what peace means by henry van dyke new york chicago fleming h. revell company london and edinburgh 1919 to my son in the faith my brother in the work tertius van dyke foreword this little book contains three plain sermons which were preached in new york in the easter season of 1919, in the park avenue presbyterian church, of which my son is minister. i had no thought that they would ever be printed. they were, and are, just _daily bread discourses_ meant to serve the spiritual needs of a congregation of christian people, seekers after truth, inquirers about duty, strangers and pilgrims, in the great city and the troubled world. but if, as friends think, these simple chapters may be of service through the printed page to a larger circle of readers, i willingly and freely let them go. may the blessing of jesus follow them on their humble path. may the spirit of truth bring them home to some hearts that want them,--to those who desire to escape from evil and do good,--to those who "seek peace and ensue it." henry van dyke. park avenue church manse, new york city. contents i. peace in the soul ii. peace on earth through righteousness iii. the power of an endless life i peace in the soul _peace i leave with you: my peace i give unto you._--st. john 14:27. peace is one of the great words of the holy scriptures. it is woven through the old testament and the new like a golden thread. it inheres and abides in the character of god,- "the central peace subsisting at the heart of endless agitation." it is the deepest and most universal desire of man, whose prayer in all ages has been, "grant us thy peace, o lord." it is the reward of the righteous, the blessing of the good, the crown of life's effort, and the glory of eternity. the prophets foretell the beauty of its coming and the psalmists sing of the joy which it brings. jesus christ is its divine messiah, its high priest and its holy prince. the evangelists and prophets proclaim and preach it. from beginning to end the bible is full of the praise of peace. yet there never was a book more full of stories of trouble and strife, disaster and sorrow. god himself is revealed in it not as a calm, untroubled, self-absorbed deity, occupied in beatific contemplation of his own perfections. he is a god who works and labours, who wars against the evil, who fights for the good. the psalmist speaks of him as "the lord of hosts, strong and mighty in battle." the revelation of st. john tells us that "there was war in heaven; michael and his angels fought against the dragon." jesus christ said: "i came not to send peace, but a sword." it is evident, then, that this idea of "peace," like all good and noble things, has its counterfeit, its false and subtle versary, which steals its name and its garments to deceive and betray the hearts of men. we find this clearly taught in the bible. not more earnestly does it praise true peace than it denounces false peace. _there is no peace, saith the lord, unto the wicked_ (isaiah 48:22). _for they have healed the hurt of the daughter of my people slightly, saying, peace, peace; when there is no peace_ (jer. 8:11). _if thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace! but now they are hid from thine eyes_ (st. luke 19:42). _for to be carnally minded is death; but to be spiritually minded is life and peace_ (romans 8:6). there never was a time in human history when a right understanding of the nature of true peace, the path which leads to it, the laws which govern it, was more necessary or more important than it is to-day. the world has just passed through a ghastly experience of war at its worst. never in history has there been such slaughter, such agony, such waste, such desolation, in a brief space of time, as in the four terrible years of conflict which german militarism forced on the world in the twentieth century. having seen it, i know what it means. now we have "supped full with horrors." we have had more than enough of that bloody banquet the heart of humanity longs for peace, as it has always longed, but now with a new intensity, greater than ever before. yet the second course of war continues. the dogs fight for the crumbs under the peace-table. ignorant armies clash by night. cities are bombarded and sacked. the barbarous bolsheviki raise the red flag of violence and threaten a war of classes throughout the world. you can never make a golden age out of leaden men, or a peaceful world out of lovers of strife. where shall peace be found? how shall it be attained and safeguarded? evidently the militarists have assaulted it with their doctrine that might makes right. evidently the pacifists have betrayed it with their doctrine of passive acceptance of wrong. somewhere between these two errors there must be a ground of truth on which christians can stand to defend their faith and maintain their hope of a better future for the world. let me begin by speaking of _peace in the soul_. that is where religion begins, in the heart of a person. its flowers and fruits are social. they are for the blessing of the world. but its root is personal. you can never start with a class--conscious or a mass--conscious christianity. it must begin with just you and god. marshal joffre, that fine christian soldier, said a memorable thing about the winning of the war: "our victory will be the fruit of individual sacrifice." so of the coming of peace on earth we may say the same: it will be the fruit of the entrance of peace into individual hearts and lives. a world at war is the necessary result of human restlessness and enmities. "from whence come wars and fightings among you? come they not hence, even of your lusts, that war in your members?" envy, malice, greed, hatred, deceit,--these are the begetters of strife on earth. a world at peace can come only from the cooperation of peaceful human spirits. therefore we must commence to learn what peace is, by seeking it in our souls through faith. christ promised peace to his disciples at the communion in that little upper room in jerusalem, nineteen hundred years ago. evidently it was not an outward but an inward peace. he told them that they would have a lot of trouble in the world. but he assured them that this could not overcome them if they believed in him and in his father god. he warned them of conflict, and assured them of inward peace. what are the elements of this wondrous gift which christ gave to his disciples, and which he offers to us? i. first, the peace of christ is the peace of being divinely loved. nothing rests and satisfies the heart like the sense of being loved. let us take as an illustration the case of a little child, which has grown tired and fretful at its play, and is frightened suddenly by some childish terror. weeping, it runs to its mother. she takes the child in her arms, folds it to her breast, bends over it, and soothes it with fond words which mean only this: "i love you." very soon the child sinks to rest, contented and happy, in the sense of being loved. "herein is love, not that we loved god, but that he loved us, and sent his son to be the propitiation for our sins." in jesus christ god is stretching out his arms to us, drawing us to his bosom, enfolding us in the secret of peace. if we believe in jesus christ as the son of god, he makes us sure of a divine affection, deep, infinite, inexhaustible, imperishable. "for god so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." god, who "spared not his dearly-beloved son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?" "nothing shall be able to separate us from the love of god, which is in christ jesus our lord." ii. the christian peace is the peace of being divinely controlled. the man who accepts jesus christ truly, accepts him as master and lord. he believes that christ has a purpose for him, which will surely be fulfilled? work for him, which will surely be blessed if he only tries to do it. most of the discords of life come from a conflict of authorities, of plans, of purposes. suppose that a building were going up, and the architect had one design for it, and the builder had another. what perplexity and confusion there would be! how ill things would fit! what perpetual quarrels and blunders and disappointments! but when the workman accepts the designer's plan and simply does his best to carry that out, harmony, joyful labour, and triumph are the result. if we accept god's plan for us, yield to him as the daily controller and director of our life, our work, however hard, becomes peaceful and secure. no perils can frighten, no interruptions can dishearten us. not many years ago some workmen were digging a tunnel, when a sudden fall of earth blocked the mouth of the opening. their companions on the outside found out what had happened, and started to dig through the mass of earth to the rescue. it was several hours before they made their way through. when they went in they found the workmen going on with their labour on the tunnel. "we knew," said one of them, "that you'd come to help us, and we thought the best way to make time pass quick was to keep on with the work." that is what a christian may say to christ amid the dangers and disasters of life. we know that he will never forsake us, and the best way to be at peace is to be about his business. he says to us: "as the father sent me, even so send i you." iii. the christian peace is the peace of being divinely forgiven. "in every man," said a philosopher, "there is something which, if we knew it, would make us despise him." let us turn the saying, and change it from a bitter cynicism into a wholesome truth. in every one of us there is something which, if we realize it, makes us condemn ourselves as sinners, and hunger and thirst after righteousness, and long for forgiveness. it is this deep consciousness of sin, of evil in our hearts and lives, that makes us restless and unhappy. the plasters and soothing lotions with which the easy-going philosophy of modern times covers it up, do not heal it; they only hide it. there is no cure for it, there is no rest for the sinful soul, except the divine forgiveness. there is no sure pledge of this except in the holy sacrifice and blessed promise of christ, "son, daughter, thy sins are forgiven thee, go in peace." understand, i do not mean that what we need and want is to have our sins ignored and overlooked. on the contrary, that is just what would fail to bring us true rest. for if god took no account of sins, required no repentance and reparation, he would not be holy, just, and faithful, a god whom we can adore and love and trust. nor do i mean that what we need is merely to have the punishment of sins remitted. that would not satisfy the heart. is the child contented when the father says, "well, i will not punish you. go away"? no, what the child wants is to hear the father say, "i forgive you. come to me." it is to be welcomed back to the father's home, to the father's heart, that the child longs. peace means not to have the offense ignored, but to have it pardoned: not to the punishment omitted, but to have separation from god ended and done with. that is the peace of being divinely forgiven,--a peace which recognizes sin, and triumphs over it,--a peace which not merely saves us from death but welcomes us home to the divine love from which we have wandered. that is the peace which christ offers to each one of us in his gospel. we need it in this modern world as much as men and women ever needed it in the old world. no new era will ever change its meaning or do away with its necessity. indeed, it seems to me that we need this old-fashioned religion to-day more than ever. we need it for our own comfort and strength. we need it to deliver us from the vanity and hollowness, the fever and hysteria of the present age. we need it to make us better soldiers and workers for every good cause. peace is coming to all the earth some day through christ. and those who shall do most to help him bring it are the men and women to whom he gives peace in the soul. ii peace on earth through righteousness _and the work of righteousness shall be peace: and the effect of righteousness quietness and confidence forever._ --isaiah 32:17. after we have found peace in our own souls through faith in god and in his son, jesus christ our saviour, if our faith is honest, we must feel the desire and the duty of helping to make peace prevail on earth. but here we are, in a world of confusion and conflict. darkness and ignorance strive against light. evil hates and assaults good. wrong takes up arms against right. greed and pride and passion call on violence to defeat justice and enthrone blind force. so has it been since cain killed abel, since christ was crucified on calvary, and so it is to-day wherever men uphold the false doctrine that "might makes right." the bible teaches us that there is no foundation for enduring peace on earth except in righteousness: that it is our duty to suffer for that cause if need be: that we are bound to fight for it if we have the power: and that if god gives us the victory we must use it for the perpetuation of righteous peace. in these words i sum up what seems to me the christian doctrine of war and peace,--the truth that in time of war we must stand for the right, and that when peace comes in sight, we must do our best to found it upon justice. these two truths cannot be separated. if we forget the meaning of the christian duty to which god called us in the late war, all our sacrifice of blood and treasure will have been in vain. if we forget the watchword which called our boys to the colours, our victory will be fruitless. we have fought in this twentieth century against the pagan german doctrine of war as the supreme arbiter between the tribes of mankind. they that took the sword must perish by the sword. but in the hour of victory we must uphold the end for which we have fought and suffered,--the advance of the world towards a peaceful life founded on reason and justice and fair-play for every man. so there are two heads to this sermon. first, the indelible remembrance of a righteous acceptance of war. second, the reasonable hope of a righteous foundation of peace. i. first of all, then, it must never be forgotten that the allies and america were forced to enter this war as a work of righteousness in order to make the world safe for peace. peace means something more than the mere absence of hostilities. it means justice, honour, fair-play, order, security, and the well-protected right of every man and nation to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. it was the german contempt for these christian ideals, it was the german idolatry of the pagan odin, naked, cruel, bloody, god of war, it was the german will to power and dream of world-dominion, that made the world unsafe for real peace in 1914. never could that safety be secured until that enemy of mankind was overcome. not only for democracy, but also for human peace, it was necessary, as president wilson said, that "the german power, a thing without honour, conscience, or capacity for covenanted faith, must be crushed." i saw, from my post of observation in holland, the hosts of heathen germany massing for their attack on the world's peace in the spring of 1914. long before the pretext of war was provided by the murder of the austrian crown-prince in serajevo, i saw the troops, the artillery, the mountains of ammunition, assembled at aix-la-chapelle and trier, ready for the invasion of neutral belgium and luxembourg, and the foul stroke at france. every civilized nation in europe desired peace and pleaded for it. little servia offered to go before the court of arbitration at the hague and be tried for the offense of which she was accused. russia, italy, france and england entreated germany not to make war, but to submit the dispute to judicial settlement, to a righteous decision by a conference of powers. but germany said no. she had prepared for war, she wanted war, she got war. and now she must abide by the result of her choice. i have seen also with my own eyes the horrors wrought by germany in her conduct of the war in belgium and northern france. words fail me to describe them. childhood has been crucified, womanhood outraged, civilization trampled in the dust. the nations and the men who took arms against these deviltries were the servants of the righteous god and the followers of the merciful christ. he told us, "if any man smite thee on the right cheek, turn unto him the left also." but never did he tell us to abandon the bodies and the lives of our women and children to the outrage of beasts in human form. on the contrary, he said to his disciples, in his parting discourse, "he that hath no sword let him sell his garment and buy one." does any silly pacifist say that means a spiritual sword? no. you could get that without selling your garment. it means a real sword,--as real as the purse and the scrip which christ told his followers to carry with them. it means the power of arms dedicated to the service of righteousness without which the world can never be safe for peace. here, then, we may stand on the word of god, on the work of righteousness in making the world safe for peace. let me tell you of my faith that every one who has given his life for that cause, has entered into eternal rest. ii. come we now to consider the second part of the text: "the effect of righteousness, quietness and confidence forever." what shall be the nature of the peace to be concluded after our victory in this righteous war? here we have to oppose the demands of the bloodthirsty civilians. they ask that german towns should endure the same sufferings which have been inflicted on the towns of belgium and northern france. let me say frankly that i do not believe you could persuade our officers to order such atrocities, or our soldiers to obey such orders. read the order which one of the noble warriors of france, general pã©tain, issued to his men: "to-morrow, in order to better dictate peace, you are going to carry your arms as far as the rhine. into that land of alsace-lorraine that is so dear to us, you will march as liberators. you will go further; all the way into germany to occupy lands which are the necessary guarantees for just reparation. "france has suffered in her ravaged fields and in her ruined villages. the freed provinces have had to submit to intolerable vexations and odious outrages, but you are not to answer these crimes by the commission of violences, which, under the spur of your resentment, may seem to you legitimate. "you are to remain under discipline and to show respect to persons and property. you will know, after having vanquished your adversary by force of arms, how to impress him further by the dignity of your attitude, and the world will not know which to admire most, your conduct in success or your heroism in fighting." the destruction of the commonplace cathedral of cologne could never recompense the damage done to the glorious cathedral of rheims. nor could the slaughter of a million german women and children restore the innocent victims of belgium, france, servia, and armenia to life. we do not thirst for blood. we desire justice. no doubt the ends of justice demand that the principal brigands who are responsible for the atrocities of this war should be tried before an international court if convicted they should be duly punished. but not by mob-law or violence. nothing could be less desirable than the assassination of william hohenzollern. it would be absurd and horrible to give a martyr's crown to a criminal. vengeance belongeth unto god. he alone is wise and great enough to deal adequately with the case. it is for us to keep our righteous indignation free from the poison of personal hatred, and to do no more than is needed to uphold and vindicate the eternal law. william hohenzollern, and his fellow-conspirators who are responsible for the beginning and the conduct of the dreadful war from which all the toiling peoples of earth have suffered, must be brought to the bar of justice and sentenced; otherwise the world will have no defense against the anarchists who say that government is a vain thing; and the bloody bolshevists who proclaim the empire of the ignorant,--the boob-rah,--as the future rule of the world, will have free scope. it is evident that a league of free, democratic states, pledged by mutual covenant to uphold the settlement of international differences by reason and justice before the use of violence, offers the only hope of a durable peace among the nations. it is also the only defense against that deadly and destructive war of classes with which bolshevism threatens the whole world. the spirit of bolshevism is atheism and enmity; its method is violence and tyranny; its result would be a reign of terror under that empty-headed monster, "the dictatorship of the proletariat." god save us from that! it would be the worst possible outcome of the war in which we have offered and sacrificed so much, and in which god has given us the opportunity to make "a covenant of peace." how vast, how immeasurable, are the responsibilities which this great victory in righteous war has laid upon the allies and america. god help us to live up to them. god help us to sow the future not with dragon's teeth, but with seeds of blessed harvest. god paint upon the broken storm-cloud the rainbow of eternal hope. god help us and our friends to make a peace that shall mean good to all mankind. god send upon our victory the light of the cross of christ our saviour, where mercy and truth meet together, righteousness and peace kiss each other. iii the power of an endless life _who is made, not after the law of a carnal commandment, but after the power of an endless life._ --hebrews 7:16. the message and hope of immortality are nowhere more distinctly conveyed to our minds than in connection with that resurrection morn when jesus appeared to mary magdalene. the anniversary of that day will ever be the festival of the human soul. even those who do not clearly understand or fully accept its meaning in history and religion,--even children and ignorant folk and doubters and unbelievers,--yes, even frivolous people and sullen people, feel that there is something in this festival which meets the need and longing of their hearts. it is a day of joy and gladness, a day of liberation and promise, a day for flowers to bloom and birds to sing, a day of spiritual spring-tide and immortal hope. mankind desires and needs such a day. we are overshadowed in all our affections and aspirations, all our efforts, and designs, by the dark mystery of bodily death; the uncertainty and the brevity of earthly existence make us tremble and despair; the futility of our plans dismays us; the insecurity of our dearest treasure in lives linked to ours fills us with dismay. is there no escape from death, the tyrant, the autocrat, the destroyer, the last enemy? why love, why look upward, why strive for better things if this imperator of failure, ultimate extinction, rules the universe? no hope beyond the grave means no peace this side of it. a life without hope is a life without god. if death ends all, then there is no father in heaven in whom we can trust. who shall deliver us from the body of this death? now comes easter with its immortal promise and assurance, jesus of nazareth, who died on calvary, a martyr of humanity, a sacrifice of divinity, is alive and appears to his humble followers. the manner of his appearance, to mary magdalene, to his disciples, is not the most important thing. the fact is that he did appear. he who was crucified in the cause of righteousness and mercy, lives on and forever. the message of his resurrection is "the power of an endless life." the proof of this message is in the effect that it produced. it transformed the handful of jesus' followers from despair to confidence. it gave christianity its growing influence over the heart of humanity. it is this message of immortality that makes religion vital to the human world to-day, and essential to the foundation of peace on earth. we must not forget in our personal griefs and longings, in our sorrows for those whom we have lost and our desire to find them again, in our sense of our own mortal frailty and the brief duration of earthly life, the celestial impulse which demands a life triumphant over death. the strongest of all supports for peace on earth is the faith in immortality. the truth is, the very character of our being here in this world demands continuance beyond death. there is nothing good or great that we think or feel or endeavour, that is not a reaching out to something better. our finest knowledge is but the consciousness of limitation and the longing that it may be removed. our best moral effort is but a slow advance towards something better. our sense of the difference between good and evil, our penitence, our aspiration, all this moral freight with which our souls are laden, is a cargo consigned to an unseen country. our bill of lading reads, "to the immortal life." if we must sink in mid-ocean, then all is lost, and the voyage of life is a predestined wreck. the wisest, the strongest, the best of mankind, have felt this most deeply. the faith in immortality belongs to the childhood of the race, and the greatest of the sages have always returned to it and taken refuge in it. socrates and plato, cicero and plutarch, montesquieu and franklin, kant and emerson, tennyson and browning,--how do they all bear witness to the incompleteness of life and reach out to a completion beyond the grave. "no great thinker ever lived and taught you all the wonder that his soul received; no great painter ever set on canvas all the glorious vision he conceived. "no musician ever held your spirit charmed and bound in his melodious chains; but, be sure, he heard, and strove to render, feeble echoes of celestial strains. "no real poet ever wove in numbers all his dream, but the diviner part, hidden from all the world, spake to him only in the voiceless silence of his heart. "so with love: for love and art united are twin mysteries: different yet the same; poor indeed would be the love of any who could find its full and perfect name. "love may strive; but vain is its endeavour all its boundless riches to unfold; still its tenderest, truest secret lingers ever in its deepest depths untold. "things of time have voices: speak and perish. art and love speak; but their words must be like sighings of illimitable forests and waves of an unfathomable sea." and can it be that death shall put the final seal of irretrievable ruin on all this uncompleted effort? can it be that the grave shall whelm all this unuttered love in endless silence? ah, what a wild waste of precious treasure, what a mad destruction of fair designs, what an utter failure, life would be if death must end all! the very reasonableness of our nature, our sense of order, declare the impotence of death to create such a wreck. and most of all our deep affections cry out against the conclusion of despair. they will not hear of dissolution. they reach out their hands into the darkness. they demand and they promise an unending fellowship, a deepening communion, a more perfect satisfaction. do you remember what thackeray wrote? "if love lives through all life, and survives through all sorrow; and remains steadfast with us through all changes; and in all darkness of spirit burns brightly; and if we die, deplores us forever, and still loves us equally; and exists with the very last gasp and throb of the faithful bosom, whence it passes with the pure soul beyond death, surely it shall be immortal. though we who remain are separated from it, is it not ours in heaven? if we love still those whom we lose, can we altogether lose those whom we love?" to deny this instinct is to deny that which lies at the very root of our life. if love perishes with death, then our affections are our worst curses, the world is the cruellest torture-house, and "all things work together for evil to those who love." do you believe it? is it possible? nay, all that is best and noblest and purest within us rejects such a faith in absolute evil as the power that has created and rules the world. in the presence of love we feel that we behold that which must belong to a good god and therefore cannot die. destruction cannot touch it. the grave cannot hold it. loving and being loved, we dare to stand in the very doorway of the tomb, and assert the power of an endless life. and it seems to me that this courage never comes to us so fully as when we are brought in closest contact with death, when we are brought face to face with that dread shadow and forced either to deny its power, once and forever, or to give up everything and die with our hopes. i wish that i could make this clear to you as it lies in my own experience. perhaps in trying to do it i should speak closer to your own heart than in any other way. for surely "there is no flock, however watched and tended but one dead lamb is there. there is no fireside, howsoe'er defended but has a vacant chair." a flower grew in your garden. you delighted in its beauty and fragrance. it gave you all it had to give, but it did not love you. it could not. when the time came for it to die, you were sorry. but it did not seem to you strange or unnatural. there was no waste. its mission was fulfilled. you understood why its petals should fall, its leaf wither, its root and branch decay. and even if a storm came and snapped it, still there was nothing lost that was indispensable, nothing that could not be restored. a child grew in your household, dearly loved and answering your love. you saw that soul unfold, learning to know the evil from the good, learning to accept duty and to resist selfishness, learning to be brave and true and kind, learning to give you day by day a deeper and a richer sympathy, learning to love god and to pray and to be good. and then perhaps you saw that young heart being perfected under the higher and holier discipline of suffering, bearing pain patiently, facing trouble and danger like a hero, not shrinking even from the presence of death, but trusting all to your love and to god's, and taking just what came from day to day, from hour to hour. and then suddenly the light went out in the shining eyes. the brave heart stopped. the soul was gone. lost, perished, blotted out forever in the darkness of death? ah, no; you know better than that. that clear, dawning intelligence, that deepening love, that childlike faith in god, that pure innocence of soul, did not come from the dust. how could they return thither? the music ceases because the instrument is broken. but the player is not dead. he is learning a better music. he is finding a more perfect instrument. it is impossible that he should be holden of death. god wastes nothing so precious. "what is excellent as god lives is permanent. hearts are dust; hearts' loves remain. hearts' love will meet thee again." but i am sure that we must go further than this in order to understand the full strength and comfort of the text. the assertion of the impotence of death to end all is based upon something deeper than the prophecy of immortality in the human heart. it has a stronger foundation than the outreachings of human knowledge and moral effort towards a higher state in which completion may be attained. it has a more secure ground to rest upon than the deathless affection with which our love clings to its object the impotence of death is revealed to us in the spiritual perfection of christ. here then, in the "power of an endless life," i find the corner-stone of peace on earth among men of good-will take this mortal life as a thing of seventy years, more or less, to which death puts a final period, and you have nothing but confusion, chance and futility,--nothing safe, nothing realized, nothing completed. evil often triumphs. virtue often is defeated. "the good die young, and we whose hearts are dry as summer dust burn to the socket." but take death, as christ teaches us, not as a full stop, but as only a comma in the story of an endless life, and then the whole aspect of our existence is changed. that which is material, base, evil, drops down. that which is spiritual, noble, good, rises to lead us on. the conviction of immortality, the forward-looking faith in a life beyond the grave, the spirit of easter, is essential to peace on earth for three reasons. i. it is the only faith that lifts man's soul, which is immortal, above his body, which is perishable. it raises him out of the tyranny of the flesh to the service of his ideals. it makes him sure that there are things worth fighting and dying for. the fighting and the dying, for the cause of justice and liberty, are sacrifices on the divine altar which shall never be forgotten. ii. the faith in immortality carries with it the assurance of a divine reassessment of earth's inequalities. those who have suffered unjustly here will be recompensed in the future. those who have acted wickedly and unjustly here will be punished. whether that punishment will be final or remedial we do not know. perhaps it may lead to the extinction of the soul of evil, perhaps to its purifying and deliverance. on these questions i fall back on the word of god: "the wages of sin is death, but the gift of god is eternal life in christ jesus our lord." iii. the faith in immortality brings with it the sense of order, tranquillity, steadiness and courage in the present life. it sets us free from mean and cowardly temptations, makes it easier to resist the wild animal passions of lust and greed and cruelty, brings us into eternal relations and fellowships, makes us partners with the wise and good of all the ages, ennobles our earthly patriotism by giving us a heavenly citizenship. yea, it knits us in bonds of love with the coming generation. it is better than the fountain of youth. we shall know and see them as they go on their way, long after we have left the path. the faith in immortality sets a touch of the imperishable on every generous impulse and unselfish deed. it inspires to sublime and heroic virtues,--spiritual splendours,--deeds of sacrifice and suffering for which earth has no adequate recompense, but whose reward is great in heaven. here is the patience of the saints, the glorious courage of patriots, martyrs, and confessors, something more bright and shining than secular morality can bring forth,--a flashing of the inward light which fails not, but grows clearer as death draws near. what noble evidences of this come to us out of the great war. "are you in great distress?" asked a nurse of an american soldier whose legs had been shot away on the battle-field. "i am in as great peace," said he, "through jesus my lord, as a man can possibly be, out of paradise." a secretary of the y.m.c.a., the night before he was killed, wrote to his father: "i have not been sent here to die: i am to fight: i offer my life for future generations; i shall not die, i shall merely change my direction. he who walks before us is so great that we cannot lose him from sight." a simple french boy, grievously wounded, is dying in the ambulance. he is a protestant the nurse who bends over him is a catholic sister. she writes down his words as they fall slowly from his lips: "o my god, let thy will be done and not mine. o my god, thou knowest that i never wished war, but that i have fought because it was thy will; i offered my life so that peace might prevail. o my god, i pray for all my dear ones, ... father, mother, brothers, sisters. give a hundredfold to those nurses for all they have done for me. i pray for them one and all." here, in the midst of carnage and confusion, horror and death, was perfect peace, the triumph of immortality. what then shall we say of the new teachers and masters, the cynical lords of materialism and misrule, who tell us that they are going to banish this outworn superstition and all others like it from the mind of man? they are going to make a new world in which men shall walk by sight, and not by faith; a world in which universal happiness shall be produced by the forcible division of material goods, and brotherhood promoted by the simple expedient of killing those whom they dislike; a world in which there shall be neither nation, god, nor church, nor anywhere a thought of any life but this which ends in the grave. it is a mad dream of wild and reckless men. but it threatens evil to all the world. do you remember what happened when the french revolution took that course, abolished the sabbath, defiled the churches, broke down the altars, and enthroned a harlot as the goddess of reason? the reign of terror followed. something like that has happened, recently, in many parts of europe. and if these new tyrants of ignorance, unbelief, and unmorality have their way, the madness and the darkness will spread until the black cloud charged with death covers the face of the earth for a season with shame and anguish and destruction. a sane world, an orderly world, a peaceful world, can never be founded on materialism. that foundation is a quicksand in which all that is dearest to man goes down in death. religion is essential to true peace in the soul and to peace on earth through righteousness. immortality is essential to true religion. thanks be to god who hath given us jesus christ, who was dead and is alive again and liveth forevermore, to touch and ennoble, to inspire and console, to pacify and uplift our earthly existence with the power of an endless life. united states senate fundamental peace ideas _including_ the westphalian peace treaty (1648) _and_ the league of nations (1919) _in connection with_ international psychology and revolutions by arthur mac donald anthropologist: washington, d. c. (reprinted from the congressional record july 1, 1919, united states senate) [illustration] washington 1919 125746--19572 [illustration] the westphalian peace treaty (1648) and the league of nations (1919) in connection with international psychology and revolutions. by arthur mac donald, anthropologist, washington, d. c, and honorary president of the international congress of criminal anthropology of europe. introduction. the league of nations may only be a first step in the direction of permanent peace, yet not a few persons seem doubtful of its utility. however, the league may be the lesser evil as compared with the old régime, which appears to have resulted in total failure after a very long and fair trial. whatever be the ultimate outcome of the league and of the problems to be solved, the one encouraging thing is that all the people are thinking seriously on the subject and longing for some way to stop war. it may be true that lasting peace can only be secured when both people and leaders (sometimes the people lead the leaders) realize the necessity of peace and the senselessness of war. but to reach such a happy realization of the truth what are we, the people, to do now? already the discussions of the league (pro and con) have fertilized the soil; the minds of the people are open as never before; and now is the supreme moment to sow peace seeds. the sooner, more thoroughly, and wider they are scattered, the better. in this way we may be able to so impress peace ideas upon everyone, as to avoid the terrible necessity of a future war, in which both sides become exhausted, as in the thirty years' war, which would be a much more horrible war than the present war. to escape such a catastrophe and make a league of nations or any kind of peace arrangements endure is preeminently an educational problem, and consists mainly in repeatedly filling the minds of the people, old and young, everywhere with fundamental peace conceptions. shall we not begin at once and persist in doing this until political wars become as impossible in the future as religious wars are now? suggestions of the peace treaty of westphalia for the league of nations.[1] the conference of nations that has taken place around the peace table at paris is doubtless the most important of any in history. one reason is the fact that the plan the conference has decided to carry out will necessarily concern most all countries of the world. for railroads, steamships, aeroplanes, telegraphs, telephones, and wireless telegraphy, as never before, have made communication between nations so easy, quick, and direct that distance is almost eliminated, enabling the whole world to think, reason, and act at the same time, and to be influenced as one human solidarity. there seems to be a strong desire in all lands that the peace conference will make future wars not only improbable but practically impossible. but how can this be done? for years countless peace plans and theories have been proposed filling volumes of books, but they are mainly of a speculative nature. since theoretical grounds have proved inadequate, is there then any experience in the history of the world which can be made a basis for permanent peace? is there, for instance, any kind of war that has resulted in doing away with itself permanently? the answer would point to the thirty years' war, closing with the peace of westphalia (1648), which seems to have put an end to all religious wars. how, then, does it happen that the peace treaty of westphalia, of all the treaties in the world, is the only one that has succeeded in stopping all religious wars? we are certainly dealing here with a phenomenal fact in history. the writer has been unable to find any discussion of this phase of the matter. it would therefore seem of interest and importance, especially at the present time, to make a brief anthropological study of the thirty years' war which led to such an exceptional and successful treaty. new field for anthropology. from the anthropological point of view, history can be looked upon as a vast laboratory for the purpose of studying humanity and assisting in its progress. in the past anthropology has concerned itself mainly with savage and prehistoric man, but it is due time that it take up the more important and much more difficult subject of civilized man, not only as an individual but as an organization[2] or nation, or group of nations. it is true that other departments of knowledge, such as history and political science, have pursued these fields, but unfortunately not always in the scientific sense; to use an ancient pun, it is his story, rather than all the facts. anthropology in this new field should seek to establish only those truths which can be based upon facts. there are doubtless many very important truths which can not be established by scientific methods, but perhaps they can be better treated in political science, psychology, ethics, philosophy, and theology. in the present inquiry the anthropological problem is this: as religious wars are admitted to be the most intense, most idealistic, and most sacrificial of all wars, and therefore most difficult to stop, can it be ascertained just how the thirty years' war, culminating in the peace of westphalia, brought about the end of all religious wars? this might suggest how all political wars may be made to cease. if the seventeenth century accomplished the more difficult task, the peace conference at paris ought to succeed in the less difficult one. if the twentieth century prides itself on being superior in diplomacy, practical statesmanship, and general mental caliber, it will now have an opportunity to show such superiority by formulating a treaty which will make all future political wars not only improbable but impossible. principles of a peace conference. in following the present peace conference and comparing it with the peace congress of westphalia, it may be well to mention a few of the principles of such congresses in general. in a treaty of peace there are first of all the usual articles, as, e.g., a declaration that peace is restored and amnesty clauses, including restitution of such conquests as are not intended to be retained, and of rights suspended by the war. also there are provisions to remove the causes out of which the war arose, redress grievances, and prevent their recurrence. this is the most essential thing for the congress to do. then there is the indemnity article to make satisfactory reparation for injury sustained and cost of war. but great prudence should be exercised here, otherwise the conquered power may feel deep resentment which is liable to sow seeds for a future war. as to personal attendance at the congress, one great advantage is that difficulties thought insurmountable in correspondence often disappear in an interview. half the work is done when members have come to know what each really wants. but in long discussions there is danger of becoming fatigued and making ill-advised concessions. there is also temptation for some members to interfere where they have no substantial interests nor rights, and to contract engagements in which they have no special concern. when strong enough, every nation will insist on the right to manage its own internal affairs. sometimes there are a few particularly able men, speaking several languages fluently (a very practical advantage), but representing only small countries, who may exercise undue influence and cause the congress to authorize things which may not prove of equal justice to all. members of congresses have been known to vote for things that they did not understand, to the great disadvantage of their own country, due mainly to inexperience and lack of familiarity with the language spoken in the congress. the peace of westphalia. as early as 1636 pope urban viii extorted from the powers engaged in the thirty years' war their unwilling consent to treat. in 1637 a discussion of safe conducts was begun, which lasted nearly five years, and it was not until 1641 that preliminaries as to time and place of the congress were signed, and these were not ratified, nor safe conducts exchanged, until 1643, making six years for controversies as to mere formalities. one of the causes of this dilatoriness was that neither side really desired peace. captiousness and punctiliousness were doubtless emphasized in order to obtain delay. the labor of concluding peace was colossal; there were endless obstacles to surmount, contending interests to reconcile, a labyrinth of circumstances to cope with, difficulties to overcome besetting the congress from the very outset of the negotiations, not only of arranging the conditions of peace but still more of carrying them through the proceedings. it is therefore fair to assume that the difficulties in establishing the peace of westphalia were as great as, and probably greater than, those now confronting the peace conference at paris. for in the westphalian congress nobody desired peace, and it was not possible to agree to an armistice, so that war continued while the congress was in session, materially affecting the deliberations; this may be one reason why the congress lasted as long as four years. to avoid questions of precedence and to lessen further opportunities for disagreement, two cities in westphalia, munster for the catholics and osnabruck for the protestants, were selected. these places were a short day's ride apart. the treaty was signed at munster october 24, 1648, and was called "the peace of westphalia." in addition to the disposition for delay, there was a tendency to criticize things generally. thus certain plenipotentiaries complained of their accommodations, saying that the houses assigned to them, though high and handsome externally, were in fact rat holes. the streets also were pronounced very narrow, so much so that when a certain very polite diplomat, who wore a very large hat, made from his coach an extremely low bow, his hat hit a very expensive vase in an open window, which fell and broke, causing great embarrassment. first, questions of etiquette were taken up. for instance, did the precedence belong to spain, and what marks of honor were due to the representatives of the neutral powers? then came contests for the ecclesiastical seats. the nuncio, the representative of the pope, wished to sit not only at the head of the table but wanted a canopy over him to distinguish him. the way in which the minor powers should be received was in doubt. it was finally decided to go half-way down the stairs with guests when departing. also the question of titles arose. the word "excellency" was chosen for addressing the envoys of the great powers, but it had to be extended to the lesser powers. the venetian envoy obtained the honor (to his joy) of being conducted, when he visited the french plenipotentiary, to the door of his coach, instead of to the staircase. these few of the many incidents during the congress will illustrate the human side of official matters. such disputes as to precedence and etiquette were to be expected in a proud and ceremonious age among representatives of numerous states, especially when many of them were of doubtful rank. there was also much display. a train of 18 coaches conveyed the french envoys in their visits of ceremony. it appeared that france desired to show that she had not been impoverished by the war like germany. the papal nuncio and the venetian envoy were mediators as well as members of the congress. france and sweden were opposed to each other in religion, but in accord on political matters. the treaty was drawn up with such fullness and precision of language as is rarely found in documents of this nature, due to a large body of trained lawyers among the members. as indicating a desire for fairness in little things as well as in larger questions, the treaty contained these words: "no one of any party shall look askance at anyone on account of his creed." as an example of wise provisions, the following may be noted: the protestants demanded the year 1618 as annus normalis for the restitution of ecclesiastical estates, the catholics insisted on the year 1630, which was much more favorable to them. the congress split the difference and made it 1624. the medius terminus is often the wisest course in acute controversies. as to temporal affairs, all hostilities of whatever kind were to be forgotten, neither party being allowed to molest or injure the other for any purpose. in regard to spiritual affairs, complete equality was to exist (aequalitas exacta mutuaque), and every kind of violence was forever forbidden between the parties. the peace of westphalia was the first effort to reconstruct the european states' system, and it became the common law of europe. few treaties have had such influence, and europe is said for the first time to have formed a kind of commonwealth watching with anxiety over the preservation of the general peace. the thirty years' war. to have called to mind some of the principal points in the peace of westphalia is not sufficient for understanding the real significance of the treaty without some consideration of the war which it closed. as already suggested, this war, looked at from a scientific point of view, is an unconscious experiment of nations, an attempt to solve a problem in abnormal international psychology. in order to comprehend this experiment and its resultant treaty, just how it brought about permanent religious peace, some of the main events of the war must be recalled as a basis upon which to work. the protestant reformation had great influence upon almost everything political in europe, until the peace of westphalia. the religious peace of augsburg (1555) furnished no settlement to questions stirred up by the reformation. it was inevitable that such fundamental disagreements should lead to a general war. the thirty years' war marked the end of the reformation, which changed the idea of christian unity and altered the theory of a holy roman empire, replacing it by the idea of autonomy for individual states. on may 23, 1618, a body of protestants entered the royal palace at prague and threw two detested representatives of the crown from the window. this act started a struggle that for 30 years involved europe in a war which spread gradually from bohemia over southern germany, then slowly to northern germany and denmark, until country after country began to take part and the fighting became general. the war might have ended in 1623, making it a five years' war, had it not been for the outrageous treatment of the protestant states of northern germany, resulting in a political disintegration in which germany lost half of her population and two-thirds of her wealth. her religion and morality sank low, and the intellectual damage required generations to restore. the roman catholic church, having guided christianity for centuries without a rival, naturally felt greatly wronged by protestant secession. this explains the uncompromising enmities of the thirty years' war. various parties claimed the control of the religious doctrines to be taught the people, as well as control of worship; they were fighting each other for this power, ready to sacrifice their lives for it. the lutherans were as intolerant toward the calvinists as they were toward the catholics. the catholic church, convinced of the absolute truth of its doctrines based upon 13 centuries of growth, naturally could not tolerate some young reformers to arise and challenge its divine right, especially not since these reformers seized old monastic and ecclesiastic foundations with domains and edifices and administered them in their own interest. the resistance of the catholic hierarchy, to the last drop of blood, was a normal reaction. as so often happens, the conditions were abnormal, not the human beings. had the war stopped in 1623 the catholics would have been left with decided advantages. their own ambitions, however, prevented it. gustavus adolphus appeared, and by his efforts protestantism is said to have been saved from extinction. during 13 of the 30 years the lands of the protestants had been devastated; during the next 17 years an equalization of the exhaustion of the parties developed before a lasting religious peace was made. it became clear in the end that neither catholics nor protestants could crush their opponents without perishing likewise. terrible results of the war. the terrible results of the thirty years' war may be summed up by saying that germany was the carcass, and the hosts which invaded the german soil were the vultures. the protestant invaders were swedes, finns, hollanders, frenchmen, englishmen, and scotchmen; on the catholic side there came in spaniards, italians, walloons, poles, cossacks, croats, and representatives of nearly all other slavonic tribes. there was an army never larger than 40,000 men, but the camp followers were 140,000, consisting of gangs of gypsies, jewish camp traders, marauders, and plunderers. the soldiers robbed and tortured all alike, both friend and foe. the inhabitants would flee to the woods, taking with them or hiding everything they could. but the invaders were experts in discovering secret treasures; they would pour water on the ground, and where it sank quickly there they knew something had been recently buried. to retaliate, the peasants would watch for stragglers, for the sick and wounded who had dropped behind, putting them to death with every device of insult and cruelty known. much of the cruelty is too hideous to mention. in many districts the desolation was so great that persons were found dead with grass in their mouths. men climbed up the scaffolds and tore down the bodies of those hanged and devoured them. the supply was large. newly buried corpses were dug up for food. children were enticed away that they might be slain and eaten. the population, when plundered, would become plunderers in turn, forming into bands, and inflict on others the horrors that they themselves had suffered. men became wholly indifferent to the sufferings of others. whole countries were destroyed, towns and villages reduced to ashes, and civilization was pushed back into barbarism for half a century. the thirty years' war is said to have been so unspeakably cruel and calamitous that the like has never been known in europe. causes of the length of the war. gustavus adolphus writes in a letter that the war would be long drawn out and stop from exhaustion. the original purpose of the war was the suppression of the protestant faith, but the victories of gustavus adolphus made the catholics hopeless. also other interests of a political nature rose up, the war passed from a german to a european question. though there were times when peace might have been made, the side who had the best of it for the moment deemed it folly to stop when victory was in reach. the other side thought it base and cowardly not to continue, as some turn of fortune might repair the losses. many a war has dragged on after the purpose for which it began had become unattainable, because those who began it were too vain to admit that the objects of the war were impossible from its outset. in a long war also individuals rise up to whom fighting becomes a second nature, who know nothing else but violence and murder. thus many soldiers were indignant when the westphalian peace was signed, for they felt they had a vested right to plunder and murder, looking upon a wretched, helpless population as their just prey. a further reason for the long continuation of the war was the very exhaustion of both sides; there was not enough strength on either side to strike a decisive blow, nor sufficient energy left to make a vigorous effort for peace, making it seem useless to try. in the earlier and middle period of the war there were many cries for peace, but in the last eight years there was a terrible silence of death and such utter desperation that no one dared to speak of peace, so great was the exhaustion. the soldiers decreased as it became more and more difficult to recruit and feed them; the military operations grew feebler and more desultory, the fighting more inconclusive, though the misery did not diminish. but while the people and soldiers had become tired of the interminable struggle and wanted peace, many of the diplomats did not appear to desire it. causes of the war. the great length of the war gradually revealed its very hopelessness and uselessness, creating a general desire for rest and peace, transforming and weakening the religious movements out of which the war had arisen. the principle of private judgment, coming from the reformation, had had time to develop and undermine the ideas of temporal rights and duties common to both parties, while many ideas first conceived by the reformation but suppressed at the time, had at last commenced to grow through the long-continued tribulations. another cause of the war was the inherent incompatibility of religious views among the people. religious discord exists to-day, but it is not decided by bloody contests, because of breadth of religious insight, general indifference, and increasing skepticism. the convictions of the people of the seventeenth century, as to the truth of their own opinions and the errors of their opponents, were of such an absolute character as can not be found nowadays even among people with the most rigid beliefs. they did not know then that it was possible to live together and yet have the most varied and contradictory religious convictions. to suppose that these people were stupid is an error. the chances are that they were less stupid than the people are to-day. how many, at the present time, can look at their country, its ideals, ideas, and customs justly and without prejudice? naturally very few. but to place ourselves outside of not only our country but our generation is much more difficult. how could we then expect the people of the seventeenth century to do this? ignorance the fundamental cause of the war. the fundamental cause that brought the thirty years' war to a close was mental insight into the uselessness and hopelessness of further struggle, caused by the feeling of exhaustion due to the long continuance of the war. the reason why this war put an end to all religious wars was, that this intellectual insight became general in europe, inculcating more liberal religious views. this psychological attitude, with increasing indifference to religion and resultant skepticism, caused religious questions to be regarded less seriously, making further wars for such purposes impossible. the basal reason, therefore, was the intellectual realization of the foolishness of bloodshed on account of difference of religious convictions; that is, lack of knowledge of this fact in the past--in short, ignorance--was at the bottom of it all, as of most evils in the world. comparisons between the thirty years' war and the european war. in order to learn what suggestions from the thirty years' war may be of use for the league of nations in the future it will be well to mention the general similarities and differences between this war and the recent european war. the similarities are as follows: 1. the thirty years' war began with the throwing out of a window (defenestration) of detested persons; the european war started from an assassination. 2. the thirty years' war had been expected for some time; a general european war had been predicted for many years. 3. the thirty years' war, beginning with a local incident, spread from country to country, just like the european war did. 4. the thirty years' war was exceedingly brutal for its generation, just as the european war has been for our time. 5. the thirty years' war was a very long one for its generation; the european war has been a relatively long one for recent times. as to the differences between the two wars, it may be said that-1. in the thirty years' war both belligerents finally proved to be nearly equal in strength. in the european war one of the belligerents, though at first meeting with reverses, in the end completely overcame the other. 2. the thirty years' war ended in the exhaustion of both belligerents; the european war closed with the exhaustion of only one belligerent. 3. the thirty years' war was waged for religious convictions rather than for gain; the european war was not so ideal in its purposes. taking a general view of the similarities and differences between the two wars, the one great question arises: is the experience of the present european war strong enough for victors and vanquished alike to be willing to yield sufficient of their natural rights and sovereignty to submit all questions of war to some superior international court from which there is no appeal? in the thirty years' war nothing further was necessary; the exhaustion of both belligerents was sufficient to end religious wars. as the victorious party in war is much less inclined (if inclined at all) than the conquered foe to yield anything, will the allies, without the experience of defeat and exhaustion, be willing to yield enough of their sovereignty to make the future peace of the world permanent? will they be magnanimous and give up some national advantages of the present for future international benefits to all mankind? in short, are they unselfish enough to so temper their justice with mercy as to establish a world peace, the greatest boon to humanity ever known? here is a supreme opportunity. will the victorious allies arise to the occasion and make future wars improbable, if not impossible? we say "impossible," because if a nation is recalcitrant it can be punished by a general boycott, leading toward its economic ruin. as the instinct of self-preservation is the most powerful influence in nations as well as in individuals, it is a moral certainty that no nation could or would submit very long to such punishment. just after a war is ended, when the belligerents feel more keenly its effect than later on, they are much more disposed to make mutual concessions. will the victors of the european war strike at once while the iron is hot, and insist on the one paramount issue, the absolute prohibition of all wars? such a decision would radiate through all further proceedings of the league of nations and greatly facilitate its work. by thus making a certainty of the most important question of all history, no matter how difficult and delicate matters of greater or less importance may be, the league of nations will have assured its success in advance as the greatest and most beneficent influence that the world has ever experienced, just as the peace of westphalia was in its generation. in the peace treaty of westphalia were these words: "the hostilities that have taken place from the beginning of the late disturbances, in any place of whatsoever kind, by one side or the other, shall be forgotten and forgiven, so that neither party shall cherish enmity or hatred against, nor molest nor injure the other for any cause whatsoever." will the peace treaty of paris contain as generous and noble words and stop all political wars forever, just as the peace of westphalia put an end to all religious wars? will the twentieth century christianity, with its supposed greater liberality and enlightenment, be as far-seeing, unselfish, and effective as the christianity of the seventeenth century? let the league of nations answer yes. just as the spread of education and knowledge has gradually liberated the intellect so as to undermine the ideas upon which religious wars were based, so a similar process of enlightenment may be necessary to cause political wars to cease. references. the following references are only a few of those easily accessible in libraries. the cambridge modern history (vol. 4) has a bibliography of some 3,000 works and brochures on the thirty years' war. bougeant. histoire des guerres et des négociations qui précédèrent le traité de westphalie. paris, 1751. bernard, mountague. four lectures in subjects connected with diplomacy. london, 1868, 8º. lecture i is entitled "the congress of westphalia" (60 pp.); comparison with other congresses is made. the cambridge modern history. the thirty years' war, volume iv. cambridge, 1906, iii, 1,003 pages. it contains a most extensive classified bibliography of the war, filling 150 pages. freytag, gustav. bilder aus der deutschen vergangenheit. includes chapters on thirty years' war. gindely, anton. history of the thirty years' war. 2 volumes, new york, 1884. hausser, ludwig. the period of the reformation, 1517 to 1648 (translation). london, 1873, 8º, 456 pages. cust, edward. lives of the warriors of the thirty years' war. 2 volumes, 12º. london, 1865. the author is a military man. leclerc. négociations sécrètes touchant la paix de muenster et d'osnabrug. puetter. geist des westphalischen friedens. international psychology and peace.[3] the history of the world would seem to indicate that international psychology is almost synonymous with international anarchy. for the last 30 or more years, as is well known, a general european war was expected, predicated, and feared. this was the abnormal psychological condition of diplomatic and military europe until the present war caused its realization. the world appears always to have existed in a pathological condition of possible, probable, or actual war. the question is, "shall the world continue to this old way of international anarchism and political pathology, or shall it make a supreme effort to shake off this monstrous incubus of war?" it is peculiar circumstances that, while anarchism within a nation is generally detested, anarchism between nations has been palatable so long. cannibalism existed for thousands of years, slavery also, yet both have been practically abandoned, and now there seems to be a chance to do away the last and greatest enemy of humanity--war. to stop an evil that has existed so long and whose roots reach back into the beginning of history will necessarily require colossal effort and great sacrifice. such an effort has been successful only once in the history of the world. that was when the westphalian peace treaty was signed, in 1648 after the thirty years' war.[4] this resulted in abolishing the most difficult kind of wars--religious wars. if the seventeenth century could accomplish this greater task, certainly the twentieth century should take courage and likewise put an end to political wars, the lesser task. it may not be possible to make war impossible, but this is no reason it should not be tried. it may be possible, however, to make war most improbable. scientific method in history necessary. in the writing of history a common illusion is to exaggerate the future importance of contemporary events. both sides in the french revolution thought that the end of the world had come, as no doubt it had for some. comparatively few men can get outside of their country and look at things as they are, but very few or none can separate themselves from their generation and look without prejudice into the future. the importance of every great event is usually exaggerated by those immediately interested. from the historical point of view, the degree of importance of current events can not be determined until some time afterwards when the sources are more accessible, and it is possible to consider them calmly, and from the point of view of strict truth, which is one of the main principles of scientific inquiry. history is continuous and not broken up by what the present generation may think to be a finality or cataclysm; there may be progress or retrogression, but neither is so great as they appear at the time of the events which cause enthusiasm and optimism in the victorious and despair and pessimism in the vanquished. these are temporary phenomena, being only links in the historical chain. the changes after this war back to normal conditions may be much greater and faster than in previous wars. in this connection it must be remembered that the humane spirit is now much more diffused in the world than in the past, which is indicated by the enormous extent of protests against the horrors of war.[5] these horrors are common to all wars and were relatively as frequent in the past, if not more so. it is true that the absolute number of outrages may have been much greater in the present war than in previous wars, but this is probably due mainly to the enormous number of individuals engaged in the war. interdependence of nations a demographic law. the world has become so closely connected through modern means of communication that any war might result in a world war. the prevalent political tendencies are in the direction of combination and resultant consolidation. the question soon arises, shall combination and regulation go beyond national limits? the old-fashioned ideas of national limits do not seem to be adapted to present conditions. commercially such limits are impracticable and appear to be so in other ways.[6] the constitution of the united states has 18 amendments. this demographic law of interdependence of nations necessarily results in combination, which eventually may lead to international solidarity. whether we will or no, this demographic law of interdependence of nations can not be escaped. just as the states of the union are now closer together than their counties were many years ago, through the enormous development of physical means of communication, so governments are now brought more closely in contact than were the states at the time of the formation of the union. this demographic law of increasing interdependence when carefully examined appears to be almost as necessary as the law of gravity. it has been at work ever since history began and, though little noticed perhaps, it has been manifesting itself more and more as history advanced. the individual is subordinate to the community and must yield some of his sovereignty to it, the community in turn must yield to the county, the county to the state, the state to the nation, and finally the nation to the world. this last step is the one now pending in europe, and eventually, if not presently, may result in international solidarity, which will practically put an end to political wars just as the westphalian peace did with religious wars. international organizations and demographic law of interdependence of states. the tendency toward this demographic law of interdependence of states is shown by the large number of international organizations such as congresses or conferences which are held from time to time in different countries of the world. from the conference of vienna (1815) to the present time there have been some two hundred or more international congresses, the majority of which had to do with regulation of economic and sociologic affairs. thus manufacturers, merchants, and capitalists of different countries have met and made agreements to control and regulate production and distribution of merchandise. there is also the universal postal union, which is an illustration of international control or government. objections are sometimes made against international government, which were made years ago against the international postal union. it now has a constitution obeyed by all nations. refusal to obey would deprive a country of the benefits of the union. as a matter of fact, no country has done this. power of international organizations. if there were an international organization for war as well as for postage, and one or two nations should refuse to obey the decisions of a majority, or three-fourths of the organization, each of these recalcitrant nations could be boycotted economically and in many other ways by the remaining member nations. it is very doubtful if any nation would take such chances. any international organization helps toward peace by making action less precipitate, for if it were known in advance that a conference were to take place, this would tend to make nations less disposed to go to war. in fact, all international conferences, like the international congress of criminal anthropology, tend to intellectual, moral, and sociological solidarity between nations, in accordance with our demographic law of interdependence. (see equation of law later on.) this international congress of criminal anthropology, for instance, consists of some four hundred university specialists in anthropology, medicine, psychology, and sociology, who come from almost all countries of the world. in the eighteenth century international relations consisted of diplomatic conversations and were regulated by an occasional treaty, but, owing to the very inadequate means of communication, few international relations were required. in the nineteenth century the change in international conditions was very great. when international organizations represent some actual phase of life, whether educational, commercial or scientific, they really regulate their relations between nations and are often organs of international government. in short, international conferences and congresses act like legislatures between nations. if conferences had been in vogue and one had been held concerning the dispute between austria and serbia, very probably there would not have been any war, because, if for no other reason, the diplomats would have seen that it might lead to a general war in europe, and as no nation cared to take that responsibility the diplomatic procedure would doubtless have been modified. thus the conference over the morocco question killed it as a cause of war. this and other practical examples of government between nations show that the great success, convenience, and benefit to all nations encourage the further development of international organizations. the difficulties and dangers predicted have not come to pass. international administration has come in the cases of railroads, ships, and automobiles. an elaborate international government has come (through treaties) in public health and epidemics, and international notification of the presence of disease has been made obligatory. sovereignty changes according to the demographic law of interdependence of nations. the old idea of the independence of the state, mingled with that of sovereignty, prestige, and honor, and exaggerated by false patriotism, although limited more and more by conditions of civilization, is one of the main obstacles to the development of international organization and government. the habit of holding conferences or congresses would get the people to expect international government and insist on it, and any country would hesitate long before refusing to agree to a conference. the idea that sovereignty is destroyed because a nation is not absolutely independent belongs to the old régime, when many modern means of communication did not exist. in those days of comparative isolation there was reason for much independence, but now countries are so closely connected, as we have seen, that their independence and sovereignty are necessarily limited, while their interdependence has increased to such an extent that what benefits or injures one benefits or injures the other. thus it is to the advantage of each state to give up some of its sovereignty, just as it is for the individual to give up some of his freedom to the community for privileges much greater than the loss of his so-called independence. it is well known how the states of our union have gradually yielded more and more of their sovereignty to the federal government. thus sovereignty decreases according to our law of the interdependence of states. cause of war not necessarily economic. it is frequently asserted that after all the main cause of most wars is rivalry in trade and commercial friction; in short, it is economic. but it is a curious fact that commerce and industry are the most insistent on international rules or law to reduce all friction to a minimum, for peaceful trading is a general benefit to all concerned. it might be stated in this connection that in historical and political as well as physical science there is no one cause of anything, but a chain of causes; for the more we study the world, the closer we find it related; nothing is nor can be really alone. when we single out a cause we mean the predominant one, and which is the strongest link in the chain of causes becomes a matter of opinion, owing to our limited knowledge of international psychology. commercial systems of the world have brought nations closer together, but political relations have remained much the same; that is, the advances in diplomacy have been very few in comparison with the growth of economic relations which makes for peace rather than war. no international government; no lasting peace. that the lack of international government means international anarchy may be illustrated by some recent events. owing to the struggle of serbia for expansion, austria feared the seizure of its own territory and loss of some of its population, and so refused to accept mediation, because the hapsburg monarchy being reported declining, she must counteract this impression by showing vigorous action. the success of austria would be regarded by russia as a threat to herself, but a defeat of austria by russia would be a defeat for germany, and a german defeat for russia and france would be regarded as a defeat for england. thus the lack of any international government or organization made cooperation for peace almost, if not quite, impossible. england might have said to herself, among other reasons, "if i stay out of the war, germany may overrun france and belgium, resulting in a union of the french and german navies, but we are an island, and it would not do to risk the danger of such a combination." frontier questions have perhaps been the main cause of more wars in history than anything else. but in the course of events such questions have come to be settled without resort to force, which is a change from national to international government. nationalism may conflict with the peoples' interest. another nationalistic anachronism is the geographical standard in governmental matters. but intercommunications are so many and so close that geographical relations have few reasons to be considered. individual and racial interests are less geographical and more sociological. but governmental matters have not developed near so fast as sociological conditions. nationalism more often represents the interests of the few rather than the many. unfortunately it is easy to bolster up a narrow and selfish nationalism by appeal to the patriotism of the masses who fail to understand the conditions and support the interests of a few against their own vital interests. while anarchy between nations (nationalism) makes future wars probable, anarchy within nations can be easily stopped by doing justice to the masses. war worst method of settling difficulties. an egotistical, selfish, and narrow nationalism, the basis of international anarchy, has been demonstrated a partial, if not complete, failure by the condition in which europe is to-day. war, though only one of many methods for settling difficulties between nations, has, nevertheless, been the main one. there is a strong desire among the people to substitute some other method. generally a nation has two things to consider--one is what it wants; the other whether it can enforce its wants. this is the usual nationalistic dilemma, but our demographic law of the interdependence of nations assumes that each country will respect the other countries and be willing to consider their wishes at least in vital matters. where the differences between two nations have threatened the peace of europe it has been felt that such a matter was more than a national question; in fact, passed over into the international realm, and so conferences have been called which to a certain extent recognized the principle of interdependence and have enforced its decisions by blockade if not by more warlike means. if a nation adopt the methods of force, it is appealing to international anarchy, which causes nations to break international law much more readily than otherwise. in fact, military necessity knows no law. it may seem odd that conferences are so often called for war instead of for peace. but it is necessity that often rules; the wheel in the machine is not examined until it is out of order, human beings were never studied scientifically until they became lunatics or criminals. so peace seems to have been little thought of until danger of war appeared. peace is like good health, we do not know its value until we lose it. secret diplomacy insidious. all treaties between nations should be published in order to make the diplomacy of intrigue and deception impossible or at least most difficult to carry into effect. secret diplomacy enables those who want war to bring something to light suddenly and cause excitement and fear among the people and thus drive them into war before they understand what they are doing. the psychology of fear shows its power in producing apprehension by catch phrases, such as "the crisis is acute," or "there is panic on the stock exchange," or "negotiations may come to an end," or "an ultimatum has been sent." patriotic as well as fear inspiring phrases are published broadcast leading the people into war, but they must always be made to believe that it is in defense of their country, whether it is or not. but open diplomacy and international conferences prevent insidious methods of producing excitement; they also give the people time to think and avoid precipitate action; also facts are brought to light that otherwise might have been concealed by those desiring war. competitive armaments lead to war. competitive armaments, for which the masses are compelled to pay and by which they are killed, hasten the probability of future wars. great armaments lead to competitive armament, which experience shows to be no guaranty of peace, for it makes a nation feel so well prepared for war that when a dispute arises, and it is thought a few days' delay may give the enemy an advantage that might never be regained, the enemy must be attacked at once. thus austria refused to extend time to serbia nor would she take part in a conference of ambassadors nor respond to the serbian note to refer the dispute to the hague. so germany refused a similar proposal to the czar on july 29 and allowed russia but 12 hours to answer the ultimatum. russia had begun to mobilize and germany's fear, if the proposal for pacific settlement were accepted, russia would get the start and gain a military advantage probably caused germany to strike at once. thus such preparedness actually prevented any chance for even discussion of a peaceful settlement. also the knowledge that russia's army and navy were to be increased and strategic railroads built and that france was about to reintroduce three years' military service may have caused germany to think it imprudent to delay an inevitable war any longer. permanent peace hindered by spirit of hate. there can be no permanent peace so long as the idea of crushing this or that nation prevails. the question is not national, but international. the nationalistic spirit of hate may be temporarily useful in stirring up a country to fight better, but it does not tend toward a lasting peace. in the study of war we should seek the causes, be impersonal, and neither condone nor accuse. the scientific investigation of war comes under the head of criminal anthropology, one of the purposes of which is by knowledge gained to lessen or stop war permanently rather than discuss the ethics of war involving the spirit of hate and vengeance. no permanent peace with nationalism alone. the existing conditions between nations are somewhat like as if a state had rules and laws as to what to do when murder and riot occur, but no laws to prevent murder and riot, or, if there were laws, no power to execute them. from the theoretical point of view these irrational and abnormal conditions are evident, and yet they have been considered normal conditions for ages. this is indicated by the remark of a diplomat, who said: "things are getting back to a wholesome state again, every nation for itself and god for us all." as long as such an extreme and pathological form of nationalism exists no permanent peace is probable, if not impossible. nationalism has had a long trial with comparative freedom, and one of its grand finales is the present european war. a few suggestions for permanent peace. it would go far beyond the purpose of this article to discuss the many methods proposed for establishing permanent peace, yet one may be allowed merely to note a few points. there might be established an international high court to decide judicial issues between independent sovereign nations and an international council to secure international legislation and to settle nonjudicial issues. also, an international secretariat should be established. some fundamental principles of such international control might be to disclaim all desire or intention of aggression, to pursue no claim against any other independent state; not to send any ultimatum or threat of military or naval operations or do any act of aggression, and never to declare war or order any general mobilization or violate the territory or attack the ships of another state, except in way of repelling an attack actually made; not to do any of these until the matter in dispute has been submitted to the international high court or to the international council, and not until a year after the date of such submission. prohibitions for recalcitrant states. in order to enforce the decrees of the international high court against any recalcitrant state an embargo on her ships and forbidding her landing at any capital might be initiated. also there might be instituted prohibition of postal and telegraph communication, of payment of debts due to citizens, prohibition of all imports and exports and of all passenger traffic; to level special duties on goods to such state and blockade her ports. in short, an effort should be made to enforce complete nonintercourse with any recalcitrant state. should a state proceed to use force to go to war rather than obey the decree of the international high court all the other constituent states should make common cause against such state and enforce the order of the international high court. the psychological moment for preventing war is soon after war. if an absolute agreement among leading nations of the world never to resort to war could be obtained at the outset all other questions could be settled more justly and with fewer difficulties, for the consciousness that the supreme question was out of the way would relieve the psychological tension and afford opportunity for a more calm and careful consideration and adjudication of all other matters in dispute. it would be like the consciousness of the lawyer, when having lost his case in all other courts is content to let the united states supreme court settle it forever. this is due to the psychological power of the radiation of justice from the top downward. such an absolute and final agreement never to resort to war can be best accomplished right after the war, when all are sick of war and the very thought of it causes the suffering, wounded, and bleeding people to turn their heads significantly away with a profound instinctive feeling, crying out that anything is better than to go back to the old régime. in such a state of mind mutual concessions are much easier to make than later on. the psychological moment to prevent such suffering of the masses from ever occurring again is soon after the war. it is a sad comment that the number and untold suffering of millions of human beings seem to have been required for the nationalistic spirit of europe to be willing to follow international humanitarian ideas toward establishing permanent peace in the world. the hague rules only suggestions. the diplomats who wrote the rules at the hague convention knew well that they might be more or less disregarded; they were only suggestions. as war assumes the right to kill human beings, what rights, then, have the victims left over that are worth mentioning? as to what way they are killed there is little use of considering, probably the quicker the better, for there is less suffering. if prisoners must starve, it is a mercy to shoot them. to regulate murder of human beings is more or less humbug. the thing to do is to try to abolish international anarchy and slaughter forever, and to accomplish this the egotism, selfishness, and narrowness of nations must be so modified that they are willing to make the necessary sacrifice. if the reader believes the general ideas set forth in this study, let him or her aid the writer in a practical way and send a contribution to help circulate these ideas, not only in english and other languages but in other countries as well as the united states. the address of the author is: the congressional, 100 east capitol street, washington, d. c. equation of the demographic law of interdependence of nations. as already noted, our demographic law of the interdependence of nations is, that increase in the means of communication between states causes increase of their interdependence but decrease in their sovereignty. just as a physical body consists of molecules of various kinds, so the state may be regarded as a psychological entity with citizens of various characteristics, and just as the density of a body is equal to its mass divided by its volume, so the density of citizenship is equal to the population divided by the land area. if, therefore, we consider the states' adult population, as its mass (m) and the resultant aggregate increase of its means of communication as its velocity (v), and (t) as the time, then the psychological force (f) or interdependence of the state can be expressed by the familiar equation in physics f=mv/t; that is to say, the interdependence of a state is equal to its adult population (mass) multiplied by the resultant aggregate increase of its means of communication (velocity) and the product divided by the time (t). the poundal unit of physical force is such a force as will move 1 pound (mass unit) at a velocity of 1 foot per second in one second of time. now, assuming the unit of citizenship of a state to be one citizen and the unit of the resultant aggregate increase of means of communication per annum in one year of time to be k, then the statal unit of psychological force is such a force as will give one citizen (mass unit) one k unit (for convenience the k unit of annual aggregate increase of means of communication can be expressed in per cents. taking some of the principal means of communication, and working out their annual average per cents of increase, we have for the united states during the census periods (1900-1910); annual average increase of passengers on railroads, 7 per cent; on street and electric railways, 3 per cent (1907-1912); of telegraph messages sent, 6 per cent; of telephone stations, 10 per cent. combining these, the per cent of annual average aggregate increase will be 6.5 per cent, as value of k, assuming the percentages are equally weighted) of resultant aggregate increase of means of communication per annum in one year of time. as yet there is no exact way to measure the sovereignty and means of communication of the state, but the psychological side of this physical equation may suggest a working hypothesis for our demographic law of the interdependence of states which may some time be useful in the realm of international psychology. to measure the aggregate influence upon citizens of the many means of communication in a state (also, for illustration merely, let us take one of the principal means of communication, as steam railroads, and we find that the annual average increase in passenger-train-car miles for one citizen of the united states, from 1908 to 1914, to be 4.45, which is the value of k for steam railroads alone for period mentioned. in a later article the author will consider in detail the practical application of the equation) as steam, street and electric railways, telegraph and telephones, will require exact detailed knowledge of the mental, moral, and physical power of the individual citizen, the unit of the social organism. such measurements might be made when psychology and sociology become sciences in the rigid sense. the underlying hypothesis in this equation is that both the psychological and physical mechanism of the world are under one fundamental law.[7] laws of revolution.[8] scientific history teaches that without war many revolutions could never have taken place. one of the greatest problems of future government is to reconcile democratic equality with hereditary inequality among the people. governments differ much more in form than in substance, and make progress when the resultant activities of the citizens direct and control them. with this in mind, a few principles of revolutions may be instructive in connection with the present european situation. 1. the causes of revolutions are summed up in the word "discontent," which must be general and accompanied with hope in order to produce results. 2. modern revolutions appear to be more abrupt than ancient. contrary to expectation, conservative people may have the most violent revolutions, because of not being able to adapt themselves to changes of environment. 3. revolution owes its power to the unchaining of the people, and does not take place without the aid of an important fraction of the army, which usually becomes disaffected by power of suggestion. 4. the triumphant party will organize according to whether the revolution is effected by soldiers, radicals, or conservatives. 5. the violence is liable to be great if a belief as well as material interests are being defended. 6. for ideas which cause violent contradictions are matters of faith, rather than of knowledge. 7. if the triumphant party go to extremes, bordering upon absurdities, they are liable to be turned down by the people. 8. most revolutions aim to put a new person in power, who usually tries to establish an equilibrium between the struggling factions, and not be too much dominated by any one class. 9. the rapidity of modern revolutions is explained by quick methods of publicity, and the slight resistance and ease with which some governments have been overturned is surprising, indicating blind confidence and inability to foresee. 10. governments sometimes have fallen so easily that they are said to have committed suicide. 11. revolutionary organizations are impulsive, though often timid, and are influenced by a few leaders, who may cause them to act contrary to the wishes of the majority. thus royal assemblies have destroyed empires and humanitarian legislatures have permitted massacres. 12. when all social restraints are abandoned, and instinctive impulses are allowed full sway, there is danger of return to barbarianism. for the ancestral ego (inherent in everyone) is let loose. 13. a country will prosper in proportion that the really superior persons rule, and this superiority is both moral and mental. 14. if certain social tendencies appear to lower the power of mind, they, nevertheless, may lessen injustice to the weaker classes; and if it be a choice between mentality and morality, morality should be preferred. 15. a financial aristocracy does not promote much jealousy in those who hope to form a part of it in the future. 16. science has caused many things once held to be historical to be now considered doubtful. thus it is asked-17. would not the results of the french revolution, which cost so much bloodshed, have been obtained without violence later, through gradual evolution? and were the results of the french revolution worth the cost of the terrible barbarism and suffering that took place? 18. to understand the people in a revolution we must know their history. 19. the accumulated thought, feeling, and tradition of a nation constitute its strength, which is its national spirit. this must not be too rigid, nor too malleable. for, in the first place, revolution means anarchy, and, in the second place, it results in successive revolutions. war and peace studies. by the author. peace, war, and humanity. printed by judd & detweiler, washington, d. c., 26 pages, 1915, 8º. comparative militarism. reprint from publications of the american statistical association, boston, december, 1915, 3 pages, 8º. atrocities and outrages of war. reprint from the pacific medical journal, san francisco, april, 1916, 16 pages, 8º. gives data for civil war, boer war, bulgaria, and russia and germany, 16 pages, 8º. some moral evils of war. reprint from pacific medical journal, san francisco, august, 1916, 8 pages, 8º. refers especially to boer war. reasons for peace. machinists' monthly journal, washington, d. c., july, 1916, pages 708-710, 8º. choosing between war and peace. reprint from western medical times, denver, colo., 6 pages, 8º. statement of european war. reprint from pacific medical journal, san francisco, calif., february, 1917, 8 pages, 8º. prevention of war. reprint from congressional record, washington, d. c., february 27, 1917, 8 pages, 8º; also, reprint 7 pages, 8º. military training in the public schools. educational exchange, birmingham, ala., february and march, 1917. war and criminal anthropology. published in the congressional record for february 27 and march 15, 1917. our national defense. testimony of american officers as to difficulties of invasion, and our coast defenses. congressional record for march 15, 1917; also, reprint, 10 pages, 8º. identification of soldiers after death and head measurements. boston medical and surgical journal, june 13, 1918; also, reprint 8 pages, 8º. revolutions. journal of education, boston, mass., december 26, 1918, 4º. anthropometry of soldiers. medical record, new york city, december 14, 1918; also, reprint 17 pages, 12º; also, in our state army and navy, philadelphia, april, 1919. psychology of swiss soldiers. arms and the man, washington, d. c., 1918; also in journal of medicine and surgery, nashville, tenn., march, 1919. international psychology and peace. chicago legal news, may 1, 1919. suggestions of the peace treaty of westphalia for the peace conference in france. journal of education, boston, mass., march 27, 1919; also, in open court, april, 1919; also (in german) milwaukee herald, april, 1919; also (in norwegian) in amerika, may 16, madison, wis.; in "la prensa" (spanish), san antonio, tex., lunes 19 de mayo de 1919; "nardoni list" (croatian), june 8, 1919; also in "rivista d'italia," milano. april. 1919. disequilibrium of mind and nerves in war. medical record, new york city, may 3, 1919; also, reprint, 12 pages, 12º. footnotes: [1] article (by writer) in central law journal, st. louis, april 25, 1919, and in open court, april, 1919, chicago, ill. [2] see a study of the united states senate by the writer (published in spanish) under the title "estudio del senado de los estados unidos de america." in revista argentina de ciencias politicas, 12 de enero de 1918. (buenos ayres, 1918.) [3] article (by writer) in chicago legal news for may 3, 1919. [4] see article (by author) entitled "suggestions from the westphalian peace treaty for the peace conference in france," published in the journal of education, boston, march 27, 1919, and central law journal, st. louis, mo., april, 1919; also in open court for april, 1919, chicago. [5] see article (by author) in pacific medical journal, san francisco, calif., april, 1916, entitled "atrocities and outrages of war"; also pamphlet (by author) entitled "war and criminal anthropology," reprinted from the congressional record for february 17 and march 15, 1917. washington, d. c. [6] woolf, l. s., international government, fabian research department, london. [7] see article (by author) entitled "anthropology of modern civilized man" in medical fortnightly and laboratory news, st. louis, mo., april, 1919; also chapter on "emil zola" in senate document (by author) no. 532, sixtieth congress, first session. [8] article (by writer) in journal of education, boston, mass., for december 26, 1918. transcriber's notes: the following misprints have been corrected: "westphalla" corrected to "westphalia" (page 5) "calvanists" corrected to "calvinists" (page 6) "turbulations" corrected to "tribulations" (page 7) "centry" corrected to "century" (page 7) "wtihout" corrected to "without" (page 7) "defenstration" corrected to "defenestration" (page 8) "importauce" corrected to "importance" (page 8) "la prenso" corrected to "la prensa" (page 16) "rivista d'ialia" corrected to "rivista d'italia" (page 16) [illustration: [_to face the title._] captain sword and captain pen. =a poem.= by leigh hunt. with some remarks on war and military statesmen. --if there be in glory aught of good, it may by means far different be attained, without ambition, war, or violence.--milton. london: charles knight, ludgate street. 1835. to the right honourable the lord brougham and vaux, with whom the writer humbly differs on some points, but deeply respects for his motives on all; great in office for what he did for the world, greater out of it in calmly awaiting his time to do more; the promoter of education; the expediter of justice; the liberator from slavery; and (what is the rarest virtue in a statesman) always a denouncer of war, =these pages are inscribed= by his ever affectionate servant, jan. 30, 1835. leigh hunt. advertisement. this poem is the result of a sense of duty, which has taken the author from quieter studies during a great public crisis. he obeyed the impulse with joy, because it took the shape of verse; but with more pain, on some accounts, than he chooses to express. however, he has done what he conceived himself bound to do; and if every zealous lover of his species were to express his feelings in like manner, to the best of his ability, individual opinions, little in themselves, would soon amount to an overwhelming authority, and hasten the day of reason and beneficence. the measure is regular with an irregular aspect,--four accents in a verse,--like that of christabel, or some of the poems of sir walter scott: càptain swòrd got ùp one dày- and the flàg full of hònour, as thòugh it could feèl-he mentions this, not, of course, for readers in general, but for the sake of those daily acceders to the list of the reading public, whose knowledge of books is not yet equal to their love of them. [illustration: stepping in music and thunder sweet, which his drums sent before him into the street. _canto_ i. _p._ 1.] captain sword and captain pen. i. how captain sword marched to war. captain sword got up one day, over the hills to march away, over the hills and through the towns, they heard him coming across the downs, stepping in music and thunder sweet, which his drums sent before him into the street. and lo! 'twas a beautiful sight in the sun; for first came his foot, all marching like one, with tranquil faces, and bristling steel, and the flag full of honour as though it could feel, and the officers gentle, the sword that hold 'gainst the shoulder heavy with trembling gold, and the massy tread, that in passing is heard, though the drums and the music say never a word. and then came his horse, a clustering sound of shapely potency, forward bound, glossy black steeds, and riders tall, rank after rank, each looking like all, midst moving repose and a threatening charm, with mortal sharpness at each right arm, and hues that painters and ladies love, and ever the small flag blush'd above. and ever and anon the kettle-drums beat hasty power midst order meet; and ever and anon the drums and fifes came like motion's voice, and life's; or into the golden grandeurs fell of deeper instruments, mingling well, burdens of beauty for winds to bear; and the cymbals kiss'd in the shining air, and the trumpets their visible voices rear'd, each looking forth with its tapestried beard, bidding the heavens and earth make way for captain sword and his battle-array. he, nevertheless, rode indifferent-eyed, as if pomp were a toy to his manly pride, whilst the ladies lov'd him the more for his scorn, and thought him the noblest man ever was born, and tears came into the bravest eyes, and hearts swell'd after him double their size, and all that was weak, and all that was strong, seem'd to think wrong's self in him could not be wrong; such love, though with bosom about to be gored, did sympathy get for brave captain sword. so, half that night, as he stopp'd in the town, 'twas all one dance, going merrily down, with lights in windows and love in eyes, and a constant feeling of sweet surprise; but all the next morning 'twas tears and sighs; for the sound of his drums grew less and less, walking like carelessness off from distress; and captain sword went whistling gay, "over the hills and far away." ii. how captain sword won a great victory. through fair and through foul went captain sword, pacer of highway and piercer of ford, steady of face in rain or sun, he and his merry men, all as one; till they came to a place, where in battle-array stood thousands of faces, firm as they, waiting to see which could best maintain bloody argument, lords of pain; and down the throats of their fellow-men thrust the draught never drunk again. it was a spot of rural peace, ripening with the year's increase and singing in the sun with birds, like a maiden with happy words- with happy words which she scarcely hears in her own contented ears, such abundance feeleth she of all comfort carelessly, throwing round her, as she goes, sweet half-thoughts on lily and rose, nor guesseth what will soon arouse all ears--that murder's in the house; and that, in some strange wrong of brain, her father hath her mother slain. steady! steady! the masses of men wheel, and fall in, and wheel again, softly as circles drawn with pen. then a gaze there was, and valour, and fear, and the jest that died in the jester's ear, and preparation, noble to see, of all-accepting mortality; tranquil necessity gracing force; and the trumpets danc'd with the stirring horse; and lordly voices, here and there, call'd to war through the gentle air; when suddenly, with its voice of doom, spoke the cannon 'twixt glare and gloom, making wider the dreadful room: on the faces of nations round fell the shadow of that sound. death for death! the storm begins; rush the drums in a torrent of dins; crash the muskets, gash the swords; shoes grow red in a thousand fords; now for the flint, and the cartridge bite; darkly gathers the breath of the fight, salt to the palate and stinging to sight; muskets are pointed they scarce know where, no matter: murder is cluttering there. reel the hollows: close up! close up! death feeds thick, and his food is his cup. down go bodies, snap burst eyes; trod on the ground are tender cries; brains are dash'd against plashing ears; hah! no time has battle for tears; cursing helps better--cursing, that goes slipping through friends' blood, athirst for foes'. what have soldiers with tears to do?- we, who this mad-house must now go through, this twenty-fold bedlam, let loose with knives- to murder, and stab, and grow liquid with lives- gasping, staring, treading red mud, till the drunkenness' self makes us steady of blood? [illustration: down go bodies--snap burst eyes- trod on the ground are tender cries. _canto_ ii. _p. 8._] [oh! shrink not thou, reader! thy part's in it too; has not thy praise made the thing they go through shocking to read of, but noble to do?] no time to be "breather of thoughtful breath" has the giver and taker of dreadful death. see where comes the horse-tempest again, visible earthquake, bloody of mane! part are upon us, with edges of pain; part burst, riderless, over the plain, crashing their spurs, and twice slaying the slain. see, by the living god! see those foot charging down hill--hot, hurried, and mute! they loll their tongues out! ah-hah! pell-mell! horses roll in a human hell; horse and man they climb one another- which is the beast, and which is the brother? mangling, stifling, stopping shrieks with the tread of torn-out cheeks, drinking each other's bloody breath- here's the fleshliest feast of death. an odour, as of a slaughter-house, the distant raven's dark eye bows. victory! victory! man flies man; cannibal patience hath done what it can- carv'd, and been carv'd, drunk the drinkers down, and now there is one that hath won the crown: one pale visage stands lord of the board- joy to the trumpets of captain sword! his trumpets blow strength, his trumpets neigh, they and his horse, and waft him away; they and his foot, with a tir'd proud flow, tatter'd escapers and givers of woe. open, ye cities! hats off! hold breath! to see the man who has been with death; to see the man who determineth right by the virtue-perplexing virtue of might. sudden before him have ceas'd the drums, and lo! in the air of empire he comes! all things present, in earth and sky, seem to look at his looking eye. iii. of the ball that was given to captain sword. but captain sword was a man among men, and he hath become their playmate again: boot, nor sword, nor stern look hath he, but holdeth the hand of a fair ladye, and floweth the dance a palace within, half the night, to a golden din, midst lights in windows and love in eyes, and a constant feeling of sweet surprise; and ever the look of captain sword is the look that's thank'd, and the look that's ador'd. there was the country-dance, small of taste; and the waltz, that loveth the lady's waist; and the galopade, strange agreeable tramp, made of a scrape, a hobble, and stamp; and the high-stepping minuet, face to face, mutual worship of conscious grace; and all the shapes in which beauty goes weaving motion with blithe repose. and then a table a feast displayed, like a garden of light without a shade, all of gold, and flowers, and sweets, with wines of old church-lands, and sylvan meats, food that maketh the blood feel choice; yet all the face of the feast, and the voice, and heart, still turn'd to the head of the board; for ever the look of captain sword is the look that's thank'd, and the look that's ador'd. [illustration: there was the country dance, small of taste; and the waltz, that loveth the lady's waist. _canto_ iii. _p._ 14.] well content was captain sword; at his feet all wealth was pour'd; on his head all glory set; for his ease all comfort met; and around him seem'd entwin'd all the arms of womankind. and when he had taken his fill thus, of all that pampereth will, in his down he sunk to rest, clasp'd in dreams of all its best. iv. on what took place on the field of battle the night after the victory. 'tis a wild night out of doors; the wind is mad upon the moors, and comes into the rocking town, stabbing all things, up and down, and then there is a weeping rain huddling 'gainst the window-pane, and good men bless themselves in bed; the mother brings her infant's head closer, with a joy like tears, and thinks of angels in her prayers; then sleeps, with his small hand in hers. two loving women, lingering yet ere the fire is out, are met, talking sweetly, time-beguil'd, one of her bridegroom, one her child, the bridegroom he. they have receiv'd happy letters, more believ'd for public news, and feel the bliss the heavenlier on a night like this. they think him hous'd, they think him blest, curtain'd in the core of rest, danger distant, all good near; why hath their "good night" a tear? behold him! by a ditch he lies clutching the wet earth, his eyes beginning to be mad. in vain his tongue still thirsts to lick the rain, that mock'd but now his homeward tears; and ever and anon he rears his legs and knees with all their strength, and then as strongly thrusts at length. rais'd, or stretch'd, he cannot bear the wound that girds him, weltering there: and "water!" he cries, with moonward stare. ["i will not read it!" with a start, burning cries some honest heart; "i will not read it! why endure pangs which horror cannot cure? why--oh why? and rob the brave and the bereav'd of all they crave, a little hope to gild the grave?" ask'st thou why, thou honest heart? 'tis _because_ thou dost ask, and because thou dost start. 'tis because thine own praise and fond outward thought have aided the shews which this sorrow have wrought.] a wound unutterable--oh god! mingles his being with the sod. ["i'll read no more."--thou must, thou must: in thine own pang doth wisdom trust.] his nails are in earth, his eyes in air, and "water!" he crieth--he may not forbear. brave and good was he, yet now he dreams the moon looks cruel; and he blasphemes. ["no more! no more!" nay, this is but one; were the whole tale told, it would not be done from wonderful setting to rising sun. but god's good time is at hand--be calm, thou reader! and steep thee in all thy balm of tears or patience, of thought or good will, for the field--the field awaiteth us still.] "water! water!" all over the field: to nothing but death will that wound-voice yield. one, as he crieth, is sitting half bent; what holds he so close?--his body is rent. another is mouthless, with eyes on cheek; unto the raven he may not speak. one would fain kill him; and one half round the place where he writhes, hath up beaten the ground. like a mad horse hath he beaten the ground, and the feathers and music that litter it round, the gore, and the mud, and the golden sound. come hither, ye cities! ye ball-rooms, take breath! see what a floor hath the dance of death! the floor is alive, though the lights are out; what are those dark shapes, flitting about? flitting about, yet no ravens they, not foes, yet not friends--mute creatures of prey; their prey is lucre, their claws a knife, some say they take the beseeching life. horrible pity is theirs for despair, and they the love-sacred limbs leave bare. love will come to-morrow, and sadness, patient for the fear of madness, and shut its eyes for cruelty, so many pale beds to see. turn away, thou love, and weep no more in covering his last sleep; thou hast him--blessed is thine eye! friendless famine has yet to die. [illustration: come hither, ye cities! ye ball-rooms take breath! see what a floor hath the dance of death. _canto_ iv. _p._ 22.] a shriek!--great god! what superhuman peal was that? not man, nor woman, nor twenty madmen, crush'd, could wreak their soul in such a ponderous shriek. dumbly, for an instant, stares the field; and creep men's dying hairs. o friend of man! o noble creature! patient and brave, and mild by nature, mild by nature, and mute as mild, why brings he to these passes wild thee, gentle horse, thou shape of beauty? could he not do his dreadful duty, (if duty it be, which seems mad folly) nor link thee to his melancholy? two noble steeds lay side by side, one cropp'd the meek grass ere it died; pang-struck it struck t' other, already torn, and out of its bowels that shriek was born. now see what crawleth, well as it may, out of the ditch, and looketh that way. what horror all black, in the sick moonlight, kneeling, half human, a burdensome sight; loathly and liquid, as fly from a dish; speak, horror! thou, for it withereth flesh. "the grass caught fire; the wounded were by; writhing till eve did a remnant lie; then feebly this coal abateth his cry; but he hopeth! he hopeth! joy lighteth his eye, for gold he possesseth, and murder is nigh!" o goodness in horror! o ill not all ill! in the worst of the worst may be fierce hope still. to-morrow with dawn will come many a wain, and bear away loads of human pain, piles of pale beds for the 'spitals; but some again will awake in home-mornings, and some, dull herds of the war, again follow the drum. from others, faint blood shall in families flow, with wonder at life, and young oldness in woe, yet hence may the movers of great earth grow. now, even now, i hear them at hand, though again captain sword is up in the land, marching anew for more fields like these in the health of his flag in the morning breeze. sneereth the trumpet, and stampeth the drum, and again captain sword in his pride doth come; he passeth the fields where his friends lie lorn, feeding the flowers and the feeding corn, where under the sunshine cold they lie, and he hasteth a tear from his old grey eye. small thinking is his but of work to be done, and onward he marcheth, using the sun: he slayeth, he wasteth, he spouteth his fires on babes at the bosom, and bed-rid sires; he bursteth pale cities, through smoke and through yell, and bringeth behind him, hot-blooded, his hell. then the weak door is barr'd, and the soul all sore, and hand-wringing helplessness paceth the floor, and the lover is slain, and the parents are nigh- oh god! let me breathe, and look up at thy sky! good is as hundreds, evil as one; round about goeth the golden sun. v. how captain sword, in consequence of his great victories, became infirm in his wits. but to win at the game, whose moves are death, it maketh a man draw too proud a breath: and to see his force taken for reason and right, it tendeth to unsettle his reason quite. never did chief of the line of sword keep his wits whole at that drunken board. he taketh the size, and the roar, and fate, of the field of his action, for soul as great: he smiteth and stunneth the cheek of mankind, and saith "lo! i rule both body and mind." captain sword forgot his own soul, which of aught save itself, resented controul; which whatever his deeds, ordained them still, bodiless monarch, enthron'd in his will: he forgot the close thought, and the burning heart, and pray'rs, and the mild moon hanging apart, which lifteth the seas with her gentle looks, and growth, and death, and immortal books, and the infinite mildness, the soul of souls, which layeth earth soft 'twixt her silver poles; which ruleth the stars, and saith not a word; whose speed in the hair of no comet is heard; which sendeth the soft sun, day by day, mighty, and genial, and just alway, owning no difference, doing no wrong, loving the orbs and the least bird's song, the great, sweet, warm angel, with golden rod, bright with the smile of the distance of god. captain sword, like a witless thing, of all under heaven must needs be king, king of kings, and lord of lords, swayer of souls as well as of swords, ruler of speech, and through speech, of thought; and hence to his brain was a madness brought. he madden'd in east, he madden'd in west, fiercer for sights of men's unrest, fiercer for talk, amongst awful men, of their new mighty leader, captain pen, a conqueror strange, who sat in his home like the wizard that plagued the ships of rome, noiseless, show-less, dealing no death, but victories, winged, went forth from his breath. three thousand miles across the waves[a] did captain sword cry, bidding souls be slaves: three thousand miles did the echo return with a laugh and a blow made his old cheeks burn. then he call'd to a wrong-maddened people, and swore[b] their name in the map should never be more: dire came the laugh, and smote worse than before. were earthquake a giant, up-thrusting his head and o'erlooking the nations, not worse were the dread. then, lo! was a wonder, and sadness to see; for with that very people, their leader, stood he, incarnate afresh, like a cæsar of old;[c] but because he look'd back, and his heart was cold, time, hope, and himself for a tale he sold. oh largest occasion, by man ever lost! oh throne of the world, to the war-dogs tost! he vanished; and thinly there stood in his place the new shape of sword, with an humbler face,[d] rebuking his brother, and preaching for right, yet aye when it came, standing proud on his might, and squaring its claims with his old small sight; then struck up his drums, with ensign furl'd, and said, "i will walk through a subject world: earth, just as it is, shall for ever endure, the rich be too rich, and the poor too poor; and for this i'll stop knowledge. i'll say to it, 'flow thus far; but presume no farther to flow: for me, as i list, shall the free airs blow.'" [illustration: then suddenly came he with gowned men, and said, "now observe me--i'm captain pen." _canto v. p. 34._] laugh'd after him loudly that land so fair,[e] "the king thou set'st over us, by a free air is swept away, senseless." and old sword then first knew the might of great captain pen. so strangely it bow'd him, so wilder'd his brain, that now he stood, hatless, renouncing his reign; now mutter'd of dust laid in blood; and now 'twixt wonder and patience went lifting his brow. then suddenly came he, with gowned men, and said, "now observe me--_i'm_ captain pen: _i'll_ lead all your changes--i'll write all your books- i'm every thing--all things--i'm clergymen, cooks, clerks, carpenters, hosiers--i'm pitt--i'm lord grey." 'twas painful to see his extravagant way; but heart ne'er so bold, and hand ne'er so strong, what are they, when truth and the wits go wrong? footnotes: [a] the american war. [b] the french war. [c] napoleon. [d] the duke of wellington, or existing military toryism. [e] the glorious three days. vi. of captain pen, and how he fought with captain sword. now tidings of captain sword and his state were brought to the ears of pen the great, who rose and said, "his time is come." and he sent him, but not by sound of drum, nor trumpet, nor other hasty breath, hot with questions of life and death, but only a letter calm and mild; and captain sword he read it, and smil'd, and said, half in scorn, and nothing in fear, (though his wits seem'd restor'd by a danger near, for brave was he ever) "let captain pen bring at his back a million men, and i'll talk with his wisdom, and not till then." then replied to his messenger captain pen, "i'll bring at my back a _world_ of men." out laugh'd the captains of captain sword, but their chief look'd vex'd, and said not a word, for thought and trouble had touch'd his ears beyond the bullet-like sense of theirs, and wherever he went, he was 'ware of a sound now heard in the distance, now gathering round, which irk'd him to know what the issue might be; but the soul of the cause of it well guess'd he. indestructible souls among men were the souls of the line of captain pen; sages, patriots, martyrs mild, going to the stake, as child goeth with his prayer to bed; dungeon-beams, from quenchless head; poets, making earth aware of its wealth in good and fair; and the benders to their intent, of metal and of element; of flame the enlightener, beauteous, and steam, that bursteth his iron house; and adamantine giants blind, that, without master, have no mind. heir to these, and all their store, was pen, the power unknown of yore; and as their might still created might, and each work'd for him by day and by night, in wealth and wondrous means he grew, fit to move the earth anew; till his fame began to speak pause, as when the thunders wake, muttering, in the beds of heaven: then, to set the globe more even, water he call'd, and fire, and haste, which hath left old time displac'd- and iron, mightiest now for pen, each of his steps like an army of men- (sword little knew what was leaving him then) and out of the witchcraft of their skill, a creature he call'd, to wait on his will- half iron, half vapour, a dread to behold- which evermore panted and evermore roll'd, and uttered his words a million fold. forth sprang they in air, down raining like dew, and men fed upon them, and mighty they grew. ears giddy with custom that sound might not hear, but it woke up the rest, like an earthquake near; and that same night of the letter, some strange compulsion of soul brought a sense of change; and at midnight the sound grew into a roll as the sound of all gath'rings from pole to pole, from pole unto pole, and from clime to clime, like the roll of the wheels of the coming of time;- a sound as of cities, and sound as of swords sharpening, and solemn and terrible words, and laughter as solemn, and thunderous drumming, a tread as if all the world were coming. and then was a lull, and soft voices sweet call'd into music those terrible feet, which rising on wings, lo! the earth went round to the burn of their speed with a golden sound; with a golden sound, and a swift repose, such as the blood in the young heart knows; such as love knows, when his tumults cease; when all is quick, and yet all is at peace. and when captain sword got up next morn, lo! a new-fac'd world was born; for not an anger nor pride would it shew, nor aught of the loftiness now found low, nor would his own men strike a single blow: not a blow for their old, unconsidering lord would strike the good soldiers of captain sword; but weaponless all, and wise they stood, in the level dawn, and calm brotherly good; yet bowed to him they, and kiss'd his hands, for such were their new lord's commands, lessons rather, and brotherly plea; reverence the past, quoth he; reverence the struggle and mystery, and faces human in their pain; nor his the least, that could sustain cares of mighty wars, and guide calmly where the red deaths ride. "but how! what now?" cried captain sword; "not a blow for your gen'ral? not even a word? what! traitors? deserters?" "ah no!" cried they; "but the 'game's' at an end; the 'wise' wont play." "and where's your old spirit?" "the same, though another; man may be strong without maiming his brother." "but enemies?" "enemies! whence should they come, when all interchange what was known but to some?" "but famine? but plague? worse evils by far." "o last mighty rhet'ric to charm us to war! look round--what has earth, now it equably speeds, to do with these foul and calamitous needs? now it equably speeds, and thoughtfully glows, and its heart is open, never to close? [illustration: and so, like the tool of a disus'd art, he stood at his wall, and rusted apart. _canto_ vi. _p. 44._] "still i can govern," said captain sword; "fate i respect; and i stick to my word." and in truth so he did; but the word was one he had sworn to all vanities under the sun, to do, for their conq'rors, the least could be done. besides, what had _he_ with his worn-out story, to do with the cause he had wrong'd, and the glory? no: captain sword a sword was still, he could not unteach his lordly will; he could not attemper his single thought; it might not be bent, nor newly wrought: and so, like the tool of a disus'd art, he stood at his wall, and rusted apart. 'twas only for many-soul'd captain pen to make a world of swordless men. postscript; containing some remarks on war and military statesmen. postscript; containing some remarks on war and military statesmen. the object of this poem is to show the horrors of war, the false ideas of power produced in the minds of its leaders, and, by inference, the unfitness of those leaders for the government of the world. the author intends no more offence to any one than can be helped: he feels due admiration for that courage and energy, the supposed misdirection of which it deplores; he heartily acknowledges the probability, that that supposed misdirection has been hitherto no misdirection, but a necessity--but he believes that the time is come when, by encouraging the disposition to question it, its services and its sufferings may be no longer required, and he would fain tear asunder the veil from the sore places of war,--would show what has been hitherto kept concealed, or not shown earnestly, and for the purpose,--would prove, at all events, that the time has come for putting an end to those phrases in the narratives of warfare, by which a suspicious delicacy is palmed upon the reader, who is told, after everything has been done to excite his admiration of war, that his feelings are "spared" a recital of its miseries--that "a veil" is drawn over them--a "truce" given to descriptions which only "harrow up the soul," &c. suppose it be necessary to "harrow up the soul," in order that the soul be no longer harrowed? moralists and preachers do not deal after this tender fashion with moral, or even physical consequences, resulting from other evils. why should they spare these? why refuse to look their own effeminacy in the face,--their own gaudy and overweening encouragement of what they dare not contemplate in its results? is a murder in the streets worth attending to,--a single wounded man worth carrying to the hospital,--and are all the murders, and massacres, and fields of wounded, and the madness, the conflagrations, the famines, the miseries of families, and the rickety frames and melancholy bloods of posterity, only fit to have an embroidered handkerchief thrown over them? must "ladies and gentlemen" be called off, that they may not "look that way," the "sight is so shocking"? does it become us to let others endure, what we cannot bear even to think of? even if nothing else were to come of inquiries into the horrors of war, surely they would cry aloud for some better provision against their extremity _after_ battle,--for some regulated and certain assistance to the wounded and agonized,--so that we might hear no longer of men left in cold and misery all night, writhing with torture,--of bodies stripped by prowlers, perhaps murderers,--and of frenzied men, the other day the darlings of their friends, dying, two and even several days after the battle, of famine! the field of waterloo was not completely cleared of its dead and dying till nearly a week! surely large companies of men should be organized for the sole purpose of assisting and clearing away the field after battle. they should be steady men, not lightly admitted, nor unpossessed of some knowledge of surgery, and they should be attached to the surgeon's staff. both sides would respect them for their office, and keep them sacred from violence. their duties would be too painful and useful to get them disrespected for not joining in the fight--and possibly, before long, they would help to do away their own necessity, by detailing what they beheld. is that the reason why there is no such establishment? the question is asked, not in bitterness, but to suggest a self-interrogation to the instincts of war. i have not thought proper to put notes to the poem, detailing the horrors which i have touched upon; nor even to quote my authorities, which are unfortunately too numerous, and contain worse horrors still. they are furnished by almost every history of a campaign, in all quarters of the world. circumstances so painful, in a first attempt to render them public for their own sakes, would, i thought, even meet with less attention in prose than in verse, however less fitted they may appear for it at first sight. verse, if it has any enthusiasm, at once demands and conciliates attention; it proposes to say much in little; and it associates with it the idea of something consolatory, or otherwise sustaining. but there is one prose specimen of these details, which i will give, because it made so great an impression on me in my youth, that i never afterwards could help calling it to mind when war was spoken of; and as i had a good deal to say on that subject, having been a public journalist during one of the most interesting periods of modern history, and never having been blinded into an admiration of war by the dazzle of victory, the circumstance may help to show how salutary a record of this kind may be, and what an impression the subject might be brought to make on society. the passage is in a note to one of mr southey's poems, the "ode to horror," and is introduced by another frightful record, less horrible, because there is not such agony implied in it, nor is it alive. "i extract" (says mr southey) "the following picture of consummate horror from notes to a poem written in twelve-syllable verse, upon the campaign of 1794 and 1795: it was during the retreat to deventer. 'we could not proceed a hundred yards without perceiving the dead bodies of men, women, children, and horses, in every direction. one scene made an impression upon my memory which time will never be able to efface. near another cart we perceived a stout-looking man and a beautiful young woman, with an infant, about seven months old, at the breast, all three frozen and dead. the mother had most certainly expired in the act of suckling her child; as with one breast exposed she lay upon the drifted snow, the milk to all appearance in a stream drawn from the nipple by the babe, and instantly congealed. the infant seemed as if its lips had but just then been disengaged, and it reposed its little head upon the mother's bosom, with an overflow of milk, frozen as it trickled from the mouth. their countenances were perfectly composed and fresh, resembling those of persons in a sound and tranquil slumber.'" "the following description (he continues) of a field of battle is in the words of one who passed over the field of jemappe, after doumourier's victory: 'it was on the third day after the victory obtained by general doumourier over the austrians, that i rode across the field of battle. the scene lies on a waste common, rendered then more dreary by the desertion of the miserable hovels before occupied by peasants. everything that resembled a human habitation was desolated, and for the most part they had been burnt or pulled down, to prevent their affording shelter to the posts of the contending armies. the ground was ploughed up by the wheels of the artillery and waggons; everything like herbage was trodden into mire; broken carriages, arms, accoutrements, dead horses and men, were strewed over the heath. _this was the third day after the battle: it was the beginning of november, and for three days a bleak wind and heavy rain had continued incessantly._ there were still remaining alive several hundreds of horses, and of the human victims of that dreadful fight. i can speak with certainty of having seen more than four hundred men _still living_, unsheltered, _without food_, and without any human assistance, most of them confined to the spot where they had fallen _by broken limbs_. the two armies had proceeded, and abandoned these miserable wretches to their fate. _some of the dead persons appeared to have expired in the act of embracing each other._ two young french officers, who were brothers, had crawled under the side of a dead horse, where they had contrived a kind of shelter by means of a cloak: they were both mortally wounded, and groaning _for each other_. one very fine young man had just strength enough to drag himself out of a hollow partly filled with water, and was laid upon a little hillock groaning with agony; a grape-shot had cut across the upper part of his belly, and he was keeping in his bowels with a handkerchief and hat. he begged of me to end his misery! he complained of dreadful thirst. i filled him the hat of a dead soldier with water, which he nearly drank off at once, and left him to that end of his wretchedness which could not be far distant.'" "i hope (concludes mr southey), i have always felt and expressed an honest and christian abhorrence of wars, and of the systems that produce them; but my ideas of their immediate horrors fell infinitely short of this authentic picture." mr southey, in his subsequent lives of conquerors, and his other writings, will hardly be thought to have acted up to this "abhorrence of wars, and of the systems that produce them." nor is he to be blamed for qualifying his view of the subject, equally blameless (surely) as they are to be held who have retained their old views, especially by him who helped to impress them. his friend mr wordsworth, in the vivacity of his admonitions to hasty complaints of evil, has gone so far as to say that "carnage is god's daughter," and thereby subjected himself to the scoffs of a late noble wit. he is addressing the deity himself:- "but thy most dreaded instrument, in working out a pure intent, is man, array'd for mutual slaughter: yea, carnage is thy daughter." mr wordsworth is a great poet and a philosophical thinker, in spite of his having here paid a tremendous compliment to a rhyme (for unquestionably the word "slaughter" provoked him into that imperative "yea," and its subsequent venturous affiliation); but the judgment, to say no more of it, is rash. whatever the divine being intends, by his permission or use of evil, it becomes us to think the best of it; but not to affirm the appropriation of the particulars to him under their worst appellation, seeing that he has implanted in us a horror of them, and a wish to do them away. what it is right in him to do, is one thing; what it is proper in us to affirm that he actually does, is another. and, above all, it is idle to affirm what he intends to do for ever, and to have us eternally venerate and abstain from questioning an evil. all good and evil, and vice and virtue themselves, might become confounded in the human mind by a like daring; and humanity sit down under every buffet of misfortune, without attempting to resist it: which, fortunately, is impossible. plato cut this knotty point better, by regarding evil as a thing senseless and unmalignant (indeed no philosopher regards anything as malignant, or malignant for malignity's sake); out of which, or notwithstanding it, good is worked, and to be worked, perhaps, finally to the abolition of evil. but whether this consummation be possible or not, and even if the dark horrors of evil be necessary towards the enjoyment of the light of good, still the horror must be maintained, where the object is really horrible; otherwise, we but the more idly resist the contrast, if necessary--and, what is worse, endanger the chance of melioration, if possible. did war appear to me an inevitable evil, i should be one of the last men to shew it in any other than its holiday clothes. i can appeal to writings before the public, to testify whether i am in the habit of making the worst of anything, or of not making it yield its utmost amount of good. my inclinations, as well as my reason, lie all that way. i am a passionate and grateful lover of all the beauties of the universe, moral and material; and the chief business of my life is to endeavour to give others the like fortunate affection. but, on the same principle, i feel it my duty to look evil in the face, in order to discover if it be capable of amendment; and i do not see why the miseries of war are to be spared this interrogation, simply because they are frightful and enormous. men get rid of smaller evils which lie in their way--nay, of great ones; and there appears to be no reason why they should not get rid of the greatest, if they will but have the courage. we have abolished inquisitions and the rack, burnings for religion, burnings for witchcraft, hangings for forgery (a great triumph in a commercial country), much of the punishment of death in some countries, all of it in others. why not abolish war? mr wordsworth writes no odes to tell us that the inquisition was god's daughter; though lope de vega, who was one of its officers, might have done so--and mr wordsworth too, had he lived under its dispensation. lope de vega, like mr wordsworth and mr southey, was a good man, as well as a celebrated poet: and we will concede to his memory what the english poets will, perhaps, not be equally disposed to grant (for they are severe on the romish faith) that even the inquisition, _like war_, might possibly have had some utility in its evil, were it no other than a hastening of christianity by its startling contradictions of it. yet it has gone. the inquisition, as war may be hereafter, is no more. daughter if it was of the supreme good, it was no immortal daughter. why should "carnage" be,--especially as god has put it in our heads to get rid of it? i am aware of what may be said on these occasions, to "puzzle the will;" and i concede of course, that mankind may entertain false views of their power to change anything for the better. i concede, that all change may be only in appearance, and not make any real difference in the general amount of good and evil; that evil, to a certain invariable amount, may be necessary to the amount of good (the overbalance of which, with a most hearty and loving sincerity, i ever acknowledge); and finally, that all which the wisest of men could utter on any such subject, might possibly be nothing but a jargon,--the witless and puny voice of what we take to be a mighty orb, but which, after all, is only a particle in the starry dust of the universe. on the other hand, all this may be something very different from what we take it to be, setting aside even the opinions which consider mind as everything, and time and space themselves as only modifications of it, or breathing-room in which it exists, weaving the thoughts which it calls life, death, and materiality. but be his metaphysical opinions what they may, who but some fantastic individual, or ultra-contemplative scholar, ever thinks of subjecting to them his practical notions of bettering his condition! and how soon is it likely that men will leave off endeavouring to secure themselves against the uneasier chances of vicissitude, even if providence ordains them to do so for no other end than the preservation of vicissitude itself, and not in order to help them out of the husks and thorns of action into the flowers of it, and into the air of heaven? certain it is, at all events, that the human being is incited to increase his amount of good: and that when he is endeavouring to do so, he is at least not fulfilling the worst part of his necessity. nobody tells us, when we attempt to put out a fire and to save the lives of our neighbours, that conflagration is god's daughter, or murder god's daughter. on the contrary, these are things which christendom is taught to think ill off, and to wish to put down; and therefore we should put down war, which is murder and conflagration by millions. to those who tell us that nations would grow cowardly and effeminate without war, we answer, "try a reasonable condition of peace first, and then prove it. try a state of things which mankind have never yet attained, because they had no press, and no universal comparison of notes; and consider, in the meanwhile, whether so cheerful, and intelligent, and just a state, seeing fair play between body and mind, and educated into habits of activity, would be likely to uneducate itself into what was neither respected nor customary. prove, in the meanwhile, that nations are cowardly and effeminate, that have been long unaccustomed to war; that the south americans are so; or that all our robust countrymen, who do not "go for soldiers," are timid agriculturists and manufacturers, with not a quoit to throw on the green, or a saucy word to give to an insult. moral courage is in self-respect and the sense of duty; physical courage is a matter of health or organization. are these predispositions likely to fail in a community of instructed freemen? doubters of advancement are always arguing from a limited past to an unlimited future; that is to say, from a past of which they know but a point, to a future of which they know nothing. they stand on the bridge "between two eternities," seeing a little bit of it behind them, and nothing at all of what is before; and uttering those words unfit for mortal tongue, "man ever was" and "man ever will be." they might as well say what is beyond the stars. it appears to be a part of the necessity of things, from what we see of the improvements they make, that all human improvement should proceed by the co-operation of human means. but what blinker into the night of next week,--what luckless prophet of the impossibilities of steam-boats and steam-carriages,--shall presume to say how far those improvements are to extend? let no man faint in the co-operation with which god has honoured him. as to those superabundances of population which wars and other evils are supposed to be necessary in order to keep down, there are questions which have a right to be put, long before any such necessity is assumed: and till those questions be answered, and the experiments dependent upon them tried, the interrogators have a right to assume that no such necessity exists. i do not enter upon them--for i am not bound to do so; but i have touched upon them in the poem; and the "too rich," and other disingenuous half-reasoners, know well what they are. all passionate remedies for evil are themselves evil, and tend to re-produce what they remedy. it is high time for the world to show that it has come to man's estate, and can put down what is wrong without violence. should the wrong still return, we should have a right to say with the apostle, "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof;" for meanwhile we should "not have done evil that good may come." that "good" may come! nay, that evil may be perpetuated; for what good, superior to the alternatives denounced, is achieved by this eternal round of war and its causes? let us do good in a good and kind manner, and trust to the co-operation of providence for the result. it seems the only real way of attaining to the very best of which our earth is capable; and at the very worst, necessity, like the waters, will find its level, and the equity of things be justified. i firmly believe, that war, or the sending thousands of our fellow-creatures to cut one another to bits, often for what they have no concern in, nor understand, will one day be reckoned far more absurd than if people were to settle an argument over the dinner-table with their knives,--a logic indeed, which was once fashionable in some places during the "good old times." the world has seen the absurdity of that practice: why should it not come to years of discretion, with respect to violence on a larger scale? the other day, our own country and the united states agreed to refer a point in dispute to the arbitration of the king of holland; a compliment (if we are to believe the newspapers) of which his majesty was justly proud. he struck a medal on the strength of it, which history will show as a set-off against his less creditable attempts to force his opinions upon the belgians. why should not every national dispute be referred, in like manner, to a third party? there is reason to suppose, that the judgment would stand a good chance of being impartial; and it would benefit the character of the judge, and dispose him to receive judgments of the same kind; till at length the custom would prevail, like any other custom; and men be astonished at the customs that preceded it. in private life, none but school-boys and the vulgar settle disputes by blows; even duelling is losing its dignity. two nations, or most likely two governments, have a dispute; they reason the point backwards and forwards; they cannot determine it; perhaps they do not wish to determine; so, like two carmen in the street, they fight it out; first, however, dressing themselves up to look fine, and pluming themselves on their absurdity; just as if the two carmen were to go and put on their sunday clothes, and stick a feather in their hat besides, in order to be as dignified and fantastic as possible. they then "go at it," and cover themselves with mud, blood, and glory. can anything be more ridiculous? yet, apart from the habit of thinking otherwise, and being drummed into the notion by the very toys of infancy, the similitude is not one atom too ludicrous; no, nor a thousandth part enough so. i am aware that a sarcasm is but a sarcasm, and need not imply any argument; never includes all;--but it acquires a more respectable character when so much is done to keep it out of sight,--when so many questions are begged against it by "pride, pomp, and circumstance," and allegations of necessity. similar allegations may be, and are brought forward, by other nations of the world, in behalf of customs which we, for our parts, think very ridiculous, and do our utmost to put down; never referring them, as we refer our own, to the mysterious ordinations of providence; or, if we do, never hesitating to suppose, that providence, in moving us to interfere, is varying its ordinations. now, all that i would ask of the advocates of war, is to apply the possible justice of this supposition to their own case, for the purpose of thoroughly investigating the question. but they will exultingly say, perhaps, "is this a time for investigating the question, when military genius, even for civil purposes, has regained its ascendancy in the person of the duke of wellington? when the world has shown that it cannot do without him? when whigs, radicals, liberals of all sorts, have proved to be but idle talkers, in comparison with this man of few words and many deeds?" i answer, that it remains to be proved whether the ascendancy be gained or not; that i have no belief it will be regained; and that, in the meanwhile, never was time fitter for questioning the merits of war, and, by inference, those of its leaders. the general peacefulness of the world presents a fair opportunity for laying the foundations of peaceful opinion; and the alarm of the moment renders the interrogation desirable for its immediate sake. the re-appearance of a military administration, or of an administration _barely civil_, and military at heart, may not, at first sight, be thought the most promising one for hastening a just appreciation of war, and the ascendancy of moral over physical strength. but is it, or can it be, lasting? will it not provoke--is it not now provoking--a re-action still more peremptory against the claims of toryism, than the state of things which preceded it? is it anything but a flash of success, still more indicative of expiring life, and caused only by its convulsive efforts? if it be, this it is easy enough to predict, that sir robert peel, notwithstanding his abilities, and the better ambition which is natural to them, and which struggles in him with an inferior one, impatient of his origin, will turn out to be nothing but a servant of the aristocracy, and (more or less openly) of a barrack-master. he will be the servant, not of the king, not of the house of commons, but of the house of lords, and (as long as such influence lasts, which can be but a short while), of its military leader. he will do nothing whatsoever contrary to their dictation, upon peril of being treated worse than canning; and all the reform which he is permitted to bring about will be only just as much as will serve to keep off the spirit of it as long as possible, and to continue the people in that state of comparative ignorance, which is the only safeguard of monopoly. every unwilling step of reform will be accompanied with some retrograde or bye effort in favour of the abuses reformed: cunning occasion will be seized to convert boons, demanded by the age, into gifts of party favour, and bribes for the toleration of what is withheld; and as knowledge proceeds to extort public education (for extort it it will, and in its own way too at last), mark, and see what attempts will be made to turn knowledge against itself, and to catechise the nation back into the schoolboy acquiescence of the good people of germany. much good is there in that people--i would not be thought to undervalue it--much _bonhommie_--and in the most despotic districts, as much sensual comfort as can make any people happy who know no other happiness. but england and france, the leaders of europe, the peregrinators of the world, cannot be confined to those lazy and prospectless paths. they have gone through the feudal reign; they must now go through the commercial (god forbid that for any body's sake they should stop there!), and they will continue to advance, till all are instructed, and all are masters; and government, in however gorgeous a shape, be truly their servant. the problem of existing governments is how to prepare for this inevitable period, and to continue to be its masters, by converting themselves frankly and truly into its friends. for my part, as one of the people, i confess i like the colours and shows of feudalism, and would retain as much of them as would adorn nobler things. i would keep the tiger's skin, though the beast be killed; the painted window, though the superstition be laid in the tomb. nature likes external beauty, and man likes it. it softens the heart, enriches the imagination, and helps to show us that there are other goods in the world besides bare utility. i would fain see the splendours of royalty combined with the cheapness of a republic and the equal knowledge of all classes. is such a combination impossible? i would exhort the lovers of feudal splendour to be the last men to think so; for a thousand times more impossible will they find its retention under any other circumstances. their royalties, their educations, their accomplishments of all sorts, must go along with the press and its irresistible consequences, or they will be set aside like a child in a corner, who has insisted on keeping the toys and books of his brothers to himself. now, there is nothing that irritates a just cause so much as a threatening of force; and all impositions of a military chief on a state, where civil directors will, at least, do as well, is a threatening of force, disguise it, or pretend to laugh at it, as its imposers may. this irritation in england will not produce violence. public opinion is too strong, and the future too secure. but deeply and daily will increase the disgust and the ridicule; and individuals will get laughed at and catechised who cannot easily be sent out of the way as ambassadors, and who might as well preserve their self-respect a little better. to attempt, however quietly, to overawe the advance of improvement, by the aspect of physical force, is as idle as if soldiers were drawn out to suppress the rising of a flood. the flood rises quietly, irresistibly, without violence--it cannot help it--the waters of knowledge are out, and will "cover the earth." of what use is it to see the representative of a by-gone influence--a poor individual mortal (for he is nothing else in the comparison), fretting and fuming on the shore of this mighty sea, and playing the part of a canute reversed,--an antic really taking his flatterers at their word? the first thirty-five years of the nineteenth century have been rich in experiences of the sure and certain failure of all soldiership and toryism to go heartily along in the cause of the many. there has been the sovereign instance of napoleon bonaparte himself--of the allies after him--of charles the tenth--of louis philippe, albeit a "schoolmaster,"--and lastly, of this strange and most involuntary reformer the duke of wellington, who refused to do, under canning, or for principle's sake, what he consented to do when canning died, for the sake of regaining power, and of keeping it with as few concessions as possible. canning perished because toryism, or the principle of power for its own sake, to which he had been a servant, could not bear to acknowledge him as its master. his intellect was just great enough (as his birth was small enough) to render it jealous of him under that aspect. there is an instinct in toryism which renders pure intellect intolerable to it, except in some inferior or mechanical shape, or in the flattery of voluntary servitude. but, by a like instinct, it is not so jealous of military renown. it is glad of the doubtful amount of intellect in military genius, and knows it to be a good ally in the preservation of power, and in the substitution of noise and show for qualities fearless of inspection. is it an ascendancy of this kind which the present age requires, or will permit? do we want a soldier at the head of us, when there is nobody abroad to fight with? when international as well as national questions can manifestly settle themselves without him? and when his appearance in the seat of power can indicate nothing but a hankering after those old substitutions of force for argument, or at best of "an authority for a reason," which every step of reform is hoping to do away? do we want him to serve in our shops? to preside over our studies? to cultivate "peace and good will" among nations? wounding no self love--threatening no social? there never was a soldier, purely brought up as such--and it is of such only i speak, and not of rare and even then perilous exceptions,--men educated in philosophy like epaminondas, or in homely household virtues and citizenship like washington--but there never was a soldier such as i speak of, who did more for the world than was compatible with his confined and arbitrary breeding. i do not speak, of course, with reference to the unprofessional part of his character. circumstances, especially the participation of dangers and vicissitude, often conspire with naturally good qualities to render soldiers the most amiable of men; and nothing is more delightful to contemplate than an old military veteran, whose tenderness of heart has survived the shocks of the rough work it has been tried in, till twenty miserable sights of war and horror start up to the imagination as a set-off against its attractiveness. but, publicly speaking, the more a soldier succeeds, the more he looks upon soldiership as something superior to all other kinds of ascendancy, and qualified to dispense with them. he always ends in considering the flower of the art of government as consisting in issuing "orders," and that of popular duty as comprised in "obedience." cities with him are barracks, and the nation a conquered country. he is at best but a pioneer of civilization. when he undertakes to be the civilizer himself, he makes mistakes that betray him to others, even supposing him self-deceived. napoleon, though he was the accidental instrument of a popular re-action, was one of the educated tools of the system that provoked it,--an officer brought up at a royal military college; and in spite of his boasted legislation and his real genius, such he ever remained. he did as much for his own aggrandizement as he could, and no more for the world than he thought compatible with it. the same military genius which made him as great as he was, stopped him short of a greater greatness; because, quick and imposing as he was in acting the part of a civil ruler, he was in reality a soldier and nothing else, and by the excess of the soldier's propensity (aggrandizement by force), he over-toppled himself, and fell to pieces. soldiership appears to have narrowed or hardened the public spirit of every man who has spent the chief part of his life in it, who has died at an age which gives final proofs of its tendency, and whose history is thoroughly known. we all know what cromwell did to an honest parliament. marlborough ended in being a miser and the tool of his wife. even good-natured, heroic nelson condescended to become an executioner at naples. frederick did much for prussia, as a power; but what became of her as a people, or power either, before the popular power of france? even washington seemed not to comprehend those who thought that negro-slaves ought to be freed. in the name of common sense then, what do we want with a soldier who was born and bred in circumstances the most arbitrary; who never advocated a liberal measure as long as he could help it; and who (without meaning to speak presumptuously, or in one's own person unauthorized by opinion) is one of the merest soldiers, though a great one, that ever existed,--without genius of any other sort,--with scarcely a civil public quality either commanding or engaging (as far as the world in general can see),--and with no more to say for himself than the most mechanical clerk in office? in what respect is the duke of wellington better fitted to be a parliamentary leader, than the sir arthur wellesley of twenty years back? or what has re-cast the habits and character of the colonel wellesley of the east indies, to give him an unprofessional consideration for the lives and liberties of his fellow-creatures? and yet the duke of wellington (it is said) _may_, after all, be in earnest in his professions of reform and advancement. if so, he will be the most remarkable instance that ever existed, of the triumph of reason over the habits of a life, and the experience of mankind. i have looked for some such man through a very remarkable period of the world, when an honest declaration to this effect would have set him at the top of mankind, to be worshipped for ever; and i never found the glorious opportunity seized,--not by napoleon when he came from elba,--not by the allies when they conquered him,--not by louis philippe, though he was educated in adversity. i mean that he has shown himself a prince born, of the most aristocratic kind; and evidently considers himself as nothing but the head of a new dynasty. when the duke of wellington had the opportunity of being a reformer, of his own free will, he resisted it as long as he could. he opposed reform up to the last moment of its freedom from his dictation; he declared that ruin would follow it; that the institutions of the country were perfect without it; and that, at the very least, the less of it the better. and for this enmity, even if no other reason existed,--even if his new light were sincere,--the duke of wellington ought not to have the _honour_ of leading reform. it is just as if a man had been doing all he could to prevent another from entering his own house, and then, when he found that the by-standers would insist on his having free passage, were to turn to them, smiling, and say, "well, since it must be so, allow me to do the honours of the mansion." everybody knows what this proposal would be called by the by-standers. and if the way in which greatness is brought up and spoilt gives it a right to a less homely style of rebuke (as i grant it does), still the absurdity of the duke's claim is not the less evident, nor the air of it less provoking. i can imagine but two reasons for the remotest possible permission of this glaring anomaly--this government of anti-reforming reformers--this hospital of sick guides for the healthy, supported by involuntary contributions: first, sheer necessity (which is ludicrous); and second, a facilitation of church reform through the lords and the bench of bishops; the desirableness of which facilitation appears to be in no proportion to the compromise it is likely to make with abuses. i have read, i believe, all the utmost possible things that can be said in its favour, the articles, for instance, written by the _times_ newspaper (admirable, as far as a rotten cause can let them be, and when not afflicted by some portentous mystery of personal resentment); and though i trust i may lay claim to as much willingness to be convinced, as most men who have suffered and reflected, i have not seen a single argument which did not appear to me fully answered by the above objection alone (about the "honour"); setting aside the innumerable convincing ones urged by reasoners on the other side: for as to any dearth of statesmen in a country like this, it never existed, nor ever can, till education and public spirit have entirely left it. there have been the same complaints at every change in the history of administrations; and the crop has never failed. allow me to state here, that any appearance of personality in this book is involuntary. public principles are sometimes incarnate in individual shapes; and, in attacking them, the individual may be seemingly attacked, where, to eyes which look a little closer, there is evidently no such intention. i have been obliged to identify, in some measure, the power of the sword with several successive individuals, and with the duke of wellington most, because he is the reigning shape, and includes all its pretensions. but as an individual who am nothing, except in connexion with what i humanly feel, i dare to affirm, that i have not only the consideration that becomes me for all human beings, but a flesh and blood regard for every body; and that i as truly respect in the noble duke the possession of military science, of a straight-forward sincerity, and a valour of which no circumstances or years can diminish the ready firmness, as i doubt the fitness of a man of his education, habits, and political principles, for the guidance of an intellectual age. i dislike toryism, because i think it an unjust, exacting, and pernicious thing, which tends to keep the interests of the many in perpetual subjection to those of the few; but far be it from me, in common modesty, to dislike those who have been brought up in its principles, and taught to think them good,--far less such of them as adorn it by intellectual or moral qualities, and who justly claim for it, under its best aspect in private life, that ease and urbanity of behaviour which implies an acknowledgment of its claims to respect, even where those claims are partly grounded in prejudice. i heartily grant to the privileged classes, that, enjoying in many respects the best educations, they have been conservators of polished manners, and of the other graces of intercourse. my quarrel with them is, that the inferior part of their education induces them to wish to keep these manners and graces to themselves, together with a superabundance, good for nobody, of all other advantages; and that thus, instead of being the preservers of a beautiful and genial flame, good for all, and in due season partakeable by all, they would hoard and make an idolatrous treasure of it, sacred to one class alone, and such as the diffusion of knowledge renders it alike useless and exasperating to endeavour to withhold. i will conclude this postscript with quotations from three writers of the present day, who may be fairly taken to represent the three distinct classes of the leaders of knowledge, and who will show what is thought of the feasibility of putting an end to war,--the utilitarian, or those who are all for the tangible and material--the metaphysical, or those who recognize, in addition, the spiritual and imaginative wants of mankind--and lastly (in no offensive sense), the men of the world, whose opinion will have the greatest weight of all with the incredulous, and whose speaker is a soldier to boot, and a man who evidently sees fair play to all the weaknesses as well as strengths of our nature. the first quotation is from the venerable mr bentham, a man who certainly lost sight of no existing or possible phase of society, such as the ordinary disputants on this subject contemplate. i venture to think him not thoroughly philosophical on the point, especially in what he says in reproach of men educated to think differently from himself. but the passage will show the growth of opinion in a practical and highly influential quarter. "nothing can be worse," says mr bentham, "than the general feeling on the subject of war. the church, the state, the ruling few, the subject many, all seem to have combined, in order to patronise vice and crime in their very widest sphere of evil. dress a man in particular garments, call him by a particular name, and he shall have authority, on divers occasions, to commit every species of offence, to pillage, to murder, to destroy human felicity, and, for so doing, he shall be rewarded. "of all that is pernicious in admiration, the admiration of heroes is the most pernicious; and how delusion should have made us admire what virtue should teach us to hate and loathe, is among the saddest evidences of human weakness and folly. the crimes of heroes seem lost in the vastness of the field they occupy. a lively idea of the mischief they do, of the misery they create, seldom penetrates the mind through the delusions with which thoughtlessness and falsehood have surrounded their names and deeds. is it that the magnitude of the evil is too gigantic for entrance? we read of twenty thousand men killed in a battle, with no other feeling than that 'it was a glorious victory.' twenty thousand, or ten thousand, what reck we of their sufferings? the hosts who perished are evidence of the completeness of the triumph; and the completeness of the triumph is the measure of merit, and the glory of the conqueror. our schoolmasters, and the immoral books they so often put into our hands, have inspired us with an affection for heroes; and the hero is more heroic in proportion to the numbers of the slain--add a cypher, not one iota is added to our disapprobation. four or two figures give us no more sentiment of pain than one figure, while they add marvellously to the grandeur and splendour of the victor. let us draw forth one individual from those thousands, or tens of thousands,--his leg has been shivered by one ball, his jaw broken by another--he is bathed in his own blood, and that of his fellows--yet he lives, tortured by thirst, fainting, famishing. he is but one of the twenty thousand--one of the actors and sufferers in the scene of the hero's glory--and of the twenty thousand there is scarcely one whose suffering or death will not be the centre of a circle of misery. look again, admirers of that hero! is not this wretchedness? because it is repeated ten, ten hundred, ten thousand times, is not this wretchedness? "the period will assuredly arrive, when better instructed generations will require all the evidence of history to credit, that, in times deeming themselves enlightened, human beings should have been honoured with public approval, in the very proportion of the misery they caused, and the mischiefs they perpetrated. they will call upon all the testimony which incredulity can require, to persuade them that, in passed ages, men there were--men, too, deemed worthy of popular recompense--who, for some small pecuniary retribution, hired themselves out to do any deeds of pillage, devastation, and murder, which might be demanded of them. and, still more will it shock their sensibilities to learn, that such men, such men-destroyers, were marked out as the eminent and the illustrious--as the worthy of laurels and monuments--of eloquence and poetry. in that better and happier epoch, the wise and the good will be busied in hurling into oblivion, or dragging forth for exposure to universal ignominy and obloquy, many of the heads we deem _heroic_; while the true fame and the perdurable glories will be gathered around the creators and diffusers of happiness."--_deontology._ our second quotation is from one of the subtilest and most universal thinkers now living--thomas carlyle--chiefly known to the public as a german scholar and the friend of goethe, but deeply respected by other leading intellects of the day, as a man who sees into the utmost recognized possibilities of knowledge. see what he thinks of war, and of the possibility of putting an end to it. we forget whether we got the extract from the _edinburgh_ or the _foreign quarterly review_, having made it sometime back and mislaid the reference; and we take a liberty with him in mentioning his name as the writer, for which his zeal in the cause of mankind will assuredly pardon us. "the better minds of all countries," observes mr carlyle, "begin to understand each other, and, which follows naturally, to love each other and help each other, by whom ultimately all countries in all their proceedings are governed. "late in man's history, yet clearly, at length, it becomes manifest to the dullest, that mind is stronger than matter--that mind is the creator and shaper of matter--that not brute force, but only persuasion and faith, is the king of this world. the true poet, who is but an inspired thinker, is still an orpheus whose lyre tames the savage beasts, and evokes the dead rocks to fashion themselves into palaces and stately inhabited cities. it has been said, and may be repeated, that literature is fast becoming all in all to us--our church, our senate, our whole social constitution. the true pope of christendom is not that feeble old man in rome, nor is its autocrat the napoleon, the nicholas, with its half million even of obedient bayonets; such autocrat is himself but a more cunningly-devised bayonet and military engine in the hands of a mightier than he. the true autocrat, or pope, is that man, the real or seeming wisest of the last age; crowned after death; who finds his hierarchy of gifted authors, his clergy of assiduous journalists: whose decretals, written, not on parchment, but on the living souls of men, it were an inversion of the laws of nature to disobey. in these times of ours, all intellect has fused itself into literature; literature--printed thought, is the molten sea and wonder-bearing chaos, in which mind after mind casts forth its opinion, its feeling, to be molten into the general mass, and to be worked there; interest after interest is engulfed in it, or embarked in it; higher, higher it rises round all the edifices of existence; they must all be molten into it, and anew bodied forth from it, or stand unconsumed among its fiery surges. woe to him whose edifice is not built of true asbest, and on the everlasting rock, but on the false sand and the drift-wood of accident, and the paper and parchment of antiquated habit! for the power or powers exist not on our earth that can say to that sea--roll back, or bid its proud waves be still. "what form so omnipotent an element will assume--how long it will welter to and fro as a wild democracy, a wilder anarchy--what constitution and organization it will fashion for itself, and for what depends on it in the depths of time, is a subject for prophetic conjecture, wherein brightest hope is not unmingled with fearful apprehensions and awe at the boundless unknown. the more cheering is this one thing, which we do see and know--that its tendency is to a universal european commonweal; that the wisest in all nations will communicate and co-operate; whereby europe will again have its true sacred college and council of amphictyons; wars will become rarer, less inhuman; and in the course of centuries, such delirious ferocity in nations, as in individuals it already is, may be proscribed and become obsolete for ever." my last and not least conclusive extract (for it shows the actual hold which these speculations have taken of the minds of practical men--of men out in the world, and even of _soldiers_) is from a book popular among all classes of readers--the _bubbles from the brunnens of nassau_, written by major sir francis head. what he says of one country's educating another, by the natural progress of books and opinion, and of the effect which this is likely to have upon governments even as remote and unwilling as russia, is particularly worthy of attention. the author is speaking of some bathers at whom he had been looking, and of a russian prince, who lets us into some curious information respecting the leading-strings in which grown gentlemen are kept by despotism:- "for more than half an hour i had been indolently watching this amphibious scene, when the landlord entering my room said, that the russian prince, g----n, wished to speak to me on some business; and the information was scarcely communicated, when i perceived his highness standing at the threshold of my door. with the attention due to his rank, i instantly begged he would do me the honour to walk in; and, after we had sufficiently bowed to each other, and that i had prevailed on my guest to sit down, i gravely requested him, as i stood before him, to be so good as to state in what way i could have the good fortune to render him any service. the prince very briefly replied, that he had called upon me, considering that i was the person in the hotel best capable (he politely inclined his head) of informing him by what route it would be most adviseable for him to proceed to london, it being his wish to visit my country. "in order at once to solve this very simple problem, i silently unfolded and spread out upon the table my map of europe; and each of us, as we leant over it, placing a forefinger on or near wiesbaden (our eyes being fixed upon dover), we remained in this reflecting attitude for some seconds, until the prince's finger first solemnly began to trace its route. in doing this, i observed that his highness's hand kept swerving far into the netherlands, so, gently pulling it by the thumb towards paris, i used as much force as i thought decorous, to induce it to advance in a straight line; however, finding my efforts ineffectual, i ventured with respectful astonishment, to ask, 'why travel by so uninteresting a route'? "the prince at once acknowledged that the route i had recommended would, by visiting paris, afford him the greatest pleasure; but he frankly told me that no russian, not even a personage of his rank, could enter that capital, without first obtaining a written permission from the emperor. "these words were no sooner uttered, than i felt my fluent civility suddenly begin to coagulate; the attention i paid my guest became forced and unnatural. i was no longer at my ease; and though i bowed, strained, and endeavoured to be, if possible, more respectful than ever, yet i really could hardly prevent my lips from muttering aloud, that i had sooner die a homely english peasant than live to be a russian prince!--in short, his highness's words acted upon my mind like thunder upon beer. and, moreover, i could almost have sworn that i was an old lean wolf, contemptuously observing a bald ring rubbed by the collar, from the neck of a sleek, well-fed mastiff dog; however, recovering myself, i managed to give as much information as it was in my humble power to afford; and my noble guest then taking his departure, i returned to my open window, to give vent in solitude (as i gazed upon the horse bath) to my own reflection upon the subject. "although the petty rule of my life has been never to trouble myself about what the world calls 'politics'--(a fine word, by the by, much easier expressed than understood)--yet, i must own, i am always happy when i see a nation enjoying itself, and melancholy when i observe any large body of people suffering pain or imprisonment. but of all sorts of imprisonment, that of the mind is, to my taste, the most cruel; and, therefore, when i consider over what immense dominions the emperor of russia presides, and how he governs, i cannot help sympathizing most sincerely with those innocent sufferers, who have the misfortune to be born his subjects; for if a russian prince be not freely permitted to go to paris, in what a melancholy state of slavery and debasement must exist the minds of what we call the lower classes? "as a sovereign remedy for this lamentable political disorder, many very sensible people in england prescribe, i know, that we ought to have resource to arms. i must confess, however, it seems to me that one of the greatest political errors england could commit would be to declare, or to join in declaring, war with russia; in short, that an appeal to brute force would, at this moment, be at once most unscientifically to stop an immense moral engine, which, if left to its work, is quite powerful enough, without bloodshed, to gain for humanity, at no expense at all, its object. the individual who is, i conceive, to overthrow the emperor of russia--who is to direct his own legions against himself--who is to do what napoleon had at the head of his great army failed to effect, is the little child, who, lighted by the single wick of a small lamp, sits at this moment perched above the great steam press of the 'penny magazine,' feeding it, from morning till night, with blank papers, which, at almost every pulsation of the engine, comes out stamped on both sides with engravings, and with pages of plain, useful, harmless knowledge, which, by making the lower orders acquainted with foreign lands, foreign productions, various states of society, &c., tend practically to inculcate 'glory to god in the highest, and on earth peace--good will towards men.' it has already been stated, that what proceeds from this press is now greedily devoured by the people of europe; indeed, even at berlin, we know it can hardly be reprinted fast enough. "this child, then,--'this sweet little cherub that sits up aloft,'--is the only army that an enlightened country like ours should, i humbly think, deign to oppose to one who reigns in darkness--who trembles at day-light, and whose throne rests upon ignorance and despotism. compare this mild, peaceful intellectual policy, with the dreadful, savage alternative of going to war, and the difference must surely be evident to everyone. in the former case, we calmly enjoy, first of all, the pleasing reflection, that our country is generously imparting to the nations of europe the blessing she is tranquilly deriving from the purification of civilization to her own mind;--far from wishing to exterminate, we are gradually illuminating the russian peasant, we are mildly throwing a gleam of light upon the fetters of the russian prince; and surely every well-disposed person must see, that if we will only have patience, the result of this noble, temperate conduct, must produce all that reasonable beings can desire."--_bubbles from the brunnens of nassau_, p. 164. by the 'penny magazine,' our author means, of course, not only that excellent publication, but all cheaply-diffused knowledge--all the tranquil and enlightening deeds of "captain pen" in general--of whom it is pleasant to see the gallant major so useful a servant, the more so from his sympathies with rank and the aristocracy. but "pen" will make it a matter of necessity, by and by, for all ranks to agree with him, in vindication of their own wit and common sense; and when once this necessity is felt, and fastidiousness shall find out that it will be considered "absurd" to lag behind in the career of knowledge and the common good, the cause of the world is secure. may princes and people alike find it out by the kindliest means, and without further violence. may they discover that no one set of human beings, perhaps no single individual, can be thoroughly secure and content, or enabled to work out his case with equal reasonableness, _till all are so_,--a subject for reflection, which contains, we hope, the beneficent reason _why all are restless_. the solution of the problem is co-operation--the means of solving it is the press. if the greeks had had a press, we should probably have heard nothing of the inconsiderate question, which demands, why they, with all their philosophy, did not alter the world. they had not the means. they could not command a general hearing. neither had christianity come up, to make men think of one another's wants, as well as of their own accomplishments. modern times possess those means, and inherit that divine incitement. may every man exert himself accordingly, and show himself a worthy inhabitant of this beautiful and most capable world! the end. london: printed by c. and w. reynell, little pulteney street. [illustration: _p. 112._] * * * * * transcriber's note: on page 67, a quote begins but has no end that this transcriber can find. it was retained as printed. ("try a reasonable condition) mr. wells has also written the following novels: love and mr. lewisham kipps mr. polly the wheels of chance the new machiavelli ann veronica tono bungay marriage bealby the passionate friends the wife of sir isaac harman the research magnificent mr. britling sees it through the soul of a bishop the following fantastic and imaginative romances: the war of the worlds the time machine the wonderful visit the island of dr. moreau the sea lady the sleeper awakes the food of the gods the war in the air the first men in the moon in the days of the comet the world set free and numerous short stories now collected in one volume under the title of the country of the blind a series of books upon social, religious and political questions: anticipations (1900) mankind in the making first and last things new worlds for old a modern utopia the future in america an englishman looks at the world what is coming? war and the future god the invisible king and two little books about children's play, called: floor games and little wars in the fourth year anticipations of a world peace by h. g. wells author of "mr. britling sees it through," "the war and the future," "what is coming?" "the war that will end war," "the world set free," "in the days of the comet," and "a modern utopia" 1918 preface in the latter half of 1914 a few of us were writing that this war was a "war of ideas." a phrase, "the war to end war," got into circulation, amidst much sceptical comment. it was a phrase powerful enough to sway many men, essentially pacifists, towards taking an active part in the war against german imperialism, but it was a phrase whose chief content was its aspiration. people were already writing in those early days of disarmament and of the abolition of the armament industry throughout the world; they realized fully the element of industrial belligerency behind the shining armour of imperialism, and they denounced the "krupp-kaiser" alliance. but against such writing and such thought we had to count, in those days, great and powerful realities. even to those who expressed these ideas there lay visibly upon them the shadow of impracticability; they were very "advanced" ideas in 1914, very utopian. against them was an unbroken mass of mental habit and public tradition. while we talked of this "war to end war," the diplomatists of the powers allied against germany were busily spinning a disastrous web of greedy secret treaties, were answering aggression by schemes of aggression, were seeing in the treacherous violence of germany only the justification for countervailing evil acts. to them it was only another war for "ascendancy." that was three years and a half ago, and since then this "war of ideas" has gone on to a phase few of us had dared hope for in those opening days. the russian revolution put a match to that pile of secret treaties and indeed to all the imperialist plans of the allies; in the end it will burn them all. the greatest of the western allies is now the united states of america, and the americans have come into this war simply for an idea. three years and a half ago a few of us were saying this was a war against the idea of imperialism, not german imperialism merely, but british and french and russian imperialism, and we were saying this not because it was so, but because we hoped to see it become so. to-day we can say so, because now it is so. in those days, moreover, we said this is the "war to end war," and we still did not know clearly how. we thought in terms of treaties and alliances. it is largely the detachment and practical genius of the great english-speaking nation across the atlantic that has carried the world on beyond and replaced that phrase by the phrase, "the league of nations," a phrase suggesting plainly the organization of a sufficient instrument by which war may be ended for ever. in 1913 talk of a world league of nations would have seemed, to the extremest pitch, "utopian." to-day the project has an air not only of being so practicable, but of being so urgent and necessary and so manifestly the sane thing before mankind that not to be busied upon it, not to be making it more widely known and better understood, not to be working out its problems and bringing it about, is to be living outside of the contemporary life of the world. for a book upon any other subject at the present time some apology may be necessary, but a book upon this subject is as natural a thing to produce now as a pair of skates in winter when the ice begins to bear. all we writers find ourselves engaged perforce in some part or other of a world-wide propaganda of this the most creative and hopeful of political ideas that has ever dawned upon the consciousness of mankind. with no concerted plan we feel called upon to serve it. and in no connection would one so like to think oneself un-original as in this connection. it would be a dismaying thing to realize that one were writing anything here which was not the possible thought of great multitudes of other people, and capable of becoming the common thought of mankind. one writes in such a book as this not to express oneself but to swell a chorus. the idea of the league of nations is so great a one that it may well override the pretensions and command the allegiance of kings; much more does it claim the self-subjugation of the journalistic writer. our innumerable books upon this great edifice of a world peace do not constitute a scramble for attention, but an attempt to express in every variety of phrase and aspect this one system of ideas which now possesses us all. in the same way the elementary facts and ideas of the science of chemistry might conceivably be put completely and fully into one text-book, but, as a matter of fact, it is far more convenient to tell that same story over in a thousand different forms, in a text-book for boys here, for a different sort or class of boy there, for adult students, for reference, for people expert in mathematics, for people unused to the scientific method, and so on. for the last year the writer has been doing what he can--and a number of other writers have been doing what they can--to bring about a united declaration of all the atlantic allies in favour of a league of nations, and to define the necessary nature of that league. he has, in the course of this work, written a series of articles upon the league and upon _the necessary sacrifices of preconceptions_ that the idea involves in the london press. he has also been trying to clear his own mind upon the real meaning of that ambiguous word "democracy," for which the league is to make the world "safe." the bulk of this book is made up of these discussions. for a very considerable number of readers, it may be well to admit here, it can have no possible interest; they will have come at these questions themselves from different angles and they will have long since got to their own conclusions. but there may be others whose angle of approach may be similar to the writer's, who may have asked some or most of the questions he has had to ask, and who may be actively interested in the answers and the working out of the answers he has made to these questions. for them this book is printed. h. g. wells. _may_, 1918. it is a dangerous thing to recommend specific books out of so large and various a literature as the "league of nations" idea has already produced, but the reader who wishes to reach beyond the range of this book, or who does not like its tone and method, will probably find something to meet his needs and tastes better in marburg's "league of nations," a straightforward account of the american side of the movement by the former united states minister in belgium, on the one hand, or in the concluding parts of mr. fayle's "great settlement" (1915), a frankly sceptical treatment from the british imperialist point of view, on the other. an illuminating discussion, advocating peace treaties rather than a league, is sir walter phillimore's "three centuries of treaties." two excellent books from america, that chance to be on my table, are mr. goldsmith's "league to enforce peace" and "a world in ferment" by president nicholas murray butler. mater's "société des nations" (didier) is an able presentation of a french point of view. brailsford's "a league of nations" is already a classic of the movement in england, and a very full and thorough book; and hobson's "towards international government" is a very sympathetic contribution from the english liberal left; but the reader must understand that these two writers seem disposed to welcome a peace with an unrevolutionized germany, an idea to which, in common with most british people, i am bitterly opposed. walsh's "world rebuilt" is a good exhortation, and mugge's "parliament of man" is fresh and sane and able. the omnivorous reader will find good sense and quaint english in judge mejdell's "_jus gentium_," published in english by olsen's of christiania. there is an active league of nations society in dublin, as well as the london and washington ones, publishing pamphlets and conducting propaganda. all these books and pamphlets i have named happen to lie upon my study table as i write, but i have made no systematic effort to get together literature upon the subject, and probably there are just as many books as good of which i have never even heard. there must, i am sure, be statements of the league of nations idea forthcoming from various religious standpoints, but i do not know any sufficiently well to recommend them. it is incredible that neither the roman catholic church, the english episcopal church, nor any nonconformist body has made any effort as an organization to forward this essentially religious end of peace on earth. and also there must be german writings upon this same topic. i mention these diverse sources not in order to present a bibliography, but because i should be sorry to have the reader think that this little book pretends to state _the_ case rather than _a_ case for the league of nations. contents i. the way to concrete realization ii. the league must be representative iii. the necessary powers of the league iv. the labour view of middle africa v. getting the league idea clear in relation to imperialism vi. the war aims of the western allies compactly stated vii. the future of monarchy viii. the plain necessity for a league ix. democracy x. the recent struggle for proportional representation in great britain xi. the study and propaganda of democracy in the fourth year the league of free nations i the way to concrete realization more and more frequently does one hear this phrase, the league of nations, used to express the outline idea of the new world that will come out of the war. there can be no doubt that the phrase has taken hold of the imaginations of great multitudes of people: it is one of those creative phrases that may alter the whole destiny of mankind. but as yet it is still a very vague phrase, a cloudy promise of peace. i make no apology therefore, for casting my discussion of it in the most general terms. the idea is the idea of united human effort to put an end to wars; the first practical question, that must precede all others, is how far can we hope to get to a concrete realization of that? but first let me note the fourth word in the second title of this book. the common talk is of a "league of nations" merely. i follow the man who is, more than any other man, the leader of english political thought throughout the world to-day, president wilson, in inserting that significant adjective "free." we western allies know to-day what is involved in making bargains with governments that do not stand for their peoples; we have had all our russian deal, for example, repudiated and thrust back upon our hands; and it is clearly in his mind, as it must be in the minds of all reasonable men, that no mere "scrap of paper," with just a monarch's or a chancellor's endorsement, is a good enough earnest of fellowship in the league. it cannot be a diplomatist's league. the league of nations, if it is to have any such effect as people seem to hope from it, must be, in the first place, "understanded of the people." it must be supported by sustained, deliberate explanation, and by teaching in school and church and press of the whole mass of all the peoples concerned. i underline the adjective "free" here to set aside, once for all, any possible misconception that this modern idea of a league of nations has any affinity to that holy alliance of the diplomatists, which set out to keep the peace of europe so disastrously a century ago. later i will discuss the powers of the league. but before i come to that i would like to say a little about the more general question of its nature and authority. what sort of gathering will embody it? the suggestions made range from a mere advisory body, rather like the hague convention, which will merely pronounce on the rights and wrongs of any international conflict, to the idea of a sort of super-state, a parliament of mankind, a "super national" authority, practically taking over the sovereignty of the existing states and empires of the world. most people's ideas of the league fall between these extremes. they want the league to be something more than an ethical court, they want a league that will act, but on the other hand they shrink from any loss of "our independence." there seems to be a conflict here. there is a real need for many people to tidy up their ideas at this point. we cannot have our cake and eat it. if association is worth while, there must be some sacrifice of freedom to association. as a very distinguished colonial representative said to me the other day: "here we are talking of the freedom of small nations and the 'self-determination' of peoples, and at the same time of the council of the league of nations and all sorts of international controls. which do we want?" the answer, i think, is "both." it is a matter of more or less, of getting the best thing at the cost of the second-best. we may want to relax an old association in order to make a newer and wider one. it is quite understandable that peoples aware of a distinctive national character and involved in some big existing political complex, should wish to disentangle themselves from one group of associations in order to enter more effectively into another, a greater, and more satisfactory one. the finn or the pole, who has hitherto been a rather reluctant member of the synthesis of the russian empire, may well wish to end that attachment in order to become a free member of a worldwide brotherhood. the desire for free arrangement is not a desire for chaos. there is such a thing as untying your parcels in order to pack them better, and i do not see myself how we can possibly contemplate a great league of freedom and reason in the world without a considerable amount of such preliminary dissolution. it happens, very fortunately for the world, that a century and a quarter ago thirteen various and very jealous states worked out the problem of a union, and became--after an enormous, exhausting wrangle--the united states of america. now the way they solved their riddle was by delegating and giving over jealously specified sovereign powers and doing all that was possible to retain the residuum. they remained essentially sovereign states. new york, virginia, massachusetts, for example, remained legally independent. the practical fusion of these peoples into one people outran the legal bargain. it was only after long years of discussion that the point was conceded; it was indeed only after the civil war that the implications were fully established, that there resided a sovereignty in the american people as a whole, as distinguished from the peoples of the several states. this is a precedent that every one who talks about the league of nations should bear in mind. these states set up a congress and president in washington with strictly delegated powers. that congress and president they delegated to look after certain common interests, to deal with interstate trade, to deal with foreign powers, to maintain a supreme court of law. everything else--education, militia, powers of life and death--the states retained for themselves. to this day, for instance, the federal courts and the federal officials have no power to interfere to protect the lives or property of aliens in any part of the union outside the district of columbia. the state governments still see to that. the federal government has the legal right perhaps to intervene, but it is still chary of such intervention. and these states of the american union were at the outset so independent-spirited that they would not even adopt a common name. to this day they have no common name. we have to call them americans, which is a ridiculous name when we consider that canada, mexico, peru, brazil are all of them also in america. or else we have to call them virginians, californians, new englanders, and so forth. their legal and nominal separateness weighs nothing against the real fusion that their great league has now made possible. now, that clearly is a precedent of the utmost value in our schemes for this council of the league of nations. we must begin by delegating, as the states began by delegating. it is a far cry to the time when we shall talk and think of the sovereign people of the earth. that council of the league of nations will be a tie as strong, we hope, but certainly not so close and multiplex as the early tie of the states at washington. it will begin by having certain delegated powers and no others. it will be an "_ad hoc_" body. later its powers may grow as mankind becomes accustomed to it. but at first it will have, directly or mediately, all the powers that seem necessary to restrain the world from war--and unless i know nothing of patriotic jealousies it will have not a scrap of power more. the danger is much more that its powers will be insufficient than that they will be excessive. of that later. what i want to discuss here now is the constitution of this delegated body. i want to discuss that first in order to set aside out of the discussion certain fantastic notions that will otherwise get very seriously in our way. fantastic as they are, they have played a large part in reducing the hague tribunal to an ineffective squeak amidst the thunders of this war. a number of gentlemen scheming out world unity in studies have begun their proposals with the simple suggestion that each sovereign power should send one member to the projected parliament of mankind. this has a pleasant democratic air; one sovereign state, one vote. now let us run over a list of sovereign states and see to what this leads us. we find our list includes the british empire, with a population of four hundred millions, of which probably half can read and write some language or other; bogota with a population of a million, mostly poets; hayti with a population of a million and a third, almost entirely illiterate and liable at any time to further political disruption; andorra with a population of four or five thousand souls. the mere suggestion of equal representation between such "powers" is enough to make the british empire burst into a thousand (voting) fragments. a certain concession to population, one must admit, was made by the theorists; a state of over three millions got, if i remember rightly, two delegates, and if over twenty, three, and some of the small states were given a kind of intermittent appearance, they only came every other time or something of that sort; but at the hague things still remained in such a posture that three or four minute and backward states could outvote the british empire or the united states. therein lies the clue to the insignificance of the hague. such projects as these are idle projects and we must put them out of our heads; they are against nature; the great nations will not suffer them for a moment. but when we dismiss this idea of representation by states, we are left with the problem of the proportion of representation and of relative weight in the council of the league on our hands. it is the sort of problem that appeals terribly to the ingenious. we cannot solve it by making population a basis, because that will give a monstrous importance to the illiterate millions of india and china. ingenious statistical schemes have been framed in which the number of university graduates and the steel output come in as multipliers, but for my own part i am not greatly impressed by statistical schemes. at the risk of seeming something of a prussian, i would like to insist upon certain brute facts. the business of the league of nations is to keep the peace of the world and nothing else. no power will ever dare to break the peace of the world if the powers that are capable of making war under modern conditions say "_no_." and there are only four powers certainly capable at the present time of producing the men and materials needed for a modern war in sufficient abundance to go on fighting: britain, france, germany, and the united states. there are three others which are very doubtfully capable: italy, japan, and austria. russia i will mark--it is all that one can do with russia just now--with a note of interrogation. some day china may be war capable--i hope never, but it is a possibility. personally i don't think that any other power on earth would have a ghost of a chance to resist the will--if it could be an honestly united will--of the first-named four. all the rest fight by the sanction of and by association with these leaders. they can only fight because of the split will of the war-complete powers. some are forced to fight by that very division. no one can vie with me in my appreciation of the civilization of switzerland, sweden, or holland, but the plain fact of the case is that such powers are absolutely incapable of uttering an effective protest against war. far less so are your haytis and liberias. the preservation of the world-peace rests with the great powers and with the great powers alone. if they have the will for peace, it is peace. if they have not, it is conflict. the four powers i have named can now, if they see fit, dictate the peace of the world for ever. let us keep our grip on that. peace is the business of the great powers primarily. steel output, university graduates, and so forth may be convenient secondary criteria, may be useful ways of measuring war efficiency, but the meat and substance of the council of the league of nations must embody the wills of those leading peoples. they can give an enduring peace to the little nations and the whole of mankind. it can arrive in no other way. so i take it that the council of an ideal league of nations must consist chiefly of the representatives of the great belligerent powers, and that the representatives of the minor allies and of the neutrals--essential though their presence will be--must not be allowed to swamp the voices of these larger masses of mankind. and this state of affairs may come about more easily than logical, statistical-minded people may be disposed to think. our first impulse, when we discuss the league of nations idea, is to think of some very elaborate and definite scheme of members on the model of existing legislative bodies, called together one hardly knows how, and sitting in a specially built league of nations congress house. all schemes are more methodical than reality. we think of somebody, learned and "expert," in spectacles, with a thin clear voice, reading over the "projected constitution of a league of nations" to an attentive and respectful peace congress. but there is a more natural way to a league than that. instead of being made like a machine, the league of nations may come about like a marriage. the peace congress that must sooner or later meet may itself become, after a time, the council of a league of nations. the league of nations may come upon us by degrees, almost imperceptibly. i am strongly obsessed by the idea that that peace congress will necessarily become--and that it is highly desirable that it should become--a most prolonged and persistent gathering. why should it not become at length a permanent gathering, inviting representatives to aid its deliberations from the neutral states, and gradually adjusting itself to conditions of permanency? i can conceive no such peace congress as those that have settled up after other wars, settling up after this war. not only has the war been enormously bigger than any other war, but it has struck deeper at the foundations of social and economic life. i doubt if we begin to realize how much of the old system is dead to-day, how much has to be remade. since the beginnings of history there has been a credible promise of gold payments underneath our financial arrangements. it is now an incredible promise. the value of a pound note waves about while you look at it. what will happen to it when peace comes no man can tell. nor what will happen to the mark. the rouble has gone into the abyss. our giddy money specialists clutch their handfuls of paper and watch it flying down the steep. much as we may hate the germans, some of us will have to sit down with some of the enemy to arrange a common scheme for the preservation of credit in money. and i presume that it is not proposed to end this war in a wild scramble of buyers for such food as remains in the world. there is a shortage now, a greater shortage ahead of the world, and there will be shortages of supply at the source and transport in food and all raw materials for some years to come. the peace congress will have to sit and organize a share-out and distribution and reorganization of these shattered supplies. it will have to rhondda the nations. probably, too, we shall have to deal collectively with a pestilence before we are out of the mess. then there are such little jobs as the reconstruction of belgium and serbia. there are considerable rectifications of boundaries to be made. there are fresh states to be created, in poland and armenia for example. about all these smaller states, new and old, that the peace must call into being, there must be a system of guarantees of the most difficult and complicated sort. i do not see the press congress getting through such matters as these in a session of weeks or months. the idea the germans betrayed at brest, that things were going to be done in the versailles fashion by great moustached heroes frowning and drawing lines with a large black soldierly thumbnail across maps, is--old-fashioned. they have made their eastern treaties, it is true, in this mode, but they are still looking for some really responsible government to keep them now that they are made. from first to last clearly the main peace negotiations are going to follow unprecedented courses. this preliminary discussion of war aims by means of great public speeches, that has been getting more and more explicit now for many months, is quite unprecedented. apparently all the broad preliminaries are to be stated and accepted in the sight of all mankind before even an armistice occurs on the main, the western front. the german diplomatists hate this process. so do a lot of ours. so do some of the diplomatic frenchmen. the german junkers are dodging and lying, they are fighting desperately to keep back everything they possibly can for the bargaining and bullying and table-banging of the council chamber, but that way there is no peace. and when at last germany says snip sufficiently to the allies' snap, and the peace congress begins, it will almost certainly be as unprecedented as its prelude. before it meets, the broad lines of the settlement will have been drawn plainly with the approval of the mass of mankind. ii the league must be representative a peace congress, growing permanent, then, may prove to be the most practical and convenient embodiment of this idea of a league of nations that has taken possession of the imagination of the world. a most necessary preliminary to a peace congress, with such possibilities inherent in it, must obviously be the meeting and organization of a preliminary league of the allied nations. that point i would now enlarge. half a world peace is better than none. there seems no reason whatever why the world should wait for the central powers before it begins this necessary work. mr. mccurdy has been asking lately, "why not the league of nations _now_?" that is a question a great number of people would like to echo very heartily. the nearer the allies can come to a league of free nations before the peace congress the more prospect there is that that body will approximate in nature to a league of nations for the whole world. in one most unexpected quarter the same idea has been endorsed. the king's speech on the prorogation of parliament this february was one of the most remarkable royal utterances that have ever been made from the british throne. there was less of the old-fashioned king and more of the modern president about it than the most republican-minded of us could have anticipated. for the first time in a king's speech we heard of the "democracies" of the world, and there was a clear claim that the allies at present fighting the central powers did themselves constitute a league of nations. but we must admit that at present they do so only in a very rhetorical sense. there is no real council of empowered representatives, and nothing in the nature of a united front has been prepared. unless we provide beforehand for something more effective, italy, france, the united states, japan, and this country will send separate groups of representatives, with separate instructions, unequal status, and very probably conflicting views upon many subjects, to the ultimate peace discussions. it is quite conceivable--it is a very serious danger--that at this discussion skilful diplomacy on the part of the central powers may open a cleft among the allies that has never appeared during the actual war. have the british settled, for example, with italy and france for the supply of metallurgical coal after the war? those countries must have it somehow. across the board germany can make some tempting bids in that respect. or take another question: have the british arrived at common views with france, belgium, portugal, and south africa about the administration of central africa? suppose germany makes sudden proposals affecting native labour that win over the portuguese and the boers? there are a score of such points upon which we shall find the allied representatives haggling with each other in the presence of the enemy if they have not been settled beforehand. it is the plainest common sense that we should be fixing up all such matters with our allies now, and knitting together a common front for the final deal with german imperialism. and these things are not to be done effectively and bindingly nowadays by official gentlemen in discreet undertones. they need to be done with the full knowledge and authority of the participating peoples. the russian example has taught the world the instability of diplomatic bargains in a time of such fundamental issues as the present. there is little hope and little strength in hole-and-corner bargainings between the officials or politicians who happen to be at the head of this or that nation for the time being. our labour people will not stand this sort of thing and they will not be bound by it. there will be the plain danger of repudiation for all arrangements made in that fashion. a gathering of somebody or other approved by the british foreign office and of somebody or other approved by the french foreign office, of somebody with vague powers from america, and so on and so on, will be an entirely ineffective gathering. but that is the sort of gathering of the allies we have been having hitherto, and that is the sort of gathering that is likely to continue unless there is a considerable expression of opinion in favour of something more representative and responsible. even our foreign office must be aware that in every country in the world there is now bitter suspicion of and keen hostility towards merely diplomatic representatives. one of the most significant features of the time is the evident desire of the labour movement in every european country to take part in a collateral conference of labour that shall meet when and where the peace congress does and deliberate and comment on its proceedings. for a year now the demand of the masses for such a labour conference has been growing. it marks a distrust of officialdom whose intensity officialdom would do well to ponder. but it is the natural consequence of, it is the popular attempt at a corrective to, the aloofness and obscurity that have hitherto been so evil a characteristic of international negotiations. i do not think labour and intelligent people anywhere are going to be fobbed off with an old-fashioned diplomatic gathering as being that league of free nations they demand. on the other hand, i do not contemplate this bi-cameral conference with the diplomatists trying to best and humbug the labour people as well as each other and the labour people getting more and more irritated, suspicious, and extremist, with anything but dread. the allied countries must go into the conference _solid_, and they can only hope to do that by heeding and incorporating labour ideas before they come to the conference. the only alternative that i can see to this unsatisfactory prospect of a peace congress sitting side by side with a dissentient and probably revolutionary labour and socialist convention--both gatherings with unsatisfactory credentials contradicting one another and drifting to opposite extremes--is that the delegates the allied powers send to the peace conference (the same delegates which, if they are wise, they will have previously sent to a preliminary league of allied nations to discuss their common action at the peace congress), should be elected _ad hoc_ upon democratic lines. i know that this will be a very shocking proposal to all our able specialists in foreign policy. they will talk at once about the "ignorance" of people like the labour leaders and myself about such matters, and so on. what do we know of the treaty of so-and-so that was signed in the year seventeen something?--and so on. to which the answer is that we ought not to have been kept ignorant of these things. a day will come when the foreign offices of all countries will have to recognize that what the people do not know of international agreements "ain't facts." a secret treaty is only binding upon the persons in the secret. but what i, as a sample common person, am not ignorant of is this: that the business that goes on at the peace congress will either make or mar the lives of everyone i care for in the world, and that somehow, by representative or what not, _i have to be there_. the peace congress deals with the blood and happiness of my children and the future of my world. speaking as one of the hundreds of millions of "rank outsiders" in public affairs, i do not mean to respect any peace treaty that may end this war unless i am honestly represented at its making. i think everywhere there is a tendency in people to follow the russian example to this extent and to repudiate bargains in which they have had no voice. i do not see that any genuine realization of the hopes with which all this talk about the league of nations is charged can be possible, unless the two bodies which should naturally lead up to the league of nations--that is to say, firstly, the conference of the allies, and then the peace congress--are elected bodies, speaking confidently for the whole mass of the peoples behind them. it may be a troublesome thing to elect them, but it will involve much more troublesome consequences if they are not elected. this, i think, is one of the considerations for which many people's minds are still unprepared. but unless we are to have over again after all this bloodshed and effort some such "peace with honour" foolery as we had performed by "dizzy" and salisbury at that fatal berlin conference in which this present war was begotten, we must sit up to this novel proposal of electoral representation in the peace negotiations. something more than common sense binds our statesmen to this idea. they are morally pledged to it. president wilson and our british and french spokesmen alike have said over and over again that they want to deal not with the hohenzollerns but with the german people. in other words, we have demanded elected representatives from the german people with whom we may deal, and how can we make a demand of that sort unless we on our part are already prepared to send our own elected representatives to meet them? it is up to us to indicate by our own practice how we on our side, professing as we do to act for democracies, to make democracy safe on the earth, and so on, intend to meet this new occasion. yet it has to be remarked that, so far, not one of the league of nations projects i have seen have included any practicable proposals for the appointment of delegates either to that ultimate body or to its two necessary predecessors, the council of the allies and the peace congress. it is evident that here, again, we are neglecting to get on with something of very urgent importance. i will venture, therefore, to say a word or two here about the possible way in which a modern community may appoint its international representatives. and here, again, i turn from any european precedents to that political outcome of the british mind, the constitution of the united states. (because we must always remember that while our political institutions in britain are a patch-up of feudalism, tudor, stuart, and hanoverian monarchist traditions and urgent merely european necessities, a patch-up that has been made quasi-democratic in a series of after-thoughts, the american constitution is a real, deliberate creation of the english-speaking intelligence.) the president of the united states, then, we have to note, is elected in a most extraordinary way, and in a way that has now the justification of very great successes indeed. on several occasions the united states has achieved indisputable greatness in its presidents, and very rarely has it failed to set up very leaderly and distinguished men. it is worth while, therefore, to inquire how this president is elected. he is neither elected directly by the people nor appointed by any legislative body. he is chosen by a special college elected by the people. this college exists to elect him; it meets, elects him, and disperses. (i will not here go into the preliminary complications that makes the election of a president follow upon a preliminary election of two presidential candidates. the point i am making here is that he is a specially selected man chosen _ad hoc_.) is there any reason why we should, not adopt this method in this new necessity we are under of sending representatives, first, to the long overdue and necessary allied council, then to the peace congress, and then to the hoped-for council of the league of nations? i am anxious here only to start for discussion the idea of an electoral representation of the nations upon these three bodies that must in succession set themselves to define, organize, and maintain the peace of the world. i do not wish to complicate the question by any too explicit advocacy of methods of election or the like. in the united states this college which elects the president is elected on the same register of voters as that which elects the senate and congress, and at the same time. but i suppose if we are to give a popular mandate to the three or five or twelve or twenty (or whatever number it is) men to whom we are going to entrust our empire's share in this great task of the peace negotiations, it will be more decisive of the will of the whole nation if the college that had to appoint them is elected at a special election. i suppose that the great british common-weals over-seas, at present not represented in parliament, would also and separately at the same time elect colleges to appoint their representatives. i suppose there would be at least one indian representative elected, perhaps by some special electoral conference of indian princes and leading men. the chief defect of the american presidential election is that as the old single vote method of election is employed it has to be fought on purely party lines. he is the select man of the democratic half, or of the republican half of the nation. he is not the select man of the whole nation. it would give a far more representative character to the electoral college if it could be elected by fair modern methods, if for this particular purpose parliamentary constituencies could be grouped and the clean scientific method of proportional representation could be used. but i suppose the party politician in this, as in most of our affairs, must still have his pound of our flesh--and we must reckon with him later for the bloodshed. these are all, however, secondary considerations. the above paragraph is, so to speak, in the nature of a footnote. the fundamental matter, if we are to get towards any realization of this ideal of a world peace sustained by a league of nations, is to get straight away to the conception of direct special electoral mandates in this matter. at present all the political luncheon and dinner parties in london are busy with smirking discussions of "who is to go?" the titled ladies are particularly busy. they are talking about it as if we poor, ignorant, tax-paying, blood-paying common people did not exist. "l. g.," they say, will of course "_insist_ on going," but there is much talk of the "old man." people are getting quite nice again about "the old man's feelings." it would be such a pretty thing to send him. but if "l. g." goes we want him to go with something more than a backing of intrigues and snatched authority. and i do not think the mass of people have any enthusiasm for the old man. it is difficult again--by the dinner-party standards--to know how lord curzon can be restrained. but we common people do not care if he is restrained to the point of extinction. probably there will be nobody who talks or understands russian among the british representatives. but, of course, the british governing class has washed its hands of the russians. they were always very difficult, and now they are "impossible, my dear, perfectly impossible." no! that sort of thing will not do now. this peace congress is too big a job for party politicians and society and county families. the bulk of british opinion cannot go on being represented for ever by president wilson. we cannot always look to the americans to express our ideas and do our work for democracy. the foolery of the berlin treaty must not be repeated. we cannot have another popular prime minister come triumphing back to england with a gross of pink spectacles--through which we may survey the prospect of the next great war. the league of free nations means something very big and solid; it is not a rhetorical phrase to be used to pacify a restless, distressed, and anxious public, and to be sneered out of existence when that use is past. when the popular mind now demands a league of free nations it demands a reality. the only way to that reality is through the direct participation of the nation as a whole in the settlement, and that is possible only through the direct election for this particular issue of representative and responsible men. iii the necessary powers of the league if this phrase, "the league of free nations," is to signify anything more than a rhetorical flourish, then certain consequences follow that have to be faced now. no man can join a partnership and remain an absolutely free man. you cannot bind yourself to do this and not to do that and to consult and act with your associates in certain eventualities without a loss of your sovereign freedom. people in this country and in france do not seem to be sitting up manfully to these necessary propositions. if this league of free nations is really to be an effectual thing for the preservation of the peace of the world it must possess power and exercise power, powers must be delegated to it. otherwise it will only help, with all other half-hearted good resolutions, to pave the road of mankind to hell. nothing in all the world so strengthens evil as the half-hearted attempts of good to make good. it scarcely needs repeating here--it has been so generally said--that no league of free nations can hope to keep the peace unless every member of it is indeed a free member, represented by duly elected persons. nobody, of course, asks to "dictate the internal government" of any country to that country. if germans, for instance, like to wallow in absolutism after the war they can do so. but if they or any other peoples wish to take part in a permanent league of free nations it is only reasonable to insist that so far as their representatives on the council go they must be duly elected under conditions that are by the standards of the general league satisfactorily democratic. that seems to be only the common sense of the matter. every court is a potential conspiracy against freedom, and the league cannot tolerate merely court appointments. if courts are to exist anywhere in the new world of the future, they will be wise to stand aloof from international meddling. of course if a people, after due provision for electoral representation, choose to elect dynastic candidates, that is an altogether different matter. and now let us consider what are the powers that must be delegated to this proposed council of a league of free nations, if that is really effectually to prevent war and to organize and establish and make peace permanent in the world. firstly, then, it must be able to adjudicate upon all international disputes whatever. its first function must clearly be that. before a war can break out there must be the possibility of a world decision upon its rights and wrongs. the league, therefore, will have as its primary function to maintain a supreme court, whose decisions will be final, before which every sovereign power may appear as plaintiff against any other sovereign power or group of powers. the plea, i take it, will always be in the form that the defendant power or powers is engaged in proceedings "calculated to lead to a breach of the peace," and calling upon the league for an injunction against such proceedings. i suppose the proceedings that can be brought into court in this way fall under such headings as these that follow; restraint of trade by injurious tariffs or suchlike differentiations or by interference with through traffic, improper treatment of the subjects _or their property_ (here i put a query) of the plaintiff nation in the defendant state, aggressive military or naval preparation, disorder spreading over the frontier, trespass (as, for instance, by airships), propaganda of disorder, espionage, permitting the organization of injurious activities, such as raids or piracy. clearly all such actions must come within the purview of any world-supreme court organized to prevent war. but in addition there is a more doubtful and delicate class of case, arising out of the discontent of patches of one race or religion in the dominions of another. how far may the supreme court of the world attend to grievances between subject and sovereign? such cases are highly probable, and no large, vague propositions about the "self-determination" of peoples can meet all the cases. in macedonia, for instance, there is a jumble of albanian, serbian, bulgarian, greek and rumanian villages always jostling one another and maintaining an intense irritation between the kindred nations close at hand. and quite a large number of areas and cities in the world, it has to be remembered, are not homogeneous at all. will the great nations of the world have the self-abnegation to permit a scattered subject population to appeal against the treatment of its ruling power to the supreme court? this is a much more serious interference with sovereignty than intervention in an external quarrel. could a greek village in bulgarian macedonia plead in the supreme court? could the armenians in constantinople, or the jews in roumania, or the poles in west prussia, or the negroes in georgia, or the indians in the transvaal make such an appeal? could any indian population in india appeal? personally i should like to see the power of the supreme court extend as far as this. i do not see how we can possibly prevent a kindred nation pleading for the scattered people of its own race and culture, or any nation presenting a case on behalf of some otherwise unrepresented people--the united states, for example, presenting a case on behalf of the armenians. but i doubt if many people have made up their minds yet to see the powers of the supreme court of the league of nations go so far as this. i doubt if, to begin with, it will be possible to provide for these cases. i would like to see it done, but i doubt if the majority of the sovereign peoples concerned will reconcile their national pride with the idea, at least so far as their own subject populations go. here, you see, i do no more than ask a question. it is a difficult one, and it has to be answered before we can clear the way to the league of free nations. but the supreme court, whether it is to have the wider or the narrower scope here suggested, would be merely the central function of the league of free nations. behind the decisions of the supreme court must lie power. and here come fresh difficulties for patriotic digestions. the armies and navies of the world must be at the disposal of the league of free nations, and that opens up a new large area of delegated authority. the first impulse of any power disposed to challenge the decisions of the supreme court will be, of course, to arm; and it is difficult to imagine how the league of free nations can exercise any practical authority unless it has power to restrain such armament. the league of free nations must, in fact, if it is to be a working reality, have power to define and limit the military and naval and aerial equipment of every country in the world. this means something more than a restriction of state forces. it must have power and freedom to investigate the military and naval and aerial establishments of all its constituent powers. it must also have effective control over every armament industry. and armament industries are not always easy to define. are aeroplanes, for example, armament? its powers, i suggest, must extend even to a restraint upon the belligerent propaganda which is the natural advertisement campaign of every armament industry. it must have the right, for example, to raise the question of the proprietorship of newspapers by armament interests. disarmament is, in fact, a necessary factor of any league of free nations, and you cannot have disarmament unless you are prepared to see the powers of the council of the league extend thus far. the very existence of the league presupposes that it and it alone is to have and to exercise military force. any other belligerency or preparation or incitement to belligerency becomes rebellion, and any other arming a threat of rebellion, in a world league of free nations. but here, again, has the general mind yet thought out all that is involved in this proposition? in all the great belligerent countries the armament industries are now huge interests with enormous powers. krupp's business alone is as powerful a thing in germany as the crown. in every country a heavily subsidized "patriotic" press will fight desperately against giving powers so extensive and thorough as those here suggested to an international body. so long, of course, as the league of free nations remains a project in the air, without body or parts, such a press will sneer at it gently as "utopian," and even patronize it kindly. but so soon as the league takes on the shape its general proposition makes logically necessary, the armament interest will take fright. then it is we shall hear the drum patriotic loud in defence of the human blood trade. are we to hand over these most intimate affairs of ours to "a lot of foreigners"? among these "foreigners" who will be appealed to to terrify the patriotic souls of the british will be the "americans." are we men of english blood and tradition to see our affairs controlled by such "foreigners" as wilson, lincoln, webster and washington? perish the thought! when they might be controlled by disraelis, wettins, mount-battens, and what not! and so on and so on. krupp's agents and the agents of the kindred firms in great britain and france will also be very busy with the national pride of france. in germany they have already created a colossal suspicion of england. here is a giant in the path.... but let us remember that it is only necessary to defeat the propaganda of this vile and dangerous industry in four great countries. and for the common citizen, touched on the tenderest part of his patriotic susceptibilities, there are certain irrefutable arguments. whether the ways of the world in the years to come are to be the paths of peace or the paths of war is not going to alter this essential fact, that the great educated world communities, with a social and industrial organization on a war-capable scale, are going to dominate human affairs. whether they spend their power in killing or in educating and creating, france, germany, however much we may resent it, the two great english-speaking communities, italy, japan china, and presently perhaps a renascent russia, are jointly going to control the destinies of mankind. whether that joint control comes through arms or through the law is a secondary consideration. to refuse to bring our affairs into a common council does not make us independent of foreigners. it makes us more dependent upon them, as a very little consideration will show. i am suggesting here that the league of free nations shall practically control the army, navy, air forces, and armament industry of every nation in the world. what is the alternative to that? to do as we please? no, the alternative is that any malignant country will be free to force upon all the rest just the maximum amount of armament it chooses to adopt. since 1871 france, we say, has been free in military matters. what has been the value of that freedom? the truth is, she has been the bond-slave of germany, bound to watch germany as a slave watches a master, bound to launch submarine for submarine and cast gun for gun, to sweep all her youth into her army, to subdue her trade, her literature, her education, her whole life to the necessity of preparations imposed upon her by her drill-master over the rhine. and michael, too, has been a slave to his imperial master for the self-same reason, for the reason that germany and france were both so proudly sovereign and independent. both countries have been slaves to kruppism and zabernism--_because they were sovereign and free_! so it will always be. so long as patriotic cant can keep the common man jealous of international controls over his belligerent possibilities, so long will he be the helpless slave of the foreign threat, and "peace" remain a mere name for the resting phase between wars. but power over the military resources of the world is by no means the limit of the necessary powers of an effective league of free nations. there are still more indigestible implications in the idea, and, since they have got to be digested sooner or later if civilization is not to collapse, there is no reason why we should not begin to bite upon them now. i was much interested to read the british press upon the alleged proposal of the german chancellor that we should give up (presumably to germany) gibraltar, malta, egypt, and suchlike key possessions. it seemed to excite several of our politicians extremely. i read over the german chancellor's speech very carefully, so far as it was available, and it is clear that he did not propose anything of the sort. wilfully or blindly our press and our demagogues screamed over a false issue. the chancellor was defending the idea of the germans remaining in belgium and lorraine because of the strategic and economic importance of those regions to germany, and he was arguing that before we english got into such a feverish state of indignation about that, we should first ask ourselves what we were doing in gibraltar, etc., etc. that is a different thing altogether. and it is an argument that is not to be disposed of by misrepresentation. the british have to think hard over this quite legitimate german _tu quoque_. it is no good getting into a patriotic bad temper and refusing to answer that question. we british people are so persuaded of the purity and unselfishness with which we discharge our imperial responsibilities, we have been so trained in imperial self-satisfaction, we know so certainly that all our subject nations call us blessed, that it is a little difficult for us to see just how the fact that we are, for example, so deeply rooted in egypt looks to an outside intelligence. of course the german imperialist idea is a wicked and aggressive idea, as lord robert cecil has explained; they want to set up all over the earth coaling stations and strategic points, _on the pattern of ours._ well, they argue, we are only trying to do what you british have done. if we are not to do so--because it is aggression and so on and so on--is not the time ripe for you to make some concessions to the public opinion of the world? that is the german argument. either, they say, tolerate this idea of a germany with advantageous posts and possessions round and about the earth, or reconsider your own position. well, at the risk of rousing much patriotic wrath, i must admit that i think we _have_ to reconsider our position. our argument is that in india, egypt, africa and elsewhere, we stand for order and civilization, we are the trustees of freedom, the agents of knowledge and efficiency. on the whole the record of british rule is a pretty respectable one; i am not ashamed of our record. nevertheless _the case is altering_. it is quite justifiable for us british, no doubt, if we do really play the part of honest trustees, to remain in egypt and in india under existing conditions; it is even possible for us to glance at the helplessness of arabia, palestine, and mesopotamia, as yet incapable of self-government, helpless as new-born infants. but our case, our only justifiable case, is that we are trustees because there is no better trustee possible. and the creation of a council of a league of free nations would be like the creation of a public trustee for the world. the creation of a league of free nations must necessarily be the creation of an authority that may legitimately call existing empires to give an account of their stewardship. for an unchecked fragmentary control of tropical and chaotic regions, it substitutes the possibility of a general authority. and this must necessarily alter the problems not only of the politically immature nations and the control of the tropics, but also of the regulation of the sea ways, the regulation of the coming air routes, and the distribution of staple products in the world. i will not go in detail over the items of this list, because the reader can fill in the essentials of the argument from what has gone before. i want simply to suggest how widely this project of a league of free nations swings when once you have let it swing freely in your mind! and if you do not let it swing freely in your mind, it remains nothing--a sentimental gesture. the plain truth is that the league of free nations, if it is to be a reality, if it is to effect a real pacification of the world, must do no less than supersede empire; it must end not only this new german imperialism, which is struggling so savagely and powerfully to possess the earth, but it must also wind up british imperialism and french imperialism, which do now so largely and inaggressively possess it. and, moreover, this idea queries the adjective of belgian, portuguese, french, and british central africa alike, just as emphatically as it queries "german." still more effectually does the league forbid those creations of the futurist imagination, the imperialism of italy and greece, which make such threatening gestures at the world of our children. are these incompatibilities understood? until people have faced the clear antagonism that exists between imperialism and internationalism, they have not begun to suspect the real significance of this project of the league of free nations. they have not begun to realize that peace also has its price. iv the labour view of middle africa i was recently privileged to hear the views of one of those titled and influential ladies--with a general education at about the fifth standard level, plus a little french, german, italian, and music--who do so much to make our england what it is at the present time, upon the labour idea of an international control of "tropical" africa. she was loud and derisive about the "ignorance" of labour. "what can _they_ know about foreign politics?" she said, with gestures to indicate her conception of _them_. i was moved to ask her what she would do about africa. "leave it to lord robert!" she said, leaning forward impressively. "_leave it to the people who know._" unhappily i share the evident opinion of labour that we are not blessed with any profoundly wise class of people who have definite knowledge and clear intentions about africa, that these "_people who know_" are mostly a pretentious bluff, and so, in spite of a very earnest desire to take refuge in my "ignorance" from the burthen of thinking about african problems, i find myself obliged, like most other people, to do so. in the interests of our country, our children, and the world, we common persons _have_ to have opinions about these matters. a muddle-up in africa this year may kill your son and mine in the course of the next decade. i know this is not a claim to be interested in things african, such as the promoter of a tropical railway or an oil speculator has; still it is a claim. and for the life of me i cannot see what is wrong about the labour proposals, or what alternative exists that can give even a hope of peace in and about africa. the gist of the labour proposal is an international control of africa between the zambesi and the sahara. this has been received with loud protests by men whose work one is obliged to respect, by sir harry, johnston, for example, and sir alfred sharpe, and with something approaching a shriek of hostility by mr. cunninghame graham. but i think these gentlemen have not perhaps given the labour proposal quite as much attention as they have spent upon the details of african conditions. i think they have jumped to conclusions at the mere sound of the word "international." there have been some gross failures in the past to set up international administrations in africa and the near east. and these gentlemen think at once of some new congo administration and of nondescript police forces commanded by cosmopolitan adventurers. (see joseph conrad's "out-post of civilization.") they think of internationalism with greedy great powers in the background outside the internationalized area, intriguing to create disorder and mischief with ideas of an ultimate annexation. but i doubt if such nightmares do any sort of justice to the labour intention. and the essential thing i would like to point out to these authorities upon african questions is that not one of them even hints at any other formula which covers the broad essentials of the african riddle. what are these broad essentials? what are the ends that _must_ be achieved if africa is not to continue a festering sore in the body of mankind? the first most obvious danger of africa is the militarization of the black. general smuts has pointed this out plainly. the negro makes a good soldier; he is hardy, he stands the sea, and he stands cold. (there was a negro in the little party which reached the north pole.) it is absolutely essential to the peace of the world that there should be no arming of the negroes beyond the minimum necessary for the policing of africa. but how is this to be watched and prevented if there is no overriding body representing civilization to say "stop" to the beginnings of any such militarization? i do not see how sir harry johnston, sir alfred sharpe, and the other authorities can object to at least an international african "disarmament commission" to watch, warn, and protest. at least they must concede that. but in practice this involves something else. a practical consequence of this disarmament idea must be an effective control of the importation of arms into the "tutelage" areas of africa. that rat at the dykes of civilization, that ultimate expression of political scoundrelism, the gun-runner, has to be kept under and stamped out in africa as everywhere. a disarmament commission that has no forces available to prevent the arms trade will be just another hague convention, just another vague, well-intentioned, futile gesture. and closely connected with this function of controlling the arms trade is another great necessity of africa under "tutelage," and that is the necessity of a common collective agreement not to demoralize the native population. that demoralization, physical and moral, has already gone far. the whole negro population of africa is now rotten with diseases introduced by arabs and europeans during the last century, and such african statesmen as sir harry johnston are eloquent upon the necessity of saving the blacks--and the baser whites--from the effects of trade gin and similar alluring articles of commerce. moreover, from africa there is always something new in the way of tropical diseases, and presently africa, if we let it continue to fester as it festers now, may produce an epidemic that will stand exportation to a temperate climate. a bacterium that may kill you or me in some novel and disgusting way may even now be developing in some congo muck-heap. so here is the need for another commission to look after the health of africa. that, too, should be of authority over all the area of "tutelage" africa. it is no good stamping out infectious disease in nyasaland while it is being bred in portuguese east africa. and if there is a disarmament commission already controlling the importation of arms, why should not that body also control at the same time the importation of trade gin and similar delicacies, and direct quarantine and such-like health regulations? but there is another question in africa upon which our "ignorant" labour class is far better informed than our dear old eighteenth-century upper class which still squats so firmly in our foreign and colonial offices, and that is the question of forced labour. we cannot tolerate any possibilities of the enslavement of black africa. long ago the united states found out the impossibility of having slave labour working in the same system with white. to cure that anomaly cost the united states a long and bloody war. the slave-owner, the exploiter of the black, becomes a threat and a nuisance to any white democracy. he brings back his loot to corrupt press and life at home. what happened in america in the midst of the last century between federals and confederates must not happen again on a larger scale between white europe and middle africa. slavery in africa, open or disguised, whether enforced by the lash or brought about by iniquitous land-stealing, strikes at the home and freedom of every european worker--_and labour knows this_. but how are we to prevent the enslavement and economic exploitation of the blacks if we have no general watcher of african conditions? we want a common law for africa, a general declaration of rights, of certain elementary rights, and we want a common authority to which the black man and the native tribe may appeal for justice. what is the good of trying to elevate the population of uganda and to give it a free and hopeful life if some other population close at hand is competing against the baganda worker under lash and tax? so here is a third aspect of our international commission, as a native protectorate and court of appeal! there is still a fourth aspect of the african question in which every mother's son in europe is closely interested, and that is the trade question. africa is the great source of many of the most necessary raw materials upon which our modern comforts and conveniences depend; more particularly is it the source of cheap fat in the form of palm oil. one of the most powerful levers in the hands of the allied democracies at the present time in their struggle against the imperial brigands of potsdam is the complete control we have now obtained over these essential supplies. we can, if we choose, cut off germany altogether from these vital economic necessities, if she does not consent to abandon militant imperialism for some more civilized form of government. we hope that this war will end in that renunciation, and that germany will re-enter the community of nations. but whether that is so or not, whether germany is or is not to be one of the interested parties in the african solution, the fact remains that it is impossible to contemplate a continuing struggle for the african raw material supply between the interested powers. sooner or later that means a renewal of war. international trade rivalry is, indeed, only war--_smouldering_. we need, and labour demands, a fair, frank treatment of african trade, and that can only be done by some overriding regulative power, a commission which, so far as i can see, might also be the same commission as that we have already hypothesized as being necessary to control the customs in order to prevent gun-running and the gin trade. that commission might very conveniently have a voice in the administration of the great waterways of africa (which often run through the possessions of several powers) and in the regulation of the big railway lines and air routes that will speedily follow the conclusion of peace. now this i take it is the gist of the labour proposal. this--and no more than this--is what is intended by the "international control of tropical africa." _i do not read that phrase as abrogating existing sovereignties in africa_. what is contemplated is a delegation of authority. every one should know, though unhappily the badness of our history teaching makes it doubtful if every one does know, that the federal government of the united states of america did not begin as a sovereign government, and has now only a very questionable sovereignty. each state was sovereign, and each state delegated certain powers to washington. that was the initial idea of the union. only later did the idea of a people of the states as a whole emerge. in the same way i understand the labour proposal as meaning that we should delegate to an african commission the middle african customs, the regulation of inter-state trade, inter-state railways and waterways, quarantine and health generally, and the establishment of a supreme court for middle african affairs. one or two minor matters, such as the preservation of rare animals, might very well fall under the same authority. upon that commission the interested nations, that is to say--putting them in alphabetical order--the africander, the briton, the belgian, the egyptian, the frenchman, the italian, the indian the portuguese--might all be represented in proportion to their interest. whether the german would come in is really a question for the german to consider; he can come in as a good european, he cannot come in as an imperialist brigand. whether, too, any other nations can claim to have an interest in african affairs, whether the commission would not be better appointed by a league of free nations than directly by the interested governments, and a number of other such questions, need not be considered here. here we are discussing only the main idea of the labour proposal. now beneath the supervision and restraint of such a delegated commission i do not see why the existing administrations of tutelage africa should not continue. i do not believe that the labour proposal contemplates any humiliating cession of european sovereignty. under that international commission the french flag may still wave in senegal and the british over the protected state of uganda. given a new spirit in germany i do not see why the german flag should not presently be restored in german east africa. but over all, standing for righteousness, patience, fair play for the black, and the common welfare of mankind would wave a new flag, the sun of africa representing the central african commission of the league of free nations. that is my vision of the labour project. it is something very different, i know, from the nightmare of an international police of cosmopolitan scoundrels in nondescript uniforms, hastening to loot and ravish his dear uganda and his beloved nigeria, which distresses the crumpled pillow of sir harry johnston. but if it is not the solution, then it is up to him and his fellow authorities to tell us what is the solution of the african riddle. v getting the league idea clear in relation to imperialism § 1 it is idle to pretend that even at the present time the idea of the league of free nations has secure possession of the british mind. there is quite naturally a sustained opposition to it in all the fastnesses of aggressive imperialism. such papers as the _times_ and the _morning post_ remain hostile and obstructive to the expression of international ideas. most of our elder statesmen seem to have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing during the years of wildest change the world has ever known. but in the general mind of the british peoples the movement of opinion from a narrow imperialism towards internationalism has been wide and swift. and it continues steadily. one can trace week by week and almost day by day the americanization of the british conception of the allied war aims. it may be interesting to reproduce here three communications upon this question made at different times by the present writer to the press. the circumstances of their publication are significant. the first is in substance identical with a letter which was sent to the _times_ late in may, 1917, and rejected as being altogether too revolutionary. for nowadays the correspondence in the _times_ has ceased to be an impartial expression of public opinion. the correspondence of the _times_ is now apparently selected and edited in accordance with the views upon public policy held by the acting editor for the day. more and more has that paper become the organ of a sort of oxford imperialism, three or four years behind the times and very ripe and "expert." the letter is here given as it was finally printed in the issue of the _daily chronicle_ for june 4th, 1917, under the heading, "wanted a statement of imperial policy." sir,--the time seems to have come for much clearer statements of outlook and intention from this country than it has hitherto been possible to make. the entry of america into the war and the banishment of autocracy and aggressive diplomacy from russia have enormously cleared the air, and the recent great speech of general smuts at the savoy hotel is probably only the first of a series of experiments in statement. it is desirable alike to clear our own heads, to unify our efforts, and to give the nations of the world some assurance and standard for our national conduct in the future, that we should now define the idea of our empire and its relation to the world outlook much more clearly than has ever hitherto been done. never before in the history of mankind has opinion counted for so much and persons and organizations for so little as in this war. never before has the need for clear ideas, widely understood and consistently sustained, been so commandingly vital. what do we mean by our empire, and what is its relation to that universal desire of mankind, the permanent rule of peace and justice in the world? the whole world will be the better for a very plain answer to that question. is it not time for us british not merely to admit to ourselves, but to assure the world that our empire as it exists to-day is a provisional thing, that in scarcely any part of the world do we regard it as more than an emergency arrangement, as a necessary association that must give place ultimately to the higher synthesis of a world league, that here we hold as trustees and there on account of strategic considerations that may presently disappear, and that though we will not contemplate the replacement of our flag anywhere by the flag of any other competing nation, though we do hope to hold together with our kin and with those who increasingly share our tradition and our language, nevertheless we are prepared to welcome great renunciations of our present ascendency and privileges in the interests of mankind as a whole. we need to make the world understand that we do not put our nation nor our empire before the commonwealth of man. unless presently we are to follow germany along the tragic path her national vanity and her world ambitions have made for her, that is what we have to make clear now. it is not only our duty to mankind, it is also the sane course for our own preservation. is it not the plain lesson of this stupendous and disastrous war that there is no way to secure civilization from destruction except by an impartial control and protection in the interests of the whole human race, a control representing the best intelligence of mankind, of these main causes of war. (1) the politically undeveloped tropics; (2) shipping and international trade; and (3) small nationalities and all regions in a state of political impotence or confusion? it is our case against the germans that in all these three cases they have subordinated every consideration of justice and the general human welfare to a monstrous national egotism. that argument has a double edge. at present there is a vigorous campaign in america, russia, the neutral countries generally, to represent british patriotism as equally egotistic, and our purpose in this war as a mere parallel to the german purpose. in the same manner, though perhaps with less persistency, france and italy are also caricatured. we are supposed to be grabbing at mesopotamia and palestine, france at syria; italy is represented as pursuing a machiavellian policy towards the unfortunate greek republicans, with her eyes on the greek islands and greece in asia. is it not time that these base imputations were repudiated clearly and conclusively by our alliance? and is it not time that we began to discuss in much more frank and definite terms than has hitherto been done, the nature of the international arrangement that will be needed to secure the safety of such liberated populations as those of palestine, of the arab regions of the old turkish empire, of armenia, of reunited poland, and the like? i do not mean here mere diplomatic discussions and "understandings," i mean such full and plain statements as will be spread through the whole world and grasped and assimilated by ordinary people everywhere, statements by which we, as a people, will be prepared to stand or fall. almost as urgent is the need for some definite statement about africa. general smuts has warned not only the empire, but the whole world of the gigantic threat to civilization that lies in the present division of africa between various keenly competitive european powers, any one of which will be free to misuse the great natural resources at its disposal and to arm millions of black soldiers for aggression. a mere elimination of germany from africa will not solve that difficulty. what we have to eliminate is not this nation or that, but the system of national shoving and elbowing, the treatment of africa as the board for a game of beggar-my-neighbour-and-damn-the-niggers, in which a few syndicates, masquerading as national interests, snatch a profit to the infinite loss of all mankind. we want a lowering of barriers and a unification of interests, we want an international control of these disputed regions, to override nationalist exploitation. the whole world wants it. it is a chastened and reasonable world we live in to-day, and the time for white reason and the wide treatment of these problems is now. finally, the time is drawing near when the egyptian and the nations of india will ask us, "are things going on for ever here as they go on now, or are we to look for the time when we, too, like the africander, the canadian and the australian, will be your confessed and equal partners?" would it not be wise to answer that question in the affirmative before the voice in which it is asked grows thick with anger? in egypt, for example, we are either robbers very like--except for a certain difference in touch--the germans in belgium, or we are honourable trustees. it is our claim and pride to be honourable trustees. nothing so becomes a trustee as a cheerful openness of disposition. great britain has to table her world policy. it is a thing overdue. no doubt we have already a literature of liberal imperialism and a considerable accumulation of declarations by this statesman or that. but what is needed is a formulation much more representative, official and permanent than that, something that can be put beside president wilson's clear rendering of the american idea. we want all our peoples to understand, and we want all mankind to understand that our empire is not a net about the world in which the progress of mankind is entangled, but a self-conscious political system working side by side with the other democracies of the earth, preparing the way for, and prepared at last to sacrifice and merge itself in, the world confederation of free and equal peoples. § 2 this letter was presently followed up by an article in the _daily news_, entitled "a reasonable man's peace." this article provoked a considerable controversy in the imperialist press, and it was reprinted as a pamphlet by a free trade organization, which distributed over 200,000 copies. it is particularly interesting to note, in view of what follows it, that it was attacked with great virulence in the _evening news_, the little fierce mud-throwing brother of the _daily mail_. the international situation at the present time is beyond question the most wonderful that the world has ever seen. there is not a country in the world in which the great majority of sensible people are not passionately desirous of peace, of an enduring peace, and--the war goes on. the conditions of peace can now be stated, in general terms that are as acceptable to a reasonable man in berlin as they are to a reasonable man in paris or london or petrograd or constantinople. there are to be no conquests, no domination of recalcitrant populations, no bitter insistence upon vindictive penalties, and there must be something in the nature of a world-wide league of nations to keep the peace securely in future, to "make the world safe for democracy," and maintain international justice. to that the general mind of the world has come to-day. why, then, does the waste and killing go on? why is not the peace conference sitting now? manifestly because a small minority of people in positions of peculiar advantage, in positions of trust and authority, and particularly the german reactionaries, prevent or delay its assembling. the answer which seems to suffice in all the allied countries is that the german imperial government--that the german imperial government alone--stands in the way, that its tradition is incurably a tradition of conquest and aggression, that until german militarism is overthrown, etc. few people in the allied countries will dispute that that is broadly true. but is it the whole and complete truth? is there nothing more to be done on our side? let us put a question that goes to the very heart of the problem. why does the great mass of the german people still cling to its incurably belligerent government? the answer to that question is not overwhelmingly difficult. the german people sticks to its militarist imperialism as mazeppa stuck to his horse; because it is bound to it, and the wolves pursue. the attentive student of the home and foreign propaganda literature of the german government will realize that the case made by german imperialism, the main argument by which it sticks to power, is this, that the allied governments are also imperialist, that they also aim at conquest and aggression, that for germany the choice is world empire or downfall and utter ruin. this is the argument that holds the german people stiffly united. for most men in most countries it would be a convincing argument, strong enough to override considerations of right and wrong. i find that i myself am of this way of thinking, that whether england has done right or wrong in the past--and i have sometimes criticized my country very bitterly--i will not endure the prospect of seeing her at the foot of some victorious foreign nation. neither will any german who matters. very few people would respect a german who did. but the case for the allies is that this great argument by which, and by which alone, the german imperial government keeps its grip upon the german people at the present time, and keeps them facing their enemies, is untrue. the allies declare that they do not want to destroy the german people, they do not want to cripple the german people; they want merely to see certain gaping wounds inflicted by germany repaired, and beyond that reasonable requirement they want nothing but to be assured, completely assured, absolutely assured, against any further aggressions on the part of germany. is that true? our leaders say so, and we believe them. we would not support them if we did not. and if it is true, have the statesmen of the allies made it as transparently and convincingly clear to the german people as possible? that is one of the supreme questions of the present time. we cannot too earnestly examine it. because in the answer to it lies the reason why so many men were killed yesterday on the eastern and western front, so many ships sunk, so much property destroyed, so much human energy wasted for ever upon mere destruction, and why to-morrow and the next day and the day after--through many months yet, perhaps--the same killing and destroying must still go on. in many respects this war has been an amazing display of human inadaptability. the military history of the war has still to be written, the grim story of machinery misunderstood, improvements resisted, antiquated methods persisted in; but the broad facts are already before the public mind. after three years of war the air offensive, the only possible decisive blow, is still merely talked of. not once nor twice only have the western allies had victory within their grasp--and failed to grip it. the british cavalry generals wasted the great invention of the tanks as a careless child breaks a toy. at least equally remarkable is the dragging inadaptability of european statecraft. everywhere the failure of ministers and statesmen to rise to the urgent definite necessities of the present time is glaringly conspicuous. they seem to be incapable even of thinking how the war may be brought to an end. they seem incapable of that plain speaking to the world audience which alone can bring about a peace. they keep on with the tricks and feints of a departed age. both on the side of the allies and on the side of the germans the declarations of public policy remain childishly vague and disingenuous, childishly "diplomatic." they chaffer like happy imbeciles while civilization bleeds to death. it was perhaps to be expected. few, if any, men of over five-and-forty completely readjust themselves to changed conditions, however novel and challenging the changes may be, and nearly all the leading figures in these affairs are elderly men trained in a tradition of diplomatic ineffectiveness, and now overworked and overstrained to a pitch of complete inelasticity. they go on as if it were still 1913. could anything be more palpably shifty and unsatisfactory, more senile, more feebly artful, than the recent utterances of the german chancellor? and, on our own side-let us examine the three leading points about this peace business in which this jaded statecraft is most apparent. let the reader ask himself the following questions:-does he know what the allies mean to do with the problem of central africa? it is the clear common sense of the african situation that while these precious regions of raw material remain divided up between a number of competitive european imperialisms, each resolutely set upon the exploitation of its "possessions" to its own advantage and the disadvantage of the others, there can be no permanent peace in the world. there can be permanent peace in the world only when tropical and sub-tropical africa constitute a field free to the commercial enterprise of every one irrespective of nationality, when this is no longer an area of competition between nations. this is possible only under some supreme international control. it requires no special knowledge nor wisdom to see that. a schoolboy can see it. any one but a statesman absolutely flaccid with overstrain can see that. however difficult it may prove to work out in detail, such an international control _must_ therefore be worked out. the manifest solution of the problem of the german colonies in africa is neither to return them to her nor deprive her of them, but to give her a share in the pooled general control of mid-africa. in that way she can be deprived of all power for political mischief in africa without humiliation or economic injury. in that way, too, we can head off--and in no other way can we head off--the power for evil, the power of developing quarrels inherent in "imperialisms" other than german. but has the reader any assurance that this sane solution of the african problem has the support of the allied governments? at best he has only a vague persuasion. and consider how the matter looks "over there." the german government assures the german people that the allies intend to cut off germany from the african supply of raw material. that would mean the practical destruction of german economic life. it is something far more vital to the mass of germans than any question of belgium or alsace-lorraine. it is, therefore, one of the ideas most potent in nerving the overstrained german people to continue their fight. why are we, and why are the german people, not given some definite assurance in this matter? given reparation in europe, is germany to be allowed a fair share in the control and trade of a pooled and neutralized central africa? sooner or later we must come to some such arrangement. why not state it plainly now? a second question is equally essential to any really permanent settlement, and it is one upon which these eloquent but unsatisfactory mouthpieces of ours turn their backs with an equal resolution, and that is the fate of the ottoman empire. what in plain english are we up to there? whatever happens, that humpty dumpty cannot be put back as it was before the war. the idea of the german imperialist, the idea of our own little band of noisy but influential imperialist vulgarians, is evidently a game of grab, a perilous cutting up of these areas into jostling protectorates and spheres of influence, from which either the germans or the allies (according to the side you are on) are to be viciously shut out. on such a basis this war is a war to the death. neither germany, france, britain, italy, nor russia can live prosperously if its trade and enterprise is shut out from this cardinally important area. there is, therefore, no alternative, if we are to have a satisfactory permanent pacification of the world, but local self-development in these regions under honestly conceived international control of police and transit and trade. let it be granted that that will be a difficult control to organize. none the less it has to be attempted. it has to be attempted because _there is no other way of peace_. but once that conception has been clearly formulated, a second great motive why germany should continue fighting will have gone. the third great issue about which there is nothing but fog and uncertainty is the so-called "war after the war," the idea of a permanent economic alliance to prevent the economic recuperation of germany. upon that idea german imperialism, in its frantic effort to keep its tormented people fighting, naturally puts the utmost stress. the threat of war after the war robs the reasonable german of his last inducement to turn on his government and insist upon peace. shut out from all trade, unable to buy food, deprived of raw material, peace would be as bad for germany as war. he will argue naturally enough and reasonably enough that he may as well die fighting as starve. this is a far more vital issue to him than the belgian issue or poland or alsace-lorraine. our statesmen waste their breath and slight our intelligence when these foreground questions are thrust in front of the really fundamental matters. but as the mass of sensible people in every country concerned, in germany just as much as in france or great britain, know perfectly well, unimpeded trade is good for every one except a few rich adventurers, and restricted trade destroys limitless wealth and welfare for mankind to make a few private fortunes or secure an advantage for some imperialist clique. we want an end to this economic strategy, we want an end to this plotting of governmental cliques against the general welfare. in such offences germany has been the chief of sinners, but which among the belligerent nations can throw the first stone? here again the way to the world's peace, the only way to enduring peace, lies through internationalism, through an international survey of commercial treaties, through an international control of inter-state shipping and transport rates. unless the allied statesmen fail to understand the implications of their own general professions they mean that. but why do they not say it plainly? why do they not shout it so compactly and loudly that all germany will hear and understand? why do they justify imperialism to germany? why do they maintain a threatening ambiguity towards germany on all these matters? by doing so they leave germany no choice but a war of desperation. they underline and endorse the claim of german imperialism that this is a war for bare existence. they unify the german people. they prolong the war. § 3 some weeks later i was able, at the invitation of the editor, to carry the controversy against imperialism into the _daily mail_, which has hitherto counted as a strictly imperialist paper. the article that follows was published in the _daily mail_ under the heading, "are we sticking to the point? a discussion of war aims." has this war-aims controversy really got down to essentials? is the purpose of this world conflict from first to last too complicated for brevity, or can we boil it down into a statement compact enough for a newspaper article? and if we can, why is there all this voluminous, uneasy, unquenchable disputation about war aims? as to the first question, i would say that the gist of the dispute between the central powers and the world can be written easily without undue cramping in an ordinary handwriting upon a postcard. it is the second question that needs answering. and the reason why the second question has to be asked and answered is this, that several of the allies, and particularly we british, are not being perfectly plain and simple-minded in our answer to the first, that there is a division among us and in our minds, and that our division is making us ambiguous in our behaviour, that it is weakening and dividing our action and strengthening and consolidating the enemy, and that unless we can drag this slurred-over division of aim and spirit into the light of day and _settle it now_, we are likely to remain double-minded to the end of the war, to split our strength while the war continues and to come out of the settlement at the end with nothing nearly worth the strain and sacrifice it has cost us. and first, let us deal with that postcard and say what is the essential aim of the war, the aim to which all other aims are subsidiary. it is, we have heard repeated again and again by every statesman of importance in every allied country, to defeat and destroy military imperialism, to make the world safe for ever against any such deliberate aggression as germany prepared for forty years and brought to a climax when she crossed the belgian frontier in 1914. we want to make anything of that kind on the part of germany or of any other power henceforth impossible in this world. that is our great aim. whatever other objects may be sought in this war no responsible statesman dare claim them as anything but subsidiary to that; one can say, in fact, this is our sole aim, our other aims being but parts of it. better that millions should die now, we declare, than that hundreds of millions still unborn should go on living, generation after generation, under the black tyranny of this imperialist threat. there is our common agreement. so far, at any rate, we are united. the question i would put to the reader is this: are we all logically, sincerely, and fully carrying out the plain implications of this war aim? or are we to any extent muddling about with it in such a way as to confuse and disorganize our allies, weaken our internal will, and strengthen the enemy? now the plain meaning of this supreme declared war aim is that we are asking germany to alter her ways. we are asking germany to become a different germany. either germany has to be utterly smashed up and destroyed or else germany has to cease to be an aggressive military imperialism. the former alternative is dismissed by most responsible statesmen. they declare that they do not wish to destroy the german people or the german nationality or the civilized life of germany. i will not enlarge here upon the tedium and difficulties such an undertaking would present. i will dismiss it as being not only impossible, but also as an insanely wicked project. the second alternative, therefore, remains as our war aim. i do not see how the sloppiest reasoner can evade that. as we do not want to kill germany we must want to change germany. if we do not want to wipe germany off the face of the earth, then we want germany to become the prospective and trust-worthy friend of her fellow nations. and if words have any meaning at all, that is saying that we are fighting to bring about a revolution in germany. we want germany to become a democratically controlled state, such as is the united states to-day, with open methods and pacific intentions, instead of remaining a clenched fist. if we can bring that about we have achieved our war aim; if we cannot, then this struggle has been for us only such loss and failure as humanity has never known before. but do we, as a nation, stick closely to this clear and necessary, this only possible, meaning of our declared war aim? that great, clear-minded leader among the allies, that englishman who more than any other single man speaks for the whole english-speaking and western-thinking community, president wilson, has said definitely that this is his meaning. america, with him as her spokesman, is under no delusion; she is fighting consciously for a german revolution as the essential war aim. we in europe do not seem to be so lucid. i think myself we have been, and are still, fatally and disastrously not lucid. it is high time, and over, that we cleared our minds and got down to the essentials of the war. we have muddled about in blood and dirt and secondary issues long enough. we in britain are not clear-minded, i would point out, because we are double-minded. no good end is served by trying to ignore in the fancied interests of "unity" a division of spirit and intention that trips us up at every step. we are, we declare, fighting for a complete change in international methods, and we are bound to stick to the logical consequences of that. we have placed ourselves on the side of democratic revolution against autocratic monarchy, and we cannot afford to go on shilly-shallying with that choice. we cannot in these days of black or white play the part of lukewarm friends to freedom. i will not remind the reader here of the horrible vacillations and inconsistencies of policy in greece that have prolonged the war and cost us wealth and lives beyond measure, but president wilson himself has reminded us pungently enough and sufficiently enough of the follies and disingenuousness of our early treatment of the russian revolution. what i want to point out here is the supreme importance of a clear lead in this matter _now_ in order that we should state our war aims effectively. in every war there must be two sets of war aims kept in mind; we ought to know what we mean to do in the event of victory so complete that we can dictate what terms we choose, and we ought to know what, in the event of a not altogether conclusive tussle, are the minimum terms that we should consider justified us in a discontinuance of the tussle. now, unless our leading statesmen are humbugs and unless we are prepared to quarrel with america in the interests of the monarchist institutions of europe, we should, in the event of an overwhelming victory, destroy both the hohenzollern and hapsburg imperialisms, and that means, if it means anything at all and is not mere lying rhetoric, that we should insist upon germany becoming free and democratic, that is to say, in effect if not in form republican, and upon a series of national republics, polish, hungarian, serbo-croatian, bulgarian, and the like, in eastern europe, grouped together if possible into congenial groups--crowned republics it might be in some cases, in the case of the serb for example, but in no case too much crowned--that we should join with this renascent germany and with these thus liberalized powers and with our allies and with the neutrals in one great league of free nations, trading freely with one another, guaranteeing each other freedom, and maintaining a world-wide peace and disarmament and a new reign of law for mankind. if that is not what we are out for, then i do not understand what we are out for; there is dishonesty and trickery and diplomacy and foolery in the struggle, and i am no longer whole-hearted for such a half-hearted war. if after a complete victory we are to bolster up the hohenzollerns, hapsburgs, and their relations, set up a constellation of more cheating little subordinate kings, and reinstate that system of diplomacies and secret treaties and secret understandings, that endless drama of international threatening and plotting, that never-ending arming, that has led us after a hundred years of waste and muddle to the supreme tragedy of this war, then the world is not good enough for me and i shall be glad to close my eyes upon it. i am not alone in these sentiments. i believe that in writing thus i am writing the opinion of the great mass of reasonable british, french, italian, russian, and american men. i believe, too, that this is the desire also of great numbers of germans, and that they would, if they could believe us, gladly set aside their present rulers to achieve this plain common good for mankind. but, the reader will say, what evidence is there of any republican feeling in germany? that is always the objection made to any reasonable discussion of the war--and as most of us are denied access to german papers, it is difficult to produce quotations; and even when one does, there are plenty of fools to suggest and believe that the entire german press is an elaborate camouflage. yet in the german press there is far more criticism of militant imperialism than those who have no access to it can imagine. there is far franker criticism of militarism in germany than there is of reactionary toryism in this country, and it is more free to speak its mind. that, however, is a question by the way. it is not the main thing that i have to say here. what i have to say here is that in great britain--i will not discuss the affairs of any of our allies--there are groups and classes of people, not numerous, not representative, but placed in high and influential positions and capable of free and public utterance, who are secretly and bitterly hostile to this great war aim, which inspires all the allied peoples. these people are permitted to deny--our peculiar censorship does not hamper them--loudly and publicly that we are fighting for democracy and world freedom; "tosh," they say to our dead in the trenches, "you died for a mistake"; they jeer at this idea of a league of nations making an end to war, an idea that has inspired countless brave lads to face death and such pains and hardships as outdo even death itself; they perplex and irritate our allies by propounding schemes for some precious economic league of the british empire--that is to treat all "foreigners" with a common base selfishness and stupid hatred--and they intrigue with the most reactionary forces in russia. these british reactionaries openly, and with perfect impunity, represent our war as a thing as mean and shameful as germany's attack on belgium, and they do it because generosity and justice in the world is as terrible to them as dawn is to the creatures of the night. our tories blundered into this great war, not seeing whither it would take them. in particular it is manifest now by a hundred signs that they dread the fall of monarchy in germany and austria. far rather would they make the most abject surrenders to the kaiser than deal with a renascent republican germany. the recent letter of lord lansdowne, urging a peace with german imperialism, was but a feeler from the pacifist side of this most un-english, and unhappily most influential, section of our public life. lord lansdowne's letter was the letter of a peer who fears revolution more than national dishonour. but it is the truculent wing of this same anti-democratic movement that is far more active. while our sons suffer and die for their comforts and conceit, these people scheme to prevent any communication between the republican and socialist classes in germany and the allied population. at any cost this class of pampered and privileged traitors intend to have peace while the kaiser is still on his throne. if not they face a new world--in which their part will be small indeed. and with the utmost ingenuity they maintain a dangerous vagueness about the allied peace terms, _with the sole object of preventing a revolutionary movement in germany_. let me put it to the reader exactly why our failure to say plainly and exactly and conclusively what we mean to do about a score of points, and particularly about german economic life after the war, paralyses the penitents and friends and helpers that we could now find in germany. let me ask the reader to suppose himself a german in germany at the present time. of course if he was, he is sure that he would hate the kaiser as the source of this atrocious war, he would be bitterly ashamed of the belgian iniquity, of the submarine murders, and a score of such stains upon his national honour; and he would want to alter his national system and make peace. hundreds of thousands of germans are in that mood now. but as most of us have had to learn, a man may be bitterly ashamed of this or that incident in his country's history--what englishman, for instance, can be proud of glencoe?--he may disbelieve in half its institutions and still love his country far too much to suffer the thought of its destruction. i prefer to see my country right, but if it comes to the pinch and my country sins i will fight to save her from the destruction her sins may have brought upon her. that is the natural way of a man. but suppose a german wished to try to start a revolutionary movement in germany at the present time, have we given him any reason at all for supposing that a germany liberated and democratized, but, of course, divided and weakened as she would be bound to be in the process, would get better terms from the allies than a germany still facing them, militant, imperialist, and wicked? he would have no reason for believing anything of the sort. if we allies are honest, then if a revolution started in germany to-day we should if anything lower the price of peace to germany. but these people who pretend to lead us will state nothing of the sort. for them a revolution in germany would be the signal for putting up the price of peace. at any risk they are resolved that that german revolution shall not happen. your sane, good german, let me assert, is up against that as hard as if he was a wicked one. and so, poor devil, he has to put his revolutionary ideas away, they are hopeless ideas for him because of the power of the british reactionary, they are hopeless because of the line we as a nation take in this matter, and he has to go on fighting for his masters. a plain statement of our war aims that did no more than set out honestly and convincingly the terms the allies would make with a democratic republican germany--republican i say, because where a scrap of hohenzollern is left to-day there will be a fresh militarism to-morrow--would absolutely revolutionize the internal psychology of germany. we should no longer face a solid people. we should have replaced the false issue of germany and britain fighting for the hegemony of europe, the lie upon which the german government has always traded, and in which our extreme tory press has always supported the german government, by the true issue, which is freedom versus imperialism, the league of nations versus that net of diplomatic roguery and of aristocratic, plutocratic, and autocratic greed and conceit which dragged us all into this vast welter of bloodshed and loss. vi the war aims of the western allies here, quite compactly, is the plain statement of the essential cause and process of the war to which i would like to see the allied foreign offices subscribe, and which i would like to have placed plainly before the german mind. it embodies much that has been learnt and thought out since this war began, and i think it is much truer and more fundamental than that mere raging against german "militarism," upon which our politicians and press still so largely subsist. the enormous development of war methods and war material within the last fifty years has made war so horrible and destructive that it is impossible to contemplate a future for mankind from which it has not been eliminated; the increased facilities of railway, steamship, automobile travel and air navigation have brought mankind so close together that ordinary human life is no longer safe anywhere in the boundaries of the little states in which it was once secure. in some fashion it is now necessary to achieve sufficient human unity to establish a world peace and save the future of mankind. in one or other of two ways only is that unification possible. either men may set up a common league to keep the peace of the earth, or one state must ultimately become so great and powerful as to repeat for all the world what rome did for europe two thousand years ago. either we must have human unity by a league of existing states or by an imperial conquest. the former is now the declared aim of our country and its allies; the latter is manifestly the ambition of the present rulers of germany. whatever the complications may have been in the earlier stages of the war, due to treaties that are now dead letters and agreements that are extinct, the essential issue now before every man in the world is this: is the unity of mankind to be the unity of a common freedom, in which every race and nationality may participate with complete self-respect, playing its part, according to its character, in one great world community, or is it to be reached--and it can only be so reached through many generations of bloodshed and struggle still, even if it can be ever reached in this way at all--through conquest and a german hegemony? while the rulers of germany to-day are more openly aggressive and imperialist than they were in august, 1914, the allies arrayed against them have made great progress in clearing up and realizing the instincts and ideals which brought them originally into the struggle. the german government offers the world to-day a warring future in which germany alone is to be secure and powerful and proud. _mankind will not endure that_. the allies offer the world more and more definitely the scheme of an organized league of free nations, a rule of law and justice about the earth. to fight for that and for no other conceivable end, the united states of america, with the full sympathy and co-operation of every state in the western hemisphere, has entered the war. the british empire, in the midst of the stress of the great war, has set up in dublin a convention of irishmen of all opinions with the fullest powers of deciding upon the future of their country. if ireland were not divided against herself she could be free and equal with england to-morrow. it is the open intention of great britain to develop representative government, where it has not hitherto existed, in india and egypt, to go on steadfastly increasing the share of the natives of these countries in the government of their own lands, until they too become free and equal members of the world league. neither france nor italy nor britain nor america has ever tampered with the shipping of other countries except in time of war, and the trade of the british empire has been impartially open to all the world. the extra-national "possessions," the so-called "subject nations" in the empires of britain, france, italy, and japan, are, in fact, possessions held in trust against the day when the league of free nations will inherit for mankind. is it to be union by conquest or is it to be union by league? for any sort of man except the german the question is, will you be a free citizen or will you be an underling to the german imperialism? for the german now the question is a far graver and more tragic one. for him it is this: "you belong to a people not now increasing very rapidly, a numerous people, but not so numerous as some of the great peoples of the world, a people very highly trained, very well drilled and well armed, perhaps as well trained and drilled and equipped as ever it will be. the collapse of russian imperialism has made you safe if now you can get peace, and you _can_ get a peace now that will neither destroy you nor humiliate you nor open up the prospect of fresh wars. the allies offer you such a peace. to accept it, we must warn you plainly, means refusing to go on with the manifest intentions of your present rulers, which are to launch you and your children and your children's children upon a career of struggle for war predominance, which may no doubt inflict untold deprivations and miseries upon the rest of mankind, but whose end in the long run, for germany and things german, can be only judgment and death." in such terms as these the oceanic allies could now state their war-will and carry the world straightway into a new phase of human history. they could but they do not. for alas! not one of them is free from the entanglements of past things; when we look for the wisdom of statesmen we find the cunning of politicians; when open speech and plain reason might save the world, courts, bureaucrats, financiers and profiteers conspire. vii the future of monarchy from the very outset of this war it was manifest to the clear-headed observer that only the complete victory of german imperialism could save the dynastic system in europe from the fate that it had challenged. that curious system had been the natural and unplanned development of the political complications of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. two systems of monarchies, the bourbon system and the german, then ruled europe between them. with the latter was associated the tradition of the european unity under the roman empire; all the germanic monarchs had an itch to be called caesar. the kaiser of the austro-hungarian empire and the czar had, so to speak, the prior claim to the title. the prussian king set up as a caesar in 1871; queen victoria became the caesar of india (kaisir-i-hind) under the auspices of lord beaconsfield, and last and least, that most detestable of all coburgers, ferdinand of bulgaria, gave kaiserism a touch of quaint absurdity by setting up as czar of bulgaria. the weakening of the bourbon system by the french revolution and the napoleonic adventure cleared the way for the complete ascendancy of the germanic monarchies in spite of the breaking away of the united states from that system. after 1871, a constellation of quasi-divine teutonic monarchs, of which the german emperor, the german queen victoria, the german czar, were the greatest stars, formed a caste apart, intermarried only among themselves, dominated the world and was regarded with a mystical awe by the ignorant and foolish in most european countries. the marriages, the funerals, the coronations, the obstetrics of this amazing breed of idols were matters of almost universal worship. the czar and queen victoria professed also to be the heads of religion upon earth. the court-centered diplomacies of the more firmly rooted monarchies steered all the great liberating movements of the nineteenth century into monarchical channels. italy was made a monarchy; greece, the motherland of republics, was handed over to a needy scion of the danish royal family; the sturdy peasants of bulgaria suffered from a kindred imposition. even norway was saddled with as much of a king as it would stand, as a condition of its independence. at the dawn of the twentieth century republican freedom seemed a remote dream beyond the confines of switzerland and france--and it had no very secure air in france. reactionary scheming has been an intermittent fever in the french republic for six and forty years. the french foreign office is still undemocratic in tradition and temper. but for the restless disloyalty of the hohenzollerns this german kingly caste might be dominating the world to this day. of course the stability of this teutonic dynastic system in europe--which will presently seem to the student of history so curious a halting-place upon the way to human unity--rested very largely upon the maintenance of peace. it was the failure to understand this on the part of the german and bulgarian rulers in particular that has now brought all monarchy to the question. the implicit theory that supported the intermarrying german royal families in europe was that their inter-relationship and their aloofness from their subjects was a mitigation of national and racial animosities. in the days when queen victoria was the grandmother of europe this was a plausible argument. king, czar and emperor, or emperor and emperor would meet, and it was understood that these meetings were the lubrication of european affairs. the monarchs married largely, conspicuously, and very expensively for our good. royal funerals, marriages, christenings, coronations, and jubilees interrupted traffic and stimulated trade everywhere. they seemed to give a _raison d'être_ for mankind. it is the emperor william and the czar ferdinand who have betrayed not only humanity but their own strange caste by shattering all these pleasant illusions. the wisdom of kant is justified, and we know now that kings cause wars. it needed the shock of the great war to bring home the wisdom of that old scotchman of königsberg to the mind of the ordinary man. moreover in support of the dynastic system was the fact that it did exist as the system in possession, and all prosperous and intelligent people are chary of disturbing existing things. life is full of vestigial structures, and it is a long way to logical perfection. let us keep on, they would argue, with what we have. and another idea which, rightly or wrongly, made men patient with the emperors and kings was an exaggerated idea of the insecurity of republican institutions. you can still hear very old dull men say gravely that "kings are better than pronunciamentos"; there was an article upon greece to this effect quite recently in that uncertain paper _the new statesman_. then a kind of illustrative gesture would be made to the south american republics, although the internal disturbances of the south american republics have diminished to very small dimensions in the last three decades and although pronunciamentos rarely disturb the traffic in switzerland, the united states, or france. but there can be no doubt that the influence of the germanic monarchy up to the death of queen victoria upon british thought was in the direction of estrangement from the two great modern republics and in the direction of assistance and propitiation to germany. we surrendered heligoland, we made great concessions to german colonial ambitions, we allowed ourselves to be jockeyed into a phase of dangerous hostility to france. a practice of sneering at things american has died only very recently out of english journalism and literature, as any one who cares to consult the bound magazines of the 'seventies and 'eighties may soon see for himself. it is well too in these days not to forget colonel marchand, if only to remember that such a clash must never recur. but in justice to our monarchy we must remember that after the death of queen victoria, the spirit, if not the forms, of british kingship was greatly modified by the exceptional character and ability of king edward vii. he was curiously anti-german in spirit; he had essentially democratic instincts; in a few precious years he restored good will between france and great britain. it is no slight upon his successor to doubt whether any one could have handled the present opportunities and risks of monarchy in great britain as edward could have handled them. because no doubt if monarchy is to survive in the british empire it must speedily undergo the profoundest modification. the old state of affairs cannot continue. the european dynastic system, based upon the intermarriage of a group of mainly german royal families, is dead to-day; it is freshly dead, but it is as dead as the rule of the incas. it is idle to close our eyes to this fact. the revolution in russia, the setting up of a republic in china, demonstrating the ripeness of the east for free institutions, the entry of the american republics into world politics--these things slam the door on any idea of working back to the old nineteenth-century system. people calls to people. "no peace with the hohenzollerns" is a cry that carries with it the final repudiation of emperors and kings. the man in the street will assure you he wants no diplomatic peace. beyond the unstable shapes of the present the political forms of the future rise now so clearly that they are the common talk of men. kant's lucid thought told us long ago that the peace of the world demanded a world union of republics. that is a commonplace remark now in every civilized community. the stars in their courses, the logic of circumstances, the everyday needs and everyday intelligence of men, all these things march irresistibly towards a permanent world peace based on democratic republicanism. the question of the future of monarchy is not whether it will be able to resist and overcome that trend; it has as little chance of doing that as the lama of thibet has of becoming emperor of the earth. it is whether it will resist openly, become the centre and symbol of a reactionary resistance, and have to be abolished and swept away altogether everywhere, as the romanoffs have already been swept away in russia, or whether it will be able in this country and that to adapt itself to the necessities of the great age that dawns upon mankind, to take a generous and helpful attitude towards its own modification, and so survive, for a time at any rate, in that larger air. it is the fashion for the apologists of monarchy in the british empire to speak of the british system as a crowned republic. that is an attractive phrase to people of republican sentiments. it is quite conceivable that the british empire may be able to make that phrase a reality and that the royal line may continue, a line of hereditary presidents, with some of the ancient trappings and something of the picturesque prestige that, as the oldest monarchy in europe, it has to-day. two kings in europe have already gone far towards realizing this conception of a life president; both the king of italy and the king of norway live as simply as if they were in the white house and are far more accessible. along that line the british monarchy must go if it is not to go altogether. will it go along those lines? there are many reasons for hoping that it will do so. the _times_ has styled the crown the "golden link" of the empire. australians and canadians, it was argued, had little love for the motherland but the greatest devotion to the sovereign, and still truer was this of indians, egyptians, and the like. it might be easy to press this theory of devotion too far, but there can be little doubt that the british crown does at present stand as a symbol of unity over diversity such as no other crown, unless it be that of austria-hungary, can be said to do. the british crown is not like other crowns; it may conceivably take a line of its own and emerge--possibly a little more like a hat and a little less like a crown--from trials that may destroy every other monarchial system in the world. now many things are going on behind the scenes, many little indications peep out upon the speculative watcher and vanish again; but there is very little that is definite to go upon at the present time to determine how far the monarchy will rise to the needs of this great occasion. certain acts and changes, the initiative to which would come most gracefully from royalty itself, could be done at this present time. they may be done quite soon. upon the doing of them wait great masses of public opinion. the first of these things is for the british monarchy to sever itself definitely from the german dynastic system, with which it is so fatally entangled by marriage and descent, and to make its intention of becoming henceforth more and more british in blood as well as spirit, unmistakably plain. this idea has been put forth quite prominently in the _times_. the king has been asked to give his countenance to the sweeping away of all those restrictions first set up by george the third, upon the marriage of the royal princes with british, french and american subjects. the british empire is very near the limit of its endurance of a kingly caste of germans. the choice of british royalty between its peoples and its cousins cannot be indefinitely delayed. were it made now publicly and boldly, there can be no doubt that the decision would mean a renascence of monarchy, a considerable outbreak of royalist enthusiasm in the empire. there are times when a king or queen must need be dramatic and must a little anticipate occasions. it is not seemly to make concessions perforce; kings may not make obviously unwilling surrenders; it is the indecisive kings who lose their crowns. no doubt the anglicization of the royal family by national marriages would gradually merge that family into the general body of the british peerage. its consequent loss of distinction might be accompanied by an associated fading out of function, until the king became at last hardly more functional than was the late duke of norfolk as premier peer. possibly that is the most desirable course from many points of view. it must be admitted that the abandonment of marriages within the royal caste and a bold attempt to introduce a strain of british blood in the royal family does not in itself fulfil all that is needed if the british king is indeed to become the crowned president of his people and the nominal and accepted leader of the movement towards republican institutions. a thing that is productive of an enormous amount of republican talk in great britain is the suspicion--i believe an ill-founded suspicion--that there are influences at work at court antagonistic to republican institutions in friendly states and that there is a disposition even to sacrifice the interests of the liberal allies to dynastic sympathies. these things are not to be believed, but it would be a feat of vast impressiveness if there were something like a royal and public repudiation of the weaknesses of cousinship. the behaviour of the allies towards that great balkan statesman venizelos, the sacrificing of the friendly greek republicans in favour of the manifestly treacherous king of greece, has produced the deepest shame and disgust in many quarters that are altogether friendly, that are even warmly "loyal" to the british monarchy. and in a phase of tottering thrones it is very undesirable that the british habit of asylum should be abused. we have already in england the dethroned monarch of a friendly republic; he is no doubt duly looked after. in the future there may be a shaking of the autumnal boughs and a shower of emperors and kings. we do not want great britain to become a hotbed of reactionary plotting and the starting-point of restoration raids into the territories of emancipated peoples. this is particularly desirable if presently, after the kaiser's death--which by all the statistics of hohenzollern mortality cannot be delayed now for many years--the present crown prince goes a-wandering. we do not want any german ex-monarchs; sweden is always open to them and friendly, and to sweden they ought to go; and particularly do british people dread an irruption of hohenzollerns or coburgers. almost as undesirable would be the arrival of the czar and czarina. it is supremely important that no wind of suspicion should blow between us and the freedom of russia. after the war even more than during the war will the enemy be anxious to sow discord between the great russian-speaking and english-speaking democracies. quite apart from the scandal of their inelegant domesticities, the establishment of the czar and czarina in england with frequent and easy access to our royal family may be extraordinarily unfortunate for the british monarchy. i will confess a certain sympathy for the czar myself. he is not an evil figure, he is not a strong figure, but he has that sort of weakness, that failure in decision, which trails revolution in its wake. he has ended one dynasty already. the british royal family owes it to itself, that he bring not the infection of his misfortunes to windsor. the security of the british monarchy lies in such a courageous severance of its destinies from the teutonic dynastic system. will it make that severance? there i share an almost universal ignorance. the loyalty of the british is not to what kings are too prone to call "my person," not to a chosen and admired family, but to a renascent mankind. we have fought in this war for belgium, for france, for general freedom, for civilization and the whole future of mankind, far more than for ourselves. we have not fought for a king. we are discovering in that spirit of human unity that lies below the idea of a league of free nations the real invisible king of our heart and race. but we will very gladly go on with our task under a nominal king unless he hampers us in the task that grows ever more plainly before us. ... that, i think, is a fair statement of british public opinion on this question. but every day when i am in london i walk past buckingham palace to lunch at my club, and i look at that not very expressive façade and wonder--and we all wonder--what thoughts are going on behind it and what acts are being conceived there. out of it there might yet come some gesture of acceptance magnificent enough to set beside president wilson's magnificent declaration of war. ... these are things in the scales of fate. i will not pretend to be able to guess even which way the scales will swing. viii the plain necessity for a league great as the sacrifices of prejudice and preconception which any effective realization of this idea of a league of free nations will demand, difficult as the necessary delegations of sovereignty must be, none the less are such sacrifices and difficulties unavoidable. people in france and italy and great britain and germany alike have to subdue their minds to the realization that some such league is now a necessity for them if their peace and national life are to continue. there is no prospect before them but either some such league or else great humiliation and disastrous warfare driving them down towards social dissolution; and for the united states it is only a question of a little longer time before the same alternatives have to be faced. whether this war ends in the complete defeat of germany and german imperialism, or in a revolutionary modernization of germany, or in a practical triumph for the hohenzollerns, are considerations that affect the nature and scope of the league, but do not affect its essential necessity. in the first two cases the league of free nations will be a world league including germany as a principal partner, in the latter case the league of free nations will be a defensive league standing steadfast against the threat of a world imperialism, and watching and restraining with one common will the homicidal maniac in its midst. but in all these cases there can be no great alleviation of the evils that now blacken and threaten to ruin human life altogether, unless all the civilized and peace-seeking peoples of the world are pledged and locked together under a common law and a common world policy. there must rather be an intensification of these evils. there must be wars more evil than this war continuing this war, and more destructive of civilized life. there can be no peace and hope for our race but an organized peace and hope, armed against disturbance as a state is armed against mad, ferocious, and criminal men. now, there are two chief arguments, running one into the other, for the necessity of merging our existing sovereignties into a greater and, if possible, a world-wide league. the first is the present geographical impossibility of nearly all the existing european states and empires; and the second is the steadily increasing disproportion between the tortures and destructions inflicted by modern warfare and any possible advantages that may arise from it. underlying both arguments is the fact that modern developments of mechanical science have brought the nations of europe together into too close a proximity. this present war, more than anything else, is a violent struggle between old political ideas and new antagonistic conditions. it is the unhappy usage of our schools and universities to study the history of mankind only during periods of mechanical unprogressiveness. the historical ideas of europe range between the time when the greeks were going about the world on foot or horseback or in galleys or sailing ships to the days when napoleon, wellington, and nelson were going about at very much the same pace in much the same vehicles and vessels. at the advent of steam and electricity the muse of history holds her nose and shuts her eyes. science will study and get the better of a modern disease, as, for example, sleeping sickness, in spite of the fact that it has no classical standing; but our history schools would be shocked at the bare idea of studying the effect of modern means of communication upon administrative areas, large or small. this defect in our historical training has made our minds politically sluggish. we fail to adapt readily enough. in small things and great alike we are trying to run the world in areas marked out in or before the eighteenth century, regardless of the fact that a man or an army or an aeroplane can get in a few minutes or a few hours to points that it would have taken days or weeks to reach under the old foot-and-horse conditions. that matters nothing to the learned men who instruct our statesmen and politicians. it matters everything from the point of view of social and economic and political life. and the grave fact to consider is that all the great states of europe, except for the unification of italy and germany, are still much of the size and in much the same boundaries that made them strong and safe in the eighteenth century, that is to say, in the closing years of the foot-horse period. the british empire grew and was organized under those conditions, and had to modify itself only a little to meet the needs of steam shipping. all over the world are its linked possessions and its ports and coaling stations and fastnesses on the trade routes. and british people still look at the red-splashed map of the world with the profoundest self-satisfaction, blind to the swift changes that are making that scattered empire--if it is to remain an isolated system--almost the most dangerous conceivable. let me ask the british reader who is disposed to sneer at the league of nations and say he is very well content with the empire, thank you, to get his atlas and consider one or two propositions. and, first, let him think of aviation. i can assure him, because upon this matter i have some special knowledge, that long-distance air travel for men, for letters and light goods and for bombs, is continually becoming more practicable. but the air routes that air transport will follow must go over a certain amount of land, for this reason that every few hundred miles at the longest the machine must come down for petrol. a flying machine with a safe non-stop range of 1500 miles is still a long way off. it may indeed be permanently impracticable because there seems to be an upward limit to the size of an aeroplane engine. and now will the reader take the map of the world and study the air routes from london to the rest of the empire? he will find them perplexing--if he wants them to be "all-red." happily this is not a british difficulty only. will he next study the air routes from paris to the rest of the french possessions? and, finally, will he study the air routes out of germany to anywhere? the germans are as badly off as any people. but we are all badly off. so far as world air transit goes any country can, if it chooses, choke any adjacent country. directly any trade difficulty breaks out, any country can begin a vexatious campaign against its neighbour's air traffic. it can oblige it to alight at the frontier, to follow prescribed routes, to land at specified places on those routes and undergo examinations that will waste precious hours. but so far as i can see, no european statesman, german or allied, have begun to give their attention to this amazing difficulty. without a great pooling of air control, either a world-wide pooling or a pooling at least of the atlantic-mediterranean allies in one air league, the splendid peace possibilities of air transport--and they are indeed splendid--must remain very largely a forbidden possibility to mankind. and as a second illustration of the way in which changing conditions are altering political questions, let the reader take his atlas and consider the case of that impregnable fastness, that great naval station, that key to the mediterranean, gibraltar. british boys are brought up on gibraltar and the gibraltar idea. to the british imagination gibraltar is almost as sacred a national symbol as the lions in trafalgar square. now, in his atlas the reader will almost certainly find an inset map of this valuable possession, coloured bright red. the inset map will have attached to it a small scale of miles. from that he will be able to satisfy himself that there is not an inch of the rock anywhere that is not within five miles or less of spanish land, and that there is rather more than a semicircle of hills round the rock within a range of seven or eight miles. that is much less than the range of a sixteen-inch gun. in other words, the spaniards are in a position to knock gibraltar to bits whenever they want to do so, or to smash and sink any ships in its harbour. they can hit it on every side. consider, moreover, that there are long sweeps of coast north, south, and west of the rock, from which torpedoes could be discharged at any ship that approached. inquire further where on the rock an aeroplane can land. and having ascertained these things, ask yourself what is the present value of gibraltar? i will not multiply disagreeable instances of this sort, though it would be easy enough to do so in the case both of france and italy as well as of great britain. i give them as illustrations of the way in which everywhere old securities and old arrangements must be upset by the greater range of modern things. let us get on to more general conditions. there is not a capital city in europe that twenty years from now will not be liable to a bombing raid done by hundreds or even thousands of big aeroplanes, upon or even before a declaration of war, and there is not a line of sea communication that will not be as promptly interrupted by the hostile submarine. i point these things out here only to carry home the fact that the ideas of sovereign isolation and detachment that were perfectly valid in 1900, the self-sufficient empire, imperial zollverein and all that stuff, and damn the foreigner! are now, because of the enormous changes in range of action and facility of locomotion that have been going on, almost as wild--or would be if we were not so fatally accustomed to them--and quite as dangerous, as the idea of setting up a free and sovereign state in the isle of dogs. all the european empires are becoming vulnerable at every point. surely the moral is obvious. the only wise course before the allied european powers now is to put their national conceit in their pockets and to combine to lock up their foreign policy, their trade interests, and all their imperial and international interests into a league so big as to be able to withstand the most sudden and treacherous of blows. and surely the only completely safe course for them and mankind--hard and nearly impossible though it may seem at the present juncture--is for them to lock up into one unity with a democratized germany and with all the other states of the earth into one peace-maintaining league. if the reader will revert again to his atlas he will see very clearly that a strongly consolidated league of free nations, even if it consisted only of our present allies, would in itself form a combination with so close a system of communication about the world, and so great an economic advantage, that in the long run it could oblige germany and the rest of the world to come in to its council. divided the oceanic allies are, to speak plainly, geographical rags and nakedness; united they are a world. to set about organizing that league now, with its necessary repudiation on the part of britain, france, and italy, of a selfish and, it must be remembered in the light of these things i have but hinted at here, a _now hopelessly unpracticable imperialism_, would, i am convinced, lead quite rapidly to a great change of heart in germany and to a satisfactory peace. but even if i am wrong in that, then all the stronger is the reason for binding, locking and uniting the allied powers together. it is the most dangerous of delusions for each and all of them to suppose that either britain, france or italy can ever stand alone again and be secure. and turning now to the other aspect of these consequences of the development of material science, it is too often assumed that this war is being as horrible and destructive as war can be. there never was so great a delusion. this war has only begun to be horrible. no doubt it is much more horrible and destructive than any former war, but even in comparison with the full possibilities of known and existing means of destruction it is still a mild war. perhaps it will never rise to its full possibilities. at the present stage there is not a combatant, except perhaps america, which is not now practising a pinching economy of steel and other mechanical material. the germans are running short of first-class flying men, and if we and our allies continue to press the air attack, and seek out and train our own vastly greater resources of first quality young airmen, the germans may come as near to being "driven out of the air" as is possible. i am a firmer believer than ever i was in the possibility of a complete victory over germany--through and by the air. but the occasional dropping of a big bomb or so in london is not to be taken as anything but a minimum display of what air war can do. in a little while now our alliance should be in a position to commence day and night continuous attacks upon the rhine towns. not hour-long raids such as london knows, but week-long raids. then and then only shall we be able to gauge the really horrible possibilities of the air war. they are in our hands and not in the hands of the germans. in addition the germans are at a huge disadvantage in their submarine campaign. their submarine campaign is only the feeble shadow of what a submarine campaign might be. turning again to the atlas the reader can see for himself that the german and austrian submarines are obliged to come out across very narrow fronts. a fence of mines less than three hundred miles long and two hundred feet deep would, for example, completely bar their exit through the north sea. the u-boats run the gauntlet of that long narrow sea and pay a heavy toll to it. if only our admiralty would tell the german public what that toll is now, there would come a time when german seamen would no longer consent to go down in them. consider, however, what a submarine campaign would be for great britain if instead of struggling through this bottle-neck it were conducted from the coast of norway, where these pests might harbour in a hundred fiords. consider too what this weapon may be in twenty years' time in the hands of a country in the position of the united states. great britain, if she is not altogether mad, will cease to be an island as soon as possible after the war, by piercing the channel tunnel--how different our transport problem would be if we had that now!