event of your determining to
come, there is a house here at your disposition; and I promise you a
friendly reception on the part of the residents. It is my opinion they
are in such a fright that they do not know what to do and business,
of course, is entirely neglected. My brother-in-law, who is the bearer
of this, will inform you in regard to what is going on. He goes to
your town to purchase rice for our house, to provide against a siege;
for rice is dear and scarce here. I remain, your obedient servant,
who kisses your hand.--Guillermo Windham.



Batavia, March 20, 1849.--It appears that the expedition against Jolo
is a matter fully determined upon. It is said that two steamers, two
frigates, and a corvette, operating at the present time against Bali,
are in readiness to set sail the first part of July. I expect that the
publishers of the Singapore paper will publish an article entitled,
"Labuan, Sarawak, the northeast coast of Borneo and the Sultan of
Sulu," by Baron Hoeveel, published in Holland in the first number
of the "Journal for Netherlands India," during the month of January
last, in which he informs his compatriots that if the Government of
Java had followed the counsels of Resident Gronovius of Sambas in
1831 or those of Resident Bloem of Sambas in 1838, they would long
ago have had treaties with the Sultan of Bruney which would have
closed Sarawak and the northern coast to all flags except the Dutch,
and that the questions with the English Government would not have
arisen, but that now it is not worth while to discuss it with the
court of St. James. England is in possession, and she will stay in
possession if she considers it to her advantage. He tells them to
be on their guard, because if they do not have a care the English
will make another move; and he indicates the point which calls for
immediate and indispensable protection, namely, the northeast coast
of Borneo: that is to say, from Sampan Manjee Point to the Cape of
Kamongan (the Straits of Makassar), which he says are tributary to the
Sultan of Sulu. He gives information concerning the different stations
for the principal departments: Malsedu (or Kinabalu), Manjedore and
Tiroen, designating the bay of Sandakan for the first establishment,
as soon as they have taken possession of this side. He enumerates
the products of this part of the world: the pearls, the diamonds,
the iron and gold mines, the birds'-nests, the trepang, etc.; so that
he has strongly influenced the minds of the Dutch. And he concludes
by stating that in the next article of his paper he will discuss the
Sultan's possession in relation to the government of the Dutch Indies,
offering some suggestions as to how his countrymen may avail themselves
of the advantages of this rich territory. It is a truly interesting
article and appears to me no less curious than reasonable. The editor
of the Journal of the Eastern Archipelago will do a good service to
his countrymen by making a translation of it, but it must be done
very soon. I am too busy to write a paper of such length, otherwise
it would have given me pleasure to send you one for your own use. I
reiterate the necessity for despatch, for I really believe that
the Dutch government will work for its own interests in accordance
with the plans which the Baron has marked out. The English will not
relish the idea of their oriental Government sleeping and permitting
the Sultan to make, under coercion, a treaty such as must be made in
order to forward the plans of Van Hoeveel. The vessels of the King
of the Low Countries, the "Prince of Orange," "Sambi," and "Argo,"
with five others, set sail on the 15th of this month, transporting
1,800 men in the direction of Bali. Afterwards they are to carry to
Surabaya, on the 25th proximo, 5,000 men more, besides from 2,500 to
3,000 coolies, 12 cannon, 2 mortars, etc., etc. Receive, etc.

These are notices taken from a letter to hand, from a trustworthy
person in Singapore.--Figueroa.



Military and Civil Government, Plaza de Zamboanga.--No. 101.--
Department  of Government.--Excellent Sir:--Notwithstanding the fact
that the lieutenant governor of this province informs me that he
transcribed and forwarded to your Excellency, while he was in charge
of the civil government during my absence in Malusu, the letter which
Mr. William Windham, a merchant of Jolo, sent me under date of May
28th, it seems to me well to send the original to your Excellency,
which I now do, retaining a copy of it for the purpose of reference
at any time. As your Excellency may note if he will compare its
contents with the text of the treaty of the 29th of the same month
of May, made with the Sultan of Sulu by the English Consul-General
to Borneo, Sir James Brooke, there is, between the terms of the former
and the spirit of Article 7 of the latter, a notable lack of agreement;
wherefore it has not seemed to me well to place entire confidence in
the offer of Windham, who may be suspected of partiality, and I have
concluded, therefore, to move in such a delicate matter with all
possible tact and foresight and in accordance with developments, which
may become extremely complicated. Considering the great interest
which the agents of the English Government show in these questions
concerning Sulu and the part of Borneo subject to the Sultan, I
immediately suspected that the announcement of the imminent arrival
of a considerable Dutch force in the archipelago was only a strategem
to obtain, through surprise and fear, the realization of the agreement
or treaty referred to; but it having been possible for me to secure
fresh data through a different channel, confirming those which Windham
furnished me,--which latter I obtained through Mr. Brooke and the
captain of the "Nemesis," and herewith transmit to your Excellency,--
I am of the opinion now that the expedition of the Dutch to Jolo is an
enterprise fully determined upon, although it may very well be delayed
or postponed by fortuitous circumstances difficult to foresee. In the
event of the appearance of the Dutch expedition, I shall never believe
that it is with the object of confining its field of action to
punishing the place of residence of the Sultan in a more thorough
manner than was done in the attempt made in April of last year; but
that they intend to conquer and occupy the Island and its dependencies.
If this should be so, I am equally of the opinion that the Government
of your Excellency, notwithstanding its conspicuous firmness and
well-known energy, will not succeed in getting them to recede from
their purpose, as everything goes to show they have determined to
carry it out in the face--most assuredly--of our known and declared
rights and claims to the rule of that land. I venture, therefore, to
believe that the only way to prevent the serious detriment which would
result to this colony, under the wise and worthy government of your
Excellency, from the occupation of Sulu, avoiding at the same time a
conflict between the Spanish and Dutch Governments, respectively, would
be, by means of persuasion and by taking advantage of the state of
extreme alarm now existing in Sulu, to anticipate them by a recognition
of the sovereignty of Spain, floating our national flag under
guaranties which would make impossible (without manifest violence) this
proposed unprecedented aggression. I am convinced that besides flying
the national flag and having the sovereignty of Spain recognized in a
formal manner, the principal guaranty must be--and I shall require it
unconditionally--that they shall agree to let us garrison with Spanish
troops the principal fort of Sulu, the residence of the Sultan. To this
end I have decided to embark in the pilot boat "Pasig" and make my way
to Jolo without delay, where, if I do not obtain the results which I
have here set forth, it will certainly not be through lack of zeal and
activity, but through encountering obstacles beyond my control or
influence, and owing to difficulties incident to the temperament of
those people and the ancient prejudices which, owing to a series of
events stretching through centuries, they feel towards us, as is only
too well known to your Excellency. To aid me in these operations and
to meet possible contingencies--since there will be needed there, in
case of success, an expert and trustworthy officer--and to carry out
reconnaissances and make plans which cannot fail to be always of the
greatest usefulness to the government at Manila, I shall invite the
chief of engineers of this place, Don Emilio Bernaldez, to accompany
me, if the exigencies of the service do not demand his presence here
and at Pasanhan. All of which I have the honor to lay before your
Excellency in the hope that it may merit your entire approval. May God
preserve your Excellency many years.


Zamboanga, June 8, 1849.

Cayetano Figueroa.

His high Excellency the Governor and Captain-General of these
Philippine Islands.



Office of the Secretary of the Governor and Captain-General of the
Philippines.

Zamboanga, June 5th, 1849.--Mr. Consul-General:--I have the honor
to inform you that from notices received from Jolo, it has come to
my knowledge that during your stay there with the steamer "Nemesis"
you negotiated a commercial treaty with the Sultan Mohammed Pulalun;
and as I am entirely ignorant of its essential clauses, and as my
Government has for a long time past, and especially of late, been
in possession or enjoyment through solemn treaties, the first made
with the Malay chiefs, masters of the coasts of Sulu, of the right
that our commercial flag be at least as privileged as any other; and
in view of the indisputable rights which Spain has to the territory
in question, rights not merely of prescription; I have the honor to
request, in view of the close friendship which unites our respective
Governments and which I honor myself in maintaining, that you have
the kindness to give me, officially, knowledge of the said treaty and
a copy thereof in order that I may forward it to the most excellent,
the Governor-General of these Philippine Islands, without prejudice
to my making before you, if the spirit of any of these articles
so requires, the remonstrances that may be necessary to uphold the
rights of Spain.--Receive, Mr. Consul-General, the assurance of my
consideration, etc.

C. de Figueroa.



To Sir James Brooke, Consul-General of her Britannic Majesty in Borneo
and Governor of Labuan.


H. M. S. "Nemesis," June 3rd, 1849.--Sir:--I have the honor to reply
to your communication of this date; and as the quickest way to furnish
your Excellency with the information desired, I enclose herewith a copy
of the agreement recently made with the Government of Sulu. It would be
unprofitable to discuss at this time the rights of Spain to which you
make allusion, and the interests of Great Britain, which are involved,
but as the best means of preserving the cordial relations which should
always exist between the public servants of our respective governments,
I propose to forward our present correspondence to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs of her Britannic Majesty. Nevertheless, permit me to
say that my opinion is that the interests of Spain and of Great Britain
in these seas should be considered entirely harmonious and equally
opposed to any system of oppression or of monopoly.--I have the honor
to be, with the greatest consideration, Sir, Your obedient servant.


Brooke, Commissioner and Consul-General.



To His Excellency C. de Figueroa, Governor of Zamboanga.


Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, desirous of encouraging commerce between her subjects and
those of the independent princes in the Eastern seas, and of putting
an end to the piracy which has up to this time hindered said commerce:
and his Highness the Sultan Mohammed Pulalun who occupies the throne
and governs the territories of Sulu, animated by like sentiments
and desirous of co-operating in the measures which may be necessary
for the achievement of the objects mentioned; have resolved to place
on record their determination on these points by an agreement which
contains the following articles: Article 1. From now on there shall
be peace, friendship, and good understanding between her Majesty
the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and his Highness Mohammed
Pulalun, Sultan of Sulu, and between their respective heirs and
successors, and between their subjects. Article 2. The subjects of
her Britannic Majesty shall have complete liberty to enter, reside,
carry on business, and pass with their merchandise through all parts
of the dominions of his Highness the Sultan of Sulu, and they shall
enjoy in them all the privileges and advantages with respect to
commerce or in connection with any other matter whatever which are
at this time enjoyed by, or which in the future may be granted to,
the subjects or citizens of the most favored nation; and the subjects
of his Highness the Sultan of Sulu shall likewise be free to enter,
reside, carry on business, and pass with their merchandise to all parts
of the dominions of her Britannic Majesty, in Europe as well as in
Asia, as freely as the subjects of the most favored nation, and they
shall enjoy in said dominions all the privileges and advantages with
respect to commerce and in connection with other matters which are now
enjoyed by, or which in the future may be granted to, the subjects or
citizens of the most favored nation. Article 3. British subjects shall
be permitted to buy, lease, or acquire in any lawful way whatever all
kinds of property within the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of
Sulu; and his Highness extends, as far as lies within his power, to
every British subject who establishes himself in his dominions, the
enjoyment of entire and complete protection and security to person
and to property--as well any property which in the future may be
acquired, as that which has already been acquired prior to the date
of this agreement. Article 4. His Highness the Sultan of Sulu offers
to allow the war vessels of her Britannic Majesty and those of the
India Company to enter freely the ports, rivers, and inlets situated
within his dominions and to permit said vessels to supply themselves,
at reasonable prices, with the goods and provisions which they may
need from time to time. Article 5. If any English vessel should
be lost on the coasts of the dominions of his Highness the Sultan
of Sulu the latter promises to lend every aid in his power for the
recovery and delivery to the owners of everything than can be saved
from said vessels; and his Highness also promises to give entire
protection to the officers and crew and to every person who may be
aboard the shipwrecked vessel, as well as to their property. Article
6. Therefore, her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, and the Sultan of Sulu, bind themselves to adopt
such measures as lie within their power to suppress piracy within
the seas, islands, and rivers under their respective jurisdiction
or influence, and his Highness the Sultan of Sulu binds himself not
to harbor or protect any person or vessel engaged in enterprises of
a piratical nature. Article 7. His Highness the Sultan of Sulu, for
the purpose of avoiding in the future any occasion for disagreement,
promises to make no cession of territory within his dominions to any
other nation, nor to subjects or citizens thereof, nor to acknowledge
vassalage or feudality to any other power without the consent of her
Britannic Majesty. Article 8. This treaty must be ratified, and the
ratifications will therefore be exchanged in Jolo within two years
from date. Home Copy.--Brooke.--Approved, etc.--Signed and sealed
May 29, 1849.