--but such countries as australia, new zealand, and japan, directly they are involved in the future in a war against any efficient naval power with an unimpeded sea access, will be isolated forthwith. i cannot conceive that any of the great ocean powers will rest content until such a tremendous possibility of blockade as the submarine has created is securely vested in the hands of a common league beyond any power of sudden abuse. it must always be remembered that this war is a mechanical war conducted by men whose discipline renders them uninventive, who know little or nothing of mechanism, who are for the most part struggling blindly to get things back to the conditions for which they were trained, to napoleonic conditions, with infantry and cavalry and comparatively light guns, the so-called "war of manoeuvres." it is like a man engaged in a desperate duel who keeps on trying to make it a game of cricket. most of these soldiers detest every sort of mechanical device; the tanks, for example, which, used with imagination, might have given the british and french overwhelming victory on the western front, were subordinated to the usual cavalry "break through" idea. i am not making any particular complaint against the british and french generals in saying this. it is what must happen to any country which entrusts its welfare to soldiers. a soldier has to be a severely disciplined man, and a severely disciplined man cannot be a versatile man, and on the whole the british army has been as receptive to novelties as any. the german generals have done no better; indeed, they have not done so well as the generals of the allies in this respect. but after the war, if the world does not organize rapidly for peace, then as resources accumulate a little, the mechanical genius will get to work on the possibilities of these ideas that have merely been sketched out in this war. we shall get big land ironclads which will smash towns. we shall get air offensives--let the experienced london reader think of an air raid going on hour after hour, day after day--that will really burn out and wreck towns, that will drive people mad by the thousand. we shall get a very complete cessation of sea transit. even land transit may be enormously hampered by aerial attack. i doubt if any sort of social order will really be able to stand the strain of a fully worked out modern war. we have still, of course, to feel the full shock effects even of this war. most of the combatants are going on, as sometimes men who have incurred grave wounds will still go on for a time--without feeling them. the educational, biological, social, economic punishment that has already been taken by each of the european countries is, i feel, very much greater than we yet realize. russia, the heaviest and worst-trained combatant, has indeed shown the effects and is down and sick, but in three years' time all europe will know far better than it does now the full price of this war. and the shock effects of the next war will have much the same relation to the shock effects of this, as the shock of breaking a finger-nail has to the shock of crushing in a body. in russia to-day we have seen, not indeed social revolution, not the replacement of one social order by another, but disintegration. let not national conceit blind us. germany, france, italy, britain are all slipping about on that same slope down which russia has slid. which goes first, it is hard to guess, or whether we shall all hold out to some kind of peace. at present the social discipline of france and britain seems to be at least as good as that of germany, and the _morale_ of the rhineland and bavaria has probably to undergo very severe testing by systematized and steadily increasing air punishment as this year goes on. the next war--if a next war comes--will see all germany, from end to end, vulnerable to aircraft.... such are the two sets of considerations that will, i think, ultimately prevail over every prejudice and every difficulty in the way of the league of free nations. existing states have become impossible as absolutely independent sovereignties. the new conditions bring them so close together and give them such extravagant powers of mutual injury that they must either sink national pride and dynastic ambitions in subordination to the common welfare of mankind or else utterly shatter one another. it becomes more and more plainly a choice between the league of free nations and a famished race of men looting in search of non-existent food amidst the smouldering ruins of civilization. in the end i believe that the common sense of mankind will prefer a revision of its ideas of nationality and imperialism, to the latter alternative. it may take obstinate men a few more years yet of blood and horror to learn this lesson, but for my own part i cherish an obstinate belief in the potential reasonableness of mankind. ix democracy all the talk, all the aspiration and work that is making now towards this conception of a world securely at peace, under the direction of a league of free nations, has interwoven with it an idea that is often rather felt than understood, the idea of democracy. not only is justice to prevail between race and race and nation and nation, but also between man and man; there is to be a universal respect for human life throughout the earth; the world, in the words of president wilson, is to be made "safe for democracy." i would like to subject that word to a certain scrutiny to see whether the things we are apt to think and assume about it correspond exactly with the feeling of the word. i would like to ask what, under modern conditions, does democracy mean, and whether we have got it now anywhere in the world in its fulness and completion. and to begin with i must have a quarrel with the word itself. the eccentricities of modern education make us dependent for a number of our primary political terms upon those used by the thinkers of the small greek republics of ancient times before those petty states collapsed, through sheer political ineptitude, before the macedonians. they thought in terms of states so small that it was possible to gather all the citizens together for the purposes of legislation. these states were scarcely more than what we english might call sovereign urban districts. fast communications were made by runners; even the policeman with a bicycle of the modern urban district was beyond the scope of the greek imagination. there were no railways, telegraphs, telephones, books or newspapers, there was no need for the state to maintain a system of education, and the affairs of the state were so simple that they could be discussed and decided by the human voice and open voting in an assembly of all the citizens. that is what democracy, meant. in andorra, or perhaps in canton uri, such democracy may still be possible; in any other modern state it cannot exist. the opposite term to it was oligarchy, in which a small council of men controlled the affairs of the state. oligarchy, narrowed down to one man, became monarchy. if you wished to be polite to an oligarchy you called it an aristocracy; if you wished to point out that a monarch was rather by way of being self-appointed, you called him a tyrant. an oligarchy with a property qualification was a plutocracy. now the modern intelligence, being under a sort of magic slavery to the ancient greeks, has to adapt all these terms to the problems of states so vast and complex that they have the same relation to the greek states that the anatomy of a man has to the anatomy of a jellyfish. they are not only greater in extent and denser in population, but they are increasingly innervated by more and more rapid means of communication and excitement. in the classical past--except for such special cases as the feeding of rome with egyptian corn--trade was a traffic in luxuries or slaves, war a small specialized affair of infantry and horsemen in search of slaves and loot, and empire the exaction of tribute. the modern state must conduct its enormous businesses through a system of ministries; its vital interests go all round the earth; nothing that any ancient greek would have recognized as democracy is conceivable in a great modern state. it is absolutely necessary, if we are to get things clear in our minds about what democracy really means in relation to modern politics, first to make a quite fresh classification in order to find what items there really are to consider, and then to inquire which seem to correspond more or less closely in spirit with our ideas about ancient democracy. now there are two primary classes of idea about government in the modern world depending upon our conception of the political capacity of the common man. we may suppose he is a microcosm, with complete ideas and wishes about the state and the world, or we may suppose that he isn't. we may believe that the common man can govern, or we may believe that he can't. we may think further along the first line that he is so wise and good and right that we only have to get out of his way for him to act rightly and for the good of all mankind, or we may doubt it. and if we doubt that we may still believe that, though perhaps "you can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time," the common man, expressing himself by a majority vote, still remains the secure source of human wisdom. but next, while we may deny this universal distribution of political wisdom, we may, if we are sufficiently under the sway of modern ideas about collective psychology, believe that it is necessary to poke up the political indifference and inability of the common man as much as possible, to thrust political ideas and facts upon him, to incite him to a watchful and critical attitude towards them, and above all to secure his assent to the proceedings of the able people who are managing public affairs. or finally, we may treat him as a thing to be ruled and not consulted. let me at this stage make out a classificatory diagram of these elementary ideas of government in a modern country. class i. it is supposed that the common man _can_ govern: (1) without further organization (anarchy); (2) through a majority vote by delegates. class ii. it is supposed that the common man _cannot_ govern, and that government therefore must be through the agency of able persons who may be classified under one of the following sub-heads, either as (1) persons elected by the common man because he believes them to be persons able to govern--just as he chooses his doctors as persons able to secure health, and his electrical engineers as persons able to attend to his tramways, lighting, etc., etc.; (2) persons of a special class, as, for example, persons born and educated to rule (e.g. _aristocracy_), or rich business adventurers _(plutocracy)_ who rule without consulting the common man at all. to which two sub-classes we may perhaps add a sort of intermediate stage between them, namely: (3) persons elected by a special class of voter. monarchy may be either a special case of class ii.(1), (2) or (3), in which the persons who rule have narrowed down in number to one person, and the duration of monarchy may be either for life or a term of years. these two classes and the five sub-classes cover, i believe, all the elementary political types in our world. now in the constitution of a modern state, because of the conflict and confusion of ideas, all or most of these five sub-classes may usually be found intertwined. the british constitution, for instance, is a complicated tangle of arrangements, due to a struggle between the ideas of class i.(2), class ii.(3), tending to become class ii.(1) and class ii.(2) in both its aristocratic and monarchist forms. the american constitution is largely dominated by class i.(2), from which it breaks away in the case of the president to a short-term monarchist aspect of class ii.(1). i will not elaborate this classification further. i have made it here in order to render clear first, that what we moderns mean by democracy is not what the greeks meant at all, that is to say, direct government by the assembly of all the citizens, and secondly and more important, that the word "democracy" is being used very largely in current discussion, so that it is impossible to say in any particular case whether the intention is class i.(2) or class ii.(1), and that we have to make up our minds whether we mean, if i may coin two phrases, "delegate democracy" or "selective democracy," or some definite combination of these two, when we talk about "democracy," before we can get on much beyond a generous gesture of equality and enfranchisement towards our brother man. the word is being used, in fact, confusingly for these two quite widely different things. now, it seems to me that though there has been no very clear discussion of the issue between those two very opposite conceptions of democracy, largely because of the want of proper distinctive terms, there has nevertheless been a wide movement of public opinion away from "delegate democracy" and towards "selective democracy." people have gone on saying "democracy," while gradually changing its meaning from the former to the latter. it is notable in great britain, for example, that while there has been no perceptible diminution in our faith in democracy, there has been a growing criticism of "party" and "politicians," and a great weakening in the power and influence of representatives and representative institutions. there has been a growing demand for personality and initiative in elected persons. the press, which was once entirely subordinate politically to parliamentary politics, adopts an attitude towards parliament and party leaders nowadays which would have seemed inconceivable insolence in the days of lord palmerston. and there has been a vigorous agitation in support of electoral methods which are manifestly calculated to subordinate "delegated" to "selected" men. the movement for electoral reform in great britain at the present time is one of quite fundamental importance in the development of modern democracy. the case of the reformers is that heretofore modern democracy has not had a fair opportunity of showing its best possibilities to the world, because the methods of election have persistently set aside the better types of public men, or rather of would-be public men, in favour of mere party hacks. that is a story common to britain and the american democracies, but in america it was expressed in rather different terms and dealt with in a less analytical fashion than it has been in great britain. it was not at first clearly understood that the failure of democracy to produce good government came through the preference of "delegated" over "selected" men, the idea of delegation did in fact dominate the minds of both electoral reformers and electoral conservatives alike, and the earlier stages of the reform movement in great britain were inspired not so much by the idea of getting a better type of representative as by the idea of getting a fairer representation of minorities. it was only slowly that the idea that sensible men do not usually belong to any political "party" took hold. it is only now being realized that what sensible men desire in a member of parliament is honour and capacity rather than a mechanical loyalty to a "platform." they do not want to dictate to their representative; they want a man they can trust as their representative. in the fifties and sixties of the last century, in which this electoral reform movement began and the method of proportional representation was thought out, it was possible for the reformers to work untroubled upon the assumption that if a man was not necessarily born a "... little liber-al, or else a little conservative," he must at least be a liberal-unionist or a conservative free-trader. but seeking a fair representation for party minorities, these reformers produced a system of voting at once simple and incapable of manipulation, that leads straight, not to the representation of small parties, but to a type of democratic government by selected best men. before giving the essential features of that system, it may be well to state in its simplest form the evils at which the reform aims. an election, the reformers point out, is not the simple matter it appears to be at the first blush. methods of voting can be manipulated in various ways, and nearly every method has its own liability to falsification. we may take for illustration the commonest, simplest case--the case that is the perplexity of every clear-thinking voter under british or american conditions--the case of a constituency in which every elector has one vote, and which returns one representative to parliament. the naive theory on which people go is that all the possible candidates are put up, that each voter votes for the one he likes best, and that the best man wins. the bitter experience is that hardly ever are there more than two candidates, and still more rarely is either of these the best man possible. suppose, for example, the constituency is mainly conservative. a little group of pothouse politicians, wire-pullers, busybodies, local journalists, and small lawyers, working for various monetary interests, have "captured" the local conservative organization. they have time and energy to capture it, because they have no other interest in life except that. it is their "business," and honest men are busy with other duties. for reasons that do not appear these local "workers" put up an unknown mr. goldbug as the official conservative candidate. he professes a generally conservative view of things, but few people are sure of him and few people trust him. against him the weaker (and therefore still more venal) liberal organization now puts up a mr. kentshire (formerly wurstberg) to represent the broader thought and finer generosities of the english mind. a number of conservative gentlemen, generally too busy about their honest businesses to attend the party "smokers" and the party cave, realize suddenly that they want goldbug hardly more than they want wurstberg. they put up their long-admired, trusted, and able friend mr. sanity as an independent conservative. every one knows the trouble that follows. mr. sanity is "going to split the party vote." the hesitating voter is told, with considerable truth, that a vote given for mr. sanity is a vote given for wurstberg. at any price the constituency does not want wurstberg. so at the eleventh hour mr. sanity is induced to withdraw, and mr. goldbug goes into parliament to misrepresent this constituency. and so with most constituencies, and the result is a legislative body consisting largely of men of unknown character and obscure aims, whose only credential is the wearing of a party label. they come into parliament not to forward the great interests they ostensibly support, but with an eye to the railway jobbery, corporation business, concessions and financial operations that necessarily go on in and about the national legislature. that in its simplest form is the dilemma of democracy. the problem that has confronted modern democracy since its beginning has not really been the representation of organized minorities--they are very well able to look after themselves--but _the protection of the unorganized mass of busily occupied, fairly intelligent men from the tricks of the specialists who work the party machines_. we know mr. sanity, we want mr. sanity, but we are too busy to watch the incessant intrigues to oust him in favour of the obscurely influential people, politically docile, who are favoured by the organization. we want an organizer-proof method of voting. it is in answer to this demand, as the outcome of a most careful examination of the ways in which voting may be protected from the exploitation of those who _work_ elections, that the method of proportional representation with a single transferable vote has been evolved. it is organizer-proof. it defies the caucus. if you do not like mr. goldbug you can put up and vote for mr. sanity, giving mr. goldbug your second choice, in the most perfect confidence that in any case your vote cannot help to return mr. wurstberg. with proportional representation with a single transferable vote (this specification is necessary, because there are also the inferior imitations of various election-riggers figuring as proportional representation), it is _impossible to prevent the effective candidature of independent men of repute beside the official candidates_. the method of voting under the proportional representation system has been ignorantly represented as complex. it is really almost ideally simple. you mark the list of candidates with numbers in the order of your preference. for example, you believe a to be absolutely the best man for parliament; you mark him 1. but b you think is the next best man; you mark him 2. that means that if a gets an enormous amount of support, ever so many more votes than he requires for his return, your vote will not be wasted. only so much of your vote as is needed will go to a; the rest will go to b. or, on the other hand, if a has so little support that his chances are hopeless, you will not have thrown your vote away upon him; it will go to b. similarly you may indicate a third, a fourth, and a fifth choice; if you like you may mark every name on your paper with a number to indicate the order of your preferences. and that is all the voter has to do. the reckoning and counting of the votes presents not the slightest difficulty to any one used to the business of computation. silly and dishonest men, appealing to still sillier audiences, have got themselves and their audiences into humorous muddles over this business, but the principles are perfectly plain and simple. let me state them here; they can be fully and exactly stated, with various ornaments, comments, arguments, sarcastic remarks, and digressions, in seventy lines of this type. it will be evident that, in any election under this system, any one who has got a certain proportion of no. 1 votes will be elected. if, for instance, five people have to be elected and 20,000 voters vote, then any one who has got 4001 first votes or more _must_ be elected. 4001 votes is in that case enough to elect a candidate. this sufficient number of votes is called the _quota_, and any one who has more than that number of votes has obviously got more votes than is needful for election. so, to begin with, the voting papers are classified according to their first votes, and any candidates who have got more than a quota of first votes are forthwith declared elected. but most of these elected men would under the old system waste votes because they would have too many; for manifestly a candidate who gets more than the quota of votes _needs only a fraction of each of these votes to return him_. if, for instance, he gets double the quota he needs only half each vote. he takes that fraction, therefore, under this new and better system, and the rest of each vote is entered on to no. 2 upon that voting paper. and so on. now this is an extremely easy job for an accountant or skilled computer, and it is quite easily checked by any other accountant and skilled computer. a reader with a bad arithmetical education, ignorant of the very existence of such a thing as a slide rule, knowing nothing of account keeping, who thinks of himself working out the resultant fractions with a stumpy pencil on a bit of greasy paper in a bad light, may easily think of this transfer of fractions as a dangerous and terrifying process. it is, for a properly trained man, the easiest, exactest job conceivable. the cash register people will invent machines to do it for you while you wait. what happens, then, is that every candidate with more than a quota, beginning with the top candidate, sheds a traction of each vote he has received, down the list, and the next one sheds his surplus fraction in the same way, and so on until candidates lower in the list, who are at first below the quota, fill up to it. when all the surplus votes of the candidates at the head of the list have been disposed of, then the hopeless candidates at the bottom of the list are dealt with. the second votes on their voting papers are treated as whole votes and distributed up the list, and so on. it will be plain to the quick-minded that, towards the end, there will be a certain chasing about of little fractions of votes, and a slight modification of the quota due to voting papers having no second or third preferences marked upon them, a chasing about that it will be difficult for an untrained intelligence to follow. _but untrained intelligences are not required to follow it_. for the skilled computer these things offer no difficulty at all. and they are not difficulties of principle but of manipulation. one might as well refuse to travel in a taxicab until the driver had explained the magneto as refuse to accept the principle of proportional representation by the single transferable vote until one had remedied all the deficiencies of one's arithmetical education. the fundamental principle of the thing, that a candidate who gets more votes than he wants is made to hand on a fraction of each vote to the voter's second choice, and that a candidate whose chances are hopeless is made to hand on the whole vote to the voter's second choice, so that practically only a small number of votes are ineffective, is within the compass of the mind of a boy of ten. but simple as this method is, it completely kills the organization and manipulation of voting. it completely solves the goldbug-wurstbergsanity problem. it is knave-proof--short of forging, stealing, or destroying voting papers. a man of repute, a leaderly man, may defy all the party organizations in existence and stand beside and be returned over the head of a worthless man, though the latter be smothered with party labels. that is the gist of this business. the difference in effect between proportional representation and the old method of voting must ultimately be to change the moral and intellectual quality of elected persons profoundly. people are only beginning to realize the huge possibilities of advance inherent in this change of political method. it means no less than a revolution from "delegate democracy" to "selective democracy." now, i will not pretend to be anything but a strong partizan in this matter. when i speak of "democracy" i mean "selective democracy." i believe that "delegate democracy" is already provably a failure in the world, and that the reason why to-day, after three and a half years of struggle, we are still fighting german autocracy and fighting with no certainty of absolute victory, is because the affairs of the three great atlantic democracies have been largely in the hands not of selected men but of delegated men, men of intrigue and the party machine, of dodges rather than initiatives, second-rate men. when lord haldane, defending his party for certain insufficiencies in their preparation for the eventuality of the great war, pleaded that they had no "mandate" from the country to do anything of the sort, he did more than commit political suicide, he bore conclusive witness against the whole system which had made him what he was. neither britain nor france in this struggle has produced better statesmen nor better generals than the german autocracy. the british and french foreign offices are old monarchist organizations still. to this day the british and french politicians haggle and argue with the german ministers upon petty points and debating society advantages, smart and cunning, while the peoples perish. the one man who has risen to the greatness of this great occasion, the man who is, in default of any rival, rapidly becoming the leader of the world towards peace, is neither a delegate politician nor the choice of a monarch and his councillors. he is the one authoritative figure in these transactions whose mind has not been subdued either by long discipline in the party machine or by court intrigue, who has continued his education beyond those early twenties when the mind of the "budding politician" ceases to expand, who has thought, and thought things out, who is an educated man among dexterous under-educated specialists. by something very like a belated accident in the framing of the american constitution, the president of the united states is more in the nature of a selected man than any other conspicuous figure at the present time. he is specially elected by a special electoral college after an elaborate preliminary selection of candidates by the two great party machines. and be it remembered that mr. wilson is not the first great president the united states have had, he is one of a series of figures who tower over their european contemporaries. the united states have had many advantageous circumstances to thank for their present ascendancy in the world's affairs: isolation from militarist pressure for a century and a quarter, a vast virgin continent, plenty of land, freedom from centralization, freedom from titles and social vulgarities, common schools, a real democratic spirit in its people, and a great enthusiasm for universities; but no single advantage has been so great as this happy accident which has given it a specially selected man as its voice and figurehead in the world's affairs. in the average congressman, in the average senator, as ostrogorski's great book so industriously demonstrated, the united states have no great occasion for pride. neither the senate nor the house of representatives seem to rise above the level of the british houses of parliament, with a government unable to control the rebel forces of ulster, unable to promote or dismiss generals without an outcry, weakly amenable to the press, and terrifyingly incapable of great designs. it is to the united states of america we must look now if the world is to be made "safe for democracy." it is to the method of selection, as distinguished from delegation, that we must look if democracy is to be saved from itself. x the recent struggle for proportional representation in great britain british political life resists cleansing with all the vigour of a dirty little boy. it is nothing to your politician that the economic and social organization of all the world, is strained almost to the pitch of collapse, and that it is vitally important to mankind that everywhere the whole will and intelligence of the race should be enlisted in the great tasks of making a permanent peace and reconstructing the shattered framework of society. these are remote, unreal considerations to the politician. what is the world to him? he has scarcely heard of it. he has been far too busy as a politician. he has been thinking of smart little tricks in the lobby and brilliant exploits at question time. he has been thinking of jobs and appointments, of whether mr. asquith is likely to "come back" and how far it is safe to bank upon l. g. his one supreme purpose is to keep affairs in the hands of his own specialized set, to keep the old obscure party game going, to rig his little tricks behind a vast, silly camouflage of sham issues, to keep out able men and disinterested men, the public mind, and the general intelligence, from any effective interference with his disastrous manipulations of the common weal. i do not see how any intelligent and informed man can have followed the recent debates in the house of commons upon proportional representation without some gusts of angry contempt. they were the most pitiful and alarming demonstration of the intellectual and moral quality of british public life at the present time. from the wire-pullers of the fabian society and from the party organizers of both liberal and tory party alike, and from the knowing cards, the pothouse shepherds, and jobbing lawyers who "work" the constituencies, comes the chief opposition to this straightening out of our electoral system so urgently necessary and so long overdue. they have fought it with a zeal and efficiency that is rarely displayed in the nation's interest. from nearly every outstanding man outside that little inner world of political shams and dodges, who has given any attention to the question, comes, on the other hand, support for this reform. even the great party leaders, mr. balfour and mr. asquith, were in its favour. one might safely judge this question by considering who are the advocates on either side. but the best arguments for proportional representation arise out of its opponents' speeches, and to these i will confine my attention now. consider lord harcourt--heir to the most sacred traditions of the party game--hurling scorn at a project that would introduce "faddists, mugwumps," and so on and so on--in fact independent thinking men--into the legislature. consider the value of lord curzon's statement that london "rose in revolt" against the project. do you remember that day, dear reader, when the streets of london boiled with passionate men shouting, "no proportional representation! down with proportional representation"? you don't. nor do i. but what happened was that the guinea-pigs and solicitors and nobodies, the party hacks who form the bulk of london's misrepresentation in the house of commons, stampeded in terror against a proposal that threatened to wipe them out and replace them by known and responsible men. london, alas! does not seem to care how its members are elected. what londoner knows anything about his member? hundreds of thousands of londoners do not even know which of the ridiculous constituencies into which the politicians have dismembered our london they are in. only as i was writing this in my flat in st. james's court, westminster, did it occur to me to inquire who was representing me in the councils of the nation while i write.... after some slight difficulty i ascertained that my representative is a mr. burdett coutts, who was, in the romantic eighties, mr. ashmead-bartlett. and by a convenient accident i find that the other day he moved to reject the proportional representation amendment made by the house of lords to the representation of the people bill, so that i am able to look up the debate in hansard and study my opinions as he represented them and this question at one and the same time. and, taking little things first, i am proud and happy to discover that the member for me was the only participator in the debate who, in the vulgar and reprehensible phrase, "threw a dead cat," or, in polite terms, displayed classical learning. my member said, "_timeo danaos et dona ferentes_," with a rather graceful compliment to the labour conference at nottingham. "i could not help thinking to myself," said my member, "that at that conference there must have been many men of sufficient classical reading to say to themselves, '_timeo danaos et dona ferentes_.'" in which surmise he was quite right. except perhaps for "_tempus fugit,"_ "_verbum sap._," "_arma virumque_," and "_quis custodiet_," there is no better known relic of antiquity. but my member went a little beyond my ideas when he said: "we are asked to enter upon a method of legislation which can bear no other description than that of law-making in the dark," because i think it can bear quite a lot of other descriptions. this was, however, the artistic prelude to a large, vague, gloomy dissertation about nothing very definite, a muddling up of the main question with the minor issue of a schedule of constituencies involved in the proposal. the other parts of my member's speech do not, i confess, fill me with the easy confidence i would like to feel in my proxy. let me extract a few gems of eloquence from the speech of this voice which speaks for me, and give also the only argument he advanced that needs consideration. "history repeats itself," he said, "very often in curious ways as to facts, but generally with very different results." that, honestly, i like. it is a sentence one can read over several times. but he went on to talk of the entirely different scheme for minority representation, which was introduced into the reform bill of 1867, and there i am obliged to part company with him. that was a silly scheme for giving two votes to each voter in a three-member constituency. it has about as much resemblance to the method of scientific voting under discussion as a bath-chair has to an aeroplane. "but that measure of minority representation led to a baneful invention," my representative went on to say, "and left behind it a hateful memory in the birmingham caucus. i well remember that when i stood for parliament thirty-two years ago _we had no better platform weapon than repeating over and over again in a sentence the name of mr. schnadhorst,_ and i am not sure that it would not serve the same purpose now. under that system the work of the caucus was, of course, far simpler than it will be if this system ever comes into operation. all the caucus had to do under that measure was to divide the electors into three groups and with three candidates, a., b., and c., to order one group to vote for a. and b., another for b. and c., and the third for a. and c., and they carried the whole of their candidates and kept them for many years. but the multiplicity of ordinal preferences, second, third, fourth, fifth, up to tenth, which the single transferable vote system would involve, will require a more scientific handling in party interests, and neither party will be able to face an election with any hope of success without the assistance of the most drastic form of caucus and _without its orders being carried out by the electors_." now, i swear by heaven that, lowly creature as i am, a lost vote, a nothing, voiceless and helpless in public affairs, i am not going to stand the imputation that that sort of reasoning represents the average mental quality of westminster--outside parliament, that is. most of my neighbours in st. james's court, for example, have quite large pieces of head above their eyebrows. read these above sentences over and ponder their significance--so far as they have any significance. never mind my keen personal humiliation at this display of the mental calibre of my representative, but consider what the mental calibre of a house must be that did not break out into loud guffaws at such a passage. the line of argument is about as lucid as if one reasoned that because one can break a window with a stone it is no use buying a telescope. and it remains entirely a matter for speculation whether my member is arguing that a caucus _can_ rig an election carried on under the proportional representation system or that it cannot. at the first blush it seems to read as if he intended the former. but be careful! did he? let me suggest that in that last sentence he really expresses the opinion that it cannot. it can be read either way. electors under modern conditions are not going to obey the "orders" of even the "most drastic caucus"--whatever a "drastic caucus" may be. why should they? in the birmingham instance it was only a section of the majority, voting by wards, in an election on purely party lines, which "obeyed" in order to keep out the minority party candidate. i think myself that my member's mind waggled. perhaps his real thoughts shone out through an argument not intended to betray them. what he did say as much as he said anything was that under proportional representation, elections are going to be very troublesome and difficult for party candidates. if that was his intention, then, after all, i forgive him much. i think that and more than that. i think that they are going to make party candidates who are merely party candidates impossible. that is exactly what we reformers are after. then i shall get a representative more to my taste than mr. burdett coutts. but let me turn now to the views of other people's representatives. perhaps the most damning thing ever said against the present system, damning because of its empty absurdity, was uttered by sir thomas whittaker. he was making the usual exaggerations of the supposed difficulties of the method. he said english people didn't like such "complications." they like a "straight fight between two men." think of it! a straight fight! for more than a quarter-century i have been a voter, usually with votes in two or three constituencies, and never in all that long political life have i seen a single straight fight in an election, but only the dismallest sham fights it is possible to conceive. thrice only in all that time have i cast a vote for a man whom i respected. on all other occasions the election that mocked my citizenship was either an arranged walk-over for one party or the other, or i had a choice between two unknown persons, mysteriously selected as candidates by obscure busy people with local interests in the constituency. every intelligent person knows that this is the usual experience of a free and independent voter in england. the "fight" of an ordinary parliamentary election in england is about as "straight" as the business of a thimble rigger. and consider just what these "complications" are of which the opponents of proportional representation chant so loudly. in the sham election of to-day, which the politicians claim gives them a mandate to muddle up our affairs, the voter puts a x against the name of the least detestable of the two candidates that are thrust upon him. under the proportional representation method there will be a larger constituency, a larger list of candidates, and a larger number of people to be elected, and he will put i against the name of the man he most wants to be elected, 2 against his second choice, and if he likes he may indulge in marking a third, or even a further choice. he may, if he thinks fit, number off the whole list of candidates. that is all he will have to do. that is the stupendous intricacy of the method that flattens out the minds of lord harcourt and sir thomas whittaker. and as for the working of it, if you must go into that, all that happens is that if your first choice gets more votes than he needs for his return, he takes only the fraction of your vote that he requires, and the rest of the vote goes on to your number 2. if 2 isn't in need of all of it, the rest goes on to 3. and so on. that is the profound mathematical mystery, that is the riddle beyond the wit of westminster, which overpowers these fine intelligences and sets them babbling of "senior wranglers." each time there is a debate on this question in the house, member after member hostile to the proposal will play the ignorant fool and pretend to be confused himself, and will try to confuse others, by deliberately clumsy statements of these most elementary ideas. surely if there were no other argument for a change of type in the house, these poor knitted brows, these public perspirations of the gentry who "cannot understand p.r.," should suffice. but let us be just; it is not all pretence; the inability of mr. austen chamberlain to grasp the simple facts before him was undoubtedly genuine. he followed mr. burdett coutts, in support of mr. burdett coutts, with the most christian disregard of the nasty things mr. burdett coutts had seemed to be saying about the birmingham caucus from which he sprang. he had a childish story to tell of how voters would not give their first votes to their real preferences, because they would assume he "would get in in any case"--god knows why. of course on the assumption that the voter behaves like an idiot, anything is possible. and never apparently having heard of fractions, this great birmingham leader was unable to understand that a voter who puts 1 against a candidate's name votes for that candidate anyhow. he could not imagine any feeling on the part of the voter that no. 1 was his man. a vote is a vote to this simple rather than lucid mind, a thing one and indivisible. read this-"birmingham," he said, referring to a schedule under consideration, "is to be cut into three constituencies of four members each. i am to have a constituency of 100,000 electors, i suppose. how many thousand inhabitants i do not know. _every effort will be made to prevent any of those electors knowing--in fact, it would be impossible for any of them to know--whether they voted for me or not, or at any rate whether they effectively voted for me or not, or whether the vote which they wished to give to me was really diverted to somebody else_." only in a house of habitually inattentive men could any one talk such nonsense without reproof, but i look in vain through hansard's record of this debate for a single contemptuous reference to mr. chamberlain's obtuseness. and the rest of his speech was a lamentable account of the time and trouble he would have to spend upon his constituents if the new method came in. he was the perfect figure of the parochially important person in a state of defensive excitement. no doubt his speech appealed to many in the house. of course lord harcourt was quite right in saying that the character of the average house of commons member will be changed by proportional representation. it will. it will make the election of obscure and unknown men, of carpet-bag candidates who work a constituency as a hawker works a village, of local pomposities and village-pump "leaders" almost impossible. it will replace such candidates by better known and more widely known men. it will make the house of commons so much the more a real gathering of the nation, so much the more a house of representative men. (lord harcourt's "faddists and mugwumps.") and it is perfectly true as mr. ramsay macdonald (also an opponent) declares, that proportional representation means constituencies so big that it will be impossible for a poor man to cultivate and work them. that is unquestionable. but, mark another point, it will also make it useless, as mr. chamberlain has testified, for rich men to cultivate and work them. all this cultivating and working, all this going about and making things right with this little jobber here, that contractor there, all the squaring of small political clubs and organizations, all the subscription blackmail and charity bribery, that now makes a parliamentary candidature so utterly rotten an influence upon public life, will be killed dead by proportional representation. you cannot job men into parliament by proportional representation. proportional representation lets in the outsider. it lets in the common, unassigned voter who isn't in the local clique. that is the clue to nearly all this opposition of the politicians. it makes democracy possible for the first time in modern history. and that poor man of mr. ramsay macdonald's imagination, instead of cadging about a constituency in order to start politician, will have to make good in some more useful way--as a leader of the workers in their practical affairs, for example--before people will hear of him and begin to believe in him. the opposition to proportional representation of mr. sidney webb and his little circle is a trifle more "scientific" in tone than these naive objections of the common run of antagonist, but underlying it is the same passionate desire to keep politics a close game for the politician and to bar out the politically unspecialized man. there is more conceit and less jobbery behind the criticisms of this type of mind. it is an opposition based on the idea that the common man is a fool who does not know what is good for him. so he has to be stampeded. politics, according to this school, is a sort of cattle-driving. the webbites do not deny the broad facts of the case. our present electoral system, with our big modern constituencies of thousands of voters, leads to huge turnovers of political power with a relatively small shifting of public opinion. it makes a mock of public opinion by caricature, and parliament becomes the distorting mirror of the nation. under some loud false issue a few score of thousands of votes turn over, and in goes this party or that with a big sham majority. this the webbites admit. but they applaud it. it gives us, they say, "a strong government." public opinion, the intelligent man outside the house, is ruled out of the game. he has no power of intervention at all. the artful little fabian politicians rub their hands and say, "_now_ we can get to work with the wires! no one can stop us." and when the public complains of the results, there is always the repartee, "_you_ elected them." but the fabian psychology is the psychology of a very small group of pedants who believe that fair ends may be reached by foul means. it is much easier and more natural to serve foul ends by foul means. in practice it is not tricky benevolence but tricky bargaining among the interests that will secure control of the political wires. that is a bad enough state of affairs in ordinary times, but in times of tragic necessity like the present men will not be mocked in this way. life is going to be very intense in the years ahead of us. if we go right on to another caricature parliament, with perhaps half a hundred leading men in it and the rest hacks and nobodies, the baffled and discontented outsiders in the streets may presently be driven to rioting and the throwing of bombs. unless, indeed, the insurrection of the outsiders takes a still graver form, and the press, which has ceased entirely to be a party press in great britain, helps some adventurous prime minister to flout and set aside the lower house altogether. there is neither much moral nor much physical force behind the house of commons at the present time. the argument of the fabian opponents to proportional representation is frankly that the strongest government is got in a house of half a hundred or fewer leading men, with the rest of the parliament driven sheep. but the whole mischief of the present system is that the obscure members of parliament are not sheep; they are a crowd of little-minded, second-rate men just as greedy and eager and self-seeking as any of us. they vote straight indeed on all the main party questions, they obey their whips like sheep then; but there is a great bulk of business in parliament outside the main party questions, and obedience is not without its price. these are matters vitally affecting our railways and ships and communications generally, the food and health of the people, armaments, every sort of employment, the appointment of public servants, the everyday texture of all our lives. then the nobody becomes somebody, the party hack gets busy, the rat is in the granary.... in these recent debates in the house of commons one can see every stock trick of the wire-puller in operation. particularly we have the old dodge of the man who is "in theory quite in sympathy with proportional representation, but ..." it is, he declares regretfully, too late. it will cause delay. difficult to make arrangements. later on perhaps. and so on. it is never too late for a vital issue. upon the speedy adoption of proportional representation depends, as mr. balfour made plain in an admirable speech, whether the great occasions of the peace and after the peace are to be handled by a grand council of all that is best and most leaderlike in the nation, or whether they are to be left to a few leaders, apparently leading, but really profoundly swayed by the obscure crowd of politicians and jobbers behind them. are the politicians to hamper and stifle us in this supreme crisis of our national destinies or are we british peoples to have a real control of our own affairs in this momentous time? are men of light and purpose to have a voice in public affairs or not? proportional representation is supremely a test question. it is a question that no adverse decision in the house of commons can stifle. there are too many people now who grasp its importance and significance. every one who sets a proper value upon purity in public life and the vitality of democratic institutions will, i am convinced, vote and continue to vote across every other question against the antiquated, foul, and fraudulent electoral methods that have hitherto robbed democracy of three-quarters of its efficiency. xi the study and propaganda of democracy in the preceding chapter i have dealt with the discussion of proportional representation in the british house of commons in order to illustrate the intellectual squalor amidst which public affairs have to be handled at the present time, even in a country professedly "democratic." i have taken this one discussion as a sample to illustrate the present imperfection of our democratic instrument. all over the world, in every country, great multitudes of intelligent and serious people are now inspired by the idea of a new order of things in the world, of a world-wide establishment of peace and mutual aid between nation and nation and man and man. but, chiefly because of the elementary crudity of existing electoral methods, hardly anywhere at present, except at washington, do these great ideas and this world-wide will find expression. amidst the other politicians and statesmen of the world president wilson towers up with an effect almost divine. but it is no ingratitude to him to say that he is not nearly so exceptional a being among educated men as he is among the official leaders of mankind. everywhere now one may find something of the wilson purpose and intelligence, but nearly everywhere it is silenced or muffled or made ineffective by the political advantage of privileged or of violent and adventurous inferior men. he is "one of us," but it is his good fortune to have got his head out of the sack that is about the heads of most of us. in the official world, in the world of rulers and representatives and "statesmen," he almost alone, speaks for the modern intelligence. this general stifling of the better intelligence of the world and its possible release to expression and power, seems to me to be the fundamental issue underlying all the present troubles of mankind. we cannot get on while everywhere fools and vulgarians hold the levers that can kill, imprison, silence and starve men. we cannot get on with false government and we cannot get on with mob government; we must have right government. the intellectual people of the world have a duty of co-operation they have too long neglected. the modernization of political institutions, the study of these institutions until we have worked out and achieved the very best and most efficient methods whereby the whole community of mankind may work together under the direction of its chosen intelligences, is the common duty of every one who has a brain for the service. and before everything else we have to realize this crudity and imperfection in what we call "democracy" at the present time. democracy is still chiefly an aspiration, it is a spirit, it is an idea; for the most part its methods are still to seek. and still more is this "league of free nations" as yet but an aspiration. let us not underrate the task before us. only the disinterested devotion of hundreds of thousands of active brains in school, in pulpit, in book and press and assembly can ever bring these redeeming conceptions down to the solid earth to rule. all round the world there is this same obscuration of the real intelligence of men. in germany, human good will and every fine mind are subordinated to political forms that have for a mouthpiece a chancellor with his brains manifestly addled by the theories of _welt-politik_ and the bismarckian tradition, and for a figurehead a mad kaiser. nevertheless there comes even from germany muffled cries for a new age. a grinning figure like a bloodstained punch is all that speaks for the best brains in bulgaria. yes. we western allies know all that by heart; but, after all, the immediate question for each one of us is, "_what speaks for me?_" so far as official political forms go i myself am as ineffective as any right-thinking german or bulgarian could possibly be. i am more ineffective than a galician pole or a bohemian who votes for his nationalist representative. politically i am a negligible item in the constituency of this mr. burdett coutts into whose brain we have been peeping. politically i am less than a waistcoat button on that quaint figure. and that is all i am--except that i revolt. i have written of it so far as if it were just a joke. but indeed bad and foolish political institutions cannot be a joke. sooner or later they prove themselves to be tragedy. this war is that. it is yesterday's lazy, tolerant, "sense of humour" wading out now into the lakes of blood it refused to foresee. it is absurd to suppose that anywhere to-day the nationalisms, the suspicions and hatreds, the cants and policies, and dead phrases that sway men represent the current intelligence of mankind. they are merely the evidences of its disorganization. even now we _know_ we could do far better. give mankind but a generation or so of peace and right education and this world could mock at the poor imaginations that conceived a millennium. but we have to get intelligences together, we have to canalize thought before it can work and produce its due effects. to that end, i suppose, there has been a vast amount of mental activity among us political "negligibles." for my own part i have thought of the idea of god as the banner of human unity and justice, and i have made some tentatives in that direction, but men, i perceive, have argued themselves mean and petty about religion. at the word "god" passions bristle. the word "god" does not unite men, it angers them. but i doubt if god cares greatly whether we call him god or no. his service is the service of man. this double idea of the league of free nations, linked with the idea of democracy as universal justice, is free from the jealousy of the theologians and great enough for men to unite upon everywhere. i know how warily one must reckon with the spite of the priest, but surely these ideas may call upon the teachers of all the great world religions for their support. the world is full now of confused propaganda, propaganda of national ideas, of traditions of hate, of sentimental and degrading loyalties, of every sort of error that divides and tortures and slays mankind. all human institutions are made of propaganda, are sustained by propaganda and perish when it ceases; they must be continually explained and re-explained to the young and the negligent. and for this new world of democracy and the league of free nations to which all reasonable men are looking, there must needs be the greatest of all propagandas. for that cause every one must become a teacher and a missionary. "persuade to it and make the idea of it and the necessity for it plain," that is the duty of every school teacher, every tutor, every religious teacher, every writer, every lecturer, every parent, every trusted friend throughout the world. for it, too, every one must become a student, must go on with the task of making vague intentions into definite intentions, of analyzing and destroying obstacles, of mastering the ten thousand difficulties of detail.... i am a man who looks now towards the end of life; fifty-one years have i scratched off from my calendar, another slips by, and i cannot tell how many more of the sparse remainder of possible years are really mine. i live in days of hardship and privation, when it seems more natural to feel ill than well; without holidays or rest or peace; friends and the sons of my friends have been killed; death seems to be feeling always now for those i most love; the newspapers that come in to my house tell mostly of blood and disaster, of drownings and slaughterings, of cruelties and base intrigues. yet never have i been so sure that there is a divinity in man and that a great order of human life, a reign of justice and world-wide happiness, of plenty, power, hope, and gigantic creative effort, lies close at hand. even now we have the science and the ability available for a universal welfare, though it is scattered about the world like a handful of money dropped by a child; even now there exists all the knowledge that is needed to make mankind universally free and human life sweet and noble. we need but the faith for it, and it is at hand; we need but the courage to lay our hands upon it and in a little space of years it can be ours. the end. ways of war and peace by delia austrian stanhope-dodge publishing company u. s. a. larchmont, n. y. 1914 copyright 1914 by delia austrian this book is dedicated to my mother with whom i have enjoyed much of the beauty and charm of europe and also, unfortunately, have seen the honors and sorrows of war contents page foreword 9 students' hostel in paris 21 paris, past and present 28 how would you like to be a refugee? 35 what mobilization means 79 the price of war and the price of peace 96 some questions answered as to the causes of the war 105 what the world-war will mean to womankind 114 ask your american friends how it feels to be without money 125 what the queen of holland is doing to preserve peace 138 what royal women are doing while their husbands are at war 144 what will the royal children do if their parents are put out of business? 151 william ii at close range 157 king george v, head of the allies 171 two russian cities 182 christmas without a santa claus 196 foreword as i advance in years i look upon life as a good deal of a paradox; at times it seems to be a mass of contradictions of love and hate, of friendship and enmity, of truths and falsehoods, of war and peace. in the same flash of time countries are throttling others; other nations are straining themselves not only to soften the hardships created by an international war, but to help feed, care for and dry the tears made by the havoc of slaughter. a most striking instance of this statement happened a few days before the outbreak of the war. through a mutual friend, while in bavaria, i learned that miss anna eckstein, an american woman, who has devoted her life to the world's peace movement was visiting her home in coburg saxe-weimar. it was a short distance from where i was staying, and i asked miss eckstein if she would come to me. the answer to my invitation was that much as she would love to see me we should have to defer our meeting to some other time. she was starting to make a tour of the rhine cities, where she was going to give important talks on the work that was being done to encourage the world's peace. this would take most of her time until the early fall, when she was going to a peace congress in vienna. she said that i might help her by forming two local centers in chicago for the signing of many petitions pledging ourselves for the peace idea platform. i had not much more than read this letter and put the petitions away for safekeeping when the word came that the great war was declared. time and again during the storm and stress of war this incident appeared as the greatest of paradoxes. here was a young woman who has consecrated her life, her talents, energy and friendships for the purpose of making the idea of world peace more than a chimera. her efforts have failed for the time being, because monarchs and statesmen, goaded on by a foolish idea for stronger empires and more possessions, had thrown their nations against each other, resulting in the most cruel and disastrous upheaval of modern times. many of the world's nations are hurling their tremendous armies with their siege-guns, bombs, mines, air-crafts, submarines and navies at each other. awful and tremendous are these gigantic masses of destruction. what they accomplish or fail to accomplish will be forgotten when the work of such women as miss anna eckstein and baroness von suttner are inscribed in glory. it was merely by chance i had the pleasure of meeting these two brilliant women at the time of the world's peace congress at the hague. miss eckstein had come as a delegate from america bringing petitions of three million names, signed by american men and women, including many of the foremost professors, students, writers, artists, capitalists and workers in all lines of industry. though born in germany, she had come to america because she realized that our country believes in peace more than it does in war. for many years she worked entirely with the peace movement in boston. but she soon saw the need of educating the young people to the ideals and principles of peace. she made a campaign of this country, talking from pulpits and platforms on what the peace idea and ideal would mean for society the world over. this educational campaign was interrupted for a short time when miss eckstein went to take the american petitions to the hague. she attended the round-table talks, afternoon teas and receptions, where time and again she showed that war, besides being futile was the most reckless extravagance of modern times. the cost of feeding and supporting a soldier would keep a child in school; the cost of a siege-gun would pay for the building of a school house, and the building of a battleship would give a country a new university. she showed them time and again that besides suffering, war meant the destruction of a nation's best manhood. it is the strong and energetic and the brilliant minds that are picked for soldiers. it is the weak and old men along with women and children that usually survive to suffer the hardships and the heartaches made possible by war. it was at one of these international receptions that i had the pleasure of hearing miss eckstein express some such ideas. she spoke of the work of the hague tribunal, and had such confidence in the sincerity of the governments and their representatives that she thought any question of vital importance might be settled there rather than that rulers should enchain civilization and throw nations to the dogs of war. later, through a foundation by mr. edwin ginn, the publisher of boston, miss eckstein went to europe for the purpose of preaching the gospel of peace. she talked in schools, theatres and concert halls before large audiences composed of school teachers, and school children, government officials and working people. but her chief purpose was to educate the school children in the larger, more wholesome ideas of peace. some of the most spacious and handsomest halls in germany were put at her disposal, and some of the most influential german officials presided at her meetings. she was equally well received, and was welcomed with the same enthusiasm in france, italy, england and the north countries. she hoped to carry this propaganda into japan, india and africa. at the same time she was working to carry a petition of thirty million names, signed in all parts of europe and the united states, to the hague. this stupendous work was almost finished when the war broke out. it was at the hague that i first heard bertha von suttner, a well-known austrian writer and lecturer. she became world-famous as the author of "lay down your arms," which won for her the nobel peace prize. her theme at the hague was "combatting dueling in germany." she told of the way the sons of officers and of the aristocracy at an early age were instructed to look upon dueling as an important part of their education. the more cuts, the more glory, for it was splendid experience for the more terrible combat of war. a deep gash in a man's face made him better looking, for it showed that he had plenty of courage. she was gathering a strong petition signed by men and women of many nationalities against this wicked pastime. it was a few years later, in chicago, that i heard bertha von suttner speak on the war in the balkans. she explained that it was only a small spark in a greater conflagration. it was being patched up, not settled, and unless the united states used her persuasive and moral influence these issues would burst forth in an international conflagration. this prediction has become a reality, though baroness von suttner did not live to see the day. for many years america has had a large national peace society. though it originated in boston its members were composed of men and women living in all parts of the united states. besides promulgating a philosophy of peace, through congresses and pamphlets, its delegates have gone to all the important european congresses. this organization was instrumental in influencing the united states to intercede in the russo-japanese war; it was instrumental in making the hague tribunal a well-organized body. it inspired carnegie to give to the hague congress a building as beautiful as the ideals and purposes of the congress were noble and just. many of our greatest american statesmen and scholars have combatted peace measures and advocated stronger armies and navies. other men of prominence in all parties have striven to keep our country in friendly relations with other powers, making treaties a worthy substitute for strong, military forces. on the other hand there are those who say that the only way to safeguard our country is to have a navy and army in keeping with its size and dignity. our present army and navy mark us as a second-rate power. there are just as many thinking men and women who say that if a man carries a loaded revolver it is bound to go off some day. it may be justly used in self-defense, but it is more than likely to injure an innocent person. mr. bryan's recommendation of treaties backed up by a year of consideration when differences take place is considered a safer method. these are all steps in the right direction, but they must be extended if this is to be the last war of any real importance that the world shall ever see. all action is based on thought, and much of our wrong acting of today is based on wrong thinking. there will always be different nationalities, just as there are various languages, religions, political parties and economic views. only a fool can say that french is a better language than italian or german. only the narrow-minded will say that the protestant religion is better than the catholic or jewish faiths. the same is true of nations. the french, the english, and the german all have their just place. the french lead the world in making certain articles better than all other countries. in certain other articles we must look for superiority to the germans, while for others to england and the united states. the time has come when national jealousies must give place to internationalism. when the interests of all the countries must be greater than the interest of any one country. there is an energy and competition that is to be recognized as healthy and praiseworthy and necessary, and there is a hectic energy based on envy that is short-sighted. we are so interdependent these days that few things can happen in one corner of the world but before night it is heralded to the other end. a great war cannot be waged on one continent but many of its bad effects are felt upon the others. it is foolish to believe that the time will come when nations can carry out their work and plans without having their differences. nations always have had and shall continue to have differences. but these shall be settled as amicably as they are between individuals. just as there are courts and judges to listen to individual grievances, so there must be an international court and judges to settle international disputes and nations, like individuals, shall be forced to abide by their decisions. for nations must be trained to understand that the interests of humanity are greater than the interests of any one people. until they can accept this point of view, naturally they should be assisted by international courts and by an international army and navy to enforce the decisions of such a court. work must be constructive, for there is not enough money and natural resources in the world that so much shall be squandered for any such extravagant pastime as war. there is a moral force and conscience in the world, no less than in heaven. the noble, unselfish work done by bertha von suttner and anna eckstein are evidences of this fact. the hague tribunal is also an expression of the same ideal. internationalism is higher than nationalism, and must be the platform of civilization. but to make peace work and internationalism more than a byeword they must be backed by an international court with its lawyers and judges and its decisions protected by an international army and navy to enforce the decisions agreed upon by the different nations and their representatives. there were few men in america who did more for the peace work of this country than dr. edward everett hale. as edwin d. mead says of him, "he stood for citizenship, he stood for education, he stood for international peace and friendship. we called him in the later years of his life the nestor of our peace cause in america." he made his church a temple of that cause. he said there should be no modern church which did not have among its regular standing committees a committee on international justice, and such a committee he founded in this church. baroness von suttner and baron d'estournelles de constant both occupied his pulpit. dr. hale worked extremely hard to organize a boston committee on international justice. dr. hale and anna eckstein were the two fountains of inspiration for edwin ginn, of boston. life had taught him that real riches and power only have value as they work for social uplift. he was sure of this after he met miss eckstein and saw the great work and effort she was expending to promote ideas of peace in the schools of this country and abroad. she influenced him to set aside one million dollars; the income of the money was to be used for this purpose. he was so impressed by her work that he asked her to give all of her time to educating the teachers and children in europe as well as in our country in the ideas of peace. dr. hale was his other great inspiration in all the great peace ideas. his first address in behalf of the peace cause was made at mohonk lake, at one of the mohonk conferences in international arbitration, and there his last address was made. his first address was made in 1901, although mr. ginn was present at the mohonk conference as a listener in 1897 and 1899. in 1901 he gave his first address, and he confessed that dr. hale had influenced him greatly in this work. in this talk he said that modern wars are due to mutual distrust on the part of the nations and great armaments. this distrust can only be removed by education and the right kind of co-operation. the great menace is the enormous armaments. the tremendous armies and monstrous navies have become far more a provocation and danger than a defense. he told the people at the mohonk conference: "we are confronted by the military class, the war power, with unlimited resources of wealth and men, and we can never overcome these obstacles except as we perfect a great organization to meet them. it will not do to leave this work to be done by a few. an adequate counteracting influence could not be exerted simply by men who could give to the cause only shreds and patches of their time. we must make this a well-organized crusade; there must be men devoted to the cause, as sumner, garrison and phillips were devoted to the cause of anti-slavery: men who would give all their time to it. and the cause must have a financial backing such as it had never had before. i should like to see a fund of one million dollars established before we marshal our forces. we spend hundreds of millions a year for war; can we not afford to spend one million for peace?" he soon afterward gave fifty thousand a year for this work, and a million bequeathed for the cause at his death. he welcomed norman angell's great work, called "the great illusion," which brought home to the business men of the world the futility of war. he was also a friend and admirer of samuel b. capen, the head of one of the two chief boston peace societies. mr. capen was president of the massachusetts peace society, and also a trustee of the world foundation. it was as a representative of the world peace foundation that mr. capen went on his journey around the world. edwin d. mead is also one of the great pioneers in america's earnest effort that has worked incessantly for international peace. he was at one of the peace congresses in europe when the war broke out. he has been one of the prime movers of the boston peace society, and president of the organization. he has attended most of the important congresses in this country and in europe. it was also through his efforts that a branch of the national peace movement was founded in chicago. students' hostel in paris among the many pleasant reminiscences of paris, few are nearer to americans than the students' hostel. this home was founded by a number of wealthy american and english women. it was started because art students and pupils of music had long felt the need of proper protection in paris. this need was compelled for two reasons--the good hotels in paris are expensive and they do not give the home life necessary to students in a foreign country. to this end the students' hostel was founded. it began in a simple way, and it took several years of experimenting to put it on a sure foundation. the club was started as a lunchroom for american business women. here they came and had luncheons at reasonable prices and found a place to rest. before long the place was inadequate, and the young women's christian association, aided by a number of wealthy american women and a few english women, bought out this place with the idea of enlarging it. they had no sooner taken the place over when they discovered that the building was inadequate for their plans. they searched paris for the right sort of accommodations, and were about to give up in despair when they found a large, roomy building in the boulevard st. michael. they negotiated with the owner, and after offering liberal inducements the building became their own. it was some time before they were enabled to take possession of the place, as the entire building had to be remodeled. it was only by chance that i came upon this organization one day in july, walking home from the sorbonne. the name "students' hostel," written on a large poster placed at the gate, attracted my attention and i rang the doorbell. the door was soon opened by a maid, who explained to me that the "students' hostel" was a hotel for american and english girls studying in paris. i asked if i might speak to the secretary, and i was led up one flight of stairs to an attractive office. miss richards welcomed me in a kindly voice, saying, "we are always glad to meet american girls. i shall be pleased to explain to you the purpose of our work. this is a hotel, not a charitable organization, though it was founded through the aid of wealthy american and english women. we hope to make this hotel self-supporting in a few years, though it could not be accomplished in the beginning. we have more than a hundred girls living here. the greater part are studying french in the sorbonne, though a few are devoting their time to the study of painting and music. "most of the girls who come here are delighted with our arrangements, for they enjoy all of the independence of a hotel and the comforts and the social life found in the home. they may come for the entire winter or stay a week, as they like. all we demand are letters of introduction from two people of influence and from the minister of the church which they attend. three dollars and fifty cents per week is the price set on a room, though a girl may have more luxurious apartments if she wishes. a dollar and a half more pays the weekly board, while we have spacious bathrooms where baths may be had for ten cents. every day at four o'clock tea is served in the tea-house during the winter months, and in the gardens when the weather permits. this is given without extra charge. "in order to make the hostel as serviceable as possible to all, a fee of one dollar a year is set as membership. this entitles a girl to the use of the library, to take advantage of the french conversations held and to attend all the weekly entertainments. there is no limitation put on creed, excepting that the girls who live in the home are expected to attend sunday afternoon services held here and prayer-meeting once a week. they pass their evenings as they think best--studying, reading, listening to lectures, and enjoying splendid concerts given in our home by well-known artists." when this explanation was ended, i was shown through the home. the first room entered was the dining-hall. the room was filled with many small tables covered with snow-white linen and dainty china. a girl could not have wished for more in her own home. across the hall was a small room with a comfortable lounge, called the rest-room, where girls can retire to rest after meal hours, or when they come home from their day's study. but the real rest-room is the library, furnished with plenty of lounges and large easy-chairs. the bookcases contain more than five hundred english and foreign books. some of these were bought with money raised by private entertainments. but the greater number were given through donation parties by friends invited to come and spend the evening in the students' hostel, some form of entertainment being prepared for them. the price of admission was a book they had read and were willing to donate to the library. the secretary explained: "the first time we ventured on one of these donation parties we questioned the results, but our friends are so generous in supplying us with books that hardly a winter goes by without our having one of these with results that have far exceeded our expectations. "several nights in the week there are lectures given by well-known writers and scientists; some of these are only free to the boarders of the hostel; to others, friends are invited. weekly concerts are given. the programs are made up by professionals and students of the hostel who are studying music. one evening a week and thursday afternoon are set aside for receptions, when the secretary and the students receive their friends. "the second floor is given over to bedrooms. it would be difficult to find more attractive bedrooms in any american college. the rooms are large and well lighted, decorated with artistic wall paper and curtains to match. one part of the room is filled with a couch, used as a place of rest by day and a bed at night. the rest of the furnishings of the rooms include student's table, a lamp and several comfortable chairs. the remainder of the furnishing is done by the students themselves. many of the walls are hung with gay posters, banners, and photographs of friends. most of the girls have only one room, though a few who are studying music find the sitting-room necessary. before leaving miss richards, i inquired who were the women who had done most to make this delightful home possible. she answered that would be hard to say, as there have been many, and some do not care to have their work known. it was only after i pressed the question a second time that she answered, "well, i suppose miss hoff is the american girls' best friend in paris. helen gould (i do not know her married name) has always given our home warm support, and last year when she traveled in italy she established a students' hostel in rome. but one thing i wish you would tell our girls at home. that this is a hotel and not a charitable organization, and a woman who stops here need not feel she is sacrificing her spirit of self-reliance and independence. all we try to offer is a comfortable home at prices within the reach of most american girls who come over to study in paris. we make an effort to do two other things; to try to give the right protection so necessary to girls who live in the french capital alone, and comradeship we all need when living in a foreign land. five dollars a week is what a girl must count on to live here. "besides home and board, we have french classes for our girls conducted by able instructors for a small tuition; these teachers give private lessons, and when it is desired to coach girls for their examinations in the sorbonne. "the students of music are not neglected. certain hours of the day are set aside for practicing. we have weekly concerts at home and make an effort to get reduced rates for our girls when any of the great halls offer concerts that are worth while. "yes, we are trying to do much for our girls who come here to study painting. many of them wish to live in the latin quarter and they find it really impossible to obtain the comforts that they are used to at home. here they can enjoy the art student's life and have protection. many discover that they are not ready to enter the ecole des beaux arts; as for the large studios, they do not always offer enough individual attention for the student. for these we have a large, well-built studio of our own, where classes are conducted by some of the best masters of paris." before leaving the hostel i was invited into a garden gay with roses and carnations and the merry voices of happy girls. they were gathered in little groups, drinking tea, chatting french, and discussing the work they had accomplished that day. a pretty american girl approached me, saying, "will you have tea, bread and butter?" in a few minutes she brought me tea on a pretty chinese tray. we laughed and chatted in turn, telling of our work and aspirations. as we sat in the beautiful twilight of that summer day we never dreamed that paris would be threatened in a few weeks and the students' hostel, so dear to american artists and students, would become deserted. paris, past and present i hate to think of paris in a sombre tone, for paris likes to be gay at all times. it is the natural tempo of the city, for whatever may be the follies of this parisian capital, she is always beautiful, lively and gay. her large, wide boulevards are now deserted, except for an occasional regiment of french and english troops that hurry along, or now and then an auto-car speeding up the boulevard carrying some high officials on an important mission. most of the fine shops in the avenue de l'opera and the rue de la paix are closed and heavily shuttered while their handsome stock of pearls and other jewels, fine dresses and furs, are hidden in vaults and put away in packing trunks. even at noontime, when the streets are usually thronged with the working-girls hurrying to their luncheon or out for a half an hour's exercise, the streets are deserted except for the appearance of some tired-looking shopgirl trying to earn a few cents in spite of present conditions. the beautiful hotels, always crowded this time of the year, are empty except for a few americans who are lingering, waiting for a boat to take them home. the large cafã©s on the boulevard are all closed. it is only the small tea-rooms and bars that dare hope for any business. the smart people who live out near the bois have heard too much about german zeppelins to venture out on a beautiful day, and forbid their nurses taking the children into the park. it is only the poorer people in the latin quarter who insist in taking their children in the beautiful gardens of the luxembourg for an airing. as night falls, the people gather in crowds to watch the skies. they have let their imaginations dwell so long on zeppelins and bombs that many imagine they see these awful implements of war when they are watching harmless stars. at the other end of the city, they gather round the eiffel tower, which now bears the highest artillery in the world. here are placed immense machine guns. up at montmartre, the people gather in little circles to read the letters they have received from their soldier boys and to discuss the possibility of paris being captured. they have forgotten all about their once lively dance-halls and cabarets. there are but few artists left in this quarter now, for they have either gone home or to the front, while the women and children amuse themselves reading the last extra or listening to an organ-grinder giving them many patriotic airs for a few sous. how lonely and sad these vacant streets and boulevards look, contrasted with their appearance on the 15th of july, which is france's national holiday. then there was dancing on nearly every street corner, made livelier by the throwing of confetti, careless laughter and much kissing. the queen of beauty ruled then, while now havoc and the cruelties of war are in supremacy. except for a few soldiers and officers moving up and down in the bois, that splendid park is quite deserted. the famous cafã©s, such as madrid and armoneville, have closed their doors. it is hard to imagine that these restaurants were visited by no less than five thousand people during an afternoon of the races. less than two months ago, the great markets of paris were crowded with country people hurrying in with their carts, horses and mules. in a short time they had distributed their splendid supply of meats, vegetables, fruits, flowers and small merchandise without and within. by seven o'clock the place was crowded with women of all social classes and wealth. now the great crowds have dwindled, for the markets only display the barest necessities and the women only come and buy as they actually need them. it is said that thousands of women have been thrown out of employment, for more than sixty per cent. of the women in paris were working women. no sooner had war been declared than most of the small shops closed their doors and this threw hundreds of women out of work. a few of the leading dressmaking establishments carried their main business over to london, but they could not give employment to all their people. a few of the large stores kept open for a while, but soon their men were called to the front and so their business did not pay. i wonder what has become of the great numbers of designers and artists who were dependent on foreign purchase for their livelihood? occasionally a pale, haggard girl passes by, as though she was seeking employment in a designer's studio or in an artist's atelier. but business is at a standstill and there is only employment for a very few out of many. the flower markets which always made paris so attractive have vanished, even the famous flower market in front of the madeleine. it is only an occasional old woman who has the courage to try to earn a few pennies by selling roses or lilies of the valley. the streets lack all energy, even in the afternoon, when there is so much energy in paris. the women have neither the courage nor the money to start off on any shopping trips. the french women now appear in simple attire and are limiting their shopping to the few things they need. many have been deprived of their large incomes, are managing to do their own housework and are looking after their children, while those who can still afford things are busy working for the red cross, visiting the hospitals and _craches_. even more deserted is the latin quarter with the sorbonne called the medicine and at the ecole des beaux arts. usually at this time of the year they are busy with their annual house-cleaning preparatory to receiving the many students that come from america, england, poland, russia and germany. their doors are closed so tightly this year they certainly will not be opened. the gaiety of the latin quarter is now a thing of the past. a few soldiers sipping their coffee out of doors is a commonplace picture for the gay-hearted artists that once promenaded the street with their pretty models and coquettes. there is now no dancing nor merry-making up at montmartre, the real artists' quarter. the streets are now so deserted they are excellent dens for thieves and robbers, for gone are even the venders with their push-carts who made a noise as they hawked their wares. even the museums and picture galleries are closed, and the only public buildings left open are those being used for military purposes. the few women and children seen on the street look frightened and worried. any jar or noise seems to promise danger. sunday is like any other day, except that crowds of people hurry to the madeleine or notre dame to beg for peace or for war to be over. all the stalls on the seine are closed and the strand is vacant except for the soldiers that patrol up and down. all the cab-drivers left in paris are either old men or women who find it hard to earn a few francs a day. the country looks almost as deserted. many a beautiful farm has gone to waste because there is no one to look after the harvest. still, the women and children are doing their level best working on the farms and doing all they can to save their vegetables and grain. many of the vineyards have been trampled on by regiments of soldiers and most of the lovely champagne country is ruined. the hardest blow of all was the news that the famous cathedral at rheims had been destroyed and all the famous buildings had either been laid in ruins or seriously damaged. the cathedral is supposed to have the finest rose window left in france and it was considered the finest piece of gothic architecture. it was in this cathedral that charles the tenth was crowned and that the lovely maid of orleans saw the coronation of charles vii which marked the fulfillment of her vision. the beautiful church of saint jacques has commemorated her life in beautiful stained glass windows, while the museum, rich in treasures that memorialize her life, has also been destroyed. it is not therefore to be wondered at that the poor french people who love their country so well are brokenhearted as they look out on the approaching night, wondering what will happen next. how would you like to be a refugee? how would you like to be a refugee for four weeks, fleeing from the horrors and hardships of war? how would you like to be cut off all this time by mail and cable from relatives and friends? how would you like to be many thousand miles from home, with little money and no credit, trying to meet your obligations and at the same time sharing the little you have with those less fortunate than you are? this is a brief summary of my experience won from the war. the situation looked so hopeless because the war came like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky. i was at bad kissingen in southern bavaria when the news came that austria was threatening servia with war. though some of the alarmists were confident that this meant the beginning of a world war, the german papers assured the nations that everything was being done to confine the war to austria and servia. even the austrian emperor had said that his country had started the war and it was up to him to work out his own salvation. i was therefore more surprised when the word came on saturday that russia had mobilized for the purpose of crossing the german frontier. this mere threat seemed to paralyze most of the americans who were busy taking their cures in this bavarian resort, for until then they had only heard war spoken of at far range. many of them went mornings and afternoons to the kurgarten and tried to drown their sorrows in the beautiful strains of the viennese orchestra, which they listened to in a listless way. the thought uppermost in their minds was how would we get out if russia really declared war on germany? the most panicky and energetic got busy and left, but most of the americans tried to pull themselves together and to wait for further developments. our unsteady nerves and heavy hearts were reassured by the articles in all the german dailies saying that they were doing their level best to stay out of the fight and to keep the war confined to austria and servia. the foreign diplomats, even of england, gave the same reassuring reports. this promise of good faith and friendship was given out on saturday, so on sunday when word came that russia had been mobilizing for three days to cross the german frontier, it came as a shock. but germany still tried to ward it off by granting russia twelve hours to give some sort of explanation for this work. this russia did by sending some of her forces across the german frontier. by noon on sunday our sanitarium was in a pandemonium of excitement, as it became known that many german officers were being recalled and were busy packing their trunks to catch the first afternoon train back to the prussian capital. i tore down-stairs two steps at a time. in the hallway i met a german countess weeping in real sorrow while her grandmother was trying to console her. when i inquired the reason for all this grief the grandmother said that her grandsons were officers and had been called to their different regiments. in the dining-room that noon there were one hundred and seventy-five worried men and women of many different nationalities. they were plotting and planning how they could escape the war, or at least get to their homes. the germans had soon decided to leave without any delay for berlin, frankfurt, munich and other german cities so they could tell each other goodbye before the men started for war. the russian merchants and bankers were alarmed and they started for st. petersburg and moscow to escape being made prisoners in germany. there were two persian princes who hurried to the minister of war and obtained permission to take out their auto-car and started for lucerne that very afternoon. many americans who had auto-cars with them made the same move trying to get to berlin, the hague or london, but most of these were shot at before they had gone very far. the two persian princes barely escaped being shot as turkish spies. in less than two hours only thirty-five guests were left in the sanitarium; most of these were americans and russians who were wondering if they had not made a mistake by staying. they were comforted when they heard the next day that most of the people who had left had not gotten very far. the thought that we were living in a military country on the eve of one of the world's greatest wars was just a little nerve-racking. that afternoon we took a carriage drive through the woods to one of the neighboring towns. it was a beautiful summer's day, and it was hard to think that a terrible war was about to break over this placid scene. the picture was made more attractive by the many peasants out for their usual sunday holiday in their large farm wagons. these carts were crowded with german families of the usual size, children, parents and grandparents. though they did not look jovial, the expression of their countenances never indicated that they realized that a great war was pending. it was after five when my mother and i returned to the sanitarium that afternoon. i had been resting less than a half-hour in the large hall when a head-waiter came and threw an extra bulletin in my lap, which read that germany had mobilized and declared war. the men seated near me turned pale; they were too stunned to make any comment on the situation. i waited until i had calmed myself and then i bounded up to my room. my mother was resting at the time, and by the way i tore into the room she must have thought a tiger was about to break loose from the zoo. "it's all up! it's all up!" i cried, as i sounded a bell for a porter to come and help me pack my book-trunk. i cleared the bureau drawers and the tables and he commenced to pack with as much enthusiasm as though we were going off to join a regiment. then i proceeded to take the dresses out of the wardrobe and began to pile everything high on the beds. "have you gone crazy?" my mother said, only to get the determined answer, "no, but we are off tomorrow," as i continued to add more clothes to the great pile. i proceeded to explain that i had engaged a swiss man to take us across the frontier and then we would decide whether to go to holland, belgium or england. while talking and working, i failed to notice that one of the nurses had been in the room giving my mother some medicine and had overheard the conversation. i was also unaware of the fact that she had gone down-stairs and told the head-doctor that i was informing the patients that germany had declared war. he sent up one of his assistants, who said that i was creating a panic in his sanitarium. his remarks in german, translated into english, were somewhat like the following: "you are an egoist to create all this excitement; don't you know that the maids are out in the hall crying?" i answered that i was sorry if any of the women had been made hysterical by the news but i was in no way responsible for the war. i soon saw that it was as difficult to combat the egotistical in peace as in war, so i decided to sit steady and await an opportunity. the next morning i went down at six-thirty to see what the fifty thousand guests were doing and how they took the situation. the place about the music-stand was packed with germans and german-americans who were listening to such strains as "der wacht am rhein," "deutchland ã¼ber alles," intermingled with our own "star spangled banner." the only comment made on these strains were the cries of "hoch! hoch!" from time to time. at the other end of the grounds was another mob of men and women reading the extra bulletin that a russian regiment had crossed the frontier and germany had declared war. the men had a worried look and the women were pale and anxious, but all showed magnificent control. there were no cries heard of "down with russia!" or "down with france!" many of these germans were still filled with hope that sir edward grey would bring these foreign powers to a satisfactory understanding. it was not until tuesday that the first men enlisted and martial law was proclaimed. a large part of the promenade was roped off and guarded by petty officers. nobody crossed this plot of ground under penalty of being shot. the proclaiming of martial law was a new experience for me, so i stood behind the ropes for hours at a time, seeing the young men come to the front, take the oath and enlist. the first regiments were only boys, still unmarried, living in romance rather than actuality. but i soon decided that it was not as hard for them to bid their sweethearts goodbye as it was a little later for fathers to bid their wives and several clinging children farewell. a week later it was even harder to see the old men, many of whom had served in the war of '70 and '71, gladly come forth again to join the rank and file. more than twenty-five thousand men enlisted in a week. they ranged from nineteen to forty-five and came from all conditions of life; the richest and the poorest alike were eager to go and fight and if necessary to die for their country. they were impatient to change their civilian uniform for the earth-color uniforms. it was pathetic to see some of them hand over their old suits to their wives, for i wondered if they would ever use them again. but they seemed hopeful as they moved on, singing their favorite military strains. each regiment had its favorite song; with one it was "der wacht am rhein," with another "deutchland ã¼ber alles." this continued for a week, until twenty-five thousand men had been called out from bad kissingen and surrounding country. most of these were farmers who had to drop their work before the harvesting of their grain. this work was turned over to women and children, while young boy scouts came and volunteered to work on the farms. the men were called into the different regiments mornings, noons and afternoons, until i wondered if it would ever stop. they marched off only to form new regiments. as i climbed the hill one day a middle-aged, kindly woman said to me in a choked voice, "i am giving everything i have in this world to this war, my husband and five sons. four of them are to fight against france and two against russia." she controlled her grief as she spoke, but it was not hard to see that her heart was broken. many of the men working in our place were called out without getting a chance to tell wives or mothers goodbye, while one man confessed modestly that he was to be the father of a first child in less than two months. in a week's time the male population was so depleted that it was hard to find a man walking in town or out in the fields. the few young men left were so ashamed they had not been taken that they hastened to explain that they belonged to the landsturm and that they would be called out during the next two weeks. that most of them went willingly is shown by the fact that in a week's time germany had over a million in arms. when a young man was refused by one ministry of war he applied to another and did not give up until he had been refused five or six times. even the tear-stained faces of mothers and sweethearts did not influence these young men from rallying around their flag. these german women were perfect spartans and were glad when they had four or five sons to give to their country. they are trying to do their best to fill the gaps made by husbands and sons in homes, in the fields and in the shops, taking their positions in stores, in banks and on street cars. in a few days these peaceful bavarian people settled down to their daily routine. they were not surprised when france as well as russia declared war on them, for it was what they naturally expected. but the news that england also had declared war came as a terrible shock. this news fanned the fire into a terrible flame and goaded the germans on to a point where they felt they must lose all or win all. although the americans were sympathizing with all this sorrow they had plenty of worries of their own. by half-past eight in the morning and at three in the afternoon, there were such crowds of people gathered before the small banks and ticket agents that it was next to hopeless to get in without being crushed, even if one wanted tickets or money. the germans, russians and english were foremost in these crowds, for the germans felt they had to get home while the russians or english wanted to escape being taken prisoners. being an american, i felt that i was well protected until one morning i was stopped by a german and was accused of being a russian. one day two of these men stopped me and i understood enough of what they were saying to know that they wanted to prove that i was a spy. fortunately i had my passport with me, and that was enough to prove that i was an innocent american looking for friends and money instead of working with bombs. the americans in our sanitarium were fairly quiet until the word came that the banks were closed; at least, they would only give out money on german letters of credit. this information was aggravated by the fact that england had closed the cable in germany. paradoxical as it may seem, it was strange to us that the days moved on just the same, the days multiplied themselves into a week, and we had a board-bill staring us in the face with no prospect of money. i thought our host might be kind enough not to present us with a bill at the end of the week, but it came in just as usual. i was so angry that i left it there for a week without looking at it. i soon made up my mind if i could not get out of germany the best thing to do was to bring some money into germany. i had some friends living in frankfurt to whom i confided our distress. i do not know which was more difficult, keeping up a german conversation over the telephone or assuring them i was hard pressed for money. after a dozen serious conversations over the 'phone, backed up by a number of german postals, i got two hundred and fifty dollars from one and seventy-five dollars from another. i also got two letters from friends, one from berlin and the other from dresden, asking if i needed help, and i hoisted the signal of distress in a hurry. only a small part of this money could be kept as a reserve fund, as we now owed two weeks' board. fortunately the banks had opened again and our government had sent instructions to give us money on our letters of credit, using their own discretion. i had to wait all day until i could get near a bank, and then the cashier said one hundred and fifty dollars was all we needed. when i explained it was not enough he became angry and accused me of calling him names. he made a terrible fuss in his bank and for a few moments i thought he would have me arrested. the question of money was only one of the many difficulties. germany was so excited by the presence of spies in her midst that she at times accused the twinkling stars of being bombs thrown into the air. determined to rid her country of spies, she sent policemen accompanied by watchdogs to search the russians and to find out the whereabouts of the others. one morning we were notified we must all present ourselves at the schoolhouse where we were to exhibit our passports or other credentials. it was really a funny sight to watch nearly two hundred thousand russians and americans trying to force a way into a small schoolhouse. when the work first started, the soldiers and first aides tried to arrange the throng in single, double and triple files, but after half an hour's venture the rope gave way and the people found themselves where they started. i was soon tired with the overpowering mob and went home to begin all over in the afternoon. after two hours hard work we had gone from the first step to the inner door. the actual work went more quickly, for when the recorder saw passports marked with the red seal of washington, d. c., he was satisfied and asked few questions. when the german mail man did not appear for a week it gradually dawned upon us that we were not getting our mail and we wanted to know the reason for this. we soon found out that if england had closed the cables germany had closed the mail, and that we could not have our letters that were marked u. s. a. until they had been opened and read. some of the more energetic americans went to the german minister of war and complained. this complaint was sent on to berlin. after a week's fuming and worrying they were told that they must go and have their pictures taken. every one who wanted his mail had to pay fifty cents for a small, ugly-looking picture made payable in advance. they presented it at the ministry of war and only a small number were allowed through the gates at a time. the most daring of the soldiers teased the russians about their names, and even had the impudence to tease the unmarried girls about their age. by the time they had pasted the pictures upon the papers, the funny-looking scrawl looked like certificates worthy of a rogue's gallery. after these minor details had been attended to the question paramount in our minds was: "how could uncle sam bring all his children home?" there was a rumor that one of our warships, "the tennessee," was to be dispatched to the other side to deliver money and good cheer. we heard that she was also authorized to buy ships, but we wondered if ships could be bought, and, if they could be, would not the other nations raise objections. a group of successful business men in our sanitarium delegated themselves as captains and pilots for an unknown ship and began studying the map of europe. there was a great diversity of opinion as to which way we should go if we went in a body. first they recommended switzerland, only to find out that switzerland had closed her gates because she feared a food famine. then they suggested italy, but this was vetoed because italy is hard to reach from bavaria and the ships sailing from italy are very small. one of their happiest suggestions was belgium, until they heard that belgium had been drawn into the war against her will. i think a few recommended england, but this was promptly vetoed because england was at war and the channel was choked with mines. strangely, no one thought of holland. in the leisure moments they busied themselves taking up a collection for the red cross and sending important messages to gerard, our ambassador in berlin. he consoled them by saying there was no immediate danger and recommended that we send for our consul in coburg. after patiently waiting a few more days our vice-consul appeared. he was shut up for several hours with a delegation who had invited him down. i have no idea what transpired at that important meeting, for no new work was undertaken to get us out of germany. he was busy telling us about his hardships and that it had taken him thirty hours to make a five-hour trip. he got busy looking after the passports of those who were fortunate enough to have them and making a record of those who wanted them. he promised to get them emergency passports signed with the biggest red seals he had. as he spoke to each one of us in turn he asked for the name of some relative or friend in the united states, adding that if anything happened to us he could notify our friends at home. when the americans worried him about how we should get home, he assured us that transports would be sent over in due time to get us all back safely. on hearing this, my mother brought me before the vice-consul and asked him what he thought of our going to holland by way of berlin. the very question seemed to frighten him, for he argued that if it took thirty-two hours to make a five-hour trip, it might take weeks to go from bavaria to holland. he was sure that some of the tracks had been pulled up and that some of the rails and bridges might be laid with bombs. he argued that even if we escaped these difficulties we might be thrown out on the fields any time and might have to run miles crossing the frontiers. he said that the small coupã©s were so crowded with people that he had seen men and women stand at the stations for hours while the more fortunate ones were crushed into third-class coupã©s or into baggage cars. my mother was then resolved not to move until our government should send transports to take us home and we should go home in a private car. i said nothing, but had my eyes set on holland as my goal. a few days later i happened to go into the holland american agency and told the man to wire to rotterdam and see if he could get us a room. to my surprise and delight i was informed the following week that we could have a whole cabin on the rotterdam, sailing on the 29th of august. then my mother refused to pay the fifty dollars down, for she was confident that the holland american ships would not run. i kept her in the office to hold the telegram while i tore up hill to consult a successful business man from st. louis as to whether i should pay fifty dollars down on what seemed to be a good chance. he argued that woman's intuition was often better than a man's reason and that i should follow out my original plan. i won my mother over to our way of thinking by telling her what she had still left in american express checks and that she could use them instead of money. when we had secured a cabin i felt as rich as john bull does since he has secured control of the english channel. hardly a day passed but i looked at the ticket to see that it had not been lost. then i began to tell people at the sanitarium and wired my friends in berlin advising them how to get out of germany. by this time the first mobilization was over and there was an interim of about ten days before the calling of the landsturm, which meant the boys from twenty-one to twenty-five and the men from forty to forty-five. the ticket agent told us that we could go at any time, that the longer we waited the worse it would become, and that by delay we were considerably reducing our chances for getting away. he could sell us tickets for a stretch but that there were no more through tickets to be had. in contradiction to this statement, the doctor who had the sanitarium said that he had been at a committee meeting of the railroads and they admitted that there were many hardships in trying to get away at present. every day i noticed men and women hurrying to the station carrying their hand luggage, and letting the maids from the pensions carry their small trunks. there was an hungarian couple at our sanitarium who had been waiting for weeks to get back to budapest. one day the woman told me she had bought provisions for five days and they were going to start the next morning, for she thought they could make the trip in five days. this gave me new courage, for i believed that if she could get back to budapest i could get to berlin. at the same time i heard that long-distance telephone connections with berlin had been reopened. after trying for some hours, i made a connection and got some friends who were stopping there. to my surprise, they told me that our embassy in berlin had chartered a special train and they were to be off in the morning. still, i did not give up hope that i would meet them in holland. the next morning i went off and bought two dress-suitcases and a straw basket, which were to hold my most prized treasures. i put on my good spring suit, jammed three good dresses and more than a dozen waists, set aside one winter hat, and a cape to carry on my arm. then i proceeded to unpack the jewelry case and put the jewelry into satchels. by the time i was ready to get my swiss courier he was gone, so i had to take a swarthy german, who had acted as interpreter at the post-office, as a substitute. when the doctor called that afternoon and saw a stranger in my mother's room he wanted to know what he was doing. i admitted that we were planning to leave the next day and intended taking him as our aide. another storm broke on the calm, for the doctor argued that neither was my mother strong enough nor i courageous enough to make the journey alone. i said little but thought much, and was determined that it must be now or never. i ate up in my room that evening, for i did not want to talk it over with anybody and wanted to finish on my own impulse. our chambermaid, marie, was both surprised and worried when she heard that we were going, and said: "think over it well, for the geheimrath knows best." that night i was so feverish that i could not sleep and i told my mother that she must decide for herself, but that my advice was for her to go. in the morning there was another discussion as to whether i should take my french books and notebooks. my mother and maid said that if they were found on me i would be arrested as a spy, but i was determined to take a chance and i am glad now that i did. a strange incident occurred that morning when the swiss man whom i had at first secured returned, and the german appeared a few minutes later. our maid and a porter favored the swiss man, so i compromised by paying the other man five dollars for his trouble. i left my mother to pack the odds and ends and to give the final decision that we were going while i went back to the minister of war to get the permission to leave. we took our luncheon in our room as we did not wish to be bombarded with questions, but a number of friends heard that we were going and they came to wish us godspeed, brought us candy and cookies, and begged us to take letters to friends across the sea. when we reached the station we found it guarded and patroled by soldiers and no one could pass the gate without showing both a ticket and pass. it was even more difficult to get three seats in a coupã©, for a russian family was taking care of a sick man and said they had only places for their nurses. when we ventured into another compartment a german woman with her grandson tried to keep us out. after we had become friendly she admitted her reason was that i looked like a russian and she refused to ride in the same compartment with a russian woman. we only rode a short distance when we had to get down and wait for another train going toward berlin. we loaded up our compartment with six bottles of strawberry selzer, as we were more thirsty than hungry. at six o'clock we found ourselves seated in a small primitive station restaurant crowded with people. among them were several active officers and a number of retired officers on their way to berlin. after supper i was talking with one of the petty officers, who said that they were hopeful though they knew they had hard battle ahead. moreover, they would never forget the friendly attitude america had shown them in this terrible world war. it was twelve o'clock before we were allowed to go through the gates and another hour before our train pulled out. the conductor explained that we would have to wait an hour until an italian train had passed. he suggested that we should take great care in crossing the railroad tracks and when we got into our seats we should not change, the reason i do not know. there were signs posted on the window, "keep your heads in and beware of bombs." this frightened my mother so that she would not move, but i was too curious to see what was going on outside to obey orders. for one hour a half-dozen guards went over the tracks looking for bombs and then they came into our coupã© looking for spies. at one o'clock we were wondering if we would ever reach berlin without being blown up with bombs. i had a weird, strange feeling, for i saw heads now and then bobbing up in the distance. i thought they were ghosts at first, but finally discovered that they were only cavalrymen riding in the baggage car. it was nearly four o'clock when i became so exhausted that i could keep awake no longer and slept for an hour and a half in an upright position. my travelling companions, including my mother and a norwegian woman going to christiania, were more fortunate in this respect. we had breakfast at weimar, and i could hardly think of this lovely saxon city and the center of german culture, the home of goethe and schiller, being disturbed by war. the large station was crowded with soldiers watching for spies. as usual, one of the soldiers believed that i was a russian, and he was surprised to find my passport identified me as an american. i should not have minded being thought a russian if they had not looked upon the most unsuspected people of russia as spies. we reached erfurt, which is known as the garden of germany, for its beautiful flowers. here my mother introduced me to a handsome german boy, seventeen years old, who had volunteered and was hurrying to kiel to be accepted into the navy. that day we counted thirty-two transports carrying german soldiers toward france, and it was only after i had seen them that i knew what german organization meant. in the baggage car was the cavalry--every man to his horse, and all had been instructed that consideration for horses came before themselves. the cannon and other field provision were on tracks, but i was told that the powder and dynamite was carried at night instead of in daytime. there were many automobiles with red cross doctors and officers accompanied by chauffeurs, who were to carry them into the enemy's country. everywhere one met courage and enthusiasm. essential marks showed printed in chalk on trains--"we shall eat our christmas dinner in paris" and "it is a short way from berlin to paris." after luncheon i walked through the town down into the deep valley, where hundreds of young men were lying in the grass waiting to be enrolled that afternoon. at the end was a garden with a large house which was being turned into a hospital for wounded soldiers, and i saw a number of red cross nurses and doctors getting things into shape. at three o'clock a military train came along carrying soldiers to berlin. there was only one coupã© vacant and that contained a high officer and another high official. the officer was kind enough to get out and make room for us. it was long after twelve o'clock when we reached berlin, and we noticed that the big bridges connecting the city were well protected with soldiers. thousands of women and children were waiting to see the american refugees hurrying to berlin, or soldiers hastening to spend a few hours with relatives before they went to war. except for these great crowds at the station there was no disorder, and it was hard to imagine that the prussian capital was in the throes of such a mighty war. our hotel was out in the thiergarten, the loveliest part of berlin, and was cool even in summer weather. the hotel manager was a dutchman, and he had great sympathy with the american refugees. he was kind enough to say that if he met any americans he would keep them there as long as they wanted to stay on credit. next morning, bright and early, we hurried off to the embassy, which is a handsome and imposing building near to the german embassy. though it was only half-past nine, there were more than three hundred people waiting to get in. a number of young officials were trying their best to line the people up in double files and to keep order. here again i had great difficulty in proving my identity. it was only after i showed my passport that i was allowed to enter. within the doorway there was a jolly negro trying to keep the women happy--his aide was a german who was doing his best to try and keep order. this was no light task, as our embassy was looking after the affairs of the english, french and russians along with its own. a number of college boys waiting to be returned home had offered their services and were assisting the clerks in their work. our embassy had been so overburdened with work that mrs. gerard was there all day long helping her husband. this work included giving out of passports, the o. k.-ing of passports, selling of tickets on special trains and the giving out of money to stranded americans. the expressions of the people waiting outside seemed to say i care for nothing save "home, sweet home" or "take me back to grigsby's station." after getting our passports signed we were told to come back next day for our tickets for the special train. in the meantime we had to turn over our passports to the german minister of war and get them back at our own embassy. the rest of the time was put in visiting a few of the galleries left open, watching the great crowds of people that surged around the emperor's house, trying to get a glimpse of him, and in trying to get the latest news of war from our own papers. sunday morning i went up to the dom church, the great church of berlin, which was packed to the doors with german men and women bent in solemn prayer. for the landsturm had been called out that morning and thousands of men knew that they would have to be off to the war in the morning. at noon, when the many church doors were thrown open, thousands of people passed out, the men with heads uncovered, the women pale and earnest, but all resigned and willing to do their best. all eyes were bent to the palace, for the lowered flag showed that the emperor was at home making his preparations for leaving that night. this was the first day for a week that there had been quiet around the palace. until sunday thousands of people were gathered all day long singing the kaiser's favorite songs and shouting "hoch! hoch!" every time they caught a glimpse of him, and especially when he ventured out on the balcony to make a speech to his people. that afternoon hundreds of people gathered with their children in the thiergarten to enjoy the animals and to listen to the military band play many patriotic airs. this was the last peaceful sunday that hundreds of husbands spent with their families. next morning many a tired woman commenced to work to help the red cross, and to put the different hospitals and royal homes that had been turned into hospitals ready for the wounded soldiers. the empress did her share, and the crown princess gave one of her palaces for this work. on every street corner there were young girls and women hard at work getting contributions for the red cross. berlin became so deserted of men that it was next to impossible to find men salesmen in the shops, while they were even trying the women out as conductors on the street cars. the banks were more than half emptied of their clerks and the police work was being done by the older men. our special train that was to take us to holland left on tuesday, so we had to be at the embassy on monday for our tickets. though the tickets were not sold until eleven o'clock that morning, by nine many were waiting patiently to put in their orders. there were first, second and third class tickets sold, but these could only be bought by americans. i tried to get one for our swiss courier, but i was told that this was a special train for americans, and so i had to leave him behind. as i look back to those few days spent in berlin, many pleasant incidents in the midst of the prussian capital in the throes of a world war recur to mind. one of these was the approach of the kaiser, accompanied by a high government official, as they rode through the brandenburger thor along unter den linden to the ministry of war. he was simply swarmed by his people, who yelled, "unser kaiser! unser kaiser! hoch! hoch!" although he appreciated their loyalty and patriotism, his face showed great care and worry and he seemed to have grown ten years older in a few weeks. a pathetic incident was the great crowds of people who came and went out of the dom church sunday morning, where they went to pray for strength and resignation. the crowd was so great that only germans were allowed to enter church that morning. it was an inspiring sight to see men of all ages, accompanied by their wives, children or sisters, come out with resolute faces, realizing the danger but determined to give their all for the cause. it was tuesday afternoon that our special train was ready at five o'clock to take us from berlin into holland. though the train was not ready much before five, hundreds of anxious americans were on the platform by three in the afternoon. most of them had plenty to do in the two hours before our train pulled out. some had to look after their trunks, make sure that they were being placed in the baggage car, while those who were not fortunate enough to have trunks with them discussed at length the probability or lack of probability of ever having their luggage again. there were many people lost in the crowds; mothers had to look for their children, wives for their husbands. a large delegation of newspaper men and publishers appeared with high mounds of literature on the war, begging the americans to see that this reading matter should be scattered broadcast in our country. even more interesting were the crowds of american women left behind, who brought all the way from one to a dozen letters, asking us to post them when we reached new york. many had tears in their eyes as they asked this favor, and not a single man or woman on that special train was hard-hearted enough to refuse. among the number of women who came to me with letters was a sweet-faced brunette about thirty. she said that she had just made her dã©but in berlin with much success as a singer. this was what she had told her husband, along with the fact that she was living in a nice pension where she had become acquainted with a well-known tenor and his family, who were taking good care of her until she would be able to come home. she gave me all this information because her letter was written in german, and she feared i might not take it unless i knew its contents. in less than a quarter of an hour's time she returned with a large bouquet of roses, saying this was a mere expression of her appreciation. our train pulled out at five o'clock sharp with much yelling and waving of handkerchiefs and fans. out of this noise one heard the cry, "godspeed!" "give my love to all the dear ones at home!" "good luck!" "auf wiedersehen!" which was answered by the refrain of the song, "deutchland ã¼ber alles!" this special train was packed with anxious-looking men, women and children. they seemed so happy to get out of a land of war into one of peace, that they never grumbled at the thought of sitting in a day coach thirty hours without any sleep except what they got napping. all along the line we saw beautiful fields waiting for the harvest to be taken in by the women and children. they were doing their best to supplement the work of their fathers and older brothers. whenever they noticed our train pass and realized that we were americans they waved their hands and shouted in friendly greeting. our coupã© had four seats, so by taking turns every one got a chance to rest an hour or two. it was not until two o'clock the next day that our train reached bentheim, which is on the dutch frontier. our train did not pull up to the platform as usual, so all the passengers in turn had the pleasure of taking a three-foot leap. this was the german side, so our luggage had to be examined before we could pass over the dutch frontier. there were only two ticket windows for nearly three thousand people, so we were wedged in like sardines. there were no porters to carry our hand luggage, so we had to hoist it on as best we could. a short ride brought us to the dutch frontier, where we were all told to get down and have our luggage, even to our hand luggage, examined again. as we could not get any porters many of us refused to get down, with the plea that we were refugees and not tourists. when the custom officials saw that some of us stood firm, they boarded the train and examined our things in a superficial way. the more obedient, who did as they were told, fared badly by their obedience. there was such a mix-up inside that many came back minus valises, dress-suitcases, carry-alls, steamer coats, and even lost their seats in their coupã©s. the passengers were divided between amsterdam, rotterdam and the hague. a large number of these were without steamer passage, but they were hurrying to rotterdam determined to get something, even if it was steerage. there were plenty who had boarded our train without a dollar in their pockets beyond a railroad ticket to help them out, and they were trusting to good luck or what friendships they might make on the way for help. many were loud in their praise of mr. and mrs. gerard for the friendly advice and the financial aid they had been given by them. in spite of the hardships endured by the financial embarrassment, loss of trunks, lack of sleep, there was much humor and joviality, which is so valuable to the american people in difficult situations. it was after one o'clock when we reached wassenaar, a small suburb of the hague. the hotel had been originally built for a golf club. it was a large, red brick building, set in a beautiful garden with such wonderful flowers as only holland can grow. surrounded by this splendid wealth of scenery, it was hard to imagine ourselves in the midst of countries that might be racked and ruined by war. the next morning we visited the palace of peace, handsome but imposingly simple. as we looked upon its splendid rooms, decorated with pictures dedicated to peace, it seemed a blasphemy to god and man that such a building should remain if men are to fight out their differences with the cruel weapons of modern warfare. for a short time we abandoned these disquieting thoughts and visited some of the lovely dutch shops, where we found a few inexpensive souvenirs for our friends who were anxiously awaiting us at home. we had our luncheon in a quaint dutch restaurant where dainty sandwiches and dutch cakes were served on the prettiest of delft china. then we hurried to our embassy to find out if the tennessee had landed, as we all expected letters and hoped for money from home. one of the clerks said that the tennessee was expected in england that day and would probably reach the dutch coast in a day or two. our embassy was crowded with americans asking for passports, money and information. mr. van dyke and his clerks, assisted by boy scouts, were working overtime to gratify all these demands. a number of our clerks looked anxious that afternoon, as gossip had it that the german consul had been called back to berlin that day, and if holland were thrown into war she would flood her entire country in less than twenty-four hours' time. our men thought it was an exaggerated rumor, but still they were advising people to leave holland as early as possible. as we hurried along the streets and past the vacant lots, we saw hundreds of soldiers going through their daily exercises so that they could join the regular army when needed. there was a great crowd of people waiting before the palace, anxious to see their queen start off for a daily drive. soon the automobile appeared, carrying the queen and a friend for a drive out in the woods. though she has grown older she is as sweet and girlish as ever. her friendly smile shows that she has the determination to meet cheerfully the most difficult situations that may confront her before the war is finished. we were about to take the 'bus up to our hotel when one of our friends stopped us and said, "are you willing to leave tonight if i can secure passage for us four on the ryndam?" i was so surprised by this question that i thought our friend, who had been studying in one of the german clinics, was losing his mental balance as a result of overstudy and war talk. "go tonight!" i exclaimed. "why, we only came at one o'clock this morning. no, indeed; war or no war, i want one week of rest in this lovely, peaceful country." "this is no time to romance," he explained. "you can enjoy pastoral beauties in our own u. s. a. there is talk that holland may go to war tonight. if she does she certainly will flood the country before she stands for any nonsense such as belgium has." with this he helped us into the 'bus and boarded the five-o'clock train for rotterdam, to take his chance of getting four tickets at the eleventh hour. when i got on to my splendid terrace window overlooking the garden i was ready to sell out at any price. i argued that it was better to be shot than to go crazy, and i knew that fifty-six hours without sleep or three days and nights without sleep in a week was too much of a strain. the beauty of these rosebeds and ponds seemed to comfort my jaded nerves more than the happy thoughts of home. so i took tea on the terrace and forgot all about an ocean voyage until the face of my watch announced it was six o'clock and time to pack. by seven our little party of three were ready for supper, but we had no idea whether we were going to stay that night. we had two auto-cars for our party of eight, in case the added four joined the two couples who had passage secured on the ryndam. our friends waited until nine and then they got ready to go, fearing that they might miss their boat if they were detained any longer. they suggested that they would give all the assistance they could, even to besieging the captain to wait a little longer. by ten the guests started to retire and most of the lights had been put out. the doctor's wife, who was a young married woman, tried to read an exciting story in one of the english monthlies, but she was so worried about her husband i am confident she did not know a word she was reading. we tried to get the holland american line at rotterdam but the wires were not working--were out of order. shortly before twelve o'clock we got a telegraph message sent over the telephone which said, "tell the americans to come to the ryndam at once." the message sounded so strange, and, being unsigned, we feared it might be a plot to get us and that we were being suspected as spies. this did not frighten the doctor's wife, who insisted on going and looking for her husband. we gave orders for the automobile to be called, and the man answered he did not want to make an hour and a half trip at that time of night. i answered that he must come around at once and set his price. it was nothing more nor less than forty dollars, and he insisted on having every gulden of it before he would turn the crank of the car. there were a number of other delays, for we could not find a porter, and the room waiter refused to carry our baggage to the car. then the manager had promised to take us to rotterdam, but he said it was too late for him to venture out in such times, and it was only when we offered the house porter a five-dollar bill that he consented to sit on the box with a revolver in his hip pocket. then our punctilious proprietor delayed us with our bill, for he was more anxious that he should not charge us one cent too much or too little than that we should catch our boat. we were even further delayed by feeing the help, who still stood around for their tips while our escort explained that money spoke in war times. finally we were off, and certainly this midnight ride compares favorably with paul revere's famous ride. i do not know how many kilometers we covered per hour, but i do know that if anything had bounced against us or we against anything we would not have lived to tell the tale. we went through deep woods, dark streets, through small villages and through long, narrow dams at breakneck speed. we had the right of way except for the tolls that had to be raised, for the soldiers watching at a distance and for an occasional drunkard that tumbled into the streets. we went so fast that every time our automobile took a bridge it flew several feet into the air. it was only kind providence watching over us that saved us from being shot as spies--at least being taken prisoners. it was one o'clock when we entered the holland american office and gave up a good cabin on the rotterdam for two berths in the auxiliary cabin on the ryndam. as we came on board we saw our ambassador, mr. van dyke, tell some of his friends goodbye and wish them godspeed. we stopped to hear some people exclaim, "my, that was a splendid speech--i guess he is sorry he is not going home--well, if a man wishes to be an ambassador he must do his duty and watch his people--i wonder how many of us will take his advice and keep neutral in thought on this trip." as soon as we got on board we found that ours was not a choice cabin. it was one of the forty cabins made in a week in the hold of the boat usually made to keep the trunks. i decided not to go to our cabin that night, as it was nearly two o'clock before the boat pulled out, and then we sat around and chatted some time about the mines in the channel and the possibility of our boat striking one and being blown to pieces. when we tired of sitting on deck we went down into the dining salon and slept on benches in impromptu manner. to tell the truth of the matter, we were reaching a point where a few hours seemed a luxurious amount of sleep. many who did not find the early morning air too brisk camped out on steamer chairs outside. next morning my mother and i went down to see what our cabin was like. after reaching the lower deck we had to climb down a small ladder to get to our room. the company had tried to make the hold attractive by arranging palms and flowers around the walls. the center of the hall was usurped by trunks, for about one-third of the first-class passengers had been fortunate enough to save their baggage. some of the flat trunks were useful, for they served as chairs and benches when our cabins became too crowded during the day. much to our surprise, we found that our small cabin was designed for four people, though it was only large enough for two during the day. i gave my mother the lower berth, and then the question became pertinent how was i to scramble into the upper one. i made many futile attempts trying to bolt and then taking a turn at the ladder. i succeeded in reaching the last step, but only went so far as bumping my head against the ceiling when i tried to crawl in. the lady who had the other lower berth soon saw that my efforts were futile, and since she was extremely slight she kindly offered me her lower berth. unknown to the authorities, we sent the fourth occupant into our friend's room and reduced the number to three. thus we had one less person in our room than the rest of the people in the auxiliary cabin, but we found out that there were just two too many when rough weather came. though everybody on board that boat had said the day before they were willing to ride steerage and to suffer all conceivable hardships without complaint, providing they could get away from warlike europe, our captain confessed that he never met so many complaining people at one time in his life. this was just a little annoying to him when he remembered that he had already been placed as a naval officer on a dutch man-of-war, and he had only been recalled because he knew where the mines lay, and the company felt he was competent to steer our ship safely out of the harbor. many of the passengers only muttered in a low voice as long as they were in the channel, for they feared the floating mines, though not a single mine broke loose and floated near our vessel. we were met by a number of english naval war boats. the ugliest of these was a small torpedo boat which stopped us before we were out of the english channel. our boat cried "halt!" as soon as we saw this little english racer coming toward us with her guns leveled toward our bow. as soon as we were near enough to hear her words one of her officers gave the following queries: "where do you come from?" "from holland," was the prompt reply. "what have you on board?" "a cargo of humans," answered the captain, loud and clear. "where are you bound for?" came the pertinent answer. "for new york," they were told. then came the fearless command: "you may follow me to scilly island, where we will examine your papers, and if they are satisfactory you may go on unmolested." it was just luncheon time when our boat stopped and two of the english officers came on board to examine our papers. before going up to the bridge he went down into the hold and looked at the baggage and into the cabins. after examining our papers carefully they found the nearest approach to german enemies were naturalized german americans. with english tact, they chatted with some of the men awhile and then went down the side of the boat and were off. we encountered a number of english men-of-war on our way out of the english channel but were only held up twice. as soon as they saw our papers signed up by the first man-of-war they let us go very promptly. as soon as we got out of the channel away from mines and men-of-war our tired, jaded refugees began to nag the purser from early morning till late at night. there were those who said that they consented to go steerage because they thought steerage was fixed up like first cabin. when they saw that their complaints were futile they sent over one socialist leader to have it out with the overworked purser. the passenger exclaimed: "i tell you it is an outrage, we are not immigrants but good american citizens. i do not look like an influential man here but i am a strong factor in the socialist party in new york, and i will make this company look sick when i get there." in marked contrast to this burly, rough man was the refined new england woman, a professor in one of our leading girls' colleges. she begged the purser to try and find three berths for her and two of her colleagues in either the first or second cabin, and asked if he in the meantime would see that the steerage was cleaned up and made a little more comfortable. a few days later i saw this professor walking on the first promenade deck telling some of her friends she felt like a culprit taking a first-class berth while her friends were left behind. more than a half-dozen worthies were brought over from the third cabin to the first. a college girl was among this number, who had been travelling with her brother. she had gotten into our cabin by mistake, and when i explained to her that her room was around the corner she begged me to leave her things in our room until she found her cabin, and she said: "i was in hysterics for joy when my brother took me out of the third class, and i know i shall die if i have to go back there." there was a talented blind boy pianist who had been travelling with a friend giving concerts abroad and a committee of wealthy men brought him into the first class; he had such a sweet, kind face, i am sure he was as uncomplaining among the steerage as he was after he had been provided with a comfortable berth. though there were not enough first-class cabins for all the women and children found in the third, the committee of wealthy men went down every day and saw that the steerage was kept as clean as possible. but there were just as many complaints among the first-class passengers, for those down in the auxiliary cabins tried to get rooms on the promenade deck, or at least have the privacy of their own rooms. most of them who were at all comfortably placed found their complaints useless. gradually these passengers became more resigned, for we had five days of rough weather, and many of them were too seasick to worry about where they could lay their heads. a few of the humorous people on board soon discovered that the auxiliary cabins were all marked four hundred, so we dubbed ourselves "the four hundred"; because of the flowers we dubbed it the palm garden or the ritz carlton. as soon as the weather moderated some of the enthusiastic women were busy getting up a red cross collection for germany. then there was a petition gotten up by some german americans, thanking the germans for the kindly treatment the americans had been accorded. the men in the meanwhile occupied themselves wondering if the stock exchange had been closed, discussing the merchants' marine and the duty of our increasing the navy. one night we had a terrible electric storm which was a beautiful sight. it was so strong it fairly lit up the rooms, but every time a crash came we thought our end was near. the women, who were most afraid of the storm felt doomed; they got dressed and went up into the upper cabin, concluding that they would rather be shot at by cannon than to be drowned at sea. the climax to all of our troubles was the making out of our declaration and being held in quarantine at ellis island. many objected to this treatment and argued that they were good american citizens and not immigrants. this was not much more than a form, for the health officers only glanced at our papers. it is strange what an influence this war had on women's consciences. there was not one woman who had been born in this country, though she had lived abroad several years, that wished to call herself a non-resident. in spite of heavy luggage lost the women were so glad to get home that they made most honest declarations. as our boat landed the dock was so packed it was hard to distinguish our friends among the thousands standing on land waving their hands and shouting a welcome home. since we only had dress-suitcases left our baggage was soon inspected, and in less than a half-hour later we found ourselves in a comfortable new york hotel. it only took a hurried breakfast and a refreshing bath to make me soon forget my own hardships. still, i shall never forget the suffering i saw as i fled from the horrors of war, and i am now confident that the expression "war is hell" is as sure and true as the fact that there are stars in heaven. what mobilization means have you ever been to war? unless you can boast of the civil war or the spanish-american war this question may sound futile. have you ever seen a manoeuvre? unless you have been an invited guest at one of the french or german manoeuvres you have but a faint idea of what a gigantic review for active military service is. have you ever seen a mobilization? probably not, unless you were one of those who rallied around our flag in the spanish-american war or in the late mexican crisis. much as you may have read how the european countries have been gathering their forces, it is all a faint picture compared with the actual gigantic work that has been taking place during the early periods of the war. until i had seen a small part of this tremendous work, i had always thought of mobilization as the task of gathering a certain number of regiments led by their officers, and sending them off with their horses, cannon and provisions to a point of attack. though these are all a small part of a great undertaking, mobilization is a gigantic, living, breathing, throbbing force, where millions of men may act in concerted action and still every individual must play a small part in this melodramatic action. i was fortunate enough to have been in germany when the word was sounded that russia was mobilizing, and that germany would do the same unless russia gave her some satisfactory explanation for her aggressive action. when no answer came, at least no satisfactory reply, a declaration was made that germany was mobilizing. what did this mean? it meant the bringing together of the most perfectly trained and equipped military force of modern times. for just as england has seen to it that she may retain the proud title of "commander of the seas," germany has been equally proud of her magnificently equipped military forces. it may take years to answer the question whether this army was being organized and trained for aggression to make other nations bow to germany's will, or whether the intelligence of the german nation realized that the issue at stake during the franco-prussian war had not been threshed out and would have to be answered later. for, as bismarck said in a conversation with the interviewer, w. b. richmond, "germany is a new empire and it must be protected from possible assault by one or two or both powers, one to the east, the other to the west of us. you must remember that the next war between france and germany must mean extinction for one. we lie between two lines of fire; france is our bitter enemy and russia i do not trust. peace may be far more dishonorable than war, and for war we must be prepared. therefore, while germany's very life as a nation is at stake, i cannot give the attention that i would otherwise wish to as regards the encouragements of the arts of peace, however much i may believe them to be, as you say, necessary to the highest development of the nation as a whole." the german people of all classes were familiar with this prophecy, therefore they were not surprised, and more, they were prepared, when russia and france in turn threw down the gauntlet of war. in most of the cities and towns you heard the familiar words spoken by men of all ranks, "well, it doesn't matter much; it had to come, today or tomorrow, only the allies had planned to wait three years longer; then the french soldiers would have their three years' service and the russian army would have been reorganized. the allies thought that we might be found napping, but we are pretty well awake, and it is to be a fight to a finish." therefore, when the word mobilization was spoken throughout germany it was more than a call. it meant that every boy and man capable of carrying a gun was more than ready--he was dead anxious to join his regiment and die for his country. whatever a man's rank might be, whatever his daily occupation was, and however responsible the work, he forgot it all in the eagerness to go to the front. one day i happened to be in a large bank in berlin when the president received his call. he read it as though he were getting an an invitation to a bankers' association banquet instead of its being a call to go to the front. he had all his affairs in shape to go, and after a short talk with some of the directors and a friendly goodbye to his associates, he closed his large rolltop desk, put his hat upon his head and was off. i chanced to be in a restaurant in berlin one day when i noticed a group of soldiers already dressed in their dark gray uniforms drinking their afternoon coffee and smoking their cigars leisurely. between the puffs of smoke, i heard the following conversation: "shooting down frenchmen will be rather different work than singing sigfried and tannhauser at a thousand dollars a night." "you musn't be so mercenary," answered another. "a campfire and a bed on the ground will make me appreciate the comforts of a new york hotel another season, more than the other, while sauerkraut and wiener wurst are fair exchange for lobster ã  la newburg and chicken patties." while a third piped up, "i know i will have a more enthusiastic audience when i sing the wacht am rhine to my regiment than i have when i sing rigoletto on first nights in new york." the same enthusiasm was shown by painters, sculptors and writers of all kinds. what was a thought on paper, on canvas or in stone now compared with the privilege of doing service for one's country! while the first regiments were being called out, more than one million reserves had offered themselves _freiwillig_. they were willing to go and take any place, even the most dangerous, in any regiment, just as long as they could serve their country. one day i met a hairdresser who had two sons; the one had been called into service and the other had enlisted and was to be called out in two weeks. when i asked the father if he did not object to having both sons leave he said, "it is better to have them go than to have them grumbling every day at home because they cannot help the fatherland." a few days later i met two young men on a train. they were tired, dirty and impatient. the explanation for all this was that they had offered themselves at a neighboring ministry of war and were refused because there were too many reserves on hand. about the same time a young girl told me seven of her relatives had been called into service. one of her brothers-in-law was disqualified, for he had been hurt while doing his one year military service. still he was determined to go, and applied at six different ministries of war before he was finally accepted to help build up the landsturm. more than two-thirds of the great physicians and surgeons of germany are in the war. many of these are volunteers. those who are too old for active service are doing their duty in hospitals or in the red cross field. but many who could do this lighter work are fighting in their regiments. as one well-known german physician said to me, "no, indeed, i want to go with my regiment. when my country is at peace i am willing to look after the sick, but now it is time for me to fight. i wish it were today, for two days seems like two months when a man is ready to go." i saw another physician work all day until nine o'clock in the evening; though he had received his commission at seven, he continued his work as though nothing had happened. then he gathered a small package of papers which probably contained important letters and money, which he handed over to the physician in the institute. he then hurried to his room and put on his military clothes--they were those of a third-class military officer. the change in costume seemed to make a different man of him. he was no longer a physician but a war hero. he bade each one goodbye in turn, even to the scrub-women, saying he hoped that they would all meet again next year, and then he hurried to his room to get a few hours of sleep as he had to leave at five next morning. the only care he had on his breast was what would become of his mother--a dear old lady of seventy, whom he loved very much--if anything should happen to him. one day while walking across the country road, i stepped up to a farmer and said: "when do you go to the war?" "next week," came the blunt reply. "and who will do your work while you are gone?" "what's a buxom wife and four sturdy children good for if they can't do a man's work when he is off at war?" the same readiness to go before they were called was as paramount among university students as it was among the farmers and merchants. a corps of young heidelberg students offered themselves and asked that they be taken in one regiment. this wish was sent to the emperor and was granted them. even the younger students were too much fired by the desire to help to stay at home. one day i came across a young boy seventeen years old, hurrying with full might to get to kiel, where he had an appointment on a naval boat. he was a handsome, sturdy lad of fine feeling, but he felt it was necessary to fight, and if need be to die for his country. he explained that he was the only son of a widowed mother, but even his great love for her could not check him. even the younger boys ranging from the age of fourteen to sixteen felt that they were shirking their duty because they could not go. i heard one young boy say to his grandmother, "isn't it too bad i am only fourteen; if i were only two years older i might do something for my country." "be patient, and your turn will come," said the old lady, good-naturedly. this eagerness to go was a great aid in hurrying the mobilization. hundreds of officers who were off on their summer vacation hurried back without an instant's delay. in all the cities, and even in the small towns and villages, the commons and kurgartens were turned into training-grounds for the reservists, and meeting-places for those enlisted. though i saw more than fifty thousand men called out in one bavarian center, in two weeks' time every man was there to take the oath and to get his military clothes at the very minute appointed. as they donned their blue military uniform, they had no idea that another special suit was awaiting them when they should get into active service. there were hundreds of thousands of earth-colored uniforms kept in reserve that no one knew anything about, except the ministry and the highest german officials. there was no disorder, no wasting of time, no asking of foolish questions--every man was a unit in a great whole. from a common soldier to the highest officer, they were ready to do their work intelligently and enthusiastically. the only emotion they showed was an impatient enthusiasm to get across the german frontier and into active service as soon as possible. they knew that this war was to be one of life and death and a fight to the finish, but all fear was forgotten in a hope of being able to do something for their country. they often explained the situation by drawing two circles, one within the other--one very large, and one extremely small--as they said, "when you come again germany is bound to look like one of these circles." when the mobilization was ordered, every farmer brought his horses to the town, where they were inspected. the horses found strong enough for battle were taken, and the others were sent back to the farm. the same thing happened to the automobiles--they were taken without a word of notice--the government kept those that they wanted and returned the others. though hurrahs, songs and laughter mingled with the tramp of feet as fifty thousand soldiers formed in line and hurried to the front, this was only a small part of a great picture. all day long in berlin we saw officers flying along in automobiles hurrying to the ministry of war to get their instructions, and then hastening off to the front. they all seemed ready and self-reliant. the nights were not wasted in berlin, where they were used for manoeuvres to try out the forty or more zeppelins which germany owns. even the passenger zeppelins, known to many americans for the trips they made through the black forest, have been turned into war dirigibles. count zeppelin himself had offered his personal services to take charge of his invention. it was said new factories were being opened to turn out two new air-crafts each month. though the krupp works at essen had been working right along making new siege-guns and special bombs for germany, it was said that the factory had put on a large force of men who were working night and day to make an added supply of ammunition. on my way from bavaria to prussia i saw a number of automobiles flying across the country carrying their officers to the front. now and then a zeppelin flew overhead practicing before it should venture into france or russia. most interesting of all were the military trains, forty-two in number, packed with soldiers and their officers. though some of them were wedged so tight they had little moving space, they laughed, smoked, and waved good-naturedly as they were being hurried across the frontier. i saw many regiments hurried, at meal-time, into depots. they were led across into open fields where large, wooden houses with many wooden benches had been erected. the work was being done under contract, and in this way thousands of soldiers were fed in a short time. the baggage cars were crowded with cavalrymen and their horses. though their horses and the straw in the car were immaculately clean, these soldiers were less well off than the infantrymen in the third-class coupã©s, for it seemed to me that the horses were getting more than their share of the room. besides these regular coupã©s, there were many freight cars which carried all kinds of canned goods and other provisions. others carried a great number of small collapsible boats, which are used as pontoons in crossing rivers. more interesting than all this were the cannons. some of these were the common cannons, while now and then loomed a great siege-gun. i was told that the cannon-balls, bombs and other explosives were carried into the country at night, as they did not want to take any chance of igniting and killing the soldiers. besides those designed for active warfare, many were used to carry messages over the battlefields and for the red cross service. i saw dozens and dozens of handsome automobiles lined up on these car-trucks carrying messengers and doctors across the frontier. but german mobilization means every precaution possible for their country as well as foreign aggression. now and then i passed gangs of workmen making ditches and trenches, repairing railroad tracks and laying new ones. every station was guarded by one or more sentries, according to its size. they kept their eyes on every passenger who went in and out of the station, and when they were the least bit doubtful they asked for one's passport on short notice. i shall never forget a picture of the morning i breakfasted at six o'clock in erfurt. i and some friends were just seated at table when a sentry approached us and asked for our passports. he scrutinized each one carefully, and when he was satisfied we were not spies he left us and approached a group of russians. they looked as exhausted as they were frightened as they explained they had gotten permission to go home. when they reached the frontier they were told they could not go across, and they found so many of their countrymen on the border that there was not half room enough for them, and they were on their way back. everywhere there were vigilant watchers looking for spies. some were so alert that they tried to make russians out of harmless american refugees, while others went so far as to accuse them of being spies. i myself was sometimes accused of being a russian, and had hard work to prove my identity. those americans who had the daring to venture out in their automobiles got the worst of it. the soldiers on watch thought nothing of shooting at their cars and taking the innocent occupants prisoners. a gentleman and his wife who went from baden-baden in the black forest to bad kissingen were shot at and arrested five times before they got there. word was brought to the village that some french spies were coming and that they should wait for them. the mob was there to greet them with pitchforks and axes, and when they saw the french car the peasants were sure that these were the people they were after. the case became more complicated, as none of the party, including the chauffeur, could speak german, and only understood their gesticulations--not their threats and volleys. they were only saved from being shot by the appearance of two officers who, after examining their pockets carefully, found some american papers and letters. still, these officers did not wish to rely on their own judgment, and so they took their prisoners to the burgomeister. he explained that he could not give any opinion until he took their films from their kodak and had them developed. their innocence rested on the kind of pictures they had taken. as the woman told her story, she said, "it was only a miracle that her husband hadn't taken pictures of soldiers, as that was his favorite kind of photography." next day the burgomeister returned the kodak and the developed films, explaining he was sorry he had detained them, and he did not see any reason why they should not go on. so he sent the soldier who had been guarding them day and night to act as their protector. they had only gone a short way when they were arrested in another town, and they had to go through another trial to prove their innocence. they said that their experience in being arrested was becoming commonplace by the time they reached their destination. some of these guards were so vigilant that they lost their heads completely and accused innocent women of all ages as spies. i was traveling on a train one day when i heard a terrible noise in a neighboring coupã©. word had been telegraphed that there was a russian spy dressed as a german officer. in his coupã© there sat an american man and his wife and a german friend, and they were accused of being his accomplices. some of the mob boarded the train, leveled revolvers in their faces, and were ready to drag them all off, when they were stopped by some higher officials. after half an hour's questioning and searching of pockets, the americans were let go, and the foreigner was taken off and shot as a spy. vigilant as were the officials about catching every spy, they were equally anxious to protect the lives of every innocent man and woman, especially the americans. at night our trains were never allowed to start off until the rails had been carefully inspected, to see that there were no bombs on the track, and not the smallest bridge was left unguarded. after the regular army was called out, there was a lull for ten days, and then came the starting of the landsturm. these included the young boys and those ordinarily considered too old for active service. some of these were sent right to the front, and others were put into six weeks' training ready to fill in the gaps when they should be needed. there is no feeling of rivalry in the germany army, for every man feels he has a post to fill and that he can do a small part in winning a real victory. as they love to explain, every man is equal on the battlefield, whether he be a prince or only a poor peasant boy, whether he be a general or a common soldier; as they march on to death or victory day after day, and week after week, they are inspired by the words: "unser gott, unser vaterland, und unser kaiser"--"our god, our fatherland, and our emperor." it was this inspiration that made the reichstadt vote ninety million dollars at once. it was that which called the socialist party along with the democrats to arms. it was that which made the emperor tell his people: "i forgive everything--we are all germans." it has been this inspiration that changed small petty states into a large imperial government. it was this inspiration that changed a strong german horde into a people that loved culture, art and education. it was their patriotism that made them brandish the sword in one hand because they feared their enemies and still kept their other hand and brain free to work for social uplift. they have created cities of which they may well be proud, adorned with beautiful theatres, opera-houses, parks, statues and public gardens. patriotism was the fount at which they drank, and it has created such master minds as goethe, schiller, wagner and gerard hauptmann. i believe that a nation that loves home and fireside and romance as much as do the germans energized a great standing army for protection and not for war. i believe that their methods may have been wrong, but that their heart was right; for a nation that has faith in god, in their ruler, and in their country, a nation that spends its energy for music and beauty, may be misunderstood, but such a people cannot hate their fellow-men. the price of war and the price of peace when word was given that the german empire had declared war, it was known that she had nine hundred thousand men at a cost of two hundred and fifty million dollars on hand. but the mobilization of her several million troops at the end of the first week increased the cost to many times that amount. this did not frighten her, as her chest at spandau had been swelled from thirty millions to ninety millions. this was enough to last for three months. when it was found out the other day that the war would last for some months longer, the national bank of germany, along with many other german banks, raised enough money on bonds to keep germany going until after christmas, without making a war loan, though the cost to france and england is somewhat less individually, still it amounts to nearly the same when the two countries are taken together. a conservative cost of the war per day is fifteen millions, of which germany is said to spent eight millions. paul leroy-beaulieu, the french economist, estimates that each of the greater belligerents is spending an average equivalent to $200,000,000 monthly. in presenting these figures to the academy of moral and political sciences today (october 17th), he said that he considered it probable that the war would continue for seven months from august 1st. accordingly, the five greater powers engaged were committed to an expenditure of $7,000,000,000. each of the smaller states, including japan, will have expenses of from $600,000,000 to $800,000,000 to meet. "one might say that the war will cost the fighting powers roughly from $9,000,000,000 to $10,000,000,000," m. leroy-beaulieu continued. "these figures, which do not take into account the losses of revenue during hostilities, will be met. "the larger part of the savings of the world will be absorbed by the taking up of national loans, and economic progress will be seriously checked." these figures are only a small part of the entire cost. it is not unusual to read of thirty to fifty thousand men being slaughtered in one great engagement, and about the same number being taken prisoners. germany has in three months already put more than three millions into actual combat, with a reserve of two millions, and she can raise ten millions if necessary. on the other hand, the allies say if paris is lost it must be retaken; if one million of allied reinforcements are not enough to accomplish it, there will be two millions and three millions. these numbers represent the flower of european civilization, for only the sane and healthy are valued in war. these men include hundreds of the ablest scientists from the pasteur institute in paris, from the private and government laboratories in berlin, frankfurt and freiburg. along with these are the great professors of all the sciences and the liberal arts, many of whom are world-renowned in the great universities of europe. included in this magnificent rank and file are the painters, sculptors, musicians, along with the celebrated architects. these men rise to the tens and hundred thousands, and every time one of these men goes down we are reminded of the fact that he may never be replaced, and it will take many centuries to give back a little of the culture and genius they represent. but the backbone of a nation is its agricultural force. the german farmers and foresters are a pride to their nation. nearly every one of these has been called or volunteered in the ranks and files, and already many thousands have been food for the cannon and guns. their wives and children are trying hard to do their part to replace the work, but all they can give is a feeble effort. the same is true of france, which has the richest fields in the world. most of the soil yields two harvests. these farmers take wonderful pride in their farms and truck-gardens, and when the great painters, millet and corot, dedicated their genius, they found worthy subjects for their brush. i have traveled through miles of this farmland in france, and its beauty was a splendid poem of what god had helped man to do. much of the rich vineyard and champagne country has been destroyed by war and neglect, and it will take years of hard toil before it can be repaired. when this war was less than two months old, whole towns, such as louvain, bruges and rheims had been laid in waste. this destruction has meant the loss of thousands of homes, public buildings, churches and cathedrals, and priceless works of art. it has also meant the destruction of many miles of railroad, river and ocean transportation, and the closing of thousands of factories. it has called forth a sudden demand for certain quantities of ammunition, horses, wagons, hospital supplies, fuel, food and clothing, with a great increase in prices on these products. credit, which has been the natural and easiest way to carry on business between individuals and nations, has been put at naught. as a result, paper and silver have depreciated in value, and people begin to want gold, for in war gold is the only medium of exchange one can be sure of. unfortunately, at the present time, there is not enough gold to do the world's business, and owners of securities, day after day, have been trying to sell their stocks and bonds for gold. in many countries the governments have had to declare moratorium, which means that none need pay their rent and debts until further notice. the world's trade has been paralyzed; as a result, most of the stock exchanges of the world have had to shut down. the new york stock exchange and the chicago board of trade are included in this number, because if they kept open the foreign countries would exchange their shares and bonds for gold, and much of our gold would be carried to the other side. because of our added diplomatic responsibilities abroad, we have had to raise one million dollars, and also two and a half millions for the americans stranded on the other side. many of our factories have closed because they dealt in a heavy export trade and for which at present there is no demand. most noticeable in these trades are the manufactures of cotton, of metal, agricultural and other machinery, copper and lubricating oils. many others of our industries are without the goods which they import from abroad, including silks, wines, hides and skins, dyes, nitrate of soda, china, etc. this war has been such a jar to industrial conditions that many manufacturers are reducing their daily output considerably, while others who have a capital are afraid to invest, and are hoarding it in the banks. though it is impossible to say how long this war will last, one thing is sure, the loss to trades the world over is great and will increase as time goes on. worse still than the loss of trade and productive labor is the fact that actual capital is being destroyed, being really burned up. when the war is over there will be an enormous war debt to pay, and the loans on money will be high. this destruction of wealth and property means that many of the countries of the world will be poor for fifty years at least, and the value of railroad and other stocks in america and europe will depreciate. when the men of the world return to work, there will be a great fall in prices because of the greater amount of productive work, and it may result in a fall, at least a temporary fall in wages, though wages will increase after things are once more established. this war may be a boon to the financial and industrial life of our country and give us many new marts of trade in commerce, but while the war lasts it will mean financial strain and hard times in many industries. it certainly will cripple european life, civilization and culture for fifty years. the game of war is a dangerous and expensive one; it means the building of great war-boats, torpedoes and other submarines, as well as air-destroyers, along with the manufacture of bombs, mines, powder, etc. this war shows that the game is being played on such colossal scale that it may take many millions every year to add to the army, navy and air-craft. it is not to be forgotten that a great man-of-war costs from three to five million dollars, and a good torpedo boat many hundred thousands. the shooting of a cannon ball of a siege-gun means an expenditure of three thousand dollars for each fire, and it takes four shots to pierce a heavy fortification. the siege-gun can only be used about thirty times, and then it is useless. if this game of war is to be continued, it will mean the burning up of capital, depriving men and women of every luxury and many necessities for much of the energy of the world, and no less of the money must be used to that end. do you not hear a song more beautiful than the cries and groans of war? do you not hear the call of life and creation, the making of more homes and the caring for those homes? many hundred years ago men knew the game of war and practiced it, because they were savages, and in this way earned their livelihood. it was only after they rose from savages and barbarians to civilized men that they laid their bows and arrows aside to cultivate the arts of peace. on all sides are seen results of this work--in busy factories, in the laying of cables, in the building of railroads, in their engineering feats, and in the stretching of wires overhead. their towns grew until they became cities and capitals, made splendid by fine pavements and sidewalks, adorned with many handsome public buildings, gates, fountains, statues, etc. a testimony of all this beauty and energy is seen in such capitals as berlin, paris, london and washington. these cities have given pleasure to millions of people, and this beauty has had large commercial value to these countries. these capitals are a pride to the people who live there, and a never-forgotten pleasure to those who have spent happy days visiting their libraries, picture galleries, museums and gardens. two of these cities, berlin and paris, are splendid examples of what can be done where there is plenty of civic pride. berlin is a symbol of law and order in its large, well-kept streets, splendid gardens and imposing public buildings. paris is a woman's city--it breathes with joy and artistic grace. this note is symbolized on a sunny afternoon at the place de la concorde, and in the bois in the springtime, when you see thousands of happy children at play. these two cities, along with our own beautiful capital adorned with its many handsome avenues, public buildings and private mansions, testify for uplift and civic pride. it will be impossible to have many beautiful cities and to improve our civic conditions if we go on playing this awful game of war, which means the destruction of capital and what man has made. but if we disarm and make other nations disarm after gratifying the most immediate needs, there will be plenty of money left for libraries, great and small, libraries for the city, and libraries for the town, for museums and galleries, for public universities, for parks and gardens adorned with statues and fountains, for the building of bridges and the making of good roads. these are the things that are beautiful and worth while. they are the complement to nature's work and god's work, and the sun will glorify them during the day and the stars will bless them at night, for creation and not destruction is the purpose of this universe. some questions answered as to the causes of the war the questions uppermost in the minds of many people are: "how will the war end? when will it end? who is in the right? and who is in the wrong?" since our country has declared neutrality, there is only one thing for every sensible american to do--to have sympathy for every man who has been called to the front, and for every family left worrying and in want at home. there are a number of questions that enter into this war. foremost among these is militarism. there is not a country at war today that believes that a government is made for its people, their theory being that a people belongs to its government. therefore it is the interest of the country, not the interest of the individual, that counts. this idea is part and parcel of the old feudal form of government, where there were a few mighty feudal lords and many vassals or dependents. these dependents lived on the estates of their lords and got their sustenance from them. in turn they had to swear life and death allegiance to their lords, fight for them in times of danger, accompany them on crusades and amuse them in time of peace in jousts and tournaments. though feudalism as a form of government is no longer fashionable, it still survives in spirit. thousands of men are employed in europe in different ways by their governments or by their monarchs, and they are in honor bound to fight for these kings and princes. in times of danger, these men are employed on railroads belonging to the government, working in palaces or on royal estates, or in the army. there are many old towns in europe where you see feudal palaces perched on high hills or overhanging crags. these were protected by drawbridges, moats or great encircling walls. all that remain of their past glory are the deserted ruins, mouldered walls and drawbridges, but the spirit of these feudal rulers still remains. they now live in capitals in the winter and on lovely estates in the summer. they have from five to twenty estates apiece. many of these places are only used a few weeks out of the year. their permanent residences are adorned with priceless furniture, tapestries and ornaments. these are kept up by a retinue of servants, while even those that are occupied for a short time call for plenty of care and expense for their maintenance. hard though it is to believe, there are palaces that have been twenty years in the process of building and are still not completed. when a new monarch comes to the throne it is not unusual to have his palace refurnished from top to bottom. entertaining at these courts means a great expenditure of money, for their china-closets are crowded with priceless china, finest glass, silver and gold service for all occasions. though the menus planned for any of these state affairs are costly, the great extravagance comes in the fine wine-cellars, rare fruits, and the hot-house flowers used for decorations. i have walked over royal estates for a half-day without reaching their limit. the place included summer houses, pagodas, alleys, private promenades, stables and carriage-houses. more than one royal stable in europe has more than two hundred royal carriages. among these are coronation coaches, state coaches, funeral coaches, guest coaches and private coaches. the finest of these are lacquered with silver and gold, while the harnesses and whips are made of real silver and gold. the private carriages include landaus, victorias, and a great number of fine automobiles. many of these are used only a year or two, and then are sold or exchanged for others. even more splendid are the stables, which include fine horses and beautiful ponies gathered from many parts of europe and the orient. the caring of these horses involves much work and cost. i have seen as many as a hundred men at work caring for one of these royal stables. some of these horses have rare pedigrees and need excellent care. they are not used on all occasions--some are kept for state functions, others for private use, and still others for military practice. a court is not complete without handsome coronation jewels to be worn at coronations and great state balls. these include priceless crowns studded with diamonds, pearls, sapphires; vieing with these are ropes of pearls, pearl and diamond rings, high orders set with diamonds, rubies and emeralds, and gold swords with hilts set with brilliants and rubies. a country might have all these things, and still she would be lacking in dignity unless she had her own royal guard. these stand watch day and night to guard the palace, and to change guards is accompanied with so much ceremony that it often takes an hour's time. if it takes a royal guard of nearly a thousand men to protect a palace, it requires a good-sized standing army and navy to protect any of these royal countries. the newest of these countries can boast that her army is not an integral part of her government. even france, which is a republic in name, is a military form of government; it is the army and the army man that has the last word to say. a part of this royal system of government is colonization. just as spain counted her power and wealth in her colonies, so do most of the other european powers do so today. england gets much of her strength and wealth from her colonies--they work for her, give her men in times of danger, and permit her to control the channel with courage and boats. her imperialism gave her the courage to tell us that she claimed certain rights to the panama canal because of the hay-pauncefote treaty. though india and canada have brought her much wealth and strength, many say that she has looked upon java, holland's rich possession, with an envious eye, while much of her friendship for france is based on her african possessions. though france has not an enormous population, she always speaks of her need of more territory which she has found in morocco, while even the smaller countries, such as belgium and holland, have valued their colonies as their greatest prize. germany is the last of the great powers to look for colonies. this she has done because she found her own territory too small for her growing population. after looking about carefully, she found out the easiest way to enlarge her territory was to get more control in africa. the question was finally settled when france gave her a small part of the congo. this was done almost at the price of the sword and the bayonet, and france and england then decided that they would cry halt if germany tried for any other extension of territory in africa. at the same time france had not forgotten that she had given alsace-lorraine to germany by the treaty of 1871, and she hoped to get it back again some time in the future. russia and austria had not been friends for many years, and germany increased this feeling for herself when she made an alliance with austria in 1879. russia had always looked upon austria as her chief enemy, and she was greatly irritated by germany's alliance. russia thought by joining hands with france she would offset the power of germany and austria. the triple entente thus faced the triple alliance. england, isolated from the continent of europe, was not worried by the triple alliance until she saw germany spring up as a great commercial nation. she looked upon germany as her chief commercial rival, for she saw the trade-mark "made in england" gradually being supplanted by that "made in germany." english merchants managed to tolerate german merchants in the markets of europe, but when england saw that germany was beginning to build up a strong sea-power, she was determined to offset her by courting the dual alliance of france and russia. the terms of her agreement with these two powers have never been published, but it was probably arranged that if russia or france should ever get in any serious difficulty, england would mediate for them. this was to be a protection to england, and a check to germany on the one side and the balkan states on the other. for servia had not forgotten that austria had annexed bosnia and herzegovnia in 1908. by stepping forward in the list against austria, servia became, as it were, a protector to the balkans, and a thorn in the side of austria. she did this because bosnia is inhabited by people of serb speech. russia, while acting as a protector of servia, saw the advantage of using servia as a cat's-paw. the murder of the austrian prince and princess by the servian government, backed by russian influence, was merely the match that set the powers of europe fighting together. whether the conflagration should spread beyond servia depended on austria and russia's attitude. austria hoped to confine the fight to servia, while russia showed her warlike attitude by mobilization. in mobilizing, russia showed a hostile attitude toward austria and germany. after the russian general mobilization became known in germany, the imperial ambassador at st. petersburg was instructed, on the 31st of july, to explain to the russian government that germany declared the state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilization of the russian army and navy, which must be followed by mobilization if russia did not cease its military measures against germany and austria-hungary within twelve hours, and notified germany thereof. as the time then given to russia had expired without the receipt of reply to the emperor's inquiry, the emperor ordered the mobilization of the entire army and navy on august the first at five p. m. the german ambassador at st. petersburg was instructed that in the event of the russian government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stated time, he should declare that germany considered itself in a state of war after a refusal of her demands. however, a confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, russian troops crossed the frontier, and marched into german territory. a few hours later france mobilized, and the next day opened hostilities. there were still hopes that england would come to the fore and settle the dispute. she said that she would remain neutral, providing germany did not touch french coast, russian coast, and respected the neutrality of belgium. but germany did not see how to make this promise and still meet her two formidable enemies, and thus a world-war began. just as it will take time to say who will be the winner and who the loser by this war, so it will take time to say who was responsible for this condition. for nations as well as for individuals, supremacy becomes mere madness when it is gained by guns and battleships. this bellicose system may once have been popular when piracy and feudalism prevailed, but this military peace, which trembles and rumbles all the time, forewarns earthquakes. it was an american who made the peace palace a reality. it must be america again who will make eternal peace more than a promise. when the time comes for the stopping of this awful carnage and bloodshed, america must insist that every nation in the world shall lay down her arms and that they shall change their men-of-war into merchant marines for the benefit of mankind. this is the fulfillment of the building of the panama canal. what the world-war will mean to womankind have you ever stopped to think what this world-war will mean to womankind? while thousands of germans, russians, french and english are daily slaughtered, wounded or captured, what does this mean to the thousands of women who are patiently waiting for their return? though the fewest of the european women want war, or are in any way responsible for it, they are taught to believe that every man belongs to his country first and to his family afterwards. if you were in germany during this life-and-death struggle you would certainly find out that the german women are natural or at least trained spartans. they are confident in the belief that however much a man is needed at home, he is more necessary to his country when she is in danger. this is the belief of rich and poor alike--the kaiserin and the crown princess hold to this ideal. no less than the poorest bavarian peasant woman, the kaiserin and the crown princess were at potsdam when the war broke out. they did not suffer their husbands' return to berlin alone, but came into the city with them, drove through the city, and were recognized by the people as part protectors of the country. whenever the emperor came out on the balcony to address his people, he was accompanied by his wife. she showed so much self-control and determination that many of the people said they had two rulers instead of one. when the landsturm were called out it was rumored that the emperor was going to leave berlin for the front that very evening. one of the kaiserin's intimate friends asked her what she would do while the emperor was gone. "what shall i do?" was the sensible reply. "but stay at home and look after all my children; this means all the women and children in the land who need me, as well as all the soldiers who are brought back wounded." that these were not idle words is shown by the fact that as soon as war was declared the empress gave forty thousand dollars out of her own private fortune to the red cross. ever since the war started she has spent all her leisure time visiting the different red cross hospitals to see that all the soldiers were getting the proper food and attention. her work has not stopped here; she went to all the markets to see that all the provisions possible were being brought in to the people, and that food should not be raised above the ordinary prices. though the crown princess is a happy mother of four lovely boys, as soon as the war broke out she and her children accompanied the crown prince to the palace. as she drove through the streets, she was received with the same enthusiastic cries as her husband, for she is greatly beloved by her people, and they knew that she would do her duty at home while her husband was leading his division to war. her lovely face was brightened by the usual happy smile, showing that she was ready to do her part rather than to thrust her burdens on the world. she turned over one of her palaces at once as a hospital, and took personal charge of the work herself. she is doing as much work as the red cross nurses, and, though her husband has been in many dangerous positions since the war broke out, she has never shown any personal anxiety. that the emperor appreciates this is shown by a telegram he recently sent to his daughter-in-law: "i rejoice with thee in the first victory of william. god has been on his side and has most brilliantly supported him. to him be thanks and honor. i sent to william the iron cross of the second and first class." the other daughters-in-law of the kaiser have shown the same courage and forbearance. princess eitel friedrich said goodbye to her husband with as much enthusiasm, while the youngest, joachim, who has just been married, was hurried to the church for a second marriage before the war. even the young princess louise, who is the mother of a young baby, had to say farewell to her beloved husband who went to join his regiment. she went up to visit her mother for a few days in berlin, and then hurried home to look after her baby and the people. their example has been followed by all the princesses of germany who, besides acting as regents while their husbands are gone, are giving all their time to red cross centers. hardly had the war been declared when thousands of women of all classes offered themselves to different red cross centers. when told that they had never had any training in red cross work they begged for some menial position, such as supplying the soldiers with food and drink as they came in and out of the stations. many have applied to the dietary cooking schools, where they are doing special cooking for the soldiers, and now they are glad that they were taught to cook at home. many of the maids in private homes are too impatient to stay and do their routine work, and they have also gone to the red cross centers without pay. as one maid said, in a small bavarian town, "how can i see others working for their country while i stay on and work for myself? though i have only two hands to give, i give them willingly for the red cross work. i can clean rooms and scrub floors, if i cannot do anything else." this same determination and courage came to the women when they told their husbands and sweethearts goodbye. in the small towns the women and girls waited for hours to see their husbands and sons go out. though their hearts may have been heavy, their faces wore happy smiles, as they shouted: "alas, farewell!" or an enthusiastic: "auf wiedersehen." in their own homes they showed the same courage and determination, as one girl said to me, "i was coming home with my sweetheart yesterday, and i couldn't help but cry just a little when i told him goodbye, but my sister-in-law never shed a tear when her husband left. she got his things ready in a hurry, and, when he went down the street, she took her child on her arms and stood in the window waving to him until he was out of sight." one german woman had six children and her husband go to war, and when one of her friends tried to console her, she answered: "my only regret is that i haven't six more to give to my country." the officials' wives have shown the same splendid daring. many of them are young married women with babies. they hurried to berlin with their husbands to visit with them a day or two before the men should be called into active service. they were seen walking with them unter den linden, or dining with them in restaurants. they talked of everything but war, and when the time came to say goodbye they hurried to the trains and bade them goodbye, as though they were only going on a short trip. the families in need of support, while husbands and brothers are gone, have found much protection in daughters and sisters. thousands have taken up men's work in the cities and in the country. they are working long hours to fill the gaps in banks, postoffices and railroads. most of the drygoods stores turned over the positions in the family to a wife or daughter so that the family may not need. even girls offered themselves as conductors and motormen on street cars. they proved themselves competent for conductors, but they found the work of motorman too strenuous. the women on the farms have been working long hours for their children, sometimes weakening under their load to bring in the rich harvest. though the belgian men showed that they had splendid courage in fighting for their principle of neutrality, the real heroines were their women. in more combats than one, when they saw their men worsted, they seized the guns and swords strewn on the battlefields and even fought in hand combats with their enemies and would not give up even when worsted. when their houses and towns were on fire they refused to retreat. the consort of the king of belgium, though she has three little children of her own, has given a large part of her private fortune and most of her time trying to provide her people with food and shelter. though holland was the first to mobilize when war was declared. queen wilhelmina insisted, through her ministers, that her country was to keep perfect neutrality. this she has reiterated time and again. as she says, "not that i have so much fear for the horrors of war, but i do not wish to see my women and children suffer the hardships resulting from war." the french women have the reputation of being timid and light-hearted, but this war shows they have plenty of courage and self-control. when war first broke out in france some of the people, especially in the large cities, were hysterical, for they had not forgotten the experiences suffered in the franco-prussian war. but the courage shown by the women to do or die, soon brought a great reaction of self-control. hundreds of women were seen promenading in the woods or sitting at the cafã©s just as though nothing important had taken place. many of the wealthy french women in paris and in the suburbs turned their beautiful homes into hospitals for wounded soldiers. thousands of others have formed red cross centers. the more experienced in nursing hurried to get commissions following their husbands to the battlefield, while hundreds of less fortunate have been sewing at home or in schools. they have also been busy providing food and clothing for destitute families. the english women are more isolated by their position, still they have not been lacking in providing their men with the few comforts that war can offer. they have formed red cross centers, gone off to nurse their soldiers and offered their services on battleships. though america has not been in the war her women have not been negligent in doing their part to allay the suffering and hardships of combat. no sooner was the rumor of war given than did the national red cross of america start a campaign for the purpose of sending red cross nurses and supplies to all great centers of europe. this involved many technical difficulties as well as plenty of work and expense. for, besides painting the ship white, it was understood that the entire crew was to be american men. they had to get plenty of money together so as to make the work efficient. before fitting out their supplies they canvassed the different countries of europe, finding out what were the especial needs of the different armies. they heard that one country was in special need of stretchers, a second absorbent cotton, a third hospital gauze. thousands of americans living abroad have joined the red cross centers of the cities in which they were living and are giving much of their time and money to strengthening the work. others who were in the war zone and waiting necessary accommodations to get home, interested themselves forming circles among their friends and giving their contributions to the general store, while the wives of our different ambassadors have stood at their post giving of their strength and fortunes to needy and destitute americans, who daily come to them in distress. when advised that they should return home for safety they answered that their places were at the side of their husbands. this is an epitome of what woman has done to relieve suffering, but what does war mean to her? it means the useless sacrifice of those that are nearest and dearest. it means the breaking of the nearest of the family ties, of the love and protection that makes these homes happy and complete. this war is daily creating heartaches and wounds for thousands of women and children that can never be compensated by any possible glory of war. this war will create millions of tear-stained faces, millions of breaking hearts that can never be comforted nor ever be made joyous. even when these young widows reach an age when their hair will be tinged with white, they can never forget the hardships that are now being made by this ruthless combat. these women may yoke their backs to the burden and bear their suffering in silence, but the grief will be greater for being suppressed. the pictures of daily suffering are too dramatic and too intense to be forgotten in a year or in a lifetime. millions of these women have gone through the trials and sufferings of child-birth with a joy in their hearts that they could be the proud mothers of good families. these same mothers are now being forced to give these sons for useless slaughter so that the greed of nations can be appeased. but the hardships will not end with the loss of life, it will mean the sacrifice of every luxury, every comfort and even the bare necessities of life for thousands and thousands of women. the main support of their family gone, they will have to offer themselves as bread winners for their families. thousands of good businesses and factories have already been swept to the ground, and thousands more will be destroyed before this war is ended. millions of unprotected women and girls will cry for work, but after cities and towns are destroyed there will be little left for those in need. but there will be other hardships for these many unprotected mothers and daughters. thousands of families have worked and saved for years to buy small homes and farms which they might call their own, and these have been destroyed like beautiful grain by a horrible gale. thousands of others have saved for years to possess small fortunes, and these have all been destroyed. o, thinking woman, woman of all lands, do you call death, destruction of life and property, glory of war? did god create human lives and fertile lands to have them all fall before the greed of man? if he had done this, he would be an unjust god, but since his watchword is "glory to god in the highest, peace on earth, goodwill to men," it is your duty, mother of the race to come, to cry halt to this awful carnage, to make your watchword in your prayer brotherly love instead of brotherly hate. for if there is one god, there is one brotherhood, and all humanity can only be linked to that god by brotherly love. ask your american friends how it feels to be without money. if "war is hell," then to be in a strange country without credit and funds is certainly purgatory. if you do not believe this to be true, ask any of your friends who happened to be in the war zone and they will certainly corroborate my story. though i was grief-stricken by the news that the great powers of europe had decided to wage a world-war, i knew that this feeling was intensified when the banks of germany refused to recognize any foreign letters of credit. i should not have had a dollar to my name had my mother been well, but as she was quite sick i went to the bank twice that week, for i thought if she were worse later i could not leave her. we had just paid a week's board-bill and i vowed that we should not pay another until the banks gave us more money. i was so angry when i saw another week sneak round and another bill appear, that i left it unopened on my bureau for a week. before long i realized that being angry would do no good. i must hustle and get some credit. the first few days it was hopeless, for there was a perfect run on the two small banks in our town; sometimes there were several hundred people waiting at the doors for them to open. most of these were russians and poles trying to get the money out of the banks and to hurry home before it was too late. one day i worked my way through the crowd and got to the cashier's desk, where i was refused. the clerk said that he would give me change, but since england had made war it was foolish to take their checks, as it might be months before he could cash them. i saw it was foolish to argue the point, but i was furious, as up to this time he had been so solicitous about our having enough money. the clerks at the other bank were even more disagreeable. they were all right to the germans, but they treated americans as a lot of dead-beats, who were more accustomed to travel on credit. but i was comforted by the fact that though there were plenty of wealthy men in our sanitarium, they were all in the same box. there were a half-dozen millionaires whose united fortunes represented at least fifty million dollars, but they could not raise five hundred dollars on it. they said little, but the seriousness of their faces showed they thought much. if they ever knew what poverty meant it was so many years ago that they had forgotten all about its sting. these tight circumstances did not bring out the soft, kind side of their nature, it seemed to make them skeptics instead. they were silent and taciturn, and acted as though a short conversation indicated a "financial touch." one of our multi-millionaires, who poses as a splendid church-worker, never let his acquaintanceship extend beyond a nod or a "how do you do," as though he thought a warmer friendship meant financial aid. he was traveling with a friend who had less in fortune, but more heart. his friend promised to look after mother and me, but somehow the philanthropist put a damper on the promise. i then turned to a wealthy brewer and he said that he would o. k. our bills if we did not get the money. this remained a promise, for he never was tested to put his promise into execution, though he did go into the bank one day and tell the clerk to give us twenty pounds more. it came about, after worrying and waiting a week, in this way: the word came that our government had arranged so that we were to get some money on our letters of credit. after standing out in the hot sun a half-day the bank clerk gave my mother and me one hundred and fifty dollars on two letters of credit. i objected, saying that we were entitled to one hundred and fifty dollars apiece. the clerk replied curtly that the money to be paid out was at his discretion. the one hundred and fifty dollars was intended for traveling expenses until we should reach berlin. he did not seem to take cognizance of the fact that we had a two weeks' board-bill to pay before we should get that far. when i appeared with my mother a few days later in quest of more money he was furious, as he accused me of calling him a d-thing, though i had only accused him of being a disagreeable person. it looked for a while as though the bank clerk was determined to have me arrested for calling him a bad name. i afterward learned that even in homes of peace you can be arrested for calling bad names and the offence becomes worse in war times. i was afraid that he might accuse me next of being a spy, so i made my escape and never saw the man again. the brewer and my mother finally quieted him and he gave us twenty pounds, or one hundred dollars, more. some of the men finally arranged so that they got a few hundred dollars every week, at least enough to pay their board. but i consoled myself by saying that there were some who had less credit than we had. there was an american man who had lived for years in china, and he said that he could not get a dollar. a chicago lawyer took pity and shared his fifty pounds with him, trusting to fate to get some more. after realizing fully that i could not get any money from the small bank, and in such desperate times it was foolish to depend on promises for aid, i decided to campaign for more money. just before the cables had been closed, i had been advised from home to seek advice and financial aid, if necessary, from two men in frankfurt; the one i had met six months before and the other i did not know. at first i thought i would take a train and go up to frankfurt to shorten the process of borrowing money. though it is only a five hours' trip, under ordinary circumstances, from where i was, it had been prolonged to a fourteen hours' journey. i did not want to trust to the mail, as less than ten per cent. of the letters written were being received. i was glad to find out that i could wire for twenty-five cents, as money was too precious to be wasted on long distance messages, and it broke my heart every time i had to send a cable. one evening i decided to find our frankfurt friend. i soon discovered i had undertaken a large contract. when i looked in the directory i could not find his business address. i was about to give up in despair when the happy thought came that i might find it in the telephone book. i found the name, heilburg, 61 beethoven strasse. it's fortunate that many of the streets in germany are named after the composers and artists, for though i had only been there once, i remembered they lived on a musical street. after waiting a half-hour i got my party, and had as much difficulty in making him remember who i was as i had in holding an intelligible german conversation over the 'phone. i thought the man would drop at the 'phone when i asked him for two hundred and fifty dollars, and he compromised on half the amount. though his intentions were the best, it took a week's hard telephoning every day until i actually had the money in my hand. in the meanwhile i had received another cable from home telling me to call up a certain banker in frankfurt. when i approached him on the same subject on the 'phone, he said he had never heard my name before, and i could not expect him to hand out money to a person he did not know. i acquiesced in his statement and said that his brother in america was a great friend of my brother. to this he answered he believed all i said was true, but did not see how he could loan me money without being authorized. finally we compromised on seventy-five dollars, and he promised to let me have more if i sent our letter of credit. i refused to do that, as i knew it would only be lost in the mail. i decided that i had enough to pay my board-bill for the next two weeks and that was a good deal more than others had, many of whom were living on credit or paying with checks and drafts. there were two or three of our guests who did not have dollar to their name, for all the english and french credit had been cut off. at the end of two weeks i saw my funds being depleted and i decided it was necessary to start on another campaign. in the meantime i had received a letter from a cousin in dresden and i answered that i could use a little money. that week she sent me two hundred dollars, which paid our board-bill and debts accrued on telephone, telegraph and cable messages. when i left i still owed one week's board-bill. at first it looked as though our host did not intend to let us go without paying, but when he saw i was firm about paying no more he yielded, and said the rest could be paid after we got home. money was so tight there for four weeks that anything beyond spending a penny for a newspaper was considered foolish extravagance, and i scolded my mother one day for spending twenty-five cents for flowers. every time i took a carriage to make a long business journey i considered myself wicked, and a carriage ride for pleasure was out of the question. the only extravagance i knew was giving some money to the red cross society and some generous tips to the men who went off to the war. at times i thought i should forget how to shop if i ever reached the point where i had plenty of money of my own. the condition of americans in berlin was not much better. i met friends with less than a dollar in their pockets. a doctor and his wife had come up from carlsbad to berlin with a quarter between them. here they were fortunate enough to meet a friend who loaned them two hundred and fifty dollars for a ticket and traveling expenses. there was a professor and his wife who were trying to get a second-class ticket on a holland-american boat, though they only had twenty-five dollars in their pockets. they trusted to luck for their ticket and their money. good fortune favored them, for on their way from berlin to holland they met a southern man, who helped them get their ticket and paid for it. every day dozens of young girls who had been studying abroad, and teachers off for a summer's holiday, presented themselves at the german embassy, telling their hard-luck stories of how they were down to the last cent, and that they would have to be home by the time school opened. mrs. gerard took care of many of these cases herself and saw to it that they were provided with third-class tickets. at the hotel where i was stopping i met an american lady with three daughters. she said that they had enough funds to take them home in four weeks by the strictest kind of management. the mother and the two young girls had taken over the task of doing the family washing in the bathtub, while the eldest girl was earning one dollar a day for stenographic work at the embassy. a little later i met two girls who had been in hamburg. they managed to pay their board and part of their tickets by helping the council out there. i soon found out that even with money in my pocket, it was hard to make money count, for when it came to getting change they would only give you paper money of small denominations. gold was the only thing that spoke, and silver was as much at a premium as paper was worthless. i found many people who were going without their next meal because they could not get their paper money changed. i went on a shopping expedition for an hour one morning, just to get a hundred marks changed. i was told that thousands of americans were stranded in switzerland, who were without a dollar and without a ticket. as a friend wrote to me, "it is a pitiable sight to see so many of our american women and children, including artists, invalids, school teachers, and mothers with families, who have been educating their children in switzerland, driven almost to destitution. they come back with tears in their eyes from swiss banks, because the clerks try to find any possible flaw in their drafts and refuse to honor their letters of credit. even the more generous of these bankers have only a few hundred dollars a week on which to do business. "those of us who are living in swiss families and boarding houses are fortunate, for the swiss people are intelligent to understand our predicament and to feel sorry for us. but many have been living in fashionable hotels, where the prices mounted immediately when tourists came piling in by the hundreds. these proprietors expect to have their bills paid weekly, which means that many of their guests are without a dollar. i am sure that more than one wealthy woman has parted with more than one handsome piece of jewelry to pay a week's board bill for herself and her children. the question uppermost in every one's mind is, "when will the tennessee with its chest of two hundred million dollars arrive, voted by congress for the relief of americans?" "i am sure that the greatest hardships are being known by those who have been living in the mountain resorts in switzerland, where they have been cut off from all communication. i have seen a number of such people come staggering into our town carrying dress-suitcases, exhausted for want of food and sleep." on our boat coming home there were a number of destitute cases, men and women without a dollar to their name. after a few days a committee of wealthy men got up a fund to help them out. the day before our boat landed a new york citizens' club sent word to our captain that they should look up the destitute cases and they should be provided with money when they reached new york. among the cases presented some were worthy and some were not. one woman made her plea that she had been separated from her husband a few years before, as a reason for getting money, though she had plenty to take her home. the american women had been made destitute by losing all their baggage and can count their material wealth in dress-suitcases. the first time i decided to start for holland the railroads were allowing tourists to take their trunks with them, but two weeks later they said they would not be responsible for any baggage taken. the most daring took a chance, only to leave their luggage in the stations. i saw stations that were piled high with five thousand and more american trunks. some of the people were fortunate to get their trunks to the frontier, only to lose them on the boundary line. my mother and i left eight trunks on the other side. these are divided between france and germany. still we are glad that they are distributed in this way, for however the war goes, we ought to get some of our belongings. on our boat i heard that there are nearly a hundred thousand american trunks in paris and the same number in london. unless these trunks are regained, many a woman will have to content herself with two dresses and one hat this winter. on our boat many a woman bewailed the loss of her trunks, as she said, "just to think, this is my first trip to europe and i haven't got one thing to show for it. it has been the dream of my life to say i owned a paris dress and hat. a hundred dollars is a good deal to pay for a hat and a dress, but certainly they were worth it, if i only had something to show for it. "i didn't mind for myself, but it doesn't seem like being away unless you have presents for the family at home. i had bought my sisters each a handsome evening bag, mother a handsome scarf and father a beautiful amber pipe." these hard straits are in marked contrast with the luxurious way in which americans have been traveling and living abroad the last ten years. our steamers have reached a point where they were perfect ocean palaces, comparable with the finest new york hotels. the hotels in europe have been transformed from simple boarding houses to marble palaces, equipped with every luxury and comfort. a room and bath in any first-class hotel brought seven dollars a day and a suite of rooms at thirty was not considered extreme. many of the restaurants were so fine and fashionable that they didn't even print prices on their bills of fare. in the summer resorts ten years ago, a hotel keeper boasted of having an omnibus to take the people to the station, an elevator and a few bathrooms. to-day these simple hotels have been transformed into perfect palaces. golf links, tennis courts and tango teas. the americans are in no small part responsible for these high prices and foolish luxuries. these hard times, experienced in the war zone, may result in bringing them to their common sense, so that they can again enjoy the simple living. what the queen of holland is doing to preserve peace if you were only in holland for a few days you would find out that wilhelmina is the best ruler in europe and one of the ablest stateswomen. no sooner had europe gone to war than she had her government give orders for mobilization. little holland was the first after the declaration of war to declare neutrality, and they have kept their faith in not giving aid nor showing any partiality to either side. this has been no small task, for england has been pressing her on one side to join the allies and germany would like to use her in a material way, especially in the bringing in of food supplies. england has time and again made charges that she was assisting germany in spite of her neutrality. on the other hand england has several times seized food supplies that belonged to holland, saying that she was importing them to send them on to germany. in spite of these difficulties, such as seizing dutch boats, because they carried germans and austrians going home to fight for their country, the queen of holland, backed by her country, has shown an abundance of common sense. at a recent opening of parliament she addressed her people, saying she hoped she could keep perfect neutrality. this they would do unless they were forced into the war, for both she and her people wanted peace more than anything else in the world. in order to maintain this peace in an honorable way, she, sided by her ministers, has done everything in her power to make a bold stand should one or the other of the nations cross the boundary. when in holland a few weeks ago, i had the good fortune to cross one of the dutch frontiers. the boundary was well guarded with men to see that none of the marching men nor contraband of war should be carried across the border. the entire standing army and a large part of the reserves, nearly a hundred thousand men in all, are scattered between the cities and the boundaries. it is said that she can call a much larger force to the front in case of actual warfare than she has at present. in nearly all the large cities, such as the hague, amsterdam and rotterdam, i saw a large number of young men going through all kinds of military tactics. they were learning how to drill, how to fire, how to dig ditches and build impromptu forts in haste. that holland is determined to make a bold stand and fight for her rights if needed, is shown by the fact that she has mined her coast and dynamited her bridges so that she can cut her dams on short notice. there was such a rumor the day we were at the hague. it had been falsely rumored that the german consul had been recalled that day and that the country would be flooded within twenty-four hours. the dutch took little credence of these wild rumors, and continued their business and went through their work of mobilizing in the same quiet, energetic way. in spite of their delicate position, there is not a country in europe that seemed less interested in the war than this north country. the hotel-keepers were too busy looking after the welfare and comforts of tired americans to take time to discuss war. the shopkeepers were too busy supplying the tourists who had any money left with old dutch silver and delftware to worry about the war. while the steamship company were too occupied enlarging their boats with auxiliary cabins, getting extra crews and recalling their captains, who had already been sent to the front, to bother their heads about war scares. it may be a mere coincidence, still it is a strange one, that some of the persecuted forefathers fled from england and remained in holland until they came to our america. it is just a little strange that an american gave such a handsome peace palace to the world, and it should find its place in holland. it is no less strange that the queen of holland and her ministers have taken such an active part in all the peace movements. in the last few weeks they have been most energetic in succoring americans who fled from germany and austria, and she has been most active in getting these refugees home. as i saw the queen of holland leave her palace one afternoon in an automobile, the crowds waiting about her palace to greet her showed that she is near and dear to all her subjects. the fact that she was not surrounded by any soldiers or civil service men shows that she has nothing to fear from assassins. every man in the crowd took off his hat as a mark of respect, while the women greeted her with shouts and the waving of handkerchiefs. though she is the third richest ruler in europe, she refuses to indulge in any foolish extravagance. her palace at the hague is pretty, but simple, while she finds the one in amsterdam too large and too expensive for common use. she spends a large part of her own private fortune for providing creches, an old people's home. she is never so happy as when she finds among her people an energetic mother with a good-sized family. the one great unhappiness in queen wilhelmina's girlhood was that she wanted children and was deprived of having them. her mother and friends say that she has grown ten years younger since she had her little daughter. she is the pride of her mother's heart, though the queen makes every effort to see that she is not pampered by herself or her subjects. although queen wilhelmina is fonder of her home and more interested in the welfare of her subjects than she is of public life, she is a splendid stateswoman and diplomat. she never signs any paper, whether it is important or unimportant, without carefully studying its contents. there is little about the history of her people or her kingdom that she does not know, for she believes much of her ability as a ruler depends on her knowledge of the past history of her country. she is very proud of her own ancestors and her people, because she says that they have been brave at sea and at home and have always aimed to play fair. she has not been blind to the fact that her neighbor, england, has been jealous of some of her colonies, especially of java. but she does not believe in worrying about that fact. on the other hand, she is also aware that in the past germany dreamed of some day uniting holland to her own territory, if not by conquest by the coming of a german heir. the queen smiles when she thinks of the dutch people becoming english or germans, for she says they are too fond of flowers, windmills, cows and meadows to be anything but good dutch people. the queen of holland realizes that her people are divided in their feeling in this war. the peasants and the fisherfolk feel that they have more to gain by being friends of england, and they are strong pro-english in their feeling. the aristocratic party sympathizes with germany, either because they have large business interests in germany or they are related by inter-marriage. though the queen of holland is married to a german prince, her attitude is one of neutrality in thought and action. whenever any of her politicians or friends try to get her frank opinion she changes the subject by talking of home affairs, such as "how is your lovely wife and your family?" because she is interested in the things nearest to her country and to her heart, she develops the trades of her people instead of spending their money for building great bulwarks of defense against the enemy that may want to devour her. she places more confidence in the men of her country and their loyalty, aided by her dams and dykes, than in a large costly army and navy. what royal women are doing while their husbands are at war it is a well-known fact, that in case of war, monarchs have a new responsibility thrown upon them, for they become commanders of the army along with their executive duties. most of these direct their campaigns from their own royal palaces and from the ministry of war. an exception to this is that of albert first, third king of belgium, and the emperor of germany. when king albert saw that his country was being attacked, and his people in danger, he took command of the army and left his wife to guard his three lovely children. crown prince leopold, aged thirteen; prince charles, aged eleven, and the little princess marie jose, aged nine. it was with trepidation and great grief that he told his young and beautiful queen elizabeth, of belgium, formerly princess of bavaria, good-by. she reminded him that her courage and determination had in no small part contributed to the reconstruction of the commerce, finance and order of their kingdom. if she had done this much she certainly could look after her own family now and do her part to ease the suffering of her people. she showed that this was more than a promise, for as soon as orders came for the evacuation of brussels she and her children left the palace and sought a new and simple home in the heavily fortified town of antwerp. this queen, who had endeared herself to her people by her heroism and thoughtfulness, was determined to do her duty now as she has always done since her husband came to the throne. wasting no time, she planned for the comforts of her children for the time she would be gone, and then enrolled as a red cross nurse. she has entered thousands of homes, left grief-stricken by the horrors of war, and has comforted thousands of heart-broken wives and mothers. kind words are only a small part of her methods. where they have been destitute for want of money and food she has made every effort to see that they were relieved of these material wants. not discouraged by the fact that she can get but a limited amount of money from the public treasury at this time, she uses most of her private fortune to carry on her work. in towns where she has visited and found families left shelterless, by the burning and sacking of homes, she has worked with tremendous energy to get these families into safe quarters and paid the rent herself. she has found work for hundreds of women to do in the fields and has given red cross work to many more, paying them out of her own purse. the empress of germany was not crushed by the news that germany was about to enter into a world war. when her husband appeared on the royal balcony and made his address to his people she was at his side, and though her face looked careworn there was no sign of weakening. while he was busy consulting with high government officials and ministry of war she was equally energetic doing her part to organize the red cross work throughout her empire. she at once gave thirty thousand dollars to the national fund, and from time to time has added to the general contribution. it is said that the emperor wept when he heard there was no alternative but war and explained to his sons that they must all go to the front at once, but his consort showed no sign of weakening, as she told her sons, one by one, good-by, and even when the sunday night came and she had to bid farewell to her husband. she busies herself all day sewing for the red cross and visiting the many hospitals in berlin, to which thousands of wounded soldiers are brought. though the crown princess cecelia has had the reputation of being worldly-minded and fond of all out-door sports, ever since the war broke out she has shown that she has a very serious side to her make-up. she was in potsdam with her four boys when the war news came, and when the crown prince hurriedly made up his mind to go to berlin, she and the children accompanied him. when they drove through the streets thousands of her country women greeted her with shouts and tossing of flowers and her happy, sweet manner, so free from fear, did much to inspire them with added courage. she drove to the station with her husband when he went to join his regiment, and instead of shedding tears she laughingly suggested that he write her and the children a love letter every day. then she busied herself looking after the palace she had given over for a hospital, looking after every detail of its furnishing. though she has four children of her own, who take much of her time, she never lets a day pass without visiting this hospital in person and makes it a point to see that every need of the wounded soldiers is gratified. she has given much enthusiasm to her two sisters-in-law, along with many thousands of german women, in their red cross efforts. because of her energy there are few circles of women in berlin, even to the american women living there, who are not doing red cross work. though holland was the first country to mobilize its army after war was declared, the queen of holland explained to her people that since holland was a peace-loving country, it would keep the strictest neutrality. though the country has been goaded on by the promises of gains on both sides, their little dutch ruler has refused to allow her people to do the slightest thing that might break her neutrality. though not a week has passed since the war began, without there being rumors that holland was about to be thrown into the arena of war and the country to be flooded, queen wilhelmina tends to her affairs of state and goes about her social duties just as though europe were in a state of perfect tranquility. on the opening of parliament, the other day, she discussed conditions and expenses caused by the war and explained that whatever this mobilization might cost they would continue to enforce this principle of neutrality. queen mary, of england, has always enjoyed the reputation of being a good mother and a capable housekeeper, rather than a social leader, since her husband came to the throne. but ever since war was declared, in england, she has been tremendously active in doing her share to supervise and enlarge the red cross work. though she never discusses the war with her husband or friends she spends every bit of her leisure making the rounds through all the hospitals in london, which are looking after wounded soldiers. very wealthy, in her own right, she has contributed quite a fortune to increasing the number of hospitals in london and adding to the red cross staff. her approach is always known by the many bundles she brings with her. more than once she has heard a sick soldier ask for something special to eat, a new pipe or a book, and she makes it a point the next day to see that his wish is gratified. though she has the reputation of being reticent among her friends, she never goes through a ward without passing a personal remark to every one of the wounded soldiers. every one of her acquaintances at court is doing red cross work, and many of them have entered into actual nursing on the battlefield largely through their queen's initiative. though queen elena of italy is a montenegrin princess, she has discouraged her people from joining the allies, after they had promised neutrality. at times this is no easy matter, as all of italy seems eager either to join the german flag or the standard of the allies. though it would seem that the queen might share the prejudices of her people, still she has not forgotten the promises her country has made to germany and austria. because of this fact she allows nobody in her presence, whether friends or employes in her home, to enter into a discussion of the present war. it is also well known that roumania only needs a spark to catch the flame, believing it may be possible for her to get something out of this present upheaval, but their sensible queen carmen sylvia is using her talented pen to speak the word of peace, while her daughter-in-law is employing her schools of sewing to contribute their part to the national red cross work. the lovely queen of greece never loses an opportunity, and up to the present time has been a potent factor in keeping her country out of war. though america has no queen to inspire us to the needs of suffering humanity in this crisis, through the initiative of many noble women, a red cross ship was fitted up at great expense to bring money, nurses and hospital supplies to all the powers at war. hundreds of circles are busy at work in many of our cities sewing for the national red cross society, or for some special red cross center. thousands of women, made refugees by the war in europe, many of whom are still unable to get home, are giving much of their time and as much money as they can afford to the red cross work. no less important has been their work of praying that war shall end and peace shall once more be established. for these women are determined that, if their voice counts, life shall never again be destroyed by war. what will the royal children do if their parents are put out of business? it has been rumored time and again that there is a possibility of most of the monarchs being put out of business by this war. the question then presents itself: "what may happen to their children?" certainly if the emperor were to be exiled, his sons have been so well educated that they will have no trouble in making a living at home or abroad. all except the youngest one, prince joachim, have visited one or the other of the german universities. they are well versed in the history of all countries as well as the literature and fine arts, so they would have little trouble in offering themselves as exchange professors in some of our large american universities. certainly their culture and information as to the real causes of the war would be valuable, and it would also do much to bring the two countries into closer and friendlier relations. if the crown prince did not favor this idea he would be counted an asset with his charming wife and their lovely family, both in our diplomatic society in washington and among the most ultra society of newport. for both the crown prince and his charming wife are very fond of americans and have always shown a decided interest for everything american including the tango, ragtime, golf and tennis. if the czar of russia should be put out of business he would find that his young heir would have to become more of an athlete and less pampered to be popular among young american boys, especially if he ever aspired to an american university. still the czarina's daughters are so beautiful and charming they would soon be made welcome wherever they went. their perfect manners and careful education would make them noticed anywhere and they are all beautiful dancers. the prince of wales, much like his grandfather, king edward, is a born diplomat and might certainly make himself valuable at our diplomatic court in washington. diplomacy is his natural bent, though he has felt it his duty to study the tactics of the navy. he has traveled much and has made it a point to study the life of a people wherever he has gone. his younger brothers have had a fine military and naval training and could certainly become officers in our own navy. his sister, the princess mary, is as charming as she is unspoiled. clothes and jewels play a small part in her life. she is a great reader and fond of traveling. her bringing up might show many an american mother how to bring up a daughter, heir to wealth and position, without being spoiled. if the king of italy were to be put out of business along with the others, his family, as neighbors, would be a pleasure anywhere, for both his little daughters and his two sons are as unspoiled as any children could be expected to be. they ride horseback, climb mountains, and fish and enjoy any kind of outdoor life without being a nuisance to their people or those about them. the queen of belgium has three young children, just like steps. though they are the loveliest among the royal children, they are the least spoiled. when their mother assumed the duties of housewife in brussels, she surrounded her children with plain, wholesome conditions. the late king leopold had robbed the palace of much of its splendor, but this sensible queen was pleased to see that her children could be brought up in a plain atmosphere. her two boys are splendid sailors and would have no trouble in entering the naval academy in our own country, while her little daughter knows all about housekeeping and is a beautiful sewer. she would certainly be a prize to any young man looking for a sensible wife. though kings sometimes have queer ideas as to what is best for their country, they, advised by their wives, nearly always train their children in a plain, sensible fashion. though they are surrounded by luxury, they enjoy very little of it themselves. before they are very old their hours are filled with study of some kind, and they are given little time for play. their days are crowded with military tactics, studies of their own and foreign countries, and diplomatic relations. an hour or two of rest a day is considered sufficient recreation and their summer vacations are limited to weeks instead of months. the german emperor at close range william ii at close range a great deal has been said about the firing lines of the different european countries, but little is known of the war lords at close range. though i have never hobnobbed with royalty i have lived for long stretches of time in the different capitals and cities of europe, especially in berlin. there i have seen the emperor and most of his family. i have seen william ii driving through the brandenburger gate hurrying from his city. i have seen him taking five-o'clock tea with his wife, his sons and their wives at sans souci, in potsdam. i have seen him addressing his people out on the balcony of his palace after war had been declared. in these three instances i saw three different types of man; the statesman, the father of a happy home, and the war lord. he is more than average tall and well built, still in the prime of life. his strong body and healthy color mark him as a man alive with energy. he stands for the famous hohenzollern, challenging eyes, full lips, retroussã© mustache and imperious air. still, as i looked at him more closely, i noticed that his left arm is withered--almost of no use. in spite of this hindrance he is an excellent, easy horseman, as much at home in the saddle as are his great generals. when at manoeuvres he has been known to sit nine hours at a time without any feeling of exhaustion. he proves himself no less energetic when hunting, which has been a favorite pastime for years. he has made a record of shooting for hours at a time without feeling much fatigue, even when bringing-down game two a minute. he has made hundreds of speeches on all subjects, that showed a gift of natural eloquence as well as a keen and impetuous nature. he believes in the divine mission of the hohenzollern. as he expresses it: "it is a tradition in our house to consider ourselves as designed by god to govern the people over which it is given us to reign. every day i think of ways of helping you, but you must help me, not by means of the opposition parties that you have so often rightly combated, but by explaining to your sovereign and having confidence in him." bismark disputed the emperor's right to act directly with his ministerial colleagues, citing a decree attributing to the prime minister alone the responsibility for official acts and prescribing that no important measure should be adopted without prior submission to him. it is to his army that he looked for greatest strength and support. "in my army we are made one for the other, and we shall remain closely bound whether god gives us war or peace. it is the soldier and the army, not majorities and parliamentary decisions, that have forged the unity of the german empire." he has a thorough knowledge of engineering and electricity, paints pictures, plays chess, and he does all this with the use of his one hand. he feels that all these things are his avocations, an outlet for his energy. with his great talent for organization, he realized that a country to be prosperous needs factories and plenty of trade schools. he was absorbed in the trade and commercial schools along with the school of forestry, which have had an international and enviable reputation, and which has made germany one of the great industrial powers of modern times. he gave every incentive to have his men stay at home in encouraging all kinds of factories, lake, and water ways, the building of canals, ocean liners and merchant marine. for it was the increasing of the numbers of ocean liners and merchant marine that made german merchandise popular and well-known in most of the ports of the world. he has kept abreast of the times regarding the manufactures in england and the united states. he has always taken an active interest in the machinery and electrical contrivances used in american factories and in the home. every year he sent many men to this country to study the methods employed in our shoe factories, tanneries, cotton mills, our electrical appliances and telephone services. as a result many of the german factories have the best of american machinery, american mechanics at the head, and they have worked out their telephone service, typewriters, adding machines and cash registers after our designs. though the emperor spent much of his time enlarging the army and navy, he considered these as a safeguard to his country, but it is the commercial interests of germany he has at heart most. he loved to read about the panama canal and to hear people discuss it, for he recognized it as the great engineering feat of the century. he would rather had it said that germany had built the panama canal than that she had organized the largest and strongest army in europe. so eager was he to know all these things that he mastered six languages fluently. he began his day's work at seven and continued it until five, with a short interval for his noonday meal and afternoon drive. though he often had a few intimate friends to supper, his evenings usually finished with work which lapsed way into midnight. though the emperor is often blamed as having precipitated the war, the point is overlooked that servia, backed by russia, was trying her utmost to disintegrate austria. when austria made war on servia without consulting germany, it was the war party in germany that held it was up to germany to help her ally. the emperor of germany was lukewarm in this matter. he felt that the war should be confined to austria and servia. he was surprised and grief-stricken when he returned to berlin and learned what had happened. it was only after he learned that england and france were backing russia that he considered the war justifiable. as he said, when he made his speech from the balcony, he hoped that german swords should only be drawn to protect the fatherland. but after war was once declared he showed, by the way he talked and discussed war matters with his generals, that he was a worthy pupil of the great von moltke, and a firsthand strategist. for he had not forgotten von bulow's plea to his countrymen, that under no circumstance would france pardon or forget the seizure of alsace lorraine by the victorious germans of 1870. on this head he writes: "when we consider our relations with france, we must not forget that she is unappeased. so far as man can tell, the ultimate aim of french policy for many years to come will be to create necessary conditions which to-day are still wanting for a settlement with germany, with good prospects of success." of anglo-german relations bismark wrote: "england is certainly disquieted by our rising power at sea and our competition which incommodes her at many points. without doubt there are still englishmen who think that if the troublesome german would disappear from the face of the earth england would only gain by it. but, between such sentiments in england and the fundamental feeling in france, there is a marked difference which finds corresponding expression in politics. france would attack us if she were strong enough. england would only do so if she thought she could not defend her vital economic and political interests except by force." though europe was on the brink of war time and again during the twenty-six years of his reign, the emperor always cast his vote for peace, as one of our great statesmen, william h. taft, said on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the emperor's reign: "the proof of the pudding is in the eating. when the german emperor went upon the throne and developed his independence of bismark and his intention to exercise his own will in the discharge of his high functions, there were many prophecies that this meant disturbance of the peace of europe. instead of that the truth of history requires the verdict, that considering the critically important part which has been his among the nations, he has been for the last quarter of a century the greatest single individual force in the practical maintenance of peace in the world." likewise theodore roosevelt says of him, he was "the one man outside this country from whom i obtained help in bringing about the peace of portsmouth, was his majesty william ii. from no other nation did i receive any assistance, but the emperor personally and through his embassador in st. petersburg, was of real aid in helping to induce russia to face the accomplished fact and come to an agreement with japan--an agreement the justice of which to both sides was conclusively shown by the fact that neither side was satisfied with it. "this was a real help to the cause of international peace, a contribution that far outweighed any amount of mere talk about it in the abstract, for in this, as in all other matters an ounce of performance is worth a ton of promise." though emperor william has been accused of having precipitated the war, he was off on his yacht taking a vacation when the murder of the austrian nobles took place, and germany faced the question of war through her alliance. it is said that the emperor broke down and sobbed like a child when he met his sons in his study after war had been declared. as andrew carnegie recently explained: "the kaiser himself is a marvelous man, possessed of wonderful ingenuity. he has done more good for germany than any other man before him. he has built up a great foreign commerce and a marvelous internal business." the trouble was started by the german military caste that rules the country. they are responsible for the war. the kaiser gathered around him a group of men who, unknown to him, acted in concert, and in his absence took the action that could not be altered. the kaiser has always been devoted to his home and his children. he has given much time to their education, for he believes firmly, "spare the rod and spoil the child." though he has the reputation of being severe, he is far more lenient with other people's children than his own. his sons were trained to serve in the army quite like the sons of the poorest peasants, and when the war broke out they were the first to hurry to their regiments. though one of his sons had just been married, he had to leave his bride like all other young lovers. the empress has been a splendid check on the kaiser's strong and determined nature, for though she is submissive and tender, she has great poise and is extremely restful. she has never worried him about her domestic affairs and still she has taken a keen interest in all his doings. the crown prince is different from his father in build, as he is in all other respects. he is tall and slight, good-looking and gracious, and acceptable to his people. next to taking an active interest in his wife and children, america appeals to him most. though he is much more of a soldier than a diplomat or statesman, he is more democratic than his father, and he is tremendously popular with his people on that account. this he has shown to his men ever since he went to the front; the comfort of his soldiers is constantly before him. he makes it a point to see that his men are provided with socks and shoes. when a student at the university of bonn he had the reputation of being a good mixer. in spite of his fair hair and blue eyes he has always been closer to the war party than has his father. he is a fearless horseman and has a deep knowledge of military tactics. the crown prince received his first military training when he was hardly large enough to mount a horse. he and all his brothers have continued this training all through their boyhood. first the crown prince went to the prince's academy military school at ploen, and completed this work at danzig. though a severe leader, he has always been the idol of his regiment, for he never asks his people to do the things he is unwilling to undertake himself. he has always been as popular with women as with his soldiers. he is exceedingly fond of american women and has been admired by many an attractive american girl. several times he had his heart set on taking one for a wife, but his father showed him the impracticability of such a venture. but he is extremely fond of his home and devoted to his wife and four lovely boys. they are splendid comrades, much more so than the average german woman is with her husband. when the war broke out princess cecilie said that she would join her husband at the front just as soon as she could. one of the dispatches sent by way of the hague from berlin says that cecilie, the german crown princess, accompanied by her two eldest sons, left berlin to join her husband at his headquarters in france. she proposed personally to bestow decorations upon officers of her dragoon regiment. though the crown princess is naturally delicate, having inherited tubercular tendencies from her father, she and her husband, along with the children, devote much of their time at winter sports in switzerland. she and her children toboggan, ski, skate on the ice, and partake of all winter sports. she is so fond of exercise that she sometimes neglects the question of handsome costumes. on more than one state occasion she has had to devise something in a hurry because her wardrobe had run low. she takes more pains selecting her sporting costumes than her evening toilettes. the first time the emperor laid eyes on her he was charmed by her beauty and grace; as he told one of his friends, "i might look the kingdom over and i could not find a lovelier wife for my son." she is no less beloved by her mother-in-law, the empress. when she should come to the throne the empress imagined she would be spoiled, as she was used to having her own way. to her surprise she found the crown princess a capable home-maker and an ideal mother. she loves to ride and romp with her four children, and she is the liveliest of the number. from the time the war broke out until the present moment she has never shown the least sorrow at being alone with her children. her one great ambition has been to allay the suffering of her people. she is a great favorite with her brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law. when the young princess victoria louise fell in love with prince ernst, the duke of braunschweig, the young girl confided the secret to her sister-in-law, who did more than her share to bring the romance to a happy issue. when one of the crown prince's brothers fell in love with one of his mother's ladies in waiting, the crown princess took her under her wing and thus allayed the emperor's displeasure. though prince eilet's wife has the name of being haughty, she has never shown that disposition with the crown princess, with whom she is on friendly terms. the emperor hates pomp and display, and all his family follow his precepts in enjoying a simple home life. they are seen to best advantage in their lovely gardens at potsdam, having five-o'clock tea on the lawn, happy and care-free away from the pomp of the court. he is equally proud and happy with his other children, august wilhelm, oscar, adelbert and joachim. like the patriarchs of old he takes himself seriously, too seriously, happy in devoting his whole energy and intelligence to his people. king george v, head of the allies it is true that king george v of england and the british empire is one of the chief figures among the allies, which include england, france and russia. it is true that his father, king edward, was largely responsible for the making of the entente, or treaties, with the allies, but he no sooner came to the throne when he renewed them and brought france and russia into more intimate relation than they had ever been. it was the last week of april of this year that king george v and queen mary made a short official visit to paris. it was a week of splendid festivities. the temporary residence of the british rulers was furnished with the finest of gobelins, beauvais tapestry and furniture. all the main avenues and principal thoroughfares from the gare saint lazare out to the bois were richly decorated with english and french flags and bunting. from the time the royal pair made their entry until they started for home they were greeted by millions of french and english. the streets were crowded all day long with men and women shouting themselves hoarse with "vive le roi, et vive la reine!" the royal pair were fãªted with receptions, luncheons and costly banquets. the intervals were filled with special performances at the opera and the theatre. there were kinemacolors and moving pictures showing the important incidents in the history of the royal pair, especially the durbar of india. a small english daily was published giving all the doings of the royal pair while in paris and even at home. there were a number of important diplomatic meetings between king george and m. poincare, the french president. the papers reported that king george had made it clear to the french people he wished to continue the friendship that has existed for nearly a century between the countries, and to strengthen the alliance which king edward had created. by the time the royal pair were ready to make their departure king george had won the reputation of being a great statesman and good diplomat. this he showed in his friendly attitude towards russia. it was probably in good faith made by france that england accepted a friendly attitude towards russia, for they had been suspicious of the czar and his government, fearing that they had designs upon india. another diplomatic stroke was the treaty that had been made by king edward with japan to protect british interests in the pacific. these royal visits and treaties show that england had brought herself into closer diplomatic relations with the continent than she had ever done. until the last fifty years england tried to keep herself as isolated from the european continent as she could. it was only after the franco-prussian war, when bismarck suggested a treaty with austria, that england commenced to look around for some allies to offset this power. this feeling grew stronger when germany began to increase and strengthen her navy. for england covets the title of being mistress of the seas, just as spain did during the time of the spanish armada. king george has shown himself an equally able diplomat and statesman at home. this was especially noticeable when on february 11, 1914, he opened one of the most momentous parliaments in british history. the irish crisis was the principal problem during the session, and in his speech his majesty spoke of the question in such momentous words as these: "this question, unless handled now with foresight, judgment and in the spirit of mutual concession, threatens grave future difficulties." the king was supported in his opinion by walter asquith, who has been the firm champion of home rule. he predicted civil war in case the demands of ireland were not satisfied, and taunted the government with pusillanimity in the face of the recent events in south africa. he then moved an amendment to the reply to the speech from the throne "that it would be disastrous for the house to proceed further with the government for ireland until the measure had been submitted to the judgment of the country." he showed his calm judgment and steady hand when the threatened ulster uprising took place by proposing home rule for all of ireland that wished it. these radical moves were the more surprising, for king george was spoken of as a strong conservative when brought to the throne. this was seen by the patience the queen and he showed during the coronation in england and india. they were spoken of as mere figures by the liberalists because they went through the endless festivities from the great procession to the numerous banquets with a smile, with words of patience and good cheer. it was the first time in many centuries that an english king and queen had made a long trip to india to partake in their coronation festivities at delhi and calcutta. they wished to renew the pledge made by the late queen victoria when she assumed the title of empress of india, emphasizing the incorporation of the great peninsula into the british empire that all her indian subjects were the children of the great white queen. they showed that this was more than a promise when they reached bombay on the 4th of december, 1911. at half-past nine they and their royal suite drove out to the fãªte grounds, adjoining the bombay gymkhana building. here in an open space some 26,000 children had been drawn up in a large semicircle, over against the centre of which was a dais for the king and queen. as their majesties drove up at a quarter to ten, four selected groups of children belonging to the european, urdu, gujarati and marathe schools sang each two verses of the national anthem in their own tongue. though they sang in their own tongue and danced their native dances, they shouted "long live the king and queen" as enthusiastically as would have done the same size body of english children. the coronation at delhi took place on the 12th of december. the royal pavilion was used as a centre of a semicircle, with a radius of about 240 yards erected round the circumference for spectators. all around the base of the mound ran a processional road, so that their majesties could drive under the eye of the onlookers. from the southern margin of this road was erected a huge stand with seating accommodations for ten thousand spectators. the stand was protected by a steep, sloping roof, ornamented with oriental cupolas. the royal pavilion rose from a broad base in three tiers and ascended by broad stairways to a central platform surmounted by a huge gilt dome. the royal dais was protected by a canopy of crimson velvet, trimmed with crimson and gold fringe. at the royal approach the principal officials and the ruling chiefs took their places at the base of the stand. they were dressed in their rich oriental silks of orange shot with gold or silver ornamented with armlets of gold, jeweled swords, priceless brooches, orders set with rubies and emeralds and diamond ornaments fastened in their caps. the arena was crowded with british and indian cavalry, handsomely trapped in gold and red velvet. there was a long procession of english cavalry and marines, enlarged by a great number of native cavalry. it was shortly before noon that their majesties appeared at the entrance. the approach was made known by a salute of 101 guns. they were welcomed by the great throng present, every one rising to his feet, and they drove round the grand stand showing themselves to all present. they were welcomed by great shouts of joy with singing and music, british and indian airs intermingling. after their majesties were seated on the throne surrounded by their suite and attendants, the king rose and announced the ceremony of his coronation in person to his subjects in india. he ended his promise of good faith by these words: "to all present, feudatories and subjects, i tender my loving greetings." then the viceroy came forward and expressed his homage, bowing low thrice as he approached the throne. he was followed by the ruling chiefs of hyderabad, baroda, mysore, kashmer, rajputana, central india, etc. these were led by the nizam, who were dressed entirely in black, except for the yellow, mitre-like headdress. after them came the chief justices and judges of the high court, the viceroy's legislative council, the governors and lieutenant-governors. the ceremony lasted for more than an hour, and was extremely picturesque. the british officials dressed in staid blue uniforms made a suitable background for the rich oriental costumes and priceless jewels worn by the indian princes. their salutations were no less interesting than their costumes, as they one by one approached the dais in turn expressing their promise of homage. some used the gesture of throwing earth on the head once or oftener; others simply bowed. the rajput chiefs almost without exception laid their swords first at the feet of the king-emperor and then at the queen-empress with deep obeisance. most interesting of all were the chiefs of bhutan and of sikkim, who after bowing reverently, brought out two white shawls, such as they use to drape the images of their most sacred gods, and spread them before their king and queen. there were other festivities included in the durbar, one of which consisted of a great banquet to 173 of the most distinguished british and native guests. there was the same display of rich oriental dress and elaborate, shimmering jewels. the next day the king reviewed his native and british troops, awarding the most valiant of his officers the albert medal. the king held a levee of his officers while the queen-empress received 120 ladies of the families of the ruling chiefs. another splendid royal entertainment was a large garden party in the fort of delhi. there were groups of entertainers and jugglers. these interspersed freely with great lords and ladies and splendid cavalry and infantry. their majesties soon appeared and took their place on the ramparts, where they received the immense throng. the same ceremony was repeated at calcutta. while there the king divided his time between the polo grounds and the public hospital. at nepal the king and his party hunted and they were successful in laying low a good bag of tigers. shortly after their coronation the king and queen showed that they are fond of many of the mediã¦val traditions. they restored the order of the bath and laid much stress on the knight of the garter. the knights of the garter have a beautiful chapel at windsor, where each has a stall. though king george inherits the diplomatic qualities of his father, he has little sporting blood in him. he keeps a racing stable and has many fine horses. he also attends to all the large races, but he does little betting, because the queen is opposed to gambling. he is fond of all outdoor sports, such as tennis, golf and polo, and he encourages his sons in these pastimes by joining with them at these sports. queen mary is an ideal companion for king george. for she believes that to be a good queen means first a devoted wife and mother. she is interested in all the king's affairs, whether it is a coronation in england and india or caring for the wounded soldiers in the hospitals in london. she is fond of good living and dressing, but she is opposed to everything that suggests foolish extravagance. after the coronation she was greatly opposed to the refurnishing of buckingham palace. though she is supposed to wear her state gowns once, she has them remodeled time and again. she objects to modern dancing, especially the hobble skirts. she likewise frowns upon the light-hearted american social leaders, who before her day were so popular at court. when king george ascended the throne the queen asked him not to smoke anything beyond an occasional cigarette, nor to drink, to bet, nor to have ladies at his club. the royal family has an ideal home life in london and in the country. much of their time is given over to sports in fine weather and reading aloud in bad weather. at sandringham they have great droves of pigeons, which the entire family love and care for. little was known of the prince of wales until he became of age and inherited his title. he went through this difficult ordeal with ease and grace. he was educated by mr. hansell, an english tutor. later he studied at osborne and dartmouth. he did his year's service as a petty officer and went through the discipline and hardships of the common marine. when the war broke out he offered himself for active military service, and was greatly disappointed because he was not accepted. his brothers are being educated in the same simple and unspoiled fashion. his oldest brother, prince albert, was born in 1895. he entered the naval college at osborne, remained there for two years and then spent two years at dartmouth. the younger brothers are george, henry and john. princess mary has had her teachers at home; she is a well-educated girl, who has given more time and thought to her study of languages and music than to clothes. she was given her first evening gown for the coronation and her first jewelry when she was sixteen. she will not be allowed to make a formal dã©but until she is of age. the queen insists that her daughter shall be trained to become an intelligent mother and capable housekeeper before she marries. when she does, it must be a love match. for queen mary was engaged to the duke of clarence, and after six weeks of courtship he died. shortly after she was engaged to his brother, prince george. though england and germany are fighting each other with a death's grip they are closely related. the emperor is a cousin of king george, and it is said that both king george and emperor william wanted to bring the two families together. it looked as though the promise would become a reality, for the king and queen were present at the marriage of the emperor's daughter--victoria luise--to prince ernest of brunswick. the germans say that the label, "made in germany" instead of "made in england," along with germany's sympathizing with the boers, are the causes of their animosity, while the english say that german imperialism and militarism are to be crushed once and for all time. two russian cities though moscow is an old city, great effort and large sums of money have been spent making the place modern and attractive. everywhere are the houses surrounded with trees and gardens brilliant in color and laid out with exquisite care. that the city is old is shown because it is irregular and without plans, but there are new sights at every turn. the city is inclosed by a number of old gates. passing under an ancient gate one reaches a narrow street suggesting an eastern town. then crossing the red place, one passes through the holy gate to the platform of the kremlin. this part of the town is as old as it is interesting. it is more picturesque because of the large square and round towers surmounted by spires. the walls on one side are skirted by the river. a splendid effect in color is had by the gold and silver domes shimmering against the brilliant green, blue and red of the sky. a magnificent view is had from sparrow hill; the ascent is made by a steep and tortuous road. from this point the river looks like a silver belt girding the city. on the opposite side the wooded hills run steeply down to the water. the general view of moscow is brilliant and grand. the many-colored roofs give richness to the picture. from the middle rises the fortress of the kremlin, the many churches send up a forest of dome-capped towers. the kremlin speaks of many centuries, as it was founded 800 years ago. the principal place is the kittye gorod in front of the spasskie gorod. it is entered by a vaulted road, where is seen a handsome and a world-famous bell, supposed to have been cast in 1800. a great quantity of gold and silver was used in the making; the height from the summit to the base is 16â½ feet, while the greatest thickness is 22 inches. another interesting feature is the museum of the imperial treasures. the interior is wonderfully light and graceful. in the first hall are resplendent banners and suits of ancient armor; the other halls are filled with many costly treasures. there are gold, silver, agate and crystal vases, silver tables and gold plate of every description. the city proper is as unusual looking as the fortress. it is a lozenge shape, lying northeast and southwest. in the center of this is an octagonal area inclosed by a second line of ramparts or walls. this part is really the city; beyond is a suburb laid out in gardens densely inhabited. within the octagon is a third area called the "chinese city." its southern wall is washed by the small river moskya. this is a southern barrier of the kremlin and is a fortress of nearly triangular shape. the two outer walls are modern in style. the city is laid out in a succession of concentric zones which start from the kremlin. the streets are hilly, therefore the tram cars are drawn by four and six horses. then there are the droskys--vehicles set on either side with no support to the sides or to the back. but the peasants consider the tiligae their national vehicle. it is a rough sort of basket fixed on four or six poles. primitive though these carts are, they are well adapted to the hilly and uneven roads. in the street one sees a motley crowd of venders, myriads of women with bright-colored kerchiefs over their heads, street-hawkers, beggars and priests in long, black, flowing robes. the streets are lined with cobble stones and bowlders and low, white houses, mostly one-story high. moscow has a number of pretty parks; the petropki park is the most noted. a part is ornamented with flower-gardens and statues, and the remainder is woodland. at the entrance are some pretty summer villas built of wood and ornamented with fretwork. moscow, like all others in the empire, is rich in churches and shrines. the most sacred of all these minor chapels is the iversky virgin, situated at the gate. the exterior walls are made of imitation malachite; the roof is a sky-blue cupola spangled with gilt stars. the facade is panelled with paintings of saints, framed in embossed brass; in front is a platform raised three steps from the ground. the number of worshipers and visitors to this shrine are so many it was found necessary to make the steps of iron. when the czar arrives at moscow, the first thing he does is to worship at the shrine. another interesting church is that of vasseli blagemor, which occupies one end of the place with its bouquet of fantastic cupolas and spires built by order of ivan the terrible. this church is considered unusual because there are two chapels in the basement. above are nine chapels. the interior glitters with hundreds of brass tapers that are always lighted. the image, which is the usual byzantine type, is a dark brown color. it has a big jewel on the brow, another in each shoulder and a net of real pearls on the brow. because of the many styles of architecture and the many chapels, this is considered the most original church in the world. the belfry building is a curious mixture of styles. the tower is arabian and byzantine, with a suggestion of indian on the fourth story. the palace is in the form of a square. the state apartments are particularly rich and are in good taste. the hall of st. george is 200 feet by 65 wide and 58 high. the handsomest of the state apartments is the banqueting hall. the ceiling is splendidly decorated and the windows richly draped. the hall is large enough to accommodate 200 guests. the service is wonderfully beautiful; most of the food is served in gold vessels. not far off is the tower of ivan veliki, which serves as a campanile for three cathedrals and has thirty-four bells. the largest is 65 feet in circumference. the city is ornamented profusely with statues and triumphal arches; the most splendid is the arch of triumph. this is made of marble and is surmounted by a beautifully carved statue of liberty, while the arch is ornamented with handsome bas reliefs. moscow has a number of attractive suburbs. one of these is ostaukea; it is well laid out and has many handsome buildings. this place is especially well known for the splendid churches made of stone and marble. moscow, beside having a great deal that is beautiful, is interesting because the old and new meet in an unusual, almost grotesque, fashion. they are not apart, as in paris, london and many other european capitals. they jog hand in hand as unevenly as the streets on which they stand. the traveler to whom st. petersburg is unknown, imagines the city as ancient, picturesque and irregular. but it is laid out as regularly as many american cities. it is an ancient city, dressed in a new guise. it is situated along the neva, with many modern buildings and parks on the one side, churches and old buildings on the other. the location of the city is not attractive; it is built on several islands in the delta. the ground is so low in many places that the buildings have to be raised on piles. this morass was changed into a splendid city by peter the great, who was insistent that he was going to train himself and his people to a fondness for the sea. as a child he had been frightened by the sudden rushing of a cascade, and for years he could not see water without trembling and fear. when he was grown, he said, "i shall build st. petersburg here without bridges, that our people may be constantly on the waters of the neva, crossing and recrossing." since this time the city has grown and expanded greatly, and bridges are a necessity. the st. nicholas is a large, massive, stone structure built on huge, granite piers. three other bridges are large floating structures which span the river in the summer, but are removed as soon as the river is frozen. on one side of the river are many pleasant summer homes and cottages surrounded by beautiful flowering gardens. on the other side are the barracks and the poorer part of the city. most of the public buildings are placed in a public square, so they are seen with little difficulty. at one end is the large senate and synod; before it stands the colossal equestrian statue of peter the great. to the south of the admiralty, the most important part of the city is seen, the bolshar storma or greater side. towards the west lies the basilius island with the large splendid exchange, the important academy of sciences and the university. the city is divided into four large divisions, separated by the great and little neva and by the great nefka. the great side includes the court, the nobility and nearly half the population. here many of the best streets and some of the handsomest residences are seen. the streets are broad and well paved. here are spacious and well-built houses, while beyond are a succession of magnificent palaces. this need not sound strange, as there are no european cities having so many princes and palaces. even the dwellings of the poor have a showy magnificence about them. everything is built on a gigantic scale. it is not unusual to find a house occupied by two hundred families, but they are not built high, two stories being the average height. building a home in this city is usually an expensive affair. the driving of the stakes alone often costs hundreds of dollars. but the palaces of the princes and nobility are usually as beautiful as the other homes are plain and unattractive. here are found richly hand-carved furniture, splendid jade and malachite vases. there is so much of everything that it is really overpowering. the royal palaces are large and furnished at great cost. the annitschoff palace is inhabited more by the present imperial family than the tauride palace. the former stands on the great pr'pektin, the neighborhood of the fontanka, and closes the brilliant range of palaces in the street. it was originally built by elizabeth. some years ago it was bought as one of the emperor's abodes. it is handsomely built, though it has no historic significance. a part of the court are usually here in residence, and it is here that the emperor holds many of his most important councils. those who saw the winter palace before the fire recall the mass of wealth devoured by the conflagration. in six hours priceless furniture, ornaments and rare pictures were destroyed. the hermitage is the san souci of st. petersburg. this was built by catherine and used for her retreat after her work and that of her courtiers was done for the day. this palace is surrounded by beautiful shade forests, refreshed by fountains and pleasant grottoes. on cool days concerts and theatricals were given within the palace, while in the warm weather these were held out of doors; beautiful music and rare voices resounded through the forest then. the people in russia do not object to the cold, uninviting houses. pleasant days bring thousands into the streets below. the nevsky prospect is a splendid street that intersects all the rings of the city. it winds its way between the handsome residences, pierces the chamber of commerce and touches the poorest parts of the city. here all types of russian life are seen, from the proudest nobility, driving in their auto-cars and handsome carriages, to the poorest peasants living in one of those immense, densely crowded apartment buildings. the scene in this portion of the street at about midday may challenge comparison with any street in the world, and the spectacle is enhanced by the magnificence of the decorations. besides the handsome residences, there are many large shops and cafã©s offering recreation to the crowds promenading up and down. st. petersburg has a number of large summer gardens, which are an adornment to the city and offer a pleasant rest to thousands in warm weather. the summer garden is the largest and most attractive of these. everywhere are the large, well-shaded benches, thronged with matrons, while the children play in the sand and catch their balls. on one side of the summer garden is the tzariziuski lug, or field of mars. now these resorts are well nigh destitute of men. there are a number of buildings in st. petersburg that are worth noticing. of these the exchange is certainly the most prominent. it stands on the farthest point of vassili ostroff, with a large open space before it, and it is reared on an elevated foundation. the granite quays on either side give solidity, while a long flight of granite steps leads down to the river. the space before the building is decorated with two immense columns, supporting the prows of ships cast in metal and erected to the memory of mercury. the building is of immense proportions and took twelve years to build. the great hall is lighted from above, while at either end and on both sides are spaces in the forms of arcades. there is an altar at one end, and a light is always kept burning for the pious merchants, who offer up a prayer before they commence the undertakings of the day. the hermitage museum is a veritable treasure prison; there is a large picture gallery, one of the finest and most celebrated in europe. the collection includes a large number of dutch cottages, such as van de meer and ostada painted. the gallery is equally rich in the old italian and french masters. a most interesting part of the collection are the treasures that were once housed at malmaison. when the emperor alexander was in paris, he visited the divorced consort of napoleon, who spoke of the property that remained to her and the insecurity of the possession. to protect it until it could be reclaimed, emperor alexander bought the treasure and took it to russia. the foundling hospital is another of the public institution of which the people are justly proud. though russian, it is under german supervision. the place is extremely large; this is necessary, for it is never without 5,000 or 6,000 children. the principal buildings are in st. petersburg, where the children are kept a few weeks. they are then sent to the peasantry in the country, where they remain until they are six years old. the girls return to st. petersburg, while there is a branch for the boys at gatshina. the building at st. petersburg is much more of a palace than a foundling home. the main building is composed of what was formerly the palace of prince bohinski and count rasumoffski. when the children are grown they are relieved from all obligations toward the institution. the boys are easily provided with positions in the trades' and imperial factories; the girls are given positions as teachers and governesses. though st. petersburg has fewer churches than moscow, it has churches of all denominations and every style of architecture. here are seen grecian, byzantine, old russian, new european architecture and what not. the handsomest of these is st. isaac's church. the church is large and imposing without. inside it has many handsome decorations, costly pictures of saints and gold crosses. the roof is supported by granite monoliths from finland, buried for centuries in deep swamps. they are crowned with capitals of bronze and support the enormous beam of a frieze formed of six polished blocks. but the cupola is the crowning glory to all this splendor. it is made of copper and overlaid with gold that glitters like the sun on a mountain. the russian capital is most attractive on a pleasant summer evening. the scene presented by the exchange, the university buildings, the academy of arts, the corps de cadets and the academy of sciences, surrounded as they are with well-kept greensward and splendid flower beds, present an inviting appearance. the river is lined with sailing craft of nearly every description, devoted to pleasure. it has several fine steam yachts which are used by members of the club for making trips up the gulf. on a summer's evening as one sits on the balcony of the english club or strolls up the quay, listening to the band in the garden of the summer palace, the swift-moving passengers in their gayly trimmed barks made a pretty sight against the splendid buildings and gilded spires of the churches. not all the beauty of st. petersburg lies in this one island. the city is in a delta and is surrounded by a whole chain of islands. the wildest and least inhabited is neva, visited principally by seals and wolves. then there are the volny islands, the truktanoff islands, and some others. these are swampy and overgrown with birch and scarcely known by name to many russians. they contain magazines and are used for powder and other stores. the most interesting of these are the gardens islands, which at one time were covered with scrubs, but alexander and nicholas saw in them possibilities for raising flowers, and they have gradually been transformed into splendid islands. yelagin belongs almost exclusively to the court; it is occupied by a chã¢teau and beautiful gardens. the court live here in the spring and early summer, when the gardens blaze with brilliant colors. the houses are certainly modest looking. the most interesting feature is that they are built on the bank of the rivers and in different styles of architecture; one gothic, a second italian and a third chinese. the hothouses are wonderfully supplied with cut and exotic plants and the peasants' cottages are filled with splendid window boxes. christmas without a santa claus have you ever stopped to think what christmas would mean with no christmas tree nor santa claus? still, this year many thousand children will have a heavy heart instead of a happy christmas tree. many thousands have lost their fathers in war and their homes have been destroyed. many others have their fathers at war, and the mothers, with their large families of children, are struggling from day to day to keep the wolf from the door. deprived of many necessities, they cannot enjoy the cheapest luxuries. under the inspiration of some of our newspaper publishers, a xmas ship was fitted out with toys of every description, including dolls, baby-buggies, cradles, games, books and finery and sent to the children of every land. this number includes the french, english, belgians, germans, etc. these gifts are not enough to make every child happy, but they will do much to ease the heartaches and disappointments. there are few countries where christmas has as much significance as it does in germany. for germany is the home of the fir-tree, and the finest of these are kept for the winter holidays. in the late fall you see a great many of the woodmen out in the woods laying low the fir-trees. a few weeks later they have been shipped in great wagon-loads into every german city and town. for many months the many toy-makers are busy making doll's houses, kitchens, kitchen utensils, dishes, a large variety of building-blocks and those puzzles and games that have made the toy-makers of nuremburg and the city of nuremburg famous. in the homes busy mothers are working day and night making leppkincuhen, tarts, cakes, cookies, etc. the extra minutes are filled hurrying to the grocers to buy candles, fruits and nuts for the tree. these are all preliminaries for the dressing of the tree, which is beautifully decorated with many candles, shimmering balls, small ornaments, figured candies, stockings jammed full with fruits and candies. then the children get out their presents which they have bought and made for their parents, brothers and sisters, and these are dedicated to the tree. the children are warned if they play unfair and try to see santa claus he will punish them by taking their toys away, and perhaps he may never come to see them again. though in most christmas homes the trees are trimmed several days ahead of time, it is on christmas eve that the children gather to sing their favorite airs, such as "o tannenbaum," and to say their prayers. then the father makes an address to santa claus, reminding him of those that have been good and suggesting, when necessary, that there might be an improvement in the behavior of some of the children. the children are then allowed to see the tree arrayed in all its glory. they dance around the tree for some time, and suddenly every one appears to hold his breath. for santa claus appears, dressed in his heavy traveling-coat, with his fur cap pulled down over his head and jingling his bells as he comes along. the servants, where there are not too many, come in to join in the festivities and get their presents from the trees. if there are relatives or friends who have no christmas trees of their own they are often invited to join in the merry-making. the tree is kept lit for three or four days, and is looked upon as an emblem of good fortune and cheer. they gaze and gaze upon this brilliantly lit tree, brilliant with light, festive with frost, silver, gold and many colored globes, as though it had been waved into the room by some beautiful little fairy. joy hangs on every branch, a bright glow comes from hundreds of tips. though the absence of the christmas tree is the greatest grief to the children, the loss is heightened by the neglect of santa claus. this old man is so grieved by this awful carnage and slaughter that he even forgets his obligations to his children of many lands. many million children all the way from norway to japan will miss the fellow with that great beard, his mischievous smile, and bushy eyebrows, half covered by the cap pulled down over his eyes. the children of belgium will miss him as much as will the germans. though the christmas tree is scarce in belgium, santa claus is greatly beloved by them. weeks before his coming the children are busy writing him letters telling him all about their good deeds, their wishes and their hopes, that they will not be neglected. the parents work hard to keep his coming a secret, but their little ones are so impatient they struggle to keep awake nights seeing what santa claus intends to bring them. once in a great while they see him climbing down the chimneys, putting their toys before the grate and piling them high in their stockings. the parents make a hard fight to see that their children are remembered with some simple gift, for they know that their children are heartbroken if they are neglected altogether. an english author, s. r. littlewood, tells the following story about a belgium child's grief because she had been neglected by santa claus, the story of the poor widow and her daughter julie: "it was christmas eve, but there was no christmas party, no cakes and toys and imps, for they were penniless and starving. they had wandered through the snow all day and there was no one who would help. weary and forlorn, numbed with the cold and fainting with hunger, they came back to their bare little attic with its broken windows, its hard pallet bed. but julie kept up a brave heart. she had not lost faith. she, like the other children, would hang out her torn stocking. this she did and she prayed that santa claus would not forget; and while her mother slept she lay awake, wondering whether after all santa claus would come. she waited and waited, and sometimes she grew afraid, and even the sound of her breath startled her in the darkness and the silence. but it seemed that santa claus would never come. the old stocking hung limp and empty. as night wore on the air grew keener. the wind blew through the roof above her head, she could see a star shining. as it twinkled there alone in the far off depths of the sky, it seemed to be flashing her a message--a message of hope. never had she seen so beautiful a star. whilst she lay gazing it seemed to grow larger and more glorious. could it be that it was coming nearer? at last it seemed to be close at hand--to fill the whole sky with light that streamed through the little gap above her and made a splendor even in that wretched garret. and now she sees that it is not really a star, but a little company of angels winging their way together to earth. in the midst is a chariot, drawn by white horses with wings and postillioned by a cherubim, and in the chariot--yes, it is santa claus. just over the house the chariot and its escort stopped, the rent in the roof widened and santa claus came down. gently, lovingly as a father, he took julie in his arms, wrapped her in his great furred coat, set her in the chariot beside him and with the throng of angels soared heavenward again, and the rustle of their wings was like the music of the wind. all the while the poor widow was sleeping, and when she awoke in the morning she found the stocking still empty and the form of her little daughter lying by her side--but it was cold and still. the poor widow kissed the lifeless lips and closed the tired eyes, which even yet gazed upward to where, through the roof, a tiny star could be seen, faintly glimmering through the dawn. for all her tears she found comfort in her heart, for she knew that santa claus had come indeed, and had brought for little julie the greatest gift of all." there are thousands of such little julies in belgium weeping because they are destitute of homes, father and santa claus' visit. though the english children are sympathizing with their little belgian friends, this great war has put a damper on their holiday spirits. in hundreds of homes the fathers are fighting for the defense of their country; in many more they are out of work. so, in merry england there is little merriment on this blessed christmas day. the children are trying to be happy with the few gifts given by their little american and european friends. but they are sad when they recall the tall, heavily-laden trees, so beautifully lighted that some of the longest tapers seemed to reach the stars. the absence of trees and presents is only a small part of their loss. for only those who have eaten a christmas dinner in england can understand what christmas day is without the feast. the great roasts are simmering and crackling on the spits, while the vegetables of potatoes, chestnuts and peas are boiling. these are accessories to the jams, jellies, pumpkin pies, plum pudding, fruits and nuts. several hours are needed at least to consume such a dinner, and several days are needed to get over the effects of such a feast. though the norse countries, including norway, sweden and holland, are neutral, they, along with the others, are suffering from the most terrible calamity of the century. the norse people call their friend senter klaas. he comes to them with white horses and flying sleighs that carry him over the house-tops to drop his gifts down the chimney-stacks. though senter klaas has done his level best to visit these children this year, as usual, he is bringing fewer christmas trees with him--and his bag is lighter. instead of carrying kites, sleighs, skates, boats and dutch dolls, his presents include caps, overcoats, shoes, mittens, dresses and aprons for those pretty norse girls. many of the swiss cities and towns are so high up in the cold, snow-covered alps, that many american children are unfamiliar to them. but this sister-republic, which loves freedom, honor and integrity, should be extremely dear to every patriotic little american. the swiss are hard-working people, and rich and poor alike in switzerland rear their children in the same simple, unspoiled fashion. but christmas is a week for real merry-making in switzerland. children and grown-ups alike are busy making visits to relatives and friends. those from the mountains come down into the lowlands, and those from the villages into the cities. in every small hamlet the stations are crowded with trees and christmas boxes being shipped in every direction. mothers and daughters are using every spare moment dressing dolls, and trimming dolls' houses for younger children. while the fathers and older brothers are equally busy making watches, sleighs and wooden noah's arks for the younger boys. switzerland is world-famous for its fir and pine trees, so the christmas trees are often large enough to bear the gifts of several families. the trees are beautifully trimmed with lights, gold and silver balls and plenty of angels and grotesque figures, fashioned of wax and of sugar. the feast and merry-making continues for three and four days in most swiss homes. the grown-ups and children are stuffed with goodies, including chickens, jellies, candied fruits, nuts, raisins and cakes. when they can eat no more they start off for a mountain climb or to skate on the ice, only to return a few hours later to continue their feast. they are comforted by the thought that they will only know high thinking and plain living for the rest of the winter. this christmas will be the harder to bear because it is the evening star in the swiss horizon. switzerland is being so heavily taxed this year by keeping her men on the frontier that the people have little money for christmas-giving. the tall trees will be few, the small trees will be decorated with only a few candles and trimmings, while the gifts will be limited to clothes and school books for the girls and boys. the christmas dinner will be a great deal smaller, with fewer goodies than in other years. though russia is so far away from santa claus' home and workshops, russian children get their full quota of toys, such as sleighs, skates and dolls. costly dolls, with real hair and handsome clothes, for the children of the nobles and aristocratic classes, and pretty peasant dolls for the middle classes and the peasants. bobsleighs and skates of different qualities for the boys of rich and poor, but this matters little as long as they are bobsleighs and skates. the children of southern lands, from spain, france and italy, know little about st. nicholas and his own day of celebration three weeks before, but to them santa claus means much as part of the christmas feast itself. in the streets and in the shops hundreds of children gaze longingly and lovingly at the bebe or bambino in italian. they beg to be taken to the great cathedrals in paris, in madrid, in florence and in rome, to see that wonderful christ-child lying in the manger, protected by the sheepfold, the peasants and the wise men. they go home and ask their parents to give them a bambino such as they saw in the manger. some get handsome babies dressed in rich swaddling clothes; others are given tiny wax dolls, but they are comforted in the thought that it is the baby they saw in the manger. the finest of these dolls come from france. about five millions are made every year and are sent to paris, where they are dressed in the latest styles. shortly before christmas prizes are offered to the costumers dressing the finest dolls. in the great shops days are set aside when this large number of handsome dolls are shown to the children. many a heart beats as those happy, sunny eyes gaze on the lovely-made dolls, dressed in faultless fashion. the boys have their exhibits of mechanical toys, including aeroplanes, trains, motor cars and many others of the sort. these dolls are sent to all parts of the world, and many find a lasting beloved home with little american girls. santa claus is known to be a very old man, with plenty of snow-white hair and loving eyes, but he has different qualities and characteristics in every land. when the early colonists came from europe to america they brought their different ideas with them, and together they molded a new character. he loves old and young alike, and generous folks most of all. he knows no difference in nationalities and creeds--he loves the protestant, the catholic and the jewish child equally. he loves american children, nor no less than the german, french, english, russian and italian children. he tells them that they are all children of one father, belong to one great family, and have one home. the joys of one are the joys of all, and the sorrows of one are the sorrows of all. because of this teaching, many millions of americans are sad this christmas, and their prayers are that every heart should be filled with love and peace, instead of hatred. to make this a living promise, many an american child has asked to share his christmas gifts with some friend across the sea, and some have offered all their christmas gifts to sad, lonely children in europe. though every great thinker and writer teaches us to love our fellow-men, dickens, more than all others, gave us the impulse of loving kindness within and without the household bonds. he taught that each little home was a world's great family, of which we are all children together. with the glow not of log-fires, but of warm hearts, he scared away the christmas ghosts and christmas goblin that had crowded round in the gloom of the centuries. with an outburst of human tenderness he challenged the cold and darkness, not of winter alone, but of the grave itself. for, as santa claus kneels by millions of his children he whispers these are all my children, one of god's many emblems of hope, in innocence and beauty; born in human love, chosen as god's messenger to spread the promise of peace and brotherly love. _other volumes in_ the authors' hand-book series the plot _of the_ short story by henry albert phillips author of "a complete course in short story writing," "a complete course in photoplay writing," "a complete course in plot construction," "art in short story narration," "the photodrama," and formerly associate editor of the "metropolitan magazine." introduction by matthew white. jr., editor of "munsey's" _the only serious work on plot sources, construction and analysis there is; just as valuable to photoplaywright as to fiction writer._ "we think the photoplaywright will find many helpful hints in 'the plot of the short story.' those who are building up their working library will find this book a welcome addition. mr. phillips proves himself a teacher as well as an author."--epes winthrop sargent in _the moving picture world_. "'the plot of the short story' will prove invaluable to the photoplaywright. originality and treatment of plot are the essence of the successful picture play, and mr. phillips points out very clearly how these plots may be obtained."--phil lang, editor of the _kalem company_. "the most practical hand-book for photoplaywrights ever written."--e. v. brewster, editor _motion picture magazine_. "it is certainly a fine little work!"--arthur leeds, editor _photoplay author_. "it is the best thing of the kind that has come my way."--modeste hannis jordan. editor _writer's bulletin_. "this hand-book may be regarded as the best thing of its kind extant."--_north carolina education._ "it is an excellent thing excellently done."--jack london. a thousand other testimonials! now going into a second large edition. _price postpaid, $1.20_ (add 10c. for collection of out of new york checks.) the stanhope-dodge publishing company book department larchmont, new york, u. s. a. _the most noteworthy auxiliary that the writer's workshop has ever known!_ the phillips automatic plot collector, file and catalog elastic and limitless in scope and capacity. will hold more than 10,000 uniform items of plot material. designed for plot material, plot germs and complete plots in the form of notes, items, newspaper clippings, excerpts, references, statistics, etc. five hundred specially made receptacles, in handsome, serviceable filing cases. more than 1,000 headings and sub-headings under which plot matter is catalogued. all divisions are logical, progressive and comprehensive. the most infinitesimal phase of fiction can be located, filed or produced instantly. each receptacle is numbered with "contents" plainly printed upon it. progressively indexed under seven grand divisions: i.--the heart of man--man's relations with woman and family. ii.--the ambition of man--man's relations with his people and fellow man. iii.--the flesh of man--man's relations with the devil and death. iv.--the soul of man--man's relations with his god and religion. v.--the mind of man--man's interpretation of the unreal and realization of the unknown. vi.--not-man--the personification of the elements, nature and animals. vii.--humor--man under the spell of the ludicrous. a stupendous work that has taken years of its author's time. a positive inspiration that creates plot material from every phenomena of life, eliminates all bungling, untidy and haphazard methods of gathering plots. will last a lifetime, keeping material under double covers in original state. it will save hours of time and days of wasted effort. plot collector, file and catalog (invented and copyrighted by henry albert phillips) sent prepaid anywhere in the postal union for _five dollars_ sole distributors: stanhope-dodge book department larchmont, new york, u. s. a. _other volumes_ the authors' hand-book series art in short story narration a searching analysis of the qualifications of fiction in general and of the short story in particular, with copious examples, making the work _a practical treatise_ by henry albert phillips introduction by rex beach "have read the book with continued interest."--brander matthews. "the book is admirable; as a series of sermons illustrative of the canon of literary good taste it is faultless."--_toronto mail and empire._ "teachers will find much in mr. phillips' book that will help them."--_america._ "you have treated your subject with great justice and discernment."--anthony hope hawkins. "i find it full of suggestions."--w. j. locke. "'art in short story narration' is a wonder book. a constant source of enthusiasm. it answers all the vital questions so perplexing to the beginner."--nelle jackman. _price postpaid, $1.20_ _in preparation_ the mechanics of fiction by the same author. introduction by a famous literary critic _price postpaid, $1.20_ glimpses of the unusual around the world by howard s. f. randolph written in a trenchant, intimate style that brings the most remote and interesting corners of the whole world to the reader's armchair. the odd byways of the earth are visualized microscopically. the author truly takes you with him! _illustrated by 68 of the most superb photographs that ever appeared in any book. price postpaid, $1.00._ combination prices: "plot," "narration" and "mechanics" and "glimpses," $4.00; 3 of the above, $3.15; 2 for $2.10. "the short story market" or "the photoplay market," each 10 cents. "list of 500 books of interest to the literary craft," 10 cents. _note--add 10 cents for collection of all out of new york checks._ the stanhope-dodge publishing co., book department larchmont, new york, u. s. a. transcriber's notes: passages in italics are surrounded by _underscores_. the word "amoeba" uses oe ligature in the original on page 94. for consistency, a period has been added at the end of the word "editor" in some footnotes where it was missing. the following misprints have been corrected: "spendid" corrected to "splendid" (page 78) "stumblingblock" corrected to "stumbling block" (page 90) "can can" corrected to "can" (page 140) other than corrections listed above, printer's inconsistencies in spelling, punctuation, hyphenation and ligature usage have been retained. prize orations of the intercollegiate peace association edited with an introduction by stephen f. weston, ph.d. executive secretary of the association professor of economics and sociology, antioch college yellow springs, ohio foreword by charles f. thwing boston the world peace foundation 1914 this volume is dedicated to the misses mary and helen seabury whose interest and assistance have made possible the orations of the intercollegiate peace association contents page foreword vii by charles f. thwing, president of the association the intercollegiate peace association 1 by stephen f. weston, executive secretary of the association the conflict of war and peace 25 by paul smith, depauw university, indiana the united states and universal peace 35 by glenn porter wishard, northwestern university, illinois the evolution of world peace 45 by levi t. pennington, earlham college, indiana the waste of war--the wealth of peace 55 by arthur foraker young, western reserve university, ohio the hope of peace 65 by stanley h. howe, albion college, michigan the roosevelt theory of war 73 by percival v. blanshard, university of michigan national honor and vital interests 81 by russell weisman, western reserve university, ohio the evolution of patriotism 91 by paul b. blanshard, university of michigan certain phases of the peace movement 101 by calvert magruder, st. john's college, maryland the assurance of peace 111 by vernon m. welsh, knox college, illinois education for peace 121 by francis j. lyons, university of texas national honor and peace 129 by louis broido, university of pittsburgh, pennsylvania the new nationalism and the peace movement 137 by ralph d. lucas, knox college, illinois man's moral nature the hope of universal peace 147 by victor morris, university of oregon the task of the twentieth century 157 by harold husted, ottawa university, kansas the present status of international arbitration 167 by bryant smith, guilford college, north carolina foreword these orations are selected from hundreds of similar addresses spoken in recent years by hundreds of students in american colleges. i believe it is not too bold to say that they represent the highest level of undergraduate thinking and speaking. they are worthy interpreters of the cause of peace, but they are, as well, noble illustrations of the type of intellectual and moral culture of american students. whoever reads them will, i believe, become more optimistic, not only over the early fulfillment of the dreams of peace among nations, but also over the intellectual and ethical condition of academic life. for the simple truth is that the cause of peace makes an appeal of peculiar force to the undergraduate. it appeals to his imagination. this imagination is at once historic and prophetic. war makes an appeal to the historic imagination of the student. his study of greek and roman history has been devoted too largely to the wars that these peoples waged. marathon, salamis, carthage, are names altogether too familiar and significant. by contrast he sees what this history, which is written in blood, might have become. if the millions of men slain had been permitted to live, and if the uncounted treasure spent had been economically used, the results in the history of civilization would have been far richer and nobler. he notes, too, does this student, that if the last decades of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth had been free from wars in europe, humanity would now have attained a far higher level of physical and intellectual strength. the historic imagination of the student pictures, as his reason interprets, such conditions. his prophetic imagination likewise exercises its creative function. the student sees nations to-day dwelling in armed truces and moving to and fro as a soldiery actual or possible. he realizes that war puts up what civilization puts down, and puts down what civilization elevates. he reads the lamented robertson's great lecture on the poetry of war, but he knows also, as robertson intimates, that "peace is blessed; peace arises out of charity." the poetry of peace is more entrancing than the poetry of carnage. to this primary element in the mind of the undergraduate--the imagination--our great cause therefore makes an appeal of peculiar earnestness. to the reason of the college man, also, the cause of peace makes a peculiar appeal through its simple logic. war is most illogical. it breaks the law of the proper interpretation of causality. when two nations of adjacent territory cannot agree over a boundary line, why should settlement be made in terms of physical force? when two nations fail to see eye to eye in adjusting the questions of certain fishing rights, why should they incarnadine the seas in seeking for the truth to be applied in settlement? in civil disputes, why, asks the student, should rifles be employed to discover truth and right? war is an intellectual anachronism, a breach of logic. of course, one may reply, humanity is not logical in its reasoning any more than it is exact in its observing. of course it is not; but the college is set to cast out the rule of no-reason and to bring in the reign of reason. peace furnishes a motive and a method of such advancement. peace is logic for the individual and for the nation. the illogical character of war is also made evident by the contrast between the college man as a thinker and war itself. the college man who thinks sees truth broadly; war interprets life narrowly, at the point of the bayonet. the college man who thinks sees truth deeply; war makes its primary appeal to the superficial love of glory, of pomp, and of circumstance. the college man who thinks sees truth in its highest relations; war is hell. the college man who thinks sees truth in long ranges and in far-off horizons; war is emotional, and the warrior flings the years into the hours. the college man who thinks, thinks accurately, with logic, with reason; war does not think--it strikes. "strike," the college man may also say, "but hear!" he cries; "yes, think." if the college can make the student think, it has created the greatest force for making the world and the age a world and an age of peace. it is plain enough, too, that the economic side of war makes a tremendous appeal to the student. the cost of the battleship _indiana_ was practically $6,000,000; the total value of grounds and buildings of the colleges and universities in indiana is slightly more than $7,000,000, and the productive funds are $4,000,000. the total cost of the battleship _oregon_ was more than $6,500,000; the total value of grounds and buildings of the universities and colleges of oregon is less than $2,000,000, and the productive funds amount to hardly more than $2,000,000. the cost of the battleship _iowa_ was nearly $6,000,000, and the productive funds of all the colleges and universities of the state are only $5,000,000. the battleship _kentucky_ cost $5,000,000; in the colleges of that state the total amount of productive funds is only $2,000,000, and the total value of grounds and buildings, $3,000,000. the battleship _alabama_ cost more than $4,500,000, and the entire property, real and personal, of all the universities and colleges in that state is less than $4,000,000. the cost of the battleship _wisconsin_ was more than $4,500,000; the whole value of all grounds and buildings of the colleges and universities of the state is only slightly more than $7,000,000. the battleship _maine_ cost more than $5,000,000, and the entire value in grounds, buildings, and productive funds of the colleges and universities of that state is little more than $5,000,000. the value of the buildings of five hundred colleges and universities in this country was estimated in a recent year at $262,000,000, and the productive funds at $357,000,000. leaving out those now in course of construction, the total cost of the battleships and armored cruisers of the united states named after individual states is $325,000,000. the cost of maintaining these battleships during the fiscal year of 1910, though many were in commission but a small part of the year, amounted to no less than $33,000,000. the amount which all the colleges and universities in this country received in tuition fees in 1911 was only $20,000,000; and the entire income received both from fees and productive funds was only about $34,000,000. in other words, when one takes into account the depreciation of the battleship or armored cruiser, the entire cost of the thirty-eight battleships for a single year is greater than the administration of the entire american system of higher education. is it not painfully manifest that the cost of war constitutes a mighty argument for the economic mind of the student? moreover, i am inclined to believe that the very difficulties belonging to the triumph of our great cause constitute ground for its closer relationship to the college man. the college man wishes, as well as needs, a hard job. the easy task, the rosy opportunity, makes no appeal. he is like garibaldi's soldiers, who, when the choice was once offered them by the commander to surrender to ease and safety, chose hardship and peril. the boxer revolution in china was followed by hundreds of applications from college men and women to be sent forth to china to take the place of the martyrs. the difficulties in the progress of the great cause are of every sort and condition. industrial narrowness and commercial greed, military and political ambitions, sectional zeal, national jealousy, the sensitiveness of each nation in matters of national honor, the glamour of the good and the beautiful under the sentiment of patriotism, the historic honor attending death for one's country, the ease of creating war scares among the people, the looseness of the organization of the higher forces of the world--all these conditions and more pile up into a pelion on ossa as a part of the difficulties standing in the progress of our great movement. but such difficulties inspire rather than deter. the student says, "i will; therefore i can." he also says, "i can; therefore i will." he knows that the forces fighting for him are more than those that fight against him, strong as these are. man in his noblest relationships, the songs of the poet (the best interpreter, from homer and virgil to the "winepress" of alfred noyes), the torture, the pains, the sufferings, the woes, the vision of the prophet of a loving and perfect humanity, the reason of logic--all these and more are to him inspirations, and strengthen him in his great quest. he is a knight of the holy grail that is filled from the river of the water of life. perhaps, furthermore, the cause makes its most impressive appeal to the collegian in its internationalism, or interpatriotism. this internationalism addresses itself to his own international appreciation. the collegian is a patriot. he is a patriot not only against a foreign country but often against certain parts of his own country--loyal to the interests which he believes a section of his own nation properly represents. the german students have fought for their fatherland; they have also fought for the liberal sentiments of their own land against reactionary movements, as in 1848. in the american civil war no brighter record is to be found than is embodied in the tablets in memorial hall, cambridge, or in memorial hall, chapel hill, university of north carolina. but the collegian possesses the international sense, and possesses it more and more deeply with each passing decade. his is the international mind, interpreting phenomena in terms of common justice. his is the international heart, feeling the universal joys and sorrows, woes and exultations. his is the international will, seeking to do good to all men. his is the international conscience, weighing right and duty in the scales of divine humanity. whatever interpretation he gives to the sayings of paul that god made all nations of men to dwell on the face of the earth and has fixed the bounds of their habitation,--whether he stops with the words "the face of the earth" or whether he goes on to interpret the limitations of their residence,--it is nevertheless true that his mind, his heart, his will, and his conscience do go out toward all nations in their endeavor to realize their highest racial and interracial peace. no man is a foreigner to him. i have, i trust, said enough to intimate that these orations arise out of a natural and normal condition of the student mind and heart. they also, in subject as well as in origin, bear a special message of cheer and hopefulness to all who have a good will toward the collegian and toward the great cause for which we all are laboring. charles f. thwing _president_ western reserve university cleveland, ohio prize orations the intercollegiate peace association _origin._ in the autumn of 1904 president noah e. byers of goshen college, goshen, indiana, a mennonite college, invited to a conference representatives of all the colleges in indiana, pennsylvania, and ohio that are conducted by those religious denominations that advocate nonresistance as one of their essential religious principles. such bodies are the mennonites, the dunkards, and the quakers. in the spring of 1905 a more specific invitation was sent out, with the result that a conference was held at goshen college, june 22-23, 1905. this date is important, since the call of president byers for such a conference was the first active step ever taken to interest the college world, and particularly undergraduates, in the great movement for world peace founded upon the idea of human brotherhood. while the conference did not take place until a month after president gilman had suggested to the lake mohonk conference, in may, 1905, that it should extend its peace work to the colleges and universities, yet the call for the conference was several months prior to the action of the mohonk conference. eight institutions were represented at this conference--goshen, earlham, central mennonite, ashland, wilmington, juniata, and penn colleges and friends' university. no definite plan of work had been mapped out, but a simple organization was effected, and arrangements were made for a second conference at earlham college (society of friends). professor elbert russell of earlham college was elected president, and upon him devolved most of the work of arranging for the second conference, which was held april 13-14, 1906. for this conference no denominational lines were drawn, it being felt that all colleges and universities should be interested in this important work. hence invitations were sent to all institutions of higher learning in both indiana and ohio. eight institutions were represented: indiana, three--earlham and goshen colleges and indiana university; ohio, five--antioch, denison, miami, wilmington, and central mennonite. this representation was small, considering the importance of the conference and the excellent program that had been arranged for by professor russell. but notwithstanding the small number of institutions represented, the conference was a marked success, made so very largely by the many excellent addresses--among others, those of edwin d. mead, benjamin f. trueblood, professor ernst richard of columbia university, and honorable william dudley foulke. on the last day of the conference the delegates from the different colleges met and perfected a permanent organization, which it was agreed should be called the intercollegiate peace association. thus, after a year of preliminary work, the intercollegiate peace association came into definite and permanent existence on april 14, 1906. at this meeting dean william p. rogers of the cincinnati law school was elected president, and professor elbert russell, secretary and treasurer. the president and the secretary, president noah e. byers of goshen college, and professor stephen f. weston of antioch college constituted the executive committee. the writer has remained on the executive committee from the beginning, as either an elected or an ex-officio member. two methods of propaganda were adopted: intercollegiate oratorical contests, and public addresses on peace questions before the student body and faculties of colleges and universities. it was also agreed that the work should begin with ohio and indiana and gradually extend to other states. although no definite plan was formulated until a year later, at the meeting at cincinnati, it was understood from the outset that it should be the aim gradually to extend the field of work, so that ultimately most of the institutions of higher learning in practically all of the states should be embraced within the organization and participate in the contests. _purpose._ the purpose of the association has been quite definitely set forth in my "historical sketch"[1] and in my report for 1912. from these the following statement is very largely borrowed. the fundamental purpose of the intercollegiate peace association is to instill into the minds and hearts of the young men of our colleges and universities the principle that the highest ideals of justice and righteousness should govern the conduct of men in all their international affairs quite as much as in purely individual and social matters, and that, therefore, the true aim of all international dealings should be to settle differences, of whatever nature, by peaceful methods through an appeal to the noblest human instincts and the highest ideals of life, rather than by the arbitrament of the sword through an appeal to the lower passions; and, further, both on humanitarian and economic grounds, to arouse in the youth of to-day an appreciation of the importance of a peaceful settlement of international disputes, and to inculcate a spirit antagonistic to the inhuman waste of life and the reckless waste of wealth in needless warfare. [1] printed in _antioch college bulletin_, vol. vii, no. 1, december, 1910. this appeal to the idealism of youth is founded upon the psychological fact that it is the ideals of life that determine the conduct of life. it is ideals that rule the world; hence the importance of right ideals based upon a comprehensive understanding of the real nature and deepest implications of human fellowship. the alleged impracticability is not in the ideal but in the difficulty of making the ideal such a dominant part of our being that it shall consistently direct our activities under every circumstance. one of the essential conditions of human progress is the conviction that such ideals are vital to the highest attainments and that these should be the aim of all our strivings. unfortunately such a standard of life is far from being realized. policy rules largely in the world of practical life; either high ideals are considered impracticable, or there is no attempt to enforce consistency between belief and practice. mindful of the further fact that the ideals and habits of thought and action that prevail in mature life are those that are formed in youth, the intercollegiate peace association turns to the young manhood of the undergraduate for its field of operations. the aim is to give such a firm mold to the ideals of the undergraduate that they shall for all time shape his activities to the end of righteous conduct in all international dealings. in particular, the aim is to cultivate in the young men of our colleges and universities such sentiments and standards of conduct as will insure their devotion to the furtherance of international peace through arbitration and other methods of pacific settlement rather than by battleships--standards of conduct based upon the fundamental truth that conflicts between men, and therefore principles of right and justice, can be rightly settled only through the mediation of mind, and that every effort to settle them by force is not only illogical, a psychological impossibility, but is the way of the brute, not the way of man, whose nature touches the divine. all the more important must this work with the undergraduate be considered when we reflect that it is the young men in our colleges and universities to-day who will mold the public opinion and the national and international policy of the next generation; for it is such young men as these that will control the pulpit and the press, the legislation and the diplomacy of the future. it is this fact that gives such peculiar importance to the work of the intercollegiate peace association. to quote from the report of the secretary for 1912: "other peace societies are laboring to create a public sentiment to-day in favor of international peace, through arbitration of all international differences. this is very essential. but the intercollegiate peace association is founded upon the belief that the cause of peace will not triumph in a day, and that it is therefore of the utmost importance that right ideals be rooted into the minds of those who will give expression to the public opinion of the future. in brief, it is building more for the future than for the immediate present. the millennium of peace will not come until the ideals of a christian civilization take deeper root in the minds and hearts of those who are the leaders of thought and action. one of the crying sins of to-day is that professions of righteous living in accordance with christian ethical ideals are not taken seriously. note the disgraceful policy that has been pursued with regard to turkey by the nations of europe that profess to be disciples of the prince of peace. hence it is of the utmost importance that those who are to become the future translators of ideals into action shall be imbued with right principles of life and of human relations. to this end it is sought to cultivate the right sentiment against war, and for international peace, among the undergraduates of our colleges; for what the undergraduate thinks about and reads about to-day will very largely determine his future principles and his conduct, and it is he who is destined to mold the ideals, shape the policies, and determine the actions of the people of to-morrow." _methods and results._ to carry out these purposes two things are essential: an awakened interest in the cause of peace, and some definite and effective method for molding sentiments and habits of thought that will persist with such vitality that they will give shape to future conduct and activities. to arouse an interest in the subject, on the part of both professors and students, it was believed at the outset that public addresses would be effective, and it was hoped that the association would be able to inaugurate a course of such addresses in our colleges and universities. it was, however, soon found that to finance such a course would require more money than we could hope to command for some time to come. in consequence, very little has been done along this line further than to arrange for occasional addresses and to encourage chapel talks. it is this field of work that the lake mohonk conference voted to adopt at the suggestion of dr. gilman. the conference also found it difficult to carry out the plan, and our association was invited to assume the whole of this work--a request we would gladly have accepted, but which we were compelled to decline for want of funds. it is a very important field of work and could be made very effective toward realizing the ultimate goal of the intercollegiate peace association, for its effect would undoubtedly be the enlistment of a much larger number of the students in the oratorical contests, which must be our chief reliance for getting international peace ideas to take a vital root in the undergraduate mind. if we cannot secure the necessary funds for carrying on this important work, it is hoped that some other peace society will do it for us, for such addresses could be made a most effective complement to our work. being compelled to abandon the public addresses for want of money, we have concentrated most of our efforts upon the intercollegiate oratorical contests as perhaps the most effective method for carrying out the purpose of the association. the contests are bound to arouse an interest in the subject, while the preparation of orations is sure to ingrain thoughts, sentiments, and convictions that will be indelible in the character of the young men who participate in the contests. while the contests are oratorical in their nature, their primary purpose is not the cultivation of oratory. oratory is simply used as a means to an end--the cultivation of right ideas of justice and righteousness between nations. that such a result will accrue is assured both in psychological principles and in experience. every student who produces a well-prepared oration in bound to make the thoughts and sentiments expressed a part of his being. the oration would not be effective if it were otherwise. the writer has heard scores of these orations, and he is convinced of the sincerity and earnestness of the orators. moreover, letters written to him by those who have won prizes, attesting their interest in and their devotion to the cause, by reason of their participation in the contests, give ample evidence that the contests are bearing fruit. nor can one read the orations in this volume without being convinced of their sincerity. indeed, the reason why we do not have intercollegiate debates instead of contests in oratory is because of the psychological truth, amply justified by experience, that the student who prepares for the negative side of a peace question would tend to have his thoughts permanently fixed along the lines of the advocates of great armaments. it is not that the student should not know the arguments opposing the ideas of the advocates of peace by arbitration. we would not cultivate bigotry even in a good cause. we would have him know the facts, as indeed he must before he can present any arguments for peace that would have any significance. but an acquaintance with the opposing arguments is quite a different thing, in its effect upon the thought of the student, from making that thought his own and publicly defending it. other results may be mentioned. while the cultivation of oratory is not a function of the intercollegiate peace association, it does foster oratory as a valuable if not an indispensable instrument for effecting its own end. in fact, the oratorical contests are something more than agencies for interesting undergraduates in the peace movement. the cultivation of the art of expression and of public speaking, now very generally provided for in college and university curriculums, is of especial significance to the work of this association. for it is not alone of importance that the graduate who leaves his alma mater should be indoctrinated with a message of peace for the world; that his message may be effective, he must also have attained some proficiency in the art of clear and forceful diction and in the art of delivering his message in a pleasing and convincing manner. therefore, it is not without reason that our contests are for the most part under the immediate direction of the department of english, or of whatever departments have charge of the public speaking in the various colleges and universities. a further factor in these contests is their cultural value, both moral and intellectual. they necessarily cultivate the highest ethical conceptions, historical and political knowledge, and careful and logical thinking. to quote from the secretary's report for 1912: "the work of the intercollegiate peace association is a great force for righteousness between nation and nation, and so between man and man, and therefore may be considered as supplementary to the more strictly moral and intellectual culture in our institutions of higher learning. the ethical value is not the only value of the contests. in the preparation of orations the undergraduate necessarily informs himself of historical conditions, of the economic and social effects of war, of the legal and constitutional principles involved, and of the problems, difficulties, and principles concerned with international relations. it is this early beginning of an intelligent understanding of the problems involved, together with the right moral insight, that must count for future effectiveness in shaping international policies and practices." finally, while these contests have chiefly in mind the shaping of the public opinion of coming generations, they are by no means a negligible factor in their influence upon the public opinion of to-day. the contests--local, state, and interstate--are heard by many hundreds of people every year, and in many cases by persons who would otherwise seldom come in contact with peace sentiments. the permeating influence in college circles extends beyond those who participate in the contests. the influence of any single contest may indeed be small, but so too is the influence of any one peace conference or congress. the task of molding public opinion along the lines of any human uplift is always slow, and only gradually do the influences of this character permeate and take possession of the social mind; but every influence leaves its impression. it is only by persistent activities and cumulative effects that the social mind can be aroused to a full consciousness of any great moral issue, and still more true is this when that moral issue is of national or international importance. the many peace societies, the intercollegiate peace association among them, are just such persistent activities, which, by gradually producing cumulative effects, will ultimately reap their reward. but more perhaps than other peace societies does the intercollegiate peace association concern itself with the social mind and the social conscience of the future. _the contests._ the first oratorical contest was held at the university of cincinnati, may 17, 1907. arrangements were made for the participation of only ohio and indiana colleges. state contests were not held, but fourteen orations were submitted from as many different institutions, nine from ohio and five from indiana. the writers of eight of these were selected by judges on thought and composition to take part in the speaking contest. four were from ohio and four from indiana. indiana won both the first and the second prize. the first prize was won by paul smith of depauw university with the subject, "the conflict of war and peace." the second prize went to lawrence b. smelser of earlham college, whose subject was "the solving principles of federation." the second contest was held at depauw university, may 15, 1908. carrying out the plan adopted at the meeting at cincinnati, the contestants were selected by means of state contests, and an invitation was extended to the colleges and universities of michigan, illinois, and wisconsin to participate in the contest. wisconsin did not respond, but contests were held in ohio, indiana, michigan, and illinois. by special arrangement juniata college was allowed to represent pennsylvania without a state contest. glenn p. wishard of northwestern university won the first prize; subject, "the united states and universal peace." the second prize was won by h. p. lenartz of notre dame university; subject, "america and the world's peace." the third interstate contest took place at the university of chicago, may 4, 1909, in connection with the second national peace congress. ohio, indiana, michigan, illinois, and wisconsin were represented, all having held state contests. levi t. pennington of earlham college won the first prize; subject, "the evolution of world peace." the second prize went to harold p. flint of illinois wesleyan university; subject, "america the exemplar of peace." the fourth annual contest was held at the university of michigan, may 13, 1910. there were six contestants, pennsylvania having come regularly into the association. arthur f. young of western reserve university won the first prize; subject, "the waste of war--the wealth of peace." the second prize went to glenn n. merry of northwestern university; subject, "a nation's opportunity." the fifth annual contest was held at johns hopkins university, may 5, 1911, in connection with the third national peace congress. there were seven contestants, maryland being represented for the first time. the first prize was won by stanley h. howe, albion college, michigan, and the second prize by wayne walker calhoun, illinois wesleyan university. mr. howe's subject was "the hope of peace," and mr. calhoun's, "war and the man." this contest was one of the most successful that had been held up to that time. it was greeted by one of the largest audiences that had attended any of the sessions of the peace congress, and the comparison of the orations, in both thought and delivery, with the speeches given in the congress, was very favorable to the young orators. a general enthusiasm was evoked for the contests. yet there was much fear that this contest might prove to be the last, there being no assurance ahead for adequate funds to carry on the work. it was decided, however, not to give up without further trial, a decision well justified by subsequent developments. assistance being secured from the carnegie peace fund, eleven states held contests in 1912. in addition to the seven that participated in the contest at baltimore, four additional states were added--new york, north carolina, iowa, and nebraska. with so many states, it became necessary for the first time to divide them into groups. two groups were formed, an eastern and a western. the western group, of five states, held its contest at monmouth college, illinois, april 26, and the eastern group, of six states, at allegheny college, pennsylvania, may 3. no prizes were given at either of these contests, but an arrangement was made with the lake mohonk conference by which the ranking orator in each contest should meet and contest for first and second place at mohonk lake at the time of the lake mohonk conference. the contest at mohonk was held may 16, the contestants being percival v. blanshard of the university of michigan, who represented the western group, and russell weisman of western reserve university, who represented the eastern group. the title of mr. blanshard's oration was "the roosevelt theory of war," and that of mr. weisman's, "national honor and vital interests." the misses seabury gave a first prize of $75 and a second prize of $50. the judges awarded the first prize to mr. blanshard and the second prize to mr. weisman. so great, however, was the interest of the guests at mohonk lake, and so nearly equal in merit were the orations, that a gentleman present gave an additional $25 to mr. weisman to make the prizes equal, and mr. joshua bailey of philadelphia gave each of the contestants an additional $50. five additional states--maine, massachusetts, texas, missouri, and south dakota--participated in the contests of 1913, making sixteen states holding contests. of these states three groups were formed, an eastern, a central, and a western. the central group held its contest at goshen college, indiana, april 25; the western group at st. louis, may 1, as part of the program of the fourth american peace congress; and the eastern group at lafayette college, pennsylvania, may 13. the same arrangements were made as in the preceding year--that the contestant holding the highest rank in each group should meet in a final contest at mohonk lake. no prizes were given, except that the business men's league of st. louis gave a prize of $100 for the contest at st. louis. the contest at mohonk was held may 15, and three prizes were given by the misses seabury--$100, $75, and $50. paul b. blanshard of the university of michigan, a twin brother of the mr. blanchard who won the first prize in 1912, represented the central group and won the first prize with the subject, "the evolution of patriotism." calvert magruder, st. john's college, annapolis, maryland, represented the eastern group and won the second prize. his subject was "certain phases of the peace movement." vernon m. welsh, knox college, illinois, represented the western group and won the third prize. his subject was "the assurance of peace." _growth._ the growth of the intercollegiate peace association, like that of most social movements, was slow in the first few years of its existence, but with the gradual accretion of new states it has gained in momentum, and is to-day increasing with such rapidity that only the lack of financial support will prevent it from embracing in its contests within another two years practically every state in the union. starting with two states at the earlham conference in 1906 and the first contest in 1907, it added three states in 1908, one in 1910, and one in 1911, making seven states participating in the contests of 1911. four more states were added for the contests of 1912, and five additional ones for the contests of 1913 (nine states in two years), making sixteen states in all. since the contest in may, 1913, eight states have been added for the contests of 1914, while the work of organization is being carried on in several other states. by 1915 at least thirty states will be holding contests if money can be secured for properly financing them. four groups are now definitely organized: an eastern, a central, a western, and a southern. a pacific group is in process of being organized. thus, in seven years from the first contest we have become a national association, extending from the atlantic to the pacific and from the lakes to the gulf. _prizes and finances._ in order to encourage the young men to enter the contests, the plan of offering prizes was adopted at the outset. the national association made itself responsible for the state prizes, leaving the local institutions to provide for such local prizes as they could arrange for. in some places such prizes are given, being provided for in different ways, and in some places no local prizes are given. at first only $50 and $25 were given for the two state prizes, but after the second year it was made a definite policy of the association to make the first state prize $75 and the second prize $50. with rare exceptions, in the case of the second prize, this policy is now maintained. in new york, however, there is a first prize of $200 and a second prize of $100, given by mrs. elmer black. for the past two or three years the national association has made itself responsible for the first prize only, leaving the states to look after the second prize, though the secretary also looks after many of the second prizes. no prizes are regularly given in the group contests, but it is hoped that a plan may be evolved for giving one prize, as the expenses of the winning contestant are large. at the national contest at mohonk lake, prizes are given to each contestant. in 1914 these prizes will probably range from $40 to $100. the prize money has come from various sources. in 1908 mr. carnegie gave $1000, and in 1909 he gave $700. the misses seabury, of new bedford, massachusetts, gave $500 a year from the first. they gave $750 in 1913 and will give $1000 for prizes in 1914. in illinois la verne w. noyes has annually given the first prize of $75 and harlow n. higginbotham the second prize of $50. in michigan r. e. olds gave the first prize until 1913, and j. h. moores the second prize until 1914. in ohio samuel mather and j. g. schmidlapp furnish the prizes for 1914. in new york, massachusetts, pennsylvania, and maryland the prizes are given by individuals at the instigation of peace societies. in some states the second prize is given by some individual or through a collection from a number of individuals. the balance of the prizes are paid out of the subvention of $1200 that has been allowed for the past three years out of the carnegie endowment fund. in 1913 the prizes amounted to $2400. in 1914 they approximate $3400, apart from any local prizes that may be given. the annual subvention of $1200 from the carnegie peace fund is wholly inadequate to meet the growing needs of this association. since this subvention was first granted, the number of states has been more than doubled, and it takes about $600 a year to run the secretary's office. unless more money is secured from some source, the association will be unable to grow beyond its present limits. _officers and organization._ the organization of the intercollegiate peace association has been a gradual development, and has undergone modifications to meet the changing conditions due to the considerable enlargement of the territory embraced within its sphere of activity, chief of which has been the practical impossibility of getting representatives to a national meeting from such a large extent of territory. at first there were a president, secretary, and treasurer, and an executive committee, with the college presidents of ohio and indiana as vice presidents. at the meeting at depauw university, in 1908, it was decided to create state committees, that should have charge of the work in their respective states. as the states grew in numbers the plan of having vice presidents was abandoned. in 1911 the chairmen of the state committees were made members of an advisory council, and in 1913 the executive committee was reorganized so that there should be one member from each group of states in addition to the president and secretary. when the organization is fully matured the elected members of the executive committee will be a self-perpetuating body, only one or two going out of office in any one year, reã«lection being permitted. the executive committee will elect the president, executive secretary, and treasurer, and the president and the executive secretary will appoint the members of the advisory council, who will be ex-officio chairmen of the state committees. the officers up to date have been as follows: _presidents:_ dean william p. rogers, cincinnati law school, 1906-1907; professor george w. knight, ohio state university, 1907-1908; professor elbert russell, earlham college, 1908-1910; dean william p. rogers, 1910-1911; president charles f. thwing, western reserve university, 1911-. _secretaries:_ professor elbert russell, 1906-1908; mr. george fulk, cerro gordo, illinois, 1908-1911; professor stephen f. weston, antioch college, 1911-. _treasurers:_ professor elbert russell, 1906-1908; professor stephen f. weston, 1908-. _orations._ in the seven years in which the contests have been held, about twelve hundred orations have been written, a little more than one half of these in the past two years. the number written in 1914 will not fall far short of five hundred. for some time we have desired to publish a volume of the prize orations, and within the past few years there has been considerable demand for such a volume, as many would-be contestants are anxious to see what they will have to measure up to in order to win. outsiders interested in the contests have also desired such a publication. the present collection was therefore projected, and the world peace foundation willingly undertook to issue it as one of the books in its international library. the ten orations that have been selected for this volume out of the twelve hundred have all won the first prize in interstate contests. the first five are the first prize orations in the national contests of the first five years before the group contests were organized, and were selected by a series of local, state, and interstate contests out of about five hundred and fifty orations delivered. the last five, selected by a series of contests out of about six hundred and fifty, are the first prize orations of the group contests of the past two years. they were delivered in the national contests at mohonk lake at the time of the lake mohonk conferences. the fact that many of the second prize orations, and indeed a number of the others, were given first place by some of the judges is indicative of the general high character of all the orations, so that the ten selected orations are very fairly typical of the thought and sentiment of the whole twelve hundred. it is therefore believed that the publication of these orations will be of great value not only as a stimulus to prospective contestants but as a convincing proof of the quality of the work that the undergraduate students of the country are doing in the contests. they are evidence that these contests call out a high grade of intellectual and moral culture, showing as they do keen and clear thinking and high moral ideals. there is included as an appendix to these orations the pugsley prize oration of 1913, by bryant smith, a senior in guilford college, north carolina, a sample of the prize essays annually submitted for the pugsley prize of $100 offered through the lake mohonk conference by chester dewitt pugsley of yonkers, new york. the essay is also fittingly printed in this volume because mr. smith represented the state of north carolina in the eastern group contest of the intercollegiate peace association in 1912, while still another reason for including it is the hope that others who have taken part in the oratorical contests, and who are thereby excluded from entering those contests again, may be encouraged to try for the pugsley prize. _subjects of orations._ in view of the fact that so many orations have been written on peace subjects, it is worthy of note that the topics have seldom been duplicated, and that when the same topic has been twice used, the handling of it has been so different that little duplication has been noticeable. each oration well represents the originality and the individuality of the writer or orator. duplication is shown in the quotations, and it is therefore suggested that quotations be sparingly used. not the least interesting feature of the orations is the combination of idealism and practicality, which they reveal in the minds of the contestants. truly, these young men "have hitched their wagon to a star," the star of universal good will. to show the wide range of subjects chosen, and therefore the scope and many-sidedness of the peace question, the following list of titles already used is given here. they are also given as suggestions to future writers of orations, for there is no objection to choosing subjects previously used. even if there is some duplication of thought, it makes little difference, since the contests are seldom held twice in the same place. included in the list are some titles that show variations in the way of stating the same thing, and these variations should be suggestive to future writers of orations. partial list of subjects america the exemplar of peace america and the world's peace america's mission in the peace movement america's mission to mankind america's obligation the arbiter of the world arbitration _versus_ war the challenge of thor the conflict of war and peace a congress of nations the cost of militarism the cost of peace the crucial parallelism the dawn of peace the dawn of universal peace democracy and peace diplomacy and peace disillusionment the dominant ideal the end; and the means the evolution of a higher patriotism the evolution of justice the evolution of law the evolution of national greatness as a world peacemaker the evolution of world peace the fallacy of the economics of war the federation of the world forces of war and peace the foundations from chaos to harmony from history's pages--peace fruits of war and fruits of peace government and international peace the growing sentiment the growth of the peace movement honor satisfied the ideal of the century idealism and the peace movement immigration and peace the inefficiency of war instead of war--what? international arbitration international justice and world peace international peace international peace and the prince of peace justice and peace justice by war or peace the keynote of the twentieth century the lasting wound the law of peace the message of the andes military selection and its effect on national life modern battlefields a nation's opportunity the new anglo-saxon the new brotherhood the new corner stone the new era the new nobility the new patriotism the next step the panama canal the passing of war the pathway to peace patriotism and peace peace and armaments peace and the evolution of conscience peace and the fortification of the panama canal peace and public opinion peace inevitable peace is our passion peace on earth peace, our great ideal the philosophy of universal peace physical and psychical aspects of war a plea for international peace a plea for peace popular fallacies about war popular government and peace popular sentiment and purer citizenship: the right road to peace the power of international tolerance the prince of peace progress toward justice the proposed court of arbitral justice the rationality of peace the real power the redemption of patriotism the regaining of the world's lost legacy right or might the significance of the hague conferences the rightful ruler a simple method of forwarding universal peace the solving principles of federation sovereignty in arbitration statesmanship _versus_ battleship thor or christ ungrateful america the united states and universal peace the united states of the world universal peace and the brotherhood of man the unnecessary evil a vision of a conquest war and christianity war--the demoralizer war and its elimination war and the laboring man war and the man war for profit war--universal brotherhood--peace the warrior's protest against war the waste of war--the wealth of peace the way of peace what, from vengeance? world federation the world organization _acknowledgments._ the intercollegiate peace association is greatly indebted to many state and city peace societies for coã¶peration and assistance. they have materially strengthened our work and made possible the enlargement of the field of our activities. to their secretaries we are deeply indebted. the fullest coã¶peration of the peace societies, each assisting and supplementing the work of others wherever possible, will bring the most fruitful and the most speedy results, and the fact that we have received such coã¶peration indicates a full appreciation of the value of the work being done in these contests. we wish also to express our gratitude to the many individual contributors of prizes, especially to the misses seabury, for their interest, encouragement, and generosity, because without their assistance our association could not have survived. to the misses seabury we are also under obligation for lending their rights over the texts of orations for this publication. for the subvention from the carnegie endowment for international peace we thank the american peace society, through whose agency it comes to us. for the publication of this volume we are deeply grateful to the world peace foundation, without whose coã¶peration the book could not have been published. to edwin d. mead and denys p. myers the editor owes his sincere thanks for suggestions and corrections of the manuscript. we trust that the volume will be amply justified by the good that it will do. stephen f. weston _executive secretary_ supplement _the contests of 1914._ this volume was projected to be published before the lake mohonk conference in may, but it was decided to include the five orations given in the national contest of 1914, and so make the volume complete for the year of issue. the last five orations, then, are the winning ones in the group contests of 1914, contesting for place in the national contest at mohonk lake, may 16, 1914. they are the picked orations of over four hundred and fifty prepared in one hundred and twenty colleges and universities, representing twenty-two states. the fifteen orations in the volume are the winning orations out of more than sixteen hundred and fifty written by the student body of the country in the past eight years. in 1914 six additional states took part in the contests, making twenty-two organized into five groups. the pacific coast and southern groups were added during the year to the three groups organized in 1913. three of the groups held their contests on may 1--the north atlantic at the college of the city of new york, the central at western reserve university, and the western at des moines college. the southern group held its contest at vanderbilt university on may 10. on the pacific coast only oregon was ready, and the winner of her state contest was permitted to represent the group in the national contest. utah and california are planning to enter the contests of 1915. virginia, west virginia, and south carolina are organizing, and a sixth group will then be formed--the south atlantic group. s. f. w. the conflict of war and peace by paul smith, depauw university, greencastle, indiana first prize oration in the national contest held at the university of cincinnati, may 17, 1907 the conflict of war and peace the past ages have witnessed a long conflict between two opposing principles--the principle of might and the principle of right. the first instituted the duel between equals and condemned the impotent to slavery; the second ordained the courts of civil justice and signed the emancipation proclamation. the principle of might licensed despotism and degraded the many in the service of the few; the principle of right proclaimed democracy and consecrated the few to the service of the many. thus in the realm of the individual and of the state the diviner conception has won its triumphs, and to-day force is tolerated only as it serves the cause of justice. but in the larger international sphere the advocates of might prolong the ancient cry for war; the disciples of right protest in a gentler demand for peace. the partisans of war urge four capital reasons in behalf of their principle: personal glory, moral education, class interest, and national egoism. we have as a heritage of our military past, not a sense of the grim tragedy of war, but traditions which award the highest meed of personal glory to the warrior. the roster of the world's heroes contains two classes of names--great soldiers and great altruists. poet and orator and populace unite to do honor to him who was not afraid to fight and to die for his home, his king, his liberty, his country, his convictions. bravery has ever won its laurel crown, for an instinct within us applauds physical courage and aggressiveness. and the gilded uniform and clanking sword, the drumbeat and the bugle call, the camp fire and the "far-flung battle line," stand as the most dramatic expressions of a deep sentiment, primitive and thrilling. akin to this martial hero worship is the argument that success in war gives training for the higher contests of peace. out of the war of 1776 the nation took george washington for president; out of the mexican war, zachary taylor; out of the civil war, general grant; out of the spanish war, theodore roosevelt. the badge of the grand army of the republic is a certificate of merit. the cross of the legion of honor opens the door to social and political and business prosperity. battle is regarded as a supreme test of sturdy manhood, and the harsh discipline of the camp as education for the finer arts of the council. war creates a heroism which later devotes itself to spiritual ends. moreover, say the advocates, the interests of class require force for their conservation. the hereditary nobility of europe was founded by military process for military purposes, and, with the passing of war, loses its warrant for existence. on the other hand, it is claimed that the under classes may come into the enjoyment of their inalienable rights, common to all humanity, only by means of the sword. witness the peasantry of russia! even in america so great a prophet as henry ward beecher foresaw a tragic day when the bivouac of capital would be set against the camp of labor. and lesser seers are not lacking who freely predict, even for our democratic land, a desperate rebellion of a proletariat of poverty against an aristocracy of wealth. finally, the demands of national egoism are urged in behalf of war. for example, japan needs new territory for her growing millions and must assume the conqueror's rã´le. or france goes mad with the lust of empire and goes forth untamed until the day of waterloo. or great britain must have new markets; and, falsely reasoning that trade follows the flag, and the flag follows the bayonet, she seizes a realm upon which the sun may never set. or the interests of white men and yellow men, of black men or red men, clash; and then the cannon must be the final test, might must make right, and the strongest must survive. the greed of territorial aggrandizement, the spirit of national adventure, the longing for commercial supremacy, the honor of a country, the pride of racial achievement--each is urged to justify the necessity for bloodshed and carnage. such are the arguments of the advocates of war. to balance these, the advocates of peace plead four greater considerations: against personal glory, the economic cost of militarism; against the moral education of war, the higher heroism of peace; against class interests, the sanctity of human life; and against national egoism, the deeper spirit of national altruism. a single modern battleship costs more than the combined value of the property and endowment of all the colleges of a certain great state. two thirds of the money passing through the treasury of the republic goes to the support of the military system. computing two hundred dollars a year as the average loss to society occasioned by the withdrawal of each soldier and sailor from productive toil, and adding this sum to the war budgets of the nations for the past fifty years, we obtain a total of billions, beyond the reach of all imagination. the money which armies, navies, wars, and pensions have cost the world in fifty years would have installed in china a system of education equal to that of the united states; would have transformed the arid deserts of india into a modern eden by irrigation; would have laid railways from cape town to the remotest corner of africa; would have dug the panama canal; and, in addition, would have sent a translation of the bible, of shakespeare, homer, goethe, and dante to every family on the globe. in a word, the wealth spent on wars in the last half century would have transformed life for a majority of human beings. the stoppage of this waste will shorten the hours of labor, reduce pauperism, elevate the peasantry of europe, lighten taxation, and work an economic revolution. the argument for moral education mistakes national gratitude to warriors for tribute to the training of the camp. but grant that war develops the combative qualities, the argument forgets a darker moral phase. it forgets the moral wrecks which are the sad products of war; it forgets the effect of the loss of the refining influence of womanhood upon the soldier; it forgets the debasement of sinking men to the physical type of life. and the argument assumes that peace has no "equivalent for war," declared by a famous educator to be the greatest need of the age. courage and endurance are as necessary in social reforms as in carnal battle. to wrestle against principalities and powers and rulers of the world-darkness calls forth the maximum powers of manhood. wendell phillips stands in the ranks of heroes as high as philip sheridan. the moral loss from war transcends the moral gain. yet war levies toll more tragic than any toll of dollars, more appalling than any moral cost. a famous painting reveals the world's conquerors, xerxes, cã¦sar, alexander, napoleon, and a lesser host, mounted proudly on battle steeds, caparisoned with gorgeous trappings; but the field through which they march is paved with naked, mutilated corpses, the ghastly price of glory. the trenches at port arthur were filled level-full with the bodies of self-sacrificed martyrs, and upon this gruesome slope the final charges were made. stripped of all sentiment, war is organized and wholesale murder, a savage and awful paradox which proclaims the shallowness of civilization. said general sherman: "only those who have never heard a shot, only those who have never heard the shrieks of the wounded nor the groans of the dying, can cry aloud for more blood, more vengeance, more desolation." god grant the world may soon heed the voice, sounding down from the solemnity of sinai, laying the divine command upon each man and each nation: "thou shalt not kill!" there yet remains the ethical argument for peace. will any one say that the supreme duty of altruism is binding upon men as individuals, and not binding upon the same men acting conjointly as a nation? when the people and the statesmen of one nation are able to put themselves in the places of the statesmen and of the people of another nation; when there is a common will to do international justice rather than to despise the weaker country; when not selfish interest alone, but the greatest good of the greatest number, becomes the driving impulse of humanity; when the thrill of fraternity crosses geographical lines and pauses not on the shores of the seas--then war will be impossible, the energies of the world will turn to the constructive arts, and from the midst of contentment unshadowed by hunger, from prosperity unmenaced by want, in the peaceful spirit of the christ, the world will sing: "the crest and crowning of all good, life's final star is brotherhood; for it will bring again to earth her long-lost poesy and mirth; will send new light on every face, a kingly power upon the race. and till it come, we men are slaves, and travel downward to dust of graves. come, clear the way, then, clear the way: blind creeds and kings have had their day. break the dead branches from the path: our hope is in the aftermath. our hope is in heroic men, star-led to build the world again. to this event the ages ran: make way for brotherhood--make way for man." all great reforms have begun with "star-led" men and have moved from individuals to groups and from groups to the nation. in every distinct advance of the race prophetic persons have anticipated the trend of the ages and have adopted new codes for themselves; the higher morality has spread by agitation to include a larger group, and finally it has become the policy of the nation. thus slavery went, and political equality came. and thus war must go and peace must come. first, we find protest against the killing of individuals by individuals. the duel fell into disrepute and at last was forbidden by law. the carrying of weapons became unfashionable and at length was made a crime. with the growth of the moral sense, mutual trust took the place of armed neutrality. the present situation is ready for the larger application of these principles. the argument which abolished the carrying of weapons must frown upon excessive national armaments. as the individual duel was superseded by personal arbitration, so the national duel must be superseded by national arbitration. the reason that maintains the civil court for the settlement of individuals' disputes calls for a higher court for the settlement of national disputes. not alone among men, not alone within states, but among the nations, right, not might, must rule; not force, but justice; and written as the world's supreme mandate, as the highest human law from which there may be no appeal, must be the unshaken law of national righteousness. tennyson's words were accounted a poet's fancy when he wrote: till the war drum throbs no longer, and the battle-flags are furl'd in the parliament of man, the federation of the world. yet the present year[1] will witness the fulfillment of that prophecy. disarmament and arbitration will be considered this summer, not by agitators, not by theorists, nor yet prophetically by poets; but in june, at the invitation of our own president,[2] an actual international conference will assemble, a parliament of the world, composed of official representatives of every nation of the globe. thus we see the foregleams of an approaching day. the time is not far distant when war will glide into the grim shadows of a scarce-remembered past, when battles will pass into the oblivion of forgotten horrors. then will society realize its dreams of a kingdom of heaven upon earth, where the barbaric lure of fighting will be lost; where no class lines may exist save those freely acknowledged by a common justice; where national egoism maintains no armies for conquest and no navies for aggrandizement; where economic resources are devoted, not to mutual physical destruction, but to splendid spiritual enlargement; where "every nation that shall lift again its hand against a brother, on its forehead will wear forevermore the curse of cain"; and where, in the realization of a vast, racial brotherhood, is fulfilled the prophetic angel's song, "peace on earth, good-will to men." ruskin, the modern bard of peace, has sung: put off, put off your mail, ye kings, and beat your brands to dust- a surer grasp your hands must know, your hearts a better trust; nay, bend aback the lance's point, and break the helmet bar- a noise is in the morning winds, but not the noise of war! among the grassy mountain paths the glittering troops increase- they come, they come!--how fair their feet,--they come that publish peace. [1] the hague conference of 1907 is referred to. [2] by the courtesy of president roosevelt the official call for the second hague conference was issued by the emperor of russia. forty-four nations were represented.--_editor._ the united states and universal peace by glenn porter wishard, northwestern university, evanston, illinois first prize oration in the national contest held at depauw university, greencastle, indiana, may 15, 1908 the united states and universal peace political and religious reforms move slowly. we change our beliefs and at the same time hold fast to old customs. farsighted public opinion has declared war to be unchristian; sound statesmanship has stamped it as unjust; the march of events has, in a majority of cases, proved it to be unnecessary--and yet we continue to build mammoth engines of destruction as if war were inevitable. truly, the millennium is not at hand, nor is war a thing of the past; but whereas war was once the rule, now it is the exception. this is an age of peace; controversies once decided by force are now settled by arbitration. europe, once the scene of continuous bloodshed, has not been plundered by conquering armies for more than a generation, while the united states has enjoyed a century of peace marred by only five years of foreign war. the four notable conflicts of the last decade have been between great and small powers, and have been confined to the outposts of civilization; while during the same period more than one hundred disputes have been settled by peaceful means. the willingness to arbitrate has been manifest; the means have been provided; the permanent international court, established by the hague conference in 1899, actually lives, and has already adjudicated four important controversies.[1] but arbitration, you say, will never succeed because the decisions cannot be enforced. you forget that already some two hundred and fifty disputes have been settled by this method, and in not one instance has the losing power refused to abide by the decision. [1] from october 14, 1902, the date of the first decision, up to the end of 1913, the permanent court has rendered thirteen decisions settling international differences.--_editor._ yesterday the man who advocated universal peace was called a dreamer; to-day throughout the world organized public opinion demands the abolition of war. yesterday we erected statues to those who died for their country; to-day we eulogize those who live for humanity. yesterday we bowed our heads to the god of war; to-day we lift our hands to the prince of peace. i do not mean to say that we have entered the utopian age, for the present international situation is a peculiar one, since we are at the same time blessed with peace and cursed with militarism. this is not an age of war, yet we are burdened by great and ever-increasing armaments; the mad race for naval supremacy continues, while the relative strength of the powers remains practically the same; the intense and useless rivalry of the nations goes on until, according to the great russian economist, jean de bloch, it means "slow destruction in time of peace by swift destruction in the event of war." in europe to-day millions are being robbed of the necessaries of life, millions more are suffering the pangs of abject poverty in order to support this so-called "armed peace." note the condition in our own country. last year we expended on our army, navy, and pensions sixty-seven per cent of our total receipts. think of it! in a time of profound peace more than two thirds of our entire expenditures are charged to the account of war. we do not advocate radical, utopian measures; we do not propose immediate disarmament; but we do maintain that when england, germany, france, and the united states each appropriates from thirty to forty per cent of their total expenditures in preparation for war in an age of peace, the time has come for the unprejudiced consideration of the present international situation. why do the great powers build so many battleships? president roosevelt, representative hobson, and others would have us believe that england, germany, and france are actually preparing for war, while the united states is building these engines of destruction for the purpose of securing peace. but what right have we to assume that our navy is for the purpose of preserving peace, while the navies of the european powers are for the purpose of making war? is not such an assumption an insult to our neighbors? as a matter of fact, england builds new battleships because germany does, germany increases her navy because france does, while the united states builds new dreadnoughts because other nations pursue that policy. call it by whatever honey-coated name you will, the fact, remains that it is military rivalry of the most barbarous type, a rivalry as useless as it is oppressive, a rivalry prompted by jealousy and distrust where there should be friendship and mutual confidence. there is riot one of the powers but that would welcome relief from the bondage of militarism; the demand for the limitation of armaments is almost universal. believing that to decry war and praise peace without offering some plan by which the present situation may be changed is superficial, we hasten to propose something practicable. how, then, shall we put an end to this useless rivalry of the nations? at present a general agreement of the great powers on the limitations of military establishments seems impossible. it remains for some powerful nation to prove to the world that the great armaments are not necessary to continued peace, with honor and justice. some nation must take the first step.[2] why not the united states? the nations of europe are surrounded by powerful enemies, while the united states is three thousand miles from any conceivable foe. they are potentially weak, while our resources are unlimited. they have inherited imperialism; we have inherited democracy. their society is permeated with militarism; ours is built on peace and liberty. our strategic position is unequaled, our resources are unlimited, our foreign policy is peaceful, our patriotism is unconquerable. in view of these facts, i ask you, what nation has the greatest responsibility for peace? are not we americans the people chosen to lift the burden of militarism from off the backs of our downtrodden brother? [2] the widely heralded proposal in 1913 for a naval holiday by all the great powers is the first move in this direction.--_editor._ now what are we doing to meet this responsibility? on the one hand, we are performing a great work for peace. many of our statesmen, business men, and laborers, united in a common cause, are exerting a tremendous influence in behalf of arbitration and disarmament. on the other hand, we are spending more on our military establishment than any other world power;[3] we are building more battleships than any other nation;[4] we are no longer trusting our neighbors; we are warning them to beware of our mailed fist; and we are thereby declaring to the world that we have lost our faith in the power of justice and are now trusting to the force of arms. [3] the orator is comparing the cost of the united states army, navy, and pensions upkeep with the military establishments of other powers.--_editor._ [4] since naval rivalry in its acute form has centered between great britain and germany, european naval building programs have exceeded those of the united states.--_editor._ and why this paradoxical situation? why do we at the same time prepare for war and work for peace? it is simply because many of our statesmen honestly believe that the best way to preserve peace is to prepare for war. it is true that a certain amount of strength tends to command respect, and for that reason a navy sufficient for self-defense is warranted. such a navy we now have. why should it be enlarged? naval enthusiasts would have us prepare, not for the probable but for the possible. seize every questionable act of our neighbors, they say, magnify it a thousand times, publish it in letters of flame throughout the land, and make every american citizen believe that the great powers are prepared to destroy us at any moment. having educated the people up to a sense of threatened annihilation, they burden them with taxes, build artificial volcanoes dedicated to peace, parade them up and down the high seas, and defy the world to attack us. then, they say, we shall have peace. is this reasonable? as sure as thought leads to action, so preparation for war leads to war. this argument that the united states, since she is a peace-loving nation, should have the largest navy in the world in order to preserve peace is illogical and without foundation. by what divine right does the united states assume the rã´le of preserving the world's peace at the cannon's mouth? since when has it been true that might makes right, and that peace can be secured only by acting the part of a bully? it is unjust, it is unpatriotic, it is unstatesmanlike, for men to argue that the united states should browbeat the world into submission; that she should build so many battleships that the nations of the eastern hemisphere will be afraid to oppose the ironclad dragon of the western hemisphere. peace purchased at the price of brute force is unworthy of the name. surely the united states cannot afford to be guilty of such an injustice. if we wish to be free; if we wish to remain a true republic; if we purpose to continue our mighty work for humanity, we must limit our preparations for war. the best way to preserve peace is to think peace, to believe in peace, and to work for peace. the extent to which the great powers will go in order to secure enthusiasm for their military establishments is almost beyond comprehension. each nation has its great military rendezvous, its grand naval parades, its magnificent display of gorgeous military uniforms, its wave of colors, blare of trumpets, and bursts of martial music. the united states is now sending her navy around the world--for the purpose of training the seamen?--certainly, but also that the youth of our land may be intoxicated by the apparent glory of it all, and thus enlist for service; that the american citizens may be aroused to greater enthusiasm by this magnificent display of the implements of legalized murder, and thus be willing to build more floating arsenals rather than irrigate arid lands, develop internal waterways, build hospitals, schools, and colleges. the trouble with such exhibitions is, that it displays only the bright side of militarism. if in place of the russian battleships they should display the starving masses of dejected and despised beings who pay for those battleships; if in place of the gay german uniforms they should exhibit the rags of the disheartened peasants who pay for those uniforms; if in place of the grand parade they should produce masses of wounded men and rivers of blood; if in place of the stirring martial music they should produce the writhing agonies and awful groans of dying men; if in place of sham war they should produce actual war,--their exhibitions would make militarism unbearable. again, we are told that we have suddenly become a world power, and that we must prepare to exercise a new diplomacy under new conditions. we must increase our navy, they say, to enforce this new diplomacy. we must prepare to fight in behalf of the monroe doctrine. but why, i ask, cannot this new diplomacy be enforced as american diplomacy has always been enforced? we promulgated the monroe doctrine without a navy; we have maintained it for over eighty years without the show of force. if our new diplomacy is right, it is as strong as the world's respect for righteousness; if it is wrong, a hundred battleships cannot enforce it. we have become a world power, and therefore we have a world-wide responsibility, and that responsibility is to establish justice, not force; to build colleges, not battleships; to enthrone love, not hate; to insure peace, not war. our mission is to strike the chains from the ankles of war-burdened humanity. our duty is to proclaim in the name of the most high our faith in the power of justice as opposed to the force of arms. may it be said of us that we found the world burdened with militarism, but left it blessed with peace; that we found liberty among the strong alone, but left it the birthright of the weak; that we found humanity a mass of struggling individuals, but left it a united brotherhood. may it be said of us that we found peace purchased by suffering, but left it as free as air; that we found peace bruised and stained with militarism, but left it ruling the world through love and liberty. may it be said of us that we fulfilled our mission as a world power; that we were brave enough and strong enough to lead the world into the path of universal peace. the evolution of world peace by levi t. pennington, earlham college, richmond, indiana first prize oration in the national contest held at the university of chicago, may 4, 1909 the evolution of world peace in the progress of the world the dream of yesterday becomes the confident hope of to-day and the realized fact of to-morrow. as old systems fail to meet new conditions and new ideals, they are discarded; and into the limbo of worse than useless things is passing the system of human sacrifice to the moloch of international warfare. for centuries world peace has been the dream of the poet, the philanthropist, the statesman, and the christian. that dream is becoming a confident hope. this generation should see it an accomplished fact. there was a time when individual prowess determined the issue of every difference. might made right, so it was thought, and the winner in any controversy was he who had the heaviest club, the strongest arm, or the thickest skull. man's interrelationships multiplied as humanity advanced; with each new relation came new causes for quarrel, and for a time advancing civilization brought but increase in murders and assassinations. we know the process by which personal combat ceased; how the duel replaced murder and ambush and assassination; how courts of law replaced the duel. the dreamer saw the day when personal combat should be no more; the man of mind refuted all the arguments in favor of the duel of men; the constructive statesman of that early day instituted courts of law and equity. men who had a difference insisted that it was their quarrel and they alone could settle it; but reason saw that two combatants inflamed by passion are least fitted of all men to see where justice lies. many held that where honor is involved, no one can adjust the difficulty but those most directly concerned; but reason saw that a man's honor cannot be vindicated by killing his enemy or being killed by him. men said, "if personal combat is abolished, courage and strength will perish from the earth." but reason saw that personal combat in a selfish cause does not bring out the highest type of courage; and that there are opportunities enough for the exercise of the highest and best moral and physical courage to keep valor alive forever. it was finally urged that there would be no power to enforce the decree if personal differences were left to the adjudication of others; but reason said, "that power will come with the need for it." and so courts of law and equity arose, based on the need of humanity; laws were passed defining rights and limiting aggression; and when one man wronged another, that wrong was settled in court by the power of the whole people and not in personal combat with the bludgeon or the knife. for similar reasons wars between states and tribes have ceased; and face to face with the inevitable logic of past progress stands the world to-day. though humanity has been slow to see it, the truth has begun to dawn in the hearts of men--that international wars are no more to be justified than civil strife, tribal warfare, or personal combat. gradually the omnipotent power of right is overcoming the inertia of humanity, and the world is moving. one by one the awful truths concerning war are forcing themselves upon the consciousness and the conscience of men. the mighty power of fact is beating down the opposition to world peace. men have begun to realize the terrible cost, the unbelievable wastefulness of actual war, and the preparation for possible war. when we read that the armed peace of europe the past thirty-seven years has cost $111,000,000,000, nearly as much as the aggregate value of all the resources of the united states, the richest nation on earth, the figures are so appalling that mortal mind cannot conceive them, and they lose their force. when we remember that two thirds of the national revenues of the united states are spent on wars past or prospective, the matter comes closer home. when we realize that the cost of a single battleship exceeds the value of all the grounds and buildings of all the colleges and universities in illinois, the figures have more meaning to us. and when we reflect that the cost of a single shot from one of the great guns of that battleship would build a home for an american family, a comfortable home costing $1700, the common man realizes that the richest nation on earth cannot afford to go to war nor prepare for war. but mere money is one of the cheapest things in all the world. the price of war never can be paid in gold. not in national treasuries can you see the payment of that price, where smug, well-groomed politicians sign bonds and bills of credit. if you would see the payment of that price of war, you must go to the place of war. with all your senses open, step upon the battlefield. smell the smoke of burning powder, the reek of charging horses, the breath of fresh, red, human blood. feel the warmth of that blood as you seek to stanch the wound in the breast of one of the world's bravest, dying for he knows not what. hear the screams of the shells, the booming roar of the cannonade, the clash of the onslaught, the shrieks of the wounded, the groans of the dying, the last gasp of him whose life has reached its end. such is the infernal music of war. see the victim of the conflict reel in the saddle and fall headlong. cast your eyes on the mangled forms of godlike men, fallen in the midst of fullest life. come in the night after the battle and look upon the ghastly faces upturned in the moonlight. gaze on the windrows of the dead, mars's awful harvest, that impoverishes all and enriches none, and you know something of the cost of war. and yet we have seen but little. could we but enter the wasted homes and see the broken hearts that war has made; could we go to the almshouses and soldiers' orphans' homes and see widows and children by the thousand suffering the doled-out charity of state or nation because war has robbed them of their rightful protectors; could we but realize the agony of the broken home, a thousandfold worse than the agony of the battlefield,--then might we know more of the real cost of war. and still our idea would be inadequate, though we realized the full measure of every groan and heartache. earth's most priceless treasures are still more intangible things, the treasures of justice and kindliness and love. in that higher realm the cost of war is most terrible and most deadly. the spirit of war in the soldier sets aside the moral law, makes human life seem valueless, human suffering a thing to be disregarded, human slaughter an honorable profession. the war spirit blinds the eye of the statesman, till wrong seems right, folly seems expediency, and the death of thousands seems preferable to the life and happiness of all under terms of peace not dictated by his own will. justice is dethroned, and revenge takes up the iron scepter and lets fly the thunderbolt. the war spirit perverts the mind of the publicist, till the achievements of honorable peace sink into insignificance, and the press clamors for the war that means money to the publisher but death to innocent thousands who can have no possible interest in the conflict. the war spirit takes possession of the pulpit, and the minister called to preach the loving message of the prince of peace stirs up the spirit of contention and animosity, of hate and murder. could we but draw aside the curtain and, back of the tinsel and gold braid, see the crime, the hate, the moral degradation that war always brings, never again would a friend of humanity ask for war. but the eyes of the world are opening to the fact that the cost of war is far too high in money and in men, in suffering and sacrifice, and in those higher values of justice and kindliness and love. and as the thought once grew that personal differences might be settled without personal combat, so men are looking toward the settlement of international difficulties without recourse to the sword. they have seen that every argument against the duel of men applies with still greater force against the duel of nations. and the world has moved farther toward world peace in the past twenty-five years than in all the centuries of history that have preceded. world peace has become not the dream of the poet but the confident hope of the world, whose realization is the task whose accomplishment is set for the men of this generation. one by one the obstacles to world peace are being broken down. commerce has destroyed much of international prejudice. community of interest has obviated many former causes of quarrel. the sophistical arguments of the friends of war are being answered by the logic of hard facts. warfare has been ameliorated by international agreement. vast reaches of territory have been neutralized. unfortified cities are no longer to be bombarded in any country. actual disarmament has taken place between the united states and canada, between chile and argentina.[1] norway and sweden have separated peaceably. bulgaria has achieved her independence without bloodshed. the dogger bank incident, which a century earlier would have plunged england and russia into war, has been adjusted amicably. two hague conferences have advanced tremendously the progress of international amity. over eighty arbitration treaties are now in force. we already have a permanent high court of nations, to which are being referred questions that would once have resulted in war. and we are nearer than the dreamer of last century dared hope to "the parliament of man, the federation of the world." [1] the famous "disarmament" between the argentine republic and chile was brought about by a series of four documents of may 28, 1902, one of july 10, 1902, and one of january 9, 1903. a preliminary protocol declares the disposition of both countries "to remove all causes for trouble in their international relations." a general treaty of arbitration unlimited in scope was signed for a period of ten years. a convention bound each country to "desist from acquiring the vessels of war now building for them, and from henceforth making new acquisitions." article ii says that "the two governments bind themselves not to increase their naval armaments during a period of five years, without previous notice." as a result of arbitration resulting from this series of agreements the frontier was disarmed and remains free from military posts. new naval programs of both countries were formulated after the expiration of the period of abnegation, and dreadnoughts are now in course of construction.--_editor._ but not yet has the millennium dawned. in the face of all this progress, armies and navies are stronger and more burdensome than ever. the united states spends more on wars past and prospective than for all educational purposes, and england, france, germany, russia, groan under the burdens of the armed peace of europe. armed to the teeth, the nations of the world lie watching one another. the mind of the world is convinced that war is futile and terribly wasteful. the heart of the world is convinced that war is cruel and inexcusable. the conscience of the world has admitted that war is wrong and morally unjustifiable. and still the preparation for war goes on, and unless conditions are changed, war is inevitable. what is to be done? the world's will must be moved, and men must be led to do what they have already admitted is right and just and expedient. as we have led in other days, so must america lead to-day. as the light of republican government and complete justice to the individual first saw full dawn in the united states, so the eyes of the world are turned toward us to see the dawn of world peace, and full justice to all the nations. it is ours to lead. the example of the united states will do more than a century of argument and conference. america should begin the disarmament that will eventually mean the triumph of world peace. we have naught to fear. we are far distant from the storm centers of the world. we have no foes within that demand a large standing army, and there are no enemies without that are anxious to try conclusions with us on land or sea. then away with war talk and war scares and "jingoism." in time of peace let us prepare for peace, that all the world may enjoy peace. american disarmament will be a tremendous stride toward the accomplishment of the world's desire--the cessation of international warfare; a great world's court, to settle all international differences; an international police force, to give effect to the decrees of this court; and the end of the burdens of armies and navies under which the whole world is groaning. let heart and voice and pen, pulpit and press and platform, soldier and statesmen and private citizen, ask for peace, and not for war. this is a part of the world's larger hope. pessimists there are who say that human nature is belligerent, and that war will never be abolished. but international warfare has already seen the handwriting on the wall. mars has been weighed in the balances and found wanting. the fruitless slaughter of the millions is not to be forever nor for long. let us hasten the day when the rolling war drum will be hushed forever, the bugle note no longer call to carnage; when "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." love shall take the place of hate, and justice sit on the throne instead of greed. some day in the not distant future the nations that have all these centuries bowed before the god of war shall own eternal allegiance to the prince of peace. and "of the increase of his government and of peace there shall be no end." the waste of war--the wealth of peace by arthur foraker young, western reserve university, cleveland, ohio first prize oration in the national contest held at the university of michigan, may 13, 1910 the waste of war--the wealth of peace in the worship of mars, herodotus tells us, the ancient scythian erected an old scimitar at the summit of a huge brush heap. to this, as a symbol of the great god of war, he offered not only the produce of the land but also human life in sacrifice. we shudder as we picture the priest standing over his victim, his hands wet with the blood of his fellow man. we cry out in horror as we think of the lives these peoples sacrificed. we call it an inhuman glorification of a pagan deity. we call it a ruthless waste of wealth and human life. these practices we pronounce to be the result of a popular delusion--a false sense of obligation to the spirit of war. yet from the time the scythian drew the blood of his victim in homage to the great war god, even down to our own day, the nations have paid homage to mars. though we boast of our progress in civilization, history reveals the fact that we, too, have been the victims of the scythian's delusion. is it not a fact that one of the most terrible customs of savage men counts among its followers to-day all the nations of the earth? the subtlest skill of the scientist, the keenest intelligence of the statesman, vast stores of the world's resources, are devoted to maintaining great armies and navies, to inventing new means of attack or defense, to enlarging and making more deadly the enginery of war. what is our boast of civilization, while we tolerate this devotion of so many men and so much of wealth to war? is this not a sacrifice essentially pagan in spirit? are we not still paying unrighteous homage to mars? why, then, we ask, do nations make provision for war the first necessity of national life? behold russia. a few years ago, in time of famine, spending millions of money for war equipment when millions of her own peasantry were slowly starving for the lack of one dollar's worth of food per month. what motive impelled russia to this heathen conduct? it was solely that germany, france, england, japan, and the united states had great armies and navies against which starving russia must be prepared to defend herself. what dire stress compels england to-day to perpetuate her program of naval supremacy when she is struggling in the throes of budget difficulties which seem all but unsolvable? what is it that compels germany and france to tax themselves until they fairly stagger under the burden of military expenditures? naught other than a suicidal lust for military power. naught other than the infatuation of the dizzy, competitive war dance of mutual destruction--each nation blindly driven by all, and all by each. we as americans profess to find in the conduct of russia, in the militarism of england and germany and france, examples of militarism run rampant. how our hearts have warmed within us when we have thought of our own republic as the happy envied nation, free from the burden of militarism! our farmer has gone singing about his work, apparently not having to carry on his back a soldier, as does the european peasant. our mechanic has freely plied his trade without thought of supporting a sailor. yet how can we say that the united states in buying battleships and erecting coast defenses, in arming her soldiers with krag-jã¶rgensens, has not been deprived of schools, colleges, and opportunities essential to happiness and prosperity? in a decade we have spent nearly a billion dollars on our navy alone. yes, we have aped the military fashions of europe and have set a new standard of military waste. verily our national advancement waits on militarism. inland waterways should be improved; forests must be safeguarded; other natural resources of untold value should be conserved; millions of acres of desert lands should be improved; millions in swamps should be redeemed. the problem of the nation's food supply is becoming urgent; for its solution we must look more and more to scientific methods in agriculture. yet contrast the support our government gives these vital interests with war's mighty drain on our treasury. congress appropriated $648,000,000 for all expenditures in 1910. of this amount $407,000,000 were appropriated for war expenditures and the glories of militarism. for this same year agriculture received for all its needs the comparatively paltry sum of $12,000,000. in spite of the fact that our nation is devoting two thirds of its enormous national expenditures to war, our militarists point to our vast national wealth and sneer at the niggardly mortals who object to spending it for guns. it is evident that no nation is yet beyond the infatuation for display of the splendors of war, yet in every one there are signs of a new power that is coming upon us. all are thinking less of the glories of war--of the beat of the drum, of the rhythmic tread of regiments, of glittering sabers and of monster battleships--and are thinking more and more of the glories of peace, of thriving industries, of magnificent libraries, of comfortable homes, and of more efficient schools. obviously, though we still possess a war spirit, we are seeing with a clearer vision that the waste of war is depriving us of the fullest measure of the wealth of peace. our frame of mind is much the same as that of the ragged street urchin who, having lost his day's earnings, thinks of a hundred things which he might have spent it for. the same spirit is permeating every nation. the american manufacturer, the russian peasant, the english mechanic, the german scientist, the french scholar, are all asking themselves, "why need the world continue to carry this atlantean burden of war?" already this sentiment has accomplished practically all that can be done in humanizing war. it has outlawed the dumdum bullet, it has enforced radical sanitary measures, it has neutralized the red cross and brought its ministrations to the relief of the sufferings of war. but humanized war is not the goal of this sentiment. as long as there is an increase of armaments there will be war; as long as the battle rages there will be waste and suffering. the same sentiment which has humanized war now demands war's abolition. it has already accomplished something toward this end in making the settlement of international disputes through arbitration more probable than war. what it has not accomplished is the discrediting of militarism. it has failed to stop the growth of armaments. can we expect our regiments to find contentment in the irksome routine of training camp with never a thought of charging the enemy? can we expect to man the seas with fleets of war just for gay parade and cruises around the world? can we expect that our skilled gunners will be satisfied to practice, practice always, and never long for human targets? it is against arming nations for battle and tempting them to fight that the peace sentiment is rousing itself and is being organized. it is in this labor that peace societies the world over are performing valiant service. their great mission is the creation of an intelligent public opinion, a force more potent than government itself. what, for instance, was the purpose of the founder of this intercollegiate peace association? not, i take it, to give men a chance to win petty oratorical triumphs; not, i suppose, to bring together speakers to entertain such audiences as this--or to weary them. but their object must have been to set the men of our colleges to thinking on the great question of peace. in such ways are peace societies using the platform and the press to establish a firm basis for unity and peace throughout the world. yesterday the advocate of world peace was called a dreamer; to-day rapidly organizing public opinion demands the abolition of war and recognizes the wealth and culture of peace. yesterday we erected statues to those who died for their country; to-day we cheer the gladstones, the mckinleys, the roosevelts, who live for humanity. yesterday we bowed the knee to mars; to-day we join in peans to the prince of peace. yes, the new spirit of the day is fraternal; it is undaunted; it is for mankind. even now the world's geniuses are mustering the soldier citizens of every nation for a peaceful conflict. the great battles of to-morrow are to be fought in quiet laboratories, in legislative halls, in courts of justice, and on the broad battlefields of productive labor. the final outcome is, indeed, irresistible. racial movements have mixed all peoples; the oceans have become the world's common highways; the air is filled with voices speaking from city to city and from continent to continent; an international postal system makes the world's ideas one; there is quick participation of mankind in the fruits of invention and research. we behold financial and economic enterprises world-wide in their outreach; we feel the force of social projects and social ideals that concern not one but every nation; and we are participating in missionary movements that affect not one but every race, and are changing the very face of nature itself. our world is a world unified beyond all possible conception a century ago, and the world unity is a certain stepping stone to world peace. the world never offered grander opportunity to the nations for leadership--not for leadership in military splendor, but for leadership in the sublime paths of peace. for the united states this call means not only opportunity but even obligation. already this country has performed well her duty in fostering international arbitration. she has been a party to half of the cases where disputes between nations have been referred to the hague tribunal. arbitration is performing its mission with more and more efficiency, yet each year the war budgets of the nations are increasing. the peace sentiment now demands a decrease of armaments, a conversion of the waste of war into the wealth of peace. to demonstrate that this is practicable is the immediate opportunity before us, our present obligation. what is our waste of war expressed in terms of the wealth of peace? notice! two thirds of the cost of one dreadnought, like the mammoth _florida_ launched but yesterday, would erect and furnish a veritable palace for every foreign ambassador and minister of the united states, thus solving a perplexing problem of our diplomatic service. one twenty-second of the cost of one dreadnought would support for one year the entire force of the american board of foreign missions in their work of proclaiming our gospel of peace. one half the cost of one dreadnought would erect and equip twenty-five manual-training schools, teaching the rudiments of a trade to forty thousand young people each year. the cost of two dreadnoughts would provide every state in the union with a half-million dollars with which to save the juvenile delinquents from criminal courts and schools of vice behind prison bars. the cost of one dreadnought, wisely spent each year in the fight against tuberculosis, would make the white plague in a single generation a disease as rare as smallpox is to-day. where now we are erecting battleships and forts, it is for us to build libraries and schools. where now we drain our treasuries in equipping men to fight their fellow men, it is for us to arm against the common enemy, disease. where now we pour out our wealth before the pagan mars, it is for us to devote our treasure to supporting the works of the prince of peace. such a victory for peace would make america not simply a world power: it would make her the world leader. will we stop tagging at the heels of great britain and germany and travel this broadening road in which we can be first? how humiliating to struggle along, a trailer in the military procession! how noble to set the daring example of living up to the belief in peace! will we say: "see our hands; we bear no bludgeons. search us; we carry no concealed weapons. militarism we have thrown to the scrap heap of practices discredited and vicious. we have stopped war's wanton waste of men and treasure; we rejoice in the growing wealth of peace ideals realized"? thus shall we speed the steadily growing public opinion of the world, to the bar of which must finally come every nation which does aught to break or hinder the world's peace. the hope of peace by stanley h. howe, albion college, albion, michigan first prize oration in the national contest held at johns hopkins university, may 5, 1911 the hope of peace the history of civilization is a record of changing ideals, and ideals are best reared in the hearts of the world's young men. inevitably, nations look toward the cradle for their future and intrust the care of their destiny to the hands of youth. "tell me what are the prevailing sentiments that occupy the minds of your young men," declared edmund burke, "and i will tell you what is to be the character of the next generation." when the blood of youth is sluggish and impure; when the young hold wealth more dear than worth, remove the check of virtue from their selfish aims, establish mammon as their god, and, ambitious to govern the world, forget how to govern themselves,--then nations choke and die. but when the blood of youth is rich and pure, pulsating through the veins of the universe with strong, resistless surge; when fathers teach anew the angel's message of good will and peace, and sons build high their goal upon a pedestal of service and of truth,--then nations breathe and live. what hope, then, asks the world, finds the doctrine of peace in the ideals and aspirations of america's youth to-day? the nation faces a charge of militarism. it is the indictment of her critics that never before in american history has the government entertained an attitude so hostile toward her neighbors and so dangerous to the interests of peace. they point to the attempt to fortify the canal and cry out that america would drain her treasury to build a monument of reproach to international integrity. they criticize the vast appropriations for the navy and declare that america is starving her poor that she may more pompously parade the seas. they protest against the "war-game" on the rio grande[1] and even charge that in the interest of a wall street king america invites the world to arms. and these are not illusions. the lure of gold has turned the nation from her mission. the spirit of commercialism has eclipsed the sentiment of brotherhood and tempted the republic to barter her honor for the price of imperial supremacy. wherein, then, again asks the world, finds america hope for the future? and to the charges of her critics, with their dismal prophecy of a "wrong forever on the throne," this is the nation's answer and defense--that an eclipse is never permanent, that the world stays not in the valley of the shadow forever, and that the solution of the problem, the fulfillment of a national mission, and the hope of world peace find their common assurance in the changing ideals of america's aspiring young men. [1] part of the united states army was mobilized on the frontier for maneuvers, in 1911, owing to the mexican revolutionary disturbances.--_editor._ the young american is essentially ambitious. he is wont to seek the shortest path to leadership, and, when blocked at one highway, to turn with undiminished ardor to another. and his ideal is a mirror of the age in which he lives. in revolutionary days he covets the glory of a minuteman, and in the deeds of warren and putnam finds the consummation of his hopes. again, in the hour of civil war his eyes turn toward the battlefield--and from her boys under twenty-one the union draws eighty-five per cent of her defenders. but fortunately for america this drama of the youth's ideal has one more act. the lure of fife and drum has become a thing of the past. the glamour of military life has become a dream of yesterday. the young man is learning that the prize of battle is never equal to the price. and with the growing conviction of the folly and futility of international strife must disappear the last apology for war. nations will cease to struggle, not when they have learned that war is a tragedy but when they have discovered that it is a farce. and the youth of to-day is learning it. in the same deplorable conditions which the nation's critics have regarded as an alarming tendency toward militarism, he reads a message of the absurdity of war. militarism itself is revealing a mission. based as it is on the spirit of aggrandizement, it is teaching to youth the economic value of a human life. it is uncovering its own selfish motives and betraying its own senseless ends. it is impressing the world with the truth that battles are fought for purse string and not for principle. it is teaching to youth a new ideal; it is itself the answer to complaints of friends and calumnies of foes. it is the cloud before the dawn. it heralds the coming of the brightest epoch yet chronicled in american history. it is the realization of that glorious prophecy of john hay that the time is coming when "the clangor of arms shall cease, and we can fancy that at last our ears, no longer stunned by the din of armies, may hear the morning stars singing together and all the sons of god shouting for joy." and is this but the dream of a visionary? is it merely the fancied perception of an inexistent star? is it nothing more than a groundless hope and an alluring vagary? the answer is visible everywhere. and the hope of peace finds its safest assurance among the institutions of learning in america. james bryce has referred to the united states as the nation having the largest proportion of its young men in college. in the last month of june more than fifty thousand collegians wore the cap and gown of graduation. it is to the trust of the college-bred man that the peace movement confides its future, and modern education assumes no greater responsibility than the training of the new world-citizen. already the school has become the most potent factor in the new uplift. the youth is no longer dependent upon the newspaper for his knowledge of world-politics. an intelligent study of foreign affairs is at last regarded as of as much importance as a study of the past. to broaden the young man's vision of the world, prominent educators are even advocating traveling fellowships. in twenty-five of the larger universities of america an association of cosmopolitan clubs is establishing the groundworks for a wider international fraternity. plans are already under way to have an organized delegation of more than a hundred students of all nationalities present at the third hague conference. day by day the problem of world-unity is becoming more and more deeply embedded in the mind and thought of the rising generation. more and more is youthful patriotism becoming a realization of the truth that "above all nations is humanity." the lure of war is losing its magnetic power and the brotherhood of man becoming more and more an international reality. a sentiment for universal peace is sweeping the world, and behind the defenses of advancing civilization, armed with the strength of a lofty and unselfish purpose, stands an army of america's young men, mustered from the nation's colleges, enlisted to serve for an eternity, and invulnerable in the protection of a new and a conquering ideal. therefore the significance of the young man in the world's affairs to-day is something more than a fancy. again and again the plea for world-harmony hears a response in the changing ideals of a new generation. the growing sentiment of the educated youth of japan finds its crystallization in the efforts of count okuma toward the consummation of world-disarmament. the spirit of the youth of england finds expression in the ambitious dream of george v, whose hope it is to tie the bond of anglo-saxon unity, long since dissevered by george iii. among the young men of russia the life of the great philosopher of world-citizenship has left a lasting conviction of the senselessness of war. even in imperialistic germany the reckless building of dreadnoughts brings out a vigorous and uncompromising protest from the thinking youth of the land. in america a vision of the international parliament of man, growing large in the minds of her leading statesmen, finds expression in the continued philanthropy of a great industrial king. and, most significant of all, these are the world-wide examples that the college man enthrones in the empire of his thoughts. sixty thousand european students, bound together by the cosmopolitan ties of a peace fraternity, have ceased to glorify the triumphs of the battlefield. the commentaries of the hero-worshiper to-day do not record the names of a marlborough or a bonaparte. rather does the young man find his idols in the more humble annals of a tolstoy or a hay. and the new ideal of international peace is not merely the religion of a few enthusiasts. in an individual way these apostles of peace voice to the world the spirit of the unnumbered thousands of obscurer men whose lives and talents are directed, not to the construction of material kingdoms but to the building of a better and more world-wide brotherhood. such is the hope of peace. the nation's critics may continue their indictment, and, pointing out the crises of the hour, paint in dismal hues a picture of the problems never to be solved except by shot and shell. her skeptics, blinded by thought of the errors of the past, may prophesy the desecration of her honor and the disappointing failure of her hopes. the press may pen a graphic story of the military spirit of the age, and frowning patriarchs relate the deeds of golden days gone by. but underneath this cloud that overhangs, and almost hidden in the gloom of history's disparagement, the new world-citizen discerns the birth-light of a brighter and more steadfast star,--perceives the coming triumph of good will and peace,--and the awakened eyes of expectant america look forward with promise to the dawn of that new day when a nation shall be judged by the weight of its cross and not by the wealth of its crown. the roosevelt theory of war by percival v. blanshard, university of michigan, ann arbor first prize oration in the western group contest, 1912, and in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may 16, 1912 the roosevelt theory of war ex-president roosevelt has made this astounding statement, "by war alone can we acquire those virile qualities necessary to win in the stern strife of actual life." these words, coming from the lips of a nation's idol, have fallen like a bomb shell in the camp of the pacifists. not that mr. roosevelt's opinion was of overwhelming weight, but that he was voicing the opinion of some of the most influential thinkers of the modern world. not long before the german philosopher nietzsche had taken a like position, and he was indorsed by von moltke, the statesman; ernest renan, the historian; hegel, the philosopher; charles kingsley and canon farrar, the divines. we must have a care, we peace advocates, how we treat such men's opinions. if they are right; if, as they maintain, war develops a nation, then we are fighting against the instrument of our own salvation and smothering the only hope of the nation itself. but are they right? does war make for national greatness? before we can give a rational verdict we must answer certain other questions. what is our nation, anyway? what are the factors that make for its greatness? and how does war affect these factors? plainly our nation is not some abstraction that haunts the marble halls at washington. nor is it our vast dominion on which, like england's, the sun never sets. you will find it rather in workshop and store and factory; it is no more nor less than our men. if the capital at washington is founded on pygmy manhood, it will be blown away like thistledown before some passing wind of revolution. russia, turkey, spain, will tell you that. if our men are giants, the nation will be lasting as adamant. england and germany and america are monumental testimonies. now what are the qualities in our men that make the nation great? here a problem in analysis confronts us. let us go about it as does the student in the laboratory. he dissects a plant or mineral to find the mysteries of its nature. we are to dissect a civilization to find the factors of its strength. one little specimen will reveal the secrets of the whole species. so one sample of civilization will show the hidden springs of all. go with me to the public square of any modern city and there you will behold the qualities that build all civilization. from the hum and rattle and roar that rises from the sea of humanity come a thousand various voices, but all speak of one theme--industry. there in the center of the throng and press a slender monument rises, crowned perhaps with a figure of liberty or justice. it tells you a simple story of idealism. yonder stands a silent, vine-clad church, crowned by a mighty finger pointing heavenward and beckoning always to the higher life. what need of going farther? industry, idealism, morality--already we have found the secret of human success, the triple key to all advance, of man or group or nation. here is carlyle, with his gospel of labor, the labor that conquers all things; here is ruskin, with his exalting idealism, that gives an aim and purpose to all human toil; here is the great apostle paul himself, who transfigures that toil and exalts that purpose with his everlasting gospel of moral sublimity. here is our threefold criterion, by which every nation must stand or fall. the anglo-saxon is what he is through unceasing industry, perpetual aspiration, and moral strength. the central african is what he is through inbred sluggishness, total lack of purpose, and almost total absence of morality. these are the basic elements of national greatness. but the great question still remains, how does war affect them? concerning the effect of war on labor, we declare unhesitatingly that the two are everlasting foes, and that whenever war lays hands on labor's throat, it strangles her. this is part of the inevitable program of war, for note that it is on the laboring men that the dreadful claims of war must fall. mark its course. a bugle sounds the call to arms. from workshop, mill, and factory the laborers pour forth; out go the men into a trade where plunder and robbery are a means of livelihood; when pillage and slaughter wane, indolence becomes the order of the day; commerce degenerates into blockade-running by sea and marauding by land. how tame the life of peace to this wild life of war! and all the time the love of toil is fading from men's minds; at home the factory wheels are turning more and more feebly, and when at last the sword is laid aside, there is only "confusion worse confounded," for the channels of labor are choked with men reared in habits of indolence or trained in the school of vice. before the scar on that nation's industry can finally be healed, decades and perhaps centuries of peace must pass away. but if war is a scar on the nation's industry, it is likewise a blot on her ideals. though this element of idealism at first seems visionary and impractical, it is one of the foundation stones of progress. the fixed gulf between what man is and what he knows he might be is the decisive factor in his advance. ideals are the pulleys of the unseen, round which man throws his hopes and aims, by which he pulls himself across the chasm and into the larger life. to advance at all, man must have ideals--for himself, for his family, for his nation. but mark the effect of war on these ideals. in place of the ideal of peace--to serve men and uplift them--one is taught the ideal of war--to make himself the most widely feared of professional murderers. instead of the ideal of peace--to make his family comfortable, happy, and prosperous--comes in the war ideal, by whose terms the family head deserts his own flock to kill other family heads for the eternal glory of the stars and stripes. as for his ideal of the nation's greatness, we have ample testimony that when bullets and cannon balls cone crashing through the splendid structure of his purpose, it speedily crumbles into an ignominious desire to hide himself behind the nearest tree. no; do not say that war builds up ideals; it tears them down and tramples them in the dust; aye more, it sets back crime itself where they should rightly stand. but if war so dethrones a nation's ideals, what may it not do to a nation's morality? imagine if you can a million men, the core of the national power, turning themselves into machines to carry out blindly the schemes of leaders who may be right or wrong; schooled in the belief that manslaughter is manliness, that the rash courage of the brute is above the moral courage of a man; forgetful of the meaning of human life; thoughtless of a thing so common as death; heedless of its eternal consequences. no wonder channing cried so bitterly: "war is the concentration of all human crimes. under its standard gather violence, malignity, rage, fraud, rapacity, and lust. if it only slew men, it would do little. but it turns man into a beast of prey. here is the evil of war, that man, made to be the brother, becomes the deadly foe of his kind; that man, whose duty is to mitigate suffering, makes the infliction of suffering his study and end." no, mr. roosevelt, for once at least you are wrong! we cannot believe that war builds up a nation. rather will we believe those words of herbert spencer, more sweeping but far more true, "advance to the highest forms of man and society depends on the decline of militancy and the growth of industrialism." "but wait," you say; "all this is theory and abstraction. we want matters of fact. your case may be true as philosophy, but you have failed to ground it in example." so it is to history that our last appeal must be made, for, says bolingbroke, "history is philosophy, teaching by example." every decree of her stern tribunal is impartial and irrevocable. war the tonic or war the poison? she is the final judge. she will take you back, if you will, to her childhood days and point you out vast empires, owning the known world, babylonians, assyrians, egyptians, medes, and persians, fearful fighters all of them. but no, not quite all either. on a sandy stretch of seashore, half hidden by the unwieldy empires around it, we see a timid, peaceful little people called the hebrews; they alone, from all that mighty company, have stood the "wreckful siege" of thirty centuries. watch its sinister movement down the ages and you will see the war cloud hover over greece, and her republics melt to nothing in disunion and decay. it hovers over the huns, and they suddenly sink from sight; over islam, and its civilization crumbles faster than it grew; over spain, and all the new world treasures cannot save her from decay. finally, like the cloud no bigger than a hand, it rises from the island of corsica and moves toward central europe. all too well does europe know its meaning. from north and south, from east and west, she pours into the field the finest armies that the old world ever saw. then she pauses. europe grows tense with a nameless dread. the storm cloud blackens, hovers lower, then bursts with all its fury through the continent. for ten long years, at the command of an imperial butcher, the soil is drenched with blood, the sky grows lurid from burning paris to burning moscow, three million homes are draped in black. grand, indeed, and glorious! but europe lost more than her gorgeous standards, more than her ruined cities; she left her manhood on those bloody fields. we might extend the awful picture, but the story is the same, dread tale of death for nations as for men. is not this enough? is it not clear that this traitor to labor, this despoiler of ideals, this foe to morality, is not the benefactor but the destroyer of nations? and shall we not "here highly resolve" no longer to walk in this "valley of the shadow of death," but to hasten toward the dawning of a brighter, purer day? for in spite of pessimism, in spite of scholarship, in spite of history, the day is "coming yet, for a' that- when man to man, the world o'er, shall brothers be for a' that." national honor and vital interests by russell weisman, western reserve university cleveland, ohio first prize oration in the eastern group contest, 1912, and second prize in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may 16, 1912 national honor and vital interests the day for deprecating in general terms the evils of war and of extolling the glories of peace is past. such argument is little needed. international trade requires peace. international finance dictates peace. even armies and navies are now justified primarily as agents of peace. yet so wantonly are these agents looting the world's treasuries that they are themselves forcing their own displacement by courts of arbitration. the two hundred and fifty disputes successfully arbitrated in the past century challenge with trumpet-tongued eloquence the support of all men for reason's peaceful rule. to-day no discussion is needed to show that if war is to be abolished, if navies are to dwindle and armies diminish, if there is to be a federation of the world, it must come through treaties of arbitration. in this way alone lies peace; yet in this way lies the present great barrier to further progress--the conception which many nations, especially the united states, hold of "national honor and vital interests." the reservation from arbitration of so-called matters of national honor and vital interests constitutes the weak link in every existing arbitration treaty between the great powers of the world. this reservation furnishes the big-navy men all the argument they need. it destroys the binding power of the treaties by allowing either party to any dispute to refuse arbitration. it was by this reservation that the united states senate so lately killed the british and the french treaties. and i contend here to-night that the one subject which imperatively demands discussion is national honor and vital interests. that the next important step must be the exposure of the reactionary influence of the united states in excepting these matters from arbitration. only fifteen months ago president taft made his memorable declaration that this barrier ought to be removed from the pathway of peace. he proposed that the united states negotiate new treaties to abide by the adjudication of courts in every international issue which could not be settled by negotiation, whether involving honor or territory or money. the next morning the proposal was heralded by the press throughout the world. a few days later the halls of parliament resounded with applause when great britain's secretary of state for foreign affairs announced that his government would welcome such a treaty with the united states. france soon followed. then, to the surprise of all, hesitating germany and cautious japan showed a like willingness to enter into such agreements. universal peace seemed all but realized. the cause was at once borne up on a mighty wave of public opinion. the peace societies were in a frenzy of activity. mass meetings of indorsement were held in england and america. editorials of approval appeared in all parts of the world. the movement was now irresistible. within eight months the british and the french treaties were drafted. three of the greatest nations of the world were at last to commit themselves unreservedly to the cause of international peace. even disputes involving national honor should not halt the beneficent work of high courts of law and of reason. the day when the treaties were signed, august 3, 1911, was hailed as a red-letter day in the annals of the civilized world. it was proclaimed the dawn of a new and auspicious era in the affairs of men and of nations. during all the months preceding the action of the senate on these treaties the only statesman of any prominence to raise his voice in opposition was ex-president theodore roosevelt. the gist of his successive and violent attacks on the treaties is contained in this utterance, which i quote, "it would be not merely foolish but wicked for us as a nation to agree to arbitrate any dispute that affects our vital interests or our independence or our honor." in this spirit, to the surprise and disappointment of the whole nation, the senate amended the treaties out of their original intent, and placed upon them limitations that defeated their purpose. by the senate's action the united states is still committed to the pretense that there may be occasion for a just and solemn war, that vital interests and national honor may force us to fight. what, then, are the vital interests that can be conserved only by saber and bullet? nothing more, nothing less, according to various acknowledged authorities, than a state's independence and its territorial integrity. did the keen mind of our former president really foresee the seizure of some of our territory by england or france? yet he protests it that it would be "not merely foolish but wicked for us as a nation to agree to arbitrate any dispute that affects our vital interests." did senator lodge and his threescore colleagues who amended the treaties actually fear an attempt to overthrow our form of government, to destroy our political institutions, or to take away those individual rights and sacred privileges upon which our government was founded? yet to save us from such fate they refused unlimited arbitration. for the united states to except from arbitration her vital interests is obvious pretense. to add thereto her national honor is extreme hypocrisy. what is national honor? no man knows. it is one thing to-day; another, to-morrow. it may involve an indemnity claim, a boundary line, a fisheries dispute. in fact, any controversy may be declared by either party, at will, to be a question of national honor. thus in the hands of an unskilled or malicious diplomacy, any question which was originally a judicial one may become a question of national honor. what, then, will we arbitrate? every case in which a favorable award is assured us. if we want texas, we send an army after it. every case that does not rouse our anger. let the _maine_ blow up and we fight. a treaty with an elastic exception like this is a farcical sham and a delusion. it is high time the true and humiliating significance of these fearsome phrases should be as familiar to every taxpayer as is the burden of bristling camps and restless navies. read the record of great britain's first offer of unlimited arbitration in the olney-pauncefote treaty of 1897. there, too, you will find national honor and vital interests clogging the machinery of universal peace. by these same exceptions the senate emasculated that treaty and defeated the spirit of the agreement. is it conceivable that the senate actually feared that our interests would be imperiled by that treaty? did it delve out some hidden dangers which escaped the careful scrutiny of both the english and american embassies, some peril unforeseen by the keen judicial mind of president cleveland, who characterized the defeat of the treaty as "the greatest grief" of his administration. but this is not all. the american representatives at both hague conferences were the first to place these same limitations on all arbitration proposals. look at it from what point of view you will, our government's conduct must appear humiliating. considering the fact that universal arbitration treaties have proved practical, it is well-nigh incredible. behold our bellicose sister american republics. argentina and chile, brazil and argentina, bolivia and peru, all have agreements for the arbitration of all questions whatsoever. all the central american republics are bound by treaty to decide every difference of whatever nature in the central american court of justice. denmark's three treaties with italy, portugal, and the netherlands withhold no cause, however vital, from reason's peaceful sway. norway and sweden likewise have an agreement to abide by the decision of the hague court in whatever disputes may occur. the very existence of all these treaties is significant, yet even more significant is the fact that they have been triumphantly tested. norway and sweden at one extremity of the globe and argentina and chile at the other have thus quietly settled disputes in which their honor and interests were seriously involved. do you ask further evidence of the hypocrisy with which our senate parades our national honor and our vital interests to the undoing of a grand work? search our history and you will find it in abundance. in the great case of the alabama claims, charles francis adams pronounced the construction of confederate ships in english ports to be a violation of the international law of neutrality. this certainly was a question of national honor and vital interests, yet he pleaded for arbitration. in reply lord john russell said, "that is a question of honor which we will never arbitrate, for england's honor cannot be made the subject of arbitration." the case was debated for six years. then came england's "grand old man," the mighty gladstone, with a different view. "it is to the interest," he said, "not only of england and the united states, but of the world, peaceably to settle those claims." he submitted them to a joint high commission. england lost and paid. thus the honor of both nations was successfully arbitrated. likewise the newfoundland fisheries case had been a bone of contention between great britain and america from the day our independence was recognized. as late as 1887 it threatened to become the cause of war. no question ever arose which more vitally affected the interests of america, yet the senate recently accepted a settlement by arbitration. similarly, the alaska fur seal dispute, the alaskan and the venezuelan boundary disputes, and the northeast boundary controversy all involved both the vital interests and the national honor of england and america, yet all were satisfactorily and permanently arbitrated. so excited were we over our northwest boundary that the principal issue of a political campaign was "the whole of oregon or none! fifty-four forty or fight!" yet we peaceably acquiesced in a treaty that gave us neither. yes, our honor may be arbitrated. if we are ill-prepared for war, we arbitrate. if we are sure of a favorable award, we arbitrate. but we must have a loophole, an ever-ready escape from obligation. posing as the most enlightened nation on the face of the globe, we refuse entirely to displace those medieval notions according to which personal honor found its best protection in the dueling pistol, and national honor its only vindication in slaughter and devastation. to unlimited arbitration we refuse to submit. fifteen years ago england, the mighty england, gave us her pledge that no cause should ever justify war. this pledge our senate in the name of honor refused. unlimited arbitration agreements were suggested at both hague conferences. americans promptly placed restrictions upon them in the name of honor. again has england with enthusiasm just offered us unrestricted arbitration. again she is repulsed by our senate in the name of honor. france, too, bears to our doors an unqualified pledge of arbitration. france, too, is repulsed by our senate in the name of honor. germany and japan express a desire to settle every question at the bar of justice. impelled by honor we pass their desire unheeded. our clevelands, our olneys, our edward everett hales, our carl schurzes, our john hays, have all urged unlimited arbitration. our davises and clarks and platts and quays in senate seats have undone their work in the name of honor. our charles eliots and nicholas butlers, our albert shaws and hamilton holts, now plead for universal peace through unlimited arbitration. senators bacon and lodge and heyburn and hitchcock, apparently impelled by constitutional prerogative, party prejudice, or personal animosity, now cast their votes for limitations in the name of honor. from the platform of peace conferences, from the halls of colleges, from the pulpit and the bench, from the offices of bankers and merchants and manufacturers, from the press, with scarcely a column's exception, there arises a swelling plea for treaties of arbitration that know no exceptions. in the name of honor that plea is defied. honor? no, an ocean of exception large enough to float any number of battleships for which pride and ambition may be willing to pay! honor? no, a finical and foolish reservation that at any moment may become a maelstrom of suspicion and rage and hatred and destruction and death! honor? no, a mountainous barrier to peace that must be leveled before there can be progress! honor? no, the incarnation of selfishness, the cloak of shrewd politics, the mask of false patriotism! national honor? no, national dishonor! before the nations of the world the united states stands to-day in an unenviable light. it is a false light. since the days of william penn and benjamin franklin our people have led in much of the march upward from the slough of weltering strife. many a stumbling block to progress we have removed from the rugged pathway, but for fifteen years our government has refused to touch the barrier of national honor and vital interests. england and france have now laid this duty squarely at our door. "it is a social obligation as imperative as the law of moses, as full of hope as the great physician's healing touch." let us here highly resolve that there shall be uttered a new official interpretation of national honor and vital interests, an interpretation synonymous with dignity and fidelity, sincerity, and integrity, and confidence in the vows both of men and of nations. "if we have 'faith in the right as god gives us to see the right,' we shall catch a vision of opportunity that shall fire the soul with a spirit of service which the darkness of night shall not arrest, which the course of the day shall not weary." the evolution of patriotism by paul b. blanshard, university of michigan, ann arbor first prize oration in the central group contest, 1913, and in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may 15, 1913 the evolution of patriotism robert southey has asked through the lips of a little child the greatest peace question that the world has known. he pictures a summer evening on the old battlefield of blenheim. on a chair before his vine-clad cottage sat old kaspar while his grandchildren, wilhelmine and peterkin, played on the lawn. suddenly peterkin from a nearby brook unearthed a skull and, running, brought it to kaspar's knee. the old man took the gruesome thing from the boy, and told him that this had been the head of a man killed in the great battle of blenheim. then little wilhelmine looked up into her grandfather's face and said: "now tell us all about the war, and what they fought each other for." here we have the central question in the problem of war. why do men fight? through the answer to that question lies the path to world-peace. few men fight to-day for glory. modern militarism has no place for lancelots and galahads. the glory of the regiment has absorbed the glory of the individual. few men fight to-day to gain great wealth. the treasures that glittered before pizarro do not tempt our soldiers. material wealth is more easily won in factory or farm or mill. few men fight to-day for religion. the conquest of religion has become a conquest of peace; the very ideal of peace is an end of religion itself. glory, wealth, religion--these are no longer the causes of war. then why do men fight? the answer is obvious. men fight to-day for patriotism. patriotism is the cause of war. the next step in our reasoning is more difficult. if patriotism is the cause of war, how shall we treat the cause to destroy the result? shall we attempt to abolish patriotism as tolstoy would have us do, or shall we try to change its nature so that war as a natural result will be impossible? to answer these questions we must study patriotism from its very beginnings. we must ask: what is patriotism? where did it come from? what place has it in our life? observe first the simplest cell of life, the amoeba. we can watch it through the microscope. it is so tiny that it keeps house in a drop of water. it has neither emotion nor consciousness, in the human sense. it lives a while, and then splits in two to form other cells that have no connection with each other. yet this infinitesimal bit of life has an instinct, the instinct to save itself. watch an amoeba as fire is brought near. it immediately moves away. its every act is regulated by this one instinct, self-preservation. now let us leave the microscope and go outdoors. over there is a bird in a tree top, feeding its young in a nest. suppose that a fire should suddenly consume the tree. would the mother bird fly away in safety? no, it would die on its nest in the effort to save its young. there is more than self-preservation here. the scientist will tell you that the instinct has expanded to include the preservation of the offspring. and now turn to primitive man. the recent excavations in sussex will give us a picture of him. he is a wild, gorilla-like figure that creeps beneath the trees. he can leap with lightning force on his prey. he drapes his body with bearskins, and eats meat from fingers that end in claws. and yet with all his savage ferocity, this is more than an animal. this is a man. in his breast there stir the instincts of a man. in his life we see the vital element of patriotism, love. his little savage family is more precious to him than all the world. he will fight and die, not only for self-preservation but for those who to him are "brother and sister and mother." this is the stamp of the human. this is the potentially divine. but as the storms of war beat about these little savage families, the sense of common danger welded them into one. out of grim necessity friendship came, and friendship gave birth to patriotism. loyalty and sacrifice were not limited to the family; men fought and died for their tribe. and now let us turn the microscope upon ourselves. we would fight for our country. we say because we love our country. we call that feeling patriotism. it is more extended than the savage love of tribe; it gives loyalty to a great government and democratic principles. we speak of that feeling as divine, but it is terribly human. its expression is the same harsh ferocity that inspired the life of the savage. to-morrow america goes to war. in great black type we read the call for men, and a sense of common danger thrills us. in the evening by a street lamp's glare we watch a passionate agitator who points to a flag that we have learned to love. the tramp, tramp of passing regiments and the sound of martial music thrill us. we lay down our tool or pen and march to the front. and then comes the first engagement. the air is blackened with rifle smoke; the roar of cannonry deafens us. dazed, we crouch behind an earthwork while the enemy creeps through the smoke. suddenly they charge. we fire, but they surge on through the smoke. they mount the earthwork. we leap together! men scream hoarsely! musket butts crash! daggers plunge into quivering flesh! divine feeling! glorious patriotism! the passing of this savage patriotism is inevitable. the whole course of nature is against it. the very history of development will tell you that. loyalty has never been an immutable thing. it has been a ceaseless and irresistible growth from the individual to the family, to the tribe, to the nation. the time for a world-patriotism has come. why should men limit their loyalty by a row of stones and trees that we call a boundary? why are men patriots, anyway, except to save their privileges and their government? the primitive patriot had no choice but to fight. he was put down in a little plot of cleared ground hemmed in by mighty forests, and made to hew out a home in a vast world of enemies. but how far we have come from him! the twentieth-century world is a little world. our earth is like an open book. we have cut through the jungle wastes of africa; we have photographed the poles. we sell and buy things from greenland and java. in such a civilization war-patriotism has no place. it is no longer the only guide to self-preservation; it has become the most terrible instrument of self-destruction. and for just this reason war-patriotism must go. it runs counter to the whole trend of nature itself. it is diametrically opposed to the mission of patriotism in the world. just as those little savage families joined hands in tribal loyalty, just as the scattered clans and tribes united under national government, so nations must clasp hands around the globe in a new spirit of "worldism" that shall make war impossible. but we cannot gain a world-spirit by a sudden destruction of our patriotism. we will never usher in tranquillity with a crash. the nihilism of tolstoy would plunge us into lawlessness and anarchy, for the chief element of patriotism we must keep. "what is that element?" you ask. it is the willingness of the individual to sacrifice his welfare for the welfare of the group. there we have the stem of the world-spirit of to-morrow. but the blossom will not burst forth in a night. it must come by an unfolding and a growth. we cannot climb to universal peace upon a golden ladder and cut the rungs beneath us. evolution builds on the past. the final spirit of "worldism" will be a broadening and a deepening and a humanizing of the spirit of sacrifice which is the noblest element in our patriotism. "but," you ask, "if the evolution of patriotism is inevitable, what have we to do with it? why should we meddle with the course of nature?" we reply that the evolution must come through you. we are not "puppets jerked by unseen wires." "consciousness," says bergson, "is essentially free." man the savage or man the philosopher--he alone can decide. let him purify patriotism with christianity and he has brotherhood; adulterate it with avarice and he has war. the evolution of patriotism is not a physical thing. listen to huxley, "social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of the ethical process." the evolution of patriotism, then, is a moral thing, and morality is man-made. we are men, but we can be supermen. we are patriots of a nation. we can be patriots of the world. the evolution of patriotism is no theorist's dream. it is a palpable fact. the patriot of one age may be the scoundrel of the next. a turn of the kaleidoscope and paul the convict trades places with nero the emperor. who was the ideal ancient patriot? the statesman, pericles? the thinker, plato? no. the most efficient murderer, a macedonian boy. "i must civilize," he says. so he starts into his neighbor's country with forty thousand fighters at his back. does persia yield its banner? no. then crush it. does thebes resist? then burn it to the ground. do the women prate of freedom? load them with slave chains. what? do they still hold out? then slaughter the swine. and as men watch him wading through seas of blood, riding roughshod over prostrate lives and dead hopes and shattered empires, the blind age cries out, "o godlike alexander!" "godlike!" oh, but there's new meaning in that word to-day. how much nobler a picture our modern patriot presents! not waving the brand of destruction, not a king of murder will you find the great patriot of to-day. his thunderbolt of conquest was a host of righteousness. his empire was built in the hearts of men. in the teeming slums of the world's greatest city he lifted the standard of the christ. haggard children stretched out hands for bread. he fed them with his last crust. thousands were dying in the city's filth. he pointed them to a more beautiful city where pain should be no more. and when the body of william booth was borne through the silent throngs of london streets, a million heads were bowed in reverence to this patriot of a purer day. in every hamlet of civilization some heart called him godlike. is not the trend of patriotism clear? are not the seeds of a new world-loyalty already in our soil? the trumpet call to war can never rouse this newer patriotism. the summons "peace on earth and good will to men"--that is the future bugle call. and for us the task is clear. to take our destiny into our own hands, to throw off the prejudices of nationalism, to turn our faces resolutely to the future and strive for that summit of brotherhood and universal peace, that "one far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves." certain phases of the peace movement by calvert magruder, st. john's college, annapolis, maryland first prize oration in the eastern group contest, 1913, and second prize in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may 15, 1913 certain phases of the peace movement ladies and gentlemen: we are gathered here this evening in the confident expectation that a rule of reason will soon be established among the nations. it has been a hard, at times almost a discouraging, fight--for it is difficult to convince the world of its own insanity, and lovers of peace have often been tempted to cry in their despair, "how long, o lord, how long?" but there have always been men, with vision unaffected by martial glamour, who have foreseen in the logic of the world's history the inevitable end of war, and we have progressed now to a point where peace is the normal condition in international relationships. but it is an armed peace, founded on the false principle of suspicion and distrust, and we come now to consider the practical question of what the third hague conference can do to establish peace upon a firm and enduring foundation. you will remember that the first hague conference established a so-called permanent court of arbitration. it is not a definite, tangible tribunal, but merely a panel of a hundred or more men from whom the arbiters in each specific case may be selected; and therefore, though it is a great step in the right direction and though it has accomplished some good work, it has not commanded full confidence and recognition. to supplement this court the conference of 1907 proposed a new organization--a judicial court of arbitration, to be composed of seventeen judges of recognized legal authority, to sit for terms of twelve years, and to be competent to decide all cases. here, then, is the nucleus of an easily accessible supreme court of the world, whose decisions would soon build up a new system of international law. its composition, jurisdiction, and procedure are agreed upon. the vital problem, a mode of selecting the judges, remains unsettled. evidently, then, the first great duty of the next hague conference is to put into operation this court, of which all the nations recognize the need and desirability. following logically the establishment of competent machinery for arbitration comes the second great duty of that conference--the passage of a convention binding the nations to resort to this court in all cases that fail of ordinary diplomatic settlement. the judicial court of arbitration, if the nations are not bound to use it, would certainly fail of its purpose. a general treaty making arbitration obligatory is not too much to demand, for the conference of 1907 declared itself unanimous "in recognizing the principle of compulsory arbitration." separate arbitration treaties mounting into the hundreds have been negotiated between individual nations, but almost all contain that fatal reservation of questions of "honor and vital interests." honor and vital interests--could any words be more vague and indefinite? are these not the very cases which interested nations are least competent to decide? a complete answer to that silly reservation is found in our hundred years' peace with great britain. as john w. foster, that keen student of our diplomatic history, has said, "the united states can have no future dispute with england more seriously involving the territorial integrity, the honor of the nation, its vital interests, or its independence, than those questions which have already been submitted to arbitration." denmark has agreed with italy and the netherlands to arbitrate all questions that fail of diplomatic settlement, thus insuring perpetual peace between those nations. here indeed is the pathway of true national honor. coincident with the establishment of the legal machinery for arbitration and the growth thereof, we would naturally have expected a cessation in the mad race for armament-supremacy. but the very reverse has happened, and to deal firmly with this contradictory situation is the third great duty of the next hague conference. of what avail are our courts of arbitral justice when this intolerable economic waste is permitted! to limit armaments was the avowed purpose of the first hague conference, but nothing was accomplished save the adoption of a neatly worded resolution that the limitation aforesaid is "highly desirable for the enlargement of the material and moral well-being of humanity." in 1907 the subject was again under discussion, the nations exhorted to a serious examination of the question--and there the matter rested. we have reached now an insufferable stage where effective action must be taken. let us hear no more that deceptive catch phrase, "if you want peace prepare for war." when bad blood is likely to arise between individuals the very worst policy to pursue is to furnish them with weapons. and so it is with nations. consider, if you will, the neck-and-neck race between great britain and the german empire in the construction of battleships. what fool will call that preparation for war a guaranty of peace? we might be disposed to admit the sincerity of those who say we must arm and ever arm to maintain peace, except that they are too often men with professional and business interests at stake. in england there have been amazing revelations of this sinister condition--armament companies with peers, members of parliament, newspaper owners, officers of the army and navy, as stockholders; enormous appropriations forced through parliament by interested parties; periodic war scares in newspapers inspired by armament syndicates. only recently we read how the great krupp firm of germany had been exposed in its practice of bribing officials to obtain valuable military information and furnishing french newspapers with war-scare articles calculated to induce germany to increase her armament orders. in russia and france they face a similar state of affairs. here in the united states we are undoubtedly not free therefrom. and then there are the navy leagues in every country, playing upon the fears of the nations by startling tales of what the others are doing, and so on through an endless chain, manufacturing a demand for battleships in the name and under the guise of patriotism. we shrink from the contemplation of such greed and selfishness, and appeal for relief to the third hague conference. we come now to a consideration of the fourth prime duty devolving upon that conference. ocean commerce in war should be rendered inviolable. in effecting this we not only abolish a barbarous custom, but at the same time remove one of the chief causes of great navies. as long as the safety of the merchant marine is not guaranteed by international agreement, just so long will nations with commercial aspirations build enormous navies for their protection. it is true england has hitherto opposed this reform,--confident in her naval supremacy,--but she cannot again fly in the face of a general demand without too great a sacrifice of prestige. here, then, are four important problems of the peace movement, all difficult, but not impossible of solution when we remember that the conference of 1907, in good faith, i believe, adopted the following declaration, "that, by working together during the past four months, the collected powers not only have learnt to understand one another and to draw close together, but have succeeded ... in evolving a very lofty conception of the common welfare of humanity." whether these fine words breathe sincerity or hypocrisy the next hague conference has ample opportunity to prove. and now, what shall we say of the position of america in this war against war? her boundless resources; her amalgamation of men from all parts of the world into one people; her impregnable geographical situation; her embodiment of the three cardinal principles of world-union (federation, interstate free trade, interstate courts); the genius and ideals of our government--all give america a logical leadership. she can boast of the first peace society in the world, of a glorious record of arbitration, of a long list of the wisest international statesmen, of a most advanced position at the hague upon the questions of ocean commerce, courts of justice, arbitration, limitation of armaments. but there is the darker view. the treaties negotiated by secretary knox with france and with england, agreeing to arbitrate every question that fails of diplomatic settlement--those treaties were rejected by the united states senate. there was a transcendent opportunity to lay the foundation for a speedy realization of peace universal, with france and england willing, yes, even anxious to coã¶perate--and america failed! mr. taft has shown that if the position of the senate is accepted as international law, then we may as well bid farewell to any hopes of leadership in the peace movement, for our nation could then enter upon no general arbitration agreements because of the prerogative of the senate in each specific case to accept or refuse arbitration. it is at this point, ladies and gentlemen, that there is work for the humblest of us to do. in the intellectual field we can aid in the creation of an intelligent, forceful public opinion that will induce the senate to recede from its fatal attitude, and that will resist a false, cheap patriotism which is relentlessly endeavoring to crush america 'neath the burden of militarism. then in the moral field we can stimulate and foster a peaceful attitude, a sentiment for peace, in the hearts of our countrymen; and until this is accomplished there can be no peace universal, for, as senator root has said, "the questions at issue between disputing nations are nothing, the spirit that deals with them is everything." and finally, in the educational field, let us take heed that the men and women of our rising generation are taught the glorious pages of our arbitration history as well as they know the battles of our country. let us take care that it is grounded into their minds and habits of thought from earliest years, that "peace hath her victories no less renowned than war." in conclusion, let us not be deceived by that vain apology for war, that it is necessary to keep alive the heroic spirit and to stimulate manly courage. despite the noble side in war, its bestial side predominates; its larger effect upon men is demoralizing. and if it be glorious to die for a cause, how much nobler to live and strive for an ideal, utilizing the talents that god gave us for its realization! the movement for peace is not one of weaklings and mollycoddles. it is championed by red-blooded men, daring to bear the ridicule of the thoughtless and to fight for the preconceptions of humanity. peace has her heroes in daily life--miners, mariners, policemen, firemen, men of every station, displaying the nobility of their souls often unheralded and unsung. the venerable william t. stead, bearing across the ocean his message of international good will, sacrificed his life on the _titanic_ that others might live. he was a hero, yes, but a hero of peace. it would be an insult to your intelligence to prove the self-evident proposition that war is uneconomic, unscientific, unchristian. the movement for its elimination, above all, is logical and practical, and should appeal to every man. is it nothing to you? yes, it is a great deal to you. merely let your imaginations picture the day when the seventy per cent of our national revenue now sacrificed on the altar of folly is diverted to the arts of peace, to the amelioration of social conditions, to advancing the happiness of our people--at peace with all other peoples in the assurance of international law and love. ladies and gentlemen, if we but do our duty, the dawn of that great day will come in our generation! the assurance of peace by vernon m. welsh, knox college, galesburg, illinois first prize oration in the western group contest, 1913, and third prize in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may 15, 1913 the assurance of peace the birth and rapid rise of the present movement for international peace are events of recent years. the nineteenth century found its welcome in the smoking cannon and crimsoned fields of hohenlinden. at its close the first great peace conference of the hague was in session. one hundred years ago napoleon was sweeping across europe in his terrible attempt to create an empire. to-day france, england, and america have agreed on treaties that declare for unbroken peace. touched by the wand of progress, the utopian ideal of yesterday has become the dominant political issue of to-day. it is pertinent, then, that we seek the true nature of this revolution. is it borne on the crest of a popular impulse that will recede as rapidly as it has risen, or is it a permanent movement, the product of natural forces working through ordinary channels? the nineteenth century represents a break with the past. swept into the mighty current of transition, the habits and customs of a thousand years have disappeared. with the development of natural resources, the establishment and growth of the factory system, the use of means of rapid communication, nations have entered upon a new era. commerce and industry have come to dominate thought and action and are transforming the very life of the world. defying the rigorous climate of both the poles, trade has penetrated the frozen recesses of hudson bay and made of the falkland islands a relay station in the progress of victorious industry. nor is the equatorial heat more discouraging. the thick jungles of africa have yielded their secrets, and the muddy waters of the amazon are churned by propellers a thousand miles from the sea. international trade routes traverse the seas, connecting continent with continent. in forty years this commerce has increased from two billions to thirty billions. giant corporations have ignored political boundaries, carried trade wherever profitable, and are supplying the varied demands of entire communities. tariff walls, but lately effective barriers, are crumbling before the onslaught of trade. nations are no longer independent. the wheat from canada and the dakotas feeds the mill workers of sheffield and the nobility of berlin. the failure of the georgia cotton crop halts the looms of england and raises the cost of living throughout europe. nations can no longer exist as self-sufficient economic units. never before were they so mutually interdependent. never before has the welfare and security of one state depended upon the enterprise and diligence of another. and the movement for international peace is the chance offspring of these new social forces, at once a protest and a warning against the wrecking of modern economic structures by the ruthless hand of war. commerce, the most important of these new forces, flourishes unprejudiced by armaments and military prestige. in the open competition of the world's markets stronger powers meet and suffer from the rivalry of states that have no military standing. relative to population, norway has a carrying trade three times as great as england's. with her million trained warriors germany is beaten by the merchants of holland. the flag of little denmark flies at more mastheads than does the stars and stripes. where then is the commercial advantage supposed to attend superior military strength? but it is to prevent the seizure of its commerce by others that nations must empty their treasuries to keep ironclads afloat. yet what could be gained by attempted confiscation? if germany annihilated england's navy to-morrow, how would she profit? commerce is a process of exchange, the continuance and promotion of which is dependent upon the degree of mutual profit. commercial gain is not a consequent of military success. it is since england seized the gold fields, diamond mines, and fertile plateaus of lower africa that british securities have dropped twenty points. in 1871 germany humbled and humiliated france almost beyond toleration, yet her share of the world's commerce has not been augmented thereby. so would it be with england. true, germany might commit some depredations and hinder the passage of trade, but what would be her motive? how could she gain? even if the british isles were depopulated, it is doubtful whether germany would benefit. for by what miracle would germany be able to develop the facilities, the shipyards, mills, factories, foundries, mines and machinery, to supply the trade which the foremost of commercial nations has been generations in building up? germany's banner might wave over the bank of england, her excise boats police the thames and the clyde, yet she would behold the trade of a conquered province going to foreign nations. trade does not follow the flag. undisturbed by political changes or military reverses, it flows in constantly widening channels wherever productive fields are found. and in the waging of war, do we reckon the direct cost to commerce? the commercial relations of the entire world are disturbed. prolonged conflict is accompanied by the closing of the bank and the factory, the dismantling of the shop and mill, and the lengthening of the bread line in every city and town. in what state of prosperity and happiness might not france have been had napoleon never lived? with half a century gone, our own country is still suffering from the devastation of the civil war. our commerce with south america is scarcely beyond the point it had reached before our week-end tiff with spain. yet there are those who prate of national honor and of war as insuring prosperity. from the leader of a newborn national party we hear that without a periodic war america would become effeminate and weak, her aggressive commercial life timid and corrupt, and within a few brief years the great republic would sink to a fourth-rate power. up, brave americans, and man the guns! awake, sons of freedom, and sweep the seas! fourteen years without a war; our beloved land is ruined. you men of the factory and mill, you men of property and business, you producers of the nation's wealth, forward into the carnage; burn the homes of thrift and industry, for commerce will be enriched thereby; ravage the fields and despoil the cities, for this will insure vigorous national life; impoverish happy peoples, spread famine and pestilence through fertile valleys, mark the sites of contented villages with smoldering ruins, defy your christian god, and kindle the fires of hell in human breasts; commit violence, treachery, rapine, ay, murder,--for the eternal glory of the stars and stripes. yet commerce and industry--the glittering prizes which every nation covets when it builds a dreadnought or enlarges its army--demand that the creative forces of peace supplant the destructive wastes of war. to-day the financial relationships of nations are inextricably entangled. the big banks in the capitals of the world are in communication with each other every second of the day. during the american crisis in 1907 the bank rate in england went up to seven per cent, forcing many british concerns to suspend operations. because of the balkan war the bank rate in berlin, paris, and vienna is the highest in twenty years, and european securities have depreciated over six billion dollars. foreign investments are raising insuperable barriers to war. should the french bombard hamburg to-day they would destroy the property of frenchmen. let emperor william capture london, loot the bank of england, and he will return to find german industry paralyzed, the banks closed, and a panic sweeping the land. let english regiments again move to invade the united states, english warships draw up in battle line to attack our seaports, and four billions of the earnings of the english people would bar the way. to the victor of the present the spoils of war are valueless. japan, victor over the great russian empire, staggers under a colossal debt. the italian government hears rumbles of discontent, because the cost of winning a victory has been too great. what better proof do we need that war is profitless, that it means financial suicide? it has been transformed from a gainful occupation into economic folly, and war will cease because the price is becoming prohibitive. in this movement for peace, capital's strongest ally is her most active enemy. raised to a position of independence and power by the industrial revolution, labor is wielding an effective influence. the complexity of modern business has aroused workingmen in every country to a common interest and sympathy. the international congress of trade unions, representing twenty countries and over ten million men, has declared for universal disarmament. just last month eighty-five thousand coal miners in illinois resolved that if the united states declared war on a foreign power, they would call a general strike. and why not? why should the workingmen of one country offer themselves as targets for those of another? why should the workers of germany be taxed to support a war against england, germany's best market? can the rice growers of japan profit by killing americans to whom they sell their produce? war means suffering and want, and the laborer has come to know it. he is cold to the sight of its flaunting flags and the sound of its grand, wild music, for he sees the larder bare, funds exhausted, and hunger at the door. he refuses to sacrifice his body and the welfare of his family upon the altar of mars. no longer can kings and emperors satisfy their grasping ambitions. armed by the ballot, the masses are to-day supreme. never again will the cruel hand of tyranny press to their lips the poisoned cup of death. their sway is absolute. the destinies of nations are in their keeping. the decree has gone forth that war must cease. born of these greater movements, a host of influences bring nearer the dawn of peace. the express and the wireless have supplanted the oxcart and the courier. chicago and boston are closer to-day than new york and albany a century ago. within the hour of their occurrence events that happen in paris are published in chicago and st. louis. political boundaries are fading before larger interests. every railroad train crossing the frontier, every ship plying the seas, every article of commerce, every exchange of business, every cable conveying news from distant lands--all these are potent factors in the cause of international peace. add to these the conciliating influence of foreign investments, the telephone and telegraph, travel, education, democracy, religion, and you have marshaled a host for peace whose clarion trumpets shall never sound retreat. casting aside the prejudice of ages, modern industrialism flings around the world the economic bonds against which the forces of militarism are powerless. here, then, in the world-wide operations of commerce and industry is the _assurance of peace_. the skeptic may scoff and the cynic point to mexico and the balkans, but the industrial revolution has produced a multitude of influences that are knitting the nations into an indissoluble unity. men are beginning to realize the integrity of mankind, and a world-consciousness is arising. kindness and justice--yesterday but community ideals--are extending their sway throughout the earth. even while bayonets are bared in conflict and cannon thunder against hostile camps, the magic of our civilization is weaving bonds of union that cannot be broken. peace, not war, is the true grandeur of nations; love, not hate, is the immutable law of god; and so surely as governments and kings are powerless to divide when home and factory would bind, some not too distant day will find the battle flags all furled, the sword's arbitrament abandoned, and the world at peace. education for peace by francis j. lyons, university of texas, austin, texas, representing the southern group first prize oration in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may 28, 1914 education for peace time was when war was beneficial. historians have justified the spread of knowledge by the sword. at the world's awakening, it was well that the new thought should be diffused even at the sacrifice of human blood. it was justified because there was no other means. we have to cast our imagination back through the centuries and realize that then there were no railroads, no telegraph, no newspapers; that man was bound by narrow limits; and the elemental processes of the world were undiscovered. we do not criticize alexander for conquering the eastern perils, for he carried in his phalanxes the spirit of new-discovered thought. we do not denounce rome for piercing the unknown realms with her legions, for she was the mother of a new belief. but this was at the dawn of history, when erudition was in its struggling embryo, and the physical was the better part of man. man went forth to battle as a religion. the world grew partly wise, and man preached the gospel of brotherhood. but it did not last. the changing of the peoples smoldered the fires of rising intelligence, and the world rolled back again in darkness--a darkness long and black. centuries passed, and a new light came, slowly but courageously. man blinkingly came forth, dazed and unsteady. the light grew, and man grew with it; but rooted deep in his heart was the love of war of his ancestors. in a different spirit, it is true; but it was there, and he went forth to battle not because it was religion, but because it was brave. the world rolled on; war grew; it developed with the state; it became an art; was studied--and now our cycle turns. it faces us as a custom backed up by the centuries--deep-rooted, a consumer that yields no returns and, what with our modern appliances, a terror to the hearts of all the world. men fought in the early ages because they thought it was just; men fought in the middle ages because they considered it brave; men of our modern age will banish war because it is a fallacy. do you know that to maintain our so-called prestige we spend seventy per cent of our national income? think of it! seventy per cent to maintain our present status and to prepare for the future! think of that awful drain; think, if applied in other channels, what good could be done! we are proud of our battleship _texas_. she is a noble war dog; yet do you realize that if we had applied the money spent on her in our own state we could have had one gigantic paved highway twice the distance from el paso to galveston? we could have had two hundred high schools, representing $75,000 each. we could have raised our institutions of higher learning to a level with any of the east or north. fifteen millions gone for a floating war machine which in twenty years will be a piece of rusted, useless iron; fifteen millions for a sailing dragon who, each time one of her big guns speaks, wastes the equivalent of a four-year college education for some youth--$1700--for a single shot. our war dogs sail the seas; our soldiers parade our forts; and we look on and raise a joyous hubbub as the nations of the world rush madly on, wasting themselves in the race for military supremacy. have you ever considered yourself transported to some celestial height, and there, from the regions of the infinite, allowed to view a battle on earth? how foolish it must seem, these pygmies coming forth to make war. see them as they charge and wound and kill! see brother slay brother! see the wounded left to die! hear the cries of distress, and picture the grief that follows all! men battling to conquer; men assuming the prerogative of a god--how foolish, yet how serious! and these artificial lines that men call boundaries, how punctiliously they are guarded! "take but a hundred feet, and we shall war with thee." how foolish this too must seem when viewed from above--that we should carry on war over even a slight infraction on any imaginary, mathematical line. we cherish the thought that the youth of our land are being taught self-restraint. it is ever impressed upon them that there are courts of justice for the settlement of controversies. law and order have become stock phrases, dinned into their ears at every turn. the man who would settle his difficulty by trying the physical metal of his adversary is of the past. by the new order he is taboo as a savage. individual self-restraint rings out in our vocabulary as nationally descriptive. the babe at the mother's knee learns first the virtue of it; the child at school is tutored to it soundly; the man in life is lectured with it regularly. brotherhood! love! self-restraint! but what of the self-restraint of the nation? in the teaching of the individual, is it not odd and inconsistent that we forget the teaching of the unit? we paint the inner rooms of our national character with colors bright and pleasing, but the exterior, though weathering the heavier storms, is forgotten. if the child be taught that individuals should arbitrate their differences, can he not learn that the individual nations are subject to the same rule? if arbitration is best for each man, surely it must be best for all. if the child be taught that self-restraint is the boasted characteristic of the model american, should he not learn that the model american nation should be self-restraining? let us learn this lesson, and surely we will never war. herein shall we find the solution of this great problem. we can preach about peace and write pretty orations, but if we are to impress it upon the hearts of the world, we must teach it, and in a systematic manner. it is not to be learned in a day. it is the labor of a generation and more. it must be a fully developed characteristic. man is learning self-development; now we must turn to the bigger ideals--national restraint, national development, international brotherhood. do you say this is idealism--visionary? on the contrary, it is thoroughly practicable. the only way to attain world-peace is for the individual citizen to think peace, to teach peace, and to act in accordance with such thoughts and teachings. just as public opinion causes war, so only through cultivated public opinion can we hope for peace. i do not say to sink our battleships and turn free our army. i do not argue that we should quit guarding ourselves and throw ourselves open to the world; but what i seek is that we should turn our faces with bright hope to the future, eager to assist in the abolition of all that tends to war, eager to assist in the only proper way--the enlightenment of the world-nations. the call comes naturally to america, the land of new belief; america, the new world of opportunity, as emerson calls it; the land cut off from the conventional past; a land that has taken world-leadership in the march of a single century. to america, where problems are studied and fallacies dethroned, the birthplace and the abiding home of democracy; to america, the christian, the civilized! what will the answer be? already we can hear the faint responses, as yet vague and indistinct, the drowned murmurings of the wiser tongues. these must grow into a national anthem whose echo will challenge the powers of the world and startle them into the consciousness of the new brotherhood. we will answer: "yes, we have learned the lessons of the centuries--that war is a fallacy, and armed peace its ill-sprung child; that man is no longer savage; that with enlightened mind he has controlled his warring instinct; that human love is a mightier power than war; and that we are one in the brotherhood of the master. "let us stand before the nations, clad in simple honesty, panoplied in elemental justice; let us appeal to the common conscience of the world; let us say to the war-made powers, there is a way out, and we will lead. we will help you police the sea; we will give our constabulary to a quota of peace, but we are through. no great standing army, no more leviathan battleships. we trust to what we boast of as the highest attainment of the age, the innate justice of civilized humanity." to such a national summons, how will texas respond? facing the mexican boundary for eight hundred miles, texas is to-day peculiarly the guardian of our nation. the situation calls not for agitation and jingoism, bit for rare patience, sanity, and self-control. through troubled waters our chosen captain is guiding the ship of state. it is no time for mutiny, but rather a time for obedience. in this critical hour let every loyal citizen say with a contemporary poet: in this grave hour--god help keep the president! to him all lincoln's tenderness be lent, the grave, sweet nature of the man that saw most power in peace and let no claptrap awe his high-poised duty from its primal plan of rule supreme for the whole good of man. in this grave hour--lord, give him all the light, and us the faith that peace is more than might, that settled nations have high uses still to curb the hasty, regulate the ill, and without bloodshed from the darkest hour make manifest high reason's nobler power. national honor and peace by louis broido, university of pittsburgh, pennsylvania, representing the north atlantic group second prize oration in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may 28, 1914 national honor and peace since the dawn of history the teachers, thinkers, and prophets of mankind have prayed and labored for the abolition of war. in the process of the centuries, their hope has become the aspiration of the mass of men. growing slowly, as do all movements for righteousness, the cause of peace first claimed the attention of the world in the year 1899, when nicholas of russia called the nations together to discuss ways and means for the arbitration of international differences and for the abolition of war. from that day on, the movement for peace has progressed by leaps and bounds, and to-day it has reached the highest point of its development. already nations have signed treaties to arbitrate many of their differences. holland, denmark, argentina, and chile have agreed to arbitrate every dispute. but these nations are not potent enough in world affairs for their action to have an international influence. it remains for the great powers like england, france, germany, and the united states to agree to submit every difficulty to arbitration, and thus take the step that will result in the practical abolition of war. if one would find the reasons that thus far have kept the great powers from agreeing to submit _all_ differences to arbitration, his search need not be long nor difficult. the peace conference of 1907 reports that the objections to international arbitration have dwindled to four. of these objections the one commonly considered of most weight is this: "we will not submit to arbitration questions involving our national honor." even so recently as the spring of 1912, our own senate refused to give its assent to president taft's proposed treaties with france and england to arbitrate all differences, and refused on the ground that "we cannot agree to arbitrate questions involving our national honor." this is the statement that you and i as workers for peace are constantly called upon to refute. let us, therefore, consider what honor is. for centuries honor was maintained and justice determined among men by a strong arm and a skillfully used weapon. it mattered not that often the guilty won and the dishonorable succeeded. death was the arbiter, honor was appeased, and men were satisfied. but with the growth of civilization there slowly came to man the consciousness that honor can be maintained only by use of reason and justice administered only in the light of truth. then private settlement of quarrels practically ceased; trial by combat was abolished; and men learned that real honor lies in the graceful and manly acceptance of decisions rendered by impartial judges. as men have risen to higher ideals of honor in their relations with one another, so nations have risen to a higher standard in international affairs. centuries ago tyrants ruled and waged war on any pretext; now before rulers rush to arms, they stop to count the cost. nations once thought it honorable to use poisoned bullets and similar means of destruction; a growing humanitarianism has compelled them to abandon such practices. at one time captives were killed outright; there was a higher conception of honor when they were forced into slavery; now the quickening sense of universal sympathy compels belligerent nations to treat prisoners of war humanely and to exchange them at the close of the conflict. at one time neutrals were not protected; now their rights are generally recognized. a few hundred years ago arbitration was almost unknown; in the last century more than six hundred cases were settled by peaceful means. during the last quarter of a century we have caught a glimpse of a new national honor. it is the belief that battle and bloodshed, except for the immediate defense of hearth and home, is a blot on the 'scutcheon of any nation. it is the creed of modern men who rise in their majesty and say: "we will not stain our country's honor with the bloodshed of war. god-given life is too dear. the forces of vice, evil, and disease are challenging us to marshal our strength and give them battle. there is too much good waiting to be done, too much suffering waiting to be appeased, for us to waste the life-blood of our fathers and sons on the field of useless battle. here do we stand. we believe we are right. with faith in our belief we throw ourselves upon the altar of truth. let heaven-born justice decide." here is honor unsmirched, untainted! here is pride unhumbled! here is patriotism that is all-embracing, that makes us so zealous for real honor that we turn from the horrors of war to combat the evils that lie at our very doors. we know that faith in such national honor will abolish war. we know, too, that men will have war only so long as they want war. if this be true, then, just as soon as you and i, in whose hands the final decision for or against war must ever rest, express through the force of an irresistible public opinion the doctrine that our conception of national honor demands the arbitration of every dispute, just so soon will our legislators free themselves from financial dictators and liberate the country from the dominance of a false conception of national honor. do you say this ideal is impractical? history proves that questions of the utmost importance can be peacefully settled without the loss of honor. the casa blanca dispute between france and germany, the venezuela question, the north atlantic fisheries case, the alabama claims--these are proof indisputable that questions of honor may be successfully arbitrated. "does not this magnificent achievement," says carl schurz of the alabama settlement, "form one of the most glorious pages of the common history of england and america? truly, the two great nations that accomplished this need not be afraid of unadjustable questions of honor in the future." in the face of such splendid examples, how meaningless is the doctrine of the enemies of peace, "we will not arbitrate questions of national honor. we will decide for ourselves what is right and for that right we will stand, even if this course plunges us into the maelstrom of war. we will not allow our country to be dishonored by any other." well has andrew carnegie expressed the modern view: "our country cannot be dishonored by any other country, or by all the powers combined. it is impossible. all honor wounds are self-inflicted. we alone can dishonor ourselves or our country. one sure way of doing so is to insist upon the unlawful and unjust demand that we sit as judges in our own case, instead of agreeing to abide by the decision of a court or a tribunal. we are told that this is the stand of a weakling, that progress demands the fighting spirit. we, too, demand the fighting spirit; but we condemn the military spirit. we are told that strong men fight for honor. we answer with mrs. mead: 'justice and honor are larger words than peace, and if fighting would enable us to get justice and maintain honor, i would fight! but it is not that way!'" for it is impossible to maintain honor by recourse to arms; right may fall before might, and, viewed in the light of its awful cost, even victory is defeat. in the words of nicholas murray butler: "to argue that a nation's honor must be defended by the blood of its citizens, if need be, is quite meaningless, for any nation, though profoundly right in its contention, might be defeated at the hands of a superior force exerted in behalf of an unjust and unrighteous cause. what becomes of national honor then?" too long have we been fighting windmills; we must struggle with ourselves; we must conquer the passions that have blinded our reason. we have been enrolled in the army of thoughtlessness; the time has come to enroll in the army of god. we have followed a false ideal of honor; we must disillusion ourselves and the world. if men declare that the preservation of courage and manliness demand that we fight, let us lead them to the fight, not against each other, but against all that is unrighteous and undesirable in our national life. men still cling to an ancient conception of national honor; let us convince them that there is a newer and higher conception. men still declare that peace is the dream of the poet and prophet; let us prove by historical example that questions, even of national honor, can be happily settled by arbitration. if men despair, let us remind them that to-day, as never before, the mass of men are slowly and surely working out god's plan for this great cause. the day of triumph is not far distant. already the moving finger of time paints on the wide horizon, in the roseate tints of the dawn, the picture of peace--peace, the victory of victories, beside which marathon and gettysburg pale into insignificance; victory without the strains of martial music, unaccompanied by the sob of widowed and orphaned; victory on god's battlefield in humanity's war on war. the new nationalism and the peace movement by ralph d. lucas, knox college, galesburg, illinois, representing the central group third prize oration in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may 28, 1914 the new nationalism and the peace movement nationalism is a precious product of the centuries. the world has paid a tremendous price to widen the political unit until its boundaries include continents. it has been an equally difficult task to weld the spirit of diverse peoples into a homogeneous whole. and the story of this development constitutes a heritage not soon to be given up. the tales of victory and defeat are held even more dear to a united people than life itself. rightly will any nation jealously defy him who dares advance to plunder its possessions. and it is well that men do not wish to surrender it upon slight provocation. that has been a good diplomacy that sought to protect the nation by war. by the extension of political unity peoples gain moral and physical strength. thrift becomes more common and moral courage greater when a people strike forward with common aims. and in proportion as the nation as a whole enjoys these advantages and opportunities, the individual widens his horizon in peaceful association with fellow men and receives a benefit beyond computation. but, good as nationalism has been in the past, a gradual change seems to be overtaking the world's politics. national diplomacy hesitates where a century ago it was firm. forces which once drove the nations apart seem now to be drawing them together. the discord of disputes seems to be disappearing in the harmony of coã¶peration. it is no longer possible to determine easily what a nation's interests really are. and it is of the forces that are bringing about this change in the policies of nations, of this new nationalism and its bearing upon the peace movement, that i wish to speak. within the last two centuries economic forces have worked a mighty revolution. continents have been converted into communities. the prosperity of our eastern industries controls the activities of the west, and a disturbance from any section throws a tremor over all. tribal barter has developed into a world-wide commerce until the most distant nation may easily acquire the products of another. steel rails weave a web of commercialism among the peoples, and the cable welds them in a mighty network which, responsive to every flash of news, brings all the nations into a mutuality of interests. so interdependent are the nations and so vital are their relations that a single fluctuation in the most distant market finds a response in our own. a slight disorder in wall street strains the whole financial world. and thus through intercourse in commerce, industry, the press, christian missions, and scholastic research a system has been developed that holds no place for the selfish policy of exploiting backward peoples. we no longer consider the advance of alien peoples in wealth and prosperity as a menace to our own. there is being developed a strong international public opinion which realizes that anything that destroys the well-being of one member is the concern of all. in the light of these facts, future world-politics can have no place for the settlement of disputes by force. a declaration of war by one of the large powers to-day would be more terrible than it has ever been in the past. the man of business, of education, of philanthropy, of civic advancement cannot reasonably advocate a policy that would ruin business, stagnate education, increase poverty, and turn progress over to the ravages of manslaughter. industry cannot continue when the shoulder that should turn the wheels of industry grows weary beneath the weight of the musket. education cannot proceed when libraries and lecture halls are deserted for the camp and fortress. a tolstoy with all his power of vivid presentation does not overdraw the picture. the moral fiber and physical strength of a people must forever afterward bear their scars. a struggling people can never rid themselves of the evil effects of the conflict, although they may rejoice in the valor of their heroes. nations cannot afford to become the theaters of carnage and bloodshed and the rendezvous of commercial and moral pirates and civic grafters. why, then, do nations throw away their strength in the building and equipping of armies and navies? the advocates of militarism tell us that we need a navy to protect our commerce. possibly it is true that under the present system of international law this is somewhat excusable; for although private property on land is exempt from confiscation and the old forms of privateering have long ago been abolished by an agreement of the powers, yet the policy does not apply to maritime warfare. enemy's goods in enemy's ships are still subject to seizure. but while this argument does hold for the present, the condition could easily be remedied. because a man with foreign capital operates ships instead of factories, why is there any special reason for exposing his property to depredation? in the light of common sense such a policy seems absurd. and it should be one of the first aims of our diplomats to eliminate all possibility of this licensed robbery, for as long as it exists there will always be the cry for extravagant expenditure in order to preserve international peace. but even if we should not need a navy to protect our commerce, again the opponents of the policy of settling international disputes by arbitration say that we need armies and navies to preserve our honor. they tell us that there are certain questions which cannot be submitted to any tribunal; that a nation must reserve the right to submit only those questions it sees fit. surrender this right, and prestige and self-respect are gone and we become a nation of "mollycoddles" whose patriotism has no virile qualities. it is true that the independence and security of each nation is essential to international life. it is self-governing nations, not subjugated ones, that make possible a strong international life. but the converse is equally true. an international life made up of independent, coã¶perating, and mutually helpful nations is the best security by which national life can be guaranteed. those who say that questions of national honor cannot be submitted to a tribunal have a wrong conception of the essence of national life. love of country means more than a mere willingness to serve as a target for the enemy's guns. we would not deduct one iota from the respect and honor due those who have served the nation on the field of battle. but what a service they might have rendered if they had been spared that life to live serving their fellow men and contributing to the vigor of the race! none of us will give up his firm resolve to defend his own country with all his strength. but theirs is a cheap patriotism which depends for its expression upon the thrilling note of fife and drum. the great test of patriotism is the everyday purpose to deal justly with one's neighbor. let him who would be a patriot and serve the nation put his life into the work close at hand, and, with a civic temper and moral courage that can grip the scourge, rid our social life of its damning influences. this is the spirit of true national honor. this it is that makes of a nation a real nation. the call to arms is but another signal of the defeat of the underlying principles of civilization. only slowly will any large number of the people accept these new conceptions. but there are already hopeful signs. the growing sentiment is rapidly crystallizing. the developing code of international equity as expressed by the establishment of such an institution as the hague court is a step in the right direction. the peaceful settlement of the venezuelan boundary dispute was an honor to the nations involved. and the work of the international commission of inquiry in the dogger bank episode between russia and england is significant of the trend. again, a modern innovation was wrought when the international conference in 1906 settled the conflicting interests of germany, france, and spain in morocco. within the last century the powers ratified over two hundred treaties, each providing for the peaceful settlement by tribunals of specified international disputes. it is true that most peace treaties have dealt almost exclusively with legal questions. the nations have hesitated to submit all international differences to a court of arbitration. but the spirit for arbitral settlement is widening. and this spirit is not for a mere avoidance of war, but seeks the substitution of a better method than war for determining justice between nations. each nation has its own individual problems to deal with, and in this respect all cannot proceed according to set rules. the movement does not mean the extinction and obliteration of nationality and national rights. the individual has not been minimized because he consents to submit his differences with his fellow men to a court for settlement. and this must be the ultimate attitude of nations whose honor we have a right to guard jealously. what, then, shall be our program? whatever attitude is to be adopted, most people agree that the day of universal peace is far in the future. the balkans and mexico remind us of the difficulty lying before the coming generations. but the numerous peace societies whose purpose it is to circulate authentic documents, that the great mass of citizens may be brought into sympathetic touch through accurate information, are doing much for the cause. the erection of the hague court gives something lasting and tangible to work from. and, above all, the nations will rise to higher standards principally by adopting the ideals of the individual. as man has risen above his barbaric ideals, so will the nations throw their military expenditures into the coffers of public welfare as they come more and more to judge their successes, not by victories in war but by achievements in education, commerce, industry, and artizanship. and, proceeding with such aims, the established international court must be the medium through which all differences will be settled. we shall discover that our internal policy of dealing with the individual can be more easily applied to international relations than was at first supposed. and having reached this point in the evolution of international peace, there must be added to the international court a world-wide police force. as the system develops and our prejudices are abandoned, a method of policing must stand as an enforcer of international law. until then there is little hope that military expenditures will radically diminish, for we cannot reasonably abolish our present methods unless we have something secure to substitute. perhaps such a system will not abolish the utter possibility of war. only the future can tell us what heights of success the policy will reach. there are those of us who have high hopes because we believe in the good sense of the american people and of our great contemporaries. by the past we are made confident of the future. but if the goal is to be reached, it is for us as individual citizens to contribute our influence toward developing the attitude of peace among our fellow men. for our international welfare and for the honor of the newest of great nations, may we in this issue throw our influence, as a united people, on the side of a higher international morality! may the united peoples of the world abolish the prejudices of misconceptions and, drawn together by common interests, resolve that the priceless heritage of centuries shall not be imperiled by war! and thus over a warring humanity the breaking day of peace shall be hastened, at whose high noon there shall be heard not the clashing of arms but the increasing hum of prosperity under the sway of the new and better national life. man's moral nature the hope of universal peace by victor morris, university of oregon, eugene, oregon representing the pacific coast group fourth prize oration in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may 28, 1914 man's moral nature the hope of universal peace two thousand years ago the coming of a prince of peace, the prince of peace, inaugurated the fulfillment of the prophetic promise that "peace shall cover the earth," and that "man shall learn war no more forever." from the time of jesus until now men have passively accepted the idea, but have failed to do their part in its fulfillment. to-day there are few indeed but believe that it would be desirable to abolish war. many also feel in a way that war is brutal. but here our feelings on this great question largely end. we are not aroused to talk, and work, and fight against war as inhuman, as economic folly, as unreason, and especially as an immorality and a sin. now we are not here to harangue about the physical sufferings wrought through war, but we are here to inquire and find out what we can do about it. how are we going to attack the war problem in order to bring about action, instead of simply talk and discussion? in considering this war problem it is well to bear in mind the fact that war is a resultant of a deeper cause, the war spirit. the war spirit is the spirit of him who first made war in heaven; the war spirit--ambitious, aggressive, covetous and revengeful, rampant through the centuries, never conquered by force, in war subdued only by exhaustion. this war spirit still exists to scourge the nations with war, to stagger with its problem of war the brains of statesmen believing in peace. how are we to attack this stupendous problem? what appeal can we make to the nations that will be strong enough to do away with the war spirit? in order to overthrow this mighty evil, certainly every possible force must be enlisted. the thought which i wish to bring to you is this: while such appeals as those to economy and to reason are of value, they are not in themselves strong enough to cause the nations to abolish war; and hence, in view of the real inner nature of the war spirit, man's moral nature, working through a developed conscience upon war, is the only force strong enough to effect universal peace. against war peace-advocates appeal with force from a business standpoint, on grounds of economy and financial expediency. the vast system of international trade and commerce calls for world peace. the prosperity of world-industries and business requires good will and brotherhood between the nations. so heavy, also, have the burdens of war and militarism become that three fourths of our own expenditures go for war purposes, past and present, and in great britain two thirds are so spent.[1] every german citizen, it is said, carries a soldier on his back. by the testimony of financiers and ministers of state themselves, nothing but financial ruin and bankruptcy await the nations if the present military tragedy continues. but has this obvious condition of affairs affected the race for armaments? not unless it has accelerated it. to every appeal to economy the reply is that the outlay is necessary if we are to exist at all. but even suppose that for a season the economic motive should lead us to abolish war, as soon as financial advantage was apparent to a nation through war it is evident that all restraints would be removed and war ensue again. the same motive used to abolish war would bring war once more. again, when we remember that it is the deeper cause, the war spirit, that we must quench, we can understand why this appeal is often made to those who bear not. so far as the great mass of men is concerned, purely economic considerations cannot change the spirit and impulses of the soul. history reveals no great uplifting of humanity or change in ideals as having arisen through purely economic or financial considerations. [1] the percentages as a matter of fact are not so large, but the argument is not impaired by the fact.--_editor._ the peace plea has also been based on grounds of reason. clearly has it been pointed out that reason demands that no person shall sit in judgment on his own case, yet this we do in a resort to arms. war is not arbitrament by reason, but arbitrament by the sword. every plain argument of reason condemns war and militarism. the arguments of reason have, indeed, been strong, and have attracted much attention, resulting in the settlement of many disputes by arbitration. but as concerns the final wiping out of war and the surrendering of heavy armaments, reason alone cannot present a permanent powerful appeal, for it is easy in times of stress to plead that reason and justice demand the war. never was there a fight but the contending parties claimed they were justified. but the chief fact that seems to put reason in the category of impotent appeals is the fact that it is an appeal to the mind, while the war spirit can only be removed by an appeal to the heart, wherein it resides. we may reason with nations all we please, but when the war fury arises, then all the reasoning proves to have been in vain, the appeal to the mind turns out to be too feeble. appeals to economy and reason, then, are appeals we must make, but they are too weak in themselves to make a permanent impression against the war spirit. we must then look for some additional, some more compelling, force. let us examine the real inner nature of war, for this ought surely to throw some light upon our problem. war is not economy; it is not reason. is war, then, morality? is it virtue? it would hardly seem necessary for us to answer this question, for modern civilized nations long ago recognized blood feuds with their kindred as contrary to real morality, as nothing but murder; but they seem unable to recognize that war is just the same--nothing but legalized, organized murder. from the use of violence in settling our international disputes arise all the deadly passions of the soul, such as treachery, insolence, revenge, and a murderous spirit, with the accompanying fruits of robbery, misery, and blood. surely, o nations! nothing which bears such fruits can be anything but corrupt, for a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. look also at its relationship to civilization and citizenship, and its effects upon theme. "war and civilization," said one of the great english ministers, "are contradictory terms, even as christ and mars." particularly damaging is the effect of war upon citizens. for does it not blunt the sensibilities, harden the heart, inflame the mind with passions, and deaden the consciences of men? said the same great english preacher, "the sword that smites the enemy abroad, also lays bare the primeval savage within the citizen at home." and again, "war is not so horrible in that it drains the dearest veins of the foe, but in that it drains our own hearts of the yet more precious elements of pity, mercy, generosity, which are the lifeblood of the soul." what now must be our conclusion about war? had we ten thousand voices, surely every one would be in honor bound to declare war an immorality. every incident of war declares it such. every result of battle hands down the same decree. in the words of a famous russian battle painter, we too may define war as "the antithesis of all morality." this clear idea of the real inner nature of war ought surely to enable us to find our ground of attack. since war is sin and war is crime, the conclusion which we draw is, that if it is possible ever to abolish war, man's conscience, his sense of right and wrong, is the only force powerful enough to accomplish the result. the great searchlight of morality must be turned on war--a searchlight which is always bright and strong and which never has failed to reveal the truth. to turn this on full and strong means to awaken the consciences of men. it must be an individual proposition--not simply the developed consciences of a few leaders who may be submerged by the war spirit of the masses, but there must be developed consciences of all the people individually. all our arbitration treaties and the actual settlement of disputes by arbitration are of great value and should be pressed as far as possible; but are these sufficient forces to develop the consciences of men against war as an immorality and a sin? what are the forces that have always come to our support against an immorality and a sin? how about our churches? have they been doing their duty? have they made it clear that war is sin and war is crime? has not the church been too easy? has its voice sounded clear and strong on this world-evil? surely a duty rests upon the ministry to be insistent in its characterization of war. what peace-advocates must do is to urge this upon the church and bring it to a realization of its duty. church members know the character of war and simply need to have the matter brought home to their hearts. what about our schools,--not simply the colleges and universities, but all the schools,--which offer fertile ground to sow the seeds of peace? thus far in the history of our schools too much emphasis has been laid upon military history, etc. dates and events of national wars have been thoroughly drilled into students, and the glory and blaze of war brought out. we have actually made it a glory and a virtue. one of the most encouraging signs of the times, however, is the fact that many of our text-books are dropping out the prolonged study of wars and centering more on the peaceful pursuits of the nation and the commercial relations with foreign powers. how about direct peace teaching in the lower schools? how much of it do we include in the work? none at all. many are the speakers who address the schools on war reminiscences, but few indeed are the appeals made for peace. not until this movement is strongly emphasized in our schools from the very beginning can we hope completely to drive out the war spirit; for time is required to develop in the individual conscience a full realization of the real nature of war, and such development should begin with the plastic period of youth. with church and school lined up on the side of peace, the home teaching will soon fall in line; and church, school, and home combined can develop so strong a conviction concerning war, can make so forceful an appeal to man's moral nature, that the war spirit will take its leave and be gone forever. we always look to history for a confirmation of our beliefs, and let us glance now to the records of the past and learn her teachings. first of all, look at the duel as the mode of settling a personal difficulty if peaceful settlement appeared impossible. first, it was heartily accepted as a gentlemanly, honorable, and brave mode of settlement. then, tolerated and simply suffered to exist. finally, condemned by conscience as an immorality and a sin, it was banished from civilized nations. look also at slavery. at first heartily accepted as a divine arrangement. then tolerated by the world as undesirable, yet not necessarily wrong. next its overthrowal attempted on grounds of pity and of reason; until finally, recognized as an immorality and a sin, it too was blotted from the pages of civilization. no great uplift of humanity, no great movement in civilization, but has found its path to success in the developed moral sense of man. no great change in civilized institutions but has found itself produced by the dynamic, moving forces of morality. war must be abolished. only the great powers of morality are vital enough, are dynamic and powerful enough, to carry out our peace program. these forces lie dormant, and simply need stimulation and development. recognizing the impotency of appeals to economy and to reason, what are we going to do? in the name of humanity let us impeach war and the war spirit. it is a traitor to every ideal of civilization and of justice. it is the instrument of hatred and of pride, the agent of jealousy and of avarice. in the name of the dead and dying, in the name of justice, which it dethrones, in the name of those whose loved ones it demands, we impeach war as a traitor, guilty of all high crimes and misdemeanors. what else shall we do? stir up from its greatest depths the heart of man. educate his conscience till he is unwilling to suffer war to exist. begin early in church, school, and home to instil in the minds of young and old continually the true conception of war, that it is an immorality, contrary to every principle of christianity and to every teaching of our christ. let us bring into the conflict against war the great, dynamic, motive force--the moral nature of man. and when we shall have thus developed the consciences of men, there will henceforth be laid up for us a crown of victory, as there will then be a fuller realization that in man's moral nature is the hope of universal peace. the task of the twentieth century by harold husted, ottawa university, ottawa, kansas, representing the western group fifth prize oration in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may 28, 1914 the task of the twentieth century age by age, civilization advances. each successive era has contributed that invention or accomplished that achievement which has placed another round in the great ladder of civilization. the development of many small states into powerful nations, and many wonderful improvements in other fields, such as steam navigation, the railroad, the telegraph, and wireless communication, crown the last as the greatest of centuries in the history of the human family. it is difficult to understand why the human mind, whence these mighty inspirations originated, has been incapable of realizing that there still remains the most degrading, the most deteriorating, the foulest blot that ever disgraced this world--the killing of civilized men, by men, as a permissible mode of settling international disputes. this world can never attain its highest standard of civilization until this one disgraceful blemish, called war, is obliterated. it is the collective task of the people living in this twentieth century to bring into reality the millennium of tennyson, till the war drum throbs no longer, and the battle-flags are furl'd in the parliament of man, the federation of the world. the beginning of this social task, then, is the enlightenment of the peoples as to the immorality, waste, and ineffectiveness of war. god commanded, "thou shalt not kill." who shall presume to declare that this precept was directed not to nations but to individuals only? that one man shall not kill, but nations may? we are horrified at the report of a single murder, yet, if viewed from the light of truth, what is war but wholesale murder? what tongue, what pen, can describe the bloody havoc of the battle of gettysburg, where, between the rise and set of a single sun, fifty thousand of our fellow men sank to earth, dead or wounded? what sentiment in human hearts which needs to be perpetuated sent rank after rank, column after column, of blue soldiers against the impregnable stone wall of fredericksburg? and who will place the blame for the carnage of cold harbor elsewhere than upon the folly of misguided patriotism and cruel, selfish interests that made the bloody battle possible? every soldier is connected, as all of us, by dear ties of kindred, love, and friendship. perhaps there is an aged mother, who fondly hoped to lean her bending form on his more youthful arm; perhaps a young wife, whose life is entwined inseparably with his; perchance a sister, a brother. but as he falls on the field of battle, must not all these suffer? his aged mother surely falls with him. his young wife is suddenly widowed, his children orphaned. that husband's helping hand is forever stayed. a parent's voice is stilled, and the children's plaintive cries for their loving father fall on unheeding ears. tell me, friends, you who know the bitterness of parting with dear ones whom you watched tenderly through the last hopeful moments, can you measure your anguish? yet, what a contrast! your dear ones departed soothed by kindness and love, while the dying soldier gasped out his life on the battlefield alone. and what a waste is war! we are just beginning to realize the tremendous cost, the incalculable wastefulness, not only of actual war but of the preparation for future possible wars. for the current fiscal year ending june 30, 1914, the united states has appropriated in round numbers $535,000,000, in preparation for future wars and because of wars fought in the past. sixty-seven cents out of every dollar expended by our national government goes to feed the present-day mania for war, present and past, leaving only thirty-three cents out of each dollar for the combined expense of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of our national government. when we realize that the cost of a single battleship exceeds the total value of all the grounds and buildings of all the colleges and universities in the state of kansas, the figures indicating this expense have more meaning to us. and when we reflect that the cost of a single shot from one of the great guns of that battleship is $1700, enough to send a young man through college, the common man realizes that the united states cannot afford to go to war or even prepare for war. and all this suffering and cost are to no purpose. war is utterly ineffectual to secure or advance its professed object. the wretchedness it involves contributes to no beneficial result, helps to establish no right, and, therefore, in no respect promotes harmony between the contending nations. when the saviour was born, angels from heaven sang to the children of the human family this benediction: glory to god in the highest, peace on earth, good will toward men. and at last, in the beginning of this twentieth century, nations seem to be visibly approaching that unity so long hoped and prayed for; and that nation which shall precede all others in the abolition of war will be crowned by history with everlasting honor. the risk will be very little, the gain incalculable. we are coming to believe that the most significant fact about man and his civilization is their improvability. individual inventive genius has added improvement after improvement until it would seem that man's mastery over nature is to be well-nigh complete as these ideas and inventions are socialized and extended to benefit all. we are now entering the era of social achievement when mankind unitedly undertakes by organization and coã¶peration mightier tasks than ever accomplished before. many dreadful diseases are disappearing before preventive medicine, and sanitary science is eliminating many plagues; pestilence is coming to be a thing of the past. human welfare is now the concern of coã¶perative mankind, and social science will condemn and banish war or fail to establish itself as an applied science. it _can_ be done! it _ought_ to be done! it _will_ be done! and although this consummation seems to many far away, it may be accomplished by very simple methods. it only waits the time of concerted action on the part of the leading nations when the principles of arbitration can be invoked more fully, and a world-court established with plenary powers for settling all disputes between the nations. international legislation has occurred repeatedly, though no world-court has as yet been established. in the case of the universal postal union we have what is tantamount to world-legislation, in that all civilized nations have entered into a formal agreement regarding the delivery of mail. another instance of practical world-legislation is that of the international bureau of weights and measures. many other examples might be given in which several nations are parties to an agreement regarding some important measure, such as the respect paid to the flag of truce, the regulations concerning commerce on the high seas, and the etiquette of diplomacy. paramount in world-importance has been the agreement of the leading nations of the world in the establishment of the hague conferences for the amelioration of war. since a conference of nations can meet and decide on the mitigation of the horrors of war, it is certainly conceivable that a tribunal of nations can prevent war. such a tribunal would in no respect differ from the supreme court of the united states in its fundamental foundations. as our supreme court is final in settling all disputes in this country, so the international court would be final in adjusting all controversies between the nations. and such a court is clearly the next decisive step in the promotion of this great task of securing world-peace. if nations can agree to establish war as their arbiter of peace, why can they not establish a more peaceful substitute? it is possible, for there is nothing in the nature of strife that cannot be settled, no quarrel that cannot be judged, no difficulty that cannot be satisfactorily adjusted. with the establishment of a true world-court, there would rise on the vision of the nations for the first time the prospect of justice for the united whole of mankind. justice to the smaller countries would be secured; encroachments by the strong upon the weak would be prevented; the moral standard of politics would be uplifted; and though every step would be exposed to the selfishness, corruption, and love of despotism that are prevalent in all men, yet is it not reasonable to suppose that, as progress is now being made in the various nations for overcoming these evils, so it would be made in this united whole, to the unspeakable benefit of mankind? this country has been foremost in the promotion of this great movement to organize the world. it is especially fitting that the united states should take the lead. the greatest nation having a government of the people and by the people, with the longest experience and the greatest success, is best fitted to lead others. we have the form of national government which foreshadows the form of world-government. theoretically, our states are sovereign; all rights which are not formally surrendered by accepting the constitution of the united states are reserved to them. in a like manner, referring to the establishment of a world-court, the nations individually will be expected to surrender to the nations collectively only such jurisdiction as pertains to the settling of their controversies. a world-court would appeal to the strongest, the purest, and the deepest thinkers of every race. it would cover a new field, appealing to reason and altruism and justice. it would by its very effect upon individuals tend to develop the qualities it demands, and would prove a mighty influence for uplifting the intellectual and moral standards not only of men but nations. it would by its very international nature annihilate all national antipathies and promote an era of universal good will and genuine understanding. to send a husband or father, glorious in the perfection of physical manhood, out on the field of carnage to be slain in an effort to settle international difficulty or to uphold fancied national honor, is unquestionable barbarism. it is far more humane to terminate disputed questions by arbitration than by the keen-edged sword. international peace compacts can hold mankind together by unbreakable yet unburdensome bonds and greatly promote prosperity and social progress. the wanton woe and waste that inevitably follow in the train of war will soon be things of the past. the twentieth century, already so full of radiant promise, so enlivened by a new social conscience, will devote its collective energies to the abolition of war and the substitution of its successor--a world-court, based on the facts of humane solidarity and the principles of international peace. the present status of international arbitration by bryant smith, guilford college, north carolina, a senior in guilford college prize-winning essay in the pugsley contest, 1912-1913 the pugsley prize-essay contests in 1908 mr. chester dewitt pugsley, then an undergraduate student in harvard university, gave $50 as a prize to be offered by the lake mohonk conference for the best essay on "international arbitration" by an undergraduate student of an american college. the prize was won by l. b. bobbitt of baltimore, a sophomore in johns hopkins university. the following year (1909-1910) a similar prize, of $100, was won by george knowles gardner of worcester, massachusetts, a harvard sophomore. a like prize of $100 in 1910-1911 was won by harry posner of west point, mississippi, a senior in the mississippi agricultural and mechanical college. the prize of 1911-1912, of which john k. starkweather of denver, colorado, a junior in brown university, was the winner, was the first offered to men students only (other similar prizes having been offered to women students) in the united states and canada. in the fifth pugsley contest (1912-1913) the prize was awarded to bryant smith of guilford college, north carolina, a senior in guilford college at the same place, whose essay follows. the judges were chancellor elmer ellsworth brown of new york university, rollo ogden, editor of the new york _evening post_, and lieutenant general nelson a. miles, u.s.a., retired. each winner is invited to the lake mohonk conference next following, where he publicly receives the prize from its donor, mr. pugsley. the present status of international arbitration the first concerted effort looking toward an eventual world-wide peace was the hague conference of 1899, where representatives of twenty-six nations assembled in response to a rescript from the czar of russia, whose avowed purpose, as set forth in the rescript, was to discuss ways and, if possible, devise means, to arrest the alarming increase in expenditures for armaments which threatened to bankrupt the national governments. unable to accomplish anything definite in this respect because of the vigorous opposition headed by germany, the delegates turned their attention toward giving official recognition and concrete form to ideas which had already obtained in the settlement of international disputes, and toward the formation of a court before which the nations might have their differences adjudicated. the principles embodied in good offices and mediation and commissions of inquiry have given gratifying evidence of their efficiency, each in its respective capacity. the original achievement of the conference, however, was the permanent court of arbitration. the composition of this court was to include not more than four persons from each of the signatory powers; from which panel, in case of an appeal to arbitration, each party was to select two judges, who, in turn, should elect their own umpire unless otherwise provided by the disputants. that it would be subject to criticism might have been expected. that twenty-six nations could unanimously agree upon any court whatever was the real occasion for surprise. the four cases arbitrated during the eight years intervening between this and the second hague conference served to bring out its defects, chief of which were its decentralized and intangible nature. nominally a court, in reality it was but a panel scattered all over the world from which a court could, with great difficulty and expense, be selected. nominally permanent, in reality it had to be re-created for each case to be judged. the second hague conference, working on a basis of this short experience, undertook to remedy these inherent defects in the arbitral machinery by leaving the permanent court just as it was, and by creating besides an international court of prize to serve a special function indicated by its name, and a court of judicial arbitration to supplement the work of, if not eventually to supplant, the former court. to insure greater impartiality and also to encourage the weaker powers the expenses of the new court, instead of falling upon the litigants in each case, were to be prorated among the ratifying powers. to insure greater tangibility and permanency the new court was to be composed of only seventeen members, each to serve a term of twelve years at a salary of $2400 per annum, with an additional $40 for each day of actual service. furthermore, the court was to meet once a year and to elect each year a delegation of three of its members to sit at the hague for settling minor cases arising in the interval between regular sessions, having the power also to call extra sessions of the entire court whenever occasion should demand. to insure a more judicial personnel the convention specifies that members shall be qualified to hold high legal posts in their respective countries. the method by which members of the court were to be appointed--the one point upon which the delegates were unable to agree--was deferred for subsequent determination. this, in addition to the one hundred and fifty-odd treaties privately entered into by two or more nations, many of which contain pledges to submit certain classes of disputes to the permanent court, is, in brief, what has been accomplished by way of constructive political organization by the modern peace movement. how much does this signify? in view of the present attitude of the social mind, what are we to infer from this as bearing upon the ultimate outcome of international arbitration? it shall be the purpose of this paper to answer that question. in an address before the mohonk conference of 1911 dr. cyrus northrup, ex-president of the university of minnesota, said: "what is really wanted is not continued talking in favor of peace with the idea of converting the people; for the people are already converted! they are ready for peace and arbitration!" in the october number of the _review of reviews_ for 1909, privy councillor karl von stengel, one of the german delegation to the first hague conference, is quoted as follows: "it must be stated emphatically that in its ultimate aims the peace movement is not only ... utopian, but ... dangerous...." these quotations are given as typical of the attitude manifested by the two extremes, the injudiciously optimistic and the ultraconservative, toward every social reform. all true progress pursues a course intermediate to these two. the idea entertained by so many enthusiastic peace advocates, that the world is ready for peace if we but had institutional facilities adequate to carry out the will of the people, is erroneous. in all democratic states political institutions are but a concrete expression of the social mind, the media created by the people, through which society executes its will. "with a given phase of human character ... there must go an adapted class of institutions."[1] therefore, i submit that if the people were ready for peace they could easily provide the means necessary for its accomplishment. [1] herbert spencer, "the study of sociology." the first gentleman quoted above drew his conclusion from the indications that of the two million inhabitants of his state, one million nine hundred thousand would favor arbitration as shown by the enthusiasm manifested at a meeting of the state peace society a few weeks before. similar conditions in other parts of the country, he thought, would corroborate the application of his assertion to the entire country. such a conclusion is fallacious in that it fails to consider three essential facts about the people of the united states which largely determine the attitude of any people toward war. first, they have no grievance. second, no appeal is being made to their patriotic bias. third, their emotions and passions are quiescent. the first of these needs only brief mention. no people in this enlightened age wishes to fight as a matter of course, regardless of any reasonable pretext. if nations never had any personal interests involved, there would, of course, be no more war. in this respect the people of the united states are not ahead of the other parts of the civilized world. disinterested parties have been in favor of peace for two thousand years. the other two facts deserve more extended consideration. the disposition in individuals to pluck motes out of their neighbors' eyes and leave beams in their own, in the nation becomes what herbert spencer calls the bias of patriotism. according to him patriotism is but an extended self-interest. we love our country because our own interests and our country's interests are one. unable to view international affairs apart from national interests, we are handicapped in making those balanced judgments necessary to judicial arbitration. an act reprehensible under the union jack becomes patriotic under the stars and stripes. at both hague conferences all the powers were seemingly in favor of curtailing expenditures for armaments. the unprecedented increase in expenditures which followed bespeaks their sincerity, or, rather, bespeaks each nation's mistrust of the sincerity of others. a number of years ago the farmers' alliance, organized in some of the southern tobacco states, voted to reduce the acreage of tobacco for a given year in order to raise the price. so many members tried to profit by this opportunity to realize a high price for a big crop that there was a greater acreage planted that year than ever before. can we expect better of groups than of the individuals of which the groups are composed? most nations question the justice of russia's policy leading up to the war with japan, england's course in south africa, and america's attitude toward the philippines; yet the body of citizens of each of these three countries, while concurring in the general opinion concerning the other two, justifies its own government's actions with patriotic pride. the chief respect in which this bias interferes with the progress of international arbitration is in restricting the scope of general arbitration treaties, the average formula of such treaties excluding all questions which involve "national honor and vital interests." a greatly modified survival of the spirit which in primitive peoples regarded the tribe over the mountain or across the stream as a fit object of hatred and fear, the objection to a judicial settlement of such questions assumes that a nation's honor and vital interests are goods peculiar in that they may be inconsistent with justice. the attitude of the united states toward the recently proposed treaty between england and america may be taken as typical of the attitude which prevails on this subject generally. the formulators of the treaty took an advanced step in that, instead of reserving questions of national honor and vital interests, they provided for the arbitration of all differences which are "justiciable in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of principles of law or equity," thereby recognizing the judicial nature of arbitration. the action of the senate, however, which sustained the opinion of the majority report of the senate committee on foreign relations, objecting to the last clause of article iii of the treaty,[2] would indicate that the significance of a general arbitration treaty attaches not so much to the definition of its scope as to who shall determine what cases conform to the definition. it would seem that the nature of the reservation is relatively unimportant so long as its interpretation devolves upon the parties at variance. the majority report, objecting to the delegation to the joint high commission of the power to determine the arbitrability of cases in terms of the treaty, contains this statement[3] in which the minority report likewise concurs: "every one agrees that there are certain questions which no nation ... will ever submit to the decision of any one else." as cases of this nature it enumerates territorial integrity, admission of immigrants, and our monroe doctrine. the significance of this insistence upon a means of evasion is evident. there is not yet enough international confidence. the powers are not yet ready to submit to unlimited arbitration. [2] the clause, referring to the commission of inquiry, reads: "it is further agreed, however, that in cases in which the parties disagree as to whether or not a difference is subject to arbitration under article i of this treaty, that question shall be submitted to the joint high commission of inquiry; and if all or all but one of the members of the commission agree and report that such difference is within the scope of article i, it shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this treaty."--_editor._ [3] see senate document 98, 62d cong., 1st sess., 9-10.--_editor._ the other enemy to rational judgment--and rational judgment must be the only basis of arbitration--is the danger of emotionalism. the average man is yet largely irrational. when cool and self-possessed, and when his prejudices and traditions do not interfere, he can pass rational judgment upon questions in which his own interests are not concerned; but when his passions are aroused he dispenses with any effort to reason and acts in obedience to blind impulse. he knows that it is expensive to fight, that it is dangerous, and that it is wrong; but when he is provoked, he fights. the characteristics of the average man are the characteristics of society. we have not yet outgrown the mob. interwoven with this impulsive temperament and associated with some of the most cherished affections of the human heart is the spirit of war, developed by thousands of generations of ancestral conflict and passed on to us as a heritage to be rooted out of our nature before we shall realize in its fullness the ideal for which we strive. mortal conflict sanctified by religion, devastation idealized by literature, pillage justified by patriotism, fellow-destruction ennobled by self-sacrifice--these form a complex of contradictory emotions from which men are as yet unable to unravel the one essential characteristic of war; namely, the attempt to dispense justice in a trial by battle, and make it stand out in its revealed inconsistency, dissociated from its traditional concomitants of which it is neither part nor parcel. the romance of knighthood and chivalry still appeals to the human heart, notwithstanding the fact that war, love, and religion, the knight's creed, are an inconsistent combination. most men can be made to see this in their minds, but cannot be made to feel it in their souls. many old civil war veterans, who would not consent for their sons to volunteer in the spanish-american war, would have gone themselves had they been able. some did go. to men so disposed it is useless to talk of the horrors of war. give us a just grievance; let some competent enthusiast inflame this passion with a war cry like "remember the maine," "fifty-four forty or fight," "liberty or death," and, reã«nforced by the animal inherent in man, it will arouse popular demonstrations devoid of all reason, creating a force that cannot be controlled by a cold, calculating intellect. can you listen to a bugle call on a clear, still night without a quickening of the pulse as there flashes through your soul a suggestion of all past history with its marshaling hosts and heroic deeds? can you see a military parade without a suggestion of "dixie" and the star spangled banner, or feeling your bosom swell with patriotic pride? this association may be, and doubtless is, a delusion, but it is a delusion developed and fortified by thousands of years of custom and precedent and it would be contrary to the history of human progress if man should become disillusionized in one generation. it may take centuries. if we are to have international arbitration in the near future, we must have it in spite of this spirit of war rather than by destroying the spirit. in fact, the only practical way to destroy it is to let it, like vestigial organs of which biologists tell us, degenerate from disuse. this inherited emotional tendency remains as a threat with which we, as exponents of arbitration, must reckon before we are justified in saying that the world is ready for peace. because of these two social characteristics--the patriotic bias which perverts judgment, and uncontrolled passions which submerge reason--the educational propagandists still have a task to perform. let us now examine the stand-pat idea that unlimited arbitration is but a dream as expressed in the quotation from privy councillor stengel. this is farther from the truth than the other extreme just discussed. he who will, with an unprejudiced mind, examine cross sections of history at widely separated stages, cannot fail to see that along with the growing tendency of reason to predominate over passion, superstition, and custom there has been a parallel tendency to restrict militarism as a social activity. from a war conceived as religion to war as patriotism, then war as commercialism and the tool of ambition, man is now coming to the more rational conception of war as the despoiler of nations. david speaks of the "season of the year" when nations went forth to battle. fifteen hundred years later governments pretended at least to justify their military operations on rational grounds. to-day war is the last resort, and even its most ardent defenders do not attempt to justify it except in disputes which involve national honor and vital interests. in view of the foregoing facts it is evident that the modern peace movement has by no means the whole of the task to perform. rather, we can almost justify ourselves in the assumption that war is not long to remain one of our social inconsistencies and that it is now making its last, and, therefore, most determined, stand on questions of national honor and vital interests. among the numerous forces contributing to this evolution of international peace, the chief agencies have been, and still are, moral and industrial. these same forces are working to-day with cumulative effect. warfare is becoming more and more inconsistent with the ethical spirit of the times. men may talk of the expenses, horrors, and devastations of war as paramount causes for the tendency to substitute arbitration; but antedating all other causes, underlying and strengthening all others, is the slowly changing social conscience which, as each generation passes, appreciates more fully warfare's inconsistency with justice and antagonism to right. this same cause found civilized society taking keen delight in the heathen barbarity of a gladiatorial combat, and has transformed and lifted it up to where it is horrified at a bull-baiting or a prize fight. it found human beings with absolute power of life and death over other human beings and has evolved the view that all men are created free and equal. it found individuals settling questions of honor by a resort to arms, and has substituted therefor a judge, counsel, and a jury. these three institutions--gladiatorial combats, slavery, and dueling--were no more regarded in their day as only temporary phenomena of social evolution than is war so regarded by military sympathizers of to-day; yet these have one by one been eliminated, and war is fast becoming as much out of harmony with the ethical spirit of this age as was each of the above out of harmony with the spirit of the age which dispensed with it, and the effort to demonstrate that war is just as dispensable is meeting with success. the teachings of christ, who two thousand years ago announced the doctrine of human brotherhood and surrendered his life to make this doctrine effective, have slowly but surely wrought their leavening influence upon the source of all war; namely, the hearts of men. warfare has for centuries been gradually yielding to this deepening consciousness and that it must eventually, if not soon, take its place beside the long-discarded gladiatorial profession, the outlawed slave trade, and the discountenanced custom of the duelist must be evident to any one who takes more than a superficial view of the great determining forces which shape human progress. besides moral forces, industrial forces were mentioned as a factor tending to the adoption of arbitration. during recent times, under the impetus caused by the relatively modern innovations of steam, electricity, and the press, this class of causes has been unusually effective. industry has overstepped international boundary lines. through the division of labor we are passing from the independence of nations to the interdependence of nations. international banking, transportation, and commerce, by establishing communities of interest in all parts of the world, are binding the peoples of the earth into one great industrial organization. as striking evidence of this development, more than one hundred and fifty international associations[4] and more than thirty-five international unions of states have been formed. the modern intricate system of communication is a veritable nervous system which, in the event of any local paralysis or upheaval, informs the entire industrial organism. the figure is no longer "the shot heard, round the world," but becomes "the pulse-beat felt, round the world." if spencer's definition of patriotism--that is, coextensive with personal interests--is correct, the bias of patriotism cannot retard the progress of arbitration much longer, for patriotism will be a world-wide feeling, since personal interests are no longer restricted to nationality. [4] "annuaire de la vie internationale," 1910-1911, reports on 510.--_editor._ no, herr stengel, each passing year finds the causes which make for war weakened and the causes which make for arbitration proportionately reã«nforced. the skeptics are the dreamers and the peace workers are the practical men of affairs. from the foregoing synopsis of the technical accomplishments of the modern peace movement to date, and from the effort to interpret their significance in the light of fundamental social characteristics and the present social attitude, i trust three things have become evident: _first._ the movement for international peace through arbitration, far from being a mere bubble on the surface of society to be burst by the first war cloud which appears on the horizon, is a movement, centuries old, coincident with social evolution, deep-rooted in the very nature of a developing world-wide civilization. _second._ international peace through arbitration is not to be a ready-made affair, coming in on the crest of some wave of popular enthusiasm as was expected by many in 1899. _third._ being an outgrowth of the natural laws of human development, a result so much deeper and more fundamental than political laws can produce, international peace through arbitration may be furthered, but cannot be accomplished, by legislation; may be delayed, but cannot be prevented, by the neglect to legislate. to undertake to hasten arbitration by forcing legislative proceedings beyond what the people will indorse, would be as futile as to turn up the hands of the clock to hasten the passage of time. to those who can appreciate these facts there is no occasion for discouragement in the suspicious attitude manifested by the powers toward any definite step in the direction of unrestricted arbitration, apparently so inconsistent with their general pacific professions. "rapid growth and quickly accomplished reforms are necessarily unsound, incomplete, and disappointing."[5] [5] f. h. giddings, "the elements of sociology." with the truth of these deductions granted, it would seem safe to assume that the institutions for the settlement of international difficulties will develop in much the same way as have the institutions for the settlement of difficulties between individuals. it should be profitable, therefore, to compare the present growth of arbitration with the evolution and decay of the various modes of trial as the idea of judicial settlement diffused itself through the mind of the english people causing established forms to give way to something better. dispensing with the blood feud, which hardly deserves the name of trial, the oldest form of such institution was trial by ordeal which, according to thayer in his "evidence at the common law," seems to have been "indigenous with the human creature in the earliest stages of his development." this form gradually fell into disuse before the more rational form of compurgation introduced into teutonic courts in the fifth century. in 1215 it was formally abolished. compurgation was abolished in 1440 as its inferiority to trial by witnesses became fully recognized. in the latter form, instituted early in the ninth century, when the witnesses disagreed the judicial talent of the day conceived of no other method of decision than to fight it out. thus we have trial by witnesses and trial by battle developing concurrently, although they were recognized as distinct forms. after two centuries of effort to abolish it, trial by battle was made illegal in 1833, the last case recorded as being so decided occurring in 1835. out of the trial by witnesses has evolved our modern trial by jury, at first limited to certain unimportant cases, then having its sphere extended as its superiority became more evident, until finally it superseded all other forms and to-day is the accepted mode of settling even questions of honor. the growth and extension of international arbitration has not been dissimilar to this. six cases were arbitrated in the eighteenth century, four hundred and seventy-one in the nineteenth, while more than one hundred and fifty cases have been arbitrated during the first thirteen years of the twentieth century. between the first and second hague conferences only four uses were submitted to the permanent court of arbitration. since the second conference, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory disposition of the venezuelan affair, eight cases have been tried, a ninth is pending, a tenth will soon be docketed if the united states is not to act the hypocrite in her international relations by refusing to submit to england's request to arbitrate the question as to whether or no we exempt our coastwise vessels from toll duty through the panama canal. defects have been detected in the permanent court of arbitration and we are well on the way toward a better court. representatives of only twenty-six nations took part in the deliberations of the first hague conference; representatives of forty-four nations took part in the deliberations of the second hague conference. wars of aggression and conquest, though not formally outlawed, are effectively so, and arbitration for the recovery of contract debts is now practically obligatory. as time passes and its feasibility gains credence, arbitration, like the jury trial, will extend its sphere of usefulness until it too settles questions of honor. nor need we imply from this analogy that it will take such an age to accomplish this result. because of the increased mobility of society, resulting from the greater like-mindedness and consciousness of kind incident to our modern communities of interests and systems of communication, and from our greater susceptibility to rational rather than traditional appeals, a reform can be wrought more easily and the people can adjust themselves to the change far more readily than several centuries ago. bearing in mind, then, our attempted analysis of counter social forces at work, our deductions from this analysis and the foregoing analogy the significance of which grows out of the truth of these deductions, let us conclude with a suggestion as to what the next hague conference should attempt. it should, of course, like the former conferences, extract as many teeth as possible from war. as to improving our arbitration facilities, its first task evidently should be to determine some method whereby members of the judicial arbitration court shall be apportioned and selected. if, as has been suggested, it is decided to use the same scheme of apportionment as that for the international court of prize, the provision that each party to a case shall have a representative on the bench should be changed so as to provide that neither party shall have a representative on the bench. if this court is not to be a misnomer like the permanent court of arbitration, its rulings must be in accord with the principles of jurisprudence rather than with the spirit of compromise such a provision would tend to produce. with this accomplished and the judicial court of arbitration put in practical working order "of free and easy access" to the powers, it may be doubted whether anything further can be done. if the powers can be made to agree to submit to the court all cases growing out of the disputed interpretation of treaties, a great advance will have been made, but it is doubtful whether the present state of public opinion would indorse such a progressive step. these international legislators can do no more than provide channels through which the spirit of international peace can exercise itself as it expands, and the judicial court of arbitration, at the optional use of the nations, conforms admirably to this requirement. the delegates should, therefore, avoid the universal tendency of such bodies to legislate too much. none of these hague conferences can alone accomplish the ultimate purpose of the so-called dreamers, but each conference may be a landmark on the upward journey toward that consummation, anticipated by utopians from the earliest times, foretold by prophets from micah and isaiah to robert burns and tennyson, labored for by practical statesmen from hugo grotius to william h. taft, when each man shall be a native of his state and a citizen of the world. authorities for acts and conventions of hague conferences: "texts of the peace conferences" by james brown scott. for data concerning proposed treaty with england: text of treaty and majority and minority reports of senate committee on foreign relations. for statistics of arbitration treaties: "revised list of arbitration treaties," compiled by denys p. myers. for development of trial by jury: "evidence at the common law" by thayer. [illustration: david low dodge] war inconsistent with the religion of jesus christ by david low dodge with an introduction by edwin d. mead published for the international union ginn & company, boston 1905 copyright, 1905, by the international union all rights reserved 55.8 contents page introduction vii war inconsistent with the religion of jesus christ 1 war is inhuman: i. because it hardens the heart and blunts the tender feelings of mankind 2 ii. war is inhuman, as in its nature and tendency it abuses god's animal creation 6 iii. war is inhuman, as it oppresses the poor 8 iv. war is inhuman, as it spreads terror and distress among mankind 12 v. war is inhuman, as it involves men in fatigue, famine, and all the pains of mutilated bodies 14 vi. war is inhuman, as it destroys the youth and cuts off the hope of gray hairs 16 vii. war is inhuman, as it multiplies widows and orphans, and clothes the land in mourning 18 war is unwise: i. because, instead of preventing, it provokes insult and mischief 23 ii. war is unwise, for instead of diminishing, it increases difficulties 26 iii. war is unwise, because it destroys property 28 iv. war is unwise, as it is dangerous to the liberties of men 30 v. war is unwise, as it diminishes the happiness of mankind 34 vi. war is unwise, as it does not mend, but injures, the morals of society 36 vii. war is unwise, as it is hazarding eternal things for only the chance of defending temporal things 42 viii. war is unwise, as it does not answer the professed end for which it is intended 44 war is criminal: i. going to war is not keeping from the appearance of evil, but is running into temptation 47 ii. war is criminal, as it naturally inflames the pride of man 49 iii. war necessarily infringes on the consciences of men, and therefore is criminal 52 iv. war is criminal, as it is opposed to patient suffering under unjust and cruel treatment 56 v. war is criminal, as it is not doing to others as we should wish them to do to us 60 vi. war is inconsistent with mercy, and is therefore criminal 61 vii. war is criminal, as the practice of it is inconsistent with forgiving trespasses as we wish to be forgiven by the final judge 63 viii. engaging in war is not manifesting love to enemies or returning good for evil 64 ix. war is criminal, because it is actually rendering evil for evil 67 x. war is criminal, as it is actually doing evil that good may come; and this is the best apology that can be made for it 71 xi. war is opposed to the example of the son of god, and is therefore criminal 72 objections answered 77 hymn 121 the mediator's kingdom not of this world: but spiritual 123 introduction to david low dodge of new york belongs the high honor of having written the first pamphlets published in america directed expressly against the war system of nations, and of having founded the first peace society ever organized in america or in the world. his first pamphlet, _the mediator's kingdom not of this world_, was published in 1809. his second and more important pamphlet, _war inconsistent with the religion of jesus christ_, was prepared for the press in 1812. this was two years before the publication of noah worcester's _solemn review of the custom of war_, which was issued in boston on christmas day, 1814. early in 1812 mr. dodge and his friends in new york deliberated on the expediency of forming a peace society; but on account of the excitement attending the war with great britain this was postponed until 1815. in august of that year the new york peace society, the first in the world, was organized, with mr. dodge as its president. this was four months before the organization of the massachusetts peace society (december 26, 1815) under the leadership of noah worcester, and nearly a year before the english peace society, the first in europe, was formed (june 14, 1816) in london. the preëminent historical interest attaching to mr. dodge's pioneering work in the peace cause in this country would alone justify and indeed seem to command the republication of his pamphlets at this time, when the great ideas for which he so courageously and prophetically stood are at last winning the general recognition of humane and thoughtful men. but it is not merely historical interest which warrants a revival of attention to these almost forgotten papers. their intrinsic power and worth are such as make their reading, especially that of the second essay, _war inconsistent with the religion of jesus christ_, which stands first in the present volume, edifying and inspiring to-day. marked by few literary graces and cast in a theological mold which the critical thought of the present has in large measure outgrown, there is a force of thought, a moral earnestness, a persevering logic, a common sense, a hatred of inhumanity, a passion for justice, a penetration and a virtue in them, which commends them to the abiding and reverent regard of all who work for the peace and order of the world. among such workers to-day are men of various political philosophies, and perhaps only a small minority are nonresistants of the extreme type of david l. dodge; but to that minority, we cannot fail to remark, belongs the greatest and most influential of all the peace prophets of this time, leo tolstoi. none can read these old essays without being impressed by the fact that their arguments are essentially the same as those of the great russian. there is little indeed of the tolstoian thunder and lightning, the pathos, wrath, and rhetoric, the poetry and prophecy, in these old-fashioned pages; but the doctrine is the same as that of _bethink yourselves!_ and _patriotism versus christianity_. in his central thought and purpose, in his religious trust and reliance upon the christian principle, the new york merchant was a tolstoi a hundred years before his time. david low dodge was born june 14, 1774, in that part of pomfret, connecticut, now called brooklyn. this was the home of israel putnam; and david dodge's father, a farmer and carpenter, was putnam's neighbor and friend,--may well have been near him when in april, 1775, upon hearing of the battle of lexington, he left his plow in the furrow and started to join the forces gathering at cambridge. david dodge's father, grandfather, and great-grandfather each bore the name of david dodge. the great-grandfather was a congregational minister, who was understood to have come from wales,--a learned and wealthy man, who was for a while settled in the vicinity of cape ann in massachusetts. the grandfather, who also received a liberal education, probably in england, came into the possession of his father's estate, for that day a large one, and we are not informed whether he followed any profession or regular business. he was a man fully six feet tall, of great muscular power, and a lover of good horses, on which he spent much time and money. he married ann low, from a wealthy massachusetts family, and settled in beverly, where their sons david and samuel were born, and where the family fortunes became much embarrassed. about 1757 the family removed to pomfret, connecticut, and the boys, whose education at the hands of their mother had been but slight, were apprenticed, david to a carpenter and samuel to a shoemaker. their father, obtaining at this time a commission in the army invading canada, met his death in a bateau which attempted to descend the falls of the oswego and was dashed to pieces on the rocks with the loss of every soul on board. david low dodge's mother, when a girl, was mary stuart, and when she married his father, in 1768, was a widow bearing the name of earl. the young husband hired a small farm, the wife by her industry and economy had furniture sufficient to begin housekeeping, and the little home was founded in which david low dodge's only sister mary was born in 1770. three years later the father hired a more expensive place in the same town, where the boy was born in 1774. "during that year," he writes in his autobiography, "my father became serious, and commenced family prayer. he was educated in the old semi-arminian views of his mother and the halfway covenant. my mother was a rigid calvinist of the whitefield school. neither of them ever made a public profession of religion, but they were careful to observe external ordinances, catechize their children, and give religious instruction. they were honest, industrious, temperate, kind-hearted people, universally respected and esteemed by all who were acquainted with them." such was the atmosphere in which the boy grew up. "the american revolution at this period was convulsing the whole country, drafting and enlisting soldiers. wagons were needed for the army, and by the advice of the putnams, the old general and his son israel, who was about two years younger than my father, he was induced to engage in the manufacture of continental wagons. he hired a convenient place for carpenters and blacksmiths, took several journeymen into the family, and embarked all his earnings in the business." the boy's half-brothers, william and jesse earl, entered the army at the tender ages of fourteen and sixteen, endured battles, sickness, and every privation, and both died towards the close of the war, the event almost wrecking the nervous system of the mother, a woman of acute sensibility. thus early were the horrors of war brought personally home to the boy. he remembered hearing the distant cannonading when new london was burned by the british, and the exclamation of the man beside him, "blood is flowing to-day." "news came the next morning that the forts were stormed, the garrisons put to the sword, new london burnt, and the british were marching upon norwich, and would proceed up into the country. my mother wrung her hands, and asked my father if we had not better pack up some things to secrete them." the boy's education was slight and fragmentary. the summer he was six years old he attended the school of a venerable irish maiden lady about sixty years of age, learning watts' _divine songs_, texts of scripture, and the _shorter catechism_. from the age of seven to fourteen--the family now living on a farm in the neighboring town of hampton--he attended the district school for two terms each winter, having no access to any other books than the primer, spelling book, arithmetic, and bible. "i used often, when not at work in the shop evenings, to retire to the old kitchen fireplace, put my lamp into the oven, and, sitting with my back against it, take my arithmetic, slate, and pencil, and try to cipher a little. i often think how i should have been delighted to have had one fifth part of the advantages enjoyed by most of my descendants." confined to the house for seven weeks a little later as the result of accidents, he turned hungrily to such books as he could secure--dilworth's _arithmetic_, webster's _abridged grammar_, and salmon's _universal english geography_. "this opened a new and astonishing field to me for contemplation. i now obtained the first glimpse of the boundaries of land and water, of the lofty mountains, and of the mighty rivers which had cut their channels through the earth. i read and surveyed the maps and meditated upon them until i began to lecture to my young companions, and was considered quite learned in geography. having an object in view, i began to thirst for knowledge, and succeeded in borrowing in succession _the travels of cyrus_, _xerxes' expedition into greece_, _the history of alexander the great_, and _hannibal's invasion of rome_." he proposed and brought about the formation of a society of young men in the town, for the improvement of minds and manners. there were fourteen young men, with an equal number of young women presently added, each furnishing a useful book as the beginning of a library. "we obtained some of the british classics, such as the _spectator_, _guardian_, etc., with a few histories; the subjects formed a foundation for conversation when we met together." now the young man's ambition turned from farming to school-teaching. he began with district schools, becoming a successful teacher from the start, prosecuting his own studies assiduously in every leisure hour, fired with a desire to improve the schools, which were everywhere as wretched as can well be imagined. for some months in 1795 he left teaching to join other young men in building a bridge at tiverton, rhode island. then he attended the academy at north canterbury, connecticut, under the charge of the eminent teacher, john adams. "this was the only opportunity i ever enjoyed of attending a good school, and this was abridged to fulfill my engagement to teach the town school in mansfield." in 1796 he opened a private school in norwich, adding the next year a morning school for young ladies and an evening school for apprentices and clerks, all of which flourished. during this time he was profoundly interested in religious matters, attending many revivals and becoming more and more concerned with moral and social problems. now, too, he married, his wife being a daughter of aaron cleveland of norwich, a strong character, afterwards a clergyman, "whose name you will find enrolled among the poets of connecticut," and who as early as 1775 published a poem on slavery, which, condemning slavery as wholly antichristian, attracted a good deal of notice. he was the first man in connecticut to arraign slavery publicly. elected to the general assembly from norwich on that issue, he introduced a bill in behalf of emancipation. with health somewhat impaired and with family cares increasing, david dodge now turned from teaching to trade. first it was as a clerk in norwich, then as a partner in a general store, then as head of various dry goods establishments in hartford and other connecticut towns, always and everywhere successful. in 1805 messrs. s. and h. higginson of boston, cousins of his wife, a firm of high standing and large capital, made him a proposition to enter into a copartnership with a view to establishing an extensive importing and jobbing store in the city of new york; and he accepted the proposition, going to new york the next year to take charge of the concern in that city. he took a store in pearl street, and the year afterwards the family took possession of the house connected with the store, still reserving the house in hartford as a retreat in case of yellow fever in new york. from this time until his death, april 23, 1852, new york was, with occasional interruptions, his home and the center of his varied and ever enlarging activities. just before the outbreak of the war with england his partners became bankrupt through losses in extensive shipping of american produce to europe. "bonaparte sprung his trap upon more than a million dollars of their property." mr. dodge now established cotton factories in connecticut, and later commenced anew the dry goods business in new york, his home for years alternating between new york and the norwich neighborhood; and for the nine years following 1835 he occupied a large farm in plainfield, new jersey. active as was his business life, and faithful his devotion to his large business affairs,--and he came to rank with the most prominent mercantile men of his day,--his mind was always intent upon social and religious subjects. "during the years of 1808 to 1811 our business became extensive and demanded much thought and attention; yet i think my affections were on the subject of religion." revivals of religion, the interests of his church in norwich or new york, the improvement of the lives of his factory operatives, the organization in new york of the christian friendly society for the promotion of morals and religion,--such were the objects which commanded him. throughout his long residence in new york he was a prominent worker in the presbyterian church, for many years an elder in the church. he took a leading part in organizing the new york bible society and the new york tract society, was much engaged in the early missionary movements in new york, and in promoting the education of young men for the ministry. he was a lover of knowledge, a great reader, and one who thought and wrote as he read. deeply interested in history, ancient and modern, his chief interest was in theological discussion. he was familiar with the chief theological controversies of the day, and upon many of them committed his views to writing. his knowledge of the bible was remarkable; he read it through critically in course forty-two times. he held firmly the calvinistic system of doctrine, and he addressed to his children a series of letters, characterized by great ability and logical force, in defense of the faith, and constituting together a compendious system of theology. several of these letters are included in the memorial volume published for the family in 1854 under the editorial supervision of rev. matson m. smith. this volume contains, besides the two essays on war here reprinted, and various verses and letters, the interesting autobiography which he prepared, at the request of his children, a few years before his death, and a supplementary biographical sketch by his pastor, rev. asa d. smith. in the mass of manuscripts which he left behind was an essay upon "the relation of the church to the world," and one upon "retributive judgment and capital punishment,"--to which he was sharply opposed. he was opposed indeed to so much in human governments as now constituted,--"whose ultimate reliance," he said, "is the sword," and whose laws he felt to be so often contrary to the laws of christ to which he gave his sole allegiance,--that he would neither vote nor hold office. strict and inflexible as he was in his views of political and religious duty, he was one of the most genial and delightful of men, a christian in whom there was no guile, fond of the young, affectionate, courteous, "given to hospitality," "careful habitually to make even the conventionalities of life a fitting accompaniment and expression of the inward principle of kindness." a face as strong as it is gentle, and as gentle as it is strong, is that which looks at us in the beautiful portrait preserved in the family treasures, and a copy of which forms the frontispiece of the present volume. the character and influence of the family which he founded in new york, during the three generations which have followed, constitute an impressive witness to david dodge's force and worth, his religious consecration, and high public spirit. at the junction of broadway and sixth avenue stands the statue of his son, william earl dodge, whose life of almost fourscore years ended in 1883. for long years the head of the great house of phelps, dodge & co., the manager of immense railway, lumber, and mining interests, the president of the new york chamber of commerce, a representative of new york in congress, a leader in large work for temperance, for the freedmen, for the indians, for theological education, for a score of high patriotic and philanthropic interests, new york had in his time no more representative, more useful, or more honored citizen. and what is said of him may be said in almost the same words of william earl dodge, his son, who died but yesterday, and who combined broad business and philanthropic activities in the same strong and influential way as his father and grandfather before him. president of many religious and benevolent associations, he was pre-eminently a patriot and an international man. the logic of his life and of his heritage placed him naturally at the head of the national arbitration committee, which was appointed at the great conference on international arbitration held at washington in the spring of 1896, following the anxiety attendant upon president cleveland's venezuelan message,--a committee which, under his chairmanship, and since his death that of hon. john w. foster, has during the decade rendered such great service to the peace and arbitration cause in this country. it is to be noted also that the names of his son and daughter, cleveland h. dodge and grace h. dodge, names so conspicuously associated to-day with charitable, religious, and educational efforts in new york, are associated, too, like his with the commanding cause of the world's peace and better organization; both names stand upon the american committee of the thirteenth international peace congress, which met in boston in 1904. thus have the generations which have followed him well learned and strongly emphasized the lesson taught by david dodge almost a century ago, that war is "inhuman, unwise, and criminal," and "inconsistent with the religion of jesus christ." it was in 1805 that a startling personal experience prompted the train of thought which soon and forever made david l. dodge the advocate of the thorough-going peace principles with which his name is chiefly identified, and led him to condemn all violence, even in self-defense, in dealings between men, as between nations. accustomed to carry pistols when traveling with large sums of money, he was almost led to shoot his landlord in a tavern at providence, rhode island, who by some blunder had come into his room at night and suddenly waked him. the thought of what his situation and feelings would have been had he taken the man's life shocked him into most searching thinking. for two or three years his mind dwelt on the question. he turned to the teaching and example of christ, and became persuaded that these were inconsistent with violence and the carrying of deadly weapons, and with war. the common churchman sanctioned such things, but not the early christians; and he found strong words condemning war in luther and erasmus, the moravians and quakers. discussing the matter with many pious and christian men, he found them generally avoiding the gospel standard. he was shocked by the "general want of faith in the promises"; but he himself laid aside at once his pistols and the fear of robbers. he became absolutely convinced that fighting and warfare were "unlawful for the followers of christ"; and from now on he began to bear public testimony against the war spirit. early in the spring of 1809 he published his essay, _the mediator's kingdom not of this world_, which attracted so much attention that in two weeks nearly a thousand copies were sold. three literary men joined in preparing a spirited and sarcastic criticism of it; and he immediately published a rejoinder. _the mediator's kingdom_ was republished in philadelphia and in providence, and mr. dodge writes truly: "these publications gave the first impulse in america, if we except the uniform influence of the friends, to inquiry into the lawfulness of war by christians. some who were favorable to the doctrines of peace judged that, with a bold hand, i had carried the subject too far; and doubtless, as it was new and had not been much discussed, i wrote too unguardedly, not sufficiently defining my terms. the rev. dr. noah worcester was one who so judged, and a few years after he published his very spirited and able essay, _the solemn review of war_." this famous essay of worcester's represents the platform of the great body of american peace workers for a century, the position of men like channing and ladd and jay and sumner; but to a nonresistant and opponent even of self-defense, like david dodge, these seemed the exponents of a halfway covenant. mr. dodge entered into private correspondence on the lawfulness of war with rev. lyman beecher, rev. aaron cleveland, his father-in-law, rev. john b. romeyn, and rev. walter king. he preserved among his manuscripts letters of twenty-five pages from dr. romeyn and mr. cleveland, and copies of his reply to dr. romeyn (one hundred and thirty-two pages) and to dr. beecher (forty-four pages). important letters from dr. beecher and governor jay he had lost. all these took the position of dr. worcester, sanctioning strictly defensive war in extreme cases,--all except mr. cleveland, who finally came into complete accord with mr. dodge, and published two able sermons on "the life of man inviolable by the laws of christ." early in 1812 the friends of peace whom mr. dodge had gathered about him in new york conferred upon the forming of a peace society, "wholly confined to decided evangelical christians, with a view to diffusing peace principles in the churches, avoiding all party questions." there being at this juncture, however, intense political feeling over the threatened war with great britain, they feared their motives would be misapprehended, and decided for the moment simply to act individually in diffusing information. mr. dodge was appointed to prepare an essay on the subject of war, stating and answering objections; and, removing at this time to norwich, he there, in a period of great business perplexity, completed his remarkable paper on "war inconsistent with the christian religion," which was published in the very midst of the war with england. upon his return to new york, the friends of peace there had two or three meetings relative to the organization of a society; and in august, 1815, they formed the new york peace society, of between thirty and forty members, their strict articles of association condemning all war, offensive and defensive, as wholly opposed to the example and spirit and precepts of christ. the peace societies formed immediately afterwards in massachusetts, ohio, rhode island, and london were organized, according to mr. dodge, without any knowledge of each other, the movements being the simultaneous separate results of a common impulse. of the new york society mr. dodge was unanimously elected president. monthly meetings were arranged, and at the first of these mr. dodge read an address upon "the kingdom of peace under the benign reign of messiah," of which a thousand copies were at once printed and circulated. within two years the society had increased to sixty members, men active not only against war--which the society regarded as "the greatest temporal evil, as almost every immorality is generated in its prosecution, and poverty, distress, famine, and pestilence follow in its train"--but in all the benevolent enterprises of that day. "several respectable clergymen united with the society,--rev. drs. e. d. griffin and m. l. parvine, rev. e. w. baldwin (to whose pen we were much indebted), rev. samuel whelpley, and his son, rev. melancthon whelpley, rev. h. g. ufford, and rev. s. h. cox. dr. cox, however, afterwards entertained different views on the subject." the new york peace society had friendly correspondence with all the other peace societies, and for several years took two hundred copies of dr. worcester's _friend of peace_. this seems finally to have contributed to divide the society, some relinquishing the nonresistant views of mr. dodge and adopting worcester's less extreme position. but our brave tolstoian was a "thorough," and never wavered. "if it was morally wrong for individuals to quarrel and fight, instead of returning good for evil,"--these are his last words on the subject in his autobiography,--"it was much more criminal for communities and nations to return evil for evil, and not strive to overcome evil with good. in fact, the great barrier to our progress was the example of our fathers in the american revolution. that they were generally true patriots, in the political sense of the term, and many hopefully pious, i would not call in question, while i consider them as ill directed by education as st. paul was when on his way to damascus." the new york peace society maintained its existence and work for many years. in 1828 it united with other societies in the creation of the american peace society, which was organized in new york on may 8 of that year on the initiative of william ladd. after this the new york society seems to have done little separate work, and finally its independent existence ceased. mr. dodge assisted in the organization of the new national society, and presided at its first annual meeting, may 13, 1829. he was chosen a member of its board of directors, and later became a life director, maintaining his connection with the society until his death in 1852, faithful to the end to the radical views by which he had become so powerfully possessed almost half a century before. for two generations new york has been without a local peace society. the services of eminent individual citizens of the city and state of new york for the peace cause during that period, however, have been signal. judge william jay of new york was for a decade president of the american peace society,--the important decade covering the great peace congresses in europe at the middle of the last century; and it was his proposal that an arbitration clause should be attached to all future commercial treaties which furnished the basis for the most constructive debates of the first congress, that at london in 1843. the three really important members of the american delegation at the hague conference were citizens of new york,--andrew d. white, seth low, and frederick w. holls. a remarkable plan adopted by the new york state bar association suggested important features of the hague court as finally constituted. it is a citizen of new york, andrew carnegie, who has given $1,500,000 for a worthy building for the court at the hague,--a temple of peace. mr. carnegie, whose influence in behalf of international fraternity is perhaps second to that of no other to-day, has also given $5,000,000 to establish a pension fund for "heroes of peace," whose heroism, too long comparatively neglected, he rightly sees to be not less than the heroism of the soldier. the most important series of arbitration conferences in recent times have been those at lake mohonk, in the state of new york, arranged by albert k. smiley,--conferences of growing size and importance, commanding world-wide attention, and performing for this country almost the same service performed for france and england by their national peace congresses. finally, it must not be forgotten that theodore roosevelt, the president of the united states, through whose initiative the second hague conference will presently meet, is also a citizen of new york. at this very time a promising movement is gaining head to organize once more in david dodge's city a new york peace society. at one of the recent mohonk conferences a large committee of new york men, under the chairmanship of mr. warner van norden, was formed for conference with this end in view. upon the american committee of the international peace congress which met in boston in 1904 were no less than sixteen residents of the city of new york,--andrew carnegie, hon. oscar s. straus, hon. george f. seward, walter s. logan, felix adler, william d. howells, mrs. charles russell lowell, mrs. anna garlin spencer, miss grace h. dodge, rev. josiah strong, rev. charles e. jefferson, cleveland h. dodge, george foster peabody, professor john b. clark, leander t. chamberlain, and j. g. phelps stokes. in the week following the boston congress a series of great peace meetings was held in new york, at the cooper union and elsewhere, arranged by members of this committee; and out of all this a new impulse has come to plans for local organization in new york. as one result a strong society was formed by the germans of the city, and a large women's peace circle has since been organized and begun important educational work. the larger new york peace society is now certainly a thing of the near future. to the men and women who will constitute that society, the noble body of those now working in their various ways in the great city for the cause of peace, is dedicated especially this republication of the old essays of david dodge, the founder of the first peace society in the world, who by his pioneering and prophetic service gave to new york a place so significant in the history of what is to-day the world's most commanding cause. september, 1905 edwin d. mead war inconsistent with the religion of jesus christ humanity, wisdom, and goodness at once combine all that can be great and lovely in man. inhumanity, folly, and wickedness reverse the picture, and at once represent all that can be odious and hateful. the former is the spirit of heaven, and the latter the offspring of hell. the spirit of the gospel not only breathes "glory to god in the highest, but on earth peace, and good will to men." the wisdom from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated; but the wisdom from beneath is earthly, sensual, and devilish. it is exceedingly strange that any one under the light of the gospel, professing to be guided by its blessed precepts, with the bible in his hand, while the whole creation around him is so often groaning under the weight and terrors of war, should have doubts whether any kind of wars under the gospel dispensation, except spiritual warfare, can be the dictate of any kind of wisdom except that from beneath; and much more so, to believe that they are the fruit of the divine spirit, which is love, joy, and peace. an inspired apostle has informed us from whence come wars and fightings. they come from the lusts of men that war in their members. ever since the fall, mankind have had naturally within them a spirit of pride, avarice, and revenge. the gospel is directly opposed to this spirit. it teaches humility, it inculcates love, it breathes pity and forgiveness even to enemies, and forbids rendering evil for evil to any man. believing as i do, after much reflection and, as i trust, prayerful investigation of the subject, that all kinds of carnal warfare are unlawful upon gospel principles, i shall now endeavor to prove that war is inhuman, unwise, and criminal, and then make some general remarks, and state and answer several objections. in attempting to do this i shall not always confine myself strictly to this order of the subject, but shall occasionally make such remarks as may occur, directly or indirectly, to show that the whole genius of war is contrary to the spirit and precepts of the gospel. war is inhuman i. because it hardens the heart and blunts the tender feelings of mankind that it is the duty of mankind to be tender-hearted, feeling for the distress of others, and to do all in their power to prevent and alleviate their misery, is evident not only from the example of the son of god but the precepts of the gospel. when the saviour of sinners visited this dark and cruel world he became a man of sorrow and was acquainted with grief, so that he was touched with the feeling of our infirmities. he went about continually healing the sick, opening the eyes of the blind, unstopping the ears of the deaf, raising the dead, as well as preaching the gospel of peace to the poor. he visited the houses of affliction and poured the balm of consolation into the wounded heart. he mourned with those who mourned, and wept with those that wept. love to god and man flowed from his soul pure as the river of life, refreshing the thirsty desert around him. he was not only affectionate to his friends but kind to his enemies. he returned love for their hatred, and blessing for their cursing. when he was surrounded by all the powers of darkness and resigned himself into the hands of sinners to expiate their guilt, and they smote him on the cheek and plucked off the hair, he "was dumb and opened not his mouth." while suffering all the contempt and torture which men and devils could invent, instead of returning evil for evil he prayed for his murderers and apologized for his persecutors, saying, "father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." the apostle exhorts christians, saying, "be ye kind and tender-hearted, forgiving one another, even as god for christ's sake hath forgiven you." authority in abundance might be quoted to show that the spirit of the gospel absolutely requires the exercise of love, pity, and forgiveness, even to enemies. but who will undertake to prove that soldiers are usually kind and tender-hearted, and that their employment has a natural tendency to promote active benevolence, while it requires all their study of mind and strength of body to injure their enemies to the greatest extent? though we often hear of the generosity and attention of soldiers to prisoners, and notwithstanding i am willing to allow that feelings of humanity are not altogether obliterated from every soldier, yet much of this apparent kindness may flow from a desire of better treatment themselves should circumstances be reversed, or from a hope of the applause of mankind. my object, however, is not to prove that all soldiers are destitute of humanity, but that their occupation has a natural tendency and actually does weaken their kind and tender feelings, and harden their hearts. is it not a fact that those who are engaged in the spirit of war, either in the council or in the field, are not usually so meek, lowly, kind, and tender-hearted as other men? does the soldier usually become kind and tender-hearted while trained to the art of killing his fellow-man, or more so when engaged in the heat of the battle, stepping forward over the wounded and hearing the groans of the expiring? does he actually put on bowels of tenderness, mercy, and forgiveness, while he bathes his sword in the blood of his brother? do these scenes generally change the lion into the lamb? on the contrary, do not the history of ages and the voice of millions bear testimony that the whole trade of war has a natural tendency to blunt the tender edge of mercy and chill all the sympathizing feelings of the human heart? who that is a parent, having an uncommonly hard-hearted and unfeeling son, would send him into the camp to subdue his inhumanity and to stamp upon him kind and tender feelings? if war has not a natural tendency to harden the heart, permit me to inquire why mankind do not usually feel as much at the distress occasioned by war as by other calamities? it would be truly astonishing, were it not so common, to see with what composure the generality of mankind hear the account of barbarous and destructive battles. they may have some little excitement when they hear of savages--whose religion teaches them revenge--using the tomahawk and scalping knife; but when thousands are torn to pieces with shot and shells and butchered with polished steels, then it becomes a very polite and civil business, and those who perish are contemplated as only reclining on a bed of honor. if an individual in common life breaks a bone or fractures a limb, all around him not only sympathize but are ready to aid in alleviating his distress; but when thousands are slain and ten thousand wounded in the field of battle, the shock is but trifling, and the feelings are soon lost in admiring the gallantry of this hero and the prowess of that veteran. and why all this sensibility at the pains of an individual, and all this indifference at the sufferings of thousands, if war has not a natural tendency to harden the heart and destroy the tender feelings of mankind? it is a fact, however, so notorious that the spirit and practice of war do actually harden the heart and chill the kind and tender feelings of mankind, that i think few will be found to deny it, and none who have ever known or felt the spirit of christ. the spirit of war must be very unlike the spirit of the gospel, for the gospel enforces no duty the practice of which has a natural tendency to harden men's hearts, but in proportion as they are influenced by its spirit and actuated by its principles they will be humane; therefore, if war hardens men's hearts it is not a christian duty, and of course it cannot be right for christians to engage in it. ii. war is inhuman, as in its nature and tendency it abuses god's animal creation when god at first created man, he gave him authority over the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, and the fishes of the deep. after he had swept away the old ungodly world of mankind for their violence with all the animal creation, except those in the ark, he was pleased to renew to noah the same privilege of being lord over the animal world. it may not perhaps be improper here to digress a little and remark that this appears to have been the original bounds of man's authority,--that of having dominion only over the animal world and not over his fellow-man. it appears that god reserved to himself the government of man, whom he originally created in his own image; from which it may be inferred that man has no lawful authority for governing his fellow-man except as the special executor of divine command, and that no government can be morally right except that which acknowledges and looks up to god as the supreme head and governor. but to return: although the animal world is put under the dominion of man for his use, yet he has no authority to exercise cruelty towards it. "for the merciful man regardeth the life of his beast." god is very merciful to his creatures; he not only hears the young ravens when they cry but he opens his hand and supplies the wants of the cattle upon a thousand hills. though god has decorated the earth with beauty and richly clothed it with food for man and beast, yet where an all-devouring army passes, notwithstanding the earth before them is like the garden of eden, it is behind them a desolate wilderness; the lowing ox and bleating sheep may cry for food, but, alas! the destroyer hath destroyed it. the noble horse, which god has made for the use and pleasure of man, shares largely in this desolating evil. he is often taken, without his customary food, to run with an express, until, exhausted by fatigue, he falls lifeless beneath his rider. multitudes of them are chained to the harness with scanty food, and goaded forward to drag the baggage of an army and the thundering engines of death, until their strength has failed, their breath exhausted, and the kindness they then receive is the lash of the whip or the point of a spear. in such scenes the comfort of beasts is not thought of, except by a selfish owner who fears the loss of his property. but all this is trifling compared with what these noble animals, who tamely bow to the yoke of man, suffer in the charge of the battle; the horse rushes into the combat not knowing that torture and death are before him. his sides are often perforated with the spur of his rider, notwithstanding he exerts all his strength to rush into the heat of the battle, while the strokes of the sabers and the wounds of the bullets lacerate his body, and instead of having god's pure air to breathe to alleviate his pains, he can only snuff up the dust of his feet and the sulphurous smoke of the cannon, emblem of the infernal abode. thus he has no ease for his pains unless god commissions the bayonet or the bullet to take away his life. but if such is the cruelty to beasts in prosecuting war, what is the cruelty to man, born for immortality? no wonder that those who feel so little for their fellow-men should feel less for beasts. if war is an inhuman and cruel employment, it must be wrong for christians to engage in it. iii. war is inhuman, as it oppresses the poor to oppress the poor is everywhere in the scriptures considered as a great sin: "for the oppression of the poor, for the sighing of the needy, now will i arise, saith the lord"; "whoso stoppeth his ears at the cry of the poor, he also shall cry himself and not be heard"; "what mean ye that ye beat my people to pieces, and grind the faces of the poor? saith the lord god of hosts." the threatenings against those who oppress the poor, and the blessings pronounced upon those who plead their cause, are very numerous in the scriptures. the threatenings are so tremendous and awful that all men ought to consider well before they are active in any step which has a natural tendency to oppress the poor and needy. that war actually does oppress the poor may be heard from ten thousand wretched tongues who have felt its woe. very few, comparatively, who are instigators of war actually take the field of battle, and are seldom seen in the front of the fire. it is usually those who are rioting on the labors of the poor that fan up the flame of war. the great mass of soldiers are generally from the poor of a country. they must gird on the harness and for a few cents per day endure all the hardships of a camp and be led forward like sheep to the slaughter. though multitudes are fascinated to enlist by the intoxicating cup, the glitter of arms, the vainglory of heroes, and the empty sound of patriotism, yet many more are called away contrary to their wishes by the iron hand of despotic laws. perhaps a parent is enrolled whose daily labor was hardly sufficient to supply a scanty pittance for a numerous offspring, who are in his absence crying for bread. and why all this sorrow in this poor and needy family? because the husband and father is gone, and probably gone forever, most likely to gratify the wishes of some ambitious men who care as little as they think of his anxious family. perhaps an only son is taken from old, decrepit parents, the only earthly prop of their declining years; and with cold poverty and sorrow their gray hairs are brought down to the dust. war cannot be prosecuted without enormous expenses. the money that has been expended the last twenty years in war would doubtless have been sufficient not only to have rendered every poor person on earth comfortable--so far as money could do it--during the same period, but, if the residue had been applied to cultivate the earth, it would have literally turned the desert into a fruitful field. only the interest of the money that has been expended in a few years by the european nations in prosecuting war would have been sufficient, under proper direction, to educate every poor child on earth in the common rudiments of learning, and to support missionaries in abundance to convey the gospel of peace to every creature. what a noble employment if those nations had exerted their powers for these objects as much as they have for injuring each other! and what a difference would have appeared in the world! blessings would have fallen on millions ready to perish, instead of desolation, terror, and death. the vast expenses of war must be met by corresponding taxes, whether by duties on merchandise or direct taxes on real estate; yet they fall most heavily on the poor. whatever duty the merchant pays to the customhouse, he adds the amount to the price of his goods, so that the consumer actually pays the tax. if a tax is levied on real estate, the product of that estate is raised to meet it, and whoever consumes the product pays the tax. in times of war the prices of the necessaries of life are generally very much increased, but the prices of the labor of the poor do not usually rise in the same proportion, therefore it falls very heavily on them. when the honest laborers are suddenly called from the plow to take the sword and leave the tilling of the ground, either its seed is but sparingly sown or its fruit but partially gathered, scarcity ensues, high prices are the consequence, and the difficulty greatly increased for the poor to obtain the necessaries of life, especially if they were dependent on the product of a scanty farm which they are now deprived of cultivating. many a poor widow, who has been able in times of peace to support her fatherless children, has been obliged in times of war in a great measure to depend on the cold hand of charity to supply their wants. the calamities of war necessarily fall more on the poor than on the rich, because the poor of a country are generally a large majority of its inhabitants. these are some of the evils of war at a distance, but when it comes to their doors, if they are favored personally to escape the ferocity of the soldiers, they fly from their habitations, leaving their little all to the fire and pillage, glad to escape with their lives, though destitute and dependent; and when they cast round their eyes for relief, they only meet a fellow-sufferer, who can sympathize with them but not supply their wants. thus does war not only oppress the poor but adds multitudes to their number who before were comfortable. if war actually does oppress the poor, then we may infer that in its nature and tendency it is very unlike the genius of the gospel, and not right for christians to engage in it. iv. war is inhuman, as it spreads terror and distress among mankind in the benign reign of messiah the earth will be filled with the abundance of peace; there will be nothing to hurt or destroy; every one will sit quietly under his own vine and fig tree, having nothing to molest or make him afraid. but in times of war, mankind are usually full of anxiety, their hearts failing them for fear, looking for those things which are coming upon our wicked world. one of the most delightful scenes on earth is a happy family where all the members dwell together in love, being influenced by the blessed precepts of the gospel of peace. but how soon does the sound of war disturb and distress the happy circle! if it is only the distant thunder of the cannon that salutes the ear, the mother starts from her repose, and all the children gather round her with looks full of anxiety to know the cause. few women can so command their feelings as to hide the cause; and let it be said to the honor of the female sex that they have generally tender feelings, which cannot easily be disguised at the distress of their fellow-beings. perhaps a mother's heart is now wrung with anguish in the prospect that either the partner of her life or the sons of her care and sorrow, or both, are about to be called into the bloody field of battle. perhaps the decrepit parent views his darling son leaving his peaceful abode to enter the ensanguined field, never more to return. how soon are these joyful little circles turned into mourning and sorrow! who can describe the distress of a happy village suddenly encompassed by two contending armies--perhaps so early and suddenly that its inhabitants are aroused from their peaceful slumbers by the confused noise of the warriors more ferocious than the beasts that prowl in the forest? were it not for the tumult of the battle, shrieks of distress from innocent women and children might be heard from almost every abode. children run to the arms of their distracted mothers, who are as unable to find a refuge for themselves as for their offspring. if they fly to the streets they are in the midst of death: hundreds of cannon are vomiting destruction in every quarter; the hoofs of horses trampling down everything in their way; bullets, stones, bricks, and splinters flying in every direction; houses pierced with cannon shot and shells which carry desolation in their course; without, multitudes of men rushing with deadly weapons upon each other with all the rage of tigers, plunging each other into eternity, until the streets are literally drenched with the blood of men. to increase the distress, the village is taken and retaken several times at the point of the bayonet. if the inhabitants fly to their cellars to escape the fury of the storm, their buildings may soon be wrapt in flames over their heads. and for what, it may be asked, is all this inhuman sacrifice made? probably to gain the empty bubble called honor,--a standard of right and wrong without form or dimensions. let no one say that the writer's imagination is heated while it is not in the power of his feeble pen to half describe the horror and distress of the scenes which are by no means uncommon in a state of war. if such are some of the effects of war, then it must be a very inhuman employment, and wrong for christians to engage in it. v. war is inhuman, as it involves men in fatigue, famine, and all the pains of mutilated bodies to describe the fatigues and hardships of a soldier's life would require the experience of a soldier, so that only some of their common sufferings can be touched upon by a person who is a stranger to the miseries of a camp. a great majority of those who enter the ranks of an army are persons unaccustomed to great privations and severe fatigues; hence the great proportion of mortality among fresh recruits. their habits and strength are unable to endure the hard fare, rapid and constant marches generally imposed upon them in active service. the young soldier commonly exchanges a wholesome table, a comfortable dwelling, an easy bed, for bad food, the field for his house, the cold earth for his bed, and the heavens over him for his covering. he must stand at his post day and night, summer and winter; face the scorching sun, the chilling tempest, and be exposed to all the storms of the season, without any comfortable repose; perhaps during most of the time with a scanty allowance of the coarsest food, and often destitute of any, except the miserable supply he may have chance to plunder,--not enough to satisfy but only to keep alive the craving demands of nature; often compelled to march and countermarch several days and nights in succession, without a moment to prepare his provisions to nourish him and glad to get a little raw to sustain his life. frequently this hardship is endured in the cold and inclement season, while his tattered clothing is only the remains of his summer dress. barefooted and half naked, fatigued and chilled, he becomes a prey to disease, and is often left to perish without a human being to administer to him the least comfort. if he is carried to a hospital, he is there surrounded by the pestilential breath of hundreds of his poor fellow-sufferers, where the best comforts that can be afforded are but scanty and dismal. but all this is comparatively trifling to the sufferings of the wounded on the field of battle. there thousands of mangled bodies lie on the cold ground hours, and sometimes days, without a friendly hand to bind up a wound; not a voice is heard except the dying groans of their fellow-sufferers around them. no one can describe the horrors of the scene: here lies one with a fractured skull, there another with a severed limb, and a third with a lacerated body; some fainting with the loss of blood, others distracted, and others again crying for help. if such are some of the faint outlines of the fatigues and sufferings of soldiers, then their occupation must be an inhuman employment, for they are instrumental in bringing the same calamities on others which they suffer themselves; and of course it is unfriendly to the spirit of the gospel, and wrong for christians to engage in it. vi. war is inhuman, as it destroys the youth and cuts off the hope of gray hairs mankind are speedily hastening into eternity, and it might be supposed sufficiently fast without the aid of all the ingenuity and strength of man to hurry them forward; yet it is a melancholy truth that a great proportion of the wealth, talents, and labors of men are actually employed in inventing and using means for the premature destruction of their fellow-beings. one generation passes away, and another follows in quick succession. the young are always the stay and hope of the aged; parents labor and toil for their children to supply their wants and to educate them to be happy, respectable, and useful, and then depend upon them to be their stay and comfort in their declining years. alas, how many expectations of fond parents are blasted! their sons are taken away from them and hurried into the field of slaughter. in times of war the youth--the flower, strength, and beauty of the country--are called from their sober, honest, and useful employments, to the field of battle; and if they do not lose their lives or limbs, they generally lose their habits of morality and industry. alas! few ever return again to the bosom of their friends. though from their mistaken and fascinating views of a soldier's life and honor they may be delighted in enlisting, and merry in their departure from their peaceful homes, yet their joy is soon turned into pain and sorrow. unthinking youth, like the horse, rushes thoughtlessly into the battle. repentance is then too late; to shrink back is death, and to go forward is only a faint hope of life. here on the dreadful field are thousands and hundreds of thousands driven together to slaughter each other by a few ambitious men, perhaps none of whom are present. a large proportion are probably the youth of their country, the delight and comfort of their parents. all these opposing numbers are most likely persons who never knew or heard of each other, having no personal ill-will, most of whom would in any other circumstances not only not injure each other but be ready to aid in any kind office; yet by the act of war they are ranged against each other in all the hellish rage of revenge and slaughter. no pen, much less that of the writer's, can describe the inhumanity and horrors of a battle. all is confusion and dismay, dust and smoke arising, horses running, trumpets blasting, cannon roaring, bullets whistling, and the shrieks of the wounded and dying vibrating from every quarter. column after column of men charge upon each other in furious onset, with the awful crash of bayonets and sabers, with eyes flashing and visages frightfully distorted with rage, rushing upon each other with the violence of brutish monsters; and when these are literally cut to pieces others march in quick succession, only to share the same cruel and bloody tragedy. hundreds are parrying the blows; hundreds more are thrusting their bayonets into the bowels of their fellow-mortals, and many, while extricating them, have their own heads cleft asunder by swords and sabers; and all are hurried together before the tribunal of their judge, with hearts full of rage and hands dyed in the blood of their brethren. o horrid and debasing scene! my heart melts at the contemplation, and i forbear to dwell upon the inhuman employment. vii. war is inhuman, as it multiplies widows and orphans, and clothes the land in mourning the widow and fatherless are special objects of divine compassion, and christianity binds men under the strongest obligation to be kind and merciful towards them, as their situation is peculiarly tender and afflicting. "a father of the fatherless, and a judge of the widow, is god in his holy habitation." "pure religion and undefiled before god and the father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction." to be active in any measure which has a natural tendency to wantonly multiply widows and orphans in a land is the height of inhumanity as well as daring impiety. i will venture to say that no one circumstance in our world has so greatly multiplied widows and fatherless children as that of war. what has humanity ever gained by war to counterbalance simply the afflictions of the widow and fatherless? i verily believe nothing comparatively. i am well aware that a very popular plea for war is to defend, as it is styled, "our firesides, our wives and children"; but this generally is only a specious address to the feelings, to rouse up a martial spirit which makes thousands of women and children wretched where one is made happy. i am sensible that those will sneer at my opinion who regard more the honor that comes from men than they do the consolation of the widow and the fatherless. in times of war thousands of virtuous women are deprived of their husbands and ten thousands of helpless children of their fathers. the little tender children may now gather round their disconsolate mothers, anxiously inquiring about their fathers, remembering their kind visages, recollecting how they used fondly to dandle them on their knees and affectionately instruct them; but now they are torn from their embraces by the cruelty of war, and they have no fathers left them but their father in heaven. it is probably no exaggeration to suppose that in europe there are now two hundred thousand widows and a million fatherless children occasioned by war. what a mass of affliction! humanity bleeds at the thought! these children must now roam about without a father to provide for, protect, or instruct them. they now become an easy prey to all kinds of vice; many probably will be trained up for ignominious death, and most of them fit only for a soldier's life, to slaughter and to be slaughtered, unless some humane hand kindly takes them under its protection. and here i cannot help admiring the spirit of christianity. it is owing to the blessed spirit and temper of the gospel of peace that many of the evils of war are so much ameliorated at the present day as well as the inhuman slavery of men. the numerous asylums that now exist for the relief of the needy, the widow, and the fatherless are some of the precious fruits of christianity; and if this spirit were universal the bow would soon be broken to pieces, the spear cut asunder, and the chariots of war burnt with fire, and wars would cease to the ends of the earth. and is it not the duty of all who name the name of christ to do all in their power to counteract this destroying evil? war not only multiplies widows and orphans but clothes the land in mourning. in times of war multitudes of people are clothed with ensigns of mourning. here are gray-headed parents shrouded in blackness, weeping for the loss of darling sons; there are widows covered with veils mourning the loss of husbands, and refusing to be comforted; children crying because their fathers are no more. cities and villages are covered in darkness and desolation; weeping and mourning arise from almost every abode. and it may be asked, what inhuman hand is the cause of all this sorrow? perhaps some rash man, in the impetuosity of his spirit, has taken some unjust, high ground, and is too proud to retrace a step, and had rather see millions wretched than to nobly confess that he had been in the wrong. surely christians cannot be active in such measures without incurring the displeasure of god, who styles himself the father of the fatherless and the judge and avenger of the widow. thus i have shown that war is inhuman and therefore wholly inconsistent with christianity, by proving that it tends to destroy humane dispositions; that it hardens the hearts and blunts the tender feelings of men; that it involves the abuse of god's animal creation; that it oppresses the poor; that it spreads terror and distress among mankind; that it subjects soldiers to cruel privations and sufferings; that it destroys the youth and cuts off the hope of the aged; and that it multiplies widows and orphans and occasions mourning and sorrow. the fact that war is inhuman is indeed one of those obvious truths which it is difficult to render more plain by argument; those who know in what war consists cannot help knowing that it is inhuman. what mr. windham said with reference to the inhumanity of slavery may be said of the inhumanity of war. in one of his speeches in the house of commons against the slave trade he stated his difficulty in arguing against such a trade to be of that kind which is felt in arguing in favor of a self-evident proposition. "if it were denied that two and two made four, it would not be a very easy task," he said, "to find arguments to support the affirmative side of the question. precisely similar was his embarrassment in having to prove that the slave trade was unjust and inhuman." whoever admits that the slave trade is inhuman must admit that war is inhuman in a greater variety of ways and on a much larger scale. the inhumanity of the slave trade was the great and, finally, triumphant argument by which it was proved to be inconsistent