Zamboanga, June 5, 1849.--Mr. Consul-General:--I have received the
letter which you have done me the honor to send under date of the day
before yesterday in reply to mine, and I acknowledge receipt of copy of
the treaty which you negotiated with his Highness the Sultan of Sulu
on the 29th May last. I have no remarks to make, Mr. Consul-General,
with respect to the first six articles of the treaty, for the
clauses they contain are not of such an urgent character that my
Government cannot postpone their discussion if it so deems advisable;
but I might perhaps create in the future serious embarrassment to our
respective Governments should I allow Article 7 to pass unnoticed. It
establishes two principles of the most vital importance: (1st) His
Highness the Sultan binds himself to recognize the sovereignty of no
power without previously notifying her Britannic Majesty; and (2nd)
to make, likewise, no cession of the least portion of the territory
of his dominions to any State, person or corporation. With relation
to the first point, and waiving for the moment the question whether,
because the Sultan is in possession, with slight exceptions, of the
coast of Sulu, this island must be regarded as his exclusive domain,
it is my duty, Mr. Consul-General, to inform you that for a long time
past the said Sultan of Sulu has admitted and acknowledged himself
to be under the protection of her Catholic Majesty, recognizing the
sovereignty of Spain in a public way and in official documents which
his Excellency the Governor-General of these Philippine Islands will
be able to produce at the proper time and place. As regards the second
point: I find no objection to the pledge of his Highness having all the
force of free right with respect to those parts of his dominions lying
outside of the island of Sulu, namely, the north and northeast part of
Borneo, now under the rule of the Sultan; but under no circumstances
with respect to the said island of Sulu and its neighboring islands;
for not only can Spain not recognize in any power the right to
intervene in the matter of ceding or not ceding the island of Sulu
and its surrounding islands, as it is claimed can be done according
to the terms of Article 7 of the Treaty; but Spain does not recognize
this right even in the Sultan and Datus of Sulu, because, as I have
had the honor to inform you, Mr. Consul-General, these territories
belong to Spain, by a right not prescribed, by a right in no way
established by the conquest of this archipelago, but positively
through the willing submission of the real natives, the Gimbahans,
who do now, and who at the end of the 17th century did, constitute
the most numerous portion of its population, whose oppressors were
then and are now the Sultan and Datus, Malay Mussulmans. At this very
time the chief of the Gimbahans, this unfortunate and enslaved race,
cherishes with respect and veneration his loving remembrance of Spain
and holds in his possession the proofs of what I assert. This fact
established, Mr. Consul-General, I am forcibly constrained to protest,
which I accordingly do, against every claim in its favor by your nation
on the terms of the said Article 7 of the treaty referred to of May
29th of the present year, since it prejudices the incontestable and
recognized rights of the crown of Spain to the sovereignty of the
territory of the island of Sulu and its surrounding islands, and to
its sovereignty over the present possessors of the coasts of this
archipelago, begging that you will kindly acknowledge receipt of this
letter in order to cover my responsibility to my Government. Receive,
again, Mr. Consul-General, the assurances, etc.


C. de Figueroa.

To Sir James Brooke, Consul-General for her Britannic Majesty in
Borneo and Governor of Labuan.



H. M. S. "Nemesis," June 5, 1849.--Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge
receipt of your communication; and as the matter in question will
probably have to be discussed between our respective Governments,
I think it better not to take up the objections raised by you in
connection with Article 7 of the treaty recently negotiated with
his Highness the Sultan of Sulu. I have the honor to be, with great
consideration, Sir, Your obedient servant.


Brooke, Commissioner and Consul-General.

To His Excellency, Col. C. de Figueroa, Governor of Zamboanga.


Military and Civil Government, Town of Zamboanga, No. 100, Government
Department.--Most Excellent Sir:--On reëmbarking at Malusu, March
31st last, returning from the operations which I had conducted against
the same on that same day, following instructions received from your
office in a communication of the 17th of the said month of May, the
result of which I reported to the most Excellent the Captain-General
in an official letter of the 2nd instant, No. 209, the war vessel of
the English East India Company, the "Nemesis" was sighted and soon
afterwards cast anchor in our vicinity. Aboard the vessel was Sir
James Brooke, Consul-General for his country in Borneo and Governor
of Labuan; and as a result of a long conference I had with the latter
gentleman in regard to recent events in Sulu--which conference it
was agreed to continue in this place immediately upon my arrival
here--I gave him, successively, the two communications of which I
attach copies; with them I send to your Excellency letters dated the
3rd and 5th instant replying to mine in terms that your Excellency
will see embodied in the two original letters of corresponding dates,
which I likewise enclose herewith, retaining copies of them, as also
an authorized copy of the treaty or agreement of the 29th of last
May, also enclosed; feeling confident that the indulgence of your
Excellency will approve my action in this delicate matter. May God
preserve your Excellency many years.


Zamboanga, June 6th, 1849.

Cayetano Figueroa.

The most Excellent, The Governor and Captain-General of the
Philippines.

Copies.--José María Peñaranda: (his flourish).






APPENDIX XVII

COMMUNICATION FROM THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE, RELATIVE TO THE TREATY OF SIR JAMES BROOKE WITH
THE SULTAN OF SULU; AUGUST 16, 1849 [291]


Office of the Captain-General and Governor of the Philippines.

To his Excellency, The Secretary of State and of the Office of
Gobernación of the Kingdom, I have the honor to state the following,
on this date, and under No. 499.

By the communications which I had the honor to send your Excellency
from Zamboanga on the 23rd of June and 4th of July last, and that of
the General second in command, No. 482, your Excellency must have been
informed of the treaty which has been made in Jolo by the Englishman
Sir James Brooke, of the answer of the Governor of Zamboanga to the
latter and his negotiation with the Sultan and Datus to have the
treaty left without effect, without obtaining the least satisfaction.

It will therefore be necessary that the question be settled between the
two Cabinets, and I believe that Holland will take our part, as she has
an illfeeling against England on account of the latter's usurpations
in Borneo, contrary to the spirit of the treaty of March 17, 1824,
between the two countries, and must fear to see her rich possessions
surrounded by those of so powerful a rival. The communications of her
Majesty's Consul in Singapore and his confidential correspondence with
the Governor-General of Java, which he has forwarded to the Secretary
of State, show that the Dutch Government wishes to maintain the most
friendly relations with Spain. Although the English press in Singapore
and Hong-Kong are still speaking of a Dutch expedition against Jolo,
nothing has been done hitherto, and the favorable season for such an
expedition has passed.

As the correspondence between Brooke and the Governor of Zamboanga will
probably play an important part in the future correspondence with the
British Government, I believe it is my duty to submit a few remarks in
regard to the action taken by the said Governor. Notwithstanding that
the objections, which he submitted to Brooke in regard to Article 7
of the treaty, were well founded, he ought not to have entered upon
such a discussion, and much less to have particularized it in such
a way: he ought to have protested against the treaty as a whole,
and to have declared it null, as made without the consent of Spain,
which holds not only a protectorate, but sovereignty or dominion over
the territory. The second defect that I find in the same letter to
Brooke, is his basing our right to the sovereignty over Sulu on the
"free submission of the true natives of the Gimbahan race, who live
in the interior of the island and are oppressed by the Sultan and the
Datus." Although there is some truth in that statement, and we might
take advantage of this element in case of a war with the Sultan,
I believe that it ought not to have been made under the present
circumstances, as, on the same principle, we would invalidate the
rights founded by us on the different treaties made by Spain with the
Sultan and Datus of Sulu. The acknowledgment made by the latter of the
sovereignty of Spain during over two centuries and more especially in
the treaties of 1646, 1737 and 1836, by the first of which they pledge
themselves to pay, as vassals, a tribute of three boatloads of rice,
as recorded in the Archives, is a powerful argument in favor of our
rights, which the Sultan has often confirmed in his communications
to this Government and in the passports which he gives his subjects,
on printed forms supplied by my predecessor;--I enclose herewith a
copy of one of said passports.

The British, who doubtless do not feel very certain about their rights,
try to excuse their conduct through the press, as they did when they
occupied Labuan by force. The Singapore Free Press of the 6th of July
published an article in which it alleges, for the purpose of proving
that Sulu has always been considered as a sovereign independent power,
that we said nothing to England when she accepted the cession of the
island of Balambangan, between Borneo and Palawan. Even supposing
the fact to be true, there would be nothing astonishing about it,
considering the distress and the lack of means of the Government
at that time, after the war which, but a few years before, it had
miraculously carried on against the English who held Manila and many
other places in the islands, and the work it had to do in order to
put down interior rebellions, to reorganize the administration and to
reëstablish normal conditions in the provinces which had been left
uncontrolled during four years and had suffered the consequences of
circumstances so unfortunate. Furthermore, the cession of Balambangan
cannot be considered as an act of free will on the part of the Sulus,
since they took advantage of the first opportunity to drive the British
off the island, when they had hardly started to firmly establish
their trading posts. The newspaper also mentions the doctrine
of Walter, which says that an agreement similar to that existing
between the Spanish and Sulu Governments does not entirely derogate
the sovereignty of the protected state, which can make treaties and
contract alliances, except when it has expressly renounced its right
to do so; and that if the first state fails to protect the other, the
treaty is invalidated; the author of the article adds that this is our
case, since we allowed the Dutch to attack Sulu without interfering,
or, as far as known, requiring a reparation or the assurance that
such an attack would not be renewed.

With regard to the first point, the reference to Walter is correct,
but Walter adds in the same paragraph that "the protected nation is
bound forever by the treaty of protection, so that it can undertake
no engagements which would be contrary to said treaty, that is to say,
that would violate any of the express conditions of the protectorate,
or be inconsistent with any treaty of the said class:" how then
could Article 7 of the treaty made by Brooke be valid, when by said
article the Sultan pledges himself to recognize the sovereignty of
no power without the previous consent of her Britannic Majesty, and
not to cede the smallest part of the territory of his dominions to any
state, person or corporation, said Sultan having already recognized the
sovereignty of Spain and the rights of the latter over the greater part
of his territory, in which the island of Palawan, which was ceded to
us in the last century by the kings of Bruney is included by mistake.

In regard to the second point, the author of the article is also in
the wrong: for this Government was neither aware of the intentions
of the Dutch, nor was its assistance requested by the Sultan; and
your Excellency knows in what terms I wrote to the Governor-General
of Java about that matter.--If I have given so many details, despite
their not being new to your Excellency it is because the article of the
Singapore Free Press may have been inspired by the British Government,
and deserves therefore not to be left unnoticed.

In the event of which I am writing, your Excellency will see the
fulfilment of my predictions, and it may perhaps be only the prelude
of events of still greater importance.

Thus I cannot but earnestly recommend to your Excellency's notice
the necessity that the Governor of the Philippines have very
detailed instructions or very ample powers to proceed as regards
the Southern regions in accordance with what he believes best
suited to her Majesty's interests and to the security of these rich
possessions. In this connection I take the liberty of recommending to
your Excellency such action as our Sovereign the Queen may deem most
wise on my communication (consulta) number 359 and others relative
to the same subject.

Perhaps, as I mentioned in my communication of the 4th of July last,
the only advantageous issue for us would be to send a strong expedition
and to occupy Jolo, our action being warranted by the piratical acts
committed by several small boats of Bwal, Sulu; the Dutch may avail
themselves of the same excuse and send an expedition before us, if,
as is possible, other pancos [292] [Moro boats] have gone south for
the same purpose; but anyhow the behavior of the Sultan and Datus of
Sulu would give us excellent reasons for taking action against them
at any time.


God keep your Excellency many years.

Manila, August 16, 1849.

The Count of Manila.

His Excellency, the Secretary of State and "Gobernación."






APPENDIX XVIII

REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO TAXES AND IMPOSTS ON NATIVES AND IMMIGRANTS
IN SULU [293]


General Government of the Philippines, Treasury Department, Manila,
February 24th, 1877.


In view of the communications of the politico-military governor
of Sulu of October 6th of last year, in which he suggests to this
general government the concession of various exemptions in favor of
the natives of these islands and of any Chinamen who shall establish
themselves in the said place, to the end that by this means there may
be promoted the immigration which the interests of that island demand:

In view of the reports issued in the premises by the central
administration of imposts, the office of the insular auditor, [294] and
the insular departments of civil administration and the treasury: and

Deeming it expedient, for the realization of the high purposes that
required the military occupation of Jolo and for the progressive
and efficacious development of the moral and material interests of
this young colony, that there should be granted certain exemptions
for the encouragement of the immigration thereto of the greatest
possible number of inhabitants: this office of the general government
in conformity with the suggestions made by the treasury department,
and in accordance with the statements made by the department of civil
administration, disposes the following:

1. All immigrants to the island of Sulu, of whatever class, race,
or nationality, who shall establish themselves definitively in the
same, engaging in agricultural, industrial, or commercial pursuits,
or in any art, trade, or occupation, shall be exempt during ten years
from all the contributions or taxes imposed, or which in the future
may be imposed, upon the inhabitants of the Philippine Archipelago.

2. The children of immigrants to Sulu, born in said island or who
establish themselves there before becoming taxpayers in the pueblos
of their birth, shall commence to pay taxes at the age of twenty-five
years, but shall be exempt from military service so long as they
reside in the said island.

This decree shall be published in the Official Gazette and communicated
to the council of administration, the office of the captain-general,
and the insular department of civil administration; and shall be
returned to the treasury department for such further action as may
be proper.


    Malcampo.



General Government of the Philippines, Treasury Department, Manila,
August 10, 1887.


In view of the investigation conducted by the intendant-general
of the treasury with the object of determining whether it would be
expedient to prolong the term of exemption from all kinds of taxes
and imposts in favor of natives and of immigrants of whatever race or
nationality who are established, or who shall establish themselves,
in Sulu for the purpose of engaging in any kind of industry, commerce,
profession, art, or trade, or in agriculture:

In view of the reports issued by the said directive bureau of the
treasury and the politico-military governor of Sulu:

And considering that exemption from all burdens constitutes one of
the most efficacious means of encouraging the immigration demanded by
the interest of the archipelago in question; this general government,
in conformity with the suggestions made by the office of the intendant
of the treasury and the politico-military governor of Sulu, disposes
that the term of exemption granted by superior decree of this general
government of February 24th, 1877, shall be understood as extended
for another term of ten years, the said extension to be reckoned
from the day following that on which the first term expires, that is,
from the 25th day of February of the current year.