with christianity. the advocates of slavery, like the advocates of war, resorted to the old testament for support; but it appeared that slavery, as it appears that war, was permitted and approved of for reasons and on principles peculiar to the ancient economy. this is apparent as well from the difference between the general design of the old and new dispensations as from the whole genius and spirit of the gospel. hence those who opposed the slave trade argued from the general nature and spirit of christianity as the strongest ground which could be taken. if slavery was inconsistent with this, it ought not to be tolerated; but slavery is inhuman and is therefore inconsistent with christianity. exactly the same is true of war, nor can anything short of an express revelation from god, commanding war or slavery, render either of them justifiable. it deserves to be distinctly considered that the gospel contains little or nothing directly by way of precept against slavery; but slavery is inconsistent with its general requirements and inculcations and is therefore wrong. but war, besides being inconsistent with the genius and spirit of the gospel, is prohibited by those precepts which forbid retaliation and revenge and those which require forgiveness and good will. it is plain, then, that he who does not advocate and defend the slave trade, to be consistent, must grant that war is incompatible with christianity, and that it is a violation of the gospel to countenance it. war is unwise that the principles and practice of war are unwise i argue: i. because, instead of preventing, they provoke insult and mischief the maxim, that in order to preserve peace, mankind must be prepared for war, has become so common, and sanctioned by such high authority, that few question its wisdom or policy; but if stripped of its specious garb, it may appear to proceed not from that wisdom which came down from above, which is "first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy"; and if it is not the wisdom from above, then it must be the wisdom from beneath. are not pride, avarice, and revenge the seeds of all kinds of carnal warfare? from these grow all the quarreling among children, the discord among families, the bickerings, law suits, and broils among neighbors, the boxing among bullies, the dueling among modern gentlemen, and wars among nations. they all originate from one and the same spirit. now, is the mild, meek, and peaceable man, unarmed, more liable to inspire jealousy in others that he is about to insult and abuse them than the high-toned duelist who constantly carries with him deathly weapons? does he, in fact, so often get into difficulty, quarreling and fighting? the respectable society of friends stands a living monument to answer the question. on the principles of self-defense, as they are styled, if one man suspects an injury from another, unless he is naturally a more powerful man, he must take a cane, as the principles of self-defense require a superior power in your own hand, either by art or muscular strength. when the other learns the suspicions and sees the preparation, he in his turn must take a bludgeon to preserve the balance of power and proclaim a threatening to awe his antagonist, who must now take a sword and return a threatening in order to maintain his dignity; for it will not do for men of honor to retract, however much they may be in the wrong. the other, again, must take a deathly weapon for his defense, and nothing is now wanting but an unhappy meeting to set each other's blood a flowing. much in the same way do nations often get into desperate warfare. one nation is busily increasing its military strength on the plausible maxim of preserving peace and maintaining its rights. another nation views the preparations with a jealous eye, and also goes to work on the same principle to make formidable preparations. all the nations around take the alarm, and on the same principle begin active preparations, all vying with each other to become the most formidable. if one sends an ambassador to inquire the cause of the great preparations, the answer always is, let the motive be what it may, _for their own defense_. then the other makes new exertions and begins to fortify towns on the confines of his neighbor, who must not only do the same but march a large army for the defense of his frontier; and the other must do likewise. by this time, if no old quarrel remained unsettled, perhaps one charges the other with encroachment on territory; the other denies the charge, and contends sharply for his pretended rights. ministers may be interchanged, and while negotiations are pending a high tone must be taken by both parties, for this is an essential principle in the doctrine of self-defense; the contrary would betray weakness and fear. newspapers must be ushered forth with flaming pieces to rouse, as it is called, the spirit of the countries, so as to impress upon the populace the idea that the approaching war is just and necessary, for all wars must be just and necessary on both sides. in the meantime envoys extraordinary may be sent to other powers by each party to enlist their aid,--most of whom are already prepared for war,--and each one selects his side according to his interests and feelings. at length the _ultimatum_ is given and refused, and the dreadful conflict commences. few wars, however, begin in this slow and progressive mode; a trifling aggression is sufficient to blow up the flame with nations already prepared. thus, we see, nations resemble bulldogs who happen to meet. they will first raise their hairs, show their teeth, then growl, and then seize upon each other with all their strength and fury; and bulldogs have something of the same kind of honor, for they scorn to retreat. hence we see that the acknowledged principles of defensive war are the vital springs of most of the wars that agitate and desolate our world. the pretended distinction between offensive and defensive war is but a name. all parties engaged in war proclaim to the world that they only are fighting in defense of their rights, and that their enemies are the aggressors; while it may be impossible for man to decide which are most in the wrong. the popular maxim of being prepared for war in order to be at peace may be seen to be erroneous in fact, for the history of nations abundantly shows that few nations ever made great preparations for war and remained long in peace. when nations prepare for war they actually go to war, and tell the world that their preparations were not a mere show. thus we may see that the principles and preparations of war actually engender war instead of promoting peace; and of course they are unwise, and, if unwise, then it is folly for christians to engage in them. ii. war is unwise, for instead of diminishing, it increases difficulties as the principles and preparations of war have a natural tendency to generate war and are actually the cause of a great proportion of the wars which do exist, so actual hostilities have a natural tendency to increase difficulties and to spread abroad the destroying evil. it is almost impossible for any two nations to be long engaged in war without interfering with the rights and privileges of other nations, which generally awakes their jealousy and resentment, so that most of the surrounding nations are drawn into the destructive vortex, which is the more easily done, as war inflames the martial spirit in other nations not engaged, and rouses up the desperate passions of men. besides, the belligerent nations are not content with suffering themselves, but use every art and persuasion to get the neighboring nations to join them; and they are generally too successful, for it seldom happens that two nations engage in war for a length of time and conclude a peace before they have involved other nations in their difficulties and distresses, and often a great proportion of the world is in arms. moreover, the nations who first engage in the contest always widen the breach between themselves by war. it is much easier settling difficulties between individuals or nations before actual hostilities commence than afterwards. mankind are not apt to be any more mild and accommodating in a state of actual warfare. besides, new difficulties constantly arise. the passions become inflamed, and charges are often made of violating the established laws of civilized warfare, which laws, however, are generally bounded only by the strength of power. if one party makes an incursion into the other's territory and storms a fortified place and burns the town, the other party must then make a desperate effort to retaliate the same kind of destruction, to a double degree, on the towns of their enemy. retaliation, or "rendering evil for evil," is not only allowed by mahometans and pagans, but is an open and avowed principle in the doctrine of self-defense among professed christian nations; not only is it sanctioned by the laity, but too often by the priests who minister in the name of jesus christ. both of the contending parties generally seize on each other's possessions wherever they can get hold of them, whether on the seas or on the land. the barbarous spoliations on each other stir up the passions of the great mass of their inhabitants, until they esteem it a virtue to view each other as natural and perpetual enemies, and then their rulers can prosecute the war with what they call vigor. can the wound now be so easily healed as it could have been before it became thus lacerated and inflamed? facts speak to the contrary, and nations seldom attempt negotiations for peace under such circumstances. they generally prosecute the war with all their power until one party or the other is overcome, or until both have exhausted their strength, and then they may mutually agree to a temporary peace to gain a little respite, when perhaps the original matter of dispute has become comparatively so trifling that it is almost left out of the account. with a small spirit of forbearance and accommodation how easily might the difficulties have been settled before such an immense loss of blood and treasure! if war does actually increase, instead of diminishing, difficulties, then it must be very unwise to engage in it. iii. war is unwise, because it destroys property property is what a great proportion of mankind are struggling to obtain, and many at the hazard of their lives. though in some instances they may misuse it, yet it is the gift of god, and when made subservient to more important things, it may be a blessing to individuals and communities. it has in it, therefore, a real value, and ought not to be wantonly destroyed while it may be used as an instrument for benefiting mankind. it is a notorious fact that war does make a great destruction of property. thousands of individuals on sea and on land lose their all, for the acquisition of which they may have spent the prime of their lives. ships on the high seas are taken, often burnt or scuttled, and valuable cargoes sent to the bottom of the deep, some possibly laden with the necessaries of life and bound to ports where the innocent inhabitants were in a state of famine. whole countries are laid waste by only the passing of an immense army: houses are defaced, furniture broken to pieces, the stores of families eaten up, cornfields trodden down, fences torn away and used for fuel, and everything swept in its train as with the besom of destruction more terrible to the inhabitants than the storms of heaven when sent in judgment. beautiful towns are often literally torn to pieces with shot and shells. venerable cities, the labor and pride of ages, are buried in ashes amid devouring flames, while in melancholy grandeur the fire and smoke rise to heaven and seem to cry for vengeance on the destroyers. notwithstanding an avaricious individual or nation may occasionally in war acquire by plunder from their brethren a little wealth, yet they usually lose on the whole more than they gain. on the general scale the loss is incalculable. it is not my object to examine the subject in relation to any particular nation or war, but upon the general scale in application to all warlike nations and all wars under the light of the gospel. if war does destroy property, reduce individuals to beggary, and impoverish nations, then it is unwise to engage in it. iv. war is unwise, as it is dangerous to the liberties of men liberty is the gift of god, and ought to be dear to every man; not, however, that licentious liberty which is not in subordination to his commands. men are not independent of god. he is their creator, preserver, and benefactor. in his hand their breath is, and he has a right to do what he will with his own; and the judge of all the earth will do right. as man is not the creator and proprietor of man, he has no right to infringe on his liberty or life without his express divine command; and then he acts only as the executor of god. man, therefore, bears a very different relation to god from what he does to his fellow-man. the whole system of war is tyrannical and subversive of the fundamental principles of liberty. it often brings the great mass of community under the severe bondage of military despotism, so that their lives and fortunes are at the sport of a tyrant. where martial law is proclaimed, liberty is cast down, and despotism raises her horrid ensign in its place and fills the dungeons and scaffolds with her victims. soldiers in actual service are reduced to the most abject slavery, not able to command their time for a moment, and are constantly driven about like beasts by petty tyrants. in them is exhibited the ridiculous absurdity of men rushing into bondage and destruction to preserve or acquire their liberty and save their lives. when the inhabitants of a country are cruelly oppressed by a despotic government, and they rise in mass to throw off the yoke, they are as often as otherwise crushed beneath the weight of the power under which they groaned, and then their sufferings are greatly increased; and if they gain their object after a long and sanguinary struggle, they actually suffer more on the whole than they would have suffered had they remained in peace. it is generally the providence of god, too, to make a people who have thrown off the yoke of their oppressor smart more severely under the government of their own choice than they did under the government which they destroyed. this fact ought well to be considered by every one of a revolutionary spirit. war actually generates a spirit of anarchy and rebellion which is destructive to liberty. when the inhabitants of a country are engaged in the peaceable employments of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, anarchy and rebellion seldom happen. when these useful employments flourish, abundance flows in on every side, gentleness and humanity cast a smile over the land, and pleasure beams in almost every countenance. to turn the attention of a nation from these honest employments to _that of war_ is an evil of unspeakable magnitude. the great object in times of war is to rouse up what is styled the spirit of the country,--which, in fact, is nothing but inflaming the most destructive passions against its own peace and safety. if you infuse into a nation the spirit of war for the sake of fighting a foreign enemy, you do that which is often most dangerous to its own liberties; for if you make peace with the common enemy, you do not destroy the spirit of war among your own inhabitants; pride, discontent, and revenge will generally agitate the whole body, so that anarchy and confusion will fill the land, and nothing but a despotic power can restrain it; and often absolute despotism is too feeble to withstand it, and the only remedy is again to seek a common enemy. nations have sometimes waged war against other nations because there was such a spirit of war among their own inhabitants that they could not be restrained from fighting, and if they had not a common foe they would fight one another. so when a nation once unsheathes the sword, it cannot easily return the sword again to the scabbard, but must keep it crimsoned with the blood of man until "they who take the sword shall perish with the sword," agreeably to the denunciation of heaven. to inflame a mild republic with the _spirit of war_ is putting all its liberties to the utmost hazard, and is an evil that few appear to understand or appreciate. no person can calculate the greatness of the evil to transform the citizens of a peaceful, industrious republic into a band of furious soldiers; and yet the unhappy policy of nations is to cultivate a martial spirit that they may appear grand, powerful, and terrific, when in fact they are kindling flames that will eventually burn them up root and branch. in confirmation of what has been said, if we examine the history of nations we shall find that they have generally lost their liberties in consequence of the spirit and practice of war. thus have republics who have boasted of their freedom lost their liberty one after another, and that this has resulted from the very nature of war and its inseparable evils is evident from the fact that so violent and deadly is this current of ruin, republics have generally sunk down to the lowest abyss of tyranny and despotism, or have been annihilated and their inhabitants scattered to the four winds of heaven. indeed, what nation that has become extinct did not first lose its liberty by war, and then hasten to its end under the dominion of those passions which war inflames? do nations ever enjoy so much liberty as when most free from the spirit of war? are their liberties ever so little endangered as when this spirit is allayed and all its foreign excitements removed? do not nations that have partially lost their civil liberties gradually regain them in proportion as they continue long without war? is it not a common sentiment that the liberties of a people are in danger when war engrosses their attention? on the whole, is it not undeniable that peace is favorable to liberty, and that war is its enemy and its ruin? if so, what can be more unwise, what more opposite to every dictate of sound wisdom and policy, than the spirit and practice of war? v. war is unwise, as it diminishes the happiness of mankind happiness is the professed object which most men are striving to obtain. alas! few, comparatively, seek it where it is alone to be found. but that happiness which flows from the benevolent spirit of the gospel is to be prized far above rubies; it is a treasure infinitely surpassing anything that can be found merely in riches, honors, and pleasures. but war always diminishes the aggregate of happiness in the world. when nations wage war upon each other, all classes of their inhabitants are more or less oppressed. they are subjected to various privations; prosperity declines; external sources of happiness are mostly dried up; anxiety for friends, loss of relations, loss of property, the fear of pillage, severe services, great privations, and the dread of conquest keep them constantly distressed. they are like the troubled sea that cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt. those actually engaged in war generally suffer privations and hardships of the severest kind. even the sage counselors who declare wars are often in so great anxiety and pain as to the result of their enterprises as to be unable quietly to refresh themselves with food or sleep. all the rejoicings occasioned by military success are fully counterbalanced by the pain and mortification of the vanquished; and, in short, all the interest and happiness resulting from war to individuals and nations are dearly bought, and are at the expense of other individuals and nations. it is because war has no tendency to increase, but does in fact greatly diminish, happiness that it is so universally regarded and lamented as the greatest evil that visits our world. hence fasting has generally been practiced by warlike christian nations to deplore the calamity, to humble themselves before god, and to supplicate his mercy in turning away the judgment. though fasting and deep humility before god is highly suitable for sinners, with a hearty turning away from their sins and humble supplication for god's mercy through the mediation of christ, yet those fasts of nations who have voluntarily engaged in war and are determined to prosecute it until their lusts and passions are gratified do not appear to be such fasts as god requires. does it not appear absurd for nations voluntarily to engage in war, and then to proclaim a fast to humble themselves before god for its evils, while they have no desire to turn away from them, but, on the contrary, make it an express object to seek the divine aid in assisting them successfully to perpetuate it? we often see contending nations, all of whom cannot be right, on any principle, proclaiming fasts, and chanting forth their solemn _te deums_ as each may occasionally be victorious. though such clashing hymns cannot mingle in the golden censer, yet few christians seem to question the propriety of quarreling and fighting nations each in their turn supplicating aid in their unhallowed undertakings and returning thanks in case of success. doubtless many would consider it as solemn mockery to see two duelists before their meeting supplicating god's blessing and protection in the hour of conflict, and then to see the victor returning thanks for his success in shedding the blood of his brother; and yet, when nations carry on the business by wholesale (if i may be allowed the expression) it is considered a very pious employment. the lord has said, "and when ye spread forth your hands, i will hide mine eyes from you: yea, when ye make many prayers, i will not hear; your hands are full of blood." penitent christians may weep and mourn with propriety for their own sins and the sins of the nations, with a hearty desire not only to forsake their own iniquities, but that the nations may be brought to confess and forsake their sins and turn from them to the living god. it is true that war is a judgment in god's providence. it is also a sin of the highest magnitude and ought to be repented of. it is a crime so provoking to heaven that other calamities generally attend it. the famine, fire, and pestilence often attend its horrors and spread distress through a land. war with its attending evils unquestionably diminishes the aggregate of happiness in the world, and is therefore unwise. vi. war is unwise, as it does not mend, but injures, the morals of society the strength, defense, and glory of a country consists primarily in the good moral character of its inhabitants. the virtuous and the good are the salt that preserve it from ruin. says the rev. dr. miller in his sermon on the death of dr. rogers (pages 366 and 388 of the memoirs), "it is manifest from the whole tenor of his word that god is slow to inflict heavy judgments upon a nation in which many of his people dwell; that he often spares it, spreads over it the protection of his providence, and finally delivers it for their sake; and, of course, that the presence of his beloved children, speaking after the manner of men, is a better defense than chariots and horsemen, a better defense than all the plans of _mere_ politicians, than all the skill, courage, and activity of _mere_ warriors." again, "i have no doubt that it is as great and precious a truth at this day as it ever was, that a praying people are, under god, the greatest security of a nation." when the inhabitants of a country become generally profane and dissolute in their manners, slaves to dissipation and vice, it is usually god's providence soon to visit them in his wrath and let loose the instruments of his destroying vengeance; how important, therefore, in a temporal point of view, is the preservation of good morals to a nation. but no event has so powerful a tendency to destroy the morals of a people as that of actual war. it draws the attention of the inhabitants from useful employments; it generates curiosity, dissipation, and idleness, and awakes all the furious passions of men. war occasions a great profanation of the sabbath. under god's providence the sabbath has always been a great barrier against vice, and the observance of it is indispensable to good morals. in time of war the sabbath among soldiers is often a day of parade. in the streets of the best-regulated cities may be seen soldiers marching, flags flying, drums and fifes playing, and a rabble of children following in the train. now all this is not only calculated to dissipate all reverential respect for the solemnities of the day among the soldiers, but is calculated to destroy the respect and observance of the day with which the children and youth have been inspired. add to this, flags are suspended from the windows of taverns and grogshops to entice in the youth by the intoxicating cup. in the camp the sabbath is almost forgotten and rendered a common day. armies from professing christian nations as often begin offensive operations on the sabbath as on any other day; and professing christians not only tolerate all this but approve of it as a work of necessity and mercy. war occasions dishonesty. in countries where armies are raised by voluntary enlistment all kinds of deception and art are practiced by recruiting officers, and connived at by their governments, to induce the heedless youth to enlist. the honor and glory of the employment is held up to view in false colors; the importance of their bounty and wages are magnified; the lightness of the duty and opportunities for amusements and recreation are held out; and probably one half have the assurances of being noncommissioned officers, with a flattering prospect of a speedy advancement; and prospects of plunder are also held out to their cupidity. these deceptive motives are daily urged under the stimulating power of ardent spirits and the fascinating charms of martial music and military finery. many a young man who has entered the rendezvous from curiosity or for the sake of a dram, without the least idea of joining the army, has been entrapped into intoxication, and his hand then grasped the pen to seal his fate. recruits after joining the army find from experience that most of the allurements held out to them to enlist were but a deception, and from lust and want they often become petty thieves and plunderers to repay them for their great privations, fatigues, and sufferings. war occasions drunkenness,--one of the greatest evils and most destructive to morality, as a multitude of other vices necessarily follow in its train. many a young man has entered the military ranks _temperate_, and has returned from them a _sot_. all the enticements of liquor are exhibited in the most inviting forms to youth in the streets by the recruiting officer, to tempt them to enlist; and while those who have enrolled themselves remain at the rendezvous, they are probably every day intoxicated with the inebriating poison, soul and body, and soon the habit becomes confirmed. while in actual service their fatigues are so great that they greedily lay hold on the destroying liquor wherever they can find it to exhilarate their languid frames, even if they had not before acquired an insatiable thirst; and soon this detestable evil will become so enchanting that they will not only barter away their wages for it but their necessary clothing. if they survive the campaign and return to their homes, they are often the visitors of grogshops and taverns, and by their marvelous stories attract the populace around them, who must join them in circulating the cup; and thus they spread this destroying evil all around. war occasions profaneness. profaneness is an abomination in the sight of god: "for the lord will not hold him guiltless who taketh his name in vain." profaneness draws down the judgments of heaven, "for because of swearing the land mourneth." that soldiers are generally considered more profane than other men is evident, because it has become a proverb that "such a person is as profane as a soldier, or a man-of-war's man." young men who have been taught to revere the name of the god of their fathers may shudder at the awful profanations that fill their ears when they first enter an army; but if destitute of grace in the heart, the sound will soon cease to offend, and they will eagerly inhale the blasphemous breath and become champions in impiety. for want of habit they may not swear with so easy a grace as the older soldiers; they will for that reason make great exertions and invent new oaths, which will stimulate their fellows again to exceed in daring impiety. seldom does a soldier return from the camp without the foul mouth of profanity. astonishing to think that those who are most exposed to death should be most daring in wickedness! war occasions gambling. a great proportion of the amusements of the camp are petty plays at chance, and the stake usually a drink of grog. the play is fascinating. multitudes of soldiers become established gamblers to the extent of their ability, and often, if they return to society, spread the evil among their neighbors. war begets a spirit of quarreling, boxing, and dueling; and no wonder that it should, for the whole business of war is nothing else but quarreling and fighting. the soldier's ambition is to be a bully, a hero, and to be careless of his own life and the lives of others. he is therefore impatient in contradiction, receives an insult where none was intended, and is ready to redress the supposed injury with the valor of his own arms; for it will not do for soldiers to shrink from the contest and be cowards. war destroys the habits of industry and produces idleness. industry is necessary to good morals as well as to the wealth and happiness of a country, and every wise government will take all laudable means to encourage it; but a large proportion of common soldiers who may return from the armies have lost the relish and habits of manual labor and are often found loitering about in public places, and if they engage in any kinds of labor, it is with a heavy hand and generally to little purpose. they therefore make bad husbands, unhappy neighbors, and are worse than a dead weight in society. their children are badly educated and provided for, and trained up to demoralizing habits, which are handed down from generation to generation. these immoralities, and many more that might be named, are not confined to soldiers in time of war, but they are diffused more or less through the whole mass of community; and war produces a general corruption in a nation, and is therefore unwise, even in a temporal point of view. but when we consider the natural effects of these immoralities on the souls of men, all temporal advantages are in comparison annihilated. in this school of vice millions are ripening for eternal woe. the destroying influence will spread and diffuse itself through the whole mass of society unless the spirit of the lord lifts up a standard against it. the state of morals, so much depressed by the american revolution, was only raised by the blessed effusions of god's holy spirit. if war does actually demoralize a people, then no wise person can consistently engage in it. vii. war is unwise, as it is hazarding eternal things for only the chance of defending temporal things says our blessed saviour: "for what is a man profited, if he should gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" the loss of a soul infinitely exceeds all finite calculations. it is not only deprived forever and ever of all good but is plunged into misery inexpressible and everlasting. all temporal things dwindle to nothing when placed in comparison with eternal realities. the rights, liberties, and wealth of nations are of little value compared with one immortal soul. but astonishing to think that millions and millions have been put at everlasting hazard only for the chance of defending temporal things! the habits and manners of a soldier's life are calculated, as we have already seen, to demoralize them, to obliterate all early serious impressions, to introduce and confirm them in the most daring wickedness and fit them for everlasting destruction. and notwithstanding god may have occasionally, to display his sovereign power, snatched some soldiers from the ranks of rebellion and made them the heirs of his grace, yet no sober christian will say that the army is a likely place to promote their salvation; but, on the contrary, must acknowledge that it is a dangerous place for the souls of men. it may be assumed as an undeniable fact that the great mass of soldiers are notoriously depraved and wicked. with but few exceptions their impiety grows more daring the longer they practice war; and when it is considered that thousands and thousands of such are hurried by war prematurely into eternity, with all their sins unpardoned, what an amazing sacrifice appears only for some supposed temporal good. but when it is remembered that this infinite sacrifice is made merely for the chance of obtaining some temporal advantage, the folly of war appears in more glaring colors, as the battle is not always to the strong. those who are contending for their rights, and are least in the wrong, are about as often unsuccessful as otherwise, and then they very much increase their evils in a temporal point of view. a wise man would not engage in a lawsuit to recover a cent, admitting that it was his just due, if the trial put to the hazard his whole estate. but this bears no comparison with _one soul_ in competition with all temporal things; and yet men, professing to be _wise_, not only put one soul at hazard but millions, not for the _chance_ of defending all temporal good, but often for a mere bubble, the hollow sound of honor; and many of those who are watching for souls, and must give an account, instead of sounding the alarm, approve of it. all who engage in war, either in the field or otherwise, practically regard _time_ more than eternity, and _temporal_ more than _eternal_ things. if souls are of more value than temporal things, and eternity of more consequence than time, it must be _unwise_ to engage in a war and put souls to immediate hazard of everlasting ruin, and totally wrong for christians to engage in it. viii. war is unwise, as it does not answer the professed end for which it is intended the professed object of war generally is to preserve liberty and produce a lasting peace; but war never did and never will preserve liberty and produce a lasting peace, for it is a divine decree that all nations who take the sword shall perish with the sword. war is no more adapted to preserve liberty and produce a lasting peace than midnight darkness is to produce noonday light. the principles of war and the principles of the gospel are as unlike as heaven and hell. the principles of war are terror and force, but the principles of the gospel are mildness and persuasion. overcome a man by the former and you subdue only his natural power, but not his spirit; overcome a man by the latter, and you conquer his spirit and render his natural power harmless. evil can never be subdued by evil. it is returning good for evil that overcomes evil effectually. it is, therefore, alone the spirit of the gospel that can preserve liberty and produce a lasting peace. wars can never cease until the principles and spirit of war are abolished. mankind have been making the experiment with war for ages to secure liberty and a lasting peace; or, rather, they have ostensibly held out these objects as a cover to their lusts and passions. and what has been the result? generally the loss of liberty, the overturning of empires, the destruction of human happiness, and the drenching of the earth with the blood of man. in most other pursuits mankind generally gain wisdom by experience; but the experiment of war has not been undertaken to acquire wisdom. it has, in fact, been undertaken and perpetuated for ages to gratify the corrupt desires of men. the worst of men have delighted in the honors of military fame and it is what they have a strong propensity for; and how can a christian take pleasure in that employment which is the highest ambition of ungodly men? the things that are highly esteemed among men are an abomination in the sight of god. is it not, therefore, important that every one naming the name of christ should bear open testimony against the spirit and practice of war and exhibit the spirit and temper of the gospel before the world that lieth in wickedness, and let their lights shine before men? but what can the men of the world think of such christians as are daily praying that wars may cease to the ends of the earth, while they have done nothing and are doing nothing to counteract its destructive tendency? alas! too many are doing much by their lives and conversation to support its spirit and principles. can unbelievers rationally suppose such prayers to be sincere? will they not rather conclude that they are perfect mockery? what would be thought of a man daily praying that the means used for his sick child might be blessed for his recovery, when he was constantly administering to him known poison? with the same propriety do those christians pray that war may come to a final end, while they are supporting its vital principles. it is contrary to fact that war is calculated to preserve liberty and secure a lasting peace; for it has done little else but destroy liberty and peace and make the earth groan under the weight of its terror and distress. it is contrary to the word of god that war is calculated to promote peace on earth and good will toward men. the law that is to produce this happy effect will not be emitted from the council of war or the smoke of a camp; but the law shall go forth out of zion, and the lord shall rebuke the strong nations and they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; then nations shall no more lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn the art of war any more; then shall the earth be filled with the abundance of peace and there shall be nothing to hurt or destroy. it is reserved alone for the triumph of the gospel to produce peace on earth and good will to men. if war does actually provoke insult and mischief; if it increases difficulties, destroys property and liberty; if it diminishes happiness, injures the morals of society, hazards eternal for only the chance of defending temporal things, and, finally, does not answer the end for which it was intended, then it must be _very unwise_ to engage in it, and it must be wrong for christians to do anything to promote it, and right to do all in their power to prevent it. war is criminal i am now to show that war, when judged of on the principles of the gospel, is highly criminal. i. going to war is not keeping from the appearance of evil, but is running into temptation ... i would have it understood that i consider every act of mankind which is palpably contrary to the spirit and precepts of the gospel _criminal_. it is an express precept of the gospel to abstain from all appearance of evil. "watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation" is also an express command of christ. a person desiring not only to abstain from evil, but from the very appearance of it, will suffer wrong rather than hazard that conduct which may involve doing wrong. he will be so guarded that if he errs at all he will be likely to give up his right when he might retain it without injuring others. no person, it is believed, will attempt to maintain that there is no appearance of evil in carnal warfare, or that it is not a scene of great temptation. one great object of the gospel is to produce good morals, to subdue the irascible passions of men and bring them into sweet subjection to the gospel of peace. but war cannot be prosecuted without rousing the corrupt passions of mankind. in fact, it is altogether the effect of lust and passion. in times of war almost every measure is taken for the express purpose of inflaming the passions of men, because they are the vital springs of war, and it would not exist without them. those who are engaged in war, both in the council and in the field, have a feverish passion, which varies as circumstances may happen to change. those who are actually engaged in the heat of battle are usually intoxicated with rage. should this be denied by any one, i would appeal to the general approbation bestowed on the artist who displays most skill in painting scenes of this kind. he who can represent the muscular powers most strongly exerted, the passions most inflamed, and the visage most distorted with rage, will gain the highest applause. the truth of the assertion is, therefore, generally admitted. some men, perhaps, may be so much under the influence of pride as to have the appearance of stoical indifference when their antagonists are at some distance, but let them meet sword in hand and the scene is at once changed. the temptations for those who constitute, or those who encourage and support, armies to commit or to connive at immorality are too various and too multiplied to be distinctly mentioned. who can deny that war is altogether a business of strife? but, says an inspired apostle, "where envying and strife is, there is confusion and every evil work." now, if war is a scene of confusion and strife and every evil work, it is impossible for any one to engage in it and avoid the appearance of evil or be out of the way of temptation; those who are armed with deathly weapons and thirsting for the blood of their fellow-mortals surely cannot be said to exhibit no appearance of evil. but if engaging in wars is putting on the appearance of evil and running into temptation, then it is highly criminal to engage in it. ii. war is criminal, as it naturally inflames the pride of man one of the abominable things which proceed out of the corrupt heart of man, as represented by our saviour, is pride. "god resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble." "the lord hates a proud look." "every one that is proud in heart is an abomination to the lord." that pride is criminal and that humility is commendable will doubtless be admitted by all who believe the scriptures. pride, however, is one of the chief sources of war. it is pride that makes men glory in their strength and prowess; it is pride that hinders them from confessing their faults and repairing the injury done to others. although pride is commonly condemned in the abstract, yet it is generally commended in soldiers and fanned by every species of art and adulation, not only by men of the world but too often by those who bear the christian name. and why is it necessary to inflame the pride of soldiers? because it is well understood that soldiers without pride are not fit for their business. if war is a christian duty, why should not the example and precepts of christ, instead of the example of the heroes of this world, be exhibited to those who fight to stimulate them? is not christ as worthy of imitation as the cæsars and alexanders of this world? he was a triumphant conqueror; he vanquished death and hell, and purchased eternal redemption for his people; but he conquered by resignation and triumphed by his death. here is an example worthy of the highest emulation. and why not animate soldiers by it? only because it would unnerve their arms for war and render them harmless to their foes. it is so common to compliment the pride of soldiers that, instead of considering it that abominable thing which the lord hates, they consider it a virtue. we frequently hear "gentlemen of the sword," as they are styled, in reply to the flattery bestowed upon them, frankly declare that it is their highest ambition to obtain the praise of their fellow-citizens; and, of course, they confess that they are seeking the praise of men more than the praise of god. these gentlemen, however, are far less criminal than those who lavish flattery on them; for doubtless most of them are sincere and think themselves in the way of their duty, while their profession often leads them, necessarily, from the means of knowing correctly what is duty. while professing christians have been taught from their cradles that the profession of arms is not merely an allowable but a noble employment, it is easy for them to slide into the current and go with the multitude to celebrate victories and to eulogize heroes, without once reflecting whether they are imitating their lord and master. but is it not time for christians to examine and ascertain if war is tolerated in the gospel of peace before they join in festivities to celebrate its bloody feats? how would a pagan be astonished if he had been taught the meek, lowly, and forgiving spirit and principles of the gospel, without knowing the practice of christians, to see a host of men, professing to be influenced by these blessed principles, marshaled in all the pomp of military parade, threatening destruction to their fellow-mortals! would he not conclude that either he or they had mistaken the genius of the gospel, or that they believed it to be but a fable? it is a notorious fact, which requires no confirmation, that military men, decorated with finery and clad in the glitter of arms, instead of being meek and lowly in their temper and deportment, are generally flushed with pride and haughtiness; and, indeed, what purpose do their decorations and pageantry answer but that of swelling their vanity? their employment is not soft and delicate. other men who follow rough employments wear rough clothing; but the soldier's occupation is not less rough than the butcher's, though, in the world's opinion, it is more honorable to kill men than to kill cattle. but if war has a natural tendency to inflame, and does inflame and increase the pride of men, it is criminal; it does that which the lord hates, and it must be highly criminal to engage in it. iii. war necessarily infringes on the consciences of men, and therefore is criminal liberty of conscience is a sacred right delegated to man by his creator, who has given no authority to man to infringe in the least on the conscience of his fellow-man. though a man, by following the dictates of his conscience, may be injured by men, yet they have no authority to deprive him of the rights of conscience. to control the conscience is alone the prerogative of god. that man has no right to violate the conscience of his fellow-man is a truth which few, under the light of the gospel, since the days of ignorance and superstition, have ventured to call in question. but military governments, from their very nature, necessarily infringe on the consciences of men. though the word of god requires implicit obedience to rulers in all things not contrary to the scriptures, it utterly forbids compliance with such commands as are inconsistent with the gospel. we must obey god rather than man, and fear god as well as honor the king. but governments, whether monarchial or republican, make laws as they please, and compel obedience at the point of the sword. they declare wars, and call upon all their subjects to support them. offensive war, by all professing christians, is considered a violation of the laws of heaven; but offensive war is openly prosecuted by professing christians under the specious name of self-defense. france invaded spain, germany, and russia; england invaded holland and denmark; and the united states invaded canada, under the pretense of defensive war. the fact is, however, that no man can, on gospel principles, draw a line of distinction between offensive and defensive war so as to make the former a crime and the latter a duty, simply because the gospel has made no such distinction. but while many christians profess to make the distinction, and to consider offensive war criminal, they ought to have the liberty to judge, when war is waged, whether it is offensive or defensive, and to give or withhold their aid accordingly; otherwise they are not permitted the free exercise of their consciences. but suppose this principle adopted by governments. could they prosecute war while they left every individual in the free exercise of his conscience to judge whether such war was offensive or defensive and to regulate his conduct accordingly? would it be possible for governments to carry on war if they depended for support on the uncertain opinion of every individual? no; such a procedure would extinguish the vital strength of war and lay the sword in the dust. the fact is well known, and monarchs declare war and force their subjects to support it. the majority in republican governments declare war and demand and enforce obedience from the minority. though the constitutions of governments may, in the most solemn manner, guarantee to citizens the free exercise of their consciences, yet governments find it necessary practically to make an exception in relation to war, and a man may plead conscientious motives in vain to free himself from contributing to the support of war. i think it proper here to notice what has appeared to me a gross absurdity among some christians in this land. they have openly declared that in their opinion the late war was offensive; that it was contrary to the laws of god, and that they were opposed to it; but though they wished not to support it because it was criminal, yet they said, if they were called on in a constitutional way, they would support it. thus did they publicly declare that they would, under certain circumstances, obey man rather than god. but soldiers actually resign up their consciences to their commanders, without reserving any right to obey only in such cases as they may judge not contrary to the laws of god. were they at liberty to judge whether commands were morally right or not, before they yielded obedience, it would be totally impracticable for nations to prosecute war. ask a general if his soldiers have the privilege of determining whether his commands are right or not, and he will tell you it is their duty only to obey. suppose that a general and his army are shut up in a city in their own country, and that provisions are failing; that an army is advancing for their relief, but cannot reach the place until all means of sustenance will be consumed; that the inhabitants cannot be let out without admitting the besiegers; and that in this extremity, to preserve his army for the defense of his country, the commander orders his men to slay the inhabitants, doing this evil that good may come. but some conscientious soldiers refuse to obey a command to put the innocent to the sword for any supposed good. what must be the consequence? their lives must answer for their disobedience. nor is this contrary to the usages of war. and christians satisfy their consciences upon the false principle that soldiers are not accountable for their conduct, be it ever so criminal, if they obey their commanders; all the blame must fall on the officers, which involves the absurdity of obeying man rather than god. thus soldiers must be metamorphosed into something besides moral and accountable beings in order to prosecute war; and, in fact, they are treated generally not as moral agents but as a sort of machinery to execute the worst of purposes. the only plausible method of which i can conceive to avoid the above consequences requires that soldiers should not practically resign their consciences, but, when commands which are morally wrong are given, that they should refuse obedience and die as martyrs. but to enter an army with such views would be to belie the very oath of obedience which they take. besides, who could execute the martyrs and be innocent? in this way all might become martyrs, and the army be annihilated. but if war does not admit the free exercise of conscience on christian principles, then it is criminal for christians to become soldiers, and the principles of war must be inconsistent with the principles of christianity. iv. war is criminal, as it is opposed to patient suffering under unjust and cruel treatment that patient suffering under unjust and cruel treatment from mankind is everywhere in the gospel held up to view as the highest christian virtue probably few professing christians will deny. but notwithstanding this truth is generally admitted, there is very commonly introduced a carnal, sophistical mode of reasoning to limit, or explain away, this precious doctrine, which is peculiar to the gospel and which distinguishes it from all other kinds of morality and religion on earth. it has relation, it is said, only to matters of religion and religious persecution,--as if the gospel required mankind actually to regard a little wealth and a few temporal things more than all religious privileges and life itself; for, by this human maxim, men may fight to defend the former, but not the latter. and this maxim is built on the supposition that christians are not bound strictly by gospel precepts in relation to temporal things, but only in relation to spiritual things. hence it is said that the martyrs conducted nobly in refusing to fight for the privilege of worshiping the true god, but if christians now refuse to fight to defend their money and their political freedom they act in a dastardly manner and violate the first principles of nature. thus are temporal regarded more than spiritual and everlasting things. the precepts of the gospel, however, unequivocally forbid returning evil for evil, and enjoin patient sufferings under injurious and cruel treatment. a few instances shall be quoted: "now we exhort you, brethren, warn them that are unruly, comfort the feeble-minded, support the weak, be patient towards all men. see that none render evil for evil to any man; but ever follow that which is good, both among yourselves, and unto all men." "if, when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with god." the apostle james, in his solemn denunciation against oppressors, says, "ye have condemned and killed the just, and he doth not resist you"; he then immediately exhorts the christians, saying, "be patient therefore, brethren, unto the coming of the lord." "finally, be ye all of one mind, having compassion one for another, love as brethren, be pitiful, be courteous, not rendering evil for evil, railing for railing; but contrariwise blessings, knowing that ye are thereunto called, that ye should inherit a blessing." "for the eyes of the lord are over the righteous, and his ears are open to their prayers; but the face of the lord is against them that do evil. and who is he that will harm you, if ye be followers of that which is good?" a patient, forbearing, suffering disposition is peculiar to the lamblike temper of the gospel, and is wholly opposed to the bold, contending, daring spirit of the world which leads mankind into quarreling and fighting. it is generally admitted, i believe, that it is the duty of christians patiently to suffer the loss of all temporal things, and even life itself, rather than willfully violate any of god's commands. if, then, it is the duty of a christian patiently to suffer death rather than bear false witness against his neighbor, be he friend or foe, is it not equally his duty patiently to suffer death rather than kill his neighbor, whether friend or foe? not merely taking away the life of our neighbor is forbidden, but every exercise of heart and hand which may have a natural tendency to injure him. but which is the greatest evil,--telling a lie, or killing a man? by human maxims you may do the latter to save your life, but not the former; though the former might injure no one but yourself, while the latter, besides injuring yourself, might send your neighbor to eternal destruction. the spirit of martyrdom is the true spirit of christianity. christ himself meekly and submissively died by the hands of his enemies, and instead of resistance, even by words, he prayed, "father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." stephen, when expiring under a shower of stones from his infuriate murderers, prayed, "lord, lay not this sin to their charge." st. paul testified that he was not only ready to be bound but to die for the lord jesus. the early martyrs resigned up their lives with patient submission as witnesses for jesus,--and this at a time, when, sir henry moncrief wellwood in his sermons, page 335, says, "tertullian has told us that christians were sufficiently numerous to have defended themselves against the persecutions excited against them by the heathen, if their religion had permitted them to have recourse to the sword." the spirit of martyrdom is the crowning test of christianity. the martyr takes joyfully the spoiling of his goods, and counts not his life dear to himself. but how opposite is the spirit of war to the spirit of martyrdom! the former is bold and vindictive, ready to defend property and honor at the hazard of life, ready to shed the blood of an enemy. the latter is meek and submissive, ready to resign property and life rather than injure even an enemy. surely patient submission under cruel and unjust treatment is not only the highest christian virtue but the most extreme contrast to the spirit of war. now if it is a duty required by the gospel not to return evil for evil, but to overcome evil with good; to suffer injustice and to receive injury with a mild, patient, and forgiving disposition,--not only in words but in actions,--then all kinds of carnal contention and warfare are criminal and totally repugnant to the gospel, whether engaged in by individuals or by communities. can it be right for christians to attempt to defend with hostile weapons the things which they profess but little to regard? they profess to have their treasure not in this world but in heaven above, which is beyond the reach of earthly invaders, so that it is not in the power of earth or hell to take away their dearest interests. there may be a propriety in the men of the world exclaiming that their dearest rights are invaded when their property and political interests are infringed upon; but it is a shame for christians to make this exclamation, while they profess to believe that their dearest interest is in the hand of omnipotence, and that the lord god of hosts is their defense. whoever, without divine command, dares to lift his hand with a deathly weapon against the life of his fellow-man for any supposed injury denies the christian character in the very act, and relies on his own arm instead of relying on god for defense. v. war is criminal, as it is not doing to others as we should wish them to do to us says our blessed saviour, "all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets." now if we wish men to be kind and forbearing to us, we must be kind and forbearing to them; if we wish them to return love for hatred and good for evil, then we must return love for hatred and good for evil; if we wish not to be injured by men, then we must not injure them; if we wish not to be killed, then we must not kill. but what is the practical language of war? does the man who is fighting his fellow-man and exerting all his strength to overcome him really wish to be overcome himself and to be treated as he is striving to treat his enemy? can it be believed that england, in the late war, wished france to do to her what she endeavored to do to france; or that the latter really desired in return what she endeavored to inflict on england? if not, both violated this express precept of christ. none can say, consistently with the principles of the gospel, that they wish to be killed by their enemies; therefore none can, consistently with those principles, kill their enemies. but professing christians do kill their enemies, and, notwithstanding all they may say to the contrary, their actions speak louder than their words. it is folly for a man to say he does not wish to do a thing while he is voluntarily exerting all his powers to accomplish it. but if the act of war does violate this express precept of christ, then it must be exceedingly criminal to engage in it. vi. war is inconsistent with mercy, and is therefore criminal mercy is the grand characteristic of the gospel, and the practice of mercy is the indispensable duty of man. "be ye merciful, as your father also is merciful"; "for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust"; "blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy"; "for he shall have judgment without mercy, that hath showed no mercy." mercy is that disposition which inclines us to relieve distress, to forgive injuries, and to promote the best good of those who are ill deserving. mercy in us towards our enemies implies seeking and pursuing their best good for time and eternity. it is sinful to exercise any affection towards enemies short of that benevolence or mercy which involves the advancement of their best good, and christians may not suspend this disposition, or do evil that any supposed good may come; for no law can be of higher authority than the express precept of christ which requires this disposition towards enemies, and of course no other consideration can be paramount to this, for nations are as much bound as individuals. it is surely too grossly absurd for any to pretend that destroying the property and lives of enemies is treating them mercifully, or pursuing their best good for time and eternity. nor can any so impose upon their imaginations as to think that injuring mankind is treating them with benevolence or mercy. but the direct object of war is injury to enemies; and the conduct of soldiers generally speaks a language not easily to be misunderstood. though soldiers are not always as bad as they might be, their tender mercies are often but cruelty. when they storm a fortified place and do not put all the captives to the sword, they are complimented for exercising mercy, merely because they were not so cruel as they might have been. but shall a highway robber be called an honest man because he takes but half the money of him whom he robs? is it an act of mercy, when a man encroaches on your property, to take away his life? do nations exercise mercy towards each other when they enter into bloody wars in consequence of a dispute which shall govern a small portion of territory? or does a nation show mercy to another that has actually invaded its rights by falling upon the aggressor and doing all the injury in its power? this surely is not forgiving injuries. and when two contending armies come in contact and rush on each other with all the frightful engines of death and cut each other to pieces they do not appear to me as merciful, kind, and tender-hearted, forgiving one another in love, even as god for christ's sake forgives his children. yet this is the rule by which they should act and by which they will at last be judged. but the whole system of war is opposed to mercy, and is therefore altogether unlike the spirit of the gospel, and must be criminal. vii. war is criminal, as the practice of it is inconsistent with forgiving trespasses as we wish to be forgiven by the final judge our saviour says: "if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly father will also forgive you; but if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your heavenly father forgive your trespasses"; "forgive, and ye shall be forgiven." here it is evident that the everlasting salvation of men depends on their exercising forgiveness towards their enemies; for if they forgive not, they will not be forgiven of god, and with what measure they mete to others, it will be measured to them again. to forgive is to pass by an offense, treating the offender not according to his desert, but as though he had done nothing amiss. but do the principles of war lead individuals or nations to pass by offenses and to treat offenders as if they were innocent? do they not, on the contrary, require justice and exact the very last mite? has it the aspect of forgiveness for us, when an enemy trespasses on our rights, to arm with weapons of slaughter and meet him on the field of battle? who, while piercing the heart of his enemy with a sword, can consistently utter this prayer: "father, forgive my trespasses, as i have forgiven the trespasses of this my enemy"? but this, in reference to this subject, is the only prayer the gospel warrants him to make. and professing christian nations, while at war and bathing their swords in each other's blood to redress mutual trespasses, are daily in their public litanies offering this prayer; but is it not obvious that either their prayers are perfect mockery, or they desire not to be forgiven but to be punished to the extent of their deserts? if individuals or nations desire that god would forgive their trespasses, then they must not only pray for it, but actually exercise forgiveness towards those who trespass against them; and then they may beat their useless swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks and learn war no more. but it must be very criminal to engage in war, or to tolerate it in any way, if it is inconsistent with the forgiveness of injuries as we hope to be forgiven, and in this respect violates the precepts of the gospel. viii. engaging in war is not manifesting love to enemies or returning good for evil returning good for evil and manifesting benevolence to enemies is, perhaps, the most elevated and noble part of christian practice,--the inculcation of which in the gospel exalts christianity far above any other form of religion and proves it to be not only divine but efficacious to subdue the turbulent and corrupt passions of men; and for these reasons this part of duty ought to be zealously advocated and diligently performed by every one who bears the christian name. the ablest writers who have defended the divine origin of the scriptures against infidels have urged this topic as constituting conclusive evidence in their favor; and unbelievers, instead of attempting to meet the argument fairly, have urged the inconsistency of christians in acting contrary to so conspicuous a rule of duty; and such is and ever has been the most powerful weapon that infidels can wield against christianity. but it is the will of god that by welldoing we should put to silence the ignorance of foolish men. let christians act in strict conformity to this part of christian practice, and they will wrest from the infidel's hand his strongest weapon. that exercising benevolence towards enemies and returning good for evil is inculcated as one of the most important doctrines of the gospel is evident as well from the whole tenor of the new testament as from the express commands of the son of god: "i say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you, that ye may be the children of your father in heaven"; "if thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink; for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head"; "be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good." such are some of the divine precepts on this subject. so different, however, are the laws of war among christian nations, that rendering comfort or relief to enemies is considered high treason, and they punish with death the performance of the very duty which god commands as a condition of eternal life! the common sense of every man revolts from the idea that resisting an enemy by war is returning good for evil. who would receive the thrust of a sword as an act of kindness? was it ever considered that killing a man was doing good to him? has not death always been considered the greatest evil which could be returned for capital crimes? but the principles of war not only allow enemies to return evil for evil by killing one another, but secure the highest praise to him who kills the most. it is often said of those who distinguish themselves in butchering their fellow-men, that "they cover themselves with glory!" nations, when they go to war, do not so much as pretend to be actuated by love to their enemies; they do not hesitate to declare in the face of heaven that their object is to _avenge_ their wrongs. but, says an inspired apostle, "dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but give place unto wrath: for it is written, vengeance is mine; i will repay, saith the lord." retributive judgment, the execution of strict justice, or vengeance, god declares often, belongs to him. he has reserved it in his own hand as his sovereign prerogative. it is not very surprising that savage pagans should glory in revenge, but that those should do so who have the bible in their hands, and profess to take it as the rule of their faith and practice, is truly astonishing. still more astonishing is it that some ministers of the gospel not only connive at but approve of the spirit and practice of revenge by war. but though the whole tenor of the gospel absolutely enjoins returning good for evil and blessing for cursing; yet the open and avowed principles of war are to return evil for evil, violence for violence. now if the principles of war are so directly opposed to the principles of the gospel, if the practice of war is so perfectly contrary to christian practice, then it must be very criminal for christians not to bear open testimony against war, and much more criminal to do anything to promote it. ix. war is criminal, because it is actually rendering evil for evil it is a fact which can neither be disguised nor controverted that the whole trade of war is returning evil for evil. this is a fundamental principle in the system of self-defense. therefore every exertion in the power of contending nations is made to inflict mutual injury, not merely upon persons in public employment and upon public property, but indiscriminately upon all persons and property. hence it is an established rule of what is styled "civilized warfare" that if one party takes a person suspected of being a spy, they put him to death; which act is retaliated by the other the first opportunity. if one party storms a fortified place and puts the garrison or the inhabitants to the sword, the other, in their defense, must retaliate the same thing, and, if possible, to a greater degree. if one side executes a number of captives for some alleged extraordinary act, the other, on the principles of self-defense, may execute double the number; the first may then, on the same principles, double this number; and so they may proceed to return evil for evil, till one or the other yields. the principles of self-defense require not merely an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, but for one eye two eyes, for one tooth two teeth. they require the retaliation of an injury to a double degree,--otherwise, there would be no balance in favor of the defensive side; but as both parties must always be on the defense, both must, of course, retaliate to a double degree. thus war is aggravated and inflamed, and its criminality raised to the highest pitch. the doctrine of retaliation is not only openly avowed and practiced by professing christian nations, but is sometimes defended before national councils by professing christians of high standing in churches. "o! tell it not in gath! publish it not in the streets of askelon! lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph!" that the retaliation of injury, of whatever kind it may be and to whomsoever it may be offered, is most absolutely and unequivocally forbidden by the whole spirit of the gospel dispensation, as well as by its positive precepts, surely can never be fairly controverted. says the great author and finisher of our faith, "ye have heard that it hath been said, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but i say unto you that ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also." whether the literal import of these words be contended for or not, they cannot fairly be construed as teaching anything short of a positive and unconditional prohibition of the retaliation of injury. had our lord added to these words the maxim of the world, "if any man assaults you with deathly weapons, you may repel him with deathly weapons," it would have directly contradicted the spirit of this command and made his sayings like a house divided against itself. the apostles largely insist upon this doctrine of their divine master, thus: "recompense to no man evil for evil"; "be ye all of one mind, not rendering evil for evil, or railing for railing"; "see that none render evil for evil to any man." these comprehensive passages make no conditions or limitations, and are, therefore, applicable to all men and binding upon all in all situations and circumstances under the light of the gospel; but had they added, "if any man injures you, you may return him an injury and repel violence with violence," it would have been most palpably absurd, and the precepts of the gospel would have been truly what infidels have asserted they are,--a series of gross contradictions. but i repeat that the open and avowed principles of war, even among christian nations, are those of returning evil for evil. surely, nations neither aim nor pretend to aim at the best good of their enemies; but, on the contrary, their real and professed object in the sight of god and man is to do them, while at war, all the injury in their power. what means that language which conveys instructions to those who command ships of war, to _sink_, _burn_, and _destroy_, if it does not mean evil to enemies? why do nations encourage the cupidity of men by licensing and letting loose swarms of picaroons on their enemies, if it is not to inflict evil on them? but all this is sanctioned under the notion of self-defense, and, as though it were a light thing for men thus publicly to trample on the laws of the gospel, they lift up their daring hands to heaven and supplicate god's help to assist them in violating his own commands! no apology can be made for such proceedings until it is shown that war is not returning evil for evil. but what is it to return evil for evil? when one man is injured by another and returns injury, he returns evil for evil and violates those precepts of the gospel which have been quoted. when one association of men is injured by another association and the injured returns an injury, evil is returned for evil and those precepts are violated. when one nation infringes on the rights of another and they in return infringe on the aggressor's rights, they return evil for evil and violate those precepts. when one nation declares war against another and is repelled by war, evil is returned for evil and those precepts are violated. but these things are constantly practiced, without a blush or a question as to their propriety; and god is supplicated to aid in the business. to what a state has sin reduced our world? is not the church covered with darkness and the people with gross darkness? a man may now engage in war with his fellow-man and openly return evil for evil, and still remain in respectable standing in most of the churches, being at the same time highly applauded and caressed by the world lying in wickedness! but if we are here to be directed and at last to be judged by the gospel, no man can return evil for evil, in war or otherwise, without aggravated guilt. x. war is criminal, as it is actually doing evil that good may come; and this is the best apology that can be made for it that it is an evil to spread distress, desolation, and misery through a land and to stain it with the blood of men probably none will deny. war, with its attending horrors, is considered by all, even those who advocate and prosecute it, to be the greatest evil that ever befalls this wicked, bleeding, suffering world. though men go to war primarily to gratify their corrupt passions,--for they can never propose the attainment of any good by war which shall be commensurate with the natural and moral evils that will be occasioned by the acquisition,--yet the prospect of attaining some supposed good must be held out as a lure to the multitude and a means of self-justification. usually the object of war is pompously represented to be to preserve liberty, to produce honorable and lasting peace, and promote the happiness of mankind; to accomplish which, liberty, property, and honor--that honor which comes from men--must be defended, though war is the very thing that generally destroys liberty, property, and happiness, and prevents lasting peace. such is the good proposed to be attained by the certain and overwhelming evil of war. but no maxim is more corrupt, more false in its nature, or more ruinous in its results than that which tolerates doing evil that good may come. nor can any defend this maxim without taking the part of infidels and atheists, to whom it appropriately belongs, and with whose principles and practice alone it is consistent. the apostle paul reprobates this maxim in the severest terms, and he considered it the greatest scandal of christian character to be accused of approving it: "as we be slanderously reported," says he, "and as some affirm that we say, let us do evil that good may come; whose damnation is just." now if war is in fact an evil, and it is prosecuted with a view to attain some good, then going to war is doing evil that good may come. it is therefore doing that which scandalizes christian character; that which is wholly irreconcilable with the principles of the gospel, and which it is highly criminal for any man or nation to do. xi. war is opposed to the example of the son of god, and is therefore criminal the example of the son of god is the only perfect model of moral excellence, and his moral conduct, so far as he acted as man, remains a perfect example for christians. but did he appear in this world as a great military character, wearing a sword of steel, clothed with military finery, and surrounded by glittering soldiers, marching in the pomp and parade of a warrior? no; he was the meek and lowly jesus, despised and rejected of men. he was king of kings and lord of lords, but his kingdom was not of this world. had his kingdom been of this world, then would he have appeared as an earthly conqueror, and his servants would have been warriors. though a prince, he was the prince of peace. at his advent the angels sang, "glory to god in the highest, on earth peace, good will to men." "he came not to destroy men's lives, but to save them." he was the lamb of god, meek and lowly. he followed peace with all men; he returned good for evil and blessing for cursing, and "when he was reviled he reviled not again." finally, he was "brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth." that he did this as a necessary part of his mediatorial work need not be denied; but that he intended it also as an example to his followers is fully confirmed by an inspired apostle, who says, "if, when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with god. for hereunto were ye called: because christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example, that ye should follow his steps: who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth: who, when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, threatened not; but committed himself to him who judgeth righteously." christ taught his disciples the doctrines of peace, and commanded them to take up the cross and follow him; to live in peace and to follow peace with all men. his last gift to them was peace. he said to them, when about to send them into the world, "behold i send you forth as lambs among wolves"; thus teaching them what treatment they might expect and what character they must maintain among wicked men. the nature of lambs and wolves is too well known for any one to mistake this figurative representation. wolves are fierce, bloody, and ravenous beasts; but lambs are mild, inoffensive, and unresisting, having no means of relief but by flight. now if a host of professing christian warriors, marshaled under the ensign of a preying eagle or a prowling lion, clothed in all the splendor of deathly armor, and rushing forward to destroy their fellow-creatures, are in figurative language but _lambs_, i confess i am at a loss where to look for the _wolves_! do these warlike christians appear mild as lambs and harmless as doves, kind and tender-hearted, doing good to all, to friends and foes, as they have opportunity? can fighting be living peaceably with all men? is it returning good for evil, and overcoming evil with good? if not, it is not imitating the example of christ. if christians were like christ, their warfare would not be carnal, but spiritual, corresponding with the armor which he has provided. they would conquer by faith and overcome by the blood of the lamb, not counting their lives dear to themselves. on the whole, if to engage in war is not avoiding the appearance of evil, but is running into temptation; if it inflates the pride of men; if it infringes on the rights of conscience; if it is not forgiving trespasses as we wish to be forgiven; if it is not patient suffering under unjust and cruel treatment; if it is not doing to others as we would have them do to us; if it is not manifesting love to enemies and returning good for evil; if it is rendering evil for evil; if it is doing evil that good may come; and if it is inconsistent with the example of christ, then it is altogether contrary to the spirit and precepts of the gospel and is highly criminal. then christians cannot engage in war or approve of it without incurring the displeasure of heaven. * * * * * in view of the subject, if what has been said is in substance correct, and of this i desire the reader conscientiously to judge, then the criminality of war and its inconsistency with the gospel are undeniable. it is admitted by all that war cannot exist without criminality somewhere, and generally where quarreling and strife are, there is blame on both sides. and how it is that many christians who manifest a laudable zeal to expose and counteract vice and wickedness in various other forms are silent on the subject of war, silent as to those parts or practices of war which are manifestly and undisputably criminal, is to me mysterious. there has been a noble and persevering opposition against the inhuman and cruel practice of the slave trade; and by the blessing of god the efforts against it have been successful, probably, for the time, beyond the most sanguine expectations. when the lawfulness of this practice was first called in question, it was violently defended as well by professing christians as by others. comparatively few christians fifty years ago doubted the propriety of buying and holding slaves; but now a man advocating the slave trade could hardly hold in this vicinity a charitable standing in any of the churches. but whence has arisen so great a revolution in the minds of the mass of professing christians on this subject? it has happened not because the spirit or precepts of the gospel have changed, but because they are better understood. christians who have been early educated to believe that a doctrine is correct, and who cherish a respect for the instructions of their parents and teachers, seldom inquire for themselves, after arriving at years of maturity, unless something special calls up their attention; and then they are too apt to defend the doctrine they have imbibed before they examine it, and to exert themselves only to find evidence in its favor. thus error is perpetuated from generation to generation until god, in his providence, raises up some to bear open testimony against it; and as it becomes a subject of controversy, one after another gains light, and truth is at length disclosed and established. hence it is the solemn duty of every one, however feeble his powers, to bear open testimony against whatever error prevails, for god is able from small means to produce great effects. there is at present in many of our churches a noble standard lifted up against the abominable sin of intemperance, the greatest evil, perhaps, war excepted, in the land, and this destructive vice has already received a check from which it will never recover unless christians relax their exertions. but if war is a greater evil than drunkenness, how can christians remain silent respecting it and be innocent? public teachers consider it to be their duty boldly and openly to oppose vice. from the press and from the pulpit they denounce theft, profaneness, sabbath breaking, and intemperance; but war is a greater evil than all these, for these and many other evils follow in its train. most christians believe that in the millennial day all weapons of war will be converted into harmless utensils of use, that wars will cease to the ends of the earth, and that the benign spirit of peace will cover the earth as the waters do the seas. but there will be then no new gospel, no new doctrines of peace; the same blessed gospel which we enjoy will produce "peace on earth and good will to men." and is it not the duty of every christian now to exhibit the same spirit and temper which will be then manifested? if so, let every one "follow the things that make for peace," and the god of peace shall bless him. objections answered as was proposed, a number of objections to the general sentiments that have been advocated shall be stated and answered. _objection first._ shall we stand still and suffer an assassin to enter our houses without resistance and let him murder ourselves and families? _answer._ i begin with this because it is generally the first objection that is made to the doctrine of peace by all persons, high and low, learned and unlearned; notwithstanding it is an objection derived from a fear of consequences and not from a conviction of duty, and might with the same propriety have been made to the martyrs who, for conscience' sake, refused to repel their murderers with carnal weapons, as to christians who, for conscience' sake, refuse at this day to resist evil. no christian will pretend that defense with carnal weapons is not criminal, if the gospel really forbids it, let the consequences of nonresistance be what they may. for the requisitions of the gospel are the rule of duty. but i presume the objection above stated arises altogether from an apprehension of consequences rather than from regard to duty. every candid person must admit that this objection is of no force, until the question whether the gospel does or does not prohibit resistance with deathly weapons is first settled. it might, therefore, justly be dismissed without further remark; but as mankind are often more influenced by supposed consequences than by considerations of duty, and as the objection is very popular, it may deserve a more particular reply. in the first place, i would observe that the supposition of the objector relates to a very extreme case, a case which has very rarely, if ever, occurred to christians holding to nonresistance with deathly weapons, and it bears little or no resemblance to the general principles or practices of war which are openly advocated and promoted by professing christians. should an event like that supposed in the objection take place, it would be a moment of surprise and agitation in which few could act collectedly from principle. what was done would probably be done in perturbation of mind. but war between nations is a business of calculation and debate, affording so much time for reflection that men need not act from sudden and violent impulse, but may act from fixed principle. in this respect, therefore, war is a very different thing from what is involved in the objection which does not in the least affect the principles or practice of systematic warfare. it is not uncommon to hear persons who are hopefully pious, when pressed by the example and the precepts of christ against war, acknowledge that most of the wars which have existed since the gospel dispensation cannot be justified on christian principles; yet these very persons are never heard to disapprove of the common principles of war, or to counteract them by their lives and conversation before a wicked world; but, on the contrary, they will often eulogize heroes, join in the celebration of victories, and take as deep an interest in the result of battles as the warriors of this world; and if their conduct is called in question, they will attempt to justify it by pleading the necessity of self-defense, and immediately introduce the above objection which is by no means parallel with the general principles and practices of all wars. the truth is, war is a very popular thing among mankind, because it is so congenial to their natural dispositions; and, however gravely some men may, at times, profess to deplore its calamity and wickedness, it is too evident that they take a secret pleasure in the approbation of the multitude and in the fascinating glory of arms; and we have reason to believe that this objection is often made merely to ward off the arrows of conviction which would otherwise pierce their consciences. the objection, however, wholly overlooks the providence and promise of god. assassins do not stroll out of the circle of god's providence. not only is their breath in his hand, but the weapons they hold are under his control. besides, god's children are dear to him, and he shields them by his protecting care, not suffering any event to befall them except such as shall be for his glory and their good. whoever touches them touches the apple of his eye. he has promised to be a very present help to them in every time of need, and to deliver them that trust in him out of all their trouble. he will make even their enemies to be at peace with them. for the eyes of the lord are over the righteous and his ears are open to their prayers, but the face of the lord is against them that do evil; and who is he that will harm you if ye be followers of that which is good? but if ye suffer for righteousness' sake, happy are ye, and be not afraid of their terror, neither be troubled. if god be thus for his children, who can be against them? is not the arm of the lord powerful to save, and a better defense to all who trust in him than swords and guns? whoever found him unfaithful to his promises or feeble to save? are not the hosts of heaven at his command? are not his angels swift to do his will? "are they not all ministering spirits sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation?" "the angel of the lord encampeth round about them that fear him, and delivereth them." if the lord is on their side, christians have no cause to fear what man can do unto them. says the blessed saviour, "whosoever will save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall find it." if consequences are rightly examined, they may prove to be of more importance than at first supposed. if the gospel does forbid resistance with deathly weapons, then he who saves his temporal life by killing his enemy may lose his eternal life; while he who loses his life for christ's sake is sure of everlasting life. thus the christian, if he is killed, goes to heaven; but the assassin, if he is killed, goes to hell, and the soul of the slayer is in danger of following. whoever kills another to prevent being killed himself, does it on presumption; for, whatever may be the appearances, god only can know whether one man will assassinate another, before the event has taken place. men, however, seem to think little of killing or being killed by fighting, whether in single combat or on the field of general battle, though they shudder at the idea of being put to death by an assassin, unless they can inflict or attempt to inflict on him the same evil. but the objection is usually made on the supposition that the doctrine in question requires christians to stand still and rather court the dagger than otherwise. this is an unfair statement, for it would be presumption to stand still when there was a chance of escape. besides, the christian must act on the defensive, not with carnal, but with spiritual weapons, which are more powerful when exercised in faith than swords or spears. probably no instance can be found of robbers murdering such as conscientiously held to nonresistance. it is resistance that provokes violence; forbearance and good will repress it. but if instances of this kind may be found, it is no evidence against the doctrine in question any more than against the principles of the martyrs. god may, for wise reasons, call away some of his children by the hands of murderers; if so, instead of losing, they save their lives. _objection second._ self-defense, and, if necessary, with deathly weapons, is the first law of nature. all the animal creation are armed with means of defense, and the principles of the gospel are not contrary to the principles of nature; therefore self-defense is not inconsistent with christianity. _answer._ it is admitted that the laws of the gospel are not contrary to the primitive laws of nature; but it is by no means granted that they are consistent with the laws of corrupt nature. in consequence of the revolt of man the earth was cursed for his sake. it appears probable that before the fall of man animals were harmless and docile; and it is not improbable that when the curse shall be removed, when the earth shall be filled with righteousness and peace, the lion and the lamb may literally lie down together. at present, indeed, the dove, the lamb, and some other animals have no means of defense, unless flight be considered such. and while warriors are figuratively represented by ferocious beasts, real christians are represented by lambs and doves. so far as nature is made to speak fairly on the subject, it speaks in favor of the doctrine which has been advocated. but corrupt nature strongly dictates many things quite contrary to the precepts of the gospel; and no doctrine will be given up more reluctantly by corrupt nature than that of the lawfulness of war, because no doctrine is more congenial with the depraved feelings and propensities of unsanctified men, for their "feet are swift to shed blood; destruction and misery are in their ways, and the way of peace have they not known; there is no fear of god before their eyes." _objection third._ the precepts of the gospel are consistent with the moral law, or the eternal nature of things, which is forever the standard of right and wrong to all moral beings in the universe; and war has been prosecuted consistently with this rule of right and wrong; therefore war cannot be contrary to the precepts of the gospel. _answer._ this is an objection founded on an undefinable something aside from divine precept; yet as some terms in it have been much used in polemic divinity by men of eminent talents and piety, whose praise is in the churches, i think it neither proper nor modest to dissent from so high authority without offering some reasons. i shall, therefore, make a few general observations on what is called the moral law, the eternal rule of right and wrong, or the nature of things; all of which phrases, i believe, have been occasionally used by eminent writers as conveying the same ideas. i cannot agree with such as suppose that a moral law or nature of things exists independently of the will of god and is the common law of god and man. it appears to me as inconsistent to suppose a law to exist without a lawgiver as to suppose a world to exist without a creator. if god is the only eternal and independent being in the universe, and if all things are the work of his power and goodness, then the supposition that an eternal law exists independently of him appears to me to be absurd, as on this supposition there exists a law without a lawgiver and an effect without a cause. if god is not the author of all things, then there must be more than one eternal cause of things. to suppose that the reason and fitness of things independently of the will of god, either in his works, his providence, or word, can be a rule of man's duty appears to me as inconsistent as to suppose that men might institute divine worship from such fitness of things independently of the existence of god; for the will of god to man seems as necessary to lay a foundation of moral obligation and to direct man's obedience as the existence of god is necessary to lay a foundation of religious worship. should it be asked whether the laws of god are not founded on the eternal nature and fitness of things, i would answer that such a supposition appears to me no more reasonable than to suppose that his power is founded on the eternal capacity of things; for the capacity of things has just as much reality and eternity in it to found the omnipotence of god upon, as the reason and nature of things have to found his infinite wisdom or justice upon. i therefore dissent from all standard of moral obligation which are supposed to exist aside from, and independently of, the divine will; and fully agree with the assembly's shorter catechism, in the answer to this question: "what is the duty which god requires of man? answer: the duty which god requires of man is obedience to his revealed will." should it, however, be said that things do exist aside from the divine will, that it does not depend on the divine will, but on the nature of things, that two and two make four, or that a thing cannot be in motion and at rest at the same time, it is by no means admitted that this order or constitution of things exists independently of god; but it is believed to be as much the effect of his power and goodness as anything else. and if god is not the author of all the laws both in the natural and moral world, it may reasonably be inquired, who is? if god is the moral governor of the world, then all his laws over men, as moral beings, must be moral laws; and to make a distinction between the laws designed to regulate the moral conduct of men, and to call some of them moral and others by different names, seems to me not necessary, while i find no such distinction in the scriptures. because some of god's laws were intended to be temporary, under certain circumstances, they were no less of a moral nature on that account; neither was it any less criminal to violate them. as created things are in some respects constantly changing, and as the relations of things are often varied, so a law may be relatively right at one time and relatively wrong at another. but as man is frail and short-sighted, and is incapable of seeing the end from the beginning, he is totally unable of himself to judge what is and what is not right, all things considered; hence the necessity of a revelation from god to direct his steps. that there is a fitness of things and a standard of moral right and wrong cannot be denied; but, instead of being founded in a supposed nature of things independent of god, it originates in the very nature and perfections of god himself, and can never be known by man any farther than the nature and perfections of god are known. a standard of right and wrong independent of god, whether by the name of moral law or nature of things, is what never has been and never can be intelligibly defined. it is like a form without dimensions, like a foundation resting on nothing. it is, therefore, in my opinion, as extravagant to talk of an eternal nature of things, without reference to the laws of god, as it would be to talk of an eternal wisdom or an eternal omnipotence, independent of the existence of god. but if the statement of the objector is meant only to imply a rule of right and wrong emanating from the nature and perfections of god, and coincident with his laws, then, admitting the propriety of the terms moral law, nature of things, etc., the objection, if it proves anything, may prove quite too much for its advocates; for under certain circumstances it has been consistent with this rule of moral right and wrong utterly to exterminate nations, to destroy men, women, and children, and show them no mercy. besides, the whole force of the objection rests on the supposition that no laws which have existed, and which were not contrary to the moral law, can be abrogated under the christian dispensation or be inconsistent with the precepts of the gospel. it hence follows that whatever has been morally right and lawful for men to do must forever remain right and lawful to be done. this is a necessary result from the premises; but no christian can consistently subscribe to this. the premises must, therefore, be unsound and the objection of no force. if literal sacrifices, slavery, and many other practices which are totally abolished under the christian dispensation were not contrary to the moral law under the old testament economy, why may not the same be true of war? why may not the gospel forbid war as consistently as it can forbid slavery? _objection fourth._ the nature of religion and morality under the ancient dispensation was the same as under the new. love to god and man was the substance of the law and the prophets; and though truth under the former was inculcated more by types and ceremonies, yet the essence of religion was the same under that as under the present dispensation; and as war was not inconsistent with the nature and precepts of religion then, it cannot be inconsistent with the nature and precepts of religion now, under like circumstances. _answer._ it is readily admitted that the essence of religion is the same under the present as under the former dispensation, both requiring at all times and in all actions holy exercises of heart in cordial obedience to divine command; yet the laws for external conduct under the two dispensations differ widely, and the practice of war involves much of the external conduct of men. it was never right for men to indulge unholy feelings in the act of war, but the external act was required as a means of executing the divine vengeance; the gospel does not command, but seems plainly to forbid, the external act of war. but to suppose that saints under the gospel can ever be placed in circumstances like those of the ancient church is to suppose that they may be put under the same typical economy which has vanished away, given place to the substance, and ceased to be binding even on the natural israelites. to be in like circumstances they must also be made the executors of god's wrath, to inflict vengeance, by his particular command, on idolatrous and rebellious nations. the israelites had the same high authority to exterminate the canaanites and subdue the idolatrous nations about palestine that the holy angels had to destroy sodom and gomorrah. it is perfectly plain that if god should positively command christians to take the weapons of war and not only repel invasion but actually exterminate nations, it would be their duty to obey, and a refusal would be open rebellion against god. the old testament saints received such commands, but christians have no such authority, which makes a material difference in circumstances. some general observations relative to the different dispensations of the church of god may illustrate this topic more fully. the old testament economy has sometimes, perhaps without reason, been divided into the adamic, patriarchal, and mosaic dispensations of the church; but as the latter was more full and complete, and as the distinction between the mosaic and christian dispensations is common, i shall confine my remarks chiefly to that distinction, though i consider the great distinction to be between the old and new testament economies. the old testament economy, in general, was typical of the new. under the former dispensation literal and temporal things typified spiritual and everlasting things under the latter. the nation of israel, chosen and separated from all other nations, typified the true israel of god, who are chosen out of every nation and sanctified and set apart as a holy nation and peculiar people, to offer up spiritual sacrifices to god. the land of canaan was a type of the heavenly canaan. jerusalem was a type of the new jerusalem from above. mount zion and the royal throne of israel, which were in jerusalem, typified the heavenly zion and the throne of the true david who now reigns in glory. the sacrifices were types of spiritual offerings. the israelites had enemies within and foes without, literal weapons of war and literal warfare, typical of spiritual foes, spiritual armor, and spiritual warfare.[1] their kings were seated on the throne of the lord (see 1 chron. xxix. 23). at the command of god they judged and made war and conquered their enemies and thus typified the son of god who is now on the throne of his father david, and who in righteousness judges and makes war and rides forth conquering and to conquer. the ancient promises and threatenings were mostly temporal, but typical of spiritual and everlasting promises and threatenings. doubtless the gospel was preached by types and figures under the old testament economy, and the saints of old looked upon those temporal things merely as shadows representing a more enduring substance. when they looked upon canaan, the land of promise, they viewed it as a type of the heavenly canaan, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on earth seeking a better country. when they looked on the bleeding lamb they beheld, by the eye of faith, the lamb of god who taketh away the sins of the world. thus we may see that almost the whole of the old testament economy was typical and temporary, and not intended to be perfect and everlasting. but under the gospel dispensation we have a new covenant and better promises which are intended to be perfect and everlasting. it is therefore more proper for those who live under this new and perfect dispensation to look at the substance than at the shadow for a rule of duty. errors are often and easily propagated by reasoning from analogy and introducing it as proof of sentiments instead of illustration. this is frequently done in relation to the old testament economy and common political government. it is not uncommon to hear ministers, in their political sermons, reason and infer just as if there were a perfect parallel between the jewish theocracy and political governments, when at the head of one was the lord of hosts and at the head of the others are but men; when one was the church of the living god, and the others are but human institutions. they not unfrequently speak of god's driving out the heathen before his american israel and planting them in a goodly land, as though there were a perfect parallel between the americans driving the indians from their native soil and taking possession of it themselves, without divine commission, and the israelites going at the express command of god and taking possession of canaan. thus they endeavor to keep up a parallel between god's ancient church and civil governments. the economy of god's ancient covenant people was by no means a political institution in the popular sense, but it was a dispensation of the church of god, and in its rites, ceremonies, and government was typical of the kingdom of messiah under his mediatorial reign, and differed widely in its nature, origin, and design from mere political governments; therefore all reasoning drawn from a supposed analogy between them is specious and false. the israelites had no authority to enact laws or to alter god's laws one iota; their duty was implicitly to obey them. but if christians take their authority for going to war from the practice of the old testament saints, their example will prove too much; it will not only allow war, but _offensive war_ in its most dreadful forms. _objection fifth._ abraham went to war, not like the israelites at the command of god, yet he met with the divine approbation when he returned from the slaughter of the kings; he, therefore, must have acted on a universal law still in force; and as christians are called the children of abraham they ought, of course, to imitate his example in such things as god approved. _answer._ abraham, like the israelites, was under a typical dispensation and practiced rites and ceremonies which were a shadow of good things to come. that he acted without divine command, in the war referred to, is more than we are warranted to say. he was a prophet and the friend of god and probably was acquainted with the divine will on this subject. christians are not called the children of abraham because they imitate his example in war, but because they exercise like precious faith with him. if christians are warranted to imitate the example of abraham in all things which were tolerated by god, then they may sacrifice cattle, practice polygamy, and buy and hold slaves. but if they object to his example as a rule of duty in these instances, why not object to his example as a rule of duty in the case of war? but to say that he acted from some universal law still in force is taking for granted the question in dispute, and cannot be admitted without evidence. the war waged by abraham against the kings was, i apprehend, offensive rather than defensive; for lot, his brother's son, whom he rescued, did not then belong to his family or kingdom, but was separated from him and was also a patriarch, a father of nations, and a prince or head over his own house or kingdom. it appears very evident that offensive as well as defensive war was tolerated under the patriarchal economy, as may be seen from the words of the inspired jacob when blessing his sons (gen. xlviii. 22). that, as well as the mosaic dispensation, was typical, and doubtless war was allowed under both for the same reasons. but there can be no doubt that whoever attempts to justify war by the example of abraham may equally justify the slavery of our fellow-men; and whoever depends on his example for authority for engaging in war, to be consistent, must advocate and defend the doctrine of slavery. _objection sixth._ it appears to be a universal law of god that "whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." if one man, or one nation, attacks another and sheds his blood, his own must be shed in return. hence this precept not only authorizes taking away the life of a murderer, but authorizes nations to repel by war nations that wage war against them. _answer._ whether this was a precept given to man as a rule of duty or not is very questionable, though it has generally been so construed, at least since the dark ages of the church; and it is still more questionable whether it is a universal and perpetual law. if we attend to the phraseology of this decree of god, we shall find it to be very different from that of the precepts, generally, delivered to moses. god did not say to noah, as he often did to moses, thou shalt do this, or that, but he said, "_i will require the life of man_," etc. if god had designed to delegate executive authority to noah and his descendants to execute retributive judgment on the manslayer, the connection of the whole language must have been altered, for god declared what he would do himself. it appears, therefore, to have been god's _decree_, and the promulgation of _his_ law by which he would inflict righteous judgment on the guilty; the penalty was intended as a warning to deter mankind from violence, the sin for which the old world was swept away. and i see no reason why this threatening should not be considered parallel with the decrees of christ,--that "all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword; he that leadeth into captivity shall go into captivity; he that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword; here is the faith and the patience of the saints." why the former should be considered as a rule of obedience for man, and these latter passages not so, i am unable to say. "he that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword" is as positive as "whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." it may be observed that the faith and patience of the saints is here spoken of in such a way as to imply that they exercised and manifested their faith and patience when they were put to death by violence or carried into captivity. and, indeed, how could their faith and patience appear if they, like the wicked world, returned evil for evil, carried into captivity, and killed with the sword? the original threatening has been fulfilled by the providence, and sometimes by the express command, of god. as noah was the head of the new world and the father of nations, it seems to have had reference to nations rather than to individuals; and all nations that have shed blood in war must, in their turn, have their own blood shed; so that all they that take the sword may perish with the sword agreeably to the threatening made known to noah, and to those announced by christ. but, admitting that the law quoted in the objection was intended as a rule of duty for man, it does not appear that it was designed to be universal and perpetual. before the flood no authority appears in any sense to have been delegated to man to shed the blood of man. so far from executing the penalty of death or causing it to be executed upon cain, who was of the wicked one and slew his brother, notwithstanding his guilty forebodings, god threatened a sevenfold vengeance on him who should presume to do it. under the mosaic dispensation many crimes were punishable with death according to positive precept; but god, for wise reasons, did not always have the penalty executed. david was guilty of murder and adultery, both capital crimes; yet he was permitted to live. all kinds of vindictive punishment under the christian dispensation appear to be absolutely forbidden. by vindictive i mean that which is intended to vindicate the law, as executing strict justice, and prevent offenses only, as taking away life, but which is not designed to promote the individual good of the person punished. that punishment which is designed and which has a tendency to promote the good of the punished, as well as to deter offenders, i consider to be strictly disciplinary or corrective, and consistent with the spirit and precepts of the gospel. says an apostle, "dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but give place unto wrath: for it is written, vengeance is mine; i will repay, saith the lord." "for the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of god." it has been said that this only forbids a revengeful temper, but this evasion will not do; for christians are here forbidden to do the very thing which god declares he will do himself, and he does nothing but what is holy. "render to no man evil for evil," is a positive precept without any limitation, and which admits of no evasion; and it must plainly rescind the law of shedding man's blood because he had shed the blood of man. but the exclamation is often made, what, not punish a murderer with death! little do those who make this exclamation think that they themselves also are sinners and that every sin deserves not only temporal death but god's wrath and curse forever, and that they are in like condemnation unless redeemed by the blood of the lamb. for such, it might be well to inquire if they know "what manner of spirit they are of." the most prominent characteristic of messiah's reign over men in this world is mercy, since he has secured the rights and honor of the divine government by the sacrifice of himself so that the guilty may live. he has given his life as a ransom and taken the world into his hands as the ruler, judge, and rewarder, and offers the chief of sinners mercy; and the merits of his blood are sufficient to cleanse from all sin as well against man as against god. and who can help being astonished at the amazing difference between his laws and his dealings with men, and those sanguinary laws of men according to which under the light of the gospel they punish with death. the professed principle and design of these laws is strict justice; but were men dealt with according to strict justice by him who rules above, who would be able to stand? these laws of men accept no atonement for capital offenses; no mercy is offered, for none is provided for those who incur their penalty; but the gospel offers mercy to the chief of sinners while it condemns those who reject the offers. capital offenders will never be condemned by civil governments for the rejection of offered mercy, for no mercy is provided for them. how unlike the divine government! but christians are commanded to be merciful, as their father in heaven is merciful, who showers down blessings on the evil and unthankful. our master has told us that with what judgment we judge we shall be judged; and with what measure we mete it shall be measured to us again; that if we forgive we shall be forgiven; and if we forgive not we shall not be forgiven; and that if we show no mercy we shall have judgment without mercy. christians ought to ponder the subject well before they advocate the consistency and safety of dispensing justice without mercy. let them learn what that meaneth, "i will have mercy and not sacrifice." _objection seventh._ "every purpose is established by counsel, and with good advice make war"; "for by wise counsel thou shalt make war," etc. here war is recognized as a duty under certain circumstances, and the manner in which it is to be undertaken is pointed out, viz., by wise counsel. _answer._ the inspired proverbs are maxims of wisdom illustrated, for the most part, by some familiar subject that existed at the time they were delivered. the object here is not to inculcate the lawfulness of war but the necessity of sound wisdom in relation to the actions of men; and the subject of war appears to be introduced merely to illustrate this idea. the counsel and wisdom of men in relation to their temporal and worldly concerns are often worthy of imitation in reference to spiritual things; for the children of this world are, in some sense, wiser in their generation than the children of light, and the conduct of worldly men is often very appropriately introduced to illustrate christian duty. our lord says, "what king, going to war with another king, sitteth not down first, and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand?" doubtless our lord's design was to warn people to count the cost before they professed to be followers of him, that they might not be deceived and discouraged, and that they might act from principle and not from hypocrisy. but he inculcated these things by referring to the example of kings in their consultations about war. and it is believed that the passages before cited are of similar import. these references to war, being introduced merely for the illustration of other subjects, will no more prove the lawfulness of war than the reference of the apostle to the olympic games, for illustration, will prove the lawfulness of those heathen feats. but if this explanation should not be satisfactory, it may be observed that the proverbs were written under the old testament economy which tolerated offensive as well as defensive war; whence it does not appear that any war can be undertaken under the present dispensation, "by wise counsel," except that which is spiritual; so that if the ancient was typical of the new dispensation, then the passages quoted will now apply only to spiritual warfare. _objection eighth._ when the soldiers demanded of john the baptist what they should do, one of the directions which he gave them was to be content with their wages. if their occupation had been unlawful, then he would not have directed them to be contented with the wages of wickedness. _answer._ john the baptist was under the mosaic economy, the new dispensation not having commenced. he was but the forerunner of the lord, a herald to sound his approach. but he gave the soldiers another direction, viz., to "do violence to no man," obedience to which is totally incompatible with war, as that is nothing else but violence. only hinder soldiers from doing violence to any man and you stop at once the whole progress of war; therefore, if the directions of john are insisted on as gospel authority, they will prove, probably, much more against the lawfulness of war than in favor of it. _objection ninth._ the centurion and cornelius were christians and soldiers and highly approved of god for their faith and piety; nor were they directed by christ or his apostles to renounce their profession; therefore the profession of arms is not inconsistent with christian duty. _answer._ they were first soldiers and then christians; and we have no evidence that they continued in the profession of arms; nor are we warranted to say that they were not directed to renounce that profession, as the scriptures are silent on the subject. peter, it appears, tarried a number of days with cornelius, and he doubtless explained to him the spirit and precepts of the gospel; and it is very probable that neither cornelius nor the centurion continued soldiers in any other sense than they were soldiers of christ, as the idolatrous rites enjoined on the roman soldiers were totally inconsistent with the christian character, aside from the unlawfulness of war itself. besides, the roman soldiers were as often engaged in offensive as in defensive war; therefore, if the argument has any force on the question, it will tolerate not only defensive but offensive war, and also the idolatrous rites of the roman armies. _objection tenth._ our lord paid tribute money, which went to support military power, but he would not contribute to the support of a wicked thing, therefore war is not inconsistent with christianity. _answer._ a distinguished trait of the christian religion is peace. the command is, "follow peace with all men." "blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of god." our lord set the example of giving no just cause of offense to any. tribute was demanded of him unjustly according to the existing laws, but lest fault should be found, he wrought a miracle and paid it. money is a temporal thing, and belongs to the governments of this world, as the various coins bear the ensign of the nation by whom they were made; but the christian's treasure is not in this world, and when the rulers of this world call for that which bears their own image and superscription, christians have no right to withhold from them their dues, for they must "render to cæsar the things that are cæsar's." for this cause they ought to pay tribute and resign up temporal things without a murmur to temporal governments, and leave it with cæsar to manage the things of cæsar. thus far are christians warranted to act, from the example of christ and the precepts of the gospel; but how does the lawfulness of war follow from christians rendering to cæsar his due? is it because some of the money goes to support war? probably, of the money which our lord paid as much went to the support of idolatry and the games of the day as to the support of war. now if the argument is sound, we may not only prove by it the lawfulness of war but the lawfulness of idolatry and many other abominable things practiced by the heathen governments. _objection eleventh._ our lord, just before his crucifixion, commanded his disciples to take swords, and, if any were destitute, to sell their garments and procure them, as they would no longer have his personal presence to protect them; and as they were to encounter great trials and difficulties, they must, besides relying on providence, take all prudent means for their defense and preservation. _answer._ that our lord did not direct them to take swords for self-defense is evident because he told them that two were enough, and because the disciples never made any use of them after their master directed peter to put up his and pronounced a penalty on all who should have recourse to swords afterwards. but the design seems to have been to show by example in the most trying situation where self-defense was justifiable, if in any case, that the use of the sword was utterly prohibited under the gospel economy, and to show the criminality and danger of ever using deathly weapons against mankind afterwards. if christ's kingdom had been of this world, then, he tells us, his servants would have fought; but his kingdom being not of this world, the weapons of their warfare were not carnal but spiritual. he therefore rebuked them for their mistaken zeal, healed the wound they made, and forbade the use of the sword. _objection twelfth._ christians are commanded to be in subjection to civil rulers who are god's ministers to execute wrath on the wicked and are ministers of good to the church; therefore christians are bound to take the sword at their command; for civil government is ordained of god and civil rulers are not to bear the sword in vain, and christians may lawfully do what god ordains to be done. _answer._ that civil government, so called in distinction from religious government, is ordained by god is fully admitted, and also that god ordains whatsoever comes to pass. but there is a great difference between his decretive and his preceptive will. the former is not a rule of duty for man without the latter; the latter is always a rule of duty. this fact might be proved by a multitude of instances from scripture. persons therefore may be very wicked in doing what god ordains to be done, if they act without his command. that civil governments and civil rulers exist only by god's decretive will, which is fulfilled by his providence and not by his preceptive will, is evident because god has never authorized the appointment of them or given any precepts or any commands as a code of laws to any denomination or class of people as such, distinct from his own covenant people or church; and this fact i beg leave to submit as a conclusive evidence that civil governments and civil rulers exist only by god's decretive will and not by his preceptive will. under the ancient dispensation no laws or directions were given to any class of men, as such, other than god's own covenant people or church, unless some special commands on singular occasions, or the general command to repent and turn to god, be excepted. the king on the throne of israel was as truly an officer in the church of god as the high priest who entered into the holy of holies. both were set apart and anointed with the holy oil, at the command of god, and both were types of the son of god. the king as much typified his kingly office as the priest did his priestly office. both were necessary parts of that complete shadow of good things then to come. under the gospel dispensation no authority from god is to be found for appointing and setting apart civil rulers, nor are there any directions given to civil rulers, _as such_, how to conduct in their office, unless those who rule in the church are called civil rulers. all the precepts and directions in the gospel, excepting such as were special (as those which related only to the apostles) or such as are universal (relating alike to all men), are given to the disciples as members of christ's kingdom, who are not of this world, even as he was not of this world. the son of god came into the world to set up the kingdom of heaven, which is a perfect and everlasting kingdom and distinct from all other kingdoms which are to be destroyed to give place to his divine and heavenly reign. he came in the likeness of men, sin excepted, and laid down his life a ransom for the world, and then rose a triumphant conqueror, and in the complex character of god and man, as mediator, he took the universe, his purchased possession, into his hands as a lawgiver, judge, and rewarder. he took the scepter when it departed from judah, and is exalted far above all principality and power and might and dominion, and has a name above every name, all executive power in heaven and earth being given to him as mediator. thus, as mediator, the kingdom of heaven is his kingdom. he reigns not only as king of kings and lord of lords but seated on the throne of his father david, he is forever king in zion and is head over all things to his church. his kingdom is not of this world, neither are his subjects of this world, though some of them are in it. he sent out his disciples to appear in a distinct character from the world and to be a light to it by imitating his example and by exhibiting his spirit and temper. they ought not to say, as the jews did, that they have no king but cæsar, for they have an everlasting king and kingdom and laws perfect and eternal. they should, therefore, set their affections on things above and not on things beneath. while the kingdoms of this world exist, christians must remain in captivity to them and must obey all their laws which are not contrary to the laws of the gospel; otherwise they cannot remain peaceful, harmless, and blameless in the midst of a wicked world before whom they must shine as lights. though the church is now in captivity, yet her redemption draweth nigh, for god will soon "overthrow the throne of kingdoms," and the thrones will be cast down and the princes of this world will come to naught. the stone which was cut out of the mountain without hands will dash them to pieces, as the potter's vessel is shivered, and will become a great mountain and fill the whole earth; then the kingdom and the dominion and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven shall be given to the people of the saints of the most high god whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom and of whose dominion there shall be no end. though god, by his decree, has ordained civil governments and established kingdoms, and will by his providence make them subservient to the good of his church and people, and notwithstanding it is the duty of christians to be in subjection to them and pay tribute, yet it does not follow that their genius and laws may not often be contrary to the genius and laws of the gospel, and when they are so christians must not obey them nor count their lives dear to themselves. it should be distinctly remembered that when christians were exhorted and commanded to be obedient to civil rulers, they were under heathen, idolatrous, civil governments, and those civil governments were by no means congenial with the spirit and precepts of the gospel; still christians were commanded to be in subjection to them; not, however, without limitation, for they utterly refused obedience in many instances and nobly suffered or died as martyrs. thus civil government may be an ordinance of god, may be subservient to the good of the church, may be an instrument in god's hands of executing his wrath, and christians may be bound to obey magistrates in all things not contrary to the gospel; and yet it will not follow that christians may consistently with the gospel take up the sword or do anything to countenance war. if it be the duty of christians to take the sword and enter the field of battle at the command of their civil rulers, then there could be no impropriety in having armies wholly made up of real christians, especially since it is the duty of every man to become a christian; and as professing christian nations are almost constantly fighting each other, it would be perfectly proper for hosts of pious saints to be daily engaged in shedding each other's blood. but how would it appear, how does it appear, for those who have drunk into the same peaceful and heavenly spirit, who are united together by the tender ties of the redeemer's blood, who are all members of the same family, and who hope through divine grace to dwell together in everlasting love and blessedness, to be fighting one another here with relentless fury? let us contemplate the subject, in this point of view, a little further. suppose an english and an american frigate in the time of war, both manned entirely with real christians, should meet in a neutral port. ought they not then to conduct towards each other as brethren of one common lord? as they are all members of the same family and have all been redeemed by the same blood, and sanctified by the same divine spirit, they surely must have the most tender affection for each other, and it would be highly proper for them to meet together for christian fellowship, worship, and communion. suppose, then, that they occasionally go on board each other's ships for religious worship; that their chaplains lead in their devotions, using such petitions as these--praying that they may be all of one heart and one mind in the knowledge of christ, knit together in the bonds of christian love; that they may have much of the wisdom from above which is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated; that they may do good to all as they have opportunity, especially to the household of faith; that they may be meek and gentle as lambs and harmless as doves; that they may be kind and forgiving and that, like their divine master, they may return good for evil and have their affections on things above and not on things beneath; after which they unitedly partake of the symbols of christ's broken body and shed blood, and then part with the tenderest tokens of christian fellowship and love. they leave the port and meet again at sea. it now becomes their duty, on the principles of war, instead of meeting as christian brethren, to meet as raging tigers and discharge the flaming engines of death on each other; and in order to perform "their duty to their god and country," they must exert all their power and skill to destroy one another. the dreadful struggle and carnage must be continued by both parties as long as both can fight. when half of their crews are wallowing in their blood and expiring in agonies, a violent effort must be made by one or both to board the other and end the contest sword in hand. those hands which recently saluted each other with christian love now plunge the envenomed steel into their brethren's bosoms. at length one is vanquished and yields to the other. those who remain alive after the conflict again unite in prayer and give thanks to god that he has given them courage and strength to fight so nobly, and that he has shielded their lives in the hour of battle. thus they again resume their christian fellowship and communion. this mutual fellowship, communion, and love are perfectly consistent with christian character and are required by it. the conduct which has been supposed as enemies when fighting is also entirely consistent with the principles of war and with the character of warriors, and is such as would be highly applauded and admired by the world. but is it not obviously and perfectly absurd and perfectly incompatible with the principles of the gospel for christians to act in this twofold character? if, however, it is the duty of christians to obey the command of their rulers and engage in war, then it would be perfectly proper for what has been supposed to take place. christians may one day surround the table of the lord together, and the next kill and destroy each other. the god of this world, not being yet chained down to hell, deceives the nations and gathers them together to battle; but the children of peace, the citizens of zion, ought not to mingle with them or listen to the deceiver. they should take to themselves not carnal weapons but the whole armor of god, that they may be able to stand in an evil day and to quench all the fiery darts of satan. _objection thirteenth._ to deny the right of the magistrate to call on his subjects to take the sword is to deny that he is an avenger to execute wrath, though the gospel expressly declares that he is. _answer._ this conclusion does not follow unless it is a fact that god cannot and does not actually make him the instrument of doing it, by his providence, without his command; for, as we have already observed, men may fulfill the decrees of god under his providence, without his command, and be very criminal in the deed. god raised up the king of assyria and made him the rod of his anger, to chastise his people and to execute wrath upon the ungodly nations around. "howbeit he meant not so, but it was in his heart to _cut off_ nations not a few." and god declared, with reference to him, "that when he had performed his whole work he would punish the fruit of his stout heart and the glory of his high looks." it will not be contended that warlike nations are commanded by god to destroy and trample down the nations of the earth as the dust of their feet; yet, when they do so, they doubtless fulfill his high decree and are avengers to execute his wrath on a wicked world. the beast represented in the revelation with seven heads and ten horns has generally been considered as an emblem of nations. these ten horns, or powers, are to hate the great harlot of babylon; to eat her flesh and burn her with fire; and though they destroy the greatest enemy of the church, and in this way are ministers of good to her, yet they receive their power and their seat and their authority from the old serpent, the dragon. and a magistrate or king may be a minister of good to the church and an avenger to execute wrath, and still be very wicked in the deed and use very unlawful means to accomplish the end. while he fulfills the decree of heaven, he acts not in obedience to the command of god, but to the dictates of his own lusts and passions. _objection fourteenth._ the passages of scripture which have been quoted against retaliation and which inculcate love to enemies and the returning of good for evil have reference to individuals in their conduct towards each other, but have no relation to civil government and are not intended as a rule of duty for one nation towards another; they therefore have no bearing on the subject of war. _answer._ those precepts of the gospel appear to be binding universally without any limitation, and men have no right to limit that which god has not limited. if the commands of the gospel are binding upon every one in his individual capacity, then they must be binding upon every one in any collective body, so that whatever is morally wrong for every individual must be equally wrong for a collective body; and a nation is only a large number of individuals united so as to act collectively as one person. therefore, if it is criminal for an individual to lie, steal, quarrel, and fight, it is also criminal for nations to lie, steal, quarrel, and fight. if it is the duty of an individual to be kind and tender-hearted and to have a forgiving and merciful disposition, it is likewise the duty of nations to be kind, forgiving, and merciful. if it is the duty of an individual to return good for evil, then it is the duty of nations to return good for evil. it is self-evident that individuals cannot delegate power to communities which they do not possess themselves. therefore, if every individual is bound to obey the precepts of the gospel and cannot as an individual be released from the obligation, then individuals have no power to release any collective body from that obligation. to say that god has given to nations a right to return evil for evil is begging the question, for it does not appear and cannot be shown that god has restricted the precepts of the gospel to individuals, or that he has given any precepts to nations as such, or to any other community than his own covenant people or church. this objection makes government an abstraction according with the common saying, "government is without a soul." no practice has a more corrupt tendency than that of attempting to limit the scriptures so as to make them trim with the corrupt practices of mankind. whoever, for the sake of supporting war, attempts to limit these precepts of the gospel to individuals and denies that they are binding upon nations destroys one of the main pillars by which the lawfulness of war is upheld. the right of nations to defend themselves with the sword is argued on the supposed right of individual self-preservation; as it is said to be right for individuals to defend themselves with deathly weapons, so it is lawful for nations to have recourse to the sword for defense of their rights. but if these passages are applicable to individuals and prohibit them from acts of retaliation, and if the rights of nations are founded on the rights of individuals, then nations have no right to retaliate injury. _objection fifteenth._ christians, with comparatively few exceptions, have not doubted the lawfulness of war, and many have actually fought and bled on the field of battle and considered themselves in the way of their duty. and shall all our pious forefathers be condemned for engaging in war? _answer._ it is admitted that many pious people have engaged in war, but they might have been in an error on this subject as well as on many other subjects. many of our pious forefathers engaged in the slavery of their fellow-men, and thought themselves in the way of their duty; but does it follow that they were not in an error? the circumstance that multitudes defend a sentiment is no certain evidence of its truth. some of the reformers were objected to because the multitude were against them. popularity, however, ever has influenced and ever will influence mankind more than plain gospel duty, until the earth shall be filled with the abundance of peace. but notwithstanding this, it is not right to follow the multitude to do evil. all ought to remember that they have no right to follow the example of any one any further than that example coincides with the example of christ or the precepts of the gospel; all other standards are fallible and dangerous. if real christians have, from mistaken zeal, prayed against each other and fought each other and shed each other's blood, this does not justify war. _objection sixteenth._ if christians generally should adopt these sentiments, it would be impossible for them to subsist in this world in its present state, and if they did continue it must be in abject slavery. they would become hewers of wood and drawers of water to the tyrannical and oppressive, and would only encourage them in their deeds of wickedness. the injustice of men must be restrained or the earth will again be filled with violence. the necessity of the case is such that mankind would be warranted to take up arms to maintain their rights and repel oppressors, if the scriptures were silent on the subject.[2] _answer._ we have the history of the heathen world to teach us what mankind are without the light of revelation. they are full of all unrighteousness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of enmity, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; they are proud, boasters, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful. now the very design of the gospel is to subdue and overcome these abominable passions and dispositions; not however by returning violence for violence but by producing virtues directly contrary. the great duty of christians is to be a light to this wicked world by exhibiting in their conduct and conversation the spirit and temper of the gospel. if such were the practice of christians, we have reason to believe that wicked men would be overawed and deterred from their violence in a great measure. besides, if all real christians should utterly refuse to bear arms for the destruction of their fellow-men, it would greatly diminish the strength and boldness of warlike nations, so that it would be impracticable for them to prosecute war with the vigor and fury that they now do. but if the gospel prohibits war, then to urge the necessity of the case against the commands of god is open rebellion against his government as well as total distrust of his word and providence. if christians live in habitual obedience to god's commands, they have the promise that all things shall work together for their good, and they have no reason to fear them that kill the body and after that "have no more that they can do." it is strange that christians should have so great a reluctance to suffer inconvenience in worldly things for the sake of the gospel. the scoffs and persecutions of the world and the fear of the loss of worldly things are powerful barriers against _christian_ warfare. the gospel teaches us that all who live godly in christ jesus shall suffer persecution, and that through much tribulation the saints must enter into the kingdom of heaven; and is it not plainly owing wholly to their conformity to the world that they now suffer so little persecution and practice so little self-denial? if there is reserved for them an eternal weight of glory, what if they, like their divine master, should not have where to lay their heads? if they are to inherit a crown of immortal glory, what if they are called to suffer the loss of earthly things? if they are hereafter to reign as kings and priests unto god, what if they are not ranked among the great and honorable of the earth? if they suffer with christ, then will they also reign with him; but if they deny him, he also will deny them; and if they are ashamed of him, he will also be ashamed of them before his father and the holy angels. let christians then obey his commands and trust to his protection while they resolutely abstain from the wicked practices of the world. _objection seventeenth._ it is the duty of mankind to use means for the preservation of life and liberty; they must till the ground, if they expect a crop. it would be presumptuous for them to pray for and to expect their daily bread without using such means as god has put in their power to obtain it; and it would be equally presumptuous to expect the preservation of their lives and liberties without using such means to preserve and defend them as god has put into their hand; they must act as well as pray. _answer._ that using means is the duty of christians, there can be no doubt; but they must be such as god has appointed, and not such as human wisdom may dictate. there is no dispute as to the propriety of using means, but only as to the kind of means which christians ought to use. the weapons of their warfare are not carnal, but spiritual, and they are mighty through god to the pulling down the strongholds of sin and satan. it is often said, if you wish to put a stop to war, spread the gospel through the world. we would inquire, if the gospel tolerates war, how will its universal diffusion put a stop to war? as has already been observed, it would be open rebellion to do what god has forbidden, and high-handed presumption to ask his aid in the things which he has prohibited. _objection eighteenth._ some ecclesiastical historians inform us that christians in the early ages of the church, though they contended so firmly for the faith as to suffer martyrdom rather than submit to idolatry, yet did not refuse to bear arms in defense of their country, even when called upon by heathen magistrates, and their example ought to have weight with us. _answer._ the testimony of the early fathers is entitled to regard, but must not be considered as infallible authority, for they were men of like passions with others and cannot be followed safely any farther than they followed christ. but the weight of their testimony on the subject, i apprehend, will be found to stand directly against the lawfulness of war on christian principles. erasmus, who was an eminent scholar, and who was probably as well acquainted with the sentiments of the primitive fathers as any modern writer, in his _antipolemus, or plea against war_, replies to the advocates of war as follows: "they further object those opinions or decrees of the fathers in which war seems to be approved. of this sort there are some, but they are only late writers, who appeared when the true spirit of christianity began to languish, and they are very few; while, on the other hand, there are innumerable ones among the writers of acknowledged sanctity which absolutely forbid war; and why should the few rather than the many intrude themselves into our mind?" barclay, who examined the writings of the fathers on this subject, says, "it is as easy to obscure the sun at midday as to deny that the primitive christians renounced all revenge and war." clarkson, who also examined the fathers, declares that "every christian writer of the second century who notices the subject makes it unlawful for christians to bear arms." clarkson has made copious extracts from the writings of the fathers against war, a few of which, as quoted by him and others, shall be inserted here. justin martyr and tatian both considered the devil the author of war. justin martyr, while speaking of the prophecies relating to the days of peace, says, "that this prophecy is fulfilled you have good reason to believe, for we who in times past killed one another do not now fight with our enemies." clarkson adds, "it is observable that the word 'fight' does not mean to strike, beat, or give a blow, but to fight in war; and the word 'enemy' does not mean a common adversary who has injured us, but an enemy of state." irenæus says that christians in his day "had changed their swords and their lances into instruments of peace, and that they knew not how to fight." maximilian and a number of others in the second century actually suffered martyrdom for refusing, on gospel principles, to bear arms. celsus made it one of his charges against the christians that they refused to bear arms for the emperor. origen, in the following century, admitted the fact and justified the christians on the ground of the unlawfulness of war itself. tertullian, in his discourse to scapula, tells us "that no christians were to be found in the roman armies." in his declaration on the worship of idols he says, "though the soldiers came to john and received a certain form to be observed, and though the centurion believed, yet jesus christ, by disarming peter disarmed every soldier afterwards; for custom can never sanction an illicit act." again, in his _soldier's garland_, he says: "can a soldier's life be lawful, when christ has pronounced that he who lives by the sword shall perish by the sword? can one who professes the peaceable doctrine of the gospel be a soldier when it is his duty not so much as to go to law? and shall he who is not to avenge his own wrongs be instrumental in bringing others into chains, imprisonment, torment, and death?" he tells us, also, that the christians in his day were sufficiently numerous to have defended themselves if their religion had permitted them to have recourse to the sword. there are some marvelous accounts of christian soldiers related by eusebius; but valesius, in his annotations on these accounts, has abundantly proved them to be fabulous, though he was not opposed to war and could have had no other object but to support the truth. eusebius, in his orations on constantine, uses such extravagant adulation, which falls but little short of idolatry, that his account of christian warriors ought to be received with great caution, especially when we recollect that church and state were, in his day, united. on the whole, it is very evident that the early christians did refuse to bear arms, and although one of their objections was the idolatrous rites connected with military service, yet they did object on account of the unlawfulness of war itself. we have no good evidence of christians being found in the armies until we have evidence of great corruption in the church. but admitting that we had good evidence that there were professing christians in the army at an early period of the church, i apprehend it would be of little importance, for the idolatrous rites and ceremonies of the heathen armies were of such a nature as to be totally inconsistent with christian character, and the example of idolatrous christians surely ought to have no weight. some objections of less importance might be stated which have from time to time been made against the sentiments here advocated; but to state and reply to everything that might be said is not necessary. specious objections have been and still are made to almost every doctrine of christianity. mankind can generally find some plausible arguments to support whatever they wish to believe. the pleas in favor of war are very congenial with the natural feelings of the human heart, and unless men will examine with a serious, candid, and prayerful disposition to ascertain the truth as it is in jesus, they will be very likely to imbibe and defend error.[3] the writer, though far from supposing that everything he has said on a subject that has been so little discussed is free from error, is conscious of having endeavored to examine it with seriousness and candor, and feels satisfied that the general sentiments he has advanced are according to godliness. he sincerely hopes that every one who may peruse these pages will do it in the meek and unbiased spirit of the gospel, and then judge whether war can be reconciled with the lamblike example of christ; whether it is really forgiving the trespasses of enemies, loving and doing them good, and returning good for evil; for if it is not, it is unquestionably inconsistent with the spirit and the precepts of christianity. all who earnestly desire and look for the millennial glory of the church should consider that it can never arrive until the spirit and practice of war are abolished. all who love our lord jesus christ in sincerity cannot but ardently desire that wars may cease to the ends of the earth and that mankind should embrace each other as brethren. if so, is it not their duty to do all in their power to promote so benevolent an object? ought not every individual christian to conduct in such a manner that if every other person imitated his example it would be best for the whole? if so, would they not immediately renounce everything that leads to wars and fightings and embrace everything which would promote that glorious reign of righteousness and peace for which they earnestly hope, long, and pray? "the work of righteousness shall be peace, and the effect of righteousness, quietness and assurance forever." footnotes: [1] says the rev. dr. scott, in his essay, p. 422: "we ought not therefore to fear our enemies because he will be with us, and if god be for us, who can be against us? or who can doubt but he that is in us is greater than he that is in the world? this was typically intimated in the promises made to israel respecting their wars with the canaanites and other nations, which were shadows and figures of the good fight of faith." bishop horne, in his preface to the psalms, views the subject in the same light. [2] all these objections introduced are carefully selected from some of the ablest advocates for the lawfulness of war. [3] the last point american christians will give up is the justification of their fathers in the war of the revolution. hymn suggested by the preceding train of thought, and appended to the original edition of the essay on war great sun of glory, rise and shine, dispel the gloom of night; let the foul spirits stretch their wings, and fly before thy light. rebuke the nations, stop their rage, destroy the warrior's skill, hush all the tumults of the earth; o speak! say, "peace, be still." break, break the cruel warrior's sword, asunder cut his bow, command him by thy sovereign word to let the captives go. no more let heroes' glory sound, no more their triumphs tell, bring all the pride of nations down- let war return to hell. then let thy blessed kingdom come, with all its heavenly train, and pour thy peaceful spirit down, like gentle showers of rain. then shall the prowling beasts of prey, like lambs be meek and mild; vipers and asps shall harmless twine around the weaned child. the happy sons of zion sit secure beneath their vines; or, shadowed by their fig-tree's tops, shall drink their cheering wines. the nations to thy scepter bow, and own "thy gentle sway"; then all the wandering tribes of men to thee their tribute pay. angelic hosts shall view the scene, delighted, spread their wings; down to the earth again they fly, and strike their lofty strings. the listening nations catch the sound, and join the heavenly choir, to swell aloud the song of praise, and vie with sacred fire. "glory to god on high!" they sound, in strains of angels' mirth; "good will and peace" to men, they sing, since heaven is brought to earth. the mediator's kingdom not of this world: but spiritual by an inquirer the writer of the following pages has, for a considerable time, doubted the propriety of some of the common practices of christians. to satisfy himself he has, if he is not deceived, candidly and diligently examined the scriptures with a view to ascertain and practice the truth. after considerable inquiry his doubts increased. he then applied to some highly respectable and pious friends, who frankly acknowledged that they had never fully examined the subject, as they had never had any doubt concerning it. they judged the matter weighty and advised him to arrange his thoughts and commit them to paper. this he has endeavored to do as well as a very infirm state of body and a press of commercial business would admit. after submitting what he had written to some of his friends, they unanimously advised him to lay it before the public, hoping that it might have a tendency to call the subject into notice and lead to a more complete and full examination. with this view he has ventured to commit the following sheets to the press. he has only to beg that the christian who may take the trouble to read them will not be so solicitous to reply to the arguments as to examine and illustrate the truth. the kingdom of our glorious mediator is but little noticed in the world, yet it is precious in the eyes of the lord. the lord hath chosen zion. she is the redeemed of the lord. he hath said, he who touches her touches the apple of his eye. she is purchased by the blood of the lamb, sanctified by the spirit of grace, and defended by the arm of omnipotence. notwithstanding she may still be covered with sackcloth, the days of her mourning have an end. the lord will raise her from the dust and make her an eternal excellency and the joy of many generations. the mystical body of christ is composed of that innumerable company which no man can number,--out of every nation and kindred and people and tongue,--which will finally stand before the throne of god and the lamb, clothed with white robes and palms in their hands. it is but one body, although composed of many members. the temple, which was a symbol of the church, was composed of many stones, although but one building. the spiritual temple is built of lively stones upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, jesus christ himself being the chief corner stone. this spiritual temple will continue to rise under different dispensations until the elect are gathered together from the four winds of heaven and the top stone is carried up with shouts of grace, grace, unto it! the mediator's kingdom is not of this world. "jesus answered, my kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that i should not be delivered to the jews" (john xviii. 36). in remarking upon these words we are naturally led to consider, i. what the mediator's kingdom is. ii. its nature. iii. its laws. from which we propose to make several inferences and illustrations for improvement. agreeably to the arrangement of our subject, we shall first endeavor to ascertain what the kingdom of the mediator is; or that kingdom which he so emphatically calls "my kingdom," in distinction from all other kingdoms. "jesus answered, my kingdom----" our glorious mediator takes to himself the majesty of a sovereign and claims a kingdom. in his mediatorial character he possesses, in an extensive sense, universal empire. he is exalted far above all principality and power and might and dominion, and has a name which is above every name. he is king of kings and lord of lords. he is not only king on his holy hill of zion but rules amongst the nations. he is, however, in an appropriate sense, king of saints under the gospel dispensation, as he governs the worlds with a view to his own glory and their exaltation. that the church, under the gospel dispensation, is in a special manner the kingdom of heaven or the kingdom which christ so often called his kingdom appears evident (it is thought) from many passages of scripture. the prophet daniel, while interpreting the symbols of the four great empires which were to arise in the earth, adds that "in the days of these kings shall the god of heaven set up a kingdom which shall never be destroyed." this kingdom could not be the church universal, for that was established in the family of adam and had continued without being broken in a line of holy men down to the prophet's day. it must therefore have a special reference to something future. when john the baptist came preaching, he said, "repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," fully implying that it had not then commenced. he preached repentance preparatory to ushering in that kingdom which the god of heaven was about to set up. in the days of the fourth great kingdom mentioned in the prophecy of daniel the lord jesus christ came into our world to establish his kingdom. as he entered upon his ministry he declared that the time was fulfilled and that the kingdom of god was at hand. when he first commissioned his disciples and sent them forth to preach, he directed them to say to their hearers, "the kingdom of god is come nigh unto you." in speaking of john the baptist, he says, he was the greatest of prophets; but adds, "he that is least in the kingdom of god is greater than he"; which must be conclusive evidence that john the baptist was not in the kingdom of god. at the last supper, after our lord had blessed and partaken of the bread, he said to his disciples, "i will not any more eat thereof until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of god." in like manner, after taking the cup, he said, "i will not drink of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of god shall come." all of which seems fully to imply that the kingdom which the god of heaven was about to set up did not commence before the gospel dispensation. christ came under the mosaic dispensation, that is, under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, by the sacrifice of himself; "and being found in the fashion of a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. wherefore god hath highly exalted him, and hath given him a name which is above every name." after he arose from the dead he appeared to his disciples "by many infallible proofs, being seen of them forty days, and speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of god." "and jesus came and spake unto them, saying, all power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the father, and of the son, and of the holy ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever i have commanded you: and, lo, i am with you always, even unto the end of the world. amen." here we see the mediator possessing a kingdom and giving laws to his subjects and commanding obedience. although his kingdom was then small, like a little leaven, yet it had the power to leaven the whole lump. the stone which was cut out of the mountain without hands will become a great mountain and fill the whole earth. every knee must finally bow to his scepter and every tongue confess that he is lord to the glory of god the father. from this concise view of the subject we conclude that the kingdom of god, or christ's kingdom, is in a special manner the gospel dispensation which was not completely established until after the resurrection of our lord. ii. the next point of inquiry is its nature. "jesus answered, my kingdom is not of this world." by this we understand the mediator's kingdom, not being of this world, supposes that its nature, its laws, and its government are all distinct from the nature, laws, and governments of this world. that the mediator's kingdom is not of this world, but spiritual, heavenly, and divine, will fully appear, it is apprehended, from the following reasons. 1st. from the character of the king. he was not born like the kings of the earth. he was the son of the living god and heir of all things. he was conceived by the power of the holy ghost and born of a virgin. his birth was not celebrated with the earthly pomp of princes, but by a few humble shepherds and a choir of angels. his palace was a stable and his cradle a manger. when a child he was not amused with toys, but was about his father's business. when he was dedicated to his ministry, it was not by the appointment of kings, or the consecration of bishops, but by the baptism of his humble forerunner, and the descent of the holy ghost in a bodily shape like a dove, and a voice from the excellent glory, saying, "this is my beloved son, in whom i am well pleased." his companions were the despised fishermen of galilee and the angels of heaven. he was "a man of sorrow and acquainted with grief"; yet he was the eternal son of the eternal father. nature owned his voice and devils trembled at his power; but he was despised and rejected of men. when he fed the hungry multitude, they were gratified with the loaves and fishes and sought to make him a king; but he departed out of the place; for his kingdom was not of this world. when satan, the god of this world, offered him all the kingdoms of this world and the glory of them if he would only fall down and worship him, he rebuked him with holy contempt and said, get thee hence, satan; for his kingdom was not of this world. the mediator did not intermeddle with the affairs of the governments of this world; for his kingdom was not of this world. when he was solicited to command a brother to divide his earthly substance, instead of complying with the request he only gave a pointed admonition and said, "man, who made me a judge, or a divider, over you?" when his enemies endeavored to catch him in his words by extorting from him something unfavorable to the laws of cæsar, jesus answered them and said, "render to cæsar the things which are cæsar's, and to god the things which are god's." when they demanded of him tribute, and that unjustly, according to their own laws, he paid it without a murmur, to set an example of peace and quietness for his disciples. in all things he avoided interfering or meddling with the governments of this world. 2dly. from the representations of the bible, "the kingdom of god is righteousness, peace, and joy in the holy ghost." the mediator's kingdom is founded in right. his scepter is a right scepter. he rules in righteousness. "the unrighteous shall not inherit the kingdom of god." righteousness is opposed to all injustice, oppression, and cruelty; it regards the rights of god and man; it requires love to the lord our god with all our heart, with all our mind, and with all our strength, and to our neighbors as ourselves. his kingdom is a kingdom of peace; he is the prince of peace. at his birth the angels sang, "peace on earth, and good will to men." peace is opposed directly to all contention, war, and tumult, whether it regards individuals, societies, or nations. it forbids all wrath, clamor, and evil speaking. it forbids the resistance of evil or retaliation, and requires good for evil, blessing for cursing, and prayer for persecution. our glorious mediator not only exhibited a pattern of peace in his life but preached peace in the great congregation. his last and richest legacy to his disciples was the gift of peace: "my peace i leave with you, my peace i give unto you: not as the world giveth, give i unto you." christ came in the power of the spirit, and was full of the holy ghost. it is the communion of the holy ghost which fills the kingdom of heaven with that joy which is unspeakable and full of glory. "except a man be born of the spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven." finally, we have his own express declaration, "my kingdom is not of this world." from what has been said it may be concluded that the mediator's kingdom is, in a special sense, the gospel dispensation, or the kingdom of heaven, and that it is not of this world, but spiritual, heavenly, and divine. and this brings us to notice, iii. the laws by which it is governed. it is governed by the same laws which regulate the heavenly hosts. "be ye therefore perfect, even as your father in heaven is perfect," is the command of our divine master. it is the kingdom of heaven. "jesus said, my kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that i should not be delivered to the jews." the laws of the mediator's kingdom require supreme love to god. jesus said, "thou shalt love the lord thy god with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is the first and great commandment." this implies right apprehension of his being and perfections, and supreme love to his word and delight in his law, such as the sweet singer of israel expressed: o how i love thy law! it is my meditation day and night. it implies unlimited confidence in god and unshaken belief in the testimony he has given of his son and a spirit of filial obedience to all his precepts. the laws of the mediator's kingdom require love to man: "thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself." this prohibits rendering to any man evil for evil; but, contrariwise, it demands blessing. it utterly forbids wrath, hatred, malice, envy, pride, revenge, and fighting; but requires, on the contrary, meekness, forgiveness, long-suffering, tenderness, compassion, and mercy. the subjects of the mediator's kingdom are commanded to do good to all as they have opportunity; but especially to those of the household of faith. this command extends not only to the gentle and kind but to the disobedient and froward; to friends and to enemies. "if thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink," is the command of our lord. this injunction, it is apprehended, is directly opposed to resisting the oppression of enemies by force. jesus said, "if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight"; but, instead of avenging wrongs, the explicit direction is "to overcome evil with good." the mediator is the only avenger of the wrongs done to his subjects: "for it is written, vengeance is mine, and i will repay, saith the lord." in a special manner the subjects of the mediator must love the brethren. they must visit the widow, the fatherless, and the afflicted, and live unspotted from the world. the lord accepts every act of kindness done to the brethren as done to himself, and regards every act of injustice, cruelty, and revenge towards them as expressed towards himself. he considers them his own property, the purchase of his blood. he will, therefore, not only be their portion but their defense; a wall of fire round about them and a glory in the midst. the mediator sits as king upon his holy hill of zion, and is swaying his scepter in righteousness throughout his vast dominions. * * * * * having very briefly considered what the mediator's kingdom in a special manner is, its nature and its laws, we now pass, as was proposed, to make several inferences and illustrations. 1st. if the mediator's kingdom is in a special manner the gospel dispensation, and its nature and laws are not of this world, but spiritual, heavenly, and divine, then we may infer that the kingdoms of this world are not united to the kingdom of our lord, but are opposed to it. if they are not for him, they are against him; and if they gather not with him, they scatter abroad. they must, therefore, be at war with the lamb; but the lamb shall overcome them, for he hath on his vesture and on his thigh a name written, king of kings and lord of lords. the great conflict in our world is between the kingdom of the mediator and the kingdom of satan; but the victory is not uncertain. although the "heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing, the kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the lord, and against his anointed, saying, let us break their bands asunder, and cast away their cords from us. he that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh: the lord shall have them in derision. then shall he speak to them in his wrath, and vex them in his sore displeasure." "out of his mouth goeth a sharp sword, that with it he should smite the nations; and he shall rule them with a rod of iron: and he treadeth the winepress of the fierceness and wrath of almighty god." the psalmist, by the holy ghost, says of christ, "thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them to pieces like a potter's vessel." again, "he shall cut off the spirit of princes; he is terrible to the kings of the earth." isaiah, by the revealing spirit, had the scenes of futurity opened to his view. he saw the glorious redeemer marching through the earth in the greatness of his power; for he saw, by prophetic vision, the great day of his wrath appear, and none but his redeemed were able to stand. in view of the dreadful scene his soul was filled with astonishment, and he exclaims: "who is this that cometh from edom, with dyed garments from bozrah? this that is glorious in his apparel, travelling in the greatness of his strength? i that speak in righteousness, mighty to save. wherefore art thou red in thine apparel, and thy garments like him that treadeth in the winefat? i have trodden the winepress alone; and of the people there was none with me: for i will tread them in my anger, and trample them in my fury; and their blood shall be sprinkled upon my garments. for the day of vengeance is in my heart, and the year of my redeemed is come. i looked, and there was none to help; and i wondered there was none to uphold: therefore mine arm brought salvation unto me; and my fury, it upheld me. and i will tread down the people in my anger, and make them drunk in my fury, and i will bring down their strength to the earth." from this it appears that the nations of the earth will be gathered like the grapes of a vineyard, and cast into the great wine press of the wrath of god almighty; and the great redeemer will thresh them in his anger and trample them in his fury. their destruction must be inevitable if their laws and governments are directly opposed to the mediator's kingdom. when he shall come out of his place to shake terribly the nations of the earth, then the _earth_[4] will no longer cover the blood of the slain; for he will make inquisition for blood, and write up the nations. then he will stain the pride of all glory and bring into contempt all the honorable of the earth. the nations will be like stubble before the devouring fire, and will be chased away like chaff before the whirlwind, and no place will be found for them. the interpretation of the symbols of the four great empires by the prophet daniel fully confirms this idea. in first describing the vision to nebuchadnezzar he says: "thou sawest till that a stone was cut out without hands, which smote the image upon his feet that were of iron and clay, and brake them to pieces. then was the iron, the clay, the brass, the silver, and the gold, broken to pieces together, and became like the chaff of the summer threshingfloors; and the wind carried them away, that no place was found for them: and the stone that smote the image became a great mountain, and filled the whole earth." the prophet thus interprets the vision: "and in the days of these kings shall the god of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand for ever. forasmuch as thou sawest that the stone was cut out of the mountain without hands, and that it brake in pieces the iron, the brass, the clay, the silver, and the gold; the great god hath made known to the king what shall come to pass hereafter." thus we see that the kingdoms of the world by not submitting to the kingdom of our lord, but by making war with the lamb, are devoted to awful destruction, for the lamb will overcome them. his kingdom will stand, for it is an everlasting kingdom; and of his dominion there shall be no end. the gospel dispensation (or the kingdom of heaven) must remain forever, as it is governed by the same spirit which prevails in the eternal fountain of blessedness himself. it is therefore emphatically called the kingdom of god not only in distinction from the kingdoms of this world but in distinction from all the other dispensations of the church. it is not of this world; it is the kingdom of heaven,--the reign of righteousness, peace, and joy in the holy ghost. 2. if the mediator's kingdom is not of this world, but spiritual, heavenly, and divine, and the kingdoms of this world are opposed to it, then we may infer that the kingdoms of this world must belong to the kingdom of satan. there are but two kingdoms in our world. at the head of one is the mediator, and at the head of the other is satan. satan is the god of this world and reigns without a rival in the hearts of the children of disobedience. he is the prince of the power of the air. all the kingdoms of this world and the glory of them are given to him[5] until the time that god shall write up the nations and make inquisition for blood. then the great battle of god almighty will be fought, and the beast and the false prophet will be cast into a lake of fire; and satan will be bound a thousand years; and the saints will take the kingdom and possess it; and wars shall cease from under heaven. after the thousand years satan will again be let loose, "and shall go out to deceive the nations which are in the four quarters of the earth, gog and magog, to gather them together to battle: the number of whom is as the sand of the sea." "and the devil who deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever." thus it appears that satan is the mainspring of all warlike powers, and when he is bound wars will cease; but as soon as he is again let loose they will rage. the writer is sensible that this will be a very unpopular doctrine with the men of this world, and with those worldly christians who are struggling and teasing and panting for the profits and the honors of this world. if it is a fact that the nature and laws of the mediator's kingdom are diametrically opposite to the kingdoms of this world, then the inference is irresistible that the kingdoms of this world belong not to the kingdom of our lord but to the kingdom of satan; and however unsavory the truth may be, it ought not to be disguised. satan is the strong man, but the mediator is the stronger, and he will bind him and spoil his goods. the son of god was manifested that he might destroy the works of the devil. when he shall destroy the rage of the nations and the tumult of the people, then satan's goods will be spoiled. when satan is cast into the bottomless pit, tumult and war will retire with him back to hell; and instead of the blast of the trumpet and the groans of the dying will be heard the shouts of the saints and the songs of the redeemed. then will be "heard as it were the voice of a great multitude, and as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunderings, saying, alleluia, for the lord god omnipotent reigneth." 3. if the mediator's kingdom is not of this world, and the kingdoms of this world are under satan's dominion, then we may infer the great impropriety of the subjects of the mediator's kingdom using the weapons of this world and engaging in tumults, wars, and fightings. "jesus answered, my kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that i should not be delivered to the jews." the jews expected in their messiah a temporal prince; but because his kingdom was not of this world they crucified the lord of life and glory. had he only appeared in the pomp of this world and in the splendor of a temporal conqueror to vanquish the romans who were in possession of their earthly canaan and oppressing their nation, they would immediately have rallied round his standard and followed him to earthly conquest and glory. he was apparently too inattentive to their rights and liberties (which the patriots of this world now emphatically call their dearest interests). they said, "if we let him alone, all men will believe on him; and the romans shall take away both our place and our nation." it may be asked, why were the jews apprehensive, if all men should believe on him, the romans would take away both their place and their nation? the answer does not appear difficult. they doubtless perceived that both his life and precepts directly opposed rendering vengeance to their enemies; and, on the contrary, demanded nothing less than love to their enemies, good for evil, and blessing for cursing. this they could not endure, as it directly opposed their carnal desires and filled them with malice against the prince of peace. they might, with much greater propriety than any nation under the gospel light, have said, "shall we imbibe this pusillanimous spirit of doing good to those who oppress us and tamely bend our necks to the yoke of tyranny and suffer our dearest interests to be wrested from us without once making a struggle to defend them? rather, let us arise and fight manfully, and defend our liberties or die gloriously in their vindication." we say they might, with much greater propriety, have made these declarations than any under the light of the gospel, because they considered themselves under the mosaic dispensation which had fully tolerated them not only in defensive but offensive war. but when they perceived that the doctrines of the mediator were calculated to disannul their dispensation and extinguish their carnal hopes (notwithstanding his credentials were divine), their malice was kindled against him, and their vengeance was not satiated until they wreaked their hands in the blood of the son of god. and we may confidently expect that wherever the same spirit of christ lifts up a standard against the same carnal policy and temporal interest there will follow the same spirit of envy, persecution, and revenge which was manifested against the lord of life and glory. if any man (no matter who) will live godly in christ jesus, he shall suffer persecution. the spirit of christ is the same now that it was then, and the world is the same, the carnal heart is the same, and the great adversary of souls is the same. only let it be styled "patriotic" to persecute the followers of the lamb of god, and we should soon see the heroes of this world drunk with the blood of the martyrs of jesus; and probably many would be as conscientious as paul was while breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the meek and lowly jesus. it is not impossible that when the witnesses[6] are slain, their crime may be a refusal to use carnal weapons in defense of their country. as it is a matter of great practical consequence to know whether the subjects of the prince of peace are authorized in any case under the gospel dispensation to use carnal weapons or not, we propose in this inference to be a little more particular. although it is supposed that the lord jesus christ acted in a threefold capacity,--as god, man, and mediator,--yet we have never heard it questioned by christians that all his conduct as man was to remain a perfect example for his brethren, and all his precepts a perfect rule for their duty. as his kingdom was not of this world, he did not intermeddle with the governments of this world; he only submitted to all their laws which were not contrary to the laws of his heavenly father. he was meek and lowly; so little did he possess of this world that he had not where to lay his head. he went about continually doing good. he was full of compassion even to his enemies. he wept over jerusalem. he was finally "brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as sheep before their shearers are dumb, so he opened not his mouth." when he was reviled he reviled not again, but committed himself to him who judges righteously. he prayed for his murderers and apologized for his persecutors, saying, "father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." as the church under a former dispensation had divine authority for engaging in war, it is important to ascertain whether this authority was abrogated under the gospel dispensation or not.[7] that many things have been tolerated under one dispensation of the church and prohibited under another, most christians allow. that the preceptive will of god is to be our only rule of duty, few christians deny. the knowledge communicated to us of the preceptive will of god to his church, under the first dispensation, is very limited. we find, however, no authority for taking the life of man in any case, not even for murder; but, on the contrary, a sevenfold vengeance was pronounced upon him who should slay the murderer. under the patriarchal dispensation he that shed man's blood by man was his blood to be shed. in this, defensive war was tolerated. under the mosaic dispensation, not only defensive but offensive war was tolerated, and not only _war_ was permitted, but _retaliation_, as, "an eye for an eye"; "a tooth for a tooth"; "life for life," etc. the question to be decided is whether these regulations are still in force, or whether they were disannulled by the gospel dispensation. the life and precepts of our lord and his disciples while under the unerring guidance of his spirit must be our only authority in this inquiry. that many things were done away by the gospel dispensation, none will deny who believe the gospel. the ceremonial part, which was only a shadow of good things to come, vanished away when the substance appeared; and not only the ceremonial part was abolished, but many other practices. polygamy was permitted under the law, but forbidden under the gospel. divorce was allowed under the mosaic but prohibited under the gospel dispensation, except in the case of adultery. under the mosaic dispensation the penalty for whoredom was stoning to death. this penalty was not enforced under the gospel dispensation, as may be seen in john viii. 11. that all kinds of war, revenge, and fighting were utterly prohibited under the gospel dispensation we think appears evident not only from the life of our glorious mediator but from his express precepts. "jesus answered, my kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that i should not be delivered to the jews." no comment can add force to this passage, for it is apprehended that no language can be more explicit against defensive war. in christ's sermon on the mount he quoted a passage from exodus, "ye have heard that it hath been said, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but i say unto you, that _ye resist not evil_: but whatsoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." the force of this passage has generally been obviated by saying that we are not to take all the words of our lord literally. although this is admitted, yet we are absolutely bound to take the spirit of every word, if we can understand them, by comparing the scriptures with the scriptures. that the spirit of this passage is directly opposed to the one our lord quoted from exodus, we think cannot fairly be denied; and, of course, it disannulled it, for he who had power to make laws under one dispensation had power to abrogate them under another. the blessed mediator did, in the most explicit manner, command his subjects to love their enemies and render good for evil. this command we are of opinion is totally incompatible with resisting them with carnal weapons. he says, "but i say unto you which hear, love your enemies, do good to them which hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you." let us for one moment compare this precept with defensive war and see if it can consistently be put into practice. suppose our country is invaded and a professed disciple of the prince of peace buckles on the harness and takes the field to repel by the point of the sword his enemy. he advances amidst the lamentations of the wounded and the shrieks of the dying to meet his foe in arms. he sees his wrath kindled and his spear uplifted, and in this trying moment he hears his lord say, "love your enemy and render to him good for evil"; and his kindness to him is like joab's to amasa; he thrusts him through the heart and hurries him to the awful tribunal of his judge, probably unprepared. dear brethren, be not deceived; for god is not mocked. who amongst our fellow-men would receive the thrust of a sword as an act of kindness? only let conscience do its office, and there will be no difficulty in deciding whether defensive war is inconsistent with the gospel dispensation or not. carnal and spiritual weapons will no more unite under the gospel dispensation than iron and miry clay. our very salvation depends on being possessed of a spirit of forgiveness to enemies. "if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your father forgive your trespasses." if men invade our rights and trespass upon our privileges, is it forgiveness to repel them at the point of the bayonet? the honest christian will find no difficulty in conscientiously deciding this question, notwithstanding he may be slow of heart in believing all that is written. all the conduct of our lord had meaning to it, and much of it was with an express view to teach his disciples by way of example. a little before he was betrayed, he ordered his disciples to take swords. the object of this must have been either to use them for defense, or for some other purpose. the event proves that they were not taken for self-defense. the question then is, for what were they taken? the event appears fully to answer the question, viz.: to prohibit, by way of example, the use of them for self-defense in the most trying situation possible. if any situation would justify self-defense with carnal weapons, it must have been the situation in which our lord and his disciples were placed at the time he was betrayed. they were in a public garden, and they were assaulted by a mob, contrary to the statutes of the romans and the laws of the jews; and the object was to take his life. this the disciples knew, and peter judged it a proper time for defense, and drew his sword and smote a servant of the high priest and cut off his ear. as our lord's kingdom was not of this world, he would not suffer his subjects to use the weapons of this world in any situation. he therefore healed the wound they made and rebuked peter for his mistaken zeal. "then said jesus unto him, put up again thy sword into his place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword. thinkest thou that i cannot pray to my father, and he would presently send me more than twelve legions of angels?" here we see that our lord not only forbade his disciples to use the sword in self-defense, but added a dreadful penalty to transgressors,--"all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." the disciples did not then fully understand that his kingdom was not of this world. as soon as they were prohibited using the weapons of this world they all forsook him and fled.[8] the apostle james, in his epistle to the twelve tribes of israel which were scattered abroad, asks them this question: "from whence come wars and fighting among you? come they not even of your lusts that war in your members? ye lust, and have not: ye kill, and desire to have, and cannot obtain: ye fight and war, and yet ye have not." "ye adulterers and adulteresses, know ye not that the friendship of the world is enmity with god? whosoever therefore will be a friend to the world is an enemy of god." from this we think it evidently appears that the warlike spirit of the world is directly opposed to god. the god of this world works effectually in the hearts of the children of disobedience and stirs up their lusts which war in their members and hurries them on to acts of cruelty, revenge, and fighting. this subject is of so much practical consequence that it requires a few observations in reply to some of the arguments of worldly and unenlightened christians in favor of using carnal weapons. it is said that government is an ordinance of god which exists throughout his vast dominion. in heaven above there are angels and archangels; and upon earth there are magistrates and powers; and in hell there is the prince of devils. that god in his holy providence has so disposed of events that governments of some kind or other do exist in all parts of his dominion, none but skeptics will deny. but who would pretend that the governments in heaven and hell are not diametrically opposite? one is the spirit of peace and love, and the other, rebellion and war. perhaps the manifestation of these different spirits here on earth may fairly be the dividing line amongst its inhabitants, and show to which kingdom they belong. they say all powers are ordained of god. thus far they are correct, but it is apprehended that they do not make a proper distinction between the ordination of god and his preceptive will for man. so far as the former agrees with the latter, it is a rule of duty and cannot be any further. one is the rule of god's own procedure (if the expression is proper), and the other the rule of action for his creatures; but the counsel of god and his laws for man are often diametrically opposite. it is not improbable that this is part of the mystery of god which will, by and by, be finished. the lord jesus christ was delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of god; and yet, by wicked hands, he was crucified and slain. here, as in the case of pharaoh, and many other instances recorded, the divine counsel and the duty of man were directly opposite. to ascertain our duty we must look at the preceptive will of god and not to his eternal counsel. although all powers are ordained of god, yet it must not be inferred that all the laws of the heathen or civilized world are to be a rule of duty for the mediator's subjects, or that their spirit is agreeable to the spirit of the gospel dispensation. it is said, we are commanded to obey magistrates and every ordinance of man for the lord's sake. all this is admitted. but these injunctions are either limited by other precepts or they are unlimited. if they are unlimited, then all who have died martyrs fell a sacrifice to superstition instead of duty. notwithstanding these directions were intended as a rule for christians in all ages, yet they were promulgated while the disciples were under idolatrous governments, and were never intended to encourage them to worship idols. these commands must, therefore, be limited. the question is, how are they limited? we apprehend, by the spirit and other precepts of the gospel. we have already shown, we trust, that these absolutely prohibit war in every form. if so, then none of these injunctions can counteract the position we are examining. they only enjoin strict obedience to all human laws under which we live that do not contradict the spirit or precepts of the gospel; when they do, they are not binding and must be resisted; not, however, with carnal but spiritual weapons; we must take joyfully the spoiling of our goods and count not our lives dear unto ourselves. it has been often said that he who refuses to comply with the commands of the magistrate resists the powers that be, and, according to the apostle's reasoning, resists the ordinance of god and will receive to himself damnation. and, further, as all powers are the ordinance of god they ought to be supported, and if they cannot without, they must be even at the point of, the sword. here the subject of the mediator must make a distinction between resisting the "powers that be" by force of arms and refusing to obey their unlawful commands. it is not supposed that in one case he would obey and that in the other he would disobey the commands of his master. no martyr ever considered himself as violating this precept in refusing to sacrifice to an idol at the command of an earthly power; neither will any subject of the mediator view himself as violating it by refusing to use carnal weapons while he believes that his lord has utterly forbidden his using them. it is apprehended that if this proves anything upon the principles of war, that it will prove too much for its advocates. the command is to obey the powers that be and not the powers that ought to be. if it is taken in an unlimited sense, it must prohibit resisting even tyrannical powers, and would, of course, condemn every christian who engaged in the american revolution. to say that all power is in the hands of the people, and, of course, it is the people who are the powers that be, is thought to be but a quibble. we will suppose a very possible case,--that a foreign power completely overturns the government of the people and disannuls their laws and gives a new code; in that case, the command to obey the powers that be would not be annihilated. the precept originally was given while the disciples were in the midst of tyrannical governments. it is thought that it is so far from tolerating defensive war that it is opposed to it. the precepts of the gospel cannot be dependent upon the convulsions of the nations. if christians are bound to aid with carnal weapons in suppressing a rebellion, then, if the opposing power gains the predominance, they must turn directly about and fight the very power they were before supporting. such conduct would not become the citizens of zion. if it is said the powers that be are christian rulers, then we say, let them govern only by the laws of the mediator's kingdom, and we will bow with reverence before them, and not teach for commandments the doctrines of men, as we cannot receive human laws for divine precepts. it is stated that our lord paid tribute, and that we are commanded to pay tribute to whom tribute is due, and that tribute supports the governments of this world. this is granted; but the mediator's subjects are required also to lead peaceable and quiet lives; this is more promoted by paying tribute than by the refusal. our lord directs peter to pay the tribute lest they should give offense. but paying tribute for the sake of preserving peace is a very different thing from actually engaging in war. whenever the christian is called upon to pay money by way of taxes or tribute, he does not part with any spiritual treasure, but only earthly property, for which he has the example and precepts of the lord. the currency of the world generally bears the ensign of the nation which made it. if it bears the image and superscription of cæsar, then "render to cæsar the things that are cæsar's, and unto god the things which are god's." christians, however, whose hearts are upon this idol, will sooner give up their lives than their god. "the love of money is the root of all evil." the real christian's treasure is in heaven and beyond the reach of the powers of earth or hell. the things of this world are but privileges loaned him, to be resigned at the call of his lord. shall he then fear those who can only kill the body and afterwards have no more that they can do? rather, let him fear him who has power to destroy both soul and body in hell forever. it is better for him to suffer wrong than to do wrong. the permission granted to the jewish church to wage war has often been pleaded as authority for christians. if this proves anything, it proves too much, for not only defensive but offensive war was permitted under the mosaic dispensation. this the tyrants of the world have not generally contended was right since the gospel dispensation. we think, however, that we have fully shown that this was abrogated under the gospel dispensation, and that all kinds of war were prohibited; if so, it has no weight on the subject.[9] it has been said that christians with a small exception have never questioned the propriety of defensive war. as it regards nominal christians, this statement is perhaps correct, but as it respects the real disciples of the mediator, it is to be questioned. we hear of no christians in the first ages of the church engaged in carnal warfare until we hear of great corruptions in the church. most protestants have been of opinion that those precious disciples who inhabited the dark valleys of piedmont during the great corruptions of the nominal church were the redeemer's true subjects. these disciples, of whom the world was not worthy, utterly refused to engage even in defensive war, notwithstanding they were hunted down by their bloody persecutors.[10] it has been often said that the reformers, who were good men, did not hesitate to engage in defensive war, and that the reformation was finally supported by the sword. that the reformers were generally pious men is readily admitted, and that the reformation, under divine providence, was a glorious event to the church is also granted. but the history of the reformers, when written by their friends, abundantly manifests that they were men, subject to like passions with other men, and that all the means they employed could not be justified, either by the spirit or the precepts of the gospel. henry the eighth was a vile man, but he was very active in protesting against the pope because his holiness would not grant him a divorce. god makes the wrath of man praise him. it will not probably be a great length of time (in the opinion of the writer) before those churches which were defended with the sword will be destroyed by the sword. it has been further urged that not only the reformers but most pious protestants have prayed for the prosperity of the arms of their country, and many have actually fought in the field of battle. all this is likewise admitted. but many pious men have had a mistaken zeal. it is fully believed that protestants, generally, have been in the habit of considering the reformation so glorious an event that they have very little inquired whether the means by which it was finally defended were agreeable to the spirit of the gospel or not. they have been taught from their earliest years to consider that the weapons of warfare used by the reformers were lawful, so that they have not hesitated to follow their example. that the example and prayers of pious people ought to have weight is readily granted, but to place a blind confidence in them, we apprehend, is criminal, for their example is to be imitated no further than it agrees with the spirit and precepts of the gospel. these must forever remain a perfect standard of duty; whereas the practice of real christians, owing to their imperfect state, is constantly changing and often contradictory. during the american revolution, doubtless, real christians were praying and fighting for the success of the american arms, and real christians in the british service were praying and fighting for the success of his majesty's arms. the truth is, they ought not to pray for war in any shape, but to pray that wars may cease from under heaven, and that god's kingdom may come and his will be done on earth as it is done in heaven; and not only to pray, but endeavor to advance the kingdom of heaven and put a stop to wars and bloodshed. the opinions of pious people often vary with the increase of light which shines upon the church. one century ago most pious people believed in the propriety of the slave trade, but very few can now be found to advocate the abominable practice. the nature of the crime has not changed, nor the evidence against it, but the truth is, that the opinion of pious people has materially changed upon this subject. we ought always to remember that the example of pious people is to be of no weight any further than it agrees with the example of our lord. it is always unsafe to be looking too much to the fallible example of those whom we have esteemed pious for a rule of duty, while we have the unerring word in our hands to light our way; when any one is depending upon the example of christians not under the immediate influence of divine inspiration for evidence to support his hypothesis, it is strong presumptive evidence that he has not the word of god in his favor. by the word of god and by that _only_ ought every controversy to be tried. it is further urged that we are commanded to pray for kings and all in authority; it is true we must pray not only for kings but all men, even enemies. this, however, does by no means imply that we are commanded to pray for a blessing upon their unhallowed undertakings; but it only implies that we must pray that they may be translated out of nature's darkness into the light of the gospel, and from the power of satan unto the living god. the great difficulty with the subjects of the mediator ever has been, and still is, a want of faith in the promises of god. they are prone to be afraid of consequences. they look nearly as much at consequences as the children of israel did while journeying from egypt to canaan. the truth is, they ought to have nothing to do with consequences, but only duties. "thus saith the lord," should be their warrant and only guide. if they implicitly follow the command, consequences are all safe in god's hand. had abraham looked only at consequences, it is not probable he would ever have been styled the father of the faithful. it is not uncommon for timid and worldly christians to be alarmed at consequences and to argue in this manner: they say, "shall we stand still and suffer an assassin to enter our houses and take our lives and property without ever attempting to resist him?" all this must go upon the supposition that he who has said he will never leave nor forsake his people, and is a very present help in every time of need, will take no care of them. no assassin could stand a moment before the prayer of faith which would enter the heavens and reach the ears of the lord of sabaoth. if faithless christians cannot be persuaded to look at the precepts and the promises, but only at consequences, they ought, at least, to examine them well. suppose god, in his holy providence, should permit an assassin to take the life of one of his dear children; the consequence would be, he would immediately be translated to glory; and possibly the assassin might become a penitent; but should he take the life of the assassin in defending himself, the consequence then would be, he would hurry him into the abyss of the damned where his probation would be eternally ended. he who puts his trust in the lord shall not fear what man can do to him; he will be like mount zion which cannot be moved. remember, dear brethren, that the weapons of our warfare are not carnal but spiritual, and mighty through god. "finally, my brethren, be strong in the lord, and in the power of his might. put on the whole armour of god, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil. for we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places. wherefore take unto you the whole armour of god (here is the equipment of a soldier of jesus christ), that ye may be able to withstand in an evil day, and having done all, to stand. stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of righteousness; and your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace; above all, taking the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked. and take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the spirit, which is the word of god: praying always with all prayer and supplication in the spirit, and watching thereunto with all perseverance and supplication for all saints." and the very god of peace shall be with you, and he will shortly bruise satan under your feet. for yet a little while and the almighty angel will come down with a great chain in his hand; and he will lay hold on the dragon, that old serpent, which is the devil and satan, and will bind him a thousand years, and cast him into the bottomless pit, and shut him up, and set a seal upon him, that he shall deceive the nations no more until the thousand years are fulfilled. then wars will cease from under heaven and the implements of death will be converted into the harmless utensils of husbandry, and there will be nothing to hurt nor destroy in all god's holy mountain. the stone which was cut out of the mountain without hands will become a great mountain and fill the whole earth. then will be heard "a loud voice saying in heaven, now is come salvation, and strength, and the kingdom of god, and the power of his christ: for the accuser of our brethren is cast down, which accused them before god day and night. and they overcame him by the blood of the lamb, and by the word of their testimony; and they loved not their lives unto the death. therefore rejoice, ye heavens, and ye that dwell in them." it is, however, very important, dear brethren, that we keep it constantly in mind that the nature and precepts of the gospel are the same now as they will be then, in that glorious reign of righteousness and peace, and that it is our duty constantly to be influenced by the same spirit now which will then be manifested by the followers of the lamb. the little leaven is of the same nature with whole lump when it is leavened. let us therefore gird up the loins of our mind and watch unto prayer. 4. if the mediator's kingdom is not of this world, but spiritual, heavenly, and divine, and if the kingdoms of this world are under the dominion of satan, and if the subjects of christ's kingdom are not permitted to use carnal weapons, then we may infer who is the "great whore that sitteth upon many waters; with whom the kings of the earth have committed fornication, and the inhabitants of the earth have been made drunk with the wine of her fornication." a virgin or chaste woman is a familiar symbol in the scriptures of the true church of god; and an unchaste woman is as familiar a symbol of an apostate or corrupt church. as a lewd woman calls herself by the name of her husband, notwithstanding she has constant intercourse with other men, so the corrupt church calls herself by the name of christ, notwithstanding she has constant illicit intercourse with the kings of the earth.[11] to understand the true nature of spiritual whoredom will assist us in ascertaining the bounds of mystical babylon. the children of israel were separated from all the nations of the earth and set apart to be holy unto the lord. as they were in covenant with the god of israel, he addressed them in the endearing character of a husband. whenever they made any covenant or formed a confederacy with the nations around them, or imitated their idolatrous abominations, they were charged with spiritual whoredom. the church, under the gospel dispensation, is redeemed from amongst men out of every nation, and sanctified and set apart to be a peculiar people to show forth the praises of god. it is styled the bride, the lamb's wife. its members are not to be conformed to this world but to be transformed by the renewing of the spirit. they do not belong to any earthly kingdom, for our lord has said, "they are not of the world, even as i am not of the world"; but they are citizens of the heavenly zion and belong to the household of god; they are members of the same community, with the innumerable company of angels and the spirits of just men made perfect; and are to be governed by the very same spirit and temper which reigns amongst those blessed inhabitants above. god is an overflowing and unbounded ocean of blessedness and love; love is therefore the fulfilling of the law. whenever the subjects of the redeemer unite themselves to the kingdoms of this world, and engage in their political contentions and fightings, then it appears they commit spiritual whoredom, for they forsake the fountain of living waters and hew out to themselves cisterns,--broken cisterns, which can hold no water. when they thus mingle with the world and unite in its pursuits they may spiritually be styled adulterers. the apostle james, while reproving the twelve tribes, which were scattered abroad, for their wars and fightings and friendship to the world, styles them adulterers and adulteresses. in direct opposition to this representation, the first fruits of the church are styled virgins, as not being defiled with women. "these are they which were not defiled with women; for they are virgins. these are they which follow the lamb whithersoever he goeth. these were redeemed from amongst men, being the firstfruits unto god and the lamb. and in their mouth was found no guile: for they are without fault before the throne of god." as virgins are pure and undefiled, so were the disciples of christ in the first age of the church when they had no impure intercourse with the kingdoms of this world and followed the lamb in refusing to engage either in its profits, honors, or fightings. they are, therefore, called virgins, without fault, in opposition to those who mingle with the world, who are spiritually styled harlots. it evidently appears, if what has been said is true, that mystical babylon, that mother of harlots and abominations of the earth, is just as extensive as the union of the church with the kingdoms of this world; and just in that proportion in which an individual christian, or a single church, or a number of churches united in one body, engage in the honors, profits, and fightings of the kingdoms of this world, just in that proportion they may be said to be guilty of spiritual whoredom. the writer is well aware that this inference, however just, will be looked upon with contempt by worldly political christians whose dearest interest is involved in the kingdoms of this world, and especially by those who are clothed in purple and scarlet and have a golden cup in their hands. he has no expectation of being candidly heard by such, but it is god's own dear children who have ignorantly mingled with the world, having been blinded by their education, from whom he expects a candid hearing. "if any man have ears to hear, let him hear." it is not common for a lewd woman openly to avow to the world her character; neither can it be expected that the mother of harlots will own her name. the writer is of opinion that very few have understood the full dimensions of this mystical city; she appears to him in her greatest extent to be bounded but little short of the whole visible church of god. she is styled "the _great city_, which spiritually is called sodom and egypt, where also our lord was crucified." "and in her was found the blood of prophets and saints and of all that were slain upon the earth." but a dreadful judgment awaits her: "she shall utterly be burnt with fire: for strong is the lord god who judges her." being mingled with the nations and supported by their power, when they become like stubble before the devouring fire, she will be consumed with them. the whore is represented as riding upon a scarlet-colored beast, and upheld by him.[12] when he, with all his heads, are cast into the lake of fire, she will likewise be given to the burning flame. but before this great and dreadful day of the lord shall come, which will burn as an oven, when the whore shall be consumed with the nations of the earth, god will call to his people to come out of her, saying unto them, "come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues." as god's ancient people were carried captives into literal babylon, so god's dear people will be found captives in mystical babylon, until they hear the command of their lord to come out of her that they be not partakers of her sins and that they receive not of her plagues. the captive daughters of zion are very numerous. o that they may soon arise and shake themselves from the dust! "shake thyself from the dust; arise, and sit down, o jerusalem: loose thyself from the bands of thy neck, o captive daughter of zion." 5. if the mediator's kingdom is not of this world, and the kingdoms of this world are under the dominion of satan, and if christ's subjects cannot unite themselves to the kingdoms of this world, without committing spiritual whoredom, then we may infer the great impropriety of the subjects of the mediator's kingdom becoming political christians and enrolling themselves with the men of this world. they cannot serve two masters: for they will either hate the one, and love the other; or else they will hold to the one, and despise the other. how humiliating is it to see subjects of the king of zion engaged in the drudgery of the prince of darkness, laboring and struggling to support his tottering throne! satan's kingdom is divided against itself and must, therefore, come to an end. but how lamentable is it to see the sons of the living god, the subjects of the prince of peace, taking sides in the cause of the adversary of souls, and actually opposing and fighting each other under his banner! they do it ignorantly and will, therefore, obtain forgiveness, for they know not what manner of spirit they are of. they are commanded to have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them. before our lord departed from this world to go to the father, he gave laws to his subjects for their rule of life until his second coming. all these laws contemplated their residing as a holy nation in the midst of a wicked and benighted world, to reflect the rays of the sun of righteousness on the thick darkness which covers the people. they were to be a city set upon a hill and a light to the world. the apostle exhorts them to "do all things without murmurings and disputings: that ye may be blameless and harmless, the sons of god, without rebuke, in the midst of a crooked and perverse nation, among whom ye shine as lights in the world." they must be a peculiar people to show forth the praises of god. how inconsistent is it, then, for the citizens of the heavenly zion to be mingling with the politicians of this world and uniting in their processions, feasts, and cabals, when they ought rather to be praying for them, that the very sins they commit in these scenes may be forgiven them! dear brethren, is it not high time to come out from the world and be separated? "be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and what communion hath light with darkness? and what concord hath christ with belial?" "wherefore come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the lord, and touch not the unclean thing; and i will receive you, and will be a father to you, and ye shall be my sons and daughters, saith the lord almighty." 6. in view of what has been said, we finally infer that every interest which is not built upon the sure foundation stone which god has laid in zion will be swept away when the storms of divine wrath shall beat upon our guilty world. "for, behold, the day cometh, that shall burn as an oven; and all the proud, yea, and all that do wickedly, shall be stubble: and the day that cometh shall burn them up, saith the lord of hosts, that it shall leave them neither root nor branch." "for the day of the lord of hosts shall be upon every one that is proud and lofty, and upon every one that is lifted up; and he shall be brought low." "the lofty looks of man shall be humbled, and the haughtiness of men shall be bowed down; and the lord alone shall be exalted in that day." "the lord at thy right hand shall strike through kings in the day of his wrath. he shall judge among the heathen, he shall fill the places with their dead bodies; he shall wound the head over many countries." "for, behold, the lord will come with fire, and with his chariots like a whirlwind, to render his anger with fury, and his rebuke with flames of fire. for by fire and by his sword will the lord plead with all flesh: and the slain of the lord shall be many." "for the indignation of the lord is upon all nations, and his fury upon all their armies: he hath utterly destroyed them, he hath delivered them to the slaughter. their slain shall be cast out, and their stink shall come up out of their carcasses, and the mountains shall be melted with blood." "for this is the day of the lord god of hosts, a day of vengeance, that he may avenge him of his adversaries: and the sword shall devour, and it shall be satiate and be made drunk with their blood." the nations must drink of the wine of the wrath of god, which shall be poured out without mixture, into the cup of his indignation; and they will be trodden in the great wine press of the wrath of god almighty. and the great whore which has drunk the blood of the saints and the blood of the martyrs of jesus will have blood to drink; for she is worthy. the sword of the lord has two edges; it will cut off the offending limbs of the church and destroy her enemies. the fire of the lord will purify his saints but utterly burn up the wicked. he "whose fan is in his hand will thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into the garner; but he will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire." although the earth is thus to be desolated, and the nations destroyed, yet the saints of the most high shall "possess the kingdom for ever and ever." "and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the most high, whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and all dominions shall serve and obey him." dear brethren, these events are rapidly rolling in the fiery wheels down the descent of time; and although the nations must first drink the vials of divine wrath and the battle of god almighty must first be fought, yet the time is at hand when we shall no more hear the sound of war, and of garments rolled in blood, for man will cease to be the enemy of man, and every one will sit quietly under his own vine and under his own fig tree; and there will be nothing to hurt or destroy in all god's holy mountain, and the knowledge of the lord shall cover the earth as the waters cover the channels of the mighty deep. dear brethren, is it not "high time to awake out of sleep: for now is our salvation nearer than when we believed. the night is far spent, the day is at hand: let us therefore cast off the works of darkness, and let us put on the armour of light." and let us pray with all prayer and supplication in the spirit for all men, not only for ourselves, our families, and our friends, and the church of god, but for a dying world, that god would in infinite compassion cut short these days of dreadful calamity for his elect's sake; and in the midst of deserved wrath remember mercy. "he that hath ears to hear, let him hear what the spirit saith unto the churches; to him that overcometh will i give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of god." footnotes: [4] the earth, in symbolical language, is supposed by the writer to denote civilized nations, in distinction from uncivilized, which are symbolized by the agitated sea. civilized nations will no longer cover the blood of the slain, under the specious idea of defending their rights and liberties. [5] if the kingdoms of this world do not belong to satan, then it was no temptation to our lord when he offered them to him. it is expressly said that he was "tempted of satan." [6] the writer has for a length of time been of opinion that no event has ever yet happened to the church which answers to slaying the witnesses. it has been given as a reason by some that the witnesses have been slain, that so much light has been diffused since the art of printing was discovered, and since the reformation, that no reason can ever again be found sufficiently plausible to satisfy the consciences of mankind in again taking the lives of their fellow-men in matters of conscience. if our country was invaded and a law should be passed that every man capable of bearing arms should equip himself for its defense, on penalty of being considered as an enemy and to be publicly executed accordingly in case of refusal for conscience' sake, there would not probably be wanting patriots sufficient to execute the laws; if they could not be found in our land of liberty, they might be found amongst the tyrants of the old world. [7] if the permission given to the church under the mosaic dispensation to engage in war has not been disannulled by the gospel dispensation (which is by no means granted), it is thought that it does not admit of the consequences which are generally drawn. the israelites were god's covenant people and were utterly prohibited from making any covenant with the nations around them, or engaging with them in their wars. it must therefore be totally improper for god's covenant people now to unite with those who are strangers to the covenant of promise, and engage with them in their tumult and fightings. it is presumed that no one who has ever read our constitution will pretend that the american nation has, in the scriptural sense, made a covenant with god. if the analogy holds good in one point, it must in another; and in that case there is no alternative left for god's covenant people but either to withdraw from those who are not in covenant with god, or adopt a national religion which must be defended by the weapons of the nation. it is believed that those who will not admit that the permission granted to the israelites to engage in war was abrogated by the gospel dispensation can never fully answer the arguments in favor of a national religion. [8] four things are noticeable from this history. _first_, that the subjects of the mediator's kingdom have no right to use carnal weapons for defense, in the most trying situation possible. _secondly_, the promulgation of a decree of heaven; that all they (whether states, churches, or kingdoms) who take the sword shall perish with the sword. every political or ecclesiastical body which is defended with the sword will by the sword be destroyed. in confirmation of this sentiment, we see while the great destroying powers were represented to st. john in the symbols of ferocious beasts, it was added, "if any man have an ear to hear, let him hear. he that leadeth into captivity shall go into captivity: he that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword"; but in opposition to this it is said, "here is the faith and the patience of the saints." we would inquire how the faith and the patience of the saints appear, if they, like the nations of the earth, lead into captivity and kill with the sword? _thirdly_, the weapon which the subjects of the redeemer are to use for defense is here brought into view, viz., prayer. nothing which appears prevented our lord from using this weapon when he was betrayed, but the necessity of the scriptures being fulfilled. had he prayed to his father, more than twelve legions of ministering spirits would have appeared swift as lightning to discharge his will. at the time he shall come in all the glory of his father the holy angels will be with him. he will break through the heavens in flaming fire and descend with the shout of the archangel and the trump of god, and cleave asunder the earth beneath; and send forth his angels who will awake the sleeping millions from their tombs and gather together his elect and take them up into the air to be ever with their lord. _fourthly_, we may expect that angels will be sent to deliver the saints in the times of trouble. angels are ministering spirits and are sent forth to minister to those who shall be the heirs of salvation. what a consolation it is that the subjects of the mediator can apply for help in times of trouble to him who has the hosts of heaven at his command; and who has said he will never leave nor forsake them! the angel of the lord encampeth round about them who fear him, to deliver them out of all their trouble. if god be for them, who can be against them? [9] although it is not expected that any intelligent and candid christian will attempt to say that the arguments which have been advanced may fairly apply to offensive but not to defensive war, yet some weak and unenlightened christians may make the assertion. in answer to such we would observe that this would be begging the question and taking for granted the very subject in dispute. we cannot be satisfied with anything short of a candid answer, drawn directly from the spirit and precepts of the gospel. when it is fairly proved that under the gospel dispensation our lord did draw a clear line of distinction between offensive and defensive war, and that he intended all such precepts as have been adduced to apply to the former and not to the latter, then we will acknowledge the weight of the argument. until this is done we shall not consider our arguments as answered. [10] the writer perceives that he has made too unlimited a statement respecting the disciples who inhabited the valleys of piedmont. historians have generally considered those who dissented from the church of rome during the dark ages as possessing similar sentiments. it is true they did agree in renouncing the authority of the pope, but in other things they did not all agree. some courted the protection of earthly powers and united with them in defending their rights by the point of the sword, and were finally destroyed by the sword. others, instead of defending themselves with carnal weapons, fled from the face of the serpent and were, under divine providence, the seed of the church in the wilderness. it is the latter class to which the writer would be understood as referring. [11] as the writer has been for some time studying the symbolical language of the scriptures, and intends (if the lord will, unless some person more able should attempt an explanation) to give his views to the public, he will not be so particular at present in explaining the symbol of the great whore which sitteth upon many waters, as he otherwise should. he early perceived that the heavens and the earth, with all their furniture, were used as an alphabet, in the language of things, to represent moral subjects. his object has been to learn the true meaning of each symbol by comparing scripture with scripture. no language can be read until the alphabet is first learned. symbolical language does not, like other languages, change with time and place, but represents the same idea to all nations and at all times. he is of opinion that one symbol does not represent two events, unless it first have a reference to some less event which is typical of some more important event; in that case, all together may be figurative of some great ultimate end. although one symbol is supposed never to represent two different things, yet two or more symbols generally represent one thing. he has found by tracing back a symbol to its first use, that its true meaning is generally manifest. since examining the scriptures with this view he has been irresistibly drawn into the conclusions now exhibited. [12] the writer is fully of opinion that a ferocious beast is never used as a symbol of a corrupt church, but of a tyrannical warlike power. he has been for some time of opinion that the second apocalyptic beast is rising, and that he will possess all the power of the first beast before him, and that under him the false prophet will appear; and the witnesses will be slain; and upon his kingdom the six first vials of his divine wrath will be principally poured out; and the seventh will be poured upon satan's kingdom universally, as he is the prince of the power of the air. transcriber's notes the section in the table of contents entitled, "because, instead of preventing, it provokes insult and mischief," does not exactly match the title of the corresponding section found within the text. this has been retained. pg 116. the word 'antipolemos' was changed to 'antipolemus.' pg 120. the word 'righteousnesss' was changed to 'righteousness.' pg 142. a question mark was changed to a period in the following sentence, "the question to be decided is whether these regulations are still in force, or whether they were disannulled by the gospel dispensation." internet archive (https://archive.org) note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see 62684-h.htm or 62684-h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/62684/62684-h/62684-h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/62684/62684-h.zip) images of the original pages are available through internet archive. see https://archive.org/details/beltofseventotem00munr the belt of seven totems ninth impression * * * * * * _books boys like_ _pirates of the delaware_ by rupert sargent holland a stirring tale of philadelphia a hundred years ago when highwaymen rode out of the shadows on the way to the green anchor inn and mysterious craft lay in hiding off the delaware capes. attractively illustrated. _hero tales of our navy_ by george gibbs famous sea victories from the time the first little american-built frigate sailed out against a british man-o'-war to the days when the allied fleet patrolled the north sea. 14 illustrations by the author. _do it yourself_ by dan beard a book of the big outdoors. how to pitch a tent, how to fish, build a canoe, take a collection hike, catch wild animals and many other things a scout must know. latest volume in dan beard's woodcraft series. 306 inimitable sketches by the author. _american trail blazers_ a splendid collection of stories, based on historical facts, which has done much to revive the early and adventurous phases of american history for boys. the story grips and the history sticks. each volume finely illustrated in color and black and white. * * * * * * [illustration: he was seized by two pair of brawny hands and dragged inboard page 193] the belt of seven totems a story of massasoit by kirk munroe author of "under the great bear," "brethren of the coast," "rick dale," "forward march," "the 'mates'' series," etc. illustrated by emlen mcconnell [illustration: logo] philadelphia & london j. b. lippincott company copyright, 1901, by kirk munroe printed by j. b. lippincott company at the washington square press philadelphia, u. s. a. _to my readers_ the following story is not intended as a history; it is merely an effort to reconcile certain apparently conflicting facts and to explain an otherwise inexplicable situation. at the time of the pilgrim fathers all american indians--not excepting those of new england--had suffered repeated outrage at the hands of white men, and in no case had they been given cause to love the invaders of their country or to welcome their presence. why, then, did the powerful massasoit permit a white invasion of his territory that he could so easily have crushed? a friendship existed from the very first between him and edward winslow, and the latter seems to have exercised a great influence over the new england sachem. what was the origin of this friendship? the narragansetts, while submitting to massasoit's authority, were always in sullen opposition to it. why? it is to answer these questions to my own satisfaction that i have constructed the theory herewith advanced. many new england natives were kidnapped and taken to various parts of europe. why might not massasoit have been among them? the wampum belt, on which was pictured the distinguishing totems of seven leading new england clans, was worn by both massasoit and metacomet (king philip), his son, and is still in existence. tasquanto (squanto) was kidnapped from cape cod and taken to england, where he remained for several years. captain dermer carried a number of native americans to london, where he sold them to be exhibited as curiosities. he finally died of wounds received at the hands of new england indians. champlain did aid a war-party of hurons to defeat the iroquois in one instance, and in another was defeated by the same foe. thus, while my story is admittedly fictional, it has a substantial historical basis. kirk munroe. _contents_ chapter page i. the village of peace 9 ii. canonicus makes trouble 18 iii. at the crossing of the sha 28 iv. the belt changes hands 38 v. what the daughters of kaweras found 50 vi. in the lodge of the arrow-maker 60 vii. nahma joins a war-party 70 viii. two young scouts 81 ix. on the lake 91 x. an oki of the waters 101 xi. the coming of sacandaga 111 xii. a meeting of deadly foes 121 xiii. to the lodges of the white man 131 xiv. two inmates of a guard-house 141 xv. the bitter winter of canada 151 xvi. a dash for liberty 162 xvii. a death-dealing thunder-stick 172 xviii. kidnapped 183 xix. sold as a slave 194 xx. one friendly face 206 xxi. a change of masters 217 xxii. nahma and the bear run aw 228 xxiii. an honored guest 238 xxiv. nahma remembers 248 xxv. back to america 259 xxvi. sassacus the pequot 270 xxvii. a royal home-coming 281 xxviii. in the council-lodge 292 xxix. winning a battle, a wife, and a friend 303 xxx. the pilgrims of plymouth 314 _list of illustrations_ page he was seized by two pair of brawny hands and dragged inboard _frontispiece._ as she caught a glimpse of the wounded youth the progress of the canoe was instantly arrested 56 nahma sprang upon the white man with uplifted knife 129 "look, then, and tremble, thou dog of a murderer" 290 _the belt of seven totems_ chapter i the village of peace in the olden days when the whole land belonged to the red man the village of longfeather the peacemaker was located on the river of sweet waters, nearly one hundred miles, as the crow flies, from the place where it flows into the sea. its ruler was longfeather, the only son of nassaup, sachem of the wampanoags, and a man wise enough to realize that peace was better for his people than war. so he had sent his only son, when still a mere youth, to one after another of the surrounding tribes that he might learn their language and establish friendships among them. thus longfeather had lived for months at a time among all the tribes dwelling east of the shatemuc and the country of the terrible iroquois. he had travelled as far north as the land of the abenakis, from whom he learned to make snow-shoes and to construct canoes of birchen bark. he had visited the nipmucks and nausets of the eastern coast, who taught him many secrets of the salt waters from which they gained their living. he had journeyed to the southward, spending a year with the narragansetts and another with the pequots, the wampum-making tribes. then for a long time he had remained with the warlike mohicans, whose great chieftain tamenand loved him as a son, and taught him from his own wisdom until longfeather became wisest of all indians dwelling in the region afterwards known as new england. so many seasons of corn-planting and harvest did the youth spend in travel and study among the tribes, that when he finally turned his face towards his own people he was become a man in years as well as in stature and strength. so it happened that he tarried again among the pequots until he had won for a bride miantomet, a daughter of their sachem. the principal industry of this tribe being the production of wampum, which was made in the form of cylindrical beads, white, black, purple, and sometimes red, cut from sea-shells, longfeather's bride was presented with a vast store of this precious material in the form of strings and belts, so that in winning her the young man also acquired much wealth. to fittingly celebrate the home-coming of his son, nassaup commanded a great feast that should last for seven days, and to it were invited the headmen of all the tribes in which longfeather had made friends. the place chosen for this notable gathering was the mouth of a beautiful valley, centrally located for the convenience of the several tribes, and gently sloping to the river of sweet waters. here, then, in early autumn, at the full of the harvest moon, were gathered hundreds of the leading sannups of the wide-spread territory bounded by the great white river (st. lawrence) on the north, the salt waters that bathe the rising sun on the east and south, and the shatemuc (hudson) on the west. these, together with their families, formed an assemblage larger and more important than any that could be recalled even by tradition, and while much of their time was devoted to feasting and dancing, they also discussed questions of great significance. one of these was the meaning of a vast ball of fire, that, brighter than the sun and glowing with many colors, had shot athwart an evening sky on the night of longfeather's marriage to miantomet. to some this phenomenon portended evil, while to others it was an omen of good promise; but all were convinced that it was connected in some way with the fortunes of longfeather. another matter discussed early and late with unflagging interest was the rumored appearance in remote regions of a race of beings having human form, but unlike any heretofore known. they were said to have white skins and hairy faces, and were believed to control thunder and lightning, which they used for the destruction of all who came in their way. some of them were also described as bestriding fire-breathing monsters of such ferocity that they carried death and destruction wherever they went. most of these rumors came from the south and from lands so remote that they had been many months travelling from tribe to tribe and from mouth to mouth. whether the beings thus imperfectly described were gods or devils none could tell. at the same time those who heard of them agreed that in spite of their form they could not be human, for were not all men made in one likeness, with red skins, black hair, and smooth faces? it was disquieting that, while most of these rumors came from the far-distant south, some of them also came from the north, and located the white-skinned strangers not more than a month's journey away. at the same time it was comforting to have all stories agree that, while they appeared from the ocean borne on the backs of vast winged monsters of the deep, they always, after a while, disappeared again as they had come. longfeather further reassured those who discussed these matters by relating a tradition that he had received from tamenand. it concerned other supernatural visitants who had once come even to the land of the wampanoags; but so long ago that not even the great-grandfather of the oldest man living had seen them. they also were described as of white skin and having hair on their faces. it was not told that they rode fire-breathing dragons, or that they were armed with thunderbolts, but they had come from the sea and returned into it again when they were ready for departure. to be sure, they had slain many of the native dwellers and caused great fear throughout the land, but after going away they had never again been seen. to this day, however, traces of their visitation remained in the form of certain pictured rocks that they had inscribed, and which no man might remove or even touch, under penalty of death. the simple-minded forest-dwellers listened to these tales with the same dread that would inspire us of to-day upon hearing that inhabitants of some distant planet, bringing death-dealing weapons that were unknown to us, had invaded the world. they shuddered, gazing furtively about them as they listened, and drew closer together as though for mutual protection. although the fears thus aroused sobered the red-skinned assemblage and left it in small humor for further festivities, this was not regretted by nassaup, since it rendered them the more willing to listen to a plan that he wished to propose. it was one so long considered that it had become the chief desire of his life, and was nothing more nor less than a federation of all the tribes there represented, in the interests of peace, mutual aid, and protection. for two days was this proposition discussed, and then it was accepted. a belt of wampum, on which was worked his own totem, was given to each of the seven head chiefs present, and a great belt of the same material, in which the seven totems were combined, was presented to longfeather. on account of his wisdom he had been unanimously chosen to rule the allied tribes, and this belt of seven totems was the badge of his authority. so longfeather became peacemaker and lawgiver to all that region, and on account of its central location he established his official head-quarters upon the very spot where the great assemblage had been held. thus was founded the village of peace, in which all questions affecting relations between the tribes were discussed and treaties were made. it was a place of refuge to which all persons accused of wrong-doing and in danger of their lives might flee, with a certainty of protection until their cases could be considered by the peacemaker. it also became a trading-point to which were attracted the skilled makers of such articles as were most in demand among the tribes. large areas of nearby lands were brought under cultivation, and these, fertilized with fish taken in quantities from the teeming river, produced wonderful crops of beans, maize, and pumpkins. no war-parties ever visited the village of peace, but there was a constant coming and going of strangers. to it travelled the abenakis, bringing furs, maple-sugar, and highly prized ornaments of copper that had come to them from the far west. here they exchanged these things for bales of dried fish from the eastern coast, seal-skins, or belts of wampum. here, also, they found expert makers of flint arrow-heads, knives, and hatchets, weavers of mats, and workers in clay, from whom they might procure rude vessels of earthen-ware. above all, here dwelt longfeather, to whom could be submitted all disputed questions, with a certainty that he would settle them wisely and justly. thus it happened that the village of peace became the political capital and chief trading-point of all new england long before ever a white man had set foot in that region. here, too, some twenty years after its founding, was born nahma, the son of longfeather, a lad whose strange adventures in after-life are now for the first time about to be related. chapter ii canonicus makes trouble the boy thus introduced was carefully trained for the high position that he must some time fill. although from his father he never heard an impatient or an unkind word, he was taught to respect his elders and to yield the most implicit obedience to those in authority over him. as soon as he was old enough to comprehend what he heard and saw he was permitted to sit beside the peacemaker and listen to the discussion of matters affecting the well-being of the tribes. from longfeather himself, from the old men of the village, and from the visitors who journeyed to it nahma learned the traditions of his people. his father also taught him to distinguish the totems of tribes or clans, together with their significance, and illustrated his lessons by means of the pictured belts that hung in the council-house. from these same teachers nahma also learned to believe in witchcraft and magic, by which alone were they able to account for many natural phenomena. thus even in the years of his youth there came to nahma a wisdom beyond that of all other lads, and his name became known from one end of the land to the other. nor during this time of mental training was that of his body neglected. every day, even in the depth of winter, when ice must be broken before water could be reached, he was made to plunge into the river or the sea to toughen him and harden his flesh. he was taught to swim and to paddle a canoe before he could walk; and often in later years when trained runners were sent by longfeather with messages to distant tribes, the lad was allowed to accompany them, that he might learn the trails, familiarize himself with remote localities and people, and acquire the art of traversing great spaces in the shortest possible time. so fleet of foot and so strong of wind did he thus become that he at one time covered the distance between the village of peace and the sand-dunes of the nausets on the edge of the great salt water between two suns, a feat never before accomplished, and at which all men marvelled. after this nahma was frequently chosen to be his father's messenger on occasions of importance, and very proud was the young warrior of the trust thus reposed in him. thus it happened that one day in the lad's eighteenth year, when a matter of grave import demanded prompt communication with a distant point in a region of danger, longfeather naturally turned to nahma, his son. troublous times had come, and the safety of the region so long ruled by the peacemaker was seriously threatened. to consider the situation longfeather had assembled a council of the tribes at montaup, on the edge of the salt water. this was the great gathering-place of the wampanoags, and to it their chieftain with his family was accustomed to resort during the heated months of each summer. so here the council was met, and after the calumet had passed entirely around its seated circle longfeather addressed the chiefs as follows: "it is well that we are come together, for the shadow of trouble is upon us like that of a black cloud hiding the sun. while we be of many tribes we have until now been of one heart, and even from the days of nassaup, my father, have we dwelt at peace one with another. now, however, is that peace threatened, and i have summoned you to see what may be done." here the speaker took one from a bundle of small sticks and handed it to the oldest chief, saying, "take this peace-stick, my brother, and remember its meaning." then to the others he continued,-"for a long time, from our fathers, and from their fathers before them, have we heard tales of strange, white-skinned beings armed with thunderbolts, who have come from the sea. we have listened with trembling, but have comforted ourselves that these strangers, whom we took to be gods, appeared not on our shores, but at places far removed. also we heard that they tarried not; but always, after a short stay, departed as they had come. take this stick, my brother, and regard it with respect, for it indicates the belief of our fathers." thus saying, longfeather handed a second stick from his bundle to the aged chief. then resuming his address, he said,-"but all our comfort has vanished with the gaining of wisdom. nearer and more frequent have come tales of the whiteskins, until now we know them to be men like unto ourselves, only of a different color and having hairy faces. they are armed with thunder-sticks that can kill at three times the flight of our strongest arrows. also have we learned that these men are borne to our coast in mighty canoes built by themselves and driven by the wind. we know that many of these canoes come for fish to the salt waters of the tarratines. not only do they thus come and go in ever-increasing numbers, but they even visit the land to care for the fish they have taken. accept this stick, my brother, to remind thee of the white-skinned men who fish." with this longfeather handed a third stick to the old man. "still," he continued, "the white fish-catchers do not attempt to remain with us, nor have they thus far given us cause to fear them. some of their lesser canoes, small when compared with those in which they come and go, but large by the side of ours, even as the eagle is larger than the hawk, have drifted empty to our shores, and our young men have made use of them. also at times the great winged canoes of the white men have been seen to pass our coast, but never until the season of last corn-planting have they tarried. then came one to the country of the narragansetts, where it remained for the space of three moons. this stick, my brother, will refresh thy memory concerning the coming and tarrying of the great white canoe." with this the speaker passed a fourth stick to the old chief. then deliberately and with emphasis he resumed his speech, saying,-"on an island that they occupied the strangers who came in this canoe erected a lodge. many of you have seen it and them. they roamed through the forest making thunder and killing beasts with their fire-sticks. above all, they traded with the narragansetts, giving them knives and hatchets made of an unknown metal, strong and sharp, kettles that fire may not harm, and many other things in exchange for skins of the beaver. only with their thunder-sticks they would not part. by many it was feared that they would remain and attempt to possess the land that is our land. but after a time they departed, and the heart of longfeather was glad when he knew they were gone. at the same moment his heart was again made heavy, for they gave out that they would come again, bringing great wealth to exchange for beaver. take this stick, my brother, to remind thee that the white men will come again. "now, my friends, what has happened? it is this. the narragansetts are puffed up with pride because they are possessed of knives and hatchets better and more deadly than any ever before seen in all the world. also, they desire to obtain more of such things and to learn the secret of the thunder-sticks that kill as far as one may see. therefore did canonicus, head sachem of the narragansetts, propose secretly to me that when the great canoe came again i should order the white men to be killed, that he and i might possess ourselves of their wealth, and so become as gods, all-powerful in the land. this stick, my brother, marks the proposition of canonicus. "to the evil words of the narragansett i refused to listen, saying to him that to do what he had in his mind would surely bring upon our heads the wrath of the great spirit. furthermore, i bade canonicus put such evil thoughts far behind him and consider them no more. this stick, my brother, is longfeather's answer to canonicus. "again, my friends, what has happened? the narragansett promised to open wide his ears that the words of longfeather might sink into his heart. did he do this? no. he closed tight his ears that they might not hear, and began to look for others who would aid him in his wickedness. so far did his eyes travel that they came even to the land of the maquas [mohawks], who from the days of the first men have been our enemies. to them is he preparing to send messengers with presents and a promise of great wealth, together with power over all the tribes, if they will join him in destroying the next white men who may come. canonicus was bidden to this council, but i cannot see him. this stick, my brother, will tell thee of his black heart. i have finished." so long did the council discuss this situation and so many were the speeches to be delivered on the subject, that a decision was not reached until late on the second day of meeting. then it was ordered that canonicus should be summoned to report in person to the assembled chiefs, who for two days longer would await his coming. if at the end of that time he had not appeared, a war-party of the allied tribes should be sent to fetch him. in the mean time longfeather would send a delegation to the maquas bearing presents, and offering, on behalf of the combined new england tribes, a treaty that should secure to all equal benefits from whatever trade might be had with the white-skinned strangers. it was furthermore agreed that so long as the white men proved themselves friendly they should be treated as friends. "for," said the peacemaker, "they are few and we are many, they are weak while we are strong, therefore let us live at peace with them, if indeed they come to us again, a thing that i trust may not happen. so shall we please the great spirit who made them, doubtless for some good reason, even as he made the red man and gave him control over the earth." so it was done even as the council had ordered, and a runner was despatched to canonicus with a summons for him to appear at montaup, and forbidding him to treat with the maquas. also active preparations were made for sending an embassy to that powerful people on behalf of the allied new england tribes, and to his joy nahma was chosen to accompany it as his father's representative. chapter iii at the crossing of the shatemuc the whole land to the very edge of the great salt water, and including the islands of the sea, was covered with a forest that sheltered it alike from summer heats and the deadly cold of winter. stately pines growing on hill-sides lifted their evergreen heads far above all other trees, and stood as ever-watchful sentinels. mighty oaks shaded wide-spread areas, while graceful elms were mirrored in lake and river. everywhere the painted maples flaunted their brilliant colors, while chestnut, beech, hickory, and walnut showered down bountiful stores of food to those trusting in them for a winter's supply. man, beast, and bird, all children of the forest, dwelt within its safe protection and were fed from its exhaustless abundance. its rivers and smaller streams, filled from brimming reservoirs and unobstructed by dams, afforded highways of travel ever ready for use and always in the best of repair. besides these, the forest was threaded with trails worn by countless generations of indian runners, traders, hunters, and fighters, and these were as familiar to the dwellers in the shade as are the streets of a city to one born within its walls. along one of these devious trails, narrow and so dim that an unpractised eye would quickly have lost it, sped a solitary runner. he was young and goodly to look upon, while his movements were as graceful as those of the deer, whose soft-tanned skins constituted his attire. he was bareheaded, and in his hair was fastened a single feather from the wing of an osprey or fishing eagle. a noticeable feature of his costume was a broad belt of wampum, worn diagonally across his breast so that it might readily be seen and recognized. on it at short intervals were worked seven figures representing birds, beasts, and fishes, for it was the belt of seven totems, indicating the authority of longfeather the peacemaker, and the young runner now wearing it so conspicuously was none other than nahma, his only son. while longfeather awaited the return of his messenger to canonicus and made ready the presents intended for sacandaga, chief sachem of the maquas, news came that the narragansett embassy to that same powerful chieftain had already set forth on its mission. thus there was no time to be lost if his own message was to reach sacandaga first, an event that he deemed to be of the utmost importance. the chiefs whom he desired to send as ambassadors could not travel at greater speed than could the narragansetts, who had a two days' start, but it was possible that a fleet-footed runner might even yet overtake and pass them. as this thought flashed through longfeather's mind he knew that if the thing might be done it could only be accomplished by the swiftest of all his runners, and he promptly caused nahma to be summoned. at that moment the young warrior was listening with eager interest to the stories of white men and their great winged canoes, told by samoset, an abenaki youth of his own age, who had accompanied his chieftain to the council at montaup. "what do they call their tribe?" inquired nahma, "and of what nature is their speech? doth it resemble ours so that one may comprehend their words?" "they appear to be of many tribes," replied samoset, "though we call them all 'yengeese.' also they speak with many tongues, strange and unpleasant to the ear." "what are they like, these tongues? hast thou not caught some word that we may hear?" "often they say 'hillo' and 'sacrã©,'" replied samoset, "but what these mean i know not. also, once, where from hiding i watched them cooking fish on a beach, a pebble rolled from me to them. as they sprang up in alarm i slipped away, fearing lest they might take offence. as i did so one of them cried out very loud, 'mass i-sawit!'" (by the mass i saw it.) "massasoit," repeated nahma, thoughtfully. "it hath a familiar sound, and might be a word of the wampanoags, except that it is without meaning. i long greatly to see these white-skinned fish-catchers and their big canoes that resemble floating hill-tops with trees growing in them. so if it may be arranged i will return with thee, samoset, to look upon these wonders. but you have said naught of the thunder-sticks about which we hear so much. what of them? are they indeed as terrible as represented?" ere samoset could answer, nahma received word that longfeather desired his presence, and, promising shortly to rejoin his companions, he left them. ten minutes later, without their knowledge or that of any person in all montaup, save only his parents, the young runner had left his father's lodge bound on a solitary mission, longer, more important, and more dangerous than any he had heretofore undertaken. he was to make his way with all speed and in utmost secrecy to sacandaga, head sachem of the maquas, and urge him, in the name of longfeather, not to treat with the narragansetts or any other single tribe before the arrival of the peacemaker's own embassy. longfeather had given his instructions hastily and in a few words. he had invested the lad with his own superb belt as a badge of authority, and had dismissed him with the peremptory orders of a sachem, delivered in the loving tone of a father who sends his only son into danger. besides the belt of seven totems, nahma carried only a bow and arrows slung to his back, a wallet of parched corn bruised in a mortar until it formed a coarse meal, a small fire-bag of flints and tinder, and a copper knife, the precious gift of his father. having taken but five minutes for preparation, he tenderly embraced his mother and bade her farewell. filled with a presentiment of coming evil, miantomet clung to him as though she could not let him go; but, comforting her with loving words, the lad gently disengaged her arms from about his neck and sprang away. in another minute he had plunged into the forest and was lost to sight amid its blackness. for some hours the way was partially revealed by the light of a young moon, and by the time of its setting nahma had placed a score of miles between him and montaup. then, as he could no longer make speed through the darkness, he flung himself down at the foot of a great oak and was almost instantly fast asleep. by earliest dawn he was again on the trail, and all that day he sped forward with hardly a pause. occasionally he passed a group of bark huts nestled beside some smooth-flowing stream and surrounded by rudely tilled fields; but at none of these did he halt, save only now and then for a few mouthfuls of food. the belt that he wore insured him everywhere a glad welcome and instant service. he forded or swam the smaller streams; while at points where his trail crossed rivers he always found canoes that he did not hesitate to appropriate to his own use if their owners were not at hand. he was on the king's business and nothing might delay it. thus nahma sped so swiftly on his errand that an hour before sunset of the second day found him, very weary but exultant, on the eastern bank of the shatemuc and at the border of the country claimed by the iroquois, of whom the maquas were the easternmost tribe. he was farther from home than he had ever been before and in a region of which he had no knowledge. at the same time he knew that the maquas, being now at peace with the new england tribes, were accustomed to send hunting-parties east of their great river, and so he had hoped to find one or more canoes at the crossing. in this, however, he was disappointed, for, search as he might, he could discover none of the desired craft, though he found a place where several had but recently been concealed. as there were no other traces of human presence in that vicinity, nahma concluded that the canoes had been taken by persons coming from across the river. he did not suspect that it might have been done by the narragansetts whom he was striving to outstrip; for thus far he had discovered no sign of them, and had reached a conclusion that they must have taken some other trail. at any rate, there was no canoe to be had, and, as he was determined to cross the river before dark, he must swim it. this he did, keeping dry his scanty clothing and few belongings by floating them on a small raft of bark that he pushed before him. arrived on the farther side our young runner made a startling discovery. not only were a number of canoes drawn out on the bank and concealed beneath overhanging bushes, but on the soft ground beside them he found the unmistakable imprint of narragansett moccasins. also, a short distance back from the river, he came upon the still smouldering remains of a small fire. at length, then, he was close upon the heels of his rivals, and he must at all hazards pass them that night in order to gain a first hearing from sacandaga. at the same time he was in immediate need of food and rest, for he was faint with hunger and exhausted by his recent exertions. there was no sign of danger, his rivals had gone on, and the fire they had so kindly provided invited him to cook food that was to be had for the taking. so abounding with fish were all the streams of that land that no one possessed of even ordinary skill at catching them need go hungry. nahma was well aware of this, and, taking a pinch of his parched corn, he stepped back to the river's bank and cast it upon the water. in another moment he had transfixed with an unerring arrow one of the half-dozen large fish that rushed greedily to the surface, and his supper was provided. having cooked it and satisfied his ravenous hunger, the lad withdrew to a thicket well beyond the circle of firelight and flung himself down for an hour of sleep before continuing his journey. the young runner was lost to consciousness within a minute after closing his eyes; but not until his heavy breathing gave notice of the fact did a painted savage, who for more than an hour had watched his every movement, drop to the ground from among the branches of a thick-leaved oak. there he had crouched as motionless as a panther awaiting its prey; and now, after stretching his cramped limbs, he stole with catlike tread towards the sleeping youth. chapter iv the belt changes hands in all the history of the world it has happened that dwellers by the sea have been more advanced and prosperous than their inland neighbors. thus, in the present instance, the wampanoags and the narragansetts were the most numerous and powerful of the new england tribes. there had always been jealousies and often open warfare between them, nor had these wholly ceased to exist upon the election of longfeather to the high office of peacemaker. canonicus, head sachem of the narragansetts, felt that he was equally entitled to be thus honored, and consequently was bitterly jealous of his successful rival. this feeling was shared by his nephew and adopted son, miantinomo, only that the envy and hatred of the latter were directed against nahma, whose place as future ruler of the allied tribes he was determined to occupy, if by any means such a thing might be accomplished. thus, when canonicus planned to secure a power greater than that of longfeather by forming an alliance with the eastern iroquois, he found in miantinomo an eager assistant. so, even as the peacemaker had chosen his own son to represent him in the mission to sacandaga, canonicus selected miantinomo for a similar position in the narragansett embassy. in this way, without either being aware of the fact, the two young rivals became actively pitted against each other in the most important undertaking of their lives. while urged to make all possible haste, the narragansett party was obliged to adapt its pace to that of the oldest chief among them; and while they expected that longfeather would also send messengers to the maquas, they fancied these would be equally restricted as to speed. they knew that they had a start of at least two days, and believed they could reach sacandaga's village, transact their business, and depart for home before the coming of their rivals. at the same time they neglected no precaution to insure the success of their undertaking. they struck the shatemuc at a point much lower than that reached by nahma, and from it ascended the river in canoes. as they advanced they kept sharp watch of the eastern shore, and removed all craft found on it to the opposite side of the river. their last exploit of this kind was at a place where they must again take to the land and follow a trail to the maqua villages. having thus provided for a further delay of the other party, they felt no apprehension of being overtaken, and proceeded leisurely on their journey. they did, however, take the added precaution of leaving a scout behind them to watch the crossing until sunset. for this purpose they selected miantinomo, as being the keenest-eyed and swiftest-footed of their party. so nahma's most active rival and secret enemy was left to cover the rear, while his elders disappeared in single file up the narrow trail. according to indian custom miantinomo had brought pigments with him, and now he relieved the tedium of his watch, which he did not believe would amount to anything, by painting his body in anticipation of a speedy arrival at the maqua villages. so interested was he in this occupation that for a time he forgot everything else; then, startled by a splash in the river, he glanced up. a swimmer, just emerged from deep water, was wading ashore pushing before him a small raft, and miantinomo instantly recognized him. being hidden behind a screen of bushes, and satisfied that nahma was still ignorant of his presence, the young narragansett, crouching low, made his way to a thick-leaved oak that overhung the trail a short distance back from the river, and was snugly hidden among its branches by the time nahma gained the land. miantinomo was not wholly surprised to discover the son of longfeather at this place; but he could not understand why he should be alone. it must be that he had come to obtain canoes in which to bring over the others of his party. thus thinking, he expected to see nahma at once recross the river. in that case he would hasten after his own companions and urge them to travel all night, that they might still reach the maqua villages in advance of their rivals. but the new-comer failed to do as expected, and miantinomo was more puzzled than ever at witnessing his preparations to secure a meal and spend some time where he was. he evidently was alone, and after the spy became convinced of this, he wondered if by some means he might not prevent longfeather's messenger from continuing his journey. he was also filled with a great longing to possess himself of the belt of seven totems, which he recognized as nahma again assumed it. well did the young narragansett realize the power conferred upon the wearer of that belt. if it should be opposed to him in the presence of sacandaga, then would his mission prove a failure and his uncle's cherished plan would come to naught. on the other hand, if the all-powerful belt could be made to appear in his behalf, if he only might possess it even for a short time, how easy would become his task! from the moment these thoughts entered his mind miantinomo was determined to acquire the coveted object by any means that should offer. he knew that nahma would never relinquish the belt of his own free will, and that it must be taken from him by either stealth or force. he knew also that should he succeed in his wicked design he would incur the vengeance of longfeather, and doubtless bring on a war in which all the new england tribes would be involved. but what of that? would not the powerful iroquois fight on the side of the narragansetts; and, armed with the white man's weapons, might they not successfully defy the world? filled with these ambitious thoughts, miantinomo flattened himself closer against the great oak limb and, regardless of the discomfort of his position, watched with glittering eyes every movement of his rival. more than anything else he resembled a venomous serpent awaiting an opportunity to spring upon an unsuspecting victim. at his back was a bow and a quiver of flint-headed arrows, with one of which he might easily have stricken nahma to the earth at any moment, but he was not yet prepared to shed innocent blood for the accomplishment of his purpose. besides, he dared not make a movement that might attract the other's attention. so he waited with all the patience of his race and an ever-strengthening resolve to obtain possession of the peacemaker's belt. in the mean time nahma, utterly unconscious of the dangerous presence so close at hand, procured, cooked, and ate his supper, selected what he believed to be a safe resting-place, and laid himself down for a nap. the moment for which miantinomo had waited was at hand, and with noiseless movement he slipped to the ground. for a few seconds he stood motionless behind the tree, to assure himself that his rival had not been aroused; then with catlike tread he stole towards the unsuspecting sleeper. at length he stood beside nahma and bent over him with the coveted belt easily within his reach. bits of moonlight sifting through leafy branches fell upon it and upon the upturned face of the sleeper. so profound was his slumber that miantinomo believed he might remove the belt without disturbing him, and laying his stone-headed war-club within easy reach, he began with the utmost caution to make the attempt. it had very nearly succeeded, and the belt, partially loosened, was within his grasp, when, without warning, nahma opened his eyes. miantinomo leaped back at the first sign of waking, and as his victim attempted to gain his feet a crushing blow stretched him again on the ground motionless and to all appearance dead. for a moment the young narragansett stood ready to repeat his cowardly assault; but, seeing that a second blow was unnecessary, he again bent over the body of his rival and snatched from it the belt for which he had been willing to risk so much. with his prize thus secured, he was about to hasten from the spot when another thought caused him to pause. it would never do to leave the evidence of his crime where it was so certain to be discovered. he had not meant to kill nahma, and now that the awful deed was committed, he trembled at thought of its possible consequences. even his own people would regard him with abhorrence if they knew of it, while the vengeance of longfeather would be swift and terrible. therefore what he had done must never be known even by his nearest friends, and before leaving that spot he must remove all traces of his murderous deed. stripping off his scanty raiment that it might not become bloodstained, he lifted the limp form of the stricken youth, and carrying it some distance down the stream, flung it into the river. he heard the heavy splash of the body as it struck the water, but was too nervous to make further inquiry as to its condition. thus whether it sank or floated he did not know, nor did he seek to discover, but fled from the spot as though pursued. reaching the place where he had left his garments and the belt, he hastily resumed the former, and concealed the latter beneath them. then he set forth at top speed to rejoin his companions and report that he had seen nothing alarming during his watch by the river-side. on the following day the narragansett embassy reached the maqua villages, where, in spite of their alluring proposition and valuable presents, they were at first received with coldness and suspicion. at the council assembled to hear their talk sacandaga flatly refused to make an alliance with any one of the new england tribes, and the narragansetts retired from it believing that the cherished plan of canonicus must come to naught. that night, however, miantinomo sought a private interview with the maqua sachem, and displayed to him the belt of seven totems, which sacandaga at once recognized, since its fame had spread far and wide. "it is the belt of longfeather," he said, after a close inspection. "yes," replied miantinomo, "it is the belt of the great peacemaker, who is also my father." "how can that be?" asked the other. "may a man have two fathers?" "by adoption, yes," answered the young narragansett. "having no son of his own, longfeather has adopted the nephew of his friend canonicus, that in time their tribes may be united under one chief. to the narragansetts i am known as miantinomo, but by all others am i called nahma, son of longfeather." "i have heard the name and it is described as being that of a most promising warrior," said sacandaga, regarding the young man with renewed interest. "one blessed with two such fathers should indeed prove himself worthy," was the modest reply. "in proof that i am regarded as a son by longfeather," he continued, "the peacemaker has intrusted me with this token of authority. never before has he parted with it, and to none, save only the mighty chief of the maquas, whose friendship he greatly desires, would he send it. also he has done this thing in secret, so that even those who come with me know not that i am intrusted with so great authority." so impressed was sacandaga by this flattering statement and by sight of the belt offered in evidence of its sincerity, that he not only listened attentively to the young man's proposals, but finally agreed to accept them. "with canonicus alone i could not have treated," he said, "for he is but one of many; but with longfeather, who represents the many, i may enter into a compact." "the words of sacandaga are good," replied miantinomo, gravely, "and will be as the singing of birds in the ears of longfeather. at the same time i trust it will not be forgotten that they may not be sent directly to him. for the present he would not have it known that he desires the wealth of the white-skinned strangers. if they think him a friend they will the more readily fall into the snare he will set for them. therefore, my father, let the public treaty be made only between sacandaga and canonicus, for longfeather will be well pleased to have it so proclaimed." "i understand and will not forget," replied the maqua chief. thus through treachery and deceit did the wily young narragansett gain his point and accomplish the mission with which he had been intrusted by canonicus. chapter v what the daughters of kaweras found sacandaga secretly gave to miantinomo a belt of wampum bearing the emblem of a tortoise, his own totem, to be transmitted to longfeather, while publicly he gave another to the narragansett chiefs for canonicus. after the formalities of the treaty as well as the private negotiations were concluded, miantinomo urged the immediate departure of his companions lest they might discover his evil doings. then, having got them well started on their homeward journey, he hastened on in advance. for this he gave an excuse that the whites who were to be plundered might appear at any time, and that every hour was now of importance. his real reason was the belief that longfeather must also have sent a delegation of chiefs to confer with the maquas, and a determination to meet them and, if possible, turn them back. so, while his companions took a trail different from the one by which they had come, miantinomo hastened back to the place where he had encountered nahma, and found those who had followed the son of longfeather camped on the opposite bank of the river awaiting the coming of canoes in which to cross over. for some time after his appearance among them they asked no questions, but waited in dignified silence to learn of his errand to them. finally, the young man said,-"my fathers, you are following nahma, the son of longfeather, on a mission to sacandaga, the iroquois. is it not so?" "it is as my young brother has said," replied one of the chiefs. "then you may be spared a farther journey," continued miantinomo, "for nahma, by virtue of the belt he wore, the great belt of seven totems, readily gained the ear of sacandaga, even while i and those with me were vainly striving to do so. thus did he make a treaty with the iroquois on behalf of longfeather, his father, and for fear that you might claim a share in the honor he has returned to montaup by another trail. even now he travels with those of my people who kept me company. i have come by this trail that i may visit the village of peace before returning to my father. for this i was heavy-hearted; but now am i glad, because i have met with you, and may so save you a useless journey." for some time the chiefs discussed this report of miantinomo; and then, because they did not wholly trust him, they decided to retain him as a hostage while one of their number visited the maqua villages for confirmation of his words. during the absence of this messenger miantinomo was filled with apprehension, though he carefully hid his feelings and affected the utmost unconcern. he even went so far as to advise longfeather's commissioners to appropriate to their own use the presents they were bearing to sacandaga, and seek their respective homes without reporting to the peacemaker. "the treaty has been made," he said. "the sachem of the maquas is satisfied and expects nothing further. you have been put to much trouble and will have no share in the honor. longfeather has no thought that the presents will be returned to him. therefore is it best that you who have earned them should keep them." to such arguments the chiefs listened not unwillingly; and when their messenger returned with a report that miantinomo had spoken truly concerning what had taken place in the maqua village, they decided to accept his advice. "why should longfeather have intrusted the belt of seven totems to one so young and inexperienced as nahma instead of to us?" they asked. "also why did he not tell us that he had done so? truly he has shamed us, and if we take his presents to wipe out our shame, then shall we do that which is right and good." having reached this conclusion, each took a share and went his way; while miantinomo, rejoicing at the complete success of his evil designs and still wearing next his skin the belt of seven totems that was the badge of highest authority in all that land, returned to his own people. there he busied himself with the secret spreading of various reports concerning the young rival with whom he had dealt so foully. one was that nahma had taken a maqua girl to wife and would thereafter dwell among the iroquois. another was to the effect that he had been murdered by his companions of longfeather's embassy for the sake of the belt that he wore, as well as for the presents intrusted to them, which they had taken for their own benefit. from sacandaga himself longfeather learned that a young man named nahma and wearing the belt of seven totems had indeed visited the maqua villages, from which he had departed again in company with the narragansett chiefs. although the latter denied this and declared that they had not seen nahma, miantinomo maintained that he had met him in sacandaga's village and spoken with him. by these and other conflicting stories was the fate of nahma so shrouded in mystery that it became impossible to discover what had really befallen him, and finally his friends mourned for him as for one who is dead. even while they thus mourned it became rumored that either canonicus or miantinomo, his adopted son, would succeed longfeather in the high office of peacemaker and ruler of the allied new england tribes. in the mean time, while all these events were happening, nahma knew nothing of them nor indeed of anything else, for he lay tossing with fever in the lodge of kaweras, principal arrow-maker of the maquas. when, apparently dead, he had been flung into the river to disappear forever from human eyes, he had fallen among a bed of reeds in a place where the water was too shallow to drown him. there he lay motionless through the long night hours, half in the water and half out of it, while the tall reeds whispered and rustled above his head. soft-flitting night-birds gazed at him with wondering eyes, while timid animals coming to the river to drink sniffed the air tainted by his presence and fled in terror. towards morning a glimmer of returning life entered the numbed brain, and in striving to obey its commands the poor bruised body began to make feeble movements. by sunrise nahma was sitting up and gazing stupidly at the green wall by which he was surrounded. also he muttered over and over, with tedious repetition, three meaningless words: "hillo, sacrã©," and "massasoit." other than this he gave no sign of restored consciousness. he did not take heed even when a sound of merry voices came to the place where he sat, nor was his attention attracted by a loud swish and rustle of the reeds that came ever nearer until it was close at hand. then there was a momentary silence, broken only by the monotonous repetition of "hillo, sacrã©, massasoit." a stifled exclamation and excited whispers announced that these words had at length reached human ears, but there was an evident hesitation while fear struggled with curiosity. after a minute the reeds in front of nahma were noiselessly parted, and the bow of a canoe stole into sight inch by inch with almost imperceptible motion. from it peered the face of a young girl, bright and fascinating, but big-eyed with apprehension as that of a startled fawn. as she caught a glimpse of the wounded youth the progress of the canoe was instantly arrested, while the girl became rigidly motionless. her eyes, however, took in every detail of his appearance and of his melancholy situation. he still appeared to see nothing and still repeated the words that had attracted attention, "hillo, sacrã©, massasoit." [illustration: as she caught a glimpse of the wounded youth the progress of the canoe was instantly arrested] "what is it, sister? what do you see?" came in a frightened whisper from an unseen speaker who occupied the farther end of the canoe; but the other, still gazing motionless, made no reply. "aeana," insisted the invisible one in a louder tone, "tell me quickly what you see. i am frightened." "i see nothing to be afraid of, otshata," replied the girl in the bow of the canoe. "it is a young man, but he is evidently sorely wounded and regards not our presence. there, you may see for yourself." with this the girl called aeana pulled the canoe into such a position that the other could catch a glimpse of nahma. "it is certain that he is handsome," whispered otshata; "but is not his condition dreadful? let us hasten and report it to our father." "no," answered aeana, decisively. "that is," she added, "we will return to our father, and that quickly, but we must either take this young man with us or leave him to perish. see you not that the river is flowing backward and that its waters are rising? if we leave him he must die, since he is in no condition to care for himself. how we may get him into the canoe i know not, but if that can be done we will carry him to kaweras, our father." the elder though more timid sister attempted a further expostulation, but without heeding her aeana brought the canoe close to where the wounded youth still sat, indifferent alike to his fate and his surroundings, idly repeating the strange words that had fixed themselves in his bewildered brain. aeana spoke to him, but he failed to comprehend what she said. she laid a gentle hand on his arm and endeavored to persuade him into the canoe, but he sat passively motionless. finally in despair the girl uttered one of the strange words that he so constantly repeated. "massasoit," she said, and the youth looked at her, seeming for the first time to recognize her presence. a faint smile flickered across his blood-smeared features, and he made a movement towards her. in another moment, aided by her supple strength, he had gained the interior of the canoe, and lay weakly with closed eyes while the two girls pulled it out from among the reeds. then seizing their paddles, they urged the light craft swiftly down the river towards their father's lodge. thus did the daughters of kaweras, who had been sent to fetch a bundle of stout reeds that might serve as shafts for bird arrows, return without them, but bringing a wounded and unconscious youth in their place. although the old arrow-maker saw at a glance that the young warrior was not of the maqua, nor even of the iroquois people, his ideas of hospitality did not permit him to ask questions nor hesitate a moment before attending to the stranger's needs. it required the united strength of father and daughters to transfer nahma from canoe to lodge, and when he was finally laid in the latter on a hastily improvised couch of boughs and skins, he was once more to all appearance dead. chapter vi in the lodge of the arrow-maker the lodge of kaweras, occupied only by him and his two daughters, stood by itself in a grassy glade shaded by elms on the western bank of the lordly shatemuc. close at hand flowed a spring of crystal water, while at no great distances were abundant materials for the prosecution of the old arrow-maker's trade. nearby hills furnished him with flints and slate, agate and milk-white quartz; stout reeds and tough, straight-grained woods were to be had for the taking. deer of the forest yielded him their strong back-sinews for binding arrow-head to shaft, and myriads of sea-fowl flying up or down the broad river gave him of their feathers. in his younger days kaweras had been a noted warrior. now he was the most expert arrow-maker of the region in which he dwelt. he was also a mystic, a prophet, and one well versed in the science of healing by means of herbs, roots, bark, and leaves. in his double capacity of arrow-maker and medicine-man kaweras was much sought after, and though his lodge stood remote from any village of his people, it was rarely without visitors. young warriors came for arrows and to catch glimpses of his pretty daughters; their elders came to consult with him concerning grave affairs; while many of all ages and both sexes came for healing or to profit by his advice. as all brought gifts, kaweras was well-to-do, and his larder was always stocked with choicest products of forest and field without effort on his own part or that of his daughters. these last kept tidy the spacious lodge with its three divisions, of which only the outer one was for the general public, prepared the family meals, and did much sewing with needles of fishbone threaded with fibre or sinew. at the same time they found abundant leisure for paddling on the river in their canoe of white birch brought from the far north and for attending to the needs of their pets, two tame fawns and a large flock of wild ducks bred in captivity. also they helped their father in the making of arrows, and especially in the gathering of material. with this busy but uneventful life the elder sister was quite content, but aeana always longed for excitement and adventure. now she had found both in the coming to their quiet lodge of a stranger, young, mysterious, wounded to the point of death, and speaking a language to which even the wisdom of her father could find no clue. furthermore, she regarded him with a proprietary interest, for had she not discovered him and rescued him from almost certain destruction? during the long illness that followed his coming, and while he lay oblivious to his surroundings, she often gazed curiously upon his face, listened to the three strange words that he repeated to the exclusion of all others, and speculated concerning him. she became impatient for him to get well that he might tell her who he was, where he came from, and how he happened to be in the sad plight that had so nearly proved fatal. she would have talked of him to their many visitors but for her father's expressed wish that nahma's presence in their lodge should be kept a secret from all men. kaweras hoped thus to learn something concerning him from unguarded conversations, but in this he was disappointed. it is true that he heard of the mysterious disappearance of nahma, the son of longfeather, but whenever that youth was mentioned miantinomo was described, and as this description did not coincide in any particular with the appearance of his patient, he had no reason to connect the two. otshata was quite as much interested in the young stranger as was her sister, but in another way. she thought him very handsome, which aeana would not admit, and secretly rejoiced in the helplessness that depended so largely upon her gentle ministrations. she had the motherly instinct that found pleasure in self-sacrifice, and from the first constituted herself chief nurse of the stricken youth. for a long time it was doubtful if nahma would ever recover from the illness by which he was prostrated; but after it finally took a turn for the better he began rapidly to mend. on the day that he first ventured outside the lodge into the freedom of open air there was much rejoicing in the little family, but it was tinged with sadness. although weak and emaciated from his long sickness, he was still a goodly youth to look upon, and gave promise of speedily regaining his physical powers; but his mind was that of a child. he could neither tell nor remember anything of his former life, even its language was lost to him, and he could converse only in such words of the iroquois tongue as he had acquired from his present associates. as he could not tell them his name, they called him "massasoit," from the word he had most frequently uttered during his delirium, and this he accepted as readily as he did all else that they offered him. while thus compelled to relearn everything that required mental effort, it was soon discovered that he had lost none of his cunning in matters calling for physical strength or skill. he could still shoot an arrow or hurl a spear with unerring aim, was rarely at fault on the dimmest trail, and proved himself an adept in such branches of indian handiwork as usually fell to the share of warriors, such as the fashioning of weapons or the building of canoes. he soon regained a muscular strength even greater than that with which he had been endowed before his illness, while his fleetness of foot excited the wonder of his friends. with all this nahma was gentle and submissive to authority, a trait that aroused the utmost scorn in the mind of aeana. from the time his mental weakness was discovered this high-spirited girl treated him as she would a child, bidding him come or go, fetch or carry, according as she felt inclined, and apparently she despised him for his ready obedience to her orders. he, on the other hand, regarded her with an intense admiration and sought in every way to win her favor. all his trophies of the chase were laid at her feet only to be contemptuously rejected or flung to otshata. in the latter, however, the young man found a friend to whom his misfortune appealed so keenly that she treated him with unwearied kindness and tenderest consideration. he called her "sister," a term that he dared not apply to aeana, and poured all his troubles into her sympathetic ear. one day nahma returned hot and weary from a chase that had lasted many hours and presented a noble stag to aeana. without taking notice of the gift, and careless of his evident weariness, she bade him fetch her water from the spring. as he willingly departed on this mission she regarded him with curling lip, and when he returned bearing a large earthen jar of water that he set before her, she promptly overturned it so that its contents were spilled. at the same time she uttered the single word "squaw" with an accent of utter contempt and entered the lodge, leaving him bewildered and mortified. walking slowly towards the river, he discovered otshata seated in a shaded nook on its bank embroidering a moccasin with painted quills. "my sister, why does aeana hate me?" he asked, as he flung himself despondently on the turf beside her. "she hates thee not, my brother," replied the other, interrupting her work to look at him. "truly she does. in every word and by every act she shows her dislike," declared nahma, bitterly. "she would be glad never to see me more, and i will go away rather than remain longer to displease her by my presence." "speak not of such a thing!" exclaimed otshata. "whither would you go, and what should we do without our hunter? if aeana seems to treat thee unkindly, it is only to inspire thee with a braver spirit. she likes it not that one come to the estate of a warrior should tamely serve her. she would have thee do brave deeds, and also she would have thee remember thy past. canst thou not do this, and by hard thinking recall some one thing? who was thy father? who struck the cruel blow that so nearly ended thy life? who are thy people? are they the saganaga of the south, the oneidas of the west, or wast thou born among the fish-eaters who dwell in the country of sunrising? i will not ask if thou hast huron blood in thy veins; for in spite of thy moccasins i feel assured that thou art not of that wicked people." by this reference otshata recalled the fact that, when found wounded in the river sedge, nahma had on his feet a pair of huron-made moccasins procured in the village of peace to replace others worn out by his journey; but of these he could give no account. "i strive to remember," declared the youth, vehemently. "night and day, sleeping and waking, i think till my head seems like to burst, but 'tis of no use. the only life that i know is here, and if i have had another, it is gone from me like a dream of the black hours. so it is well that i should go away, and if these hurons be thy enemies and the enemies of aeana, then will i go and fight against them that she may no longer despise and hate me." "no, no!" cried otshata. "think not of the war-path, my brother. the hurons are very fierce and terrible and cruel. also they are so filled with evil designs that only the wisest and most experienced warriors may hope for success against them. thee they would easily kill; or, what is worse, they would take advantage of thy simplicity to adopt thee and make thee sharer of their wickedness." at this point the conversation was interrupted by a summons from kaweras bidding massasoit come to him quickly. while it had been comparatively easy to keep secret the presence of a stranger in the lodge of kaweras during his illness, it became impossible to do so after he was out and about. so a knowledge of the mysterious youth who could remember nothing of his past speedily became noised abroad, and many persons, attracted by curiosity, came to see him. the victim of these interviews dreaded them so intensely that he spent much time in remote forest depths to avoid them. now, however, he was fairly caught, and going reluctantly to the lodge, followed at a distance by otshata, he found himself in the presence of a distinguished-looking chieftain who was seated on a robe beside kaweras. behind them stood a group of warriors. as nahma drew near the eyes of all these were fixed intently upon him, though no word was spoken until he paused within a few paces of his host. chapter vii nahma joins a war-party "massasoit," said kaweras, as the young man regarded him inquiringly, "i would have plumes from ke-neu, the great eagle, to make a war-bonnet. he waits yonder for an invitation to come to us. can you persuade him?" with this the speaker pointed upward to where a golden eagle, attracted by a bait of raw flesh placed temptingly at some distance from the lodge, circled on motionless pinions. glancing in the direction indicated, nahma stepped within the lodge, from which he quickly reappeared bearing a bow and three arrows. again taking his station in front of kaweras, he stood for a moment motionless, watching intently the movements of the eagle, that still circled slowly downward. one arrow was fitted to the bowstring, while the other two were stuck in the ground before him. suddenly the youth lifted his weapon and let fly its feathered dart. then he shot twice more with such marvellous rapidity of motion that the third arrow was leaving the bow ere the first had reached its mark. as the spectators uttered an involuntary exclamation of amazement, the great bird, evidently stricken to its death, plunged dizzily downward with feebly beating wings. "bring it," said the sachem, addressing those who stood behind him, and each taking the command to himself, all sprang away in a breathless race for the trophy. "do thou bring it," said kaweras to nahma. instantly the young bowman darted forward with such amazing swiftness that, despite the distance already gained by the others, he overtook and passed them ere they could reach the coveted goal. as he picked up the dead bird and bore it back the others made way for him, nor did one offer to take from him the prize that he had thus twice won. as he laid it at the feet of kaweras the bird was seen to be transfixed by three arrows. "the young man should be named sharp-eye, quick-hand, and swift-foot," exclaimed the visiting sachem, who was none other than sacandaga, "for he has proved himself to excel the best of my warriors in all these things. not until this day have i believed the tales told me touching his skill; but now i know them to have been less than the truth. if he be as fearless as he is quick he should take high rank as a warrior. how say you, massasoit? will you go with me and my young men to do battle with the hurons, who are reported to have taken the war-path against us?" for a moment the youth hesitated. he glanced at the old arrow-maker, whose features were unmoved and who made no sign. then he looked towards otshata, whose face showed her distress and who made an imploring gesture for him to decline the offer. finally he turned to aeana, who stood motionless and with averted gaze, but her attitude and expression were unmistakable. they said as plainly as words, "he is a squaw and dares not face the war-path." in an instant nahma's resolution was taken, and he answered sacandaga, saying,-"i am without experience of the war-path, nor have i knowledge of any people save only of these, my father and my sisters. if, however, these hurons be the enemies of kaweras and of his daughters, then will i gladly go with thee to fight against them." "it is well," replied sacandaga, greatly pleased to have gained so promising a recruit. "spend thou the night with my young men, who will instruct thee concerning many things, and in the morning will we set forth." some hours later, when the camp-fires had burned low and the recumbent forms gathered about them were buried in slumber, two men issued silently from the lodge of kaweras and made their way to a secluded spot on the river-bank, where they believed they might discuss weighty matters without danger of being overheard. they were sacandaga and the old arrow-maker, and when they had gained the place they sought the latter broke the silence by saying,-"it is now many days since i became aware that sacandaga proposed to honor my poor lodge by a visit. also am i informed of his object in coming, though he has told it to no man." "how may such a thing be?" asked the other. "to all men come dreams, but to a few only is given the power of understanding them," replied kaweras. "the many dream dreams and forget them on waking. some indeed recall them and make vain efforts to comprehend their meaning; but to kaweras a dream speaks a language as easy of understanding as the signs of the forest or the voices of birds that dwell among its branches." "so i have heard, and for that reason have i come to thee," said sacandaga. "tell me, then, what is my desire and if it may be accomplished." "the hurons are reported to be gathering on the war-path leading to the country of the iroquois, and thy desire is to proceed with such promptness against them that they may be surprised and destroyed while still in their own territory. then would you descend on their villages and wipe them out, that the power of our enemies may be broken forever." "that is indeed a hope that i have cherished, but always in secret, and for my brother to know of it is proof that i have not done wrong in coming to him for advice," said sacandaga. "how, then, kaweras, will this plan of mine succeed, and shall we thus rid ourselves of the wolves whose howling has so long troubled our ears?" the prophet hesitated before making reply. then he said slowly, "sometimes the dream-pictures are so plenty and come so quickly that it is hard to make out one from another, as it is hard to understand the words of one man when many are talking. i see a fight. in it are maquas and hurons. the maquas chase their enemies and kill them. it is morning and the sun is shining. also with this picture i see another battle in which the hurons are overcoming the maquas and taking many prisoners. in this one is thunder and lightning, by which many are killed. which is the true picture i know not, nor how to advise my brother concerning them." "then will i interpret and tell thee their meaning," exclaimed sacandaga. "both are true, and their meaning is this. i and my young men are to go on the war-path against the huron dogs and will surely encounter them. if we do so on a fair morning when there is no sign of storm in the air, then shall we overcome them and wipe them from the face of the earth. if we should meet them in the morning and delay an attack until later in the day, then would the great spirit grow angry and send his lightnings to destroy us. it is well, my brother. i will remember to seek the enemy on a fair morning and avoid him on a day of storm. now i would ask thee one more question. what do thy dreams tell of the young man who is called massasoit?" "this only," answered kaweras, "that he is the son of a chieftain, and will himself become a leader of men, wiser even and more powerful than his father." "but who is his father?" "i know not, though of late i have come to a suspicion that this young man may be nahma, the missing son of longfeather." "that cannot be, for i have had dealings with the son of longfeather and know that he and this youth are not one person." "did not that one also claim to be a son of canonicus?" "he did so claim." "then he may have spoken falsely; for uncas, the mohican, hath lately sent me word that nahma and miantinomo are two separate persons, holding no love for each other and having nothing in common." "if the words of uncas should prove true and it shall appear that i have been led falsely into a treaty with canonicus, then shall the wrath of sacandaga fall upon the narragansetts even as one destroys a serpent that has stung him. i will look closely into the matter when i have returned from dealing with the hurons. until then it is well that i keep this young man where i may watch over him." in the mean time the youth under discussion had just passed the pleasantest evening his short memory could recall. he was like a boy brought up in a nursery with only girls for companions, at length set free and for the first time admitted to the company of men. he had no recollection of companions of his own age and sex, so that the young warriors who now welcomed him to their ranks were revelations as surprising as they were interesting. how much they knew, and what wonderful things they told him! at the same time how delightful was it to listen to their praise of his own accomplishments! until now he had not known that he possessed accomplishments, but supposed that every one could shoot and run equally well with himself. he could not remember having learned to do these things, nor had he found occasion since entering the lodge of kaweras to test his skill in them against that of others. now, therefore, he was surprised as well as pleased to find himself in the position of a hero on account of abilities that he had heretofore regarded as commonplace. so pleasant was the evening thus spent with his new companions that when sacandaga gave the signal for conversation to cease that his young men might sleep and so prepare for an early start on the morrow, nahma was filled with eager anticipations of the new life opening before him, and already wondered how he could have been content with that passed in the lodge of kaweras. with the earliest promise of dawn he was first of all the sleeping warriors to spring to his feet and begin preparations for departure. such as he had to make were few and simple, but to him they were of vast importance. new moccasins and leggings of buckskin, a light robe of soft furs in which to wrap himself at night, and a wing feather from the great eagle for his head completed his list of personal belongings. besides these he would take a bow and the quiver of fine flint-headed arrows that kaweras presented to him that morning, his stone hatchet or tomahawk, and the copper scalping-knife that was his sole relic of a former but unremembered life. also he must furnish to the general stock of provisions a large, close-woven basket of parched corn. by sunrise a meal had been hastily eaten and everything was in readiness for the setting forth of the war-party. kaweras embraced nahma and bade him make for himself a name. tears streamed down the cheeks of otshata as she bade him farewell and pressed into his hands a pair of daintily embroidered moccasins as a token of remembrance. the youth looked on all sides for aeana, but she was nowhere to be seen. only after his canoe was well out on the river and he glanced back for a farewell view of the place that had been to him a home did he see, standing on a slight elevation and gazing in his direction, a solitary figure that he knew to be that of the girl who scorned him. some days later he found tucked down in the toe of one of otshata's moccasins an exquisite little tinder-bag of softest fawn-skin that he had last seen hanging from the shapely neck of aeana. chapter viii two young scouts for two days did sacandaga's little expedition proceed up the shatemuc, now making tedious carries around roaring waterfalls, and again laboriously hauling their laden canoes up some stretch of tumultuous rapids. at one of these places sacandaga, bidding nahma accompany him, left the river and made his way swiftly along a broad trail that led to the westward. after following it for a while they came to a place of many springs delightfully shaded by giant trees. although no human being was to be seen, there were on all sides remnants of former encampments. also the ground about certain of the springs was worn bare by innumerable hoof-prints, showing that deer and other animals were accustomed to gather here in great numbers. deeply marked trails leading from every direction centred here, as though the springs formed a meeting-place for all people. as nahma noted these things sacandaga smiled at his expression of astonishment. "it is sara tioga, the place of healing," he said. "to it come all who are sick or suffer pain that they may drink of the medicine waters and be cured. many would be here now but for the report that an enemy is coming this way. when we have wiped him out then will we return hither, that we may rejoice with feasting and dancing. at that time will be seen a great gathering of the iroquois, for this is the place of all their places that they most love. now, however, we may tarry only long enough to drink of the life-giving waters and then must we hasten forward. in drinking take careful note of the spring most offensive to thy taste, for thus may be discovered which one is most needful to thy well-being." so nahma drank of all the springs, finding some of them salt, some sparkling with effervescence, and others so nauseous that he turned from them in disgust. "i like none of them and will drink no more," he finally declared. "then must all of them be for thy good and thou must stand in need of all the elements they contain," answered his companion, who cared to hear naught but praise of his beloved springs. "but let us go, for we have no time to lose." as they turned to depart from the beautiful place, nahma suddenly sprang upon his companion with such violence that sacandaga was hurled to the ground and the young man fell with him. at the same moment an arrow was buried to its shaft in the trunk of a beech a few paces in front of them, where it stood quivering with the force that had sped it. even as he fell nahma bounded up, and an instant later, when the startled sachem also gained his feet, he saw the young warrior darting back in the direction from which they had just come. at the same time a third figure hideously daubed with war-paint appeared in plain view. he stood directly in front of the rash youth with bended bow and a second arrow drawn to its head. quick as thought nahma dropped, and the feathered missile flew harmlessly above him. as he again leaped to his feet his assailant turned to fly, but ere he had taken half a dozen steps he sprang convulsively into the air and plunged headlong with outstretched arms. an arrow sped from sacandaga's bow had passed through his body. "why did you kill him?" asked nahma, regretfully, as the two stood together looking down on the still twitching body of their late foe. "is it not what my young brother would have done?" inquired sacandaga, in surprise. "no; i would have caught him and made him tell me things." "what things?" "why he hid from us and tried to kill us, who he was, and what he was doing here. i do not remember seeing him among thy young men." sacandaga smiled grimly. "he seems to have escaped being seen until he came within range of quick-eye's vision; but all thy questions may be answered in a word. he is a huron." "a huron!" cried nahma. "how may that be, when he looks like other men? i thought a huron was a wolf. surely my father has said so." "a huron is a wolf in spirit," replied sacandaga, as he stooped and deftly removed the dead man's scalp, "but the wolfish spirit is concealed beneath the semblance of a man." "then how may one know a huron?" asked the puzzled youth. "by his paint, his moccasins, the cut of his scalp-lock, the fashion of his weapons, his cast of feature, and by a thousand other signs as plain as the difference between light and darkness." all these things had once been well known to nahma; but now they were as though he had never before heard of them, and he listened eagerly to the words of sacandaga's lesson. "this time," concluded the sachem, "my young brother has done well, and to his quickness of sight combined with promptness of action do i owe my life. but never again, my son, run openly upon an enemy without first knowing his strength. it is seldom that a huron spy comes alone into the iroquois country, and had there been others, or even one other, with this one, thy death had been certain. always when surprised seek first a place of hiding from which to discover the strength of thy enemy and plan for meeting him." the huron scout who had just paid the penalty of his daring was one of two sent to discover if the iroquois had knowledge concerning the projected invasion of their country. his companion had remained with their canoe at the upper end of andia-ta-roc-te (lake george) while he had penetrated the country as far as the springs of healing, where, if the iroquois felt themselves secure from invasion, he was certain to discover a number of their lodges. he was greatly disappointed at finding the place unoccupied, and was about to retrace his steps with the information that an alarm had been given, when sacandaga and his young companion appeared on the scene. hiding like a snake in the grass, the huron watched these two with longing eyes while waiting to see if they would be followed by others. he recognized sacandaga, and was determined if possible to carry back with him the scalp of that redoubtable chieftain. an opportunity came as his enemies turned to depart, and he cautiously brought his bow into position. at that instant nahma, glancing back, caught sight of a tip of the weapon projecting above the tall grasses and did the only thing possible to save his companion's life. as the fortunate survivors of this episode left the scene of its occurrence they took a path leading northward, and after a time came again to the shatemuc, having cut off a great bend of the river that the canoes must necessarily follow. as they went they discovered the slight trail left by the huron scout, but at the river it was lost. wading to the opposite bank, nahma soon recovered it, and asked permission to follow it farther; but sacandaga would not grant this until the arrival of the canoes. then, after briefly relating what had happened, he selected a young warrior already famous as a trailer and ordered him to accompany nahma over the path the huron had come. this warrior was named ah-mik-pan-pin, or the grinning beaver, on account of two prominent front teeth over which his lips were never wholly closed. "have a care," said sacandaga on parting with the young men, "and run no risks for the sake of scalps. what i desire is a knowledge of the party to which that huron belonged. i would know how large it is, where it is camped, and whether it is coming or going. find out these things as quickly as may be and come again with thy news. the maquas will sleep to-night at the foot of the great rock by the shore of the wide waters. they will have no fire and will make no sound, but he who utters the cry of wah-o-nai-sa (the whippoorwill) twice and then once will be answered by the same cry once and then twice. go thou and come again quickly." with this nahma and grinning beaver set forth, and were instantly lost to view in the thickness of the forest. for two hours they sped forward without a pause, then they began to see spaces of light through the trees, and the beaver intimated that they must now exercise the greatest caution. "this trail will not lead us to them," he whispered, "for they will have moved to one side or the other after their runner left. let us, then, go separately to the water's edge, thou on the one side and i on the other. whoever reaches the beach first shall utter the cry of wah-o-nai-sa, and if it be not quickly answered he shall return to see what is wrong. is it well?" "it is well," replied nahma, and the two went their respective ways as agreed. with the utmost caution and without a sound louder than his own breathing did nahma circle towards the lighted space marking the limit of the forest. all at once he stopped and listened. from behind him, faint and distant, he had heard an unmistakable exclamation of surprise. it was not repeated nor did he hear further sounds, but it was enough, and after a moment of listening he started back over the way he had come. he found the place where he had parted from his companion, and then followed the slight trail made by the latter. suddenly and without warning he came upon a sight so startling that he stood in his tracks like one petrified, gazing at it with dilated eyes. two warriors locked in a deadly embrace lay motionless on the ground. their surroundings were drenched with blood, and to all appearance both were dead. nahma stooped over them, and saw to his horror that one of the faces, so swollen and distorted that he had not sooner recognized it, was that of his recent comrade. the other was a huron, and a knife still clutched by the beaver's hand was buried to the hilt in his heart. at the same time his own fingers held the throat of the young iroquois with a grip like that of a vise. it required all of nahma's strength to unlock that death-clutch, but at length he succeeded, and the two mortal foes so recently thrilled with vigorous life lay side by side stark and rigid. chapter ix on the lake nahma gazed about him in dismay. night was coming on, he was alone in a place of which he had no knowledge, and he believed himself surrounded by enemies. he even fancied he could see dark faces peering at him from behind the shadowy tree-trunks. above all, the companion upon whom he had relied for guidance and counsel lay dead at his feet. although a savage himself, accustomed only to savage sights and ways, our lad had seen so little of death that this last fact seemed incredible. he kneeled beside the beaver and gazed into his face, calling him by name in a low voice and bidding him open his eyes. as he did this the dreadful aspect of the face on which he was looking suggested another that he had seen but a week earlier. it had been that of a man drowned in the shatemuc and brought to the lodge of kaweras. to all appearance he was dead, and yet the old arrow-maker had restored him to life. nahma remembered perfectly what was done at that time, for he had closely watched every operation, and had even assisted kaweras in his efforts. now, in his despair over the present situation, but feeling that he could not yield to it without making some attempt at its betterment, he set to work upon the beaver exactly as kaweras had done with the drowned man. he turned the body on its face, drew forward the tongue, and cleared the mouth of froth. then by rolling the body on its side and back again, at the same time applying a gentle pressure to back and breast, he forced air into and expelled it again from the lungs, thus producing an artificial breathing. after that he sought to restore circulation by rubbing upward along the legs. in all his efforts he was without hope of success and only worked for the sake of doing something. he was therefore utterly amazed as well as overjoyed to detect in his patient a slight gasping for breath. he could scarcely believe he had heard aright until it was repeated, and then he knew that the beaver was still to be counted among those who lived. without thought of the danger from probable enemies, nahma sprang to his feet, started towards the lake for water, and had gone half-way before he recalled that he had nothing in which to fetch it. upon this he ran back, and picking up the still unconscious form of his companion, staggered to the beach with it in his arms. on his way he ran across a canoe concealed in a clump of bushes, but paid no attention to it for the moment. as he laid his burden on the sand and glanced up to see if they were still safe from the presence of enemies, he detected a vague form some distance up the beach that disappeared within the forest even as he looked. it must of course be a huron warrior, and doubtless others were with him. in that case to remain where they were meant certain destruction, and there was but one way to save his helpless companion as well as himself. the canoe that he had just discovered would at least bear them away from the treacherous forest and give them a fighting chance for their lives in the open. in another minute nahma had launched the light craft, placed his comrade inside, and was paddling furiously out over the lake. he had not gone more than one hundred yards when a series of yells from behind, and a flight of arrows sent with deadly intent, showed that his escape was discovered. most of the arrows fell short, and none of them inflicted any damage. at the same time nahma, glancing back, thought he saw other canoes coming down the coast. it was now so nearly dark that all objects were indistinct, and if he could only maintain his lead for a short time longer he might still evade his pursuers. so the tired youth infused new energy into his paddling and urged his craft forward with redoubled speed. as he knew nothing of the lake, he had no idea where to look for the great rock beside which sacandaga was to spend the night, nor was the beaver in any condition to afford him information. so he held a course as far as possible from both shores and continued his paddling until nearly midnight, when he was forced by sheer exhaustion to give it over. dark as was the night, our lad could still distinguish the darker forms of occasional islands as he passed them, and at length drawing cautiously in towards one of these, he made a landing. in all this time the beaver had been slowly struggling back to life, but he was still devoid of strength or a knowledge of his surroundings. so nahma prepared as well as he could a bed of branches and grass, to which he bore his comrade. he also dragged up the canoe and turned it on its side to provide shelter from a drizzle of chill rain that was beginning to fall. having completed these simple preparations, the youth ate a handful of parched corn drawn from his wallet, and lying down beside the beaver was almost instantly fast asleep. in regard to the necessaries of life the american of that day was in no degree removed from the beasts of the field. like them he could thrive upon the natural products of the forest, and he also found its shelters sufficient for his needs even in the most inclement weather. with materials for a feast at hand he feasted; but when they were lacking he went without food uncomplainingly and for incredible lengths of time. if in the present instance our lad had dared allow himself the luxury of a fire he would quickly have acquired all the comforts of a home, including an abundance of cooked food, a good bed, warmth, and light. as it was he accepted cold, wet, hunger, and a most uncomfortable resting-place as things liable to be encountered at any time in the ordinary course of events. the remainder of the night passed without incident, and by dawn nahma was once more alert. his first move was to climb a tall tree that stood close at hand and take a comprehensive survey of the lake. seeing it thus for the first time by daylight, he was impressed by its marvellous beauty. its blue waters were dotted with islands all wooded and blending every shade of green. on both sides forest-covered hills rose abruptly from the shore, and back of them towered mountains higher than any he had ever seen. the lake was nowhere more than a mile or two in width, and to the northward it narrowed rapidly. having gazed as long as he dared on the outspread beauties of the scene, and satisfied himself that nothing was in motion on the face of the waters, the youth descended from his observatory and proceeded to make ready a breakfast. he was tired of parched corn, and his ravenous appetite demanded something more substantial. he even decided to run the risk of a fire. so he gathered a small quantity of dry, hard wood that would burn with the least amount of smoke, and, after an exasperating struggle with flints and tinder, caught a spark that was finally fanned into a brisk blaze. with the making of a fire the hardest part of his breakfast-getting was ended, although he had as yet nothing to cook. five minutes later, however, he was in possession of a large pickerel and two good-sized bass, all of which had been enticed within striking distance of his arrows by a bait of worms. these fish wrapped in green leaves were buried under a bed of coals, and while they were cooking nahma gathered berries. when all was in readiness, he was vastly disappointed to find that his companion was unable to share in the meal. the beaver had so far recovered that he was able to sit up and take an intelligent interest in what was going on. the expression of longing with which he regarded those baked fish left no doubt that he, too, was hungry; but, alas! he could not swallow food. his throat was so swollen that he could not even speak, and he still breathed with difficulty. he was so parched with thirst that he managed after a painful struggle to swallow a few drops of water, but that was all. so nahma was reluctantly obliged to eat alone while his companion watched him enviously. as he ate, the former told what he knew concerning the events of the preceding evening, and the beaver learned for the first time that they were on an island far down the lake in hiding from a war-party of hurons. he had wondered at finding himself alone with nahma instead of in sacandaga's company, but had supposed that they were within a short distance of the great rock, as he knew had been the case when they first gained the lake-shore. his distress at being unable to ask questions and express his views on the situation was so evident as to suggest a possible remedy, upon which nahma immediately set to work. first he stripped some sheets of bark from a white birch, and with them fashioned a rude but water-tight bowl that would hold about a gallon. this he partially filled with water. in the mean time he had thrown into the fire some large beach pebbles, and these were now thoroughly heated. lifting them with forked sticks and dropping them into the bowl, he almost instantly had hot water, with which he bade the beaver bathe his throat. while the latter was doing this nahma bethought himself to climb once more into his observatory for another look at the lake. as he gained the highest available branch and glanced back over the way they had come he uttered an exclamation of dismay. not more than two miles distant was a fleet of canoes advancing directly towards him. he could plainly see the flash of their paddles and note their movements as they separated or closed together. there was no doubt but that the enemy from whom he had fled was again close upon him, and to remain on that island meant certain discovery, since no indian would pass a fire without finding out by whom it had been kindled. to leave the island and make for the mainland on either side was out of the question, for their moving canoe would surely be discovered. thus the only thing remaining to be done was to proceed straight down the lake, with the hope of gaining another place of concealment while still hidden by the island from those who came behind. with this plan formed our young warrior hastily descended the tree, told his companion that the hurons were again in hot pursuit, and bundled him into the canoe ere he had time to gain further information. then nahma gave him a paddle and told him that if he valued his life he must put forth whatever of strength he had remaining. chapter x an oki of the waters as nahma had intended remaining on the island until his companion fully recovered from his injuries, he had not hurried with anything that he had done that morning. consequently it was mid-day when the flight was resumed and the fugitives again headed their canoe down the lake, keeping the island directly behind them as a screen from their pursuers. although working furiously at his paddle, nahma glanced behind him every few moments, and as time passed was amazed that the enemy did not come into sight. at length, after a couple of hours of incessant labor, the canoe rounded a bold headland that nearly cut the lake in twain, and was hidden behind it from any who might be following. here the lake was very narrow, and nahma proposed that they should run the canoe ashore, hide it, and seek to rejoin their friends by land. "no," said the beaver, who had recovered his power of speech. "if the hurons are following us, they will surely have scouts in the forest on both sides. we should be certain to fall in with these, and i am not yet ready for fighting. now that we have come thus far by water, let us keep on. at a short distance from here this lake ends, but it is joined to another much larger. on that other a canoe may go north even to the country of the hurons. it may also go south to the land of the iroquois. let us, then, find the big water and turn to the south, for if those following us be hurons they will certainly hold a course to the northward." "we will do as my brother says," replied nahma, delighted to have again the counsel of his more experienced companion. so the course of the canoe was continued, but only nahma now wielded a paddle. the beaver had been so much benefited by hot-water applications and by the subsequent exercise of paddling that his throat was again serviceable. not only could he talk but he believed he could eat, and as nahma had brought along one of the three fish caught for breakfast, he made the attempt with such gratifying success that it quickly disappeared. being thus refreshed and strengthened, he began to question his companion concerning the events of the preceding night. when nahma related the finding of the two mortal enemies clutched in a death-grapple the beaver said,-"it is so. as i saw the huron he saw me, and we sprang at each other with our knives, for we were too close to use bows or even the tomahawk. his knife broke, and as i drove mine into his body his fingers closed about my throat. ugh! it was the grip of a bear, and i could not loose it. again and again did i bury my knife in his heart, but he would not let go. then all became black and i died. how my brother brought me back from the place of okis [departed spirits] i know not, but when next i awoke he lay beside me under a canoe and a band as of fire was about my head. now, therefore, the life of grinning beaver belongs to his brother. but tell me quickly how knew you we were pursued by hurons? there were traces of but two of them, while many of our own people were to meet sacandaga at the great rock." "i know that our pursuers are hurons, or at least enemies, because they crept on us by stealth. also when they saw we had escaped they yelled with rage and shot arrows to kill us. besides that, they followed after us in canoes, and but for the coming of darkness would surely have overtaken us." "is it certain that they shot after us with arrows?" "it is certain, for one of them struck the canoe and lies even yet where it fell. so my brother may see for himself and know that i have spoken truly." the beaver plucked the arrow thus indicated from the sheathing of the canoe in which its point was embedded and examined it closely. as he did so a puzzled expression came over his face, and he exclaimed,-"but this is not a huron arrow! it is of the iroquois, and might have been made by kaweras himself. look. as a bowman thou shouldst know this fashion of feathering." "i do know it," replied nahma, taking the proffered arrow as he spoke and studying its make. "also i should have recognized it sooner had i looked, but it fell in darkness, and since then i have been too busy to recall it until now." "if this was the only style of arrow aimed at us," continued the beaver, "those who pursue us must be friends, who have in turn mistaken us for enemies." "it would seem so," agreed nahma, in a mortified tone, "and it is to my shame that i should have shown so great stupidity." "take it not to heart, my brother. no warrior may learn his trade save by experience. what you have done has been well done, and no harm has come of it. only now that we know those behind us to be friends, we must look sharply for enemies in front and see that our friends come not upon them unaware." "shall we not turn back at once," asked nahma, "and give to sacandaga a warning of the true state of affairs?" "not at once, but presently," replied the beaver, "for we are even now close to the great waters of which i spoke. it will be well, therefore, if we take a look at them before turning back. we may thus have news to report that will cause him to rejoice at sight of us." during this conversation nahma had continued to paddle easily, and the canoe had glided gently forward with the current of a forest-shaded stream forming an outlet to the lake they had just traversed. as the beaver concluded his remarks the roar of falling waters ahead of them gave warning that their farther progress in this direction was barred. so the canoe was left cunningly as though it had drifted to that place, and the two young scouts made their way through a mile-wide strip of forest to the shore of a second lake that lay behind. here they gazed eagerly out over the wide water-way, but for a moment saw nothing unusual. as they were about to venture into the open, nahma checked the movement with a guarded exclamation of amazement. a human figure had suddenly appeared on the crest of a headland that jutted into the lake a short distance from them, and for several seconds it stood motionless in the full light of the westering sun, as though spell-bound by the beauty of the outspread landscape. although it presented the form of man, it was unlike anything either of the astonished observers had ever seen. it appeared twice the size of an ordinary man, and at certain points it glinted in the sunlight with a sheen like that of rippling waters. its head, upon which the sunlight also flashed, was of huge proportions and apparently devoid of hair. "it is an oki," whispered the beaver, apprehensively. "a god of the waters. see you not how he shines with wetness?" even as the beaver spoke, a second figure appeared for an instant beside the one at which the awe-stricken youths were gazing. it was that of a man like themselves, half-naked, painted, and bedecked with feathers. this last apparition plucked the other by the arm and they disappeared together. our young scouts looked at each other in wonderment. "we must know more of this affair," said the beaver. "let us move in that direction and see what may be found." a few minutes later, moving with the utmost caution, they had reached a point from which they could look beyond the headland. there they beheld a scene that held their gaze with breathless interest, and, crouching beneath the overhanging branches of a thick-growing spruce, they watched it in silence. the sun was setting and its light was growing dim, but they could see a fleet of canoes drawn up on the lake-shore, and beyond them many men moving busily about a large cleared space. they could not discover among these the strange figure that had first attracted their attention, nor was there any glow of fire-light. the beaver drew in his breath as though about to speak, but nahma checked him with warning hand, and at the same instant a twig snapped directly behind them. the young scouts dared not so much as move their heads, but from the corners of their eyes they caught glimpses of four shadowy forms that flitted noiselessly by and vanished in the direction from which they themselves had come. they were hurons seeking to make certain before the complete shutting in of night that no enemy lurked in the vicinity of their camp. for several minutes after these had passed our lads remained motionless and silent. then the beaver rose and moved without a sound in the direction taken by the huron scouts, while nahma, his nerves tense with excitement, followed the lead thus given. neither spoke until finally they came again to the place where they had left their canoe. to their dismay, it was gone, but the beaver said in a whisper,-"it is well for us that it is of huron make, so that they may think it was left by those of their own people who were sent ahead. now let us find sacandaga, for we have much to tell him." the task of making their unlit way back along the shore of the stream they had so recently descended without effort was beset with many difficulties. they must keep close to the river, for not only was it their guide but by it sooner or later their friends were almost certain to pass. they must thread the forest mazes in silence, and they must pause with every minute to listen for the dip of paddles. even then sacandaga's canoes might drift by them unseen and unheard. but a warning must be given, if such a thing were possible, and in spite of all obstacles they pushed steadily forward. at length they came to a place where the stream began to broaden. they had gained the lower end of andia-ta-roc-te and dared go no farther. so they waited while nahma uttered full and clear the plaintive call of the whippoorwill. twice did he repeat it, and then once more after a brief interval. chapter xi the coming of sacandaga as the concluding notes of nahma's cry echoed over the still waters and were lost among the distant hills, the two youths listened anxiously for an answer. nor had they long to wait, for within a minute the call of a whippoorwill came back to them almost exactly as the young warrior had uttered it; but it came from the wrong direction. "sacandaga has passed us after all," muttered nahma in a tone of vexation. "not so," replied the beaver, "for that was not the answer agreed upon. do you not remember? the call was to be two and then one, while the answer was to be one and then two. this answer came back even as the call was given, and so could not have been made by sacandaga or any of his warriors." "who, then----?" began nahma, but he was interrupted by a quavering note of ko-ko-anse (the little screech-owl) that came from no great distance. "it is a huron call," whispered the beaver; "answer it quickly." this nahma did, and the beaver continued, "they are on the water and will come to this point for further information. do you remain here and take care that they discover not thy presence. i will retire a little and entice them or some of them to me, for i can speak the huron tongue. after that we must be guided by what will follow. is it well?" "it is well," whispered nahma, as he crouched low beside a log, one end of which extended into the water. he did not hear the beaver take his departure, but knew that he was gone. then from off the river, but close at hand, came again the tremulous cry of ko-ko-anse. it was answered by the beaver from a short distance inland, who in a voice disguised as though by weakness cried,-"help me, brothers. help me before i die." "who calls?" inquired a voice from the water. "a huron scout sorely wounded and helpless," answered the beaver. "is he alone?" "he is alone. there was another with him, but he was killed two days since. help or i perish." "art thou chebacno or wabensickewa?" "i am wabensickewa. chebacno was slain by the iroquois, who are even now making ready a war-party. i hastened back to bring news of it, and landed here to rest until darkness. while i slept a panther leaped on my back. before i could kill him he had so injured me that i cannot walk. also are my eyes blinded so that i cannot see. i have a canoe that you will find at the water's edge, if indeed the wind has not drifted it away. i have called many times, and was about to give over calling when your answer came to lend me new strength. now, then, my brothers, come quickly, for i have much to tell before i die." a moment later nahma felt a slight jar pass through the log against which he lay and heard a few whispered words of consultation. then two figures stepped ashore and, passing so close to him that he could have touched them, noiselessly entered the forest. he waited for a moment and then cautiously lifted his head. against the faint gleam of water he could distinguish the black bulk of a canoe and see that it still held two other figures who sat motionless. slowly he raised his bow with a stone-headed arrow fitted to its string until one of the sitting figures was fairly covered. then he waited with tense muscles and a heart that seemed like to burst with its furious beating. from behind him came a low moaning that he knew was made by the beaver to deceive his enemies. suddenly the oppressive silence was broken by the twang of a bowstring that was instantly followed by fierce yells. high above these rose the defiant war-cry of the iroquois, but its last note was cut short and ended in a choking gurgle. somehow nahma managed to hear these things, though he was at the same time intensely busy with affairs of his own. at the first intimation of a struggle behind him he had let fly his ready arrow, and one of the two figures in the canoe dropped heavily forward. the other, seeing what he had supposed was a log suddenly endowed with life and leaping towards him, uttered a cry of terror, sprang overboard, and disappeared beneath the black waters. while nahma tossed the limp form of the other huron from the canoe preparatory to going in pursuit of this swimmer, a rustling among the bushes warned him to make good his own escape while yet he might, and giving the canoe a great shove, he leaped aboard. as the craft shot out into the open a voice hailed it from the shore; but as the words were spoken in the huron tongue, nahma made no answer. he hesitated for a moment, wondering whether it might not be the beaver who called; but with a repetition of the demand he knew that that was not the case. he was confirmed in this belief by hearing a slight splash from close at hand, a stifled exclamation, and a few whispered words. evidently the swimmer who had made so hasty an exit from the canoe had been encouraged by the voice of a friend to gain the land, and now the two were once more in communication. what had become of the beaver? recalling the iroquois war-cry and its sadly suggestive ending, nahma had little doubt that he had been overcome and killed. he hated to think of deserting his comrade without knowing for a certainty whether he were alive or dead, and yet to attempt a landing in face of two enemies, and perhaps three, would be an act of folly. his canoe had drifted out so far that they could not see him in his present position, but it would be almost impossible to gain the shore anywhere in that vicinity without detection. while in this state of indecision, which in reality lasted but a few seconds, he heard faint and far away the cry of a whippoorwill. twice was it uttered, and then again after a short interval. it must be the signal of sacandaga, since it came from up the lake. doubtless it had been made in answer to the beaver's far-reaching war-cry. in another moment nahma's canoe, impelled by a noiseless paddle, was speeding in that direction. he dared not at once reply to the signal for fear of drawing a flight of huron arrows; but as soon as he believed himself beyond range of these he rested on his paddle and sent far across the lake the vibrant cry of wah-o-nai-sa once and then twice. a full minute elapsed before the answer came, and then he was startled by its nearness. had he not known better, he would have sworn that it was uttered by a bird in flight while passing directly above him. allowing his craft to drift, he listened and heard the quick dip of many paddles. a fleet of canoes was rushing towards him, and, as he began to distinguish their vague outlines, he uttered a low call to attract attention. "who is it?" demanded the voice of sacandaga, sharply, as the speed of the oncoming canoes was checked. "it is massasoit," answered the lad. "where is grinning beaver, thy companion? did he utter the war-cry of the iroquois that came to us as we were entering our canoes for a night of travel?" "i fear the beaver is dead," replied nahma. "and if so, he was killed even with the sounding of his war-cry." "who killed him?" demanded sacandaga, fiercely. "the hurons." "how many are there?" "only four did we encounter. of these i saw one fall, and believe that the beaver, who was separated from me, killed another. one leaped into the water and one i know escaped from the beaver." "were you on land or on the water?" "we were on land, and this is the canoe in which the hurons came." "where did it happen?" "at the beginning of a river that leads to the wide waters lying towards the rising sun." "what know you of these wide waters? have you been to them?" "shortly before the coming of darkness were we there, and we turned back to bring news of the war-party that we saw." "hurons?" "hurons, my father, and like the leaves of a tree for numbers. also they have with them an oki to make timid the hearts of their enemies." "what mean you by an oki?" with this nahma described as well as he could the strange being seen by himself and the beaver, and all who could get within hearing listened to his words with breathless attention. when nahma declared that the apparition, though seen on a headland, still gleamed with wetness as though just emerged from the lake, his auditors were deeply impressed. only sacandaga was incredulous, and appeared to treat the incident as of small account. "it is but a huron trick!" he exclaimed, that all might hear. "they are too cowardly to fight like men, but have prepared an image with the hope that sight of it will turn our blood to water. it is well, though, that we have learned of this thing and know what to expect. now let us find whether the beaver is alive or dead, and if the huron dogs have indeed slain him, bitterly shall he be avenged before we are done with them." so nahma guided the iroquois canoes to the place where he had uttered that first fateful call of the whippoorwill, and sacandaga, with half a dozen warriors, made a landing on the very log beside which he had lain. it took them but a few minutes to discover the body of their late comrade cold in death and scalped; but there was no trace of those who had perpetrated the deed. if he had indeed killed one of them, the others had either hidden the body or taken it away. having learned these things and thirsting for vengeance, the iroquois re-entered their canoes and glided silently down-stream towards the place where their enemies were encamped. chapter xii a meeting of deadly foes after carrying their canoes around the two waterfalls that obstruct the outlet of lake george, the iroquois finally glided like so many night-shadows out onto the surface of lake champlain. then, guided by the son of longfeather, they approached the place where he had seen the hurons. sacandaga had entered the canoe of the young scout that he might learn more fully what had happened during the past two days; also his place was in the leading canoe, that from it he might direct the movements of his followers, who were now nearly two hundred in number. he had thought of attempting a night surprise of the northern invaders by attacking their camp under cover of darkness; but this plan was dismissed almost as soon as formed, for he remembered the prophecy of kaweras. the fight in which the iroquois were to be successful must take place in broad daylight and on a fair morning. the battle might not, therefore, be waged at night, nor even on the morrow, unless it were a day of cloudless sunshine. at the same time the hurons must be given no chance for escape, and to compel them to remain where they were he stationed his force at the mouth of the cove in which lay their fleet. this position was taken in silence and, it was thought, without attracting attention. that the men from the north had, however, received notice of their enemies' coming and were keenly on the alert to meet them was soon proved by a jeering hail from the land. "are the bark-eaters fish that they remain in the water? if they call themselves men, why do they not come on shore and accept the welcome awaiting them?" to this taunt the iroquois replied with a chorus of fierce yells and savage intimations of what would happen when they got ready to enter the camp of the huron dogs. so the night was spent in a brisk exchange of taunts, jeers, threats, and insulting remarks well calculated to increase the bitterness of the hate already existing between the two tribes. the iroquois even betrayed their knowledge of the mysterious being whom the hurons had called to their aid, and expressed the utmost contempt for him. to this those on shore made no reply except to advise the iroquois to call upon their own gods for the aid they would surely need on the morrow. "something has given them courage," remarked sacandaga, "for never have i known hurons to talk so bravely in the presence of iroquois. but we will see whether their boldness can stand the test of daylight." at length the wished-for dawn arrived, and by its earliest gleams sacandaga landed his force at a point beyond arrow-shot of the huron camp and bade them light fires for the preparation of breakfast. he was well aware of the fighting value of a full stomach, and was too wise a leader not to seek every possible advantage even against a foe whom he despised. nor were the hurons less ready to make the most of this opportunity for preparing cooked food, the first time they had dared do so in several days. thus both parties remained hidden from each other, except through the eyes of their watchful scouts, until the sun was an hour high. not only did sacandaga wish to refresh his men by this rest, but he was determined not to begin fighting until assured of conditions propitious to his undertaking. with the weather, however, he had every reason to be pleased, for never was a fairer morn. the sky was cloudless, the air clear and crisp, the lake of a heavenly blue, and all nature was at its best. as he looked about him he became elated over the certainty of his forthcoming victory. "the hurons have never yet been able to stand before an equal number of iroquois," he said, "and to-day with all things in our favor it will be strange indeed if we do not wipe them out. but we may not delay, lest the spirits become angry and send their lightnings to punish our indifference to the favors they have shown. let us, then, get to work and finish this business quickly, that we may the more speedily return to our own people." although sacandaga was one of the most skilful warriors of his time, and well versed in all the tricks of his trade as practised by forest fighters, he saw fit in the present instance to lead his painted savages to the attack in a compact body. as the hurons occupied the centre of a large cleared space so wide as to place them beyond the reach of arrows from forest covers, this plan was in a measure forced upon him. at the same time he hoped to overawe the enemy and terrify him by the number and ferocious appearance of his followers. so the iroquois, half naked, painted, befeathered, decked with bears' claws and wolf-tails, dashed from the forest yelling and brandishing their weapons, and advanced with a rush to where the hurons awaited them. the latter appeared terrified, and seemed to shrink from the impending onslaught. then their solid formation broke, leaving a wide gap, from which stepped a single figure. the iroquois were not more than fifty paces distant; but at sight of this apparition they came to a sudden halt and stood as though petrified with amazement. the figure confronting them was indeed that described by massasoit, only it loomed up larger than they had expected, and gleamed with a dazzling lustre in the bright sunlight. it had the form of a man, but its face was covered with a growth of hair that hung down on its breast. the person who appeared so remarkable to the denizens of the forest that they deemed him a god was none other than the intrepid french explorer samuel de champlain, founder of the city of quebec. with but two followers he had been induced to accompany a war-party of canadian indians on their foray into iroquois territory, and was thus the first of his race to look upon the waters of the noble lake that has ever since borne his name. for a few moments the iroquois gazed awe-stricken upon this first white man they had ever seen. then, relying upon the prophecy of kaweras, that only thunder and lightning could prevent them from winning a victory, they bent their bows and let fly a cloud of arrows. many of these were aimed at the white man standing so boldly before them, but, to their dismay, he remained unharmed. nahma in particular, who had shot at the very centre of the shining breastplate, was amazed and terrified to see his arrow, after striking, bound back as though it had encountered a wall of rock. but scant time was given for the consideration of this marvel; for, even as they shot at him, the mysterious being brought into position a strange-looking stick that he carried until it was pointed directly at them. then came a flash of lightning, a roar of thunder, a cloud of smoke, and a dozen of the iroquois fell to the ground as though smitten by the wrath of god. as was afterwards proved, but two of them were killed and one--sacandaga--was grievously wounded, while the others had fallen from sheer fright. at the same time the hurons rushed forward with triumphant yells and a flight of arrows. for a moment the iroquois wavered and seemed about to fly. then nahma, son of longfeather, sprang to the front with a loud cry, and, swinging a stone war-club above his head, made straight for the thunder-god who had wrought such havoc. champlain was in the act of drawing his sword when he was staggered by a terrific blow that would surely have killed him but for the steel cap that he wore. before he could recover, and ere a second blow could be delivered, there came another flash of lightning accompanied by its thunderous roar from a clump of bushes at one side, and two more iroquois were stricken with sudden death. at this fresh proof that the all-powerful spirits were indeed fighting against them the hearts of the iroquois melted, and they fled from the field a panic-stricken mob. even nahma joined in the mad flight; but he paused long enough to pick up his wounded chieftain, whom he hoped to be able to carry as far as the canoes. at their heels streamed the exultant hurons, striking down the fugitives by the score. one of these drove a spear through the body of sacandaga; and nahma, staggering under his burden, was knocked down by the force of the blow. as he disengaged himself from the dead sachem and regained his feet he found himself once more face to face with the awful being who held in his hands the thunders and lightning of a manitou. at this moment champlain, who had found time to reload his musket, fired a second shot into the ranks of the flying iroquois. ere its smoke could lift, nahma, frenzied with rage and reckless of consequences, sprang upon the white man with uplifted knife. the blow was urged with all the splendid strength of the young warrior's arm, but it only bent the copper blade in his grasp and left him defenceless. ere he could renew his flight he was flung to the earth and bound immovably with thongs of tough bark. [illustration: nahma sprang upon the white man with uplifted knife] nahma's first battle was ended in utter defeat, but he did not feel humiliated, for he believed that he had fought against immortal spirits who could come to no harm from the hands of man. he only wondered vaguely, as he lay awaiting the pleasure of his captors, why the okis should have ranged themselves on the side of the perfidious hurons instead of aiding the iroquois, whom he then believed to be the most nearly perfect of human beings. about one-half the force that sacandaga had led so confidently to battle that morning reached the canoes and continued their flight up the lake. the hurons did not pursue them, for they were too busy killing or taking captive those who were left behind. by noon the whole affair was ended, and the triumphant hurons, taking with them twoscore of dejected prisoners, as many bloody iroquois scalps, and a number of canoes laden with spoils, set forth on their return to the st. lawrence. with them went champlain, still thrilled with the excitement of fighting and killing, but already disgusted with the barbarities of his savage allies. could he have foreseen that his act of that day had created a powerful enemy who for two hundred years to come would let pass no opportunity for the killing of a frenchman, his thoughts would have been still more sombre. in camp that night, while still occupied with his melancholy reflections, he was accosted by one of his white companions, who said,-"look yonder, monsieur. they are about to punish in pretty fashion the young devil who twice this day attempted to take thy life." chapter xiii to the lodges of the white man realizing that for some reason the all-powerful white man who had that day given them a victory over their enemies was displeased, the hurons agreed after a long consultation that it must be because the only one among the iroquois who had dared attack him was still allowed to live. so, although such pleasures were generally reserved for their home-returning, they determined to sacrifice the audacious young warrior on the spot with the hope of thus regaining the favor of their allies. in order that he might thoroughly comprehend what was in store for him, they decided that he should first witness the torture of one of his companions. for this purpose a victim was selected at random from among the captives, and the two young men, facing each other, were securely bound to saplings standing but a few yards apart. about the feet of each was piled a quantity of dry wood, and they were ordered to chant their death-songs if they dared. the maqua immediately began in defiant tones to recount his own deeds of prowess on the war-path, and tell how many hurons he had slain. he hurled defiance at his enemies, taunted them with their cowardice, and sought to so enrage them that they would kill him at once; but nahma remained dumb. he had no deeds to tell of, nor was he in a humor to invent any. suddenly the hurons made a rush at the one who thus defied them, and for a few minutes a fierce struggle raged about the helpless form. when next it appeared in view its scalp had been torn off, while the still living body was gashed and mutilated almost beyond recognition; but defiant words still issued chokingly from its trembling lips. the poor mortal frame was nearly spent, but its brave spirit was undaunted. the next act of torture was by fire. blazing splinters of fat pine were thrust into the mangled body and hot ashes were poured on its bleeding head. then a light was applied to the dry wood, and in another minute the eager flames were leaping high about their victim. the awful tragedy was accompanied by shrieks of laughter, mocking yells, and a frantic dancing about the two young warriors, one of whom was thus made to serve as a hideous object lesson to the other. when the first was so nearly dead that his defiant utterances were reduced to mere gaspings for breath, the dancing demons turned their attention to the second victim, and prepared to inflict upon him a series of still more devilish torments. nahma had witnessed everything with fascinated gaze; but though sickened to the point of fainting, had made no movement nor uttered a sound to betray the agony of his thoughts. he now knew what to expect, and was nerving himself to endure to the end, as became a warrior. aeana would never know, of course; but if by any chance the story of his last hour should reach her ear, she must have no excuse to call him "squaw." one of his tormentors approached with a bar of iron heated until it glowed; for, through trading with the french, this metal was now known to the indians of the st. lawrence valley. "put out his eyes," shouted a spectator. "he has seen enough." as the glowing iron approached his face nahma instinctively closed his eyes; but a yell of derision from those near enough to note the movement caused him to open them again quickly. but even in that brief space something had happened, for the first thing on which they rested was a gigantic figure bounding towards him. it uttered inarticulate cries of rage and brandished a weapon. with a single blow from this it dashed to earth the man bearing the red-hot iron. falling on his own instrument of torture, the wretch uttered a yell of pain as it seared his flesh. at the same moment the terrible new-comer levelled his weapon at the mutilated form bound to the opposite stake, and with a flash of lightning accompanied by a stunning burst of thunder, instantly freed the tortured spirit from its misery. before the smoke of the discharge cleared away the new-comer was beside nahma, cutting savagely at his bonds. as the last one dropped he grasped the young warrior by an arm and led him a few paces from the cruel stake. then turning to the sullen hurons, who shrank from the indignant blaze of his eyes, he denounced them in bitter terms. "you are worse than wolves," he cried. "you are scum and _canaille_. you are devils, and should be made to dwell forever in a pit of fire. because you go forth to fight against a man and he meets you bravely, is that a reason for torturing him when the fortune of war has placed him helpless in your hands? this youth was the only one of all his people who dared attack me face to face and hand to hand. better still, he was the only iroquois brave enough to attempt the succor of their wounded chieftain. he is fleet of foot and might easily have escaped, but he would not go alone. so he fell into your inhuman hands, and as a reward for his bravery you propose to torture him to death. bah! you make me so sick that i have a mind to sever all connection with you from this hour, and order my men to beat you from my sight with sticks. now remember that this youth is _my_ captive, and whoever touches so much as a hair of his head shall die, for i will not have him harmed. "come, lad, with me," added champlain, turning to nahma; "you shall eat and rest, and after that if you desire to return to your own people you shall be free to do so. only it would please me to have you remain a little for instruction in the ways of white men and the making of a better acquaintance between us, for i have taken a fancy to you beyond any that i have yet entertained for a native of this wilderness." although nahma understood no word of what the marvellous stranger said, he recognized the friendly tone and gesture, and was quite willing to follow wherever the other might lead. as they were about to move away a chief of the hurons stood in the path and begged for a hearing. "it is true," he said, "that we would have killed this young man; but it is because we thought our white father angry that he still lived. also is it true that in any case we should have put him to death on reaching the place of our own people. we must have done this, for if we should let him live he would sooner or later make an escape, and in escaping would surely kill some of our people. it is because he is a brave warrior that we could not let him live to do us mischief. if he were a coward, then could we make of him a slave to hoe corn with the squaws; but with a brave man this might not be done. also because of his bravery would we have tested him by fire, that he might give proof of his courage to the very end of his life. any brave man, huron or iroquois, would rather perish at the stake than live the life of a slave. it is our way, and if it be not also the way of our white father, let him not cover us with shame on account of it, for we have not yet learned one that is better." "you have spoken well," answered champlain, "and already am i penitent for my hasty words, since, as you say, you were only acting according to your conception of what is right. therefore i forgive you and will continue to extend the hand of friendship. at the same time, see you to it that no more atrocities are enacted in my presence. also see to it that this youth is accorded the respect due him over whom my protection is extended." so it came to pass that nahma, son of longfeather, now known as massasoit the iroquois, was saved from a dreadful death to become the companion of the first white man he had ever met, who was also one of the foremost adventurers of his age. although champlain had laid aside his steel armor, he was still so utterly different in appearance from any person nahma had ever seen that the latter continued to regard him as a supernatural being, and accompanied him with much trepidation. also the youth was dazed by the peril he had just escaped and the strangeness of his deliverance. as they went towards champlain's own camp-fire, nahma noticed for the first time that two more of the strange beings walked close beside them; and, listening to their conversation, though of course without understanding it, he all at once became convinced that they were indeed human like himself. moreover, it flashed into his mind that they must be of that white race concerning which he had heard much talk in the lodge of kaweras. by that shrewd indian the apparently meaningless words repeated by nahma during his illness had been conjectured to belong to the vocabulary of white men, and he had said as much to his young guest. thinking of these things and acting upon a sudden impulse, just as they reached champlain's separate camp nahma exclaimed,-"hillo!" the three white men stared at him in amazement. "sacrã©!" added the young warrior. "what have we here?" cried champlain. "a savage from the interior wilderness speaking both english and french. it is incredible.