This decree shall be published in the Official Gazette; the Government
of his Majesty shall be informed thereof and a copy of the records
transmitted; it shall be communicated to the council of administration,
the tribunal of accounts, the office of the Captain-General, and the
insular department of civil administration; and shall be returned to
the office of the intendant of the treasury for any further action
that may be proper.


    Terrero.



Office of the Governor-General of the Philippines.

Most excellent and most illustrious Sir: The politico-military governor
of Sulu, in a communication dated the 9th instant, states as follows:


    Most excellent Sir: As the time expiration of the exemptions
    granted to Sulu and its port by decree of the general government
    under the able direction of your Excellency, dated February 24th,
    1877, and extended by superior order issued from the same office
    for another term of ten years, on August 23rd, 1887, is drawing
    near, the person who has the honor to sign hereunder believes
    that the moment has come to call the attention of your Excellency
    to the matter, and he takes the liberty to set down some remarks
    in the premises, to the end that when your Excellency determines
    what is deemed most expedient, they may be taken under advisement.

    In the exemptions granted to Sulu, it must be borne in mind that
    they affect two distinct elements, which constitute the life
    and favor the development of this locality. Some have reference
    to the exemption from all taxes, tributes, and gabels imposed,
    or to be imposed, in favor of natives or foreigners taking up
    their abode in the Sulu archipelago. Others refer exclusively
    to the declaration of a free port, with exemption from all taxes
    and customs formalities in favor of the capital of the island.

    In treating this question and in considering what ought to be done
    in the future, when the moment arrives for determining whether
    a fresh extension is expedient, or whether, on the contrary,
    this territory must enter upon the normal administrative life
    general in other localities of the Philippine Archipelago,
    the subject must be dealt with under the two aspects above
    set forth. In regard to the declaration of freedom of the port
    granted to Jolo, it is undoubtedly expedient to continue it for
    the present without change. So long as the protocol entered into
    with the other nations who are parties thereto, continues in
    force--in which protocol our incontestable right of sovereignty
    over this archipelago, with the limitations therein stipulated,
    is declared--it would be highly impolitic to close the period
    of franchise granted to this port. Should there be established
    the embarrassing obstacles and difficulties to commerce entailed
    by the formalities of customs regulations, the English steamers
    which now carry on the trade with Singapore, would immediately
    cease to visit this port and would make their destination some
    other port of the island, where, under the provisions of the
    protocol above referred to, no one could lawfully obstruct them
    until after the effective occupation of the new port selected for
    trading operations, and until after having allowed to elapse the
    requisite time subsequent to publishing this resolution in the
    official papers of the Peninsula. The distinguished intelligence
    of your Excellency will perceive easily that after this had been
    repeated several times, we should find ourselves compelled either
    to occupy effectively all the islands of the Sulu archipelago where
    English steamers might attempt to establish their business, or,
    in the end, to allow them to carry on their commercial operations
    at any place that suited them, which, without doubt, would be much
    more prejudicial than what happens at the present time; for, at
    any rate, so long as steamers come exclusively to this port or to
    that of Siasi, as is the case at present, the trade can be watched
    easily and conveniently and without the commercial operations which
    are carried on giving rise to diplomatic questions; it is easy,
    also to prevent the traffic of arms and war supplies, which would
    not be the case if they touched at other points where our sphere of
    action is not so direct and effective. Furthermore, the advantages
    of the present situation must also be taken into account. So long
    as these steamers touch only at Jolo and Siasi, as happens now,
    these two points are the only markets, whither all the people of
    the archipelago must necessarily go to trade, not only to supply
    themselves with the effects which they import and are necessary
    to life, but also to sell all the products they gather in their
    fields and in the seas, which constitute the element of commerce
    that justifies English vessels in visiting these regions, making it
    possible to collect sufficient freight to maintain the two regular
    lines now established. It is obvious that, since we are masters
    of the towns of Jolo and Siasi--the only points of distribution
    for effects necessary to the life of the natives here--we can,
    when we consider it expedient, prevent the sale of these effects
    to the villages hostile to the city, a most momentous advantage
    resulting therefrom and a means of government of inestimable
    value. So long as the Moros have to supply themselves from these
    markets, our importance is incontestable; all their outbreaks
    are easily checked without appeal to violent methods; and the
    civilizing effect which results from the constant intercourse
    which is necessitated by their coming to the occupied ports, is
    extended, thereby modifying the sanguinary and turbulent habits of
    this race. If the revenues from the duties which would be imposed
    were of sufficient importance to cover the expenses entailed by
    the occupation of Sulu, the arguments supporting the opinion
    above expressed could easily be set aside. But unfortunately
    there can not be expected from the custom house of Jolo, in the
    event of its establishment, even the expenses necessary to cover
    the salaries of the personnel engaged therein. For, the foreign
    steamers which now visit this port would immediately discontinue
    their voyages, and even though it were possible to prevent them
    from making port at some other place for the purpose of carrying
    on their mercantile operations--a thing which would not be easy so
    long as the treaty is in force--what would happen? Why, that the
    trade would be continued by means of smaller boats which would
    come from Borneo, and it would not be feasible to prevent this
    except by the posting of a very large number of coastguards along
    the shores of the innumerable islands of Sulu, a method which
    it would be altogether impossible to adopt. It is, therefore,
    unquestionably expedient to maintain the present status, whether
    the matter be considered under its economic aspect or under that
    of the policy it is necessary to develop in this territory. A
    very different course must, in the opinion of the undersigned,
    be followed in the matter of the exemption from taxation granted
    to the inhabitants of Sulu. These exists here a numerous Chinese
    colony, which is the element that really enjoys the benefit of
    the advantages flowing from the present free-port conditions,
    and it is neither just nor equitable that, while the Chinese find
    in us the support and protection which enable them to carry on
    and develop the trade in which they alone engage, they should not
    contribute in any way towards the expenses of the Government which
    furnishes them so many advantages. It is, therefore, expedient
    to impose upon all Chinaman residing in the Sulu territory the
    obligation to pay the same taxes as are paid by those of the same
    race in other parts of the Philippines. The establishment of this
    system promises not only the profit of the sums which would be
    collected as a consequence thereof, but also the desideratum of
    introducing order into the anarchical manner of life obtaining
    among the Chinese here. As soon as the obligation to pay taxes
    is imposed upon all and the lists of tax-payers are made up,
    individual interest will see to it that all persons living in
    the country are included therein; for it is unquestionable that,
    since each desires to be placed under the same conditions as the
    other, the Chinamen themselves will be of very great assistance
    in discovering those who now are not included in the incomplete
    and untrustworthy census lists existing in the offices of the
    Government of Sulu. It is believed, then, that it is expedient
    and just to discontinue the franchise now enjoyed by the Chinese
    here, and that they should begin to contribute at once towards
    defraying the expenses of the treasury, paying at least as much as
    is paid by their countrymen in other parts of the Philippines. It
    would appear also equitable that the Indians residing here should
    also begin to pay the cédulas [295] of the class to which they
    respectively belong; but there must be borne in mind the limited
    number of individuals of this race residing here; the expediency
    of encouraging by this means the immigration of fresh residents;
    and, above all, the services they render in any case of alarm,
    whether caused by juramentados or by more serious aggressions
    attempted against the city; all of which circumstances make it
    proper that they should continue enjoying the exemption from
    the payment of poll-tax which they now enjoy, as also exemption
    from all the other taxes upon the insignificant industries from
    which they gain a subsistence. The treasury could not hope for
    any happy results in this direction; and, on the other hand, if
    such a tax were imposed, the place would, in a very short time,
    be left entirely without any civilian population; for only with
    difficulty, and thanks to the franchises, can persons be found
    who will face the constant danger in which residents in Jolo are
    placed--especially those who engage in the cultivation of the
    soil in the outskirts of the town; of which class the civilian
    population is, in a very large majority, composed.

    It remains, only, most excellent Sir, to discuss the expediency,
    or otherwise, of establishing taxation upon commerce, industry,
    and property. All the urban property of Jolo is in the hands of
    the Chinese, with so few exceptions that there are not more than
    three property holders who do not belong to that race. In their
    hands is all the commerce, with the sole exception of two Spanish
    houses: every thing relating to business is in their power; so
    that any burden imposed in this direction would not be borne by
    them, but would be paid by the garrison of Jolo. For, united as
    the Chinamen are in every thing that relates to the avoidance of
    tax-paying, they would come to a perfect understanding to surtax
    every thing,--not in the same proportion as the contributions
    they would pay, but with a considerable increase, with the
    result that the only tax-payer to the treasury and for the
    Chinaman would be the unfortunate inhabitant of Jolo. And since
    the population here consists almost entirely of the garrison,
    which renders such arduous services at this place, I believe
    that it would not be just to add to the other disadvantages that
    the service here offers, the very serious one that would result
    from the imposition of taxes in this capital. Furthermore, one
    must not lose sight of what might happen or rather what would
    immediately happen, when, by taxing the commerce of the city,
    the majority of the Chinamen now established here would go to
    Maymbung, with a tendency to store their merchandise at other
    important points in the island, in which places our rule is, it
    may be said, nominal, and it is unnecessary to insist upon the
    undesirable consequences that would follow; for we should return
    to the condition in which Maymbung stood in April of the year
    1887, when this town was a very important center of resistence
    to our rule, due to the facility afforded in that place for the
    purchase of unlimited arms and ammunition, a business carried
    on by the foreign steamers who anchored there at that time. And
    all this without taking into account the undesirability, from a
    political point of view, of affording the Moros the opportunity
    of purchasing their supplies at prices lower than those in this
    city; since, if the merchants in that town did not pay taxes
    they would be able to sell at lower prices than those in the
    capital. Summing up what I have stated above and recapitulating
    the questions herein treated, I will conclude by submitting to
    the distinguished intelligence of your Excellency that I consider
    necessary and of the highest political expediency the maintenance
    of the freedom of the port granted to Jolo; that this franchise
    should be extended to Siasi, which enjoys this privilege in fact
    though not by right; and that care should be taken to prevent the
    slightest obstacle from interfering with the trade at both points,
    to the end that foreign steamers may, in their own interest,
    touch only at these two points of the archipelago of Sulu; that
    the Chinamen should be formed into guilds or associations, after
    the pattern of the organizations prevailing in other parts of the
    Philippines, these being necessary, further, to the making up of
    the lists of tax-payers; that, as a consequence of the formation
    of these associations, they should be compelled to pay taxes to
    the same extent as all other Chinamen residing in the country,
    unless your Excellency is of the opinion that the quota should
    be increased in consideration of the other advantages they enjoy;
    that there should be imposed a tax upon smokers of opium and upon
    the importation thereof. This tax would be a source of revenue of
    some consideration if it were farmed, as was the intention four
    years ago, when sale to the highest bidder was desisted from in
    view of the decree of franchises which is the subject of this
    communication. Finally, that property, commerce, and industries
    should not be taxed, nor should the civilian population be burdened
    with the poll-tax, since the latter deserve consideration by
    reason of the arduous services they render in this place; and
    this applies to the garrison, as well as to the civilians who
    make up the town, who, in the end, would be the persons who
    alone would have to bear these burdens. Such, most excellent
    Sir, is the opinion, expressed as succinctly as possible, of the
    undersigned in regard to these matters, which, at no distant date,
    will present themselves for resolution and which your Excellency
    will determine with your well-known ability and good judgment.

    Which I have the pleasure to transmit to your most Illustrious
    Excellency, to the end that you may take note of the part relating
    to the economic side of this question.


    God preserve your most illustrious Excellency for many years.

    Manila, July 31st, 1896.

    Blanco.

    To the most excellent and most illustrious the Intendant-General
    of the Treasury.



Office of the Intendant-General of the Treasury Division of Direct
Imposts

Most excellent and most illustrious Sir: The just considerations set
forth by the politico-military governor of Sulu in a communication
addressed to his high Excellency the Governor-General of these islands
on July 9th of last year, forwarded to your most illustrious Lordship
on the 31st of the same month and year, reveal a close study of the
questions treated, based upon practice and experience.

The chief of the division of direct imposts, who signs hereunder,
in presenting the report ordered by your most illustrious Lordship
in your decree of the first day of the following August, must begin
by expressing at once his conformity with the views given by the
governor of Sulu, in the part relating to this division.

Undoubtedly considerations of the highest political moment led the
high authorities of the Archipelago, on August 23rd of 1887, to extend
for another term of ten years the franchises granted to Sulu, and
since these considerations have not ceased to be of moment, to judge
from the enlightened views expressed by the said politico-military
governor, it is to be presumed that it is expedient to grant a fresh
concession of franchises; but not, at this time, for a period of time
equal to that about to expire, though for a period that might well be
half that of the previous term; for, regarding the matter prudently,
it might happen that during this lapse of time the conditions in
the places under discussion should alter in such a way as to counsel
either the total suppression of the liberties in question or their
partial modification.

But if there are considerations in favor of this new concession,
equity counsels that there be excluded therefrom the Chinese in so far
as relates to the imposition of the poll-tax, since they control all
the business and are the only persons who really exploit that region.

Consequently, the chief of the division of direct imposts has the
honor to report to your most illustrious Lordship:

1. That it be recommended to his high Excellency the Governor-General
of these Islands, that, to take the place of the present franchises,
there be granted again, at the proper time, to the ports of Jolo and
Siasi, the exemption from the payment of all urban and industrial taxes
in favor of the natives and of the Chinese established at those points.

2. That there be created at once the imposition of the poll-tax upon
the Chinese.

3. That the natives and the civilian population be exempt from the
payment of poll-tax.

Your most illustrious Lordship will, however, determine whatever he
deems most expedient.


Manila, August 6th, 1897.

Marcelino Pacheco.



Office of the Intendant-General of the Treasury Division of Indirect
Imposts

Most excellent and most illustrious Sir: In compliance with the
decree which, under date of August 10 of the current year, your
most illustrious Excellency saw fit to issue, to the effect that, in
the shortest possible space of time the divisions of imposts should
report upon the matters concerning each one in the proceedings set
on foot by the politico-military governor of Sulu in regard to the
expediency or the inexpediency of the renewal of the exemption from
taxation enjoyed by the natives in that place, I have to state to
your illustrious Excellency that:

1. The undersigned chief, fully agreeing with the enlightened views set
forth by the governor of Sulu, believes that the maintenance of the
declaration of freedom of the port granted to Jolo is of the highest
political moment and that the franchise should be extended to Siasi.

2. That in regard to indirect imposts which are of such a nature that,
while they are a source of profit to the state, they bring also no
small benefit to the tax-payer, these should be made applicable to
the Sulu archipelago, as undoubtedly has been the case, as a matter
of fact, up to the present time in regard to the stamp and lottery
revenues.

3. Both for the reasons set forth by the governor of Sulu as well
as for these given by his predecessor on June 11, 1893, in favor of
a tax upon opium smokers, the undersigned chief believes that it is
not only just but a matter of the greatest necessity to continue the
imposition of this tax.

Your most illustrious Excellency will, however, order whatever he
deems most expedient.


Manila, September 10th, 1897.

José Garcés de Marcilla.




Office of the Intendant-General of the Treasury,

Manila, December 28, 1897.


Let the report of the Chamber of Commerce and of the administration
of customs of Manila be heard, within one and the same period of
five days.


Dominguez.






APPENDIX XIX

THE PROTOCOL OF SULU, OF 1877, BETWEEN SPAIN, GERMANY, AND GREAT
BRITAIN, MAY 30, 1877 [296]


General Government of the Philippines

Royal Order

Colonial office.--No. 281.--Excellent Sir: The Secretary of State sent
the following communication to this office on the 26th of March last:
By Royal order communicated by the Secretary of State and for such
action as is indicated therein I deliver herewith to your Excellency a
copy of the protocol signed on the 11th inst. by Señor Manuel Silvela,
Secretary of State, and by the representatives of Great Britain and
Germany, for the purpose of establishing the liberty of trade and
commerce in the Sulu seas; said protocol takes effect on this date,
as specified in Article 5 of the same.--Referred to your Excellency
by Royal order with a copy of the protocol, for its execution.--God
keep your Excellency many years.


Madrid, April 2, 1877.

Martin de Herrera. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.

Manila, May 30, 1877. The above order shall be executed, communicated
and published. Moriones.


[Protocol referred to.]

The Hon. Austin Henry Layard, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of her Britannic Majesty; and Count Von Hatzfeldt,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the
Emperor of Germany, commissioned by their respective Governments to
terminate the difficulties which have occurred in the Sulu seas and to
establish for that purpose, in a final way, the liberty of commerce
in those seas, acknowledged by the Secretary of State of Spain in
the Notes which he sent on April 15, 1876, to the representatives of
Great Britain and Germany;

After having examined with due attention the preliminaries of the
question and especially the negotiations formerly carried on between
the Governments of Great Britain and Germany and that of Spain,
have agreed to draw up the following Protocol:

The Secretary of State of Spain, in the name of his Government, says:

Considering the preliminary fact that the German ships "Marie Louise"
and "Gazelle" were returned and an indemnity paid for their cargoes
in 1873 and 1874, and that the German ship "Minna" was returned twice
in 1875 and 1874;

Duly appreciating the increasing requirements of navigation and
commerce, and above all the legal status constituted by the Notes of
the Spanish Secretary of State dated the 15th of April last and by
the official publication of said Notes by the Governments of Great
Britain and Germany, as also by the instructions given accordingly
by said Governments to their consuls, agents and commanders of their
naval forces;

Therefore the Government of his Majesty the King of Spain recognizes
that the merchant ships going to the Sulu archipelago can no longer
be required to call first at Zamboanga, to pay the harbor dues there
and to provide themselves with a navigation permit delivered at said
port. It furthermore believes that it must acknowledge, as provided
in the Notes of the 15th of April last, the complete liberty of
direct trade and commerce for ships and subjects of Great Britain,
the German Empire and the other powers, with the Sulu archipelago.

Considering that the Governments of Great Britain and of Germany have
maintained all their claims in regard to the liberty of navigation,
commerce and direct trade with the Sulu archipelago and within the
archipelago; that the Government of his Majesty the King of Spain
admits that it cannot guarantee the security of commerce at unoccupied
places of the archipelago in return for duties and dues paid, but will
guarantee perfect security to the ships and subjects of Great Britain,
Germany and the other powers at places occupied by said Government,
and provide the establishments necessary for the protection of their
trade, the Spanish Secretary of State remarks that there is no reason
why said ships and subjects should be exempted, at places occupied by
Spain, from the formalities, general regulations, and ordinary duties,
whose nature will be explained in the present Protocol.

The undersigned representatives of Great Britain and of Germany refer,
on their part, to the Notes and official communications sent by them
on this matter to the Spanish Government, and requesting the latter to
acknowledge the absolute liberty of commerce and trade in all parts
of the Sulu archipelago, said acknowledgment having been mentioned
by the Spanish Government in the Notes of April 15, 1876.

In consequence of what precedes and as the result of their conferences,
the undersigned have agreed on the following declarations:

I

Commerce and direct trading by ships and subjects of Great Britain,
Germany and the other powers are declared to be and shall be absolutely
free with the Sulu archipelago and in all parts thereof, as well as the
right of fishery, without prejudice to the rights recognized to Spain
by the present Protocol, in conformity with the following declarations:

II

The Spanish authorities shall no longer require ships and subjects
of Great Britain, Germany and the other powers, going freely to
the archipelago of Sulu, or from one point to another within the
Sulu waters, or from such a point to any other point in the world,
to touch, before or after, at any specified place in the archipelago
or elsewhere, to pay any duties whatsoever, or to get a permit from
said authorities, which, on their side, shall refrain from obstructing
or interfering in any way with the above mentioned trade.

It is understood that the Spanish authorities shall in no way and under
no pretense prevent the free importation and exportation of all sorts
of goods, without exception, save at such places as are occupied,
and in accordance with Declaration III, and that in all places not
occupied effectively by Spain, neither the ships and subjects above
mentioned nor their goods shall be liable to any tax, duty or payment
whatsoever, or any sanitary or other regulation.

III

In the places occupied by Spain in the archipelago of Sulu the Spanish
Government shall be empowered to establish taxes and sanitary and
other regulations, while said places are effectively occupied; but
Spain pledges herself, on her part, to provide in such places the
offices and employees necessary to meet the requirements of commerce
and the application of said regulations. It is however expressly
understood that the Spanish Government, while it is resolved to impose
no restrictive regulations in the places occupied by it, pledges itself
voluntarily not to establish in said places taxes or duties exceeding
those provided in the Spanish tariffs or in the treaties or conventions
between Spain and any other power. Neither shall it put into force
in said places exceptional regulations applicable to the commerce
and subjects of Great Britain, Germany and the other powers. In case
Spain should occupy effectively other places in the archipelago of
Sulu, and provide thereat the offices and employees necessary to
meet the requirements of commerce, the Governments of Great Britain
and Germany shall not object to the application of the rules already
stipulated for places occupied at present. But, in order to avoid the
possibility of new claims due to the uncertainty of business men in
regard to the places which are occupied and subject to regulations and
tariffs, the Spanish Government shall, whenever a place is occupied
in the Sulu archipelago, communicate the fact to the Governments of
Great Britain and Germany, and inform commerce at large by means of
a notification which shall be published in the official journals of
Madrid and Manila. In regard to the tariffs and regulations stipulated
for places which are occupied at the present time, they shall only be
applicable to the places which may be subsequently occupied by Spain
six months after the date of publication in the Official Gazette of
Madrid. It remains agreed that no ship or subject of Great Britain,
Germany and other powers shall be required to call at one of the
occupied places, when going to or from a place not occupied by Spain,
and that they shall not be liable to suffer prejudice on that account
or on account of any class of merchandise shipped to an unoccupied
place in the archipelago.

IV

The three Governments represented by the undersigned pledge themselves
respectively to publish the present declarations and to have them
strictly respected by their representatives, consular agents and
commanders of the naval forces in the seas of the Orient.

V

If the Governments of Great Britain and Germany do not refuse their
adhesion to the present Protocol within 15 days from this date, or if
they notify their acceptance before the expiration of said period,
through their undersigned representatives, the present Declarations
shall then come into force.


Manuel Silva, Secretary of State of His Majesty the King of Spain.

Done at Madrid, the 11th of March, 1877.

A true copy.--Madrid, April 2, 1877.--A true copy.--The Subsecretary,
Francisco Rubio.






APPENDIX XX

THE PROTOCOL OF SULU OF 1885, BETWEEN SPAIN, GERMANY, AND GREAT
BRITAIN, MARCH 7, 1885 [297]


General Government of the Philippines

Royal Order

Foreign Office.--No. 312.--Excellent Sir: The Secretary of State sends
me the following communication on March 29th, 1885:--Excellent Sir: I
have the honor to forward you a translated copy of the protocol between
Spain, Germany and Great Britain, the latter two nations recognizing
the sovereignty of the first over the archipelago of Sulu, signed in
Madrid on the 7th of March, 1885.--I send you this communication by
Royal order, and enclose a copy of the treaty referred to. God keep
your Excellency many years.--Madrid, April 8, 1885.--Tejada.

Manila, June 17, 1885.--To be executed and published in the Official
Gazette.


Terrero.


A seal which says: Office of the Minister of State.--Translation.--The
undersigned, his Excellency Señor José Elduayen, Marquis of Pazo
de la Merced, Minister of State of his Majesty the King of Spain;
His Excellency Señor Count Solms Sonnerwalds, Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of Germany,
and His Excellency Sir Robert B. D. Morier, Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of her Britannic Majesty, authorized in due
form to carry on the negotiations followed in London and Berlin during
the years 1881 and 1882 by the representatives of his Majesty the
King of Spain with the Governments of Great Britain and Germany, for
the purpose of obtaining from these two powers the solemn recognition
of the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago of Sulu, have agreed
on the following articles:

I

The Governments of Germany and Great Britain recognize the sovereignty
of Spain over the parts which are effectively occupied as well as
over those which are not yet occupied, of the archipelago of Sulu,
whose limits are established in Article II.

II

As expressed in Article I of the treaty signed on September 23, 1836,
between the Spanish Government and the Sultan of Sulu, the archipelago
of Sulu includes all the islands between the western extremity of the
island of Mindanao on one side and the mainland of Borneo and the
island of Palawan on the other, except those mentioned in Article
III. It is understood that the islands of Balabak and Kagayan Sulu
belong to the archipelago.

III

The Spanish Government renounces, as far as regards the British
Government, all claims of sovereignty over the territories of the
mainland of Borneo which belong or may have belonged to the Sultan
of Sulu, including the neighboring islands of Balambangan, Banguey,
Malawati, and all those comprised within a zone of three maritime
leagues from the coast, and which are part of the territories
administered by the company known as "The British North Borneo
Company."

IV

The Spanish Government pledges itself to carry out in the archipelago
of Sulu the stipulations contained in Articles I, II, and III of the
protocol signed in Madrid on March 11, 1877, viz.: (1) Commerce and
direct trading by ships and subjects of Great Britain, Germany and the
other powers are declared to be and shall be absolutely free with the
archipelago of Sulu and in all parts thereof, as well as the right
of fishery, without prejudice to the rights recognized to Spain by
the present Protocol, in conformity with the following declarations:
(2) The Spanish authorities shall no longer require ships and subjects
of Great Britain, Germany and the other powers, going freely to the
archipelago of Sulu, or from one point to another point in the world,
to touch, before or after, at any specified place in the archipelago
or elsewhere, to pay any duties whatsoever, or to get a permit from
said authorities, who, on their side, shall refrain from obstructing
or interfering in any way with the above mentioned trade.