--my young friend, who taught you the tongues of the old world? where have you met white men?" "mass, i saw it," remarked nahma. he was well pleased at the effect of the words already used, but looked for a still greater exhibition of amazement on the part of his hearers at this final utterance. to his disappointment, they only gazed blankly and evidently without understanding. "that is evidently a native word, and must be his own name," said champlain. "massasoit. it hath a pleasing sound and fits well his aspect. not only has he proved himself to be braver than any of his fellows, but he hath a look of superior intelligence. for these things i had thought to afford him opportunity of escaping during the night, and so of making his way back to his own people. now, however, he has so aroused my interest and curiosity with his fluency in foreign tongues that i cannot afford to loose him until we are better acquainted. see to it, therefore, that he does not escape." thus nahma, who if he had held his tongue would have been set free, was still retained as a captive and borne northward by the victorious hurons. the journey down the lake, through the rapid richelieu, and over the broad flood of the mighty st. lawrence was full of interest and novel sensations to our lad. none of them was, however, to be compared with the wonder and amazement that filled his soul on the evening of the tenth day of travel, when they came to quebec, and he gazed for the first time on the lodges of white men. chapter xiv two inmates of a guard-house samuel de champlain was one of the most daring and persistent of explorers in the new world. before coming of age he visited the west indies and mexico, going down the pacific coast of the latter country as far as panama. then as he crossed the isthmus he conceived the idea, which he afterwards made public, of a ship canal that should connect the two oceans. his next voyage, inspired by the published narrative of jacques cartier, carried him into the st. lawrence and up that mighty river as far as hochelaga (montreal), which point cartier had also reached nearly seventy years earlier. champlain subsequently explored the coasts of canada and new england, helped to found the unfortunate settlements of st. croix and port royal, and sailed to the southward as far as cape cod. on his way he stopped in boston harbor, which he describes as being filled with heavily wooded islands. he also discovered the charles river, and named it riviã¨re du guast. on the following day he took refuge from a gale in plymouth harbor, which he named port st. louis, and which he thus visited long before the pilgrims landed on its shores. after spending some years on the coast and crossing the atlantic several times, the energetic frenchman again entered the st. lawrence and sailed as far as stadaconie, where cartier first and after him roberval had planted ill-starred and short-lived settlements. at this point champlain determined to establish a base from which to explore the vast regions that, hidden in savage mystery, stretched away indefinitely on all sides. it should also be head-quarters for the greatest fur trade the world had ever known, and for the religious institutions from which he hoped to spread christianity among the heathen. here, then, on a narrow strand at the foot of towering cliffs, he set his men to work, and before the summer was ended they had erected three spacious buildings, enclosed them within a stout palisade, planted defensive batteries, dug a moat around the whole, cleared land for a garden, and opened up a trade with the neighboring indians. thus was begun a city destined to become one of the most important of the new world, and to it champlain gave the name of quebec, which was his pronunciation of a native word signifying a narrowing of the river. in quebec, twenty-seven years later, the great frenchman died, leaving behind him a record of adventure and achievement such as but few others could show. he had succeeded where many had failed, and had established an empire in the new world. he had crossed the ocean more than a score of times to make himself equally welcome in the court circles of france and beside the council-fires of huron warriors. he had explored the ottawa to its head-waters, crossed the divide to lake nipissing, descended to georgian bay, and was the first white man to gaze upon the inland sea that he named lake huron. he next discovered lake ontario, crossed it in a bark canoe, and penetrated the iroquois country as far as the site of syracuse. in the beautiful lake that bears his name he has an enduring monument. he started on the journey that ended on lake champlain with the hope, then common to all explorers, of discovering a western passage to china, and only failed because he could not find what did not exist. instead of it, he discovered, saved from an awful death, and carried to quebec the youth who was to become known to the world as massasoit, chief of the wampanoags. champlain had long been looking for some young indian of intelligence and proved courage whom he might teach to speak his own language, attach to his person, and employ to advantage in his proposed explorations. in nahma he believed he had found all the desired qualities, and, what was still better, the youth, being an iroquois, would never join any huron conspiracy against the french. the shrewd adventurer was therefore greatly pleased with his prize and impatient to begin his training. at the same time he found his huron allies so jealous of his liking for an iroquois, that while he remained in their company he dared not treat his captive with any marked attention. he saw that nahma was provided with food, and would not permit him to be beaten or abused, as were some of the prisoners, but that was all. he dared not even have the youth in his own canoe, much as he wished to gain his confidence. thus, nahma saw but little of his white companions on the weary journey that finally ended at quebec. at the mouth of the richelieu the victorious war-party disbanded, the larger number, together with most of the prisoners, going up the st. lawrence towards their homes on the ottawa, and only half a dozen canoes of montagnais, who dwelt on the saguenay, followed champlain down the great river. as these came within sight of quebec they raised a triumphant war-song and plied their paddles with redoubled energy, while champlain and the other white men discharged their muskets in token of victory. this was the first news of their absent leader received by the anxious garrison since his departure, and in their joy over his safe return they gave him a thunderous welcome from their cannon. not only did this dreadful sound nearly paralyze poor nahma, but it so terrified a small party of indians who were trading within the fort that they rushed from it in dismay, took to their canoes, and paddled off with all speed. so precipitate was their flight that they left behind one of their number, who in his terror had leaped from a second-story window of the trading house and broken a leg. champlain had left his infant colony in charge of pierre chauvin, a smart young officer, who now met him outside the palisades with tidings that caused an instant change of plan. the only ship that would return to france that year had dropped down to tadousac for a lading of furs but two days earlier. for a moment champlain hesitated, and then his mind was made up. he must board that ship before she sailed, for he had despatches of the utmost importance to send home by her. thus he must immediately hasten to tadousac. this decision he imparted to chauvin, adding,-"i will shortly return, and until then take thou good care of this youth." here the speaker indicated nahma. "see that he escape not, for his security is of importance to our cause. keep him, then, safely until i come again, when i will inform thee further concerning him. _au revoir, mon ami._ may the saints protect thee." thus saying, champlain rejoined his indian allies, who were impatient to be off, and in another minute was again sweeping down the great river. by his order nahma had been hastily bundled ashore, and now stood gazing first at the wonderful structures rising close at hand and then at the disappearing canoes. chauvin stood near by, biting his moustache and growling at his chief's sudden departure. "i wish i were in his place," he muttered; "and if once i could set foot on shipboard i would sail away never again to revisit this detestable country. how now, you spawn! what are you staring at?" he cried, suddenly turning upon nahma, who was looking curiously at him. chauvin hated indians as he did everything else in the country that had so bitterly disappointed his dreams of easily acquired wealth, and he was disgusted that one of them should now be left in his care. "away with him to the guard-house!" he shouted to a couple of soldiers in attendance, "and keep him in close confinement until the governor's return, since that is his excellency's order." so nahma was roughly hustled away, led inside the palisade, across the enclosed court, and thrust into the guard-house. it was a small structure solidly built of logs, having a rude stone chimney and a single unglazed window some eighteen inches square that was fitted with iron bars and could be closed from the outside by a heavy shutter. there were also bars across the throat of the chimney. the floor was of earth and the room was unfurnished. as the massive door of this dungeon swung to with a crash behind him the young indian stood for a moment motionless. then, in a frenzy of rage, he dashed himself against the immovable barrier, clutched at the window-bars in a vain effort to wrench them from their fastenings, and rushed about the narrow space, seeking some outlet, like a wild animal when first caged. while our lad was thus engaged the door of his prison was again flung open and two soldiers entered. still possessed by his frenzy, nahma sprang forward, determined to kill them and make good his escape or die in the attempt; but the sight of a burden that they bore caused him to pause. it was the form of another indian youth apparently helpless. behind them came others bringing straw, two blankets, food, and a jug of water. with the straw and blankets they made a bed in one corner, on which they laid the wounded youth. then without a word to the prisoner they departed, barring the door behind them. now our lad had at least something to occupy his mind and divert his thoughts from his own unhappiness. he saw that the new-comer was neither a huron nor an iroquois; but as he bent over him and began to ask questions he discovered that they had many words of the wide-spread algonquin tongue in common. thus he quickly learned that the other was named tasquanto, that he was of a band of the abenakis who had come to quebec to trade, and that, terrified by the awful noise of cannon, he had leaped from a window and broken a leg. his comrades having deserted him, he had been brought to the guard-house that the only other indian remaining in the fort might wait upon him. so nahma was provided with an occupation that probably prevented him from either killing himself in his despair or losing his mind. thanks to the teaching of kaweras, he was able to set and properly bandage tasquanto's broken limb, and for weeks thereafter he was his fellow-prisoner's devoted attendant. in the mean time the green of summer was succeeded by the gorgeous tints of autumn, and its short-lived glory gave way to the white desolation of a northern winter; but champlain did not return to quebec, nor did any word come from him. at the end of two months chauvin sent messengers to tadousac; but they returned without having seen a living soul, white or red; and not until the weary winter was half spent did the garrison of that lonely fort learn what had become of the leader whom they were mourning as dead. chapter xv the bitter winter of canada the canadian winter, that is now a time of so much animation and gayety in the city of quebec, proved a season of terror, starvation, sickness, and death to the handful of frenchmen left by champlain to guard his infant settlement. at its beginning they recklessly squandered their stores, eating and drinking with no thought of the morrow. if champlain had been with them he would have taught them differently, for he had already passed several winters in the country and knew their bitter meaning. but, lacking his wise guidance, they indulged in riotous living until suddenly they came face to face with famine. the winter was not more than half spent when this happened, and they began to suffer from hunger. now that it was too late for any real good, chauvin seized every particle of food that remained, locked it up, and doled it out to his men in such meagre allowance as barely served to keep life in their shivering bodies. he also sent them into the woods to hunt, or to dig roots and groundnuts, with which to help out their scanty fare. he had expected to be able to purchase all the provisions he needed from indians, who, during the summer, had brought game to the fort in abundance, but now not a native was to be seen except a few poor wretches who came empty-handed and as beggars. unlike their brethren of the south, who cultivated fields and stored harvests for the winter, the improvident dwellers of that region lived wholly by hunting, feasting while game was plentiful and starving when it was gone. in all this time no one within the limits of that wretched fort suffered as did the son of longfeather. from the day that he was thrust into his prison he was not allowed to leave it for a breath of outside air, or a glimpse of the freedom for which his soul longed, until it seemed as though he would rather die than remain within those hated walls another minute. and with it all he had no idea why he was thus confined or what fate was in store for him. only, as days, weeks, and months passed, he became more and more certain that he was to have no release save only by death itself. but one thing kept him from seeking this instead of waiting for it, and that was the friendship of the young indian who, wounded and helpless, had been brought to him during the first hour of his imprisonment. tasquanto's recovery was slow, and for many weeks he depended upon nahma for everything. it did not take long for these two, drawn to each other by the bonds of race and a common misfortune, to cement a friendship, and swear that they would either gain freedom or perish together. although they could not plan an escape from their closely guarded prison and must wait for chance to aid them, they spent hours in discussing the course to be pursued if ever they got beyond those hated walls. "we must make all haste to cross the river," said tasquanto, "for the hurons would quickly kill us if we remained on this side. if it is frozen that will be easy. if not, we must steal one of the clumsy boats of these awkward white men, who make everything bigger and heavier than is needful. on the other side we will conceal ourselves until we can build a canoe, and then we will go southward. beyond that i cannot see, for if we go to the country of thy people, they will kill me; while it would be dangerous for thee, an iroquois, to be found in my country." "but i am not of the iroquois," protested nahma. "not of the iroquois! who, then, are thy people?" "that i know not. i was found among the maquas, who are a tribe of the iroquois, sorely wounded and without memory of aught that had ever happened before that time. since then i have been an iroquois by adoption, but it is certain that i am not one by birth." this statement so changed the aspect of affairs that it was agreed they should travel towards the country of the abenakis in case an escape could be effected. it also afforded a fruitful topic of speculation, and thus helped pass the weary hours. finally, the time came when tasquanto was so fully recovered that he was sent out to hunt food for the hungry garrison, and during the day nahma was left alone, since only at night was his companion allowed to rejoin him. chauvin realized that if both were sent into the woods they would at once make good their escape; while, from the friendship he had noted between them, he felt assured that tasquanto would return to his comrade so long as the latter was held. nor did he dare allow nahma to escape while there was a chance of champlain's return. so our poor lad shivered and starved in his hated prison-house, finding his only occupation in making snow-shoes from materials furnished by tasquanto. he designed them for his own use, but they were taken from him by his guards as fast as completed, so that in the end he had nothing to show for his labors. one night a great grief befell him; tasquanto failed to appear at the usual hour, nor did he come during the night, though nahma watched and waited for him until morning. he asked eager questions of the guard who brought his miserable breakfast, but the man refused to answer, and all that day our lad sat in a lethargy of despair, careless whether he lived or died. the following night was one of furious storm and bitter cold. the north wind roaring through the bending forest shrieked and howled in savage glee as it struck the forlorn little outpost of white men. it leaped down the wide-throated chimneys and scattered their fires. it slammed shutters and doors, while if any ventured abroad, it blinded and choked them with stinging volleys of snowdrift. so fierce and deadly was it that even military discipline came to an end, and all sentries were permitted to abandon their posts. nahma sat alone in the dark, numbed and nearly perished with the cold, for he had burned up the last bit of fuel brought him two days earlier by tasquanto, and none had been supplied since. in the many voices of the storm, now shrill and clamorous, then deep and menacing, and again filled with weird moanings that died in long-drawn sighs, he heard the spirits of the dead, the okis of another world, calling to him, and bidding him share their wild freedom. he knew that he had but to yield to the drowsiness already overpowering him, and the deadly cold would speedily release him from all earthly prisons. perhaps tasquanto's spirit was among those now calling; yes, he was sure of it, for he recognized his friend's voice. "massasoit," it called, "massasoit, wake up! it is i, tasquanto, thy brother. wake up and come to me." the cry was agonized in its intensity, and after a little even nahma's dulling senses recognized that it was uttered by human lips. at the same time he felt that the storm was beating on his face, and struggling weakly to his feet, he gained the window through which it came. its shutter was wide open, and beyond its bars stood tasquanto speaking to him. "i thought thee dead, my brother, for i have called many times without answer," said tasquanto, as he became aware that his friend was at hand. "and i believed thy voice to be that of thy spirit, for i also thought thee gone to the place of the dead," replied nahma. "why have you remained away from me these many hours?" "it is because they drove me from the gate, saying that my hunting was of no avail, and that i should not longer eat of their stores. but i could not go, my brother, without word with thee, and now has the storm-god given me a chance for speaking. if it were not for these bars we could do more than speak, for those who kept guard have been driven to shelter, and there is none to hinder us from going away together. but they may not be broken, and so we must wait until other means are found for thy release. but fear not that i will desert thee. i have found a way for passing the wall, and will come to this place whenever it may be done without notice. in the mean time i will prepare for our flight. already have i built a lodge in a safe place beyond the river, and----" here tasquanto's words were suddenly interrupted, and the heavy shutter was slammed to as though by a fierce gust of wind. then the door was flung open and the faint gleam of a horn lantern illumined the interior. a little earlier on that same evening chauvin, while talking with one of his officers concerning champlain and his unexplained absence, had been reminded of the young indian whom the governor had consigned to his care, but to whom he had not given a thought in many days. now he inquired carelessly whether he were alive or dead. "i know not," replied the officer, who, following his chief's example, had not concerned himself about the fate of so insignificant a being as a captive indian. "and why do you not know?" cried chauvin, with a sudden burst of petulant rage. "it is your duty to know, and to be ready with instant report concerning everything taking place within the walls of quebec. do you think because the governor chooses to absent himself for a while that no one is left here to maintain his authority? by the saints, monsieur, i will give you cause to remember that pierre chauvin is not to be trifled with, and that when he asks a question he expects it to be promptly answered. go, then, at once, sir, and inform yourself by personal observation of the condition of this prisoner, or haply you may find yourself in his place." without daring to reply, the bewildered officer bowed and left the room. thus it happened that, accompanied by a soldier whom he had summoned to attend him, he came to nahma's prison-house in time to interrupt the conversation between him and tasquanto and frighten the latter into a precipitate retreat. finding, to his satisfaction, that the prisoner was still alive, the officer demanded of the soldier why, in such weather, he was kept without fire. the soldier replied that it had been left to the other indian to provide the guard-house with fuel; whereupon his superior passed out to him the rating he himself had received from chauvin. "and so, _canaille_, you leave your duties to be performed by a miserable skulking savage. a pretty state of affairs in a king's fortress. bring wood at once, sir, and fire, also fetch something in the way of food, for this wretch looks like to die of starvation, a thing that may not be allowed of the governor's own prisoner, even though he be a heathen." so on that night of bitter tempest not only were nahma's spirits raised by a new hope, but the horrors of freezing and starvation that had threatened his life were sensibly mitigated. two days later came the first word received from champlain since his hurried departure for tadousac four months earlier. chapter xvi a dash for liberty the mystery of champlain's disappearance weighed heavily on the spirits of the forlorn little garrison left to hold quebec. he had been the life and mainstay of the colony, the firm rock upon which it was founded. without him there seemed no hope of its continuance or of relief from their distress. they were convinced that he was dead, for they knew he would never have left them without at least sending a message to tell where he had gone. so they mourned him sincerely if also selfishly, and planned to abandon his settlement at the first opportunity, if indeed any should offer. the great storm cast an added gloom over the garrison, and they were so unhappy that every man was ready to fly at his neighbor's throat upon the slightest provocation, when a small band of indians was reported to be making a camp near at hand. instantly every face brightened, for it was thought that they must have brought provisions to trade for goods. thus, when, a little later, one of them approached the fort, he was given prompt admittance. being conducted to the presence of the commandant, he announced that his people were so very hungry that they had come to the white men to beg a little food from their abundant stores. at the same time he had brought a message from the great white chief, for which he was entitled to a reward. with this the indian produced a folded paper, greasy and grimed with dirt, which he handed to chauvin. as the latter unfolded it he uttered an exclamation, for it contained a note written in french and signed "champlain." its condition rendered it difficult to decipher, but as the reader gradually mastered its contents his face darkened, until suddenly he sprang up, seized a stick, and began furiously to belabor the astonished savage, who had been waiting in smiling expectancy for his reward. with a howl of pained surprise, he leaped back and rushed from the building with the enraged commandant in hot pursuit. not until the terrified native had escaped from the fort and disappeared in the forest did chauvin give over his chase. then, to the amazement of his men, he ordered a cannon to be loaded and fired in the direction taken by the object of his wrath. although the crashing ball did no damage, it, and the roar of the gun bursting upon the winter stillness, so frightened the recently arrived indians that they instantly abandoned their partially constructed camp and fled in hot haste from that hostile neighborhood. refusing to answer questions, and so leaving the curiosity of his men unsatisfied, chauvin returned to his quarters, and lifting champlain's note from the floor where he had flung it, read it for the second time with gritting teeth and bitter maledictions. it was dated four months earlier, and read as follows: "my good friend pierre: "i am just arrived at tadousac and find the ship about to sail. i also find it to be of the last importance that one of us should return in her to france. had i known this two days earlier, or could i get word to you in season, the mission would devolve upon you, since i am loath to leave at this time. as it happens, i myself must go; but will return in earliest spring. so, my friend, until then everything is left to you. husband carefully your provisions, keep up the spirits of your men, and maintain friendly relations with the natives. i forward this by a messenger, whom you will suitably reward for its prompt delivery. regretting that we may not exchange duties, for i would gladly remain, i sign myself, as ever, "thy friend, "champlain." "death and furies!" cried chauvin, again flinging the note to the floor and grinding it beneath his heel. "to think that while we have mourned him as dead he has been all the time comfortably in france. also that i might have gone in his stead if only he could have got word to me in time. ten thousand thunders! it would enrage a saint! maintain friendly relations with the natives, forsooth! i would i could blow them all to eternity. suitably reward that rascal messenger! burning at the stake would be too good for him. and, heavens! all this time we have been keeping one of the scoundrels in luxurious idleness, gorging him with food robbed from our own bellies, providing him with fire and lodging to gratify a whim of the governor's, doubtless long since forgotten. but not another minute shall he thus impose upon us. he shall go, and that with such speed as will amaze him." with this the angry commandant again descended to the court, summoned all the able-bodied men of the garrison, and bade them form a double line outside the guard-house door, after first providing themselves with cudgels. "the red whelp inside," he said, "has without recompense devoured our substance long enough. now, therefore, i propose to send him forth bearing tokens of our regard that may not be forgotten in haste. watch sharply, then, and remember that any man failing to deal him at least one blow shall go without his supper this night. are you ready? it is well!" thus saying, chauvin unlocked the guard-house door and flung it open preparatory to stepping inside and driving out with blows its solitary occupant. the next moment he was hurled sprawling to the ground, and a slight, half-naked figure, animated by desperation, was darting with such speed between the lines of unprepared soldiers that some failed even to go through the motions of striking at him, while others wasted their blows on the empty air. uttering yells of delight at the novel nature of this entertainment, they ran after him; but they might as well have pursued a fleeting shadow. before they could head him off he had sped through the open gate and was gone. after tasquanto's visit nahma's shutter had been nailed up, so that he no longer had even the poor consolation of gazing out on the blank wall of palisades. nor could he employ his hands, for he was now in darkness, save for such faint gleams as filtered down his chimney. under these conditions he believed that he might speedily die, and planned for one last effort at escape before his waning strength should turn to utter weakness. on that very day he had determined that when next his prison door was opened it should never again close on his living body. so he sat watching it with feverish impatience. the roar of chauvin's vengeful cannon startled him and at the same time gave him a vague hope of some unusual happening that might result in his favor. so he became keenly alert, and was not taken by surprise when, without previous warning, the door of the guard-house was flung open. dropping from his shoulders the blanket which alone had saved him from freezing, the youth sprang forward, reckless of consequences, and a minute later, without an idea of how the miracle had been accomplished, found himself outside the fort and speeding towards the icebound river. so blinded were his eyes by the unaccustomed light and glare of snow that until now he had seen nothing save the figure that had opened his door, and his movements had been guided by instinct rather than knowledge. the single fact indelibly impressed upon his brain was that tasquanto waited somewhere beyond the river. consequently that was the one direction for him to take, and he would doubtless have plunged into its waters, had they been free, as readily as he now leaped upon its snow-covered surface. so long as he was within sight of the fort and within range of its guns his strength lasted, and he sped forward with the same fleetness that had formerly aroused the wonder of his iroquois friends. thus he gained the middle of the river, and climbed a rugged ridge of hummocks and huge ice-blocks upheaved during the final struggle of rebellious waters against the mighty forces of the frost-king. on the farther side of this our poor lad faltered, staggered, and then sank with a groan. the nervous strength that had borne him thus far was exhausted, and in this place of temporary safety it yielded to the weakness of his long imprisonment. he had made a splendid dash for liberty, but now he had reached the limit of his powers, and must either be recaptured within a short space or die of the bitter cold. even as he lay with closed eyes gasping for breath he felt its numbing clutch, and knew that very shortly he would be powerless against it. but it did not matter. he would at least die in possession of the freedom for which he had longed, and, after all, what had he to live for? he was friendless, homeless, and without even a people whom he might call his own. no tribe claimed him, there was no lodge within which he had the right of shelter. it would be much better in the land of spirits, for there his own would know him as he would know them. the trail to it was easy and short, also it was a very pleasant path, bright with sunshine and gay with flowers. there was music of singing birds, and already were the voices of his own people calling to him. "massasoit!" they cried, "massasoit!" then they named him brother and bade him open his eyes that he might see them. so he opened his eyes and gazed into the anxious face of tasquanto, who knelt beside him rubbing vigorously at his limbs and slapping him smartly to restore circulation in the numbing body. he smiled happily at sight of nahma's unclosed eyes, but did not for an instant desist from his rubbings and slappings until the other at length sat up, and then unsteadily regained his feet. "now, my brother," said tasquanto, taking a robe of skins from his own shoulders as he spoke and throwing it about nahma, "together must we reach the lodge i have prepared, for i will never return to it alone. the trail is long and hard, but it must be overcome or we shall perish together." so the journey was begun, nahma at first leaning heavily on his comrade's supporting arm, but gaining new strength with each step. as he had taken neither nourishment nor stimulant, this was wholly owing to the effect upon his spirits of renewed hope and a cheery companionship. as they walked tasquanto told him how, ever since the storm, his attempts at communication had been frustrated, how in the mean time he had increased the comforts of his hidden lodge, how at sound of chauvin's cannon he had hastened towards the fort to learn the cause of the firing, and of the overwhelming joy with which he had discovered nahma as the latter topped the ice-ridge in the middle of the river. then nahma related as well as he could the details of his wonderful escape from the fort, and by the time his narrative was ended they were come to the rude lodge that tasquanto had built in anticipation of just such a need as had now arisen. chapter xvii a death-dealing thunder-stick tasquanto's lodge was snugly hidden in a dense growth of heavy timber near the place where the chaudiã¨re flows into the st. lawrence. it was merely a frame of poles covered so thickly with branches of fragrant spruce and balsam that it presented the appearance of a green mound rising above the surrounding snow. its walls were so thick as to be almost wind-proof, and in the middle of its earthen floor was a small circle of stones that formed a rude fireplace. in this only the dryest of wood was burned, and the little smoke that resulted escaped through an aperture left in the roof. on two sides were elastic beds of spruce boughs covered deep with flat hemlock branches and balsam tips. the very air of the place was a tonic, and the escaped captive, fresh from the foulness of his prison, drew in eager breaths of its life-giving sweetness as he sank wearily, but happily, down on the nearest pile of boughs. as he lay there gazing about the rude shelter with an air of perfect content he uttered frequent exclamations of amazement, for tasquanto was drawing from various hiding-places an array of treasures such as no indian of nahma's acquaintance had ever before possessed: a copper kettle, a steel hatchet, two knives, a blanket, several glass bottles, and a fragment of mirror. then, with conscious pride, but also with evident trepidation, he produced the most wonderful trophy of all, a rusty musket, one of the awful thunder-sticks that rendered the white man all-powerful. during the night of the great storm the entire garrison of quebec had gathered for warmth in the hall of the commandant's house, and tasquanto had taken advantage of this to make a foray into the deserted barracks with the above result. he had brought away the musket with fear and trembling, dreading lest it might explode and kill him at any moment. even now he handled it cautiously, while nahma could not for some time be persuaded to touch it. so it was laid carefully down, and he was permitted to feast his eyes on the marvel while tasquanto busied himself in preparing a feast of more substantial character. he had been so fortunate as to discover the winter den of a bear, which he had also succeeded in killing, so that now he could offer his guest not only the warmth of a shaggy robe but an abundance of meat. instead of half-burning and half-cooking a chunk of this on the coals, as was the custom of his people, he displayed a rudiment of civilization by cutting it up into small bits and stewing them in his copper kettle. after the youths had eaten heartily of this meal, which, simple as it was, proved more satisfactory to nahma than the very best of those given him in quebec, they spent several hours in discussing their plans for the future and in examining tasquanto's treasures. having overcome his awe of the thunder-stick sufficiently to take it in his hands, nahma became anxious to test its powers. he had seen champlain discharge his musket, and knew that it was done through the agency of a lighted slow-match applied to the priming-pan. his knowledge of the firing of a gun was thus far in advance of tasquanto's, who, having never witnessed the operation at close range, had no idea of how it was accomplished. but he was quite willing to learn, and so it was agreed that on the following morning nahma should give the owner of the musket his first lesson in its use. both of them were so excited over the prospect of experimenting for their own benefit with the deadly thunder of the white man that they lay awake most of the night discussing their proposed adventure; and, as a consequence, slept much later than they had intended on the following morning. the day was well advanced, therefore, when the two lads, after preparing and eating another hearty meal, stepped outside to test their newly acquired weapon. it was carried by nahma, who, nervous with excitement, still presented a bold front, while, under his direction, tasquanto fetched a blazing brand from the fire. resting the barrel of his piece across the trunk of a prostrate tree and holding its stock at arm's length, nahma bade his companion apply fire to the pan. with much trepidation and a strong desire to clap both hands to his ears, tasquanto valiantly did as he was bidden, but without result. again and again did he apply the glowing coal, but still the gun refused to obey the wishes of its inexperienced owners. "it will only speak and deal out its death-medicine at the command of white men," said tasquanto, disconsolately. "not so," replied nahma, "for once i saw it obey the will of a huron warrior. but i think i know what is needed. it must be turned over so that the flame may rise to it. also in this weather the thunder-stick is so cold that it will take much fire to warm it into action. make, therefore, a hot blaze, and i am assured that something will happen." so nahma turned the gun, and, forgetting to remain at arm's length, bent anxiously over the refractory piece, while tasquanto built a regular fire beneath it. of a sudden the musket went off with a tremendous report that roused the woodland echoes for miles. also it sprang savagely backward, bowling over both nahma and tasquanto as though they had been ninepins. but the most astounding result of the discharge was a series of shrieks and yells that resounded through the forest as though it were peopled by a pack of demons. at the same time a number of leaping figures dashed from an extensive thicket at which the gun had been inadvertently pointed and fled as though for their lives. something had assuredly happened. as our bewildered lads cautiously lifted their heads to learn the extent of the damage done by the fearful force they had so recklessly let loose, each was thankful to see that the other was still alive. next they glanced at the musket. it lay half buried in the snow, looking as innocent and harmless as a stick of wood; but they knew of what terrible things it was capable, and would hereafter be very careful how they allowed it to come into contact with fire. they were convinced that in some unexplained manner it could absorb flame until it had accumulated a certain quantity and could then eject this with deadly effect. being reassured concerning their own condition and the present harmlessness of the musket, they next bethought themselves of the dreadful cries that had seemed to mingle with the report, and they agreed that these must have been uttered by the okis, or spirits of the forest, in protest against such a rude disturbance of its winter quiet. as they stiffly picked themselves up, nahma declared his intention of visiting the thicket towards which the thunder-stick had been pointed, to see whether he could discover where its lightnings had struck. tasquanto tried to dissuade him, declaring that the place must be the abode of okis; but to this nahma answered that if so they were certainly frightened away for the present, which would therefore be the best time to visit their haunts. so the two cautiously made their way in that direction, and had not gone more than fifty paces when they came upon a sight almost as startling as had been the discharge of the musket. it was the dead body of a huron warrior not yet cold. his life's blood still trickled from a jagged wound in the breast and crimsoned the snow on which he had fallen. on all sides of him were other signs that told as plainly as spoken words how narrowly our lads had escaped falling into the hands of a merciless foe. there were marks of a cautious approach along the trail they themselves had made the day before, of the halt for observation when the intended victims were discovered, and of the panic-stricken flight that followed the unexpected musket-fire by which one of their number had been so suddenly killed. "the thunder-stick is indeed a god," remarked nahma. "it can discover and kill the enemies of those to whom it is friendly even before they have knowledge of approaching danger." "yes," replied tasquanto, as he coolly scalped the dead huron; "with it to fight on our side we are become as sagamores, terrible and all-powerful. i will take it to my own people, and when it shall lead them in battle who will be able to stand before them? even the white men, whom many still think to be gods, are now no stronger than we. oh, my friend! let us shout for joy, since in all the world there is no man more powerful than are massasoit and tasquanto, his brother." when the exultant young warriors returned to camp, bearing with them the trophies of their exploit, they also carried, very reverently, the weapon which they termed a "thunder-god," and which had rendered them such notable service. then, while nahma set to work on a pair of snow-shoes, tasquanto, who had seen the french soldiers oil and burnish their guns, coated his with bear's grease, removed its smoke-stains, and rubbed its barrel until it shone. when he had done for it everything that his limited knowledge prescribed, he placed it in a corner where they could constantly admire it, and began the construction of a rude toboggan of bark. by the time this was completed nahma's snow-shoes were also ready for service, and the fugitives were prepared to start on their long southward journey. for a beginning of this they made their way slowly up to the head-waters of the chaudiã¨re, crossed a rugged divide to those of the penobscot, and there established a permanent camp. from this they set lines of traps that yielded a rich reward in the way of pelts, and before spring opened they got out the frame of a canoe. as soon as sap began to run in the birch-trees they secured enough bark to cover it, and by the time the river opened they were prepared to float with its current to the country of tasquanto's people. their voyage down the swift-rushing river was filled with adventures and with hair-breadth escapes. not only were they in almost constant danger from foaming rapids and roaring waterfalls, but only unceasing vigilance and an occasional display of their musket saved them from death or capture by the hostile tribes through whose territory they passed. at length they carried around the last cataract and entered upon the long, broad reaches by which the river flowed in dignified majesty to the sea. this was tasquanto's country, and now they might watch for the villages in which he would be assured a friendly welcome. finally one was sighted, and nahma proposed that, after the custom of white men on returning from victorious expeditions, they should discharge their thunder-stick. nothing loath to add to his own importance by such an announcement of their coming, tasquanto promptly assented to this proposition. so they landed a few hundred yards above the village and made preparations for the second discharge of their formidable weapon. chapter xviii kidnapped being by this time, as they fondly imagined, thoroughly acquainted with the white man's thunder-stick and with all details of the process necessary to render it effective, our young indians were determined to leave undone nothing that might contribute to the complete success of their proposed salute. to begin with, the musket must be pointed away from the village, and they themselves must keep at a respectful distance while it was accumulating its fiery energy. also, to produce an extraordinary volume of sound, the flame by which the thunder-stick was fed must be big and hot. they knew this, because on the occasion of their previous experiment they had, with the aid of a flame, produced a much louder noise than that made by the white man's slow-matches. consequently they argued that the greater the flame the louder the report. at the same time they were willing to acknowledge that slow-matches were excellent things to have under certain conditions, when, for instance, one was so closely beset that he wished to fire with great rapidity, even as many as two or three shots in the course of an hour. so they were determined to obtain one at the very first opportunity, and imagined that thus provided their shooting equipment would be complete. but a blaze would be much better for their present purpose, and they would take care that it was big enough to produce an astonishing result. so carefully did they make their preparations that while tasquanto collected dry wood for the fire, nahma cut a couple of forked sticks on which to rest the musket and drove them solidly into the ground. to these he lashed the gun until it resembled a victim about to be burned at the stake. he did not, of course, forget to place it upside down, so that its firing-pan might receive full benefit of the upleaping flames. then wood was piled beneath it until it really looked as though they were intent upon burning the gun instead of being merely desirous of discharging it. while they were making these preparations several of the villagers, noticing the presence of strangers, came out to discover their business. to these tasquanto made the peace sign, and at the same time warned them not to come too close. so they halted and watched with curiosity the mysterious proceedings of the strangers. at length all was in readiness, and tasquanto, as principal owner of the thunder-stick, claimed the privilege of setting fire to the inflammable structure he had reared beneath it. as the brisk blaze shot upward he ran back and joined nahma at a safe distance. on the opposite side were the village indians, filled with uneasy expectancy mingled with awe; for they imagined they were witnessing some impressive religious ceremony. the flames mounted higher and higher until they completely enveloped the devoted musket, and tasquanto, so excited as to be unconscious of the act, clapped his hands to his ears to deaden the sound of the thunderous report that he momentarily expected. but it did not come. the wooden stock of the gun began to smoke, and then burst into a blaze. being very dry and also saturated with oil, it was speedily consumed. at the same time the lashings burned through, and the red-hot barrel, already bent out of shape, fell into the glowing coals. as though drawn by an irresistible fascination, tasquanto, with hands still held to his ears, had moved nearer step by step, gazing with incredulous eyes at this destruction of the thing he had regarded as a god, loud-voiced and invincible. the puzzled spectators on the other side also cautiously approached closer. suddenly tasquanto, seeming to awake as from a dream, started down the hill-side towards the canoe, and nahma followed him. both knew why they fled. for some unexplained reason their expected triumph had resulted in a dismal failure. this had laid them open to the ridicule that an indian finds especially hard to bear, and they had no wish to be questioned concerning what had just taken place. the spectators of their recent remarkable performance, curious to see what they would do next, followed them so closely that, in order to escape, our lads were forced to run. gaining their canoe, they shoved it off and leaped in as the foremost of their pursuers reached the water's edge. without heeding the many invitations to return that quickly became threatening commands, nahma and tasquanto plied their paddles with such diligence that they were quickly beyond arrow range; and, speeding past the village without a pause, they were soon lost to sight of its puzzled inhabitants. not until they were some miles farther down the river was a word exchanged between the young men. then, as nahma drew in his paddle and paused for breath, he remarked,-"the thunder-stick of the white man is bad medicine for bow-and-arrow people." "yes," replied tasquanto, mournfully, "it seems that we have much to learn." while in camp that night discussing the humiliating events of the day they were joined by a solitary hunter who was on his way up the river. after a guarded interchange of questions and answers, during which neither party learned anything definite concerning the other, the stranger told them of certain white men who were trading at the mouth of the penobscot, and advised them to carry their furs to that market. "are they franã§aise?" asked nahma, who was determined never again to fall within the power of those who had so cruelly imprisoned him. "no," was the reply, "they are of a people who call themselves 'yengeese' and who make war on the white-coats." "have they thunder-sticks?" asked tasquanto. "in plenty." "then let us go to them. if we accomplish nothing else we may learn the white man's secret, and so shall our shame be wiped out." on the following day, therefore, a few hours carried our lads to where the river broadened into a bay dotted with islands. as their little craft was lifted on the first great swells that came rolling in from the open sea, nahma uttered an exclamation and pointed eagerly. "look!" he cried. "what is it? was ever such a thing seen in the world before?" tasquanto glanced in the direction indicated and laughed. truly, the sight was remarkable, and one still rare to those waters; but he had already seen one so similar in the st. lawrence that he could now speak with the authority of superior knowledge. "it is the winged canoe of the white man," he said. "in it he comes up out of the great salt waters and after a little flies back again to his own place. knew you not that his whiteness is caused by the washing of the waters in which he lives?" "no," replied nahma, doubtfully. "nor did i know that any canoe could be so vast. it even has trees growing from it." "yes," admitted the other, to whom this phenomenon was also a puzzle. "but they be not trees that bear fruit, nor even leaves, though they have branches and vines. on them the canoe spreads its wings, which are white like the pinions of wembezee" (the swan). "let us go closer that we may see these things," said nahma, to whom the appearance of that little english trading-ship was as wonderful as had been his first view of quebec. so they approached slowly and cautiously, feasting their eyes on the marvel as they went, and directing each other's attention to a myriad of details. finally they were within hailing distance, and a man standing on the ship's towering poop-deck beckoned for them to come on board. tasquanto, who knew the etiquette of such occasions, held up a beaver-skin, as much as to say "will you trade?" for reply the white man displayed some trinkets that glittered in the sunlight, thereby intimating his willingness to transact business. at the same time he turned to one who stood close at hand and said,-"they be two young bucks, without old men, women, or children. nor is there another native in sight. it is therefore the best chance by far that has offered for filling sir ferdinando's order. 'twenty pounds will i give thee, dermer, for a native youth of intelligence delivered here at plymouth in good condition.' those were his very words, and it will be well to have two; for if one dies on the passage, as the cattle are so apt to do, then will the other make good the loss. if both survive, so much the better, since we can readily dispose of the extra one. we must entice them on board, therefore, and the instant they set foot on deck do thou see to it that they are secured. be careful, however, that they suffer no injury, for i would get them across in good condition if possible." "aye, aye, sir," answered the other, who was mate of the ship. "if you can toll 'em on board i'll handle them as they were unweaned lambs. i'll warrant you they won't escape if once i get a grip on them, slippery devils though they be." when the canoe ran alongside the ship a few trinkets were tossed into it as presents and in token of good-will. then a ladder of rope was lowered, and by signs our lads were invited to come on board. they looked at each other doubtfully. "is it safe to trust these white men?" asked nahma. "to discover the secret of the thunder-sticks, and perhaps to obtain one in exchange for our furs, is worth a risk," replied tasquanto. as he spoke he glanced longingly up to where the ship's captain, with a leer on his face that passed for a reassuring smile, tempted them by a lavish display of trade goods. "truly, it would be worth much," hesitated nahma. "at the same time, having once escaped from a prison, i have no desire to see the inside of another." "then stay thou here while i go," said tasquanto, whose desire to wipe out his recent humiliation was so great as to overcome his prudence. "the secret of the thunder-stick i must have even though it cost me my life." "does my brother think so meanly of me as to believe that i would let him face a danger alone while i remained in safety?" inquired nahma, reproachfully. "let him go and i will follow close at his heels; for whatever happens to one of us must happen to both." so the canoe was made fast, the bundle of furs was attached to a line let down for it, and tasquanto began to climb the swaying ladder while nahma steadied it from below. as the former disappeared over the ship's side the son of longfeather followed swiftly after him. topping the high bulwarks, he glanced anxiously down in search of his comrade, but tasquanto was not to be seen. a suspicion of foul play darted into his mind, but too late for him to act upon it, for at the same instant he was seized by two pair of brawny hands and dragged inboard. half an hour later the ship under full canvas was speeding merrily down the bay with her jubilant crew bawling out the chorus of a homeward-bound chantey. chapter xix sold as a slave the distress and terror of our poor lads when they found themselves flung into the horrible darkness of the ship's hold with its hatch closed above them would have been pitiful had there been any witnesses. but there was none, and for many weary hours they seemed to have been imprisoned in mere wantonness only to be forgotten as soon as the treacherous act had been accomplished. their sole comfort was that they were together; for, on being dropped into the hold, nahma found tasquanto, stunned by the magnitude of his misfortune, awaiting him. for a time the two remained speechless, only holding to each other, listening, and fearfully awaiting what next might happen. although they could see nothing there was much to hear, for the anchor was being hove up, sails loosed and sheeted home, canvas was slatting, yards were creaking, and all to the accompaniment of much hoarse shouting and a continual tramping of heavy feet. but none of these sounds conveyed to our captives the slightest idea of what was taking place. after a while the ship began to heel until they believed her to be capsizing, and that their last hour had come. also they heard a sound of rushing waters. a little later both were so utterly prostrated by sea-sickness that whatever might happen no longer concerned them. in this wretched plight they lay for what seemed like many days, but in reality only until the middle of the next forenoon, when, of a sudden, the hatch above them was removed and they were blinded by the flood of light that followed. then men came to them and they were driven on deck, where, dazed and weak with illness, they staggered from side to side with the motion of the ship. their pitiable appearance was greeted by shouts of coarse mirth from the crew, who found in it a vastly entertaining spectacle. the captives were offered food, but refused it with loathing, though they drank eagerly from a bucket of water placed beside them as they sat on deck at the foremast's foot. after a while nahma became sufficiently revived by the fresh air to gaze about him with somewhat of interest in his strange surroundings. everything was marvellous and incomprehensible. even the bearded sailors in petticoats and pigtails, which latter he took to be scalp-locks, were entirely different from the french, who, until now, were the only white men he had known. nor could he comprehend a word of the barbarous language in which they conversed. when he was tired of looking at them he began to wonder in which direction lay the land, and to turn over in his mind a plan for making a quick rush to the ship's side, leaping overboard, and swimming to shore. before broaching this scheme to his comrade nahma decided to get his bearings. so he gained his feet and mounted a scuttle-butt, by which his eyes were lifted above the level of the high bulwarks. to his consternation there was no land in sight. not so much as a tree nor a blue hill-top could he discover in any direction. his unaccustomed eyes could not even distinguish the line of the horizon dividing a gray sky from the immensity of gray waters that stretched away on all sides. the bewildering sight filled him with a dread greater than any he had ever known, and he slipped back to his place beside tasquanto, utterly hopeless. "whether we be going up or down i know not," he said to the latter; "but certain it is that we now float among the clouds, with no prospect of ever again returning to the earth on which dwell people after our own kind. already are we become okis." "then is it a most unhappy condition," answered tasquanto, "and the medicine-men are liars." after a few hours on deck our lads were again driven into the darkness and foulness of the hold; but on every pleasant day thereafter for weeks was the process of bringing them on deck for an airing repeated. in times of storm they were kept below, with their sufferings immeasurably increased by sickness, by the violent pitching of the ship, by lack of food and water, and by terrors of the creakings and groanings that filled the surrounding blackness. for more than a month did they thus suffer, hopeless of ever again sighting land or of any relief from their unhappy situation. then, to nahma at least, came the worst of all. one day, while they were on deck, he suddenly lifted his head and sniffed the air. "it is a breath of earth," he whispered, as though fearful of uttering the glad news aloud. "i can smell it. oh, my brother! to once more gain the freedom of a forest would be a happiness exceeding any other. let us be ready on the morrow when we are again brought into the light. it may be that we shall be near enough to swim to the land. once within cover of the forest we would never again look upon the face of a white man." about this time they were sent below, but that faint scent of land not yet distinguished by any other on the ship had infused them with a new hope, and for hours they talked of what might be done on the morrow. in the mean time their ship was so near the english coast that twenty-four hours later she lay at anchor in the harbor of plymouth and her small boat was ready to go ashore. "fetch me the heathen desired by sir ferdinando," ordered captain dermer. "which one, sir?" "either will do. call them up and take the first that shows a head. drive the other back, and keep him below until my return." "aye, aye, sir." so the hatch was partially removed, and the signal for which our lads had waited so impatiently was given. tasquanto was first to answer it and gain the deck. nahma followed closely, but was met by a blow that tumbled him back into the hold. then the hatch was replaced, and he was once more confronted by the horrors of solitary confinement. for a time he continued to hope that he would be allowed on deck, or that his comrade would be restored to him; but, as the weary hours dragged slowly by without either of these things happening, these hopes grew fainter and fainter until finally they vanished. when food and water were brought to him, he drank of the latter but refused to eat, although the food was fresh meat, the first he had seen since the dreadful day when he had been enticed aboard the ship. it was another proof that they were once more near land. perhaps even now the forest for which he longed was close at hand, and perhaps people of his own race were come off to trade. perhaps tasquanto, who had picked up a number of english words, was acting as interpreter for them. in that case he would doubtless find a chance for escape, though even if he should, nahma was certain that he would not make use of it. were they not brothers, sworn to share each other's fortunes, good or ill, to the end? no! tasquanto would never desert him; but sooner or later, if he were still alive, would come again to him. of this our lad was certain. after a while the lonely prisoner fell asleep, and when he next awoke the ship was again in motion. he felt about for his companion, but could not find him; he called aloud, but got no answer. then he knew that he was indeed alone in the world and that something terrible must have happened to tasquanto. when next he was allowed on deck he looked eagerly for his friend, and, seeing nothing of him, relapsed into a condition of apathy. he no longer cared what happened, and refused to eat the food offered him. "won't eat, eh?" growled captain dermer, on learning of this state of affairs. "we'll see about that." the grizzled old mariner's method of seeing about things was so effective that the refractory young indian shortly found himself pinned to the deck by two sailors. a third pinched his nose, and when he opened his mouth for breath poured in hot soup that the victim was obliged to swallow to keep from choking. so he was fed by force, and his strength was sustained until the ship once more came to anchor. as usual, nahma was confined below when this happened, and when he was next brought on deck he was given no time to look about him before being seized, stripped of the foul garments that he had worn during the voyage, and scrubbed from head to foot, roughly but thoroughly. then he was provided with a new suit of buckskin that had been acquired by trade from the abenakis. he was also given colors and a mirror and ordered to paint his face. showing symptoms of disobedience, he was made to understand that one of the crew would do it for him; and, rather than be thus disfigured, he reluctantly complied. after he had satisfactorily decorated himself, greatly to the amusement of the crew, he was left to his own devices and allowed to wander about the deck as he pleased. gaining a position where he could see beyond the ship's side, he was as amazed and bewildered as though he had been transported to another planet, for the vessel had ascended the thames, and his outlook was upon london. not a tree was to be seen, not a green thing, only houses, until it seemed as though the whole world must be covered with them. even the river disappeared beneath houses built in a double row on a bridge that spanned it a short distance away. the ship was moored beside a great dingy building, from and into which men came and went as thickly as bees swarming about a hollow tree in his native woods. although no such clouds of smoke hung above london then as infold it to-day, there was enough to impress our young savage with the belief that a forest fire must be raging just beyond the buildings that obstructed his view. this belief was strengthened by the ceaseless roar of the city, that, to him, held the same elements of terror as the awful voice of a wide-spread conflagration. if tasquanto were only with him that they might discuss these things. but, alas! he was alone, as unfitted for a life-struggle amid those heretofore undreamed-of surroundings as a newborn babe, and, like it, unprovided with a language understandable by those about him. set down in the heart of a primeval forest he would have been perfectly at home; but face to face with this hideous wilderness of human construction he was appalled at his own insignificance and utter helplessness. as he turned away terror-stricken he noticed that several persons gathered about captain dermer were regarding him curiously. one of them, a young man of about nahma's own age, apparently touched by the hopeless expression on our lad's painted face, stepped towards him with outstretched hand. "winslow," he said, pointing to himself. "massasoit," answered the other, promptly, and indicating his own person. although he could not understand the newcomer's words he appreciated the hearty grip of his hand, and, gazing into his honest eyes, felt that here was one who might become a friend. "what are you going to do with him?" inquired winslow, stepping back beside captain dermer. "let him go when he can pay his passage-money, or turn him over to the first person who will pay it for him," was the reply. "what is the sum?" "twenty pounds, no more nor less." "i have not that amount with me, but if you will give me a day or two i think i can get it. will you keep him until i come again?" "unless some other turns up in the mean time equally desirous of accommodating him." "captain, i vill pay the money on the spot," exclaimed a voice, and wheeling about, winslow saw a man of sporty aspect arrayed in tawdry imitation of a gentleman, and of a decidedly hebraic cast of countenance. he was extending a handful of gold pieces, which captain dermer took and counted. "it is a trade," he said. "take him and may luck go with you." thus was sold, in the city of london, a free-born native american; and he was but one of many new world people who shared a similar fate both before and afterwards. chapter xx one friendly face the man who on pretence of paying nahma's passage-money had in reality bought him was a well-known london fur-dealer, who had visited the ship to appraise her cargo. the young fellow who had extended to our forlorn lad the hand of friendship, and who, but for lack of ready means, would have redeemed him from a threatened slavery, was a mr. edward winslow. he was the youngest son of a well-to-do devon family, who had taken a degree at oxford and was now reading law in the temple. he was intensely interested in america and everything pertaining to it. thus, on hearing that a ship just arrived from the new world was in the thames, he hastened to board her, that he might converse with those who had so recently trod the shores he longed to visit. nahma was the first american he had ever seen, and he regarded him with a lively curiosity that was changed to pity at sight of his hopeless face. now he turned fiercely on the jew who by payment of a paltry sum of money had become master of the young stranger's fate. "what do you intend to do with him?" he asked. "vat vould you have done mit him yourself had your purse been as full as your stomach?" asked the other, impudently. "i would have found for him a home in which he might be taught christianity and civilization, and then i would have taken the first opportunity for sending him back to his own land." "mayhap those be the very things i also vould do by the young heathen; who knows?" replied the furrier, with a leer. "at any rate, i have charge of him now, and vill take him at once to my happy home. you may set him ashore for me, captain." "not i," responded captain dermer. "i have no longer aught to do with him. take him ashore yourself." thus confronted with his new responsibility, the man approached nahma and, seizing him roughly by an arm, said, "come mit me, heathen." with a quick motion the young indian wrenched himself free and faced his new master with so fierce a look that the latter involuntarily quailed beneath it and stepped back. "ah!" he snarled, "that's your game, is it? ve'll see who comes out best." with this he called to some men of his employ who were hoisting out bales of furs and bade them come to him, bringing a stout cord. "hold!" cried winslow, stepping beside the young indian. "see you not that he is desperate, and that if you try to bind him there will be bloodshed? he will surely kill you, if he dies for it the next moment. leave him to me and i will guarantee to take him where you may desire, only i give you warning to treat him decently and without violence." thus saying the speaker held out his hand to nahma, and by signs intimated that he was to accompany him. by instinct the young american had recognized this youth as a friend, and now he unhesitatingly left the ship in his company. as a mob would have been attracted by the appearance of an american indian in the crowded streets, a covered cart belonging to the furrier was procured, and in it our lad was driven to a rear entrance of his master's shop, which fronted on a fashionable thoroughfare, while the others reached the same place on foot. during that bewildering ride nahma sat with stolid face but with keen eyes, taking in all the marvellous details of his surroundings. next to the throngs of people hurrying to and fro along the narrow, crooked, and ill-paved streets, the appearance of horses most impressed him, for never had he seen beasts at once so large and so completely under the control of man. no word passed between winslow and the furrier until their destination was reached. then the latter asked, sneeringly,-"now, me lud, vat vill your 'ighness do next?" "i will go inside and see him disposed," replied the young man, calmly. "oh, vell, come in and view the royal apartments," said the other, willing to have winslow continue his responsibility until the new acquisition was safely housed. so the young indian was taken from the cart and led into the shop, causing a buzz of excitement among the few who saw him climbing a narrow back stairway. he was finally guided to a small chamber directly beneath the roof and lighted by a single window that could not be opened. had it not been for winslow's reassuring presence, nahma would have refused to ascend those stairs, which, being the first he had ever encountered, filled him with dismay. after winslow had seen the stranger in whom he took so great an interest thus safely placed for the present and the furrier had locked the door on his captive, the two descended again to the shop. "what will you now do with him?" asked the former. "it may be i vill train him to my business and send him out to america as a fur-buyer," answered the other. "maybe i vill keep him as a curiosity. i have not yet decided; but vatever i do is no concern of yours." "will you sell him to me?" "maybe so ven i see your money." with this winslow was forced to be content, and he departed with the hope of redeeming his newly made friend and of carrying out his vaguely formed intentions concerning him. although twenty pounds was not a large sum, it would embarrass him to procure it, since his family, though well-to-do, were not people of wealth, and he was living on a monthly allowance so small as barely to support him in gentility. in the mean time nahma, left to his own melancholy company, gazed from his window over the roofs and chimney-pots of london, feeling that no greater evils could possibly befall him, and yet wondering vaguely what would happen next. food was brought to him and water, but no change in his situation took place until the following morning. then his master appeared accompanied by a coarse-featured man of evident strength, whom the furrier had engaged to be keeper of his new treasure. by them the young indian was taken down to the shop, where a small platform had been prepared for him. it was covered and surrounded with costly furs, and here nahma was seated with a fur robe draped across his shoulders. close at hand stood his keeper to see that he neither escaped nor did injury to any about him. with the tableau arranged, a stout 'prentice lad took a stand just outside the street entrance and cried in lusty tones the novel attraction to be seen within. "step this way, lords and ladies. come all ye gentlefolk, attend the reception of his highness, a native american cannibal prince just arrived from the new world. look within! look within! under the sign of the ermine royal sits he. free of charge are all gentlefolk invited to meet him. this way, lords and ladies. look within!" to this novel reception none but the well-dressed and evidently well-to-do were admitted, since the poor could not be expected to purchase furs then any more than now. and there would have been no room for them in the limited space of the dingy little shop even had they been admitted, for ere long it was crowded with fashionable folk eager to be entertained by a novelty, while their retainers filled the street. the spectators stared at nahma and listened with credulous ears to the marvellous tales told concerning him by the furrier, who, clad in gorgeous raiment, acted the parts of host and showman. also many of them purchased furs, which was more to the purpose. never had the ermine royal done such a business, and never had its proprietor greater reason to be satisfied with a venture. amid all came edward winslow with his twenty pounds, which he proffered to the jew in return for nahma's release. but the latter laughed him to scorn. "for twenty pund did you think to get him, me lud? nay, that was the price i paid, as you vell know, and i must at least double my money. forty pund is my lowest offer, and fifty if he continues to attract trade as at present. speech mit him? i have no objection, only have a care that you seek not to seduce him from my service, or a thing might happen not to your liking." keenly disappointed at this result of his undertaking, the young man pushed his way through the crowd until he stood close to the platform, when he called, softly,-"massasoit." instantly a glad light flashed into the eyes of the dejected figure thus set up for a show, and, turning eagerly in that direction, he exclaimed,-"winslow." then the two friends clasped hands, and winslow managed to convey the information that he would come again on the morrow. he kept his promise; and, though he had not succeeded in securing the money necessary to redeem the young indian, his visit brought much comfort. for many days thereafter he came regularly, often bringing some little thing that he thought might give pleasure; and these daily glimpses of a friendly face were the only rays of light penetrating the unhappy darkness of nahma's captivity. he was never allowed to leave the building, and was only marched to and fro up and down those weary stairs between the den in which he lived and the hated platform on which he was exhibited to gaping customers. at the end of three weeks winslow, having received his month's allowance and so raised the necessary forty pounds, tendered it to the fur-dealer for the release of his slave, only to be told that the price had again been doubled. upon this the young man flew into a rage and there was an exchange of bitter words, that ended in winslow being told to mind his own affairs and not attempt an interference with those that did not concern him. as several 'prentice lads had gathered near during this quarrel and stood eagerly awaiting their master's permission to pounce upon the stranger, he realized the weakness of his position, and prudently ended the affair by withdrawing from the scene. at the same time he was as determined as ever to effect nahma's deliverance, and that speedily. for this purpose he invited a number of the more reckless of his temple companions to a dinner, at which he told the story of massasoit and enlisted their sympathies in his behalf. then he proposed a rescue, to which they enthusiastically agreed. according to this plan they were to meet near the furrier's shop at the busiest hour of the second day from then, each man wearing his sword, and prepared to use it if necessary. there they were to mingle with the sight-seers and resist any attempts at interference with the movements of winslow. the latter undertook to spirit the young indian out of the same rear entrance through which he had first been brought, into an unfrequented alley, while one of his friends should for a moment distract the attention of the keeper. to perfect the details of this scheme and provide a safe retreat for him whom they proposed to rescue occupied two days, and then all was in readiness. at this point the would-be rescuers were confronted by an unforeseen and insurmountable obstacle. the young indian had disappeared. he was no longer an inmate of the furrier's shop, and no one could or would give the slightest information concerning him. chapter xxi a change of masters for some days nahma's master had been uneasy about him. close confinement, lack of exercise and fresh air, and a hopeless melancholy were so telling upon the captive that his health was seriously affected. he was thin and miserable, had no appetite, and suffered from a hacking cough. these things troubled the fur-dealer, not because of his humanity, for he had none, but because of a prospect of losing the money he had invested in this bit of perishable property. he was also alarmed by winslow's interest in the young indian, and feared the very thing that the former had planned. then, too, one of his gentleman customers had suggested that when the fact of an american prince being in london came to the king's ears he would probably order him to be brought to the palace. in that case, as the furrier well knew, he would never be recompensed for his outlay, since king james was not given to spending unnecessary money, and he might even be called to account for holding a royal personage in captivity. he wished now that he had not described his indian as a prince; and, all things considered, decided that the sooner he got rid of him the better off he would be. it happened that while he was in this frame of mind he was visited by a travelling mountebank, whose business was to exhibit freaks and curiosities of whatsoever kind he could obtain, at country fairs. having heard of the fur-dealer's indian, he went to see him, and was so impressed with his value as an attraction that he promptly offered ten pounds for him. "already haf i refused forty," replied the furrier. "it was doubtless offered when he was in condition. now, as any one may see, he is on the verge of a quick decline and is like to die on your hands. it would be a risk to take him at any price, and it will cost a pretty penny to restore him to health, without which he is of no more value than a mangy dog." "but i haf advanced twenty pund for his passage-money, and haf been at the expense of his keep ever since." "a cost that has been repaid a thousand-fold by the advertisement he has given your wares. but to insure you against loss, which i well know a jew hates worse than death itself, i will give twenty pounds for the varlet, sick and scrawny though he be. what say you? is it a bargain?" "hand over the price and he is yours." of course the subject of this barter was not consulted concerning it. nor did he know anything of the change about to come over his life until darkness had fallen. then, as he lay on his bed of musty straw, dreaming of the free forest life that was once his, he was startled by the entrance into his room of two men, one of whom bore a rush-light. in him nahma recognized his hated keeper, but the other was a stranger. "come," said the former, gruffly; and, glad of any break in the deadly monotony of his life, nahma obediently followed him, while the other brought up the rear. down-stairs they went and out into the darkness of the streets, where each of the men grasped him by an arm as though fearful that he might attempt an escape. the young indian smiled bitterly as he realized this, for nothing was further from his thought. in all that wilderness of houses he had but one friend, and he knew no more where to look for winslow than he would if the latter were dead. to him all other white men represented cruelty and injustice, therefore nothing was to be gained by escaping from those who held him. he would only fall into the clutches of others against whom he would be equally powerless. so he went along quietly and with apparent willingness, somewhat to the surprise of his new master. "i fail to note but that he goes readily enough," he remarked. "methought you said he was vicious and like to prove troublesome." "oh, he's quiet enough now," replied the other, "but wait and see. they're as treacherous, these hammerican savages, as cats. purr till they see a good chance and then scratch. if they draw life's blood they're all the more pleased. i knows 'em, for i've had experience, and my word! but you've got to watch 'em every minute." it was by such representations that the keeper hoped to induce the showman to continue him in his present easy position. now he wished that his charge would make some aggressive exhibition merely to demonstrate the necessity for his own presence. he slyly pinched the prisoner's arm until it was ready to bleed, with the hope of at least causing him to cry out; but nahma endured the pain with all the stoicism of his race and gave no sign. thus they proceeded through a weary labyrinth of foul streets, only lighted at long intervals by flaring torches borne by retainers of well-to-do pedestrians, until finally they turned into the yard of a rambling tavern that stood on the outskirts of the town. it was a famous resort for wagoners who transported goods to and from all parts of the kingdom, and its court was now crowded with ponderous vehicles and their lading. here nahma was thrust for safe-keeping into an outhouse, the air of which was close and foul, and its door was barred behind him. to our unhappy lad it seemed as if the whole remainder of his life was to be marked only by a succession of imprisonments, each more dismal than its predecessor. in quebec he had had tasquanto's companionship and an open window. on shipboard he had been given the same comrade and a daily outing. in the furrier's establishment he had had a window and an occasional hand-clasp from winslow; but here he was alone, in absolute darkness, and gasping for a breath of fresh air. the wretched night finally came to an end, and with the first gray of morning his new master appeared, bringing an armful of coarse clothing, soiled and worn. stripping nahma of his buckskin suit, he compelled him to don these ill-fitting garments, and then left him a platter of bones for his breakfast. a little later they were on the road, and, to his amazement, nahma found himself leading a bear. it was a big brown bear, and its whole head was enclosed in a stout muzzle; but, in spite of this, our young indian, who had never heard of a tame bear, felt anything but comfortable at finding himself in such company unarmed. besides himself and the bear, the party was made up of the showman, a cadaverous youth answering to the name of "blink," who afterwards proved to be a contortionist, and a heavily laden pack-horse. to nahma's relief, the big man who had acted as his keeper was no longer of the company. for a time our lad was so taken up with his bear and the discomforts of his unaccustomed clothing that he paid but slight attention to his surroundings. then, all of a sudden, he uttered a cry of amazed delight, for they were entering a forest. no longer were houses to be seen, no longer was the horrid din of the city to be heard. once more was he beneath green trees, with the songs of birds ringing in his ears and the smell of the woods in his nostrils. he drew in long breaths of the scented air, and a new light came into his eyes. having found a forest, might he not also hope to discover people of his own kind? if there were forests in this strange land and bears, why should there not also be indians? at any rate, he would keep a sharp watch, and if he should see any, how quickly he would take leave of his present companions and join them! that night they lay at an inn, where an iron shackle was locked about one of nahma's ankles, and, with the bear, he was chained up in a stable. on the following day they reached a straggling country town in which a fair was to be held and where they were to give an exhibition. here they pitched a tent. nahma's suit of buckskin was restored to him, and he was again made to paint his face. in this first exhibition he had nothing to do but stand and be stared at by curious rustics, but after this he was taught and encouraged to perform a number of acts in company with the bear. one of these was to shoot, with bow and arrow, an apple, or some other small object, from the animal's head. then they would wrestle together, and finally a sort of a dance was arranged for them, in which blink, made up as a clown for the occasion, also took part. thus the show became so unique and popular that its proprietor coined more money than any other on the road. but with prosperity came an evil more terrible even than adversity; for, with money to spend, the showman began to squander it in gambling and drinking until it was a rare thing for him to draw a sober breath. he became quarrelsome with his intimates and brutal to those in his power. his poor bear was beaten and tortured to make it learn new tricks until it became a snarling, morose beast, influenced only by fear, and dangerous to all except the young indian, who was its fellow-sufferer. he, too, was abused, starved, beaten, and in all ways maltreated for not learning faster and pouring more money into his master's bottomless pockets. one day, while nahma and the bear were wearily performing their antics before a crowd of gaping yokels in the market-place of a small shire town in the west, the youth's attention was drawn to a child who was uttering shrill cries of pleasure. she was a dainty little thing with flaxen hair and blue eyes, exquisitely dressed, and was in charge of a maid. they had come from a coach that was drawn up before a shop near by, and the throng had opened to make way for them until they stood in the very front rank. suddenly the child, in an ecstasy of delight, pulled away from her nurse and ran forward with the evident intention of caressing the bear as though he had been a big dog. the brute was so tired, hungry, and cross that nahma had with difficulty kept him to his work. now, with a snarl and a fierce gleam in his small bloodshot eyes, he raised a threatening paw as though to sweep away the little fluttering thing that came running so confidently towards him. a great cry rose from the crowd. the maid, so terrified as to be incapable of motion, screamed and covered her face with her hands; but nahma, darting forward, snatched the child from under the descending paw. so narrow was the escape that his left arm was torn from shoulder to elbow by the cruel claws, and he staggered beneath the blow. the showman, who had been passing his cap among the spectators, ran to the bear and, beating him over the head with a stout cudgel, drove him to his quarters in a near-by stable. part of the populace cheered nahma, while others demanded the death of the bear, and amid all the confusion came the mother of the little girl, frantic with terror. to her our lad delivered the child, frightened but unharmed. then, without waiting to be rewarded, or even thanked, he ran to look after his friend the bear. chapter xxii nahma and the bear run away nahma found the showman and blink engaged in a violent dispute over the bear. the former was insisting that blink should escape, with the animal, from the rear of the stable and lead it to a place of concealment on the outskirts of the village, where he would join them later. in the mean time he would divert the attention of the mob until the escape could be made. blink, who was not on friendly terms with the bear, was refusing on the ground that, with the animal in its present temper, his life would not be worth a moment's purchase. "then let the heathen take him, and do you go along to see that they do not give us the slip," exclaimed the man, as nahma appeared and a howl from the mob announced their approach. their interest had been distracted for a minute while they watched the lady with the frightened child in her arms regain her coach, which was immediately driven away. now they were ready to settle with the bear, and turned towards the stable in which he had taken refuge. as they drew near the showman, who, though a brute, was no coward, appeared in its open doorway and confronted them. "good my masters," he cried, "what seek you?" "thy bear!" roared a dozen voices. "bring forth thy bear that we may bait him. he is not fit to live, and must be slain." again the showman attempted to speak, but his voice was drowned in the bedlam of cries raised by the mob; and, losing control of his temper, he shook his cudgel defiantly at them. upon this a shower of stones was hurled at him, and one of them striking him on the head, he staggered and fell. at this the mob halted, and some even sneaked away, fearful of consequences. the village barber, who was also its surgeon, bustled forward to make an examination of the wounded man. he was conscious, but in spite of, or possibly on account of, copious bloodletting, which was the only remedy administered, he died a few hours later. so completely was public attention distracted by this tragic event, that for a time no thought was given to the original cause of the disturbance, and, finally, when search was made for the bear, he was nowhere to be seen. not until the following day was any trace discovered of those who had been in the showman's company. then the one known as "blink" was found on the edge of a wood, helplessly bound and half dead from a night of cold and terror. he could only tell that, having escaped with the bear and the heathen, the latter had suddenly set upon him without warning or provocation and reduced him to the condition in which he was discovered. what had become of them or whither they had gone he knew not, nor did he care. he only hoped he would never again set eyes on the savage monsters who were so unfit for christian company. in the mean time nahma and his companions had found no difficulty in leaving the village unnoticed, since all public attention was for the moment drawn in the opposite direction. thus they successfully gained the woodland that had been appointed by the showman as a place of rendezvous. here the young american suddenly realized that only blink stood between him and the freedom for which he longed. up to this time he had been shackled at night and so closely watched by day that no chance of escape had offered. now one had come, and so quick was our lad to take advantage of it that within a minute the unsuspecting blink was lying helplessly bound hand and foot with his own kerchief and a sash that formed part of his professional costume. thus was he left, while nahma and the bear, whom the former now regarded as his sole friend in all the world, plunged into the forest depths and disappeared. the england of that long-ago date was a very different country from the england of to-day, and its entire population hardly exceeded two millions of souls. its few cities were small, and connected by highways so abominable that travellers frequently lost their way while trying to follow them. not more than one-quarter of the arable lands were under cultivation, while the remainder was covered with dark forests and great fens, marshes, and desolate moors across which one might journey for a day without sight of human habitation. game of all kinds abounded, and its hunting formed the chief recreation of the gentry and of those nobles who left london during a portion of the year to dwell on their estates. thus our young indian, upon gaining his freedom, found himself amid surroundings at once familiar and congenial. he had with him the bow and arrows used in his recent exhibitions, a fire-bag containing flint, steel, and tinder, and a dirk that had been taken from blink. thus provided he had no anxiety on the score of maintaining himself comfortably. he realized that the bear was an encumbrance, but in his present loneliness he was loath to part from it. and so the two pushed on together until they had penetrated several miles into the forest, when darkness overtook them. then nahma made a fire beside a small stream and cooked a rabbit he had shot an hour earlier, while the bear nosed about for acorns, grubs, and edible roots. they continued to traverse the forest on the following day, keeping to the same general direction until our lad was satisfied that he was beyond danger from pursuit, when he began to look about for a supper and a camping-place. both of these came at the same time, for on discovering, successfully stalking, and finally killing a deer, he found that the animal had been drinking from a spring of clear water, beside which he determined to establish his camp. further than this he had no plans. it was enough for the present that he was free, in the forest that he loved, and beyond all knowledge of the white man whom he hated. here, then, he would abide for a time, or until he should discover people of his own kind, for he was still impressed with the belief that others like himself must inhabit those game-filled forests. that night both he and the bear, to whom he talked as though it were a human being, ate to their satisfaction of deer meat, and nahma lay down to sleep beside his shaggy friend, happier than he had been at any time since leaving his native land. the next morning he was early astir and ready to begin work on the lodge that he proposed to construct. by mid-day he had the poles of the frame cut, set in the ground, arched over until they met, and fastened in position. then he went in quest of proper material for a thatch or covering. the bear, having spent the morning in feeding, was left behind, chained to a small tree and fast asleep. while searching for the material he wanted nahma struck the fresh trail of a deer, which after a long chase he overtook and killed. as he was returning with the hide and haunches on his back he was startled by a baying of hounds, which changed as he listened to a snarling, growling, and yelping that indicated a battle royal. from the nature and direction of these sounds our lad realized that trouble of some kind had come to the bear, and, without a thought of danger to himself, he ran to the assistance of his comrade. reaching the scene, he found the bear, though sadly hampered by his chain, making a gallant fight against a pack of boar-hounds that had come across him while ranging the forest. they were fierce, gaunt creatures, and although two of their number, already knocked out, were lying to one side feebly licking their wounds, it was evident that the chained bear was overmatched and must speedily be dragged down. flinging away his burden and drawing his dirk, nahma rushed forward and sprang into the thick of the fray, uttering the fierce war-cry of the iroquois as he did so. for a few minutes there was a furious and indiscriminate mingling of bear, dogs, and man, then of a sudden the young indian was seized from behind, dragged backward, and flung to the ground by one of two men clad in the green dress of foresters, who had just arrived on the scene. while nahma's assailant hastily but securely fastened the lad's arms so as to render him harmless, the other ranger ended the battle, still raging, by thrusting a keen-bladed boar-spear through the bear's body. it pierced the animal's heart, and he sank with a sobbing groan. "a fair sorrowful bit o' wark this, jean," remarked the man who had killed the bear, as he examined the several dogs. "fower dead; two killed by yon brute and two by the dirk of this wastrel. all the rest gouged, cut, and bit up. but he'll answer for it smartly when once sir amory claps eyes on him, the thievin', murthren gypsy poacher." "yes, i reckon he'll sweat fine," replied the other, with a grin; "but did iver thou see bear chained afore?" "noa, niver. lucky thing 'twas, though. but come on whoam. bring poacher with 'e, and we'll send pack-horse for bear. no use looking furder for pigs this day." so poor nahma, once more bereft of his freedom and of the dumb brute whom he regarded as his only friend, his garments rent and his body bleeding from a dozen wounds, was marched away between the two stout rangers, while after them trooped the dogs. sir amory effingham, a knight in high favor at court, was lord of that region, and being devoted to the chase, he spent several months of each year at garnet hall, the ivy-covered forest castle in which his family had been cradled for generations. it lay a league from the scene of nahma's capture, and by the time he was brought within sight of its battlemented towers the short day was closing and night was at hand. while one of the rangers kennelled the dogs and looked after their wounds, the other thrust nahma, with his hurts still unattended, into an empty store-room, locked its door, and went to make report of what had taken place. "a gypsy, eh? a poacher, caught red-handed, and a dog-killer, is he?" quoth sir amory, angrily. "hanging will be too good for him. he should be drawn and quartered as an example to all of his kidney, and i will deal with his case in the morning. look well to him, then, see that he escapes not, and bring him to me in the great hall after the breaking of fast." "yes, sir amory." "and, jean, send for that bear and have his pelt taken before the body stiffens." "yes, sir amory." "also, jean, give both the dogs and the prisoner a good feed of bear's meat." so all was done as directed; only nahma, realizing the nature of the food thrown to him some hours later, refused to eat of it. chapter xxiii an honored guest on the following morning, after the lord of the manor, his family, and all his retainers had partaken of their rude but abundant breakfast, and washed it down with copious draughts of ale, which at that time took the place of coffee or tea, sir amory ordered the prisoner of the preceding evening to be brought before him. the dining-tables, which were merely boards laid on trestles, were cleared away, and the great hall was made ready to serve as a court of justice. witnesses were summoned, and spectators gathered, until but few of the knight's following were absent. squires, pages, men-at-arms, grooms, foresters, and under-servants, all filled with an eager curiosity, flocked to the scene of trial; for the case in hand was of so serious a nature that its resulting punishment would be certain to afford vast entertainment. in those days the killing of a deer by any person beneath the rank of a gentleman was a capital offence; while the killing of a hunting dog by one of the peasant class ranked as a crime so abominable as to merit the severest penalty. for either of these things the offender might be hanged, whipped to death, or executed in any other fitting manner, at the discretion of the judge. he might not be beheaded, as that form of punishment was reserved for offences against the state, committed by persons of rank. neither might he be burned, since the stake was only for witches and victims of religious persecution. if the lord of the manor were inclined to be merciful, the deer-stealer or dog-killer might be given his life, and escape with some such slight punishment as having his ears cropped or a hand chopped off; but in the present case it was universally agreed that the crime was of a nature to demand the severest possible punishment. thus, when the prisoner appeared, he was regarded with eager curiosity as one who promised to furnish a spectacle of uncommon interest. friendless, wounded, ragged, half starved, and utterly ignorant of the situation confronting him, the son of longfeather was led the whole length of the great hall to the dais at its upper end, on which sat the master of his fate. as he was halted, sir amory exclaimed,-"on my soul, as scurvy a knave as ever i set eyes upon. i knew not that even a gypsy could present so foul an aspect. what is thy name and condition, sirrah?" not understanding what was said, nahma made no answer. only, recalling the teaching of his own people, he stared his questioner full in the face with a mien that, in spite of his sorry plight, was quite as haughty as that of the knight himself. "a contumacious varlet and insolent," remarked sir amory, "but it is possible that we may find means to lower his pride. let the ranger named jem stand forth and relate his tale of the occurrence concerning which this investigation is made." so jem told his story, and it was corroborated by the other forester. also were the dead hounds introduced as evidence, together with the dirk that nahma had used so effectively. "what hast thou to say in thy own behalf, scoundrel?" asked the knight, turning again to the prisoner after all this testimony against him had been submitted. still there was no answer, but only an unflinching gaze and a proudly uplifted head. "think you the creature is dumb?" inquired the puzzled magistrate. "no, sir amory," replied one of the foresters, "of a surety he is not, for we heard him call loudly to the bear, and at sound of his voice the beast made violent effort to break his chain that he might get to him." "chain?" quoth the knight. "this is the first mention i have heard of any chain. what mean you? was the bear indeed chained?" "chained and muzzled was he," admitted the ranger, "else it had gone more hardly with the dogs than happened." "chained and muzzled," repeated the knight, reflectively, and casting a searching gaze upon the prisoner. "still, it may be only a coincidence." with this he gave an order in a low tone to a page who stood at hand, and the boy darted away. "saw you trace of other gypsies at or near that place?" asked the knight, continuing his examination of the forester. "no, sir amory. that is, we saw no humans, but there was a booth partly built close at hand." "what is the material of the prisoner's dress?" "deer-skin, sir amory, nothing less." at this moment a tapestry was drawn aside, and a lady, appearing on the dais, stood beside her husband with a look of inquiry. she was followed by one bearing in her arms a child, at sight of which the prisoner was surprised into a momentary start as of recognition. "my dear," said sir amory, "will you favor us by glancing at yonder gypsy and telling if ever you have set eyes on him before?" the lady looked in the direction indicated, but shook her head. ere she could speak, however, the maid, who had followed her gaze, uttered a cry, and exclaimed,-"it is the very one, my lady. the youth, i mean, who danced with that dreadful bear and saved the life of my little mistress." "yes," said the lady, slowly. "i did not recognize him on the moment; but now me-thinks he is the same from whose hands i received my child, safe and unharmed, though blood-bespattered. but, amory, what is he doing here? a prisoner and under guard! surely----" "it is all a mistake," cried the knight, rising to his feet in great agitation. "he is not a prisoner, but an honored guest. nor is he under guard, but under the protection of one who owes to him a life dearer than his own. gentlemen, the hearing is dismissed; the prisoner is honorably acquitted, and will hereafter be known as my friend, if indeed he can forgive the cruel wrong i meditated against him. away, ye varlets. bring food and wine. fetch warm water and clean napery, salve and liniments. body o' me! the youth is wounded and hath had no attention. he looks ready to drop with weakness. draw a settle for him beside the fire. fetch----" but the servants were already flying in every direction in their efforts to minister to the evident needs of him whose position had undergone so sudden a transformation. at the same time nahma himself was even more bewildered by the good fortune that was overwhelming him than ever by the hard fate that had for so long been his constant attendant. somewhat later the lady who, with her companions, had withdrawn, came again to the hall, and stepping to where she could obtain a good view of the youth, looked at him steadily for the space of a minute. he, in the mean time, had been bathed and fed, his wounds had been dressed, and he wore a body-gown from the knight's own wardrobe that gave him an air of grace and dignity. "he is no gypsy, sir amory," said the lady, finally, withdrawing her gaze and turning to her husband. "i myself am beginning to doubt if he belongs to those nomads," replied the knight. "but if not a gypsy, to what race can he lay claim, with that tinge of color and with hair of such raven blackness?" "dost remember the tale told us in london by my cousin edward concerning an arrival from the new world in whom he had taken an interest?" "ay, well do i, and it so aroused my curiosity that i made an errand shortly after to the place where he was said to be, but he had disappeared. how was he called? can you remember the name?" "he was called 'massasoit,'" replied the lady, uttering the word distinctly and observing the youth as she spoke. turning quickly he looked at her with eager questioning. "who are your friends?" she asked, addressing him directly and speaking the words slowly. he understood and answered, "bear frien'. tasquanto frien'. white man frien', winslow." "that proves it!" cried the lady, triumphantly. "he must be the american indian of whom cousin edward told us, and who is said to be a prince in his own country. at any rate, as he certainly saved the life of our child, we have ample reason to befriend him." "indeed, yes," agreed sir amory. "and to fail in a duty so plainly indicated would lay us open to the charge of base ingratitude." thus it happened that the young american who had been kidnapped from his own country, sold as a slave in london, and finally arrested on a charge that threatened to cost him his life, became the honored guest of a stately english home. his hosts sought in every way to promote his comfort and happiness, and when they discovered that he preferred living in the open to dwelling under a roof, he was promptly given the freedom of their domain. he was also accorded full liberty to dwell on it where he pleased, and to kill such of its abundant game as would supply his needs. armed with this permission, nahma immediately repaired to the place where he had already begun the building of a lodge after the fashion of his own people, and completed it to his satisfaction as well as that of his hosts, who took a lively interest in his work. he covered it with bark and lined its interior with the skins of fur-bearing animals. in the centre was his fireplace, and at one side his couch of dry sedge-grass covered with the great shaggy hide of his one-time friend, the bear. here our indian dwelt almost as contentedly as though in his own land and under the trees of his native forest. much of his time was devoted to accompanying sir amory on his hunting expeditions, during which the youth's marvellous skill in tracking game and his fearlessness in moments of peril won for him both admiration and respect. on days when there was no hunting he busied himself with making bows, arrows, or snow-shoes, and in receiving visits from the green-coated foresters, whose tastes and pursuits were so similar to his own. he taught them some things, but learned more than he taught; and chiefest of all the things that he learned was to load and fire a musket. thus was solved the mystery of the white man's thunder-stick, and he could now smile as he recalled the melancholy experience of tasquanto and himself in attempting to fire a salute. so some months were happily passed, and it seemed as though our young american would spend the remainder of his life as an english forester. then all of a sudden there occurred an amazing thing, by which he was rendered so unhappy that he no longer cared to live if the balance of his days must be passed under existing conditions. chapter xxiv nahma remembers most welcome of all the guests at nahma's lodge was the little lady betty, who was sometimes taken thither by her father mounted in front of him on his great flemish horse baldric. a strong friendship had sprung up between the child and the young indian, and she was never happier than during the hour occasionally spent with him. she always brought some little gift, and he never failed to have ready a unique bit of his own handiwork to offer in return. once it was a wee bow and a quiver of small stone-headed arrows. again he presented her with the beautifully dressed skin of an otter. at length he completed a pair of tiny snow-shoes gayly fringed and ornamented. for some days after they were finished he waited expectantly the coming of his little friend, and as she failed to appear, he finally decided to take his gift to the castle. now, it happened that sir amory, being called by some business to the near-by city of bristol, had taken his wife and little daughter with him for a brief visit, from which they had just returned. as was usual on such occasions, they had brought back a number of trifling gifts for members of the household, and also one for the young indian whom they held in such high esteem. the city of bristol, more than any other in england, was building up a trade with the new world. while this trade was more especially with the virginia plantations, it was gradually extending northward along the american coast. thus a ship, recently returned, had voyaged as far north as the french settlements, trading with natives wherever found on her way. this ship had brought back many curious things, among which was an object of native make that sir amory, having his indian guest in his mind, purchased on sight. "it may interest him," he said to his wife, "and, at any rate, it will be something for betty to take him when next she and i ride to his lodge." so this present was fetched home with the others, and was to have been carried out to nahma on the very day of his appearance at the castle. on learning that the indian waited outside with a gift for betty, sir amory ordered him to be brought in. the knight and his lady together with several guests were grouped near the huge fireplace in the great hall as nahma entered and, advancing gravely, extended a hand to his host. then, looking about inquiringly, he pronounced the single word "betty." "i' faith!" laughed the knight, "the young man hath quickly recognized the most important personage of this establishment and will have dealings with none other. let mistress betty be brought." as soon as the little girl appeared, the young indian, kneeling gracefully, presented her with his gift. after the tiny snow-shoes had been passed from hand to hand for inspection and their use had been explained, lady effingham said,-"now, betty, give him the present fetched from bristol." thus saying she placed a small packet in the child's hand, and the latter, advancing shyly, handed it to nahma. with a smiling face the young warrior undid the wrappings of the packet until its contents were exposed. suddenly his expression changed to one of consternation and bewilderment. for a moment he held the object in his hands gazing at it wildly and in evident perplexity. then he uttered a great cry and a gush of tears filled his eyes. he gasped and seemed about to speak; but, words failing him, he turned and fled from the hall, leaving its occupants amazed at his strange actions. "it is doubtless a native charm of some kind," quoth the knight, breaking the silence, "and a powerful one at that, for never did i see a man so upset by a trifle. after a little, when he has had time to quiet down, i will question him concerning his agitation, but until then we must amuse ourselves with conjecture." in the mean time nahma had not paused in his flight until reaching his own lodge. there he sat down and examined his newly acquired prize with minutest care, alternately laughing and crying as he did so. at length, apparently satisfied with his inspection, he said aloud in the long forgotten tongue of the wampanoags,-"truly it is my father's wampum, and i am nahma, the son of longfeather." it was indeed the belt of seven totems, thus marvellously restored to him from whose unconscious form it had been taken nearly three years earlier in the far-away land of the iroquois. not only had nahma thus regained his father's badge of authority, but at sight of it the memory of his earlier years, lost to him ever since he had been struck down by miantinomo, was abruptly and fully restored. he recalled who he was and found himself once more in command of his native tongue. he also remembered every incident of his journey to the country of the maqua as though it had been undertaken but the day before. he even remembered lying down for a brief rest after eating his supper on the western bank of the shatemuc; but beyond that came a blank, and his next memory was of aeana in the lodge of kaweras. as these things passed through his mind in rapid review, he was also whelmed by a great wave of home-sickness. the voices of his own people rang in his ears, and he heard the plash of waves on the beach at montaup. the scent of burning cedar from the evening camp-fires was in his nostrils, and he felt the spring of brown pine needles beneath his feet as he threaded the dim forest trails of his native land. in a bark canoe he once more ran the foaming rapids of great rivers, or, lying beside tasquanto, he was lulled to sleep by the roar of mighty cataracts. so distinct were the pictures thus flashed before him by the magic belt that he had no longer a wish to live unless he could once more gaze upon them in reality. every other feeling was merged in an intense desire to regain his own country and rejoin his own people. at length the longing for these things became so great that the youth sprang to his feet, determined to set forth at once in quest of them. his reason told him that such an adventure was well-nigh hopeless; but the wampum belt urged him forward and persuaded him that by some means he would succeed. so nahma departed forever from the lodge that, but an hour earlier, had seemed his home for life, and set forth on the tremendous journey. he took with him only his weapons, a fur cloak, the fire-bag that had once belonged to aeana, and the belt of seven totems girded about his body next his skin. as he emerged from the lodge he stood for a moment irresolute. whither should he turn? what path would lead him to montaup? then the last word uttered in his hearing by betty's mother rang again in his ears. it was "bristol." from there the belt had but recently come, and there he would begin to retrace its mysterious course to the place where he had lost it. he had heard the foresters speak of bristol, and he knew that it lay in the direction of the setting sun. what bristol was, or how far away, he did not know, any more than what he should do upon getting there. it was enough that his first step was decided upon, and without a single backward glance he began his long homeward journey. an hour later sir amory on his good horse baldric, and with mistress betty in his arms, rode up to the deserted lodge and uttered a cheery call for its supposed occupant to come forth. the knight was puzzled at finding the place empty; and for several days thereafter he caused search to be made for its recent owner. but nothing came of this, nor for many years did he hear a word concerning the disappearance and whereabouts of massasoit. that night nahma slept in the wood, as lonely and friendless a human being as could be found in all the world, but so happy in his regained memory and in the knowledge that he, like others, could now lay claim to home and people, towards whom he was journeying, that nothing else mattered. on the morrow he struck the broad trail of a highway that led to the westward, and thereafter he followed it. noting that his appearance attracted attention from the few travellers whom he met, he determined to procure a suit of clothing that would render him less conspicuous. he dreaded to approach a house, and was at a loss how to accomplish his purpose until at dusk of the second day. then he ran across a camp-fire surrounded by a group of dark-skinned persons, who for a moment he believed to be people of his own race. he did not discover his mistake until he was within the circle of fire-light and it was too late to retreat. so he put on a bold face, accepted an invitation to eat with the gypsies, and strove hard, though without success, to understand what they said. they in turn were as much puzzled by him as he was by them; but this did not prevent them from exchanging a well-worn suit of clothing for nahma's fur robe when he intimated by signs his willingness to make such a trade. as soon as he procured these things he put them on over his buckskin garments; and, as a dilapidated cap had been thrown in to complete the bargain, he was so thoroughly disguised that even sir amory would have failed to recognize him. the gypsies invited their guest to cast his fortunes with them, and proposed among themselves to compel him to do so in any event. he neither declined nor accepted their offer, but after a while lay down to sleep near their fire, as though willing, at any rate, to remain with them for the present. thus they were much chagrined to find in the morning that he had disappeared without leaving a trace to show which way he had gone. so it happened that our wanderer came at length to the snug little seaport of bristol, at that time second in importance only to london. and thus was taken the first step of his momentous journey. dusk was falling as he entered the place, and for some time he wandered aimlessly through its narrow streets. then, unexpectedly, he came to the water front and discovered ships, some under sail and others anchored in the stream. his heart leaped at sight of them, for he supposed that all ships passed to and from his own country. therefore if he could only find one about to depart, and contrive to get on board, the second and longest step of his journey would be provided for. he managed to exchange his bow and arrows for a meal in a small public-house near the water, and when he had eaten it he again strolled outside looking for a place in which to pass the night. it was now quite dark, and, without going far, he lay down to sleep under the lee of a boat that was drawn up on one of the wharves. some hours later he was awakened by sounds of shouting and scuffling close at hand, and sprang to his feet in alarm. as he did so a rough voice called out,-"here's another stout fellow! seize him, lads, and hustle him along." immediately nahma was surrounded, and, despite his furious struggles, was quickly overthrown and securely bound. chapter xxv back to america for a short space our lad was heart-broken by this rude awakening from his dreams of freedom and of a return to his own country. half dazed as he was, he had fought desperately; and now, hustled along in company with a dozen other unfortunates, all bound and suffering from rough handling, his sole thought was of how he could soonest put an end to the life that he was resolved not to pass in slavery. he recalled with satisfaction the dirk that, hidden in his clothing, still remained to him, and was determined to use it at the earliest opportunity, first on such of his present enemies as he could reach and then on himself. suddenly his sombre reflections were interrupted and given a decided change of direction by finding himself crowded, together with his wretched companions, into a boat. no sooner had it received them than it was rowed out to the mouth of the harbor where stood a ship under easy sail. from the moment of realizing that he was in a boat nahma was filled with a wild hope, and when he was transferred from it to the deck of a waiting ship this hope was confirmed. for some reason utterly beyond his comprehension he had once more been kidnapped, but only to be placed in the very position he had longed to attain. the ways of the white man were past understanding. why had he been brought by force from his own country? and why should an equal amount of anxiety now be shown, and even a greater amount of force be used, to carry him back to it? he could not imagine, nor did he care. it was enough that the second step of his homeward journey had been taken for him and that the object he had so ardently desired was accomplished. nahma would gladly have remained on deck and attempted to make himself useful without a thought of escaping or of doing harm to those who had unwittingly so aided his plans. but this was not permitted, and he was bundled below with the poor wretches who had been ruthlessly torn from their homes to be taken as bondsmen to the virginia plantations. so great was the demand for labor in that colony that criminals were sent there to work out their sentences and debtors to labor until their indebtedness was discharged. in fact, all of whom society wished to rid itself were shipped across the ocean. men anxious to try their fortunes in the new world but too poor to pay their passage went out under contract, to serve any master who would purchase their time until they had made good the money thus advanced. but even these sources of supply were not sufficient to satisfy the demand for laborers, and unscrupulous shipmasters found great profit in gathering up unsuspecting citizens by means of press-gangs sent ashore on the eve of departure, getting them on board, and sailing at once for the distant scene of their enforced servitude. thus nahma now found himself in a motley company of mechanics, sailors, small tradesmen, 'prentice lads, and others, all being carried away against their will and without the knowledge of their friends. some had left dependent families unprovided for, while others were parted from sweethearts or newly married wives. to us of to-day all this sounds incredible; but the age of "good queen bess" was an age of cruelty, when even the best thinking persons only shrugged their shoulders on hearing of such things, and thanked their stars that they were not in similar plight. some of the group now surrounding nahma in the small space allotted to them, which was dimly lighted by a vilely smoking lamp, were groaning, some weeping, others were bemoaning their hard fate, and all were as wretchedly unhappy as it is possible for mortals to be. that is, all except our young indian, who was overjoyed at finding himself on a ship that he believed would carry him back to his own country and people. the kidnapped men were kept below for several days, or until land was out of sight and the ship was ploughing her slow way across the bay of biscay; but after that they were allowed on deck from sunrise until dark. as nahma, buoyed by hope and eager anticipation, was the only one among them who was not seasick, he was compelled to act as steward of their mess. at first his duties in this capacity were light and he performed them willingly, but later, when his companions had gained their sea-legs, they forced all sorts of disagreeable tasks upon him, and treated him with such cruelty that his hatred of white men was increased a hundred-fold. they were much puzzled over his nationality, which he never revealed, though often questioned concerning it. most of them declared that he was a gypsy, while others insisted that he was of negro blood and called him "guinea." the captain of the ship while strongly suspecting him to be an american would not admit it, but spoke of him as a "jack spaniard." so slow was the weary voyage that it was two months to a day before the westerly winds against which they were beating brought to nahma's sensitive nostrils the first scent of land. that evening he hid himself on deck so that he might sniff the air all night, and at daybreak he was rewarded by the sight of land lying cloud-like on the western horizon. during that day he was so inattentive to his enforced duties as to win many a blow and kick from his brutal masters. although the young indian's blood boiled with rage, he did not attempt to resent these things, but submitted to them with an assumed meekness that ill-expressed his feelings. he felt that he could afford to abide his time, for was he not almost within reach of his own people? at the same time deep down in his heart he vowed a bitter vengeance against those who thus degraded him, if ever the opportunity should come. and it came sooner than he expected, though not through his own people, as he had hoped. before the features of the landfall became recognizable the wind hauled to the eastward and the weather thickened, with every indication of a storm. thus the skipper was greatly relieved shortly before night to find his ship running into a broad bay between two distant headlands that he believed to be the capes of virginia, though in reality they were those of delaware. without attempting to discover the mouth of the james, he sought only a lee under which the night might be passed in safety. when this was found and the ship was snugly anchored for the first time since leaving bristol, not only the captain but his entire company began a carouse to celebrate this successful termination of their perilous voyage. liquor flowed freely in the cabin, and was served forward in such generous measure that a liberal portion even found its way to the wretched bondmen who expected shortly to be sold into years of servitude. thus by midnight nearly every man on board was helplessly drunk, and most of them were asleep. up to this hour the storm had steadily increased in violence, and the ship, though still safe, was surging heavily at her cables. at the same time but a single figure was in motion on her decks, and he was creeping forward as stealthily as though fearful of being discovered. gaining the bow undetected, he bent for a minute over one of the straining cables, and when he arose two of its hempen strands had been severed. then he stepped quickly to the other, drew his keen blade across it once, twice, three times, and with the last stroke it parted. the one first cut gave way almost at the same moment, and the freed ship started up the bay like a restive steed just given a loose rein. with his long-meditated design thus successfully accomplished, nahma darted back to his place of hiding and awaited developments. he had long since discovered that he was destined to be sold into slavery among those white men who had settled far to the southward of his own country. tales of their injustice and cruelty towards the natives had reached montaup even before he left there, and had filled his boyish heart with a fierce indignation. now he was determined not to fall alive into their hands, and believed that on this night or never he must effect an escape. he could not swim to shore because of the distance and the heavy seas. all the ship's boats were inboard and securely lashed, so that he could not make off in one of them. consequently his only feasible plan seemed to be to let the ship herself drift until she fetched up on some beach, from which he might gain the safe cover of the woods. he had never experienced a shipwreck and knew nothing of its terrors. even if he had he would not have hesitated to carry out his desperate plan. the captain of the drifting ship, too hard-headed to be overcome by any amount of liquor, was the first to become aware that her cables had parted. he stumbled on deck, bawling out orders that were mingled with strange oaths, and, gaining the wheel, put his vessel's head before the wind that she might scud without danger of being thrown on her beam ends. then he bellowed for assistance, but it came tardily, and was of slight avail. there was but one spare anchor, and when finally it was broken out, bent on, and got overboard, the ship was so far in the open that it could not hold. so the helpless vessel drifted for several hours, and shortly before daybreak struck with such force that all of her masts went by the board. then ensued a period of horrible crashing, grinding, and pounding, with which were mingled the shrieks of drowning men. some of the strongest swimmers reached the shore, bruised and breathless but still alive, and foremost among them was the almost naked form of him who had caused the disaster. battered and beaten by roaring breakers, weak and nearly perished with cold, nahma was at the same time upheld by such a spirit of exultation as he had never before known. he was once more free and once more lying on the beloved soil of his native land. no sooner had he regained his breath after being flung on the beach than he struggled to his feet and staggered to the safe shelter of a forest that grew almost to the water's edge. he did not look back nor give a thought to what was taking place behind him. the white men who would have sold him into slavery might care for themselves, as might those who had so recently degraded him by their blows and curses. an hour later our young indian was seated by a camp-fire of the saganaga or delawares, and telling them in sign language, supplemented by the few words they had in common, of the wonderful treasure that the sea had brought to their very doors. they, recognizing the splendid belt of wampum that he wore, listened to him with closest attention; and when he had finished, all the able-bodied men of the village hastened to the scene of the wreck, leaving nahma to the kindly hospitality of those who remained behind. that night there was no village in the delaware nation, nor probably on the entire atlantic coast, so rich in scalps and plunder as the one in which the son of longfeather was an honored guest. chapter xxvi sassacus the pequot this utter destruction of the ship and of her entire company gave great satisfaction not only to the young indian who had suffered so much on her but to the saganaga, who were at that time feeling very bitter against white men on account of the recent stealing of a number of their tribe to be sold into slavery. it had been the usual case of a cordial welcome to the strangers from beyond the sea, a brisk trade by which the confidence of the indians was won, and then a sudden sailing with some twenty of them on board. now, thanks to nahma, the lenni lenape were revenged and their hearts were lightened of a burden. also they had acquired wealth beyond their wildest dreams, and were very grateful to him who had thrown it in their way. he did not tell them that he had been a slave in the white man's country, for he was determined to keep that humiliating knowledge to himself. so he only gave them to understand that he too had been kidnapped, and let them imagine it to have been of recent occurrence. they had at once recognized the belt of seven totems that nahma wore diagonally across his breast when first appearing among them, though no member of their tribe had ever before seen it. they, however, knew it from description; for, among american indians, tribal totems and the belts of principal chieftains were as well known as are the banners of european nations, and the coats of arms of their rulers, among white men. the saganaga also knew that none but longfeather or his eldest son might wear the belt of seven totems, and so they treated nahma with every mark of consideration. finding that he was desirous of returning at once to his own country, they furnished him with clothing, weapons, and a belt of wampum bearing the likeness of a serpent, which he was to deliver to the peacemaker as a badge of friendship. they also provided an escort of young warriors, who would guide him to the country of the pavonias. these people, who were a branch of the saganaga, occupied the territory lying on the south side of the shatemuc at the point where it flows into the sea, and they willingly furnished nahma with a canoe in which to continue his journey. launching this craft on the waters of the narrow, tide-swept channel afterwards known as the kill von kull, and receiving from his friends a goodly store of parched corn, our traveller set forth alone on the last stage of his homeward journey. on leaving the kill he crossed new york bay, undotted by a single sail, passed the densely wooded island that was to be known as "governor's," and entered the east river. here he came upon a scene of enchanting beauty. on his right stretched the level salt marshes and wooded plains of long island. on the other hand lay rock-ribbed manhattan, rugged with hills and valleys, among which sparkled many crystal springs and rippling brooks. it was covered from end to end and from water's edge to water's edge with groves of stately forest-trees interspersed with grassy glades in which fed herds of deer. over all was flung the exquisite veil of a may verdure, while the air was heavy with the scent of blossoms and filled with the song of mating birds. on the river's edge brown rocks were fringed with fantastic sea-growths that waved in the swift tide like banners streaming in a breeze. brooding ducks and wading heron peopled every placid cove, fish leaped from the clear waters, and white-plumed gulls flecked the blue sky. the beauty and peace of nature reigned undisturbed over all; for, as yet, no old world keel had cleaved those waters, and the site of what was destined to become the greatest city of the earth was still untainted by the blight of civilization. nor did nahma see a human being on his whole journey from bay to sound. in the place destined to hold millions of his kind he was alone. skirting the northern shore of long island sound, the solitary voyager, always taking pains to avoid observation, passed the country of the mohicans and entered upon that of the pequots. during the four days thus occupied he had not held communication with any man, having shunned alike the infrequent villages of bark huts and the camp-fires of fishermen or shell gatherers, as well as their canoes. he did not wish to be delayed or recognized before reaching the country of his own people. consequently he hesitated for a moment when, on the fourth day of his journey, he discovered two figures in a canoe making signals of distress. they were midway between an island lying several miles off shore and the mainland, and their canoe was so low in the water that it seemed about to sink. one of the figures was that of a man, who was paddling with desperate energy, while the other, evidently a woman, was furiously bailing water from the sinking craft. only for a moment did nahma hesitate, and then he headed with all speed in that direction. the water-logged canoe sank before he reached it; but, within a few minutes, he had rescued the survivors, and they were safely bestowed in his own craft. with this accomplished, he started towards the land that had been their objective-point when, as he afterwards learned, their canoe had been pierced and ripped open by a sword-fish. whether this had been done with malice, playfully, or by accident they could not tell; but it had so endangered their lives that they would, almost of a certainty, have drowned had not the stranger come to their rescue. not a word was spoken by any one of the three until the canoe had nearly gained the land. then the rescued man, who, though young, was of commanding aspect, turned from his paddling in the bow and said,-"thou hast saved us from death and i will not forget it. i am sassacus, chief of the pequots." nahma's heart leaped within him. the pequots formed one of the tribes acknowledging the authority of his father, and this youth was his own cousin. he was about to make reply, when the other continued: "i perceive thou art a stranger, and if thy business be not too pressing, my lodge would be honored to shelter thee as a guest." "gladly would i tarry," was the reply, "but i may not, for i bear a belt from the saganaga to longfeather the peacemaker, that must be promptly delivered. the name by which i am known is massasoit." the pequot chieftain turned and gazed keenly at the speaker. "have not the lenni lenape learned that longfeather has gone the great journey?" he asked. "dead! longfeather dead, and i not with him at the end!" cried nahma, shocked by the suddenness of this news into an unpremeditated betrayal of feeling. "when did he die, and how? was he killed in battle?" "he went to the place of okis when the willow leaves were the size of mouse-ears, and he was killed by the pale-faces who come from the sea with death and destruction in their hands," answered the young chieftain, bitterly. "killed by the white man!" gasped nahma, his face growing black and the cords of his neck swelling with rage. "then by his blood i swear----" "wait," commanded sassacus. "not directly did the men from the sea take his life, nor was his blood shed. with the falling of leaves one of their winged canoes came to land near montaup. from it were set on shore two men more nearly dead than living. then the great canoe departed, leaving them to die. the dwellers of that country took pity on them and cared for them; but they died, and in a short time all who had gone near them were also dead. the plague spread from the pokanokets to the nausets, the nipmucks, the naticks, the abenakis, and may still be spreading in the land of cold, though on this side it was stayed by the coming of warm weather, and thy---longfeather was the last to die of it." for a few moments nahma sat silent. then, lifting his face, on which were unconcealed traces of a mighty grief, he said, "i will go with thee, sassacus." "it is well," replied the other, and no further word was spoken between them until after a landing was made. even then the subject that had so greatly affected the new-comer was not again mentioned until after he had been taken to the lodge of the young chieftain and refreshed. this having been done, the guest requested that his host would walk apart with him, and when they were by themselves he said,-"thy news of the peacemaker hath so confused my plans that i am at a loss how to proceed and would learn further from thee. first i would know who exercises authority in place of the great wampanoag? left he a son to rule in his stead?" sassacus looked curiously at his guest as he answered,-"longfeather had a son who should take his place, but he disappeared many moons ago." "how?" "no man knows for a certainty. some say that he joined the iroquois, and others that he was taken prisoner by the hurons of the cold land. in that case there is small chance of his being now alive." "who, then, wears the belt of seven totems?" "no one wears it," replied the other, gravely, "for it also disappeared at the same time. miantinomo the narragansett claims the place and authority of longfeather in the name of canonicus, his father, and is even now at montaup." "miantinomo!" exclaimed nahma, bitterly. "by what right does he make such a claim?" "by the right of a strong arm," replied the other. "is he loved and respected as was longfeather?" "no; he is hated by many and feared by all." "why, then, was he allowed to assume authority?" "because there was none other to dispute him." "if one should come----?" began nahma, hesitatingly. "if one should come wearing the belt of seven totems, or bearing other proof that he is the son of longfeather," said sassacus quickly, and with a meaning glance at his companion, "then would he find many to support his claim." for a full minute nahma hesitated, and the young men gazed steadfastly at each other. then nahma slowly thrust a hand within his buckskin shirt, and, drawing forth the belt of seven totems, displayed it to his companion. "here is the peacemaker's badge of authority," he said, "and here also is he who should succeed him, for i am nahma, son of longfeather." "i have known it, my brother," replied sassacus, "since the moment i saw thy face on hearing news of thy father's death, but i would not speak till thou hadst spoken. now, however, i gladly acknowledge thee as my sachem, and will at once make public announcement of thy coming." "not so," objected nahma. "for the present, and until i can meet miantinomo face to face, i must be massasoit of the lenni lenape. if, however, my brother will go to montaup with a following of his young men, i will gladly travel in his company." chapter xxvii a royal home-coming by murder, treachery, fraud, and force miantinomo the narragansett had finally attained the position upon which he had so long cast envious eyes. at the death of longfeather he had caused himself to be proclaimed peacemaker, or ruler of the confederated new england tribes, in the name of his adopted father, who was now too old to take an active part in affairs of this kind. the various stories concerning nahma, circulated from time to time, had not disturbed him, for did he not know that his rival was dead? nor had he any fear that the belt of seven totems would ever again be seen in those parts, since he had given it to a white trader in exchange for a hatchet, and it had been carried to that mysterious place beyond the sea from which nothing ever returned. he had also learned with satisfaction of sacandaga's death, for that chieftain was the only red man who had ever seen the belt in his possession. with all traces of his own treacherous dealings thus wiped out, the ambitious young man had no hesitation in proclaiming canonicus, his father, to be longfeather's successor by virtue of his position as head of the strongest tribe in the confederation. although miantinomo was generally disliked, no person felt strong enough to dispute this claim, and so he was sullenly accepted as lawgiver of the tribes. in this capacity he hastened to take possession of montaup, which had become the recognized seat of government. there he at once proceeded to belie his assumed character of peacemaker by making preparations on a large scale for invading the country of the iroquois. he had never forgiven them for refusing to treat with him simply as a narragansett, and now that he was in a position to command a war-party equal to any they could put in the field, he believed the time for humiliating them had come. he sent a runner to the hurons urging them to attack the iroquois from the north about the time that he proposed to cross the shatemuc, and he imagined that the combination thus formed would prove overpowering. he also hoped that all this warlike activity would divert the thoughts of those who were displeased with his usurpation of authority, and he knew that a successful war would firmly establish his position. so miantinomo had sent messengers to every tribe and clan of the new england confederacy bidding their warriors assemble at montaup, and already were a great number thus gathered. among others sassacus had received a summons to this effect, but the fiery pequot had determined to disobey it and risk the consequences. now, however, the coming of nahma had so changed the aspect of affairs that he gladly accepted the invitation to present himself at montaup accompanied by a strong body of picked warriors. miantinomo, who had feared that sassacus more than any other might rebel against his self-assumed authority, received him with effusive hospitality. "now do i know," he said, "that my undertaking against the arrogant iroquois will succeed, since they have no warriors to equal the pequots in bravery." "it is good that you esteem my young men so highly," replied sassacus, "and it is certain that they will do what may be to establish firmly the power of the peacemaker. i am also accompanied to montaup by one who will doubtless prove more welcome than all the others. he is a medicine-man of the saganaga, who brings to the peacemaker a belt of friendship from his people." "say you so!" exclaimed miantinomo, his dark face lighting with pleasure, for an alliance with the lenni lenape of the south as well as one with the hurons of the north would render him invincible. "where is he? why has he not already been brought to the lodge of council?" "he is an old man and weary, who secludes himself from the common gaze in a lodge of skins that was pitched for him as soon as the canoes came to land," replied sassacus. "he desires not to make his message public, since it is for your ears alone. for this reason he requests that a new medicine-lodge be erected in which he may receive you in private and with ceremonies befitting so important an occasion." "an old man say you?" inquired miantinomo, doubtfully. "he has every appearance of extreme age and decrepitude." "have you seen the belt that he bears?" "i have seen it, and know it to be a serpent-belt of the saganaga. he hopes also to take one from you, that his people may know his mission to have been truly performed. if his terms be not granted, then with his belt will he depart to the land of the iroquois." "without doubt i will grant all that he asks," replied miantinomo, hastily, "for a friendship with the saganaga may not be thrown away. at once shall a medicine-lodge be built, and when next the shadows are shortest then will i meet him." "if it is your pleasure i will see to the building of the lodge," said sassacus. "it is my pleasure," answered the other, and with this the interview ended. by noon of the following day the medicine-lodge, a simple affair of poles and bark, stood finished on the edge of a cleared space that formed the public gathering-place of montaup. it was a mere shell bare of all furnishings, as was noted by the many curious persons who peeped in at its open doorway. the news that something of absorbing interest was to take place within it had attracted a large assemblage to its vicinity, where they waited with eager curiosity. at the same time there was but little mingling of those belonging to the several tribes represented. the narragansetts, with miantinomo seated in front of them, were grouped by themselves close to the lodge but a little to one side. although they outnumbered any of the visiting delegations, they formed but a fraction of the whole gathering. opposite to them and equally near the lodge stood the pequots with the plumed head of sassacus towering above them, and beside him stood our old acquaintance, samoset. the wampanoags were there in full force supported by a large delegation of their near relatives, the pokanokets. besides these were representatives of every new england tribe that had acknowledged the authority of longfeather. all were warriors, armed as for battle, and headed by their most experienced chiefs. about half an hour before the sun attained his meridian a distant chanting of voices, accompanied by the measured beating of medicine-drums, announced the opening of the ceremonies, and a buzz of expectation swept over the great assembly. then appeared a procession of medicine-men clad in fantastic garb calculated to inspire those who beheld it with awe. most prominent among them was an old man enveloped in a long robe of costly furs. he was so feeble and bent with age that he leaned heavily upon a stick and was also supported by two attendants. directly in front of him walked a boy, very proud of his honorable position, and bearing in outstretched hands the wampum serpent-belt of the saganaga so displayed that all might see it. the procession halted before the lodge, while its members engaged in a medicine-dance, circling with furious gestures and wild cries about the central figure of the old man. precisely at the hour of noon the dancing came to an abrupt end, and the old medicine-man, taking from the boy who had borne it the belt of the saganaga, entered the empty lodge alone. for a few minutes his voice was heard in the feeble chanting of an incantation, and then it invited the presence of the peacemaker. upon this miantinomo stepped forth without hesitation and entered the lodge, vanishing from sight beyond its heavy curtain of double deer-skins. the light of the interior was so dim that for a moment he could see nothing; then he made out the form of its solitary occupant standing before him, and holding the belt that he believed was to confirm him in his assumed position. the old man, leaning on his stick, was still enveloped in the long robe that covered him from head to foot. gazing steadfastly at miantinomo, he said, sternly,-"why dost thou come here? i summoned longfeather the peacemaker." "he is dead," replied the other, "and i----" "then should his son nahma have come in his place," interrupted the old man. "he, too, is dead," said miantinomo; "that is," he added, hastily, "he is dead to this people, for he is a traitor and dwells in the lodges of their enemies." "thou, then, art authorized to fill his place?" "i am so authorized by canonicus, my father, and will seek to wipe out the shame cast upon the name of longfeather by his unworthy son." "why, then, dost thou not wear the peacemaker's badge of authority, the great belt of seven totems?" "because it was stolen and carried away by nahma the renegade." "now do i know that thou liest!" exclaimed the old man with an energy of voice as startling as it was unexpected. "thou knowest, better than any other, that the son of longfeather was foully murdered while he slept on the farther bank of the shatemuc. thou knowest that his body, stripped of its badge of authority, was flung into the river. thou knowest that the belt of seven totems, first used to blind the eyes of sacandaga, was afterwards sold to a white-faced trader that it might disappear forever beyond the salt waters. thou knowest who first put in circulation the false tale that the son of longfeather was a traitor and a renegade. thou knowest, and i know, for such things may not be hid from the okis. also will i prove to thee that the dead may live, and that evil designs may come to naught even when they seem most likely to succeed. look, then, and tremble, thou dog of a murderer." [illustration: "look, then, and tremble, thou dog of a murderer"] with these words the dimly outlined form of the old man straightened into erectness, his stick fell to the ground, he flung back his enveloping robe, and at the same moment a slab of bark dropped from the roof of the lodge, allowing a flood of noonday sunlight to stream on the place where he stood. for an instant miantinomo stared dumbly at the figure, young, tall, and handsome, richly clad and wearing across its breast the peacemaker's belt of seven totems, that gazed sternly at him with accusing eyes. then, with a great cry of terror, he rushed from the lodge and fled like one who is pursued by a deadly vengeance in the direction of the nearest forest. as the startled assemblage, gathered to witness his crowning triumph, gazed after the flying figure in bewilderment, their attention was further attracted, and they were thrilled by a shout of joyful amaze. instantly all eyes were again turned towards the lodge, where in place of an old medicine-man stood a young chieftain, as noble a specimen of his race as ever trod american soil. depending from one shoulder was the long-lost belt of seven totems and from the other a serpent-belt of the saganaga. at his feet knelt samoset, crying out that it was indeed his brother and his master, nahma, the son of longfeather. "i am the son of longfeather, and i was nahma," said the young man, so distinctly that all might hear. "but now and henceforth am i massasoit the peacemaker." upon this the whole assemblage, led by sassacus and his loyal pequots, broke into a joyous tumult of welcome and crowded about the youth who, so long lost to them, had been thus marvellously restored to his rightful position. only the narragansetts took advantage of the glad confusion to steal away unnoticed and follow the trail of their dishonored leader. chapter xxviii in the council-lodge massasoit could not relate the whole story of his adventurous wanderings, since no indian known to have been a slave might afterwards be accepted as a leader among his people. consequently he omitted all reference to his unhappy experiences in england. nor did he ever mention that he had crossed the great salt waters; but he told of his adventures among the iroquois, as a captive to the hurons, while in quebec, and on a ship that was to have carried him into slavery among the yengeese of the south. he described the destruction of that ill-fated craft, together with the loss of her company, his own welcome at the hands of the saganaga, and his homeward journey, to all of which the assemblage listened with breathless attention. in conclusion, the young chieftain said,-"i have told all there is to tell. when i left you longfeather ruled this land. he has gone from you never to return. i am his son, and it was his wish that i should be peacemaker in his place. if that be also your desire, or if it be not, now is the time to speak. will you have massasoit for your sagamore or another?" standing very straight and gazing proudly about him, the young man awaited an answer, and it was promptly given. first came sassacus, saying,-"the pequots accept massasoit as their peacemaker and will listen to his words." after him in grave procession came the chiefs to tender their allegiance; and a few days later the venerable canonicus came also, for massasoit had not told that miantinomo had attempted to murder him, and so the narragansetts were not yet outcast from the federation. thus did massasoit occupy his father's place in the great lodge of council, while his authority was acknowledged from the shatemuc to the sea, and from the country of the mohicans to that of the hurons, who dwelt near the great river of the north. with his position thus established, the young sachem, leaving sassacus to hold montaup during his absence, set forth on an expedition of the utmost importance both to himself and to his people. it had three objects: first, to find his mother, who had fled from miantinomo; second, to restore the peaceful relations with the iroquois that had been threatened by the usurper; and last, but by no means least, to visit the lodge of kaweras. as a following worthy of his rank he took with him one hundred warriors, and with these he pressed forward over the trail that he had followed as a youth three years earlier. at the village of peace, on the river of sweet waters, he found miantomet, and raised her in a moment from the dejection of a childless fugitive to a proud motherhood, with the son, whom she had so long mourned as dead, once more restored to her. but only for a short time might these two enjoy their reunion, for massasoit found that whole section of country alarmed over an invasion of hurons, who were said to be coming down the valley of the shatemuc in formidable numbers. so he pushed on, hoping to form a junction with the iroquois before the common enemy should arrive. the eastern iroquois or maquas were hard beset. two powerful expeditions had descended at once upon the country of the five nations. one, under leadership of our old acquaintance champlain, had crossed lake ontario, penetrated deep into the territory of the oneidas, and was supposed to be advancing upon the maquas from the west. another expedition, accompanied by three white men, was coming from the north by way of the shatemuc, and already were fugitives flying before them to the palisaded villages, bringing sad tales of rapine and destruction. as though this state of affairs were not bad enough, it was reported that the new england tribes, led by miantinomo, were advancing from the east. thus it seemed as though the maquas were doomed to destruction, and a feeling of despair had seized upon the warriors gathered for the defence of their three palisaded strongholds. one night, during this unhappy condition of suspense, a group of chief men were seated about a small fire in the council-house of the easternmost village, gloomily discussing the situation. news had come that the enemy was close at hand, and that the village would be assaulted by overwhelming numbers on the morrow. so oppressed were the councillors by the hopelessness of their situation that for some time they sat in silence, and one among them appeared to be dozing, as though exhausted. suddenly this one, who was our old friend kaweras, awoke, uttering an exclamation of pleasure, and looked about him with smiling cheerfulness. "what pleases my brother?" asked he who sat nearest. "has he seen a vision of the spirit land to which all of us will go before the setting of another sun?" "no," replied kaweras. "it is not yet time for visions of the spirit land." "how so, when even the youngest warrior knows that we are in no condition to withstand an attack of the hurons and of those armed with thunder-sticks who accompany them?" "it is because he who is to deliver us even now approaches, and in a vision have i seen him." "comes he from the west, and is he the wild-cat of the oneidas?" "no. he is from the east, and more powerful than the wild-cat or any other single chieftain of the iroquois. he is not of us, but he has already fought with us. i have known him, but until now i have not known him. whence he comes or how he has passed our young men i know not, but even now he is at hand. behold, he is here!" the old man had risen to his feet in his excitement, and now stood staring eagerly at the skin-hung entrance. as he finished speaking the curtain was drawn aside and a young warrior stepped within the lodge. he advanced to where the firelight fell full upon his face, and then stood motionless as though awaiting recognition. nor was it long in coming, for, after a moment of silence, kaweras stepped forward with extended hand, uttering the single word, "massasoit." "yes, my father, it is massasoit," was the reply; but the old man hardly noticed what was said, for his eye had fallen on a belt worn by the new-comer, and he was studying its devices with an expression of amazement. finally he said, in a low tone,-"it is the belt of seven totems, the great colier of the peacemaker." "and i," responded massasoit, "am the peacemaker, since i was nahma, son of longfeather. for thy exceeding kindness to me in other days am i now come with a war-party to help the people of sacandaga in their time of trouble." "how came he inside our walls?" asked one of the chiefs, suspiciously. "that will i tell at another time," replied massasoit. "now there are things of more importance to be considered." the young man did not care to acknowledge that aeana had given him admittance, but so it was. he had left his warriors in concealment at some distance from the village while he went alone to discover the exact state of affairs. that same afternoon, before warning of the near approach of the hurons had been given, he had seen several women go to a small stream for water, and recognized aeana among them. after a while he managed to toss a small packet so that it fell at her feet. glancing about with a startled air, the girl picked it up, and found in it the embroidered tinder-bag that she had concealed in her sister's gift to massasoit so long ago that she had almost forgotten the incident. as she gazed at the token, hardly knowing whether to be frightened or pleased, the low call of a wood-dove attracted her attention to a nearby thicket. hesitatingly she moved close enough to hear the whispered words, "be not afraid. i am here as a friend to help the maquas against their enemies; but first i would see kaweras. at moon-setting will i come alone to the gate, and i rely upon thee to give me admittance." outwardly calm, but with a wildly fluttering heart, aeana rejoined her companions without having been for an instant out of their sight, and returned with them to the village. there she debated long with herself as to whether she should tell her father or otshata of what had happened; but, until the time of moon-setting, she had not found courage to do so. she had not meant to admit the young warrior without their knowledge, especially as news had come, within an hour, of the near approach of the hurons; but a will stronger than her own seemed to compel her, and finally she did as massasoit desired. then, sadly frightened, she whispered, "in the council-house is kaweras," and fled away into the darkness, leaving the young man to discover his bearings as best he might. having at length gained the council-lodge and being received as already stated, massasoit was compelled to answer many questions before securing the confidence of all the chiefs. little by little, however, it was acquired. kaweras told what he knew of him. the belt that he wore was a potent influence; and finally one, who had been with sacandaga at the time of his death, recognized the young man as he who had risked his own life to save that of the iroquois chieftain. after that they listened with closest attention to all he had to say. thus, before he left them, he had outlined a plan of operations for the morrow, or whenever the hurons should make an attack, that they promised to follow. massasoit also instructed the iroquois as to the nature of fire-arms, which they had heretofore regarded with all the terror of ignorance. he described the manner in which the thunder-sticks must be loaded before becoming effective as weapons, and assured his hearers that, after being discharged, they were for a long time no more dangerous than so many wooden billets. having thus restored a cheerful confidence to the council, the young chieftain departed and made his way to where his own warriors anxiously awaited him. immediately upon rejoining these, and without pausing to rest, he led them on a long detour, so that, before daylight, they had gained a position in the rear of the hurons, by whom the presence of the young peacemaker was as yet unsuspected. with the rising of the sun hundreds of dark forms might have been seen gliding stealthily from tree to tree in the direction of the maqua village. at a short interval behind the last of these came another group moving in the same direction, but with even greater caution. foremost among them was massasoit, leading his people in an enterprise that would make or mar his own reputation for all future time. suddenly the morning stillness of the forest was rudely broken by the roar of three muskets fired in quick succession, and the battle was begun. chapter xxix winning a battle, a wife, and a friend upon the advice of massasoit, the iroquois had set up dummies to draw the musket-fire of the enemy; also most of their young men had been placed in ambush outside the walls. these, though few in number as compared with the advancing host of hurons, sprang to their feet with frightful yells and rushed towards the place marked by the smoke of the now empty muskets. they seemed doomed to certain destruction, and the hurons calmly awaited their coming. all at once, and without warning, a flight of arrows from the rear brought a score of the invaders to the ground, and at the same moment the woods behind them seemed alive with yelling foemen. for a few minutes the bewildered hurons, thus entrapped, fought desperately. then the three white men, who were objects of massasoit's especial vengeance, were killed while hurriedly endeavoring to reload their muskets. as they fell their savage allies, who had until now regarded them as invincible, broke into a panic-stricken flight, each man endeavoring only to save himself. after them raced massasoit and his warriors, together with the jubilant iroquois, and many and fierce were the hand-to-hand conflicts that took place in the dim forest coverts that day. at its close, when the wearied but exultant victors gathered once more at the wildly rejoicing village, their trophies of scalps and prisoners outnumbered their combined forces. the following week was devoted to the wildest forms of savage festivity, and the rejoicings were redoubled near its close by the arrival of a runner from the west, bringing the great news that the other invading force under champlain had been defeated and driven back by the onondagas and oneidas. in all this time of feasting massasoit was the hero and central figure. not only had he saved the maqua village and probably the whole tribe from destruction, but, on that day of fighting, he had proved himself the foremost warrior of his people and had brought in more huron scalps than any other. he found no difficulty in forming a compact with the iroquois on behalf of his own people, by which both were bound not to cross the shatemuc except for friendly visits. thus our young chieftain would have been supremely happy but for one thing, and that was his treatment at the hands of aeana. this girl, who now seemed the most beautiful and desirable of all earthly creatures, behaved to him in a manner so strange that he could in no wise account for it. not only did she refuse to grant him an interview, but she studiously avoided meeting him, and went no longer with the other women to the stream for water. thus he had not been able to exchange a single word with her, and as the time for his departure drew near he was in despair. in his distress he sought out otshata, as he had done once before, and, pouring out his heart, asked her what he should do. otshata laughed in his face. "what fools men be!" she said. "dost thou not remember, massasoit, the time when she bade thee fetch water?" "well do i remember." "and thou performed the service?" "truly, i did, even as she bade me." "and she scorned the offering when it was brought to her?" "even so, and taunted me with the name of 'squaw.'" "remembering that, art thou still at a loss to know why she now refuses to meet thee?" "to my confusion, i am," replied the puzzled youth. at this otshata laughed again long and heartily; but at length she asked,-"didst thou ever know a woman to accept friendship with a slave when a master might be had?" then, still laughing, she ran away, leaving the young man to ponder her words. as a result of this conversation, massasoit announced that he and his warriors would depart for their own country on the morrow, and at daylight of the next morning they had disappeared. that day aeana, heavy-hearted and with lagging step, went with the other women for water. as she bent over the stream an exclamation from one of her companions caused her to look up and directly into the eyes of massasoit, who stood on the opposite bank. with a shrill cry of dismay, aeana turned and fled towards the village; but, swiftly as she ran, massasoit overtook her ere she had covered half the distance. seizing her in his arms, he picked her up and, despite her struggles, bore her swiftly away. on the edge of the wood he paused to utter a far-carrying yell of triumph, and then, still bearing his precious burden, he disappeared amid the leafy shadows. but his defiant challenge was answered, and half a dozen young iroquois, all of whom were aspirants for the hand of the arrow-maker's beautiful daughter, dashed forth in hot pursuit. this race for a bride was over a forest course something more than a mile in length. at its farther end was the shatemuc and a waiting canoe containing a single occupant. as massasoit gained this and it was shoved off, the foremost of his pursuers was so close that he fell into the water in a vain effort to grasp the elusive craft. beyond the river the iroquois might not pass by the terms of their recent treaty, and thus on its farther side, massasoit felt his prize to be as secure as though he already had her at montaup. as they stepped out on the land that acknowledged the son of longfeather to be its ruler, aeana regarded the bold youth with eyes that laughed even through their tears, and said, "i hate you; but if you had not done it, then should i have despised you forever." so massasoit won his bride, and in far-away montaup, beside the great salt waters that bathe the rising sun, no woman led a happier life than did the daughter of kaweras. after this several years were passed in peaceful content by those new england tribes owning the rule of massasoit. with his superior knowledge of the world he was able to teach them many things that caused them to prosper as never before. only was he worried by the narragansetts, who, while sullenly admitting his authority, awaited eagerly an opportunity to renounce and defy it. in the mean time aeana had presented the peacemaker with two sons, the younger of whom, named metacomet, was to become famous in after-years as king philip. with all his peace and apparent security massasoit had one ever-present fear, and it was of the white man. he had a knowledge greater than any of his people concerning the number and power of these dwellers beyond the sea, and he dreaded lest they should seek to obtain a foothold in his country, as they had already done both on the st. lawrence and the james. as one measure of precaution against this he issued orders to every new england tribe that they should hold no intercourse with any whites attempting to trade on the coast. so determined was he to carry out this policy that when an unfortunate french trading vessel was wrecked on a shore of massachusetts bay, he caused her to be burned, and commanded that all survivors of her crew be put to death. holding these views, massasoit became very angry when it was reported to him that the narragansetts, in defiance of his authority, were actively trading with an english ship that had appeared on their coast, and he at once determined to make an example that should be remembered. a runner was despatched to his trusted ally sassacus, whose country lay beyond that of the narragansetts, ordering the pequots to advance from the west until they should meet massasoit coming from the opposite direction. then, gathering a strong force from the tribes near at hand, the peacemaker set forth for the scene of unlawful trading. so demoralized were the narragansetts by the simultaneous appearance of two powerful war-parties within their borders that they offered only a slight resistance before fleeing to their palisaded stronghold, where they anxiously awaited the expected attack. in the mean time the captain of the english vessel, which was snugly anchored in the mouth of a small river, where he had been carrying on a brisk and most profitable trade with the indians, was disgusted to have it suddenly cease. for days a fleet of canoes had surrounded his ship. now not one was to be seen, nor could any of the natives be discovered on shore. his recent great success had been largely due to the fact that he had on board an english-speaking indian, through whom all negotiations had been conducted. when a whole day had passed without change in the situation the captain consulted with this indian, and asked what he supposed had become of the natives. "they be fearful to come off since they have learn that you steal red men for slaves," was the answer. "ho, ho! is that all? but think you, squanto, that they have any furs left?" "me think they keep back many of the best." "by the lord harry! then must we go to them, since they are afraid to come to us. boat away, there! and, squanto, you may come too if you will promise to make no attempt at escape." "these be not my people," replied the indian, evasively. "that's so. i picked you up at a great distance from here. but never mind. if you serve me truly perhaps i will take you back there some day. attempt to play me false, though, and i will kill you as i would a rat. tumble in, then, and let us hie ashore." it was a strong boat's crew and heavily armed that thus made a landing in search of the trade which no longer came to their ship, and they followed a plainly marked trail leading from the beach to the place where had been an indian village. now it was deserted and void of life, though their guide announced that it had been occupied as recently as a few hours before. while the new-comers were prowling about with hopes of discovering something in the way of plunder, their attention was distracted by a column of smoke rising in the direction of their boat. they had left it hauled partially out of the water and in charge of two well-armed men. now, hastening back, they were panic-stricken by the discovery that the boat was in flames. it was also badly crushed, as though it had been lifted bodily and dropped on a ledge of sharp rocks. worst of all, it contained the dead bodies of those who had been left on guard. the weapons of both men were missing, and they had been scalped but not otherwise mutilated. taking advantage of the confusion following this discovery, the indian guide dove into a nearby thicket and disappeared. a minute later, while the whites were huddled about their burning boat attempting to extinguish the flames, a great flight of arrows, that seemed to come from every direction at once, instantly killed more than half their number. then came a rush of yelling savages, and in another minute but one man was left alive. he was wounded, but his life had been spared by the express order of massasoit. the indian guide had been made prisoner, bound, and left to himself; but now that all was over, the young leader, ordering his warriors to remain behind, went to him. stooping, he severed the prisoner's bonds and assisted him to his feet. then gazing steadily at him, he cried in a voice that trembled with emotion,-"tasquanto, my brother, dost thou not remember massasoit?" chapter xxx the pilgrims of plymouth since being separated from massasoit years before in plymouth harbor, tasquanto, whose name the english had shortened to "squanto," had known nothing of the fate of his fellow-captive beyond that he had been sold as a slave in london. in the mean time he had been received into the household of sir ferdinando gorges, governor of plymouth, who had large interests in the new world, and had been taught to speak english. then he was sent on trading-vessels to act as interpreter between whites and indians. in this capacity he had made several voyages to america, but always so closely guarded that never until now had he been allowed to set foot on his native shores. tasquanto was so overcome at finding in the great sachem massasoit, concerning whom he had heard much, his own long-lost friend that for a few moments he was speechless with joyful amazement. when he had succeeded in partially expressing this, he related briefly how he happened to be in his present situation, and added that the cruel taskmaster from whom he had just escaped was the same captain dermer who had formerly betrayed them into slavery. "i knew it when first i saw him this morning," replied massasoit, grimly, "for his evil face has ever been pictured in my heart. for that reason have i spared his worthless life until i could consult with thee, my brother, as to how we may best deal with him." "did you, then, know me also?" asked tasquanto. "the moment i set eyes on thee. those white dogs had been slain an hour sooner but for thy presence among them and a fear of doing thee harm. now, what say you? shall this man be delivered to the tormentors, or shall he be killed where he lies? it is certain that his punishment must be great, for he has earned all that may be given. also i do not care that he should recognize me and spread the report that i was once his slave, for that would shame me in the eyes of my people. thou, too, must ever keep secret the matter of my having crossed the salt waters." "i will remember," replied tasquanto. "as for this white man, i would crop his ears with the same brand of ownership that he has placed upon many an indian captured and sold into slavery. then would i let him sail away in his own ship as a warning to all other white men. death he deserves, since he has treated many of our people to death and worse, but to him the shame of cropped ears will be even more bitter than death." so favorably was massasoit impressed with this idea that he ordered it carried out at once. thus, half an hour later, the brutal dermer, who had done so much to cause the name of englishman to be hated in the new world, was set adrift in a canoe, minus both his ears, and allowed to depart to his own ship. it is recorded in history that he reached virginia, where he soon afterwards died from wounds received at the hands of new england savages. having thus satisfactorily concluded one part of his undertaking, massasoit next turned his attention to the rebel narragansetts. moving his entire force against their stronghold, he demanded that all goods received from the english should be delivered up, and also that miantinomo should come to his camp, bringing a chief's belt in token of submission. massasoit swore that, in case his demands were refused, he would not depart from that place until every rebel in the fort was destroyed. so mild were these terms in comparison with what had been expected that they were instantly accepted, and a cruel war between neighbors was averted. with peace thus restored, the authority of massasoit over the great territory, already named new england by captain john smith, was so firmly established that until the day of his death it was never again questioned. but if one of his two chief causes for anxiety was thus removed, the other was looming ominously near. some six months after tasquanto's escape from his long captivity a little english ship, buffeted by winter gales of the north atlantic, was slowly approaching the american coast. although only of one hundred and fifty tons' burden, or about the size of a small coasting schooner of to-day, she carried one hundred passengers besides her crew and an immense quantity of freight. for three months had her passengers--men, women, and children--been on board the overcrowded little craft, and they were sick for a sight of land. their destination was the mouth of the shatemuc or hudson river, but their first landfall, made under a cold december sky, was the bluff headland, stretching far out to sea like a beckoning finger, that gosnold, some twenty years earlier, had named the cape of cods. from here the ship was headed southward towards her destination, but soon became involved in a labyrinth of shoals covered with roaring breakers. also she was beaten by adverse gales until her weary company hailed with joy her captain's decision to run back to the safe shelter of cape cod. here, in what is now the harbor of provincetown, the sea-worn strangers disembarked, so profoundly happy at finding themselves once more on land that the wooded wilderness seemed a paradise. they had come to establish homes in the new world, and though disappointed at not gaining the more southerly latitude for which they had set out, they now determined to remain where they were, since it was too late in the season for further explorations. still, they spent two weeks in examination of the country close at hand, and finally selected a site for settlement across the bay enclosed by cape cod. here was a good harbor, plenty of fresh water, and much land already cleared of forest growth by its former indian occupants. they named this place "plymouth" after the last english port from which they had sailed, and on christmas day began the work of building houses. during that winter half of these stout-hearted settlers died, so that in the early spring only fifty persons, enfeebled by the sickness from which but seven had wholly escaped, remained to make good their claim to the land they had thus seized. during all this time the colonists had not encountered any of the native owners of the soil, though they had caught occasional glimpses of vanishing forms, and often saw signal-fires or smokes that denoted the presence of watchful observers. in spite of these things they did not hesitate to appropriate indian property wherever they found it. thus, when they discovered hidden stores of corn and parched acorns, laid by for winter use, they promptly removed them to plymouth. also whenever they ran across an indian lodge, they took from it everything that seemed to them of value. they even robbed indian graves of their sacred relics, and these things were reported to massasoit by his scouts. from the first appearance of the _mayflower_ on the stormy horizon he had known of all its movements. he had been relieved when it started southward, and was greatly disturbed by its return to cape cod. he was also much puzzled to account for the doings of its company, since evidently they were neither traders nor fishermen. why had they brought women and children with them? also why had they in the first place attempted to sail to the southward, if his country was the place they were seeking? he finally decided that they must be bound for the virginia settlement of white men, and were only waiting until the winter storms were over before resuming their voyage to the country of powhatan. this decision eased massasoit's mind, for, while he was determined that no whites should settle within his boundaries, he was also averse to unnecessary bloodshed. so he awaited patiently the departure that he believed the strangers would make with the coming of warmer weather. if they did not so depart, he knew that he could wipe them out of existence as easily as he could crush a worm that came in his path. thus forbearing to disturb them, he waited and watched, receiving almost daily reports from his scouts, who at all times lurked in the vicinity of the feeble settlement. he heard with grim satisfaction of their rapid decrease in numbers, and grew wroth at their violation of indian graves and their appropriation of unguarded indian property. still he forbore to molest them, but as spring drew near he sent samoset to learn how soon they intended to depart. to his dismay this messenger brought back word that the english had no intention of ever again leaving the place where they had established themselves. "then must i remind them that i have no desire for their presence," quoth massasoit, and at once he sent out runners to gather a large force of warriors in the vicinity of plymouth. accompanied by a body-guard of sixty men, the sachem himself hastened to the place of rendezvous and established a camp, from which he sent tasquanto among the whites to learn in detail their strength and intentions. with his ready command of english and his knowledge of white men's customs, gained by painful experience, tasquanto or "squanto," as he now called himself, found no difficulty in gaining all the information he desired from the strangers. he even learned their names and the relative rank held by their leading men. when tasquanto returned and reported these things, he mentioned one name that caused massasoit to start and betray symptoms of great agitation. "art thou certain that one among them is so called?" he asked. "i am certain," replied tasquanto. "then go quickly and ask that man, as he values his own life and that of his people, to meet me alone by the big pine that looks down upon his lodges. i will be there unaccompanied. stay! take to him this belt that it may be to him a token of safe-conduct and true speaking." with this massasoit removed from his own person the great belt of seven totems and handed it to tasquanto. he also instructed the latter to withdraw beyond earshot when he had conducted the white man to the place of meeting. half an hour later massasoit, with unpainted face and simply clad, stood alone at the foot of the great pine, looking down on the group of poor little huts that sheltered the feeble english remnant. within a mile of the place were gathered five hundred warriors awaiting but a signal from him to utterly destroy the helpless settlement. then to him came an englishman, young, sturdy, and heavily bearded. as he approached within a few paces he halted and examined the indian curiously, for he had been told that he was to meet a sachem who was ruler of many tribes. on the other hand, massasoit gazed into the bearded face of the white man with an eagerness that was almost disconcerting. then, as though satisfied with his scrutiny, he extended a hand, exclaiming as he did so,-"winslow! my frien' winslow!" for a moment the other hesitated, then his face lighted joyously as he grasped the proffered hand in both of his, crying,-"massasoit? they told me the name of the mighty chieftain was massasoit, but never did i suspect that he was the friend whom i had found and lost in london." for an hour the two, thus strangely brought together after years of distant wanderings, held converse with each other while the fate of the new world hung upon their words. when their conversation was finally ended, winslow had promised never to reveal the fact that the proud sachem had once been bought and sold as a slave in england. he had also promised that the colony to which he belonged should never commit an act of aggression against the people of massasoit, but that his friends should be their friends and his enemies their enemies. on his part, and out of an abounding gratitude for the only friendship shown him at a time when he stood most in need of friends, massasoit agreed that the poor little english settlement should be allowed to exist, and, moreover, promised to protect it from its enemies to the full extent of his power. then the two parted, the one to go back to his wondering warriors and dismiss them to their homes, the other to carry the glad news into plymouth that the great massasoit was ready to make a treaty of friendly alliance with his english neighbors. so on the morrow governor carver, accompanied by winslow, sturdy myles standish, and others of his principal men, met massasoit. then, after much feasting and an exchange of courtesies, they mutually signed a treaty of friendship that remained unbroken for upward of half a century from that memorable date. thus was the crumb of bread once cast upon troubled waters by edward winslow returned to him again with a thousand-fold of increase after many days. thus also did nahma, son of longfeather, now become massasoit, wearer of the belt of seven totems, make possible and establish forever the white man's settlement of new england. * * * * * * n. b. when the good ship _mayflower_ returned to england from that her most memorable voyage to the new world she bore in her cargo a packet of richest furs, together with many specimens of dainty beadwork, consigned to lady betty effingham, who dwelt near to bristol, england, with goodly wishes from her friend and humble servant, massasoit. +-------------------------------------------------+ |transcriber's note: | | | |obvious typographic errors have been corrected. | | | +-------------------------------------------------+ potash and perlmutter settle things books by montague glass potash and perlmutter settle things worrying won't win harper & brothers new york [established 1817] [illustration: "he gives himself dead away by getting sore."] potash and perlmutter settle things _by_ montague glass _author of "worrying won't win"_ harper & brothers publishers new york and london potash and perlmutter settle things copyright, 1919, by harper & brothers printed in the united states of america published september, 1919 contents chap. page i. they arrive, and so does the president 1 ii. settling the preliminaries 15 iii. the president's visit to england 24 iv. everything is proceeding satisfactorily--maybe 33 v. this here peace conference--it needs publicity 42 vi. joining the legion of honor 52 vii. some cruel and unusual punishments for the kaiser 62 viii. it enters on its no-gold-casket phase 72 ix. worrying should begin at home, ain't it? 82 x. the new hungarian rhapsody 92 xi. it is still up in the air, but you can't say the same for transatlantic voyages 102 xii. this here victory liberty loan 112 xiii. when is a secret treaty secret? 122 xiv. the first day of may 132 xv. the peace treaty as good reading 142 xvi. the german roman holiday and the americanization of americans 152 xvii. mr. wilson's favor of the 20th ulto. and contents noted 162 xviii. being up in the air, as applied to transatlantic flights, crown jewels, and league of nations speeches 172 xix. the leak and other mysteries 182 xx. july the first and after 192 xxi. what the public wants, economically and theatrically 202 xxii. they discuss the signing of it 212 xxiii. the recent unpleasantness in toledo, ohio 222 xxiv. feeding the peace conferencers and the household 232 xxv. what are you going to do about it? this includes libeled millionaires, enforced prohibition, and 241 shantung xxvi. the approaching royal visit 251 illustrations "he gives himself dead away by getting sore" _frontispiece_ "i wouldn't blame chairman clemenceau neither, because if this here peace conference is going to end this side of nineteen-fifty, it's got to be speeded up some" _facing p._ 44 "a whole lot of people is so badly predicted to the lapel-button habit they would join anything" " 52 "... which when you consider that mr. wilson started in--in a small way" " 144 potash and perlmutter settle things i they arrive, and so does the president "_nu_, what's the matter _now_?" morris perlmutter asked, as he entered the office one morning after the cessation of hostilities on the western front. "_ai, tzuris!_" abe moaned in reply, and for at least a minute he continued to rock to and fro in his chair and to make incoherent noises through his nostrils in the manner of a person suffering either from toothache or the recent cancelation of a large order. "it serves you right," morris said. "i told you you shouldn't eat that liberty roast at wasserbauer's yesterday. it used to give you the indigestion when it was known as _koenigsburger klops_, which it is like the german empire now calling itself the german republic; changing its name ain't going to alter its poisonous disposition none." "that's right!" abe said. "make jokes, why don't you? you are worser as this here feller zero." "what feller zero?" morris demanded. "zero the emperor what fiddled when rome was burning," abe replied. "he's got nothing on you. _you_ would fiddle if rome, watertown, and ogdensburg was burning." "i don't know what you are talking about at all," morris said. "and, besides, the feller's name was nero, not zero." "that's what you say," abe commented, "which you also said that the operators was only bluffing and that they wouldn't strike on us in a thousand years, and considering that you said this only yesterday, mawruss, it's already wonderful how time flies." "well," morris said, "how could i figure that them lunatics is going to pick out the time when we've got practically no work for them and was going to fire them, anyway, to call a strike on us?" "you should _ought_ to have figured that way," abe declared. "didn't the kaiser abdicate just before them germans got ready to kick him out?" "the king business ain't the garment business," morris observed. "i know it ain't," abe agreed. "kings has got their worries, too, but when it comes to laying awake nights trying to figure out whether them designers somewheres in france is going to turn out long, full skirts or short, narrow skirts for the fall and winter of nineteen-nineteen and nineteen-twenty, mawruss, i bet yer the entire collection of kings, active or retired, doesn't got to take two grains of trional between them." "if everybody worried like _you_ do, abe," morris said, "the government would got to issue sleeping-powder cards like sugar cards and limit the consumption of sleeping-powders to not more than two pounds of sleeping-powders per person per month in each household." "well, some one has got to do the worrying around here, mawruss," abe said, "which if it rested with you, y'understand, we could make up a line of samples for next season that wouldn't be no more like paris designs than general pershing looks like his pictures in the magazines." "say, for that matter," morris said, "we are just as good guessers as our competitors; on account the way things is going nowadays, nobody is going to try to make a trip to paris to get fashion designs, because if he figured on crossing the ocean to buy model gowns for the fall and winter of nineteen-nineteen and nineteen-twenty, y'understand, between the time that he applied for his passport and the time the government issued it to him, y'understand, it would already be the spring and summer season of nineteen-twenty-four and nineteen-twenty-five. so the best thing we could do is to snoop round among the trade, and whatever we find the majority is making up for next year, we would make up the same styles also, and that's all there would be _to_ it." "we wouldn't do nothing of the kind," abe declared. "i've been thinking this thing over, and i come to the conclusion that it's up to you to go over to paris and see what is going on over there." "i don't got to go to paris for that, abe," morris said. "i can read the papers the same like anybody else, and just so long as there is a chance that the war would start up again and them hundred-mile guns is going to resume operations, i am content to get my ideas of paris styles at a distance of three thousand miles if i never sold another garment as long as i live." "but when it _was_ working yet, it only went off every twenty minutes," abe said. "i don't care if it went off every fourth of july," morris said, "because if i went over there it would be just my luck that the peace nogotiations falls through and the germans invent a gun leaving frankfort ever hour on the hour and arriving in paris daily, including sundays, without leaving enough trace of me to file a proof of death with. am i right or wrong?" "all right," abe said. "if _that's_ the way you feel about it, _i_ will go to paris." "_you_ will go to paris?" morris exclaimed. "sure!" abe declared. "the operators is on strike, business is rotten, and i'm sick and tired of paying life-insurance premiums, _anyway_. besides, if leon sammet could get a passport, why couldn't i?" "you mean to say that faker is going to paris to buy model gowns?" morris demanded. "i seen him on the subway this morning, and the way he talked about how easy he got his passport, you would think that every time he was in washington with a line of them masquerade costumes which sammet brothers makes up, if he didn't stop in and take anyhow a bit of lunch with the wilsons, y'understand, the president raises the devil with tumulty why didn't he let him _know_ leon sammet was in town." "then that settles it," morris declared, reaching for his hat. "where are you going?" abe asked. "i am going straight down to see henry d. feldman and tell that crook he should get for me a passport," morris said. "you wouldn't positively do nothing of the kind," abe said. "did you ever hear the like? wants to go to a lawyer to get a passport! an idea!" "well, who would i go to, then--an osteaopath?" morris asked. "leon sammet told me all about it," abe said. "you go down to a place on rector street where you sign an application, and--" "that's just what i thought," morris interrupted, "and the least what happens to fellers which signs applications without a lawyer, y'understand, is that six months later a truck-driver arrives one morning and says where should he leave the set of washington irving in one hundred and fifty-six volumes or the piano with stool and scarf complete, as the case may be. so i am going to see feldman, and if it costs me fifteen or twenty dollars, it's anyhow a satisfaction to know that when you do things with the advice of a smart crooked lawyer, nobody could put nothing over on you outside of your lawyer." when morris returned an hour later, however, instead of an appearance of satisfaction, his face bore so melancholy an expression that for a few minutes abe was afraid to question him. "_nu!_" he said at last. "i suppose you got turned down for being overweight or something?" "what do you mean--overweight?" morris demanded. "what do you suppose i am applying for--a twenty-year endowment passport or one of them tontine passports with cash surrender value after three years?" "then what is the matter you look so _rachmonos_?" abe said. "how _should_ i look with the kind of partner which i've got it?" morris asked. "paris models he must got to got. domestic designs ain't good enough for him. such high-grade idees he's got, and i've got to suffer for it yet." "well, _don't_ go to europe. what do _i_ care?" abe said. "_we_ must go," morris replied. "what do you mean--we?" abe demanded. "i mean you and me," morris said. "feldman says that just so long as it is one operation he would charge the same for getting one passport as for getting two, excepting the government fee of two dollars. so what do you think--i am going to pay henry d. feldman two hundred dollars for getting me a passport when for two dollars extra i can get one for you also?" "but who is going to look after the store?" abe exclaimed. "say!" morris retorted, "you've got relations _enough_ working around here, which every time you've hired a fresh one, you've given me this blood-is-redder-than-water stuff, and now is your chance to prove it. we wouldn't be away longer as six weeks at the outside, so go ahead, abe. here is the application for the passport. sign your name on the dotted line and don't say no more about it." * * * * * "yes, mawruss," abe said, three weeks later, as they sat in the restaurant of their paris hotel, "in a country where the coffee pretty near strangles you, even when it's got cream and sugar in it, y'understand, the cooking has _got_ to be good, because in a two-dollar-a-day american plan hotel the management figures that no matter how rotten the food is, the guests will say, 'well, anyhow, the coffee was good,' and get by with it _that_ way." "on the other hand, abe," morris suggested, "maybe the french hotel people figure that if they only make the coffee bad enough, the guests would say, 'well, one good thing, while the food is terrible, it ain't a marker on the coffee.'" "but the food tastes pretty good to me, mawruss," abe said. "wait till you've been here a week, abe," morris advised him. "anything would taste good to you after what you went through on that boat." "what do you mean--after what _i_ went through?" abe demanded. "what i went through don't begin to compare with what you went through, which honestly, mawruss, there was times there on that second day out where you acted so terrible, understand me, that rather as witness such human suffering again, if any one would of really and truly had your interests at heart, they would of give a couple of dollars to a steward that he should throw you overboard and make an end of your misery." "is _that_ so!" morris retorted. "well, let me tell you something, abe. if you think _i_ was in a bad way, don't kid yourself, when you lay there in your berth for three days without strength enough to take off even your collar and necktie, y'understand, that the captain said to the first officer ain't it wonderful what an elegant sailor that mr. potash is or anything _like_ it, understand me, which on more than one occasion when i seen the way you looked, abe, i couldn't help thinking of what chances concerns like the equ_itta_ble takes when they pass a feller as a number one on his heart and kidneys, and ain't tried him out on so much as a staten island ferry-boat to see what kind of a traveler he is." "listen, mawruss," abe interrupted, "did we come over here paying first-class fares for practically steerage accommodations to discuss life insurance, or did we come over here to buy model garments and get through with it, because believe me, it is no pleasure for me to stick around a country where you couldn't get no sugar or butter in a hotel, not if you was to show the head waiter a doctor's certificate with a hundred-dollar bill pinned on it. so let us go round to a few of these high-grade dressmakers and see how much we are going to get stuck for, and have it over with." accordingly, they paid for the coffee and milk without sugar and the dark sour rolls without butter which nowadays form the usual hotel breakfast in france, and set out for the office of the commission agent whose place of business is the rendezvous for american garment-manufacturers in search of parisian model gowns. the broad avenues in the vicinity of the hotel seemed unusually crowded even to people as accustomed to the congested traffic of lower fifth avenue as abe and morris were, but as they proceeded toward the wholesale district of paris the streets became less and less traveled, until at length they walked along practically deserted thoroughfares. "and we thought business was rotten in america," morris said. "why, there ain't hardly one store open, hardly." abe nodded gloomily. "it looks to me, mawruss, that if there is any new garments being designed over here," he said, "they would be quiet morning gowns appropriate for attending something informal like a sale by a receiver in supplementary proceedings, or a more or less elaborate afternoon costume, not too showy, y'understand, but the kind of model that a fashionable paris dressmaker could wear to a referee in bankruptcy's office so as not to make the attending creditors say she was her own best customer, understand me." "well, what could you expect?" morris said, as they toiled up the stairs to the commission agent's office. "the chances is that up to a couple of months ago, in a paris dressmaker's shop, a customer arrived only every other week, whereas a nine-inch bomb arrived every twenty minutes, and furthermore, abe, it was _you_ that suggested this trip, not _me_, so now that we are over here, we should ought to make the best of it, and if this here commission agent can't show us no new designs, he could, anyhow, show us the sights." but even this consolation was denied them, for when they reached the commission agent's door it was locked and barred, as were all the other offices on that floor, and bore a placard reading: ferme ã� cause du jour de fã�te "_nu!_" morris said, after he had read and re-read the notice a number of times, "what are we going to do _now_?" "this is the last hair," abe said, "because you know how it is with these frenchers, if they close for a death in the family, it is liable to be a matter of weeks already." "maybe it says gone to lunch, will be back in half an hour," morris suggested, hopefully. "not a chance," abe declared. "more likely it means this elegant office with every modern improvement except an elevator, steam heat, and electric light, to be sublet, because it would be just our luck that the commission agent is back in new york right now with a line of brand-new model gowns, asking our bookkeeper will either of the bosses be back soon." "we wouldn't get back in ten years, i'll tell you that, unless we hustle," morris declared. he led the way down-stairs to the ground floor, where, after a few minutes, they managed to attract the attention of the _concierge_, who emerged from her shelter at the foot of the stairs and in rapid french explained to abe and morris that all paris was celebrating with a public holiday the arrival of president wilson. "it's a funny thing about the french language," morris said, as she concluded. "even if you don't understand what the people mean, you could 'most always tell what they've been eating, which if the french people was limited by law to a ton of garlic a month per person, abe, this lady would go to jail for the rest of her life." "_attendez!_" said the _concierge_. "_au dessus il yã  un monsieur qui parle anglais._" she motioned for them to wait and ascended the stairs to the floor above, where they heard her knock on an office door. evidently the person who opened it was annoyed by the interruption, for his voice--and to abe and morris it was a strangely familiar voice--was raised in angry protest. "now listen," said the tenant, "i told you before that i've only got this place temporarily, and as long as i am in here i don't want you to do no cleaning nor nothing, because the air is none too good here as it is, and furthermore--" he proceeded no farther, however, for abe and morris had taken the stairs three at a jump and began to wring his hands effusively upon the principle of any port in a storm. "well, well, well, if it ain't leon sammet!" abe cried, and his manner was as cordial as though, instead of their nearest competitor, leon were potash & perlmutter's best customer. "the english language bounces off of that woman like water from a duck's neck," leon said, "which every five minutes she comes up here and talks to me in french high speed with the throttle wide open like a racing-car already." "and the exhaust must be something terrible," abe said. "i am nearly frozen from opening the windows to let out her conversation," leon said, "and especially this morning, when i thought i could get a lot of letter-writing done without being interrupted, on account of the holiday." "so that's the reason why everything is closed up!" morris exclaimed. "but christmas ain't for pretty near two weeks yet," abe said. "what has christmas got to do with it?" leon retorted. "to-day is a holiday because president wilson arrives in paris." "and you are working here?" abe cried. "why not?" leon asked. "you mean to say that president wilson is arriving in paris to-day and you ain't going to see him come in?" morris exclaimed. "what for an american are you, anyway?" "say, for that matter, president wilson has been arriving in new york hundreds of times in the past four years," leon said, "and i 'ain't heard that you boys was on the reception committee exactly." "that's something else again," abe said. "in new york we've got business _enough_ to do without fooling away our time rubbering at parades, but president wilson only comes to paris once in a lifetime." "and some of the people back home is kicking because he comes to paris even _that_ often," leon commented. "_let_ 'em kick," morris declared, "which the way some americans runs down president wilson only goes to show that it's an old saying and a true one that there is no profit for a man in his own country, so go ahead and write your letters if you want to, leon, but abe and me is going down-town to the champs elizas and give the president a couple of cheers like patriotic american sitsons should ought to do." "in especially," abe added, "as it is a legal holiday and we wouldn't look at no model garments to-day." ii settling the preliminaries "after all, mawruss," abe potash said, as he sat with his partner, morris perlmutter, in their hotel room on the night after the president's arrival in paris, "a president is only human, and it seems to me that if they would of given him a chance to go quietly to a hotel and wash up after the trip, y'understand, it would be a whole lot better as meeting him at the railroad depot and starting right in with the speeches." "what do you mean--give him a chance to wash up?" morris asked. "don't you suppose he had a chance to wash up on the train, or do you think him and mrs. wilson sat up all night in a day-coach?" "i don't care if they had a whole section," abe retorted; "it ain't the easiest thing in the world to step off a train in a stovepipe hat, with a clean shave, after a twenty-hour trip, even if it would of been one of them eighteen-hour limiteds even, and begin right away to get off a lot of _schmooes_ about he don't know how to express the surprise and gratification he feels at such an enthusiastic reception, in especially as he probably lay awake half the night trying to memorize the bigger part of the speech following the words, 'and now, gentlemen, i wouldn't delay you no longer.' so that's why i say if they would have let him go to his hotel first, y'understand, why, then he--" "but mr. and mrs. wilson ain't putting up at no hotel. they are staying with a family by the name of murat," morris explained. "relations to the wilsons maybe?" abe inquired. "not that i heard tell of," morris replied. "well, whoever they are they've got my sympathy," abe said; "because once, when the independent order mattai aaron held its annual grand lodge meeting in new york, me and rosie put up the grand master, by the name louis m. koppelman, used to was koppelman & fine, the fashion store, pottstown, pennsylvania, and the way that feller turned the house upside down, if he would have stayed another week with us, understand me, i would have hired a first-class a number one criminal lawyer to defend me and wired the relations for instructions as to how to ship the body home." "i bet yer the murats feel honored to got mr. and mrs. wilson staying with them," morris said. "for the first few days maybe," abe admitted, "but wait till a couple weeks go by! i give them until january 1, 1919, and after that mr. and mrs. murat would be signaling each other to come up-stairs into the maid's room and be holding a few ain't-them-people-got-no-home conversations. also, mawruss, for the rest of their married life, mawruss, every time the tropic of who invited them in the first place comes up at meal-times, y'understand, either mr. or mrs. murat is going to get up from the table and lock themselves up in the bedroom for the remainder of the evening. am i right or wrong?" "i wouldn't argue with you," morris said, "because if i would give you the slightest encouragement you are liable to go to work and figure where mrs. murat is kicking to mr. murat that she couldn't make out with the housekeeping money while the wilsons is in paris, on account of having to buy an extra bottle of grade b milk every day, or something like that, which you talk like mr. and mrs. wilson was in paris on a couple of weeks' vacation, whereas the president has come here to settle the peace of the world." "did i say he didn't?" abe protested. "and while you are sitting here talking a lot of nonsense," morris went on, "big things is happening, which with all the questions he has got to think about, i bet yer the president _oser_ worries his head about a little affair like board and lodging. also i read in one of them paris editions of an american paper that there come over to france on the same steamer with him over three hundred experts--college professors and the like--and them fellers is now staying in paris at various hotels, which, if that don't justify mr. wilson in putting up with a private family, y'understand, i don't know what does!" "i thought at the time i read about them experts coming over to help the president in the peace conference that he was letting himself in for something," abe observed. "i bet yer!" morris said. "and that's where colonel house was wise when he comes over on a steamer ahead of them, because it is bad enough when you are crossing the ocean in winter-time to be president of the united states and to have to try not to act otherwise, without having three hundred experts dogging your footsteps and thinking up ways to start a conversation and swing it towards the subject they are experts in. which i bet yer every time the president tried to get a little exercise by walking around the promenade deck after lunch there was an expert on jugo-slobs laying for him who was all worked up to tell everything he knew about jugo-slobs in a couple of laps, provided the president lasted that long." "well, i'll tell you," abe said, "a man which employs experts to ask advice from deserves all he gets, mawruss, because you know how it is when you ask an advice from somebody which don't know a thing in the world about what he is advising you. he'll talk you deaf, dumb, and blind, anyhow. so you can imagine what it must be like when you are getting advice from an expert!" "it seems to me that before the president gets through he will be looking around for an expert which is expert in choking off advice from experts, otherwise the first time the president consults one of them experts, if he's going to wait for the expert to get through, he will have to be elected to a third term and then maybe hold over, at that," morris commented. "i should think the president would be glad when this peace conference is over," abe said. "say! for that matter he'll be glad when it's started," morris said. "which the way it looks now, abe, the preliminaries of a peace conference is harder on a president in the way of speeches and parades than two liberty loan campaigns and an inauguration. take, for instance, the matter of dinners, and i bet yer before he even goes to london next week he would have six meals with the president of france alone--i can't remember his name." "call him lefkowitz," abe said, "i'll know who you mean." "well, whatever it is, he looks like a hearty eater, abe," morris remarked. "in fact, mawruss, from what i seen of them french politicians in the parade this morning," abe observed, "none of them looked like they went slow on starchy foods and red meats, whereas take the american peace commissioners, from the president down, and while they don't all of them give you the impression that they eat breakfast food for dinner exactly, still at the same time if these here peace preliminaries is going to include more dinners than parades, the french commissioners has got them under a big handicap." "maybe you're right," morris agreed. "but my idee is that with these here preliminary peace dinners it ain't such a bad thing for us if our peace commissioners wouldn't be such hearty eaters, y'understand, because you know how it is when we've got a hard-boiled egg come into the place to look over our line, it's a whole lot better to get an idee of about how much he expects to buy after lunch than before, in especially if we pay for the lunch. so if this here president lefkowitz, or whatever the feller's name is, expects to fill up the president with a big meal of them french _ã  la_ dishes until mr. wilson gets so good-natured that he is willing to tell not only his life history, but also just exactly what he means by a league of nations, y'understand, the dinner might just as well start and end with two poached eggs on toast, for all the good it will do." "still, it ain't a bad idee to have all these dinners over and done with before the business of the peace conference begins, mawruss," abe remarked, "because hafterwards, when mr. wilson's attitude on some of them fourteen propositions for peace becomes known, y'understand, it ain't going to be too pleasant for mrs. wilson to be sitting by the side of her husband and watch the looks of some of the guests sitting opposite during the fish course, for instance, not wishing him no harm, but waiting for a good-sized bone to lodge sideways in his throat, or something." "she is used to that from home already, whenever she has a few republican senators to dinner at the white house," morris said. "but that ain't here nor there, anyhow, because after the peace conference begins the president will be so busy, y'understand, that sending out one of the assistant secretaries of state to a busy bee lunch-room to bring him a couple of sandwiches and some coffee will be the nearest to a formal dinner that the president will come to for many a day. take, for instance, the proposition of the freedom of the seas, and there's a whole lot to be said on both sides by people like yourself which don't know one side from the other." "and i don't want to know, neither," abe said, "because it wouldn't make no difference to me how free the seas was made, once i get back on terra cotta, mawruss; they could not only make the seas free, y'understand, but they could also offer big bonuses in addition, and i wouldn't leave america again not if they was to give me a life pass good on the _olympic_ or _aquitania_ with meals included." "so your idea is that the freedom of the seas means traveling for nothing on ocean steamers?" morris commented. "say!" abe retorted, "why should i bother my head what such things mean when i got for a partner a feller which really by rights belongs down at the peace headquarters, along with them other big experts?" "i never claimed to be an expert, but at the same time, i ain't an ignerammus, neither, which even before i left new york, i knew all about this here freedom of the seas," morris said, "which the day before we sailed i was talking to henry binder, of binder & baum, and he says to me--" "excuse me, but what does binder & baum know about the freedom of the seas?" abe demanded. "they are in the wholesale pants business, ain't it?" "sure, i know," morris continued, "and paderewski is a piano-player, and at the same time he went over to poland to organize the new polish republic." "and the result will be that when the new polish republic gets started under the direction of this here piano-player," abe said, "and they get a new polish national anthem, it will be an expert piano-player's idea of something which is easy to play, and the consequence is that until the next polish revolution, every time a band plays the polish national anthem, them poor polacks would got to stand up for from forty-five minutes to an hour while the band struggles to get through with what it would have taken paderewski three minutes at the outside." "henry binder is a college graduate even if he would be in the pants business," morris said, "and he said to me: 'perlmutter,' he said, 'the freedom of the seas is like this,' he says. 'you take a country like norway and it stands in the same relation to the big naval powers like we would to the other big manufacturers. now, for instance,' he says, 'last year we did a business of over two million dollars, and--'" abe raised his right hand like a traffic policeman. "stop right there, mawruss," he said, "because if the freedom of the seas is anything like binder & baum doing a business of two million dollars last year, i don't believe a word of it, which it wouldn't make no difference if henry binder was talking about the freedom of the seas or astronomy, sooner or later he is bound to ring in the large amount of goods he is selling, and, anyway, no matter what henry binder tells you, you must got to reckon ninety-eight per cent. discount before you could believe a word he says." "and do you suppose for one moment that the members of the peace conference is going to act any different from henry binder in that respect?" morris asked. "every one of the representatives of the countries engaged in this here peace conference is coming to france with a statement of the very least they would accept, and it is pretty generally understood that all such statements are subject to a very stiff discount, which that is what these here preliminaries is for, abe--to get a line on the discounts before the peace conference discusses the claims themselves." "well, when it comes to the allies scrapping between themselves about league of nations and freedoms of seas, i am content that they should be allowed a liberal discount on what they say for what they mean, mawruss, but when it comes to germany," he concluded, "she's got to pay, and pay in full, net cash, and then some." iii the president's visit to england "the alphabet ain't what it used to be before the war, mawruss," abe said, as he read the paper at breakfast in his paris hotel shortly after president wilson's visit to england. "former times if a feller understood c. o. d. and n. g., y'understand, he could read the papers and get sense out of it the same like he would be a college gradgwate, already; but nowadays when you pick up a morning paper and read that colonel harris lefkowitz, we would say, for example, a. d. c. to the c. o. at g. h. q. of the a. e. f., has been decorated with the d. s. o., you feel that the only way to get a line on what is going on in the world is to get posted on this--now--algebry which ambitious young shipping-clerks gets fired for studying during office hours." "well, if you get mixed up by these here letters, think what it must be like for president wilson to suddenly get one of them english statesmen sprung on him by--we would say--the king--where the king says: 'mr. president, shake hands with the rutt hon. duke of cholomondley, k.c.m.g., r.v.o., k.c.b., f.p.a., g.s.i., and sometimes w. and y.'" morris said, "in especially as i understand cholomondley is pronounced as if written rabinowitz." "it would anyhow give the president a tropic for conversation such as ain't it the limit what you got to pay to get visiting-cards engraved nowadays, which it really and truly must cost the english aristocracy a fortune for such things," abe said, "in particularly if the daughter of such a feller gets married with engraved invitations, mawruss, after he had paid the stationery bill, y'understand, he wouldn't got nothing left for her dowry." "well, i guess the president wasn't in no danger of running out of tropics of conversation while he was in england, abe," morris said, "which during all the spare time mr. wilson had on his trip he did nothing but hold conversations with mr. balfour, and this here lord george, and you could take it from me, abe, there wasn't many pauses to be filled up by mr. wilson saying ain't it a funny weather we are having nowadays, or something like that." "how do you know?" abe asked. "was you there?" "i wasn't there," morris said, "but last night i was speaking in the lobby of the hotel to one of them newspaper reporters which made the trip with the president, and after i had given the young feller one of the cigars we brought with us from new york he got quite friendly and told me all about it. it seems, abe, that the visit was a wonderful success, in particular the first day mr. wilson was in england. the weather was one of the finest days they had in winter over in england for years already. only six inches of rain, and the passage across the english channel was so smooth for this time of the year that less than eighty per cent. of the passengers was ill as against the normal percentage of 99.31416. as mr. wilson had requested that no fuss should be made over his visit, things was kept down as much as possible, so that, on leaving calais, the president's boat was escorted by only ten torpedo-boat destroyers, a couple battle-ships, three cruisers, and eight-twelfths of a dozen assorted submarines. there was also a simple and informal escort of about fifty airy-oplanes, the six dirigible balloons having been cut out of the program in accordance from the president's wishes. however, abe, all this simplicity was nothing compared to the way they acted when the president arrived at dover. there the arrangements was what you might expect when the president of a plain, democratic people visits the country of another plain, democratic people, abe. the only people there to meet them was about twenty or thirty dukes, a few field-marshals, three regiments of soldiers, including the bands, and somebody which the newspaper reporter says he at first took for caruso in the second act of 'aã¯da' and afterwards proved to be the mayor of dover in his official costume. "the ceremony of welcoming mr. and mrs. wilson to the shores of england was very short, the whole thing being practically over in two hours and thirty minutes," morris continued. "it consisted of either the firing of a presidential salute of twenty-one guns or the playing of the american national anthem by the massed bands of three regiments, the reporter says he couldn't tell which, on account he stood behind one of the drums. later the president made a short speech, in which he said: 'may i not say how glad i am to land in dover,' or something to that effect." "and after that boat-ride from france he would have said so if it had been barren island, or any other place-just so long as it was free from earthquakes and didn't roll none," abe agreed. "also, mawruss," he continued, "some day the president is going to begin a speech with, 'may i not,' and the chairman of the meeting will take him at his word and put it to a standing vote, and it is going to surprise the president how few people is going to remain seated on the proposition of whether or not he shall continue to begin letters and speeches with, 'may i not.'" "say!" morris exclaimed. "when we get by mail a cancelation and answer it, 'dear gents, your favor received,' does that mean we think the customer is doing us a favor by canceling an order on us? _oser a stuck._ and in the same way, when mr. wilson says, 'may i not?' nobody fools themselves for a minute that the president is asking permission. that's just a habit us and him got into, abe, and in fact, abe, mr. wilson's 'may-i-nots' have always meant that not only was he going to say what he intended to say, but that he was also going to do it, too. so, therefore, you take the speech he made at the gelthall in london, and--" "but as i understand your story, mawruss, he only just arrived in dover," abe said, "so go ahead with your lies, and tell me what happened next." "well," morris went on to say, "after the mayor of dover had presented mr. wilson with the freedom of the city in a gold casket--" "excuse me, mawruss," abe interrupted, "but what is this here freedom of the city that mayors is all the time presenting to mr. wilson?" "i don't know," morris replied, "except that seemingly a freedom of the city always comes in a gold casket." "sure, i know," abe said, "but what does mr. wilson gain by all these here freedoms of cities?" "gold caskets," morris replied, "although i think myself that some of these mayors ain't above getting by with a gold-plated silver casket, or even a rolled-gold casket, relying on the fact that mr. wilson is too much of a gentleman to get an appraisal, anyhow till he returns to america." "well, if i would be mr. wilson, i wouldn't take it so particular to act too gentlemanly to them mayors," abe commented, "because i see in the papers that when the mayor of london presented him with the freedom of the city, mr. wilson got the freedom part, but he was told that the gold casket was in preparation, which i admit that i don't know nothing about this here mayor of london, but you know how it is when a customer gets married, mawruss, and we put off sending him a wedding present till we could get round to it, y'understand, which we are all human, mawruss, and it wouldn't surprise me in the least if six months from now the mayor of london would be going round saying, 'why should we give that feller a gold casket--am i right or wrong?'--and let the whole gold-casket thing die a natural death." "they'll probably come across with it after a few how-about-casket cables, and, anyhow, if they didn't, abe, the english people certainly done enough for mr. wilson," morris continued, "because that newspaper reporter told me that the reception which mr. wilson got in london was something enormous, y'understand. the king and queen was waiting to meet him and the station platform was covered with a red-velvet pile carpet which was so thick, understand me, that they 'ain't been able as yet to locate a couple of suit-cases which was carelessly put down by the rutt hon. the duke of warrington, k.g.y., y.m.h.a., first lord red cap in waiting, and sunk completely out of sight while he helped a couple of assistant red caps in waiting, also dukes, load the presidential wardrobe trunks on the royal baggage transfer truck." "what do you mean--also dukes?" abe demanded. "do you mean to say that the red caps which hustles the king's baggage is dukes?" "at the very least," morris declared, "because the master of the royal fox-hounds is an earl, abe, and i leave it to you, abe, if handling baggage ain't a better job than feeding dogs. also, abe, there is lords in waiting and ladies in waiting, and it wouldn't surprise me in the slightest if during their stay in buckingham palace some of the members of mr. wilson's party which ain't been tipped off have telephoned down to the office for towels and kept the marquis of hendersonville, lanes county, england, knight commander of the bath, waiting at the bedroom door ten minutes, while they went through all their clothes trying to find something smaller than a quarter to slip him." "and do you believe for one moment, mawruss--if there was a marquis of hendersonville, which i never heard of such a person, mawruss--and he did happen to be knight commander of the bath, y'understand, that he is actually handing out soap and towels in the king of england's palace?" abe inquired. "certainly i don't believe it," morris replied, "and i also don't believe that calling anybody right honorable is going to make him any more right than he is honorable, unless, of course, he is honorable to start with and really and truly wants to be right, y'understand. and that is what mr. wilson went to england to find out, abe, because it ain't going to affect the peace conference one way or the other if the master of the royal fox-hounds don't know a dawg-biscuit from a gingersnap, y'understand, whereas if this here war is going to be settled once and for all, abe, it's quite important that the right honorable english statesmen should have right and honorable intentions." "and did mr. wilson find out?" abe asked. "sure he did," morris said, "although from what this here newspaper reporter tells me, abe, there was a whole lot of lost motion about the investigation. take, for instance, the attitude of mr. lord george on the freedom of the seas, for instance, and you would think that in the case of a busy man like mr. wilson, y'understand, he would of rung him up on the telephone, made an appointment for luncheon the next morning, and by half past one at the outside they would have got the matter in such shape that the only point not settled between 'em would be a friendly quarrel as to see who should pay for the eats, y'understand. actually, however, the arrangements for having mr. wilson get into touch with lord george was conducted by the comptroller of the royal household, and the line of march was down piccadilly as far as forty-second street, over to hyde park, and by way of hyde park west to eighth avenue to mr. lord george's office in the london & liverpool title guarantee and trust company building. the order of procession was as follows: "twelve mounted policemen. "the band of the king's own sixty-ninth regiment. "typographical union no. 6, allied printing trades council of great britain and ireland. "william j. mustard association, drum and fife corps. "household guards. "first carriage--mr. wilson and the king. "second carriage--mrs. wilson and the queen. "third carriage--mr. george creel. "fourth carriage--master of the royal fox-hounds, master of the royal buck-hounds, master of the royal stag-hounds, two masters of assorted hounds. "six motor-cycle policemen. "the stock exchange closed, and promissory notes falling due on that date became automatically payable on the following day. admission to the reviewing-stand was by card, some of which found their way into the hands of the speculators, and will shortly be the subject of a john doe investigation by the district attorney of middlesex county, so the newspaper feller told me." "but what is this here lord george's attitude towards the freedom of the seas, mawruss?" abe asked. "that the newspaper feller didn't know," morris said. "well, who does know?" abe insisted. "lord george," morris replied. iv everything is proceeding satisfactorily--maybe "yes, abe," morris perlmutter said to his partner, abe potash, a few days after mr. wilson's return from his visit to italy, "up to a short time ago hardly anybody in america had ever even heard about italy's claims to the dalmatian territory." "naturally!" abe replied; "because if there is six people in the whole united states which is engaged in the business of selling spotted dogs to fire-engine houses, mawruss, that would be big already." morris threw up both hands in a gesture of despair. "what is the use talking foreign politics to a feller which thinks that italy's claims to the dalmatian territory means she wants the exclusive right to make new york, cleveland, chicago, and st. louis with a line of spotted dogs for fire-engine companies!" he exclaimed. "and i wouldn't even have known that it meant that much," abe retorted, entirely unabashed, "excepting that six months ago my wife's sister's cousin wanted me i should advance her a hundred dollars to pay a lawyer he should bring suit against the city for her on account she got bitten by one of them fire-house dalmatians, mawruss, which up to that time i always had an idea they was splashed-up white dogs. so go ahead, mawruss, i'll be the goat. what is italy's claims to the dalmatian territory?" "well, in the first place, italy thinks she should be awarded all them towns where a majority of the people which lives in them speaks italian," morris said; "like fiume, spalato, ragusa--" "also new rochelle, mount vernon, and the bronx," abe added; "and if she wants to get nasty, mawruss, she could claim all the territory east of third avenue, from ninetieth street up to the harlem river, too. furthermore, mawruss, there is neighborhoods south of washington square where not only the majority of the people speaks italian, but the minority speaks it also. so you see how complicated things becomes when a new beginner like me starts in to talk foreign politics." "for that matter, all us americans is new beginners on foreign politics, from mr. wilson down, abe," morris said. "and that is why mr. wilson done a wise thing when he visited italy the other day, and took a lot of american newspaper fellers with him, because, between you and me, abe, it wouldn't surprise me in the least if some of them reporters went down there under the impression that the only thing which distinguished ragusa from ravioli or spalato from spaghetti was the difference in the shape of the noodles, but that otherwise they was cooked the same, with chicken livers and tomato sauce, which you know how it is in america: ninety per cent. of the people gets their education from reading in newspapers, and the consequence is that if the american newspaper reporters has a sort of hazy idea that sonnino is either an item on the bill of fare, to be passed up on account of having garlic in it, or else a tenor which the metropolitan opera house ain't given a contract to as yet, y'understand, then the american public has got the same sort of hazy idea. so mr. wilson done the right thing traveling to italy, even if he did have an uncomfortable journey." "what do you mean--an uncomfortable journey?" abe demanded. "why, i understand he traveled on the king of italy's royal train!" "sure, i know," morris agreed; "but when a king is sleeping on a royal train in europe, abe, he can be pretty near as comfortable as a traveling-salesman sitting up all night on a day-coach in america, and if he spends two nights on such a royal train, the way president wilson did in going from paris to rome, which is about as far as from new york to chicago, y'understand, it wouldn't make no difference how many people is waiting at the station to holler 'long live the king!' understand me, he is going to feel half dead, anyway." "and yet there is people which claims that mr. wilson don't give a whoop whether he makes himself popular or not," abe commented, "which before i could lay awake two nights on a train, i wouldn't care if every newspaper reporter in the united states never got no nearer to italy than a fifty-cent _table d'hã´te_, including wine." "maybe you would care if you was going to italy to make speeches the way mr. wilson did," morris said. "which if the king of italy was to go to america and make speeches in italian at the capitol in washington, it would be just as well if he would bring along an audience of a few dozen italians with him, and not depend on enough barbers, shoe-blacks, and vegetable-stand keepers horning in on the proceedings to give the congressmen and senators a hint as to where the applause should come in. in fact, i was speaking to one of them newspaper fellers which went to italy, abe, and he says that he listened carefully to all the speeches which was made in italian, mawruss, and that once he thought he heard the word chianti mentioned, but he couldn't say for certain. he told me, however, that the correspondent of _the new york evening post_ also claims that he heard orlando, the prime minister, in a speech delivered in rome, use the words il trovatore, but that otherwise the whole thing was like having the misfortune to see somebody give an imitation of eddie foy when you've escaped seeing eddie foy in the first place, so you can imagine what chance mr. wilson would have stood with them italians if the american correspondents hadn't been along to start the cries of 'bravo!' in the right spot. "so you see, abe, it's a good thing for them newspaper men to see what kind of people the italians is in their own country," morris continued, "because if this here league of nations idea is going to be put over by mr. wilson, americans should ought to know from the start that italy is a big league nation and its batting average in this war is just as good as the other big league nations." "did any one say it wasn't?" abe demanded. "i know they didn't," morris said. "but just the same, abe, there's a whole lot of people in america which judges the italians by the way they behave in the ice business and 'cavalleria rusticana,' and also a feller can get a very unfavorable opinion of italians by being shaved in one of them ten-cent palace barber shops, understand me, so even if them newspaper men couldn't appreciate the performance without a libretto, y'understand, they could anyhow see for themselves that the italians in italy is doctors and lawyers, clothing-dealers and bankers, just the same like the americans are in america, and if they can pass the word back home, with a few details of how it feels to be a foreigner in a foreign country, that wouldn't do no harm, neither." "that is something which an american newspaper correspondent wouldn't touch on at all," abe said, "because i bet that every last one of them has already sent back to america an article about this trip to italy, which, when the readers of his newspaper looks at it, mawruss, not only would they think that he understood sonnino's speech from start to finish, y'understand, but also that every time the newspaper feller is in rome, which the article would lead one to believe has been on an average of once a week for the past ten years, mawruss, him and sonnino drink coffee together." "ain't he taking a big chance when he writes a thing like that?" morris commented. "yow! a chance!" abe exclaimed. "why, to read the things that a few of these here washington correspondents used to write when they was in america yet, you would think every one of them was pestered to death with telephone messages from the white house where mr. tumulty says if the newspaper feller has got a little spare time that evening the president would consider it a big favor if he would step around to the white house, as mr. wilson would like to ask him an advice about a diplomatic note which has just been received from lord george in regards to the freedom of the seas or something." "but don't you suppose the newspaper which a nervy individual like that is working for would fire him on the spot?" morris observed. "not at all," abe said, "because the newspaper-owner likes people to get the idea that the newspaper has got such an important feller for a washington correspondent, just as much as the correspondent does himself, mawruss, so you can imagine the bluff some of them fellers is going to throw now that they really got something interesting to write about like this here peace conference. if mr. wilson gains all his fourteen points, y'understand, the special paris correspondent of the bridgetown, pa., _daily register_ is going to write home, 'and he could have gained fifteen if he would only have listened to me.' also, mawruss, during the next three months, if the peace conference lasts that long, the readers of the cyprus, n. j., _evening chronicle_ is going to get the idea that president wilson, clemenceau, lord george, and a feller by the name of delos m. jones, who is writing peace conference articles for the cyprus, n. j., _evening chronicle_, are in secret conference together every day, including sundays, from 10 a.m. to midnight, fixing up the boundaries between rumania and servia." "well, them boys has got to produce something to make their bosses back in america continue paying salary and traveling expenses," morris said, "because from what this here newspaper correspondent tells me, if he didn't get his imagination working, all he could write for his paper would be descriptions of paris scenery, including the outside of the buildings where on the insides, with the doors locked and the curtains pulled, mr. wilson and the american peace commissioners is openly and notoriously carrying on open and notorious peace conversations with the other allied peace commissioners, and for all the newspaper correspondents know to the contrary, abe, the only point on which them peace commission fellers ain't breaking up the furniture over is that when they come out, y'understand, it is agreed that the newspaper correspondents will be told that everything is proceeding satisfactorily." "but i thought mr. wilson promised before he left america that the old secret diplomacy would be a thing of the past," abe said. "so he did," morris agreed, "and by what i gather from this here newspaper man he kept his promise, too, and we now have got a new diplomacy, compared to which the fellers who were working under the rules of the old secret diplomacy bladded everything they knew." "but i distinctly read it in the papers the other day that every morning at half past ten, mawruss, mr. lansing meets the newspaper correspondents and lets them know what's been going on," abe said. "he meets them," morris replied, "but so far as letting them know what has been going on is concerned, all he says that everything is proceeding satisfactorily and is there any gentleman there which would like to ask him any questions, which naturally any newspaper correspondent who could ask mr. lansing such questions as would make mr. lansing give out any information he didn't want to give out, wouldn't be wasting his time working as a newspaper correspondent, abe, but would be considering offers from the law firm of hughes, brandeis, stanchfield, hughes & stanchfield to come in as a full partner and take exclusive charge of the cross-examination of busted railroad presidents." "maybe the reason why mr. lansing don't tell them newspaper correspondents nothing is that he ain't got nothing to tell them," abe suggested. "well, then, if i would be him, abe, i would make up something," morris said, "because if he don't they will, or anyhow some of them will, and there is going to be a lot of stuff printed in american papers where the correspondent says he learns from high authority that things ain't going so good in the peace conference as mr. wilson would like, because mr. wilson is the doctor in the case, and you know how it is when somebody is too sick to be seen and the doctor is worried, abe, he sends down word by the nurse that everything is proceeding satisfactorily, and the visitor goes away trying to remember did he or did he not throw away that fifty-cent black four-in-hand tie he wore to the last funeral he went to." "i got a whole lot of confidence in mr. wilson as the doctor for this here war-sickness which europe is suffering from, mawruss," abe said. "so have i," morris said: "but you've got to remember that there's a whole lot of those doctors on the case, abe--some of them quack doctors, too, and, when the doctors disagree, who is to decide?" "i don't know," abe said; "but i think i know who would like to." "who?" morris asked. "some of these here washington newspaper correspondents you was talking about," abe concluded. v this here peace conference--it needs publicity "well, mawruss," abe potash said, as he and his partner, morris perlmutter, sat at breakfast in their paris hotel one sunday morning, "i see that the peace conference had a meeting the other day where it was regularly moved and seconded that there should be a league of nations, and, in spite of what them republican senators back home predicted, mawruss, when chairman clemenceau said, 'contrary minded,' you could of heard a pin drop." "sure you could," morris perlmutter agreed, "because the way this here peace conference is being run, abe, when mr. clemenceau says: 'all those in favor would please say _aye_,' he ain't _asking_ them, he's telling them, which i was speaking to the newspaper feller last night, abe, and he says that, compared to the delegates at this here peace convention, y'understand, the delegates of a new york county democratic convention are free to act as they please. in fact, abe, as i understand it, at the sewed-up political conventions which they hold it in america, the bosses do occasionally let a delegate get up and say a few words which ain't on the program exactly, but at this here peace convention a delegate who tries to get off a speech which 'ain't first been submitted in writing ten days in advance should ought to go into training for it by picking quarrels with waiters in all-night restaurants. "take this here meeting which they held it on saturday, abe," morris continued, "and it was terrible the way chairman clemenceau jumps, for instance, on a feller from belgium by the name m. hyman." "that ain't the same m. hyman which used to was m. hyman & co. in the coat-pad business?" abe inquired. "this here m. hyman used to was a belgium minister in london," morris went on, "which he got up and objected to the way the five big nations--america, great britain, france, italy, and japan--was, so to speak, hogging the convention." "well, i think the reverend hyman was right, at that," abe said, "which i just finished reading mr. wilson's speech at that meeting, mawruss, in which he said that no longer should the select classes govern the rest of mankind, y'understand, and after the american, french, british, italian, and japanese delegates gets through applauding what mr. wilson says, they select themselves to run the rest of the nations in the league of nations. naturally an ex-minister like the reverend hyman is going to say, 'why don't you practise what you preach?'" "and if he wouldn't of been an ex-minister, abe," morris said, "the chances is that chairman clemenceau would of whispered a few words into the cauliflower ear of one of the sergeants-at-arms, and when the session closed, y'understand, the hat-check boy would have had one hat left over with the initials m. h. in it which mr. hyman didn't have time to claim before he hit the car tracks, y'understand, and i wouldn't blame chairman clemenceau, neither, because, if this here peace conference is going to end this side of nineteen-fifty, it's got to be speeded up some." [illustration: "i wouldn't blame chairman clemenceau neither, because if this here peace conference is going to end this side of nineteen fifty, it's got to be speeded up some."] "nobody says it 'ain't," abe agreed, "but this here m. hyman is a belgium and he's got a right to be heard." "he _would_ have if everybody didn't admit that belgium shall be protected in every which way, abe," morris agreed, "but there is also a lot of small nations which has got delegates at the peace convention, like cuba, y'understand, and some of them south american republics, and, once you begin with them fellers, where are you going to leave off? take, for instance, the committee on reparation, which has got charge of deciding how much money germany ought to pay for losses suffered by the countries which made war on her, y'understand, and there wasn't one of them spanish-american republics which didn't want to get appointed on that committee, because, when the reparation committee gets to work, practically all of them republics is going to come along with claims for smoke damages, bills for labor in connection with ripping out the fixtures of confiscated german steamers, loss of services of the presidents of such republics by reason of tonsillitis from talking about how bravely they would have fought if they had raised an army and navy which they didn't, y'understand, and any other claims against germany which they think they might have had a chance to get by with." "well, of course there is bound to be a lot of them small republics which is going to make a play for a little easy money, mawruss," abe said, "but the indications is that when the proofs of claims is filed by the alleged creditors, y'understand, there would be a couple of them comma hounds on the reparation committee which would reject such claims on the grounds of misplaced semicolons alone. then six months hafterwards, when the representative of one of them republics goes over to what used to was the office of the peace conference with a revised proof of claim, which he has just received by return mail, understand me, he would find the premises temporarily occupied by one of them crooked special-sale trunk concerns, and that's all there would _be_ to it." "then you think that this here peace conference would only last six months, abe?" morris asked. "sure i do," abe replied, "and less, even, because right now already the interest is beginning to die out, which it wouldn't surprise me in the slightest, mawruss, if in three weeks or so, when mr. wilson is temporarily out of the cast on account of going home to america to sign the new tax bill, y'understand, the attendance of the delegates would begin to fall off so bad, understand me, that the peace conference managers would got to spend a lot of money for putting in advertisements that george clemenceau presents: "'the international peace conference the unparalleled success of two hemispheres 'enthralling' _tribune_ 'punch with a kick in it' _sun_ 'vigor and suspense' _world_ 'wins audience' _globe_ 'gripping' _mail_ 'ausgezeichnet' _tageblatt_ quai d'orsay now. matinees, saturday, 2:30.'" "and even then they wouldn't get an audience, abe," morris said, "because those kind of advertisements don't fool nobody but the suckers which pays for them, abe." "maybe not," abe agreed, "but if the delegates stays away, mawruss, the peace conference could always get an audience by letting in the newspaper correspondents, which i don't care if in addition to mr. lord george and colonel house they would got performing at this here peace conference douglas fairbanks and caruso, it wouldn't be a success as a show, _anyhow_, because no theayter could get any audiences if they would make it a policy to bar out the newspaper crickets." "well, i'll tell you," morris began. "nobody likes to read in newspapers more than i do, abe. they help to pass away many unpleasant minutes in the subway when a feller would otherwise be figuring on if god forbid the brakes shouldn't hold what is going to become of his wife and children, y'understand; but, at the same time, from the way this here newspaper feller which hogs our cigars is talking, abe, i gather that the big majority of newspaper reporters now in paris has got the idea that this here peace conference is being held mainly to give newspaper reporters a chance to write home a lot of snappy articles about peace conferences, past and present. although, of course, there is certain more or less liberal-minded newspaper men which think that if, incidentally, mr. wilson puts over the league of nations and the freedom of the seas, why, they 'ain't got no serious objections, just so long as it don't involve talking the matter over privately without a couple of hundred newspaper reporters present." "sure, i know," abe said; "but if them newspaper fellers has got such an idee, mawruss, it is mr. wilson's own fault, because ever since we got into the war, y'understand, mr. wilson has been talking about open covenants of peace openly arrived at, and even before we went into the war he got off the words 'pitiful publicity,' and also it was him and not the newspaper men which first give the readers of newspapers to understand that the old secret diplomacy was a thing of the past, mawruss, so the consequences was that, when mr. wilson come over here, the owners of newspapers sent to paris everybody that was working for them--from dramatic crickets to baseball experts--just so long as they could write the english language, y'understand, because them newspaper-owners figured that, according to mr. wilson's own suggestions, this here peace conference was not only going to be a wide-open affair, openly arrived at, y'understand, but also pitifully public, whereas not only it ain't wide open, mawruss, but it is about as pitifully public as a conference between the members of the financial committee of tammany hall on the day before election. also, mawruss, a newspaper reporter could arrive at that peace conference openly or he could arrive at it disguised with false whiskers till his own wife wouldn't know him from a jugo-slob delegate, y'understand, and he couldn't get past the elevator-starter even." "that was when the conference opened," morris said; "but i understand they are now letting them into the next room and giving them once in a while a look through the door during the supper turns when the polack and servian delegates is performing." "and that ain't going to do them a whole lot of good, neither," abe declared, "because this here newspaper feller told me last night, when he was smoking my last cigar, that he has been mailing back an article a day to america ever since the president arrived here and there ain't not one of them which has got there yet." "and i was reading in the america edition of the paris edition of the london edition of the manchester, england, _daily news_ that the newspaper correspondents couldn't only send back a couple of hundred words or so by telegraph, abe," morris said, "which the way it looks to me, abe, if some news don't find its way back to america pretty quick about this here peace conference and mr. wilson, y'understand, people back home in washington is going to say to each other, 'i wonder whatever become of this here--now--wilson?' and the friend is going to say, '_what_ wilson?' and the other feller would then say, 'why, this here woodruff wilson.' and then the friend would say, 'oh, him! didn't he move away to paris or something?' and the other feller would then say, 'i see where benny leonard put up a wonderful fight in madison square garden yesterday,' and that's all there would be to that conversation." "maybe it is because of this, and not because of signing the new tax bill, that the president is going home in a few days for a short stay in america," abe suggested. "sure, i know," morris agreed; "but what good is them short visits going to do him, because i ain't such an optician like you are, abe. i believe that this here peace conference is going to last a whole lot longer than six months, abe, and, if mr. wilson keeps on going home and coming back, maybe the first time he goes back he would get some little newspaper publicity out of it, and the second time also, perhaps, but on the third when he returns from france only the democratic newspapers would give him more as half a column about it, and later on, when he lands from his third to tenth trips, inclusive, all the notice the papers would take from it would be that in the ship's news on the ninth page there would be a few lines saying that among those returning on the s.s. _george washington_ was j. l. abrahams, and so on through the b's, c's, and d's right straight down to the w's, which you would got to read over several times before you would discover the president tucked away as w. wilson between two fellers named max wangenheim and abraham welinsky." "there is something in what you say, mawruss," abe admitted; "but, at the same time, a big man like mr. wilson ain't looking to get no newspaper notoriety. he is working to become famous." "sure, i know," morris said; "but the only difference between notoriety and fame is that with notoriety you get the publicity now, whereas with fame you get the publicity fifty years from now, and the publicity which mr. wilson is going to get fifty years from now ain't going to help him a whole lot in the next presidential campaign." "mr. wilson ain't worrying about the next presidential campaign, mawruss," abe declared. "what he is trying to do is to make a success of this here peace conference." "then he would better get a press agent for it," morris observed, "because, if they don't get some more publicity, it will die on its feet." vi joining the legion of honor "i see where several americans took advantage to join the legion of honor while they was over here," morris perlmutter remarked, as he sat at luncheon with his partner, abe potash, in the restaurant of their paris hotel. "some people is crazy for life insurance," abe potash commented, "in especially if they could combine it with the privilege to make speeches at lodge-meetings. also, mawruss, a whole lot of people is so badly predicted to the lapel-button habit that they would join anything just so long as they get a lapel-button to show for it." [illustration: "a whole lot of people is so badly predicted to the lapel button habit they join anything"] "but this here legion of honor must be a pretty good fraternal-insurance proposition at that," morris observed, "because it says here in the paper where several new york bankers has gone into it, which it's a mighty hard thing to separate them fellers from their money even with first-class, a-number-one, gilt-edged, two-name commercial paper, and if this here legion of honor was just a lapel-button affair which assessed its members every time they had a death claim to pay, you could take it from me, abe, not one of them bankers would of went near it, so maybe it would be a good thing if we looked into it, abe." "if you want to join this here legion of honor, that's _your_ business, mawruss," abe said, "but i already belong to the independent order mattai aaron, which i've been paying them crooks for three years now that i should get a sick benefit fifteen dollars a week without being laid up with so much as tonsillitis even." "about the sick benefit i wasn't thinking about at all," morris declared; "but you take a feller like sam feder, president of the kosciusko bank, for instance, and if we should be maybe next year a little short and wanted an accommodation from two to three thousand dollars, y'understand, it wouldn't do us no harm if we could give him the l. of h. grip for a starter. am i right or wrong?" "say!" abe exclaimed. "the chances is that when them new york bankers gets back to new york they will want to forget all about joining this here l. of h." "why, what is there so disgraceful about joining the l. of h.?" morris asked. "nobody said nothing about its being disgraceful, because lots of decent, respectable fellers is liable to make a mistake of that kind, understand me," abe said; "but _you_ take one of these here members of the firm of--we would say, for example, j. g. morgan, y'understand, which comes back from paris after joining this here l. of h., and what happens him? the first morning he comes down to the office wearing an l. of h. button, mawruss, everybody from the paying-teller up is going to ask him what is the idea of the button, and he is going to spend the rest of the day listening to stories about people joining insurance fraternities which busted up and left the members with undetermined sentences of from three to five years, y'understand. the consequence would be that if any of his depositors expect to get an accommodation by giving him the l. of h. grip or wearing an l. of h. button, y'understand, they might just so well send him an invitation to a banquet where, in order to gain his confidence and respect, they are going to drink champagne out of an actress's slipper, and be done with it. am i right or wrong?" "well, you couldn't exactly blame them fellers which joined the l. of h.," morris observed, "because paris has a very funny effect on some of the most level-headed americans which goes there without their families and business associates, which if this here league of nations had been fixed up at a peace conference held somewheres down on lower broadway instead of the quai d'orsay, abe, the chances is that the united states senate would of had a whole lot more confidence in it than they have at present." "say!" abe explained. "this here league of nations could of been pulled off in paris or it could of been pulled off in a respectable neighborhood like prospect park west, brooklyn, mawruss, for all the spare time it gave the fellers which framed it to indulge in any wild night life. take, for instance, the proposed constitution and by-laws, which was printed on three pages of the newspaper the other day, mawruss, and anybody which dictated that _megillah_ to a stenographer would be too hoarse for weeks afterwards to order so much as a plain benedictine. also, mawruss, nobody which didn't lead a blameless life could have a brain clear enough to _understand_ the thing, let alone composing it, which last night i sat up till two o'clock this morning reading them twenty-six articles, mawruss, and ten grains of asperin hardly touched the headache which i got from it." "naturally," morris said, "because when mr. wilson wrote that constitution, abe, he figured that people which is going to read it has got a better education as one year in night school." "sure, i know," abe agreed, satirically, "but at the same time everybody ain't such a natural-born harvard gradgawate like you are, mawruss, and furthermore, mawruss, it's a big mistake for mr. wilson to go ahead on the idea that we _are_, y'understand, because, so far as i remember it, the constitution of the united states didn't say that this was a government of the college gradgawates by the college gradgawates for the college gradgawates, y'understand; neither did the declaration of independence start in by saying, 'we, the college gradgawates of the united states,' mawruss. the consequences is that most of us ingeramusses which has got one vote apiece, even around last november already, begun to feel neglected, and you could take it from me, mawruss, if mr. wilson tries to win the confidence of the american people with a few more of them documents with the twin-six words in them, y'understand, by the time he gets ready to run for president again, mawruss, the only people which is going to vote for him would be the ph.d. and a.m. fellers." "well, mawruss," abe said, a few days after the conversation above set forth, "i see that president wilson got back to america after a rough passage." "was he seasick?" morris asked. "not a day," abe replied. "then that accounts for it," morris commented. "accounts for what?" abe asked. "doctor grayson being an admiral," morris replied, "which a couple of years ago, when mr. wilson appointed doctor grayson to be an admiral over the heads of a couple of hundred fellers which had been captains of ships for years already, a lot of people got awful sore about it, and now it appears that he got the appointment because he can cure seasickness." "i suppose if doctor grayson could cure locomotive ataxia the president would of appointed him director-general of railroads," abe remarked. "for my part, abe," morris said, "if i had a good doctor like doctor grayson attending me, and it was necessary to appoint him to something in order to keep him, abe, i would appoint him a field-marshal, just so long as he could make me comfortable on an atlantic trip in winter-time." "but there isn't no office in the army or navy that president wilson could appoint doctor grayson to which would have been a big enough reward if doctor grayson could have made the president feel comfortable in washington when he got there, mawruss," abe said, "which i see by the paper this morning that thirty-seven united states senators, coming from every state in the union except missouri, suddenly discovered they was from missouri, in particular the senator from massachusetts, and not only does them senators want to know what the meaning of that constitution of the league of nations means, but they also give notice that, _whatever_ it means, they are going to knife it, _anyway_." "sure, i know," morris said; "they're like a lot of business men you and me has had experience with, abe. they claim a shortage and kick about the quality of the shipment before they even start to unpack the goods. why don't they wait till mr. wilson goes back and finishes up his job?" "they haven't got the time," abe replied, "because the session ends on march 4th at noon, just about twenty-four hours before admiral grayson is paying his first professional call on president wilson aboard the _george washington_, and by the time congress gets together again president wilson expects to have the league of nations proposition sewed up so tight that there will be nothing left for them senators to do but to indorse it." "but, as i understand it, them senators just loafed away their time during the end of the session and didn't pass a whole lot of laws which they should ought to have passed, abe, so that it will be necessary for president wilson to call an extra session in a few days," morris said. "that's what them senators figured," abe agreed, "but they was mistaken, mawruss, because the president ain't going to run any chances of being interrupted while he is working on this here peace conference by s o s messages from washington to please come home if he wants to save _anything_ out of the wreck congress is making of the inside of the capitol." "but i thought that before he went to europe in the first place, abe, president wilson said to congress that it wouldn't make any difference to them about his being in europe, because he was in close touch with them, and that the cables and the wireless would make him available just as though he was still living in the white house," morris said. "sure, i know," abe agreed; "but the trouble with that situation was that it 'ain't been discovered by the inventors yet how a president can shake hands with a senator by wireless or how he can sit down to dinner by wireless with a few congressmen and make them feel that he is their one best friend. also, mawruss, it comes high even for a president to send cable messages to a senator which he thinks is getting sore about something, such cable messages being in the nature of: 'hello, henry, what's the good word? why is it i 'ain't seen you up to the white house lately, henry?' or, 'where have you been keeping yourself lately, henry?' or, 'mrs. lodge and the children all right, henry?' or something like that." "say, for that matter, abe," morris observed, "president wilson never did a whole lot of jollying when he could have done it over the telephone at unlimited local-service rates. in fact, from what i have seen of mr. wilson, he looks to me like a man who would find it a whole lot easier to be easy in his manner toward congressmen by wireless or by cable than face to face." "well, you couldn't blame mr. wilson exactly, mawruss," abe said, "because, up to the time he became governor of new jersey, his idea of being a good mixer was to get together with a couple of ll.d.'s and sit up till pretty near nine o'clock knocking the trustees, y'understand. in fact, up to the time he resigned from being president of princeton college, life to mr. wilson was just correcting one examination paper after another, all of which 'ain't got nothing to do with this here league of nations being a good thing, mawruss," abe declared. "and it don't affect the fact that mr. wilson is a high-grade, a-number-one gentleman, which is doing the best he knows how to make good to his country, abe," morris declared. "did i say he wasn't?" abe asked. "then what are you dragging up his past life for?" morris demanded. "what do you mean--dragging up his past life?" abe rejoined. "the way you talk, mawruss, you would think that being president of a college come in two degrees, like grand larceny, and had to be lived down through the guilty party getting the respect of the community by years of honest work." "say, lookyhere, abe," morris protested, "don't try to twist things around till it looks like i was knocking mr. wilson, and not you." "i am knocking president wilson!" abe exclaimed. "why, i've got the greatest respect for mr. wilson, and always did, mawruss, but it would be foolish not to admit that the practice which a president of the united states gets in being a college professor is more useful to him in framing up a first-class, a-number-one league of nations than it is in getting his political enemies to accept it. am i wright or wrong?" "maybe he would have got them to accept it if he had stayed in touch with them personally and managed the peace conference by wireless and cable," morris suggested. "he probably figured that if he wanted to put over this here league of nations it was more necessary for him to be on the job in france than on the job in america," abe said. "well," morris commented, "the next time the united states of america has a peace conference on its hands, abe, the president will have to be a copartnership instead of an individual, with one member of the firm in washington and the other in paris." "but what would admiral grayson do?" abe asked. "he couldn't be in two places at the same time." "probably the washington president could find a bright young physician in the treasury department," morris concluded, "and promote him to the honorary title and salary of comptroller of the currency." vii some cruel and unusual punishments for the kaiser "i see where an american army officer reports that he has investigated into the food situation in germany and that the german people looks thin," abe potash observed to his partner, morris perlmutter. "that's already german propoganda, abe," morris said. "word come down from headquarters that the german people should look thin in order to get the sympathy of the american officer, so they looked thin, y'understand." abe shrugged his shoulders. "maybe you're right, mawruss," he said, "but all i could say is that them german propoganders which has charge of making the german people look thin is wasting their time in germany, because there is plenty people in america which would make them propoganders rich for life if they would only come over to new york and open an office for giving reduction propoganda at a thousand dollars a treatment." "well, i'll tell you," morris said; "ordinarily, if the german people looked thin you would believe them. also, before the war, if somebody went to germany and people asked him when he come back how was the weather there, he didn't say, 'unless they was putting one over on me, it was snowing,' y'understand, but to-day it's different. nobody has got no confidence in the germans nowadays. in fact, even the germans themselves is losing confidence in them. take berlin, for instance, and every week the spartacist, or red, government has got the support of the people from 9:30 a.m. tuesday until 6 p.m. thursday, when the german people begins to lose confidence in them, so that by 8:30 a.m. friday the coalition, or yellow, government comes into power. the coalition, or yellow, government then keeps the confidence of the people until sunday midnight, when, under the influence of the sunday night _ersat delicatessen_ supper, the germans starts in to suspect that everything ain't right with the yellow government, neither, so back they go to the red government, and they seize police headquarters, the bureau of assessments and arrears, and desk room in the office of the deputy commissioner of water-supply, gas, and electricity, and that's the way it goes." "it's a funny thing to me why them colored german governments always starts a revolution by seizing police headquarters, mawruss," abe commented. "that's the way they finance the revolution," morris replied; "because i understand that the night life in berlin has been going on the same as usual, revolution or no revolution, abe, which i bet yer that as soon as the new chief of police is appointed by the red or yellow government, as the case may be, he don't waste no time, but he right away sends out plain-clothes men to the proprietors of them berlin all-night restaurants with positive instructions to close all restaurants at eleven sharp and not to accept nothing but gold coin of the present standard of weight and fineness." "and yet it used to be thought that when it comes to graft, mawruss, german officials was like cã¦sar's ghost," abe observed--"above suspicion." "that's only another way of them impressions about germany which us americans has had reversed on us, abe," morris said, "which the way our idees about what kind of a people the germans used to was has changed, mawruss, it wouldn't surprise me in the least if the old habit the germans had for drinking beer was just a bluff, y'understand, and that at heart they was prohibitionists to a man. in fact, abe, if i would be a german bolshevik with instructions to shoot the kaiser on sight, i should go gunning for a short, stout man with a tooth-brush mustache and a holy horror of wearing uniforms, because it's my opinion that all them so-called portraits of the kaiser was issued for the purpose of misleading anarchists to shoot at a thin man in a heavily embroidered uniform with spike-end mustaches." "well, whatever he looks like, mawruss," abe said, "if i was him, rather than have such a terrible fate hanging over me, y'understand, i would telegraph to berlin for them to send along a good shot while they was about it, and have the thing over with quick, mawruss." "say!" morris exclaimed. "you and me should have hanging over us the life which the kaiser is going to lead from now on! for two hundred and fifty dollars a week at a pallum beach hotel you could only get a very small idea of the hardships the kaiser will got to undergo in the future, abe." "but do you mean to told me that after what happened to that english lady in brussels and the captain of the english mail-boat, mawruss, the english ain't going to persecute the kaiser?" abe demanded. "_you_--the english would persecute the kaiser!" morris exclaimed. "don't you know that the kaiser's mother was the king of england's father's sister? do you suppose for a moment that the king of england wants a convict in the family?" "well, has he got any _mishbocha_ in france, mawruss?" abe asked. "because if not, mawruss, it seems to me that now, while all the witnesses is in paris, it wouldn't be a bad idea to get the march term of the paris county grand jury to hand down an indictment for murder with intent to kill or something." "that sounds reasonable to anybody not connected with this here peace conference, abe," morris admitted, "but it seems that the committee for fixing responsibility says that if they was to hang or shoot the kaiser it would give him an awful drag with the german people, and they don't want the kaiser to get popular again, dead or alive. their idea is to punish him by letting him live on to be an outcast among all the people of the earth, except the proprietors of first-class european hotels, dealers in high-grade automobiles, expensive jewelry storekeepers, fashionable tailors, and a couple of million other people who don't attach an awful lot of importance to the moral character of anybody which wants to enjoy life and has got the money to do it with. in other words, abe, they claim that, in leaving the kaiser to his conscience and his bank-account they are punishing him a whole lot worse as hanging him or shooting him." "and i suppose that same committee is going to sentence von tirpitz to six months at monte carlo, while ludendorff will probably be confined to a ritz hotel eight hours a day for the rest of his natural life," abe suggested. "the committee claims not," morris replied. "it seems that the kaiser's ministers--like von tirpitz and ludendorff--is going to get what is coming to them, on the grounds that they are guilty of violations of international law and 'ain't got no relations among the royal families of england or italy." "but why not bring the whole fleet over to america, and let the authorities dispose of them there?" abe inquired. "the kaiser would be just as much a martyr if he was sentenced in america as in europe," morris replied. "who says anything about sentencing him?" abe demanded. "all it would be necessary to do would be to swear out a warrant against him and leave the rest to a couple of headquarters detectives, which, naturally, when them fellers would tell him to come along with them, the kaiser would technically resist the arrest by asking what for. this would mean at the very least ten stitches in his scalp, mawruss, not reckoning a couple of broken ribs or so when the fingerprints was taken, and, while it wouldn't be only a starter in the way of punishment, he would anyhow find out that it is one thing to be actually engaged in a modern battle, and that looking at it through a high-power telescope while sitting in a bomb-proof limousine six miles away is absolutely something else again. later on, mawruss, when a new york police-court lawyer visited him in his cell after the kaiser had lunched on bread and water and the police-court lawyer on what used to be called _koenigsburger klops_ and is now known as liberty roast, understand me, the kaiser would get just an inkling of what it means to be caught in a gas attack without a gas-mask." "you talk like you would got a little experience in the way of sitting in prison yourself, abe," morris commented. "i am giving you what practically happened to a feller by the name immerglick which was arrested by mistake on account the police thought he looked like an italian who was wanted for barrel murder, mawruss," abe exclaimed, "and if the police behaves this way to a perfect stranger which is innocent at that, mawruss, you could imagine what them fellers would do to a well-known guilty party like the kaiser. but that's neither here nor there, mawruss. what i am trying to do is to work out a punishment proposition for the kaiser which would get by with such a sensitive bunch as this here committee to place responsibility seems to be." "go ahead and have a good time with your pipe-dream, abe," morris said. "you couldn't make me feel bad, no matter what happens to the kaiser in your imagination." "well," abe continued, "after he is through with trying to get rid of the police-court lawyer, mawruss, he should ought to be arranged before the magistrate in a traffic court, y'understand, and should be accused of driving at the rate of twenty-two miles an hour, which is two miles past the legal speed limit, and then he would find out that all them commandants of ruhleben and the other german prison camps wasn't even new beginners in the art of making prisoners feel cheap, because you take one of these here traffic-court magistrates which has had years of experience bawling out respectable sitsons who has got the misfortune to own automobiles, mawruss, and what such a feller wouldn't do to humilitate the kaiser, y'understand, ain't even dreamt of in german prison camps yet." "i see you still feel sore about getting fined twenty-five dollars for driving like a maniac down at far rockaway last summer abe," morris commented. "how i feel or how i don't feel hain't got nothing to do with it, mawruss," abe retorted. "and furthermore, mawruss, any motor-cycle policeman which has got the nerve to swear that he could tell inside of two miles an hour how fast somebody is driving, understand me, is guilty of perjury on the face of it, which i told the judge. 'judge, your honor,' i says, 'i admit i was going fast,' i says, 'but--'" "excuse me," morris interrupted, "but i thought you was talking about how to punish the kaiser, ain't it, which, while i admit you got some pretty good ideas on the subject, abe, still at the same time there is plenty of ways that the kaiser could get punished in america without going to the trouble and expense of arresting him first, abe. there is a whole lot of experiences which the american people pays to go through just once, y'understand, which if the kaiser could be persuaded to take them all on, one after the other, abe, his worst enemies would got to pity him. supposing, for instance, he would start off with one of them electric vibrating face massages, abe, and if he comes through it alive, y'understand, he would then be hustled off to one of these here strong-arm bunkopathic physicians, which charges five dollars for the first visit and never has to quote rates for the second or third visits, because once is plenty, y'understand." "but i thought the idea was not to let anybody have any sympathy for the kaiser, mawruss," abe broke in. "plenty of fellers i know goes to these here near-doctors," morris declared, "and nobody has got any sympathy for them, neither. also, abe, i 'ain't got no sympathy for anybody who goes to these here restaurants where they run off a cabarattel review, abe, and yet it's a terrible punishment at that, so there's another tip for you if you want any more ideas for making the kaiser suffer." "say, when it comes right down to it, mawruss, and if you don't want to show the feller no mercy at all, y'understand," abe said, "what's the matter with making him see some of them war plays they was putting on in new york last winter?" "why only _war_ plays?" morris asked. "i sat through a couple musical shows last winter without the option of a fine, y'understand, and it would be a good thing if the kaiser could see performances like that--just to make him realize that in losing his throne, y'understand, he has no longer got the power to order the actors shot, together with the composer and the man that wrote the jokes." "but the biggest punishment of all you 'ain't even hinted at yet," abe said, "and it's a punishment which thousands of americans is getting right now without no sympathy from nobody, which its name is: "'form 1040. united states internal revenue service individual income tax return for net incomes of more than $5,000 for calendar year, 1918.' also, mawruss, when you consider what the kaiser done, mawruss, i ask you is it too much that the committee on fixing responsibility should order him starved to death or talked to death or any other slow and painful death, because such a fate is going to be a happy one compared with the thousands of decent, respectable american business men which is headed straight for an insane-asylum, trying to fill out "'(a) totals taxable at 1918 rates (see instructions page 2 under c). (b) totals taxable at 1917 rates (see instructions, included in k (a) page 2). (c) amount of stock dividends (column 4) taxable at 1916 rates (enter as 20).'" "well, after all, abe," morris said, "there's one worser punishment you could hand out the kaiser than filling out this here income tax." "what's that?" abe inquired. "paying it," morris said. viii it enters on its no-gold-casket phase "when a feller gets his name in the papers as often as mr. wilson, mawruss, it don't take long for them highwaymen to get on to him," abe potash remarked, shortly after mr. wilson's return to paris. "what highwaymen?" morris inquired. "them presidents of orphan-asylums and homes," abe said, "and in a way it serves mr. wilson right, mawruss, because, instead of keeping it to himself that he got stuck over four thousand dollars for tips alone while he was in france, y'understand, as soon as he arrived in boston he goes to work and blabs the whole thing to newspaper reporters, and you could take it from me, mawruss, that for the next six months mr. wilson would be flooded with letters from associations for the relief of indignant armenians, homes for chronic freemasons, and who knows what else. so therefore you take this here carter h. glass, mawruss, and he naturally comes to the conclusion that mr. wilson is an easy mark, because--" "excuse me, abe," morris interrupted, coldly, "but who do you think this here carter h. glass is, anyway?" "i don't know," abe went on, "but whoever he is he probably figured that if he was going to get turned down he would anyhow get turned down big, because it says here in the paper that he cables mr. wilson he should please let him have three million dollars for this here bureau for paying allowances to the relations of soldiers and--" "listen, abe," morris said, "if you wouldn't know who carter h. glass is after paying twelve per cent. on all you made over four thousand dollars last year, y'understand, nothing that i could say would ever learn you, so therefore i 'ain't got no expectations that you are going to remember it when i tell you that this here carter h. glass is secretary of the treasurer, and when he cabled mr. wilson for three million dollars, it ain't so hopeless like it sounds. also, abe, while mr. wilson gives it out to the papers that he got stung four thousand dollars for tips, it also appears in the papers that he came home with a few gold caskets and things, not to mention one piece of tapestry which the french government presented him with, valued at two hundred thousand dollars alone, y'understand, and if that kind of publicity is going to give mr. wilson a reputation as an easy giver-up, abe, all i can say is that the collectors for orphan-asylums and homes don't read the papers no more carefully than you do, abe." "but why should the secretary of the united states treasury got to touch mr. wilson for?" abe demanded. "every day the people of the united states is paying into the united states treasury millions and millions dollars income-tax money and all the president owns is a few gold caskets which he got presented with, and maybe a little tapestry, y'understand. what's the matter with that feller carter h. glass? is he afraid he is going to run short if he spends a couple million dollars or so? has he lost his nerve or something?" "well, i'll tell you, abe," morris began. "the secretary of the treasury 'ain't got such a cinch like some people think, y'understand. if the bureau for paying allowances to the relations of soldiers send over and asks the secretary of the treasury to be so good and let 'em have for a few days three million dollars, understand me, you would naturally think that it is one of them dead open-and-shut, why-certainly propositions. the impression you have is that the secretary grabs ahold of the 'phone and says to the head of stock to look on the third shelf from the elevator shaft is there any more of them million-dollar bills with the picture of rutherford b. hayes on 'em left, and if not, to send jake up with three hundred of them three-by-seven-inch ten-thousand-dollar bills, and that's all there is to it. but as a matter of fact he doesn't do nothing of the kind, because nobody could get any money out of the secretary of the treasury except by an act of congress." "well, it's nothing against mr. glass that he is such a tight-wad, mawruss, because that's the kind of man to have as secretary of the treasurer, mawruss, which supposing they had one of them easy-come, easy-go fellers for secretary of the treasurer, mawruss--somebody who would fall for every hard-luck story he hears, y'understand, and how long is it going to be before the police is asking him what did he done with it all?" abe said. "so, for my part, mawruss, they could abuse mr. glass all they want to, y'understand, but i would be just as well satisfied, so far as my income taxes is concerned, if the only way you could get money out of him was by a miracle instead of an act of congress. am i right or wrong?" "do me the favor, abe," morris said, "and don't talk a lot of nonsense about a subject about which you don't know nothing about, because when i say that nobody could get money out of carter h. glass except by an act of congress, y'understand, i ain't talking poetical in a manner of speaking. they must actually got to got and act of congress before anybody could get any money out of the secretary of the treasury, no matter if mr. glass would be the most generous feller in existence, which, for all i know, he _might_ be. so, therefore, abe, when congress adjourned without passing the acts which was necessary in order that the secretary of the treasury should pay the railroads seven hundred and fifty million dollars to keep 'em going, y'understand, not to mention such chicken-feed like three million dollars for this here soldiers' relations bureau and the like, it leaves the country practically broke with seven or eight billion dollars in the bank. _now_ do you understand what i am driving into?" "i think i do," abe said, "but explain it to me just as if i didn't, because what is a mystery to me is, why did congress adjourn without passing them acts, mawruss?" "they did it to put mr. wilson in bad on account he went to europe without calling an extra session," morris said. "i thought congress got paid by the year and not by the session," abe remarked. "so they do," morris continued, "but they said they wanted to stay in session while mr. wilson was in europe to _help_ him, and mr. wilson thought they wanted to stay in session while he was in europe to knock him, and he said: 'watch! i'll fix them fellers,' and _they_ said: 'watch! _we'll_ fix that feller.' and between the two of them, the railroads is left dry and high, the war risks bureau claims that they could only keep going for a week or so, the soldiers' relations people is sending out j o s signals, and that's the way it goes." "and who do you think is right, mawruss?" abe asked. "mr. wilson or congress?" "well, i ain't exactly prepared to say, y'understand," morris replied, "but it's a question in my mind whether or not there ain't just so much need for a peace conference in washington as there is in paris, and if so, abe, whether mr. wilson ain't at the wrong peace conference." "so far as that goes, mawruss," abe said, "he might just so well be in washington as in paris, because the tapestry and gold-casket period of this here conference is already a thing of the past, which i see that mr. wilson ain't even staying with the murats no longer." "naturally," morris said, "after the way this here murat went around talking about the league of nations." "why, i thought he was in favor of it!" abe said. "he was in favor of it," morris said, "up to the time mr. wilson and lord george had the conference with the jugo-slobs where they laid out the frontiers by making the ink-bottle represent bessarabia and the mucilage-bottle macedonia. when murat saw the library carpet the next morning, he began to say that, after all, why shouldn't france control her own foreign policy." "i don't blame him," abe commented. "later on the polish national committee called on mr. wilson and was shown into the parlor before the butler had a chance to put the slip covers on the furniture," morris continued, "and that very evening murat went around saying that if france was going to have to police the corridor through west prussia to dantzig, he was against articles fourteen to twenty, both inclusive, of the league constitution, and where could he find a good dry-cleaner." "that don't surprise me, neither," abe remarked. "but it wasn't till the president's body-guard of secret-service men had an all-night stud-poker session in the yellow guest-room that he actually made speeches against the league of nations," morris went on, "and at that, the room will never look the same again." "i wonder if there ain't some kind of property-damage insurance that he could have took out against a thing happening like that?" abe speculated. "i don't know," morris said, "but if there is, you can bet your life that this here mrs. bischoffsheim, where the president is staying now, has got it." "and she is going to need it, mawruss," abe said, "because what the best home-trained men do with cigarettes and fountain-pens, when their minds are occupied with business matters, ain't calculated to improve the appearance of a bar-room, neither." "say!" morris commented. "the president _oser_ cares what his address is in paris, but i'll bet you he is doing a lot of thinking as to what it is going to be in washington after march 4, 1921." "it ain't a question of who is going to move _out_ of the white house, mawruss," abe said. "what people in america is wondering is, who is going to move _in_, which right now there is a couple of generals, five or six senators, and a banker or so which is figuring on not renewing the leases of their apartments beyond march 3, 1921, in case they should be obliged to go to washington for four years, or maybe eight." "lots of things can happen before the next presidential election," morris said. "that's what these senators and generals thinks," abe agreed, "and in the mean time, mawruss, nobody has got to press them a whole lot to speak at dinners and conventions, which i see that a general made a speech at a meeting in memory of grover cleveland the other day where he didn't refer once to mr. wilson, but said that mr. cleveland wasn't an expert at verbal messages and believed in the monroe doctrine." "well, suppose the general did say that," morris said. "what of it?" "nothing of it," abe replied; "but on the other hand, if this here general had gone a bit farther, understand me, and said that grover cleveland never refused to meet judge cohalan at the metropolitan opera house and as a general rule didn't act cold toward a sinn fein committee, mawruss, you would got to admit that such remarks is anyhow suspicious, ain't it?" "all it is suspicious of to me, abe," morris said, "is that if such a general has got ambitions to be president, y'understand, he ain't going the right way about it, because fashions in opinions changes like fashions in garments, abe. at this day and date nobody could tell no more about what the people of the united states is going to think in the fall of 1920 as what they are going to wear in the fall of 1920, which it would of been a whole lot better for the general's prospects if he would of said that grover cleveland was just as expert at verbal messages as another great american and believed just as strongly in a league of nations. in fact, abe, if there was, heaven forbid, a chance of me being nominated for president in 1920, i would lay pipes for claiming that it was me that suggested the whole idea of the league of nations to president wilson in the first place. am i right or wrong?" "you're right about the heaven forbid part, anyway," abe commented. "because," morris continued, as though he had not heard the interruption, "what between the people who are willing to take president wilson's word for it and the people who ain't willing to take a united states senator's word for anything, y'understand, this here league of nations looks like a pretty safe proposition for any politician to tie up to, and it wouldn't surprise me in the least if even some of them senators which signed the round robin would be claiming just before the 1920 national conventions that they was never what you might call actually against a league of nations except, as one might say, in a manner of speaking, if you know what i mean. also, abe, these here senators which is now acting like they would have sworn a solemn oath, in addition to the usual amount of swearing about such things, that they would never ratify this here league of nations, y'understand, are already beginning to say that they wouldn't ratify it anyhow in its present form, understand me, and before they got through, abe, you could take it from me, that when it finally comes up for ratification them same senators is going to go over it again carefully and find that it has been amended by inserting two commas in article two and a semicolon in article twenty-five, and a glad shout of 'oh, well, this is something else again!' will go up, understand me, and after they vote to unanimously ratify it they will be telling each other that all you have to do is to make a firm stand against mr. wilson and he will back right down." "the way it looks to me, mawruss," abe commented, "the back-down is on the other foot." "it's fifty-fifty, abe, because, when the president gets his back up, the senate starts to back down," morris concluded, "and _vice versa_." ix worrying should begin at home, ain't it? "i see where the italian delegates to the peace conference says that if italy don't get fiume, mawruss, there would be a revolution in italy," abe potash remarked to his partner, morris perlmutter. "any excuse is better than none," morris perlmutter commented, "which it is very clear to me, abe, that with the example of poland in front of them, the italians being also a musical people and seeing that poland has got it a first-class a-number-one pianist like paderewski for a president, y'understand, they are taking the opportunity of fiume to put in caruso or scotti or one of them fellers as president." "they would got to offer their presidents an awful big salary if they expect to compete with the metropolitan opera house, mawruss," abe said. "if poland could do it, abe, why couldn't italy?" morris said. "which paderewski didn't have to tune pianos on the side to make a living over here, neither, abe, and, besides, abe, if they would let caruso have a free hand in the formation of his cabinet, he would probably get a good barytone for secretary of state, a basso for secretary of commerce and labor, de luca for secretary of the treasury, martinelli for secretary of war, and draw on the chicago opera company for secretaries of the navy, the interior, and agriculture. after that, abe, all the italian government would got to do would be to move the capital to milan and hold open sessions of the cabinet at the scala with a full orchestra, and they could take in from ten to twenty thousand dollars at the door, daily, in particular if they was to advertise that caruso would positively appear at every session of the cabinet, y'understand." "but, joking to one side, mawruss," abe declared, "while personally i got to admit that up to a short time ago, for all i knew about fiume, y'understand, if somebody would of said to me suddenly, 'fiume,' i would have said, 'fiume yourself, you dirty loafer!' and the chances is there would have been a fight then and there, understand me. still, i couldn't help thinking that as between old friends like the italians and perfect strangers like the jugo-slobs, y'understand, italy should ought to have fiume and anything else she wants within reason and even a couple of places not within reason, if she wants them that bad." "in deciding these things, abe," morris said, "mr. wilson couldn't consider prejudice." "no?" abe retorted. "well, could he consider who discovered america? a jugo-slob, i suppose, what? but never mind going so far back as christopher columbus, mawruss. take our best workmen right in our own shop, mawruss--them tonies and them roccos with all the time a pleasant smile no matter how hard we work them, and what are they? jugo-slobs or italians? take it in the city of new york alone, and do we get there half a million jugo-slobs or half a million italians? i am asking you? also, mawruss, i suppose the american people is crazy to see jugo-slob opera, with wonderful jugo-slob singers and composed by jugo-slob composers, ain't it? furthermore, mawruss, when you want to give your wife a treat, you take her out and blow her to a good jugo-slob _table d'hã´te_, one dollar and a half including wine--what?" "listen, abe," morris protested, "i didn't say a word that italy shouldn't have fiume." "i know you didn't," abe said, "but there's a whole lot of people which does, mawruss, and how they expect to use it for an argument to get the millions of italians in america to subscribe to the next victory loan, mawruss, may be perfectly clear to them, mawruss, but _i_ couldn't see it and i doubt if them millions of italians will be able to see it, neither." "probably you ain't wrong exactly," morris said, "but whichever way mr. wilson thinks is the best for the good of europe, abe, that's the way he would decide it about fiume." "well, i'll tell you, mawruss," abe observed, "while i consider that europe, excepting the coffee they give you for breakfast, is a high-grade continent, taking it by and large, still at the same time i ain't so fanatical about it that if i would be president wilson, i wouldn't once in a while give america a look-in also. furthermore, mawruss, admitting that mr. wilson is acting wonderful in the way he is unselfish about america, y'understand, and that he would probably go down in history as a great and good man, y'understand, he should ought to watch out that he don't act _too_ unselfish about america, mawruss, otherwise he would be going down as a great and good man in french and english history and not in american history." "there is even some people which figures that he would be a great man in the history of the world even," morris interrupted. "sure, i know," abe said, "and that's the trouble with a whole lot of people these days, mawruss. they are figuring on world propositions, and what goes on in the next block don't interest them at all. worrying should begin at home, mawruss, whereas with them world thinkers they couldn't get really and truly anxious about the way things is going anywheres nearer to the woolworth building than the nevski prospekt. 'ain't you ashamed of yourselves to be kicking about not having a job,' they says to the returning american soldiers, 'when thousands of muzhiks in ukrania is idle.' and they go to work and collect dollar after dollar for milk to feed czecho-slovak babies, with sixty cents after sixty cents overhead on the collection, y'understand, while right here in new york city families with an income of eighteen dollars a week has got to pay twenty cents a quart for grade b milk when the milk-wagon drivers ain't on strike." "people has become european-americans from reading too much newspapers nowadays, abe," morris said, "which in these times of one newspaper trying to show the others how much more money it is spending for foreign cables, y'understand, if you want to see who is murdered in your own town, understand me, you are liable to find a couple of lines about it 'most any part of the paper except in the first four pages, and the consequences is that people gets the impression from reading the papers that a strike in berlin is ever so much more important than a strike in hoboken for the simple reason that as the berlin strike cost the newspaper proprietor several hundred dollars for cables, he put it on the front page, whereas the strike in hoboken only cost him seven cents car fare for the reporter each way, and therefore it gets slipped in on the eleventh page with over it the head-line: 'plan american orchestra. chicago's new philharmonic is headed by mrs. j. ogden armour,' the orchestra story with the strike head-line having failed to get into the paper at all." "well, i'll tell you," abe said, "people which reads the newspapers don't take the same amount of interests in strikes like they once used to did before the united states government organized them conciliation and arbitration boards, which nowadays strikes is long, dull affairs consisting of the first strike, the arbitration, the decision, the second strike, the arbitration, the decision, the third strike, and so on for several months, because that's the trouble with arbitration, mawruss: everybody is willing to arbitrate and nobody is willing to be decided against." "also strikes is becoming too common, abe," morris said. "everybody is going on strike nowadays, from milk-wagon drivers to the united states senate, and although the last strike only _begun_ as a strike and ended up as a lock-out, y'understand, still the example wasn't good to the country, which if the strike fever is going to spread as high up as the united states senate, abe, where is it going to stop? the first thing you know, the members of the metropolitan club will be going on strike for a minimum of six hundred sturgeon eggs in a ten-dollar portion of fresh astrakhan caviar, and the amalgamated bank presidents of america, new york local no. 1, will be walking out in a body for a minimum wage of fifty thousand dollars a year, with a maximum working year of four months." "but even when strikes had no foreign competition in the newspapers, mawruss," abe said, "the interest in them soon died out, which very few people outside the parties concerned ever finds out when a strike ends or who wins, and you might even say gives a nickel one way or the other, mawruss." "it ain't only strikes which affects people like that, abe," morris commented. "long-drawn-out murder trials and graft investigations also suffers that way, which i bet yer the american newspaper-reading people will soon get on to the fact that the newspapers is playing up to their cable tolls, y'understand, and everybody will be starting in to read the paper at the fourth or fifth page." "still, i think that considerable interest was revived in the league of nations and the peace conference by the argument that senator lodge put up last week in lowell, massachusetts," abe said. "it wasn't _in_ lowell, but _with_ lowell," morris corrected. "in or with," abe said, "it caused a whole lot of comment in the newspapers, and the people which bought the next morning them papers that printed the whole affair in full, mawruss, skipped as much as two or three pages about it." "well, they didn't miss much, abe," morris said, "because it didn't come up to the advertisement." "what do you mean--the advertisement?" abe inquired. "why, for days already, the newspapers come out with a notice that senator lodge would argue with this here lowell, which he is a college president and not a town, abe, the argument to take place in a big hall in boston, and the application for tickets was something tremendous, abe, because you know how arguments about the league of nations is, abe. sometimes the parties only use language and sometimes the smaller one of the two goes to a hospital, understand me. but, however, in this case it must be that the friends of senator lodge must have went to him and said: 'what do you want to get into an argument with lowell for? treat him with contempt. what do you care _what_ he says about you? you are _doch_ a united states senator, ain't it?' and the friends of this here lowell also must have went to him and said: 'listen, lowell, don't make a show of yourself. if lodge wants to behave himself that way, all right; he's only a united states senator, but you are anyhow president of harvard college, and you can't afford to _act_ that way.' 'act _what_ way?' lowell probably said. 'do you think i am going to sit down and let him walk all over wilson, which wilson and me was presidents of colleges together for years already?'" "and besides a college president don't make such big money that he could afford to sneeze at his share of the gate receipts, neither," abe commented. "be that as it may," morris said, "they probably figured that it was too late to call the thing off, but their friends must have got them together and talked lodge over into behaving like a gentleman, because he practically agreed to everything that lowell said and, so to speak, 'threw' the whole debate right at the outset, which, reading the reports in the newspapers next morning, abe, it is a wonder to me that the referee or the umpire didn't stop it before it had gone the first five minutes, even." "well, if people is foolish enough to bet on such things, mawruss," abe commented, "they deserve to lose, ain't it?" "so the consequences is that some people is now saying that senator lodge backed down because he didn't have a leg to stand on," morris continued, "while them people which probably made a little easy money on lowell is saying, '_yow!_ backed down!' and that lowell is a crackerjack, a-number-one arguer, and won the argument on his merits, y'understand." "the whole thing should ought to be investigated by the massachusetts boxing commission in order to see that them kind of disgraceful exhibitions shouldn't occur again," abe said, "otherwise this here james butler which is president of columbia college will fix up an argument with another united states senator, and whoever is now president of princeton college will arrange a frame-up with a governor of a state or somebody, and the first thing you know, mawruss, college presidents will be getting such a reputation as public speakers that the next republican national convention will be again unloading a college president on us as president of the united states." "say," morris protested, "if all college presidents would make as good a president as mr. wilson done, abe, i am content that we should have such a president for president." "president wilson done all right, mawruss," abe declared. "he done a whole lot to add a touch of refinement to what otherwise would of been a very rough war, understand me. he's got the respect and admiration of the whole world, mawruss, and i ain't going to say _but_ neither, but would say _however_. mawruss, for the next ten years or so the united states of america ain't going to be as quiet as a college exactly. maybe the presidents of colleges will continue to deal with college professors and college students which couldn't talk back, mawruss, but the next president of the united states will have to stand an awful lot of back-talk from a whole lot of people about taxes, business conditions, railroads, and so forth, and instead of coming right back with a snappy remark originally made by some big roman philosopher and letting it go at that, mawruss, he would got to come right back with a plan devised by some big pittsburgh business man and act on it, too." "there's something in what you say, abe," morris admitted. "so, therefore, if we've got to drag a college president for president, mawruss," abe concluded, "let's hope he would be anyhow president of a business college." x the new hungarian rhapsody "i see where a feller by the name rubin or robin or something like that, which was working as a traveling-salesman for the red cross in russia, got examined by congress the other day," abe potash said one morning in march, "and in the course of explaining how he come to spend all that money for traveling expenses or something, he says that the bolsheviki in russia is a very much misunderstood people." "sure, i know," morris said; "it is always the case, abe, that when somebody does something which could only be explained on the grounds that he would sooner be in jail than _out_, he goes to work and claims that nobody understands him." "but rubin claims that the reason bolshevism sprung in the first place was that the bolsheviki was tired of the war," abe continued, "whereas the allies thought they were quitters." "what do you mean--whereas?" morris asked. "wait, that ain't the only 'whereas,'" abe said. "rubin also said that the allies thinks the bolsheviki is a bunch of organized murderers, _whereas_ the allies don't understand that the only people murdered by them bolsheviki was the property-owners which objects to their property being taken, and that as a matter of fact them poor bolsheviki are simply _obliged_ to take the property, there being no other alternative except working for a living." "_nebich!_" morris exclaimed, "and did he say anything else about them bolsheviki that we should ought to break our hearts over, abe?" "rubin didn't, but there is some of these here liberal-minded papers which seems to think that what this here rubin says is not only a big boost for the bolsheviki, but that it should ought to be a lesson to us not to pass laws in this country to prevent the bolsheviki from operating over here." "but we already got laws over here to take care of people which would sooner commit murder than work, abe," morris said, "and as for being liberal-minded about the bolsheviki, abe, i am content that after they are sentenced they should have all the privilege that the other convicts have, and that's as far as i would go." "well, you couldn't claim credit for being very funny that way, mawruss. you've got practically all the unliberal-minded people in the united states siding with you," abe declared, "because, being liberal-minded is a matter of being able to see only the unpopular side of every question. it is the liberal-minded people which thinks there is something to be said in favor of the germans and says it, y'understand. it is the liberal-minded people which is always willing to try anything that don't seem reasonable to practically everybody." "and i suppose them liberal-minded people would even approve of germany trying to get out of paying an indemnity by pulling off one of them street affairs with shooting which passes for bolshevik revolution," morris said, "but the backing of such liberal-minded americans wouldn't help the germans none, because there would be a whole lot of husky parties in khaki going into germany and acting in such an unliberal-minded way that the germans would wish they would have paid the indemnity voluntarily on the instalment plan rather as have it collected all in one sum by levy and sale under an execution." "well, i'll tell you," abe said, "it is always the case that when the creditors begin to scrap among themselves, y'understand, the fraudulent bankrupt stands a good chance to get away with the concealed assets, ain't it, and in particular in this case where there is so many liberal-minded people around which don't want to be too hard on germany, _anyway_." "i bet yer," morris said, fervently; "and while this here peace conference is killing a whole lot of time deliberating how to make this the last war, y'understand, they will wake up some fine morning to find out that they have really made it the last war but one. furthermore, abe, this next-to-the-last war wouldn't be a marker to the war we are going to have in collecting indemnities from bolsheviki, because when it comes to atrocities, abe, a bolshevik government could make the old german government look like the society for the prevention of cruelty to children, y'understand." "might the peace conference would hurry up, maybe," abe suggested. "they've got to hurry up if they don't want to be shifted from a peace conference to a council of war," morris said. "look what has already happened in hungary." "and yet, mawruss, you would think that with a nation like the hungarians, which is used to eating in hungarian restaurants, y'understand, a little thing like starvation wouldn't worry them at all," abe said, "so therefore i couldn't understand why the hungarians should have gone bolshevik from want of food, as the papers says they did." "_my_ paper didn't say it," morris commented, "and if it did, i wouldn't believe it, anyway, because the most you could claim for bolshevism as a cure for starvation is that it keeps the patient so busy worrying about his other troubles that he forgets how hungry he is. furthermore, abe, the way it looks to me, this here bolshevik revolution in hungary ain't even what the poor food law would call a bolshevik type revolution, because it is my idea that lenine and trotzky could read the papers the same like anybody else. so, therefore, when they seen it that all the american newspaper correspondents was sending out word that the peace conference should ought to hurry up its work because of the spread of bolshevism, y'understand, and that the delegates should ought to go easy on germany because, if they didn't, germany would probably go bolshevik, y'understand, this here trotzky, which once used to work on a new york newspaper but lived it down by changing his name from bronstein to trotzky, understand me, at once gets up a line of snappy advertisements headed: "'why bolshevism?' to the effect that a revolution a day drives indemnities away and for particulars to write to trotzky & lenine, department m, petrograd land title and trust building, petrograd. and, of course, hungary fell for it." "so you think that this here hungarian revolution is a fake?" abe asked. "it ain't a fake, it's a business," morris replied, "which i bet yer that right now messrs. ebert, scheidemann & co. is writing trotzky & lenine they should please quote prices on bolshevist uprisings as per hungarian sample, f.o.b. berlin, and also that it wouldn't be only a matter of a few days when knocking germany would be a capital offense in petrograd, upon the grounds that the customer is always right." "but i understand that in budapest the working-men is seizing the factories and running them themselves," abe said. "there's always bound to be a certain number of people which couldn't take a job," morris commented. "there's no joke about it," abe declared, "which i see in the paper this morning that the new hungarian soviet government has directed the presidents of banks to put their business in the hands of the clerks and that the landlords has got to let the janitors manage the apartment-houses." "the landlords has got to do that in america, whether the government tells 'em to or not, abe," morris said, "and as for the bank presidents, abe, they might just as well go out and look for another job to-day as to wait till next week when them committees of factory-workers will start in to make overdrafts at the point of a revolver." "things must be terribly mixed up in hungary, according to the papers," abe observed. "well, i'll tell you," morris said, "in some countries a bolshevik government could be quite disturbing, but take hungarian cooking, for instance, and it wouldn't really make a whole lot of difference if _gulyas_ or paprika chicken was cooked by one chef or a committee of scullions, abe, it would be just so miscellaneous and nobody could tell from eating it what had been put into it, y'understand. also, abe, take these here gipsy hungarian bands, and while there would probably be a terrible conglomeration of noises if a committee of players was to start in to conduct the boston symphonies or the new york philharmonics, y'understand, a committee of gipsy musicians couldn't make a _czardas_ sound worser than it does, no matter how they disagree as to the way it should ought to be played." "for that matter, there's a lot of things produced in germany which a soviet government couldn't spoil, neither, mawruss," abe said, "like music by this here nathan strauss, the composer, or _koenigsburger klops_, now called liberty roast, which i see by last sunday's paper that the kaiser has been talking again." "and what's that got to do with germany going bolshevik?" morris asked. "nothing, except that it partially accounts for it," abe replied, "which a newspaper feller by the name of begbie called on the kaiser in holland, and he says the kaiser couldn't see it at all." "see what?" morris asked. "why, he couldn't see what people is making such a fuss about," abe said. "he says that, so far as starting this here war is concerned, he didn't _say_ nothing, he didn't _do_ nothing, and all he knows about it is that he lays the whole thing to the freemasons." "you mean the f. a. m.?" morris asked. "what other freemasons is there?" abe said. "you're sure he didn't say the knights of pythias or the i. o. o. f., because, while i don't belong to the masons myself, abe, rosie's sister's husband's brother by the name harris november has been a thirty-sixth degree mason for years already," morris declared, "and i'll swear that if a gabby feller like him would have known that the masons had anything to do with bringing on the war, abe, he would of spilled it already long since ago." "well, of course, i don't know nothing about what harris november said or what he didn't say, mawruss, but that's what the kaiser said," abe continued, "and he also had a good deal to say about queen victorine of england what a wonderful woman she was, _olav hasholom_, and how she told him many times he should look out for that low-life of a son of hers by the name edwin." "but i always thought this here edwin was such a decent, respectable feller," morris interrupted. "that's what everybody else thought," abe went on, "but the kaiser says that many times the old lady says to him he shouldn't have nothing to do with edwin. 'believe me,' she said, according to the kaiser, 'he wouldn't do you no good intellectually, morally, or socially,' and so for that reason the kaiser wouldn't join the entente with england, france, and russia." "because this here edwin was at the bottom of it?" morris inquired. "that's what the kaiser _said_," abe replied. "maybe he also caught the poor czar _selig_ eating with his knife or something," morris suggested. "that he didn't say, neither," abe answered, "but he might just so well have said it, for all it would go down with me, mawruss, because we all know how kings sow their rolled oats, mawruss, and any king which wouldn't associate with any other king on the grounds of running around the streets till all hours of the night or gambling, y'understand, if that ain't a case of a pot calling a kettle, i don't know what is." "and i suppose he topped off them lies by getting religious, ain't it?" morris remarked. "naturally," abe said. "and in particular he got very sore at the freemasons on account of them being atheists." "that's the first time i hear that about the freemasons," morris observed. "i think, myself, that he was getting them mixed up with the elks." "the elks ain't atheists," abe said. "i know they ain't, but at the same time they ain't religious fanatics exactly," morris said, "which to a particular feller like the kaiser would be quite enough, abe." "also, mawruss," abe went on, "he claims that the freemasons is all bolshevists, and in fact, from the way he carried on about the freemasons, you would think he was crazy on the subject." "maybe they once turned him down or something," morris commented, "which when i was treasurer of friendship lodge, 129, i. o. m. a., before we quit giving sick benefits, abe, we turned down a feller by the name turkeltaub on account of varicose veins, and the way he went around calling us all kinds of highwaymen you wouldn't believe at all." "but the newspaper feller that interviewed him says that the kaiser seems to be in pretty good health, mawruss," abe declared. "that don't make him a good risk, neither," morris retorted. "i suppose the interviewer didn't say how his appetite was." "what's his appetite got to do with it?" abe asked. "because, in speaking of murderers just before they go to the chair, abe," morris concluded, "the newspaper always say, 'the condemned man ate hearty.'" xi it is still up in the air, but you can't say the same for transatlantic voyages "i am surprised to see that an old-established and well-settled government like mexico should got a revolution on his hands, mawruss," abe potash declared as he skimmed the head-lines in the morning papers. "what makes you think that mexico is an old-established and well-settled government, abe?" morris perlmutter asked. "germany and hungary do," abe replied, "which up to the time this here general blanquet lands the other day in mexico, people was beginning to say that why couldn't germany have one last revolution and stick to it and look at mexico the way she settled down, not having had a single revolution to speak of since january fifteenth, nineteen-nineteen." "well, i think the reason why the mexicans 'ain't had a revolution in so long isn't because they didn't want to, abe," morris said, "but because it has taken them all that time to learn the technical terms. you see, a really and truly up-to-date revolution couldn't be run off nowadays, abe, unless it is one of them bolshevik type revolutions, and in order to get the right kind of newspaper publicity for it the management has got to know enough russian not to say _soviet_ when they mean _mir_. also i bet yer when it comes to a zemstvo, the mexicans don't know even now whether you dance it to a guitar and cascanet accompaniment or eat it with garlic and chili sauce." "a feller could make quite some money nowadays from teaching russian by mail to revolutionary socialists," abe commented. "that ain't necessary in this country, abe," morris said, "because the bolshevik government in russia has sent over here a feller by the name of martens to give a course in bolshevism to american working-men." "and did our government let him land?" abe asked. "seemingly they did," morris replied, "which is pretty liberal of our government when you consider that right now we got american soldiers in russia which is fighting bolshevism." "it's even more than liberal, it's crazy," abe said, "because while i believe in free speech, y'understand, bolshevik speeches ain't free by a whole lot. over in hungary they became payable in thirty, sixty, and ninety days and the only people which ain't ruined by them is the makers and indorsers." "you are right about the makers, abe," morris commented. "for the most part they are a bunch of no-account foreigners which all they risk by making such speeches is hoarseness, y'understand, but some of the indorsers of such speeches comes from the best american families, and if the time ever comes when there _should_ be a little temporary bolshevik trouble by foreigners in this country who have been encouraged by the liberal attitude of the government to think that the worst which could happen to them would be ten dollars or ten days, y'understand, them indorsers would got to pay the same like any other decent, respectable people which ain't bolsheviks. take, for example, in hungary and the protelariats is making the middle class give up their bath-rooms to the working-people every saturday night." "but the protelariats in new york has all got bath-rooms in their tenement-houses, mawruss," abe protested. "i know they have, but they'll probably figure that why should they trouble themselves to empty the coal out of their bath-tubs, which is what them protelariats now use bath-tubs for, abe, just to save the middle class the inconvenience of changing their bath night from saturday to friday," morris said, "but at the same time, abe, it don't look to me that a country which has got the modern convenience of america is going to go bolshevik for the next few hundred years, anyway, because it is my idee that what makes a people become bolsheviks is the lack of good plumbing and savings-bank accounts, and rather as have the privacy of their bath-rooms and their savings-bank accounts invaded, the big majority of the american people would declare the united states of america an obsolete monarchy with ivan d. ivanovitch, alias john d. rockafeller, jr., as the first czar, understand me." "well, if i would be the united states government i wouldn't let a bolshevik land exactly," abe declared. "what do you mean--you wouldn't let him land _exactly_?" morris asked. "i mean what i say," abe said. "i would let him pretty nearly land and then tip up the gang-plank. also, mawruss, if i would be the united states government, i would allow free speech, but not free speakers, y'understand, which i would make public speaking a profession the same like lawyers, dentists, or doctors, because if nobody could be a public speaker without taking a four-year course in public speaking and then getting licensed to practise as a public speaker after passing an examination, y'understand, he would think anyhow twice before he says something in public which would bring him up on charges to show cause why he shouldn't have his license to practise as a public speaker taken away from him. in other words, mawruss, the way i would prevent bolshevism is that i would make the sheepskin take the place of the soapbox as a necessary article for public speaking, and incidentally in the foreign neighborhoods of our big cities, y'understand, not only would soap-boxes be used for soap, but it would also go a long way towards making bath-tubs used for bathing." "at the same time, abe," morris said, "i couldn't help thinking that if the feller who talks in public was given less to talk about, y'understand, it would help a whole lot, too, which there wouldn't be nearly so many loafers go into the bolshevik line if there wasn't so many respectable people engaged in what might be called manufacturing bolshevik supplies, such as army officers which claims that nobody has a right to kick if a soldier gets ten years' hard labor for using bad grammar in speaking to an officer, y'understand. also there is a lot of state legislatures in this country which has seemingly formed themselves into societies for the encouragement of bolshevism by earning, anyhow, the gratitude of canners and cotton manufacturers who have got women and children working for them till all hours of the night, y'understand. then again there is the perfectly respectable people which would like to make by law a sunday out of every week-day and a living tomb out of sunday, understand me, and which would have nobody but themselves to blame if some day they would got to furnish soap and towels for the protelariats in their bath-rooms." "well, i'll tell you," abe said, "bolshevism as a form of government is pretty nearly exploded, mawruss. it is now used principally as a threat such as when germany says if the polaks get danzig and west prussia, y'understand, germany would take up bolshevism, and paderewski says if the polaks don't get danzig, poland would take up bolshevism, understand me." "and paderewski would take up giving piano lessons to raise enough money to get out of poland, abe," morris commented, "and he would probably have to do so, too, as there ain't much chance of his getting away with that danzig stuff. also, abe, we americans should ought to be the last to encourage him to think that he will, abe, because while i don't know how long it is since danzig, germany, was danzig, poland, i do know that it ain't nearly so long ago as galveston, texas, was galveston, mexico, y'understand. so, therefore, if mr. wilson lets poland get back danzig, it wouldn't be long before mexico would elect teresa carreã±o or fannie bloomfield zeisler as president and claim galveston with a corridor taking in san antonio and houston, understand me." "just the same, i am in favor that germany should have to give up danzig even if danzig 'ain't belonged to poland since 1492 and the only danzig people now speaking polish as a regular language is the interpreter of the first district magistrate's court for the city and county of danzig, y'understand," abe declared. "furthermore, i think this here peace conference is taking it too particular about what germany should or shouldn't give up, mawruss, which if the shoe pinched on the other foot, mawruss, and this here peace conference was being held in berlin or vienna, y'understand, with germany, austria, turkey, and bulgaria as the big four, understand me, there wouldn't be any question as to what allied territory would or wouldn't be given up by the allies, mawruss. if germany would have won the war, mawruss, she would have taken calais and boulogne with as much argument over it as a golluf-player taking a scotch highball, y'understand, and if france would have threatened to go bolshevik on account of it, germany would of said, 'don't do us no favors,' understand me, and let it go at that. so, therefore, if the people of danzig couldn't speak polish, mawruss, let 'em learn to do so, even if it would be necessary for them to go to a nose and throat specialist till they got used to the pronunciation." "say, for my part i am willing that this here peace conference should do anything and everything, abe, just so long as they would get through with their work and i wouldn't have to listen no longer to your nonsense," morris declared. "no nonsense at all," abe protested. "the thing this here peace conference should ought to have done from the start was to consider what germany would have done under the circumstances, put the reverse english on it, and then let her whoop, which i see by the paper that they are now getting ready to make airyoplane journeys across the atlantic ocean, mawruss." "and what's that got to do with this here peace conference?" morris asked. "nothing," abe said, "except that i see mr. wilson is writing home that they should please send over the _george washington_ in case it should be necessary for him to make good any bluff he might throw to the peace conference that if they don't do as he says, he would leave them flat and go back to america. so, therefore, if he has to make good sooner than he thinks, he could go home by airyoplane and not wait for the _george washington_." "i don't think that this here transatlantic airyoplane flying is exactly in the president-carrying class just yet, abe," morris suggested. "neither do i, mawruss," abe said, "but the manufacturers of airyoplanes seems pretty confident, mawruss. in fact, i see in the papers that it won't be but a matter of a few years when the new york business man which has business to do in london, instead of getting on the _mauretania_ in new york and landing six days later in liverpool, y'understand, would be able to take the railroad to halifax, nova scotia, spend the night there or anyhow only as many nights there as it would be necessary before the steamer sails for saint john's, newfoundland, and then take the steamer to saint john's, newfoundland, where there would be a passenger airyoplane in waiting and no first-class hotels, y'understand. at saint john's, such is the strides airyoplane-manufacturing has made, mawruss, he would probably only have to stick around for five or six days till the airyoplane was in shape to leave, understand me, and in twenty-four hours he would land at the azores, where there ain't no hotels at all, understand me. in less than four days more, provided the repairs didn't take longer, he would be on his way to lisbon, portugal, which he would reach on the following day or days. there the same airyoplane or another airyoplane, in case the same airyoplane got smashed in landing, would be ready or approximately ready to start for paris, and might even start, you couldn't tell. on arriving in paris, he would be only a few hours by railroad and steamer from london, provided he was in shape to travel, which, when you consider that only a few years ago flying was in its infancy, mawruss, you've got to admit that nobody could ever have dreamed that it was possible to make such a journey." "not unless you ate something which disagreed with you before you went to sleep," morris commented, "and even then, abe, where is the advantage?" "it ain't the advantage, it's the novelty of the thing," abe said, "and i'll bet yer, mawruss, that if an airyoplane company was to open a ticket-office in new york to-morrow, mawruss, men would be standing in line to buy accommodations on the first available airyoplane--men with wives and families and no life insurance at that." "they would be the very first ones," morris agreed, "but the way it looks to me, abe, new york business men which has not business to do in london would continue to take twin-screw steamers with bilge keels, no matter how unimportant the business they was going to transact over there might be, because even the stockholders in airyoplane-manufacturing corporations would got to admit that while airyoplane-flying ain't in its infancy, exactly, it ain't in the prime of life, neither. also, abe, as long as gas only costs a dollar twenty-five a thousand cubic feet, why should any one want to pull off such a high-priced suicide as these here transatlantic airyoplane voyages is going to be?" "anyhow, the first one has still got to be made yet, mawruss," abe remarked. "and even if the tenth one was successful, abe," morris concluded, "you could take it from me, this here transatlantic airyoplane navigation ain't going to put much of a crimp into the business of manufacturing seasick remedies. am i right or wrong?" xii this here victory liberty loan "the way some people is acting about this here victory loan, mawruss," abe potash remarked one morning in april, "you would think that they was all presidents of a first national bank and that this here carter j. glass has already made a big overdraft and if he don't like the line of credit they are giving him, he should be so good as to take his account somewheres else, y'understand." "them same people probably think that investing their money in any securities bearing interest at less than fifteen per cent. per annum is, so to speak, the equivalence from giving money to orphan-asylums and hospitals, understand me," morris perlmutter said. "'we already give them liberty loan _schnorrers_ two hundred dollars toward the expenses of their rotten war,' they probably say, 'and _still_ they ain't satisfied.'" "and at that they don't mean nothing by it," abe said, "because there is a whole lot of business men in the united states which couldn't even give up the family housekeeping money every week without anyhow saying to their wives: 'here, take my blood; take my life. what do you want from me, _anyway_?'" "maybe they do and maybe they don't mean nothing by it, abe," morris said, "but it would be a whole lot easier for this here carter j. glass if everybody would act as his own victory bond salesman and try to sell himself just one more bond than he has really got any business buying, y'understand." "it would be a whole lot easier for this here carter j. glass, mawruss, but it would be practically impossible for pretty nearly everybody else," abe remarked, "which human nature is so constituted, mawruss, that the only time a man really and truly uses some high-class, silver-tongued salesmanship on himself is when he is trying to persuade himself that it is all right for him to do something which he knows in his heart it is dead wrong for him to do." "well, at least, abe, in this here victory loan campaign, every man should ought to try to put himself in the place of the salesman which is trying to sell him some of these victory bonds," morris continued, "so we would say, for example, that you would be a victory bond salesman, abe, and you are calling on a feller which he is a pretty tough proposition in such matters by the name of, we would say, for instance, abe potash." "why don't you make the feller which the salesman is supposed to call on a really and truly hard-boiled egg, by the name, we would say, for instance, mawruss perlmutter?" abe asked. "which when you put up to me a hypocritical case, mawruss, why is it you must always start in by getting insulted already?" "what do you mean getting insulted?" morris asked. "i am only putting something up to you for the sake of argument not arguments." "well, then, why not be perfectly neuter and call the tough proposition which the victory bond salesman is visiting, somebody by the name of a competitor like leon sammet, for instance?" abe suggested. "because i am trying to make you put yourself in the place of the victory bond salesman who is trying to sell you bonds," morris declared. "put your _own_ self in the place of the victory bond salesman," abe exclaimed, "which if you want to give me any hypocritical cases for the sake of argument, mawruss, i have seen the way you practically snap the head off a collector for a charitable fund enough times to appreciate how you would behave towards a victory bond salesman, so go ahead on the basis that you are the tough proposition and not me." "a charitable fund is one thing and this here victory loan another," morris said. "i know it is," abe agreed, "but at the same time, mawruss, a whole lot of people feels that if ever they give a couple dollars to an orphan-asylum, they practically got vaccinated against future attacks of the same complaint, and if three years later the collector for the orphan-asylum calls on them again they say: 'why, i already gave you two dollars for that orphan-asylum! what did you done with it all?' and i bet yer that just as many people considered that the fifty-dollar bond which they bought during the first liberty loan campaign should ought to have set up such a strong antiseptic in their system that they would be immune to all other liberty bond campaigns, no matter if such campaigns would continue until there was, god forbid! a fiftieth liberty loan already." "some people never even got, so to speak, jabbed the first time," morris observed, "and the way they avoid liberty bond salesmen, abe, you would think that such a salesman was a sort of liberty bond typhoid mary and would infect them tightwads with a disease where they were liable to break out all over with coupons or something." "as a matter of fact, mawruss, that's just the effect which a liberty bond salesman should ought to have on the right kind of sitson," abe said, "which while i don't mean to say that making a good investment like buying of a liberty bond should ought to be considered as a disease, mawruss, it should anyhow be infectious and should ought to spread so rapidly that everybody in the united states could say they had it to the extent of at least one fifty-dollar bond of the victory loan." "but there is over a hundred million people in the united states, abe," morris said, "and if they all bought one fifty-dollar bond, y'understand, it would make the victory loan five billion dollars, whereas this here carter j. glass is only asking for four billion five hundred million." "well, to my mind, he's acting too modest, mawruss," abe went on, "because if we expect germany to raise the first five billion dollars of her indemnity with nothing to show for it but the promise that she would have to raise five billion more every two years till the whole indemnity was paid, understand me, how much more should we raise over here with the promise that it is going to be paid back to us in a few years, with interest at the rate of four and three-quarters per cent. per annum? why, under them conditions, mawruss, any american which would refuse to buy a victory loan bond should ought to be considered as applying for german sitsonship papers and should ought to be exported to hamburg, where his adopted fellow-sitsons is getting frisked by the german government for every cent they possess and ain't getting so much as a receipt to show for it." "for that matter, an american which refuses to buy victory liberty bonds should ought to completely lost his memory, abe," morris declared. "evidently a feller, if some one starts a conversation about the war, is going to say, '_what_ war?' and when it is reminded to his memory that as recently ago as last november the papers was printing every day columns and columns about the war which was going on in europe, he would probably say: 'oh, _that_ war! i thought that war was already a thing of the past.' and also probably he might even ask, 'tell me, was there many people hurt?'" "well, if some folks has got such short memories like all that, and is only affected by what they have read in the papers at the latest the day before yesterday, mawruss," abe said, "why not have the victory liberty loan salesmen approach them on the basis of what is going on _now_ in europe? 'you are asked,' such a salesman would say, 'to invest your money in a first-class a-number-one security, backed by the united states government and bearing interest at the rate of four and three-quarters per cent. per annum, and that is the very least you could do for your country when you consider that right now,' the salesman would say, and he should practise in advance to make his voice sound tragical, 'right now _your_ uncles and _my_ uncles is making peace in paris with all the strength of language which they've got in their system. "'yes, mr. sitson,' the salesman should go on to say, 'the government is only asking _you_ to invest in interest-bearing cash money, so to speak, and what for a sacrifice is _that_ compared to the suffering of _your_ father-in-laws and _my_ father-in-laws which is bravely standing larynx to larynx in the battle area of the peace conference while the air is filled with the french, italian, greek, jugo-slob, and polish remarks? _you_ sit here in your comfortable home while the flower of our experts and college professors is exposed to all kinds of coffee and cigars. ain't you ashamed to be doing nothing but buy bonds when old and feeble men like most of the american peace delegates is battling with french waiters, french taxicab-drivers, french hotel service, and french laundry-lists, giving and receiving no mercy, y'understand, and you should thank heaven that your own country has been spared the horrors of having on our own soil this here peace conference which is now raging in paris, understand me.'" "that would be anyhow an argument," morris admitted, "but with these here victory liberty bonds it shouldn't ought to be a case of first come first serve. with only four and a half billion dollars' worth of victory liberty bonds for sale, abe, seventy-five per cent. of the people of the united states should ought to be going around looking as sore as fellers that sell tickets in theater box-offices, and when any one asks 'em why, they should say: 'ain't it just my luck! i put off buying my victory liberty bonds till april 23d, and when i got round to the bank there wasn't one left.' yes, abe, instead of victory liberty bond salesmen having to go about visiting customers, y'understand, they should ought to have luxurious fitted-up offices, and it should ought to be a case of when the customer arrives the victory liberty bond salesman should ought to be playing auction pinochle or rummy with two other victory liberty bond salesmen. then when the customer says is this the place where they sell victory liberty bonds, the salesman says, 'i'll be with you in a minute,' and makes the customer stand around without even offering him a seat until the salesmen gets through playing two more hands. the customer should then make out his own application, y'understand, have the exact change ready, and close the door quietly when leaving, and that's the way i would sell victory liberty bonds if i was the government." "that's the way you even try to sell garments," abe commented. "because," morris continued, evading the challenge, "it is my idee that it is a privilege to be allowed to buy these here victory liberty bonds, and before any one gets that privilege, abe, he should be made to prove that he has done something to deserve it. yes, abe, instead of a man wearing a button to show that he has bought liberty bonds, he should ought to go before a notary public and make an oath that he has given up his quota to all red cross and united war relief drives and otherwise done everything he could do to help win the war if he couldn't fight in it, y'understand, and then, and only then, abe, he should be given a button entitling him to buy victory liberty bonds under the conditions i have stated." "but, joking apart, mawruss, and talking business, not poetry, understand me," abe asked, "do you actually think that this here victory liberty loan would be all taken up by them methods? to my mind, mawruss, it would be a whole lot better to look the horse straight in the teeth, y'understand, and take it as settled that a lot of people which has got the money to buy bonds would go round saying that they would be very glad to buy bonds if they only had the money, y'understand. to such people, mawruss, i would remind them again that a war, even when you win it, ain't a cash-in-advance proposition. in fact, a war ain't even a c. o. d. proposition. wars is paid for on the instalment plan, mawruss, and while this particular war is over, understand me, the bill has still got to be paid, and if such people won't lend the government the money to pay for the war, the government would have to do what the german government is going to do to the german people--instead of touching them for it and paying it back, they would frisk them for it and not even say much obliged, y'understand." "at that, abe, i ain't worried a whole lot about the result of this victory liberty loan," morris said. "when all is said and done, abe, the american people love their country." "i know they do," abe agreed, "but also, mawruss, there is a whole lot of fellers which loves their families and at the same time don't lose no sleep nights because they ain't providing for them as they should ought to do. so to them people i would say: 'which would you rather have it as a souvenir of the war: victory liberty bonds or tax bills?' also, 'would you sooner be paid interest or would you sooner pay interest?'" "in other words, abe, you would threaten 'em into buying bonds," morris observed. "only when it's necessary, mawruss," abe concluded, "and that wouldn't be in the case of one thousandth of one per cent. of the entire population, because the great majority of the people thinks the way i do about their money: the government let me make it, and the government lets me keep it, and if the government would sooner borrow part of it instead of taking it all, mawruss, that's only the government's good nature, which nobody should presume too much on good nature, mawruss. am i right or wrong?" xiii when is a secret treaty secret? "i see where president wilson sent a letter to the german government that they might just so well save the car fare and not send any delegates to this here peace conference which wouldn't be prepared for the worst, mawruss," abe potash said one morning in april. "you would think, considering how excited the german people gets nowadays, that they would have a hard time finding any one to take the job of delegate, abe," morris perlmutter suggested, "which the least that happens to one of them german delegates after the german people finds out what was in the paper he signed is that his executioners would claim that the daylight-saving law made it unnecessary for them to wait till sunrise, y'understand." "well, he would always have the excuse that the only thing he seen of the peace treaty before he signed it was a dotted line, mawruss," abe said, "and also, mawruss, it is just possible that the return half of them german peace delegates will read _via_ amsterdam, and that before taking a three years' lease of an amsterdam apartment some of them peace delegates would first visit a ticket-scalper and get that much off their minds, anyway." "and even in paris them german peace delegates wouldn't be, neither," morris declared, "which i see that the french government is too safe arranging for the accommodation of them german delegates at a hotel next to the place where the peace treaty is going to be signed, abe, and the lot on which the hotel stands is going to be protected with an egg-proof fence eight feet high so that the german delegates can escape any stray rotten eggs." "the fence could be twelve feet high, mawruss," abe remarked, "and it wouldn't do any good, because nobody could escape rotten eggs in a french hotel, mawruss, rotten coffee, neither. also, mawruss, eggs 'ain't got nothing to do with that fence, because if that fence wouldn't be there, mawruss, when it comes time for them german delegates to sign the treaty, mawruss, the peace conference would got to appoint a committee of resident buyers to round up them german delegates, on account that nobody else but resident buyers who is accustomed to entertaining their american clients would know where them german delegates had disappeared to." "well, in a way it is the peace conference's own fault because they sent word to the german government that they didn't want to deal with no messengers, but that the german delegates should all be high-up officials, abe," morris said, "which seemingly as a general thing the higher up a german happens to be, y'understand, the lower down he can act. take, for example, the crown prince, abe, and i always thought that no matter how much people abused him, abe, he could anyhow go home and say to his wife whatever i done, i done it all for you, instead of going somewhere else and saying it to ballet-dancers, as his wife's mother claims." "i understand he was leading a double life, mawruss," abe observed. "he was leading a double life in spades, abe," morris declared, alluding to the game of auction pinochle. "day after day his wife's mother says he would leave the house to go down-town to the palace, and instead he would go down-town not to the palace and never show up till all hours of the morning. then when his wife asked him where he was putting in his time, y'understand, instead of acting reasonable and telling her a phony story about being sick and tired of getting stuck at the reichskanzlei night after night, and that he wished the old man would get through springing a new chancellor on him every week, understand me, he gives himself dead away by getting sore. in fact, abe, his mother-in-law says that the hohenzollern royal colors is black and blue, anyhow so far as the crown princess is concerned, and that she made up her mind that she wouldn't let her daughter live with him no longer, so the chances is that if the german people goes back to the monarchy, they would not only got to pay indemnities for what the crown prince done, but alimony besides." "well, even if the mother-in-law couldn't prove what she says about her daughter's husband, which very few mother-in-laws can, mawruss," abe said, "the crown princess would be able to get her devorce upon the grounds that her husband was convicted of a felony, y'understand, which he will be, mawruss, just so soon as the peace conference has finished drawing up the indictment." "then them german people will be paying her temporary alimony permanently for the rest of her life, abe," morris said, "because them fellers which is drawing the indictments against the kaiser and the crown prince seems to be taking their own time about it." "it's a big job, mawruss, because you take the indictment against the crown prince, mawruss, and the chances is that the first two hundred counts alone is for french chã¢teau furniture, and when some one steals anything from a french chã¢teau, mawruss, it's a hundred to one that he is guilty not only of larceny, y'understand, but of concealing mortgaged property besides, understand me," abe said, "which it has always been a wonder to me, mawruss, that some of these ladies of the four hundred who open tea-rooms for european war relief has never considered doing nothing for them ruined mortgagees of france, or the suffering judgment creditors of allied noblemen. most of our best families has had experience some time or another with railroad reorganizations, and you would think they would have enough sympathy for them starving lienors of france, mawruss, to get up, anyhow, a bazaar. it could be advertised with a picture by some big artist like c. g. gibson, where an old man in what used to was a fur overcoat before the moths got into it is bending over liber 2244 of mortgages, page 391, which is all the old feller has got to show for what was once a first lien on some gilt-edged chã¢teau property, mawruss." "well, i'll tell you," morris said, "there's a certain number of people which nobody has got any sympathy with, like mortgagers, coal dealers, head waiters, garage proprietors, and fellers which works in theayter ticket-offices, to which, of course, must also be added postmaster-general burleson." "and why that feller is so unpopular is a mystery to me, mawruss," abe said. "you would think, to hear the way the newspapers talk about him, that the very least he had done was to mix arsenic with the gum which they put on the backs of stamps, whereas, so far as i could see, the poor feller is only trying to do his duty and keep down the wages of telephone operators, which i don't know how strong telephone operators is with the rest of the country, but compared with the hit that they make with me, mawruss, mr. burleson would be a general favorite, y'understand." "he was already in bad before them telephone girls struck on him, abe," morris said, "and for the very reason, as you say, that he has always done his duty as he seen it, which the trouble with them fellers that do their duty as they see it is that nobody else could see it, abe. it is also the case that them people which do their duty as they see it usually has rotten eyesight, abe, and when it comes right down to it, abe, there is even some people which claims that mr. wilson should also consult an oculist to find out if he don't need to have his glasses changed. in fact, there's a couple of fellers by the name orlando and sonnino which seems to think that mr. wilson is practically blind so far as fiume is concerned." "you mean to say they 'ain't settled that fiume thing yet, mawruss?" abe asked. "they did and they didn't," morris said. "mr. wilson give out a long statement about it in which he thought he settled it, abe, and the italian peace delegates said they would go home and leave the peace conference flat, y'understand, and thought they settled it, but the way it looks now, abe, if the peace conference stays in session till they do settle it, when mr. wilson comes back and explains the peace treaty to congress, he will speak with such a strong french accent that only the members from louisiana will be able to understand a word he says." "but why does mr. wilson say that italy shouldn't have fiume?" abe inquired. "because it doesn't square up with his fourteen points," morris replied, "and seemingly he don't want to stretch a point." "well, if he did, mawruss, it wouldn't be the first time," abe declared, "because if you recollect them fourteen points, which is more than most people could, mawruss, point number one said that there should be open covenants of peace openly arrived at, mawruss, and also something about such terms being discussed openly, frankly, and in the public view, mawruss, and the way mr. wilson has stretched that point, mawruss, it'll never look like the same point again." "say!" morris interrupted. "as a keep-it-dark proposition, abe, mr. wilson 'ain't got nothing on this here lloyd george, clemenceau, and the firm of orlando & sonnino, to say nothing of the japanese delegates, which i suppose you heard about them secret treaties, abe." "i never heard tell of them," abe replied. "neither did mr. wilson until the other day, which the way it happened was this," morris continued: "orlando & sonnino was talking the whole thing over in a friendly way with lloyd george and mr. wilson, and mr. wilson says that when it come right down to it italy's claims to trieste wasn't what would be called in the language of diplomacy exactly kosher, neither, and sonnino says: 'is that so? well, how about our treaty?' and although orlando kicked his partner under the table and lloyd george give him one of them what-are-you-trying-to-do-spoil-everything looks, mr. wilson caught on right away. 'what treaty?' he asked, and lloyd george says: 'why, you know what treaty. i was sitting right here when clemenceau told you all about it,' and it appears that all the time mr. wilson was kidding himself along that if he compromised by letting italy have trieste, she would pass up fiume, abe, it seems she had a secret agreement with france and england that she was to have trieste, anyway." "no wonder mr. wilson feels sore," abe remarked. "wait, that ain't all," morris said. "now it appears that japan has also a secret treaty with france and england to get a slice of china which formerly belonged to germany, y'understand, and mr. wilson is beginning to experience what it is like when you sit in a poker game all evening and don't find out till the last round is on that everybody else around the table is playing for the house." "they could all be playing honest at that, mawruss," abe suggested. "sure they could, with the exception of having a couple of secret treaties or so," morris agreed, "but at the same time, abe, i wouldn't be a bit surprised if since the discovery of these here secret treaties, mr. wilson has waked up more than once somewheres around three a.m. and asked himself did he or did he not need a mandatory, y'understand, and also wondered what the folks back home is thinking--particularly a few senators like lodge and johnson." "i don't agree with you, mawruss," abe declared. "i think that mr. wilson will get the better end of the deal, because from what has happened in this war, mawruss, diplomacy is one of them games where the feller which don't know how to play it has got a big advantage over the feller that does. so, therefore, while the old-time experienced diplomatist is saying it never has been done that way and therefore couldn't be done, mawruss, a new beginner like mr. wilson has already gone to work and done it, which i bet yer right now, mawruss, that if mr. wilson don't want italy to have fiume she won't get it, and the same thing goes for japan also, mawruss--secret treaty or no secret treaty." "still, there's a whole lot of people in america which would like to see italy get fiume, abe," morris said. "there was a whole lot of people, mawruss," abe said, "but this secret-treaty business has killed it, which if italy wanted to be fair about it, why didn't she come right out before the armistice even and say, 'look-a-here, we got a secret treaty and we may as well tell you so right from the start'?" "then the secret treaty wouldn't been no more secret, abe," morris said. "she would have been doing the manly thing, anyway," abe said. "i know she would," morris admitted, "but that's the difference between the old-fashioned italian diplomacy and the new-fashioned american diplomacy. the italians believe that there should be secret covenants of peace secretly arrived at, and we believe that there should be open covenants of peace openly arrived at." "there is also the difference, mawruss, that the italians stick to their beliefs," abe concluded, "and we don't." xiv the first day of may "i see where in genoa they already changed the name of a street which only last week they called wilson avenue, mawruss," abe potash said one morning after the rupture with orlando. "well, that's the trouble with calling articles after the latest popular success, abe," morris said. "it don't make no difference if it's streets or cigars, the first thing you know the people gets a grouch on the original of the brand and the manufacturer has got to tear up a few thousand flor de president wilson labels and go back to calling it the regalia de ginsburg brothers, or whatever the name was." "but in genoa they didn't go back to the name of the old street, mawruss," abe said. "they renamed it fiume street." "and it wouldn't surprise me in the least if a few burleson streets was changed to second class avenue, abe," morris declared, "on account this is a time of great ups and downs in the reputations of politicians, not to say statesmen, abe, which six months from now nobody would be able to say offhand whether the name was bela hanson or old kun except the immediate family in budapest or seattle, as the case may be." "in a way, mawruss, the reputations of politicians, not to say statesmen, can get to be, so to speak, a nuisance to their fellow-countrymen," abe observed, "which it happens once in a while that some politicians and statesmen gets to having such a high regard for their reputations, mawruss, they would sooner injure their country than their reputation. italian statesmen, french statesmen, english statesmen, and even, you might say, american statesmen goes about their work with one eye on the job in hand and the other eye on a possible statue or so at the junction of main street and railroad avenue in their native town, y'understand, with a subscription on the pedestal: "'harris j. sonnino erected by his fellow-townsmen of east rome, august 1, 1919.'" "such an ambition, anyhow, makes the statesmen try to do the right thing," morris observed. "and it also occasionally makes him do the obstinate thing, mawruss," abe continued. "in fact, mawruss, sometimes i couldn't help wishing that it was the custom to have corporations and not men as ambassadors and presidents, because it would be such a simple matter when the republicans nominated the chicago title guarantee, security and mortgage company for president and the democrats nominated the algonquin trust company, of pottstown, for the voters of the country to compare the statement of assets of each company and judge which was the most reliable, y'understand. also, mawruss, if the algonquin trust company was now president of the united states, understand me, and somebody was to say they didn't like the way the president was running things at the peace conference, y'understand, nobody would have the nerve to arrest him for criticizing a great and good corporation like the algonquin trust company. furthermore, mawruss, if italy had been represented at this here peace conference not by sonnino, but by the milan trust company, which no doubt acts as executor, guardian or trustee like any other trust company, and therefore why not as ambassador, understand me, there never would have been no scrap about fiume arising from the fact that the milan trust company could never go home and face the people of italy without fiume, and also nobody would have considered that mr. wilson's statement was a direct slap in the face of the milan trust company, mawruss." "listen, abe," morris protested, "if you are trying to invent this _schmooes_ about corporations just so you could knock mr. wilson, y'understand, such a scheme wouldn't deceive a child even." "i wouldn't knock president wilson for anything, mawruss," abe retorted. "i _couldn't_ knock him, because when i think of mr. wilson i see before my eyes a good-looking gentleman with a pleasant smile on his face, y'understand, and not very far away stands mrs. wilson, which, if mr. wilson didn't put over even one fourteenth of his fourteen points, mawruss, his visit to europe with mrs. wilson wouldn't be wasted, mawruss, because it would have given them people over in the old country a chance to see what an american lady is and should ought to be, y'understand. but on the other hand, mawruss, if the democrats _had_ elected the algonquin trust company as president of the united states at the last election, y'understand, whenever i would think of the president of the united states i would see before my eyes a twenty-five-story fire-proof building with all the rents raised one hundred and fifty per cent. since last january, understand me, and i could go to work and knock with a clear conscience." "but why should you want to knock the president of the united states?" morris demanded. "ain't i telling you that i don't want to knock him?" abe declared. "all i am saying is that, if such a thing was possible, it would be a whole lot better to have a corporation as president of the united states instead of an individual, mawruss, because corporations don't get sick, corporations don't get insulted, a corporation _oser_ cares whether it gets cheered or hooted, and finally, mawruss, a corporation couldn't ride around italy in an open carriage with the king of italy and give the italian people the impression that all they had to do was to ask for fiume and it was theirs." "and another thing about a corporation, abe, is that it ain't a copartnership where one partner could get every day a headache from listening to the other partner talking a lot of nonsense, abe," morris declared, "which you must got to remember that, beginning the first of may, if you would go to a soda-fountain and say, 'give me something for a headache,' they would give you a united states internal revenue stamp for which you would got to pay two cents before they would even take the cork out of the bromo-asperin bottle." "what's the difference whether they tax a headache coming or going, mawruss?" abe commented. "a whole lot of difference," morris said. "in the first place, the taxes which the country used to collect in one week from people when they were catching headaches would be more than equivalence to the taxes which the country is going to the taxes which the country is going to collect from people curing headaches during the next ten years. also, abe, nobody thought it was a hardship to pay taxes on a coming headache, whereas there will be a terrible howl go up over the tax on the same article in the opposite direction." "at that, i think these here may 1st taxes is going to have a good effect on the american people, mawruss," abe said, "because there's nothing like taxes to make a man wake up and take an interest in the way the government is being run." "a man would got to be an awful sound sleeper in that respect if he wasn't roused up a little by the income tax which he has been paying for the past four or five years, abe," morris said. "that's only once a year, mawruss," abe said, "but these here may 1st taxes is going to keep him awake three hundred and sixty-five days out of the year. people which thought you was a tightwad if you happened to mention that six hundred million dollars of the country's money was used up in experimenting with aeroplanes, is now going to shriek in agony every time they buy a three-dollar-and-a-quarter shirt that it's a shame and a disgrace the way every little secretary in the president's cabinet is gallivanting half over europe on the people's money, and they'd probably be just as hard if the shirt only cost two dollars and a quarter, excepting that the luxury tax of ten per cent. is only collected from the purchasers of men's shirts of the value of three dollars and upwards on amounts in excess of three dollars each. also, mawruss, people which has just paid eight dollars for a bathrobe on which the tax would be ten per cent. of fifty cents, or five cents cash, y'understand, is going to say: 'couldn't that feller travel to and from europe in one state-room the same like anybody else? must he got to have a whole steamboat?' and they will start right in to estimate that the cost of keeping a steamboat the size of the _george washington_ in commission is forty-five thousand six hundred and twenty-two dollars and thirty-eight cents per diem, and is it any wonder you've got to pay a one-cent tax on every orange phosphate, understand me." "some people is willing to get in a knock at mr. wilson without even so much as an orange-phosphate tax for an excuse, abe," morris said, significantly. "i know they are," abe replied, innocently, "and as for postmaster-general burleson, seemingly he couldn't suit nobody no matter what he does. take, for instance, them fourteen bombs which was mailed in new york the other day, mawruss, and if it wouldn't be that postmaster-general burleson has probably given strict orders that no mail should be forwarded which was short even a half-a-cent postage-stamp even, the chances is that every one of them fourteen bombs would have been delivered and exploded by now. but suppose that, instead of postmaster-general burleson, we would have had as postmaster-general some good-natured feller which when his new york representatives called him up and told him they were holding fourteen packages there for additional postage, would have said: 'oh, let 'em go. we couldn't afford to be small about a little thing like additional postage.' and what would have happened? why, the fourteen judges, mayors, and assorted senators and district attorneys to which them packages was addressed would have been lucky if they escaped with nothing worse than singed eyebrows, mawruss. and to-day yet, mawruss, them fellers which has got only postmaster-general burleson to thank that they can still riffle a deck of cards, understand me, is probably going around beefing about the terrible delay in the delivery of mail under the administration of postmaster-general burleson." "and do you think that the police will ever find out who sent them bombs, abe?" morris asked. "probably not," abe replied, "but they will probably find some man or men who would have _liked_ to have sent them and would have been _glad_ to have sent them, and as nobody is going to miss such fellers, mawruss, it probably won't make much difference in the long run if any such case of mistaken identity ain't discovered until the sentence is carried out, y'understand." "i see that it says in the paper where the anarchists which sent them bombs was celebrating the first day of may, which is the anarchists' fourth of july, abe," morris observed, "which, considering all the trouble that takes place in europe with general strikes and riots on the first of may, abe, it's a wonder to me that the constitution of the league of nations didn't contain an article providing that in the interests of international peace, y'understand, the month of may should hereafter contain thirty days instead of thirty-one, commencing with the second day of may, and leave them anarchists up against it for a day to celebrate." "the first of may is the socialists' fourth of july, not the anarchists'," abe said, "which, while it is possible that these here anarchists sent them bombs around the first of may out of compliment to their friends the socialists, mawruss, an anarchist don't attach no particular sentiment to the day when a bomb explodes, just so long as it does enough damage, mawruss." "just the same, i am in favor of doing away with the first of may," morris insisted, "and if it ain't practical to abolish the date, abe, let 'em anyhow cut out the celebration. them general strikes causes a whole lot of trouble." "they do if you take them seriously," abe agreed, "because in this country, at least, mawruss, only a few people takes part in the may first general strike. this year we only had two of our work-people away on account of the general strike, and one of them now claims he stayed home on account of injuring his hand in one of our buttonhole-machines, which i have got proof to show, mawruss, that when the police threw him out of the hall where the meeting was taking place he landed on his wrist." "he should have landed on his neck," morris observed, "because if them socialists get hurt by their nonsense it's their own fault, abe. they go to work and announce a general strike, and naturally the authorities takes them seriously and gets ready for trouble with a lot of policemen, which you know as well as i do, abe, when the police gets ready for trouble they usually find it, even if they have to make it themselves. the consequence is, abe, that a fractured skull has become practically the occupational disease of being a socialist, just the same as phosphorus-poisoning attacked people which worked in match-factories in the old days before the swedish manufacturers invented matches which strike only on the box one time out of fifty if the weather conditions is just right." "sure, i know," abe observed, "but people worked in match-factories because they couldn't make a living in any other way, mawruss, whereas nobody compels any one to be a socialist if he don't want to, mawruss, and what enjoyment them socialists get out of it i don't know." "it gives them, for one thing, the privilege of wearing a red necktie," morris suggested. "and that don't make them a first-class risk for accident insurance," abe concluded, "around the first of may, anyhow." xv the peace treaty as good reading "at last the wind-up of this here peace conference seems to be in sight, mawruss," abe potash said to his partner, morris perlmutter, the day after the treaty of peace was handed to the german plenipotentiaries. "as short a time ago since as last week it begun to look like our american delegates was going to stay in paris for the rest of their lives, which, according to the tables of mortality prepared by some of our leading life-insurance companies, based on the average ages of all five of them delegates, would be anyhow until august 1, 1919." "well, they seem to have done a pretty good job, abe," morris observed. "i read over the accounts of the treaty of peace, abe, and what them germans has got to do outside of restoring the skull of the sultan okwawa under section eight of the treaty would keep her busy for fifty years yet." "and who is this here sultan okwawa?" abe inquired. "i don't know," morris replied, "but, considering the number of skulls which needs restoring on account of what the germans done during the past five years, abe, and also considering the fact that this is the only skull mentioned by name in the peace treaty, he must of had some pretty influential friends at the peace conference. also, i see that the germans is also to give back the papers belonging to m. reuher which they took in 1871, and, although section eight don't say nothing about it, i presume that if the papers are returned the finder can keep the money which was in the wallet at the time it was lost." "do you mean to tell me that this here peace treaty has got such small particulars like that in it?" abe demanded. "it don't seem to have overlooked anything, abe," morris went on, "which, when you consider that mr. wilson started in--in a small way--with only fourteen points, it's already wonderful how that man worked his way up. there must be several hundred thousand points in that peace treaty, including such points like the sultan's skull and this here reuher's papers, which mr. wilson never even dreamed of when he sat down that day in january, 1918, and thought out the original fourteen." [illustration: "which when you consider that mr. wilson started in--in a small way"] "he probably considered that if we ever licked germany sufficient to make her accept as much as thirty-three and a third per cent. of them fourteen points that we would be doing well already," abe remarked. "and so did everybody else," morris agreed. "and now they would got to accept a treaty of peace which loads up germany with practically every punishment that this here peace conference could think of except prohibition." "i must read that treaty sometime," abe said. "it sounds like it would be quite amusing already." "amusing ain't no name for it," morris said. "the way the american people is going to enjoy reading that treaty of peace, abe, would put mr. wilson not only in the class of favorite american presidents along with george washington and abraham lincoln, but also would give him an insured position as one of america's favorite authors along with harry bell wright and bradstreet. a good american could pass a very profitable month or so skimming it over, abe, which it consists of fifteen sections, of which only the head-lines fills three full pages of the morning papers." "well, how long do you think it would take them german delegates to read it, mawruss?" abe inquired. "they ain't going to read it," morris said. "they're only going to sign it, and it ain't a bad idea, neither, because if they did read it, abe, some of them germans would drop dead along about the second section, which describes how much of germany is left after france, poland, denmark, and belgium gets through helping themselves." "might they would expire while they was reading the first section, maybe," abe suggested. "the first section 'ain't got nothing to do with germany," morris explained. "the first section consists of the constitution of the league of nations." "is that the same constitution of the league of nations which them united states senators raised such a round robin about?" abe asked. "it has been changed since then," morris said. "the amendments consist of two commas contributed by ex-president taft and a semicolon from charles evans hughes. elihu root also suggested they insert the words _as aforesaid_ in the first paragraph and also the words _anything hereinbefore contained to the contrary notwithstanding_ in the last paragraph, but couldn't get by with it. however, abe, the league of nations is already such old stuff that people reading it in section one of the peace treaty will in all probability skip it the way they did the first time it come out, and, anyhow, the real treaty of peace, so far as the plot and action is concerned, don't start till the second section." "could you remember any of the second section?" abe asked. "that's the section which tells about how much territory germany gives up to poland, france, belgium, and denmark, and after it goes into effect, abe, it is going to considerably alter the words, if not the music, of '_deutschland, deutschland, ueber alles_,'" morris declared. "it also means, abe, that the school-boys who used to was geography sharks and could bound germany right off the reel, abe, would now got to learn them boundaries all over again and then take half an hour or so to tell what they've learned. you see, abe, the danzig area, for instance, consists of a v made a w by the addition of a similar v on the west, including the city of danzig and--" "excuse me," abe interrupted, "but this here sounds like a clothing alteration to me, which, if germany's boundary was made smaller, why did they got to put a couple of v's into it?" "the v's was put into poland's boundary, not germany's," morris said. "and i bet that poland breathes a whole lot easier now that her boundary has got a couple of v's in it," abe commented. "them two v's ain't all poland gets," morris continued. "she also gets the southeastern tip of silesia beyond and including oppeln, most of posen and west prussia, and a line is drawn from--" "that's all right," abe said. "i'll take your word for it, mawruss, because, while that might be music to some people's ears, when it comes to geography i couldn't tell one note from another. so go ahead and tell me what is in the next section." "the next section is also got in it a little complicated geography, abe," morris said. "it practically repeats what was said in the last section about how much territory germany gives up, and then proceeds to rub it in. you know, of course, about the sarre basin." "i _say_ i do, but don't let that stop you," abe replied. "go ahead and describe it to me just like as if i didn't." "well, to make a long story short before i tell it, abe," morris said, "the sarre valley, which in germany is like the scranton and wilkes-barre section in pennsylvania, is to be practically owned by france for fifteen years. at the end of that time, an election is going to be held and the people will vote as to whether they want to stay french or go back to germany." "and i suppose france will count the votes," abe commented, "in which case she will probably appoint a board of elections consisting of whoever happens to be the philadelphia director of public safety at that time, the leader of the eighth assembly district of new york city, and a couple of chicago aldermen, mawruss." "the treaty of peace don't provide for it," morris said, "but if any odds are quoted on the curb, abe, it wouldn't be on the result, but the size of the majority. there is also the same kind of an election to be held in schleswig-holstein, without much chance of a recount taking place, either, but so far as the rest of sections three, four, and five is concerned, abe, germany gives up all her interests in every part of the world without the privilege of even having all those in favor please saying aye, y'understand." "it would have made a big noise, anyhow," abe declared. "because the only people who ain't in favor of germany giving up her colonies is germans, and not _all_ germans at that." "however, what happens to germany in the first five sections of this here peace treaty, abe, is only, so to speak, the soup and entrã©e of the meal which the allies makes of her," morris said. "section six is where the real knife-and-fork work begins, abe, which it starts right in with the german army and reduces it to the size of the salvation army, exclusive of the doughnut-cooking department." "i'm surprised that you should compare the salvation army to a low-life army like the german army," abe protested. "i am only talking for the sake of argument, abe," morris assured him, "which if this here section six is carried out, abe, the new german army wouldn't be armed with anything near as dangerous as doughnuts. in fact, abe, the way this here peace treaty specifies what arms and ammunition the german army should be supplied with, the only thing that it would got to remind it that it is an army and not a _sã¤ngerbund_ would be the uniforms." "and i am surprised that the peace treaty didn't forbid uniforms also, mawruss," abe said, "because if it wouldn't of been for his uniforms, mawruss, the chances is that the german people would of caught on to that miserable four-flusher of a kaiser already long since ago, mawruss. take these here spiked helmets, in particular the ones which is made of nickel plate, mawruss, and only to wear such a thing is liable to bring out all the meanness in them naturally mean german soldiers, mawruss, so therefore i am in favor that the peace treaty be amended by providing that the uniform of the german army should be a three-button, black, single-breasted sack suit with no padding in the shoulders, mawruss, and the helmet should be a brown derby hat of the pattern of 1898, and that the soldiers agree to wear this derby hat, of the same block and width of brim, for at least twenty years, mawruss, because nothing takes the conceit out of a man so much as wearing a funny-looking hat, y'understand." "this here peace treaty don't need no outside assistance when it comes to taking the conceit out of the german army, and the navy, neither, abe," morris continued. "in fact, section six does the same to the german navy as you would like to do to the german army, excepting that, instead of derby hats, it refers to battle-ships. in other words, abe, it says that the german navy should have only six small battle-ships and that none of them could be replaced inside of twenty years. just consider for a moment how it feels for a speed-bug which once used to consider that if he didn't buy himself every three months a new special-body twin six, y'understand, that he was living pretty close to the cushion, and condemn such a feller to go round for the next twenty years in a four-cylinder 1910-model punkocar, abe, and you will get some small idea of what admiral von tirpitz and all them other bloodthirsty german admirals feels when they read that part of section six which refers to the new german navy." "that wasn't the way they used to feel," abe declared. "up to a few days ago, mawruss, von tirpitz and hindenburg and all them other german army and navy experts was treating this war like it would of been a pinochle game, and each of them was busy explaining by post-mortems how if his partner hadn't played the hand rotten they would have won by three points, not counting the last trick, but what are you going to do with a _strohschneider_ like that, and so forth." "did they mention anything about playing with marked cards?" morris asked. "they did not," abe said, "nor did they say anything about having stacked the cards or dealing off of the bottom of the deck, mawruss, but you would think from the way them fellers acted at versailles, mawruss, that this here peace conference is the breakup of a nice little friendly game, y'understand, and that _not_ only should the winners take i. o. u's. from the losers, but that it is also up to the winners to serve a good delicatessen supper and pay for the lights and attendance." "that must have been before they heard about the _capora_ which is in store for them under section seven of this here peace treaty, abe," morris said, "which in order that there shouldn't be any softening of the sound to them german cauliflower ears, abe, the words _one billion_ ain't used at all, but instead it speaks about a thousand million pounds, abe, and, while it ain't any harder to raise than one billion pounds, it certainly gives you the impression that it is." "and how many of these thousands of millions of pounds must the german people got to pay before they get through?" abe asked. "that the peace treaty don't say, abe," morris replied. "it leaves the fixing of the total amount for a commission to be appointed later, abe, and the german people will be notified of their liabilities not later than may 1, 1921; but in the mean time, abe, just to keep up their spirits they would got to pay a few instalments of one thousand million pounds each." "but if the instalments is one thousand million pounds each, mawruss, what do you think will be the grand total which germany would have to pay?" abe asked. "about the same grand total as the allies would have been obliged to pay if germany had won," morris replied. "and how much would that have been?" abe inquired. "all they could raise, abe," morris concluded, "plus ten per cent." xvi the german roman holiday and the americanization of americans "i was speaking to my wife's sister's boy which he is just getting ready to gradgawate from high school, mawruss, and i wish you could hear the way that feller talks, mawruss," abe potash said to his partner, morris perlmutter. "i shall probably got to have that pleasure, abe," morris perlmutter replied, "because the first thing your wife's relations does when they gradgawate from school or go broke, as the case may be, is to get a job in this place and the second thing they do is to get fired." "listen, mawruss," abe said, "if i would of given jobs in this place to the number of relations by marriage which you already stuck me with, y'understand, i might just so well run a free business college and be done with it, which what i was going to say was that this here young feller was telling me that in the old days when the romans won a war the way the allies did, they used to make the losers walk in a parade so that the roman people could see how them losers suffered." "and what's that got to do with my giving jobs to my wife's relations?" morris inquired. "it 'ain't got nothing to do with it, but if you would let me open my mouth once in a while and not try to gag me every time i want to tell you something, mawruss," abe continued, "maybe i could learn you something." "maybe," morris admitted, "but when you start in to tell about how smart one of your nephews by marriage is, abe, it generally ends up by our paying a few weeks' salary to a young feller which all he learned about double entry is making birds with a pen, so i just want to warn you before you go any further, abe, that in the future with me, abe, if any of your nephews is an expert bird-maker with a pen, y'understand, you should please find him a job in a millinery concern and let me out." "i wasn't going to say nothing about giving a job to nobody," abe protested. "all i am trying to tell you is that if the treaty of peace, which you talked my head off about the other day, contained a section that the germans should walk in a parade and show to the allies how that peace treaty made them suffer, mawruss, lenine and trotsky and all the other crickets who abuse mr. wilson like the new york republican newspapers and the american ladies who are attending that zurich permanent peace convention, would of called the allies all sorts of barbarians, y'understand. however, mawruss, it only goes to show how unnecessary such a section in the peace treaty would be, mawruss, because the germans is now obliging with a wonderful roman exhibition of themselves. in fact, mawruss, from the lowest to the highest, them german people seems to be saying to each other, 'let's act like real germans and make the worst of it!'" "did any one expect anything else from them germans?" morris asked. "well, from the way this here four-flusher von brockdorff-rantzau behaved the day they handed him the peace treaty, mawruss," abe said, "it looked like the germans had made up their minds to be just so stiff-necked as they always was, mawruss, and i begun to think that they were going to treat it as a case of _so mechullah, so mechullah_, y'understand, but the way them germans is now crying like children, mawruss, there ain't going to be enough sackcloth and ashes in germany to go around, and them german professors will have to get busy and invent some _ersatz_ sackcloth and ashes to supply the demand." "crooks are always poor sports, abe," morris declared, "in particular when they throw themselves on the mercy of the people that they didn't intend to show no mercy to themselves. take this here ebert, for instance, and he don't make no bones about saying that the german people relied on president wilson and the united states of america being easy marks, but _ai tzuris_, what a mistake that was! in effect he says that president wilson on january 22, 1917, made the statement that the victor must not force his conditions on the vanquished, and relying on that statement, germany went to work and got into a war with the united states because if germany got licked, y'understand, the worst that can happen her is that she makes peace again on her own terms, and then when germany did get licked, see what happens to her. president wilson behaves like a frozen snake in the grass which somebody tries to warm by putting the snake into his pants pocket, y'understand, and when the snake gets thawed out, understand me, it bites the hand that feeds it, and what are you going to do in a case like this?" "at that, mawruss, ebert ain't making near so bad an exhibition of himself as this here prince von hohenlohe. there was a feller which was used to was the german chancellor, mawruss," abe said, "and the dirty deals which he helped to put over on the rumanians and the russians, by way of treaties of peace, y'understand, was such that if we would of attempted it with the germans, mawruss, and the united states congress would of confirmed it, mawruss, victor berger would be fighting to be let out of the house of representatives and to be admitted to leavenworth, instead of _vice versa_, on the grounds that he didn't want to associate with no crooks, y'understand, but seemingly this here hohenlohe is suffering from loss of memory as well as loss of self-respect, mawruss, because he is now making speeches in which he is weeping all over his already tear-stained copy of the peace treaty and calling it the tragedy of versailles, whereas compared to the treaty of peace which you might call the tragedy of brest-litovsk, mawruss, this here versailles treaty of peace is a follies of 1919 with just one laugh after another, y'understand." "and i see also where this here scheidemann is also figuring very largely in this here roman exhibition the germans is making of themselves, abe," morris observed. "he said the other day that the germans would never, never, never--or anyhow not until next thursday a week--sign the peace treaty. he put his hand on where a german's heart would be if he had one, abe, and said that no germans would positively and absolutely not submit to any such treaty of peace as the one offered to them, or that is to say they would not submit to it except on and after may 22, 1919, and anyhow, nobody would ever trust president wilson again." "and yet, mawruss, when them germans gets over the first shock of this here peace treaty and wipe away their tears sufficient to see things a little more clearly, y'understand," abe commented, "it is just barely possible that they are going to do some rapid figuring on what they gain by not supporting a few thousand princes, not to mention the money which that bloodthirsty kaiser and his family used to draw in salaries and commissions, mawruss, and when these amounts are offset against indemnities which the germans are required to pay under the peace treaty, mawruss, it will in all probability be found that the german nation is beggared, as this here scheidemann would say, to the extent of $0.831416 per capita per annum by such indemnities. the result is going to be that some of them germans will then begin to figure how maybe it was worth that much money per capita per annum to get rid of that _rosher_ and they will also begin to realize that it has been worth even more than that much per capita per annum to the allied people to see a performance such as the german people continuing to weep in sympathy with ebert and scheidemann, y'understand, they will be advising them two boys to go and take for ten cents apiece some mathematic spirits of ammonia and quit their sobbing." "however, abe," morris remarked, "there was a few americans which instead of being in the audience enjoying the performance was back on the stage with the germans and weeping just so hard as any of them. take these here american lady delegates to the small-time peace conference which is running at zurich, switzerland, in opposition to the old original peace conference in paris, abe, and them ladies with their voices choked by tears, abe, passed a resolution that be it resolved that the peace treaty is already secret diplomacy, that it is the old case of the side winning the war getting the spoils, and a lot of other resolutions to which the only resolution anybody could pass in answer to such resolutions would be, 'well, what of it?'" "that only proves to me, mawruss, how necessary it is, this here americanization work which you read so much about in the papers," abe declared. "here is four american ladies which is lived in the country for some years--in fact, ever since they was born, and that ain't such a short time neither, when you see their pictures, mawruss, and yet them ladies talks like they never heard tell of the star-spangled banner. seemingly the fact that we licked germany don't appeal to them at all, and so far as these resolutions which they passed between sobs, mawruss, gives any indications, mawruss, they would like to have seen this here european war end in a draw, with perhaps germany getting just a shade the better of it." "and what has all this got to do with americanization work, abe?" morris inquired. "i always thought that americanization was taking the greenhorns which comes to this country from europe, and teaching them how to think and act like americans." "that comes afterward, mawruss," abe said, "because it seems that ever since this here european war, mawruss, americanization needs to begin at home, mawruss, and that the first ones to be americanized should ought to be americans. there is, for instance, mr. o. g. villard, who was born and raised in this country, mawruss, which he comes out with a statement the other day that them loafers of the munich soviet who killed all them professors and ladies a couple of weeks ago, compared very favorably with the legislatures of the states of new york and pennsylvania, mawruss. now when you consider that them two legislatures is part of our government, mawruss, the way it looks to me is that if a foreigner had said such a thing he would have been americanized without the option of a fine by the nearest city magistrate." "at the same time, abe," morris said, "when you read in the papers about the new york state senator thompson and the goings-on up in albany, abe, it looks like americanization should ought to be done at the source, y'understand, and then it wouldn't be necessary to americanize mr. villard at all." "sure, i know, mawruss," abe agreed, "but what i am driving into is that americanization for americans must appeal very strongly to colored americans, especially the americanization of those americans who believe that the colored man should ought to be put in his place and don't hesitate about designating the place as the end of a rope without the trouble and expense of a jury trial, y'understand." "i would even get a little more personal as that, abe," morris declared. "i would even say that there should ought to be classes in americanization for those americans who believe that the religion and race origin of certain other americans makes them eligible to give their children's lives to the country and their money to red cross and other war drives--but that it don't make them eligible to stay at first-class summer hotels or play golluf by first-class country clubs." "say," abe broke in, "there is need of more important americanization among americans than that, mawruss. there should ought to be americanization of americans who think it is american for landlords to ask for raises of their rent and un-american for workmen to ask for raises of their wages. in fact, this whole americanization movement should ought to be centered on americanizing out of americans any habits, customs, or schemes they try to put across which is apt to make polish-americans, italian-americans, jewish-americans or assorted foreign-americans say to one another, 'well, if that's the way americans behave, give me back my hyphen and let me go home.'" "well, after all, abe, it's a mighty small bunch of americans which ain't americanized yet," morris observed. "i know it," abe said, "and it's their smallness which makes me sore, mawruss, because no matter how small they are by number, or nature, mawruss, they are the ones that the turks pulled on us when we protested about them poor armenians _nebich_. also, mawruss, if mr. wilson should protest that the new polish republic ain't treating our people as equals, y'understand, the new polish republic could come right back with: 'neither is any number of summer hotels we could name in the adirondacks mountains of your own united states.' also, if the peace delegates from this country gives a hint to the greeks that there is colonies of bulgarians living in greece for years already which wants to be greeks and should ought to have the same voting rights as greeks, y'understand, all venezuela or whatever the greek secretary of state has got to say is, 'well, we hold that these people 'ain't got a right to vote under a law called the grandfather law, which we copied from similar laws passed in the states of georgia, alabama, and mississippi--in your own united states,' and them poor old peace delegates of ours wouldn't have a word to say." "at that, abe, i think all them disagreeable things in this country is going to be changed by the war," morris suggested. "perhaps, mawruss," abe concluded, "but considering what changes have taken place because of this war, it's wonderful how little changed things really are." xvii mr. wilson's favor of the 20th ulto. and contents noted "yes, mawruss," abe potash said to his partner, morris perlmutter, one morning recently, "a feller which has got to write to the newspaper to say that he didn't say what the newspaper said he said when it reported his speech, y'understand, has usually made a pretty rotten speech in the first place, and in the second place when he tries to explain what it really was that he did say, mawruss, it practically always sounds worse than what the newspaper said he said." "but what did he say and who said it, abe?" morris inquired. "ambassador morgenstimmung or morgenstern, i couldn't remember which, mawruss," abe replied, "and although he 'ain't wrote to the newspapers yet to deny that he said it, mawruss, it is only a question of time when he would do so, because he either said one thing or the other, but he couldn't say both." "listen, abe, if you think that unless you break it to me gradually what this here morgenstern said, it would be too much of a shock to me," morris announced, "let me tell you that it is a matter of indifference to me _what_ he said." "so it is to 'most everybody else except the immediate family, mawruss," abe continued, "but not to keep you in suspense, mawruss, what this ambassador morgenstern said was in a speech to the american soldiers in coblenz where he told them that there was going to be another big war in which america would got to fight during the next fifteen or twenty years, and also that he had every confidence in the league of nations." "well, there's a whole lot of united states senators which has got the same kind of confidence in the league of nations, abe," morris declared. "in fact, some of them is confident that the league of nations will bring about a war for us in even less than fifteen years." "well, i'll tell you," abe said, "the word _confidence_ has got a whole lot of different meanings, mawruss, and it's quite possible that this here ambassador morgenstern used the word with reference to the league of nations in its chatham square or green-goods meaning, because otherwise how could the league of nations cause another war in less than fifteen years, unless, of course, the feller which prophesied it was a republican senator, which mr. morgenstern is not." "to tell you the truth, abe," morris said, "i have heard and read so many different things about this here league of nations that it wouldn't surprise me in the least if the final edition of it provided that any nation which didn't go to war at least once every three years with some other nation or nations, y'understand, should be expelled from the league of nations with costs, y'understand, and in fact, abe, it is my opinion that when some one makes a speech about this here league of nations nowadays, he might just so well write a letter to himself denying that he said what the newspaper said he said, and let it go at that, because it's a hundred to one that he was the only person who didn't skip it when it was printed in its original garbled condition." "at that, mawruss, you are going to be really and truly surprised to find out what that league of nations covenant means when it comes up to be argued about by the united states senate," abe observed, "because a great many of them senators is high-grade, crackerjack, a-number-one lawyers on the side, mawruss, and formerly used to make their livings by showing that the contract which the plaintiff made with the defendant meant just the opposite to what the plaintiff or defendant meant it to mean--or _vice versa_, according to which end of the lawsuit such a senator was arguing on, mawruss, so you can imagine what is going to happen to that league of nations covenant. take a level-headed lawyer like senator hiram s. johnson of california, mawruss, which he 'ain't got the least disposition to believe that the league of nations covenant means what president wilson says it means, understand me, and when he gets through showing what he thinks it means, and senator borah gets through showing what _he_ thinks it means, and senator reed gets through thinking what he thinks it means, understand me, that league of nations covenant will have as many different meanings as the contested last will and testament of a childless millionaire who has married a telephone operator on his death-bed to spite his grandnieces and nephews, mawruss." "congress will have a lot of other matters to settle before that league of nations comes up, abe," morris said, "which i was reading the other day the message which president wilson wrote from paris, and he certainly laid out a lot of work for them to do till he gets back." "you mean that letter of may 20th where he says: 'dear gents: sorry not to be with you and i have been out of touch with things over in america so long that you will know a whole lot better than i do what is needed in the way of laws,' mawruss, and then goes to work and tells them what is needed to the extent of half a newspaperful?" abe asked. "i couldn't remember the exact words," morris replied. "well, i've been expecting every day to see in the newspapers that he got an answer from the round robins reading: 'dear sir: yours of the 20th inst. to hand and contents noted and in reply would say we wouldn't positively do nothing of the kind, and in case you are not back with samples on or before ten days from date, we will take such steps as we may think proper to protect our interests in the matter and oblige,'" abe said, "because if you will remember, mawruss, them round robins wanted mr. wilson to let the senate go on making laws while he was away, and the president says, 'you couldn't make no laws till i get back,' and then when them round robins asked him when he would be back, he said, 'i'll be back when i am back,' and now he ain't back, and he has got to ask them round robins to go to work with the other senators and congressmen and make the laws which they wanted to make in the first place, mawruss." "then it is going to be some time before he gets back if any such a deadlock like that happened, abe," morris said, "because i see where it says in the papers that mr. wilson won't come back until he has signed the treaties of peace with germany and austria, and france and england won't agree to finish up the treaties for mr. wilson's signature until they know that the united states senate will ratify them and the united states senate won't ratify them until they are finished up and submitted to them signed by mr. wilson, and then i didn't read no more about it, abe, because i begun to get dizzy." "i very often get that way myself nowadays when i am reading in the newspapers, mawruss," abe said, "in particular when they print them full texts, like the full text of the league of nations covenant or the full text of the president's message. former times when the papers had in 'em straight murders and bank robberies from the inside or out, mawruss, and you sat opposite somebody in the subway who had to move his lips while he was reading, you took it for granted that he was an ignoramus which had to hear them simple words pronounced, even if it was by his own lips, before he could understand them, mawruss, but you take this here letter of the 20th inst., mawruss, and when you read where president wilson says with reference to telephone and telegraph rates, mawruss, 'there are many confusions and inconsistencies of rates. the scientific means by which communication by such instrumentalities could missing be rendered more thorough and satisfactory has not been made full use of,' understand me, you could move your lips, your scalp, heaven and earth, mawruss, and still you couldn't tell what mr. wilson was driving into." "well, i glanced over that message myself, abe," morris said, "and the capital i's was sticking up all through it like toothpicks on the cashier's desk of an armchair lunch-room, abe. in just a few lines, abe, mr. wilson says, 'i hesitate, i feel, i am conscious, i trust, i may, i shall, i dare say, i hope and i shall,' and when he started to say something about woman suffrage, he undoubtedly begun with 'may i not,' but evidently when he showed the first draft to colonel house or somebody, they said, 'why do you always say, _may i not_'? and after discussing such substitutes as '_doch allow me_,' 'if you 'ain't got no objections,' and 'you would excuse me if i would take the liberty,' abe, they decided to use, 'will you not permit me,' so, therefore, that part of the president's message which talks about woman suffrage says, 'will you not permit me to speak once more and very earnestly of the proposed amendment to the constitution and so forth,' and that, to my mind, is what give president wilson the idea that it might be a good thing to let the manufacture and sale of wine and beer continue after june 30th, which he probably argued, 'if i have such a tough time shaking off the _may-i-not_ habit, how about them poor fellers which has got the liquor habit?'" "maybe he figured that way and maybe he didn't, mawruss," abe said, "but if any one feels that he ought to stock up with a few bottles of wine for _kiddush_ or _habdolah_ purposes on or after june 30, 1919, mawruss, he oughtn't to be misled by anything president wilson said in his letter of the 20th ulto., mawruss, because when it comes to extending the life of the beer and wine industry after june 30th, mawruss, them senators and representatives is more likely to take suggestions from the president of the anti-saloon league than from the president of the united states." "and i don't know but what they are right at that, abe," morris said, "because this here prohibition is strictly a matter of what the majority thinks, abe." "but from the howl that has been going up, mawruss," abe protested, "it looks to me like the majority of people wants the sale of schnapps to continue." "i didn't say it was a question of what they want, abe," morris declared, "i said it was a question of what the majority thinks, and the majority of people thinks that while they can drink schnapps and they can let it alone, abe, the majority of people also think that the majority of the people who drink schnapps would be a whole lot better off without it. so that's the way it stands, abe. nobody wants to leave off buying liquor, but nobody wants to take the responsibility of letting the sale of liquor continue." "also, mawruss, i've been reading a good many articles in the magazines about this here prohibition lately," abe declared, "and in every case the writer shows how disinterested he is, y'understand, by stating right at the start that so far as he is concerned, they could leave off selling liquor to-morrow and he would be perfectly satisfied." "and he is going to have to be, abe," morris said, "because that way of looking at the liquor question is what has brought about prohibition. practically everybody who drinks schnapps and enjoys it, abe, is afraid that everybody else who drinks schnapps and _enjoys_ it is going to think that he drinks schnapps and enjoys it, so he goes to work and pulls this phony unselfish stuff about, 'so-far-as-i-am-concerned, it don't make no difference how soon the country goes prohibition,' and the result is that the country is going prohibition, and nobody even now has got nerve enough to admit that it's going to cut him out of a great many good times in the future." "well, there's one thing about it, mawruss," abe declared, "it's going to make near-by foreign countries, no matter what the climate may be, great summer and winter resorts for these fellers who don't care how soon prohibition goes into effect and who will continue not to care until 1 a.m. on july 1, 1919. yes, mawruss, this here prohibition is going to give a wonderful boost to the business of building bridges across the rio grande river and to running lines of steamers between the united states and them foreign countries near by where the inhabitants have got it figured out that if you drink and enjoy it, you might just as well admit it before it's too late to keep the government from not taking a joke, if you know what i mean." "sure i know what you mean," morris said, "and it has always seemed to me, abe, that even the scotch whisky business ain't going to be affected so adversely by this here prohibition, neither, except that the merchandise is going to reach its ultimate hobnail liver _via_ mexico and cuba instead of new york and chicago, and furthermore, abe, there will be a great demand for sleepers on them northbound trains from mexico, and the berths will only have to be made up once on leaving the mexican frontier. however, the diners won't do much of a business on them trains, but they will certainly have to carry extra-large ice-water tanks." "and while i don't wish them drink-and-leave-it-alone fellers no particular harm, mawruss," abe declared, vehemently, "some time when they are traveling on one of them oasis-bound limiteds, mawruss, it would serve them right if it run off the rails or something and shook 'em up just enough to make them realize the inconvenience their own foolishness has brought on them." "say!" morris exclaimed. "i didn't know you was taking this prohibition affair so much to heart, abe." "what do you mean--take it so much to heart?" abe protested. "i take a glass of schnapps once in a while, mawruss, but so far as i am concerned this here prohibition can come into effect this afternoon yet, and it wouldn't affect me none." "i am the same way, abe. i can drink and i can leave it alone," morris said. "or, anyhow, i _think_ i can." xviii being up in the air, as applied to transatlantic flights, crown jewels, and league of nations speeches "the way i feel about it is this, mawruss," abe potash said to his partner, morris perlmutter: "it don't make no difference if them two boys failed in their intentions, y'understand, they succeeded in making millions and millions of people in paris, winnipeg, new york, and who knows where not, stop hating each other for anyhow a few hours, and instead they smiled and shook hands and allowed themselves a recess in their regular work of winning strikes, losing strikes, shooting, starving, and cheating each other and their countries, while they all joined in being glad that mrs. hawker and the baby had got the popper back home with them and that grieve was safe with his family or anyhow as safe as a young feller can be who is liable to quit his home at any moment and do the same wonderful, foolish thing all over again." "it's too bad that all them strikers and bolsheviks which is acting as senselessly as children, couldn't also act as sensibly as children, abe," morris perlmutter observed, "and stop crying long enough to forget what they were crying about, y'understand, but they won't. they are bound and determined to eat the goose which lays the golden eggs, abe, and the end is going to be that they will find out it ain't a goose at all, but that instead of killing a goose that's fit for food they have only smashed an incubator that's fit for nothing but laying more eggs, and that's the way it goes." "well, it's certainly wonderful how popular them two young fellers become in the course of a few days, mawruss," abe declared. "which makes you think, mawruss, if such a thing happens to two unknown young men like hawker and grieve, there is big possibilities in this cross-the-ocean flight for fellers which was once highly thought of and which nowadays nobody gives a nickel about. take, for instance, them two william j. fellers, bryan and mcadoo, which only a short time since people was reading about it in the papers, mawruss, and what them fellers should ought to do is to hire a good, undependable airyoplane, y'understand, and take the first boat for trespassing, or whatever the place is. then all they have to do is to make a good start, and get afterwards rescued by a tramp steamer, and right away they become general favorites again. or the kaiser and the crown prince might try it, mawruss. there must be plenty of airyoplanes laying around germany nowadays which could be picked up for a song, and when word come that it had fallen into the atlantic ocean with them two birds aboard somewhere around one thousand five hundred miles from sixty degrees forty-three minutes, y'understand, it might make the hohenzollerns so popular that there would be a counter-revolution or something." "but suppose they would overdo the thing and not get rescued," morris suggested. "well, that would make them popular with _me_, anyhow," abe said, "and there is probably millions of people like me in that respects, mawruss. still, joking to one side, mawruss, there is some things which you couldn't joke about like what this young feller read did, which is working for the united states navy, mawruss. there was a young feller what took his life in his hands, mawruss, and yet from the maps which the newspapers printed, you would think it was already a dead open-and-shut proposition that if the airyoplane was to break down anywheres between trespassing and europe, mawruss, there would be waiting united states navy ships like taxi-cabs around the hotel knickerbocker, waiting to pick up this here read before he even so much as got his feet wet, understand me. yes, mawruss, right across the whole page of the newspaper was strung the _winthrop_, the _farragut_, the _cushing_, and other fellers' names up to the number of fourteen destroyers, and the way it looked on that map, there was a solid line of boats waiting to receive any falling airyoplane all the way from one side of the ocean to the other, whereas you know as well as i do, mawruss, you can as much make both ends meet on the atlantic ocean with fourteen ships as a shipping-clerk with ten children can in new york city on a salary of eighteen dollars a week." "i understand them ships was only fifty miles apart," morris observed. "sure, i know," abe agreed, "but if that airyoplane was to drop anywheres between the second and the forty-ninth mile, mawruss, them ships might just as well have been stationed on the north river between seventy-second and one hundred and thirtieth streets, mawruss, for all the good it would have done this young feller read. also, mawruss, if they would have had so many destroyers on the atlantic ocean that they would have run out of regular navy names for them and had to resort to the business directory so as to include the acker, the merrall, the condit, the rogers, the peet, the browning, the king, the marshall, and the field, in that collection of ships, mawruss, that wouldn't of made this here read's life a first-class insurable risk, neither." "and being picked up by a destroyer ain't such a wonderful _capora_, neither, y'understand," morris said, "which they tell me that on one of them destroyers an admiral even couldn't last out as far as the battery even without anyhow getting pale. also, abe, i couldn't see that it proved anything when this here read had the good luck to arrive at lisbon, except that he was a brave young feller and seemingly didn't care how much his family worried about him." "that's what people have always said when anything new in the way of transportation was tried, mawruss, but them people was never the ones that deposited the checks when the scheme begun to pay dividends some two or three years later," abe retorted. "the world never made no advances with the assistance of the even-so and what-of-it fellers, which, when the king and queen of spain raised a little money on the crown jewels, mawruss, so that christopher columbus _olav hasholom_ could make the first trip across the atlantic ocean by water, mawruss, the people which saw in it the first steps towards the _aquitania_ and _levinathan_ wasn't so plentiful, neither." "probably the feller which lent the money on the jewels wasn't so enthusiastic about it, at any rate," morris declared, "because as first-class, a-number-one security for a loan, abe, crown jewels 'ain't got very much of an edge on them sympathetic pearls which carries such a tremendous overhead for electric light in the store windows where they are displayed. take, for instance, the austrian crown jewels, abe, and i see in the paper where for years and years everybody took the austrian emperor's word for it that they contained more first-water diamonds than could be found in stocks of all the fifth avenue jewelers and follies of from 1910 to 1919 chorus ladies combined, and the other day when the provisional government tried to sell them austrian crown jewels to buy food for the starving austrians, y'understand, for what was thought to be rubies, diamonds, and pearls weighing from twenty to a hundred carats apiece, abe, they couldn't get an offer of as much as a bowl of crackers and milk." "what do you suppose happened to the originals, mawruss?" abe asked. "what _should_ of happened to them?" morris asked, rhetorically. "i bet yer that not once, but hundreds of times, an austrian emperor has taken one of the ladies of the vienna opera house ballet to the vaults of the vienna deposit and storage company and just to show her how much he thought of her, when she said, '_my, ain't that a gorgeous stone!_' he has said, '_do you really like it?_' and pried it right out of its setting right then and there." "and i also bet yer that when the ballet lady got a valuation on it the next day," abe said, "the pawnbroker said to her, '_ain't this a diamond which the emperor pried out of his crown for you?_' and when she said, '_yes_,' he says that the fixed loaning value of an imperial pried-out diamond was one dollar and eighty-five cents, and from that time on the ballet lady would be very much off all emperors." "it seems to me that in all the other countries of the world where kings and emperors still hold on to their jobs, abe, it wouldn't be a bad thing for the government to check up the crown jewels on them, in case of emergencies like revolutions or having to pay war indemnities," morris remarked, "which i wouldn't be surprised if right now the german people is figuring on raising several million marks on the german crown jewels towards paying the first billion-dollar instalment of the war indemnity, and when the government appraiser gets ahold of them, he will turn in a report that they are not even using that kind of stuff in decorating soda-fountains even." "in that case the german government will probably try to arrange a swop," abe said, "trusting to luck that the allied governments having agreed to take them crown jewels at the value placed on them by the kaiser, will not discover their real value until they've changed hands, mawruss, in which event the german government will claim that the substitution took place after the allies received them and did the allies think they could get away with anything as raw as that." "even the germans 'ain't got such a nerve," morris commented. "'ain't they?" abe retorted. "well, how about the counter-claim they are now making for an indemnity of $3,048,300,000, _aus gerechnent_? them germans has got the nerve to claim anything that they think they've got the slightest chance of getting away with, mawruss, so they stick in this indemnity which they say they ought to receive from the allies because the blockade which the allies kept up against germany during the war caused such a shortage in food that one million less german children was born during that time." "three thousand and forty-eight dollars and thirty cents is a pretty high valuation to put on a german, and a new-born german at that," morris commented. "you're sure that the three thousand and forty-eight dollars ain't a mistake? because thirty cents sounds like the correct figures to me, abe." "the birth reduction ain't the only item in their bill, mawruss," abe continued. "they also claim that the blockade prevented the importing of rubber, camphor, and quinine." "and i suppose they claim that tire trouble, moths, and malaria increased something terrible," morris said. "well, they're going to have just as hard a time proving that claim as senator reed would that brazil is a nation of colored people, abe." "when did senator reed say that, mawruss?" abe asked. "when he was arguing against the league of nations, in the senate the other day," morris replied. "he said that there were fifteen white nations in the league and seventeen colored nations, and he reckoned brazil in as one of the colored nations, probably because he confused the brazil population with the brazil nuts which are sometimes called nigger-toes, abe. however, abe, he also included cuba as a colored nation, because he claimed that fifty per cent. of the population is colored." "but the president of cuba and the gentlemen which is running the cuban government ain't colored people, mawruss," abe said. "that don't make no difference to senator reed, abe," morris declared. "to senator reed, anything that's found alive in a stable is a horse, abe; in fact, coming from missouri, as senator reed does, considering the size of the colored population of that state, senator reed probably considers himself a colored man, because senator reed is perfectly honest in his opinions, abe. when he argues that cuba is a colored nation, he believes it, so, therefore, when he argues himself into being a colored man, he probably believes that he ain't quite so dark a colored man as senator vardaman, who comes from mississippi, abe, but only a light colored man, which is of course all nonsense, like senator reed's arguments. senator vardaman is a white man and senator reed is a white man and they are both of them as white as, but no whiter than, the president of cuba and several million brazilian gentlemen. but with senator reed it's a case of any argument is a good argument, so long as it is an argument against the league of nations." "but as i understand it senator vardaman ain't in the senate no more," abe said. "he got defeated last election." "and the way he is heading, abe," morris said, "senator reed will join him next election, because, while nine times out of ten, when it comes to re-election, a united states senator has got things pretty well sewed-up, _so_ sewed-up he couldn't have them, that he could make such foolish speeches on such an important matter. furthermore, it don't make no difference how wise or how foolish the speeches which senators makes against the league of nations might be, abe, it is going to go through, _anyhow_." "what makes you think that?" abe asked. "because i see where the national democratic committee met in chicago the other day, and the chairman by the name cummings threatened that if the senate don't approve the league of nations covenant, mr. wilson would run for president again," morris said. "what do you mean--threatened?" abe demanded. "you talk like mr. wilson running for president again was something to be scared about." "i don't talk that way, but mr. cummings does," morris said. "in fact, the democratic national committee, on the head of what mr. cummings said, passed a resolution that they were in favor of the prompt ratification by the senate of the treaty of peace, including the league of nations, so it would appear that the democratic national committee ain't so tickled about mr. wilson running again, neither." "well, if mr. wilson don't run again for president on the democratic ticket, mawruss, who will?" abe inquired. "i don't know, and, furthermore, i think that the democratic national committee is temporarily in the same condition about that proposition as hawker and grieve was about that cross-atlantic proposition--also temporarily," morris concluded, "i mean, up in the air." xix the leak and other mysteries "outside of one poor night watchman _nebich_," abe potash said to his partner, morris perlmutter, "the only people which has really and truly suffered from the goings-on of them anarchists is the insurance companies, mawruss." "in a case like that, abe, the insurance companies ain't liable under their policies," morris said, "and they wouldn't got to pay no losses for the damage when them bombs done it to them buildings." "who said anything about the insurance companies paying losses?" abe asked. "i am talking about the insurance companies paying lawyer bills, mawruss, which i never read any of that part of my insurance policies that is printed in only such letters as could have been designed in the first place by them fellers you read about who go blind from engraving the whole of the constitution of the united states on a ten-cent piece, y'understand, but i have no doubt, mawruss, that it wouldn't make no difference if the loss was caused by anything so legitimate as throwing a lighted cigarette in a waste-paper basket, understand me, the only reason why an insurance company pays any losses at all is that they figure it's cheaper to let the policyholder have the money than the bunch of murderers they got representing them as their general counsel." "no doubt you're right," morris agreed, "but in these here bomb outrages abe, the way the police 'ain't been able to get a clue to so much as a suspicious red necktie, y'understand, it looks as though this bomb-exploding was going to be such a regular amusement with anarchists as pinochle-playing is with clothing salesmen, understand me, so the insurance companies would got to make a stand, otherwise they would be paying for new stoops for the houses of anybody and everybody who ever said an unkind word in public about lenine and trotzky." "it seems to me that the police ain't so smart like they once used to be, mawruss," abe remarked. "no, nor never was," morris said. "in fact, abe, from the number of crimes which has got into the let-bygones-be-bygones stage with the police lately, clues ain't of no more use to them fellers at all. what them detectives need is that the criminal should leave behind him at the scene of the crime a line of snappy, up-to-date advertising containing his name, address, and telephone number, otherwise they seem to think they have the excuse that they couldn't be expected to perform miracles, and let it go at that." "i see where right here in new york, mayor hylan puts the whole thing up to the newspapers," abe observed. "he wrote to a friend the other day one of them strictly confidential letters with an agreement on the side to ring up the reporters as soon as it was delivered, y'understand, in which he said the reason why so many crimes was going undiscovered by the police was that the newspapers was unprincipled enough to print that a lot of crimes was going undetected by the police, understand me, and the consequence was that criminals read it and, relying on the fact that the police wouldn't catch them if they committed crimes, they went to work and committed crimes." "and i suppose them criminals' confidence in the police wasn't misplaced, neither," morris suggested. "not so far as i've heard," abe said, "but even if the newspapers wouldn't of printed the information, mawruss, why should mayor hylan assume that burglars don't write each other letters occasionally, or, anyhow, once in a while meet at lunch and talk over business matters?" "well, i've noticed that mayor hylan, mayor thompson, and a lot of other mayors, senators, and people which is all the time getting into the public eye in the same sense as cinders and small insects, abe, always blames the newspapers for everything that goes wrong," morris remarked, "because such people is always doing and saying things that when it gets into the newspaper sounds pretty rotten even to themselves, understand me, so therefore they begin to think that the newspaper is doing it deliberately, and consequently they get a grouch on against all newspapers." "sure, i know, mawruss, but that don't excuse the police for not finding out who sent them bombs through the mails in the first place," abe said. "it is now beginning to look, mawruss, that the american police has begun to act philosophically about crooks, the way the american public has always done, and they shrug their shoulders and say, 'what are you going to do with a bunch of crooks like that?'" "well, in a way you can't blame the police for not catching them bomb-throwers, abe," morris said. "they've been so busy arresting people for violations of the automobile and traffic laws that they 'ain't hardly got time for nothing else, so you see what a pipe it is for criminals, abe. all they have got to do is to keep out of automobiles and stick to street cars, and they can rob, murder, and explode bombs, and the police would never trouble them at all." "but considering the number of people which gets arrested every day for things like having in their possession a bottle of schnapps, mawruss, or smoking paper cigarettes in the second degree, or against the peace and dignity of the people of the state of kansas or virginia, and the statue in such case made and provided leaving a bottle of near-beer uncorked on the window-sill until it worked itself into a condition of being fermented or intoxicating liquor under section six sub-section (b) of the said act, y'understand, it is surprising to me that the police didn't by accident gather in anyhow _one_ of them anarchists, mawruss," abe said, "because, after all, mawruss, it can't be that only respectable people violate all them prohibition, anti-cigarette, and anti-speeding laws, and that, outside of dropping bombs, anarchists is otherwise law-abiding." "at the same time, abe, i couldn't help feeling sorry for a policeman who would arrest an anarchist by accident, especially if he didn't carry any accident insurance, because the only way to avoid accidents in arresting anarchists is to take a good aim at a safe distance, and let somebody else search the body for packages," morris declared. "to tell you the truth, mawruss, i think the reason why them anarchists which explode bombs is never discovered, y'understand, ain't up to the police at all, but to the contractor which cleans up the scene of the explosion," abe said. "if he would only instruct his workmen to sift the rubbish before they cart it away, they might anyhow find a collar-button or something, because next to windows, mawruss, the most breakage caused by anarchistic bomb explosions is to anarchists." "still, there must be a lot of comparatively uninjured anarchists hanging around--anarchists with only a thumb or so missing which the police would be able to find if they really and truly used a little gumption, abe," morris said. "also if they would keep their ears open, there must be lots of noises which now passes for gas-range trouble and which if investigated while the experimenter was still in the dancing and hand-flipping stage of agony, abe, might bring to light some of the leading spirits in the chemical branch of the american anarchists. then of course there is the other noises which sounds like gas-range troubles, and which on investigation proves to be speeches, abe, and while it is probably true that you can't kill ideas by putting the people which owns up to them in jail, abe, i for one am willing to take a chance and see how it comes out, because, after all, it ain't ideas which makes and explodes bombs, but the people which holds such ideas." "also, mawruss," abe said, "it is the people which holds such ideas that says you can't kill ideas by putting the people what holds them into jail, but just so soon as them people gets arrested, not only do they claim that they never held such ideas, but they deny that there even existed such ideas, and then the noise of the denials they are making is drowned out by the noise of the bombs which is being exploded according to the ideas they claim they don't hold, and that's the way it goes, mawruss. the chances is that the mystery of who exploded them bombs will remain a mystery along with the mystery of how the peace treaty come into the possession of them new york interests in the form of a volume of three hundred and twenty pages, as senator lodge says it did." "to me that ain't no mystery at all, abe," morris said. "the chances is that them new york interests, whatever they may be, abe--and i got my suspicions, abe--simply seen it in the saturday edition of one of them new york papers which makes a specialty of book-advertising, an advertisement reading: "the peace terms" read about them in this stirring, heart-touching romance. get it, begin it; you'll read every word and wish there was more. would it be worth while to risk the happiness of all future time for the sake of four years of forbidden pleasure? with the frankness characteristic of him, william w. wilson in his latest work tells what happens--economically and spiritually--to the nation who tried it. "the peace terms" by william w. wilson author of _a thousand snappy substitutes for may i not_, etc. 30 illustrations, 320 pages. $1.50 net. at all book-stores so the new york interests give the office-boy three dollars and says to him he should go 'round to the news-stands in the nearest subway station and buy a couple of them books, y'understand, and for the remainder of the afternoon, y'understand, the members of the new york interests which 'ain't got their feet up on the desk reading them books, is asking the members which has if they 'ain't got nothing better to do with their time than to put it in reading a lot of nonsense like that, understand me." "but who do you think published it, mawruss?" abe asked. "say!" morris exclaimed. "it is already over a month since the first edition of that peace treaty was handed to the german delegates, and what is a little thing like a copyright to them crooks when it comes to making a profit of ten cents a volume? i bet yer that europe is already flooded with pirated editions of that peace treaty retailing at anywheres from twenty-five cents up, and yet them highwaymen claims that it is unacceptable to them. as a matter of fact, the german business man 'ain't found anything nearly so acceptable in a merchandising way since the time they began to imitate gillette safety razors and kodak cameras. they'll probably make enough of the park row and ann street peddling rights alone to pay the first instalment of the reparation indemnity, abe." "i see where austria also finds the terms of the peace treaty which was handed to her unacceptable, mawruss," abe remarked. "well, for that matter, abe, there probably ain't a petitentiary in this or any other country which ain't filled with crooks who finds the terms of their punishment unacceptable," morris said, "but i never heard it advanced as an argument why the sentence should ought to be upset on appeal, abe. also, abe, germany and austria is in just so good a position to accept or not accept their punishment as any other defendant would be after he has had his pedigree taken and is handcuffed to the deputy-sheriff with the black maria backed up against the curb, y'understand." "well, i suppose i must of lost thousands of dollars serving on juries in my time, mawruss," abe said, "and i would of lost thousands more if every prisoner would of behaved the way germany and austria has since the judge asked them if they had anything to say why sentence should ought to be passed on them. evidently they must of thought it was up to them to make regular after-dinner speeches, leaving out only the once-there-was-an-irishman story." "and even that 'ain't been left out," morris said, "which i see that the united states senate has passed a resolution that they are in favor the peace conference should hear what the delegates from the new irish republic has got to say." "is ireland a republic now?" abe asked. "it's anyhow as much of a republic as the rhenish republic is a republic or the kingdom of the hadjes is a kingdom," morris continued, "which the american delegates let them hadjes have their say, abe, and if the hadj-american vote figured very strong in the last presidential election or the hadj-american subscribers to the victory loan represented as much as .000000001 per cent. of the total amount raised, the newspapers kept it pretty quiet, abe. so, therefore, abe, leaving out of the question altogether that a very big percentage of the highest grade citizens which we've got in this country is irish by ancestry and brains, abe, why shouldn't the irish have their say before the peace conference?" "for one thing," abe said, "the delegates to the peace conference is already pretty well acquainted with what them irishmen would tell them, unless them delegates is deaf, dumb, and blind." "that's all right, abe, but a good argument was never the worse for being repeated," morris concluded, "in especially when it comes from people which has given us not only good arguments during the past four years, but service, blood, and money. am i right or wrong?" xx july the first and after "it's already surprising what people will eat if they couldn't get anything else," abe potash commented one morning in june. "not nearly so surprising as what they would drink in the same circumstances," morris perlmutter remarked. "well, i don't know," abe continued. "here it stands in the newspapers where a professor says that for the information of them men which would sooner eat grasshoppers as starve, mawruss, they taste very much like shrimps if you know how shrimps taste, which i am thankful to say that i don't, mawruss, because i never yet had the nerve to eat shrimps on account of them looking too much like grasshoppers." "that's nothing," morris declared. "in porto rico, where they have had prohibition now for some time already, the authorities has just found out that the people has been drinking so much hair tonic as ersat-schnapps, abe, that the insides of the stomach of a porto-rican looks like the outside of the president of the new polish republic, if you know what i mean." "well, if the prohibition law is going to be enforced so as to confiscate the schnapps which is now being stored away by the people who have had an insurance actuary figure out their expectancy of life at ten drinks a day for 13.31416 years, mawruss, or all the cellar will hold, y'understand," abe said, "it won't be much later than july 2d before somebody discovers that there's quite a kick to furniture polish or 6-in-1, mawruss, and in fact i expect to see after july 1st, 1919, that there would be what looks like stove polish, shoe polish, automobile-body polish, and silver polish retailing at from one dollar to a dollar and a half per hip-pocket-size bottle, which after being strained through blotting-paper, y'understand, would net the purchaser three drinks of the worst whisky that ever got sold on chatham square for five cents a glass." "and i suppose that pretty soon they will be passing a law forbidding the manufacture of stove polish and directing that the labels on the bottles shall contain the statement: "stove polish by volume 2, seventy-five per cent. and in a thimbleful of what ain't stove polish in that stove polish, abe, there wouldn't be no more harm than two or three quarts of so much nitroglycerin, y'understand," morris said. "also on saturday nights you will see the poor women _nebich_ hanging around the swinging doors of paint and color stores right up to closing-time to see is their husbands inside, while the single men will stagger from house-furnishing store to house-furnishing store--or the poor men's clubs, as they call them places where stove and silver polish is sold." "but joking to one side, mawruss, you don't suppose that the polaks and the huns and all them foreigners is going to leave off drinking schnapps just because of a little thing like a prohibition amendment to the constitution of the united states, do you?" abe said. "why do you limit yourself to polaks and huns, abe?" morris asked. "believe me, there is fellers whose forefathers was old established american citizens before henry clay started his cigar business, y'understand, and when them boys gets a craving for schnapps after july 1st, they would _oser_ go to the nearest carnegie library and read over the prohibition amendment to the constitution till that gnawing feeling at the pit of the stomach had passed away, understand me. at least, abe, that is what i think is going to happen, and from the number of people which is giving out prophecies to the newspapers about what is going to happen, and from the way they differ from each other as to what is going to happen--not only about prohibition, but about conditions in europe, the next war, the kaiser's future, and the next presidential campaign, y'understand, it seems to me that anybody could prophesy anything about _everything_ and get away with it." "they could anyhow get away with it till it does happen," abe commented. "sure i know, but generally it don't happen," morris said. "take for instance where mr. vanderlip is going round telling about the terrible things which is going to happen in europe unless something which mr. vanderlip suggests is done, and take also for instance where mr. davison is going round telling about the terrible things which is going to happen in europe unless something which mr. _davison_ suggests is done, y'understand, and while i don't know nothing about europe, understand me, i know something about mr. vanderlip, which is that he just lost his jobs as director of the war savings stamp campaign and president of the national city bank, and you know as well as i do, abe, when a man has just lost his job things are apt to look pretty black to him, not only in europe, understand me, but in asia, africa, and america, and sometimes australia and new zealand, also." "well, how about mr. davison?" abe asked. "well, i'll tell you," morris said, "mr. davison is a banker and i am a garment manufacturer, y'understand, and with me it's like this: conditions in the garment trade is never altogether satisfactory to me, abe. as a garment manufacturer, i can always see where things is going to the devil in this country or any other country where i would be doing business unless something is done, y'understand, and if anybody would ask me what _ought_ to be done, the chances is that i would suggest something to be done which wouldn't make it exactly rotten for the garment trade, if you know what i mean." "mr. vanderlip and mr. davison did good work during the war for a dollar a year, mawruss," abe said, "and no one should speak nothing but good of them." "did i say they shouldn't?" morris retorted. "all i am driving into is this, abe; we've got a lot of big business men which during the war for a dollar a year give up their time to advising the united states what it should do, y'understand, who are now starting in to advise the world what it should do and waiving the dollar, abe, and if there is anything which is calculated to make a man unpopular, abe, it is giving free advice, so therefore i would advise all them dollar-a-year men to--" "and is any one paying you to give such advice?" abe asked. "furthermore, mawruss, nobody asks you for your advice, whereas with people like mr. vanderlip, mr. davison, the crown prince, samuel gompers, and mary pickford, y'understand, they couldn't stick their head outside the door without a newspaper reporter is standing there and starts right in to ask them their opinion about the things which they are supposed to know." "and what is the crown prince supposed to know?" morris asked. "not much that mary pickford don't about things in general," abe said, "and a good deal less than she does about moving pictures, but otherwise i should put them about on a par, except that mary pickford has got a brighter future, mawruss, which i see that one of these here newspaper fellers got an interview with the crown prince which 'ain't been denied as yet. it took place in an island in holland where the crown prince is living in retirement with a private chef, a private secretary, a couple of private valets, his personal physician, and the nine or ten other personal attendants that a hohenzollern cuts himself down to while he is roughing it in holland, mawruss. when the newspaper feller spoke to him he was wearing the uniform of a colonel in the eighth pomeranian crown prince's own regiment, which is now known as the william j. noske association, of black tulle over a midnight-blue satin underdress--the whole thing embroidered in gray silk braid and blue beads. a very delicate piece of rose point-lace was arranged as a fichu, mawruss, and over it he wore a lavin cape of black silk jersey with a monkey-fur collar and slashed pockets. it would appear from the article which the newspaper feller wrote that the crown prince didn't seem to be especially talkative." "in these here interviews which newspaper fellers gets in europe, abe," morris commented, "the party interviewed never does seem to be talkative. in fact, he hardly figures at all, because such articles usually consist of fifty per cent. what a lot of difficulties the correspondent was smart enough to overcome in getting the interview, twenty-five per cent. description, twenty-two and a quarter what the correspondent said to the party interviewed, and not more than two and three-quarters per cent. interview." "whatever way it was, mawruss, the crown prince didn't exactly unbosom himself to this here reporter, but he said enough to show that he wasn't far behind mr. vanderlip when it comes to taking a dark view of things as a result of losing his job, mawruss," abe continued. "probably he took even a darker view of it than mr. vanderlip," morris suggested, "because there are lots of openings for bank president, but if you are out of a job as a crown prince, what is it, in particular if your reference ain't good?" "he didn't seem to be worrying about his own future," abe continued, "but he seemed to think that if the old man got tried by the allies, mawruss, the shock would kill him." "many a murderer got tried by the court of general sessions, even, and subsequently the shock killed them, abe," morris said. "what is electric chairs for, _anyway_?" "but he told the reporter that you wouldn't have any idea how old the old man is looking," abe went on. "he shouldn't take so much wood-cutting exercise," morris said. "the first thing you know, he would injure himself for life, even if he ain't going to live long." "don't fool yourself, mawruss," abe said, "the kaiser ain't going to die from nothing more violent than a rich, unbalanced diet, y'understand, and as for the crown prince, he's got it all figured out that he will return to germany and go into the farming business, and there ain't no provided-i-beat-the-indictment about it, neither, because he knows as well as you do that the allies would never have the nerve to try either one of them crooks." "nobody seems to have the nerve to do anything nowadays, except the bolshevists, abe," morris said, with a sigh. "here up to a few days ago the bolshevist government of russia had been running a new york office on west forty-second street, with gold lettering on the door, a staff of stenographers, and a private branch exchange, and the new york police didn't pay no more attention to them than if they would of been running a poolroom with a roulette-wheel in the rear office. the consequence was that when them bolshevists finally got pulled, abe, they beefed so terrible about how they were being prosecuted in violation of the constitution and the code of civil procedure, y'understand, that you would think the bombs which mr. palmer and them judges nearly got killed with was being exploded pursuant to section 4244 of the united states revised statutes and the acts amendatory thereof, abe." "and we let them cutthroats do business yet!" abe exclaimed. "well, in a way, i don't blame the bolshevists for not knowing how to take the behavior of the american government towards them, abe," morris declared. "if we only had one way of treating them and stick _to_ it, abe, it would help people like this here ex-custom-house feller dudley field malone and this ex-red cross feller robins to know where they stood in the matter of bolshevism. but when even the united states army itself don't know whether it is for the bolshevists or against them, abe, how could you expect this here robins to know, either, let alone the bolshevists?" "but i thought this country was against bolshevism," abe said. "as far as i can gather, abe, the united states is against bolshevism officially on monday, wednesday, and friday, and on saturday from nine to twelve, and it is for admiral kolchak on tuesday and thursday," morris said. "at any rate, that's what one would think from reading the newspapers. fiume is the same way, abe. the united states is in favor of ceding fiume to the italians during three days in the week of eight working-hours each, except in the sporting five-star edition, when fiume is going to be internationalized. however, abe, the united states wants to be quite fair about preserving the rights of small nationalities, so we concede fiume to the jugo-slobs in at least two editions of the pink evening papers and in the special magazine section of the sunday papers." "well, the way i feel about bolshevism, i am against it every day in the week, including sundays, mawruss," abe said, "and if i would be running a newspaper, i would show them up in every edition from the night edition that comes out at half past eight in the morning, down to the special ten-o'clock-p.m. extra, which sometimes is delayed till as late as five forty-five. furthermore, while variety makes a spicy life, mawruss, newspapers are supposed to tell you the news, and while it may be agreeably exciting to some people when they read on monday, wednesday, and friday that the germans would positively sign the amended treaty of peace, and on tuesday, thursday, and saturday that they positively wouldn't do nothing of the kind, y'understand, i am getting so used to it that it don't even make me mad no longer." "the newspapers has got to suit all tastes, abe," morris observed. "but the taste for bolshevism ain't a taste, mawruss, it's a smell," abe concluded, "and whoever has got it shouldn't ought to be encouraged. he should ought to be disinfected, and that's all there is to it." xxi what the public wants, economically and theatrically "i see where a minister said the other day he couldn't understand why it was that fellers in the theayter business goes to work and puts on the kind of shows which they do put on, mawruss," abe potash said, a few days after the ministerial controversy over a certain phase of the broadway drama. "maybe they got hopes that quite a number of people would pay money to see such shows, abe," morris suggested, "because so far as i could tell from the few fellers in the theayter business whose acquaintance i couldn't avoid making, abe, they are business men the same like other business men, y'understand, and what they are trying to do is to suit the tastes of their customers." "but what them ministers claims is that them customers shouldn't ought to have such tastes," abe said. "that is up to the ministers and not the fellers in the theayter business," morris said. "theayter managers ain't equipped in the head to give people lectures on how terrible it is that people should like to see the plays they like to see, because as a general thing a feller in the theayter business is the same as a feller in the garment business or grocery business--he didn't have to pass no examination to go into such a business, and what a theayter feller don't know about delivering sermons, abe, if a minister would know it about the show business, y'understand, instead of drawing down three thousand a year telling people to do what they don't want to do, understand me, he would be looking round for a nice, fully rented, sixteen-story apartment-house in which to invest the profits from a show by the name, we would say, for example, 'early to bed.'" "but the trouble with the theayter fellers is that they think any show which a lot of people would pay money to see, mawruss, is a good show," abe declared. "why shouldn't the managers think that?" morris asked. "if the ministers had the people trained right, any show which a lot of people would pay money to see should _ought_ to be a good show." "you think the ministers could train people to like a good show!" abe exclaimed. "it's human nature for people to like the kind of show they do like, mawruss, and how could ministers, even if they would be the biggest _tzadeekim_ in the world, change human nature?" "that's what i am trying to tell you, abe," morris said. "the theayter managers simply supply a demand which already exists, abe, and they are as much to blame for the conditions which creates that demand as you could blame a manufacturer of heavy-weight underwear for cold winter weather." "but why should the theayter manager try to supply an unhealthy demand, mawruss?" abe asked. "the demand for heavy winter underwear is also unhealthy, abe," morris said. "in america, where the houses is heated, heavy underwear would give you a cold, whereas in norway and sweden the demand for heavy underwear is healthy because norway and sweden houses is like norway and sweden plays, abe, they are constructed differently from the american fashion. they are built solid, but there ain't no light and heat in them, and yet, abe, the highbrows which is kicking about the american style of plays is crazy about these here norway and sweden plays and want american theayter managers to put on plays like them. in other words, abe, they are arguing in favor of the manufacture and sale of heavy winter underwear for an exclusively b. v. d. trade, and so, therefore, such high-brows could be ministers or they could be dramatic crickets, abe, but they might just so well save their breath with such arguments, because the customer buys what he _wants_ to buy, and what the customer _wants_ to buy the manufacturer manufactures, and that's all there is _to_ it." "and now that you have settled this here question of them 'early to bed' plays, mawruss," abe said, "would you kindly tell me what the idea of them germans was in sinking all them white-elephant war-ships which everybody with any sense wished was at the bottom of the ocean, _anyway_, y'understand?" "well, i'll tell you, abe," morris began. "them germans being german, y'understand, and having signed an armistice where they agreed to take them war-ships to an allied port and _keep_ them there, y'understand, just couldn't resist breaking their word and sinking them war-ships." "but don't you think, mawruss, that when the allies allowed the germans to sign such an armistice they was awful careless," abe said, "because if they wanted them war-ships to stay afloat, mawruss, all they had to do was to make the germans sign an agreement not to take them war-ships to allied ports and sink them there, and the thing was done." "how do you know that the allies didn't get them germans to agree the way they did, so as to get rid of all them war-ships without the trouble and expense of blowing them up?" morris asked. "i don't know it," abe admitted, "but even to-day yet, mawruss, them allied diplomatists is acting like they thought deep down in their hearts that there was a little honor--a little truth--left in them germans somewhere, mawruss, so the chance is that when that armistice was signed, the allies thought that at last the germans was going to stand by a signed agreement. however, it seems to me, mawruss, that there should ought to be an end to this here better-luck-next-time attitude towards the germans' idea of honor on the part of the allies." "well, what are you going to do with such people, abe?" morris asked. "to me it's a business proposition, mawruss," abe said, "and the way i feel about this here peace treaty is that it is nothing but composition notes, signed by the germans without indorsement by anybody. now you know as well as i do, mawruss, if a bankrupt owes you money and he has got _some_ assets, you ain't going to take composition notes for the entire amount of debts and let the bankrupt keep the remains of his assets, because composition notes without indorsements don't deceive nobody, mawruss. if i get from a bankrupt unindorsed composition notes, i simply put them away in my safe and forget about them, which if a bankrupt ever paid his unindorsed composition notes he would be adding murder to his other crimes on account the holders of such composition notes would drop dead from astonishment." "the death-rate from such a cause among business men ain't high, abe," morris commented. "if i was an accident-insurance company's actuary, i would take a chance and leave such a cause of death out of my calculations," abe agreed. "it never happens, and so, therefore, mawruss, if germany lives up to the terms of the peace treaty it would only be because the german signature is guaranteed by the indorsement of a large allied army of occupation, and, therefore, if we've got to do it first as last, why monkey around with a new german cabinet? why not close up the peace conference _sine die_, tell germany her composition notes ain't acceptable, y'understand, and proceed to make a levy and sale with the combined armies of the allies as deputy-sheriffs, mawruss, because not only are the germans bankrupts, but they are fraudulent bankrupts, and on fraudulent bankrupts nobody should have no mercy at all?" "but don't you think it might be just as well to give the germans a few days' grace and see how this here new cabinet goes to work?" morris suggested. "you don't have to know how it works, mawruss," abe replied. "all you have to do is to know how it was formed and you can guess how it would work, which i bet yer that erzberger got together with von brockdorff-rantzau and they combed over the list of candidates to get just the right kind of people for a german cabinet, because the ordinary tests which they use in england, france, or america, mawruss, don't apply to germany. you've got to be awful careful in forming a german cabinet, mawruss, otherwise you are liable to have slipped in on you just one decent, respectable man with an idea of keeping his word and doing the right thing, mawruss, and by a little carelessness like that, understand me, the whole cabinet is ruined. however, mawruss, you could take it from me that a couple of experienced cabinet-formers like this here erzberger and von brockdorff-rantzau didn't fall down on their job, and i bet yer that every member of the new cabinet is keeping up the best traditions of the good old german spirit, which is to be able to look the whole world straight in the eye and lie like the devil, y'understand." "then you think this cabinet wouldn't act no different to the other cabinets?" morris said. "not if the allies don't act different," abe said, "and where the allies made their first big mistake was the opening session at versailles, when the usher or the janitor or whoever had charge of such things didn't take von brockdorff-rantzau by the back of his neck and yank him to his feet after he started to talk without rising from his chair, because the germans is very quick to take a tip that way, mawruss. whatever they put over once, they think they could put over again, and since that time all arguments the germans has made about the peace treaty have been, so to speak, delivered by the german people and the german cabinet, not only seated, y'understand, but also with the feet cocked up on the desk, the hat on, and in the corner of the mouth a typical german cigar which is made up of equal parts hay and scrap rubber blended with the _vossicher zeitung_ and beet-tops and smells accordingly." "well, it is one of the good qualities of the american people that before they get good and sore, as they have a right to do, abe, they will put up with a whole lot of bad manners from people that they deal with," morris said. "take, for instance, these here foreign-born reds which they held a meeting in madison square garden the other evening, and if they said in any other country about the government what they said in madison square garden, y'understand, the owner of madison square garden would of pocketed thousands of dollars for the moving-picture rights of the bayoneting alone. but we don't do business that way. there ain't no satisfaction in bayoneting a lot of people for being fresh and not knowing how to behave. fining them and putting them in prison is also no relief to our feeling, neither. what we really itch to do, abe, is to act the way a man would act if he gives somebody food and shelter in his home, and, as soon as such a _schnorrer_ feels refreshed by what he has eaten and the good bed he has slept in, he turns on his host and, after insulting the members of the household, tries to wreck the furniture and set the house on fire. such a feller you would first kick as many times as you had the strength; you would then duck him in the nearest body of water, provided it was muddy enough, and after he had come up for the third time you would fish him out and ride him on a rail to the town limits and there you would advise him never to show his face around them parts again." "but as i understand this here red meeting, mawruss," abe said, "it was something more as not knowing how to behave. practically every speaker told the audience that they should rise up against the government." "sure i know, abe," morris agreed, "but the audience was composed of people who had already made up their minds that they should rise up against the government, and there is only one thing which prevents them from rising up--they 'ain't got the nerve. furthermore, them speakers could go on advising till they got clergyman's sore throat from the violent language they was using, and that audience could sit there being advised till the management of madison square garden dispossessed the meeting for non-payment of rent, y'understand, and still that audience wouldn't have the nerve. them reds are a lot of rabbits, abe. they could rise up in russia and hungary against a lot of rabbits, y'understand, but over here the most them rabbits has got the courage to do is to plant a few bombs, of which one or two has been ungrateful enough to bite the hand that threw them, understand me, but as soon as them red rabbits discovers that the percentage of mortality among bomb-throwers is equal to the death-rate from some such rare disease as sleeping-sickness or beriberi, abe, they wouldn't even have the nerve to throw bombs." "still, i think the district attorney should ought to do something about that madison square meeting, mawruss," abe said, "because even if madison square garden would have been only one-tenth filled, considering the high price of rails in the present steel-market and the distance of madison square from muddy water, mawruss, it would be anyhow unpractical to duck or ride on rails the number of reds which attended that meeting, even supposing enough respectable people could be found who would take the trouble." "as a matter of fact, abe," morris said, "it don't even pay to encourage them speech-making reds by thinking they are important enough to be ducked in muddy water. after all, most of them are still young and sooner or later they would got to go to work, and once a man goes to work in this country it is only a matter of time when he gets up into the capitalistic class." "there is also another thing to be considered about these here reds, mawruss," abe said. "as reds, they couldn't be taken altogether seriously, because reds would be reds only up to a certain point. after that they're yellow." xxii they discuss the signing of it "yes, mawruss, when the history of this here peace conference is written, y'understand, a whole lot of things which up to now has been mysteries will be made very plain to the people which has got twenty-five dollars to invest in such a history and the spare time in which to read it," abe potash said to his partner morris perlmutter a few days after the treaty was signed. "there will be a great many people who will try to find the time at that," morris commented, "because i see by the morning paper that one of mr. wilson's relatives has bought for him in southern california a piece of property especially for mr. wilson to write the history of the peace conference in, and why should he go to all that expense if there wasn't a big market for such a history?" "i wonder did mr. wilson have to pay much money for the history rights to the peace conference?" abe asked. "what do you mean--did he pay much money?" morris exclaimed. "anybody can write a history of the peace conference without paying a cent for the privilege, and even if they couldn't, y'understand, who is going to bid against mr. wilson, because when it comes to what actually happened at them confidential meetings between mr. wilson, clemenceau, and lord george, abe, mr. wilson had a monopoly of the raw material in the history line. he didn't even let colonel house in on it, so you can bet your life if there was any competitors of mr. wilson trying to get a few ideas for a competing line of popular-price peace conference histories, abe, mr. wilson didn't exactly unbosom himself to them historians, neither, because a diplomatic secret is a diplomatic secret, abe, but when in addition, the diplomat is counting on writing a history of them diplomatic doings, abe, diplomatic secrets become trade secrets." "it seems to me, mawruss, that while you couldn't blame mr. wilson for writing a history of the peace conference for a living after he loses his job in march, 1921," abe continued, "still at the same time, considering that mr. wilson has taken such a prominent part in this here peace conference, and considering also that mr. wilson is only human, no matter what senator reed might say otherwise, don't you think he is going to have a difficult time in deciding for himself just where history leaves off and advertising begins?" "the probabilities is that he wouldn't give himself a shade the worst of it, if that's what you mean," morris observed, "but as to whether or not such a history would be the equivalent of an actor writing a criticism of his own performance, abe, that i couldn't say, because the chances is that when lord george gets through with the job of chief cabinet minister or whatever his job is called, he would also try his hand at writing a history, and if that is the case, you could make up your mind to it that clemenceau ain't going to sit down at his time of life and let them two historians put it all over him. so, therefore, if mr. wilson should feel like writing in his history: 'at this point, things was at a standstill and nobody seemed to know what to do next, when suddenly some one made a suggestion which cleared up the whole situation. it was woodrow wilson who spoke'--y'understand, he will figure that lord george is probably going to say in his history: 'at this point the peace conference was up against it and it looked like the bottom had fallen out of everything, when like a voice from heaven, somebody made a remark which smoothed away all difficulties. it was lord george who came to the rescue.' the consequence will be that both of them historians will beat clemenceau to it, by giving credit for the suggestion to the feller who made it, even if it would have been orlando himself." "but suppose mr. wilson actually did make the suggestion, mawruss, and in the interests of telling the strict truth about the matter, he feels that he is obliged to mention it in his history," abe said, "he's bound to run up against a big chorus of _yows!_" "well, so far as i could see, nobody compels mr. wilson to write a history of that peace conference if he don't want to," morris replied, "and if he should decide not to do so, he could always rent that southern california property furnished for the season, or if he feels that he must occupy it himself for history business purposes, he could anyhow write a domestic history of the united states from december 5, 1918, to july 6, 1919, both inclusive, in which his name need hardly occur at all. but joking to one side, abe, when the history of this here peace conference gets written, it don't make no difference who writes it, he ain't going to be able to ignore mr. wilson exactly. in fact, abe, the history of this here peace conference is going to be more or less principally about mr. wilson, and if the feller who writes it wouldn't be exactly senator lodge, y'understand, the truth is bound to leak out that mr. wilson did a wonderful job over in paris. of course he made a whole lot of enemies over here, but then he also made a whole lot of peace over there, abe, and, after all, that is what he went there for." "still i couldn't help thinking that from a business point of view, mawruss, the peace conference suffered a good deal from poor management," abe said. "take for instance the signing of the peace treaty in mirror hall, versailles, and properly worked up, the allies could of made enough out of that one show alone to pay for all the ships that germany sank a few days ago, which holding a thing like that in a hall, mawruss, is a sample of what kind of management there was." "they had the germans sign that peace treaty in that hall because it was the same hall where them germans made the french sign the peace treaty in 1870," morris explained. "sure i know," abe said, "but what did they know about such things in 1870? even grand opera they gave in halls in them days, which, considering the amount of interest there was in the signing of the peace treaty, mawruss, i bet yer enough people was turned away from mirror hall, versailles, to more than fill five halls of the same size. as it was, mawruss, so many people crowded into that mirror hall that nobody could see anything, and the consequence was that when clemenceau begun his speech the disorder was something terrible." "i suppose his opening remark was: 'koosh! what is this? a _kaffeeklatsch_ or something?'" morris remarked, satirically. "it might just so well have been, for all anybody heard of it," abe went on. "in fact, the papers say that all through it there was loud cries of, 'down in front!' from people which had probably bought their tickets at the last moment off of a speculator who showed them a diagram of mirror hall, batesville, and not versailles, on which it looked like they was getting four good ones in the fifth row, center aisle, mawruss." "probably also while clemenceau was speaking, there was difficulty in calling off the score-card and ice-cream-cone venders," morris said. "i am telling you just exactly what i read it in the newspapers," abe said, "which there ain't no call to get sarcastic, mawruss. the signing of that treaty was arranged just the same like any other show is arranged, except that the arrangements wasn't quite so good. the idea was to make it impressive by keeping it very plain, and that is where the allies, to my mind, made a big mistake, because the people to be impressed was the germans, and what sort of an impression would that signing of the peace treaty by delegates in citizen clothes make on a country where a station agent looks like a colonel and a colonel looks like the combined annual conventions of the knights of pythias and the i. o. m. a." "the chances is that the allies did the best they could with the short time they had for preparation, because you must got to remember that the germans didn't make up their minds to sign till two days before the signing, and considering that the president of the united states wears only the uniform prescribed by the double-page advertisements of rochester, chicago, and baltimore clothing manufacturers for people who ride in closed cars, two days is an awful short time to hire a really impressive uniform, let alone to have one made to order, abe," morris said. "furthermore, abe, the signing of that peace treaty could have been put on by the feller that runs off these here follies with the assistance of george m. cohan and the management of the metropolitan opera house, y'understand, and the costumes could have been designed by ringling brothers, with a few hints from rogers, peet, understand me, and i don't believe them germans would stick to the terms of the treaty anyway." "europe should worry about that, mawruss," abe said. "the main thing is that the peace is signed and the last of our boys would soon be home again from europe, and once we get them back again in this country, mawruss, it _oser_ would make any difference to us whether germany keeps the treaty or she don't keep it, mawruss, the chances of us sending our boys back again is pretty slim." "but under section ten of the league covenant, abe," morris began, "the time might come when we would got to send them." "maybe," abe admitted, "but if any of them european nations has got the idea that because germany is going to be slow pay we would oblige with a few million troops, mawruss, they've got another idea coming. we are a nation, not a collection agency, and no amount of section tens is going to make us one, either." "well, that is the danger of this here league of nations, abe," morris said, "and if the senate ratifies it, we are not only a collection agency, but a burglar insurance company as well, and in fact some of the senators goes so far as to say that we ain't so much insuring people against the operations of burglars as insuring burglars against the loss of their _ganevas_." "i know the senators is saying that, and i also know that mr. wilson says it ain't so," abe agreed, "but this here fuss about international affairs has got what the lawyers calls a statue of limitations running against it right now, and i give both mr. wilson and the senate six months, and they will be going round saying: 'do you remember when six months ago we got so terrible worked up over that--now--national league,' and somebody who is sitting near them will ask, for the sake of having things just right, 'you mean that league of nations, ain't it?' and mr. wilson will say: 'league of nations! national league! what's the difference? let's have another round of old dr. turner's favorite asparagus tonic and forget about it.'" "so you think that all this international politics will be forgotten as quickly as that?" morris commented. "say!" abe said, "it won't take long for mr. wilson to settle down into american ways again. of course it will be pretty hard for him during the first few weeks, whenever he gets a sick headache, to send out for a doctor instead of an admiral, and he may miss his evening _schmooes_ with clemenceau, lord george, and orlando, but any one that will have such a lot of _clav hasholom_ times to talk over as mr. wilson will for the rest of his life, even if he does have to hold out some of the stuff for his history of the peace conference in three volumes, price twenty-five dollars, mawruss, would never need to play double solitaire in order to fill in the time between supper and seeing is the pantry window locked in case mrs. wilson is nervous that way. then again there is things happening in this country which looked very picayune to mr. wilson over in france, and which will seem so big when he arrives here that almost as soon as he sets his foot on the dock in hoboken, the league of nations will get marked off in his mind for depreciation as much as a new automobile does by merely having the owner's number plates attached to it, even if it ain't been run two miles from the agency yet." "i never thought of it that way," morris admitted, "but it is a fact just the same that this here league of nations is only being operated at the present time under a demonstrator's license, so to speak, and as soon as it gets its regular number, the manufacturers and the agents won't be so sensitive about the knocks that the prospective customers is handing it." "and just so soon as the demonstrations have gone far enough, mawruss, just you watch all the nations of the earth that ain't made up their minds whether they want to ride or not, jump aboard," abe said. "also, mawruss, this league of nations is to the united states senate what a new-car proposition is to the head of any respectable family. if the wife wants it and the children wants it, it may be that the old man will think it over for a couple of weeks, and he may begin by saying that the family would get a new car over his dead body, and what do they think he is made of, money? y'understand, but sooner or later he is going to sign up for that new car, and don't you forget it. and after all, mawruss, if the other big nations is in on this league of nations, we could certainly afford to pay our share of what it costs to run it." "maybe we could," morris concluded, "but if a new league of nations is like a new automobile, we are probably in for an expensive time, because with a new car, abe, it ain't what you run that costs so much money. it's what you back into." xxiii the recent unpleasantness in toledo, ohio "if we would only had our wits about us the day we sent for the policeman to put out that feller we had running the elevator, mawruss, we could of made quite a lot of money maybe," abe potash remarked to morris perlmutter a few days after the heavy-weight title changed hands. "if we would only had our wits about us and you had taken my advice to let the feller sleep off his jag instead of hauling in a policeman to wake him up and throw him out, abe," morris said, "they wouldn't of broken, between them, fifty dollars' worth of fixtures and ruined a lot of garments on us." "well, that's what i mean, mawruss, which is forty-five thousand people could be persuaded into paying anywheres from ten to a hundred dollars apiece to see that nine-minute affair in toledo where the two loafers didn't have nothing against one another personally and couldn't of kept their minds on the fight anyhow for trying to figure their share of the profits, y'understand, what would them forty-five thousand _meshugoyim_ paid to see for twenty minutes a couple of fellers which they really and truly wanted to kill each other without any intermissions of so much as two seconds, mawruss?" abe said. "well, i'll tell you, abe," morris said, "these here fight fans are the same like moving-picture fans; they would a whole lot sooner pay out money to see the imitation article than the real thing. tell one of these here fight fans that for ten cents you would let him know where at half past nine o'clock on monday morning an iron-molder has got an appointment to meet a stevedore who used to be engaged to the iron-molder's sister and now refuses to return the twenty-five dollars he borrowed from her to get the wedding-ring and the marriage license, and the fight fan would ask you what is that _his_ business. tell a moving-picture fan that there is a family over on tenth avenue where the father is a ringer for william s. hart and is _also_ in jail, y'understand, and that such a family is about to be dispossessed for non-payment of rent, understand me, and if you made an offer to such a moving-picture fan, that for a contribution of fifteen cents toward finding the family a new home, you would show him a close-up of the landlord, of the notice to quit and of the court-room of the municipal court of the city of new york for the eleventh judicial district where such proceedings are returnable, understand me, the moving-picture fan wouldn't come across with a nickel, not even if you undertook to engage the entire combined orchestras of the strand, the rivoli, and the rialto moving-picture theaters to play 'hearts and flowers' while the furniture was being piled on the moving-van." "i wouldn't blame the moving-picture fan at that, mawruss," abe said, "because if such a moving-picture fan would see one of these here harrowing william s. hart and mary pickford incidents in real life, mawruss, when it reached the point where the moving-picture fan's heart is going to break unless there would be a quick happy ending, y'understand, not only would there _not_ be a happy ending, but also, mawruss, instead of the next incident being a mack sennett comedy in real life, mawruss, it might be something so sad, y'understand, that if a moving-picture corporation would try to reproduce it on the screen, it would cost them a fortune for glycerin alone." "a moving-picture fan's heart don't break so easy as all that, abe," morris said. "moving-picture fans is like doctors and undertakers, abe. they've got so used to other people's misfortunes that it practically don't affect them at all. moving-picture fans can see william s. hart come out of jail to find his wife married to the detective who not only arrested him in the first reel, but is also giving terrible _makkas_ to mr. hart's youngest child in the second reel, y'understand, and wrings that moving-picture fan's heart to the same extent like it would be something in a tropical review entitled: 'eighth annual convention of the united ice-men of america, akron, ohio. arrival of the delegates at the akron, union, depot,' y'understand. yes, abe, the effect of five-reel films on a moving-picture fan's heart is like the effect of five-star scotch whisky on a typical club-man's life. it hardens it to such an extent that it practically ceases to do the work for which it was originally put into a human body, abe." "to tell you the truth, mawruss, i 'ain't got no use for any kind of a fan, and that goes for moving-picture fans, fight fans, baseball fans, and pinochle fans, not to mention grand-opera fans, first-night theayter fans, and every other fan from golluf downwards. take these here fight fans which chartered special trains for toledo, ohio, and paid a hundred dollars for a ringside seat, mawruss, and to my mind it would take one of these here insanity experts to figure out just what made them do it at a time when on account of the raise in rent and living expenses, so many heads of families is staying home with their families these hot sundays and reading the papers about the fight fans chartering special trains and paying a hundred dollars for ringside seats, and not feeling the heat any the less because of reading such things. also, mawruss, as one business man to another who has had the experience of riding on a sleeper and making cleveland, toledo, detroit, and chicago even under normal travel conditions, mawruss, i ask you, where is the pleasure in such a trip?" "them fight fans don't do it for pleasure, abe," morris said. "they do it for a reputation." "a reputation for what?" morris asked. "a reputation for having paid the united states railroad administration twice the regular fare to toledo for a railroad journey, and also the reputation for having paid the manager of this here prize-fight fifty times the regular price of a ticket for a legitimate entertainment," morris replied. "but what for a reputation is that for a sane man to get?" abe asked. "well," morris commented, "for that matter, what kind of a reputation does the same man get when he pays fifty dollars to reserve a table at a broadway restaurant on new-year's eve? that's where your friend the insanity expert comes in, abe. it's the kind of a reputation which the people among which such a feller has got it--when they talk about it says: 'and suppose he did. what _of_ it?'" "it seems to me, mawruss, that when a feller gets the reputation for having such a reputation, his friends should ought to tip him off that if he don't be mighty careful, the first thing you know he would be getting that kind of a reputation," abe said, "because there is also a whole lot of other people among which he got that reputation, who wouldn't stop at saying: 'suppose he did. what _of_ it?' they would try to figure out the answer upon the basis that a feller who pays a hundred dollars for a ringside seat to see a fight which lasted nine minutes, y'understand, and his money, understand me, are soon parted, and the first thing you know, mawruss, that poor nebich of a prize-fight fan would be unable to attend the next annual heavy-weight championship of the world to be held in yuma, arizona, or some such summer resort, in august, 1921, simply because the united states railroad administration refused to accept for his transportation in lieu of cash two thousand shares of the shapiro texas oil and refining corporation of the par value of one hundred dollars apiece, notwithstanding that he also offers to throw in a couple of hundred shares of a farm-tractor manufacturing corporation and lots 120 to 135, both inclusive, in block 654 on a map filed in the office of the clerk of atlantic county, new jersey, entitled map of property of the east by southeast, atlantic city land and development company." "well, it would serve such a feller right if such a thing did happen to him," morris commented, "because any one who takes an interest in such a disgusting affair as this here fight should not only lose his money, but he should ought to go to jail." "i give you right, mawruss," abe replied. "and why the newspapers print the reports of such a thing is a mystery to me. here there are happenings, happenings over in europe which is changing the history of the world every twenty-four hours, mawruss, and to this one prize-fight which a man has got to be a loafer not to get sick at his stomach over it, mawruss, they are devoting practically the entire newspaper. i give you my word, mawruss, it took me pretty near three hours to read it last night." "at the same time, abe," morris said, "you would think that a man of this here jeff willard's fighting record wouldn't of give up so easy." "look what he was up against," abe reminded him. "there 'ain't been a fighter in years with this feller dempsey's speed and science, mawruss." "but i don't think that willard was trained right, abe," morris said. "what do you mean--not trained right?" abe retorted. "from what the newspapers has been saying during the past few weeks, mawruss, he was in wonderful condition, and his sparring partners seemingly could hit him on any part of his face and body, and it never seemed to affect him any." "sure i know," morris agreed, "but what for a training was that for a rough affair like this here prize-fight turned out to be, which if i would of been this here jeff willard's manager, abe, i wouldn't of put no faith in sparring partners. a sparring partner is only human--that is to say, if any prize-fighter could be human--and naturally such a sparring partner ain't going to do himself out of a good job by going too far and seriously injuring a heavyweight champion. the consequences was, abe, that this here jeff willard went into the ring, confident that he couldn't be knocked down by a blow from a fighter like dempsey, simply because he had no experience in being knocked down by a blow." "maybe he couldn't of been knocked down by a blow from his sparring partners," abe suggested. "maybe they weren't strong enough." "that's just what i'm driving into, abe," morris said, "which if instead of willard's manager wasting time by trying to have sparring partners knock him down, he would have gone to work and had willard knocked down by something which could really and truly knock him down, like a fifth avenue stage or a heavy automobile delivery truck, y'understand, the result might have been very different." "sure i know," abe said, "but you could easy overdo such a training method, mawruss, and end up with an autopsy instead of a prize-fight. also, mawruss, the way it looked to experts after this here fight had been pulled off, where willard made his mistake was in training to receive punishment instead of training to give it." "willard didn't believe in training to give punishment," morris said. "if he had believed in it, he could have gone over to europe and received pretty nearly a year and a half of the very best training a prize-fighter could get in giving punishment, abe, and also, abe, he would have avoided getting called a slacker by some of them prize-fight fans, who seemed to be sore that willard should have quit after losing only half his teeth and having still another eye to see with, the right one being blinded in the first round, abe." "well, the chances is that when willard goes to consult a doctor, which he would probably have to do after the licking he got, mawruss," abe said, "before he would get the opportunity to tell the doctor that he had been in a prize-fight, the doctor will give one look at him and lay the whole trouble to abscesses at the roots of the teeth, and he will order willard to go and have the rest of them drawn right away, so he might just as well have stayed one more round and let dempsey finish the job. also, mawruss, them fight fans _oser_ cared whether willard had served in the army or not. willard was the loser, and naturally them broadway fight fans didn't have no sympathy with a loser, so even if there hadn't been no european war for willard not to serve in, mawruss, they would of tried to think of some other name to shout at him as he staggered out of the ring, like prohibitionist or league-of-nationer." "of course them fight fans had in a way a right to get sore, abe," mawruss remarked, "because a whole lot of them had bet money on willard to win." "sure they did," abe agreed, "but gambling on the personal injuries of two human beings, even if they do agree of their own will to see how long they can stand such injuries without growing unconscious, mawruss, is my idea of nothing to gamble about. but i suppose the typical fight fan don't feel that way about it. probably when some member of his family has got to go through an operation, he wipes away his tears with one hand and makes a book on the result with the other. he probably offers his friends even money that the party won't come out of the ether, one to two that the party wouldn't rally from the shock, and one to three against complete recovery inside of a month, or he will make a combination offer whereby his friends can play the operation across the board as a two or three proposition, mawruss." "and his friends, being also prize-fight fans, will probably take him up," morris suggested. "certainly they will," abe concluded, "because to a prize-fight fan suffering is not a sight which is to be avoided. it is something which a typical prize-fight fan would take a special train and pay a hundred dollars any time to see." xxiv feeding the peace conferencers and the household "anybody which don't arrange beforehand what the price is going to be, mawruss, is never overcharged, no matter how much he gets soaked in the bill," abe potash said to his partner, morris perlmutter, a few days after the hotel crillon filed its claim against the american peace mission for two million francs, "which, if the way the united states government arranged with the management of the hotel crillon for the board and lodging of them peace conferencers is any criterium, mawruss, we would got to start a recruiting drive for fifty thousand certified public accountants for service abroad, with a chance to see the wonderful scenery and bookkeeping of france." "i thought the united states government didn't make any arrangement with the hotel crillon before them peace conferencers went over, abe," morris said. "that's what i mean, mawruss," abe said, "which, when president wilson made up his mind to send all them experts over to france he sent for ambassador sharp and asked him where's a good place for them indians to stay, and sharp told him the hotel crillon, and when mr. wilson asked him is it a good medium-price place, mr. sharp says he shouldn't worry, that jake crillon is a good feller and wouldn't overcharge nobody, y'understand, and for to leave it to jake, and so mr. wilson done so, mawruss, and naturally this is the result." "why, what for a bill did the management of the hotel crillon put in against the united states government, abe?" morris asked. "they 'ain't put in any bill as yet, mawruss," abe said. "this here is only a preliminary claim of two million francs, on account of the loss of regular customers because the hotel has been occupied for such a long time by them american peace conferencers." "well, wouldn't most of the regular customers come back if the management promised that after them peace conferencers went home they would disinfect the hotel and give it a thorough overhauling or something?" morris asked. "the question 'ain't been argued as yet, mawruss," abe said, "but you'll have to admit that if two years from now a guest of the hotel crillon complains to the management of something about his room smelling awful peculiar, y'understand, and if the management should go to work and tear up the floor and overhaul the plumbing, only to find that it's a case of the room not having recovered from an american jugo-slob expert holding conferences with the jugo-slob delegates to the peace conference in it, understand me, two million francs ain't going to go such a long ways, in especially at the present rate of exchange, mawruss." "perhaps you're right, abe," morris said. "perhaps it is better that a lump sum like two million francs would be charged rather as go into the items themselves, because, for instance, if that american mission to negotiate peace had been staying at the hotel which we stayed at, abe, a bill would have been submitted like this, abe: "mm. american mission to negotiate peace to hotel se'escroquerie et londres, dr. terms, net cash 800 rooms; 8 baths tel.: 6060 rivoli march, 1919: to entertaining mm. orlando and sonnino, as follows: table overturned and following articles broken: 1 inkstand and mucilage-bottle. fr. 24.50 1 table-cover damaged by mucilage. 45.00 chairs injured as follows: 1 light chair thrown through window. 58.00 1 heavy chair thrown through window. 85.00 labor as follows: sweeping up broken eye-glasses. 2.00 sweeping up hair. 3.00 removing blood-stains from carpet. 4.50 credit: by one unclaimed hat, labeled 'mike, the popular rome hatter'. .20 _____ total fr. 382.40 and not only would it have given away a whole lot of diplomatic secrets, but the american mission would also have got to pay a luxury tax of ten per cent. on the hotel's telephone number and a little mistake of a hundred francs in the addition." "but this here hotel crillon was a strictly first-class hotel, mawruss," abe said, "and with strictly first-class hotels it's the same in europe as it is in this country, mawruss; the rates are so fixed that it ain't necessary for the management to make mistakes in the bill, while the accounting department always figures the overhead so as to include the hotel's telephone number, the number of the guest's room, and, in the case of mountain-resort hotels, the altitude of the hotel above sea-level." "well, that's just what i am driving into, abe," morris said. "even when hotel bills are submitted weekly and the management has got his signed checks to show for it, abe, nobody never realizes that he owes all that money to a hotel, y'understand, and when at the end of the peace commission's tenancy the hotel management sends in its final bill, abe, there's going to be considerable argument between mr. joseph grew, the secretary of the commission, and all them peace conferencers, expert and otherwise, as to who ordered what and when, y'understand, which i see by the newspapers, abe, that mr. grew has already begun an investigation about who authorized the serving of one hundred bottles tchampanyer wine on june 14th, and if mr. grew couldn't trace the party which signed for one hundred bottles tchampanyer wine on june 14th, y'understand, what chance does he have of finding out who is responsible for each and every one of the hundreds of checks with illegible signatures which is bound to show up in the final accounting for such articles as scrambled eggs, bacon, and coffee, which any peace conferencers might have signed for, whether his home town was in a dry state or not, abe." "and mr. grew wouldn't get no sympathy from the president, neither, mawruss," abe said, "which, when the morning mail arrives at the white house nowadays just as mr. wilson is saying to mrs. wilson, '_some_ coffee, mommer!'--because the average american has got to be home from europe at least a month before a good cup of coffee ceases to become a miracle, mawruss--it won't take more than two letters from mr. grew asking mr. wilson does he remember whether at the conference between him, clemenceau, lord george, venezuelas, and baron ishii, held in parlor a on march 22d, did or did not somebody order a rye-bread tongue sandwich and a split of evian water, and if so to please sign inclosed check for same, _non pro tunc_ as of march 22d, 1919, understand me, before the only effect an envelope addressed in the handwriting of mr. grew will have on mr. wilson is that he is going to throw it unopened into the waste-paper basket without so much as saying, 'i wonder what that _schlemiel_ wants from me _now_.'" "as a matter of fact, abe, the price of food 'ain't interested mr. wilson since a few days ago when he asked mrs. wilson, 'how much are we paying now for coffee, mommer?' and mrs. wilson says fifty-eight cents a pound, and mr. wilson says for the love of mike, and then asks what she is paying for eggs, and mrs. wilson says at ginsburg's economy market eighty-five cents a dozen, and mr. wilson says he would just as lieve have some hash from last night's rib roast, and mrs. wilson says she doesn't blame him and so would she, but that they are going to have that rib roast cold for lunch on account ginsburg is practically _schenking_ his customers rib roast for fifty-five cents a pound," morris said. "and how did you come to hear about this conversation, mawruss?" abe asked. "i didn't hear about it," morris replied, "but i presume it took place the morning after the newspapers printed the report of the federal trade commission about the packing-houses, abe, because a similar conversation happened at my breakfast-table that morning, and i presume it also happened at yours." "well, it's time that business men begun to take a little interest in the cost of what they are eating, mawruss," abe said. "on account of the increase in the price of food, mawruss, the business man is now paying more money to all the people which is working for him, except his wife." "sure, i know," morris said, "but the business man which is mean enough to hold down his wife to twenty dollars a week housekeeping money simply because the principle of the closed shop and collective bargaining can't be applied to an american household the way it could to a turkish harem, abe, don't live so well as he used to. former times when such a man complained to his wife that the chicken was a little tough, y'understand, she used to say, 'what do you want for twenty dollars a week housekeeping money--mocking-birds?' nowadays, however, the best that such a man has got to complain about being tough is round steak, and his wife now says, 'what do you want for twenty dollars a week housekeeping money--chicken?'" "and the standard of living for even business men is going down so fast, mawruss, that next year when such a man complains that the tripe is tough, she is going to say, 'what do you expect for twenty dollars a week housekeeping money--round steak?'" abe said, "and if them packers goes on trying to control the entire bill of fare from soup to cereals, mawruss, it would only be a matter of a few years when such a husband is going to complain that the puffed jute is tough, and his wife is going to ask him, 'what do you expect for twenty dollars a week housekeeping money--ensilage?' which, if something ain't done pretty soon to stop dealers boosting the price of food, mawruss, twenty dollars a week housekeeping money ain't going to feed a family of hearty-eating canary-birds." "i suppose that in the end, abe, the business man would be obliged to admit that the high cost of living is just as expensive for his wife as it is for his other employees," morris concluded, "and, without the formality of a strike, the wives of business men will be conceded a new wage-scale of from thirty to forty dollars, in place of the old scale of twenty dollars, for a working-week of one hundred and sixty-eight hours, because it don't make no difference if the senate confirms the league of nations or not, abe, married business men will never live up to the clause which provides for an international working-day of eight hours--anyhow, so far as their wives is concerned." "that ain't the only clause of the peace treaty which wouldn't be lived up to, mawruss," abe said, "because i see that already the germans is having their troubles restoring to the british government this here skull of the sultan mkwiwa, mawruss, which, according to section eight, i think it is, of the treaty of peace, was removed from german east africa and taken to germany." "but the germans claim that it was never taken from german east africa, but was buried there, and they misremember the name of the cemetery," morris declared. "i know they do, and i couldn't understand their attitude in the matter, mawruss," abe said. "why don't they go to work and send england any old skull, which a skull is a skull, ain't it?--and one skull is just as much like another skull as two pinochle decks with the same backs, and who is going to check them up on it no matter what kind of a skull they send? besides, mawruss, the people who had pull enough to get that skull section inserted in the treaty of peace is going to be divided into two classes when that skull arrives in east africa, _anyway_--namely, those who will throw a bluff that they recognized the skull as the sultan's skull as soon as they laid eyes on it, y'understand, and those who will refuse to concede that any skull is the sultan's skull. there will also, of course, be a large class of east africans who won't give a nickel one way or the other; so if germany couldn't find the sultan's skull, let them send england an _ersatz_ sultan's skull with a genwine sultan's label on it. they've been doing that sort of thing for years with american safety-razors, american folding-cameras, and american typewriters; why should they now take it so particular with a german east african sultan?" "then you think there is something suspicious about the way germany is acting over this here skull?" morris suggested. "i wouldn't call it exactly suspicious, mawruss," abe said, "but at the same time i wouldn't put it beyond the germans that, after the allies gets through discussing together whether or not the sultan's skull is genwine, they would suddenly awake to the fact that at least two of the million-mark bills which germany paid over in the indemnity, y'understand, are _not_. so, therefore, my advice to england is, examine the german indemnity carefully, and don't let no returned sultan's skull distract your attention, even if it would be made of plaster of paris with a round hold on top for keeping matches in it, and on the bottom a sign, reading: "_grã¼ss aus schveningen_." xxv what are you going to do about it? this includes libeled millionaires, enforced prohibition, and shantung "well i'll tell you, mawruss," abe potash said, recently, "i doubt very much if i would be able to say offhand who arnold benedict was if i would be asked such a question by a smart lawyer in a court-room full of reporters, which, if they hadn't happened to be there at that particular moment, would of probably gone to their graves without even the faintest suspicion that you didn't spell _ignorant idealist_ with two l's, y'understand." "still, abe, you've got to admit that plaintiff in a libel suit don't deserve much sympathy if he don't post himself before going on the stand as to the meaning of the libel, so as to anyhow be able to say that it _was_ a libel and not a compliment, understand me," morris said. "he took his lawyers' word for it that it was a libel, mawruss," abe said, "and, anyhow, mawruss, nobody has got a right to call anybody an ignorant philantropist even, no matter how ignorant such a philantropist might be about what the word philantropist would mean." "and do you _know_ what it means?" morris asked. "a philantropist is a feller who gives big sums of moneys to orphan-asylums, hospitals, and colleges, and if he could afford it he's a philantropist, mawruss, and if he couldn't, then he's a sucker, and that is what is called a philantropist," abe said, "which, if i didn't know what it meant, mawruss, i ain't such an ignorant idealist that i would use such a word in front of you and expect you not to try to trip me up on it." "i see you've also been looking up what ignorant idealist means," morris observed. "and i ain't very peculiar that way, neither, mawruss," abe admitted, "because i bet yer that in the last two days at least five million people has been looking up in the dictionary what that word idealist means and not knowing even _then_ what it means, y'understand, and still that 'ain't prevented them from knocking mr. ford, mawruss." "but the fact remains, abe, that them five million people ain't suing nobody for calling them ignorant idealists," morris interrupted. "also, mawruss, they ain't running one of the largest industrial plants in the country on a profit-sharing basis with several thousand employees," abe declared, "which there is a whole lot of big manufacturers in this country who could go on the stand at a moment's notice and pass a cross-examination with a hundred-per-cent. mark on all them words which you read in them medical journals you pick up from the doctor's desk in his private office when he excuses himself for a minute to answer the 'phone and which you put down so quick and pretend you 'ain't been reading when he comes back again, if you know what i mean. and furthermore, if these same big manufacturers was elected to the united states senate to-morrow they could make a speech against doing away with child labor in words of six syllables, y'understand, and would probably make such a speech, because the trouble with most big manufacturers is not that they are ignorant, understand me, but that they ain't idealists, mawruss." "just the same, abe, a man should ought to know what he don't know and side-step it," morris said. "but the way it is in this country, mawruss, a multimillionaire can't side-step it. the newspapers won't let him, because if he gets a reputation for having made fifty million dollars in the safety-pin business, we would say, for example, and news gets so scarce in the newspapers that somebody starts a discussion about which is the biggest musician, kreisler _oder_ zimbalist, y'understand, right away the editor sends out reporters to interview the most prominent men in the country as to what their opinion is in the matter, and naturally one of the first men such a reporter would call on is harris j. rosenbaum, the safety-pin king. now, what is rosenbaum going to do under the circumstances? is he going to admit to the reporter that up to date he has been so busy in his safety-pin plant that he 'ain't had time to post himself as to whether kreisler and zimbalist is performers on the trombone _oder_ the mouth-organ? _oser!_ he finds out from the reporter that these two fellers has got a piece-work wage-scale for playing on the fiddle of five dollars a note, net cash, and he says that both of them is wonderful fiddlers, y'understand, but that to his mind kreisler plays with more of the artistic temperature than zimbalist, or if he doesn't actually say so, y'understand, the reporter goes back to his newspaper and _says_ he said so, and the consequence is that when in next sunday's paper rosenbaum reads, kreisler greater artist says safety-pin king, he not only begins to believe that he did say it, but also that it's funny how a man can go on for years being an expert on fiddle-playing and only find it out by accident, as it were." "and i suppose that a few months later, on the strength of what he _don't_ know about fiddle-playing, abe," morris remarked, "harris j. rosenbaum, the safety-pin king, is running for united states senator and comes pretty near getting elected, too." "there don't seem to be no reason why he wouldn't be," abe declared, "because just so long as united states senators is selected by election and not by a competitive examination, mawruss, there will always be a certain percentage of harris j. rosenbaums in the united states senate, which you can't keep millionaires out of public office, if they want to fool away their time in such things, and after all, mawruss, it ain't having brains which makes a man a millionaire, it's having a million dollars." "then you don't blame mr. ford for the way he has behaved himself, abe?" morris asked. "not in the least," abe said. "millionaires behave the way their fellow-countrymen encourages them to behave, mawruss, which to my mind, mawruss, the only way to learn a millionaire like mr. ford his place is not to notice him and, in particular, not to pay no attention to anything he says, and such a millionaire would quick subside and devote himself to the manufacture of safety-pins or the best four-cylinder car for the money in the world, as the case may be, which i see in the paper that the refusal of the united states senate to confirm the treaty of peace looks quite certain to them people to whom the winning of the willard-dempsey fight by jeff willard looked quite certain, mawruss." "well, to my mind, abe, them round-robins is right to look into the treaty and the league of nations covenant before they confirm them," morris said. "also, abe, you couldn't blame them senators for getting indignant about the shantung settlement." "personally i couldn't blame them and i couldn't praise them, mawruss, because, like a hundred million other people in this country, not being in the silk business, mawruss, i never had the opportunity to find out nothing about even where shantung was on the map till they printed such a map in the papers last week, and if you've got to go and look it up on a map first to find out whether you should ought to be indignant or not, mawruss, you couldn't get exactly red in the face over japan taking shantung, unless you are a senator from the pacific coast, where people have got such a wonderful color in their cheeks that easterners think it's the climate, when, as a matter of fact, it is thinking about japanese unrestricted immigration that does it." "but the senators represents the people which elects them, abe," morris said, "and if it don't take much to make a californian indignant about any little thing he suspects japan is doing, y'understand, then senator hiram johnson has got a right to go 'round looking permanently purple over this here shantung affair. as for the other senators, abe, the theory on which they talk each other deaf, dumb, and blind is that they are doing a job which it is impossible for the hundred million people of this country to do for themselves. they are saving their constituents the trouble of leaving their homes and spending a lot of time on government-controlled railroads, going to and from washington to make their own laws, y'understand. that is what representative government is, abe, and if the people of this country couldn't get indignant over what ain't right in this here treaty of peace and league of nations without working up such indignation by several days' careful investigation of the reasons for getting indignant, then it is up to the united states senate to get indignant for them, even if the individual senators has got to sit up with wet towels 'round their heads and strong black coffee stewing on the gas-stove, so as not to fall asleep over the job of letting their feelings get the better of their judgment in working up a six-hour speech which will give the country the impression that it just came pouring out on the spur of the moment as a consequence of the senators' red-hot indignation about this here shantung." "it's too bad that the house of representatives couldn't be mind-readers like the senate, mawruss, and get off indignant speeches about what is making certain sections of the country so indignant, mawruss, that if their congressmen is going to really and truly represent them, there would be a regular epidemic of apoplexy in washington," abe said, "which i am talking about the enforcement of prohibition, mawruss." "for myself, abe, i couldn't understand why it should be necessary to pass a law to enforce a law," morris remarked, "because, if that is the case, what is going to be the end? after they pass this here law to enforce the prohibition law, are they going to pass another law to enforce the law to enforce prohibition, or do they expect that this here enforcement law will enforce itself, and if so, then why couldn't the prohibition law be enforced without a law to enforce it?" "to tell you the truth, mawruss, a dyed-in-wool dry could be as hopeful as a man could possibly be on soft drinks, and in his heart of hearts he must got to know that if congress would sit from now till the arrival of _elia hanov'e_ and did nothing all that time but pass an endless chain of enforcement laws, prohibition will never be enforced except in the proportion of 2.75 enforcement to 97.25 violation, anyhow in those parts of the country where the hyphen americans live and like their beverages with a hyphen in it, because, mawruss, where a hundred per cent. of the population of a certain district has been drinking beer and light wines since 12 a.m. on rosh hashonah in the year one up to and including twelve midnight on june 30, 1919, y'understand, and seeing no harm in it, understand me, not only would an act of congress fail to change the hearts and conscience of such people, but there could be an earthquake, a cyclone, and anything else which a confirmed dry would call a judgment on them people, and still they wouldn't see no harm in it." "then what is the country going to do to enforce the prohibition law?" morris asked. "i don't know," abe said; "but one thing is certain, you can't change people's habits on and after a certain hour on a certain date by putting a law into effect on such date. you might just so well expect that, if the senate should confirm the provision handing over shantung to the japanese, all the chinamen in shantung is immediately going to open stores for the sale of imitation expensive vases and fake silk embroidery, start factories for the manufacture of phony swedish safety-matches, and do all the other things which japanese do so successfully that any reputable business man is willing to take a chance on getting indignant about shantung without even asking his stenographer to look it up for him." "but i thought you thought that prohibition would be a good thing, abe?" morris said. "i do," abe said. "i think brown stewed fish, sweet and sour, the way my rosie cooks it, is a good thing, but at the same time, mawruss, i realize that my taste in this respect is supported only by what you might call a very limited public sentiment, consisting of rosie and me, y'understand, and the rest of the household couldn't stand to eat it at all. so, therefore, when we have sweet and sour fish we cook for the rest of the family eggs or meat, and in that way we have happiness in the home. now a country is a home for the people in it, ain't it, and the main thing is that they should stick together and be happy, and how could they be happy if even the great majority of the people tells the rest what they should and shouldn't eat or drink?" "but you admit that _schnapps_ is harmful, don't you?" morris insisted. "and i also admit that sweet and sour fish ain't exactly a health food, mawruss," abe said. "in fact, you wouldn't believe what a lot of bicarbonate of soda rosie and me uses up between us after we eat that fish; but even so, mawruss, after you have said all you could say against that fish, the fact remains that rosie and me, we like it." "well, even if the people do like booze, and it does them harm, i say they shouldn't have it," morris said. "i agree with you down to the ground, mawruss," abe said. "and i don't care if it is booze or sweet and sour, you are still right; but if sweet and sour fish was prohibited, although the fish and the onions and the sugar and the vinegar which you make it out of _wasn't_, y'understand, and in spite of the law, rosie and me liked it and wanted to continue to eat it, the question then is and the question is going to continue to be: "how are you going to stop it?" xxvi the approaching royal visit "i see where the king of england, to show his appreciation of what we done it during the war, mawruss, is going to send his eldest son, the king of england, junior, or whatever his name is, to visit us," abe potash said to his partner, morris perlmutter. "yes?" morris replied. "well, why don't the king, senior, come himself?" "you must think that kings has got nothing better to do with their time than fool it away on ocean steamers, mawruss," abe said. "a king of england is a very busy man, mawruss, which i bet yer right now he is dated up as far ahead as purim, 1921, laying corner-stones, opening exhibitions, making the speech of the afternoon or the evening, as the case may be, at assorted luncheons, teas, and dinners; trying on uniforms; signing warrants at a fee of two guineas and sixpence--not including three cents war tax--for the appointment of tea, coffee, or cocoa manufacturers as purveyors of tea, coffee, or cocoa to the royal household, y'understand, and doing all the other things which a king does in england and a prominent elk does in america." "well, anyhow, i suppose the king of england, junior, must of done a lot of hard work during the war which makes the king, senior, think that it is time the boy had a vacation." "_oser!_" abe said. "so far as i can make out, the young feller made a couple of tourist's tours of the battle-fields, mawruss, and maybe helped out once or twice with the corner-stone laying; but otherwise, for all the actual fighting he did, instead of being the king of england's son during the war, he might just so well have been mr. ford's son." "well, kings, junior or senior, ain't supposed to fight, abe," morris said. "the most their countries expects of them is that they should share the privations of their subjects by reducing the cost of running their homes till they are living as economically during war-times as a texas oil millionaire does during peace-times. there was days together there, in the terrible winter of 1916-1917, when the only dishes which appeared on the tables of european kings, outside of green-turtle soup and roast pheasant, was hothouse asparagus and fresh strawberry ice-cream, abe. the sufferings of kings, junior and senior, during the war 'ain't half been told in the newspapers, abe." "the kings of england, junior and senior, is very popular in england at that, mawruss," abe said, "which every week the illustrated papers prints picture after picture of both of them kings looking every inch kings, or anyhow openers or better, y'understand; and in fact, mawruss, the english-reading public never seems to get tired of seeing pictures of building operations, just so long as there is one of them kings in it laying the corner-stone or turning the first sod of the excavation." "for that matter, abe, them brown illustrated supplements to american sunday newspapers which rubs off so on palm beach suits and ladies' white gloves, 'ain't absolutely declared a boycott on kings' pictures, neither," morris declared. "i suppose that pictures of them kings with or without marshal haig reviewing soldiers and handing out medals is easy worth several hundred dollars a week to the dry cleaners of new york city alone." "did i say they didn't?" abe asked. "which, considering the trouble and expense this country was put to over the declaration of independence, mawruss, you would be surprised how much interest a whole lot of ladies takes in the english royal family. here a short time ago the king, senior's, father a brother's daughter got married beneath her to one of the chief stockholders of the canadian pacific railroad, mawruss, and you would think from the way my rosie carried on about it that the girl's mother was going round saying what did she ever do that her daughter should go to work and marry a feller that made his living that way, and what a mercy it was the grandmother didn't live to see it; the theory being, mawruss, that when a king's relation marries a healthy young chief stockholder with nothing flowing in his veins but the blood of a couple of generations of managing directors, y'understand, it is the equivalence of a bank president's daughter eloping with a professional dancer in a cabaret." "and when the king, junior, arrives in this country there is going to be a lot of disappointment among them ladies which also gets their pictures printed by the sunday supplement sitting around cross-legged in ankle-length, awning-striped skirts at dawg-shows, in such a way that even the dawgs must feel embarrassed if they've got the ordinary dawg's sense of decency, abe," morris said, "because i see by the paper that the king, senior, has instructed his son that while in new york he should live on board the english battle-ship which is bringing him here so as not to have no truck with any millionaires." "i suppose the old man thinks that one managing director's child in the royal family is enough," abe suggested. "well," morris said, "looking at him from the king's standpoint, it will save the young feller's mother a lot of anxiety to know that he is safe on board an english battle-ship every night instead of running around the streets of a country where everybody, up to and including the president himself, is the young feller's social inferior." "and also, you can't blame the old man if he ain't taking no risks when the young feller gets home and his mother asks him did he have a good time, that two right honorable general practitioners in waiting would got to work over her for an hour or so bringing her out of one swoon after another as the result of her son saying, 'i'll _say_ i did,'" abe observed. "still, at the same time, abe," morris said, "it is going to be a wonderful opportunity for the young feller, even if he gets home again, he would occasionally use the words, '_you've said it_,' instead of '_quite so_.'" "but that ain't the idea in the king's sending him over here, mawruss," abe said. "the intention is that it is a wonderful opportunity for the american people to see how a king looks and at the same time not have it come off on your gloves. in other words, mawruss, it's as a favor to us that the young feller is coming over here, and the chances is that his personal feelings in the matter is very much the same as yours or mine would be if we was about to make sarahcuse, rochester, buffalo, detroit, and chicago with a line of popular-price garments. we would do it in the course of making a living and not for the education of the thing." "then my advice to the young feller and his father is that he should stay home in these times when the building trade is looking up so, abe, and help out with the corner-stone laying," morris said, "and give the people of this country a real treat by sending over lord george or marshall field haig, which while this here king, junior, is a decent, respectable young feller and his father is also a gentleman that nobody could say a word against no matter if it does cost the english people sixpence in the pound of the ten shillings in the pound which they've got to pay income tax in order that the english royal family should continue to live in the style to which it has become accustomed during the past five hundred years, abe, still, at the same time, if i could be standing on the curb watching lord george or this here haig driving by, it would give me a real thrill to think that i am at last looking at the face of a man who for over four years has been working night and day to put over the biggest thing that has ever been put over in the history of the world, y'understand; whereas, what for a thrill would i get from looking at the face of a man who, putting it big, has been laying as many corner-stones as all the bricklayers' unions in the american federation of labor and has been presiding at as many banquets as this here irving j. cobb and gustave thomas combined?" "at that, there will be a whole lot of ambulance calls for people who has fainted away in the crowds that will collect to see the king, junior, drive up fifth avenue, mawruss," abe said. "i know there will," morris said; "and if it rested with me, abe, i wouldn't spend so much as two cents for mathematic spirits of ammonia to bring them to, neither, because them crowds in america is helping along a european idea which we sent across several million american soldiers to wipe out. them american crowds will be encouraging european kings to believe that even in america we still think it is all right for the ordinary people of europe to sacrifice their lives and their property, in order that them corner-stone layers shall cop out the credit." "as a matter of fact, mawruss," abe said, "mr. wilson invited the young feller to visit america." "_yow_, president wilson invited him!" morris exclaimed. "after the experience president wilson had in paris staying with the murats he must have a pretty good idea what it means to be eaten out of house and home by the people that tags along with a king or a president, which i bet yer the most that mr. wilson said when he was visiting england last christmas was that he told the king, senior, if he was ever in washington to be sure and look him up, or to not to fail to let him know if he was ever in washington, or that the latch-string was always out at the white house, or any one of the hundreds of things that ordinarily the most inhospitable person in the world is perfectly safe in saying without any one taking him up on it." "well, that's where mr. wilson made a big mistake, mawruss," abe said, "because evidently this here king, junior, couldn't take a joke, y'understand; which, the way it looks now, mawruss, even if mr. wilson had said, 'i hope to see you again sometime,' he would of immediately taken out of his vest pocket such a little book which you put memorandums in it and said how about august 30, 1919, or would september 10th suit mr. wilson better, and that's the way it would of went." "anyhow, that's neither here nor there, abe," morris said, "because, no matter how many times nowadays mrs. wilson is going to ask mr. wilson why he couldn't of said good-by, king, and let it go at that, because such people, if you give them the least little encouragement, they would use you like you was running a boarding-house already, understand me, it ain't going to improve matters for mr. wilson when the young feller does arrive." "say!" abe exclaimed. "it wouldn't do that king, junior, no harm to rough it a little there at the white house, mawruss." "what do you mean--rough it?" morris demanded. "don't you suppose the president of the united states eats just so good in his own home as the king of england does in his, abe? it would be the least of mr. wilson's worries if the young feller would expect chicken _ã  la_ king and fillet of kingfish for breakfast, dinner, and supper already, but when it comes to making up a list of the guests which would be invited to meet this here king of england, junior, that is where mr. wilson is wise he would get himself run over by a trolley-car or something, and sustain enough injuries to keep him confined to his bed from a few days before the young feller arrives until the morning after the british ambassador successfully slips it to the young feller that the people in washington is beginning to wonder if a king of england 'ain't got no home, y'understand." "but why couldn't mr. wilson give one big dinner for the king, junior, to which he would invite the senate and house of representatives in a body, and have the whole thing over at one _schlag_, y'understand?" "say," morris said, "the dining-room at the white house is a big place, but it ain't exactly madison square garden, and it ain't even childs's boardwalk restaurant, neither." "then let him invite them to a series of meals in rotation alphabetically, and let it go at that," abe suggested. "before that would get him out of his troubles and not hold up the confirmation of the peace treaty and league of nations, abe, mr. wilson would first got to get an act of congress passed amending the order of the alphabet and making l for lodge, j for johnson, and r for reed come ahead of h for hitchcock, who, of course, wouldn't mind helping out mr. wilson by allowing himself to be shifted to the third or fourth sitting," morris said. "maybe it would be a good thing to let the alphabet stand and square things with borah and brandegee," abe retorted. "it might even be still better if mr. wilson would write the king, junior, to be so good and postpone his visit until after inauguration day, 1921, and put the entire problem up to the next president, whoever he might be," morris said. "he might even be mr. wilson," abe concluded; "because, when it comes to a job like entertaining this here king, junior, what american is anxious to tackle it, even if by doing so he could become president even? am i right or wrong?" the end novels of thomas hardy the new thin-paper edition of the greatest living english novelist is issued in two bindings: red limp-leather and red flexible cloth, 12mo. frontispiece in each volume. _desperate remedies_ _far from the madding crowd_ _a group of noble dames_ _the hand of ethelberta_ _jude the obscure_ _a laodicean_ _life's little ironies_ _the mayor of casterbridge_ _a pair of blue eyes_ _the return of the native_ _tess of the d'urbervilles_ _the trumpet major_ _two on a tower_ _under the greenwood tree_ _the well-beloved_ _wessex tales_ _the woodlanders_ harper & brothers new york established 1817 london novels of will n. harben "his people talk as if they had not been in books before, and they talk all the more interestingly because they have for the most part not been in society, or ever will be. they express themselves in the neighborly parlance with a fury of fun, of pathos, and profanity which is native to their region. of all our localists, as i may call the type of american writers whom i think the most national, no one has done things more expressive of the life he was born to than mr. harben." william dean howells. _the hills of refuge_ _the inner law_ _abner daniel_ _ann boyd. illustrated_ _dixie hart. frontispiece_ _gilbert neal. frontispiece_ _mam' linda_ _jane dawson. frontispiece_ _paul rundel. frontispiece_ _pole baker._ _second choice. frontispiece_ _the desired woman. frontispiece_ _the georgians._ _the new clarion. frontispiece_ _the redemption of kenneth galt. frontispiece_ _the substitute._ _westerfelt._ _post 8vo, cloth_ harper & brothers new york established 1817 london books by margaret deland _the rising tide. illustrated_ _around old chester. illustrated_ _the common way. 16mo_ _dr. lavendar's people. illustrated_ _an encore. illustrated_ _good for the soul. illustrated_ _the hands of esau. illustrated_ _the awakening of helena richie. illustrated_ _the iron woman. illustrated_ _old chester tales. illustrated_ _partners. illustrated_ _r. j.'s mother. illustrated_ _the voice. illustrated_ _the way to peace. illustrated_ _where the laborers are few. illustrated_ harper & brothers new york established 1817 london books by sir gilbert parker _the world for sale_ _the money master_ _the judgment house_ _the right of way_ _the ladder of swords_ _the weavers_ _the battle of the strong_ _when valmond came to pontiac_ _the lane that had no turning_ _northern lights_ _pierre and his people_ _an adventurer of the north_ _a romany of the snows_ _cumner's son, and other south sea folk_ harper & brothers new york established 1817 london [transcriber's note: the following typographic errors were corrected: p. 55: changed decclaration to declaration p. 64: changed kasier to kaiser p. 65: changed single quote to double quote p. 69: changed kasier to kaiser p. 71: added closing parenthesis to end of (b) p. 167: added missing word "be" to "by such instrumentalities could rendered" p. 204: added missing period ] available by internet archive (https://archive.org) note: images of the original pages are available through internet archive. see https://archive.org/details/wherearewegoing00lloy where are we going? by the right honourable david lloyd george o.m., p.c., m.p. british prime minister 1916-1922 [illustration: logo] new york george h. doran company copyright, 1923, by george h. doran company [illustration: logo] where are we going? ii printed in the united states of america preface the chapters collected in this book represent a running comment on the european situation during the past ten months. although in the haze that covers the continent it is difficult always to see clearly what is happening, and still more difficult to forecast what is likely to occur, i have not deemed it necessary to revise any of the estimates i made from time to time in these periodic reviews on the position. in the period covered by them peace has gone back perceptibly and unmistakably. of the years immediately after the end of the great war it may be said that up to the present year each showed a distinct improvement over its predecessor. the temper of the warring nations showed a gradual healing and improvement, and east and west there was a return to reason and calm in their attitude towards each other. in the cannes discussions of january 1922 the atmosphere of hostility which poisoned the spa discussions in 1920 had largely disappeared, and the applause which greeted herr rathenau's fine speech at genoa in april 1922 was cordial and general. the electric messages from paris failed to provoke a thunderstorm, and one of the speakers, at the last meeting of the assembly, drawing an illustration from the weather outside, said the conference had broken up under blue skies and a serene firmament. that was in may 1922. those words, when used, met with cheering approval: if used to-day they would be greeted with scoffing laughter. the present year has been one of growing gloom and menace. the international temper is distinctly worse all round. a peace has been patched up with the turkish empire. no one believes it can endure long. the only question is, how long? there may be other patched-up treaties between struggling nations before the year is out. there is only one prediction concerning them which can at this stage be safely made--they will leave european peace in a more precarious plight than ever. a peace wrung by triumphant force out of helplessness is never a good peace. that is why i view with apprehension the character of the settlement which may soon be wrung out of german despair in the ruhr and imposed on greek impotence in the adriatic. the fiume settlement may turn out to be more satisfactory in spite of threatening omens. the jugo-slavs are a formidable military proposition to be tackled by any power. the war proved them to be about the best fighting material in europe. they are also fairly well equipped with modern weapons, and if unhappily the need arose their deficiencies in this respect would soon be supplied from the workshops of czecho-slovakia and elsewhere. i am, therefore, still hopeful that fiume may be remitted for settlement to diplomatists and not to gunmen. international right in these turbulent days seems to depend, not on justice, but on a reckoning of chances. the slavs are ready to defend their rights and can do so. there is, therefore, some talk of conferences and even arbitration in their case. germany and greece cannot put up a fight. unconditional surrender is, therefore, their lot. all the same, this is not only a wrong but a miscalculation. unjust concessions, extracted by violence, are not settlements; they are only postponements. unfortunately, the decisions at the next great hearing of the cause are just as likely to be provisional--and so the quarrel will go on to the final catastrophe unless humanity one day sees the light and has the courage to follow it. but that day must not be too distant, otherwise it will come too late to save civilisation. the last conflict between great nations has exposed the devastating possibilities of modern science. henceforth progress in the destructiveness of the apparatus of war has been, and will continue to be, so rapid that a conflict to-morrow would spread ten times the desolation caused by the great war of 1914-18. there is a concentration of much scientific and mechanical skill on strengthening the machinery of devastation. incredible progress--if progress be the word--has been made within the last three or four years in perfecting and increasing the shattering power of this kind of devilry. what will it be like five, ten, twenty years hence! whilst nations are piling up, perfecting and intensifying their explosives, they are also saturating the ground with the inflammable passions which one day will precipitate the explosion. injustice, insult, insolence, distilled into the spirit of revenge, is everywhere soaking into the earth. i have never doubted that france could impose terms on germany. it was clear that she could starve germany into submission to any conditions dictated to her. it is astonishing that the germans should have held out so long. what i have steadily predicted in these articles is that those terms will not produce as much reparation as a more conciliatory course would have brought--that to operate them will be a source of constant friction, and that the methods employed to impose and execute them will rouse a spirit of patriotic wrath which will in the end bring disaster to the victor of to-day. when the invasion of the ruhr was decided upon, the shortage in the promised coal deliveries upon which default was declared was barely 10 per cent. a little better organisation of the wagon service on the french side would have made up that deficiency in a very short time. during the months of the occupation the french and belgians have not succeeded in collecting one-sixth the tonnage delivered during the corresponding months last year. it will take weeks after passive resistance has collapsed to restore railways and collieries to working order. the new _régime_ will have to liquidate arrears of at least 15,000,000 tons before it begins its regular monthly deliveries. what about cash payments? it is not too much to say that germany is much less able to meet her obligations in this respect than she was before the invasion. her credit has been blown out of sight into infinite space. it will take a long time to pull it back from its wanderings and set its feet once more firmly on european earth. there are only four ways in which the huge sum due from germany can be liquidated:- (1) by handing over to the allies the gold reserves of germany and of germans either at home or on deposit abroad. the former is negligible; the amount of the latter is disputable. much of it is essential to enable germany to purchase abroad the raw material and food necessary to her existence. the worse german credit becomes the larger must this deposit be. as for the foreign securities and deposits which are not strictly necessary for trading, they cannot all be made available, for nothing will induce some of the depositors to part with the whole of these securities. the sum, therefore, derivable from this source would amount to but a small percentage of the total figure payable for reparations. (2) deliveries of coal, timber, potash, dyes and other raw material. with the exception of timber, these deliveries have been, on the whole, satisfactory--since the spa agreement. it did not require the pressure of armed invasion to improve these deliveries, including the timber demands of the allies. (3) a percentage levied on german exports. these are paid for in gold or its equivalent, and the levy would therefore be remitted in gold. a levy of 20 per cent. on german exports would have produced between £40,000,000 and £50,000,000 a year on the basis of last year's exports. when german trade returned to normal it would yield £100,000,000. this sum, added to the value of the material delivered, would cover interest and sinking fund on the £2,500,000,000 which is now the accepted maximum of german capacity. (4) the restoration of german credit with a view to the immediate raising of a loan on reparation account. this would help the allies over their urgent financial difficulties. these four methods of payment are the only known and knowable means of obtaining reparations. they would have been more immediately fruitful if so much time, money and resource had not been wasted over this ill-judged invasion. the apologists of french action in the ruhr contend that france was driven to these extremes by the refusal of britain to co-operate with her in bringing legitimate pressure to bear on germany to carry out the treaty. those who put forward this contention argue in ignorance of the proposals submitted by the british government to the allied conference in august 1922. these would have exploited all the methods above set forth to the limit of their productiveness. these proposals were substantially accepted by all the allies except france. repeated efforts have been made this year in parliament to induce the government to publish this scheme. both the present and the late prime minister gave favourable if not definite answers to the request for publication. but so far the august proceedings have not made their public appearance. why this reluctance to give the whole facts to the public? the discussions at the november and january conferences have been published in full. these meetings were only adjournments from the august conference. the story of the fateful conference is, therefore, incomplete if august is suppressed. ought not the world to know the proposals which france rejected in august 1922? in the absence of official publication i will take the responsibility now of giving a summary. it was proposed:- (1) that germany should be called upon to take such measures as the reparations commission should stipulate, in order to balance her budget and restore her financial stability. (2) that the reichsbank should be made independent of government control. (3) that 26 per cent. of the total value of german exports should be collected in gold or foreign currencies and paid into a separate account in the reichsbank in the name of the sub-committee of the reparations commission known as the committee of guarantees. (4) that the produce of all german import and export duties other than the levy should be paid monthly to a special account at the reichsbank, which should be under the scrutiny of the committee of guarantees. the german government should have the disposal of the sums standing to the credit of this account so long as the reparations commission was satisfied that it fulfilled the obligations imposed upon it. if at any time the commission was not satisfied that this was the case the committee of guarantees should have the right to take over the sums standing to the credit of this account and to secure the payment to it of the produce of these duties thereafter. (5) there were stern provisions for supervision of german finance by the committee of guarantees and for preventing the export of german capital. (6) there were provisions for supervision over state mines and forests in the event of their being a failure in delivery of coal or timber as the case might be. a moratorium up to december 1922 was to be given conditionally on the acceptance of the above terms by the german government, and the reparations commission were then to proceed to fix the further annual payments. had these drastic proposals been adopted and enforced by the allies, what would have been the result? deliveries of coal and timber would have been ensured up to the full quota arranged. by means of the levy on exports, £50,000,000 would have been already collected in gold and paid into allied account. the mark would have been stabilised, and could have been made the basis of a considerable loan. as german trade gradually recovered the export levy would bring in larger amounts. this year would certainly have produced a yield of between £60,000,000 and £70,000,000. this is what would have been effected for reparations if the plan put forward by the british government had been accepted and put into execution in august. by the settlement of this most troublous question, the great cost and the still greater irritation of the ruhr episode would have been avoided, trade would have continued its convalescence, and the peace of europe would have been established. what would have happened if germany had refused these terms? we should certainly have heard what objections or counter-proposals germany had to offer. but we were resolved to have a settlement that would put an end to the fiscal chaos inside germany, and having thus put her in a position to pay we were equally resolved that she should pay up to the limit of her capacity. we, therefore, undertook, if germany rejected the terms finally agreed upon, to join france and the other allies in any coercive measures deemed advisable to compel acceptance. m. poincaré refused to agree. his refusal alone rendered that conference fruitless. over a year has elapsed since then. he has pursued a different policy. so far it has brought him nothing. i am bold enough to predict that in future it will bring france considerably less than the august 1922 plan would have yielded. if he is out for reparations his policy will inevitably fail in comparison with that he so rashly threw over. but if he is out for trouble it has been a great success, and in future it will be an even greater triumph for his statesmanship. a permanent garrison in the ruhr has possibilities of mischief which it does not require any special vision to foresee. enduring peace can only rest on a foundation of justice. it is just that germany should exert herself to the limit of her strength to repair the damage wrought by her armies. she was the aggressor; she was the invader. her aggression inflicted serious hurt on her neighbours. by the established precepts of every civilised law in the world she ought to pay up. a peace which did not recognise that obligation would be unjust and provoke a righteous resentment in the breasts of the wronged. that sentiment would have been inimical to the good understanding that is one of the essentials of peace. moreover, it is not conducive to good behaviour amongst nations that they should be allowed to ravage and destroy without paying the penalty of their misdeeds. that is why i do not agree with those who would wipe out the claim for reparations entirely. on the other hand, civilised jurisprudence has also advanced to the stage where it forbids the creditor to attach his debtor's freedom and independence as security for the payment of the debt. the law that permitted a debtor to be sold into bondage for an unliquidated liability has now been voted barbarous by the more humane usage and wont of the day. that is why i protest against using armed force to occupy and control a country whilst the scourge of starvation is being used to whip its workmen into toiling for payment of a foreign debt. as mr. gladstone once said: "justice means justice to all." the main difficulty of a just settlement of reparations comes from the growing disposition to take sides blindly in this dispute. one party sees nothing but the outrage of 1914-18, the costly vindication of right, and the just claim of the victims to compensation for their losses. the other party sees nothing but the harsh fury with which the victors in the cause press their verdict to execution. peace can only be restored by a full recognition of the equities as well as the humanities--of the humanities as well as the equities. i have sought in these pages to deal fairly with both. d. lloyd george. _september 13th, 1923._ contents chapter page i: the great peril 25 post-war europe revisited--impoverishment and taxation--race hatreds unchanged--how war is begun--vengeance is the lord's--the churches and the league of nations. ii: europe still arming 51 marshal foch and the cause of the great war--navies for defence--strength of europe's armies--europe more militant than ever. iii: the eruption in the mediterranean 59 dropping hot cinders in the balkans--seeing war in pictures--force the arbiter of right and wrong--limiting the activities of the league--bottling up the adriatic. iv: is the league of nations a success? 68 triumphs of the league--all great powers should be in it--america and the league--treaty and the league--ending the arbitrament of the sword. v: the treaty of versailles and its critics 81 treaty criticised but not read--america and the treaty--labour and the treaty--treaty and league of nations interwoven. vi: 1922 95 war dance still in the world--ultimatum instead of conference--cannes and genoa--enemies at council table--talk of an american loan. vii: what is france after? 104 clemenceau and the rhine--annexation and revenge--anglo-american guarantee to france--poincaré and the rhine. viii: what is france after? 116 versailles treaty and the rhine frontier--foch and the political frontier--american and british pressure--sham republic of the rhine. ix: what is france after? 130 bonar law and poincaré--productive sanctions and reparations--moratorium for germany fails--britain stands aside. x: reparations 136 reparations and the treaty--capacity to pay--reparations commission changed--america's vacant chair--worthless "c" bonds for britain. xi: mr. hughes's new haven speech 147 secretary hughes's new haven speech, a timid deliverance--impartial tribunal of experts--offer of american help. xii: the french invasion of the ruhr 156 what germany has paid--"in technical default"--wrong way to make germany pay--ruining german industry--france's secret aim. xiii: lost opportunities 167 french failure in the ruhr--wild oats of reparation--the ruhr and the league of nations--the bankers' conference. xiv: french schemes 175 italy and the ruhr--iron ore of lorraine and german coal deposits--loucheur and hugo stinnes--german workmen in bondage. xv: the quicksand 183 loucheur and the ruhr--lack of leader in france--disregard of allies--aggression and security--failure of bonar law. xvi: the first german offer 191 does france seek a settlement?--demand for submission in the ruhr--german offer inadequate--keeping america out--treaty idea not followed. xvii: the second german note 202 german offer and the loan to germany--can berlin assent to invasion?--reintroducing america--weakening debtors ability to pay. xviii: the napoleonic dream 213 european mind unhinged--what every frenchman knows--pickwick follows snodgrass--germany may collapse--undoing the work of bismarck. xix: is it peace? 225 stresemann man of energy--chaos ahead for germany--british unemployment--france a self-contained country--balfour's note a generous offer. xx: what next? 234 pen-and-ink jousting--tory "diehards" and france--poincaré and the dove of peace--what "pay and stay" means--france's minimum and britain's surrender. xxi: the british debt to america 244 borrowing for allies--british taxpayer's burden--creditor nation now debtor--britain must pay her way--her currency not discredited--inter-allied debts. xxii: inter-allied debts 252 discovery of the middle west--legend of british wealth--1,400,000 unemployed--the balfour note--can britain afford to be more generous than america? xxiii: the british elections 264 minority rule and moral authority--national liberals at the polls--danger of england's electoral system--labour's prospects--warring liberal factions. xxiv: how democracy works 282 growth of britain's electorate--women suffrage--new voters without a party--absentees from the polls--freaks of the group system. xxv: political realities 291 post-war legislation--the irish cauldron--labour and capital--agriculture and industry--socialism courting fascism. xxvi: should we make peace with russia? 301 pre-revolutionary russia--corruption and betrayal--"shaking hands with murder"--if turkey, why not russia?--need for russia's exports. xxvii: palestine and the jews 312 stupidity of anti-semitism--blighting rule of the turk--the jew as a cultivator--race equality in palestine--zionist declaration. xxviii: the treaty of lausanne 322 turkish fezzes in the air--blow of prestige of the west--massacres and misgovernment--fertile country a wilderness--had wilson succeeded--lausanne a milestone, not a terminus. xxix: the signing of the irish treaty 339 gladstone's home-rule fight--scene in no. 10 downing street--griffith and collins--to sign or not to sign--childers, sullen and disappointed--treaty a pillar of hope for future. xxx: prohibition 350 the lesson from russia--britain not convinced--experiments difficult--public uneducated--outlook not encouraging. xxxi: unofficial publication of "official" information 361 julius cæsar began it--self defence and secret information--the versailles decision--general rules and special cases. where are we going? i the great peril if a man on a bright july morning in 1914 had sailed abroad and had the misfortune to be wrecked on a desert island, returning to civilisation a week ago, the change which europe presented to him would be sufficient to induce him to believe that his long solitude had unhinged his mind. to him it would have appeared as the stuff of which dreams are made. he would have remembered a german empire with an august head, ruling with autocratic sway a population striding with giant steps into prosperity and wealth, possessing a matchless army, whose tread terrified europe; with a fleet that provoked articles and novels and agitations about the invasion of england; with vast possessions across the seas. in its place he would see germany, instead of being a confident, powerful, arrogant empire, a timid, nervous, and apologetic republic presided over by a respectable and intelligent workman, her minister issuing notes to propitiate belgium, and having them sent back like the stupid exercises of a backward schoolboy to be rewritten in accordance with the pleasure of the taskmaster; the great army reduced to a force one-half the size of that of serbia; the menacing fleet at the bottom of the sea; the watch on the rhine kept by french, british, and belgian soldiers. he would see the krupp works in french occupation; not a german colony left. russia he would have recollected as a powerful autocracy rooted in a superstitious belief by the peasantry in the divinity of its head. he would find it now a revolutionary area ruled by the exiles of yesterday, shunned by the rest of the world because of the violence of its communistic doctrines; tsardom, with its gilded retinue of splendour, flung into a hideous doom, and the sceptre of peter the great enforcing the doctrines of karl marx. he would see the austrian empire as much a thing of the past as the empire of nebuchadnezzar, a poor province lifted out of beggary by the charity of her foes: new states, which had been dead and buried for centuries, risen from the dead, casting off their shrouds, marching in full panoply; trieste an italian port; the dolomites an italian bastion. the turk alone quite unchanged, a few more amputating operations performed upon him, but still preserving sufficient vitality to massacre christians irrespective of denomination or race, and to become a sore trial and perplexity to the rest of the world. if our returned voyager travelled through europe he would find even more fundamental changes in the world of finance, trade and commerce. he would find impoverishment, dislocation; the elaborate and finely-spun web of commerce rent to pieces, and its torn threads floating in the wind. with a few sovereigns in his pocket, he would expect in return 25 francs, 20 marks, and about 26 lire. instead of that, with a paper sovereign he would find that he could buy 70 francs, nearly 100 lire, 250,000 german marks, 300,000 austrian kronen, and millions of russian roubles. the money-changers who once prospered on decimal fractions now earning a precarious livelihood in the flights of the multiplication table. that would give him a better indication perhaps of the reality of the change than even the fall of empires. on his journeys he would travel through prosperous provinces rutted and overturned as by a gigantic earthquake; he would pass vast cemeteries where 10,000,000 young men fallen in the great war were having their last sleep; he would see on all hands signs of mutilation of men who had been engaged in the great struggle. taxation everywhere quintupled with nothing but debt to show for it; industry with its back bent under a burden of taxation which when he left existed only in the nightmares of the dyspeptic rich. he would then be able to realise something of the tremendous upheaval that had taken place in the world. but what would surprise him more than all these amazing and bewildering transformations would be the one thing in which there was no change. he would naturally expect that after such terrifying experiences, the world would have learnt its lesson, turned its back finally on war, its crimes and its follies, and set its face resolutely toward peace. it is the one thing he discovers has not changed--the world has not learned one single syllable. suspicions amongst nations exist just as ever, only more intense; hatreds between races and peoples, only fiercer; combinations forming everywhere for the next war; great armies drilling; conventions and compacts for joint action when the tocsin sounds; general staffs meeting to arrange whether they should march, where they should march, how they should march, and where they should strike; little nations only just hatched, just out of the shell, staggering under the burden of great armaments, and marching along towards unknown battlefields; new machinery of destruction and slaughter being devised and manufactured with feverish anxiety; every day science being brought under contribution to discover new methods to destroy human life--in fact, a deep laid and powerfully concerted plot against civilisation, openly organised in the light of the sun. and that after his experience of four or five years ago! man the builder, and man the breaker, working side by side in the same workshop, and apparently on the best of terms with each other, playing their part in the eternal round of creation and dissolution, with characteristic human energy. what a complex creature is man! it is little wonder that god gave him up repeatedly in despair. he is unteachable. i wonder whether it is realised that if war were to break out again, the calamity would be a hundredfold greater than that of the last experience. next time, cities will be laid waste. possible, and i am sorry to say, probable enemy nations are more closely intertwined, and the engines of havoc are becoming more and more terrible. i have called attention repeatedly to the developments which took place during the late war, in the variety, the range, and the power of destructive weapons. compare the aëroplane at the beginning of the war, and its small bomb which could easily be manhandled, with the same machine at the end. by the end of the war machines had been built, and but for the armistice would have been used, the devastating power of which was terrific. since then the power of the machine, the weight of the explosive, and the incendiary material it drops, have grown, and are still growing. science is perfecting old methods of destruction, and searching out new methods. one day, in its exploration, it may hit on something that may make the fabric of civilisation rock. can anything be done to avert this approaching catastrophe? that is the problem of all problems for those who love their fellowmen. i warn you that it is madness to trust to the hope that mankind, after such an experience, will not be so rash as to court another disaster of the same kind. the memory of the terrors, the losses, the sufferings of the war, will not restrain men from precipitating the world into something which is infinitely worse, and those who think so, and, therefore, urge that it is not necessary to engage in a new crusade for peace, have not studied the perverse, the stubborn, and the reckless nature of man. there is the danger that the last war may even make some nations believe in war. i have talked to many young soldiers who were fortunate enough to have passed unscathed through some of the worst experiences of the war, to many who suffered mutilation in some of these experiences; they have given me one common impression that the memory of fear is evanescent, and that they cannot now re-create in their own minds the sensations of terror through which they passed. if that is true of those who went through the furnace, what of the multitudes who simply looked on?--the multitudes of those who were too young to take part, and can only recall the excitement produced by the conflict and the glory of victory? the recollection of the headaches of an orgy never lasts as long as that of its pleasures. it is useless to recall memories of the terror and torture of the war, and expect them to crusade for peace. memory is a treacherous crusader. it starts with a right purpose fresh and hot on its path, but its zeal gets fainter as the days roll past, and it ends by handing over its banner to the foe. you can only redeem mankind by appealing to its nobler instincts. fear is base, and you cannot lift mankind by using it as a lever. the churches alone can effectively rouse the higher impulses of our nature. that is where their task comes in. there is another reason why we cannot regard the danger as having passed away. you have all the elements which made for the great war of 1914 more potent than ever to-day. the atmosphere of europe is charged with them. what made the last war? armed international dislikes, rivalries, and suspicions. the dislikes were based on age-long racial feuds stimulated by memories of recent wrongs. celt and teuton disliking each other; slav and teuton suspicious of each other; the hatred of the slav for the teuton intensified by the arrogance with which germany humiliated russia at the moment of her weakness immediately after the japanese war, when she was peculiarly sensitive to insult. you will recollect the peremptoriness and the insolence of her gesture over the bosnian annexation, and insolences are always more painful than wrongs and rankle longer. they corrode the flesh, and burn into the soul of a nation, keeping its anger aflame. i wish nations always remembered that. there was the hatred of the celt for the teuton deepened by the annexation of alsace-lorraine, and by the incidents inseparable from the invasion of a foreign soil. there was germany suspecting that every railway constructed by russia was aimed at her heart. there was france convinced that germany was only waiting her opportunity to pick a quarrel which would enable her to deprive france of her much-coveted colonies. there was england watching with vigilant insight and increasing anger the growth of germany's great fleet, which she was convinced was aimed at her shores. there were great armies in every continental country ready to march at a moment's notice, fully equipped, each commander firmly persuaded that his own legions were irresistible. you had there all the conditions that made for war. had it come of set purpose? i have read most of the literature concerning the events that led up to that war, and it is full of warning as to how wars happen. they do not come because the majority of those who are concerned are bent upon bloodshed, not even the majority who have the decisive voice if they exercised it in time. had a plebiscite been taken in every country in europe a week before war was declared as to whether they wished to engage in a european conflict, the proposal would have been turned down by a majority so overwhelming as to show that the proposition was one that no nation had the slightest idea of entertaining. that is not the reason why it came. but you have always in control of the affairs of nations some men who hesitate; many who are apathetic, many who are merely inefficient and stupid; and then most men, even in a government, have their minds concentrated on their own immediate tasks. i will give you an illustration of how war is begun, once you have the predisposition to quarrel, without anybody wanting it and with the vast majority of the people who are to be engaged in it opposed to it. austria issued an ultimatum to serbia. there is nothing a big bully likes better than to hector a little man who is near the point of his toe. serbia was so near the boot that austria was constantly tempted to give it a kick, and it did. it issued an ultimatum, which was a very insolent one. the serbian reply was a practical acceptance of the austrian demands. this is the note the kaiser wrote on it: "a brilliant performance this. but with it disappears"--listen to this written by the kaiser of germany just a few days before war was declared--"but with it disappears every reason for war, and the austrian minister ought to have remained quietly in belgrade. after that i would never have given orders for mobilisation." in three days there was war. let me give another illustration. admiral tirpitz said he saw von jagow two days after the austrian reply. von jagow, the german foreign minister, was so little interested in the austro-serbian conflict that he confessed to the german ambassador to austria on july 27th, two days after the reply had been received, that he had not yet found time to read the serbian reply to austria. here is the document on which ten million young men who had no responsibility for it have been slain, homes have been desolated, and a debt of taxation, confusion and sorrow incurred which will not be wiped out as long as this generation lasts. it is inconceivable, if one had not some knowledge of the carelessness and the procrastination which are bred in official circles by long practice. that was only three days before war was declared. this high official in the wilhelmstrasse, who subsequently agreed to the fateful decision to declare war against russia, had not even read the critical document which ought to have averted the struggle. but there are always the vigilant few, the very few resolute men whose whole mind and energy and skill is engaged ceaselessly in driving forward the chariots of war. whilst others are asleep, they are craftily dodging the traffic, and stealing along unawares, slowly getting their chariots into position for the next push forward. whilst others are asleep, they lash the fiery steeds along their destructive course. in the press, on the platform, in the council chambers, in the chancelleries, in society of all kinds, high and low, they are always pressing along. when the precipice is reached, they dash through the feeble resistance of the panic-stricken mob of counsellors and officials, and nations are plunged into the abyss before they know it. this is the way most wars come. read the history of the war of 1870. it came about in the same confused, clumsy, purposeless way. in all these cases there is always in the background the sinister figure of that force for mischief which used to be known by our puritan fathers as the devil. have these hatreds and suspicions abated? are there no rivalries to-day? are there no men whose one joy is in war? was the devil numbered amongst the slain in the last war? i have never seen his name in any casualty list. look around. his agents are more numerous, more active, more pressing and efficient than ever. europe to-day is a cauldron of suspicions and hatreds. it is well to speak frankly. celt and teuton are now interlocked in a conflict which is none the less desperate because one of the parties is disarmed. there is a suppressed savagery which is but ill concealed, and there are new hatreds which, if they have not been brought into existence during the war, have at any rate come to the surface. mankind has learnt no lesson from the four or five years of war, although it has been scourged with scorpions. there was nothing that contributed more to the last catastrophe than the annexation by germany of alsace-lorraine. as long as that act of folly remained uncorrected there was no real peace possible in europe. the nations concerned were just abiding their opportunity, and the opportunity came. now you have two alsace-lorraines at least. there is the annexation of vilna by force; there is the annexation of galicia by force, by violence, by the use of arms against the will of the population. elsewhere you have the german and the pole quarrelling over silesia; the russian and the pole over doubtful boundaries; the czech and the magyar; the serbian and the bulgarian; the russian and the rumanian; the rumanian and the magyar. there is the age-long feud between greek and turk. all have an air of biding opportunity, all are armed ready for slaughter. europe is a seething cauldron of international hates, with powerful men in command of the fuel stores feeding the flames and stoking the fires. it is no use blaming the treaty of versailles. this state of things has nothing to do with treaties. here it is the spirit that killeth and not the letter. sometimes wrongs are imaginary. where the wrongs are imaginary time will heal the sense of hurt, but sometimes they are real, and time will fester the wound, but everywhere and always the hatreds are real enough. can nothing be done? if it can, let it be done in time. let it be done at once. yet, once more i remind you that if the gun is loaded--and it is loaded in every land--when the quarrel begins it is apt to go off, not because the trigger is deliberately pulled, but because some clumsy fellow in his excitement stumbles against it. in a continent which is nominally christian, the churches surely are not impotent. when the west was all catholic, and it had the good fortune to have a high-minded and capable occupant of the throne of st. peter, many a struggle was averted by his intervention. can the churches not once more display their power? they can only do so by moving together, not merely every denomination in britain, but every christian community throughout europe--catholic and protestant--catholics even more than protestants, for the countries where the peril is most imminent are more under the domination of the catholic churches than of the protestant faiths. if all the heroism of millions, their sacrifice and their sufferings, are to be thrown away, it will be the most colossal, criminal and infamous waste ever perpetrated in human history. millions of men endangered their lives willingly. millions lost their lives for the sake of establishing peace on earth on the basis of international right. a temple to human right was built with material quarried out of all that is choicest in the soul of man. but its timbers are being drenched with the kerosene of hatred, and one day a match will be lit by some careless or malignant hand which will set fire to this magnificent edifice; its splendour will be reduced to black embers, and the hope of mankind will be once more laid in ashes. the task of the churches is to put forth the whole of their united strength to avert that catastrophe. peace is only possible when you introduce into the attitude of nations towards each other principles which govern the demeanour of decent people in a community towards their neighbours. if international methods were introduced into the dealings of neighbours with each other life would become intolerable--the unconcealed suspicions, distrusts and ill-will which rule everywhere, the eternal expectancy of and preparation for blows, the readiness of the strong to use violence, either to enforce his will on his weaker neighbour or to deprive him of his liberty or his possessions, or even his life, to satisfy anger, revenge, or greed. had this been the rule in private affairs, we should all have to live in caves, or in castles, according to our means. as a matter of fact, man is only half civilised. in international matters he is still a savage, in his heart he recognises no law but that of force. the savage has his restraints. his instinct warns him not to pounce save when he thinks he can do so effectively and with impunity, and for some purpose which he thinks worth his while. whether he hates or covets, he has no other restraint. i wish i could say that in essence nations to-day obey any other impulse. man must be civilised in his international relations, otherwise wars will go on as long as mankind remains on this earth. i have seen a city wrenched from its people. i have seen a whole province appropriated against the protests of its people, and all within the last four years, since the great war to establish international right. there was no conceivable justification for either of these depredations except that both the city and the province were desirable, were at hand, were very tempting, and that the owners were too feeble to resist their pillagers. the lesson must be taught that larceny does not diminish in turpitude as it increases in the scale of its operations. a nation that feloniously steals, takes, and carries away a city or province is just as criminal as the thief sentenced to imprisonment for robbery by violence on the high-road. and these national felonies will assuredly bring trouble one day. they invariably do so, and unfortunately international trouble is never confined to the felon. human retribution, once it begins, is as indiscriminating and uncontrollable as a prairie fire. the flames consume the wheat as well as the tares. hell fire administered by the hand of man scorches the innocent equally with the guilty. the doom of germany involved millions in its tortures who were outside her gates, abominated her crimes, and did all they could to prevent their perpetration. that is why it is written: "'vengeance is mine, i will repay,' saith the lord." it is the supreme duty of the churches to teach nations to understand that the moral law is just as applicable to them in their corporate capacity as it is to the individuals who compose them; to teach them that hatred is just as unseemly between nations as it is between individuals, and far more dangerous. goodwill must be assiduously cultivated between nations. it must be ingeminated in every way--in schools, in the press, in sermons, in classes. the men who are always sowing distrust and dislike of men of other races and lands should be picked out, condemned, shown up, hunted by the scorn, the contempt and the wrath of their fellowmen. they are more dangerous than the incendiary who burns down an occasional hay-rick or habitation. let the best side of every nation be better known. each nation has made its contribution to the sum of human greatness. dwell on that, and not on the failings and the deficiencies, the errors, and the crimes which are unhappily common to all nations. name me the land that has no stain on its record. there is no end to the resourcefulness of hate. its variety is infinite. i recollect, not so long ago, a time when you were not a patriot if you were pro-french; the fact that you were pro-french stamped you as a little englander. france was supposed to be a busy and malignant foe of britain all the world over, scheming everywhere against british interests. she stood for all that was unpleasant and repugnant to the british mind--in her thought, her literature, her politics, and her manners. france heartily reciprocated our dislike. there were at least two occasions when war between the two countries was apprehended, was openly talked of, and was even likely. the atmosphere of the press in both capitals was charged with brimstone. now it is to germany you must not utter one word of toleration or even fair play. i am not counselling the abandonment of the just measure of our national rights as against either of these two countries, but they are both great nations. they are both nations that have contributed richly of the things that make for the elevation, for the happiness, for the splendour of mankind. if germany is the land of bismarck with its blood and iron, all protestants will remember that she is also the land of luther and the reformation. if she fought in the late war for four years to establish a military domination in europe, she fought for thirty years with enduring valour and much suffering to establish the freedom of conscience in europe. she has given to the world great literature, great painters, great philosophers, great explorers in all the continents of thought. she is the land of unrivalled song. even in the middle of the bloody conflict with germany, every sunday we praised god in our churches to the notes of german music. let us give credit for these things in our efforts to reconstitute the reign of goodwill. and if we feel angry with france, let us remember her dazzling array of great writers, her gigantic struggles for liberty, the penetrating imagination devoted to scientific research, which has brought incalculable blessings to humanity. let us not judge france by the fussy little men that give expression to her petulance in the fits of temper that overtake every nation, but by the great men who have given noble expression to her immortal soul. france is the land of victor hugo, of pascal, of renan, and many another teacher who has taken humanity by the hand along the upward road. everything depends on a consistent, determined, continuous inculcation of the principles and the ideal of goodfellowship, between nations. goodwill on earth means to think well of and dwell on the best side of others, and goodwill on earth and peace have been linked together. without the one you will not have the other. let us, therefore, cultivate the spirit of brotherhood amongst men. the church must appeal to the noblest sentiments of the human heart. mankind can only be redeemed by an appeal to those higher instincts. not by an appeal to ignoble fear. war means terror, war means death, war means anguish. that will not prevent war, and never has. man is the most fearless of god's creatures, and when his passions are roused there is no fear that will restrain him. the fire of his passion burns the restraints of self-preservation like bands of tow, so that fear will not restrain the nations and make peace among them. war destroys trade, it brings unemployment. look at all the losses, reckoning them up in cash. that will not prevent war: it never has. selfish interests have a means of deluding themselves. greed has a blind side. do not trust to selfishness and selfish interest to ensure peace. selfishness will ensure nothing which is worth keeping in the world. selfishness pays good dividends, but it wastes capital. the nation or the individual that makes self-love the managing-director of the soul will end in bankruptcy--bankruptcy of respect, bankruptcy of ideals--bankruptcy of honour--bankruptcy of friendships. what is it that germany is suffering from now? her great tragedy is not her indemnity, not even her gigantic casualties, not even the destruction of her trade. the one great tragedy of germany is that she has lost the respect of mankind. it affects her trade, it affects her business, it makes it difficult for her to climb to the pitch whence she fell. the rope is gone. she has done things of which she herself is now ashamed. her people--i can see it when i meet them--are ashamed. that is the tragedy. they are a gallant people, they are a brave people, they fought bravely, but they are broken-spirited. why? they have lost their self-respect because they have done something that they know in their hearts was wrong. these are the things that have to be taught to nations. a public opinion must be worked up that will be strong enough to sustain international right. no law is possible without an active public opinion for its enforcement, least of all international law. without it the league of nations is a farce. you might as well have a wooden cannon; however splendidly mounted it may be, however imposing its appearance, every one knows that the moment it is fired it will burst. unless the world is taught to respect its authority, it will become a butt of derision. it is no use keeping up pretences. pretences never delude events. the league of nations may gather together representatives of all the great powers of the earth, and yet it may be a futile, barren, costly nothing unless it has behind it the spirit of the people who constitute those nations. the real danger of the moment is lest the league of nations should become a mere make-believe, whilst the same old intrigues, the same old schemes, the same old international greed and hatred, should be working their will freely outside. the decision of the league of nations has been, within the last two or three years, openly flouted by a member of that league, a member which owes its national independence to the treaty which founded that league. another nation, one of the principal authors of the league, refuses to refer a question in which is it concerned, and in which europe is concerned, to the arbitrament of the league. both these nations prefer to resort to force. the rest of the world looks on feebly with indifference, accepting the rebuff to their league in each case. why? because there is no public opinion in the recalcitrant countries to bring pressure to bear on the respective governments, and there is no public opinion strong enough outside to exercise the necessary insistence. the churches alone can remedy this. there ought to be an international movement of all the churches, catholic and protestant, protestant and catholic. i know it is difficult to compass. the divisions in christendom are too often fatal to common action for the attainment of common aims. they ought to be overcome. they must be overcome. there was a time in the middles ages when religion exercised a direct as well as an indirect influence in the domain of government and social relations. it helped to win for englishmen their great charter. it gradually emancipated the serfs. it preserved the peace of europe many a time when it was gravely imperilled by the quarrels of kings. in the days of puritanism, and the days of the covenant, the partnership between religion and politics won for us the two great boons of parliamentary liberty and liberty of conscience. when methodism spurred the conscience of england, its influence was felt in the political movement that emancipated the slaves throughout the british empire. that was one of the greatest feats of disinterested righteousness ever exhibited by a nation. the tasks awaiting religion to-day in the sphere of government are even greater--emancipation of the worker from the tyrannies of economic greed, the saving of the nation from the curse of alcohol, and the spreading of the angels' message heard on the hills of bethlehem until the obdurate heart of man shall at last re-echo it: "peace on earth and goodwill amongst men." ii europe still arming marshal foch once told me that he considered the german army of 1914 the finest army the world ever saw, in numbers, organisation, training, and equipment. what set that army in motion? much has been written and spoken as to the origin of the great war, and as to who and what was responsible for so overwhelming a cataclysm. no one ever believed that it was the assassination of a royal archduke. some said it was the working out of the pan-german scheme to rule the earth; some contended it was the german fear of the growing power of russia, the nervous apprehension of what looked like an encircling movement by russia, france and britain. the great french marshal's dictum is the real explanation. unless due weight is given to this outstanding fact the diplomatic muddle of july, 1914, becomes unintelligible. were it not that the german army was more perfect and more potent than either the french or the russian army--were it not that every german officer was convinced that the german military machine was superior to all its rivals--there would have been no war, whatever emperors, diplomatists, or statesmen said, thought, or intended. all nations have their ambitions, but they are not tempted to impose them upon their neighbours if the hazard is too obviously great. but a sense of overpowering force behind national aims is a constant incitement to recklessness, to greed, and to ambitious patriotism. the more one examines, in the growing calm, the events of july, 1914, the more one is impressed with the shrinking of the nominal rulers of the attacking empires as they approached the abyss, and with the relentless driving onward of the military organisation behind these terror-stricken dummies. navies are essentially defensive weapons. no capital in the world can be captured by navies alone, and no country can be annexed or invaded by a fleet. but armies are grabbing machines. a transcendent army has always led to aggression. no country can resist the lure of an easy military triumph paraded before its eyes for two successive generations. the inference is an obvious one. to ensure peace on earth nations must disarm their striking forces. without disarmament, pacts, treaties, and covenants are of no avail. they are the paper currency of diplomacy. that is the reason why all the friends of peace are filled with despair when they see nations still arming and competing in armies whilst trusting to mere words and signatures to restrain the irresistible impetus of organised force. a statistical survey of european armies to-day is calculated to cause alarm. europe has not learnt the lesson of the war. it has rather drawn a wrong inference from that calamity. there are more men under arms in europe to-day than there were in 1913-14, with none of the justification or excuse which could be pleaded in those days. in pre-war times the statesmen of each country could make a parliamentary case for their military budgets by calling attention to the menace of prodigious armies across their frontiers. germany and austria built up great armaments because their frontiers were open to the attack of two great military powers who had engaged to pool their resources in the event of war. france and russia raised huge armies because germany possessed the most redoubtable army in the world, and could rely in the case of war upon the assistance of the not inconsiderable forces of the austrian empire. and both austria and france had always the uncertain factor of italy, with her army of 3,000,000, to reckon with. but since the war these mutual excuses no longer exist. the two great military empires of central europe have disappeared. germany, which before the war had a peace establishment of 800,000 men and reserves running into millions, has to-day a total army of 100,000 men--about one-third the size of the polish army. the formidable german equipment which for four years pounded the cities and villages of northern france to dust is either destroyed or scattered for display amongst the towns and villages of the victors. the austrian army, which had in 1913-14 a peace establishment of 420,000 men and a reserve of two or three millions of trained men, has to-day been reduced to a tiny force of 30,000 men. in spite of these facts france has still an army of 736,000 men now under arms, with a trained reserve of two or three millions more. she is strengthening and developing her air force as if she feared--or contemplated--an immediate invasion. in 1914 france had an air force of 400 aëroplanes; to-day she has 1,152.