It is understood that the Spanish authorities shall in no way and
under no pretense prevent the free importation and exportation of
all sorts of goods, without exception, save at such places as are
occupied, and in accordance with Declaration 3, and that in all places
not occupied effectively by Spain, neither the ships and subjects
above mentioned nor their goods shall be subject to any tax, duty
or payment whatsoever, or any sanitary or other regulation. (3) In
the places occupied by Spain in the archipelago of Sulu, the Spanish
Government shall be empowered to establish taxes and sanitary and
other regulations, while said places are effectively occupied; but
Spain pledges herself, on her part, to provide in such places the
offices and employees necessary to meet the requirements of commerce
and the application of said regulations. It is however expressly
understood that the Spanish Government, which is resolved to impose
no restrictive regulations in the places occupied by it, pledges
itself voluntarily not to establish in said places taxes or duties
exceeding those provided in the Spanish tariffs or in the treaties
or conventions between Spain and any other power. Neither shall it
put into force in said places exceptional regulations applicable to
the commerce and subjects of Great Britain, Germany and the other
powers. In case Spain should occupy effectively other places in the
archipelago of Sulu, and provide thereat the offices and employees
necessary to meet the requirements of commerce, the Governments of
Great Britain and Germany shall not object to the application of
the rules already stipulated for places occupied at present. But in
order to avoid the possibility of new claims due to the uncertainty of
business men in regard to the places which are occupied and subject
to regulations and tariffs, the Spanish Government shall, whenever a
place is occupied in the Sulu archipelago, communicate the fact to
the Governments of Great Britain and Germany, and inform commerce
at large by means of a notification which shall be published in the
Official Gazettes of Madrid and Manila. In regard to the tariffs
and regulations stipulated for places which are occupied at the
present time, they shall only be applicable to the places which
may be subsequently occupied by Spain six months after the date of
publication in the Official Gazette of Madrid.

It remains agreed that no ship or subject of Great Britain, Germany
and the other powers shall be required to call at one of the occupied
places, when going to or coming from a place not occupied by Spain,
and that they shall not be liable to suffer prejudice on that account
or on account of any class of merchandise addressed to an unoccupied
place in the archipelago.

V

The Government of her Britannic Majesty pledges itself to see
that there is entire freedom of commerce and navigation, without
distinction of flags, in the territory of North Borneo administered
by the "British North Borneo Company."

If the Governments of Great Britain and Germany do not refuse their
adhesion to the present protocol within fifteen days from this date,
or if they notify their acceptance before the expiration of said
period, through their undersigned representatives, the present
declarations shall then come into force. Done at Madrid the 7th
of March, 1885.--Seal.--(Signed) J. Elduayen.--Seal.--(Signed)
C. Solms.--Seal.--(Signed) R. B. D. Morier.






APPENDIX XXI

DECREE OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO PAYMENT OF TRIBUTE BY
SULUS, MARCH 1, 1894 [298]


Office of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Manila, March
1, 1894.


In view of the obligation incurred by the Sultan of Sulu by virtue
of which the Moros of all the Sulu archipelago have to pay from the
first day of January of next year, one real each, as a tribute of
vassalage; and since it is necessary to organize this service in a
regular manner and in harmony with the customs of the races living
there, I decree the following:

1. The Sultan of Sulu shall direct at once all the Datus and Chiefs
of the Moro rancherias [299] to make up lists of the names of the
inhabitants composing each aggregation, giving therein, besides the
names, the status of each individual.

2. These partial lists shall be fused in one single general census
which the Sultan of Sulu shall deliver to the politico-military
governor of that archipelago before October 1, of the current year.

3. The interpreters of Jolo, Siasi, Tata'an, and Bangao shall assist
the Sultan in the work of making up these lists and shall translate
them into Spanish; and for this extra work they shall receive the
allowances designated below, the amounts being deducted from the
total proceeds of the liege-money above referred to.


    Allowances

    To the interpreter of Jolo       P20   per month.
    To the junior linguist of Jolo   P 6   Do.
    To the interpreter of Siasi      P 8   Do.
    To the interpreter of Tata'an    P 8   Do.
    To the interpreter of Bangao     P 8   Do.


4. As soon as the lists are completed and have been examined by the
politico-military governor of Sulu, certified copies shall be sent
to this office.

5. The collection of the tribute shall be made by means of certain
special cedulas, which in due time will be furnished to the Sultan for
distribution, who will collect the amounts paid in and deliver them
over in specie at the office of the politico-military governor of Sulu.

6. The total proceeds from the said tribute, after deducting the
amount of the allowances to the interpreters, shall be devoted for
the present to the development of the establishments of Jolo, and
especially to the construction of roads.

To be communicated.


Blanco.






APPENDIX XXII

ROYAL COMMUNICATION RELATIVE TO THE RIGHTS OF FOREIGNERS ON THE PEARL
FISHERIES OF SULU [300]


Manila, December 25, 1895. His high Excellency the Minister of
Colonial Affairs.


Excellent Sir: In compliance with the Royal order communicated
under date of the 23rd of October last, I have the honor to send
to your Excellency a copy of the previous record of investigations
transmitted by the office of this General Government, together with
the report of the office of the secretary, the remittance of which
your Excellency requests.

The inquiry formulated by the politico-military governor of Sulu,
arising out of a resolution of the fishery board of the naval station
relative to the order prohibiting foreign subjects from engaging in
the pearl fisheries in the waters of the Sulu archipelago, did not call
for a speedy resolution nor a close study, it being sufficient to bring
the matter to the knowledge of your Excellency without entering deeply
into the question involved, in order not to prejudice the resolution of
the same, leaving to the supreme judgment of his Majesty's Government
the entire appreciation of its reach and consequences, as the only
authority acquainted with the demands of our international relations
and the influence thereon of a decision in regard to a matter of such
recognized importance as is that of the interpretation to be given
to Declaration I of the Sulu Protocol of May 11th of 1877, contained
in Article IV of the Protocol between Spain, Germany, and Great
Britain, signed in Madrid on March 7th, 1885:--hence the brevity of
the data contained in the communications above referred to and even
the forbearance of this office from expressing a concrete opinion
(in any case, not called for) in regard to a question as vital as it
is complex. But circumstances, which are always superior to every will
and every calculation, now make prompt action necessary, and not only
forbid any delay, but impose upon this General Government the duty
of emitting an opinion which shall complement the data furnished
by the office of the secretary of the same, which data were less
extensive and explicit than they would certainly have been had not a
respect for the free initiative of the Supreme Government acted as
a restraining influence. The incident arising out of the presence
in the city of Jolo of the British subject Mr. H. W. Dalton, from
Sandakan, awaiting the arrival of a fleet of boats of light tonnage
belonging to the English concern, The Pearling and Trading Co. Ltd.,
[301] of which he is the representative for the purpose of using the
same in the mother-of-pearl shell fishery, which fact I communicated
to your Excellency by cablegram on the 3rd of the current month,
makes more urgent the sovereign decision in regard to the concrete
point as to whether foreign subjects are allowed to engage in the
pearl fishery in the archipelago of Sulu.

In the judgment of this office (which has, on various occasions,
inspired only by a regard for the best interests of the nation,
expressed the opinion that the Sulu Protocol is too prejudicial to
the said interests to permit of the points of doubtful interpretation
in the same being interpreted liberally), the point in regard to the
right of fishery which foreigners lay claim to exercise freely in
waters under the jurisdiction of our sovereignty, is not a doubtful
one at all, but is entirely contrary to their pretensions. The claims
are founded, according to the statements of those who agree with the
views which they involve, in Declaration I of the said Protocol of
1877, reproduced in the Protocol of 1885 and in that signed in Rome
in the same year, relating to the Caroline and Pelew Archipelagoes.

This declaration runs as follows--ratified by Article IV of the second
of these important diplomatic documents:


    The direct commerce and trade of boats and subjects of Great
    Britain, of Germany, and of the other powers, is declared, and
    shall be, absolutely free in the archipelago of Sulu and in all
    its parts, as also the right of fishery, without prejudice to the
    rights recognized as belonging to Spain in the present Protocol,
    in conformity with the following declarations * * *.

    III. At points occupied by Spain in the archipelago of Sulu, the
    Spanish Government may establish imposts, and sanitary and other
    regulations of whatever kind, during the effective occupation of
    the said points * * *.


From the transcript it is evident that Spain may regulate the
exercise of the right of traffic and commerce, not with the purpose
of restricting, and much less of denying, the principle of commercial
liberty recognized in Declaration I, but with that of conditioning
the exercise of that right in such a way that her own rights as
a sovereign nation shall not be infringed. And what she may do in
regard to mercantile trade, with greater reason she may and should
do in everything referring to the right of fishery, a right which is
declared only in general terms, and one of which the protocol does
not treat except in making the affirmation of the principle itself,
whereas in regard to commerce, it descends to minute details.

And this could not be otherwise, for anything else would be equivalent
to impairing the sovereignty of Spain; and this, in an agreement in
which this sovereignty is openly recognized and proclaimed, would
pre-suppose a contradiction so palpable and absurd that it is not
worth while even to discuss it.

Spain, as a sovereign and independent state, holds and exercises her
sovereignty not only in her territories and on the coasts of the same,
but in her jurisdictional waters, and can, therefore, regulate the
exercise therein of any right granted to foreign subjects, and may,
even, in the exercise of her sovereignty, prohibit the enjoyment
of such right altogether; this is an indisputable principle of
international law, though there is nothing to prevent a state from
limiting the same in favor of another or other states; but it is a
sine qua non condition to this that there shall be an express and clear
declaration of her will on this point, and no one can reasonably affirm
that Spain has made in the Sulu Protocols, neither in that of 1877, nor
in that of 1885, a total or partial surrender of this right in regard
to that of fishery; there is, it is true, a declaration in general
terms that the fisheries are absolutely free in the archipelago of
Sulu; but this absoluteness of the principle is immediately qualified
by the condition that it shall be without prejudice to the rights
recognized as belonging to Spain in the protocol, and it has already
been pointed out that one of these rights--the principal one and
that which contains all the others, the right of sovereignty--is
proclaimed and recognized at the head of the agreement. Outside this
declaration in general terms, there will not be found in all the
protocol a provision or regulation referring to the exercise of the
right of fishery and much less a concrete and express declaration on
the part of Spain that she will permit the exercise thereof freely on
her coasts and in her territorial waters. To permit of this a concrete,
clear, and definite declaration would be necessary, such as is to be
found in the Morocco Treaty, signed on November 30, 1861, Article 57
of which establishes qualifiedly "That Spanish subjects shall have a
right to fish along the coasts of the Moroccan Empire;" and even so,
in Article 60 of the same treaty, it is stipulated that, in order to
facilitate the coral fishery, in which the Spaniards engage on the
coast of Morocco, fishers shall pay the sum of 150 Spanish dollars for
each coral fishing boat, and that through the representative of Spain
they shall request permission from the minister of foreign affairs
of His Majesty the Sultan who shall issue the necessary authorization.

From which it may be seen that even in the case of declarations in
regard to the right of fishery which are concrete, clear and definite,
there is needed, for the free exercise of the same, something more
than a declaration in general terms, such as is that contained in
the Sulu Protocol of 1877.

Furthermore, it is always customary in international agreements which
refer to fishery rights to lay down regulations and provisions which
shall regulate the exercise of such rights, as is proved by a multitude
of agreements, among which are: that already cited of Morocco, that of
February 18th, 1886, between Spain and France regarding the fishery
and navigation of the Bidasoa, in which the right of oyster fishing
is restricted, its absolute prohibition being made possible; as also
that of 1889 ratifying the preceding one, the Portuguese convention
of March 27th of 1893 and the coast police and fishery regulations;
as well as that of August 22nd of 1894, in regard to the fisheries
in the waters of the Algarbes, etc.; all of which is well known by
the illustrious Government of His Majesty, and attention is called
to it here only in support of the opinion maintained, namely, that
the right to authorize, condition, restrict, and even prohibit the
engagement in fishery on its coast and in its jurisdictional waters
is inherent in the sovereignty of an independent state; and if it has
this right in regard to fisheries in general, with greater reason must
it preserve and exercise the same in regard to oyster fisheries, by
reason of the changes which may be produced in the sea bed, and even
for the purpose of preserving the breeding grounds of the precious
pearl-shell mollusk, the Avicula Margaritifera, the banks being the
property of the nation, and like all its territory, inalienable and
non-prescriptible; both so that they shall not be exhausted and that
their exploitation may be reserved for the national industry.

From the preceding, written with less detail than would have been the
case had the pressure of time permitted, it may easily be inferred
that, in the opinion of this General Government, Spain in spite of
Declaration I of the Sulu Protocol--perhaps it would be more correct
to say, by virtue of that very declaration, the terms of which
really determine the meaning of Declaration III and Article I of the
Treaty--preserves intact her right as a sovereign nation to restrict,
condition, and even prohibit engagement in the oyster fishery on her
coasts and in her jurisdictional waters, without further limitations
than those which she may deem expedient to self-impose.

Admitting her rights as a sovereign state, there arises a question of
a political nature, which the circumstances above indicated convert
into a problem demanding an early resolution.

To what extent should Spain exercise this right?

On this point, the views of the General Government will be expressed
as concisely as possible and with the soberness demanded both by the
respect due to the high prerogatives of the public authorities and by
an ignorance of many of the elements which enter into the question,
without a knowledge of which it is difficult to determine to what
extent it is expedient to restrict the exercise of the right to engage
in the oyster fisheries which foreign subjects claim to exercise freely
in the Sulu archipelago, a pretension which this General Government
regards as entirely opposed to the rights of Spain and her moral and
material interests in the Far East. Our prestige with the Malay races
here, our moral influence over these semi-civilized Mohammedan people,
who recognize no right or supremacy but that of might, demand that
Spain, as a colonizing nation, shall maintain the integrity of her
sovereignty and shall not seem to be subjugated to the will of other
Powers, as would appear if, in her territories and on her coasts,
with the knowledge and permission of her authorities and of her war
ships, and without even heeding them, foreigners should perform acts
which, like that of engaging in the mother-of-pearl fishery, being
contrary to our material interests, cannot be carried out without
paying tribute to the Moro sultans and chieftains themselves.