[1] but numbers signify little. the size, the power, and the purpose of the machines signify much. amongst the 1,152 air machines of to-day will be found bombers of a destructiveness such as was not dreamt of in 1914. should human folly drift once more into war these preparations are full of evil omen as to the character of that conflict. a single bomb dropped from one of the new bombers contains more explosive material than one hundred of those carried by the old type. and the size of the machine and of its bombs is growing year by year. where is it to stop? and what is it all for? where is the enemy? where is the menace which demands such gigantic military developments? not one of the neighbours of france has to-day a force which reaches one-fourth the figures of her formidable army. germany no longer affords a decent pretext. the population of germany is equal to the aggregate population of poland, rumania, jugo-slavia, and czecho-slovakia, but her army barely numbers one-seventh of the aggregate peace establishment of these four countries. rumania alone, with a population of 15,000,000, has an army twice the size of that allowed by the treaty of versailles to germany with her population of 60,000,000. these countries have in addition to their standing armies reserve forces of millions of trained men, whilst the young men of germany are no longer permitted to train in the use of arms. her military equipment is destroyed, and her arsenals and workshops are closely inspected by allied officers lest a fresh equipment should be clandestinely produced. an army of 700,000 is, therefore, not necessary in order to keep germany within bounds. the only other powerful army in europe is the russian army. it is difficult to gather any reliable facts about russia. the mists that arise from that unhealthy political and economic swamp obscure and distort all vision. the statistics concerning her army vary according to the point of view of the person who cites them. the latest figure given by the russians themselves is 800,000. on paper that indicates as formidable a force as that possessed by the french. but the events of the past few years show clearly that the russian army is powerful only for defence, and that it is valueless for purposes of invasion. it has neither the transport that gives mobility nor the artillery that makes an army redoubtable in attack. the polish invasion of 1923 was a comedy, and as soon as the poles offered the slightest resistance the bolsheviks ran back to their fastnesses without striking a parthian blow at their pursuers. the state of russian arsenals and factories under bolshevism is such that any attempt to re-equip these armies must fail. the russian army, therefore, affords no justification for keeping up armaments in europe on the present inflated scale. the fact is that europe is thoroughly frightened by its recent experience, and, like all frightened things, does not readily listen to reason, and is apt to resort to expedients which aggravate the evils which have terrified it. militarism has reduced it to its present plight, and to save itself from a similar disaster in future it has become more militarist than ever. every little state bristles with guns to scare off invaders. meanwhile no country in europe pays its way, except britain, with her reduced army and navy. but by means of loans and inflated currencies they all, even the smallest of them, contrive to maintain larger armies than frederick the great or the grand monarque ever commanded in their most triumphant years. and the cost of armaments to-day has grown vastly out of proportion to the numbers of the units that compose them. france--in many ways the richest country in europe--displays a gaping and a growing rent in her national finance which has to be patched up by paper. the deficit grows in spite of the fact that a large part of her army is quartered on germany to the detriment of reparations, and that the german contribution conceals much of the cost of that large army. a good deal of the borrowing is attributable to the cost of repairing her devastated area, but the burden of maintaining so huge an army is responsible for a considerable share of the deficiency. the economic recovery of europe is seriously retarded by the cost of the new militarism. the old continent is throwing to the dogs of war with both hands the bread that should feed her children. one day those dogs will, in their arrogant savagery, turn upon the children and rend them. _algeciras, december 26th, 1922._ footnote: [1] 1,152 refers to when this chapter was written, _i. e._, january 6th, 1923. the figure has increased since then. iii the eruption in the mediterranean the shores of the mediterranean have from time immemorial been the scene of eruptions and earthquakes. they generally break out without warning. sometimes they are devastating in their effects, destroying life and property over wide areas and on a vast scale. sometimes they provide a brilliant spectacular display, terrifying in appearance, but not causing much destruction. to which of these two categories does the last eruption of mussolini belong? to drop hot cinders in the balkans is a dangerous experiment. the soil is everywhere soaked with naphtha and it floats about in uncharted pools and runlets which easily catch fire. a cinder flung from vienna started a conflagration which spread over continents. that was only nine years ago. the ground is still hot--the smoke blinds and stifles. you cannot see clearly or breathe freely. now and again there is a suspicious ruddiness in the banks of smoke which proves that the fire is not yet out. and yet there are statesmen flinging burning faggots about with reckless swagger. the temper of europe may be gauged from the reception accorded to these heedless pyrotechnics on the part of national leaders by their own countrymen. every time it occurs, whether in france, italy or turkey, and whether it be poincaré, mussolini, or mustapha kemal who directs the show, applause greets the exhibition. i remember the first days of the great war. there was not a belligerent capital where great and enthusiastic crowds did not parade the streets to cheer for war. in those days men did not know what war meant. their conception of it was formed from the pictures of heroic--and always victorious--feats, hung in national galleries and reproduced in the form of the cheap chromos, engravings, and prints, which adorn the walls in every cottage throughout most lands. the triumphant warriors on horseback with the gleaming eye and the flourishing sabre are their own countrymen; the poor vanquished under the crashing hoofs are the foe. hurrah for more pictures! the crown prince denies that he ever used the phrase "this jolly war." his denial ought to be accepted in the absence of better proof than is yet forthcoming as to the statement ever having been made. but the phrase represented the temper of millions in those fateful days. it used to be said that in wars one lot cheered and the other fought. but the cheering mobs who filled the streets in august were filling the trenches in september, and multitudes were filling graves ere the year was out. but when they cheered they had no realisation of the actualities of war. they idealised it. they only saw it in pictures. but the cheerers of to-day know what war means. france lost well over a million lives in the last fight. italy lost 600,000, and there are men in every workshop in both countries who know something of the miseries as well as the horrors of war and can tell those who do not. what, then, accounts for the readiness, at the slightest provocation, to rush into all the same wretchedness over again? the infinite capacity of mankind for deluding itself. last time, it is true, it was a ghastly affair. this time it will be an easy victory. then you had to fight a perfectly armed germany, or austria; now it is a very small affair indeed--in one case a disarmed germany which cannot fight, or, in the other case, a miserable little country like greece with no army or navy to talk of. so hurrah for the guns! a bloodless victory, except, of course, to the vanquished. more pictures for the walls to show our children what terrible people we are when provoked! this episode may end peaceably, but it was a risk to take, and quite an unnecessary risk under the circumstances of the case. italy was indignant, and naturally indignant, at the murder of her emissaries in cold blood on greek territory and, although it took place in a well-known murder area--on the albanian border where comitadjis and other forms of banditti reign--still, greece was responsible for giving adequate protection to all the boundary commissioners who were operating within her frontiers. italy is, therefore, entitled to demand stern reparation for this outrage. this greece promptly concedes. not merely has greece shown her readiness to pay a full indemnity, but she has offered to salute the italian flag by way of making amends for the offence involved to the italian nation in this failure to protect italian officers transacting legitimate business on greek soil. mussolini's answer to the greek acknowledgment of liability is to bombard a defenceless town, kill a few unarmed citizens, and enter into occupation of a greek island. does any one imagine, if the incident had occurred on french soil, and the french government had displayed the same willingness to express regret and offer reparation, that, without further parley, he would have bombarded ajaccio? or, had it been britain, would he have shelled cowes and occupied the isle of wight? but greece has no navy. that, i suppose, alters the merits of the case! force is still the supreme arbiter of right and wrong in international affairs in europe. it is worth noting how a new code of international law is coming into existence since the war. the french armies invade a neighbour's territory, occupy it, establish martial law, seize and run the railways, regulate its press, deport tens of thousands of its inhabitants, imprison or shoot down all who resist, and then proclaim that this is not an act of war. it is only a peaceful occupation to enforce rights under a peace treaty. signor mussolini shells a town belonging to a country with whom he is at peace, and forcibly occupies part of its territory, and then solemnly declares that it is not an act of war, but just a reasonable measure of diplomatic precaution. once force decides the issue it also settles the rules. there was a time when english and spaniards fought each other in the west indies whilst their governments at home were ostensibly at peace. and french and english fought in india without any diplomatic rupture between versailles and st. james's. but in those days these lands were very remote and the control of the centre over events at these distances was intermittent and occasionally feeble. and sometimes it suited governments to ignore what was taking place on the fringe of empire. but even in those days an attack on the homeland meant war, and it would mean war to-day were the attacked countries not powerless. i have heard it said that there is one law for the rich and another for the poor. there is no doubt one international law for the strong and another for the weak. what about the league of nations? this is pre-eminently a case for action under the covenant. italy and greece are both parties. how can they, consistently with the terms of the treaty they so recently signed, refuse to leave this dispute to be dealt with by the league? italy had a special part in drafting the treaty and in imposing it upon germany and austria. she cannot now in decency repudiate its clauses. it is suggested in some quarters that, the dignity of italy being involved in the dispute, she cannot possibly consent to leave it in the hands of the league. that surely is a fatal limitation on the activities of the league of nations. every dispute involving right implicates the national honour and as every nation is the judge of its own honour, ultimately all differences would be ruled out of the covenant which it did not suit one country or the other to refer. the league is not allowed to touch reparations. if this quarrel also is excluded from the consideration of the league, it is no exaggeration to say that this valuable part of the treaty of versailles becomes a dead letter. it is one of the gross ironies of the european situation that the treaty of versailles is being gradually torn to pieces by the countries which are not only the authors but have most to gain by its provisions. france has already repudiated the first and most important part of the treaty by declaring that it will refer no question arising between herself and her neighbours under the treaty itself to the league of nations. she has further invaded and occupied her neighbour's territory in defiance of the provisions of the treaty. if italy also declines to respect the first part of that treaty, then nothing is left of it except what it suits nations to enforce or obey. and if the framers do not owe allegiance to the treaty they drafted, why should those who only accepted it under duress bow to its behests? the victors are busily engaged in discrediting their own charter. it would have been a more honourable course for the nations to pursue if they had followed the example of america by refusing to ratify the whole treaty. to sign a contract and then to pick and choose for execution the parts of it that suit you is unworthy of the honour of great nations which profess to lead the world towards a higher civilisation. there are ugly rumours of possible complications arising out of this unfortunate incident. it does not need a vivid imagination to foretell one or two possible results of a disastrous character. in this country they would be deplored, not only for their effect on european peace, but for the damage they must inevitably inflict on the best interests of italy. she has had enough of victory. what she needs now--what we all need--is peace. there is no country which has more genuine goodwill for italy's prosperity and greatness than great britain. it is an old and tried friendship. the two nations have many common interests: they have no rivalries. hence, the deep anxiety of britain that italy should not commit a mistake which will mortgage her future even if it does not imperil her present. there are no doubt strategic advantages for italy in holding corfu. it enables them to "bottle up" the adriatic. but it is greek and it menaces slavonia, and this introduction of foreign elements into the body of a state for strategic reasons always provokes inflammatory symptoms injurious to the general health of a community. they tend to become malignant and sooner or later they bring disaster. bosnia ultimately proved to be the death of the austrian empire. when the bosnian cancer became active the evil of italia irredenta broke out once more, and between them they laid the empire of the hapsburgs in the dust. italy has played a great part in the work of civilisation, and so has greece. they have still greater tasks awaiting them--one on a great and the other necessarily on a smaller scale. it would be a misfortune to humanity if they spent their fine enthusiasm on hating and thwarting each other. _london, september 3rd, 1923._ iv is the league of nations a success? is the league of nations a success? it is impossible to answer the question candidly without giving offence to rival partisans. if you indicate successes already placed to the account of the league, opponents deny or minimise these triumphs, and suggest that you are blinded by attachment to a chimera. if you point to shortcomings, the extreme zealots of the league get angry and hint that you are a secret enemy. i mean nevertheless to attempt an answer, for much depends on a fearless examination of progress made or missed. my first answer would be that it is scarcely fair to pose this question just yet. the league was founded only three years ago--much too short a period to afford a test of the working of a gigantic, complex, but very delicate and sensitive human machine. there has been hardly time enough even to catalogue and chart the myriads of nerves that thread its system. you cannot move a finger at the councils of geneva without touching some hidden nerve and setting it in a condition of quivering protest. the league has, however, been long enough in existence to reveal its strength and its weaknesses, its power, its potentialities and its perils. it has already achieved triumphs of which its founders may well be proud. the restoration of austria to life when it seemed to have been hopelessly submerged in the deluge of economic, financial and political disaster which had overwhelmed it, is a notable feat of artificial respiration. the successful effort organised by the league to stamp out typhus in eastern europe and prevent its spread to the west is also a success worthy of record. but for this intelligently conducted campaign that terrible disease would have ravaged russia and central europe and laid low millions out of populations so enfeebled by hunger and privation as to become easy victims to its devastating assaults. the labour branch of the league has also been specially active and energetic, and its persistent endeavours to raise and co-ordinate the standards of toil in all countries are producing marked and important results. in addition great credit is due to the league for the splendid work it has accomplished in alleviating the distress which prevailed amongst the famine-stricken areas of eastern europe and amongst the refugees who fled from the horrors of victorious bolshevism in russia, and the still greater horrors of turkish savagery in asia minor. but these humanitarian tasks, praiseworthy though they be, were not the primary objects of the foundation of the league. its main purpose was the averting of future wars by the setting up of some tribunal to which nations would be bound by their own covenant and the pressure of other nations to resort in order to settle their differences. its failure or success as an experiment will be judged by this test alone. how does it stand in this respect? it succeeded in effecting a settlement of a dangerous dispute between sweden and finland over the possession of the aaland islands. that success was on the line of its main purpose. here the methods of the league gave confidence in its complete impartiality. so much can, unfortunately, not be said of another question where it was called in and gave its decision. its silesian award has been acted upon but hardly accepted by both parties as a fair settlement. that is due to the manner adopted in reaching judgment. instead of following the aaland precedent in the choice of a tribunal, it pursued a course which engendered suspicion of its motives. it created a regrettable impression of anxiety to retain a certain measure of control over the decision. there was a suspicion of intrigue in the choice of the tribunal and the conduct of the proceedings. in the aaland case no great power was particularly interested in influencing the conclusions arrived at either way. but here two powers of great authority in the league--france and poland--were passionately engaged in securing a result adverse to germany. the other party to the dispute had no friends, and was moreover not a member of the league. britain stood for fair play, but she was not a protagonist of the claims of germany. poland had a powerful advocate on the league--a country with a vital interest in securing a pro-polish decision. in these circumstances the league ought to have exercised the most scrupulous care to avoid any shadow of doubt as to its freedom from all bias. had it chosen distinguished jurists outside its own body to undertake at least a preliminary investigation as it did in the aaland case, all would have been well. it preferred, however, to retain the matter in its own hands. hence the doubts and misgivings with which the judgment of the league has been received not only by the whole of germany, but by many outside germany. this decision, and the way poland has flouted the league over vilna served to confirm the idea which prevails in russia and germany that france and poland dominate the league. the silesian award may be just, but the fact remains that it will take a long series of decisions beyond cavil to restore or rather to establish german and russian confidence in the league. it is unfortunate that countries which cover more than half europe should feel thus about a body whose success depends entirely on the confidence reposed in its impartiality by all the nations which may be called upon to carry out its decrees, even though these may be adverse to their views or supposed interests. the vilna fiasco, the armenian failure, the suspicions that surround the silesian award, the timidity which prevents the tackling of reparations, which is the one question disturbing the peace of europe to-day, the futile conversations and committees on disarmament which everyone knows, will not succeed in scrapping one flight of aëroplanes or one company of infantry. all these disappointments arise from one predominating cause. what is it? undoubtedly the great weakness of the league comes from the fact that it only represents one half the great powers of the world. until the others join you might as well call the holy alliance a league of nations. the ostensible purpose of that combination was also to prevent a recurrence of the wars that had for years scorched europe, and to establish european peace on the firm basis of a joint guarantee of delimited frontiers. but certain powers with selfish ambitions dictated its policy. they terrorised europe into submission and called that peace. no historical parallel is quite complete, but there is enough material in the occurrences of to-day to justify the reference. the league to be a reality must represent the whole civilised world. that is necessary to give it balance as well as authority. that was the original conception. to ask why that failed is to provoke a bitter and a barren controversy. i do not propose to express any opinion as to the merits of the manoeuvres which led to the defeat of the treaty in america. whether the senate should have honoured the signature of an american president given in the name of his country at an international conference, or whether the commitment was too fundamentally at variance with american ideas to justify sanction--whether the amendments demanded as the condition of approval would have crippled the league and ought to have been rejected, or whether they were harmless and ought to have been accepted--these are issues which it would serve no helpful purpose for me to discuss. but as to the effect of the american refusal to adhere to the league, there can be no doubt. it robbed that body of all chance of dominating success in the immediate future. it is true that three great powers remained in the league, but russia was excluded, germany was not included, and when america decided not to go in, of the great powers, britain, france and italy alone remained. the effect has been paralysing. where these three powers disagree on important issues upon which action is required, nothing is done. the smaller powers cannot, on questions where one or more of the great powers have deep and acute feeling, impose their will; and no two great powers will take the responsibility of overruling the third. hence questions like reparations which constitute a standing menace to european peace are not dealt with by the league. had america been in, even with an amended and expurgated constitution, the situation would have been transformed. america and britain, acting in concert with an openly sympathetic italy and a secretly assenting belgium, would have brought such pressure to bear on france as to make it inevitable that the league should act. the success of the league depends upon the readiness of nations great and small to discuss all their differences at the council table. but no great power has so far permitted any international question in which it has a direct and vital interest to be submitted to the league for decision. it has been allowed to adjudicate upon the destiny of the aaland islands, over the fate of which sweden and finland had a controversy. it has taken cognisance of disputes between poland and lithuania about vilna, although even here its decision has been ignored by the parties. but the acute and threatening quarrel which has broken out between france and germany over the question of reparations the former resolutely declines to submit to consideration by the league. the treaty of versailles is so wide in its application and so comprehensive and far-reaching in its character that it touches international interests almost at every point. so that the french refusal to agree to a reference of any problems in which they are directly concerned which may arise out of this treaty has had the effect of hobbling the league. as long as that attitude is maintained, the league is impotent to discharge its main function of restoring and keeping peace. the dispute over reparations clouds the sky to-day, and until it is finally settled it will cause grave atmospheric disturbances for a whole generation. it is not an impossibility that it may end in the most destructive conflict that ever broke over the earth. it is churning up deadly passions. if ever there was an occasion which called for the intervention of an organisation set up for the express purpose of finding peaceable solutions for trouble-charged international feuds, surely this is pre-eminently such a case. not only do the french government decline to entertain the idea of putting the covenant which constitutes the first and foremost part of the treaty of versailles into operation: they have gone so far as to intimate that they will treat any proposal of the kind as an unfriendly act. the constitution of the league stipulates that it will be the friendly duty of any power to move that any international dispute which threatens peace shall be referred to the league. nevertheless, one leading signatory rules out of the covenant all the questions which vitally affect its own interests. this is the power which has invaded the territory of another because the latter has failed to carry out one of the provisions of the same treaty! this emphatic repudiation of a solemn contract by one of its promoters has been acquiesced in by all the other signatories. repudiation and acquiescence complete the electrocuting circuit. this limitation of the activities of the league is the gravest check which it has yet sustained in its career. i do not believe it would have occurred had america, with or without article 10, been an active member of this body. its great authority, added to that of britain and italy, would have made the pressure irresistible, and its presence on the council would have helped materially to give such confidence in the stability and impartiality of the league that germany would have accepted the conclusions arrived at without demur and acted upon them without chicane. a rational settlement of the reparations problem by the league would have established its authority throughout the world. germany, russia and turkey, who now treat its deliberations with distrust and dislike tinctured with contempt, would be forced to respect its power, and would soon be pleading for incorporation in its councils. the covenant would thus become a charter--respected, feared, honoured and obeyed by all. there would still be injustice, but redress would be sought and fought for in the halls of the league. there would still be oppression, but freedom would be wrung from the clauses of the covenant. argument, debate and intercession would be the recognised substitutes for shot, shell and sword. wars would cease unto the ends of the earth, and the reign of law would be supreme. wherein lies the real power of the league, or to be more accurate, its possibility of power? it brings together leading citizens of most of the civilised states of the world to discuss all questions affecting or likely to affect peace and concord amongst nations. the men assembled at geneva do not come there of their own initiative, nor do they merely represent propagandist societies engaged in preaching the gospel of peace. they are the chosen emissaries of their respective governments. they are the authorised spokesmen of these governments. when in doubt they refer to their governments and receive their instructions, and the proceedings are reported direct to the governments. they meet often and regularly, and they debate their problems with complete candour as well as courtesy. it is in itself a good thing to accustom nations to discuss their difficulties face to face in a public assembly where reasons have to be sought and given for their attitude which will persuade and satisfy neutral minds of its justice and fairness. it is a practice to be cultivated. it is the practice that ended in eliminating the arbitrament of the sword in the internal affairs of nations. it is only thus that international disputes will gradually drift into the debating chamber instead of on to the battlefield for settlement. wars are precipitated by motives which the statesmen responsible for them dare not publicly avow. a public discussion would drag these emotives in their nudity into the open where they would die of exposure to the withering contempt of humanity. the league by developing the habit amongst nations of debating their differences in the presence of the world, and of courting the judgment of the world upon the merits of their case, is gradually edging out war as a settler of quarrels. that is the greatest service it can render mankind. will it be allowed to render that service? if not, then it will perish like many another laudable experiment attempted by mankind in the effort to save itself. but if it dies, the hope of establishing peace on earth will be buried in the same tomb. _london, april 2nd, 1923._ v the treaty of versailles and its critics i have had recently special opportunities for appreciating the extent to which the treaty of versailles has not been read by those who have formed very definite opinions concerning its qualities. there is no justification for a failure to peruse this great international instrument. it is the most important document of modern times. it has reshaped for better or for worse much of the geography of europe. it has resurrected dead and buried nationalities. it constitutes the deed of manumission of tens of millions of europeans who, up to the year of victory, 1918, were the bondsmen of other races. it affects profoundly the economics, the finance, the industrial and trade conditions of the world; it contains clauses upon the efficacy of which may depend the very existence of our civilisation. nevertheless there are few who can tell you what is in the treaty of versailles. you might have thought that although men differed widely as to its merits, there would have been no difficulty in securing some measure of agreement as to its actual contents. every endeavour was made to give full publicity to the draft when it was first presented to the germans, and to the final document when signed. even before the form of the draft was ever settled, the actual decisions were reported from day to day. never was a treaty so reported and so discussed in every article and every particle of its constitution, and to-day you can procure an official copy of it from any bookseller for the moderate price of 2_s._ 6_d._ in spite of that no two men who happen to profess diverse opinions as to its justice or injustice can agree as to its contents. a visitor to england in the year 1713 probably experienced the same perplexity in seeking information from a whig and a tory respectively as to the treaty of utrecht. so this treaty has become one of those fiercely debated subjects, as to which the contestants deliberately refuse to regard any testimony, or recognise the existence of any fact, which is in the least inconsistent with their particular point of view. it has come to pass that the real treaty of versailles has already disappeared, and several imaginary versions have emerged. it is around these that the conflict rages. in france there exist at least two or three schools of thought concerning the versailles treaty. there is one powerful section which has always regarded it as a treasonable pact, in which m. clemenceau gave away solid french rights and interests in a moment of weakness under pressure from president wilson and myself. that is the poincaré-barthou-pertinax school. that is why they are now, whilst in form engaged in enforcing the treaty, in fact carrying out a gigantic operation for amending it without consulting the other signatories. this has come out very clearly in the remarkable report from a french official in the rhineland which was disclosed in the london _observer_. it is obvious from this paper that whilst the french government have worked their public into a frenzied state of indignation over the failure of germany to carry out the treaty of versailles, they were the whole time deliberately organising a plot to overthrow that treaty themselves. their representative on the rhine was spending french money with the consent of the french government to promote a conspiracy for setting up an independent republic on the rhine under the protection of france. it was a deliberate attempt by those who disapproved of the moderation of the treaty of versailles to rewrite its clauses in the terms of the militarist demands put forward by marshal foch at the peace conference. marshal foch, the soul of honour, wanted to see this done openly and straightforwardly. what he would have done like the gentleman he is, these conspirators would have accomplished by deceit--by deceiving their allies and by being faithless to the treaty to which their country had appended its signature. that is one french school of thought on the treaty of versailles. it is the one which has brought europe to its present state of confusion and despair. there is the second school which reads into the treaty powers and provisions which it does not contain, and never contemplated containing. these critics maintain stoutly that m. briand, and all other french prime ministers, with the exception of m. poincaré, betrayed their trust by failing to enforce these imaginary stipulations. they still honestly believe that m. poincaré is the first french minister to have made a genuine attempt to enforce french rights under the treaty. in the background there is a third school which knows exactly what the treaty means, but dares not say so in the present state of french opinion. perhaps they think it is better to bide their time. that time will come, and when it does arrive, let us hope it will not be too late to save europe from the welter. in america there are also two or three divergent trends of opinion about this treaty. one regards it as an insidious attempt to trap america into the european cockpit, so as to pluck its feathers to line french and english bolsters. if anything could justify so insular an estimate it would be the entirely selfish interpretation which is put upon the treaty by one or two of the allied governments. the other american party, i understand, defends it with vigour as a great human instrument second only in importance to the declaration of independence. there may be a third which thinks that on the whole it is not a bad settlement, and that the pity is a little more tact was not displayed in passing it through the various stages of approval and ratification. this party is not as vocal as the others. in england we find at least three schools. there are the critics who denounce it as a brutal outrage upon international justice. it is to them a device for extorting incalculable sums out of an impoverished germany as reparation for damages artificially worked up. then there is the other extreme--the "die-hard" section--more influential since it became less numerous, who think the treaty let germany off much too lightly. in fact they are in complete agreement with the french chauvinists as to the reprehensible moderation of its terms. in britain also there is a third party which regards its provisions as constituting the best settlement, when you take into account the conflicting aims, interests, and traditions of the parties who had to negotiate and come to an agreement. but take all these variegated schools together, or separately, and you will find not one in a thousand of their pupils could give you an intelligent and comprehensive summary of the main principles of the treaty. i doubt whether i should be far wrong in saying there would not be one in ten thousand. controversialists generally are satisfied to concentrate on the articles in the treaty which are obnoxious or pleasing to them as the case may be, and ignore the rest completely, however essential they may be to a true judgment of the whole. most of the disputants are content to take their views from press comments and denunciatory speeches. unhappily the explanatory speeches have been few. some there are who have in their possession the full text--nominally for reference; but you will find parts of the reparations clauses in their copies black with the thumb-marks which note the perspiring dialectician searching for projectiles to hurl at the object of his fury. the clauses which ease and modify the full demand are treated with stern neglect, and the remainder of the pages are pure as the untrodden snow. you can trace no footprints of politicians, publicists, or journalists, in whole provinces of this unexplored treaty. the covenant of the league of nations is lifted bodily out of the text, and is delivered to the public as a separate testament for the faithful so that the saints may not defile their hands with the polluted print which exacts justice. they have now come to believe that it never was incorporated in the treaty of versailles, and that it has nothing to do with that vile and sanguinary instrument. and yet the first words of this treaty are the following: "the high contracting parties, "in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security, "by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, "by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, "by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and "by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another, "agree to this covenant of the league of nations." then follow the articles of the debated covenant. a speaker who took part recently in a university debate on the subject told me that the undergraduates exhibited the greatest surprise when he informed them that the league of nations was founded by the versailles treaty. a few days ago i had a similar experience at the oxford union. i was speaking against a motion framed to condemn the principles of the treaty as unwise and unjust. in its defence i recalled some of its outstanding features. but as most of my narrative had no bearing on reparations it was greeted with impatience and cries of "question" from a group of anti-versaillists. they honestly thought i was travelling outside the motion in giving a short summary of the other sections of the treaty. to them it is all condensed in mr. keynes's book, and other hostile commentaries. anything which is inconsistent with these, or supplements the scanty or misleading statements they make, is deemed to be tainted and biassed. to refer to the text itself they regard as unfair, and as playing into the hands of the defenders of a wicked and oppressive pact. the actual treaty has been already put by them out of bounds, and you wander into its forbidden clauses on pain of being put into the guardroom by one or other of the intolerant factions who patrol the highways and byways of international politics. in all the debates on the subject in the house of commons i have only once heard the treaty itself quoted by a critic, and strangely enough that was by way of approval. i have indicated one important section of the treaty to which is accorded something of the reverence due to holy writ by an influential section of the public. this group would be shocked were they reminded that their devotion is given to a chapter in the hateful treaty. there is yet another large and important section which is completely ignored by the critics--that which reconstructs central europe on the basis of nationality and the free choice of the people instead of on the basis of strategy and military convenience. this is the section that liberated poland from the claws of the three carnivorous empires that were preying on its vitals, and restored it to life, liberty and independence. it is the section that frees the danes of schleswig and the frenchmen of alsace-lorraine. for these oppressed provinces the treaty of versailles is the title-deed of freedom. why are these clauses all suppressed in controversial literature? here is another of the ignored provisions--that which sets up permanent machinery for dealing with labour problems throughout the world, and for raising the standard of life amongst the industrial workers by means of a great international effort. no more beneficent or more fruitful provision was ever made in any treaty. it is so momentous and so completely overlooked in general discussion, that i think it worth while to quote at length the general principles laid down by a provision which will one day be claimed as the first great international charter of the worker. "the high contracting parties recognise that differences of climate, habits and customs, of economic opportunity and industrial tradition, make strict uniformity in the conditions of labour difficult of immediate attainment. but, holding as they do, that labour should not be regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there are methods and principles for regulating labour conditions which all industrial communities should endeavour to apply so far as their special circumstances will permit. "among these methods and principles, the following seem to the high contracting parties to be of special and urgent importance:- "_first._--the guiding principle above enunciated that labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce. "_second._--the right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers. "_third._--the payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country. "_fourth._--the adoption of an eight-hour day or forty-eight hour week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been attained. "_fifth._--the adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours, which should include sunday wherever practicable. "_sixth._--the abolition of child labour and the imposition of such limitations on the labour of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development. "_seventh._--the principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value. "_eighth._--the standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labour should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein. "_ninth_.--each state should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed." it will take long before the principles propounded in the covenant of the league under the labour articles are fully and faithfully carried out, but in both a good deal of quiet and steady progress have already been attained. m. albert thomas is an admirable chief for the labour bureau. he has zeal, sympathy, tact, energy and great organising talent. he is pressing along with patience, as well as persistence. but that is another question. it raises grave issues as to the execution of the treaty. what i have to deal with to-day is the misunderstandings which exist as to the character of the treaty itself. the british public are certainly being deliberately misled on this point. why are those sections which emancipate oppressed races, which seek to lift the worker to a condition above destitution and degradation, and which build up a breakwater against the raging passions which make for war, never placed to the credit of the treaty of versailles? the type of controversialist who is always advertising his idealism has made a point of withholding these salient facts from the public which he professes to enlighten and instruct. there is no more unscrupulous debater in the ring than the one who affects to be particularly high-minded. i do not mean the man who is possessed of a really high mind, but the man who is always posing as having been exalted by grace above his fellows. he is the pharisee of controversy. beware of him, for he garbles and misquotes and suppresses to suit his arguments or prejudices in a way that would make a child of this world blush. that is why i venture to put in a humble, although i fear belated, plea for the reading of the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text, of the treaty of versailles. herein lies the only fair way of arriving at a just conclusion on the merits of a treaty which holds in its hands the destiny of europe for many a generation. vi 1922 the year nineteen hundred and twenty-two witnessed a genuine struggle on the part of the nations to re-establish peace conditions in the world. during 1919-20 and 1921 "the tarantella was still in their blood." the mad war dance was still quivering in their limbs and they could not rest. the crackle of musketry was incessant and made needful repose impossible. there was not a country in europe or asia whose troops were not firing shots in anger at some external or internal foe. america rang down the fire curtain until this hysterical frenzy had burnt itself out. was she right? it is too early yet to give the answer. the case is but yet "part heard"--many witnessing years whose evidence is relevant have not yet entered the box: it will, therefore, be some time before the verdict of history as to her attitude can be delivered. but 1922 testifies to many striking symptoms of recovering sanity on the part of the tortured continents. before 1922 you had everywhere the querulity of the overstrained nerve. the slightest offence or misunderstanding, however unintentional, provoked a quarrel, and almost every quarrel was followed by a blow. it was a mad world to live in. the shrieks of clawing nations rent the european night and made it hideous. a distinguished general declared that at one period--i think it was the year of grace 1920--there were thirty wars, great and small, proceeding simultaneously. who was to blame? everybody and nobody. mankind had just passed through the most nerve-shattering experience in all its racking history, and it was not responsible for its actions. millions of young men had for years marched through such a pitiless rain of terror as had not been conceived except in milton's description of the battle scenes when the fallen angels were driven headlong to the deep. and when the angel of peace led the nations out from the gates of hell, no wonder it took them years to recover sight and sanity. nineteen twenty-two was a year of restored composure. the outward visible sign was seen in the changed character of the international conferences held during the year. the ultimatum kind of conference gave way to the genuine peace conference. the old method insisted upon by french statesmen was to hammer out demands on the conference anvil and send them in the form of an ultimatum to nations who, in spite of peace treaties, were still treated as enemies; the new method was to discuss on equal terms the conditions of appeasement. germany, having no fleet in the pacific, was not invited to the washington conference, and russia was excluded for other reasons. but at cannes germany was represented, and at genoa both germany and russia had their delegates. the washington conference was, in some respects, the most remarkable international conference ever held. it was the first time great nations commanding powerful armaments had ever sat down deliberately to discuss a voluntary limitation of their offensive and defensive forces. restrictions and reductions have often been imposed in peace treaties by triumphant nations upon their beaten foes. the versailles treaty is an example of that operation. but at washington the victors negotiated a mutual cutting-down of navies built for national safety and strengthened by national pride. the friends of peace therefore have solid ground for their rejoicing in a contemplation of substantial reductions already effected in the naval programmes of the most powerful maritime countries in the world--britain, the united states of america, and japan--as a direct result of the washington negotiations. american statesmanship has given a lead of which it is entitled to boast, and 1922 is entitled to claim that this triumph of good understanding has brought a measure of glory which will give it a peculiar splendour amongst the years of earth's history. the gatherings at cannes and genoa can also claim outstanding merit in the large and growing family of international conferences. at washington the allies alone foregathered. at cannes and genoa nations came together which had only recently emerged out of deadly conflict with each other. at each conference i met on both sides men who had but just recovered from severe wounds sustained in this struggle. at cannes french, belgian, italian, japanese, as well as british ministers and experts, sat down in council with german ministers and experts to discuss the vexed question of reparations without taunt or recrimination. there was a calm recognition not only of the needs of the injured countries, but also of the difficulties of the offending state. outside and beyond the german problem there was a resolve to eliminate all the various elements of disturbance, political and economic, that kept europe in a ferment and made its restoration impossible. here it was decided to summon all the late belligerent nations to a great conference at genoa to discuss reconstruction. to these were added the neutral nations of europe. it was a great decision. there were three obstacles in the way of realising the programme. the first was the stipulation of france that the specific problems raised by the treaty of versailles should be excluded altogether from the purview of the conference. this was a grave limitation of its functions and chances. still, if the cannes sittings had continued, an arrangement might have been arrived at with the germans which would have helped the deliberations of genoa. the second obstacle was the refusal of america to participate in the discussions. why did the american government refuse? there were probably good reasons for that refusal, but the recording angel alone knows them all fully and accurately. the third obstacle was the fall of the briand ministry, and the substitution of a less sympathetic administration. in spite of all these serious drawbacks genoa accomplished great things. it brought together into the same rooms enemies who had not met for years except on the battlefield. they conferred and conversed around the same table for weeks--at conferences, committees, and sub-committees. they broke bread and drank wine together at the same festive boards. before the conference came to an end there was an atmosphere of friendliness which was in itself a guarantee of peaceable relations, for the delegates who represented the nations at genoa were all men of real influence in their respective countries. but however important the intangible result, there was much more achieved. the thirty nations represented in the assembly entered into a solemn pact not to commit any act of aggression against their neighbours. when they entered the conference there were few of them who were not oppressed with suspicions that these neighbours meditated violence against their frontiers. when they arrived at genoa they were all anxious for peace, but apprehensive of impending war. genoa dispelled those anxieties. one of the most promising results of the pact and the improved atmospheric conditions out of which it arose is the substantial reduction in the bolshevik army. it has already been reduced to the dimensions of the french army, and we are now promised a further reduction. that removes a real menace to european peace. if the reduction of armies in the east of europe is followed by a corresponding reduction in the west the reign of peace is not far distant. this is not the time to dwell upon the important agreements effected at genoa on questions of exchange, credit, and transport. all the recommendations made depend for their successful carrying out on the establishment of a real peace and a friendly understanding between nations. peace and goodwill on earth is still the only healing evangel for idealists to preach and statesmen to practise. without it plans and protocols must inevitably fail. where does peace stand? the weary angel is still on the wing, for the waters have not yet subsided. she may perhaps find a foothold in the great west, and britain is fairly safe--not yet ireland. but the continent of europe is still swampy and insecure. the debate in the french chamber on reparations is not encouraging. the only difference of opinion in the discussion was that displayed between those who advocated an advance into the ruhr, and the seizure of pledges further into german territory, and those who preferred "developing" the left bank of the rhine. occupying, controlling, developing, annexing--they all mean the same thing; that the province to the left bank of the rhine is to be torn from germany and grafted into france. there is no peace in this talk. it is a sinister note on which to end the pacific music of 1922. you must interpret it in connection with another event of 1922--the russo-german agreement. since then chicherin--a spirit of mischief incarnate--has almost made berlin his abode. the men who are devoting their ingenuity to devising new torments for germany are preparing new terrors for their own and their neighbours' children. the year ends with rumours of great american projects for advancing large sums of money to all and sundry in the hope of settling the vexed question of german reparation. the loan, it is surmised, will be accompanied by guarantees on the part of france not to invade further german territory. some go so far as to conjecture that it is to be an essential condition of participation in this christmas bounty of madame rumour that france is to reduce her armies and to undertake not to exceed washington limits for her navies. nobody seems to know, and i am only repeating the gossip of the press. but if the £350,000,000 loan is likely to materialise, its projectors are wise in imposing conditions that would afford them some chance of receiving payment of a moderate interest in the lifetime of this generation. no prudent banker would lend money on the security of a flaming volcano. _london, december 20th, 1922._ vii what is france after? _1. the rhine_ m. clemenceau, in the remarkable series of speeches delivered in the united states of america, implies a breach of faith on the part of britain in reference to the pact to guarantee france against the possibility of german aggression. england has no better friend in the whole of france than m. clemenceau. throughout a strenuous but consistent career he has never varied in his friendship for england. many a time has he been bitterly assailed for that friendship. french journalists are not sparing of innuendo against those they hate. they hate fiercely and they hit recklessly, and m. clemenceau, a man of scrupulous integrity, at one period in his stormy political life was charged by certain organs of the paris press with being in the pay of england. if, therefore, he now does an injustice to britain i am convinced it is not from blind hatred of our country, but from temporary forgetfulness of the facts. he states the facts with reference to the original pact quite fairly. it was proffered as an answer to those who claimed that the left bank of the rhine should be annexed to france. there was a strong party in france which urged m. clemenceau to demand that the rhine should be treated as the natural frontier of their country, and that advantage should be taken of the overwhelming defeat of germany to extend the boundaries of france to that fateful river. for unknown centuries it has been fought over and across--a veritable river of blood. if french chauvinism had achieved its purpose at the paris conference the rhine would within a generation once more overflow its banks and devastate europe. the most moderate and insidious form this demand took was a proposal that the german provinces on the left bank of the rhine should remain in french occupation until the treaty had been fulfilled. that meant for ever. reparations alone--skilfully handled by the quai d'orsay--would preclude the possibility of ever witnessing fulfilment. the argument by which they supported their claim was the defencelessness of the french frontier without some natural barrier. france had been twice invaded and overrun within living memory by her formidable neighbour. the german military power was now crushed, and rich and populous provinces of the german empire had been restored to france and poland, but the population of germany was still fifty per cent. greater than that of france and it was growing at an alarming rate, whilst the french population was at a standstill. german towns and villages were clamant with sturdy children. you cannot talk long to a frenchman without realising how this spectre of german children haunts france and intimidates her judgment. these children, it is said, are nourished on vengeance: one day the struggle will be resumed, and france has no natural defence against the avenging hordes that are now playing on german streets and with the hum of whose voices german kindergartens resound. we were told the rhine is the only possible line of resistance. providence meant it to play that part, and it is only the sinister interference of statesmen who love not france that deprives frenchmen of this security for peace which a far-seeing nature has provided. the fact that this involved the subjection to a foreign yoke of millions of men of german blood, history, and sympathies, and that the incorporation of so large an alien element, hostile in every fibre to french rule, would be a constant source of trouble and anxiety to the french government, whilst it would not merely provide an incentive to germany to renew war but would justify and dignify the attack by converting it into a war of liberation--all that had no effect on the rhenian school of french politics. this school is as powerful as ever. in one respect it is more powerful, for in 1919 there was a statesman at the head of affairs who had the strength as well as the sagacity to resist their ill-judged claims. but what about 1922? where is the foresight and where is the strength? there is a real danger that the fifteen years' occupation may on one pretext or another be indefinitely prolonged. when it comes to an end will there be a ministry in france strong enough to withdraw the troops? before the fifteen years' occupation is terminated will there be a ministry or a series of ministries strong enough to resist the demand put forward without ceasing in the french press that the occupation should be made effective? upon the answer to these questions the peace of europe--the peace of the world, perhaps the life of our civilisation--depends. the pressure to do the evil thing that will once more spill rivers of human blood is insistent. the temptation is growing, the resistance is getting feebler. america and britain standing together can alone avert the catastrophe. but they can do so only by making it clear that the aggressor--whoever it be--will have the invincible might of these two commonwealths arrayed against any nation that threatens to embroil the world in another conflict. there are men in germany who preach vengeance. they must be told that a war of revenge will find the same allies side by side inflicting punishment on the peace-breakers. there are men in france who counsel annexation of territories populated by another race. they must be warned that such a step will alienate the sympathies of britain and america, and that when the inevitable war of liberation comes the sympathies of america and britain will be openly ranged on the side of those who are fighting for national freedom. the time has come for saying these things, and if they are not said in high places humanity will one day call those who occupy those places to a reckoning. the pact was designed to strengthen the hands of m. clemenceau against the aggressive party which was then and still is anxious to commit france to the colossal error of annexing territory which has always been purely german. m. clemenceau knows full well that britain has been ready any time during the last three years up to a few months ago to take upon herself the burden of that pact with or without the united states of america. at cannes early this year i made a definite proposal to that effect. it was a written offer made by me on behalf of the british government to m. briand, who was then prime minister of france. i was anxious to secure the co-operation of france in a general endeavour to clear up the european situation and establish a real peace from the urals to the atlantic seaboard. french suspicions and french apprehensions constituted a serious difficulty in the way of settlement, and i thought that if it were made clear to france that the whole strength of the british empire could be depended upon to come to her aid in the event of threatened invasion french opinion would be in a better mood to discuss the outstanding questions which agitate europe. international goodwill is essential to the re-establishment of the shattered machinery of international commerce. with a great country like france, to which the issue of the war had given a towering position on the continent of europe, in a condition of fretfulness, it was impossible to settle europe. hence the offer which was made by the british government. m. briand was prepared to welcome this offer and to proceed to a calm consideration of the perplexities of the european situation. it was agreed to summon a conference at genoa to discuss the condition of european exchange, credit and trade. it was also resolved that an effort should be made to establish peace with russia and to bring that great country once more inside the community of nations. a great start was made on the path of genuine appeasement. the german government were invited to send their chief minister to the cannes conference in order to arrive at a workable settlement of the vexed question of reparations. the invitation received a prompt response, and dr. rathenau, accompanied by two or three leading ministers and a retinue of financial experts, reached cannes in time to take part in the discussions. the negotiations were proceeding helpfully, and another week might have produced results which would have pacified the tumult of suspicious nations and inaugurated the promise of fraternity. but, alas, satan is not done with europe. a ministerial crisis in france brought our hopes tumbling to the ground. the conference was broken up on the threshold of fulfilment. suspicion once more seized the tiller, and europe, just as she seemed to be entering the harbour of goodwill, was swung back violently into the broken seas of international distrust. the offer made by britain to stand alone on the pact of guarantee to france was rejected with disdain. we were told quite brutally that it was no use without a military convention. this we declined to enter into. europe has suffered too much from military conventions to warrant the repetition of such a disastrous experiment. the pact with britain lies for the moment in the waste-paper basket. but we never flung it there. m. clemenceau ought to have made his complaint in paris against men of his own race and not in new york against englishmen. with the pact went the effort to make peace in europe. the history of genoa is too recent to require any recapitulation of its features. the new french ministry did not play the part of an inviting government responsible for pressing to a successful end the objects of cannes, but rather that of the captious critic who had to be persuaded along every inch of the road and who threatened at every obstacle to turn back and leave the rest of europe to struggle along with its burden, amid the mocking laughter of france. i am not complaining of m. barthou. he did his best under most humiliating conditions to remain loyal to the conference which his government had joined in summoning. but his task was an impossible one. he was hampered, embarrassed and tangled at every turn. whenever he took any step forward he was lassoed by a despatch from paris. i have good authority for stating that he received over eight hundred of these communications in the course of the conference! what could the poor man do under such bewildering conditions? the other european countries were perplexed and distracted. they were anxious that genoa should end in a stable peace. there was no doubt about the sincerity, the passionate sincerity, of the desire for peace throughout europe, but european nations could not help seeing that one of the great powers was working for a failure. they had a natural anxiety not to appear to take sides. it is a marvel that in spite of this unfortunate attitude adopted by the french government a pact was signed which has, at any rate, preserved the peace in eastern europe for several months. before the conference we heard of armies being strengthened along frontiers and of movements of troops with a menacing intent from the baltic to the black sea. genoa at least dispelled that cloud. but a permanent peace has not yet been established and the pact with russia will soon expire. i am, however, hopeful that the spirit of genoa will stand between contending armies and prevent the clash of swords. all this, however, is leading me away from an examination of m. clemenceau's suggestion that britain did not keep faith in the matter of guaranteeing france against german aggression. the offer was definitely renewed at cannes, and m. poincaré has not accepted it. i have my own opinion as to why he has not done so. it is not merely that he does not wish to set the seal of his approval upon a predecessor's achievement. i am afraid the reason is of a more sinister kind. if france accepts britain's guarantee of defence of her frontier every excuse for annexing the left bank of the rhine disappears. if this is the explanation, if french ministers have made up their minds that under no conditions will they, even at the end of the period of occupation, withdraw from the rhine, then a new chapter opens in the history of europe and the world, with a climax of horror such as mankind has never yet witnessed. the german provinces on the left bank of the rhine are intensely german--in race, language, tradition and sympathies. there are seventy millions of germans in europe. a generation hence there may be a hundred millions. they will never rest content so long as millions of their fellow-countrymen are under a foreign yoke on the other side of the rhine, and it will only be a question of time and opportunity for the inevitable war of liberation to begin. we know what the last war was like. no one can foretell the terrors of the next. the march of science is inexorable, and wherever it goes it is at the bidding of men, whether to build or to destroy. is it too much to ask that america should, in time, take an effective interest in the development along the rhine? to that extent i am in complete accord with m. clemenceau. neither britain nor america can afford to ignore the manoeuvres going on along its banks. it is a far cry from the rhine to the mississippi, but not so far as it used to be. there are now graves not far from the rhine wherein lies the dust of men who, less than six years ago, came from the banks of the mississippi, with their faces towards the rhine. _london, december 2nd, 1922._ viii what is france after? _2. the rhine_ (continued) the breakdown of the london conference, and especially the reason for that breakdown, proves the warning i uttered in my last chapter was necessary and timely. m. poincaré demanded the occupation of the only rich coalfield left to germany as a guarantee for the carrying out of impossible terms. it is because i am profoundly convinced that the policy represented by this project will lead to trouble of the gravest kind for europe and the world that i felt moved to sound a note of warning. i knew it would provoke much angry misrepresentation. i am accustomed to that. i deemed it to be my duty to face it. the statement i made in my last chapter about the existence of a strong party in france which regarded the rhine as the natural barrier of that country has provoked a storm of denial, repudiation and indignation. it is denounced as a wicked invention. some are amazed at the impudence of the calumny. where is the party? france knows nothing of it. is it not a monster which has emanated from the brain of the enemy of france? repudiations have their value, especially if they come from men of authority, and i shall bear invective with the fortitude to which all men who wish to be happy though politicians should be hardened provided i elicit denials which may render future international mischief difficult. but a further perusal of the evidence on which i based my statement has served to deepen my apprehensions. what was the statement? let me quote the actual words i used:- "there was a strong party in france which urged m. clemenceau to demand that the rhine should be treated as the natural frontier of their country, and that advantage should be taken of the overwhelming defeat of germany to extend the boundaries of france to that fateful river. "the most moderate and insidious form this demand took was a proposal that the german provinces on the left bank of the rhine should remain in french occupation until the treaty had been fulfilled. that meant for ever. reparations alone--skilfully handled by the quai d'orsay--would preclude the possibility of ever witnessing fulfilment. "the pact was designed to strengthen the hands of m. clemenceau against the aggressive party which was then, and still is, anxious to commit france to the colossal error of annexing territory which has always been purely german." what was the basis on which i made this assertion? it was thoroughly well known to all those who were engaged in the operations of the peace conference. the rhine was the background of all manoeuvre for weeks and months. whether the subject matter was the league of nations, the german fleet, or the status of fiume, we knew that the real struggle would come over the rhine. on one hand, how much would france demand? on the other, how much would the allies concede? there was a subconscious conflict about the rhine throughout the whole discussion, however irrelevant the topic under actual consideration happened to be. but unrecorded memories are of little use as testimony unless corroborated by more tangible proofs. do such proofs exist? i will recall a few. there was a party which considered the rhine to be the only natural frontier of france. it was a strong party, with a strong man as its spokesman--in many ways the strongest in france--marshal foch. his splendid services in the war gave him a position such as no soldier in france or in any other country could command. the soldier who, by his genius, leads a nation to victory, possesses a measure of influence on the public opinion of the people he has saved from destruction such as no other individual can aspire to--as long as his services are fresh in the memory of his fellow-countrymen. that, i admit, is not very long. gratitude is like manna--it must be gathered and enjoyed quickly, for its freshness soon disappears. but in the early months of 1919 marshal foch was still sitting at the banquet table of popular favour enjoying the full flavour of grateful recognition. his word on all questions affecting the security and destiny of france was heard with a deference which no other man in france could succeed in securing. he has also a quality which is not usually an attribute of generalship: he is a lucid, forceful and picturesque speaker. he was, therefore, listened to for what he was, for what he said, and for the way he said it. what did he say? he said a good deal on the subject of the rhine frontier and i cannot quote it all. i will take a few germane sentences out of his numerous utterances on the subject. on the 19th day of april, 1919, there appeared in the london _times_ an interview with marshal foch. from that interview i take these salient passages:- "'and now, having reached the rhine, _we must stay there_,' went on the marshal very emphatically. 'impress that upon your fellow-countrymen. it is our only safety, their only safety. we must have a barrier. we must double-lock the door. democracies like ours, which are never aggressive, must have strong _natural military frontiers_. remember that those seventy millions of germans will always be a menace to us. do not trust the appearances of the moment. their natural characteristics have not changed in four years. _fifty years hence_ they will be what they are to-day.' * * * * * * * "from the table at the other end of the room marshal foch brought a great map, six or eight feet square, on which the natural features of this part of western europe were marked. the rhine was a thick line of blue. to the west of the river the marshal had drawn in pencil a concave arc representing the new frontier that france will receive under the peace treaty. it was clearly an arbitrary political boundary conforming to no natural feature of the land. "'look at that,' said marshal foch. 'there is no natural obstacle along that frontier. is it there that we can hold the germans if they attack us again? no. here! here! here!' and he tapped the blue rhine with his pencil. "'here we must be ready to face our enemies. this is a barrier which will take some crossing. if the germans try to force a passage over the rhine--ho! ho! but here'--touching the black pencilled line running north-west from lorraine past the saar valley to the belgian frontier--'here there is nothing.' * * * * * * * "'no; if you are wise you insist on having your locks and your wall, and we must have our armies on the rhine. some people object that it will take many troops to hold the rhine. not so many as it would take to hold a political frontier. for the rhine can be crossed only at certain places, whereas the new political frontier of france can be broken anywhere and would have to be held in force along its entire length.'" he expounded his doctrine in greater detail in an official memorandum which, as commander-in-chief of the allied armies, he submitted to m. clemenceau:- "to stop the enterprises towards the west of this nation, everlastingly warlike, and covetous of the good things belonging to other people, only recently formed and pushed on to conquest by force regardless of all rights and by ways the most contrary to all law, seeking always the mastery of the world, _nature has only made one barrier--the rhine. this barrier must be forced on germany. henceforward the rhine will be the western frontier of the germanic peoples...._" he repeated this demand in a subsequent memorandum. many of us recall his dramatic irruption into the placid arena of the peace conference in may, 1919, still brandishing the same theme. it may be said that marshal foch is not and does not pretend to be a statesman. he is only a great soldier. nevertheless, his political influence was so great that even in 1920 he overthrew the most powerful statesman in france within a month of his triumphant return at the polls with a huge supporting majority in the french parliament. it was marshal foch who, by his antagonism, was responsible for m. clemenceau's defeat at the presidential election of 1920. but for marshal foch's intervention m. clemenceau would have been to-day president of the french republic. why was he beaten, at the height of his fame, by a candidate of infinitely less prestige and power? the wrath of marshal foch and his formidable following was excited against m. clemenceau because the latter had, under pressure from the allies, gone back on the agreed french policy about the rhine. m. tardieu, as is well known, was one of the two most prominent ministers in m. clemenceau's administration, and closely associated with his chief in the framing of the peace treaty. he has written a book, and in that book he gives at length a document which he handed to the allies on march 12th, 1919, containing the following proposal:- "in the general interest of peace and to assure the effective working of the constituent clause of the league of nations, the western frontier of germany is fixed at the rhine. consequently germany renounces all sovereignty over, as well as any customs union with, the territories of the former german empire on the left bank of the rhine." there is a sardonic humour about the words "in the general interest of peace and to assure the effective working of the constituent clause of the league of nations." but it demonstrates that at that date m. clemenceau and his minister had become converts to the doctrine of the rhine as the natural boundary of germany. american and british pressure subsequently induced him to abandon this position and, as i said in a previous chapter, the pact was part of the argument addressed to him. but the party of the rhine never forgave. hence his failure to reach the presidential chair. it was an honourable failure and will ever do him credit. the reasons assigned for that defeat by the _annual register_, 1919-20--certainly not a partisan authority--prove that even an unexcitable chronicler laboured then under the delusion--if it be a delusion--which possessed me when i wrote the offending article. explaining the remarkable defeat the _annual register_ says:- " ... clemenceau's supporters contended that the terms of the treaty of versailles were satisfactory from the french point of view; his opponents declared that he had given way too much to the american and british standpoints and that the peace was unsatisfactory, particularly in respect of the guarantees for the reparations due to france _and in the matter of the french eastern frontier. it will be remembered that a large body of french opinion had desired that france should secure the line of the rhine as her eastern frontier._" i can if necessary quote endless leading articles in french journals and writings and speeches of french politicians. men of such divergent temperaments and accomplishments as m. franklin bouillon and m. tardieu gave countenance to this claim that germany should be amputated at the rhine. one carried the theme along on the torrent of his clattering lava and the other on the dome of an iceberg. later on at the reception of marshal foch when he was elected a member of the french academy, m. poincaré, turning at one moment in his discourse to the marshal, said in reference to the veteran general's well-known attitude on the peace treaty, "ah, monsieur le maréchal, if only your advice had been listened to." has he also gone back on an opinion so histrionically expressed? let us hope for the best. i know it will be said that although the boundaries of germany were to end at the rhine, the province on the left bank was not to be annexed, but to be reconstituted into an "independent" republic. what manner of independence and what kind of republic? all german officers were to be expelled; it was to be detached by special provision from the economic life of germany upon which it is almost entirely dependent for its existence. it was not to be allowed to associate with the fatherland. the rhine which divided the new territory from germany was to be occupied in the main by french troops: the territories of the independent republic were to be occupied by foreign soldiers. its young men were to be conscripted and trained with a view to absorbing them into french and belgian armies to fight against their own countrymen on the other side of the rhine. the whole conditions of life in the "free and independent republic" were to be dictated by an "accord" between france, luxemburg and belgium, and, in the words of marshal foch, "britain would be ultimately brought in." but i am told that these proposals did not mean annexation. then what else did they mean? you do not swallow the oyster. you only first give it an independent existence by detaching it from its hard surroundings. you then surround it on all sides and absorb it into your own system to equip you with added strength to prey on other oysters! what independence! and what a republic! it would have been and was intended to be a sham republic. had the plan been adopted it would have been a blunder and a crime, for which not france alone but the world would later on have paid the penalty. in the face of these quotations and of these undoubted facts, can any one say that i calumniated france when i said there was a powerful party in that country which claimed that the rhine should be treated as the natural barrier of germany, and that the peace treaty should be based upon that assumption? let it be observed that i never stated that this claim had the support of the french democracy. the fact that the treaty, which did not realise that objective, secured ratification by an overwhelming majority in the french parliament and subsequently by an emphatic verdict in the country, demonstrates clearly that the french people as a whole shrank with their invincible good sense from following even a lead they admired on to this path of future disaster. but the mere fact that there are potent influences in france that still press this demand, and take advantage of every disappointment to urge it forward, calls for unremitting vigilance amongst all peoples who have the welfare of humanity at heart. in conclusion i should like to add that to denounce me as an enemy of france because i disagree with the international policy of its present rulers is a petulant absurdity. during the whole of my public career i have been a consistent advocate of co-operation between the french and british democracies. i took that line when it was fashionable in this country to fawn on german imperialism. during the war i twice risked my premiership in the effort to place the british army under the supreme command of a french general. to preserve french friendship i have repeatedly given way to french demands, and thus have often antagonised opinion in this country. but i cannot go to the extent of approving a policy which is endangering the peace of the world, even to please one section of a people for whose country i have always entertained the most genuine affection. _london, december 9th, 1922._ ix what is france after? _3. the paris conference_ the third conference with m. poincaré over reparations has ended, like its two predecessors, in a complete breakdown. the first was held in august, the second in december, and the third fiasco has just been witnessed. i congratulate mr. bonar law on having the courage to face a double failure rather than agree to a course of policy which would in the end prove disappointing, and probably disastrous. agreement amongst allies is in itself a desirable objective for statesmen to aim at, but an accord to commit their respective countries to foolishness is worse than disagreement. france and britain must not quarrel, even if they cannot agree; but if french ministers persist in the poincaré policy, the companionship of france and britain over this question will be that of parallel lines which never meet, even if they never conflict. what is the object of this headstrong policy? reparations? there is no financier of repute, in any quarter of the globe, who will agree that these methods will bring the allies any contributions towards their impoverished resources. at the august conference all the experts were in accord on this subject, but whilst these methods will produce no cash, they will produce an unmistakable crash. my recollections of the august discussions enable me to follow with some understanding the rather confused reports which have so far reached me here.[2] it is common ground amongst all the allies that germany cannot under present conditions pay her instalments. it is common ground that she must be pressed to put her finances in order, and by balancing her budget restore the efficiency of her currency, so as to meet her obligations. but m. poincaré insisted that, as a condition of granting the moratorium, pledges inside german territory should be seized by the allies. these pledges consisted of customs already established, and of new customs to be set up on the rhine and around the ruhr, so that no goods should be permitted to pass from these german provinces into the rest of germany without the payment of heavy customs dues. the other proposed pledges were the seizure of german forests, of german mines, and of 60 per cent. of the shares in certain german factories. mr. bonar law, judging by his official _communiqué_ after the breakdown of the conference, seems to have raised the same objections to these pledges as i put forward at the august conference. they would bring in nothing comparable to the cost of collection; they would provoke much disturbance and irritation and might lead to consequences of a very grave character. in fact, these pledges are nothing but paper and provocation. the customs barrier on the rhine was tried once before, and was a complete failure. it was tried then as a sanction and not as a means of raising money. for the former purpose it may have achieved some measure of success, but from the point of view of collecting money it was a ludicrous fiasco. there are at the present moment hundreds of millions of paper marks collected at these new tollhouses still locked up in the safe of the reparations commission. they are admittedly worthless. as long as these tolls lasted, they were vexatious; they interfered with business; they dealt lightly with french luxuries working their way into germany, but laid a heavy hand on all useful commodities necessary to the industry and life of the people. they were ultimately withdrawn by consent. m. poincaré now seeks to revive them. the seizure of german forests and mines will inevitably lead to even more serious consequences. the allied control established in the far interior of germany would require protection. protection means military occupation in some shape or other. military occupation of these remote areas means incidents, and incidents quickly ripen into more serious complications. hence the reluctance of the british government of which i was the head to concur in this dangerous policy. hence the refusal of mr. bonar law's government to accept the responsibility for sanctioning such a policy. even logically it is indefensible. there are only two alternative points of view. one is that germany cannot pay under present conditions until her finances are restored, and that a moratorium ought to be granted for a period which will enable that financial restoration to mature. the second is that germany can pay, that she is only shamming insolvency, and that all that you have to do is to apply the thumbscrew firmly and cash will be forthcoming. logically i can understand either of these two alternatives, but i fail to comprehend the reason for a proposal that will grant a moratorium on the ground that germany cannot pay, and at the same time apply the thumbscrew until she pays. i am glad the british prime minister has had the wisdom not to associate himself with a policy which will bring inevitable discredit upon those who share the responsibility of enforcing it. meanwhile, the prospects of europe's recovery are once more to be retarded by the vain stubbornness of some of her rulers. _ronda (spain), january 6th, 1923._ footnote: [2] this chapter was written at ronda (spain). x reparations what is the reparations problem? why does it appear to be further from solution than ever? the great public in all lands are perplexed and worried by its disturbing insolubility. it keeps them wondering what may happen next, and that is never good for a nerve-ridden subject like postwar europe. the real trouble is not in solving the problem itself, but in satisfying the public opinion which surrounds it. i do not mean to suggest that it is an easy matter to ascertain what payments germany can make, or for germany to pay and keep paying these sums once they have been ascertained. but if the difficulty were purely financial it could be overcome. the heart of the problem lies in the impossibility at present of convincing the expectant, indignant, hard-hit and heavily burdened people of france that the sums so fixed represent all that germany is capable of paying. the question of compelling a country to pay across its frontiers huge sums convertible into the currency of other countries is a new one. at first it was too readily taken for granted that a wealth which could bear a war debt of £8,000,000,000 could surely afford to bear an indemnity of £6,000,000,000 provided that this smaller sum were made a first charge on the national revenues; and it took time for the average mind to appreciate the fundamental difference between payment inside and transmission outside a country. when i think of the estimates framed in 1919 by experts of high intelligence and trained experience as to germany's capacity to pay cash over the border i am not disposed to complain of the impatience displayed by french taxpayers at the efforts made at successive conferences to hew down those sanguine estimates to feasible dimensions. i am content to point with pride to the fact that the common sense of the more heavily burdened british taxpayer has long ago taught him to cut his loss and keep his temper. when his example is followed all round, the reparations question is already solved. when public opinion in all the allied countries has subsided into sanity on german reparations, as it already has in britain, financiers can soon find a way out, and trade and commerce will no longer be scared periodically from their desks by the seismic shocks given to credit every time a french minister ascends the tribune to make a statement on reparations. regarding the payment of reparations solely from the point of view of finance, the issues can be stated simply, and i think solved readily. it is always assumed by those who have never read the treaty of versailles, and the letter that accompanied it, that this much-abused and little-perused document fixed a fabulous indemnity for payment by germany. the treaty may have its defects; that is not one of them, for it fixed no sum for payment, either great or small. it stipulated that a reparations commission should be set up in order, _inter alia_, to assess the damage inflicted by germany on allied property and the compensation for injury to life and limb in allied countries. in the second place--and this is also overlooked--it was to ascertain how much of that claim germany was capable of paying. on both these questions germany is entitled to be heard before adjudication. it is in accordance with all jurisprudence that as germany was the aggressor and the loser she should pay the costs. but it would be not only oppressive but foolish to urge payment beyond her capacity. the amount of damage was to be ascertained and assessed by may, 1921. capacity was to be then determined and revised from time to time, according to the varying conditions. even so fair a controversialist as the eminent italian statesman signor nitti has ignored the latter provision in the versailles treaty. no wonder that he should, for there are multitudes who treat every alteration in the annuities fixed in may, 1921, as if it were a departure from the treaty of versailles to the detriment of the victors; whereas every modification made was effected under the provisions and by the machinery incorporated in the treaty for that express purpose. but there has undoubtedly been a departure from the treaty--a fundamental departure. it has, however, been entirely to the detriment of the vanquished. in what respect? i propose to explain, for the whole trouble has arisen from this change in the treaty. the treaty provided that the body to be set up for deciding the amount to be paid in respect of reparations should consist of a representative each of the united states of america, the british empire, france, italy, and belgium. with the exception of the united states of america, all these powers are pecuniarily interested in the verdict. at best it was therefore on the face of it not a very impartial tribunal. still, britain, as a great trading community, was more interested in a settlement than in a few millions more or less of indemnity wrung out of germany; and italy also was a country which had large business dealings with germany and would not therefore be tempted to take a violently anti-german view on the commission. the presence therefore of the united states of america, britain and italy together on the commission constituted a guarantee for moderation of view. now the only disinterested party has retired from the tribunal. the most interested party is in the chair, with a casting vote on certain questions. that is not the treaty signed by germany. if you sign an agreement to pay a sum to be awarded by a, b, c, d, and e, trusting for a fair hearing largely to the influence of a, who is not only very powerful but who is the only completely disinterested referee and a then retires from the board of arbitrators, you are entitled to claim that the character of the agreement is changed. the representatives of france and belgium on the reparations commission are honourable men who are most anxious to do justice, but they are watched by a jealous, vigilant and exacting opinion constantly ready to find fault with concession and to overpower moderating judgment. the balance of the treaty has therefore been entirely upset. what is really needed is to restore that balance so as to secure a fair verdict on the only question in issue--how much germany can pay. when you come to consider that issue you must view the claim for reparations as you would any ordinary debt. you must make up your mind whether you wish to ruin the debtor or to recover the cash. if there are no sufficient realisable assets, then, if you want your money, you must keep your debtor alive. if you want beef from your cow you must forgo the milk. if your object is to destroy your debtor, you press for payment of more than he can be reasonably expected to pay, and then seize his house, his lands, and his chattels, whether they can be disposed of or not. on the other hand, if you want your money, you will find out what he can pay, and then proceed judiciously, patiently, and firmly to recover that amount. by that i do not mean what he can pay by condemning himself to a life of servitude and poverty. no brave nation will stand that long. that is not a method of recovering an old debt, but of creating a new one. i mean, what a nation can be expected to pay steadily without revolt for a whole generation. if you scrape the butter from the bread of every german child for thirty years you may add to the sum of your indemnity a milliard or two of gold marks. that is not what was intended by the treaty of versailles. hungry faces make angry hearts, and the anger spreads further than the hunger. i mean, what germany can pay without condemning a generation of workers to egyptian bondage, and their children to semi-starvation. every oppression, if persisted in, ultimately ends in the ruin of the red sea for the oppressors. europe has only just escaped with great loss from its waters. we do not want to be overwhelmed in another. how are you to arrive at the exact figure of the annuities germany can reasonably be expected to pay without creating these intolerable conditions for her people? that is the question. the answer was given in the treaty as signed: by setting up a commission to inquire and determine. that commission has been weakened, and its character almost destroyed by the defection of the united states of america. is it possible to find a substitute? i am afraid a reference of that question to a new committee of experts would not advance matters, for each country would demand a representative on that committee, and that would only mean the reparations commission over again under another name. the only hope of a fair and final decision is to secure the presence of a representative of the united states of america on the adjudicating body, whatever it may be. is that impossible? i need hardly say that i am not venturing to express any opinion as to the american refusal to ratify the treaty as a whole. i am only stating quite frankly my view that, unless america takes a hand in reparations, real settlement will be postponed until the hour of irreparable mischief strikes. if for reasons of which i am not competent to judge america cannot occupy her vacant chair on the tribunal which may decide fateful issues for humanity, i despair of any real progress being made. allied ministers can accept from a body representing the leading powers who won the war decisions they dare not take on their own responsibility. that is the essence of the matter. it is no use blaming politicians. if they of their own initiative attempt to ride down public sentiment, which alone confers authority upon them, they will inevitably fail. in every country there are plenty of itching partisans ready to take advantage of tactical blunders committed by political opponents or personal rivals. but the judgment of an international tribunal is another matter, and statesmen can accept it and act upon it without being taxed with responsibility for its conclusions. british opinion cannot and will not accept a settlement based on the assumption that abatements in the sum claimed for reparations, if and when made, must be discounted by the british taxpayer alone. france undoubtedly suffered more severely from the ravages of war than any other belligerent. but that is recognised in the proportion allocated to her of the reparations payments. she is to be paid 52 per cent. of the total, _i. e._, more than all the other allied countries put together. britain comes next in the damage sustained by her people, and she is given 22 per cent. in many respects she has suffered more heavily than any other allied country, especially in taxation and in trade. she is willing to stand in with the allies for loss as well as for profit, but she will resent bitterly the suggestion that the loss must necessarily be her share, whilst such profit as there is belongs to others. the american people, who receive no part of the compensation awarded and collected, will _a fortiori_ take the same view of their obligations in the matter. they certainly will not see the force of a settlement to be made at their expense, as if they had been condemned to pay an indemnity. the question is not what remission or indulgence shall be granted to germany, but what payment she is capable of making. if germany can pay a large indemnity france gets 52 per cent. of that, and britain only 22 per cent. if germany can only make a disappointing payment, france still gets 52 per cent. and britain 22 per cent. there is, therefore, no ground for debiting britain and america with the cost of reduced expectations. the offer to hand over the worthless "c" bonds to the british empire in return for her claims is an insult to the intelligence of the british public. let us get away from these shifts on to the straight road. back to the treaty--that is the real remedy. there is no need to revise it--all that is required is to restore it. if america reappears on the arbitrating tribunal she need not accept the rest of the treaty. then a fair and enduring settlement would soon ensue, this irritating sore would rapidly heal, and the condition of the world would steadily improve. _algeciras, january 1st, 1923._ xi mr. hughes's new haven speech the preceding chapter was written at algeciras on january 2nd, 1923. on january 3rd there appeared in the spanish papers a compressed report of the speech delivered by the american secretary of state, mr. hughes, at new haven. it made suggestions on the subject of reparations which were obviously intended for consideration at the forthcoming paris conference. i knew the chairman of that conference, m. poincaré, would not be too anxious to bring these proposals to the notice of his colleagues, but i had some hope that the british, italian, and belgian premiers might do so. i therefore cabled the following message to the british and american press:- "i have read with gladness secretary hughes's important speech. as far as i can judge from compressed report appearing in the local paper of this remote corner of spain his suggestions and mine travel in same direction. earnestly hope paris conference will give american proposals priority of consideration. all other expedients will but postpone mischief which will in the end have to be redeemed with compound interest at usurious rates by an embarrassed europe." i constantly refer to this speech in subsequent articles, and as it has been suggested that the interpretation i placed on it is not borne out by the text, i append the full report which appeared in _the times_ of december 30th, 1922:- "mr. hughes, the secretary of state, in a speech which he delivered before the american historical association at new haven, connecticut, to-night lifted yet another corner of the veil which has shrouded the immediate plans of the united states government. much of his address concerned the washington conference of 1921, but it ended with a discussion of economic conditions in europe which are of prime importance. "mr. hughes began with the admission that 'we cannot dispose of these problems by calling them european, for they are world problems, and we cannot escape the injurious consequences of failure to settle them.' they were, however, european problems in the sense that they cannot be solved without the consent of the european governments, and the _crux_ of the situation lay in the settlement of reparations. 'there will be no adjustment of other needs, however pressing, until a definite and accepted basis for the discharge of reparations claims has been fixed. it is futile to attempt to erect any economic structure in europe until the foundation is laid.' "then followed a passage referring to the attempts to link up the debts owed to the united states with the question of reparations or with projects of cancellation, attempts which had been steadily resisted. it led up to a discussion of the attitude of the united states towards reparations, 'standing, as it does, a distinct question, and as one which cannot be settled unless the european governments concerned are able to agree.' first came a denial that america desired to see germany relieved of her responsibility for the war, or of her just obligations, or that america wished that france should lose 'any part of her just claims.' on the other hand, america did not wish to see a prostrate germany. some americans had suggested that the united states should assume the _rôle_ of arbitrator, but mr. hughes did not think 'we should assume such a burden of responsibility.' "from this point the speech deserves quotation in full: "'but the situation,' said mr. hughes, 'does call for a settlement upon its merits. the first condition of a satisfactory settlement is that the question should be taken out of politics. statesmen, have their difficulties, their public opinion, the exigencies they must face. it is devoutly to be hoped that they will effect a settlement among themselves, and that the coming meeting in paris will find a solution. but if it does not, what should be done? "'the alternative of forcible measures to obtain reparations is not an attractive one. no one can foretell the extent of the serious consequences which might ensue from such a course. apart from political results, i believe that the opinion of experts is that such measures will not produce reparation payments, but might tend to destroy the basis of those payments, which must be found in economic recuperation. if, however, statesmen cannot agree, and such an alternative is faced, what can be done? is there not another way out? the fundamental condition is that in this critical moment the merits of the question as an economic one must alone be regarded. sentiment, however natural, must be disregarded; mutual recriminations are of no avail; reviews of the past, whether accurate or inaccurate, promise nothing; assertions of blame on the one hand and excuses on the other come to naught. "'there ought to be a way for statesmen to agree upon what germany can pay, for no matter what claims may be made against her that is the limit of satisfaction. there ought to be a way to determine that limit and to provide a financial plan by which immediate results can be obtained and european nations can feel that the foundations have been laid for their mutual and earnest endeavours to bring about the utmost prosperity to which the industry of their people entitles them. "'if statesmen cannot agree and the exigencies of public opinion make their course difficult, then there should be called to their aid those who can point the way to a solution. "'why should they not invite men of the highest authority in finance in their respective countries--men of such prestige, experience, and honour that their agreement upon the amount to be paid and upon the financial plan for working out payments would be accepted throughout the world as the most authoritative expression obtainable? the governments need not bind themselves in advance to accept the recommendations, but they can at least make possible such an inquiry with their approval and free the men who may represent their country in such a commission from any responsibility to foreign offices and from any duty to obey political instructions. "'in other words, they may invite an answer to this difficult question from men of such standing and in such circumstances of freedom as will ensure a reply prompted only by knowledge and conscience. i have no doubt that distinguished americans would be willing to serve on such a commission. if the governments saw fit to reject the recommendation upon which such a body agreed they would be free to do so, but they would have the advantage of impartial advice and of an enlightened public opinion. the peoples would be informed that the question would be rescued from assertion and counter-assertion and the problem put upon its way to solution. "'i do not believe that any general conference would answer the purpose better, much less that any political conference would accomplish a result which prime ministers find it impossible to reach. but i do believe that a small group, given proper freedom of action, would be able soon to devise a proper plan. it would be time enough to consider forcible measures after such opportunity had been exhausted.' "mr. hughes's closing words were: "'there lies the open broad avenue of opportunity, if those whose voluntary action is indispensable are willing to take advantage of it. and once this is done, the avenues of american helpfulness cannot fail to open hopefully.'" the argument developed by mr. hughes in this speech is identical with that upon which i based my appeal in the previous chapter for an impartial investigation into germany's capacity, and he concludes with a proposal which is in effect identical with mine. he does not state categorically that the american government would be prepared to be officially represented on the commission. but when he says, "i have no doubt that distinguished americans would be willing to serve on such a commission," it means that the government would be indirectly represented. the allied governments would certainly have consulted the government of the u.s.a. as to the american representative nominated to sit on the commission, and no american expert would be appointed without full assurance that he was acceptable to the government of his country. it is a misfortune that such important proposals should have been put forward so timorously that those who wished to ignore them could easily pretend they had never heard them made. speeches delivered even by secretaries of state at an academic function in a small provincial town might very well be overlooked in foreign chancelleries, whose postbags bulge with weighty despatches from many lands, without any suggestion of studied neglect. it was clear from mr. bonar law's subsequent attitude in the course of the debate in the house of commons on the ruhr invasion that he at any rate had not seen mr. hughes's new haven deliverance. timid diplomatic flutterings make no impression in a great situation, and so lead to nothing. this is an excellent example of how not to speak if you wish to be heard, and of how to speak if you have no desire to be heeded. _london, july 4th, 1923._ xii the french invasion of the ruhr france has once more jumped on the prostrate form of germany, and the sabots have come down with a thud that will sicken the hearts of multitudes on both sides of the atlantic whose friendship for france stood the losses and griefs of a four years' war. germany having been overthrown and disarmed after a prodigious effort, involving a strain upon the combined strength of america, italy, and the whole british empire, as well as france, and her arms bound with the thongs of a stern treaty, the process of dancing upon her while she is down can at any time now be performed with complete impunity by any one of these powers alone. the spectacle every time it is repeated, provides much satisfaction to those who indulge in the barren delights of revenging the memory of past wrongs. there is no doubt some joy for the unsportsmanlike mind in kicking a helpless giant who once maltreated you and who, but for the assistance of powerful neighbours, would have done so a second time. but what good will it bring devastated france or her overtaxed allies? the additional coal and timber that will be wrung out of germany will barely cover the direct cost of collection. although germany bears the extra cost, the expense of these punitive measures must all in the end diminish the means of reparation, and therefore fall on the victor. how many students of the problem of reparations have ever taken the trouble to ascertain the extent to which the maintenance of allied armies of occupation has already drained the resources of germany? between direct cash payments, the cost of supplies, and outlay in labour and material for building huge barracks, these armies have already cost germany 6,000,000,000 gold marks--roughly 1,200,000,000 dollars, or over £300,000,000. how much better it would have been if most of this money had gone towards rebuilding the devastated area! it is not without significance, now that war is being waged against germany for what the american representative in paris termed her technical default, to recollect that, between the expense of the army of occupation and contributions already made towards reparations, germany has already paid to the allies over three times the amount of the total indemnity exacted by bismarck in 1871. this is without making any allowance for the vast and highly developed colonies which she surrendered. let, therefore, no one approach this problem as if he were dealing with a recalcitrant country that is deliberately refusing to acknowledge any of her obligations under a treaty which she has signed. the costs of the last war are acknowledged to be irrecoverable. it is difficult enough to find the means for payment of damages. who will pay the growing cost of this new war? so far i have referred only to the direct outlay upon these aggressive measures. the indirect cost to victor and vanquished alike will be crushing. it is already accumulating. the mere threat has depreciated the value of the franc, and thus reduced its purchasing capacity abroad. this loss must be borne by the french consumer. there may be a rally; but i shall be surprised if the improvement is more than temporary. all that is obvious for the moment to the untrained eye is the way in which the mark is dragging the french and belgian franc slowly along its own downward course. as the distance between them lengthens and the invisible cord which ties them together becomes more and more attenuated, it may ultimately snap and the franc be released from this dangerous association. that i doubt, for a bankrupt germany means a country to which even the most hopeful cannot look as a means of redeeming french deficits. once that is clear to the french peasant he will not so readily part with his savings, and the real difficulties of french finance will begin at that stage. a policy, therefore, which demoralises the german currency is one which is also fatal to the solvency of french finance. let us follow the probable sequence of events. the terrified german mark is rushing headlong to the bottom of the pit where the austrian krone is already lost beyond rescue. as long as reparation coal is dug out by bayonets, and reparation timber is cut down by swords, it is idle to talk of restoring the mark by putting german finance in order. no tariff, however nimble, can keep pace with the runaway mark. it would baffle the most resourceful finance minister to adapt his budget to a currency which disappears beyond the horizon while he is sitting at his desk to pen his proposals. if the mere threat of force has produced such a panic, what will be the effect of the actual measures? it is safe to predict that the advance of french troops into germany will not restore the composure of the frightened mark and arrest its flight. what, then, becomes of the hope of renewed payments of the annuity? at best germany could only be expected to pay when her foreign trade was so improved that she could provide a margin out of her exports with which to pay her annuities. her foreign trade is largely dependent upon her foreign exchanges. these are now destroyed beyond prospect of recovery for years. britain proposed a voluntary moratorium for a short term of years in order to place germany in a position where she could at the end of that term pay a reasonable annuity. the french government have in effect substituted a compulsory moratorium for an indefinite period with no prospect of payment in sight. the only chance of securing an early instalment of reparation payments was by pressing germany to put her finances in order and giving her fair time in which to do so. the only chance of negotiating a loan on german security to assist france to pay for the repair of her devastated provinces, and to enable her to put her own finances in order, was by restoring the stability of german currency. french statesmen have deliberately thrown both these chances away. the effect on the value of their own currency must be grave, and frenchmen will have to pay in increased cost of living for a venture dictated by short-sighted and short-tempered statesmanship. when one thinks of the consequences one is driven to ask whether french politicians are really seeking reparations or are pursuing another purpose quite incompatible with the recovery of money payments under the treaty. this is the wrong road to reparations. it leads in exactly the opposite direction. whither, then, does it lead? there is no doubt that its effect will be ruinous as far as german industry is concerned. i have already dealt with its disastrous influence upon german currency, and with the indirect effect of a rapidly depreciating currency upon german foreign trade. the seizure of the ruhr mines will have another serious effect. even now the result of the compulsory alienation of so much of germany's coal supply in the ruhr, in silesia, and the saar, from german industry, has diminished german productiveness. the fuel deficiency thereby created inside germany has been partially supplied by purchases of coal from outside sources. the necessity for providing gold to pay for foreign coal has added considerably to germany's financial difficulties. a still larger foreign purchase will be the inevitable result of the forcible diversion of large quantities of ruhr coal to france and italy, with further financial embarrassments as a consequence. that is bad enough. but i fear worse. will the german miner work with the same regularity and efficiency for a foreign master as he does for a german employer? is there the least possibility of the production being maintained at its present level? the influence of this added muddle on world trade is incalculable. nobody gains; everybody is a loser by the move. how is a germany whose embarrassed finances are made still more involved--how is a germany whose industry becomes more and more difficult--how is a germany reduced to despair to be of the slightest use to france, belgium, italy, or anybody else? the feather-headed scribes who have advocated this rash policy assume that france will be helped because germany will thus be reduced to impotence. for how long? the disintegration of germany is not an unlikely consequence of this move. i know that is the expectation. frenchmen still hanker after the days when saxons and bavarians and wurtembergers were allies, and almost vassals, of france against prussia. it was the lure that led the third napoleon to his ruin. it is the attraction which is now drawing france once more to a sure doom. the policy will bring no security to france in the future. it deprives her of all hope of reparations in the immediate present. there will no longer be a germany to pay. it would be too hopeless a task to attempt recovery from each of the severed states. but what of increased security? nothing can keep germans permanently apart. they will, at the suitable moment reunite under more favourable conditions, freed from external as well as internal debt. france will have lost her reparations and only retained the hatred of an implacable foe become more redoubtable than ever. how would europe have fared in the interval whilst france was learning from events what every other country can see now? there is no knowing what will happen when a brave people of 60,000,000 find themselves faced with utter ruin. whether they turn to the left or to the right will depend on questions of personal leadership, which are not yet determined. all we can be sure of is that they can hardly go on as they are, maintaining an honest struggle for ordered freedom and democratic self-government. the french proclamation, with its threat of "severest measures in case of recalcitrancy," is ominous of much that may happen. no people accustomed to national independence have ever been able long to tolerate a foreign yoke. chancellor cuno's action is the first manifestation of the spirit of revolt. it will certainly grow in intensity. the lash will then fall, sooner or later, and germany will be inevitably driven to desperate courses. a communist germany would infect europe. european vitality is so lowered by exhaustion that it is in no condition to resist the plague. would a reactionary germany be much better--brooding and scheming vengeance? russia, with her incalculable resources of men and material, is at hand, needing all that germany can best give and best spare. the bolshevik leaders only require what germany is so well fitted to supply in order to reorganise their country and convert it into the most formidable state in europe or asia. nations hard pressed on the east have in the past moved forward irresistibly to the west. in obedience to the same law a people hard pressed on the west will look to the east. when the french troops marched on essen they began a movement the most far-reaching, and probably the most sinister in its consequences, that has been witnessed for many centuries in europe. and these are the people who, after fifty years of patient and laborious waiting, have demonstrated to the world in 1918 the stupidity of abusing victory in 1871. if the teacher so soon forgets his own special lesson the pupil is not likely to remember when fury overcomes terror. _algeciras, january 15th, 1923._ xiii lost opportunities the french government, having conspicuously failed to win its anticipated coup, is doubling the stakes each time it loses. when will it end? and where will it end? it is ill gambling with human passions. they are all engaged in this wild venture--on both sides of the table. pride, greed, vanity, obstinacy, temper, combativeness, racial antagonisms, but also patriotism, love of justice, hatred of wrong and high courage. each side draws from the same arsenal of fiery human emotions. unless some one steps in to induce a halt i fear the result will be devastating. france has now abandoned all hope of being able to run the mines, railways, and workshops of the ruhr by military agencies. in these days you cannot shoot every worker who fails to excavate so many hundredweights of coal per diem, or who refuses to fill a wagon or drive a locomotive when and by whomsoever he is told to do so. france cannot provide the necessary complement of miners and railwaymen from outside to fill vacancies created by sulky workers. and even if she could it would take many months ere they become sufficiently accustomed to their new conditions to work without peril to themselves. so a new policy has been improvised. it is nothing less than the siege of germany. sixty millions of germans are to be starved into surrender. that is a long business, as every one knows who has been engaged on the difficult operations of strike breaking. we have often witnessed workers with little support or sympathy from the rest of the community hold out for weeks after their funds have been exhausted. in germany all classes are united in resistance. the national pride fortifies endurance and incites to sacrifice. and the ports are still open. meanwhile incidents may happen, developments may occur which will create a situation that will baffle all the resources the invaders can command. it is very little use looking backward. but there are many who are disposed to say that the invasion of the ruhr was bound to come and the sooner the safer. the ruhr coal mines were the wild oats of reparation. get it over quickly. the headache will bring repentance and france will then settle down to a quiet life. that is the argument. i must enter an emphatic protest against this view. if this ill-judged enterprise had been put off for a few more months i do not believe any french government would have embarked upon it. there is no french statesman of any standing who, in his heart, believes in its wisdom. now that the credit of france is involved in its success they will all support it. but french opinion, as a whole, was moving with startling rapidity from this policy. the parisian pulse was still feverish, but the provinces had completely calmed down. vacancies occurring in the senate, the chamber of deputies and the provincial assemblies during several months have afforded an opportunity of testing real french opinion and the results have been sensational. at election after election, fought in typical constituencies all over france, the champions of ruhrism have been beaten by emphatic majorities. masses of french workmen have always opposed this policy. the peasant in every land always moves slowly. but there can be no doubt that the french peasant has had enough of military adventures. his sons were never numbered amongst the "exempts," and the losses in the peasant homes of france were appalling. driving through the villages in agricultural france you find yourself asking, "where are the young men?" the answer invariably comes, "this village suffered severely in the war." you will receive the same answer in the next village, and the next. we cannot wonder, therefore, that by-elections in rural as well as in urban france display an unmistakable weariness of plans which involve the marching of armed frenchmen into hostile territory. the sorrowing people of france have good reason to shrink from any course of action that leads to further shedding of blood. for these reasons i have steadily favoured every scheme that had the effect of postponing decision as to the ruhr. delay meant ultimate defeat for the chauvinists. that is why they strove so hard to rush their government into this precipitate action. the abrupt termination of the paris conference was their opportunity and they seized it with tingling fingers. until then there had never been a clean break on which violence could be founded. the friends of moderation both here and on the continent had seen to that. there had been reference of questions for the scrutiny of experts and calming adjournments to await their report. when it arrived there were endless suggestions and counter-suggestions to meet difficulties. in the end europe was saved from the catastrophe of once more handing over its destinies to the guidance of blind force. unhappily, weariness or impatience induced the paris negotiators in a few hours to drop the reins which had for at least four years held the furies from dashing along their career of destruction. there were many alternative plans that might have been discussed. there was the proposal to refer the whole question to the league of nations. it is true that when i suggested it in august last m. poincaré summarily rejected it. but the allies also rejected m. poincaré's proposals by a majority of four to one at that conference. that did not prevent his repeating them in january--and this time he succeeded in winning over the majority to his view. a little more persistence and less pessimism might have persuaded belgium, italy and japan to aid our appeals to france to trust rather to the league of nations than to the uncertainties of war. what is still more inexplicable is the failure of the conference to take any note of mr. secretary hughes's new haven speech. neglected opportunities litter the path of this troublesome question. there were the cannes conversations, broken off just as they were reaching fruition. had they been continued another week they would have ended in a helpful settlement which would have brought reparations to france, confidence to germany, and peace to europe. they struck on one of the many sunken reefs which bestrew the french political seas, and it will not surprise me to find that the whole cargo of reparations disappeared then beyond salvage into the deep with these shipwrecked negotiations. again, germany threw away a great opportunity at genoa when all the nations of europe came together for the first time to discuss their troubles in the spirit of equality and amity. it is true that reparations were excluded at the instance of france from the programme of the conference. but the spirit engendered by a friendly settlement of all other outstanding questions would have rendered a reasonable and temperate consideration of reparations inevitable. germany, by its foolish staging of its russian agreement, made all that impossible. resentment and suspicion were once more equipped with a scourge and they used it relentlessly to drive out all goodwill for germany from the purlieus of that great congress. another lost opportunity. then there was the bankers' committee, appointed to consider the question of raising an international loan to help france to finance the repair of her devastated area and also to assist germany to restore her demoralised currency. i remember how eager poor rathenau was to float that loan and how sanguine he was that it would succeed. he was confident that the german nationals who have invested their gold in other lands could be induced to subscribe heavily to the loan. the bankers concerned--all were of the highest reputation in the financial world--were confident that if german reparations were fixed at a reasonable sum investors throughout the world would gladly put their money into a great international loan which would help to restore europe. the french government testily declined to consider the essential conditions indicated by the bankers. another lost opportunity, and europe once more lumbered along its dreary way to seek another. it came with mr. hughes's famous speech. it was clearly the result of prolonged consideration. for weeks there had been rumours of much consultation in washington on the state of europe, and we were encouraged to hope that america meant business. the result was mr. secretary hughes's offer. it was made four days before the paris conference and was obviously intended to be discussed by the allies there. an endeavour has been made to minimise the importance of this american approach to europe, but it is incomprehensible to me how so momentous a pronouncement has been treated as if it were merely the casual utterance of a politician who had to find some topic of more or less interest with which to illuminate a discourse. another opportunity lost--perhaps the greatest--perhaps the last. never has luck striven so hard to save stupidity. but luck loses its temper easily and then it is apt to hit hard. _london, february 15th, 1923._ xiv french schemes "french troops occupying fresh german territory." "further advance into germany." "reinforcements." "french cut off the british bridgehead on the rhine." "proposals for new coinage in the ruhr." what is it all leading to? is it really reparations? signor nitti, who has made a thorough study of all the documents bearing on french designs against germany, has come definitely to the conclusion that these measures have no reference to the recovery of damages for the devastated area, but that they are all taken in the execution of a vast project for securing french control over all the coal and iron of continental europe. he supplies chapter and verse for his theory. something has undoubtedly roused the suspicions of signor mussolini. they come rather late in the day to be effective. he naturally does not relish the idea of an italy whose coal and steel supplies are placed at the mercy of a gigantic trust directed from paris. italy has no coal and iron of her own. her interest is, therefore, in a free market. hence signor mussolini's alarm. is there any ground for it? let those who imagine that italian statesmen are unnecessarily disturbed read the discussions in the french press leading up to the speeches recently delivered by m. millerand, m. barthou, and m. poincaré. with regard to m. barthou's intervention, i feel i must, as one of the founders of the reparations commission, say a word. there were important questions of amount, method, and time which could not be determined before the signature of the peace treaty and could not be settled at all without giving germany a full opportunity of being heard. hence the appointment of the reparations commission. it was called into existence to settle these questions after hearing evidence and deliberating on its effect. of this commission m. barthou is now chairman. he, therefore, presides over a body which has committed to its charge judicial functions of a momentous character. he has to adjudicate from time to time on the case presented by germany under a multitude of different heads. inflammatory speeches on the very subjects upon which he has to preserve judicial calm are quite incompatible with his position. when he occupied the same post m. poincaré ultimately recognised that he could not continue to write controversial articles on questions which might come before him for decision as a judge. he, therefore, very properly resigned his commissionership. but to revert to the speeches delivered by these eminent statesmen. if they mean what the actual words convey, then france means to stick to the ruhr. not by way of annexation. oh, no. that, according to m. barthou, is a "foolish, mendacious and stupid" lie. but france means to hang on to the _gages_ until reparation is paid. what are the _gages_? the industries of the ruhr. if the french government is to control the industries which represent the life of this prosperous area for thirty years it assumes greater authority over the district than it exercises over the mining area of the pas de calais. in its own mining districts no government takes upon itself--except during a war--to give directions as to the destination and distribution of the coal produced. but there are indications that the control over the ruhr industries is to be of a much more far-reaching character than this. and this is where the hints--broad hints--thrown out by the french press come in. france, in order to secure the payment of the reparation instalments in future, is to be given shares in these great mines and industries. what proportion of shares? amongst the _gages_ demanded by m. poincaré in august of last year were sixty per cent. of the shares in certain pivotal german industries in the rhine area. now the ruhr industries are clearly to be included within the scope of the demand. france has the iron ore of lorraine and the coal of the saar valley. her financiers have been engaged in buying up coal mines in silesia. if she can secure the controlling interest in the ruhr mines and belgium and poland can be persuaded to join in the deal, then the continent of europe will be at the mercy of this immense coal and iron combine. i said in the previous chapter that the ports were still open. as long as they are, central europe can protect itself to a certain extent against this gigantic trust, for the products of britain and america will be available. but that possibility is to be provided against. nothing is to be left to chance. one of the _gages_ is to be control over german customs. how can germany balance her budget without a revenue? how can she raise a revenue without a tariff? what more productive tariff than a duty on foreign coal and metal manufactures? and thus all competitive products will be excluded from the german markets. the combine will be supreme. it is true that if this cynical scheme comes off there is an end of reparations--for the independence of german industry is strangled and its life will soon languish. but there are signs that french enterprise has abandoned all idea of recovering reparations and that it is now brooding upon loot--on an immense scale. for the discussions in the french press contemplate even wider and more far-reaching developments than those involved in the control of german industries. italy, poland, and even russia are to be brought in. the high line taken for years by the parisian papers about "no traffic with murder" is being given up. instead we have much sentimental twaddle about restoring the old friendly relations between france and russia--of course, for a consideration. russia is to buy; germany is to manufacture; france is to profit. these proposals, which have for some time been in the air, are now actually in type. now the type is ordinary black--later on it may be red. twenty lives have already been lost over the preliminaries of execution. i fear there will be many more as the difficulties become more apparent. it is not without significance that the terms which germany is to be called upon to accept in the event of her submission have never been formulated. no ultimatum was issued before invasion. if germany were to-morrow to throw up her hands what conditions would she have to comply with? who can tell? germany clearly does not know. the british government does not know. they were never discussed at the paris conference. m. poincaré has only asserted with emphasis that he "will not accept promises." if the ruhr is to be evacuated promises must be accepted at some stage, for germany cannot deliver ten years' coal instalments in advance, and she cannot pay fifty milliards of gold marks over the counter. so, if m. poincaré's statement means anything, then the control of ruhr industries must be vested in france until the whole of the mortgage has been redeemed. hence the vast plan for the exploitation of germany, and through germany of europe. a pretty scheme, but--like most plans which make no allowance for human nature--bound to fail. how long would italy and russia consent to be exploited for the enrichment of french capitalists? italy has already made it clear that she has no intention of walking into the trap. russia may or may not have been approached. it is not improbable that there have been informal soundings. it is not easy to reckon what the bolshevists may or may not do in any circumstances. but one can be fairly assured that they will not place their heads in the jaws of a rapacious capitalistic crocodile of this character. brigands are not made of that simple stuff. will german statesmen consent to sell their country into political and economic bondage for an indefinite period? it is incredible. no doubt there had been feelers between french and german capitalists for some time before the ruhr invasion. m. loucheur and herr stinnes are credited with having had conversations on the subject of amalgamating the interests of lorraine iron ore and ruhr coal. but the ruhr invasion has awakened the patriotism of germany from its stupor. a potent new element has therefore been introduced into the calculation. this element does not mix well with international finance. it may be depended upon to resist to the last any effort to put german industry under foreign control, and without control the _gage_ is worthless. then there is the german workman who must be taken into account. the miner and the engineer in all countries are proverbially independent. they take no orders even from their own governments. during the war they had to be reasoned with before they could be persuaded to take a course urged upon them by the government of the day in the interests of their own country. they will view the commands of a syndicate controlled by foreign governments with suspicion and repugnance. should disputes arise--and they are more likely than ever to arise constantly under these conditions--who will be responsible for the protection of life, liberty, and property? will foreign troops operate? or will the german army and police act practically under orders given from paris? the popular sympathy will be with the strikers. it is a fantastic idea born of failure and, therefore, bound itself to be a failure. _london, march 1st, 1923._ xv the quicksand when you have walked some distance into a quicksand, and are sinking deeper and deeper with every step you take, it is always difficult to decide whether you are more likely to reach firm ground by pressing forward or by going backward. you must do one or other. you cannot just stand fast, for that is inevitable destruction. the french government clearly are of opinion that safety lies in marching further into the quagmire. so three more german cities have been occupied, more burgomasters and officials expelled, more men and boys shot in the streets, more black troops imported, more regulations and more decrees issued; there are more depressions of french, belgian and italian exchanges, more confusion in everybody's business in central europe--in a sentence, everywhere there is more quaking sand and less solid coal. the total shortage in deliveries as compared with the promises of spa was only eight per cent. had it not been for this fatuous invasion, france during the past six or seven weeks would have already received from the ruhr nearly 3,000,000 tons in coal and in coke. france has actually received 50,000 tons during this period. a swarm of engineers, railwaymen, bargemen, officials of all kinds, and hotel waiters, supported by a formidable army have in six weeks produced this ridiculous output. no doubt the amount will later on be increased by further pressure and by pouring in more railwaymen, but it will be a long time ere france receives her spa quota minus eight per cent., and then there will be some months' arrears to make up. no wonder that m. loucheur stated flatly in the french chamber that he did not approve of the ruhr enterprise. he has one distinct advantage over the ruhr plungers--he does know something about business. he can boast also of another gift, the possession of which is not without significance when you consider his present attitude. he is an admirable judge of to-morrow's weather. that is a rare endowment amongst politicians. any simpleton can tell you which way the wind is blowing to-day, but it requires a man of special insight and experience in these matters to forecast the direction of the wind to-morrow. m. loucheur is one of those exceptionally well-equipped weather prophets. so he satisfies the opinion of to-day by giving his support to m. poincaré, and he safeguards his position against the morrow's change by stating clearly that he does not approve the policy he supports. i have read no declaration from any french statesman of eminence--with the doubtful exception of m. barthou--indicating a belief in the wisdom of the venture. and yet french courage, french pride, french loyalty, french patriotism--and maybe french blood and treasure--are committed irretrievably to a reckless gamble which most of the responsible statesmen who led france by their wisdom through her great troubles regard with doubt, anxiety and apprehension. will the french government try to extricate themselves from the difficulties into which they have precipitated their country and europe? i fear not. heedlessness rushes a man into danger; it needs courage to get out. and when getting out involves an admission of blame there are few men who possess that exalted type of courage. there are other reasons why the present government of france will flounder further into the quicksand. when governments make mistakes in england, the threat of a parliamentary defeat or a couple of adverse by-elections pulls them out roughly but safely, and the governments start on a new course amid the general satisfaction of friend and foe. the willesden, mitcham, and liverpool elections rescued the government from one of the most hopeless muddles into which any administration has ever contrived to get its affairs. in similar circumstances in france a change of government is negotiated with amazing dexterity and celerity. but you cannot arrange the preliminary overthrow of an existing government unless there is some one in the background ready and willing to form the next. there are generally two or three outstanding men of high repute prepared to serve their country in any emergency. the trouble to-day in france is that every alternative leader disapproves of this enterprise and believes it must ultimately fail. on the other hand, there is no prominent figure in french politics prepared to take upon himself the odium of sounding the retreat. it would always be said that success was in sight, and that had it not been for the new minister's cowardice and perfidy france would have emerged triumphantly out of all her financial worries. the _drapeau_ would have been lowered and betrayed. no french statesmen dare face that deadly accusation. so the present french government is tied to the saddle of its charger and is forced to go on. another explanation of the difficulty of withdrawing is to be found in the increasing fury of the original fomenters of this rashness. the more fruitless the enterprise the greater the energy they display in spurring the government further into its follies. in the previous article i gave a summary of the ambitious plans they had conceived for syndicating european resources under french control. the industries of europe controlled from paris--that is their magnificent dream. now they propound a new treaty which is to supersede the treaty of versailles. boundaries are to be revised, rich provinces and towns practically annexed, the ruhr coal is to be harnessed to lorraine coal, and germany, having been further mutilated and bound, is to be reduced to a state of complete economic subjection. there has been nothing comparable to these ideas since the norman conquest, when the saxons, having first of all been disarmed, were reduced to a condition of economic thraldom for the enrichment and glorification of their new masters. needless to say britain and america are not to be invited to attend this new peace conference. they are to be graciously informed of the conditions of the new peace when finally established by french arms. the british empire, which raised millions of men to liberate french soil from the german invaders and which lost hundreds of thousands of its best young lives in the effort, is not even to be consulted as to the settlement which its losses alone make possible. america, who came to the rescue with millions of its bravest, is barely worth a sentence in these ravings of brains intoxicated with an unwholesome mixture of hatred, greed and military arrogance. the french government are not committed by any overt declarations to these schemes; but it is ominous that they issue from the pens whose insistent prodding has driven this government on to its present action. up to the present no repudiation has come from the head of the government or from any of his subordinates. the very vagueness of his published aims would leave him free to adopt any plans. pledges for reparation and security will cover a multitude of aggressions. the british government have just issued as a parliamentary paper a full report of the proceedings of the paris conference. it is an amazing document. as far as i can see no real endeavour was made by any of its members to prevent a break-up. at the first failure to secure agreement the delegates threw up their hands in despair and sought no alternatives. they agreed about nothing except that it was not worth while spending another day in trying to agree. even m. theunis, the resourceful belgian premier, had nothing to suggest. a blight of sterility seems to have swept over the conference. on this aspect of the fateful and fatal conference of paris i do not now propose to dwell. i wish to call attention to it for another purpose. i have perused the blue book with great care. i was anxious to find out exactly what m. poincaré proposed to demand of germany as a condition of submission to the french will. what was germany to do if she was anxious to avert the fall of the axe? i have read his speeches and annexes in vain for any exposition of these terms. it is true he was never asked the question. that sounds incomprehensible. but every one engaged was in such a hurry to break up the conference and thus put an end to disagreeable disagreements that it never seems to have occurred to them to ask this essential question. and the party principally concerned was not represented. the result is that no one knows the terms upon which the french army is prepared to evacuate the ruhr. mr. bonar law could not explain when questioned in the house of commons. i am not surprised, for no one has ever told him and he never asked. i am sure that by this time m. poincaré has quite forgotten why he ever went into the ruhr. for that, amongst other reasons, he will remain there until something happens that will provide us with an answer. most human tragedy is fortuitous. _london, march 10th, 1923._ xvi the first german offer the french and belgian governments have slapped another opportunity in the face. to make that slap resound as well as sting, they have accompanied their rejection of the german offer by a savage sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment on the head of the greatest industrial concern in the ruhr, if not in europe. what for? because he ordered the works' syren to sound "cease work" for one day when the french troops occupied the place. there is a swagger of brutality about that sentence which betokens recklessness. it came at a moment when the german government had just made an offer of peace, and when that ally of france who had made the deepest sacrifices in the war to save her and belgium from ruin was urging the french government to regard that offer at least as a starting-point for discussion. the answer was to treat the german note as an offence, to promulgate that penal sentence which outrages every sense of decency throughout the world, and to refuse to permit an ally, who had been so faithful in the time of trouble for france and belgium, even the courtesy of a discussion on the tenor of the reply to be given to a note that so vitally concerned the interest of all the allies without exception. prussian arrogance in its crudest days can furnish no such example of clumsy and short-sighted ineptitude. it gives point to lord robert cecil's observation in the house of commons that it is very difficult to reconcile the french attitude with a conception that the french government, with the opinion behind it, desires a settlement. what is the german offer? it proposes to limit the total obligations of germany in cash and in kind to thirty milliards of gold marks (£1,500,000,000) to be raised by loans on the international money markets at normal conditions in instalments of:- 20 milliards up to july 1, 1927. 5 milliards up to july 1, 1929. 5 milliards up to july 1, 1931. there are provisions for payment of interest from july, 1923, onward, and the agreements entered into for delivery of payments in kind on account of reparations are to be carried out in accordance with the arrangements already made. then comes this important provision. after a paragraph in which it is argued that the above figures would strain the resources of germany to the utmost it adds:- "should others not share this opinion, the german government propose to submit the whole reparations problem to an international commission uninfluenced by political considerations, as suggested by state secretary hughes." they further state that the german government are prepared to devise suitable measures in order that the whole german national resources should participate "in guaranteeing the service of the loan." guarantees are also offered for deliveries in kind. in order to ensure a permanent peace between france and germany they propose an agreement that all contentious questions arising between them in future should be referred to arbitration. the note finally stipulates that the evacuation of the ruhr "within the shortest space of time" and the restoration of treaty conditions in the rhineland constitute "an essential leading up to negotiations on basis of above ideas." the above represents the substance of the german proposals. the french and belgian governments in their reply stand by the may, 1921, schedule of payments and decline to forego even the very problematical "c" bonds of £4,250,000,000. hitherto it has been common ground that £2,500,000,000 is the figure which germany can be expected to pay. the french and belgian governments are now insisting on the full measure of the £6,600,000,000 award. the hughes proposal they scoff at and treat its putting forward by germany as part of "an expression of a systematic revolt against the treaty of versailles." the real temper and purpose of this intransigeant attitude is to be found in two sentences. here is the first. alluding to the resistance offered in the ruhr to the french attempt to exploit its resources the note says: "the belgian and french governments cannot take into consideration any german proposal whilst the resistance continues." that is, however complete and satisfactory a proposal may be in itself, it would be rejected unless preceded by abject surrender to french designs in the ruhr. then later on comes this significant sentence emphasising the moral of the first:- "the belgian government and the french government have decided that they will only evacuate the newly occupied territories according to the measure and in proportion to the payments effected. they have nothing to alter in this resolution." an impossible payment is to be insisted upon--costs of occupation are to be added to that, and until both are liquidated french armies are to remain in possession of the richest areas in germany. meanwhile the british empire and the united states of america, who, at a prodigious cost in life and treasure, saved france from a similar humiliation to that which she is now inflicting on germany, are practically told when they venture to offer suggestions to mind their own business. no interference will be tolerated from meddlers of any sort. the sum offered by germany in settlement of reparations is no doubt inadequate. it cannot be accepted by any of the allies in discharge of the german obligations under the treaty. the german government must make a very substantial advance on that offer before they can hope to come to terms with the allied governments. i have no doubt the german government fully realise that fact, and i am sure they did not put forward these figures as their final tender. they meant them to be taken as a beginning and a basis for negotiation. in fact they say so. when you enter into negotiations your lawyer, if he knows his business, never starts with the figure he is authorised ultimately to propose. nor does the client always communicate to his advocate the last figure he would be prepared to pay if he had to decide between that and a continuation of the struggle, with its costs and its complications. once pourparlers begin the original figure disappears, and disappears quickly. that is the history of all negotiation, private and public. a refusal to meet in conference until the figure proposed is acceptable rules out discussion between parties as a means of coming to terms on the main question in a dispute. i have taken part in the settlement of probably more industrial differences than most politicians. in every case i have started with an _impasse_. the first meeting of the parties always revealed an apparently unbridgeable chasm between their respective positions; but perseverance and an honest endeavour on both sides to find a solution usually ends in agreement. goodwill can bridge any abyss. unconditional surrender if insisted upon between independent bodies is a sure prelude to fresh disputes. the mere fact, therefore, that germany put forward a proposal which falls short of the needs and equities of the case is not a sufficient reason for declining to meet her representatives at a conference to determine what the right sum should be, and the best method of liquidating it. but there is another and a stronger reason why the german offer should not have been so peremptorily rejected. it did not end with a submission of an inadequate amount in discharge of reparations claims. had it done so the french government might perhaps contend that germany must make up her mind, before she is allowed to confer, to raise that figure to something which at least approximates to the region of acceptability. but even if the french contention in that respect were reasonable, it is ruled out by the circumstance that in this note the german government have proposed an alternative if the figure they offer is considered unacceptable. that alternative changes the whole character of the note, when you come to judge of the question of its _bona fides_. this proposition consists in the complete and categorical acceptance by the german government of mr. secretary hughes's famous new haven suggestions. it will be recollected that, as a way out of the reparations entanglement, he proposed that an international expert commission should be set up to inquire into the question of the amount which germany is capable of paying, and the best method of discharging her obligations once they were fixed. mr. hughes made it clear that the united states of america were prepared to assist in such an inquiry. it is this that lent such significance and importance to his speech. when i first read that speech i thought it of such moment that i cabled from spain to the british and american papers my earnest hope that the allies, about to sit in conference in paris, would immediately consider its terms, and act upon it. it seemed to me the supreme opportunity for placing the vexed question which is fretting europe almost into nervous paralysis on a pathway which must inevitably lead to a real settlement. the more i think of that proposal, the more am i convinced that it was right, and the more am i perplexed by the rude indifference with which it was treated by the allied governments. to this hour i am baffled to explain why those who are anxious for a conclusion never brought this momentous declaration of american readiness to take a hand to the notice of the conference. i can suggest explanations, but none which is not a grave reflection on the way in which the proceedings of that conference were handled. i can understand those who wish to exploit reparations for ulterior purposes being anxious to keep america out of the business. but why did britain, italy and belgium neglect this chance of securing the association of the one power which could be helpful to the allies in reaching a fair and sound decision, and what is equally important, helpful in all subsequent operations for cashing that decision? now germany states categorically that, if her cash tender is unacceptable to the allies, she is willing to leave the question of the amount she is capable of paying to an international tribunal on which america is represented, and to abide by the decision of that tribunal, whatever it may be. that is in substance mr. secretary hughes's suggestion. how can a note containing so reasonable a proposal, and a proposal originally emanating from so powerful and so friendly a quarter, be treated as if it were an insult to the dignity of france--and of belgium! to declare--as the french note does--that the hughes proposition is an abrogation of the treaty of versailles is to ignore the provisions of that treaty. as a matter of fact it would be a restoration of the treaty. as i have repeatedly pointed out, that treaty delegated the question of the amount which germany has to pay in respect of reparations to an allied commission on which the united states of america was to be represented. the function of this commission was to assess the amount of the damages for which germany is responsible under the treaty, and then to adjudicate on the capacity of germany to pay those damages in whole or in part. the commission was authorised to fix the amount of the annual payments to be demanded of germany on the double basis of liability and capacity. the withdrawal of the only country which had no direct interest in reparations from the treaty left the commission a lop-sided and highly prejudiced tribunal. the reparations commission no longer carries out the treaty idea. its character has completely changed. it is essential in order to adhere to the treaty of versailles that america should have a representative on the tribunal that fixes the payments to be exacted from germany. the german government now offer to submit the fate of their country to the unaltered clauses of the treaty which was signed in the galerie des glaces in june, 1919. france and belgium have no right in honour to demand submission to any other. because they insist on enforcing something which is entirely different from the contract entered into by them with germany in 1919, europe is disquieted and international relations are saturated with the inflammable spirit of resentment, hatred, and revenge. no wonder marshal foch is touring central europe to put the allied armies in order! he seems to me to be the one man in france who has an understanding of what all this is leading up to. _london, may 14th, 1923._ xvii the second german note the germans have tried another note. inasmuch as all the allied press without exception are agreed in describing it as a great improvement over the first, it is hardly worth while taking up time and space to demonstrate how the essentials of this more favoured document were contained in its reprobated predecessor. psychologically it is a decided advance on the first note. it is crisp and condensed, and does not indulge in the irritating processes of an argument. you should never attempt to argue with an angry man who is brandishing a bludgeon--unless you are at a safe distance from him. germany is in this case at his feet. the second german note therefore is wise in avoiding the provocation of an appeal to reason. it makes its offer simply and uncontentiously. it also suggests a number of substantial guarantees for the payment of interest on the loans to be raised for reparations purposes. i cannot pretend to assess the value that would be attached to these _gages_ by prospective borrowers. i have no doubt they would add materially to the security of the investment. but this array of securities standing alone will not entice the investor to risk his money on a german reparations loan. he will look at germany as a whole, and not in parts. he will want to know what is likely to happen to that great country during the coming years, and to its industry, its finance, its politics, and its people. a railway which collects its rates and fares in a corrupt currency is of no use as a security for any loan--a customs revenue collected in a fugitive coin is equally worthless. the only reliable basis for a loan is a stable germany. you can have no stable germany until you settle reparations. that is, therefore, the first essential preliminary to all discussions on _gages_ be they _productifs_ or otherwise. hence the propositions that really matter in the german note are not those which give a schedule of guarantees, but those which bear on the fixation of the amount which germany is to be called upon to pay. on this question the note does not increase the sum which the first note estimated as the limit of german capacity. but it reaffirms the readiness of the german government to submit the consideration of the capacity of germany to pay to an impartial tribunal. it offers to place at the disposal of this body all the material which is necessary to enable it to arrive at a just conclusion. it proceeds to suggest that all further discussion on the subjects at issue between the parties should take place at a conference rather than by interchange of notes. how can any unprejudiced person refuse to recognise the essential reasonableness of this part of the offer? it is common ground that the annuities imposed upon germany in may, 1921, demand modification. even m. poincaré proceeds on that assumption. there is, therefore, a most important and highly difficult figure to be ascertained. what annuity can germany pay? and when will she be in a position to pay? is it unreasonable to propose that this question which involves a most searching examination into german assets should be referred to a tribunal which would be capable of giving it calm and judicial consideration? and what objection can there be to discussing the matter at a conference where germany as well as all the allies would be represented? if this were a business or a trade dispute these two proposals would be regarded as eminently sensible and fair, and the party that rejected them would be condemned by public opinion. what are the objections to acceptance formulated by the french press? up to the date of writing this article the french government have not officially expressed their views on the german note. but one may safely assume from past experience that parisian journalists consulted the quai d'orsay before writing their critical articles. the first is that the french government will discuss no proposals emanating from germany until the latter withdraw its passive resistance to french and belgian exploitation of the ruhr. what does this exactly mean? if it imports--as a preliminary condition to conference or consideration of terms--an acquiescence by germany in the occupation and exploitation by france and belgium of the ruhr valley until reparations be fully paid, then the position is hopeless. a german government may submit to such an occupation because it has no force at its command to offer resistance. but no german government can give assent to such an invasion of its territories. a peace signed on such terms would inevitably be repudiated at the first favourable opportunity. meanwhile there would be constant friction and trouble in the ruhr. i can hardly believe that this is what the french government mean to insist upon, in spite of an article in the _temps_ which bears that interpretation. but they may only ask that whilst terms are being discussed an armistice shall be concluded, the first condition of which will be that all obstacles now interposed in the way of supplying france, belgium, and italy with reparation coal and coke shall be withdrawn. an armistice on those terms ought not to be difficult to arrange, especially if the french and belgian authorities withdraw the ban they have placed on the export of ruhr products to the unoccupied parts of germany. unless the terms are mutually accommodating, i surmise that the german government will experience an insurmountable difficulty in persuading the stubborn miners and railway operatives of the ruhr to assist in furnishing to france the products of their labour which are denied to their own fellow-countrymen. it is too readily taken for granted that the ruhr workmen will obey any behest that comes from berlin. governments in germany have ceased to receive that kind of obedience. it is one of the indirect consequences of the great disaster that the decrees of wilhelmstrasse no longer command the respect which attached to them in pre-war days. still, a conference at which all the interests concerned were represented would experience no difficulty in fixing up stipulations which would make it possible for france to enter a conference on reparations without any suspicion being attached to her ministers that they had lowered the national flag on entering the room. i trust that good sense will prevail over temper and exaggerated pride--on both sides. should this preliminary point of honour be disposed of, then what remains? the fixation of the annuities and the guarantees for their payment. what are the objections to accepting the method put forward in the german note for these two points? it is not the german method--it is the american method adopted by the german government. a conference with an impartial tribunal if conference fails. i know of no other way except a resort to blind force. it is objected that the treaty of versailles has already provided such a tribunal in the reparations commission for the specific purpose of adjudicating upon germany's liability and germany's capacity, and that to set up another for exactly the same purpose would be to supersede that treaty. there are two answers to this contention. the first is that the reparations commission as at present constituted is not the body to which germany agreed to refer these questions so vital to her existence. it is not the body which britain and the other allies contemplated. the withdrawal of america from the commission--after germany had already signed the treaty--has completely changed the balance and therefore the character of this tribunal. no man in his senses can pretend that in its mutilated form it is either impartial in its composition or judicial in its methods. m. poincaré does not conceal the fact that the french government issues orders to its representative on that "judicial" body. the chairman is an eminent french deputy who has played and still plays a conspicuous and influential part in french politics, and is looking forward to pursuing his career as a politician whithersoever it may lead. ever since he has been chairman he has delivered speeches in public denouncing the party of whose case he is supposed to be the chief judge. all his colleagues represent powers who have a direct pecuniary interest in the result of their decisions. the only disinterested power has retired from the commission. the american proposal is very moderate. it implies the restoration of the treaty by reintroducing america to the body that settles reparations. if france objects to the appointment of a separate commission why should it not be agreed between the allies that their representatives on the body of experts to be set up shall be the men who now constitute the reparations commission? to these the american government could add their nominee. germany has a right under the treaty to present her case. the whole question of capacity could then be gone into in the light of the experience acquired during the last four years, and a settlement could thus be effected on a sound basis. such settlement would have a much better chance of being workable, and therefore more durable than terms imposed by force on a people who only accept under duress. but whatever the french view may be of the suggested annuities or guarantees, or of the impartial commission, it is inconceivable that they should reject the conference. it is the surest road to reparations. at spa the method of pelting the bewildered reich with demand notes was for a time abandoned, and that of conference at the same table was substituted. the results were admirable. the process of disarmament made immediate strides towards satisfactory completion, and the coal deliveries became fuller and steadier. at cannes last year the allies once more started to confer with german ministers. all those who were present at those discussions--without exception--admit that satisfactory progress was being made towards a comprehensive settlement when the conferees were scattered by a bomb. it is too early yet to estimate the loss which inured to europe through that explosion. but all idea of discussion between the parties has since been loftily and petulantly dismissed as an exhibition of pernicious weakness. what has been substituted for it? for twelve months we had rather a ridiculous display of feather-rustling about the farmyard to inspire terror. threatening speeches full of ominous hints of impending action were delivered at intervals in different parts of france. these produced nothing but increased confusion and incapacity to pay. every speech cost france milliards in postponed reparations. french opinion not unnaturally insisted on some action being taken. hence this rash invasion. at cannes a two-year moratorium would have been accepted as a settlement. already a year and a half of that period would by now have elapsed. german finances would, under the strict allied supervision which was conceded, by now have been restored to soundness--the mark would have been stabilised, and a loan could have been negotiated which would have provided the allies with substantial sums towards lightening the burdens they are all bearing. confidence would have been restored in europe, and for the first time there would have been real peace. one can see what the alternative has produced. whatever the final terms may be, germany is not in a financial position to pay what she was able to offer then. these eighteen months have been devoted to reducing assiduously german capacity to pay allied debts, and the value of the german security for such payment. at cannes the mark stood at 770 to the pound sterling. it now stands at 500,000. germany will need an extended moratorium to recover from the clumsy mishandling of the past year and a half. the mark has to be picked up out of the abyss into which it has been thrown by those whose interest it was to lift it out of the depression wherein it lay. a debtor on whose restored health and nerve payment entirely depends has been violently pushed down several flights of stairs. it will take him a long time to recover from the bruises, the shake, and the loss of blood. what an achievement in scientific debt collecting! if reparations are ever to be paid the allies must retrace their steps and get back to conference. once the parties--all the parties--sit round the table i feel assured that the common sense of most will in the end prevail. we shall never get back what has been lost during 1922-23, but we shall get something that will help. it will take some time to set up the tackle for hoisting the mark out of the crevass and some to do the winding. but the sooner a start is made the less winding there will be to do. so for everybody's sake it is high time to stop the strutting and get back to business. xviii the napoleonic dream what a muddle it all is! france and germany are both anxious to settle in the ruhr, but are too proud to admit it. the struggle, therefore, goes on, and will continue to the detriment of both. belgium is sorry she ever entered the ruhr, but cannot get out of it. every time she tries to get away france pulls her back roughly by the tail of her coat, so she has to do sentry-go at essen whilst her franc is leading a wild life at home. italy has forgotten that she ever sanctioned the occupation, and her moral indignation is mounting rapidly, although it has not yet risen to a height which is visible across the alps. great britain is growling futile notes of dissatisfaction with everybody--france and germany alike. the confusion of tongues is deafening and paralysing, and no one is quite happy except the spirit of mischief who is holding his sides with ghoulish laughter. he never had such a time--not since the tower of babel. and this time it may end in a second deluge. the horror of the great war seems to have unhinged the european mind. nations do not think normally. the blood pressure is still very high. the excitement over the ruhr does not tend to improve it. when some of the articles written and speeches delivered to-day come to be read by the diligent historian a generation hence, he will recognise there the ravings of a continent whose mental equilibrium has been upset by a great shock. the real issue involved in all this struggle is a comparatively simple one. how much can germany pay and in what way can she pay? america, britain, italy and germany are all agreed that the only way to settle that question is to appoint competent experts to investigate and report upon it. the pope also has blessed this reasonable suggestion. france, on the contrary, says it is a question to be determined by guns and generals--both equally well fitted for that task. germany must present her accounts to the mitrailleuse and argue her case before the soixante-quinze. it is a mad world. every one is interested in one question--or perhaps two. how will it all end and how soon is that end coming? although i have nothing to fear from recalling the predictions of my early articles on this subject, i hesitate to hazard a fresh forecast. but one may review the possibilities and note the drift of the whirling currents. in assessing the chances, you must begin with some knowledge of the man who will decide the event. m. poincaré is possessed of undoubted ability and patriotism, but he is also a man who lives in a world of prejudices so dense that they obscure facts. you have but to turn to one statement in his last note where he says the conferences and ultimatums of the past four years secured nothing from germany. what are the facts? during the three and a half years that preceded the ruhr invasion, germany paid to the allies in cash and in kind over ten milliards of gold marks,--£500,000,000 in sterling, 2,000,000,000 in dollars--a considerable effort for a country which had but lately emerged out of the most exhausting of wars and whose foreign trade was down sixty to seventy per cent. you might imagine that a man who had taken the grave step of ordering armies to invade a neighbour's territories would also have taken the trouble to ascertain the elementary facts of his case. part of this gigantic sum went to pay for armies of occupation; part for reparations, but it all came out of german assets. will the next three and a half years bring anything approximating that figure to the allied coffers? it is a safe statement to make that no one in charge of the french movements anticipated a resistance approaching in its stubbornness to that which they have encountered. the friendly press, both in france and in england, foretold a speedy collapse of the german opposition, and on this assumption all the french plans were based. during the first days of the occupation an englishman asked a french officer how long he thought it would take. the answer is indicative of the spirit in which the venture started: "optimists think it will take a fortnight," he said; "pessimists think it may take three weeks." a reference to the january telegrams from paris and düsseldorf will show that this officer accurately expressed the general sentiment of those who were responsible for the ruhr invasion. soldiers estimate the chances of resistance in terms of material and trained men, and statesmen too often build their hopes on the same shallow foundation. they never allow for the indomitable reserves of the human heart, which do not figure in army lists or statesmen's annuals. the resistance of paris in 1870 was as confounding to bismarck as the stubbornness of the ruhr miners is to poincaré to-day. the last regular army had been destroyed, all docketed food stores exhausted, and still the struggle of the devoted citizens went on for months. there were few men in england who thought the boer peasants could continue their resistance for more than three months after our armies reached south africa. the three months ran into three years and only then capitulated on honourable terms. the northern states of america never contemplated the possibility of a five years' struggle with a blockaded, starved and overwhelmed confederacy. the war of 1914-18 is littered with miscalculations attributable to the blind refusal of rulers and their advisers to recognise the moral element as a factor in the reckoning. the ruhr tragedy is not the first, nor indeed may it be the last, to be initiated by facile memoranda framed by general staffs and civilian functionaries, drawing their inspiration from pigeonholes. whatever may transpire in the ruhr it is already clear that the estimates of military men, of transport officials, of intelligence departments, and of presiding ministers, have been hopelessly falsified. many more soldiers have been sent into the ruhr than had been thought necessary: a great deal less coal has come out of the ruhr than had been confidently expected. there are already as many frenchmen in the ruhr as napoleon commanded at waterloo; and they have succeeded in sending across the frontier in six months only as much coal as the germans delivered in one month during the period of "default" which provoked the invasion. desperate efforts have been made at great cost to increase the yield with a view to satisfying french and foreign opinion that resistance is gradually breaking down. rubbish is shovelled into wagons in order anyhow to swell the quota. coal is seized anywhere, even in the streets. and monsieur trocquer, the bluff and genial breton in charge of the transport arrangements, breezily challenges all the critics to look at the mounting pyramids of his dustcart collection and rejoice with him in the triumph of french organisation under his control. alas, the celtic fire of monsieur trocquer, even when fed by the sweepings of the ruhr, cannot keep going the blast furnaces of lorraine! so we find disappointment and discontent amongst the forge-masters of france. but there is a limit to human endurance. either france or germany must give way in the end. which will it be, and when will it come--and how? in answering these questions one must remember that for france the honour of her flag is involved in success. failure would irretrievably damage her prestige. every frenchman knows that. that is why french statesmen who disapprove of the invasion support the government in all their proposals for bringing it to a successful end. and here france has a legitimate complaint against her allies. it is useless for italy now to counsel wisdom. signor mussolini was present at the "hush conference" which sanctioned the invasion. he fixed the price of assent in coal tonnage. that price has been regularly paid. belgium is now becoming scared at the swelling magnitude of the venture. but she committed her own honour as well as that of france to carrying it through. i regret to think that britain is not free from responsibility in the matter. it is true that her representatives disapproved of the enterprise, but not on grounds of right or justice. on the contrary, whilst expressing grave doubt as to the ultimate success of the invasion they wished the french government well in the undertaking on which they were about to embark. not one of the allies is in a position with a clean conscience to urge france to haul down her flag. there is only one course which could be urged on the french government as being consistent with french honour, and that is the reference of the dispute to the league of nations. such a reference would be an enforcement of the treaty of versailles. that suggestion the british government have refused to press on france. the struggle must, therefore, proceed to its destined end. it may be assumed that the british government will not intervene effectively. how about the ministerial declarations? surely these strong words must be followed by strong action! those who rely on that inference know nothing of the men who use the words or of the forces upon which they depend for their ministerial existence. it is true that some weeks ago mr. snodgrass took off his coat and proclaimed cryptically, but fearlessly, that unless peace was restored on his terms something would happen. the french government, unperturbed, replied that they meant to persist in their course. so last week mr. snodgrass takes off his waistcoat. but do not be alarmed: there will be no blows: his friends will hold him back. meanwhile, mr. winkle has left for paris in order to lunch with one of the combatants. next week he will be followed by mr. pickwick, who will call on another, and the week after mr. tupman proposes to pay another propitiatory visit. it will be an incalculable advantage to m. poincaré that they each represent a different and conflicting point of view. the french have accurately taken the measure of the mind and muscle of those who indulge in these spectacular exhibitions of ball punching in westminster with cakes and ale at rambouillet. we may therefore assume that whatever conversations take place at these general gatherings or ensue from them, the french will not be talked out of the ruhr. from the emphatic declarations made by the head of the french government it is gathered that france will insist at all costs on enforcing her will. she has put forward two demands. the first is that germany shall abandon passive resistance as an essential preliminary to negotiation. the second is that her forces should remain in the ruhr until the last payment is made. will the german government accept these conditions? a settlement on these terms is only possible on two assumptions. the first is that a german government can be found strong enough to accept them and to survive their acceptance. the second is that there is a french government wise enough to give a liberal interpretation to these demands. the first depends to a large extent on the second. the events of the past few months have added immeasurably to the difficulties of negotiation. incidents inseparable from a foreign occupation in any land have exasperated german opinion and reached depths of hatred which had never been stirred even by the great war--the deportation of 75,000 germans from their homes in the ruhr area, the repression, the shooting, the starving, the holding up of food trains until essential supplies rot. the myriad insolences of unchallengeable force, the passions which make french policy so intractable are entirely attributable to the german occupation of france. frenchmen are now sowing the same seeds of anger in the german breast. hatreds are bad negotiators. that is why i despair of a real settlement. but germany may collapse. she might even break up, temporarily. the authority of the central government has already largely disappeared. there is practically no collection of taxes. the mark has gone down in a little over a week from 1,000,000 to the £ to 27,000,000.[3] how can any government collect taxes in such a fugitive and attenuated currency? you might as well try to collect land taxes on the tail of a comet. the state of the currency is but a symptom of the general disintegration. berlin has ceased to wield any influence in bavaria, and the monarchy might be restored in that province at no distant date. there is a movement in the rhineland to set up a republic freed from the dominion of prussia. this movement is fostered by french agencies and financed by french subventions. if it is declared prussia will not be allowed to suppress it. we may, therefore, soon witness a rhineland republic whose glorious freedom and independence will be jealously guarded against internal as well as external foes by the coloured warriors of senegal and cochin-china. saxony might be captured by communists and prussia be torn between monarchist and communist. these are not unlikely happenings. is it too much to say they are not altogether out of the computation of french statesmanship? if germany dissolves, then the rhineland and the ruhr would remain under the dominion of france. france would not secure reparations, but she would enjoy security, and she would, so it is conjectured, enormously enhance her power in the world. an old french dream would be realised. the work of bismarck would be undone and the achievement of napoleon would be restored and perpetuated. there is an old welsh adage which says that it is easy to kindle a fire on an old hearthstone. this idea of a rhineland under french domination is the old hearthstone of charlemagne. mazarin sought to relight its flames. napoleon the first kindled on it a blaze that scorched europe. napoleon the third had hopes of warming his chilling fortunes at the glow of its embers, and now the great victory of 1918 has set french ambitions once more reviving the fires on the old hearthstone of a rhineland ruled by the frank. altogether it is a bad look-out for europe. _london, august 6th, 1923._ footnote: [3] since this was written the mark has fallen far beyond. xix is it peace? the charleville speech[4] and m. poincaré's reply to lord curzon's despatch[5] leave things exactly where they were. rumour said the reply would be long and logical. for once rumour hath not lied. m. poincaré regards this exchange of bolstered notes as a pillow fight which he is quite prepared to prolong in order to gain time whilst the real struggle is developing to its destined end. the prominence given in the press to the fact that this rigid reply is "courteous" is significant of the pitiable condition to which the entente has been brought by these maladroit negotiations. what will mr. stanley baldwin and lord curzon do next? much depends for europe on that next step, and something for them also hangs upon their action or inaction. one is reminded of the answer given by émile ollivier to the question addressed to him as to his opinion of one of napoleon the third's experiments in constitutional government: "si c'est une fin, vous êtes perdu; si c'est un commencement, vous êtes fondé." that sage comment is equally applicable to the curzon note. we can only "wait and see," first for the french official reply, and second for the decision of the british government upon that note. the only new factor in the situation that may have a determining influence on events is the accession of herr stresemann to the german chancellorship.[6] i know nothing of him beyond newspaper report, but he is generally supposed to be a man of energy, courage and resource. if that be true, his appointment to the official leadership of the german people may be an event of the first magnitude. we shall soon know what he is made of. germany has suffered more from weak or misguided leadership in recent years than any great country in the world. it blundered her into the war, it blundered through the war, it blundered into the armistice, it blundered during the peace negotiations, and it has blundered her affairs badly after the peace. but no one can predict what germany is capable of with a wise and strong leadership. herr stresemann has a responsibility cast upon him and an opportunity afforded him such as have not been given to any statesman since the days of stein and his coadjutors for regenerating his country and lifting her out of the slough of despond in which she has been sinking deeper and deeper. those who ignore the effect which powerful and magnetic personalities may have upon the fortunes of nations in despair must have forgotten their history books. the fall of dr. cuno and the rise of herr stresemann may well turn out to be a more decisive event than the despatch or the publication of the curzon note. but if he lacks those rare qualities which alone can inspire a people in an emergency to heroic action and endurance, then there is nothing but chaos ahead of germany. for the moment it is more important to keep a discerning eye on herr stresemann than to watch this endless fencing between downing street and the quai d'orsay. it is not often i find myself in agreement with m. poincaré, but when he states that british unemployment is not attributable to the occupation of the ruhr i am substantially in accord with him. in july last[7] i called the attention of the house of commons to world conditions which injuriously affected our export trade and made unemployment on a large scale inevitable in the british labour market for some time to come. we are more dependent on our overseas trade, export, entrepôt, shipping and incidental business than any country in the world. almost half our industrial and commercial activities are associated with outside trade in all its forms. that is not a full statement of the case, for if this important section of our business were to languish, the home trade would also necessarily suffer by the consequential diminution in the purchasing capacity of our people. before the french ever entered the ruhr our overseas trade was down to 75 per cent. of its pre-war level. our population has increased by two millions since 1913; our taxation has increased fourfold; our national debt tenfold; but our business is down 25 per cent. to what is this fall in our outside sales and services attributable? it is the direct consequence of the war. our customers throughout europe are impoverished. what is just as bad, our customers' customers are impoverished. so that neither can buy at our stalls the quantities or the qualities which they could be relied upon to purchase before the war. until europe can buy, australia, canada, india and china cannot pay, as the prime minister pointed out in his last speech in the house of commons. germany, before the war, bought australian wool, canadian grain, indian jute and tea, and the proceeds as often as not went to pay for goods bought by those countries in british markets. the same observation applies to russia, austria, and the levantine countries. the purchasing capacity of europe must, therefore, be replenished, a process which will, at best, take years of patient industry. the mischief of the ruhr lies not in the creation of bad trade, but in retarding the process of recovery. it has undoubtedly had that effect. before the french entered the ruhr trade was gradually if slowly improving all round. the prices of 1922 were lower than those of 1921; therefore, the contrast in sterling was not as apparent as it became on the examination of weights and measures. the export figures, notably in manufactured goods, show a decided increase on those of the preceding year. this advance is reflected in the statistics of unemployment. during the first ten months of 1922 there was a reduction of over 500,000 in the numbers of the registered unemployed. the succeeding ten months give only a slight improvement. something has happened to arrest the rate of progress towards better times. this is where the ruhr comes in. even if it is not, to quote the prime minister, a penknife stuck in the watch and stopping the works, it is certainly more than a grain of dust which has perceptibly slowed the action of the sensitive machinery of trade. the effect of the ruhr disturbance would continue for some time if the penknife were removed now. for the moment m. poincaré is wedging it in more deeply and firmly. even if he withdrew it now, the works would not recover their normal steadiness for a long while. during these last disturbing months germany has become appreciably poorer. her wealth production has been depressed throughout most of her industrial areas. to a certain extent lorraine and belgium have also been affected adversely. the reservoir of wealth upon which industry draws has not been filling up as it ought if the world is ever to recover. these things are hidden from france. she is a more self-contained country than britain--perhaps also a more self-centred country. even after the napoleonic wars, which drained her best manhood and exhausted her fine nervous virility, she suffered from no interval of economic depression. her great and victorious rival across the channel lumbered painfully through fifteen years of misery, poverty and distress. her own population, basking in the sunshine of prosperity, regarded across the narrow waters, with a natural contentment, the dark fogs that enveloped and drenched their old enemies. commiseration or sympathy from them at that time was not to be expected. we had fought them for twenty years with an inveterate pertinacity and at last beaten them to the ground and occupied their capital. to-day we suffer because we helped to save their capital from foreign occupation and their country from being humbled to the dust by a foreign foe. neither in french speeches, notes, nor articles is there any appreciation shown of that cardinal fact in the situation. all that is clear at the moment is the stubbornness of the french attitude. m. poincaré has not so far receded one millimetre from his original position. threats and cajoleries alike are answered by a repetition of the same formulæ, with the slight variations in word or phrase which one would expect from a practised writer. but the theme is always the same and the application is identical to the point of monotony. he is not winning much coal out of his discourses and literary exercises, but to do him justice he is getting something for his country. last year lord balfour, in the note he sent to the allies on behalf of the british government, offered to forego all claims for debts and reparations if britain were secured against payment of the american debt. that meant a surrender of claims aggregating over £3,000,000,000 in return for an assured £1,000,000,000. a very handsome and generous offer. the curzon note proposes to surrender all our claims for a precarious return of £710,000,000. the ruhr occupation has already brought down the british claim against the allies by £290,000,000. m. poincaré may not be able to extract reparations out of germany, but in seven months he has succeeded in forcing £290,000,000 out of great britain. he will certainly ask for more--and probably receive it. mr. bonar law was right when he said that under certain conditions great britain would be the only country to pay a war indemnity. those conditions have arisen under his successors. _criccieth, august 20th, 1923._ footnotes: [4] m. poincaré's speech at charleville on august 19th, on the subject of french policy in the ruhr. [5] the british note was sent to france, august 13th, 1923, and m. poincaré's reply was received on august 23rd. [6] the german government fell on august 13th, 1923, and herr stresemann succeeded dr. cuno as chancellor. [7] house of commons, july 16th, 1923. xx what next?[8] the pen-and-ink joust is suspended for a fortnight, whilst the figures of british unemployment are leaping upwards. when the exhausted british knights have been reinvigorated by french waters they will once more charge full tilt at the french champion--at least, they will have made up their minds by then whether they will shiver another fountain-pen against his blotting-pad. this is the advice ponderously and pompously tendered them in inspired articles. so far, the french nation is jubilant that m. poincaré has scored heavily on points. he is a defter penman, and, moreover, he does not delegate his draughtsmanship to a committee of ministers, all holding irreconcilable views as to how to proceed, when to proceed, and whither to proceed, and amongst whom there is no agreement except on one point--that no one quite knows what action to propose. up to this last reply they cherished the vain delusion that the french could be shelled out of the ruhr by reproaches which were both querulous and apologetic. that is not the way to shift continental statesmanship from its purpose. the french foreign office is better informed as to cabinet divisions in this country than are the british public. it knows that the prime minister and foreign secretary dare not take measures which will hamper french action in the ruhr. when the tory diehards placed co-operation with france in the forefront of their programme they honestly meant it. for them it was not a mere manoeuvre to unhorse the coalition. they cannot, therefore, support an attitude of resistance to french pressure on germany. a refusal to join france in squeezing germany is to them a continuation of the evil of the coalition they overthrew with the help of mr. stanley baldwin and lord curzon. they will not tolerate it. that explains the impotence of british diplomacy in a situation which is so critical to our existence as a great commercial people. the cabinet can agree on wordy notes; they are hopelessly divided as to action. they have, therefore, dispersed far and wide to search for fortuitous guidance hither and thither--some in the tranquillity of their english country houses; some in the healing springs of france; some in the mists of scottish moorlands. mayhap one of them will bring home a policy acceptable to his colleagues. it is all very humiliating to the empire that raised ten millions of men and spent £10,000,000,000 of its treasure to win the war. the net result of the voluminous correspondence on which our rulers have concentrated months of anxious wisdom and unwearying hesitancy is that the allies whom we saved from destruction refuse to move one inch out of their road to secure our friendly companionship. they are marching resolutely in one direction, whilst we are shambling along in another. we have travelled long distances from each other since january last, and we are now altogether out of sight of the position we held in common when we met the germans at cannes early last year.[9] the entente has never been more cordial than it was then--it has never shown more promise of hopeful partnership for the peace of the world. we were on the point of securing an amicable and businesslike arrangement with germany for the payment of reparations and of concluding an agreement for protecting the frontiers of france and belgium against the possibility of future invasion. from these starting-points it was proposed that britain, france, italy, and belgium should advance together to a general settlement of european problems in east and west--political, financial, economic and transport. this we had agreed to do and, with the unity and goodwill which then prevailed, could have accomplished. but m. poincaré had no use for the dove of peace. he wanted to fly his falcon. he had trained and bred it in the french farmyard, and there it had brought down many a domestic bird successfully. when his chance came he flew it at the wounded german eagle. it is poor sport, and somewhat cruel, but it evidently gives great joy to frenchmen of a sort. the best are ashamed of it, but their voices are drowned in the clamour of the unthinking. if the helpless bird is torn to pieces, there is nothing in that for french or belgian larders. quite unintentionally the hawk has brought down the entente also. it may not be dead, but it has made its last flight. henceforth international arrangements will be on a less exclusive basis. france is irrevocably committed to the exploitation of the ruhr by force. that is what "pay or stay" means. to that policy the majority in this country are definitely opposed. if the diehards in the cabinet were by any chance to win, and either mr. baldwin surrendered or resigned in favour of a poincarist administration in this country, neither he nor any possible successors could carry the country along into the ruhr venture. some of them around the prime minister who have so suddenly assumed pro-french sentiments as the shortest cut to higher altitudes than those to which they have yet succeeded in climbing, know full well that, although they may use the diehards for their own ends, if they succeeded in their somewhat sinister purpose they could not carry out the diehard policy. they are, therefore, endeavouring to provide for contingencies by negotiating on their own a fresh understanding with france. but british premiers are not appointed at rambouillet nor do they draw their authority from the quai d'orsay. whatever may be thought of mr. bonar law or of mr. stanley baldwin by political partisans, no one suggests that they derived their promotion from other than purely british sources. but for a fortnight nothing is to happen--except the spread of unemployment in britain and of despair in germany. at the end of the fortnight will there be a surrejoinder to m. poincaré's rejoinder? or will there be another conference? both m. poincaré and the present parliamentary régime in britain came into power on the cry of "enough of these eternal conferences; let us return to the good old diplomatic methods that prevailed before the war"--and, they might add, "which helped to make it possible." nevertheless, mr. bonar law's administration during its short tenure of six months participated in four european conferences, and m. poincaré, during his eighteen months' official career, has found it necessary to take part, directly, in five conferences, and directly and indirectly in eight. the french press are urging him on to add another to a record which already beats that of m. briand in the matter of "joy-riding"--to quote the contemptuous diehard name for international conferences during coalition days. it is a suspicious circumstance that those who were once resentful and scornful of conferences should now be clamouring for one both here and in france. the reason is scarcely concealed by ardent advocates of the resumption of "picnic diplomacy." at the old conferences, so it is contended, france was invariably forced to give way. now she can and will command the situation. there is a new note of confidence ringing through french despatches and echoed in the french press. france must get what she wants; britain must take what she is given. the french share of reparations must first be assured--debts due to britain can come out of what is left. it is rather greedy, but characteristic, of the british that they should expect to be paid what is owing to them! with their smug and hypocritical puritan temperament and outlook they insist that contracts should be respected! france, for the sake of the entente, will make a concession even to british cupidity and pharisaism. it will permit the british empire to collect--not the whole of what is due to her, but a much-reduced claim out of germany once the french demand for reparations is cashed or as good as cashed! to me this is a new france. during my years of discussion with french statesmen i never heard this voice. i had three or four talks with m. poincaré, and i never heard him speak in these supercilious tones. impunity has developed them since to their present pitch of stridency. belgium is to suggest a meeting of the premiers. when it comes the french minimum terms are to be rigid and unequivocal. here they are:- 1. france must be paid her irreducible minimum of £1,300,000,000 in respect of reparations, whatever happens to any one else. 2. belgium is also to have her priority of £100,000,000. 3. as germany cannot raise these huge sums immediately, france and belgium are to hold the ruhr until they are paid. hints have been thrown out by the more conciliatory french journals that the french government might consider an early retirement from the ruhr if the payment of reparations were made the subject of an international guarantee. that implies britain and america becoming sureties for payment of the german indemnity! 4. as to the rest, france and belgium have no objection, subject to the above conditions, to great britain collecting £700,000,000, _i.e._, about 23 per cent., of her international claims (debts and reparations) from germany. but this munificent concession is to be made on the distinct understanding that she forgoes entirely the remaining 77 per cent. of her bonds. the allies and germany between them owe great britain £3,000,000,000. the french and belgian governments are willing that great britain should collect £700,000,000 of that amount from germany, provided the remaining £2,300,000,000 is for ever cancelled--and always provided that the £1,400,000,000 due to france and belgium has been satisfactorily guaranteed. 5. these handsome terms can only be propounded if germany first of all withdraws all passive resistance in the ruhr. that is an essential preliminary. the french government have stated these terms with such precision and such emphasis, and repeated them with such undeviating insistence, that any departure from them on the french side seems impossible. the hope of a conference rests entirely on the confidence in a british surrender. there is a dismal "joy-ride" in prospect for the british prime minister and his foreign secretary. is it conceivable they can contemplate such a capitulation? i do not see how the present government, after all it has said and written, can so far submit to french dictation as to make it likely that further discussions would lead to agreement. what is the alternative? herr stresemann can alone answer that question. it is not yet clear what he means to do. perhaps he is feeling his way to a decision. _london, august 27th, 1923._ footnotes: [8] london, august 27th, 1923. [9] the cannes conference, january, 1922. xxi the british debt to america as i roll homeward along the coast of spain a wireless message announces that the british government have accepted the american debt terms. the details which i have received are not sufficient to enable me to form an opinion regarding the character of those terms, or their bearing on allied indebtedness to britain as to the terms of payment. i know nothing of the steps taken by mr. baldwin and the government of which he is a member to make this the first step in an all-round settlement of inter-allied debts. that is a matter of infinite moment to us, and i assume that this is somewhere--and effectively--in the arrangement. as to the payment of our own debt, the government represent the real sentiment of the nation as a whole. the british taxpayer is no doubt fully alive to the fact that this heavy debt was incurred by him during the war in the main in order to finance american supplies to our allies. we could have paid for all the supplies we required for our own use without resort to any loan from the american government. nevertheless, the money was advanced by the lender on our credit and our signature. our credit as a nation, therefore, demands that we should pay. whether we can collect enough money from our own debtors to meet this charge becomes increasingly doubtful, as it is becoming increasingly needful. britain is alone in thinking she is under any moral obligation to pay the external liabilities incurred for the effective prosecution of the war. the attitude of the late and of the present government is identical in this respect. why have the british public taken a different view of their national obligations towards external war debts from that adopted by other allies? in giving the answer i do not wish to dwell on obvious ethical considerations which must weigh whenever you consider whether you will carry out an engagement which you have entered into with another who has already performed his part of the engagement on the strength of your promise. these ought to be conclusive; but to urge them might be deemed to be an unworthy reflection on the honour of those who take a different view of their national duty. i have no desire to offer censure or criticism upon their decision. they, no doubt, have their reasons for the course they are adopting. we have certainly overwhelming reasons for showing an honest readiness to pay our debts. the settling up of accounts is always an unpleasant business, especially amongst friends. strangers expect it and prepare for it--and there is no resentment when the bill arrives. but a man hates reminding his friend at the end of a business in which both have been engaged in warm amity that there is "a little balance" to be paid up. he has been expecting the friend to mention the matter to him. so he puts off introducing the unpleasant topic from year to year. but the friend disappoints his expectations. not a hint comes from that quarter of any realisation that there is anything due. it soon looks as if it had been forgotten altogether. the friend is most insistent on collecting the business accounts due to himself. he is angry at all delays in payment of his own bills. but his conscience is blind on the side of the debts he himself owes. it is not an uncommon experience, and we are suffering from it to-day. the war left us a creditor nation to the extent of over 2,000 million pounds, and a debtor nation to the extent of about half that amount. we readily accepted an invitation from our creditor to discuss the repayment of the debt we owe. our debtors have displayed an invincible reluctance to enter into a similar discussion with us. that ought not to influence our final decision. britain is the greatest of all international traders, and her credit rests on the reputation she has well earned--that her bond is a sacred trust which her people always honour and redeem without counting the cost in toil and treasure. i remember when war broke out the panic which seized bankers and brokers as they contemplated the obligations incurred by british firms with their support to finance world trade. these liabilities ran into hundreds of millions sterling, and the only security for repayment was represented by a bundle of flimsy paper, criss-crossed with the signatures of men most of whom no british banker had ever seen, many of them dwelling in countries with whom we were actually at war. there was one signature, however, on each paper which was known to bankers and carried with it the good name of britain throughout the world; and it was that of some well-known british firm. traders in far-distant lands parted with their produce on the credit of that signature and of the country with which it was associated. it is true that the government had no responsibility for any of these transactions; but the honour of britain was involved in seeing that the foreign merchants should not suffer ruin because they put their trust in british commercial integrity. for that reason the british government of the day shouldered the burden, took all the risk, and although it meant a liability of between four hundred and five hundred millions sterling, not a voice was raised in protest. the action then taken, though quite unprecedented, was not only honourable; it was wise. it saved british pride from a reproach; it also saved british credit from a blow from which it would not have recovered for a generation. during that generation this lucrative business would have passed into other hands. as soon as the war was over the people of britain, with an instinctive impulse that required no persuasion to stimulate its activity, set about the task of restoring their war-battered credit. government, bankers, merchants, brokers, manufacturers, and workers of all kinds were of one mind; borrowing must come to an end; britain must pay her way--whatever the sacrifice. expenditure was ruthlessly cut down. the army and navy were reduced below pre-war dimensions. other services were curtailed. heavy taxation was imposed--taxation such as no other country bears. the budget at home must balance. debts to other countries must be paid off. already large sums have been paid abroad. it required courage and constancy to pursue such a policy; but the endurance of the nation was beyond praise. it is now calmly facing the liquidation of this heavy debt to the united states of america; but no party has yet arisen, or is likely to arise, to demand that the hand of the negotiators should be arrested. britain means to pay the last of her debts without a murmur. we are already reaping some of the reward. the purchasing value of our currency has already risen under its burdens, and, as a consequence, the cost of living has fallen steadily, while other countries who have pursued a different policy find the cost of living for their people ascending month by month. a short time ago we were taunted in the french chamber of deputies by the president of the council that our unsound financial policy had been responsible for our unemployment. it is true that if we had gone on borrowing instead of paying our way--if we had defied our foreign creditors instead of paying them--we also, like many other european countries, might have fostered an artificial prosperity by means of a discredited currency. but british credit would have rapidly disappeared beyond recovery and british trade would soon have followed. meanwhile, the cost of living in great britain would have been double what it is to-day. we all therefore dismissed that policy from our minds without paying it the tribute of a discussion. trust is the only soil in which credit flourishes. had that trust been forfeited british buyers and consequently british consumers would to-day have been paying more for their wheat, their meat, their cotton, and their wool. the burden of repayment to the united states will be infinitely less than that of the indirect burden involved in large purchases with a discredited currency. the government are therefore right in arranging with the american treasury without loss of time for the liquidation of a debt incurred by this country. i am taking for granted that they have made every effort to see that the agreement shall form a part of an all-round settlement of inter-allied debts. but as to our own debt the moral obligation must remain whatever our allies do or fail to do. why it was incurred, the circumstances in which it was entered into, the purposes for which the money was advanced, were open to the consideration of the american government in arranging terms. that, however, was their privilege; ours is to honour our signature. xxii inter-allied debts a cold shiver ran down the back of england when it was announced officially that the british government had definitely agreed to pay over £30,000,000 a year for sixty years to the united states in respect of debts incurred by us on behalf of our allies without seeking a contribution from our debtors to protect the taxpayers of this country. it is not that anyone dreamt the evil dream of repudiation. that was never woven into the texture even of the worst nightmare out of the many that have disturbed our repose since the greatest nightmare of all left the world a quivering nervous wreck. nor did we expect remission of our debts. whenever we were tempted to exaggerate the bounds of human charity paragraphs appeared that reminded us of the attitude of the "middle west." america was discovered by europe centuries ago, but the "middle west," as a political entity, is to untutored europeans a discovery of the war. we were then told by returning explorers that it was the seat of the american conscience--inexorable, intractable, but irresistible when engaged in any enterprise. how potent this conscience was, as a world force, the war demonstrated. from the heights it hurled an avalanche of force against germany that overwhelmed the last hope of resistance. unfortunately for us when it came to debts we struck against the hard side of the middle west conscience. our hope was therefore not in remission. there were, however, many other possibilities. we were not the only debtors of the american government. other allies had borrowed not merely indirectly through us, but directly from america. we had every confidence that the united states government would not mete out to britain severer treatment than it was prepared to accord to our allies. we had to contend, it is true, with legends of our inexhaustible wealth. apart from our great coal deposits, and a climate which leaves those who endure it no alternative but activity, we have no treasure except the industry, the resources and the inherited skill of our people. we have nothing like the rich plains and the fertilising and ripening sunshine of france, which maintain sixty per cent. of its population. our sources of wealth--apart from coal--are precarious, for they depend more largely than any other country on conditions outside our own. we are international providers, merchants and carriers. a sixty-year contract to pay large sums across the seas is in many respects a more serious consideration for us than for countries whose riches are inherent in their soil and are, therefore, more self-contained. the demoralised condition of the world markets has left us with a larger proportion of our industrial population unemployed than any other european country. i hear tales of unemployment in the united states of america, but the reports that reach us here on american unemployment are so contradictory that i can build no argument upon them. but, as to the gigantic dimensions of our unemployed problem there can be no doubt. we have 1,400,000 workmen on the unemployed register drawing unemployment pay in one form or another. the annual cost to the nation of feeding its workless population runs to over £100,000,000--almost the figure of the annuity demanded from germany as a war indemnity. although there are signs of improvement the omens point to a prolonged period of subnormal trade. continuous depression for years will mean that britain will suffer more from the devastation to her trade caused by the war than france from the devastation of her provinces. our country, anxious about its means of livelihood, with a million and a half of its workmen walking the streets in a vain search for work, has to bear the heaviest burden of taxation in the world. why? because it has not only to pay interest on its own heavy war debts, but also on £3,000,000,000 which it either advanced to the allies or incurred on their behalf. that is why we felt hopeful that the united states would not discriminate against a nation so situated. when i talk of debts the allies owe to us, i want to emphasise the fact that these debts are not paper myths nor tricks of accountancy. they are onerous facts representing a real burden borne at this hour by the bent and panting taxpayer of britain. if these loans had never been made the weight on his shoulders to-day would have been lighter by over two shillings in the pound. he is every year paying to the actual lenders--some british, some american--that proportion of his income. it is a weight he undertook to carry for his allies during the war on the sacred pledge of those allies that they would take it over after the war. the american government borrowed from their public to make advances to great britain, and have called upon the british taxpayer to redeem his pledge. we make no complaint, for the demand is a mitigation of the strict letter of the bond. but that amount is in substance part of the debt owing by the allies to britain. and the british taxpayer naturally feels it is hard on him to have to bear not only his own legitimate burdens but that he should in addition have to carry the debts of his less heavily taxed brethren in continental countries. he naturally inferred that if equal pressure had been administered on all debtors alike it would have forced an all-around consultation which would have terminated in an all-round settlement. that was the real purport of the balfour note. the true significance of that great document has been entirely misunderstood--sometimes carelessly, sometimes purposely, sometimes insolently. i guarantee that not one per cent. of its critics if confronted suddenly with an examination on its contents would secure one mark out of a hundred. it has suffered the same fate as the treaty of versailles. opinion is sharply divided as to both between those who rend without reading and those who read without rending. most men have received their impressions of the balfour note from denunciatory phrases penned by writers who received their ideas about it from men who gave instructions to condemn it without ever reading it. the men who really understood both the versailles treaty and the balfour note have been too busy to find time to inform, to interpret, and to explain. but the time has come when the public attention should be once more drawn to the remarkable and far-reaching proposals of the balfour note. they constitute an offer on the part of britain to measure the amount of her claims against her allies by the extent of her obligations to the united states of america. the british government even offered to include the claim of their country against germany in this generous concession. what does that mean in reference to present conditions? that if the allies and germany between them found the £30,000,000 a year which britain has undertaken to pay america, she would forgo her claim to the £3,300,000,000 due to her under contract and treaty. it was a great offer and if accepted would have produced results beneficent beyond computation. britain, which would have been the heaviest direct loser, would have profited indirectly through the world recovery that would have ensued. how was it received? some criticised it because it asked too little--some because it demanded too much. many criticised because they were determined to approve nothing that emanated from such a government, but most of its censors condemned it because they never took the trouble to understand it, and the shrillest among the street cries happened to denounce it. the government that propounded it soon after left the seat of authority, and the administration that succeeded put forward a new scheme which attracted even less acceptance. so this great project which would have settled for ever the question which above all others is vexing peace and unsettling minds in europe was pigeon-holed where it was not already basketed. but surely this is not the end of all endeavours to reach a settlement of the question of inter-allied debts. we cannot rest satisfied with an arrangement which effectively binds us to pay without prospect of the slightest contribution from our debtors. what america cannot indulge in we cannot afford. the gold of europe now lies in its coffers. who are we--plunged in the mire of debt up to our nostrils--to give ourselves airs of generosity superior to the only golden land left in this war-stripped earth? if there is to be a general jubilee in which all alike participate in order to give the world a new start, then i feel sure britain will play her part bravely and nobly. but a jerry-mandered jubilee which frees france, italy and belgium from all their debts whilst leaving britain sweating to pay off debts incurred for her allies on the strength of their bond--that we cannot bear. i trust the government will insist on an arrangement with our allies which, even if it is not a replica of our contract with the american government, will at any rate ensure us a contribution that will safeguard us against loss under that contract. it is i fear hopeless to expect that we should be recouped the 2_s._ in the pound which interest on allied debts costs our taxpayers, but at any rate we might be guaranteed against the 6_d._ in the pound which the american instalments involve. i feel the effort is beset with difficulties and that the outlook is not hopeful. there have of late been a few discouraging symptoms. one is the reception accorded at the recent paris conference to the british prime minister's liberal offer regarding inter-allied debts. it was a tactical error to open the conference with such a scheme and the effect was singularly unfortunate. had i been disposed to press my criticisms on the conduct of the recent negotiations in paris it would have been that they were so managed that for the first time since the war britain has been completely isolated at a european conference. that is a misfortune, for it encouraged the french government to rash action. up to the last conference britain and italy had remained in substantial accord even when france and belgium took a different view, and belgium had never before quitted any of the gatherings in complete disagreement with great britain. so france, always tempted as she was to occupy the ruhr, hesitated to do so in the face of so formidable an allied resistance. what is relevant, however, to the subject of this article is the cause of our unwonted isolation on the occasion of the last conference. the british premier started the negotiations by tabling proposals which promised forgiveness of most of the indebtedness of these countries to britain, but which implied immediate arrangements for beginning repayment of the rest. this suggestion of repayment instantly consolidated opposition to the whole of the british plan. it became clear that existing governments on the continent had no intention, unless firmly pressed, of paying the smallest percentage of the debt they incurred on the faith of a solemn engagement to repay the loan when that was possible, and to pay interest meanwhile. if we point to the fact as we did in the balfour note, that we have undertaken to repay the united states of america the heavy debt incurred by us on behalf of the allies, they simply shrug their shoulders and say in effect: "that is your affair. we repay neither britain nor america, and there is an end of it." the other unpleasant incident is a speech delivered by m. poincaré in the french chamber in the course of which he dealt casually with the subject of inter-allied indebtedness. the french prime minister then announced categorically that france had no intention of paying her debts until she has first received her share of reparations from germany. what does that mean in effect? that the france represented by m. poincaré has no intention of ever paying her debts. when the colossal figure of german reparations is taken into account thirty years is a moderate estimate of the period required for its liquidation. is the french debt to lie dormant carrying no interest meanwhile? if it is, then the debt is practically wiped out, for the present value of £500,000,000 debt payable thirty years hence is insignificant. the present government of france have therefore declared they do not mean to pay what france owes. surely the time to dictate the conditions of your repayment of a loan--when you propose to pay, how much you propose to pay, or whether you mean to pay at all--is when you are borrowing and not after you have spent the money. and yet in the same speech in which m. poincaré serves up hot platitudes for senatorial palates about the sanctity of national obligations, he dismisses france's faithful ally with the cold comfort that france is too busy collecting the accounts due to her to attend to the debts she owes. i believe in my heart that there is a france of which he is not the spokesman--a great france which will not treat shabbily a faithful friend who stood by her in the hour of despair and who is now staggering under unparalleled burdens incurred in the discharge of the obligations of friendship. all this makes it more necessary that the situation should be cleared up without undue delay. having just completed negotiations for liquidating our own war indebtedness to america we are in a position to insist on a settlement with those on whose behalf we incurred that indebtedness. if nothing is done the conditions will harden against us. we shall be assumed to have accepted the poincaré repudiation. i do not know what conditions the government have made with the united states government as to the marketability of the securities to be created in funding our debt. if they are to be placed on the market the chance of any future deal is destroyed. ere that be done we must know where we are in reference to our own claims. i trust the government will act promptly. delay was justifiable so long as we were in the same position in reference to what we owed as what we claimed. the baldwin settlement has altered all that. if we do not insist on an arrangement now the british taxpayer will have the fate of issachar--that of the poor beast between two burdens--his own and that of the allies. xxiii the british elections it is the duty of every patriotic citizen, in view of the difficulties with which the country is confronted, to assist the government of the day by every means at his disposal. factious criticism disturbs judgment and tends to unnerve. governments to-day require full command of mind and nerve to enable them to arrive at sound decisions and to persevere in them. faction is, therefore, treason to the country. that does not, however, preclude a calm survey of the elections and their meaning. quite the contrary, for we must think of the future and prepare for it. the result of the elections has fully justified those who maintained that no party standing alone could hope to secure the measure of public support which will guarantee stable government. it is true that the conservatives have succeeded in obtaining the return of a majority of members to the new parliament. but the most notable feature of the elections is the return of a decisive majority of members by a very definite minority of the electors. i observe that the prime minister, in returning thanks to the nation, claims that he has received a vote of confidence from the people of this country. out of a total poll of fifteen millions his candidates secured less than six million votes. making full allowance for uncontested seats, this figure cannot be stretched out to a height much above six millions. that means that only two-fifths of the electorate voted confidence in the administration, whilst three-fifths voted confidence in other leaders or groups. a party which has a majority of three millions recorded against it on a national referendum can hardly claim to have received a national vote of confidence. it might be argued that when the question of confidence or no confidence comes to be stated, the national liberals having promised co-operation, the votes recorded by them ought not to be placed on the debit side of the confidence account. the basis of the appeal made by the national liberal candidates for support is practically that stated by me in my manchester speech: "the supreme task of statesmanship at this hour is the pacification of the nations, so that the people shall have leisure to devote themselves to the peaceful avocations of life, to fill up the depleted reservoirs from which we all draw. "my course is a clear one. i will support with all my might any government that devotes itself and lends its energy to that task with single-mindedness, fearlessness, and with resolution--provided it does not embark upon measures which inflict permanent injury upon the country, whether these measures be reactionary or revolutionary. that does not mean that i pledge myself to support inefficiency, vacillation, or infirmity in any government or in any party. but any government that does not pursue that course i will resist with all my might. that is my policy." i have perused the addresses of many national liberal candidates and i have addressed many meetings in their constituencies, and i find that their attitude towards the government is defined in these terms, with purely verbal variations. the address of mr. j. d. gilbert, who won central southwark, is a very fair sample taken out of the bulk: "if you honour me again with your confidence i will support any progressive measures brought forward by the present government or any other government. i shall not offer factious opposition or nagging criticism while our country is in difficulties at home or abroad." there may be one or two who went further, but none expressed confidence. i have made some inquiries as to the number of conservative votes polled by national liberal candidates. i am informed that on an average it represents less than one-third of the total. at the last election 167 national liberal candidates were put up. they polled an aggregate of 1,652,823 votes, that is, an average of 9,897 per candidate. what proportion of this vote was conservative? there is a good practical method of testing this question. in sixty-two seats national liberals were fought by conservative as well as by other candidates. in these cases the average vote polled by national liberals was 6,820. that means that where the conservatives supported national liberal candidates their votes would represent about 30 per cent. of the poll for these candidates. on the other hand, the number of liberal votes polled by conservatives, where a compact existed, at least balances this account, for although the total in each constituency does not equal the figures of the conservative support in national liberal constituencies, still, that support was spread over many more constituencies. the prime minister and his chief electioneering manager both emphatically repudiated the suggestion that there was any pact between conservatives and national liberals, and urged that there were only local arrangements made between the candidates of the two parties for their mutual convenience. as the head of the national liberal group i expressed grave doubts as to the composition of the ministry, and much apprehension as to the language in which its policy was defined. that represents the general attitude of the national liberals toward the government. their support, therefore, cannot be claimed in totalling the votes recorded for the government. the fact, therefore, remains that those who voted confidence in the government represent only forty per cent. of those who went to the poll and twenty-five per cent. of the total electorate. i place this fact in the forefront, because it is bound to have a profound effect upon the course of events during--maybe beyond--the lifetime of this parliament. it is the first time, certainly since the reform act, that a pronounced minority of the electorate has succeeded in securing the control of parliament and the government of the country. it would be idle to pretend that in a democratic country like ours, thoroughly imbued with the spirit of representative government, this does not weaken the moral authority of the government of the day. therefore, if the government is wise it will bear that fact in mind and will not commit itself to policies which challenge the nine millions who between them represent a majority of the people of this country. it is not a very good beginning to claim these striking figures as a vote of confidence. i sincerely trust it does not indicate a resolve to ignore, if not to defy, what is an obvious and ought to be a governing factor in the policy of the government. a corollary to this curious working of our electoral system is to be found in the under-representation of the other parties in the present parliament, and unless representative government is to be discredited altogether, the present parliament ought at once to devote its mind and direct its energies to the discovery of some method and machinery which will avert the danger which clearly arises from the working of the present system. the parliament of 1918 undoubtedly gave a larger majority to the government than the figures warranted. but the majority of votes cast for government candidates was so overwhelming that under any system of voting there would have been a larger working majority for the government than that which the present government can command. so when trouble arose it was not open to any section of the community to object that the government had no authority because it did not represent the electorate of this country. we are faced with a new danger to constitutional government. what has happened at this election may be repeated at the next--but not necessarily in favour of the same party. if we are to be governed by a succession of administrations who rule in spite of the protest of a majority of the people, the authority of government will be weakened beyond repair. the luck of the electoral table has this time favoured the conservatives. next time it may turn in favour of the labour party. they have at this election secured 55 seats out of a total of 141 by a minority of votes. the conditions were, in many respects, against them. their funds were exhausted by the prolonged period of heavy unemployment. the trade union movement was passing through an ebb tide in its prosperity, both in funds and in members. there was a good deal of discontent with the trade union leaders. many workmen felt they had been let down badly by some of their activities in industrial disputes. moreover, labour has been committed by visionaries to a rash experiment which handicapped it severely in the election. next time may be the spring tide of labour. they have learnt their lesson at the polls, and are not likely to repeat the blunder of november, 1922. this time the votes cast for them have attained the gigantic aggregate of four millions and a quarter. supposing under those conditions they add another two millions to their poll. although the other groups may secure between them nine millions of votes, labour may have the same luck as the conservatives at the last election and be placed in power by a decisive majority of members elected by a minority of votes. i am not going to speculate as to what may happen under those conditions; the kind of legislation that may be proposed; the action of the house of lords in reference to it, provoking, as it undoubtedly will, a fierce class conflict; or the turn given to administration in the various departments of government. of one thing i am, however, certain. that is, that as a minority administration in 1922 and onwards will help to discredit government with certain classes of the community, a minority labour administration would weaken the respect of other classes for representative government, and between them an atmosphere will be created inimical to the moral authority of all government in this country. i have many a time warned the public that, in spite of appearances, this country is in many respects very top-heavy. it is over-industrialised. its means of livelihood are in some ways precarious, and depend on conditions over which we have very little control, and once something happens which may have the effect of causing a lean-over either in one direction or in the other, it will be more difficult to recover than in lands where the population depends in the main for its livelihood upon the cultivation of the soil and the development of the natural resources of the country. i therefore earnestly trust that in the interests of stability and good government, which must be based on the goodwill and co-operation of the community as a whole, this parliament will apply its mind seriously to finding some means of preventing a repetition either in one direction or another of this freak of representative government. another feature of the election is the heavy vote polled by liberal candidates in spite of untoward circumstances. whatever the difficulties of the labour party might be in this election they were not comparable to those under which liberalism fought the campaign. it was divided by bitter internecine conflicts. the leaders of one section seemed to be more intent on keeping representatives of the other section out of parliament than on fighting for the common cause. the bulk of their speeches was devoted to attacks on the leaders of the other liberal group, and there was not much room left for a statement of the liberal case. what happened in manchester is typical. here the rank and file took the matter in hand and enforced agreement. lord grey was brought down to bless it. but the whole of his benedictory speech consisted of a thin and dreary drip of querulous comment on the leaders of the other group, with a distinct hint that the return of a conservative government would be by no means a bad thing in the interests of the country. the speech was hailed by a tory journal with the heading "lord grey supports mr. bonar law." he then went straight to support mr. mckinnon wood as candidate with a repetition of the same speech. thence he rushed off to reiterate the same performance at bedford in support of lady lawson, and he finished off by reciting it for two days at meetings in support of mr. walter runciman. no wonder that he succeeded in damping liberal enthusiasm to such an extent that his unfortunate protégés surprised even their opponents in the poverty of the support given them at the polls. as soon as the coalition broke up the leaders of this liberal section met to consider the situation. the one positive result of their deliberations was not the issue of a ringing appeal for unity on the basis of liberal principles, but a peevish intimation through the press that efforts at unity were to be discouraged at the election. it was clearly ordained that the coalition liberals should be crushed out. the conservatives spurned them, and the independent liberals gave notice that they had no use for them. they were destined for extinction. lord crewe's speech proceeded on the same lines. may i say how sincerely i rejoice in the tribute to the "amateur diplomatist" which is implied in the conferring by a conservative government of the blue ribbon of diplomacy upon the leader of the independent liberals in the house of lords? this precipitate and lamentable decision lost at least forty liberal seats, gave to the conservatives their majority, and what is equally important established the labour party as his majesty's official opposition in the house of commons. the latter is much the most serious practical result of the decisions of the independent leaders to debar united action at the last election. if liberals had united when the coalition came to an end, liberalism might have polled five million votes. it would have now held a powerful second position in parliament, and the country and the nation would have looked to it in the future as it has hitherto done in the past for the alternative to "toryism." instead of that it is a poor split third. how could they expect to win at the polls? the national liberals were pursued into their constituencies. thirty-five national liberal seats were assailed by independent liberal candidates. i am not making a complaint, but offering an explanation. whatever the views of the national liberal leaders might have been on the subject of liberal unity they were given no chance to effect it, and although they entered into no national compact with the conservatives their followers in certain areas had no option but to negotiate local arrangements with the conservatives for mutual support. the implacable attitude of the independent liberals left them no choice in the matter. what was the inevitable result? no real fight was put up for liberal principles on either side. the independent liberals were tangled by the personal preoccupation of their leaders. they had accumulated enormous dumps of ammunition for the day of battle on the assumption that the main attack would be on the coalition liberals, and, although the conservatives now lined the opposite trenches, anger dominated strategy, and the guns were still fired at their old foes, whilst the tory government was only bombarded with bouquets. on the other hand, the national liberal leaders were embarrassed by the engagements into which their followers had been driven by the action of the independent liberal leaders and the two warring factions. the national liberals, in spite of their enormous difficulties, have not been exterminated. i am not going to enter into a barren inquiry as to whether their numbers are or are not greater than those of mr. asquith's followers. let it be assumed that they are equal. the marvel is that under these fratricidal conditions so many liberals of any complexion have been returned. i am not setting forth these unhappy facts in order to prolong the controversy which has poisoned liberalism for years, but in order to call attention to the vitality which, in spite of these depressing conditions, can bring up 4,100,000 voters to the polls. electorally liberalism is the balancing power, and if it casts its united strength against either reaction or subversion its influence must be decisive, whatever the composition of this parliament may be. it is common knowledge that the independent liberals confidently anticipated the return of at least 120 members of their group. the fact that they only succeeded in securing the return of about fifty is naturally to them a source of deep disappointment. if the failure of high hopes leads to contemplation of the real causes of that failure and a sincere desire is manifested to substitute co-operation for conflict my colleagues and i will welcome it. we cannot force our society on an unwilling company. during the campaign i repeatedly expressed the hope that one outcome of this election would be to bring moderate men of progressive outlook in all parties to see the wisdom of acting together. but progressive minds are by no means confined to the liberal party. i have met and worked with them in the conservative party, and the election will have taught many men and women in the labour party that violent and extravagant proposals impede progress. if the limits are not too narrowly drawn, this parliament may witness the effective association of men of many parties who are genuinely concerned in the advancement of mankind along the paths of peace and progress for the attainment of their common ideals. if that end is achieved, the coming years will not be spent in vain. one word as to the national liberals. when the dissolution came no party was ever placed in a more embarrassing and even desperate situation. the conservatives have at their disposal a great political machine. the labour party could command the support of all the trade unions, with their elaborate machinery for organising the wage-earning population. the independent liberals had in england and in scotland captured the liberal machine almost in its entirety, and had spent six years in perfecting it, their leaders having no other occupation. the national liberal leaders inherited no political machinery, and were too preoccupied with great world affairs to be able to devote any time to the improvisation of an effective new organisation. conservatives, independent liberals, and labour all alike attacked national liberal seats where they thought any advantage might be gained for their respective parties by doing so. the conservatives only refrained from attack in cases where they thought there was more to be gained by arrangement. there was a great volume of popular sentiment behind our group. i visited britain, north, south, east, west, and i have never witnessed such crowds nor such enthusiasm at any electoral contest in which i have ever taken part; but there was no organisation to convert acclamation into electoral power, and you could not build up a vast political machine in three weeks. our supporters were not provided with an opportunity to test their strength in two-thirds of the constituencies. in nearly three hundred constituencies they could not do so without impairing the chances of liberal candidates. a compact with conservatives ruled them out of others. it is a wonder that, in spite of these adverse and even paralysing conditions our numbers are twice those of the independent liberals in 1918. we have now for the first time full opportunity for placing our case and point of view before the country and organising support for them. it is our duty to do so. every month will contribute its justification for the course we have hitherto pursued, and for the counsel we have steadfastly given to a country struggling through abnormal difficulties. _london, november 20th, 1922._ xxiv how democracy works the startling english by-elections of the last few weeks have called attention to the working of the new electorate in great britain and set men pondering about its possibilities in a way a general election failed to make them think. democracy in the sense of government of a great state by the absolute and unfettered authority of the majority of its own citizens of all ranks and conditions is a modern experiment. the united states of america are the oldest democracy in the world to-day. how many realise that britain became a democracy for the first time in 1917? until then the majority of its adult population had no voice in the making or administration of the laws that ruled their lives. the united states of america, france and italy have adopted universal suffrage as the basis of authority for many a year. so have the british dominions, but britain herself, the pioneer of representative institutions, until recently shrank from the experiment of adult suffrage. before the reform act of 1832 the total electorate of this country numbered only 3 per cent. of the population. the distribution of power amongst this small percentage was so arranged that even the 3 per cent. represented in effect no more than at best 1 per cent. a generation of turmoil and agitation, almost culminating in revolution, succeeded in forcing through a measure which increased the 3 per cent. to 4.5 per cent. of the population! it is true that the distribution of votes was more equitable, but even with that improvement to call this ridiculous percentage a democracy would be absurd. another generation of growing agitation ensued. this also ended in violence. then mr. disraeli, one of the boldest and most venturesome of british statesmen, in 1867 doubled the electorate. his measure increased the number of voters to 9 per cent. of the population. disraeli's audacious plunge horrified some of his aristocratic supporters and shocked many whigs. "bob" lowe had already foretold calamities that would follow gladstone's more cautious proposals. seven years later saw the election of the first tory parliament since 1841. so much for the prophecies of the men who always fear evil must flow from justice. fifteen years after the disraeli measure the gladstone administration added another 7 per cent. to the electorate. the gladstone proposals, which raised the number of voters to 16 per cent., were so vehemently contested that they nearly precipitated a constitutional crisis of the first magnitude. ultimately, however, they were carried, and there the franchise remained until the war. the electorate that, through its representatives, accepted the german challenge in 1914, and was therefore responsible for involving the country in the most costly and sanguinary war it ever waged, represented one-sixth of the population and about one-third of the adults. the conscription act converted the country to the injustice of this state of things. millions of men were forced to risk their lives for a policy which they had no share in fashioning. millions of women faced anxieties and tortures worse than death in pursuit of the same policy, and yet no woman was allowed to express any opinion as to the selection of the rulers who led them to this sacrifice. it was felt to be so unjust that in the exaltation of war, which lifted men to a higher plane of equity, this obvious wrong was redressed. hence the greatest of all the enfranchisement acts, the act of 1917, that for the first time converted the british system of government into a democracy. how has it worked? it is too early to speak of its results. mr. austen chamberlain in a letter[10] has called attention to one aspect of its operation. he emphasises a fact which is already known to every man who has passed through the experience of a contested election, that nearly one-half the new electorate is unattached to any political party. if you deduct out of the total the numbers of the old electorate which had already formed ties of a party character, you will find from the result of the elections that more than half the new electorate is free and floating about without any anchor or rudder and ready to be towed by the first party that succeeded in roping them. millions of the new electors are too indifferent or too undecided about political issues to take sides at the polling booths. in the hotly contested election of january, 1910, 92 per cent. of the voters went to the poll. at the second election which took place in the same year the percentage was 89. the slight difference between the two elections would be accounted for by the fact that in the second election the register was old. compare these results with the two elections which have occurred since the 1917 enfranchisement. at the 1918 election 64 per cent. only of the voters could be induced to make the acquaintance of the ballot-boxes. this might be explained by the inevitable political apathy which follows a great war. the pulse of party beat feebly and irregularly. the old party organisations had, through five years of neglect, fallen into complete disrepair--the new party had not yet had time to perfect its machinery. hence the failure of competitive effort to induce at least 6,000,000 of the new voters to take a sufficient interest in their new privileges to exercise them at the election. the next four years were a period of growing political activity. the new party was especially energetic. their chief organiser, mr. arthur henderson, m.p., is one of the most gifted party managers of this generation, and his achievement is an outstanding feature of political organisation in this country. the old parties also had time to repair their machinery; by the time the election was called their organisations were in full working order. the only party which had no organisation worth speaking of was the national liberal party. the others were ready for the struggle. nevertheless, when the election came in november nearly 5,000,000 of the electors were not sufficiently interested in the contest to take the trouble to record their votes. it showed an improvement of 10 per cent. on the previous election, but there still remained nearly 20 per cent.--making allowance for death, sickness, removals, etc.--who stayed at home, and could not be persuaded by personal or public appeal or pressure exercised by three or four great organisations, to walk a few hundred yards out of their way in order to place a simple cross on the ballot paper that was awaiting them. the municipal elections tell a still more dismal story of apathy. but that is an old story. it was with difficulty that the old electorate, with all its long training, could be cajoled to visit the polling booths where the good government of the towns in which they breathed, lived, toiled, enjoyed themselves, and rested was being determined. at their worst, however, they made a better show than the newly enfranchised voters. how does the record compare with democracy in other lands? france is no better. on the whole, i understand it is worse. the voting in the united states of america fluctuates according to the interest excited by the particular election. in this respect america does not differ from britain. i cannot lay my hand on the percentage of the poll at the last presidential election, but i gather it was higher than ours at the general election. the germans polled at their last election 89 per cent. of their electorate; in italy the percentage was much lower. with an unpolled and unticketed electorate of over 4,000,000 anything may happen. they have clearly no interest in the ordinary political conflicts that engage the minds of their fellow-citizens; otherwise, the excitement of two general elections would have roused them to such faint exhibition of partisanship as is implied in the choosing of a candidate out of the two or three who have taken the trouble to send along their pictures. but one day an issue may arise which will wake up the most lethargic. what will it be? and what view will they take of it when it comes? and who will succeed in catching the eye of the slumbering multitude when it opens? much depends on the answer to these questions. they may rally to the defence of property menaced by rapacious creeds. they may rush to the protection of their homes threatened by avaricious wealth. even those who have already voted are liable to sudden and devastating changes of opinion. witness mitcham, willesden, and edgehill. these three seats were regarded as being amongst the safest in england, and were selected for that very reason. amongst many disquieting factors there is one which ought to be dealt with ere another election arrive. under the present system a minority of electors may usurp absolute dominion over the fortunes of this kingdom for fully five years. this is one of the freaks of the group system. the present parliamentary majority has been elected by an aggregate vote which represents something a little better than one-fourth of the total electorate and one-third of those who recorded their votes. if mitcham and edgehill are a foretaste of what is to happen at the "general," labour will be the lucky third. a similar turnover of votes in every constituency would place them easily in that position. america has brought its vast electorate under what seems to us to be a perfect discipline. but in the process it has passed through much tribulation, including the furnace of a terrible civil war. italy has been impelled to correct the working of democratic institutions by a display of force. britain may mobilise and drill its electoral forces with less trouble. but it has a socialist party, which has grown by millions within less than a decade--and is still growing. this week its most eloquent member has proposed, in the house of commons, a solemn motion for the abolition of private property. deputies chosen by four and a quarter million of british electors will vote for this proposal, and if, four years hence, they add another million and a half to their poll, they will be in a position to place that motion on the statute book. their increase between 1918 and 1922 was greater than that. footnote: [10] see the _times_, march 14, 1923. xxv political realities a few weeks ago i predicted that the comparative calm which has prevailed in the political seas of britain during the past few years was coming to an end. recent parliamentary scenes leave no doubt that the prolonged political depression is to be followed by a period of storms--it may be hurricanes. no amount of organisation or propaganda can excite real feeling in an electorate over trivial and unreal issues. why did the coalition of 1915 fall? and why did the liberal party split in 1916? who was responsible? should the general election have taken place in 1918 or 1919? ought open and declared opponents of the government of the day to have then received government support or at least government neutrality? these are questions which agitate a few who are personally interested, but they leave the nation cold. the war was real enough. but the war was supported by men of all parties, and, therefore, provoked no political controversy. the minority which opposed it was negligible, and challenged no parliamentary discussion on the question. the treaty of peace was, on the whole, accepted by all parties when it was first submitted to parliament. the leaders of the opposition parties in the lords and commons at the time of its presentation offered no serious criticism of its provisions. the legislation proposed by the coalition, although in ordinary seasons much of it would have aroused angry passions, coming as it did after the war had exhausted emotion, passed with no more than a feeble murmur of protest. take, for instance, such controversial topics as adult suffrage, the enfranchisement of women, the wholesale reductions in hours of labour, representative government in india, and notably the conferring upon ireland of a measure of home rule more complete than any proposed by gladstone. any one of these measures proposed before the war would have led to heated discussion throughout the land. the case of ireland is perhaps the most significant of the changed temper of the nation immediately after the great war. the conflict over irish home rule has now culminated in a treaty accepted by the nation as a whole and acquiesced in by the most violent amongst its opponents. but fiercer political passions were stirred up by the struggle between parties over ireland than by any political question of modern times. the causes underlying the conflict dealt with two of the most powerful motives which make the human heart throb--race and religion. there was the old feud between saxon and gael extending over at least seven centuries. it drenched the moors of ireland with the blood of both races before a keener edge was given to its hatreds by the introduction of an acute religious quarrel. after the reformation the religious differences which rent europe with fratricidal wars added fresh fury to the racial enmities which made poor ireland a cauldron of perpetual strife. when mr. gladstone proposed to settle this raging tumult by wresting supremacy from a race which had been dominant in that island for 700 years and a faith which had been supreme there for 400 years and transferring it to the race and religion which all that time had been in a condition of servitude, and when in order to attain his ends he had to secure the adhesion of men of the ruling blood and creed to his proposals, the passions raised were deeper and angrier than any witnessed in british politics for many a day. it led for the first time in the history of parliament to scenes of physical violence on the floor of the house. it shows what we may expect when there are genuine divisions of opinion which profoundly move masses of men and women in a democracy. those who recall the tropical heat of parliamentary debates in 1893 naturally regard their voyage through the frigid proceedings of the last parliament as they would a sail through arctic seas. that voyage is now over, and there are signs that the waters will soon be lashed into fury. for years political controversy between parties has been suspended in the presence of a common danger. reaction was inevitable, and the greater the suppression the more violent the rebound. that does not, however, altogether account for the visible omens of a coming struggle unprecedented in its gravity. fundamental issues have been raised of such moment to millions that they cannot be settled without a struggle that will rock society. the scene enacted in the commons a few days ago was by no means as exciting as that which some of us witnessed in 1893. but it gave me an uneasy feeling that the period of calm is definitely over, and that parliament henceforth must expect gusts and gales--and worse. emotions are once more welling up, and there are signs of a great stir coming in british politics. the cause is easily explained. the sense of exhaustion is passing away, and issues containing a serious challenge to the privileges and rights of powerful classes in the community and vital to the interests of all classes have been raised by one of the great political parties that divide britain. the momentous character of that challenge may be gathered from the terms of the motion submitted by mr. philip snowden to the judgment of the house of commons:- "that in view of the failure of the capitalist system to adequately utilise and organise natural resources and productive power, or to provide the necessary standard of life for vast numbers of the population, and believing that the cause of this failure lies in the private ownership and control of the means of production and distribution, this house declares that legislative effort should be directed to the gradual supersession of the capitalist system by an industrial and social order based on the public ownership and democratic control of the instruments of production and distribution." this motion will receive the full support of every member of the labour party. a few men outside the socialist party who have acquainted themselves with the publications of that party were quite prepared for this demand of a complete change in the organisation of society. and as they saw that party grow with startling rapidity they knew we should not have long to wait before these subversive ideas would be formulated in the house of commons. still, even for the students of socialist literature, the actual tabling of the resolution on behalf of the second largest party in the state came as a surprise and a shock. too much credit was given to the restraining influence of the trade union section of the party. sir lynden macassey, in his informing book on "labour policy, false and true," points out that it was in 1885 that the avowed advocates of this proposal for the abolition of private property and for the nationalisation of all the means of production and distribution first stood for parliament. there were only two candidates standing on this platform, and they polled 32 and 29 votes respectively. last election the aggregate socialist poll reached the imposing figure of 4,251,011 votes. the party that secured a majority of members in the house of commons only polled 5,457,871 votes. mr. ramsay macdonald states categorically that he knows that the independent liberal members--exclusive of their leaders--favour nationalisation and the capital levy. if that be an accurate statement of the views of the majority of these gentlemen, and of those who elect them, nearly one-half the british electorate are already prepared to assent to socialism by easy stages--which is the purport of mr. philip snowden's motion. on that assumption we are on the eve of greater and more fundamental changes affecting the lives of every class and condition of men and women than have yet been seen in this country. hence the new sense of struggle with which the political atmosphere is palpitating. capitalism is to be arraigned before the supreme court of the nation, condemned, sentenced, and executed by instalments--chinese fashion. the composition of that court is not to-day favourable to the prosecution. but who will be the judge after the next general election? it is customary in political controversy to state that the election which is for the moment impending will be the most epoch-making in history. without exaggeration, the next british election may well turn out to be so. the british people, with their inherited political instinct, are beginning to realise that grave decisions must then be taken. hence the greater keenness shown by the voters at by-elections--hence the new interest taken by the public in the proceedings of parliament. there is still a good deal of apathy and indifference. the average comfortable citizen is still inclined to think these socialist schemes so crazy as to be impossible. they cannot believe that 21,000,000 of sane people can possibly contemplate giving their sanction to such fantasies. there are two cardinal facts which are constantly overlooked by the complacent. the men and women who have no property for the state to seize constitute an overwhelming majority of the electors of the country. the second fact to note is the great preponderance of the industrial population over the steadier and more stolid agricultural population. america, in spite of its gigantic manufacturing and distributing industries, still retains 60 per cent. of its population on the land. the same proportion of the french and italian populations is agrarian. barely 10 per cent. of the british workers are engaged in cultivating the soil. most of our workers breathe and have their being in the crowded and excitable atmosphere of factories, workshops, and mines. the air is filled with germs of all kinds, and isolation in these thronging areas is impossible. hence the rapidity with which the fever has spread. can it be arrested? nothing will be done until the danger is visible to every eye. to vary the metaphor, no one will believe in the flood until it is upon us. trained weather prophets who forecast its coming will be laughed at or told they have a personal or party interest in ark building. it is an old tale--as old as the dawn of history. "as in the days before the flood, they were eating and drinking and knew not until the flood came and took them all away." the trouble can only be averted in two ways. one is the systematic inculcation of sound doctrines of economic truth into the minds of the working people of this country. the second, and the more important, is the rooting out of the social evils which furnish the revolutionary with striking and indisputable object-lessons of the failure of the capitalistic system as an agent of human happiness. without the latter the former effort will be futile. arguments in favour of the existing order will be refuted by glaring and painful facts. meanwhile, let the champions of that order take note of the efforts put forth by the socialists to advertise their eagerness to redress the wrongs of the ex-service men and to soften the asperities of discipline for the soldier. the socialist leaders have shrewdly taken note of the causes that produced the overthrow of their italian brethren, and they mean to take such steps as will ensure that if fascism comes in britain it will be an ally, and not a foe. _london, april 16th, 1923._ xxvi should we make peace with russia? i am frankly delighted that negotiations between lord curzon and the soviet government seem to indicate a genuine desire on the part of both parties to establish a more satisfactory understanding between this country and russia. the bolshevist episode, like all revolutionary terrors, has been at times a shrieking nightmare which has made the world shudder. it did render one supreme service to civilisation--it terrified democracy back into sanity just at the time when the nervous excitability that followed the war was bordering on mental instability. in our attitude towards the soviet government we must, however, constantly bear in mind one consideration. what matters to us is not so much the russian government as the people of russia, and for the moment the bolshevist administration represents the only medium for dealing with that mighty nation. as long as it remains the only constituted authority in russia, every act of hostility against it injures russia. as we discovered in 1919, you cannot wage war against the government for the time being of a country without devastating the land and alienating its people. you cannot refuse to trade with it now without depriving its people of commodities--and especially of equipments--essential to their well-being. it is the people, therefore, who would suffer, and it is the people who would ultimately resent that suffering. governments come and go, but the nation goes on for ever. the russian people deserve--especially at the hands of all the allied nations--every sympathetic consideration we can extend to them. not only because they have to endure the sway of a tyrannical oligarchy imposing its will by ruthless violence, but even more for the reasons that led to the establishment of that tyranny. if the fruit is bitter we must bear in mind how the tree came to be planted in the soil. it may sound like quoting ancient history to revert to the events of eight or nine years ago, but no one can understand russia, or do justice to its unhappy people, without recalling the incidents that led to the great catastrophe. those who denounce any dealings with the existing order seem to have persuaded themselves that pre-revolutionary russia was governed by a gentle and beneficent despotism which conferred the blessings of a tolerant and kindly fatherland upon a well-ruled household. in no particular is this a true picture of the _ancien régime_. the fortress of peter and paul was not erected, nor its dungeons dug, by the bolshevists. siberia was not set up as a penal settlement for political offenders for the first time--if at all--by the bolshevists. in 1906 alone 45,000 political offenders were deported to endure the severities of siberia. persecution of suspected religious leaders was not started by the soviets. to them does not belong the discredit of initiating the methods of pogromism. under the "paternal" reign of the tsars dissent from the orthodox faith was proscribed and persecuted, and the jews were hunted like vermin. let us not forget also that beyond all these circumstances the revolution was rendered inevitable by the ineptitude and corruption of the old system, and especially by the terrible suffering and humiliation which that state of things inflicted on russia in the great war. any one who has read the _memoirs of an ambassador_, by m. paléologue, will find a complete explanation in its pages of the savage hatred with which the russian revolutionaries view all those who were associated in any degree with the old order. he tells the story of how the gallant army found itself at the critical hour without ammunition, rifles, transport, and often without food. no braver or more devoted men ever fought for their country than the young peasants who made up the russian armies of 1914-15-16. with little and often no artillery support, they faced without faltering the best-equipped heavy artillery in the world. they were mown down by shell fire and machine guns by the million. their aggregate casualties up to september, 1916, even according to the reluctant admissions of the tsarist generals of the day, were five millions. in reality they were much heavier. often they went into action with sticks, as the russian war office had no rifles with which to arm them. they picked up as they advanced rifles dropped by fallen comrades. there is nothing in the war comparable to the trustful heroism of these poor peasants. we know now why there were no rifles, or shells, or wagons. the wholesale corruption of the _régime_ has been exposed to the world by irrefutable documentary evidence. here are a few extracts from m. paléologue's interesting book. one extract from his diary reads:- "the lack of ammunition means that the rôle of the artillery in battle is necessarily insignificant. the whole burden of the fighting falls on the infantry and the result is a ghastly expenditure of human life. a day or two ago one of the grand duke sergius's collaborators, colonel englehardt, said to major wehrlin, my second military attaché: 'we're paying for the crimes of our administration with the blood of our men.'" about the same date talking about the deplorable state of things, the grand duke sergius, who was inspector-general of artillery, said to the french ambassador, "when i think that this exhibition of impotence is all that our aristocratic system has to show, it makes me want to be a republican." when a grand duke talked like that early in 1915, what must a peasant soldier have thought by the spring of 1917, after many more millions of his comrades had been slaughtered as a result of the same "exhibition of impotence." it is no use pointing to the fact that our army was also short of ammunition at that date. the british army was a small army organised on the basis of a maximum expeditionary force of six divisions. the russian army was a great conscript force organised on the basis of a hundred divisions in the field. i recollect well our own military reports from the russian fronts. they provided much distressing reading. they filled you with compassion for the millions of gallant men who were the victims of corruption and stupidity in high places. i recall one statement made to our general which betrays the callous indifference with which men in authority seemed to treat the appalling sacrifice of life amongst loyal soldiers who were facing death without a murmur, because the "little father" willed it. whenever anxious inquiries were directed by our officer as to the gigantic losses in men which filled him with dismay as well as horror, the usual reply was, "don't worry yourself. thank god, of men at all events we have enough." an answer which sends a thrill of horror through you when you read it. that is why at the end of two and a half years the patient men in the field at last mutinied. that is why their parents and brothers in the fields supported them. the "little father" had failed them, and his minions had betrayed them. it is a sordid and horrid tale of peculation, maladministration, and cruel treachery. millions of british and french money went in shameless and open bribery, whilst the soldiers in the field, for need of what the money could buy, were opposing bare breasts covering brave hearts to the most terrible artillery in the world. if the rest of the money had been well spent, what was left after providing for profuse graft would still have sufficed to save that gallant army from destruction. but unhappily no real interest was taken in anything beyond the amount and the payment of the pocket-money. that seemed to be the main purpose of the transaction. nothing was well managed except the inevitable bribe. there were honourable and upright men who did their duty by their distracted and plundered country, but they were helpless in the torrent of corruption. no wonder a great russian industrialist engaged in the ministry of war, in dwelling on the sad failure of tsarism and its probable results in june, 1905, predicted a revolution with "ten years of the most frightful anarchy." "we shall," he added, "see the days of pugatchef[11] again and perhaps worse"--a striking prophecy verified with appalling accuracy. it is not pleasant to recall these dreadful episodes, which reveal the betrayal of a devotion faithful unto death. but this story is essential to the right appreciation of events. there is no savagery like that of a trustful people which finds that its trust was being imposed upon the whole time. here the retribution has been hideous in all its aspects. but the provocation was also revolting from every point of view. to judge russia fairly that must be taken into account. i think the government are, therefore, taking the right view of their responsibilities when through their foreign secretary they open negotiations with the representative of the soviet government in this country. you can easily evoke resounding cheers amongst the thoughtless by declaring melodramatically that you will never "shake hands with murder." in practice this policy has always been a failure. mr. pitt in a famous passage declined to assent to that doctrine when he was attacked for trying to open negotiations with the "assassins" of the french revolution. he was driven out of this calm and rational attitude by the inflammable rhetoric of burke, aided by the arrogance of the victorious revolutionaries. nevertheless, the sequel proved he was right. french bolshevism was not defeated by foreign armies, nor starved out by the british blockade. but it was driven into the arms of napoleon, and europe suffered bitterly for the folly of the hotheads on both sides. it would have been better for that generation had it listened to the wise counsel of william pitt. if you decline to treat with russia as long as its present rulers remain in power, then you ought to place turkey in the same category. the military junta that governed turkey has been guilty of atrocities at least as vile as any committed by the bolshevists. but at lausanne we ostentatiously stretched the friendly hand of britain to the authors of the armenian massacres. and france, italy--yes, and america also--tendered the same warm handshake. i am not criticising the offer of amity made as a condition of peace. we must make peace in the world, and you cannot do so if you put whole nations off your visiting list because of the misconduct of those who govern them. once you begin you are not quite sure where it will end. in these cases the innocent suffer the most. a refusal to trade with russia would not deprive the soviet commissaries of a single necessity or comfort of life. the communists are quite strong enough to take care of themselves. but the peasants--who are not communists--would continue to suffer, and their sufferings would increase as their reserves of clothing and other essentials became completely exhausted. and the people of this country who need the produce of russia for their own use would also suffer to a certain extent. america can afford this exalted aloofness. she does not need the russian grain and timber. she is an exporter of those commodities. but we cannot do as well without them, and we also sadly need russian flax for our linen industries, which are languishing for the want of it. last year there were quite considerable imports of russian produce into this country. this year owing to the prospects of an improved harvest these imports will be much larger. they are greatly needed here for our own consumption, and they pay for exports of machinery and textiles which the russian on his part urgently requires. but beyond and above all these material considerations, the world needs peace. in the old days conveyancing attorneys in this country kept a property transaction going by interminable requisitions on the title of the other party. they exercised all their ingenuity and invoked the added ingenuity of trained counsel to probe for defects in the right of the vendor to deal. those were leisurely days, and men could afford to dawdle. even then these exercises often ended in ruinous litigation. to-day time presses and the atmosphere is dangerous for the plying of irritating interrogatories. it is time we made up our minds that the soviets have come to stay, whether we like it or no, and that one or other of the formidable men who rule russia to-day are likely to rule it for some time to come. the sooner we have the courage to recognise this fact, the sooner will real peace be established. footnote: [11] pugatchef was the pretender who led a revolt of the peasants in the reign of catherine and spread rapine and carnage through the provinces bordering the volga and ural. xxvii palestine and the jews "what's his reason? i am a jew." _the merchant of venice._ of all the bigotries that savage the human temper there is none so stupid as the anti-semitic. it has no basis in reason; it is not rooted in faith; it aspires to no ideal; it is just one of those dank and unwholesome weeds that grow in the morass of racial hatred. how utterly devoid of reason it is may be gathered from the fact that it is almost entirely confined to nations who worship jewish prophets and apostles, revere the national literature of the hebrews as the only inspired message delivered by the deity to mankind, and whose only hope of salvation rests on the precepts and promises of the great teachers of judah. yet in the sight of these fanatics the jews of to-day can do nothing right. if they are rich they are birds of prey. if they are poor they are vermin. if they are in favour of a war it is because they want to exploit the bloody feuds of the gentiles to their own profit. if they are anxious for peace they are either instinctive cowards or traitors. if they give generously--and there are no more liberal givers than the jews--they are doing it for some selfish purpose of their own. if they do not give--then what could one expect of a jew but avarice? if labour is oppressed by great capital, the greed of the jew is held responsible. if labour revolts against capital--as it did in russia--the jew is blamed for that also. if he lives in a strange land he must be persecuted and pogrommed out of it. if he wants to go back to his own he must be prevented. through the centuries in every land, whatever he does, or intends, or fails to do, he has been pursued by the echo of the brutal cry of the rabble of jerusalem against the greatest of all jews--"crucify him!" no good has ever come of nations that crucified jews. it is poor and pusillanimous sport, lacking all the true qualities of manliness, and those who indulge in it would be the first to run away were there any element of danger in it. jew-baiters are generally of the type that found good reasons for evading military service when their own country was in danger. the latest exhibition of this wretched indulgence is the agitation against settling poor jews in the land their fathers made famous. palestine under jewish rule once maintained a population of 5,000,000. under the blighting rule of the turk it barely supported a population of 700,000. the land flowing with milk and honey is now largely a stony and unsightly desert. to quote one of the ablest and most far-sighted business men of to-day, "it is a land of immense possibilities, in spite of the terrible neglect of its resources resulting from turkish misrule. it is a glorious estate let down by centuries of neglect. the turks cut down the forests and never troubled to replant them. they slaughtered the cattle and never troubled to replace them." it is one of the peculiarities of the jew-hunter that he adores the turk. if palestine is to be restored to a condition even approximate to its ancient prosperity, it must be by settling jews on its soil. the condition to which the land has been reduced by centuries of the most devastating oppression in the world is such that restoration is only possible by a race that is prepared for sentimental reasons to make and endure sacrifices for the purpose. what is the history of the jewish settlement in palestine? it did not begin with the balfour declaration. a century ago there were barely 10,000 jews in the whole of palestine. before the war there were 100,000. the war considerably reduced these numbers, and immigration since 1918 has barely filled up the gaps. at the present timorous rate of progress it will be many years before it reaches 200,000. jewish settlement started practically seventy years ago, with sir moses montefiore's experiment in 1854--another war year. the sultan had good reasons for propitiating the jews in that year, as the allies had in 1917. so the jewish resettlement of palestine began. from that day onward it has proceeded slowly but steadily. the land available was not of the best. prejudices and fears had to be negotiated. anything in the nature of wholesale expropriation of arab cultivators, even for cash, had to be carefully avoided. the jews were, therefore, often driven to settle on barren sand dunes and malarial swamps. the result can best be given by quoting from an article written by mrs. fawcett, the famous woman leader. she visited palestine in 1921 and again in 1922, and this is her account of the jewish settlements: "so far from the colonies and the colonists draining the country of its resources they have created resources which were previously non-existent; they have planted and skilfully cultivated desert sands and converted them into fruitful vineyards and orange and lemon orchards; in other parts they have created valuable agricultural land out of what were previously dismal swamps producing nothing but malaria and other diseases. the colonists have not shrunk from the tremendous work and the heavy sacrifices required. many of the early arrivals laid down their lives over their work; the survivors went on bravely, draining the swamps, planting eucalyptus trees by the hundred thousand so that at length the swamp became a fruitful garden, and the desert once more blossomed like the rose." everywhere the jew cultivator produces heavier and richer crops than his arab neighbour. he has introduced into palestine more scientific methods of cultivation, and his example is producing a beneficent effect on the crude tillage of the arab peasant. it will be long ere canaan becomes once more a land flowing with milk and honey. the effects of the neglect and misrule of centuries cannot be effaced by the issue of a declaration. the cutting down of the trees has left the soil unprotected against the heavy rains and the rocks which were once green with vineyards and olive groves have been swept bare. the terraces which ages of patient industry built up have been destroyed by a few generations of turkish stupidity. they cannot be restored in a single generation. great irrigation works must be constructed if settlement is to proceed on a satisfactory scale. palestine possesses in some respects advantages for the modern settler which to its ancient inhabitants were a detriment. its one great river and its tributaries are rapid and have a great fall. for power this is admirable. whether for irrigation, or for the setting up of new industries, this gift of nature to palestine is capable of exploitation only made possible by the scientific discoveries of the last century. the tableland of judea has a rainfall which if caught in reservoirs at appropriate centres would make of the "desert of judea" a garden. if this be done arab and jew alike share in the prosperity. there are few countries on earth which have made less of their possibilities. take its special attractions for the tourist. i was amazed to find that the visitors to palestine in the whole course of a year only aggregate 15,000. it contains the most famous shrines in the world. its history is of more absorbing interest to the richest peoples on earth, and is better taught to their children, than even that of their own country. some of its smallest villages are better known to countless millions than many a prosperous modern city. hundreds of thousands ought to be treading this sacred ground every year. why are they not doing so? the answer is: turkish misrule scared away the pilgrim. those who went there came back disillusioned and disappointed. the modern "spies" on their return did not carry with them the luscious grapes of escol to thrill the multitude with a desire to follow their example. they brought home depressing tales of squalor, discomfort, and exaction which dispelled the glamour and discouraged further pilgrimages. settled government gives the holy land its first chance for 1900 years. but there is so much undeveloped country demanding the attention of civilisation that palestine will lose that chance unless it is made the special charge of some powerful influence. the jews alone can redeem it from the wilderness and restore its ancient glory. in that trust there is no injustice to any other race. the arabs have neither the means, the energy, nor the ambition to discharge this duty. the british empire has too many burdens on its shoulders to carry this experiment through successfully. the jewish race with its genius, its resourcefulness, its tenacity, and not least its wealth, can alone perform this essential task. the balfour declaration is not an expropriating but an enabling clause. it is only a charter of equality for the jews. here are its terms: "his majesty's government view with favour the establishment in palestine of a national home for the jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-jewish communities in palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by jews in any other country." the declaration was subsequently endorsed and adopted by president wilson and the french and italian foreign ministers. the zionists ask for no more. it has been suggested by their enemies that they are seeking to establish a jewish oligarchy in palestine that will reduce the arab inhabitant to a condition of servitude to a favoured hebrew minority. the best answer to that charge is to be found in the memorandum submitted by the zionist association to the league of nations. "the jews demand no privilege, unless it be the privilege of rebuilding by their own efforts and sacrifices a land which, once the seat of a thriving and productive civilisation, has long been suffered to remain derelict. they expect no favoured treatment in the matter of political or religious rights. they assume, as a matter of course, that all the inhabitants of palestine, be they jews or non-jews, will be in every respect on a footing of perfect equality. they seek no share in the government beyond that to which they may be entitled under the constitution as citizens of the country. they solicit no favours. they ask, in short, no more than an assured opportunity of peacefully building up their national home by their own exertions and of succeeding on their merits." it is a modest request which these exiles from zion propound to the nations. and surely it is just that it should be conceded, and if conceded then carried out in the way men of honour fulfil their bond. there are fourteen millions of jews in the world. they belong to a race which for at least 1900 years has been subjected to proscription, pillage, massacre, and the torments of endless derision--a race that has endured persecution, which for the variety of torture, physical, material and mental, inflicted on its victims, for the virulence and malignity with which it has been sustained, for the length of time it has lasted, and more than all for the fortitude and patience with which it has been suffered, is without parallel in the history of any other people. is it too much to ask that those amongst them whose sufferings are the worst shall be able to find refuge in the land their fathers made holy by the splendour of their genius, by the loftiness of their thoughts, by the consecration of their lives, and by the inspiration of their message to mankind? xxviii the treaty of lausanne[12] the vanquished have returned to their spiritual home at angora throwing their fezzes in the air. the victors have returned with their tails well between their legs. all tragedies have their scenes of comedy, and the lausanne conference is one of those amusing episodes interpolated by fate to relieve the poignancy of one of its greatest tragic pieces--the turk and civilisation. the turk may be a bad ruler, but he is the prince of anglers. the cunning and the patience with which he lands the most refractory fish once he has hooked it is beyond compare. what inimitable play we have witnessed for six months on the shores of lake leman! once the fish seemed to have broken the tackle--that was when the first conference came to an abrupt end. it simply meant, however, that the wily oriental was giving out plenty of line. time never worries him, he can sit and wait. he knew the moment would come when they would return with the hook well in their gullets, and the play begin once more--the reeling in and the reeling out, the line sometimes taut and strained but never snapping. time and patience rewarded him. at last the huge tarpon are all lying beached on the banks--britain, france, italy, and the united states of america--high and dry, landed and helpless, without a swish left in their tails, glistening and gasping in the summer sun. it is little wonder that ismet had a smile on his face when all was over. reports from angora state that the peace is hailed there as a great turkish triumph; and so it is. the turk is truly a great fisherman. if he could govern as well as he angles, his would be the most formidable empire in the world. unfortunately he is the worst of rulers, hence the trouble--his own and that of those who unhappily have drawn him as governor in the lottery of life. the able correspondent of the _daily telegraph_ at the lausanne conference has supplied us from time to time with vivid pen pictures of the four greatest powers of the world struggling in the toils of the squalid and broken remains of an empire with an aggregate population equal to that of a couple of english counties that i could name. this is what he wrote about this conference, which constitutes one of the most humiliating incidents in the history of western civilisation:- "the records of the present conference present an even more marvellous series of concessions and surrenders. what was frayed before is threadbare now. the allies have whittled away their own rights with a lavish hand in the cause of peace. they have also--and this is a graver matter, for which it seems they will have to give an account in the not distant future--gone back on their promises to small races, which are none the less promises because the small races have not the power to enforce their performance. the figure that the european delegates are cutting in lausanne, and the agents of the _concessionnaires_ in angora--all alike representatives of the west--has been rendered undignified as much by the manner as the matter of their worsting." since those distressing words were written the powers have sunk yet deeper into the slough of humiliation. _the times_ correspondent wiring after the agreement writes in a strain of deep indignation at the blow inflicted on the prestige of the west by this extraordinary treaty. in order to gauge the extent of the disaster to civilisation which this treaty implies it is only necessary to give a short summary of the war aims of the allies in turkey. they were stated by mr. asquith with his usual succinctness and clarity in a speech which he delivered when prime minister at the guildhall on november 9th, 1914:- "it is not the turkish people--it is the ottoman government that has drawn the sword, and which, i venture to predict, will perish by the sword. it is they and not we who have rung the death-knell of ottoman dominion, not only in europe but in asia. with their disappearance will disappear as i, at least, hope and believe, the blight which for generations past has withered some of the fairest regions of the earth." in pursuance of the policy thus declared by the british premier on behalf of the allies a series of agreements was entered into in the early months of 1915 between france, russia, and ourselves, by which the greater part of turkey, with its conglomerate population, was to be partitioned at the end of the war. cilicia and syria were allocated to france; mesopotamia to britain; armenia and constantinople to russia. palestine was to be placed under the joint control of britain and france. arabia was to be declared independent and a territory carved largely out of the desert--but including some famous cities of the east, damascus, homs and aleppo--was to be constituted into a new arab state, partly under the protection of france and partly of britain. smyrna and its precincts were to be allotted to greece if she joined her forces with those of the allies in the war. the straits were to be demilitarised and garrisoned. when italy came into the war later on in 1915, it was stipulated that in the event of the partition of turkey being carried out in pursuance of these agreements, territories in southern anatolia should be assigned to italy for development. what was the justification for breaking up the turkish empire? the portions to be cut out of turkey have a population the majority of which is non-turkish. cilicia and southern anatolia might constitute a possible exception. in these territories massacres and misgovernment had perhaps succeeded at last in turning the balance in favour of the turk. but in the main the distributed regions were being cultivated and developed before the war by a population which was western and not turanian in its origin and outlook. this population represented the original inhabitants of the soil. the experiences, more especially of the past century, had demonstrated clearly that the turk could no longer be entrusted with the property, the honour, or the lives of any christian race within his dominions. whole communities of armenians had been massacred under circumstances of the most appalling cruelty in lands which their ancestors had occupied since the dawn of history. and even after the war began 700,000 of these wretched people had been done to death by these savages, to whom, it must be remembered, the great powers so ostentatiously proffered the hand of friendship at the first lausanne conference. even while the conference was in session, and the handshaking was going on, the turks were torturing to death scores of thousands of young greeks whom they deported into the interior. as "a precautionary measure" 150,000 greeks of military age, of whom 30,000 were military prisoners, were last year driven inland to the mountains of anatolia. on the way they were stripped of their clothes, and in this condition were herded across the icy mountains. it is not surprising that when an agreement was arrived at for the exchange of military prisoners, the turks found the greatest difficulty in producing 11,000, and of the total 150,000 it is estimated that two-thirds perished. the allied powers had every good reason for determining, as they hoped for all time, that this barbarian should cease to shock the world by repeated exhibitions of savagery against helpless and unarmed people committed to his charge by a cruel fate. apart from these atrocities the fact that great tracts of country, once the most fertile and populous in the world, have been reduced by turkish misrule and neglect to a condition which is indistinguishable from the wilderness, alone proves that the turk is a blight and a curse wherever he pitches his tent, and that he ought in the interests of humanity to be treated as such. when a race, which has no title to its lands other than conquest, so mismanages the territories it holds by violence as to deprive the world of an essential contribution to its well-being, the nations have a right--nay, a duty--to intervene in order to restore these devastated areas to civilisation. this same duty constitutes the reason and justification for the white settlers of america overriding the prior claims of the indian to the prairies and forests of the great west. on the shores of the mediterranean are two races with a surplus population of hard-working, intelligent cultivators, both of them belonging to countries which had themselves in the past been responsible for the government of the doomed lands covered by the turkish empire. greece and italy could claim that under their rule this vast territory throve and prospered mightily. they now pour their overflow of population into lands far away from the motherland. yet they are essentially mediterranean peoples. the history of the mediterranean will for ever be associated with their achievements on its shores and its waters. the derelict wastes of asia minor need them. valleys formerly crowded with tillers are now practically abandoned to the desert weeds. irrigation has been destroyed or neglected. the italian engineers are amongst the best in the world, and once they were introduced into asia minor would make cultivation again possible. there is plenty of scope in the deserts of anatolia for both italian and greek. i was hoping for a peace that would set them both working. had such a settlement been attained, a generation hence would have witnessed gardens thronging with happy men, women, and children, where now you have a wilderness across which men, women, and children are periodically hunted down into nameless horror. yet another reason for the allied decision was the bitter resentment that existed at the ingratitude displayed by the turk towards britain and france. they were naturally indignant that he should have joined their foes and slammed the gate of the dardanelles in their face, and by that means complicated and prolonged their campaign and added enormously to their burdens, their losses, and their dangers. but he had not the thankfulness even of the beast of prey in the legend towards the man who had cured his wounded limb. france and britain had many a time extracted the thorn from the turkish paw when he was limping along in impotent misery. they had done more. they had often saved the life of that empire when the russian bear was on the point of crushing it out of existence; and yet without provocation, without even a quarrel, he had betrayed them to their enemies. i have set out shortly what the war policy of the allies was in reference to turkey. the treaty of sèvres considerably modified that policy in many vital aspects. by that treaty, constantinople, cilicia, and southern anatolia were left to the turk; armenia was created into an independent state. there were many objections which could be raised to the original proposals of 1915, as it might be argued that they contemplated handing over in cilicia and southern anatolia populations which in the main were turkish and moslem to christian rulers. but in substance the modified plan of sèvres was sound, and if carried out would have conduced to the well-being of the millions to be liberated by its terms for ever from turkish rule. the world at large also would have benefited by the opportunity afforded to the industrious and intelligent armenian and greek populations of turkey to renew the fertility of this land, once so bountiful in its gifts, thus enriching man's store of good things. the barbarian invasion which withered that fertility was pushed back into the interior by the treaty of sèvres. the treaty of lausanne has extended and perpetuated its sway from the black sea to the mediterranean. i have explained the why and wherefore of sèvres. but why lausanne? it is a long and painful story--a compound of shortsightedness, disloyalty, selfishness, and pusillanimity amongst nations and their statesmen. and more than all, fate happened to be in its grimmest mood when dealing with this problem. the russian revolution eliminated that great country from the solution of the problem on the lines of protection for the oppressed races of turkey, and instead cast its might on the side of the oppressor. president wilson was inclined to recommend that the united states of america should undertake the mandate for the armenians. had he succeeded, what a different story would now have been told! what a different story the generations to come would also tell! but his health broke down at the vital moment and america would have none of his humanitarian schemes. then came the departure of sonnino from the quirinal. with him went for a momentous while the old dreams of italian colonisation, which in the past had done so much to spread civilisation in three continents. his successors were homelier men. i have still my doubts as to whether they served italy best by the less adventurous and more domesticated policy they pursued. the future may decide that issue. but whatever the decision, the time for action passed away, and unless and until there is another break up in turkey, the chance italy has lost since 1919 will not be recovered. will it ever come back? there followed the french check in cilicia, and the negotiations at angora with mustapha kemal, which were both single-handed and under-handed; for the allies were not even informed of what was going on. this was a fatal step, for it broke up the unity which alone would enable the western powers to deal effectively with the turk. this unity was never fully re-created. there can be no reunion without confidence. there can be no trust in the west that is broken in the east. much of the recent mischief in the entente came from the clandestine negotiations at angora. the last fatal change was the greek revolt against venizelos. it is often said that he is the greatest statesman thrown up by that race since pericles. in all he has undertaken he has never failed his people. disaster has always come to them when they refused to follow his guidance. when king alexander was killed by a monkey, the greeks were called upon to decide between constantine and venizelos. their choice was ruinous to their country. no greater evil can befall a nation than to choose for its ruler a stubborn man with no common sense. before the advent of constantine, greece, with no aid and little countenance from the powers, was able to hold the forces of mustapha kemal easily at bay and even to drive him back into the fastnesses of anatolia. in encounter after encounter the greek army, led by men chosen for their military gifts and sufficiently well equipped, inflicted defeat after defeat on the armies of angora. but with constantine came a change. in the greek army, courtiers were substituted for soldiers in the high command. french, british and italian public opinion, with the memory of constantine's treachery during the war still fresh in their minds, altered their attitude towards the greeks who had elevated him to the throne in defiance of allied sentiment. indifferent powers became hostile; hostile powers became active. the final catastrophe began with the heroic but foolish march of the greek army into the defiles of asia minor, followed by the inevitable retreat. it was consummated when constantine for dynastic reasons appointed to the command of the troops in asia minor a crazy general whose mental condition had been under medical review. the greeks fight valiantly when well led, but like the french, once they know they are not well led, confidence goes, and with confidence courage. before the kemalist attack reached their lines the greek army was beaten and in full retreat. with attack came panic, with panic the complete destruction of what was once a fine army. with the disappearance of that army vanished the last hope for the salvation of anatolia. that the history of the east, and probably the west, should have been changed by the bite of a monkey is just another grimace of the comic spirit which bursts now and again into the pages of every great tragedy. all that could be done afterwards was to save the remnants of a great policy. western civilisation put up its last fight against the return of savagery into europe, when in september and october of last year british soldiers and sailors, deserted by allies and associates alike, saved constantinople from hideous carnage. the pact of mudania was not sèvres, but it certainly was better than lausanne. from sèvres to mudania was a retreat. from mudania to lausanne is a rout. what next? lausanne is not a terminus, it is only a milestone. where is the next? no one claims that this treaty is peace with honour. it is not even peace. if one were dealing with a regenerated turk, there might be hope. but the burning of smyrna, and the cold-blooded murders of tens of thousands of young greeks in the interior, prove that the turk is still unchanged. to quote again from the correspondent of _the times_ at lausanne:- "all such evidence as can be obtained here confirms the belief that the new turk is but the old, and that the coming era of enlightenment and brotherly love in turkey, for which it is the correct thing officially to hope, will be from the foreigners' point of view at best a humiliating, and at worst a bloody, chaos." the amazing legend that the turk is a gentleman is dying hard. that legend has saved him many a time when he was on the brink of destruction. it came to his aid in october last when the policy of this country was changed by the revolt of the turcophile against the coalition. the turk has massacred hundreds of thousands of armenians, and dishonoured myriads of christian women who trusted to his protection. nevertheless the turk is a gentleman! by his indolence, his shiftiness, his stupidity, and his wantonness, he has reduced a garden to a desert. what better proof can there be that he is a real gentleman? for a german bribe he sold the friends who had repeatedly saved his wretched life. all the same, what a gentleman he is! he treated british prisoners with a barbarous neglect that killed them off in hundreds. still, he is such a gentleman! he plunders, he slays, and outrages those who are unable to defend themselves. he misgoverns, cheats, lies, and betrays. for all that, the turk is a gentleman! so an agitation was engineered with perverse tenacity to save this fine old oriental gentleman from the plebeian hands that sought his destruction. hence the black treaty of lausanne. _london, july 25th, 1923_ footnote: [12] london, july 25th, 1923. the treaty of lausanne, between the allies and the turks, was signed on july 24th, 1923. xxix the signing of the irish treaty when a few days ago i was half-way through the speech i delivered in the house of commons on the land system the faithful commons were summoned in the manner consecrated by centuries of tradition to the bar of the house of lords to hear the royal assent being given to the bill for the constitution of the irish free state. notwithstanding a natural preoccupation with my interrupted speech two scenes came to my mind during my short journey to and from the upper chamber. the first was the spectacle of a crowded house of commons nearly thirty years ago. when the doors were opened for prayers there was the unwonted sight of a throng of hustling m.p.'s pressing through the swing doors to secure seats. i need hardly say this was not the symptom or the outcome of any religious revival amongst our legislators. it was entirely due to the ancient custom that confers upon a member occupying a seat at prayers the unchallengeable right to that seat for the rest of the sitting. rows of chairs were arrayed on the floor of the house. that was an innovation never since followed. what was it all about? there sat in the middle of the treasury bench huddled up and almost hidden by more stalwart and upright figures an old man of 83 years, to all appearances in the last stage of physical decrepitude and mental lassitude. his name was william ewart gladstone, the greatest parliamentary gladiator of all time. the lifelong champion of oppressed nationalities was to-day to inaugurate his final effort to give freedom to the irish race trodden for centuries by ruthless force. the last remnant of his strength was to be consecrated to the achievement of irish liberty, and hundreds of eager legislators to whom peel and russell, palmerston and disraeli were but historical names, were avid competitors for seats from which they could better listen to a man who had sat in governments with the first three and crossed swords with the fourth. it was a memorable sight. the preliminary questions which precede all parliamentary business were by common consent postponed, and a deep and solemn silence thrilling with expectancy fell upon the humming assembly as mr. speaker peel in his sonorous voice called out "the prime minister." the inert heap which was the centre of all gaze sprang to the table an erect and alert figure. the decrepitude was cast off like a cloak--the lassitude vanished as by a magician's wand, the shoulders were thrown back, the chest was thrown forward, and in deep, ringing tones full of music and force the proposed new irish charter was expounded for three unwearying hours by the transfigured octogenarian rejuvenated by the magic of an inspired soul. i had a seat just opposite the great orator. i was one of the multitude who on that occasion listened with marvel to that feat of intellectual command and physical endurance. it was more than that. it was an unrivalled display of moral courage, rare in political conflict. mr. gladstone had only just emerged out of a general election where, in spite of six years of his eloquent advocacy, the voice of great britain had declared emphatically against his irish policy, and the poor parliamentary majority at his back was made up out of the preponderating irish vote in favour of home rule. he was confronted with the most formidable parliamentary opposition ever ranged against a minister, redoubtable in debating quality, still more redoubtable in its hold on british pride. he was eighty-three years of age, but he never quailed, and through the sultry summer months of 1893 he fought night by night with mighty strokes the battle of irish emancipation. he did not live to carry the cause through to victory, but he planted the banner so firmly in the soil that no assault could succeed in tearing it down, and on the day when i stood with mr. bonar law at the bar of the house of lords i saw this banner flourished in triumph from the steps of the throne by a unionist lord chancellor. that was the first memory that flashed through my brain. the next was of a dreary december night just one year ago when on one side of the cabinet table in 10 downing street sat four representatives of great britain and on the other five irish leaders. it was the famous room wherein british cabinets have for generations forged their irish policies. coercion and concession alike issued from that chamber. pitt's act of union was discussed there, and so were gladstone's home rule bills, the decision to use british soldiers to throw irish tenants out of their houses with battering ram and torch and equally the bill which made every irish tenant lord and master of his home at the expense of the british treasury--all issued forth from this simple and unadorned council chamber. and now came the final treaty of peace. would it be signed? it was an anxious moment charged with destiny for the two great races who confronted each other at that green table. the british representatives who were associated with me on the occasion were mr. austen chamberlain; [i recall now how he sat by the side of his doughty father, mr. joseph chamberlain, in 1893, during the famous nightly duel between him and mr. gladstone. how strangely little thirty arduous years have changed his personal appearance!] lord birkenhead, who, in 1893 was carving for himself a brilliant career as a student at oxford and as a debater in the union; mr. winston churchill who was then a cadet at sandhurst whilst his father was engaged in the last great parliamentary struggle of his dazzling but tragic career; sir gordon hewart, now lord hewart, the man who has risen on the pinions of a powerful intelligence to the height of lord chief justice of england. my recollection is that the other two british delegates--sir laming worthington-evans and sir hamar greenwood--were stricken with illness and were unable to be present. after weeks of close investigation the climax of decision had been reached. britain had gone to the limit of concession. no british statesman could have faced any assembly of his countrymen had he appended his signature to a convention that placed ireland outside that fraternity of free nations known as the british empire or freed her from that bond of union which is represented by a common fealty to the sovereign. it is not easy to interpret the potency of this invisible bond to those who are brought up to venerate other systems. it is nevertheless invincible. would the irish leaders have the courage to make peace on the only conditions under which peace was attainable--liberty within the empire? opposite me sat a dark, short, but sturdy figure with the face of a thinker. that was mr. arthur griffith, the most un-irish leader that ever led ireland, quiet to the point of gentleness, reserved almost to the point of appearing saturnine. a man of laconic utterance, he answered in monosyllables where most men would have considered an oratorical deliverance to be demanded by the dignity of the occasion. but we found in our few weeks' acquaintance that his yea was yea and his nay meant nay. he led the irish deputation. he was asked whether he would sign. in his abrupt, staccato manner he replied, "speaking on my own behalf i mean to sign." by his side sat a handsome young irishman. no one could mistake his nationality. he was irish through and through, in every respect a contrast to his taciturn neighbour. vivacious, buoyant, highly strung, gay, impulsive, but passing readily from gaiety to grimness and back again to gaiety, full of fascination and charm--but also of dangerous fire. that was michael collins, one of the most courageous leaders ever produced by a valiant race. nevertheless he hesitated painfully when the quiet and gentle little figure on his left had taken his resolve. both saw the shadow of doom clouding over that fateful paper--their own doom. they knew that the pen which affixed their signature at the same moment signed their death-warrant. the little man saw beyond his own fall ireland rising out of her troubles a free nation and that sufficed for him. michael collins was not appalled by the spectre of death, but he had the irishman's fear of encountering that charge which comes so readily to the lips of the oppressed--that of having succumbed to alien wile and betrayed their country. patriots who cheerfully face the tyrant's steel lose their nerve before that dread accusation. it was the first time michael collins ever showed fear. it was also the last. i knew the reason why he halted, although he never uttered a word which revealed his mind, and i addressed my appeal to an effort to demonstrate how the treaty gave ireland more than daniel o'connell and parnell had ever hoped for, and how his countrymen would be ever grateful to him not only for the courage which won such an offer, but for the wisdom that accepted it. he asked for a few hours to consider, promising a reply by nine o'clock. nine passed, but the irish leaders did not return. ten. eleven, and they were not yet back. we had doubts as to whether we should see them again. then came a message from the secretary of the irish delegation that they were on their way to downing street. when they marched in it was clear from their faces that they had come to a great decision after a prolonged struggle. but there were still difficulties to overcome--they were, however, difficulties not of principle but of detail. these were discussed in a businesslike way, and soon after one o'clock in the morning the treaty was complete. a friendly chat full of cheerful goodwill occupied the time whilst the stenographers were engaged in copying the draft so disfigured with the corrections, interpolations and additions, each of which represented so many hours of hammering discussion. outside in the lobby sat a man who had used all the resources of an ingenious and well-trained mind backed by a tenacious will to wreck every endeavour to reach agreement--mr. erskine childers, a man whose slight figure, whose kindly, refined and intellectual countenance, whose calm and courteous demeanour offered no clue to the fierce passions which raged inside his breast. at every crucial point in the negotiations he played a sinister part. he was clearly mr. de valera's emissary, and faithfully did he fulfil the trust reposed in him by that visionary. every draft that emanated from his pen--and all the first drafts were written by him--challenged every fundamental position to which the british delegates were irrevocably committed. he was one of those men who by temperament are incapable of compromise. brave and resolute he undoubtedly was, but unhappily for himself he was also rigid and fanatical. when we walked out of the room where we had sat for hours together, worn with tense and anxious labour, but all happy that our great task of reconciliation had been achieved, we met mr. erskine childers outside sullen with disappointment and compressed wrath at what he conceived to be the surrender of principles he had fought for. i never saw him after that morning. michael collins and arthur griffith i met repeatedly after the signature of the treaty, to discuss the many obstacles that surged up in the way of its execution, and i acquired for both a great affection. poor collins was shot by one of his own countrymen on a bleak irish roadside, whilst he was engaged in restoring to the country he had loved so well the order and good government which alone enables nations to enjoy the blessings of freedom. arthur griffith died worn out by anxiety and toil in the cause he had done so much to carry to the summit of victory. erskine childers was shot at dawn for rebellion against the liberties he had helped to win. truly the path of irish freedom right up to the goal is paved with tragedy. but the bloodstained wilderness is almost through, the verdant plains of freedom are stretched before the eyes of this tortured nation. ireland will soon honour the name of the green isle, and i am proud to have had a hand in erecting the pillar which will for ever mark the boundary between the squalor of the past and the hope of the future. _london, december 16th, 1922._ xxx prohibition four years ago the united states of america, by a two-thirds majority, voted prohibition of the sale of alcoholic liquors. the british house of commons have just voted down a bill for the same purpose by a majority of 236 to 14. america treats prohibition as one of its greatest moral triumphs. britain treats it as a joke. what accounts for this remarkable disparity in the attitude of the two great english-speaking communities towards one of the most baffling and elusive problems civilisation has to deal with? it cannot be a fundamental difference in temperament or in moral outlook. the men who engineered prohibition in america are of our own race and kind, bred in the puritan traditions that came originally from our shores. if the evils of excessive drinking had been more apparent in america than in britain i could understand the states of the union deciding to take more drastic action than has been thought necessary in our country. but the facts are exactly the reverse. the consumption of alcohol in the united kingdom some years before the war per head of the population was higher than that of the united states. the poverty, disease, and squalor caused by alcohol was much greater in britain than in america. what, then, accounts for the readiness of america to forbid the sale and the reluctance of britain even seriously to restrict it? i would not care to dogmatise on the subject, but i will hazard two or three possible explanations. i set aside the suggestion that property owners are frightened by the sequel to prohibition in russia. i have heard it argued that the prohibition ukase of the tsar was responsible for the russian revolution. that is probably true, for a people stupefied by alcohol will stand anything. the inefficiency and corruption of the tsarist régime was so appalling that no sober nation could have tolerated it without rebellion for a single year, and when the fumes of vodka ceased to muddle and blind the _moujik_, he rebelled against the autocracy that had betrayed his country into disaster. the russian experiment in drink, therefore, contains no warning against prohibition, except a very limited one, that those who wish to misrule a country in safety must first of all drench it with alcohol. there is, of course, the ready explanation that old countries are very conservative, and do not take kindly to change. their joints are stiff with age, and they creak along well-worn paths slowly and painfully, but they lack the suppleness of limb that tempts younger communities to sprint across untrodden country. that is the argument. i am afraid this explanation will not hold. old countries when thoroughly moved can leap like the hart. the french revolution demonstrated how vigorously one of the oldest nations of europe could tear along unbroken tracks when impelled by a new passion. and i saw britain spring to arms in 1914, when five millions of men joined the colours without the lash of compulsion to stir their blood. england renewed her youth, and her movements had the energy, the audacity, and the endurance of a people untired by a march of centuries. this people, if stirred by a call which reaches its heart or conscience, is capable of action as bold as that which wrested magna charta out of a despot in the twelfth century, overthrew an ancient religion in the fifteenth century, led a king to the scaffold in the seventeenth century, or challenged the greatest military empires in the world in the sixteenth, the nineteenth, and the twentieth centuries. and if they were convinced that the liquor traffic must be destroyed, they would execute it with as little compunction or hesitation as they displayed in suppressing the mass or in decapitating charles i. at the present moment the british people are not in the least persuaded that the evils of alcohol for a minority of the population cannot be dealt with effectively without resorting to the very drastic expedient of forbidding its consumption by the majority who use it in moderation. are they likely to be convinced? that depends on the failure or success of all other expedients to exterminate the evil of alcoholism. that brings me to another explanation. america reached prohibition by the path of experiment. the federal system lent itself to the trial of every form of remedy, including prohibition. for well over half a century you have had almost every form of temperance expedient ever suggested in actual working in some state or other of the american republic. when i was a lad i heard debates and addresses in welsh about the comparative merits of the "maine law" and high license. high license, reduction of licenses, local option, prohibition, have all been tried. they have all been in operation quite long enough to enable the american public to form a judgment on their merits. statistical results over long periods constitute a reliable basis for inference. american federalism furnished the opportunity, and the states took full advantage of it. hence the prohibition law. to the practical man the figures in the prohibition states looked attractive from a business point of view. he hesitated, but the moral wave that swept over america carried him over the bar. but without the experience at his door i doubt whether the american business man would have assented to prohibition. the british constitution does not lend itself to these valuable experiments. otherwise, london might have tried one experiment, lancashire another, yorkshire a third, scotland a fourth, and wales a fifth. the whole legislative power of the united kingdom was until quite recently vested in the imperial parliament. ireland has now a legislature of its own. in theory, what suited one part of the kingdom must do for the whole, and what did not suit the more populous parts could not be permitted to others. as far as scotland, ireland, and wales are concerned, there was in practice a certain relaxation of this rule. but as far as the liquor laws went, any serious alteration in any part of the kingdom was difficult to secure if it offended the prejudices or damaged the interests of the rest. it took years to get it through parliament even in a mutilated condition. there was no real freedom of experiment. the scottish local veto act is a compromise modified to suit english sentiment. even as it is, it took thirty years of scottish insistence to carry. wales has been unable to secure local option, although it has been demanded by four-fifths of its representatives for over a generation. we have, therefore, in this country been denied the practical experience which has guided america to so dramatic a conclusion. in the absence of such experience it has been found impossible to educate and organise public opinion throughout britain to the point of concentrating attention and pressure on this one issue. other issues always cut across and jam the current. you cannot secure unanimity of action on temperance reform even amongst the religious forces. if they were united in their demand, and prepared to enforce it at elections, nothing could resist their power. between elections they seem agreed in their policy; but no sooner does the party bugle sound than they all fall into rank in opposite armies, and the temperance banner is hurriedly packed into the cupboard for use after the polls have been declared. it is then once more brought out to wave over the tabernacle, and its wrinkles are straightened out in the breeze. i have seen the fiercest champions of local option supporting brewers at elections because they were the official opponents of irish home rule in the contest. i remember being told by an eminent scottish divine, who was a strong temperance advocate, but who had hitherto supported anti-temperance candidates because of his inveterate opposition to gladstone's home rule, that, unless his party carried a measure of local option for scotland soon, he would have to abandon them, home rule or no home rule. he died without redeeming his promise. the time never came for him. the irish issue dominated elections for nearly a generation. free trade played a great part also. if the exigencies of party conflict had permitted the same consistent propaganda work, extending over the same number of years, to be devoted to the drink problem as was given to the wrongs of ireland or free trade, no doubt public opinion could have been educated up to the point of supporting drastic reform. but this has not been found practicable by political parties owing to the distraction of other issues. this is the main reason why british opinion is so far behind american opinion on the temperance question. in america the battle of sobriety was fought on the state platform, whilst the national platform was left free for other conflicts. the war, however, enabled the british government to effect reforms which have materially reduced the consumption of alcohol in this kingdom. these results have been achieved by an enormous increase in the taxation of alcoholic liquors, and by a considerable reduction in the hours of sale. the taxation of beer was raised from £13,000,000 in 1913 to £123,000,000 in 1921. the duty on spirits in 1913 yielded £22,000,000, in 1921 it gave the revenue £71,000,000. one of the effects has been an appreciable reduction in the alcoholic strength of the beverage sold. the hours of sale in the morning and afternoon have been curtailed appreciably. by this measure the workman is prevented from starting his day by drinking alcohol, and the afternoon break prevents the drinker from soddening all day. the effect of these combined measures has been highly beneficial. the quantity of beer sold fell from 34,152,739 barrels of 36 gallons at standard gravity of 10.55 in 1913, to 23,885,472 standard barrels in 1921. spirits fell from 30,736,088 proof gallons in 1913 to 20,162,395 in 1921. these figures represent a remarkable and almost sensational reduction in the quantity of alcohol consumed by the population. convictions for drunkenness fell from 188,877 in 1913 to 77,789 in 1921. deaths from alcoholic diseases were more than halved during the same period. this is the most distinct advance in the direction of effective temperance reform hitherto taken by the british parliament, and the effect is striking in its encouragement. it would be a serious national misfortune if the admirable results attained by these war measures were lost by relaxations. most of the pressure exerted upon parliament has up to the present been in the direction of easing the grip of the state on the traffic. most candidates in all parties at the last election were forced to pledge themselves to support reduction in the beer duty. clubs, even more than "pubs," have urged extensions in drinking hours. the beer duty has already been reduced. it is anticipated that the reduction will have the effect of increasing consumption. this is regrettable, for it means so much reclaimed land once more sinking into the malarial swamp. there is one consolation, however, that the women will claim the next turn in reduction of taxation. sugar and tea will then provide effective barriers in the way of a further cheapening of alcoholic liquors just yet. but all this is a long, long way off prohibition. a majority of 20 to 1 against mr. scrymgeour's prohibition bill, and a majority of 4 to 1 in favour of cheaper beer--both recorded in the same parliamentary week--is not encouraging to those who would suppress alcohol in britain. temperance reformers here are, therefore, watching the progress of america's bold bid for sobriety with hopeful, if anxious, eyes, and with longing hearts. what britain does next will depend entirely on the success or failure of what america is doing now. xxxi unofficial publication of "official" information a storm is working up over the publication by public servants of information which came into their possession in the course of their official careers. the immediate occasion is mr. winston churchill's story of the war. angry questions are being asked in parliament, and it is publicly announced that the cabinet have appointed a committee of its members to consider the whole problem. it is rather late in the day to make all this fuss about the publication of war documents, for generals, admirals, and ministers in all lands, including ours, have during the last three years been inundating the european and american public with a flood of reminiscences, explanations, criticisms, attacks and defences on the conduct of operations, either of the great war or the great peace, in which they were engaged. warriors on land and on sea have displayed an unprecedented eagerness to inform the public as to their own share in the great victory, and as to how much more brilliant that share would have been but for the wrongheadedness or stupidity of some collaborator. like julius cæsar, they mean to live in history not merely through their battles, but also through their commentaries upon them. on the other hand, statesmen have been engaged in disclaiming responsibility for particular parts of the treaty of versailles, and where blame has been attached to them, either by opponents or supporters, for the form in which those parts were cast, they have striven hard to prove that it was attributable to pressure which they were unable to resist from other actors in the drama. in each case highly confidential information is disclosed, secret documents are used, cabinet and council proceedings are published, without the slightest regard to precedent. one disclosure has led to another, one revelation has rendered another inevitable. a general, admiral or minister criticises on the strength of half-disclosed minutes or documents some other public functionary, military, naval, or political. what is the latter to do? his reputation is at stake. is he not to be allowed to repair the omission or to correct the misquotation? take the case of ministers who played an important part in the conduct of the war or the peace, and whose actions have been subjected to malignant and persistent misrepresentation. in attacking these ministers statements are made which, if accepted by the public, would irretrievably damage or even destroy their reputation. in formulating the attack a document is partially quoted, or the report of a council or cabinet meeting is misquoted. the minister knows that a full and fair quotation would clear his good name of the imputation sought to be cast upon it. is he not to be allowed, in those circumstances, to publish it? a mere denial would carry no weight. a full revelation would settle the dispute in his favour. the publication cannot conceivably affect any public interest, it would supply no information which could serve any possible enemy of his country. is he not to be allowed to use the only means available to redeem his credit from the ruin of accepted calumny? his critic has been allowed to disclose secret information without protest. is he to be forbidden to do so in self-defence? he claims that he served his country faithfully to the best of his powers in time of crisis and peril. for that he is defamed by men who had access to secret information and use it freely without criticism, censure or demur. why should his country deny him the same privilege for his protection? that is the case which the cabinet committee will have to consider. whatever general rules may be laid down they must in all fairness take into account these exceptional circumstances. those who are now taking a prominent part in emphasising the enormity of giving to the public documents which were acquired in the public service had not a word to say when portions of those documents were used for purposes with which they were in sympathy. is it not rather late for them to protest now? there is such a thing as fair play even when politicians are attacked. so far as the british are concerned the writing of the books of the type alluded to was started, i think, by field-marshal lord french of ypres, in his book, _1914_. this work is of the nature of an apologia; and the writer, to assist in establishing his case, alludes to discussions with the cabinet and does not hesitate to quote textually secret memoranda and dispatches written by himself and others. the late admiral of the fleet, lord fisher, gives in his book, _memories_, examples of his own intervention at the war council meetings. in his autobiography, _from private to field-marshal_, which appeared some time later, field-marshal sir william robertson, who was for over two years the confidential adviser of the cabinet and as such attended all war councils and most war cabinet meetings, when it suits his argument gives to the public his version of what passed at these highly secret conclaves. though he does not quote secret documents textually, he describes the proceedings and deliberations of the supreme war council, inter-allied conferences and the war cabinet, and refers to the opinions of individuals. in his recent speeches he has gone even further. a still more recent work, _sir douglas haig's command_, is the result of collaboration by two authors of whom one, at least, held an official position during the war, being sir douglas haig's private secretary when he was commander-in-chief of the british army in france. this book is even less reticent. it, also, is essentially an apologia and justification of an individual. to establish their case, the writers not only summarise some of the secret proceedings of the supreme war council and war cabinet, but give extracts of their decisions. these extracts are freely used as the basis of animadversion on the council and cabinet of that day. it is true that some of the quotations are stated to be taken from french books previously published, but others are not, which arouses curiosity as to the source of the knowledge displayed. in addition there have been endless articles in magazines and newspapers, some signed, some written anonymously, all attacking either ministers, generals or admirals, and most of them clearly supplied with secret information by men who must have acquired it in their official capacity. as to all these disclosures protest has hitherto been silent. but when it is indicated that replies are forthcoming and that these replies will reveal the real nature of the misquoted documents or proceedings, the wrath of the assailants and their sympathisers knows no bounds. what happened in reference to the consultations held in connection with the framing of the peace treaty affords an illustration of the way these revelations occur. the question of the publication of these proceedings was definitely discussed at versailles, after the signature of the peace treaty with germany on the 28th june, 1919, by president wilson, representing the united states, m. clemenceau and m. simon, representing france, m. sonnino, representing italy, m. makino, representing japan, and myself. this is what occurred on that occasion. for the first time i quote from my own notes written at the time: "president wilson was strongly of opinion that these documents ought to be treated as purely private conversation, and he objected to the communication of the accounts given in the notes of the private conversations, in which all present had spoken their minds with great freedom, as improper use might afterwards be made of these documents. on the other hand, he did not object to the notes being communicated to special individuals in the personal confidence of members of the council. though he looked upon certain statements, the conclusions and the actions as being official, and therefore available in the appropriate offices, the actual conversations were private. in the united states no one had the right to claim documents of this kind. president wilson's view was that each government should take the course traditional in its own country with the clear and distinct understanding that no one should under any circumstances make the _procès verbal_ public. m. clemenceau did not think that such documents should be regarded as private property, whilst m. sonnino thought they need not be considered as official documents. "for my own part i was anxious to know what the precedents were. i also felt bound to enter a caveat that if attacks should be made on the political heads i might be forced in particular cases to refer to these notes, and i gave warning that i might have to do so unless a protest was then made. m. clemenceau agreed so far, that it might be impossible to refuse extracts from the _procès verbaux_ to prove particular facts." it will be observed from this record that i was the first to safeguard the interest of persons who, i felt certain, would be attacked for their share in the treaty. i am the last to take advantage of the proviso. what followed? m. clemenceau was bitterly attacked by his political opponents for surrendering french rights to the treaty. president wilson was also attacked by his political opponents for his assent to other provisions of the treaty. in self-defence they authorised the publication of the secret reports of the paris meeting. m. clemenceau entrusted his defence to m. tardieu. m. tardieu, in his book _the truth about the treaty_, gives most of his attention to the drawing up of that international instrument, but deals with the last portion of the war period and quotes from the proceedings of inter-allied conferences, and also of the supreme war council, giving the opinions of individuals. he does the same with the deliberations of the peace conference. in fact the whole book is based on international proceedings of a secret nature. m. poincaré, in maligning his rivals, has not refrained from making full use of information which came to his knowledge as president of the republic. for example, in his article, _souvenirs et documents_, in the _temps_ of the 12th september, 1921, he quotes _in extenso_ a letter of april, 1919, from himself as president of the republic to the president of the council, m. clemenceau, and a letter from me in reply to the president of the council. my consent was not even asked to the publication of my letter. this correspondence referred to the period proposed to be placed on the occupation by the allies of the left bank of the rhine. according to signor nitti, m. poincaré makes somewhat similar disclosures in his articles published in the _revue des deux mondes_. all these disclosures were partial, truncated and, therefore, misleading. they did not give the public a complete account of what occurred. the impression created was, therefore, unfair to the other actors in that great drama. that is undoubtedly what impelled ex-president wilson to hand over his documents to mr. ray baker with a view to the presentation of the case from the standpoint of the american delegation. hence his book, _woodrow wilson and world settlement_. it is mostly based on the secret minutes of the supreme war council, numerous extracts from which are given. signor nitti, the late italian premier, on the other hand, expressly states that he does not publish any document which was not intended for publication. nevertheless, he prints a memorandum written by myself for the peace conference in march, 1919, under the title of _some considerations for the peace conference before they finally draft their terms_, and also m. clemenceau's reply, both of which are secret documents. but he excuses his action in this case because extracts from this memorandum had already been published. i only mention these matters, not by way of arraignment of these various distinguished men for divulging secrets they ought to have kept under lock and key. that is not in the least my object. i do so in order to point out that general rules as to the conditions under which confidential material can be used are not applicable to circumstances of the great war and the peace that ensued. disclosures already made largely for purposes of criticism and aspersion upon individuals or bodies of individuals have given the assailed parties a special position which cannot in justice be overlooked. _london, march 17th, 1923._ file made using scans of public domain works at the university of georgia.) an inquiry into the nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation by thorstein veblen new york b.w. huebsch 1919 _all rights reserved_ copyright, 1917. by the macmillan company. published april, 1917: reprinted august, 1917. new edition published by b.w. huebsch. january, 1919. preface it is now some 122 years since kant wrote the essay, _zum ewigen frieden_. many things have happened since then, although the peace to which he looked forward with a doubtful hope has not been among them. but many things have happened which the great critical philosopher, and no less critical spectator of human events, would have seen with interest. to kant the quest of an enduring peace presented itself as an intrinsic human duty, rather than as a promising enterprise. yet through all his analysis of its premises and of the terms on which it may be realised there runs a tenacious persuasion that, in the end, the régime of peace at large will be installed. not as a deliberate achievement of human wisdom, so much as a work of nature the designer of things--_natura daedala rerum_. to any attentive reader of kant's memorable essay it will be apparent that the title of the following inquiry--on the nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation--is a descriptive translation of the caption under which he wrote. that such should be the case will not, it is hoped, be accounted either an unseemly presumption or an undue inclination to work under a borrowed light. the aim and compass of any disinterested inquiry in these premises is still the same as it was in kant's time; such, indeed, as he in great part made it,--viz., a systematic knowledge of things as they are. nor is the light of kant's leading to be dispensed with as touches the ways and means of systematic knowledge, wherever the human realities are in question. meantime, many things have also changed since the date of kant's essay. among other changes are those that affect the direction of inquiry and the terms of systematic formulation. _natura daedala rerum_ is no longer allowed to go on her own recognizances, without divulging the ways and means of her workmanship. and it is such a line of extension that is here attempted, into a field of inquiry which in kant's time still lay over the horizon of the future. the quest of perpetual peace at large is no less a paramount and intrinsic human duty today than it was, nor is it at all certain that its final accomplishment is nearer. but the question of its pursuit and of the conditions to be met in seeking this goal lies in a different shape today; and it is this question that concerns the inquiry which is here undertaken,--what are the terms on which peace at large may hopefully be installed and maintained? what, if anything, is there in the present situation that visibly makes for a realisation of these necessary terms within the calculable future? and what are the consequences presumably due to follow in the nearer future from the installation of such a peace at large? and the answer to these questions is here sought not in terms of what ought dutifully to be done toward the desired consummation, but rather in terms of those known factors of human behaviour that can be shown by analysis of experience to control the conduct of nations in conjunctures of this kind. february 1917 contents chapter i introductory: on the state and its relation to war and peace 1 the inquiry is not concerned with the intrinsic merits of peace or war, 2. --but with the nature, causes and consequences of the preconceptions favoring peace or war, 3. --a breach of the peace is an act of the government, or state, 3. --patriotism is indispensable to furtherance of warlike enterprise, 4. --all the peoples of christendom are sufficiently patriotic, 6. --peace established by the state, an armistice--the state is an instrumentality for making peace, not for perpetuating it, 7. --the governmental establishments and their powers in all the christian nations are derived from the feudal establishments of the middle ages, 9. --still retain the right of coercively controlling the actions of their citizens, 11. --contrast of icelandic commonwealth, 12. --the statecraft of the past half century has been one of competitive preparedness, 14. --prussianised germany has forced the pace in this competitive preparedness, 20. --an avowedly predatory enterprise no longer meets with approval, 21. --when a warlike enterprise has been entered upon, it will have the support of popular sentiment even if it is an aggressive war, 22. --the moral indignation of both parties to the quarrel is to be taken for granted, 23. --the spiritual forces of any christian nation may be mobilised for war by either of two pleas: (1) the preservation or furtherance of the community's material interests, real or fancied, and (2) vindication of the national honour; as perhaps also perpetuation of the national "culture," 23. chapter ii on the nature and uses of patriotism 31 the nature of patriotism, 31. --is a spirit of emulation, 33. --must seem moral, if only to a biased populace, 33. --the common man is sufficiently patriotic but is hampered with a sense of right and honest dealing, 38. --patriotism is at cross purposes with modern life, 38. --is an hereditary trait? 