There is no doubt that the need for preserving cordial relations with
Germany and England and for maintaining the most perfect understanding
between the European powers in anticipation of some concerted action
in regard to the Empires of China and of Japan, which will render
necessary in the future the expansive policy of the latter towards
the south, as well as the hegemony claimed by the latter in the
Orient, counsel a circumspect international policy and a moderate
exercise of our sovereign rights in the archipelago of Sulu; and for
this reason, perhaps it would be inexpedient to forbid the right of
fishery to foreign subjects, as such action would certainly give rise
to diplomatic questions and remonstrances, which should be avoided
at any cost; but this General Government deems it indispensable to
condition and regulate the exercise of this fishery right, especially
in so far as it relates to the pearl-producing oyster, the exploitation
of which should be governed by considerations of our prestige and
of the advantage and benefit of our material interests. Supported
therefore by our right of sovereignty, by international practice,
and by the terms of Declarations I and III of the Protocol of 1877 and
of Articles I and IV of that of 1885, there should be issued certain
coast police and fishery regulations for the Sulu archipelago, laying
down clearly the relations which are to exist between the Spanish
Government and foreign subjects engaging in the fishery industries
along our coasts and in our jurisdictional waters; which industries
should not be engaged in, especially in the case of the oyster,
without the necessary authorization of the Spanish authorities, and
after the payment of the corresponding industrial patent or license,
or of the dues which it may be deemed expedient to exact.

Much more might be said in regard to this important question,
as unexpectedly presented as it is urgent of resolution, given
the conditions created by the claim of the British subject
Mr. H. W. Dalton; and this General Government appreciates fully
the deficiency of its suggestions, which will be advantageously
supplemented by the great wisdom of his Majesty's Government, its
exalted patriotism, and the solicitous care that it gives to everything
touching the high interests of the nation, by which elevated sentiments
they are inspired.






APPENDIX XXIII

ROYAL DIRECTIONS RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGNERS ENGAGED IN
PEARL FISHING IN THE SULU WATERS, MARCH 23, 1896 [302]


Colonial Office

Excellent Sir: Examined by this office of the government the papers
transmitted by your Excellency with the official communication
No. 1967, of September 16th last, in the question raised by the
politico-military governor of Sulu, by reason of a communication
addressed to the same by the office of the commander-general of
the naval station at Manila, directing the prohibition of the
mother-of-pearl fishery in the waters of Sulu and the Carolines;
studied also the report of the General Government, and that of the
council of administration of the Philippines, and heard also the
illustrious opinion of the Department of State, to secure which the
papers were sent there, accompanied by the Royal order of the 7th of
January last; bearing in mind that our prestige among the natives in
those islands would perforce suffer seriously if foreigners were to
perform, without any intervention on the part of our authorities, acts,
which, like that of engaging in the mother-of-pearl shell fishery,
they cannot carry on without paying tribute to the Moro Sultans and
chieftains; though it is not less true that the absolute prohibition of
the right of fishery to foreigners would arouse, as wisely foreseen by
your Excellency, diplomatic remonstrances based upon the Protocol of
Sulu of March 7th, 1886; his Majesty the King (whom God protect), the
Queen Regent of the Kingdom acting in his name, has seen fit to direct
that your Excellency be informed that he has seen with pleasure the
tact and prudence with which this question has been dealt with, in the
first place by your Excellency, and afterwards by all the authorities
who have intervened in the same; that so long as the representative of
the English Pearling and Trading Company, the captains of their boats,
or other foreigners, do not urge with importunity the right to carry
on the industry of the mother-of-pearl shell fishery within the zone of
jurisdictional waters and at occupied places, an endeavor must be made
to prevent their doing so, in order, if possible, to set a precedent
favorable to our interests; and that in the event of their insisting,
it will be necessary to permit them to engage in the industry of the
mother-of-pearl fishery, with the obligation to submit in so doing to
the rules and regulations now in force or which may be put into force
hereafter. It is also the wish of his Majesty that your Excellency be
apprised of the expediency of formulating, with the greatest possible
despatch, coast police and fishery regulations for the archipelagoes
of Sulu and the Carolines; in which regulations care must be taken not
to make special mention of the Protocols, nor to recognize expressly
the rights of foreigners, and, on the other hand, not to depart from
the terms of the provisions of these international agreements, so
that in the event of any foreigners claiming the right in question,
they shall not be able to elude compliance with the regulations by
basing their pretensions on the terms of the said Protocols; for all
of which your Excellency will place yourself in harmony with the
competent authorities whose duty it is to take cognizance of this
matter, submitting afterwards for the approbation of this office
drafts of the coast police and fishery regulations above referred to.

By Royal order I communicate the above to you for proper action.

God protect your Excellency many years.


Madrid, March 23rd, 1896.

Tomas Castellano: rubricated.

To the Honorable the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.






APPENDIX XXIV

LA TORRE'S VIEWS ON THE POLICY THAT SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN MINDANAO
AND SULU, JANUARY 11, 1893 [303]


Office of the Governor-General of the Philippines

A seal with the inscription: "Office of the Captain-General of the
Philippines. Headquarters."

Excellent Sir: At all times the condition of the unsubdued regions
of the island of Mindanao and, in general, of the whole archipelago,
has occupied the close attention of the Governors-General of these
Islands, and they have studied, according to their respective views,
the best methods for the complete subjection of the same.

For my part, I have meditated deeply upon every thing relating
to this important matter, and judging both from past experience
and from observations that I have been able to make personally,
as I apprised your Excellency after my return from a visit to the
aforementioned island on May 29th last, I believe it is evident
that the adoption of the same system for the subjection of different
races will not be productive of good results. In the island of Luzon,
a properly understood policy of conciliation, accompanied by slight
displays of force, will be successful in conciliating and subduing
the people sooner or later; for it may be observed at once that here
there does not exist that great racial antagonism which nearly always
makes compromise impossible. Such a policy, linked with prudence and
particularly with justice on the part of the delegates of authority,
will always be productive of great results, aside from the fact that
there are here many villages whose inhabitants are not warlike, but,
on the contrary, are docile, and await only some slight indication on
our part to regard us as protectors and allies against their enemies.

Much has already been done in this direction, as is shown by the many
politico-military provinces existing in this island; but we should
not stop in this island of progress; and in order to carry forward
and consummate the complete subjugation of the extensive districts not
yet subdued, troops must be detailed,--not in very large numbers, but
still in numbers sufficiently large to affect appreciably the service,
equally necessary in other regions of the archipelago. This is one
of the reasons which make requisite an increase in the army force
stationed here; further, if the number of the comandancias [304]
is to be increased, it is obvious that, in order to garrison them,
more troops are needed.

I have pointed out the need there is for employing different methods
for the subjection of the different races; and in fact, in regard
to the races inhabiting Mindanao, I believe that it is obvious and
unquestionable that favorable results will never be secured without
employing methods other than those of attraction.

The Moro race is completely antithetic to the Spanish, whether the
latter be peninsular or indigenous, and will ever be our eternal enemy.

The past proves clearly that those ostensible and ephemeral
submissions, apparently guaranteed by oaths and agreements, do not
bind the Moros in the slightest degree; for, knowing nothing of the
first principles of good-faith and loyalty, they do not hesitate
to break their promises whenever a favorable opportunity offers and
they think it possible to defeat our troops. They make a pretense of
being trusting and attentive even to our smallest suggestions, but
they are always watching for a good chance to open up hostilities,
and will resort to treason and cunning.

For these reasons it is well that they should know that we are the
stronger; that our friendship suits their interests because we are
backed by force--which is the only argument they can understand;
that their friendship is of no moment to us; and that the instant
they antagonize us, they will be promptly and severely punished.

Having taken up this point of view, the policy that we should adopt
may be inferred.

It is not necessary to undertake operations on a large scale, or to
open what might be termed a regular campaign, as has been done every
two or three years in the past; but, with our troops established at
a number of fortified places, it may be seen at once from what has
been said above, that we ought to maintain them there at any cost,
and that, abandoning an attitude entirely passive, we should advance
little by little in our conquest, always establishing ourselves
firmly on the territory conquered. In this way we shall, step by
step, bring under our dominion a large area of territory, at the same
time extending our sphere of influence towards the interior. Given
the conditions above described, it will be understood at once how
much we should lose in importance in the eyes of such an enemy if,
in response to their frequent attacks, we confined ourselves entirely
to a defensive policy, for they would interpret such an attitude as
an indication of weakness; consequently it is impossible for us to
maintain an attitude of inactivity: rather, taking advantage of the
treacherous conduct of the enemy, we should castigate them by means
of rapid and unexpected excursions lasting a few days, and for this
purpose it is indispensable that small columns of troops be stationed
at two or three well chosen points.

That the Moros are not disposed to be our friends is evident: and
while frequent examples in the history of these islands, in addition
to what has been said above, are sufficient to prove this assertion,
it is further corroborated by the many despatches I have addressed to
your Excellency, apprising you of the attacks made by the Moros upon
our troops and especially of the incidents which have taken place
during the last months of the year 1892. These I will recapitulate
succinctly, as they show that, far from breaking the rebels, the
events have only increased their strength.

On the morning of October 28th, while a reconnaissance was being made
at the post of Baras, the detachment making the same was attacked
by some fifty or sixty Moros, who were awaiting them in ambush. The
latter were, however, repulsed, and our troops being reënforced by a
detachment from the fort, the enemy fled, leaving five dead on the
field, besides two spears, three krises, three kampilan, and two
daggers, the losses on our side being one dead and five wounded.

On the morning of November 9th, again at the time of making a
reconnaissance, at the post of Malabang, our men were attacked by
some sixty Moros, who, being repulsed, fled, leaving six dead on the
field--three others dying later, according to reports received--besides
four kampilan, three krises, one tabas, one lance, and four daggers;
the losses of our side being one soldier killed and six wounded.

These two posts being afterwards visited by the military commander
of Illana Bay and the politico-military governor of Mindanao, by
reason of reports having been received that some thousand Moros had
banded together for the purpose of attacking these two places, they
informed me that excellent discipline prevailed among the troops of
the said garrisons, and that the Moros must have beaten a retreat,
since they had not been seen in that country.

On my part I have directed that the greatest possible vigilance,
care, and watchfulness be exercised at all the posts, never losing
sight of the fact that they are always in the presence of the enemy,
as is proved by the frequency with which they have been attacked. I
have ordered, further, that, when making reconnaissances or upon any
other occasion when it is necessary to separate a detachment from the
main body, the greatest number of soldiers that the circumstances
permit be employed, so as to prevent a surprise or ambuscade,
which aside from the direct loss that it entails, might have the
effect of demoralizing the troops, and so of increasing the boldness
and temerity of the enemy; I have given special instructions, too,
that the officers display in the field the greatest possible energy,
so as to keep up the spirits and confidence of the men.

In the northern portion of Mindanao, between Iligan and Mumungan the
Moros have also been active in making attacks, and although beaten
in every case, thanks to the good discipline prevailing among the
men and the judgment shown by the officers, who inspire the former
with confidence and afford them a good example at all times, they
still hope to have better luck in their future raids, as is proved
by the despatches received from the politico-military commander of
Mumungan. These despatches show that our soldiers no longer fear the
Moro race, nor even the Juramentados; and that our men always await the
attack of the enemy with great calmness and bravery, as is shown by
the accounts of the frequent ambuscades laid and surprises attempted
by the Moros. Already at the beginning of 1892 the attitude of the
sultans and datus in the neighborhood of Mumungan was so questionable
that Captain Abad, then commander of the fort there, having attempted
to go up the river Agus, accompanied by only one officer and four
men--thus in the guise of absolute peace--Datu Ala, of Balud, who
is now our friend, stopped him when he approached his territory,
telling him that although he wished to live at peace with us, he
could not allow him to advance further, nor any part of our troops
to do so. In spite of this, two months after this incident, General
Castilla, following closely my instructions, and taking advantage of
the circumstance foreseen by me--that upon his arrival at Mumungan he
was visited by the neighboring datus and sultans, including the Sultan
of Pantar, he announced to the latter, acting under instructions from
me, his intention of returning the friendly visit. Leaving Mumungan
early, in spite of a continuous heavy rain storm, he reached Pantar
at about eleven in the morning without making any stop, accompanied
by Ala and another datu, and while he was holding an affectionate
interview with the Sultan of Pantar and the troops were resting,
the captain of engineers, Navarro, made a clandestine inspection of
the ground and took a rough sketch of the best site for the future
fort, close to a bridge that can be built across the river Agus,
with a turret or rough defensive fortification on the opposite bank;
this done, General Castilla returned that same afternoon to Mumungan,
which he reached before night, without having fired a shot, in spite of
the predictions of the datus that he might easily meet with resistance
on the road.

Later, all the datus living in the region lying between Pantar and
Iligan reiterated to me, personally, in May last, at Mumungan, and
later to the military commander, their protestations of adhesion to
Spain. Afterwards there came the visit that a goodly number of datus,
among them the Datu of Pantar, made me in Manila, where they remained
and were entertained during fifteen days; and with the consistent
approval of these, the road from Iligan to Mumungan was built, in
consequence of which work the weekly attendance of Moros at the market
of Iligan increased, and the Datu of Bukamar and another from Marawi
presented themselves in that place. Thither also the Datu Amay-Pakpak,
now an old man, promised to send his son. The concurrence of Moros
at that place was further increased by the assistance that was given
to a wounded Moro; until, at last, a solemn oath of allegiance was
secured, being taken, in the presence of the aforementioned military
commander, by a great number of datus and sultans, in accordance with
their ritual.

On November 8th, the military commander of Mumungan, under the pretext
of a wedding to which the Datu of Pantar had invited him and which he
attended, made an inspection of the country in the neighborhood of
the said rancheria [305] of Pantar, lying to the south of Mumungan,
and had an opportunity of seeing that, in conformity with the reports
I had received, Pantar possessed advantageous conditions for the
establishment there of another advance fort, the construction of
which could be commenced upon the continuation and completion up
to that point of the new road built from Iligan to Mumungan. But in
spite of the good intentions of the military commander not to break
into hostilities except in the last resort, in accordance with the
positive instructions I had given him, he was unable to prevent his
troops being attacked upon the return journey, and therefore they
opened fire upon the enemy; which proves once again the difficulty of
following the path of conciliation and attraction with an enemy who
pays absolutely no heed to reason; in spite of the fact that with
this method there had been joined that of warning the neighboring
Moros who profess to be so friendly, that the only genuine proof of
adhesion to which I should give credit would be that of the moral
and collective support of all of them against any act of aggression
within their territory committed by Moros from other rancherias,
whether in large or in small numbers.

On November 25th I was informed by the same military commander that,
while the convoy was transferring supplies from Mumungan to Iligan,
there appeared a juramentado, who attempted to wound a soldier; but
the latter, waiting for him with great calmness, defended himself
valiantly, and the Moro was despatched with the assistance of some
other soldiers who came upon the scene.

On the 10th of December I was informed that a detachment of the troops
stationed at Mumungan, while on its way to the market of Iligan was
attacked by a body of fourteen juramentados who, however, were repulsed
with a loss of two killed, while, on our side, one man was lost.

At Baras, also, while making the reconnaissance on December 10th there
appeared a band of Moros in an attitude of hostility; but they were
compelled to retire at the first volley from our troops. Nevertheless,
two juramentados separated themselves from the main body and attacked
an equal number of our men; the latter awaited them firmly and killed
them with bayonet thrusts. Another Moro was also slain while attempting
a precipitate flight. Recently, on the 15th of December, the military
commander of Mumungan, hearing of the intentions of the enemy, which
were far from peaceable, determined, in order to guard against all
contingencies, to continue the extension of the road and to complete
and close the palisade around the new inclosure at the fort, made so
as to accommodate the increased number of troops. For the first of
these two purposes, he left the fort at half past five in the morning,
well-armed and ready to punish the Moros if they presented themselves,
setting out with one hundred and fifty men of the 73rd regiment and
sixteen convicts, besides a corporal and eight persons of the 73rd
in charge of a company of engineers, another company of the 73rd and
sixty convicts, who marched without arms and equipped for work.

At ten o'clock in the morning the advance guard reached the entrance to
the wood, and as the intention was to collect lumber that had already
been cut and dragged to the road, the troops advanced. At this moment
there appeared in the middle of the road some eight hundred Moros
brandishing their arms and uttering war-cries, who immediately retired
to some defensive works which they had constructed out of the very
logs above referred to. In view of this, our troops continued their
march, opening fire at about one hundred yards from the defensive
works of the enemy, and in a little while, captured the same, routing
the defenders, as well as some more of the enemy who appeared on the
two flanks of the column, causing some eighty deaths; on our side we
had one killed and two wounded convicts. After this incident, the said
military commander made his way to Iligan without suffering any attack,
in spite of the fact that the Moros had constructed other defensive
works on the road, which latter were destroyed without any casualties.

The conduct of the troops on this march was brilliant, and I wish to
recommend to the consideration of your Excellency those who especially
distinguished themselves; but I have again directed the military
commander of Mumungan to avoid as far as possible all necessity for
fresh combats, extending, but without any compromise of dignity,
the policy of conciliation which I have so strongly recommended to him.

From all the above your Excellency will understand with how much
foresight I requested from the Government of his Majesty, on the
24th of April last, permission to place on a war footing as many of
the seven regiments which make up the infantry in these Islands as
had not yet been placed on this footing, setting forth the estimated
cost of the same in the plans which I sent for approval, and if the
increase was necessary then, it is evident that at the present time
it is much more necessary; for, as your Excellency will see from what
I have communicated to you in this extensive document, the condition
of the Moros, justifying the predictions made by me at that time,
has become steadily more hostile as they never rest nor miss any
opportunity of causing us the greatest possible harm, endeavoring
to obstruct all the work we plan to carry out for the improvement
of the means of communication between our present possessions; and
while it is true that they are not successful in their attempts,
still we must put a stop to their increasing audacity.

I take the liberty again to call the attention of your Excellency to
the absolute necessity of placing on a war footing the three regiments
now on a footing of peace, in accordance with the permission already
granted by the Department--without waiting until next July. In this
way, without undertaking a regular campaign, as I have already stated,
and without expense to the Government, it will be possible to improve
the present condition of things, which is gradually becoming somewhat
discreditable to the honor of the flag. I do not doubt that your
Excellency will so understand it, and I thank you in advance, in
the name of this suffering army, for the immediate concession of the
credit necessary for the reënforcement above mentioned. God protect
your Excellency many years.


Manila, January 11th, 1893.


Most Excellent Sir:--Eulogio Despojol.--Followed by a rubric. The most
Excellent the Minister of War.--A copy.--The Acting Colonel in Command
of Headquarters.--Pedro de Bascaran.--A seal with the inscription:
"Office of the Captain-General of the Philippines.--Headquarters."

A copy.--Luis de la Torre: rubricated.







NOTES

[1] See Ethnological Survey Publications, Vol. IV, Pt. I, p. 11.

[2] The spelling of proper names used throughout this paper is that
adopted by the author and differs in some respects from that in use
in the Division of Ethnology.--Editor.

[3] This settlement is on a small adjacent island of the same name.

[4] An officer next below a datu in rank.

[5] An officer next below a panglima in rank.

[6] The word Tumangtangis means "Shedder of tears." As the summit of
this mountain is the last object to be seen by sailors leaving the
island, they weep from homesickness when they lose sight of it.

[7] Quoted in Keppel's "Visit to the Indian Archipelago," p. 70.

[8] Some maps place this mountain near Tu'tu', but reliable Moros
apply the name to the mountain west of Si'it and nearer to Su' than
to Tu'tu'.

[9] Princess Ipil and her followers were wrecked and drowned at this
point. Their bodies are said to have turned into stone and formed the
rocks that line the shore. Some of the rocks seemed to the people to
resemble petrified human beings.

[10] Names of fruits with no English equivalents.

[11] A Philippine tree from the blossoms of which a perfume is made.

[12] Spanish word for street.

[13] Beach at the head of the bay.

[14] A sultanate in northern Borneo.

[15] The Mindanao Herald, July 21, 1906.

[16] Gum copal.

[17] Most of these are females.

[18] See below, p. 148.

[19] The eleventh month of the Mohammedan year.

[20] Sulu; the head, the chief.

[21] Arabic; the slave of the Merciful.

[22] Malay; sir or mister.

[23] Arabic; leader, caliph, high priest.

[24] A Sulu form of the Arabic "Caliph."

[25] Malay-Sanskrit; minister of state.

[26] The central high region of Sumatra.

[27] Malay; officer of state. It literally means "rich man."

[28] Sanskrit; king.

[29] Malay-Sanskrit; emperor or caliph. It is here used as a proper
noun.

[30] A place in Lati, Sulu.

[31] Sulu; chicken, fowl.

[32] Sulu-Malay; slave.

[33] Sanskrit; wise.

[34] Arabic; understanding, mind.

[35] Malay-Sanskrit; subordinate officer of state.

[36] Arabic; lady, grandmother.

[37] Arabic; safe and sound.

[38] Malay; lady, woman.

[39] Arabic; righteous.

[40] A title of nobility.

[41] Arabic, Fatimah; the name of the Prophet's daughter.

[42] Arabic; brilliant.

[43] Arabic; wife or husband.

[44] Arabic; beautiful.

[45] Arabic; hoping.

[46] Arabic; faithful.

[47] Arabic; religion.

[48] Arabic; trusted or trustworthy.

[49] Arabic; guide, leader.

[50] Sulu; fruit.

[51] Arabic; intelligent.

[52] Arabic; feminine of "salim" or safe and sound.

[53] Arabic; sleeping.

[54] Arabic; known.

[55] Arabic; noble, subordinate officer of state.

[56] Sanskrit; Iddha, kindled, lighted, or sunshine.

[57] Sanskrit; Indra, the god of the heavens, or most likely Indira,
name of Lakshmi, the wife of Vishnu.

[58] Sulu; light, sun.

[59] Arabic; wise.

[60] The name of Mohammed's wife.

[61] Arabic; everlasting, eternal.

[62] Arabic; perfection.

[63] Arabic; scribe.

[64] Arabic; educated, taught.

[65] Arabic; virtuous.

[66] Arabic; pride, glory.

[67] Arabic; father.

[68] Arabic; firm, resolute, an attribute of God.

[69] Arabic; Mary.

[70] The Baklaya party should have been mentioned after the Tagimaha,
but it was evidently left out by mistake. Tagimaha is a Sanskrit word
which means country.

[71] Arabic; generous, noble.

[72] Arabic; served, master.

[73] Arabic; noble, applied to a descendant of Mohammed.

[74] Sulu, anchorage. The settlement lies 3 miles west of Jolo.

[75] It is used here as a name. As a title it is higher than raja
and is equivalent to sultan or emperor.

[76] The Moro word for Zamboanga.

[77] Arabic; night, a common name.

[78] Arabic; power, superior authority, sultan.

[79] Arabic; glory.

[80] A corrupt form of the Arabic Ahmad.

[81] From the Arabic "Sheikh," meaning chief.

[82] A place in Sumatra (?)

[83] Java.

[84] Arabic; master or noble, addressed to descendants of the prophet
Mohammed.

[85] Town and state in southeastern Sumatra.

[86] Arabic; noble. This word is often pronounced by the Moros as
"salip" or "sarip."

[87] Arabic; height.

[88] Sanskrit; princess.

[89] Sanskrit; greater king, emperor.

[90] In Malay it indicates rank or office; in Sulu it is used only
as a name.

[91] Malay; young.

[92] Arabic; defender.

[93] Arabic; honor, respect.

[94] Arabic; star, meteor, bright flame.

[95] Arabic; chosen (by God).

[96] Arabic; interceder.

[97] Arabic; victory.

[98] From the Arabic `azeem or great; not from `Alim, meaning learned.

[99] Arabic; exalter or defender.

[100] Arabic; Israel.

[101] Arabic; honor.

[102] Arabic; orator; the pandita who reads the oration, a part of
the religions services held on Friday.

[103] See Ethnological Survey Publications, Vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 64.

[104] The servant of the giver.

[105] Jamiyun is Sanskrit and means brother or sister's son; Kulisa
is Indra's thunderbolt.

[106] One of the names of the wife of Vishnu.

[107] Sulu; the sun.

[108] The Sulus believed that Alexander the Great came to Sulu and
that their ancient rulers were descended from him.

[109] Sanskrit; the plant. Jamiyun Kulisa, Indira Suga, and Masha'ika
are the names of the ancient gods of Sulu. Prior to Islam the Sulus
worshiped the Vedic gods and evidently believed them to be the
forefathers or creators of men. The Sulu author was ignorant of this
fact and used the names of the gods as names of real men.

[110] Arabic; faithful.

[111] Chief.

[112] A gong used for signals and in worship.

[113] Western district of the Island of Sulu.

[114] The northern and central district of the Island of Sulu.

[115] The southern and central part of the Island of Sulu.

[116] The eastern part of the Island of Sulu.

[117] The town where the present Sultan of Sulu resides.

[118] The inhabitants of the region west of the town of Jolo.

[119] The inhabitants of the northern coast, east of Jolo.

[120] Arabic; generous.

[121] Arabic; master or served.

[122] Arabic; noble; a title applied to a descendant of Mohammed.

[123] Arabic; plural of wali, a man of God.

[124] Sulu; anchorage; the ancient capital of Sulu.

[125] A district in Sumatra.

[126] Arabic; beauty.

[127] Arabic; plural of karim, meaning generous.

[128] Arabic; orator; a high religious title, allied to Imam.

[129] Arabic; slave or servant.

[130] Arabic; the Giver, referring to God.

[131] See p. 152.

[132] Genealogies; see Vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 11, Ethnological Survey
Publications.

[133] Sanskrit; sunshine.

[134] Natives of the Celebes; they were often called by the Spaniards
Macassars.

[135] Timway or tumuway, meaning "leader" or "chief," is the title
given to the chiefs of the land before Islam. Timway has been replaced
by datu.

[136] It is possible that this color distinction arose from an early
superstition or belief of Hindu origin assigning those divisions of
the island to the four respective Hindu deities, who are generally
represented by those four colors.

[137] Quoted in Keppel's "Visit to the Indian Archipelago," p. 127.

[138] This term is applied in Sulu in the same sense as the Malay
terms Orang-banua and Orang-bukit, meaning hill tribes or aborigines,
or, as they say in Mindanao, Manubus.

[139] This term is used here in the same sense as Orang-Malayu meaning
the better or seacoast Malays.

[140] The determination of this date and that of the rule of Abu
Bakr is covered by a complete statement which will appear in the
chapter on the early Mohammedan missionaries in Sulu and Mindanao,
to be published in a later paper.

[141] The first historic seat of Malay rule was Pagar Ruyong (in
the mountains of Sumatra), the capital of the so-called "Empire of
Menangkabaw." (Malay-English Dictionary, R. J. Wilkinson, III, 2.)

[142] Brass cannon used by Moros.

[143] Variety of mango.

[144] The prince of the princes.

[145] The exalter of the humble.

[146] The defender of the faith; the first.

[147] Malay word, meaning "in the mountain."

[148] The Sulu equivalent of "Digunung."

[149] The kind.

[150] "The Philippine Islands," Blair and Robertson, Vol. IV, p. 174.

[151] Bisayas.

[152] Natives of the Philippine Islands.

[153] Large estates assigned to Spaniards.

[154] An honorific title given to the early governors of the
Philippines.

[155] The Philippine Islands, Blair and Robertson II, pp. 98, 99.

[156] Ibid., II, p. 156.

[157] Ibid., VII, p. 68, 69.

[158] So given in the text without explanation. It is probably
a weight.

[159] The Philippine Islands, VIII, pp. 73-75.

[160] Apuntes sobre Jolo, Espina, p. 56.

[161] A large canoe used by the Malayan peoples with two rows of oars,
very light, and fitted with a European sail; its rigging of native
manufacture. (Philippine Islands, II, p. 246.)

[162] Large Moro boat with outriggers.

[163] Bungsu, the sultan; sire and intermediator.

[164] Name of boat used in the Philippine Islands.

[165] Rizal conjectures that this word is a transformation of the
Tagál word, lampitaw, a small boat still used in the Philippines.

[166] We follow Stanley's translation. He derives the word cacatal
(zacatal) from zacatc, or sacate, signifying "reed," "hay," or other
similar growths, zacatal thus being a "place of reeds" or a "thicket."

[167] A long weapon resembling a sword, used by Moros.

[168] From kalasag, a shield. (Rizal.)

[169] Argensola says that this native, named Ubal, had made a
feast two days before, at which he had promised to kill the Spanish
commander. (Rizal.)

[170] Posts set upright in the ground.

[171] Sucesos de Is Islas Filipinas, Dr. Antonio de Morga, Mexico,
1609; The Philippine Islands, XV, pp. 90-92.

[172] See Appendixes I and II, Pacification of Mindanao.

[173] Fathoms.

[174] The Philippine Islands, Blair and Robertson IX, pp. 283, 285-287.

[175] Ibid., IX, pp. 289, 290.

[176] See Appendix III, Moro Raids of 1599 and 1600.

[177] History of the Philippines, Barrows, pp. 153, 154.

[178] See Appendix IV, Gallinato's expedition to Jolo.

[179] See Appendix V, Olaso's expedition.

[180] The greatest Sultan of Mindanao, the son of Bwisan.

[181] An account of this fight and the Moro expedition under Tagal
is given in "The Philippine Islands," Blair and Robertson XXVII,
pp. 215-226.

[182] See "Letter from Corcuera to Philip IV." (The Philippine Islands,
XXVII, pp. 346-359.)

[183] See Appendix VI, Corcuera's campaign in Jolo.

[184] On Moro pirates and their raids in the seventeenth century,
see The Philippine Islands, Blair and Robertson, XLI, pp. 277-324.

[185] A Spanish measure of weight used in the Philippine Islands,
equivalent to about 133 pounds.

[186] The defender of the Faith.

[187] Relación de a entrada del Sultan Rey de Joló, in Archivo del
Bibliófilo Filipino, Vol. I.

[188] History of the Philippines, Barrows, p. 227.

[189] See Appendix VII, Obando's report on the preparations to be
undertaken to return Alimud Din to Sulu; also Appendix VIII, Obando's
report on the circumstances attending the attempt to return Alimud
Din to Sulu.

[190] The Philippine Islands, Foreman, pp. 145, 146.

[191] The sultan complained that he had not been treated in Manila
with dignity equal to his rank and quality, and that he had constantly
been under guard of soldiers in his residence (this was explained to
be a guard of honor).

[192] The Philippine Islands, Foreman, p. 147.

[193] On the occupation of Palawan and Balabak, see Appendixes IX
and X.

[194] History of the Philippines, Barrows, p. 228.

[195] See Appendix XI.

[196] See Forrest's "A Voyage to New Guinea," pp. 320-335.

[197] Another name for Jolo and the name of the stream which passes
through it.

[198] It is more likely that elephants were obtained from Borneo
and Sumatra.

[199] Some were more than 90 feet in length.

[200] One of the settlements forming the town of Kotabato.

[201] This was an erroneous impression. It no doubt seemed so to
Captain Forrest who judged from his observations of Sultan Israel
who acquired a taste for European music in Manila.

[202] A Voyage to New Guinea, Capt. Thomas Forrest, pp. 336-337.

[203] Name given to the network of channels by which the waters of
the Pasig River find their way to the sea.

[204] History of the Philippines, Barrows, pp. 246-248.

[205] See Appendixes XII, XIII, XIV, and XV.

[206] A variety of palm from which mats and sails are made.

[207] Edition of 1853, pp. 57-69.

[208] A leaf chewed with betel nut.

[209] Amirul Mu'minin or Alimud Din I.

[210] See Appendixes XVI and XVII.

[211] A visit to the Indian Archipelago, p. 58.

[212] A big dugout canoe.

[213] Vessels of some 11 meters length, 1 1/2 meters beam, and 40
centimeters overhang at the bow. They are furnished with outriggers
and a removable deck [commonly of loose slats]. (Note in Montero y
Vidal's History of the Piracy of the Mohammedan Malays.)

[214] The Spanish word for conquest transliterated. The word can not
be understood by the Sulus.

[215] Datu Daniel.

[216] Spanish. Como reconocimiento de dominio (i.e., of Spain). The
idea is that the settler acknowledges that he does not own the land
in fee simple, but holds it as a tenant of the state.

[217] A police force maintained in the Philippines during Spanish
times.

[218] Troops made up of men deported from other parts of the Islands.

[219] A large knife used by Moros in fighting.

[220] Men who have taken an oath to kill non-Mohammedans.

[221] Moro cannon.

[222] About 5 cents, United States currency.

[223] See Appendix XVIII, on regulations relative to taxes and
imports on natives and immigrants in Sulu; also Appendix XIX, on the
protocol of Sulu of 1877 between Spain, Germany, and Great Britain;
Appendix XX, on the protocol of Sulu of 1885 between Spain, Germany,
and Great Britain; Appendix XXI, decree of the General Government
in regard to payment of tribute of Sulus; Appendixes XXII and XXIII,
on rights of foreigners engaged in pearl fishing in Sulu waters.

[224] A chief subordinate to a datu.

[225] See Appendix XXIV, on La Torre's views on the policy that should
be adopted in Mindanao and Sulu.

[226] The Philippine Islands, Blair and Robertson, XV, pp. 93-100.

[227] A point and settlement on the north bank of the Mindanao River
and at its mouth.

[228] A careful review of Ronquillo's reports and letters on his
pacification of Mindanao shows an evident error in the use of the
word Bwayan to signify the settlement or stronghold of the Sultan
of Magindanao. Bwayan here, and probably in Figueroa's report, too,
is used in place of Magindanao, which lay on the site occupied at
present by Kotabato. Bwisan was then the Sultan of Magindanao and
headed the opposition to Ronquillo's advance up the north branch of
the Mindanao River. Sirungan, who is mentioned in this report, might
have been a datu or subdatu of Magindanao, not necessarily Sirungan,
the Raja of Bwayan.

[229] The correct name is Sirungan.

[230] Cachil or Kachil is a Malay word signifying "little" or "young,"
hence a youth of distinction or a younger prince of the royal line.

[231] A tributary of the Mindanao River which rises in Talayan,
and empties at Taviran.

[232] The Philippine Islands, Blair and Robertson, XI, pp. 135-139.

[233] Unsigned.

[234] Point or bay, not an Island.

[235] Point or bay, not an island.

[236] The Strait of Sunda, which separates Java from Sumatra.

[237] The Philippine Islands, Blair and Robertson, XV, pp. 190-196.

[238] This word is as commonly used with an "l" as with an "r,"
as Sirungan.

[239] A strong wind south by west.

[240] Shields.

[241] This was the first piratical expedition made against the
Spaniards by the inhabitants of the southern islands. (Rizal.)

Barrantes (Guerras Piraticas) wrongly dates the abandonment of La
Caldera and the incursion of the Moros 1590. Continuing, he says:
"The following year they repeated the expedition so that the Indians
retired to the densest parts of the forests, where it cost considerable
trouble to induce them to become quiet, for a woman, who proclaimed
herself a sibyl or prophetess, preached to them that they should not
obey the Spaniards any longer, for the latter had allied themselves
with the Moros to exterminate all the Pintados."

[242] Native word for mountain.

[243] Those to whom land had been granted with control over the
natives who worked on it.

[244] The Island of Gimarás, southeast of Panay, and separated from
it by the Strait of Iloilo.

[245] Probably gongs.

[246] Neither Stanley nor Rizal throws any light on this word. The
Spanish dictionaries likewise fail to explain it, as does also a
limited examination of Malay and Tagal dictionaries. Three conjectures
are open: 1. A derivative of tifatas, a species of mollusk, hence a
conch; 2. A Malay or Tagal word for either a wind or other instrument,
the Malay words for "to blow," "sound a musical instrument," being
tiyup and tiyupkan; 3. A misprint for the Spanish pifas, a possible
shortened form of pifanos, signifying fifes.

[247] The Philippine Islands, Blair and Robertson, XV, pp. 240-244,
264-268.

[248] Sailing vessels.

[249] The Philippine Islands, Blair and Robertson, XXIII, pp. 87, 88.

[250] Unsigned.

[251] A small vessel used as a tender to carry messages between
larger vessels.

[252] The Philippine Islands, Blair and Robertson, XXVIII, pp. 41-63.

[253] In the manuscript that we follow the letter of March 31 is
given second, while that of April 5 is given first; we have arranged
them chronologically.

[254] Garo: probably the same as garita; a fortified outpost.

[255] The translation of this passage seems to be, "If God fights
against a city, he who guards it watches in vain." The difficulty
lies in "a custodierit," which we translate as "fights against."

[256] A Spanish measure of length which is about equal to 1 yard,
English measure.

[257] The Gimbahans or Sulus of the interior mountains.

[258] Babui, in their language, signifies "pig"; apparently they
called the Spaniards "swine," as expressing the acme of contempt for
their besiegers.

[259] "Thanks be to God who has given us the victory through our Lord
Jesus Christ."

[260] Combés says (Hist. Mindanao, Reana's ed., column 264) that this
queen, named Tuan Baluka, was a native of Basilan, and that she had
acquired such ascendancy over her husband that the government of Sulu
was entirely in her hands. This statement explains the presence of
the Basilan men in the Sulu stronghold.

[261] Zamboanga, the correct spelling is Samboangan.

[262] Culverins of small bore.

[263] This letter is unsigned; but the transcript of it made by
Ventura del Arco places it with others ascribed to Barrios. See
detailed accounts of the expedition against Jolo (Sulu) in Combés's
Hist. Mindanao y Joló (Retana and Pastells ed.), cols. 349-368;
Diaz's Conquistas, pp. 388-401: Murillo Velarde's Hist. Philipinas,
fol. 92, 93; and La Concepcion's Hist. Philipinas, V, pp. 334-351.

[264] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[265] The Recoletos or barefoot Augustinian friars.

[266] Spanish expediente, the collection of all the papers referring
to a single subject.

[267] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[268] Maestre de Campo.

[269] The inhabitants of Koran, northeast Borneo, pagan pirates
subdued by Sulu in 1769.

[270] Official designation of the Audiencia when assembled in executive
session under the presidency of the Captain-General.

[271] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[272] Sp. forzados, men compelled to row in the galleys, usually as
punishment for crime.

[273] Manila. The shorter form of its title of "La siempre noble y
leal Ciudad."

[274] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[275] A small sailing vessel.

[276] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[277] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[278] The Honorable East India Company.

[279] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[280] I.e., of the Sulus.

[281] Sp. champanes.

[282] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[283] "En sus propios buques" (i.e., of Sulu).

[284] This and the following statements are not correct.

[285] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[286] Though inaccurate and biased, the ideas expressed in this report
represent the opinion and feelings of many Spanish officials who were
connected with Moro affairs.

[287] The correct name is Abu Bakr.

[288] Such a statement is unduly biased.

[289] A Spanish magistrate.

[290] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[291] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[292] Vessels up to 80 feet length by 18 or 20 beam, made of wood,
bamboo, nipah, and rattan. The Moros arm them by placing at the two
sides lantakas and falconets, mounted on iron swivels, and at the
bow and stern, cannon set in stout pieces of timber. The sails are
usually of matting made of saguran [a kind of palm-leaf], spread on
bamboo poles. (Note in Montero y Vidal's History of the Piracy of
the Mohammedan Malays.)

[293] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[294] Sp. Contaduría General.

[295] Personal registration fees.

[296] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[297] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[298] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[299] Settlements.

[300] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[301] The Gearling & Tradin (sic.).

[302] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[303] From the Division of Archives, Executive Bureau, Manila.

[304] A term used by the Spaniards to designate certain governmental
districts in the Philippines.

[305] Settlement.