41. --variety of racial stocks in europe, 43. --patriotism a ubiquitous trait, 43. --patriotism disserviceable, yet men hold to it, 46. --cultural evolution of europeans, 48. --growth of a sense of group solidarity, 49. --material interests of group falling into abeyance as class divisions have grown up, until prestige remains virtually the sole community interest, 51. --based upon warlike prowess, physical magnitude and pecuniary traffic of country, 54. --interests of the master class are at cross purposes with the fortunes of the common man, 57. --value of superiors is a "prestige value," 57. --the material benefits which this ruling class contribute are: defense against aggression, and promotion of the community's material gain, 60. --the common defense is a remedy for evils due to the patriotic spirit, 61. --the common defense the usual blind behind which events are put in train for eventual hostilities, 62. --all the nations of warring europe convinced that they are fighting a defensive war, 62. --which usually takes the form of a defense of the national honour, 63. --material welfare is of interest to the dynastic statesman only as it conduces to political success, 64. --the policy of national economic self-sufficiency, 67. --the chief material use of patriotism is its use to a limited number of persons in their quest of private gain, 67. --and has the effect of dividing the nations on lines of rivalry, 76. chapter iii on the conditions of a lasting peace 77 the patriotic spirit of modern peoples is the abiding source of contention among nations, 77. --hence any calculus of the chances of peace will be a reckoning of forces which may be counted on to keep a patriotic nation in an unstable equilibrium of peace, 78. --the question of peace and war at large is a question of peace and war among the powers, which are of two contrasted kinds: those which may safely be counted on spontaneously to take the offensive and those which will fight on provocation, 79. --war not a question of equity but of opportunity, 81. --the imperial designs of germany and japan as the prospective cause of war, 82. --peace can be maintained in two ways: submission to their dominion, or elimination of these two powers; no middle course open, 84. --frame of mind of states; men and popular sentiment in a dynastic state, 84. --information, persuasion and reflection will not subdue national animosities and jealousies; peoples of europe are racially homogeneous along lines of climatic latitude, 88. --but loyalty is a matter of habituation, 89. --derivation and current state of german nationalism, 94. --contrasted with the animus of the citizens of a commonwealth, 103;--a neutral peace-compact may be practicable in the absence of germany and japan, but it has no chance in their presence, 106. --the national life of germany: the intellectuals, 108. --summary of chapter, 116. chapter iv peace without honour 118 submission to the imperial power one of the conditions precedent to a peaceful settlement, 118. --character of the projected tutelage, 118. --life under the _pax germanica_ contrasted with the ottoman and russian rule, 124. --china and biological and cultural success, 130. --difficulty of non-resistant subjection is of a psychological order, 131. --patriotism of the bellicose kind is of the nature of habit, 134. --and men may divest themselves of it, 140. --a decay of the bellicose national spirit must be of the negative order, the disuse of the discipline out of which it has arisen, 142. --submission to imperial authorities necessitates abeyance of national pride among the other peoples, 144. --pecuniary merits of the projected imperial dominion, 145. --pecuniary class distinctions in the commonwealths and the pecuniary burden on the common man, 150. --material conditions of life for the common man under the modern rule of big business, 156. --the competitive régime, "what the traffic will bear," and the life and labor of the common man, 158. --industrial sabotage by businessmen, 165. --contrasted with the imperial usufruct and its material advantages to the common man, 174. chapter v peace and neutrality 178 personal liberty, not creature comforts, the ulterior springs of action of the common man of the democratic nations, 178. --no change of spiritual state to be looked for in the life-time of the oncoming generation, 185. --the dynastic spirit among the peoples of the empire will, under the discipline of modern economic conditions, fall into decay, 187. --contrast of class divisions in germany and england, 192. --national establishments are dependent for their continuance upon preparation for hostilities, 196. --the time required for the people of the dynastic states to unlearn their preconceptions will be longer than the interval required for a new onset, 197. --there can be no neutral course between peace by unconditional surrender and submission or peace by the elimination of imperial germany and japan, 202. --peace by submission not practicable for the modern nations, 203. --neutralisation of citizenship, 205. --spontaneous move in that direction not to be looked for, 213. --its chances of success, 219. --the course of events in america, 221. chapter vi elimination of the unfit 233 a league of neutrals, its outline, 233. --need of security from aggression of imperial germany, 234. --inclusion of the imperial states in the league, 237. --necessity of elimination of imperial military clique, 239. --necessity of intermeddling in internal affairs of germany even if not acceptable to the german people, 240. --probability of pacific nations taking measures to insure peace, 244-298. --the british gentleman and his control of the english government, 244. --the shifting of control out of the hands of the gentleman into those of the underbred common man, 251. --the war situation and its probable effect on popular habits of thought in england, 252. --the course of such events and their bearing on the chances of a workable pacific league, 255. --conditions precedent to a successful pacific league of neutrals, 258. --colonial possessions, 259. --neutralisation of trade relations, 263. --futility of economic boycott, 266. --the terms of settlement, 269. --the effect of the war and the chances of the british people being able to meet the exigencies of peace, 273. --summary of the terms of settlement, 280. --constitutional monarchies and the british gentlemanly government, 281. --the american national establishment, a government by businessmen, and its economic policy, 292. --america and the league, 294. chapter vii peace and the price system 299 the different conceptions of peace, 299. --psychological effects of the war, 303. --the handicraft system and the machine industry, and their psychological effect on political preconceptions, 306. --the machine technology and the decay of patriotic loyalty, 310. --summary, 313. --ownership and the right of contract, 315. --standardised under handicraft system, 319. --ownership and the machine industry. 320. --business control and sabotage, 322. --governments of pacific nations controlled by privileged classes, 326. --effect of peace on the economic situation, 328. --economic aspects of a régime of peace, especially as related to the development of classes, 330. --the analogy of the victorian peace, 344. --the case of the american farmer, 348. --the leisure class, 350. --the rising standard of living, 354. --culture, 355. --the eventual cleavage of classes, those who own and those who do not, 360. --conditioned by peace at large, 366. --necessary conditions of a lasting peace, 367. an inquiry into the nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation on the nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation chapter i introductory: on the state and its relation to war and peace to many thoughtful men ripe in worldly wisdom it is known of a verity that war belongs indefeasibly in the order of nature. contention, with manslaughter, is indispensable in human intercourse, at the same time that it conduces to the increase and diffusion of the manly virtues. so likewise, the unspoiled youth of the race, in the period of adolescence and aspiring manhood, also commonly share this gift of insight and back it with a generous commendation of all the martial qualities; and women of nubile age and no undue maturity gladly meet them half way. on the other hand, the mothers of the people are commonly unable to see the use of it all. it seems a waste of dear-bought human life, with a large sum of nothing to show for it. so also many men of an elderly turn, prematurely or otherwise, are ready to lend their countenance to the like disparaging appraisal; it may be that the spirit of prowess in them runs at too low a tension, or they may have outlived the more vivid appreciation of the spiritual values involved. there are many, also, with a turn for exhortation, who find employment for their best faculties in attesting the well-known atrocities and futility of war. indeed, not infrequently such advocates of peace will devote their otherwise idle powers to this work of exhortation without stipend or subsidy. and they uniformly make good their contention that the currently accepted conception of the nature of war--general sherman's formula--is substantially correct. all the while it is to be admitted that all this axiomatic exhortation has no visible effect on the course of events or on the popular temper touching warlike enterprise. indeed, no equal volume of speech can be more incontrovertible or less convincing than the utterances of the peace advocates, whether subsidised or not. "war is bloodier than peace." this would doubtless be conceded without argument, but also without prejudice. hitherto the pacifists' quest of a basis for enduring peace, it must be admitted, has brought home nothing tangible--with the qualification, of course, that the subsidised pacifists have come in for the subsidy. so that, after searching the recesses of their imagination, able-bodied pacifists whose loquacity has never been at fault hitherto have been brought to ask: "what shall we say?" * * * * * under these circumstances it will not be out of place to inquire into the nature of this peace about which swings this wide orbit of opinion and argument. at the most, such an inquiry can be no more gratuitous and no more nugatory than the controversies that provoke it. the intrinsic merits of peace at large, as against those of warlike enterprise, it should be said, do not here come in question. that question lies in the domain of preconceived opinion, so that for the purposes of this inquiry it will have no significance except as a matter to be inquired into; the main point of the inquiry being the nature, causes and consequences of such a preconception favoring peace, and the circumstances that make for a contrary preconception in favor of war. by and large, any breach of the peace in modern times is an official act and can be taken only on initiative of the governmental establishment, the state. the national authorities may, of course, be driven to take such a step by pressure of warlike popular sentiment. such, e.g., is presumed to have been the case in the united states' attack on spain during the mckinley administration; but the more that comes to light of the intimate history of that episode, the more evident does it become that the popular war sentiment to which the administration yielded had been somewhat sedulously "mobilised" with a view to such yielding and such a breach. so also in the case of the boer war, the move was made under sanction of a popular war spirit, which, again, did not come to a head without shrewd surveillance and direction. and so again in the current european war, in the case, e.g., of germany, where the initiative was taken, the state plainly had the full support of popular sentiment, and may even be said to have precipitated the war in response to this urgent popular aspiration; and here again it is a matter of notoriety that the popular sentiment had long been sedulously nursed and "mobilised" to that effect, so that the populace was assiduously kept in spiritual readiness for such an event. the like is less evident as regards the united kingdom, and perhaps also as regards the other allies. and such appears to have been the common run of the facts as regards all the greater wars of the last one hundred years,--what may be called the "public" wars of this modern era, as contrasted with the "private" or administrative wars which have been carried on in a corner by one and another of the great powers against hapless barbarians, from time to time, in the course of administrative routine. it is also evident from the run of the facts as exemplified in these modern wars that while any breach of the peace takes place only on the initiative and at the discretion of the government, or state,[1] it is always requisite in furtherance of such warlike enterprise to cherish and eventually to mobilise popular sentiment in support of any warlike move. due fomentation of a warlike animus is indispensable to the procuring and maintenance of a suitable equipment with which eventually to break the peace, as well as to ensure a diligent prosecution of such enterprise when once it has been undertaken. such a spirit of militant patriotism as may serviceably be mobilised in support of warlike enterprise has accordingly been a condition precedent to any people's entry into the modern concert of nations. this concert of nations is a concert of powers, and it is only as a power that any nation plays its part in the concert, all the while that "power" here means eventual warlike force. [footnote 1: a modern nation constitutes a state only in respect of or with ulterior bearing on the question of international peace or war.] such a people as the chinese, e.g., not pervaded with an adequate patriotic spirit, comes into the concert of nations not as a power but as a bone of contention. not that the chinese fall short in any of the qualities that conduce to efficiency and welfare in time of peace, but they appear, in effect, to lack that certain "solidarity of prowess" by virtue of which they should choose to be (collectively) formidable rather than (individually) fortunate and upright; and the modern civilised nations are not in a position, nor in a frame of mind, to tolerate a neighbor whose only claim on their consideration falls under the category of peace on earth and good-will among men. china appears hitherto not to have been a serviceable people for warlike ends, except in so far as the resources of that country have been taken over and converted to warlike uses by some alien power working to its own ends. such have been the several alien dynasties that have seized upon that country from time to time and have achieved dominion by usufruct of its unwarlike forces. such has been the nature of the manchu empire of the recent past, and such is the evident purpose of the prospective japanese usufruct of the same country and its populace. meantime the chinese people appear to be incorrigibly peaceable, being scarcely willing to fight in any concerted fashion even when driven into a corner by unprovoked aggression, as in the present juncture. such a people is very exceptional. among civilised nations there are, broadly speaking, none of that temper, with the sole exception of the chinese,--if the chinese are properly to be spoken of as a nation. modern warfare makes such large and direct use of the industrial arts, and depends for its successful prosecution so largely on a voluminous and unremitting supply of civilian services and wrought goods, that any inoffensive and industrious people, such as the chinese, could doubtless now be turned to good account by any warlike power that might have the disposal of their working forces. to make their industrial efficiency count in this way toward warlike enterprise and imperial dominion, the usufruct of any such inoffensive and unpatriotic populace would have to fall into the hands of an alien governmental establishment. and no alien government resting on the support of a home population trained in the habits of democracy or given over to ideals of common honesty in national concerns could hopefully undertake the enterprise. this work of empire-building out of unwarlike materials could apparently be carried out only by some alien power hampered by no reserve of scruple, and backed by a servile populace of its own, imbued with an impeccable loyalty to its masters and with a suitably bellicose temper, as, e.g., imperial japan or imperial germany. however, for the commonplace national enterprise the common run will do very well. any populace imbued with a reasonable measure of patriotism will serve as ways and means to warlike enterprise under competent management, even if it is not habitually prone to a bellicose temper. rightly managed, ordinary patriotic sentiment may readily be mobilised for warlike adventure by any reasonably adroit and single-minded body of statesmen,--of which there is abundant illustration. all the peoples of christendom are possessed of a sufficiently alert sense of nationality, and by tradition and current usage all the national governments of christendom are warlike establishments, at least in the defensive sense; and the distinction between the defensive and the offensive in international intrigue is a technical matter that offers no great difficulty. none of these nations is of such an incorrigibly peaceable temper that they can be counted on to keep the peace consistently in the ordinary course of events. peace established by the state, or resting in the discretion of the state, is necessarily of the nature of an armistice, in effect terminable at will and on short notice. it is maintained only on conditions, stipulated by express convention or established by custom, and there is always the reservation, tacit or explicit, that recourse will be had to arms in case the "national interests" or the punctilios of international etiquette are traversed by the act or defection of any rival government or its subjects. the more nationally-minded the government or its subject populace, the readier the response to the call of any such opportunity for an unfolding of prowess. the most peaceable governmental policy of which christendom has experience is a policy of "watchful waiting," with a jealous eye to the emergence of any occasion for national resentment; and the most irretrievably shameful dereliction of duty on the part of any civilised government would be its eventual insensibility to the appeal of a "just war." under any governmental auspices, as the modern world knows governments, the keeping of the peace comes at its best under the precept, "speak softly and carry a big stick." but the case for peace is more precarious than the wording of the aphorism would indicate, in as much as in practical fact the "big stick" is an obstacle to soft speech. evidently, in the light of recent history, if the peace is to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management,--in spite of the state rather than by its good offices. at the best, the state, or the government, is an instrumentality for making peace, not for perpetuating it. * * * * * anyone who is interested in the nature and derivation of governmental institutions and establishments in europe, in any but the formal respect, should be able to satisfy his curiosity by looking over the shoulders of the professed students of political science. quite properly and profitably that branch of scholarship is occupied with the authentic pedigree of these institutions, and with the documentary instruments in the case; since political science is, after all, a branch of theoretical jurisprudence and is concerned about a formally competent analysis of the recorded legal powers. the material circumstances from which these institutions once took their beginning, and the exigencies which have governed the rate and direction of their later growth and mutation, as well as the _de facto_ bearing of the institutional scheme on the material welfare or the cultural fortunes of the given community,--while all these matters of fact may be germane to the speculations of political theory, they are not intrinsic to its premises, to the logical sequence of its inquiry, or to its theoretical findings. the like is also true, of course, as regards that system of habits of thought, that current frame of mind, in which any given institutional scheme necessarily is grounded, and without the continued support of which any given scheme of governmental institutions or policy would become nugatory and so would pass into the province of legal fiction. all these are not idle matters in the purview of the student of political science, but they remain after all substantially extraneous to the structure of political theory; and in so far as matters of this class are to be brought into the case at all, the specialists in the field can not fairly be expected to contribute anything beyond an occasional _obiter dictum_. there can be no discourteous presumption, therefore, in accepting the general theorems of current political theory without prejudice, and looking past the received theoretical formulations for a view of the substantial grounds on which the governmental establishments have grown into shape, and the circumstances, material and spiritual, that surround their continued working and effect. by lineal descent the governmental establishments and the powers with which they are vested, in all the christian nations, are derived from the feudal establishments of the middle ages; which, in turn, are of a predatory origin and of an irresponsible character.[2] in nearly all instances, but more particularly among the nations that are accounted characteristically modern, the existing establishments have been greatly altered from the mediaeval pattern, by concessive adaptation to later exigencies or by a more or less revolutionary innovation. the degree of their modernity is (conventionally) measured, roughly, by the degree in which they have departed from the mediaeval pattern. wherever the unavoidable concessions have been shrewdly made with a view to conserving the autonomy and irresponsibility of the governmental establishment, or the "state," and where the state of national sentiment has been led to favor this work of conservation, as, e.g., in the case of austria, spain or prussia, there the modern outcome has been what may be called a dynastic state. where, on the other hand, the run of national sentiment has departed notably from the ancient holding ground of loyal abnegation, and has enforced a measure of revolutionary innovation, as in the case of france or of the english-speaking peoples, there the modern outcome has been an (ostensibly) democratic commonwealth of ungraded citizens. but the contrast so indicated is a contrast of divergent variants rather than of opposites. these two type-forms may be taken as the extreme and inclusive limits of variation among the governmental establishments with which the modern world is furnished.[3] [footnote 2: the partial and dubious exception of the scandinavian countries or of switzerland need raise no question on this head.] [footnote 3: cf., e.g., eduard meyer, _england: its political organisation and development_. ch. ii.] the effectual difference between these two theoretically contrasted types of governmental establishments is doubtless grave enough, and for many purposes it is consequential, but it is after all not of such a nature as need greatly detain the argument at this point. the two differ less, in effect, in that range of their functioning which comes in question here than in their bearing on the community's fortunes apart from questions of war and peace. in all cases there stand over in this bearing certain primary characteristics of the ancient régime, which all these modern establishments have in common, though not all in an equal degree of preservation and effectiveness. they are, e.g., all vested with certain attributes of "sovereignty." in all cases the citizen still proves on closer attention to be in some measure a "subject" of the state, in that he is invariably conceived to owe a "duty" to the constituted authorities in one respect and another. all civilised governments take cognizance of treason, sedition, and the like; and all good citizens are not only content but profoundly insistent on the clear duty of the citizen on this head. the bias of loyalty is not a matter on which argument is tolerated. by virtue of this bias of loyalty, or "civic duty"--which still has much of the color of feudal allegiance--the governmental establishment is within its rights in coercively controlling and directing the actions of the citizen, or subject, in those respects that so lie within his duty; as also in authoritatively turning his abilities to account for the purposes that so lie within the governmental discretion, as, e.g., the common defense. these rights and powers still remain to the governmental establishment even at the widest democratic departure from that ancient pattern of masterful tutelage and usufruct that marked the old-fashioned patrimonial state,--and that still marks the better preserved ones among its modern derivatives. and so intrinsic to these governmental establishments are these discretionary powers, and by so unfailing a popular bias are they still accounted a matter of course and of axiomatic necessity, that they have invariably been retained also among the attributes of those democratic governments that trace their origin to a revolutionary break with the old order. to many, all this will seem a pedantic taking note of commonplaces,--as if it were worth while remarking that the existing governments are vested with the indispensable attributes of government. yet history records an instance at variance with this axiomatic rule, a rule which is held to be an unavoidable deliverance of common sense. and it is by no means an altogether unique instance. it may serve to show that these characteristic and unimpeachable powers that invest all current governmental establishments are, after all, to be rated as the marks of a particular species of governments, and not characteristics of the genus of governmental establishments at large. these powers answer to an acquired bias, not to an underlying trait of human nature; a matter of habit, not of heredity. such an historical instance is the so-called republic, or commonwealth, of iceland--tenth to thirteenth centuries. its case is looked on by students of history as a spectacular anomaly, because it admitted none of these primary powers of government in its constituted authorities. and yet, for contrast with these matter-of-course preconceptions of these students of history, it is well to note that in the deliberations of those ancients who installed the republic for the management of their joint concerns, any inclusion of such powers in its competency appears never to have been contemplated, not even to the extent of its being rejected. this singularity--as it would be rated by modern statesmen and students--was in no degree a new departure in state-making on the part of the founders of the republic. they had no knowledge of such powers, duties and accountabilities, except as unwholesome features of a novel and alien scheme of irresponsible oppression that was sought to be imposed on them by harald fairhair, and which they incontinently made it their chief and immediate business to evade. they also set up no joint or collective establishment with powers for the common defense, nor does it appear that such a notion had occurred to them. in the history of its installation there is no hint that the men who set up this icelandic commonwealth had any sense of the need, or even of the feasibility, of such a coercive government as would be involved in concerted preparation for the common defense. subjection to personal rule, or to official rule in any degree of attenuation, was not comprised in their traditional experience of citizenship; and it was necessarily out of the elements comprised in this traditional experience that the new structure would have to be built up. the new commonwealth was necessarily erected on the premises afforded by the received scheme of use and wont; and this received scheme had come down out of pre-feudal conditions, without having passed under the discipline of that régime of coercion which the feudal system had imposed on the rest of europe, and so had established as an "immemorial usage" and a "second nature" among the populations of christendom. the resulting character of the icelandic commonwealth is sufficiently striking when contrasted with the case of the english commonwealth of the seventeenth century, or the later french and american republics. these, all and several, came out of a protracted experience in feudalistic state-making and state policy; and the common defense--frequently on the offensive--with its necessary coercive machinery and its submissive loyalty, consequently would take the central place in the resulting civic structure. to close the tale of the icelandic commonwealth it may be added that their republic of insubordinate citizens presently fell into default, systematic misuse, under the disorders brought on by an accumulation of wealth, and that it died of legal fiction and constitutional formalities after some experience at the hands of able and ambitious statesmen in contact with an alien government drawn on the coercive plan. the clay vessel failed to make good among the iron pots, and so proved its unfitness to survive in the world of christian nations,--very much as the chinese are today at the mercy of the defensive rapacity of the powers. and the mercy that we gave them was to sink them in the sea, down on the coast of high barbarie. no doubt, it will be accepted as an axiomatic certainty that the establishment of a commonwealth after the fashion of the icelandic republic, without coercive authority or provision for the common defense, and without a sense of subordination or collective responsibility among its citizens, would be out of all question under existing circumstances of politics and international trade. nor would such a commonwealth be workable on the scale and at the pace imposed by modern industrial and commercial conditions, even apart from international jealousy and ambitions, provided the sacred rights of ownership were to be maintained in something like their current shape. and yet something of a drift of popular sentiment, and indeed something of deliberate endeavour, setting in the direction of such a harmless and helpless national organisation is always visible in western europe, throughout modern times; particularly through the eighteenth and the early half of the nineteenth centuries; and more particularly among the english-speaking peoples and, with a difference, among the french. the dutch and the scandinavian countries answer more doubtfully to the same characterisation. the movement in question is known to history as the liberal, rationalistic, humanitarian, or individualistic departure. its ideal, when formulated, is spoken of as the system of natural rights; and its goal in the way of a national establishment has been well characterised by its critics as the police state, or the night-watchman state. the gains made in this direction, or perhaps better the inroads of this animus in national ideals, are plainly to be set down as a shift in the direction of peace and amity; but it is also plain that the shift of ground so initiated by this strain of sentiment has never reached a conclusion and never has taken effect in anything like an effectual working arrangement. its practical consequences have been of the nature of abatement and defection in the pursuit of national ambitions and dynastic enterprise, rather than a creative work of installing any institutional furniture suitable to its own ends. it has in effect gone no farther than what would be called an incipient correction of abuses. the highest rise, as well as the decline, of this movement lie within the nineteenth century. in point of time, the decay of this amiable conceit of _laissez-faire_ in national policy coincides with the period of great advance in the technology of transport and communication in the nineteenth century. perhaps, on a larger outlook, it should rather be said that the run of national ambitions and animosities had, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, suffered a degree of decay through the diffusion of this sentimental predilection for natural liberty, and that this decline of the manlier aspirations was then arrested and corrected by help of these improvements in the technological situation; which enabled a closer and more coercive control to be exercised over larger areas, and at the same time enabled a more massive aggregate of warlike force to strike more effectively at a greater distance. this whole episode of the rise and decline of _laissez-faire_ in modern history is perhaps best to be conceived as a transient weakening of nationalism, by neglect; rather than anything like the growth of a new and more humane ideal of national intercourse. such would be the appraisal to be had at the hands of those who speak for a strenuous national life and for the arbitrament of sportsmanlike contention in human affairs. and the latterday growth of more militant aspirations, together with the more settled and sedulous attention to a development of control and of formidable armaments, such as followed on through the latter half of the nineteenth century, would then be rated as a resumption of those older aims and ideals that had been falling somewhat into abeyance in the slack-water days of liberalism. there is much to be said for this latter view; and, indeed, much has been said for it, particularly by the spokesmen of imperialist politics. this bias of natural liberty has been associated in history with the english-speaking peoples, more intimately and more extensively than with any other. not that this amiable conceit is in any peculiar degree a race characteristic of this group of peoples; nor even that the history of its rise and decline runs wholly within the linguistic frontiers indicated by this characterisation. the french and the dutch have borne their share, and at an earlier day italian sentiment and speculation lent its impulsion to the same genial drift of faith and aspiration. but, by historical accident, its center of gravity and of diffusion has lain with the english-speaking communities during the period when this bias made history and left its impress on the institutional scheme of the western civilisation. by grace of what may, for the present purpose, be called historical accident, it happens that the interval of history during which the bias of natural liberty made visible headway was also a period during which these english-speaking peoples, among whom its effects are chiefly visible, were relatively secure from international disturbance, by force of inaccessibility. little strain was put upon their sense of national solidarity or national prowess; so little, indeed, that there was some danger of their patriotic animosity falling into decay by disuse; and then they were also busy with other things. peaceable intercourse, it is true, was relatively easy, active and far-reaching--eighteenth and nineteenth centuries--as compared with what had been the case before that time; but warlike intercourse on such a scale as would constitute a substantial menace to any large nation was nearly out of the question, so far as regards the english-speaking peoples. the available means of aggression, as touches the case of these particular communities, were visibly and consciously inadequate as compared with the means of defense. the means of internal or intra-national control or coercion were also less well provided by the state of the arts current at that time than the means of peaceable intercourse. these means of transport and communication were, at that stage of their development, less well suited for the purposes of far-reaching warlike strategy and the exercise of surveillance and coercion over large spaces than for the purposes of peaceable traffic. but the continued improvement in the means of communication during the nineteenth century presently upset that situation, and so presently began to neutralise the geographical quarantine which had hedged about these communities that were inclined to let well enough alone. the increasing speed and accuracy of movement in shipping, due to the successful introduction of steam, as well as the concomitant increasing size of the units of equipment, all runs to this effect and presently sets at naught the peace barriers of sea and weather. so also the development of railways and their increasing availability for strategic uses, together with the far-reaching coordination of movement made possible by their means and by the telegraph; all of which is further facilitated by the increasing mass and density of population. improvements in the technology of arms and armament worked to the like effect, of setting the peace of any community on an increasingly precarious footing, through the advantage which this new technology gave to a ready equipment and a rapid mobilisation. the new state of the industrial arts serviceable for warlike enterprise put an increasingly heavy premium on readiness for offense or defense, but more particularly it all worked increasingly to the advantage of the offensive. it put the fabian strategy out of date, and led to the doctrine of a defensive offense. gradually it came true, with the continued advance in those industrial arts that lend themselves to strategic uses, and it came also to be realised, that no corner of the earth was any longer secure by mere favor of distance and natural difficulty, from eventual aggression at the hands of any provident and adventurous assailant,--even by help of a modicum of defensive precaution. the fear of aggression then came definitively to take the place of international good-will and became the chief motive in public policy, so fast and so far as the state of the industrial arts continued to incline the balance of advantage to the side of the aggressor. all of which served greatly to strengthen the hands of those statesmen who, by interest or temperament, were inclined to imperialistic enterprise. since that period all armament has conventionally been accounted defensive, and all statesmen have professed that the common defense is their chief concern. professedly all armament has been designed to keep the peace; so much of a shadow of the peaceable bias there still stands over. throughout this latest phase of modern civilisation the avowed fear of aggression has served as apology, possibly as provocation in fact, to national armaments; and throughout the same period any analysis of the situation will finally run the chain of fear back to prussia as the putative or actual, center of disturbance and apprehension. no doubt, prussian armament has taken the lead and forced the pace among the nations of christendom; but the prussian policy, too, has been diligently covered with the same decorous plea of needful provision for the common defense and an unremitting solicitude for international peace,--to which has been added the canny afterthought of the "defensive offense." it is characteristic of this era of armed peace that in all these extensive preparations for breaking the peace any formal avowal of other than a defensive purpose has at all times been avoided as an insufferable breach of diplomatic decorum. it is likewise characteristic of the same era that armaments have unremittingly been increased, beyond anything previously known; and that all men have known all the while that the inevitable outcome of this avowedly defensive armament must eventually be war on an unprecedented scale and of unexampled ferocity. it would be neither charitable nor otherwise to the point to call attention to the reflection which this state of the case throws on the collective sagacity or the good faith of the statesmen who have had the management of affairs. it is not practicable to imagine how such an outcome as the present could have been brought about by any degree of stupidity or incapacity alone, nor is it easier to find evidence that the utmost sagacity of the statecraft engaged has had the slightest mitigating effect on the evil consummation to which the whole case has been brought. it has long been a commonplace among observers of public events that these professedly defensive warlike preparations have in effect been preparations for breaking the peace; against which, at least ostensibly, a remedy had been sought in the preparation of still heavier armaments, with full realisation that more armament would unfailingly entail a more unsparing and more disastrous war,--which sums up the statecraft of the past half century. prussia, and afterwards prussianised germany, has come in for the distinction of taking the lead and forcing the pace in this competitive preparation--or "preparedness"--for war in time of peace. that such has been the case appears in good part to be something of a fortuitous circumstance. the season of enterprising force and fraud to which that country owes its induction into the concert of nations is an episode of recent history; so recent, indeed, that the german nation has not yet had time to live it down and let it be forgotten; and the imperial state is consequently burdened with an irritably uneasy sense of odium and an established reputation for unduly bad faith. from which it has followed, among other things, that the statesmen of the empire have lived in the expectation of having their unforgotten derelictions brought home, and so have, on the one hand, found themselves unable to credit any pacific intentions professed by the neighboring powers, while on the other hand they have been unable to gain credence for their own voluble professions of peace and amity. so it has come about that, by a fortuitous conjuncture of scarcely relevant circumstances, prussia and the empire have been thrown into the lead in the race of "preparedness" and have been led assiduously to hasten a breach which they could ill afford. it is, to say the least, extremely doubtful if the event would have been substantially different in the absence of that special provocation to competitive preparedness that has been injected into the situation by this german attitude; but the rate of approach to a warlike climax has doubtless been hastened by the anticipatory policy of preparedness which the prussian dynasty has seen itself constrained to pursue. eventually, the peculiar circumstances of its case--embarrassment at home and distaste and discredit abroad--have induced the imperial state to take the line of a defensive offense, to take war by the forelock and retaliate on presumptive enemies for prospective grievances. but in any case, the progressive improvement in transport and communication, as well as in the special technology of warfare, backed by greatly enhanced facilities for indoctrinating the populace with militant nationalism,--these ways and means, working under the hand of patriotic statesmen must in course of the past century have brought the peace of europe to so precarious a footing as would have provoked a material increase in the equipment for national defense; which would unavoidably have led to competitive armament and an enhanced international distrust and animosity, eventually culminating in hostilities. * * * * * it may well be that the plea of defensive preparation advanced by the statesmen, prussian and others, in apology for competitive armaments is a diplomatic subterfuge,--there are indications that such has commonly been the case; but even if it commonly is visibly disingenuous, the need of making such a plea to cover more sinister designs is itself an evidence that an avowedly predatory enterprise no longer meets with the requisite popular approval. even if an exception to this rule be admitted in the recent attitude of the german people, it is to be recalled that the exception was allowed to stand only transiently, and that presently the avowal of a predatory design in this case was urgently disclaimed in the face of adversity. even those who speak most fluently for the necessity of war, and for its merits as a needed discipline in the manly virtues, are constrained by the prevailing sentiment to deprecate its necessity. yet it is equally evident that when once a warlike enterprise has been entered upon so far as to commit the nation to hostilities, it will have the cordial support of popular sentiment even if it is patently an aggressive war. indeed, it is quite a safe generalisation that when hostilities have once been got fairly under way by the interested statesmen, the patriotic sentiment of the nation may confidently be counted on to back the enterprise irrespective of the merits of the quarrel. but even if the national sentiment is in this way to be counted in as an incidental matter of course, it is also to be kept in mind in this connection that any quarrel so entered upon by any nation will forthwith come to have the moral approval of the community. dissenters will of course be found, sporadically, who do not readily fall in with the prevailing animus; but as a general proposition it will still hold true that any such quarrel forthwith becomes a just quarrel in the eyes of those who have so been committed to it. a corollary following from this general theorem may be worth noting in the same connection. any politician who succeeds in embroiling his country in a war, however nefarious, becomes a popular hero and is reputed a wise and righteous statesman, at least for the time being. illustrative instances need perhaps not, and indeed can not gracefully, be named; most popular heroes and reputed statesmen belong in this class. another corollary, which bears more immediately on the question in hand, follows also from the same general proposition: since the ethical values involved in any given international contest are substantially of the nature of afterthought or accessory, they may safely be left on one side in any endeavour to understand or account for any given outbreak of hostilities. the moral indignation of both parties to the quarrel is to be taken for granted, as being the statesman's chief and necessary ways and means of bringing any warlike enterprise to a head and floating it to a creditable finish. it is a precipitate of the partisan animosity that inspires both parties and holds them to their duty of self-sacrifice and devastation, and at its best it will chiefly serve as a cloak of self-righteousness to extenuate any exceptionally profligate excursions in the conduct of hostilities. any warlike enterprise that is hopefully to be entered on must have the moral sanction of the community, or of an effective majority in the community. it consequently becomes the first concern of the warlike statesman to put this moral force in train for the adventure on which he is bent. and there are two main lines of motivation by which the spiritual forces of any christian nation may so be mobilised for warlike adventure: (1) the preservation or furtherance of the community's material interests, real or fancied, and (2) vindication of the national honour. to these should perhaps be added as a third, the advancement and perpetuation of the nation's "culture;" that is to say, of its habitual scheme of use and wont. it is a nice question whether, in practical effect, the aspiration to perpetuate the national culture is consistently to be distinguished from the vindication of the national honour. there is perhaps the distinction to be made that "the perpetuation of the national culture" lends a readier countenance to gratuitous aggression and affords a broader cover for incidental atrocities, since the enemies of the national culture will necessarily be conceived as an inferior and obstructive people, falling beneath the rules of commonplace decorum. those material interests for which modern nations are in the habit of taking to arms are commonly of a fanciful character, in that they commonly have none but an imaginary net value to the community at large. such are, e.g., the national trade or the increase of the national territory. these and the like may serve the warlike or dynastic ambitions of the nation's masters; they may also further the interests of office-holders, and more particularly of certain business houses or businessmen who stand to gain some small advantage by help of the powers in control; but it all signifies nothing more to the common man than an increased bill of governmental expense and a probable increase in the cost of living. that a nation's trade should be carried in vessels owned by its citizens or registered in its ports will doubtless have some sentimental value to the common run of its citizens, as is shown by the fact that disingenuous politicians always find it worth their while to appeal to this chauvinistic predilection. but it patently is all a completely idle question, in point of material advantage, to anyone but the owners of the vessels; and to these owners it is also of no material consequence under what flag their investments sail, except so far as the government in question may afford them some preferential opportunity for gain,--always at the cost of their fellow citizens. the like is equally true as regards the domicile and the national allegiance of the businessmen who buy and sell the country's imports and exports. the common man plainly has no slightest material interest in the nationality or the place of residence of those who conduct this traffic; though all the facts go to say that in some puzzle-headed way the common man commonly persuades himself that it does make some occult sort of difference to him; so that he is commonly willing to pay something substantial toward subsidising businessmen of his own nationality, in the way of a protective tariff and the like. the only material advantage to be derived from such a preferential trade policy arises in the case of international hostilities, in which case the home-owned vessels and merchants may on occasion count toward military readiness; although even in that connection their value is contingent and doubtful. but in this way they may contribute in their degree to a readiness to break off peaceable relations with other countries. it is only for warlike purposes, that is to say for the dynastic ambitions of warlike statesmen, that these preferential contrivances in economic policy have any substantial value; and even in that connection their expediency is always doubtful. they are a source of national jealousy, and they may on occasion become a help to military strategy when this national jealousy eventuates in hostilities. the run of the facts touching this matter of national trade policy is something as follows: at the instance of businessmen who stand to gain by it, and with the cordial support of popular sentiment, the constituted authorities sedulously further the increase of shipping and commerce under protection of the national power. at the same time they spend substance and diplomatic energy in an endeavor to extend the international market facilities open to the country's businessmen, with a view always to a preferential advantage in favor of these businessmen, also with the sentimental support of the common man and at his cost. to safeguard these commercial interests, as well as property-holdings of the nation's citizens in foreign parts, the nation maintains naval, military, consular and diplomatic establishments, at the common expense. the total gains derivable from these commercial and investment interests abroad, under favorable circumstances, will never by any chance equal the cost of the governmental apparatus installed to further and safeguard them. these gains, such as they are, go to the investors and businessmen engaged in these enterprises; while the costs incident to the adventure are borne almost wholly by the common man, who gets no gain from it all. commonly, as in the case of a protective tariff or a preferential navigation law, the cost to the common man is altogether out of proportion to the gain which accrues to the businessmen for whose benefit he carries the burden. the only other class, besides the preferentially favored businessmen, who derive any material benefit from this arrangement is that of the office-holders who take care of this governmental traffic and draw something in the way of salaries and perquisites; and whose cost is defrayed by the common man, who remains an outsider in all but the payment of the bills. the common man is proud and glad to bear this burden for the benefit of his wealthier neighbors, and he does so with the singular conviction that in some occult manner he profits by it. all this is incredible, but it is everyday fact. in case it should happen that these business interests of the nation's businessmen interested in trade or investments abroad are jeopardised by a disturbance of any kind in these foreign parts in which these business interests lie, then it immediately becomes the urgent concern of the national authorities to use all means at hand for maintaining the gainful traffic of these businessmen undiminished, and the common man pays the cost. should such an untoward situation go to such sinister lengths as to involve actual loss to these business interests or otherwise give rise to a tangible grievance, it becomes an affair of the national honour; whereupon no sense of proportion as between the material gains at stake and the cost of remedy or retaliation need longer be observed, since the national honour is beyond price. the motivation in the case shifts from the ground of material interest to the spiritual ground of the moral sentiments. in this connection "honour" is of course to be taken in the euphemistic sense which the term has under the _code duello_ governing "affairs of honour." it carries no connotation of honesty, veracity, equity, liberality, or unselfishness. this national honour is of the nature of an intangible or immaterial asset, of course; it is a matter of prestige, a sportsmanlike conception; but that fact must not be taken to mean that it is of any the less substantial effect for purposes of a _casus belli_ than the material assets of the community. quite the contrary: "who steals my purse, steals trash," etc. in point of fact, it will commonly happen that any material grievance must first be converted into terms of this spiritual capital, before it is effectually turned to account as a stimulus to warlike enterprise. even among a people with so single an eye to the main chance as the american community it will be found true, on experiment or on review of the historical evidence, that an offense against the national honour commands a profounder and more unreserved resentment than any infraction of the rights of person or property simply. this has latterly been well shown in connection with the manoeuvres of the several european belligerents, designed to bend american neutrality to the service of one side or the other. both parties have aimed to intimidate and cajole; but while the one party has taken recourse to effrontery and has made much and ostentatious use of threats and acts of violence against person and property, the other has constantly observed a deferential attitude toward american national self-esteem, even while engaged on a persistent infraction of american commercial rights. the first named line of diplomacy has convicted itself of miscarriage and has lost the strategic advantage, as against the none too adroit finesse of the other side. the statesmen of this european war power were so ill advised as to enter on a course of tentatively cumulative intimidation, by threats and experimentally graduated crimes against the property and persons of american citizens, with a view to coerce american cupidity and yet to avoid carrying these manoeuvres of terrorism far enough to arouse an unmanageable sense of outrage. the experiment has served to show that the breaking point in popular indignation will be reached before the terrorism has gone far enough to raise a serious question of pecuniary caution. this national honour, which so is rated a necessary of life, is an immaterial substance in a peculiarly high-wrought degree, being not only not physically tangible but also not even capable of adequate statement in pecuniary terms,--as would be the case with ordinary immaterial assets. it is true, where the point of grievance out of which a question of the national honour arises is a pecuniary discrepancy, the national honour can not be satisfied without a pecuniary accounting; but it needs no argument to convince all right-minded persons that even at such a juncture the national honour that has been compromised is indefinitely and indefinably more than what can be made to appear on an accountant's page. it is a highly valued asset, or at least a valued possession, but it is of a metaphysical, not of a physical nature, and it is not known to serve any material or otherwise useful end apart from affording a practicable grievance consequent upon its infraction. this national honour is subject to injury in divers ways, and so may yield a fruitful grievance even apart from offences against the person or property of the nation's businessmen; as, e.g., through neglect or disregard of the conventional punctilios governing diplomatic intercourse, or by disrespect or contumelious speech touching the flag, or the persons of national officials, particularly of such officials as have only a decorative use, or the costumes worn by such officials, or, again, by failure to observe the ritual prescribed for parading the national honour on stated occasions. when duly violated the national honour may duly be made whole again by similarly immaterial instrumentalities; as, e.g., by recital of an appropriate formula of words, by formal consumption of a stated quantity of ammunition in the way of a salute, by "dipping" an ensign, and the like,--procedure which can, of course, have none but a magical efficacy. the national honour, in short, moves in the realm of magic, and touches the frontiers of religion. throughout this range of duties incumbent on the national defense, it will be noted, the offenses or discrepancies to be guarded against or corrected by recourse to arms have much of a ceremonial character. whatever may be the material accidents that surround any given concrete grievance that comes up for appraisal and redress, in bringing the case into the arena for trial by combat it is the spiritual value of the offense that is played up and made the decisive ground of action, particularly in so far as appeal is made to the sensibilities of the common man, who will have to bear the cost of the adventure. and in such a case it will commonly happen that the common man is unable, without advice, to see that any given hostile act embodies a sacrilegious infraction of the national honour. he will at any such conjuncture scarcely rise to the pitch of moral indignation necessary to float a warlike reprisal, until the expert keepers of the code come in to expound and certify the nature of the transgression. but when once the lesion to the national honour has been ascertained, appraised and duly exhibited by those persons whose place in the national economy it is to look after all that sort of thing, the common man will be found nowise behindhand about resenting the evil usage of which he so, by force of interpretation, has been a victim. chapter ii on the nature and uses of patriotism patriotism may be defined as a sense of partisan solidarity in respect of prestige. what the expert psychologists, and perhaps the experts in political science, might find it necessary to say in the course of an exhaustive analysis and definition of this human faculty would presumably be something more precise and more extensive. there is no inclination here to forestall definition, but only to identify and describe the concept that loosely underlies the colloquial use of this term, so far as seems necessary to an inquiry into the part played by the patriotic animus in the life of modern peoples, particularly as it bears on questions of war and peace. on any attempt to divest this concept of all extraneous or adventitious elements it will be found that such a sense of an undivided joint interest in a collective body of prestige will always remain as an irreducible minimum. this is the substantial core about which many and divers subsidiary interests cluster, but without which these other clustering interests and aspirations will not, jointly or severally, make up a working palladium of the patriotic spirit. it is true, seen in some other light or rated in some other bearing or connection, one and another of these other interests, ideals, aspirations, beatitudes, may well be adjudged nobler, wiser, possibly more urgent than the national prestige; but in the forum of patriotism all these other necessaries of human life--the glory of god and the good of man--rise by comparison only to the rank of subsidiaries, auxiliaries, amenities. he is an indifferent patriot who will let "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" cloud the issue and get in the way of the main business in hand. there once were, we are told, many hardy and enterprising spirits banded together along the spanish main for such like ends, just as there are in our day an even greater number of no less single-minded spirits bent on their own "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness," according to their light, in the money-markets of the modern world; but for all their admirable qualities and splendid achievements, their passionate quest of these amenities has not entitled these gentlemen adventurers to claim rank as patriots. the poet says: "strike for your altars and your fires! strike for the green graves of your sires! god and your native land!" but, again, a temperate scrutiny of the list of desiderata so enumerated in the poet's flight, will quickly bring out the fact that any or all of them might drop out of the situation without prejudice to the plain call of patriotic duty. in the last resort, when the patriotic spirit falls back on its naked self alone, it is not reflection on the merits of these good and beautiful things in nature that gives him his cue and enforces the ultimate sacrifice. indeed it is something infinitely more futile and infinitely more urgent,--provided only that the man is imbued with the due modicum of patriotic devotion; as, indeed, men commonly are. it is not faith, hope or charity that abide as the irreducible minimum of virtue in the patriot's scheme of things; particularly not that charity that has once been highly spoken of as being the greatest of these. it may be that, viewed in the light of reason, as doctor katzenberger would say, patriotic devotion is the most futile thing in the world; but, for good or ill, the light of reason has nothing to do with the case,--no more than "the flowers that bloom in the spring." the patriotic spirit is a spirit of emulation, evidently, at the same time that it is emulation shot through with a sense of solidarity. it belongs under the general caption of sportsmanship, rather than of workmanship. now, any enterprise in sportsmanship is bent on an invidious success, which must involve as its major purpose the defeat and humiliation of some competitor, whatever else may be comprised in its aim. its aim is a differential gain, as against a rival; and the emulative spirit that comes under the head of patriotism commonly, if not invariably, seeks this differential advantage by injury of the rival rather than by an increase of home-bred well-being. indeed, well-being is altogether out of the perspective, except as underpinning for an edifice of national prestige. it is, at least, a safe generalisation that the patriotic sentiment never has been known to rise to the consummate pitch of enthusiastic abandon except when bent on some work of concerted malevolence. patriotism is of a contentious complexion, and finds its full expression in no other outlet than warlike enterprise; its highest and final appeal is for the death, damage, discomfort and destruction of the party of the second part. it is not that the spirit of patriotism will tolerate no other sentiments bearing on matters of public interest, but only that it will tolerate none that traverse the call of the national prestige. like other men, the patriot may be moved by many and divers other considerations, besides that of the national prestige; and these other considerations may be of the most genial and reasonable kind, or they may also be as foolish and mischievous as any comprised in the range of human infirmities. he may be a humanitarian given over to the kindliest solicitude for the common good, or a religious devotee hedged about in all his motions by the ever present fear of god, or taken up with artistic, scholarly or scientific pursuits; or, again, he may be a spendthrift devotee of profane dissipation, whether in the slums or on the higher levels of gentility, or he may be engaged on a rapacious quest of gain, as a businessman within the law or as a criminal without its benefit, or he may spend his best endeavors in advancing the interests of his class at the cost of the nation at large. all that is understood as a matter of course and is beside the point. in so far as he is a complete patriot these other interests will fall away from him when the one clear call of patriotic duty comes to enlist him in the cause of the national prestige. there is, indeed, nothing to hinder a bad citizen being a good patriot; nor does it follow that a good citizen--in other respects--may not be a very indifferent patriot. many and various other preferences and considerations may coincide with the promptings of the patriotic spirit, and so may come in to coalesce with and fortify its driving force; and it is usual for patriotic men to seek support for their patriotic impulses in some reasoned purpose of this extraneous kind that is believed to be served by following the call of the national prestige,--it may be a presumptive increase and diffusion of culture at large, or the spread and enhancement of a presumptively estimable religious faith, or a prospective liberation of mankind from servitude to obnoxious masters and outworn institutions; or, again, it may be the increase of peace and material well-being among men, within the national frontiers or impartially throughout the civilised world. there are, substantially, none of the desirable things in this world that are not so counted on by some considerable body of patriots to be accomplished by the success of their own particular patriotic aspirations. what they will not come to an understanding about is the particular national ascendency with which the attainment of these admirable ends is conceived to be bound up. the ideals, needs and aims that so are brought into the patriotic argument to lend a color of rationality to the patriotic aspiration in any given case will of course be such ideals, needs and aims as are currently accepted and felt to be authentic and self-legitimating among the people in whose eyes the given patriotic enterprise is to find favor. so one finds that, e.g., among the followers of islam, devout and resolute, the patriotic statesman (that is to say the politician who designs to make use of the popular patriotic fervor) will in the last resort appeal to the claims and injunctions of the faith. in a similar way the prussian statesman bent on dynastic enterprise will conjure in the name of the dynasty and of culture and efficiency; or, if worse comes to worst, an outbreak will be decently covered with a plea of mortal peril and self-defense. among english-speaking peoples much is to be gained by showing that the path of patriotic glory is at the same time the way of equal-handed justice under the rule of free institutions; at the same time, in a fully commercialised community, such as the english-speaking commonly are, material benefits in the way of trade will go far to sketch in a background of decency for any enterprise that looks to the enhancement of the national prestige. but any promise of gain, whether in the nation's material or immaterial assets, will not of itself carry full conviction to the commonplace modern citizen; or even to such modern citizens as are best endowed with a national spirit. by and large, and overlooking that appreciable contingent of morally defective citizens that is to be counted on in any hybrid population, it will hold true that no contemplated enterprise or line of policy will fully commend itself to the popular sense of merit and expediency until it is given a moral turn, so as to bring it to square with the dictates of right and honest dealing. on no terms short of this will it effectually coalesce with the patriotic aspiration. to give the fullest practical effect to the patriotic fervor that animates any modern nation, and so turn it to use in the most effective way, it is necessary to show that the demands of equity are involved in the case. any cursory survey of modern historical events bearing on this point, among the civilised peoples, will bring out the fact that no concerted and sustained movement of the national spirit can be had without enlisting the community's moral convictions. the common man must be persuaded that right is on his side. "thrice is he armed who knows his quarrel just." the grounds of this conviction may often be tawdry enough, but the conviction is a necessary factor in the case. the requisite moral sanction may be had on various grounds, and, on the whole, it is not an extremely difficult matter to arrange. in the simplest and not infrequent case it may turn on a question of equity in respect of trade or investment as between the citizens or subjects of the several rival nations; the chinese "open door" affords as sordid an example as may be desired. or it may be only an envious demand for a share in the world's material resources--"a place in the sun," as a picturesque phrase describes it; or "the freedom of the seas," as another equally vague and equally invidious demand for international equity phrases it. these demands are put forward with a color of demanding something in the way of equitable opportunity for the commonplace peaceable citizen; but quite plainly they have none but a fanciful bearing on the fortunes of the common man in time of peace, and they have a meaning to the nation only as a fighting unit; apart from their prestige value, these things are worth fighting for only as prospective means of fighting. the like appeal to the moral sensibilities may, again, be made in the way of a call to self-defense, under the rule of live and let live; or it may also rest on the more tenuous obligation to safeguard the national integrity of a weaker neighbor, under a broader interpretation of the same equitable rule of live and let live. but in one way or another it is necessary to set up the conviction that the promptings of patriotic ambition have the sanction of moral necessity. it is not that the line of national policy or patriotic enterprise so entered upon with the support of popular sentiment need be right and equitable as seen in dispassionate perspective from the outside, but only that it should be capable of being made to seem right and equitable to the biased populace whose moral convictions are requisite to its prosecution; which is quite another matter. nor is it that any such patriotic enterprise is, in fact, entered on simply or mainly on these moral grounds that so are alleged in its justification, but only that some such colorable ground of justification or extenuation is necessary to be alleged, and to be credited by popular belief. it is not that the common man is not sufficiently patriotic, but only that he is a patriot hampered with a plodding and uneasy sense of right and honest dealing, and that one must make up one's account with this moral bias in looking to any sustained and concerted action that draws on the sentiment of the common man for its carrying on. but the moral sense in the case may be somewhat easily satisfied with a modicum of equity, in case the patriotic bias of the people is well pronounced, or in case it is reenforced with a sufficient appeal to self-interest. in those cases where the national fervor rises to an excited pitch, even very attenuated considerations of right and justice, such as would under ordinary conditions doubtfully bear scrutiny as extenuating circumstances, may come to serve as moral authentication for any extravagant course of action to which the craving for national prestige may incite. the higher the pitch of patriotic fervor, the more tenuous and more thread-bare may be the requisite moral sanction. by cumulative excitation some very remarkable results have latterly been attained along this line. * * * * * patriotism is evidently a spirit of particularism, of aliency and animosity between contrasted groups of persons; it lives on invidious comparison, and works out in mutual hindrance and jealousy between nations. it commonly goes the length of hindering intercourse and obstructing traffic that would patently serve the material and cultural well-being of both nationalities; and not infrequently, indeed normally, it eventuates in competitive damage to both. all this holds true in the world of modern civilisation, at the same time that the modern civilised scheme of life is, notoriously, of a cosmopolitan character, both in its cultural requirements and in its economic structure. modern culture is drawn on too large a scale, is of too complex and multiform a character, requires the cooperation of too many and various lines of inquiry, experience and insight, to admit of its being confined within national frontiers, except at the cost of insufferable crippling and retardation. the science and scholarship that is the peculiar pride of civilised christendom is not only international, but rather it is homogeneously cosmopolitan; so that in this bearing there are, in effect, no national frontiers; with the exception, of course, that in a season of patriotic intoxication, such as the current war has induced, even the scholars and scientists will be temporarily overset by their patriotic fervour. indeed, with the best efforts of obscurantism and national jealousy to the contrary, it remains patently true that modern culture is the culture of christendom at large, not the culture of one and another nation in severalty within the confines of christendom. it is only as and in so far as they partake in and contribute to the general run of western civilisation at large that the people of any one of these nations of christendom can claim standing as a cultured nation; and even any distinctive variation from this general run of civilised life, such as may give a "local colour" of ideals, tastes and conventions, will, in point of cultural value, have to be rated as an idle detail, a species of lost motion, that serves no better purpose than a transient estrangement. so also, the modern state of the industrial arts is of a like cosmopolitan character, in point of scale, specialisation, and the necessary use of diversified resources, of climate and raw materials. none of the countries of europe, e.g., is competent to carry on its industry by modern technological methods without constantly drawing on resources outside of its national boundaries. isolation in this industrial respect, exclusion from the world market, would mean intolerable loss of efficiency, more pronounced the more fully the given country has taken over this modern state of the industrial arts. exclusion from the general body of outlying resources would seriously cripple any one or all of them, and effectually deprive them of the usufruct of this technology; and partial exclusion, by prohibitive or protective tariffs and the like, unavoidably results in a partial lowering of the efficiency of each, and therefore a reduction of the current well-being among them all together. into this cultural and technological system of the modern world the patriotic spirit fits like dust in the eyes and sand in the bearings. its net contribution to the outcome is obscuration, distrust, and retardation at every point where it touches the fortunes of modern mankind. yet it is forever present in the counsels of the statesmen and in the affections of the common man, and it never ceases to command the regard of all men as the prime attribute of manhood and the final test of the desirable citizen. it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that no other consideration is allowed in abatement of the claims of patriotic loyalty, and that such loyalty will be allowed to cover any multitude of sins. when the ancient philosopher described man as a "political animal," this, in effect, was what he affirmed; and today the ancient maxim is as good as new. the patriotic spirit is at cross purposes with modern life, but in any test case it is found that the claims of life yield before those of patriotism; and any voice that dissents from this order of things is as a voice crying in the wilderness. * * * * * to anyone who is inclined to moralise on the singular discrepancies of human life this state of the case will be fruitful of much profound speculation. the patriotic animus appears to be an enduring trait of human nature, an ancient heritage that has stood over unshorn from time immemorial, under the mendelian rule of the stability of racial types. it is archaic, not amenable to elimination or enduring suppression, and apparently not appreciably to be mitigated by reflection, education, experience or selective breeding. throughout the historical period, and presumably through an incalculable period of the unrecorded past, patriotic manslaughter has consistently been weeding out of each successive generation of men the most patriotic among them; with the net result that the level of patriotic ardor today appears to be no lower than it ever was. at the same time, with the advance of population, of culture and of the industrial arts, patriotism has grown increasingly disserviceable; and it is to all appearance as ubiquitous and as powerful as ever, and is held in as high esteem. the continued prevalence of this archaic animus among the modern peoples, as well as the fact that it is universally placed high among the virtues, must be taken to argue that it is, in its elements, an hereditary trait, of the nature of an inborn impulsive propensity, rather than a product of habituation. it is, in substance, not something that can be learned and unlearned. from one generation to another, the allegiance may shift from one nationality to another, but the fact of unreflecting allegiance at large remains. and it all argues also that no sensible change has taken effect in the hereditary endowment of the race, at least in this respect, during the period known by record or by secure inference,--say, since the early neolithic in europe; and this in spite of the fact that there has all this while been opportunity for radical changes in the european population by cross-breeding, infiltration and displacement of the several racial stocks that go to make up this population. hence, on slight reflection the inference has suggested itself and has gained acceptance that this trait of human nature must presumably have been serviceable to the peoples of the earlier time, on those levels of savagery or of the lower barbarism on which the ancestral stocks of the european population first made good their survival and proved their fitness to people that quarter of the earth. such, indeed, is the common view; so common as to pass for matter-of-course, and therefore habitually to escape scrutiny. still it need not follow, as more patient reflection will show. all the european peoples show much the same animus in this respect; whatever their past history may have been, and whatever the difference in past experience that might be conceived to have shaped their temperament. any difference in the pitch of patriotic conceit and animosity, between the several nationalities or the several localities, is by no means wide, even in cases where the racial composition of the population is held to be very different, as, e.g., between the peoples on the baltic seaboard and those on the mediterranean. in point of fact, in this matter of patriotic animus there appears to be a wider divergence, temperamentally, between individuals within any one of these communities than between the common run in any one community and the corresponding common run in any other. but even such divergence of individual temper in respect of patriotism as is to be met with, first and last, is after all surprisingly small in view of the scope for individual variation which this european population would seem to offer. * * * * * these peoples of europe, all and several, are hybrids compounded out of the same run of racial elements, but mixed in varying proportions. on any parallel of latitude--taken in the climatic rather than in the geometric sense--the racial composition of the west-european population will be much the same, virtually identical in effect, although always of a hybrid complexion; whereas on any parallel of longitude--also in the climatic sense--the racial composition will vary progressively, but always within the limits of the same general scheme of hybridisation,--the variation being a variation in the proportion in which the several racial elements are present in any given case. but in no case does a notable difference in racial composition coincide with a linguistic or national frontier. but in point of patriotic animus these european peoples are one as good as another, whether the comparison be traced on parallels of latitude or of longitude. and the inhabitants of each national territory, or of each detail locality, appear also to run surprisingly uniform in respect of their patriotic spirit. heredity in any such community of hybrids will, superficially, appear to run somewhat haphazard. there will, of course, be no traceable difference between social or economic classes, in point of heredity,--as is visibly the case in christendom. but variation--of an apparently haphazard description--will be large and ubiquitous among the individuals of such a populace. indeed, it is a matter of course and of easy verification that individual variation within such a hybrid stock will greatly exceed the extreme differences that may subsist between the several racial types that have gone to produce the hybrid stock. such is the case of the european peoples. the inhabitants vary greatly among themselves, both in physical and in mental traits, as would be expected; and the variation between individuals in point of patriotic animus should accordingly also be expected to be extremely wide,--should, in effect, greatly exceed the difference, if any, in this respect between the several racial elements engaged in the european population. some appreciable difference in this respect there appears to be, between individuals; but individual divergence from the normal or average appears always to be of a sporadic sort,--it does not run on class lines, whether of occupation, status or property, nor does it run at all consistently from parent to child. when all is told the argument returns to the safe ground that these variations in point of patriotic animus are sporadic and inconsequential, and do not touch the general proposition that, one with another, the inhabitants of europe and the european colonies are sufficiently patriotic, and that the average endowment in this respect runs with consistent uniformity across all differences of time, place and circumstance. it would, in fact, be extremely hazardous to affirm that there is a sensible difference in the ordinary pitch of patriotic sentiment as between any two widely diverse samples of these hybrid populations, in spite of the fact that the diversity in visible physical traits may be quite pronounced. in short, the conclusion seems safe, on the whole, that in this respect the several racial stocks that have gone to produce the existing populations of christendom have all been endowed about as richly one as another. patriotism appears to be a ubiquitous trait, at least among the races and peoples of christendom. from which it should follow, that since there is, and has from the beginning been, no differential advantage favoring one racial stock or one fashion of hybrid as against another, in this matter of patriotic animus, there should also be no ground of selective survival or selective elimination on this account as between these several races and peoples. so that the undisturbed and undiminished prevalence of this trait among the european population, early or late, argues nothing as to its net serviceability or disserviceability under any of the varying conditions of culture and technology to which these europeans have been subjected, first and last; except that it has, in any case, not proved so disserviceable under the conditions prevailing hitherto as to result in the extinction of these europeans, one with another.[4] [footnote 4: for a more extended discussion of this matter, cf. _imperial germany and the industrial revolution_, ch. i. and supplementary notes i. and ii.] the patriotic frame of mind has been spoken of above as if it were an hereditary trait, something after the fashion of a mendelian unit character. doubtless this is not a competent account of the matter; but the present argument scarcely needs a closer analysis. still, in a measure to quiet title and avoid annoyance, it may be noted that this patriotic animus is of the nature of a "frame of mind" rather than a mendelian unit character; that it so involves a concatenation of several impulsive propensities (presumably hereditary); and that both the concatenation and the special mode and amplitude of the response are a product of habituation, very largely of the nature of conventionalised use and wont. what is said above, therefore, goes little farther than saying that the underlying aptitudes requisite to this patriotic frame of mind are heritable, and that use and wont as bearing on this point run with sufficient uniformity to bring a passably uniform result. it may be added that in this concatenation spoken of there seems to be comprised, ordinarily, that sentimental attachment to habitat and custom that is called love of home, or in its accentuated expression, home-sickness; so also an invidious self-complacency, coupled with a gregarious bent which gives the invidious comparison a group content; and further, commonly if not invariably, a bent of abnegation, self-abasement, subservience, or whatever it may best be called, that inclines the bearer unreasoningly and unquestioningly to accept and serve a prescriptive ideal given by custom or by customary authority. * * * * * the conclusion would therefore provisionally run to the effect that under modern conditions the patriotic animus is wholly a disserviceable trait in the spiritual endowment of these peoples,--in so far as bears on the material conditions of life unequivocally, and as regards the cultural interests more at large presumptively; whereas there is no assured ground for a discriminating opinion as touches its possible utility or disutility at any remote period in the past. there is, of course, always room for the conservative estimate that, as the possession of this spiritual trait has not hitherto resulted in the extinction of the race, so it may also in the calculable future continue to bring no more grievous results than a degree of mischief, without even stopping or greatly retarding the increase of population. all this, of course, is intended to apply only so far as it goes. it must not be taken as intending to say any least word in derogation of those high qualities that inspire the patriotic citizen. in its economic, biological and cultural incidence patriotism appears to be an untoward trait of human nature; which has, of course, nothing to say as to its moral excellence, its aesthetic value, or its indispensability to a worthy life. no doubt, it is in all these respects deserving of all the esteem and encomiums that fall to its share. indeed, its well-known moral and aesthetic value, as well as the reprobation that is visited on any shortcomings in this respect, signify, for the purposes of the present argument, nothing more than that the patriotic animus meets the unqualified approval of men because they are, all and several, infected with it. it is evidence of the ubiquitous, intimate and ineradicable presence of this quality in human nature; all the more since it continues untiringly to be held in the highest esteem in spite of the fact that a modicum of reflection should make its disserviceability plain to the meanest understanding. no higher praise of moral excellence, and no profounder test of loyalty, can be asked than this current unreserved commendation of a virtue that makes invariably for damage and discomfort. the virtuous impulse must be deep-seated and indefeasible that drives men incontinently to do good that evil may come of it. "though he slay me, yet will i trust in him." in the light--and it is a dim and wavering light--of the archaeological evidence, helped out by circumstantial evidence from such parallel or analogous instances as are afforded by existing communities on a comparable level of culture, one may venture more or less confidently on a reconstruction of the manner of life among the early europeans, of early neolithic times and later.[5] and so one may form some conception of the part played by this patriotic animus among those beginnings, when, if not the race, at least its institutions were young; and when the native temperament of these peoples was tried out and found fit to survive through the age-long and slow-moving eras of stone and bronze. in this connection, it appears safe to assume that since early neolithic times no sensible change has taken effect in the racial complexion of the european peoples; and therefore no sensible change in their spiritual and mental make-up. so that in respect of the spiritual elements that go to make up this patriotic animus the europeans of today will be substantially identical with the europeans of that early time. the like is true as regards those other traits of temperament that come in question here, as being included among the stable characteristics that still condition the life of these peoples under the altered circumstances of the modern age. [footnote 5: cf. _imperial germany and the industrial revolution_, as above.] the difference between prehistoric europe and the present state of these peoples resolves itself on analysis into a difference in the state of the industrial arts, together with such institutional changes as have come on in the course of working out this advance in the industrial arts. the habits and the exigencies of life among these peoples have greatly changed; whereas in temperament and capacities the peoples that now live by and under the rule of this altered state of the industrial arts are the same as they were. it is to be noted, therefore, that the fact of their having successfully come through the long ages of prehistory by the use of this mental and spiritual endowment can not be taken to argue that these peoples are thereby fit to meet the exigencies of this later and gravely altered age; nor will it do to assume that because these peoples have themselves worked out this modern culture and its technology, therefore it must all be suitable for their use and conducive to their biological success. the single object lesson of the modern urban community, with its endless requirements in the way of sanitation, police, compulsory education, charities,--all this and many other discrepancies in modern life should enjoin caution on anyone who is inclined off-hand to hold that because modern men have created these conditions, therefore these must be the most suitable conditions of life for modern mankind. in the beginning, that is to say in the european beginning, men lived in small and close groups. control was close within the group, and the necessity of subordinating individual gains and preferences to the common good was enjoined on the group by the exigencies of the case, on pain of common extinction. the situation and usages of existing eskimo villages may serve to illustrate and enforce the argument on this head. the solidarity of sentiment necessary to support the requisite solidarity of action in the case would be a prime condition of survival in any racial stock exposed to the conditions which surrounded these early europeans. this needful sense of solidarity would touch not simply or most imperatively the joint prestige of the group, but rather the joint material interests; and would enforce a spirit of mutual support and dependence. which would be rather helped than hindered by a jealous attitude of joint prestige; so long as no divergent interests of members within the group were in a position to turn this state of the common sentiment to their own particular advantage. this state of the case will have lasted for a relatively long time; long enough to have tested the fitness of these peoples for that manner of life,--longer, no doubt, than the interval that has elapsed since history began. special interests--e.g., personal and family interests--will have been present and active in these days of the beginning; but so long as the group at large was small enough to admit of a close neighborly contact throughout its extent and throughout the workday routine of life, at the same time that it was too small and feeble to allow any appreciable dissipation of its joint energies in such pursuit of selfish gains as would run counter to the paramount business of the common livelihood, so long the sense of a common livelihood and a joint fortune would continue to hold any particularist ambitions effectually in check. had it fallen out otherwise, the story of the group in question would have been ended, and another and more suitably endowed type of men would have taken the place vacated by its extinction. with a sensible advance in the industrial arts the scale of operations would grow larger, and the group more numerous and extensive. the margin between production and subsistence would also widen and admit additional scope for individual ambitions and personal gains. and as this process of growth and increasing productive efficiency went on, the control exercised by neighborly surveillance, through the sentiment of the common good as against the self-seeking pursuits of individuals and sub-groups, would gradually slacken; until by progressive disuse it would fall into a degree of abeyance; to be called into exercise and incite to concerted action only in the face of unusual exigencies touching the common fortunes of the group at large, or on persuasion that the collective interest of the group at large was placed in jeopardy in the molestation of one and another of its members from without. the group's prestige at least would be felt to suffer in the defeat or discourtesy suffered by any of its members at the hands of any alien; and, under compulsion of the ancient sense of group solidarity, whatever material hardship or material gain might so fall to individual members in their dealings with the alien would pass easy scrutiny as material detriment or gain inuring to the group at large,--in the apprehension of men whose sense of community interest is inflamed with a jealous disposition to safeguard their joint prestige. with continued advance in the industrial arts the circumstances conditioning life will undergo a progressive change of such a character that the joint interest of the group at large, in the material respect, will progressively be less closely bound up with the material fortunes of any particular member or members; until in the course of time and change there will, in effect, in ordinary times be no general and inclusive community of material interest binding the members together in a common fortune and working for a common livelihood. as the rights of ownership begin to take effect, so that the ownership of property and the pursuit of a livelihood under the rules of ownership come to govern men's economic relations, these material concerns will cease to be a matter of undivided joint interest, and will fall into the shape of interest in severalty. so soon and so far as this institution of ownership or property takes effect, men's material interests cease to run on lines of group solidarity. solely, or almost solely, in the exceptional case of defense against a predatory incursion from outside, do the members of the group have a common interest of a material kind. progressively as the state of the arts advances, the industrial organisation advances to a larger scale and a more extensive specialisation, with increasing divergence among individual interests and individual fortunes; and intercourse over larger distances grows easier and makes a larger grouping practicable; which enables a larger, prompter and more effective mobilisation of forces with which to defend or assert any joint claims. but by the same move it also follows, or at least it appears uniformly to have followed in the european case, that the accumulation of property and the rights of ownership have progressively come into the first place among the material interests of these peoples; while anything like a community of usufruct has imperceptibly fallen into the background, and has presently gone virtually into abeyance, except as an eventual recourse _in extremis_ for the common defense. property rights have displaced community of usufruct; and invidious distinctions as between persons, sub-groups, and classes have displaced community of prestige in the workday routine of these peoples; and the distinctions between contrasted persons or classes have come to rest, in an ever increasing degree, directly or indirectly, on invidious comparisons in respect of pecuniary standing rather than on personal affiliation with the group at large. so, with the advance of the industrial arts a differentiation of a new character sets in and presently grows progressively more pronounced and more effectual, giving rise to a regrouping on lines that run regardless of those frontiers that divide one community from another for purposes of patriotic emulation. so far as it comes chiefly and typically in question here, this regrouping takes place on two distinct but somewhat related principles of contrast: that of wealth and poverty, and that of master and servant, or authority and obedience. the material interests of the population in this way come to be divided between the group of those who own and those who command, on the one hand, and of those who work and who obey, on the other hand. neither of these two contrasted categories of persons have any direct material interest in the maintenance of the patriotic community; or at any rate no such interest as should reasonably induce them to spend their own time and substance in support of the political (patriotic) organisation within which they live. it is only in so far as one or another of these interests looks for a more than proportionate share in any prospective gain from the joint enterprise, that the group or class in question can reasonably be counted on to bear its share in the joint venture. and it is only when and in so far as their particular material or self-regarding interest is reenforced by patriotic conceit, that they can be counted on to spend themselves in furtherance of the patriotic enterprise, without the assurance of a more than proportionate share in any gains that may be held in prospect from any such joint enterprise; and it is only in its patriotic bearing that the political community continues to be a joint venture. that is to say, in more generalised terms, through the development of the rights of property, and of such like prescriptive claims of privilege and prerogative, it has come about that other community interests have fallen away, until the collective prestige remains as virtually the sole community interest which can hold the sentiment of the group in a bond of solidarity. to one or another of these several interested groups or classes within the community the political organisation may work a benefit; but only to one or another, not to each and several, jointly or collectively. since by no chance will the benefit derived from such joint enterprise on the part of the community at large equal the joint cost; in as much as all joint enterprise of the kind that looks to material advantage works by one or another method of inhibition and takes effect, if at all, by lowering the aggregate efficiency of the several countries concerned, with a view to the differential gain of one at the cost of another. so, e.g., a protective tariff is plainly a conspiracy in restraint of trade, with a view to benefit the conspirators by hindering their competitors. the aggregate cost to the community at large of such an enterprise in retardation is always more than the gains it brings to those who may benefit by it. in so speaking of the uses to which the common man's patriotic devotion may be turned, there is no intention to underrate its intrinsic value as a genial and generous trait of human nature. doubtless it is best and chiefly to be appreciated as a spiritual quality that beautifies and ennobles its bearer, and that endows him with the full stature of manhood, quite irrespective of ulterior considerations. so it is to be conceded without argument that this patriotic animus is a highly meritorious frame of mind, and that it has an aesthetic value scarcely to be overstated in the farthest stretch of poetic license. but the question of its serviceability to the modern community, in any other than this decorative respect, and particularly its serviceability to the current needs of the common man in such a modern community, is not touched by such an admission; nor does this recognition of its generous spiritual nature afford any help toward answering a further question as to how and with what effect this animus may be turned to account by anyone who is in position to make use of the forces which it sets free. among christian nations there still is, on the whole, a decided predilection for that ancient and authentic line of national repute that springs from warlike prowess. this repute for warlike prowess is what first comes to mind among civilised peoples when speaking of national greatness. and among those who have best preserved this warlike ideal of worth, the patriotic ambition is likely to converge on the prestige of their sovereign; so that it takes the concrete form of personal loyalty to a master, and so combines or coalesces with a servile habit of mind. but peace hath its victories no less renowned than war, it is said; and peaceable folk of a patriotic temper have learned to make the best of their meager case and have found self-complacency in these victories of the peaceable order. so it may broadly be affirmed that all nations look with complacency on their own peculiar culture--the organised complex of habits of thought and of conduct by which their own routine of life is regulated--as being in some way worthier than the corresponding habits of their neighbors. the case of the german culture has latterly come under a strong light in this way. but while it may be that no other nation has been so naive as to make a concerted profession of faith to the effect that their own particular way of life is altogether commendable and is the only fashion of civilisation that is fit to survive; yet it will scarcely be an extravagance to assert that in their own secret mind these others, too, are blest with much the same consciousness of unique worth. conscious virtue of this kind is a good and sufficient ground for patriotic inflation, so far as it goes. it commonly does not go beyond a defensive attitude, however. now and again, as in the latterday german animation on this head, these phenomena of national use and wont may come to command such a degree of popular admiration as will incite to an aggressive or proselyting campaign. in all this there is nothing of a self-seeking or covetous kind. the common man who so lends himself to the aggressive enhancement of the national culture and its prestige has nothing of a material kind to gain from the increase of renown that so comes to his sovereign, his language, his countrymen's art or science, his dietary, or his god. there are no sordid motives in all this. these spiritual assets of self-complacency are, indeed, to be rated as grounds of high-minded patriotism without afterthought. these aspirations and enthusiasms would perhaps be rated as quixotic by men whose horizon is bounded by the main chance; but they make up that substance of things hoped for that inflates those headlong patriotic animosities that stir universal admiration. so also, men find an invidious distinction in such matters of physical magnitude as their country's area, the number of its population, the size of its cities, the extent of its natural resources, its aggregate wealth and its wealth per capita, its merchant marine and its foreign trade. as a ground of invidious complacency these phenomena of physical magnitude and pecuniary traffic are no better and no worse than such immaterial assets as the majesty of the sovereign or the perfections of the language. they are matters in which the common man is concerned only by the accident of domicile, and his only connection with these things is an imaginary joint interest in their impressiveness. to these things he has contributed substantially nothing, and from them he derives no other merit or advantage than a patriotic inflation. he takes pride in these things in an invidious way, and there is no good reason why he should not; just as there is also no good reason why he should, apart from the fact that the common man is so constituted that he, mysteriously, takes pride in these things that concern him not. * * * * * of the several groups or classes of persons within the political frontiers, whose particular interests run systematically at cross purposes with those of the community at large under modern conditions, the class of masters, rulers, authorities,--or whatever term may seem most suitable to designate that category of persons whose characteristic occupation is to give orders and command deference,--of the several orders and conditions of men these are, in point of substantial motive and interest, most patently at variance with all the rest, or with the fortunes of the common man. the class will include civil and military authorities and whatever nobility there is of a prescriptive and privileged kind. the substantial interest of these classes in the common welfare is of the same kind as the interest which a parasite has in the well-being of his host; a sufficiently substantial interest, no doubt, but there is in this relation nothing like a community of interest. any gain on the part of the community at large will materially serve the needs of this group of personages, only in so far as it may afford them a larger volume or a wider scope for what has in latterday colloquial phrase been called "graft." these personages are, of course, not to be spoken of with disrespect or with the slightest inflection of discourtesy. they are all honorable men. indeed they afford the conventional pattern of human dignity and meritorious achievement, and the "fountain of honor" is found among them. the point of the argument is only that their material or other self-regarding interests are of such a nature as to be furthered by the material wealth of the community, and more particularly by the increasing volume of the body politic; but only with the proviso that this material wealth and this increment of power must accrue without anything like a corresponding cost to this class. at the same time, since this class of the superiors is in some degree a specialised organ of prestige, so that their value, and therefore their tenure, both in the eyes of the community and in their own eyes, is in the main a "prestige value" and a tenure by prestige; and since the prestige that invests their persons is a shadow cast by the putative worth of the community at large, it follows that their particular interest in the joint prestige is peculiarly alert and insistent. but it follows also that these personages cannot of their own substance or of their own motion contribute to this collective prestige in the same proportion in which it is necessary for them to draw on it in support of their own prestige value. it would, in other words, be a patent absurdity to call on any of the current ruling classes, dynasties, nobility, military and diplomatic corps, in any of the nations of europe, e.g., to preserve their current dignity and command the deference that is currently accorded them, by recourse to their own powers and expenditure of their own substance, without the usufruct of the commonalty whose organ of dignity they are. the current prestige value which they enjoy is beyond their unaided powers to create or maintain, without the usufruct of the community. such an enterprise does not lie within the premises of the case. in this bearing, therefore, the first concern with which these personages are necessarily occupied is the procurement and retention of a suitable usufruct in the material resources and good-will of a sufficiently large and industrious population. the requisite good-will in these premises is called loyalty, and its retention by the line of personages that so trade on prestige rests on a superinduced association of ideas, whereby the national honour comes to be confounded in popular apprehension with the prestige of these personages who have the keeping of it. but the potentates and the establishments, civil and military, on whom this prestige value rests will unavoidably come into invidious comparison with others of their kind; and, as invariably happens in matters of invidious comparison, the emulative needs of all the competitors for prestige are "indefinitely extensible," as the phrase of the economists has it. each and several of them incontinently needs a further increment of prestige, and therefore also a further increment of the material assets in men and resources that are needful as ways and means to assert and augment the national honor. it is true, the notion that their prestige value is in any degree conditioned by the material circumstances and the popular imagination of the underlying nation is distasteful to many of these vicars of the national honour. they will incline rather to the persuasion that this prestige value is a distinctive attribute, of a unique order, intrinsic to their own persons. but, plainly, any such detached line of magnates, notables, kings and mandarins, resting their notability on nothing more substantial than a slightly sub-normal intelligence and a moderately scrofulous habit of body could not long continue to command that eager deference that is accounted their due. such a picture of majesty would be sadly out of drawing. there is little conviction and no great dignity to be drawn from the unaided pronouncement: "we're here because, we're here because, we're here because we're here," even when the doggerel is duly given the rhetorical benefit of a "tenure by the grace of god." the personages that carry this dignity require the backing of a determined and patriotic populace in support of their prestige value, and they commonly have no great difficulty in procuring it. and their prestige value is, in effect, proportioned to the volume of material resources and patriotic credulity that can be drawn on for its assertion. it is true, their draught on the requisite sentimental and pecuniary support is fortified with large claims of serviceability to the common good, and these claims are somewhat easily, indeed eagerly, conceded and acted upon; although the alleged benefit to the common good will scarcely be visible except in the light of glory shed by the blazing torch of patriotism. in so far as it is of a material nature the benefit which the constituted authorities so engage to contribute to the common good, or in other words to confer on the common man, falls under two heads: defense against aggression from without; and promotion of the community's material gain. it is to be presumed that the constituted authorities commonly believe more or less implicitly in their own professions in so professing to serve the needs of the common man in these respects. the common defense is a sufficiently grave matter, and doubtless it claims the best affections and endeavour of the citizen; but it is not a matter that should claim much attention at this point in the argument, as bearing on the service rendered the common man by the constituted authorities, taken one with another. any given governmental establishment at home is useful in this respect only as against another governmental establishment elsewhere. so that on the slightest examination it resolves itself into a matter of competitive patriotic enterprise, as between the patriotic aspirations of different nationalities led by different governmental establishments; and the service so rendered by the constituted authorities in the aggregate takes on the character of a remedy for evils of their own creation. it is invariably a defense against the concerted aggressions of other patriots. taken in the large, the common defense of any given nation becomes a detail of the competitive struggle between rival nationalities animated with a common spirit of patriotic enterprise and led by authorities constituted for this competitive purpose. except on a broad basis of patriotic devotion, and except under the direction of an ambitious governmental establishment, no serious international aggression is to be had. the common defense, therefore, is to be taken as a remedy for evils arising out of the working of the patriotic spirit that animates mankind, as brought to bear under a discretionary authority; and in any balance to be struck between the utility and disutility of this patriotic spirit and of its service in the hands of the constituted authorities, it will have to be cancelled out as being at the best a mitigation of some of the disorders brought on by the presence of national governments resting on patriotic loyalty at large. but this common defense is by no means a vacant rubric in any attempted account of modern national enterprise. it is the commonplace and conclusive plea of the dynastic statesmen and the aspiring warlords, and it is the usual blind behind which events are put in train for eventual hostilities. preparation for the common defense also appears unfailingly to eventuate in hostilities. with more or less _bona fides_ the statesmen and warriors plead the cause of the common defense, and with patriotic alacrity the common man lends himself to the enterprise aimed at under that cover. in proportion as the resulting equipment for defense grows great and becomes formidable, the range of items which a patriotically biased nation are ready to include among the claims to be defended grows incontinently larger, until by the overlapping of defensive claims between rival nationalities the distinction between defense and aggression disappears, except in the biased fancy of the rival patriots. of course, no reflections are called for here on the current american campaign of "preparedness." except for the degree of hysteria it appears to differ in no substantial respect from the analogous course of auto-intoxication among the nationalities of europe, which came to a head in the current european situation. it should conclusively serve the turn for any self-possessed observer to call to mind that all the civilised nations of warring europe are, each and several, convinced that they are fighting a defensive war. the aspiration of all right-minded citizens is presumed to be "peace with honour." so that first, as well as last, among those national interests that are to be defended, and in the service of which the substance and affections of the common man are enlisted under the aegis of the national prowess, comes the national prestige, as a matter of course. and the constituted authorities are doubtless sincere and single-minded in their endeavors to advance and defend the national honour, particularly those constituted authorities that hold their place of authority on grounds of fealty; since the national prestige in such a case coalesces with the prestige of the nation's ruler in much the same degree in which the national sovereignty devolves upon the person of its ruler. in so defending or advancing the national prestige, such a dynastic or autocratic overlord, together with the other privileged elements assisting and dependent on him, is occupied with his own interest; his own tenure is a tenure by prestige, and the security of his tenure lies in the continued maintenance of that popular fancy that invests his person with this national prestige and so constitutes him and his retinue of notables and personages its keeper. but it is uniformly insisted by the statesmen--potentates, notables, kings and mandarins--that this aegis of the national prowess in their hands covers also many interests of a more substantial and more tangible kind. these other, more tangible interests of the community have also a value of a direct and personal sort to the dynasty and its hierarchy of privileged subalterns, in that it is only by use of the material forces of the nation that the dynastic prestige can be advanced and maintained. the interest of such constituted authorities in the material welfare of the nation is consequently grave and insistent; but it is evidently an interest of a special kind and is subject to strict and peculiar limitations. the common good, in the material respect, interests the dynastic statesman only as a means to dynastic ends; that is to say, only in so far as it can be turned to account in the achievement of dynastic aims. these aims are "the kingdom, the power and the glory," as the sacred formula phrases the same conception in another bearing. that is to say, the material welfare of the nation is a means to the unfolding of the dynastic power; provided always that this material welfare is not allowed to run into such ramifications as will make the commonwealth an unwieldy instrument in the hands of the dynastic statesmen. national welfare is to the purpose only in so far as it conduces to political success, which is always a question of warlike success in the last resort. the limitation which this consideration imposes on the government's economic policy are such as will make the nation a self-sufficient or self-balanced economic commonwealth. it must be a self-balanced commonwealth at least in such measure as will make it self-sustaining in case of need, in all those matters that bear directly on warlike efficiency. of course, no community can become fully self-sustaining under modern conditions, by use of the modern state of the industrial arts, except by recourse to such drastic measures of repression as would reduce its total efficiency in an altogether intolerable degree. this will hold true even of those nations who, like russia or the united states, are possessed of extremely extensive territories and extremely large and varied resources; but it applies with greatly accentuated force to smaller and more scantily furnished territorial units. peoples living under modern conditions and by use of the modern state of the industrial arts necessarily draw on all quarters of the habitable globe for materials and products which they can procure to the best advantage from outside their own special field so long as they are allowed access to these outlying sources of supply; and any arbitrary limitation on this freedom of traffic makes the conditions of life that much harder, and lowers the aggregate efficiency of the community by that much. national self-sufficiency is to be achieved only by a degree of economic isolation; and such a policy of economic isolation involves a degree of impoverishment and lowered efficiency, but it will also leave the nation readier for warlike enterprise on such a scale as its reduced efficiency will compass. so that the best that can be accomplished along this line by the dynastic statesmen is a shrewd compromise, embodying such a degree of isolation and inhibition as will leave the country passably self-sufficient in case of need, without lowering the national efficiency to such a point as to cripple its productive forces beyond what will be offset by the greater warlike readiness that is so attained. the point to which such a policy of isolation and sufficiency will necessarily be directed is that measure of inhibition that will yield the most facile and effective ways and means of warlike enterprise, the largest product of warlike effectiveness to be had on multiplying the nation's net efficiency into its readiness to take the field. into any consideration of this tactical problem a certain subsidiary factor enters, in that the patriotic temper of the nation is always more or less affected by such an economic policy. the greater the degree of effectual isolation and discrimination embodied in the national policy, the greater will commonly be its effect on popular sentiment in the way of national animosity and spiritual self-sufficiency; which may be an asset of great value for the purposes of warlike enterprise. plainly, any dynastic statesman who should undertake to further the common welfare regardless of its serviceability for warlike enterprise would be defeating his own purpose. he would, in effect, go near to living up to his habitual professions touching international peace, instead of professing to live up to them, as the exigencies of his national enterprise now conventionally require him to do. in effect, he would be _functus officio_. there are two great administrative instruments available for this work of repression and national self-sufficiency at the hands of the imperialistic statesman: the protective tariff, and commercial subvention. the two are not consistently to be distinguished from one another at all points, and each runs out into a multifarious convolution of variegated details; but the principles involved are, after all, fairly neat and consistent. the former is of the nature of a conspiracy in restraint of trade by repression; the latter, a conspiracy to the like effect by subsidised monopoly; both alike act to check the pursuit of industry in given lines by artificially increasing the cost of production for given individuals or classes of producers, and both alike impose a more than proportionate cost on the community within which they take effect. incidentally, both of these methods of inhibition bring a degree, though a less degree, of hardship, to the rest of the industrial world. all this is matter of course to all economic students, and it should, reasonably, be plain to all intelligent persons; but its voluble denial by interested parties, as well as the easy credulity with which patriotic citizens allow themselves to accept the sophistries offered in defense of these measures of inhibition, has made it seem worth while here to recall these commonplaces of economic science. the ground of this easy credulity is not so much infirmity of intellect as it is an exuberance of sentiment, although it may reasonably be believed that its more pronounced manifestations--as, e.g., the high protective tariff--can be had only by force of a formidable cooperation of the two. the patriotic animus is an invidious sentiment of joint prestige; and it needs no argument or documentation to bear out the affirmation that its bias will lend a color of merit and expediency to any proposed measure that can, however speciously, promise an increase of national power or prestige. so that when the statesmen propose a policy of inhibition and mitigated isolation on the professed ground that such a policy will strengthen the nation economically by making it economically self-supporting, as well as ready for any warlike adventure, the patriotic citizen views the proposed measures through the rosy haze of national aspirations and lets the will to believe persuade him that whatever conduces to a formidable national battle-front will also contribute to the common good. at the same time all these national conspiracies in restraint of trade are claimed, with more or less reason, to inflict more or less harm on rival nationalities with whom economic relations are curtailed; and patriotism being an invidious sentiment, the patriotic citizen finds comfort in the promise of mischief to these others, and is all the more prone to find all kinds of merit in proposals that look to such an invidious outcome. in any community imbued with an alert patriotic spirit, the fact that any given circumstance, occurrence or transaction can be turned to account as a means of invidious distinction or invidious discrimination against humanity beyond the national pale, will always go far to procure acceptance of it as being also an article of substantial profit to the community at large, even though the slightest unbiased scrutiny would find it of no ascertainable use in any other bearing than that of invidious mischief. and whatever will bear interpretation as an increment of the nation's power or prowess, in comparison with rival nationalities, will always be securely counted as an item of joint credit, and will be made to serve the collective conceit as an invidious distinction; and patriotic credulity will find it meritorious also in other respects. so, e.g., it is past conception that such a patent imbecility as a protective tariff should enlist the support of any ordinarily intelligent community except by the help of some such chauvinistic sophistry. so also, the various royal establishments of europe, e.g., afford an extreme but therefore all the more convincing illustration of the same logical fallacy. these establishments and personages are great and authentic repositories of national prestige, and they are therefore unreflectingly presumed by their several aggregations of subjects to be of some substantial use also in some other bearing; but it would be a highly diverting exhibition of credulity for any outsider to fall into that amazing misconception. but the like is manifestly true of commercial turnover and export trade among modern peoples; although on this head the infatuation is so ingrained and dogmatic that even a rank outsider is expected to accept the fallacy without reflection, on pain of being rated as unsafe or unsound. such matters again, as the dimensions of the national territory, or the number of the population and the magnitude of the national resources, are still and have perhaps always been material for patriotic exultation, and are fatuously believed to have some great significance for the material fortunes of the common man; although it should be plain on slight reflection that under modern conditions of ownership, these things, one and all, are of no consequence to the common man except as articles of prestige to stimulate his civic pride. the only conjuncture under which these and the like national holdings can come to have a meaning as joint or collective assets would arise in case of a warlike adventure carried to such extremities as would summarily cancel vested rights of ownership and turn them to warlike uses. while the rights of ownership hold, the common man, who does not own these things, draws no profit from their inclusion in the national domain; indeed, he is at some cost to guarantee their safe tenure by their rightful owners. in so pursuing their quest of the kingdom, the power and the glory, by use of the national resources and by sanction of the national spirit, the constituted authorities also assume the guardianship of sundry material interests that are presumed to touch the common good; such as security of person and property in dealings with aliens, whether at home or abroad; security of investment and trade, and vindication of their citizens before the law in foreign parts; and, chiefly and ubiquitously, furtherance and extension of the national trade into foreign parts, particularly of the export trade, on terms advantageous to the traders of the nation. the last named of these advantages is the one on which stress is apt to fall in the argument of all those who advocate an unfolding of national power, as being a matter of vital material benefit to the common man. the other items indicated above, it is plain on the least reflection, are matters of slight if any material consequence to him. the common man--that is ninety-nine and a fraction in one hundred of the nation's common men--has no dealings with aliens in foreign parts, as capitalist, trader, missionary or wayfaring man, and has no occasion for security of person or property under circumstances that raise any remotest question of the national prowess or the national prestige; nor does he seek or aspire to trade to foreign parts on any terms, equitable or otherwise, or to invest capital among aliens under foreign rule, or to exploit concessions or take orders, for acceptance or delivery; nor, indeed, does he at all commonly come into even that degree of contact with abroad that is implied in the purchase of foreign securities. virtually the sole occasion on which he comes in touch with the world beyond the frontier is when, and if, he goes away from home as an emigrant, and so ceases to enjoy the tutelage of the nation's constituted authorities. but the common man, in point of fact, is a home-keeping body, who touches foreign parts and aliens outside the national frontiers only at the second or third remove, if at all, in the occasional purchase of foreign products, or in the sale of goods that may find their way abroad after he has lost sight of them. the exception to this general rule would be found in the case of those under-sized nations that are too small to contain the traffic in which their commonplace population are engaged, and that have neither national prowess nor national prestige to fall back on in a conceivable case of need,--and whose citizens, individually, appear to be as fortunately placed in their workday foreign relations, without a background of prowess and prestige, as the citizens of the great powers who are most abundantly provided in these respects. with wholly negligible exceptions, these matters touch the needs or the sensibilities of the common man only through the channel of the national honour, which may be injured in the hardships suffered by his compatriots in foreign parts, or which may, again, be repaired or enhanced by the meritorious achievements of the same compatriots; of whose existence he will commonly have no other or more substantial evidence, and in whose traffic he has no share other than this vicarious suffering of vague and remote indignity or vainglory by force of the wholly fortuitous circumstance that they are (inscrutably) his compatriots. these immaterial goods of vicarious prestige are, of course, not to be undervalued, nor is the fact to be overlooked or minimised that they enter into the sum total of the common citizen's "psychic income," for whatever they may foot up to; but evidently their consideration takes us back to the immaterial category of prestige value, from which the argument just now was hopefully departing with a view to consideration of the common man's material interest in that national enterprise about which patriotic aspirations turn. these things, then, are matters in which the common man has an interest only as they have a prestige value. but there need be no question as to their touching his sensibilities and stirring him to action, and even to acts of bravery and self-sacrifice. indignity or ill treatment of his compatriots in foreign parts, even when well deserved, as is not infrequently the case, are resented with a vehemence that is greatly to the common man's credit, and greatly also to the gain of those patriotic statesmen who find in such grievances their safest and most reliable raw materials for the production of international difficulty. that he will so respond to the stimulus of these, materially speaking irrelevant, vicissitudes of good or ill that touch the fortunes of his compatriots, as known to him by hearsay, bears witness, of course, to the high quality of his manhood; but it falls very far short of arguing that these promptings of his patriotic spirit have any value as traits that count toward his livelihood or his economic serviceability in the community in which he lives. it is all to his credit, and it goes to constitute him a desirable citizen, in the sense that he is properly amenable to the incitements of patriotic emulation; but it is none the less to be admitted, however reluctantly, that this trait of impulsively vicarious indignation or vainglory is neither materially profitable to himself nor an asset of the slightest economic value to the community in which he lives. quite the contrary, in fact. so also is it true that the common man derives no material advantage from the national success along this line, though he commonly believes that it all somehow inures to his benefit. it would seem that an ingrown bias of community interest, blurred and driven by a jealously sensitive patriotic pride, bends his faith uncritically to match his inclination. his persuasion is a work of preconception rather than of perception. but the most substantial and most unqualified material benefit currently believed to be derivable from a large unfolding of national prowess and a wide extension of the national domain is an increased volume of the nation's foreign trade, particularly of the export trade. "trade follows the flag." and this larger trade and enhanced profit is presumed to inure to the joint benefit of the citizens. such is the profession of faith of the sagacious statesmen and such is also the unreflecting belief of the common man. it may be left an open question if an unfolding of national prowess and prestige increases the nation's trade, whether in imports or in exports. there is no available evidence that it has any effect of the kind. what is not an open question is the patent fact that such an extension of trade confers no benefit on the common man, who is not engaged in the import or export business. more particularly does it yield him no advantage at all commensurate with the cost involved in any endeavour so to increase the volume of trade by increasing the nation's power and extending its dominion. the profits of trade go not to the common man at large but to the traders whose capital is invested; and it is a completely idle matter to the common citizen whether the traders who profit by the nation's trade are his compatriots or not.[6] [footnote 6: all this, which should be plain without demonstration, has been repeatedly shown in the expositions of various peace advocates, typically by mr. angell.] the pacifist argument on the economic futility of national ambitions will commonly rest its case at this point; having shown as unreservedly as need be that national ambition and all its works belong of right under that rubric of the litany that speaks of fire, flood and pestilence. but an hereditary bent of human nature is not to be put out of the way with an argument showing that it has its disutilities. so with the patriotic animus; it is a factor to be counted with, rather than to be exorcised. as has been remarked above, in the course of time and change the advance of the industrial arts and of the institutions of ownership have taken such a turn that the working system of industry and business no longer runs on national lines and, indeed, no longer takes account of national frontiers,--except in so far as the national policies and legislation, arbitrarily and partially, impose these frontiers on the workings of trade and industry. the effect of such regulation for political ends is, with wholly negligible exceptions, detrimental to the efficient working of the industrial system under modern conditions; and it is therefore detrimental to the material interests of the common citizen. but the case is not the same as regards the interests of the traders. trade is a competitive affair, and it is to the advantage of the traders engaged in any given line of business to extend their own markets and to exclude competing traders. competition may be the soul of trade, but monopoly is necessarily the aim of every trader. and the national organisation is of service to its traders in so far as it shelters them, wholly or partly, from the competition of traders of other nationalities, or in so far as it furthers their enterprise by subvention or similar privileges as against their competitors, whether at home or abroad. the gain that so comes to the nation's traders from any preferential advantage afforded them by national regulations, or from any discrimination against traders of foreign nationality, goes to the traders as private gain. it is of no benefit to any of their compatriots; since there is no community of usufruct that touches these gains of the traders. so far as concerns his material advantage, it is an idle matter to the common citizen whether he deals with traders of his own nationality or with aliens; both alike will aim to buy cheap and sell dear, and will charge him "what the traffic will bear." nor does it matter to him whether the gains of this trade go to aliens or to his compatriots; in either case equally they immediately pass beyond his reach, and are equally removed from any touch of joint interest on his part. being private property, under modern law and custom he has no use of them, whether a national frontier does or does not intervene between his domicile and that of their owner. these are facts that every man of sound mind knows and acts on without doubt or hesitation in his own workday affairs. he would scarcely even find amusement in so futile a proposal as that his neighbor should share his business profits with him for no better reason than that he is a compatriot. but when the matter is presented as a proposition in national policy and embroidered with an invocation of his patriotic loyalty the common citizen will commonly be found credulous enough to accept the sophistry without abatement. his archaic sense of group solidarity will still lead him at his own cost to favor his trading compatriots by the imposition of onerous trade regulations for their private advantage, and to interpose obstacles in the way of alien traders. all this ingenious policy of self-defeat is greatly helped out by the patriotic conceit of the citizens; who persuade themselves to see in it an accession to the power and prestige of their own nation and a disadvantage to rival nationalities. it is, indeed, more than doubtful if such a policy of self-defeat as is embodied in current international trade discriminations could be insinuated into the legislation of any civilized nation if the popular intelligence were not so clouded with patriotic animosity as to let a prospective detriment to their foreign neighbors count as a gain to themselves. so that the chief material use of the patriotic bent in modern populations, therefore, appears to be its use to a limited class of persons engaged in foreign trade, or in business that comes in competition with foreign industry. it serves their private gain by lending effectual countenance to such restraint of international trade as would not be tolerated within the national domain. in so doing it has also the secondary and more sinister effect of dividing the nations on lines of rivalry and setting up irreconcilable claims and ambitions, of no material value but of far-reaching effect in the way of provocation to further international estrangement and eventual breach of the peace. how all this falls in with the schemes of militant statesmen, and further reacts on the freedom and personal fortunes of the common man, is an extensive and intricate topic, though not an obscure one; and it has already been spoken of above, perhaps as fully as need be. chapter iii on the conditions of a lasting peace the considerations set out in earlier chapters have made it appear that the patriotic spirit of modern peoples is the abiding source of contention among nations. except for their patriotism a breach of the peace among modern peoples could not well be had. so much will doubtless be assented to as a matter of course. it is also a commonplace of current aphoristic wisdom that both parties to a warlike adventure in modern times stand to lose, materially; whatever nominal--that is to say political--gains may be made by one or the other. it has also appeared from these considerations recited in earlier passages that this patriotic spirit prevails throughout, among all civilised peoples, and that it pervades one nation about as ubiquitously as another. nor is there much evidence of a weakening of this sinister proclivity with the passage of time or the continued advance in the arts of life. the only civilized nations that can be counted on as habitually peaceable are those who are so feeble or are so placed as to be cut off from hope of gain through contention. vainglorious arrogance may run at a higher tension among the more backward and boorish nations; but it is not evident that the advance guard among the civilised peoples are imbued with a less complete national self-complacency. if the peace is to be kept, therefore, it will have to be kept by and between peoples made up, in effect, of complete patriots; which comes near being a contradiction in terms. patriotism is useful for breaking the peace, not for keeping it. it makes for national pretensions and international jealously and distrust, with warlike enterprise always in perspective; as a way to national gain or a recourse in case of need. and there is commonly no settled demarkation between these two contrasted needs that urge a patriotic people forever to keep one eye on the chance of a recourse to arms. therefore any calculus of the chances of peace appears to become a reckoning of the forces which may be counted on to keep a patriotic nation in an unstable equilibrium of peace for the time being. as has just been remarked above, among civilised peoples only those nations can be counted on consistently to keep the peace who are so feeble or otherwise so placed as to be cut off from hope of national gain. and these can apparently be so counted on only as regards aggression, not as regards the national defense, and only in so far as they are not drawn into warlike enterprise, collectively, by their more competent neighbors. even the feeblest and most futile of them feels in honour bound to take up arms in defense of such national pretensions as they still may harbour; and all of them harbour such pretensions. in certain extreme cases, which it might seem invidious to specify more explicitly, it is not easy to discover any specific reasons for the maintenance of a national establishment, apart from the vindication of certain national pretensions which would quietly lapse in the absence of a national establishment on whom their vindication is incumbent. of the rest, the greater nations that are spoken of as powers no such general statement will hold. these are the peoples who stand, in matters of national concern, on their own initiative; and the question of peace and war at large is in effect, a question of peace and war among these powers. they are not so numerous that they can be sifted into distinct classes, and yet they differ among themselves in such a way that they may, for the purpose in hand, fairly be ranged under two distinguishable if not contrasted heads: those which may safely be counted on spontaneously to take the offensive, and those which will fight on provocation. typically of the former description are germany and japan. of the latter are the french and british, and less confidently the american republic. in any summary statement of this kind russia will have to be left on one side as a doubtful case, for reasons to which the argument may return at a later point; the prospective course of things in russia is scarcely to be appraised on the ground of its past. spain and italy, being dubious powers at the best, need not detain the argument; they are, in the nature of things, subsidiaries who wait on the main chance. and austria, with whatever the name may cover, is for the immediate purpose to be counted under the head of germany. there is no invidious comparison intended in so setting off these two classes of nations in contrast to one another. it is not a contrast of merit and demerit or of prestige. imperial germany and imperial japan are, in the nature of things as things go, bent in effect on a disturbance of the peace,--with a view to advance the cause of their own dominion. on a large view of the case, such as many german statesmen were in the habit of professing in the years preceding the great war, it may perhaps appear reasonable to say--as they were in the habit of saying--that these imperial powers are as well within the lines of fair and honest dealing in their campaign of aggression as the other powers are in taking a defensive attitude against their aggression. some sort of international equity has been pleaded in justification of their demand for an increased share of dominion. at least it has appeared that these imperial statesmen have so persuaded themselves after very mature deliberation; and they have showed great concern to persuade others of the equity of their imperial claim to something more than the law would allow. these sagacious, not to say astute, persons have not only reached a conviction to this effect, but they have become possessed of this conviction in such plenary fashion that, in the german case, they have come to admit exceptions or abatement of the claim only when and in so far as the campaign of equitable aggression on which they had entered has been proved impracticable by the fortunes of war. with some gift for casuistry one may, at least conceivably, hold that the felt need of imperial self-aggrandisement may become so urgent as to justify, or at least to condone, forcible dispossession of weaker nationalities. this might, indeed it has, become a sufficiently perplexing question of casuistry, both as touches the punctilios of national honour and as regards an equitable division between rival powers in respect of the material means of mastery. so in private life it may become a moot question--in point of equity--whether the craving of a kleptomaniac may not on occasion rise to such an intolerable pitch of avidity as to justify him in seizing whatever valuables he can safely lay hands on, to ease the discomfort of ungratified desire. in private life any such endeavour to better oneself at one's neighbors' cost is not commonly reprobated if it takes effect on a decently large scale and shrewdly within the flexibilities of the law or with the connivance of its officers. governing international endeavours of this class there is no law so inflexible that it can not be conveniently made over to fit particular circumstances. and in the absence of law the felt need of a formal justification will necessarily appeal to the unformulated equities of the case, with some such outcome as alluded to above. all that, of course, is for the diplomatists to take care of. but any speculation on the equities involved in the projected course of empire to which these two enterprising nations are committing themselves must run within the lines of diplomatic parable, and will have none but a speculative interest. it is not a matter of equity. accepting the situation as it stands, it is evident that any peace can only have a qualified meaning, in the sense of armistice, so long as there is opportunity for national enterprise of the character on which these two enterprising national establishments are bent, and so long as these and the like national establishments remain. so, taking the peaceable professions of their spokesmen at a discount of one hundred percent, as one necessarily must, and looking to the circumstantial evidence of the case, it is abundantly plain that at least these two imperial powers may be counted on consistently to manoeuvre for warlike advantage so long as any peace compact holds, and to break the peace so soon as the strategy of imperial enterprise appears to require it. there has been much courteous make-believe of amiable and upright solicitude on this head the past few years, both in diplomatic intercourse and among men out of doors; and since make-believe is a matter of course in diplomatic intercourse it is right and seemly, of course, that no overt recognition of unavowed facts should be allowed to traverse this run of make-believe within the precincts of diplomatic intercourse. but in any ingenuous inquiry into the nature of peace and the conditions of its maintenance there can be no harm in conveniently leaving the diplomatic make-believe on one side and looking to the circumstances that condition the case, rather than to the formal professions designed to mask the circumstances. * * * * * chief among the relevant circumstances in the current situation are the imperial designs of germany and japan. these two national establishments are very much alike. so much so that for the present purpose a single line of analysis will passably cover both cases. the same line of analysis will also apply, with slight adaptation, to more than one of the other powers, or near-powers, of the modern world; but in so far as such is held to be the case, that is not a consideration that weakens the argument as applied to these two, which are to be taken as the consummate type-form of a species of national establishments. they are, between them, the best instance there is of what may be called a dynastic state. except as a possible corrective of internal disorders and discontent, neither of the two states "desires" war; but both are bent on dominion, and as the dominion aimed at is not to be had except by fighting for it, both in effect are incorrigibly bent on warlike enterprise. and in neither case will considerations of equity, humanity, decency, veracity, or the common good be allowed to trouble the quest of dominion. as lies in the nature of the dynastic state, imperial dominion, in the ambitions of both, is beyond price; so that no cost is too high so long as ultimate success attends the imperial enterprise. so much is commonplace knowledge among all men who are at all conversant with the facts. to anyone who harbors a lively sentimental prejudice for or against either or both of the two nations so spoken of, or for or against the manner of imperial enterprise to which both are committed, it may seem that what has just been said of them and their relation to the world's peace runs on something of a bias and conveys something of dispraise and reprobation. such is not the intention, however, though the appearance is scarcely to be avoided. it is necessary for the purposes of the argument unambiguously to recognise the nature of these facts with which the inquiry is concerned; and any plain characterisation of the facts will unavoidably carry a fringe of suggestions of this character, because current speech is adapted for their reprobation. the point aimed at is not this inflection of approval or disapproval. the facts are to be taken impersonally for what they are worth in their causal bearing on the chance of peace or war; not at their sentimental value as traits of conduct to be appraised in point of their goodness or expediency. so seen without prejudice, then, if that may be, this imperial enterprise of these two powers is to be rated as the chief circumstance bearing on the chances of peace and conditioning the terms on which any peace plan must be drawn. evidently, in the presence of these two imperial powers any peace compact will be in a precarious case; equally so whether either or both of them are parties to such compact or not. no engagement binds a dynastic statesman in case it turns out not to further the dynastic enterprise. the question then recurs: how may peace be maintained within the horizon of german or japanese ambitions? there are two obvious alternatives, neither of which promises an easy way out of the quandary in which the world's peace is placed by their presence: submission to their dominion, or elimination of these two powers. either alternative would offer a sufficiently deterrent outlook, and yet any project for devising some middle course of conciliation and amicable settlement, which shall be practicable and yet serve the turn, scarcely has anything better to promise. the several nations now engaged on a war with the greater of these imperial powers hold to a design of elimination, as being the only measure that merits hopeful consideration. the imperial power in distress bespeaks peace and good-will. those advocates, whatever their nationality, who speak for negotiation with a view to a peace compact which is to embrace these states intact, are aiming, in effect, to put things in train for ultimate submission to the mastery of these imperial powers. in these premises an amicable settlement and a compact of perpetual peace will necessarily be equivalent to arranging a period of recuperation and recruiting for a new onset of dynastic enterprise. for, in the nature of the case, no compact binds the dynastic statesman, and no consideration other than the pursuit of imperial dominion commands his attention. there is, of course, no intention to decry this single-mindedness that is habitually put in evidence by the dynastic statesmen. nor should it be taken as evidence of moral obliquity in them. it is rather the result of a peculiar moral attitude or bent, habitual to such statesmen, and in its degree also habitual to their compatriots, and is indispensably involved in the imperial frame of mind. the consummation of imperial mastery being the highest and ubiquitously ulterior end of all endeavour, its pursuit not only relieves its votaries from the observance of any minor obligations that run counter to its needs, but it also imposes a moral obligation to make the most of any opportunity for profitable deceit and chicanery that may offer. in short, the dynastic statesman is under the governance of a higher morality, binding him to the service of his nation's ambition--or in point of fact, to the personal service of his dynastic master--to which it is his dutiful privilege loyally to devote all his powers of force and fraud. democratically-minded persons, who are not moved by the call of loyalty to a gratuitous personal master, may have some difficulty in appreciating the force and the moral austerity of this spirit of devotion to an ideal of dynastic aggrandisement, and in seeing how its paramount exigence will set aside all meticulous scruples of personal rectitude and veracity, as being a shabby with-holding of service due. to such of these doubters as still have retained some remnants of their religious faith this attitude of loyalty may perhaps be made intelligible by calling to mind the analogous self-surrender of the religious devotee. and in this connection it may also be to the purpose to recall that in point of its genesis and derivation that unreserved self-abasement and surrender to the divine ends and guidance, which is the chief grace and glory of the true believer, is held by secular students of these matters to be only a sublimated analogue or counterfeit of this other dutiful abasement that constitutes loyalty to a temporal master. the deity is currently spoken of as the heavenly king, under whose dominion no sinner has a right that he is bound to respect; very much after the fashion in which no subject of a dynastic state has a right which the state is bound to respect. indeed, all these dynastic establishments that so seek the kingdom, the power and the glory are surrounded with a penumbra of divinity, and it is commonly a bootless question where the dynastic powers end and the claims of divinity begin. there is something of a coalescence.[7] [footnote 7: "to us the state is the most indispensable as well as the highest requisite to our earthly existence.... all individualistic endeavor ... must be unreservedly subordinated to this lofty claim.... the state ... eventually is of infinitely more value than the sum of all the individuals within its jurisdiction." "this conception of the state, which is as much a part of our life as is the blood in our veins, is nowhere to be found in the english constitution, and is quite foreign to english thought, and to that of america as well."--eduard meyer, _england, its political organisation and development and the war against germany_, translated by h.s. white. boston 1916. pp. 30-31.] the kaiser holds dominion by divine grace and is accountable to none but god, if to him. the whole case is in a still better state of repair as touches the japanese establishment, where the emperor is a lineal descendant of the supreme deity, amaterazu (_o mi kami_), and where, by consequence, there is no line of cleavage between a divine and a secular mastery. pursuant to this more unqualified authenticity of autocratic rule, there is also to be found in this case a correspondingly unqualified devotion in the subjects and an unqualified subservience to dynastic ends on the part of the officers of the crown. the coalescence of dynastic rule with the divine order is less complete in the german case, but all observers bear witness that it all goes far enough also in the german case. this state of things is recalled here as a means of making plain that the statesmen of these imperial powers must in the nature of the case, and without blame, be drawn out from under the customary restraint of those principles of vulgar morality that are embodied in the decalogue. it is not that the subject, or--what comes to the same thing--the servant of such a dynastic state may not be upright, veracious and humane in private life, but only that he must not be addicted to that sort of thing in such manner or degree as might hinder his usefulness for dynastic purposes. these matters of selfishly individual integrity and humanity have no weight as against the exigencies of the dynastic enterprise. these considerations may not satisfy all doubters as to the moral sufficiency of these motives that so suffice to decide the dynastic statesmen on their enterprise of aggression by force and fraud; but it should be evident that so long as these statesmen continue in the frame of mind spoken of, and so long as popular sentiment in these countries continues, as hitherto, to lend them effectual support in the pursuit of such imperial enterprise, so long it must also remain true that no enduring peace can be maintained within the sweep of their imperial ambition. any peace compact would necessarily be, in effect, an armistice terminable at will and serving as a season of preparation to meet a deferred opportunity. for the peaceable nations it would, in effect, be a respite and a season of preparation for eventual submission to the imperial rule. by advocates of such a negotiated compact of perpetual peace it has been argued that the populace underlying these imperial powers will readily be brought to realise the futility and inexpediency of such dynastic enterprise, if only the relevant facts are brought to their knowledge, and that so these powers will be constrained to keep the peace by default of popular support for their warlike projects. what is required, it is believed by these sanguine persons, is that information be competently conveyed to the common people of these warlike nations, showing them that they have nothing to apprehend in the way of aggression or oppressive measures from the side of their more peaceable neighbours; whereupon their warlike animus will give place to a reasonable and enlightened frame of mind. this argument runs tacitly or explicitly, on the premise that these peoples who have so enthusiastically lent themselves to the current warlike enterprise are fundamentally of the same racial complexion and endowed with the same human nature as their peaceable neighbours, who would be only too glad to keep the peace on any terms of tolerable security from aggression. if only a fair opportunity is offered for the interested peoples to come to an understanding, it is held, a good understanding will readily be reached; at least so far as to result in a reasonable willingness to submit questions in dispute to an intelligent canvass and an equitable arbitration. projects for a negotiated peace compact, to include the dynastic states, can hold any prospect of a happy issue only if this line of argument, or its equivalent, is pertinent and conclusive; and the argument is to the point only in so far as its premises are sound and will carry as far as the desired conclusion. therefore a more detailed attention to the premises on which it runs will be in place, before any project of the kind is allowed to pass inspection. as to homogeneity of race and endowment among the several nations in question, the ethnologists, who are competent to speak of that matter, are ready to assert that this homogeneity goes much farther among the nations of europe than any considerable number of peace advocates would be ready to claim. in point of race, and broadly speaking, there is substantially no difference between these warring nations, along any east-and-west line; while the progressive difference in racial complexion that is always met with along any north-and-south line, nowhere coincides with a national or linguistic frontier. in no case does a political division between these nations mark or depend on a difference of race or of hereditary endowment. and, to give full measure, it may be added that also in no case does a division of classes within any one of these nations, into noble and base, patrician and plebeian, lay and learned, innocent and vicious, mark or rest on any slightest traceable degree of difference in race or in heritable endowment. on the point of racial homogeneity there is no fault to find with the position taken. if the second postulate in this groundwork of premises on which the advocates of negotiable peace base their hopes were as well taken there need be no serious misgiving as to the practicability of such a plan. the plan counts on information, persuasion and reflection to subdue national animosities and jealousies, at least in such measure as would make them amenable to reason. the question of immediate interest on this head, therefore, would be as to how far this populace may be accessible to the contemplated line of persuasion. at present they are, notoriously, in a state of obsequious loyalty to the dynasty, single-minded devotion to the fortunes of the fatherland, and uncompromising hatred of its enemies. in this frame of mind there is nothing that is new, except the degree of excitement. the animus, it will be recalled, was all there and on the alert when the call came, so that the excitement came on with the sweep of a conflagration on the first touch of a suitable stimulus. the german people at large was evidently in a highly unstable equilibrium, so that an unexampled enthusiasm of patriotic self-sacrifice followed immediately on the first incitement to manslaughter, very much as if the nation had been held under an hypnotic spell. one need only recall the volume of overbearing magniloquence that broke out all over the place in that beginning, when the day was believed to be dawning. such a popular frame of mind is not a transient episode, to be created at short notice and put aside for a parcel of salutary advice. the nation that will make such a massive concerted move with the alacrity shown in this instance must be living in a state of alert readiness for just such an onset. yet this is not to be set down as anything in the way of a racial trait specifically distinguishing the german people from those other adjacent nationalities that are incapable of a similarly swift and massive response to the appeal of patriotism. these adjacent nationalities are racially identical with the german people, but they do not show the same warlike abandon in nearly the same degree. but for all that, it is a national trait, not to be acquired or put away by taking thought. it is just here that the line of definition runs: it is a national trait, not a racial one. it is not nature, but it is second nature. but a national trait, while it is not heritable in the simple sense of that term, has the same semblance, or the same degree, of hereditary persistence that belongs to the national institutions, usages, conventionalities, beliefs, which distinguish the given nation from its neighbors. in this instance it may be said more specifically that this eager loyalty is a heritage of the german people at large in the same sense and with the same degree of permanence as the institution of an autocratic royalty has among them, or a privileged nobility. indeed, it is the institutional counterfoil of these establishments. it is of an institutional character, just as the corresponding sense of national solidarity and patriotic devotion is among the neighboring peoples with whom the german nation comes in comparison. and an institution is an historical growth, with just so much of a character of permanence and continuity of transmission as is given it by the circumstances out of which it has grown. any institution is a product of habit, or perhaps more accurately it is a body of habits of thought bearing on a given line of conduct, which prevails with such generality and uniformity throughout the group as to have become a matter of common sense. such an article of institutional furniture is an outcome of usage, not of reflection or deliberate choice; and it has consequently a character of self-legitimation, so that it stands in the accredited scheme of things as intrinsically right and good, and not merely as a shrewdly chosen expedient _ad interim_. it affords a norm of life, inosculating with a multiplicity of other norms, with which it goes to make up a balanced scheme of ends, ways and means governing human conduct; and no one such institutional item, therefore, is materially to be disturbed, discarded or abated except at the cost of serious derangement to the balanced scheme of things in which it belongs as an integral constituent. nor can such a detail norm of conduct and habitual propensity come into bearing and hold its place, except by force of habituation which is at the same time consonant with the common run of habituation to which the given community is subject. it follows that the more rigorous, comprehensive, unremitting and long-continued the habituation to which a given institutional principle owes its vogue, the more intimately and definitively will it be embedded in the common sense of the community, the less chance is there of its intrinsic necessity being effectually questioned or doubted, and the less chance is there of correcting it or abating its force in case circumstances should so change as to make its continued rule visibly inexpedient. its abatement will be a work not of deliberation and design, but of defection through disuse. not that reflection and sane counsel will count for nothing in these premises, but only that these exertions of intelligence will count for relatively very little by comparison with the run of habituation as enforced by the circumstances conditioning any given case; and further, that wise counsel and good resolutions can take effect in the way of amending any untoward institutional bent only by way of suitable habituation, and only at such a rate of change as the circumstances governing habituation will allow. it is, at the best, slow work to shift the settled lines of any community's scheme of common sense. now, national solidarity, and more particularly an unquestioning loyalty to the sovereign and the dynasty, is a matter of course and of commonsense necessity with the german people. it is not necessary to call to mind that the japanese nation, which has here been coupled with the german, are in the same case, only more so. doubtless it would be exceeding the premises to claim that it should necessarily take the german people as long-continued and as harsh a schooling to unlearn their excess of chauvinism, their servile stooping to gratuitous authority, and their eager subservience to the dynastic ambitions of their masters, as that which has in the course of history induced these habits in them. but it would seem reasonable to expect that there should have to be some measure of proportion between what it has cost them in time and experience to achieve their current frame of mind in this bearing and what it would cost to divest themselves of it. it is a question of how long a time and how exacting a discipline would be required so far to displace the current scheme of commonsense values and convictions in force in the fatherland as to neutralise their current high-wrought principles of servility, loyalty and national animosity; and on the solution of this difficulty appear to depend the chances of success for any proposed peace compact to which the german nation shall be made a party, on terms of what is called an "honorable peace." the national, or rather the dynastic and warlike, animus of this people is of the essence of their social and political institutions. without such a groundwork of popular sentiment neither the national establishment, nor the social order on which it rests and through which it works, could endure. and with this underlying national sentiment intact nothing but a dynastic establishment of a somewhat ruthless order, and no enduring system of law and order not based on universal submission to personal rule, could be installed. both the popular animus and the correlative coercive scheme of law and order are of historical growth. both have been learned, acquired, and are in no cogent sense original with the german people. but both alike and conjointly have come out of a very protracted, exacting and consistent discipline of mastery and subjection, running virtually unbroken over the centuries that have passed since the region that is now the fatherland first passed under the predaceous rule of its teutonic invaders,--for no part of the "fatherland" is held on other tenure than that of forcible seizure in ancient times by bands of invaders, with the negligible exception of holstein and a slight extent of territory adjoining that province to the south and south-west. since the time when such peoples as were overtaken in this region by the germanic barbarian invasions, and were reduced to subjection and presently merged with their alien masters, the same general fashion of law and order that presently grew out of that barbarian conquest has continued to govern the life of those peoples, with relatively slight and intermittent relaxation of its rigors. contrasted with its beginnings, in the shameful atrocities of the dark ages and the prehistoric phases of this german occupation, the later stages of this system of coercive law and order in the fatherland will appear humane, not to say genial; but as compared with the degree of mitigation which the like order of things presently underwent elsewhere in western europe, it has throughout the historical period preserved a remarkable degree of that character of arrogance and servility which it owes to its barbarian and predatory beginnings. * * * * * the initial stages of this germanic occupation of the fatherland are sufficiently obscure under the cloud of unrecorded antiquity that covers them; and then, an abundance of obscurantism has also been added by the vapours of misguided vanity that have surrounded so nearly all historical inquiry on the part of patriotic german scholars. yet there are certain outstanding features in the case, in history and prehistory, that are too large or too notorious to be set aside or to be covered over, and these may suffice to show the run of circumstances which have surrounded the german peoples and shaped their civil and political institutions, and whose discipline has guided german habits of thought and preserved the german spirit of loyalty in the shape in which it underlies the dynastic state of the present day. among the most engaging of those fables that make the conventional background of german history is the academic legend of a free agricultural village community made up of ungraded and masterless men. it is not necessary here to claim that such a village community never played a part in the remoter prehistoric experiences out of which the german people, or their ruling classes, came into the territory of the fatherland; such a claim might divert the argument. but it is sufficiently patent to students of those matters today that no such community of free and ungraded men had any part in the germanic beginnings; that is to say, in the early experiences of the fatherland under german rule. the meager and ambiguous remarks of tacitus on the state of domestic and civil economy among the inhabitants of germany need no longer detain anyone, in the presence of the available archaeological and historical evidence. the circumstantial evidence of the prehistoric antiquities which touch this matter, as well as the slight allusions of historical records in antiquity, indicate unambiguously enough that when the germanic immigrants moved into the territories of the fatherland they moved in as invaders, or rather as marauders, and made themselves masters of the people already living on the land. and history quite as unambiguously declares that when the fatherland first comes under its light it presents a dark and bloody ground of tumultuous contention and intrigue; where princes and princelings, captains of war and of rapine as well as the captains of superstition, spend the substance of an ignominiously sordid and servile populace in an endless round of mutual raiding, treachery, assassinations and supersession. taken at their face value, the recorded stories of that early time would leave one to infer that the common people, whose industry supported this superstructure of sordid mastery, could have survived only by oversight. but touched as it is with poetic license and devoted to the admirable life of the master class--admirable in their own eyes and in those of their chroniclers, as undoubtedly also in the eyes of the subject populace--the history of that time doubtless plays up the notable exploits and fortunes of its conspicuous personages, somewhat to the neglect of the obscure vicissitudes of life and fortune among that human raw material by use of which the admirable feats of the master class were achieved, and about the use of which the dreary traffic of greed and crime went on among the masters. of the later history, what covers, say, the last one thousand years, there is no need to speak at length. with transient, episodic, interruptions it is for the fatherland a continuation out of these beginnings, leading out into a more settled system of subjection and mastery and a progressively increased scale of princely enterprise, resting on an increasingly useful and increasingly loyal populace. in all this later history the posture of things in the fatherland is by no means unique, nor is it even strikingly peculiar, by contrast with the rest of western europe, except in degree. it is of the same general kind as the rest of what has gone to make the historical advance of medieval and modern times; but it differs from the generality in a more sluggish movement and a more tenacious adherence to what would be rated as the untoward features of mediaevalism. the approach to a modern scheme of institutions and modern conceptions of life and of human values has been slow, and hitherto incomplete, as compared with those communities that have, for good or ill, gone farthest along the ways of modernity. habituation to personal subjection and subservience under the rigorous and protracted discipline of standardised service and fealty has continued later, and with later and slighter mitigation, in the fatherland; so as better to have conserved the spiritual attitude of the feudal order. law and order in the fatherland has in a higher degree continued to mean unquestioning obedience to a personal master and unquestioning subservience to the personal ambitions of the master. and since freedom, in the sense of discretionary initiative on the part of the common man, does not fit into the framework of such a system of dependence on personal authority and surveillance, any degree of such free initiative will be "licence" in the eyes of men bred into the framework of this system; whereas "liberty," as distinct from "licence," is not a matter of initiative and self-direction, but of latitude in the service of a master. hence no degree of curtailment in this delegated "liberty" will be resented or repudiated by popular indignation, so long as the master to whom service is due can give assurance that it is expedient for his purposes. the age-long course of experience and institutional discipline out of which the current german situation has come may be drawn schematically to the following effect: in the beginning a turmoil of conquest, rapine, servitude, and contention between rival bands of marauders and their captains, gradually, indeed imperceptibly, fell into lines of settled and conventionalised exploitation; with repeated interruptions due to new incursions and new combinations of rapacious chieftains. out of it all in the course of time came a feudal régime, under which personal allegiance and service to petty chiefs was the sole and universal accredited bond of solidarity. as the outcome of further unremitting intrigue and contention among feudal chiefs, of high and low degree, the populace fell into larger parcels, under the hands of feudal lords of larger dominion, and the bias of allegiance and service came to hold with some degree of permanence and uniformity, or at least of consistency, over a considerable reach of country, including its inhabitants. with the rise of states came allegiance to a dynasty, as distinguished from the narrower and more ephemeral allegiance to the semi-detached person of a victorious prince; and the relative permanence of territorial frontiers under this rule gave room for an effectual recrudescence of the ancient propensity to a sentimental group solidarity; in which the accredited territorial limits of the dynastic dominion served to outline the group that so was felt to belong together under a joint dispensation and with something of a joint interest in matters of fame and fortune. as the same notion is more commonly and more suggestively expressed, a sense of nationality arose within the sweep of the dynastic rule. this sense of community interest that is called nationality so came in to reenforce the sense of allegiance to the dynastic establishment and so has coalesced with it to produce that high-wrought loyalty to the state, that draws equally on the sentiment of community interest in the nation and on the prescriptive docility to the dynastic head. the sense of national solidarity and of feudal loyalty and service have coalesced, to bring this people to that climax of patriotic devotion beyond which there lies no greater height along this way. but this is also as far as the german people have gone; and it is scarcely to be claimed that the japanese have yet reached this stage; they would rather appear to be, essentially, subjects of the emperor, and only inchoately a japanese nation. of the german people it seems safe to say that they have achieved such a coalescence of unimpaired feudal fealty to a personal master and a full-blown sense of national solidarity, without any perceptible slackening in either strand of the double tie which so binds them in the service of the dynastic state. germany, in other words, is somewhat in arrears, as compared with those europeans that have gone farthest along this course of institutional growth, or perhaps rather institutional permutation. it is not that this retardation of the german people in this matter of national spirit is to be counted as an infirmity, assuredly not as a handicap in the pursuit of that national prestige on which all patriotic endeavour finally converges. for this purpose the failure to distinguish between the ambitions of the dynastic statesmen and the interests of the commonwealth is really a prodigious advantage, which their rivals, of more mature growth politically, have lost by atrophy of this same dynastic axiom of subservience. these others, of whom the french and the english-speaking peoples make up the greater part and may be taken as the typical instance, have had a different history, in part. the discipline of experience has left a somewhat different residue of habits of thought embedded in their institutional equipment and effective as axiomatic premises in their further apprehension of what is worth while, and why. it is not that the difference between these two contrasted strains of the western civilisation is either profound or very pronounced; it is perhaps rather to be stated as a difference of degree than of kind; a retardation of spiritual growth, in respect of the prevalent and controlling habits of thought on certain heads, in the one case as against the other. therefore any attempt to speak with sufficient definition, so as to bring out this national difference of animus in any convincing way, will unavoidably have an appearance of overstatement, if not also of bias. and in any case, of course, it is not to be expected that the national difference here spoken for can be brought home to the apprehension of any unspoiled son of the fatherland, since it does not lie within that perspective. it is not of the nature of a divergence, but rather a differential in point of cultural maturity, due to a differential in the rate of progression through that sequence of institutional phases through which the civilised peoples of europe, jointly and severally, have been led by force of circumstance. in this movement out of the dark ages and onward, circumstances have fallen out differently for those europeans that chanced to live within the confines of the fatherland, different with such effect as to have in the present placed these others at a farther remove from the point of departure, leaving them furnished with less of that archaic frame of mind that is here in question. possessed of less, but by no means shorn of all--perhaps not of the major part--of that barbaric heritage. circumstances have so fallen out that these--typically the french and the english-speaking peoples--have left behind and partly forgotten that institutional phase in which the people of imperial germany now live and move and have their being. the french partly because they--that is the common people of the french lands--entered the procession with a very substantial lead, having never been put back to a point abreast of their neighbors across the rhine, in that phase of european civilisation from which the peoples of the fatherland tardily emerged into the feudal age. so, any student who shall set out to account for the visible lead which the french people still so obstinately maintain in the advance of european culture, will have to make up his account with this notable fact among the premises of his inquiry, that they have had a shorter course to cover and have therefore, in the sporting phrase, had the inside track. they measure from a higher datum line. among the advantages which so have come, in a sense unearned, to the french people, is their uninterrupted retention, out of roman--and perhaps pre-roman--times, of the conception of a commonwealth, a community of men with joint and mutual interests apart from any superimposed dependence on a joint feudal superior. the french people therefore became a nation, with unobtrusive facility, so soon as circumstances permitted, and they are today the oldest "nation" in europe. they therefore were prepared from long beforehand, with an adequate principle (habit of thought) of national cohesion and patriotic sentiment, to make the shift from a dynastic state to a national commonwealth whenever the occasion for such a move should arise; that is to say, whenever the dynastic state, by a suitable conjunction of infirmity and irksomeness, should pass the margin of tolerance in this people's outraged sense of national shame. the case of the german people in their latterday attitude toward dynastic vagaries may afford a term of comparison. these appear yet incapable of distinguishing between national shame and dynastic ambition. by a different course and on lines more nearly parallel with the life-history of the german peoples, the english-speaking peoples have reached what is for the present purpose much the same ground as the french, in that they too have made the shift from the dynastic state to the national commonwealth. the british started late, but the discipline of servitude and unmitigated personal rule in their case was relatively brief and relatively ineffectual; that is to say, as compared with what their german cousins had to endure and to learn in the like connection. so that the british never learned the lesson of dynastic loyalty fully by heart; at least not the populace; whatever may be true for the privileged classes, the gentlemen, whose interests were on the side of privilege and irresponsible mastery. here as in the french case it was the habits of thought of the common man, not of the class of gentlemen, that made the obsolescence of the dynastic state a foregone conclusion and an easy matter--as one speaks of easy achievement in respect of matters of that magnitude. it is now some two and a half centuries since this shift in the national point of view overtook the english-speaking community. perhaps it would be unfair to say that that period, or that period plus what further time may yet have to be added, marks the interval by which german habits of thought in these premises are in arrears, but it is not easy to find secure ground for a different and more moderate appraisal. the future, of course, is not to be measured in terms of the past, and the tempo of the present and of the calculable future is in many bearings very different from that which has ruled even in the recent historical past. but then, on the other hand, habituation always requires time; more particularly such habituation as is to take effect throughout a populous nation and is counted on to work a displacement of a comprehensive institutional system and of a people's outlook on life. germany is still a dynastic state. that is to say, its national establishment is, in effect, a self-appointed and irresponsible autocracy which holds the nation in usufruct, working through an appropriate bureaucratic organisation, and the people is imbued with that spirit of abnegation and devotion that is involved in their enthusiastically supporting a government of that character. now, it is in the nature of a dynastic state to seek dominion, that being the whole of its nature. and a dynastic establishment which enjoys the unqualified usufruct of such resources as are placed at its disposal by the feudalistic loyalty of the german people runs no chance of keeping the peace, except on terms of the unconditional surrender of all those whom it may concern. no solemn engagement and no pious resolution has any weight in the balance against a cultural fatality of this magnitude. * * * * * this account of the derivation and current state of german nationalism will of course appear biased to anyone who has been in the habit of rating german culture high in all its bearings, and to whom at the same time the ideals of peace and liberty appeal. indeed, such a critic, gifted with the due modicum of asperity, might well be provoked to call it all a more or less ingenious diatribe of partisan malice. but it can be so construed only by those who see the question at issue as a point of invidious distinction between this german animus on the one hand and the corresponding frame of mind of the neighboring peoples on the other hand. there may also appear to the captious to be some air of deprecation about the characterisation here offered of the past history of political traffic within the confines of the fatherland. all of which, of course, touches neither the veracity of the characterisation nor the purpose with which so ungrateful a line of analysis and exposition has been entered upon. it is to be regretted if facts that may flutter the emotions of one and another among the sensitive and unreflecting can not be drawn into such an inquiry without having their cogency discounted beforehand on account of the sentimental value imputed to them. of course no offense is intended and no invidious comparison is aimed at. even if the point of it all were an invidious comparison it would immediately have to be admitted that the net showing in favor of these others, e.g., the french or the english-speaking peoples, is by no means so unreservedly to their credit as such a summary statement of the german case might seem to imply. as bearing on the chances of a peace contingent upon the temper of the contracting nationalities, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that such a peace compact would hold indefinitely even if it depended solely on the pacific animus of these others that have left the dynastic state behind. these others, in fact, are also not yet out of the woods. they may not have the same gift of gratuitous and irresponsible truculence as their german cousins, in the same alarming degree; but as was said in an earlier passage, they too are ready to fight on provocation. they are patriotic to a degree; indeed to such a degree that anything which visibly touches the national prestige will readily afford a _casus belli_. but it remains true that the popular temper among them is of the defensive order; perhaps of an unnecessarily enthusiastic defensive order, but after all in such a frame of mind as leaves them willing to let well enough alone, to live and let live. and herein appears to lie the decisive difference between those peoples whose patriotic affections center about the fortunes of an impersonal commonwealth and those in whom is superadded a fervent aspiration for dynastic ascendency. the latter may be counted on to break the peace when a promising opportunity offers. the contrast may be illustrated, though not so sharply as might be desirable, in the different temper shown by the british people in the boer war on the one hand, as compared with the popularity of the french-prussian war among the german people on the other hand. both were aggressive wars, and both were substantially unprovoked. diplomatically speaking, of course, sufficient provocation was found in either case, as how should it not? but in point of substantial provocation and of material inducement, both were about equally gratuitous. in either case the war could readily have been avoided without material detriment to the community and without perceptible lesion to the national honour. both were "engineered" on grounds shamelessly manufactured _ad hoc_ by interested parties; in the one case by a coterie of dynastic statesmen, in the other by a junta of commercial adventurers and imperialistic politicians. in neither case had the people any interest of gain or loss in the quarrel, except as it became a question of national prestige. but both the german and the british community bore the burden and fought the campaign to a successful issue for those interested parties who had precipitated the quarrel. the british people at large, it is true, bore the burden; which comes near being all that can be said in the way of popular approval of this war, which political statesmen have since then rated as one of the most profitable enterprises in which the forces of the realm have been engaged. on the subject of this successful war the common man is still inclined to cover his uneasy sense of decency with a recital of extenuating circumstances. what parallels all this in the german case is an outbreak of patriotic abandon and an admirable spirit of unselfish sacrifice in furtherance of the dynastic prestige, an intoxication of patriotic blare culminating in the triumphant coronation at versailles. nor has the sober afterthought of the past forty-six years cast a perceptible shadow of doubt across the glorious memory of that patriotic debauch. such is the difference of animus between a body of patriotic citizens in a modern commonwealth on the one hand and the loyal subjects of a dynastic state on the other hand. there need be no reflections on the intrinsic merits of either. seen in dispassionate perspective from outside the turmoil, there is not much to choose, in point of sane and self-respecting manhood, between the sluggish and shamefaced abettor of a sordid national crime, and a ranting patriot who glories in serving as cat's-paw to a syndicate of unscrupulous politicians bent on dominion for dominion's sake. but the question here is not as to the relative merits or the relative manhood contents of the two contrasted types of patriot. doubtless both and either have manhood enough and to spare; at least, so they say. but the point in question is the simpler and nowise invidious one, as to the availability of both or either for the perpetuation of the world's peace under a compact of vigilant neutrality. plainly the german frame of mind admits of no neutrality; the quest of dominion is not compatible with neutrality, and the substantial core of german national life is still the quest of dominion under dynastic tutelage. how it stands with the spirit that has repeatedly come in sight in the international relations of the british community is a question harder to answer. it may be practicable to establish a peace of neutrals on the basis of such national spirit as prevails among these others--the french and english-speaking peoples, together with the minor nationalities that cluster about the north sea--because their habitual attitude is that of neutrality, on the whole and with allowance for a bellicose minority in all these countries. by and large, these peoples have come to the tolerant attitude that finds expression in the maxim, live and let live. but they are all and several sufficiently patriotic. it may, indeed, prove that they are more than sufficiently patriotic for the purposes of a neutral peace. they stand for peace, but it is "peace with honour;" which means, in more explicit terms, peace with undiminished national prestige. now, national prestige is a very particular commodity, as has been set out in earlier passages of this inquiry; and a peace which is to be kept only on terms of a jealous maintenance of the national honour is likely to be in a somewhat precarious case. if, and when, the national honour is felt to require an enhanced national ascendancy, the case for a neutral peace immediately becomes critical. and the greater the number and diversity of pretensions and interests that are conceived to be bound up with the national honour, the more unstable will the resulting situation necessarily be. the upshot of all this recital of considerations appears to be that a neutral peace compact may, or it may not, be practicable in the absence of such dynastic states as germany and japan; whereas it has no chance in the presence of these enterprising national establishments. no one will be readier or more voluble in exclaiming against the falsity of such a discrimination as is here attempted, between the democratic and the dynastic nations of the modern world, than the spokesmen of these dynastic powers. no one is more outspoken in professions of universal peace and catholic amity than these same spokesmen of the dynastic powers; and nowhere is there more urgent need of such professions. official and "inspired" professions are, of course, to be overlooked; at least, so charity would dictate. but there have, in the historic present, been many professions of this character made also by credible spokesmen of the german, and perhaps of the japanese, people, and in all sincerity. by way of parenthesis it should be said that this is not intended to apply to expressions of conviction and intention that have come out of germany these two years past (december 1916). without questioning the credibility of these witnesses that have borne witness to the pacific and genial quality of national sentiment in the german people, it will yet be in place to recall the run of facts in the national life of germany in this historical present and the position of these spokesmen in the german community. * * * * * the german nation is of a peculiar composition in respect of its social structure. so far as bears on the question in hand, it is made up of three distinctive constituent factors, or perhaps rather categories or conditions of men. the populace is of course the main category, and in the last resort always the main and decisive factor. next in point of consequence as well as of numbers and initiative is the personnel of the control,--the ruling class, the administration, the official community, the hierarchy of civil and political servants, or whatever designation may best suit; the category comprises that pyramidal superstructure of privilege and control whereof the sovereign is the apex, and in whom, under any dynastic rule, is in effect vested the usufruct of the populace. these two classes or conditions of men, the one of which orders and the other obeys, make up the working structure of the nation, and they also between them embody the national life and carry forward the national work and aim. intermediate between them, or rather beside them and overlapping the commissure, is a third category whose life articulates loosely with both the others at the same time that it still runs along in a semi-detached way. this slighter but more visible, and particularly more audible, category is made up of the "intellectuals," as a late, and perhaps vulgar, designation would name them. these are they who chiefly communicate with the world outside, and at the same time they do what is academically called thinking. they are in intellectual contact and communication with the world at large, in a contact of give and take, and they think and talk in and about those concepts that go in under the caption of the humanities in the world at large. the category is large enough to constitute an intellectual community, indeed a community of somewhat formidable magnitude, taken in absolute terms, although in percentages of the population at large their numbers will foot up to only an inconsiderable figure. their contact with the superior class spoken of above is fairly close, being a contact, in the main, of service on the one side and of control on the other. with the populace their contact and communion is relatively slight, the give and take in the case being neither intimate nor far-reaching. more particularly is there a well-kept limit of moderation on any work of indoctrination or intellectual guidance which this class may carry down among the people at large, dictated and enforced by dynastic expediency. this category, of the intellectuals, is sufficiently large to live its own life within itself, without drawing on the spiritual life of the community at large, and of sufficiently substantial quality to carry its own peculiar scheme of intellectual conventions and verities. of the great and highly meritorious place and work of these intellectuals in the scheme of german culture it is needless to speak. what is to the point is that they are the accredited spokesmen of the german nation in all its commonplace communication with the rest of civilised europe. the intellectuals have spoken with conviction and sincerity of the spiritual state of the german people, but in so doing, and in so far as bears on the character of german nationalism, they have been in closer contact, intellectually and sympathetically, with the intellectual and spiritual life of civilised europe at large than with the movements of the spirit among the german populace. and their canvassing of the concepts which so have come under their attention from over the national frontiers has been carried forward--so far, again, as bears on the questions that are here in point--with the german-dynastic principles, logic and mechanism of execution under their immediate observation and supplying the concrete materials for inquiry. indeed, it holds true, by and large, that nothing else than this german-dynastic complement of ways and means has, or can effectually, come under their observation in such a degree of intimacy as to give body and definition to the somewhat abstract theorems on cultural aims and national preconceptions that have come to them from outside. in short, they have borrowed these theoretical formulations from abroad, without the concrete apparatus of ways and means in which these theorems are embodied in their foreign habitat, and have so found themselves construing these theoretical borrowings in the only concrete terms of which they have had first-hand and convincing knowledge. such an outcome would be fairly unavoidable, inasmuch as these intellectuals, however much they are, in the spirit, citizens of the cosmopolitan republic of knowledge and intelligence, they are after all, _in propria persona_, immediately and unremittingly subjects of the german-dynastic state; so that all their detail thinking on the aims, ways and means of life, in all its civil and political bearings, is unavoidably shaped by the unremitting discipline of their workday experience under this dynastic scheme. the outcome has been that while they have taken up, as they have understood them, the concepts that rule the civic life of these other, maturer nations, they have apprehended and developed these theorems of civic life in the terms and by the logic enforced in that system of control and surveillance known to them by workday experience,--the only empirical terms at hand. the apex of growth and the center of diffusion as regards the modern culture in respect of the ideals and logic of civic life--other phases of this culture than this its civil aspect do not concern the point here in question--this apex of growth and center of diffusion lie outside the fatherland, in an environment alien to the german institutional scheme. yet so intrinsic to the cultural drift of modern mankind are these aims and this logic, that in taking over and further enriching the intellectual heritage of this modern world the intellectuals of the fatherland have unavoidably also taken over those conceptions of civil initiative and masterless self-direction that rule the logic of life in a commonwealth of ungraded men. they have taken these over and assimilated them as best their experience would permit. but workday experience and its exigencies are stubborn things; and in this process of assimilation of these alien conceptions of right and honest living, it is the borrowed theorems concerning civic rights and duties that have undergone adaptation and revision, not the concrete system of ways and means in which these principles, so accepted, are to be put in practice. necessarily so, since in the german scheme of law and order the major premise is the dynastic state, whereas the major premise of the modern civilised scheme of civic life is the absence of such an organ. so, the development and elaboration of these modern principles of civic liberty--and this elaboration has taken on formidable dimensions--under the hand of the german intellectuals has uniformly run out into pickwickian convolutions, greatly suggestive of a lost soul seeking a place to rest. with unquestionably serious purpose and untiring endeavour, they have sought to embody these modern civilised preconceptions in terms afforded by, or in terms compatible with, the institutions of the fatherland; and they have been much concerned and magniloquently elated about the german spirit of freedom that so was to be brought to final and consummate realisation in the life of a free people. but at no point and in no case have either the proposals or their carrying out taken shape as a concrete application of the familiar principle of popular self-direction. it has always come to something in the way of a concessive or expedient mitigation of the antagonistic principle of personal authority. where the forms of self-government or of individual self-direction have concessively been installed, under the imperial rule, they have turned out to be an imitative structure with some shrewd provision for their coercion or inhibition at the discretion of an irresponsible authority. neither the sound intelligence nor the good faith of these intellectuals of the fatherland is to be impugned. that the--necessarily vague and circumlocutory--expositions of civic institutions and popular liberty which they have so often and so largely promulgated should have been used as a serviceable blind of dynastic statecraft is not to be set down to their discredit. circumstances over which they could have no control, since they were circumstances that shaped their own habits of thought, have placed it beyond their competence to apprehend or to formulate these alien principles (habits of thought) concretely in those alien institutional details and by the alien logic with which they could have no working acquaintance. to one and another this conception of cultural solidarity within the nation, and consequent cultural aliency between nations, due to the different habits of life and of thought enforced by the two diverse institutional systems, may be so far unfamiliar as to carry no conviction. it may accordingly not seem out of place to recall that the institutional system of any given community, particularly for any community living under a home-bred and time-tried system of its own, will necessarily be a balanced system of interdependent and mutually concordant parts working together in one comprehensive plan of law and order. through such an institutional system, as, e.g., the german imperial organisation, there will run a degree of logical consistency, consonant with itself throughout, and exerting a consistent discipline throughout the community; whereby there is enforced a consistent drift or bent in the prevalent habits of life, and a correlative bent in the resulting habits of thought prevalent in the community. it is, in fact, this possession of a common scheme of use and wont, and a consequent common outlook and manner of thinking, that constitutes the most intrinsic bond of solidarity in any nationality, and that finally marks it off from any other. it is equally a matter of course that any other given community, living under the rule of a substantially different, or divergent, system of institutions, will be exposed to a course of workday discipline running to a different, perhaps divergent, effect; and that this other community will accordingly come in for a characteristically different discipline and fall under the rule of a different commonsense outlook. where an institutional difference of this kind is somewhat large and consistent, so as to amount in effect to a discrepancy, as may fairly be said of the difference between imperial germany and its like on the one hand, and the english-speaking nations on the other hand, there the difference in everyday conceptions may readily make the two peoples mutually unintelligible to one another, on those points of institutional principle that are involved in the discrepancy. this is the state of the case as between the german people, including the intellectuals, and the peoples against whom their preconceptions of national destiny have arrayed them. and the many vivid expressions of consternation, abhorrence and incredulity that have come out of this community of intellectuals in the course of the past two years of trial and error, bear sufficient testimony to the rigorous constraint which these german preconceptions and their logic exercise over the intellectuals, no less than over the populace. conversely, of course, it is nearly as impracticable for those who have grown up under the discipline of democratic institutions to comprehend the habitual outlook of the commonplace german patriot on national interests and aims; not quite, perhaps, because the discipline of use and wont and indoctrination is neither so rigorous nor so consistent in their case. but there is, after all, prevalent among them a sufficiently evident logical inability to understand and appreciate the paramount need of national, that is to say dynastic, ascendancy that actuates all german patriots; just as these same patriots are similarly unable to consider national interests in any other light than that of dynastic ascendancy. going simply on the face value of the available evidence, any outsider might easily fall into the error of believing that when the great adventure of the war opened up before them, as well as when presently the shock of baffled endeavour brought home its exasperating futility, the intellectuals of the fatherland distinguished themselves above all other classes and conditions of men in the exuberance of their patriotic abandon. such a view would doubtless be almost wholly erroneous. it is not that the intellectuals reached a substantially superior pitch of exaltation, but only that, being trained in the use of language, they were able to express their emotions with great facility. there seems no reason to believe that the populace fell short of the same measure in respect of their prevalent frame of mind. to return to the workings of the imperial dynastic state and the forces engaged. it plainly appears that the intellectuals are to be counted as supernumeraries, except so far as they serve as an instrument of publicity and indoctrination in the hands of the discretionary authorities. the working factors in the case are the dynastic organisation of control, direction and emolument, and the populace at large by use of whose substance the traffic in dynastic ascendancy and emolument is carried on. these two are in fairly good accord, on the ancient basis of feudal loyalty. hitherto there is no evident ground for believing that this archaic tie that binds the populace to the dynastic ambitions has at all perceptibly weakened. and the possibility of dynastic germany living at peace with the world under any compact, therefore translates itself into the possibility of the german people's unlearning its habitual deference and loyalty to the dynasty. as its acquirement has been a work of protracted habituation, so can its obsolescence also come about only through more or less protracted habituation under a system of use and wont of a different or divergent order. the elements of such a systematic discipline running to an effect at cross purposes with this patriotic animus are not absent from the current situation in the fatherland; the discipline of the modern industrial system, for instance, runs to such a divergent effect; but this, and other conceivable forces which may reenforce it, will after all take time, if they are to work a decisive change in the current frame of mind of the patriotic german community. during the interval required for such a change in the national temper, the peace of the world would be conditioned on the inability of the dynastic state to break it. so that the chances of success for any neutral peace league will vary inversely as the available force of imperial germany, and it could be accounted secure only in the virtual elimination of the imperial state as a national power. if the gradual obsolescence of the spirit of militant loyalty in the german people, through disuse under a régime of peace, industry, self government and free trade, is to be the agency by force of which dynastic imperialism is to cease, the chance of a neutral peace will depend on the thoroughness with which such a régime of self-direction can be installed in this case, and on the space of time required for such obsolescence through disuse. obviously, the installation of a workable régime of self-government on peaceable lines would in any case be a matter of great difficulty among a people whose past experience has so singularly incapacitated them for self-government; and obviously, too, the interval of time required to reach secure ground along this line of approach would be very considerable. also, in view of these conditions, obviously, this scheme for maintaining the peace of nations by a compact of neutrals based on a compromise with an aspiring dynastic state resolves itself into the second of the two alternatives spoken of at the outset, viz., a neutral peace based on the elimination of germany as a war power, together with the elimination of any materials suitable for the formation of a formidable coalition. and then, with imperial germany supposedly eliminated or pacified, there would still remain the japanese establishment, to which all the arguments pertinent in the case of germany will apply without abatement; except that, at least hitherto, the dynastic statesmen of japan have not had the disposal of so massive a body of resources, in population, industry, or raw materials. chapter iv peace without honour the argument therefore turns back to a choice between the two alternatives alluded to: peace in submission to the rule of the german dynastic establishment (and to japan), or peace through elimination of these enterprising powers. the former alternative, no doubt, is sufficiently unattractive, but it is not therefore to be put aside without a hearing. as goes without saying, it is repugnant to the patriotic sentiments of those peoples whom the imperial german establishment have elected for submission. but if this unreflecting patriotic revulsion can once be made amenable to reason, there is always something to be said in favor of such a plan of peaceable submission, or at least in extenuation of it; and if it is kept in mind that the ulterior necessity of such submission must always remain in perspective as a condition precedent to a peaceful settlement, so long as one or both of these enterprising powers remains intact, it will be seen that a sane appraisal of the merits of such a régime of peace is by no means uncalled for. for neither of these two powers is there a conclusive issue of endeavour short of paramount dominion. * * * * * there should also be some gain of insight and sobriety in recalling that the intellectuals of the fatherland, who have doubtless pondered this matter longer and more dispassionately than all other men, have spoken very highly of the merits of such a plan of universal submission to the rule of this german dynastic establishment. they had, no doubt, been considering the question both long and earnestly, as to what would, in the light of reason, eventually be to the best interest of those peoples whose manifest destiny was eventual tutelage under the imperial crown; and there need also be no doubt that in that time (two years past) they therefore spoke advisedly and out of the fulness of the heart on this head. the pronouncements that came out of the community of intellectuals in that season of unembarrassed elation and artless avowal are doubtless to be taken as an outcome of much thoughtful canvassing of what had best be done, not as an enforced compromise with untoward necessities but as the salutary course freely to be pursued with an eye single to the best good of all concerned. it is true, the captious have been led to speak slightingly of the many utterances of this tenure coming out of the community of intellectuals, as, e.g., the lay sermons of professor ostwald dating back to that season; but no unprejudiced reader can well escape the persuasion that these, as well as the very considerable volume of similar pronouncements by many other men of eminent scholarship and notable for benevolent sentiments, are faithfully to be accepted as the expressions of a profound conviction and a consciously generous spirit. in so speaking of the advantages to be derived by any subject people from submission to the german imperial rule, these intellectuals are not to be construed as formulating the drift of vulgar patriotic sentiment among their compatriots at large, but rather as giving out the deliverances of their own more sensitive spirit and maturer deliberation, as men who are in a position to see human affairs and interests in a larger perspective. such, no doubt, would be their own sense of the matter. reflection on the analogous case of the tutelage exercised by the american government over the subject philippinos may contribute to a just and temperate view of what is intended in the régime of tutelage and submission so spoken for by the german intellectuals,--and, it may be added, found good by the imperial statesmen. there would, of course, be the difference, as against the case of the philippinos, that whereas the american government is after all answerable, in the last resort and in a somewhat random fashion, to a popular opinion that runs on democratic preconceptions, the german imperial establishment on the other hand is answerable to no one, except it be to god, who is conceived to stand in somewhat the relation of a silent partner, or a minority stockholder in this dynastic enterprise. yet it should not be overlooked that any presumptive hard usage which the vassal peoples might look for at the hands of the german dynasty would necessarily be tempered with considerations of expediency as dictated by the exigencies of usufruct. the imperial establishment has shown itself to be wise, indeed more wise than amiable, but wise at least in its intentions, in the use which it has made of subject peoples hitherto. it is true, a somewhat accentuated eagerness on the part of the imperial establishment to get the maximum service in a minimum of time and at a minimum cost from these subject populations,--as, e.g., in silesia and poland, in schleswig-holstein, in alsace-lorraine, or in its african and oceanic possessions,--has at times led to practices altogether dubious on humanitarian grounds, at the same time that in point of thrifty management they have gone beyond "what the traffic will bear." yet it is not to be overlooked--and in this connection it is a point of some weight--that, so far as the predatory traditions of its statecraft will permit, the imperial establishment has in all these matters been guided by a singularly unreserved attention to its own material advantage. where its management in these premises has yielded a less profitable usufruct than the circumstances would reasonably admit, the failure has been due to an excess of cupidity rather than the reverse. the circumstantial evidence converges to the effect that the imperial establishment may confidently be counted on to manage the affairs of its subject peoples with an eye single to its own material gain, and it may with equal confidence be counted on that in the long run no unadvised excesses will be practised. of course, an excessive adventure in atrocity and predation, due to such human infirmity in its agents or in its directorate as has been shown in various recent episodes, is to be looked for now and again; but these phenomena would come in by way of fluctuating variations from the authentic routine, rather than as systematic features of it. that superfluity of naughtiness that has given character to the current german imperial policy in belgium, e.g., or that similarly has characterised the dealings of imperial japan in korea during the late "benevolent assimilation" of that people into japanese-imperial usufruct, is not fairly to be taken to indicate what such an imperial establishment may be expected to do with a subject people on a footing of settled and long-term exploitation. at the outset, in both instances, the policy of frightfulness was dictated by a well-advised view to economy of effort in reducing the subject people to an abject state of intimidation, according to the art of war as set forth in the manuals; whereas latterly the somewhat profligate excesses of the government of occupation--decently covered with diplomatic parables on benevolence and legality--have been dictated by military convenience, particularly by the need of forced labor and the desirability of a reduced population in the acquired territory. so also the "personally conducted" dealings with the armenians by use of the turks should probably also best be explained as an endeavour to reduce the numbers of an undesirable population beforehand, without incurring unnecessary blame. all these things are, at the most, misleading indications of what the imperial policy would be like under settled conditions and in the absence of insubordination. by way of contrast, such as may serve to bring the specific traits of this prospective imperial tutelage of nations into a better light, the ottoman usufruct of the peoples of the turkish dominions offers an instructive instance. the ottoman tutelage is today spoken of by its apologists in terms substantially identical with the sketches of the future presented by hopeful german patriots in the early months of the current war. but as is so frequently the case in such circumstances, these expressions of the officers have to be understood in a diplomatic sense; not as touching the facts in any other than a formal way. it is sufficiently evident that the ottoman management of its usufruct has throughout been ill-advised enough persistently to charge more than the traffic would bear, probably due in great part to lack of control over its agents or ramifications, by the central office. the ottoman establishment has not observed, or enforced, the plain rules of economy in its utilisation of the subject peoples, and finds itself today bankrupt in consequence. what may afford more of a parallel to the prospective german tutelage of the nations is the procedure of the japanese establishment in korea, manchuria, or china; which is also duly covered with an ostensibly decent screen of diplomatic parables, but the nature and purpose of which is overt enough in all respects but the nomenclature. it is not unlikely that even this japanese usufruct and tutelage runs on somewhat less humane and complaisant lines than a well-advised economy of resources would dictate for the prospective german usufruct of the western nations. there is the essential difference between the two cases that while japan is over-populated, so that it becomes the part of a wise government to find additional lands for occupancy, and that so it is constrained by its imperial ambitions to displace much of the population in its subject territories, the fatherland on the other hand is under-populated-notoriously, though not according to the letter of the diplomatic parables on this head--and for the calculable future must continue to be under-populated; provided that the state of the industrial arts continues subject to change in the same general direction as hitherto, and provided that no radical change affects the german birth-rate. so, since the imperial government has no need of new lands for occupancy by its home population, it will presumably be under no inducement to take measures looking to the partial depopulation of its subject territories. the case of belgium and the measures looking to a reduction of its population may raise a doubt, but probably not a well taken doubt. it is rather that since it has become evident that the territory can not be held, it is thought desirable to enrich the fatherland with whatever property can be removed, and to consume the accumulated man-power of the belgian people in the service of the war. it would appear that it is a war-measure, designed to make use of the enemy's resources for his defeat. indeed, under conditions of settled occupation or subjection, any degree of such depopulation would entail an economic loss, and any well-considered administrative policy would therefore look to the maintenance of the inhabitants of the acquired territories in undiminished numbers and unimpaired serviceability. the resulting scheme of imperial usufruct should accordingly be of a considerate, not to say in effect humane, character,--always provided that the requisite degree of submission and subservience ("law and order") can be enforced by a system of coercion so humane as not to reduce the number of the inhabitants or materially to lower their physical powers. such would, by reasonable expectation, be the character of this projected imperial tutelage and usufruct of the nations of christendom. in its working-out this german project should accordingly differ very appreciably from the policy which its imperial ambitions have constrained the japanese establishment to pursue in its dealings with the life and fortunes of its recently, and currently, acquired subject peoples. the better to appreciate in some concrete fashion what should, by reasonable expectation, be the terms on which life might so be carried on _sub pace germanica_, attention may be invited to certain typical instances of such peace by abnegation among contemporary peoples. perhaps at the top of the list stands india, with its many and varied native peoples, subject to british tutelage, but, the british apologists say, not subject to british usufruct. the margin of tolerance in this instance is fairly wide, but its limits are sharply drawn. india is wanted and held, not for tribute or revenue to be paid into the imperial treasury, nor even for exclusive trade privileges or preferences, but mainly as a preserve to provide official occupation and emoluments for british gentlemen not otherwise occupied or provided for; and secondarily as a means of safeguarding lucrative british investments, that is to say, investments by british capitalists of high and low degree. the current british professions on the subject of this occupation of india, and at times the shamefaced apology for it, is that the people of india suffer no hardship by this means; the resulting governmental establishment being no more onerous and no more expensive to them than any equally, or even any less, competent government of their own would necessarily be. the fact, however, remains, that india affords a much needed and very considerable net revenue to the class of british gentlemen, in the shape of official salaries and pensions, which the british gentry at large can on no account forego. narrowed to these proportions it is readily conceivable that the british usufruct of india should rest with no extraordinary weight on the indian people at large, however burdensome it may at times become to those classes who aspire to take over the usufruct in case the british establishment can be dislodged. this case evidently differs very appreciably from the projected german usufruct of neighboring countries in europe. a case that may be more nearly in point would be that of any one of the countries subject to the turkish rule in recent times; although these instances scarcely show just what to expect under the projected german régime. the turkish rule has been notably inefficient, considered as a working system of dynastic usufruct; whereas it is confidently expected that the corresponding german system would show quite an exceptional degree of efficiency for the purpose. this turkish inefficiency has had a two-fold effect, which should not appear in the german case. through administrative abuses intended to serve the personal advantage of the irresponsible officials, the underlying peoples have suffered a progressive exhaustion and dilapidation; whereby the central authority, the dynastic establishment, has also grown progressively, cumulatively weaker and therefore less able to control its agents; and, in the second place, on the same grounds, in the pursuit of personal gain, and prompted by personal animosities, these irresponsible agents have persistently carried their measures of extortion beyond reasonable bounds,--that is to say beyond the bounds which a well considered plan of permanent usufruct would countenance. all this would be otherwise and more sensibly arranged under german imperial auspices. one of the nations that have fallen under turkish rule--and turkish peace--affords a valuable illustration of a secondary point that is to be considered in connection with any plan of peace by submission. the armenian people have in later time come partly under russian dominion, and so have been exposed to the russian system of bureaucratic exploitation; and the difference between russian and turkish armenia is instructive. according to all credible--that is unofficial--accounts, conditions are perceptibly more tolerable in russian armenia. well informed persons relate that the cause for this more lenient, or less extreme, administration of affairs under russian officials is a selective death rate among them, such that a local official who persistently exceeds a certain ill-defined limit of tolerance is removed by what would under other circumstances be called an untimely death. no adequate remedy has been found, within the large limits which russian bureaucratic administration habitually allows itself in questions of coercion. the turk, on the other hand, less deterred by considerations of long-term expediency, and, it may be, less easily influenced by outside opinion on any point of humanity, has found a remedy in the systematic extirpation of any village in which an illicit death occurs. one will incline to presume that on this head the german imperial procedure would be more after the russian than after the turkish pattern; although latterday circumstantial evidence will throw some sinister doubt on the reasonableness of such an expectation. it is plain, however, that the turkish remedy for this form of insubordination is a wasteful means of keeping the peace. plainly, to the home office, the high command, the extinction of a village with its population is a more substantial loss than the unseasonable decease of one of its administrative agents; particularly when it is called to mind that such a decease will presumably follow only on such profligate excesses of naughtiness as are bound to be inexcusably unprofitable to the central authority. it may be left an open question how far a corrective of this nature can hopefully be looked to as applicable, in case of need, under the projected german imperial usufruct. it may, i apprehend, be said without offense that there is no depth of depravity below the ordinary reach of the russian bureaucracy; but this organisation finds itself constrained, after all, to use circumspection and set some limits on individual excursions beyond the bounds of decency and humanity, so soon as these excesses touch the common or joint interest of the organisation. any excess of atrocity, beyond a certain margin of tolerance, on the part of any one of its members is likely to work pecuniary mischief to the rest; and then, the bureaucratic conduct of affairs is also, after all, in an uncertain degree subject to some surveillance by popular sentiment at home or abroad. the like appears not to hold true of the turkish official organisation. the difference may be due to a less provident spirit among the latter, as already indicated. but a different tradition, perhaps an outgrowth of this lack of providence and of the consequent growth of a policy of "frightfulness," may also come in for a share in the outcome; and there is also a characteristic difference in point of religious convictions, which may go some way in the same direction. the followers of islam appear on the whole to take the tenets of their faith at their face value--servile, intolerant and fanatic--whereas the russian official class may perhaps without undue reproach be considered to have on the whole outlived the superstitious conceits to which they yield an expedient _pro forma_ observance. so that when worse comes to worst, and the turk finds himself at length with his back against the last consolations of the faith that makes all things straight, he has the assured knowledge that he is in the right as against the unbelievers; whereas the russian bureaucrat in a like case only knows that he is in the wrong. the last extremity is a less conclusive argument to the man in whose apprehension it is not the last extremity. again, there is some shadow of doubt falls on the question as to which of these is more nearly in the german imperial spirit. on the whole, the case of china is more to the point. by and large, the people of china, more particularly the people of the coastal-plains region, have for long habitually lived under a régime of peace by non-resistance. the peace has been broken transiently from time to time, and local disturbances have not been infrequent; but, taken by and large, the situation has habitually been of the peaceful order, on a ground of non-resisting submission. but this submission has not commonly been of a whole-hearted kind, and it has also commonly been associated with a degree of persistent sabotage; which has clogged and retarded the administration of governmental law and order, and has also been conducive to a large measure of irresponsible official corruption. the habitual scheme of things chinese in this bearing may fairly be described as a peace of non-resistance tempered with sabotage and assassination. such was the late manchu régime, and there is no reason in china for expecting a substantially different outcome from the japanese invasion that is now under way. the nature of this japanese incursion should be sufficiently plain. it is an enterprise in statecraft after the order of macchiavelli, metternich, and bismarck. of course, the conciliatory fables given out by the diplomatic service, and by the other apologists, are to be taken at the normal discount of one-hundred percent. the relatively large current output of such fables may afford a hint as to the magnitude of the designs which the fables are intended to cover. the chinese people have had a more extended experience in peace of this order than all others, and their case should accordingly be instructive beyond all others. not that a european peace by non-resistance need be expected to run very closely on the chinese lines, but there should be a reasonable expectation that the large course of things would be somewhat on the same order in both cases. neither the european traditions and habitual temperament nor the modern state of the industrial arts will permit one to look for anything like a close parallel in detail; but it remains true, when all is said, that the chinese experience of peace under submission to alien masters affords the most instructive illustration of such a régime, as touches its practicability, its methods, its cultural value, and its effect on the fortunes of the subject peoples and of their masters. now, it may be said by way of preliminary generalisation that the life-history of the chinese people and their culture is altogether the most imposing achievement which the records of mankind have to show; whereas the history of their successive alien establishments of mastery and usufruct is an unbroken sequence of incredibly shameful episodes,--always beginning in unbounded power and vainglory, running by way of misrule, waste and debauchery, to an inglorious finish in abject corruption and imbecility. always have the gains in civilisation, industry and in the arts, been made by the subject chinese, and always have their alien masters contributed nothing to the outcome but misrule, waste, corruption and decay. and yet in the long run, with all this handicap and misrule, the chinese people have held their place and made headway in those things to which men look with affection and esteem when they come to take stock of what things are worth while. it would be a hopeless task to count up how many dynasties of masterful barbarians, here and there, have meanwhile come up and played their ephemeral role of vainglorious nuisance and gone under in shame and confusion, and dismissed with the invariable verdict of "good riddance!" it may at first sight seem a singular conjuncture of circumstances, but it is doubtless a consequence of the same conjuncture, that the chinese people have also kept their hold through all history on the chinese lands. they have lived and multiplied and continued to occupy the land, while their successive alien masters have come and gone. so that today, as the outcome of conquest, and of what would be rated as defeat, the people continue to be chinese, with an unbroken pedigree as well as an unbroken line of home-bred culture running through all the ages of history. in the biological respect the chinese plan of non-resistance has proved eminently successful. and, by the way, much the same, though not in the same degree, is true for the armenian people; who have continued to hold their hill country through good days and evil, apparently without serious or enduring reduction of their numbers and without visible lapse into barbarism, while the successive disconnected dynasties of their conquering rulers have come and gone, leaving nothing but an ill name. "this fable teaches" that a diligent attention to the growing of crops and children is the sure and appointed way to the maintenance of a people and its culture even under the most adverse conditions, and that eventual death and shameful destruction inexorably wait on any "ruling race." hitherto the rule has not failed. the rule, indeed, is grounded in the heritable traits of human nature, from which there is no escape. for its long-term biological success, as well as for the continued integrity of a people's culture, a peace of non-resistance, under good or evil auspices, is more to be desired than imperial dominion. but these things are not all that modern peoples live for, perhaps it is safe to say that in no case are these chief among the things for which civilised europeans are willing to live. they urgently need also freedom to live their own life in their own way, or rather to live within the bonds of convention which they have come in for by use and wont, or at least they believe that such freedom is essential to any life that shall be quite worth while. so also they have a felt need of security from arbitrary interference in their pursuit of a livelihood and in the free control of their own pecuniary concerns. and they want a discretionary voice in the management of their joint interests, whether as a nation or in a minor civil group. in short, they want personal, pecuniary and political liberty, free from all direction or inhibition from without. they are also much concerned to maintain favorable economic conditions for themselves and their children. and last, but chiefly rather than least, they commonly are hide-bound patriots inspired with an intractable felt need of national prestige. it is an assemblage of peoples in such a frame of mind to whom the pacifists are proposing, in effect, a plan for eventual submission to an alien dynasty, under the form of a neutral peace compact to include the warlike powers. there is little likelihood of such a scheme being found acceptable, with popular sentiment running as it now does in the countries concerned. and yet, if the brittle temper in which any such proposal is rejected by popular opinion in these countries today could be made to yield sufficiently to reflection and deliberate appraisal, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that its acceptance would not be the best way out of a critical situation. the cost of disabling and eliminating the warlike power whose dominion is feared, or even of staving off the day of surrender, is evidently serious enough. the merits of the alternative should be open to argument, and should, indeed, be allowed due consideration. and any endeavour to present them without heat should presumably find a hearing. it appears to have been much of the fault of the pacifists who speak for the peace league that they have failed or refused to recognise these ulterior consequences of the plan which they advocate; so that they appear either not to know what they are talking about, or to avoid talking about what they know. it will be evident from beforehand that the grave difficulty to be met in any advocacy of peace on terms of non-resistant subjection to an alien dynastic rule--"peace at any price"--is a difficulty of the psychological order. whatever may be conceived to hold true for the chinese people, such submission is repugnant to the sentiments of the western peoples. which in turn evidently is due to the prevalence of certain habitual preconceptions among modern civilised men,--certain acquired traits of temper and bias, of the nature of fixed ideas. that something in the way of a reasonably contented and useful life is possible under such a régime as is held in prospect, and even some tolerable degree of well-being, is made evident in the chinese case. but the chinese tolerance of such a régime goes to argue that they are charged with fewer preconceptions at variance with the exigencies of life under these conditions. so, it is commonly accepted, and presumably to be accepted, that the chinese people at large have little if any effectual sense of nationality; their patriotism appears to be nearly a negligible quantity. this would appear to an outsider to have been their besetting weakness, to which their successful subjection by various and sundry ambitious aliens has been due. but it appears also to have been the infirmity by grace of which this people have been obliged to learn the ways of submission, and so have had the fortune to outlive their alien masters, all and sundry, and to occupy the land and save the uncontaminated integrity of their long-lived civilisation. * * * * * some account of the nature and uses of this spirit of patriotism that is held of so great account among western nations has already been set out in an earlier passage. one or two points in the case, that bear on the argument here, may profitably be recalled. the patriotic spirit, or the tie of nationalism, is evidently of the nature of habit, whatever proclivity to the formation of such a habit may be native to mankind. more particularly is it a matter of habit--it might even be called a matter of fortuitous habit--what particular national establishment a given human subject will become attached to on reaching what is called "years of discretion" and so becoming a patriotic citizen. the analogy of the clam may not be convincing, but it may at least serve to suggest what may be the share played by habituation in the matter of national attachment. the young clam, after having passed the free-swimming phase of his life, as well as the period of attachment to the person of a carp or similar fish, drops to the bottom and attaches himself loosely in the place and station in life to which he has been led; and he loyally sticks to his particular patch of ooze and sand through good fortune and evil. it is, under providence, something of a fortuitous matter where the given clam shall find a resting place for the sole of his foot, but it is also, after all, "his own, his native land" etc. it lies in the nature of a clam to attach himself after this fashion, loosely, to the bottom where he finds a living, and he would not be a "good clam and true" if he failed to do so; but the particular spot for which he forms this attachment is not of the essence of the case. at least, so they say. it may be, as good men appear to believe or know, that all men of sound, or at least those of average, mind will necessarily be of a patriotic temper and be attached by ties of loyalty to some particular national establishment, ordinarily the particular establishment which is formally identified with the land in which they live; although it is always possible that a given individual may be an alien in the land, and so may owe allegiance to and be ruled by a patriotic attachment to another national establishment, to which the conventionalities governing his special case have assigned him as his own proper nation. the analogy of the clam evidently does not cover the case. the patriotic citizen is attached to his own proper nationality not altogether by the accident of domicile, but rather by the conventions, legal or customary, which assign him to this or that national establishment according to certain principles of use and wont. mere legal citizenship or allegiance does not decide the matter either; at least not by any means unavoidably; as appears in the case of the chinese subject under manchu or japanese rule; and as appears perhaps more perspicuously in the case of the "hyphenate" american citizen, whose formal allegiance is to the nation in whose land he prefers to live, all the while that his patriotic affection centers on his spiritual fatherland in whose fortunes he has none but a non-resident interest. indeed, the particular national tie that will bind the affections--that is to say the effectual patriotic attachment--of any given individual may turn out on closer scrutiny to be neither that of domicile or of formal legal allegiance, nor that of putative origin or pedigree, but only a reflex of certain national animosities; which may also turn out on examination to rest on putative grounds--as illustrated by a subsidiary class of hyphenate american citizens whose affections have come to be bound up in the national fortunes of one foreign power for the simple, but sufficient, reason that, on conventional grounds, they bear malice against another equally foreign power. evidently there is much sophistication, not to say conventionalised affectation, in all this national attachment and allegiance. it will perhaps not do to say that it is altogether a matter of sophistication. yet it may not exceed the premises to say that the particular choice, the concrete incidence, of this national attachment is in any given case a matter of sophistication, largely tempered with fortuity. one is born into a given nationality--or, in case of dynastic allegiance, into service and devotion to a (fortuitously) given sovereign--or at least so it is commonly believed. still one can without blame, and without excessive shame, shift one's allegiance on occasion. what is not countenanced among civilised men is to shift out of allegiance to any given nationality or dynasty without shifting into the like complication of gainless obligations somewhere else. such a shifting of national or dynastic base is not quite reputable, though it is also not precisely disreputable. the difficulty in the case appears to be a moral difficulty, not a mental or a pecuniary one, and assuredly not a physical difficulty, since the relation in question is not a physical relation. it would appear to be of the moral order of things, in that sense of the term in which conventional proprieties are spoken of as moral. that is to say, it is a question of conforming to current expectations under a code of conventional proprieties. like much of the conventional code of behavior this patriotic attachment has the benefit of standardised decorum, and its outward manifestations are enjoined by law. all of which goes to show how very seriously the whole matter is regarded. and yet it is also a matter of common notoriety that large aggregates of men, not to speak of sporadic individuals, will on occasion shift their allegiance with the most felicitous effect and with no sensible loss of self-respect or of their good name. such a shift is to be seen in multiple in the german nation within the past half-century, when, for instance, the hanoverians, the saxons, and even the holsteiners in very appreciable numbers, not to mention the subjects of minuscular principalities whose names have been forgotten in the shuffle, all became good and loyal subjects of the empire and of the imperial dynasty,--good and loyal without reservation, as has abundantly appeared. so likewise within a similar period the inhabitants of the southern states repudiated their allegiance to the union, putting in its place an equivalent loyalty to their new-made country; and then, when the new national establishment slipped out from under their feet they returned as whole-heartedly as need be to their earlier allegiance. in each of these moves, taken with deliberation, it is not to be doubted that this body of citizens have been moved by an unimpeachable spirit of patriotic honour. no one who is in any degree conversant with the facts is likely to question the declaration that it would be a perversion, not to say an inversion, of fact to rate their patriotic devotion to the union today lower than that of any other section of the country or any other class or condition of men. but there is more, and in a sense worse, to be found along the same general line of evidence touching this sublimated sentiment of group solidarity that is called nationalism. the nation, of course, is large; the larger the better, it is believed. it is so large, indeed, that considered as a group or community of men living together it has no sensible degree of homogeneity in any of their material circumstances or interests; nor is anything more than an inconsiderable fraction of the aggregate population, territory, industry, or daily life known to any one of these patriotic citizens except by remote and highly dubious hearsay. the one secure point on which there is a (constructive) uniformity is the matter of national allegiance; which grows stronger and more confident with every increase in aggregate mass and volume. it is also not doubtful, e.g., that if the people of the british dominions in north america should choose to throw in their national lot with the union, all sections and classes, except those whose pecuniary interest in a protective tariff might be conceived to suffer, would presently welcome them; nor is it doubtful that american nationality would cover the new and larger aggregate as readily as the old. much the same will hold true with respect to the other countries colonised under british auspices. and there is no conclusive reason for drawing the limit of admissible national extension at that point. so much, however, is fairly within the possibilities of the calculable future; its realisation would turn in great measure on the discontinuance of certain outworn or disserviceable institutional arrangements; as, e.g., the remnants of a decayed monarchy, and the legally protected vested interests of certain business enterprises and of certain office-holding classes. what more and farther might practicably be undertaken in this way, in the absence of marplot office-holders, office-seekers, sovereigns, priests and monopolistic business concerns sheltered under national animosities and restraints of trade, would be something not easy to assign a limit to. all the minor neutrals, that cluster about the north sea, could unquestionably be drawn into such a composite nationality, in the absence, or with due disregard, of those classes, families and individuals whose pecuniary or invidious gain is dependent on or furthered by the existing division of these peoples. the projected defensive league of neutrals is, in effect, an inchoate coalescence of the kind. its purpose is the safeguarding of the common peace and freedom, which is also the avowed purpose and justification of all those modern nations that have outlived the régime of dynastic ambition and so of enterprise in dominion for dominion's sake, and have passed into the neutral phase of nationality; or it should perhaps rather be said that such is the end of endeavour and the warrant of existence and power for these modern national establishments in so far as they have outlived and repudiated such ambitions of a dynastic or a quasi-dynastic order, and so have taken their place as intrinsically neutral commonwealths. it is only in the common defense (or in the defense of the like conditions of life for their fellowmen elsewhere) that the citizens of such a commonwealth can without shame entertain or put in evidence a spirit of patriotic solidarity; and it is only by specious and sophistical appeal to the national honour--a conceit surviving out of the dynastic past--that the populace of such a commonwealth can be stirred to anything beyond a defense of their own proper liberties or the liberties of like-minded men elsewhere, in so far as they are not still imbued with something of the dynastic animus and the chauvinistic animosities which they have formally repudiated in repudiating the feudalistic principles of the dynastic state. the "nation," without the bond of dynastic loyalty, is after all a make-shift idea, an episodic half-way station in the sequence, and loyalty, in any proper sense, to the nation as such is so much of a make-believe, that in the absence of a common defense to be safeguarded any such patriotic conceit must lose popular assurance and, with the passing of generations, fall insensibly into abeyance as an archaic affectation. the pressure of danger from without is necessary to keep the national spirit alert and stubborn, in case the pressure from within, that comes of dynastic usufruct working for dominion, has been withdrawn. with further extension of the national boundaries, such that the danger of gratuitous infraction from without grows constantly less menacing, while the traditional régime of international animosities falls more and more remotely into the background, the spirit of nationalism is fairly on the way to obsolescence through disuse. in other words, the nation, as a commonwealth, being a partisan organisation for a defensive purpose, becomes _functa officio_ in respect of its nationalism and its patriotic ties in somewhat the same measure as the national coalition grows to such a size that partisanship is displaced by a cosmopolitan security. doubtless the falling into abeyance through disuse of so pleasing a virtue as patriotic devotion will seem an impossibly distasteful consummation; and about tastes there is no disputing, but tastes are mainly creations of habit. except for the disquieting name of the thing, there is today little stands in the way of a cosmopolitan order of human intercourse unobtrusively displacing national allegiance; except for vested interests in national offices and international discriminations, and except for those peoples among whom national life still is sufficiently bound up with dynastic ambition. in an earlier passage the patriotic spirit has been defined as a sense of partisan solidarity in point of prestige, and sufficient argument has been spent in confirming the definition and showing its implications. with the passing of all occasion for a partisan spirit as touches the common good, through coalescence of the parts between which partisan discrepancies have hitherto been kept up, there would also have passed all legitimate occasion for or provocation to an intoxication of invidious prestige on national lines,--and there is no prestige that is not of an invidious nature, that being, indeed, the whole of its nature. he would have to be a person of praeternatural patriotic sensibilities who could fall into an emotional state by reason of the national prestige of such a coalition commonwealth as would be made up, e.g., of the french and english-speaking peoples, together with those other neutrally and peaceably inclined european communities that are of a sufficiently mature order to have abjured dynastic ambitions of dominion, and perhaps including the chinese people as well. such a coalition may now fairly be said to be within speaking distance, and with its consummation, even in the inchoate shape of a defensive league of neutrals, the eventual abeyance of that national allegiance and national honour that bulks so large in the repertory of current eloquence would also come in prospect. all this is by no means saying that love of country, and of use and wont as it runs in one's home area and among one's own people, would suffer decay, or even abatement. the provocation to nostalgia would presumably be as good as ever. it is even conceivable that under such a (contemplated) régime of unconditional security, attachment to one's own habitat and social circumstances might grow to something more than is commonly seen in the precarious situation in which the chances of a quiet life are placed today. but nostalgia is not a bellicose distemper, nor does it make for gratuitous disturbance of peaceable alien peoples; neither is it the spirit in which men lend themselves to warlike enterprise looking to profitless dominion abroad. men make patriotic sacrifices of life and substance in spite of home-sickness rather than by virtue of it. * * * * * the aim of this long digression has been to show that patriotism, of that bellicose kind that seeks satisfaction in inflicting damage and discomfort on the people of other nations, is not of the essence of human life; that it is of the nature of habit, induced by circumstances in the past and handed on by tradition and institutional arrangements into the present; and that men can, without mutilation, divest themselves of it, or perhaps rather be divested of it by force of circumstances which will set the current of habituation the contrary way. the change of habituation necessary to bring about such a decay of the bellicose national spirit would appear to be of a negative order, at least in the main. it would be an habituation to unconditional peace and security; in other words, to the absence of provocation, rather than a coercive training away from the bellicose temper. this bellicose temper, as it affects men collectively, appears to be an acquired trait; and it should logically disappear in time in the absence of those conditions by impact of which it has been acquired. such obsolescence of patriotism, however, would not therefore come about abruptly or swiftly, since the patriotic spirit has by past use and wont, and by past indoctrination, been so thoroughly worked into the texture of the institutional fabric and into the commonsense taste and morality, that its effectual obsolescence will involve a somewhat comprehensive displacement and mutation throughout the range of institutions and popular conceits that have been handed down. and institutional changes take time, being creations of habit. yet, again, there is the qualification to this last, that since the change in question appears to be a matter, not of acquiring a habit and confirming it in the shape of an article of general use and wont, but of forgetting what once was learned, the time and experience to be allowed for its decay need logically not equal that required for its acquirement, either in point of duration or in point of the strictness of discipline necessary to inculcate it. while the spirit of nationalism is such an acquired trait, and while it should therefore follow that the chief agency in divesting men of it must be disuse of the discipline out of which it has arisen, yet a positive, and even something of a drastic discipline to the contrary effect need not be altogether ineffectual in bringing about its obsolescence. the case of the chinese people seems to argue something of the sort. not that the chinese are simply and neutrally unpatriotic; they appear also to be well charged with disloyalty to their alien rulers. but along with a sense of being on the defensive in their common concerns, there is also the fact that they appear not to be appreciably patriotic in the proper sense; they are not greatly moved by a spirit of nationality. and this failure of the national spirit among them can scarcely be set down to a neutral disuse of that discipline which has on the other hand induced a militant nationalism in the peoples of christendom; it should seem more probable, at least, that this relative absence of a national ambition is traceable in good part to its having been positively bred out of them by the stern repression of all such aspirations under the autocratic rule of their alien masters. * * * * * peace on terms of submission and non-resistance to the ordinary exactions and rulings of those imperial authorities to whom such submission may become necessary, then, will be contingent on the virtual abeyance of the spirit of national pride in the peoples who so are to come under imperial rule. a sufficient, by no means necessarily a total, elimination or decadence of this proclivity will be the condition precedent of any practicable scheme for a general peace on this footing. how large an allowance of such animus these prospectively subject peoples might still carry, without thereby assuring the defeat of any such plan, would in great measure depend on the degree of clemency or rigor with which the superior authority might enforce its rule. it is not that a peace plan of this nature need precisely be considered to fall outside the limits of possibility, on account of this necessary condition, but it is at the best a manifestly doubtful matter. advocates of a negotiated peace should not fail to keep in mind and make public that the plan which they advocate carries with it, as a sequel or secondary phase, such an unconditional surrender and a consequent régime of non-resistance, and that there still is grave doubt whether the peoples of these western nations are at present in a sufficiently tolerant frame of mind, or can in the calculable future come in for such a tolerantly neutral attitude in point of national pride, as to submit in any passable fashion to any alien imperial rule. if the spiritual difficulty presented by this prevalent spirit of national pride--sufficiently stubborn still, however inane a conceit it may seem on sober reflection--if this animus of factional insubordination could be overcome or in some passable measure be conciliated or abated, there is much to be said in favor of such a plan of peaceable submission to an extraneous and arbitrary authority, and therefore also for that plan of negotiated peace by means of which events would be put in train for its realisation. any passably dispassionate consideration of the projected régime will come unavoidably to the conclusion that the prospectively subject peoples should have no legitimate apprehension of loss or disadvantage in the material respect. it is, of course, easy for an unreflecting person to jump to the conclusion that subjection to an alien power must bring grievous burdens, in the way of taxes and similar impositions. but reflection will immediately show that no appreciable increase, over the economic burdens already carried by the populace under their several national establishments, could come of such a move. as bearing on this question it is well to call to mind that the contemplated imperial dominion is designed to be very wide-reaching and with very ample powers. its nearest historical analogue, of course, is the roman imperial dominion--in the days of the antonines--and that the nearest analogue to the projected german peace is the roman peace, in the days of its best security. there is every warrant for the presumption that the contemplated imperial dominion is to be substantially all-inclusive. indeed there is no stopping place for the projected enterprise short of an all-inclusive dominion. and there will consequently be no really menacing outside power to be provided against. consequently there will be but little provision necessary for the common defense, as compared, e.g., with the aggregate of such provision found necessary for self-defense on the part of the existing nations acting in severalty and each jealously guarding its own national integrity. indeed, compared with the burden of competitive armament to which the peoples of europe have been accustomed, the need of any armed force under the new régime should be an inconsiderable matter, even when there is added to the necessary modicum of defensive preparation the more imperative and weightier provision of force with which to keep the peace at home. into the composition of this necessary modicum of armed force slight if any contingents of men would be drawn from the subject peoples, for the reason that no great numbers would be needed; as also because no devoted loyalty to the dynasty could reasonably be looked for among them, even if no positive insecurity were felt to be involved in their employment. on this head the projected scheme unambiguously commends itself as a measure of economy, both in respect of the pecuniary burdens demanded and as regards the personal annoyance of military service. as a further count, it is to be presumed that the burden of the imperial government and its bureaucratic administration--what would be called the cost of maintenance and repairs of the dynastic establishment and its apparatus of control--would be borne by the subject peoples. here again one is warranted in looking for a substantial economy to be effected by such a centralised authority, and a consequent lighter aggregate burden on the subjects. doubtless, the "overhead charges" would not be reduced to their practicable minimum. such a governmental establishment, with its bureaucratic personnel, its "civil list" and its privileged classes, would not be conducted on anything like a parsimonious footing. there is no reason to apprehend any touch of modesty in the exactions of such a dynastic establishment for itself or in behalf of its underlying hierarchy of gentlefolk. there is also to be counted in, in the concrete instance on which the argument here turns, a more or less considerable burden of contributions toward the maintenance and augmentation of that culture that has been the topic of so many encomiums. at this point it should be recalled that it is the pattern of periclean athens that is continually in mind in these encomiums. which brings up, in this immediate connection, the dealings of periclean athens with the funds of the league, and the source as well as the destination of these surplus funds. out of it all came the works on the acropolis, together with much else of intellectual and artistic life that converged upon and radiated from this athenian center of culture. the vista of _denkmäler_ that so opens to the vision of a courageous fancy is in itself such a substance of things hoped for as should stir the heart of all humane persons.[8] the cost of this subvention of culture would doubtless be appreciable, but those grave men who have spent most thought on this prospective cultural gain to be had from the projected imperial rule appear to entertain no doubt as to its being worth all that it would cost. [footnote 8: _denk 'mall_] any one who is inclined to rate the prospective pecuniary costs and losses high would doubtless be able to find various and sundry items of minor importance to add to this short list of general categories on the side of cost; but such additional items, not fairly to be included under these general captions, would after all be of minor importance, in the aggregate or in detail, and would not appreciably affect the grand balance of pecuniary profit and loss to be taken account of in any appraisal of the projected imperial régime. there should evidently be little ground to apprehend that its installation would entail a net loss or a net increase of pecuniary burdens. there is, of course, the ill-defined and scarcely definable item of expenditure under the general head of gentility, dignity, distinction, magnificence, or whatever term may seem suitable to designate that consumption of goods and services that goes to maintain the high repute of the court and to keep the underlying gentlefolk in countenance. in its pecuniary incidence this line of (necessary) expenditure belongs under the rubric of conspicuous waste; and one will always have to face the disquieting flexibility of this item of expenditure. the consumptive demand of this kind is in an eminent degree "indefinitely extensible," as the phrasing of the economists would have it, and as various historical instances of courtly splendor and fashionable magnificence will abundantly substantiate. there is a constant proclivity to advance this conventional "standard of living" to the limit set by the available means; and yet these conventional necessities will ordinarily not, in the aggregate, take up all the available means; although now and again, as under the _ancien régime_, and perhaps in imperial rome, the standard of splendid living may also exceed the current means in hand and lead to impoverishment of the underlying community. an analysis of the circumstances governing this flexibility of the conventional standard of living and of pecuniary magnificence can not be gone into here. in the case under consideration it will have to be left as an indeterminate but considerable item in the burden of cost which the projected imperial rule may be counted on to impose on the underlying peoples. the cost of the imperial court, nobility, and civil service, therefore, would be a matter of estimate, on which no close agreement would be expected; and yet, here as in an earlier connection, it seems a reasonable expectation that sufficient dignity and magnificence could be put in evidence by such a large-scale establishment at a lower aggregate cost than the aggregate of expenditures previously incurred for the like ends by various nations working in severalty and at cross purposes. doubtless it would be altogether a mistaken view of this production of dignity by means of a lavish expenditure on superfluities, to believe that the same principle of economy should apply here as was found applicable in the matter of armament for defense. with the installation of a collective national establishment, to include substantially all the previously competing nations, the need of defensive armament should in all reason decline to something very inconsiderable indeed. but it would be hasty to conclude that with the coalescence of these nations under one paramount control the need of creating notoriety and prestige for this resulting central establishment by the consumption of decorative superfluities would likewise decline. the need of such dignity and magnificence is only in part, perhaps a minor part, of a defensive character. for the greater part, no doubt, the motive to this conspicuously wasteful consumption is personal vanity, in imperial policy as well as in the private life of fashion,--or perhaps one should more deferentially say that it is a certain range of considerations which would be identified as personal vanity in case they were met with among men beneath the imperial level. and so far as the creation of this form of "good-will" by this manner of advertising is traceable to such, or equivalent, motives of a personal incidence, the provocation to economy along this line would presumably not be a notable factor in the case. and one returns perforce to the principle already spoken of above, that the consumptive need of superfluities is indefinitely extensible, with the resulting inference that nothing conclusive is to be said as to the prospective magnitude of this item in the imperial bill of expense, or of the consequent pecuniary burdens which it would impose on the underlying peoples. * * * * * so far the argument has run on the pecuniary incidence of this projected imperial dominion as it falls on the underlying community as a whole, with no attempt to discriminate between the divergent interests of the different classes and conditions of men that go to make up any modern community. the question in hand is a question of pecuniary burdens, and therefore of the pecuniary interests of these several distinguishable classes or conditions of men. in all these modern nations that now stand in the article of decision between peace by submission or a doubtful and melancholy alternative,--in all of them men are by statute and custom inviolably equal before the law, of course; they are ungraded and masterless men before the law. but these same peoples are also alike in the respect that pecuniary duties and obligations among them are similarly sacred and inviolable under the dispassionate findings of the law. this pecuniary equality is, in effect, an impersonal equality between pecuniary magnitudes; from which it follows that these citizens of the advanced nations are not ungraded men in the pecuniary respect; nor are they masterless, in so far as a greater pecuniary force will always, under this impersonal equality of the law, stand in a relation of mastery toward a lesser one. class distinctions, except pecuniary distinctions, have fallen away. but all these modern nations are made up of pecuniary classes, differing from one another by minute gradations in the marginal cases, but falling, after all, and in the large, into two broadly and securely distinguishable pecuniary categories: those who have more and those who have less. statisticians have been at pains to ascertain that a relatively very small numerical minority of the citizens in these modern nations own all but a relatively very small proportion of the aggregate wealth in the country. so that it appears quite safe to say that in such a country as america, e.g., something less than ten percent of the inhabitants own something more than ninety percent of the country's wealth. it would scarcely be a wild overstraining of its practical meaning to say that this population is made up of two classes: those who own the country's wealth, and those who do not. in strict accuracy, as before the law, this characterisation will not hold; whereas in practical effect, it is a sufficiently close approximation. this latter class, who have substantially no other than a fancied pecuniary interest in the nation's material fortunes, are the category often spoken of as the common man. it is not necessary, nor is it desired, to find a corresponding designation for the other category, those who own. the articulate recognition of this division into contrasted pecuniary classes or conditions, with correspondingly (at least potentially) divergent pecuniary interests, need imply no degree of approval or disapproval of the arrangement which is so recognised. the recognition of it is necessary to a perspicuous control of the argument, as bears on the possible systematic and inherent discrepancy among these men in respect of their material interests under the projected imperial rule. substantially, it is a distinction between those who have and those who have not, and in a question of prospective pecuniary loss the man who has nothing to lose is differently placed from the one who has. it would perhaps seem flippant, and possibly lacking in the courtesy due one's prospective lord paramount, to say with the poet, _cantabit vacuus coram latrone viator_. but the whole case is not so simple. it is only so long as the projected pecuniary inroad is conceived as a simple sequestration of wealth in hand, that such a characterisation can be made to serve. the imperial aim is not a passing act of pillage, but a perpetual usufruct; and the whole question takes on a different and more complex shape when it so touches the enduring conditions of life and livelihood. the citizen who has nothing, or who has no capitalisable source of unearned income, yet has a pecuniary interest in a livelihood to be gained from day to day, and he is yet vulnerable in the pecuniary respect in that his livelihood may with the utmost facility be laid under contribution by various and sundry well-tried contrivances. indeed, the common man who depends for his livelihood on his daily earnings is in a more immediately precarious position than those who have something appreciable laid up against a rainy day, in the shape of a capitalised source of income. only that it is still doubtful if his position is precarious in such a fashion as to lay him open to a notable increase of hardship, or to loss of the amenities of life, in the same relative degree as his well-to-do neighbour. in point of fact it may well be doubted if this common man has anything to apprehend in the way of added hardship or loss of creature comforts under the contemplated régime of imperial tutelage. he would presumably find himself in a precarious case under the arbitrary and irresponsible authority of an alien master working through an alien master class. the doubt which presents itself is as to whether this common man would be more precariously placed, or would come in for a larger and surer sum of hard usage and scant living, under this projected order of things, than what he already is exposed to in his pecuniary relations with his well-to-do compatriots under the current system of law and order. under this current régime of law and order, according to the equitable principles of natural rights, the man without means has no pecuniary rights which his well-to-do pecuniary master is bound to respect. this may have been an unintended, as it doubtless was an unforeseen, outcome of the move out of feudalism and prescriptive rights and immunities, into the system of individual liberty and manhood franchise; but as commonly happens in case of any substantial change in the scheme of institutional arrangements, unforeseen consequences come in along with those that have been intended. in that period of history when western europe was gathering that experience out of which the current habitual scheme of law and order has come, the right of property and free contract was a complement and safeguard to that individual initiative and masterless equality of men for which the spokesmen of the new era contended. that it is no longer so at every turn, or even in the main, in later time, is in great part due to changes of the pecuniary order, that have come on since then, and that seem not to have cast their shadow before. in all good faith, and with none but inconsequential reservations, the material fortunes of modern civilised men--together with much else--have so been placed on a pecuniary footing, with little to safeguard them at any point except the inalienable right of pecuniary self-direction and initiative, in an environment where virtually all the indispensable means of pecuniary self-direction and initiative are in the hands of that contracted category of owners spoken of above. a numerical minority--under ten percent of the population--constitutes a conclusive pecuniary majority--over ninety percent of the means--under a system of law and order that turns on the inalienable right of owners to dispose of the means in hand as may suit their convenience and profit,--always barring recourse to illegal force or fraud. there is, however, a very appreciable margin of legal recourse to force and of legally protected fraud available in case of need. of course the expedients here referred to as legally available force and fraud in the defense of pecuniary rights and the pursuit of pecuniary gain are not force and fraud _de jure_ but only _de facto_. they are further, and well known, illustrations of how the ulterior consequences of given institutional arrangements and given conventionalised principles (habits of thought) of conduct may in time come to run at cross purposes with the initial purpose that led to the acceptance of these institutions and to the confirmation and standardisation of these habitual norms of conduct. for the time being, however, they are "fundamentally and eternally right and good." being a pecuniary majority--what may be called a majority of the corporate stock--of the nation, it is also fundamentally and eternally right and good that the pecuniary interests of the owners of the material means of life should rule unabated in all those matters of public policy that touch on the material fortunes of the community at large. barring a slight and intermittent mutter of discontent, this arrangement has also the cordial approval of popular sentiment in these modern democratic nations. one need only recall the paramount importance which is popularly attached to the maintenance and extension of the nation's trade--for the use of the investors--or the perpetuation of a protective tariff--for the use of the protected business concerns--or, again, the scrupulous regard with which such a body of public servants as the interstate commerce commission will safeguard the legitimate claim of the railway companies to a "reasonable" rate of earnings on the capitalised value of the presumed earning-capacity of their property. * * * * * again, in view of the unaccustomed freedom with which it is here necessary to speak of these delicate matters, it may be in place to disclaim all intention to criticise the established arrangements on their merits as details of public policy. all that comes in question here, touching these and the like features of the established law and order, is the bearing of all this on the material fortunes of the common man under the current régime, as contrasted with what he would reasonably have to look for under the projected régime of imperial tutelage that would come in, consequent upon this national surrender to imperial dominion. * * * * * in these democratic countries public policy is guided primarily by considerations of business expediency, and the administration, as well as the legislative power, is in the hands of businessmen, chosen avowedly on the ground of their businesslike principles and ability. there is no power in such a community that can over-rule the exigencies of business, nor would popular sentiment countenance any exercise of power that should traverse these exigencies, or that would act to restrain trade or discourage the pursuit of gain. an apparent exception to the rule occurs in wartime, when military exigencies may over-rule the current demands of business traffic; but the exception is in great part only apparent, in that the warlike operations are undertaken in whole or in part with a view to the protection or extension of business traffic. national surveillance and regulation of business traffic in these countries hitherto, ever since and in so far as the modern democratic order of things has taken effect, has uniformly been of the nature of interference with trade and investment in behalf of the nation's mercantile community at large, as seen in port and shipping regulations and in the consular service, or in behalf of particular favored groups or classes of business concerns, as in protective tariffs and subsidies. in all this national management of pecuniary affairs, under modern democratic principles, the common man comes into the case only as raw material of business traffic,--as consumer or as laborer. he is one of the industrial agencies by use of which the businessman who employs him supplies himself with goods for the market, or he is one of the units of consumptive demand that make up this market in which the business man sells his goods, and so "realises" on his investment. he is, of course, free, under modern principles of the democratic order, to deal or not to deal with this business community, whether as laborer or as consumer, or as small-scale producer engaged in purveying materials or services on terms defined by the community of business interests engaged on so large a scale as to count in their determination. that is to say, he is free _de jure_ to take or leave the terms offered. _de facto_ he is only free to take them--with inconsequential exceptions--the alternative being obsolescence by disuse, not to choose a harsher name for a distasteful eventuality. the general ground on which the business system, as it works under the over-ruling exigencies of the so-called "big business," so defines the terms of life for the common man, who works and buys, is the ground afforded by the principle of "charging what the traffic will bear;" that is to say, fixing the terms of hiring, buying and selling at such a figure as will yield the largest net return to the business concerns in whom, collectively or in severalty, the discretion vests. discretion in these premises does not vest in any business concern that does not articulate with the system of "big business," or that does not dispose of resources sufficient to make it a formidable member of the system. whether these concerns act in severalty or by collusion and conspiracy, in so defining the pecuniary terms of life for the community at large, is substantially an idle question, so far as bears on the material interest of the common man. the base-line is still what the traffic will bear, and it is still adhered to, so nearly as the human infirmity of the discretionary captains of industry will admit, whether the due approximation to this base-line is reached by a process of competitive bidding or by collusive advisement. the generalisation so offered, touching the material conditions of life for the common man under the modern rule of big business, may seem unwarrantably broad. it may be worth while to take note of more than one point in qualification of it, chiefly to avoid the appearance of having overlooked any of the material circumstances of the case. the "system" of large business, working its material consequences through the system of large-scale industry, but more particularly by way of the large-scale and wide-reaching business of trade in the proper sense, draws into the net of its control all parts of the community and all its inhabitants, in some degree of dependence. but there is always, hitherto, an appreciable fraction of the inhabitants--as, e.g., outlying agricultural sections that are in a "backward" state--who are by no means closely bound in the orderly system of business, or closely dependent on the markets. they may be said to enjoy a degree of independence, by virtue of their foregoing as much as may be of the advantages offered by modern industrial specialisation. so also there are the minor and interstitial trades that are still carried on by handicraft methods; these, too, are still somewhat loosely held in the fabric of the business system. there is one thing and another in this way to be taken account of in any exhaustive survey, but the accounting for them will after all amount to nothing better than a gleaning of remnants and partial exceptions, such as will in no material degree derange the general proposition in hand. again, there runs through the length and breadth of this business community a certain measure of incompetence or inefficiency of management, as seen from the point of view of the conceivable perfect working of the system as a whole. it may be due to a slack attention here and there; or to the exigencies of business strategy which may constrain given business concerns to an occasional attitude of "watchful waiting" in the hope of catching a rival off his guard; or to a lack of perfect mutual understanding among the discretionary businessmen, due sometimes to an over-careful guarding of trade secrets or advance information; or, as also happens, and quite excusably, to a lack of perfect mutual confidence among these businessmen, as to one another's entire good faith or good-will. the system is after all a competitive one, in the sense that each of the discretionary directors of business is working for his own pecuniary gain, whether in cooperation with his fellows or not. "an honest man will bear watching." as in other collusive organisations for gain, confederates are apt to fall out when it comes to a division of what is in hand. in one way and another the system is beset with inherent infirmities, which hinder its perfect work; and in so far it will fall short of the full realisation of that rule of business that inculcates charging what the traffic will bear, and also in so far the pressure which the modern system of business management brings to bear on the common man will also fall short of the last straw--perhaps even of the next-to-the-last. again it turns out to be a question not of the failure of the general proposition as formulated, but rather as to the closeness of approximation to its theoretically perfect work. it may be remarked by the way that vigilant and impartial surveillance of this system of business enterprise by an external authority interested only in aggregate results, rather than in the differential gains of the interested individuals, might hopefully be counted on to correct some of these shortcomings which the system shows when running loose under the guidance of its own multifarious incentives. on the opposite side of the account, it is also worth noting that, while modern business management may now and again fall short of what the traffic will bear, it happens more commonly that its exactions will exceed that limit. this will particularly be true in businessmen's dealings with hired labour, as also and perhaps with equally far-reaching consequences in an excessive recourse to sophistications and adulterants and an excessively parsimonious provision for the safety, health or comfort of their customers--as, e.g., in passenger traffic by rail, water or tramway. the discrepancy to which attention is invited here is due to a discrepancy between business expediency, that is expediency for the purpose of gain by a given businessman, on the one hand, and serviceability to the common good, on the other hand. the business concern's interest in the traffic in which it engages is a short-term interest, or an interest in the short-term returns, as contrasted with the long-term or enduring interest which the community at large has in the public service over which any such given business concern disposes. the business incentive is that afforded by the prospective net pecuniary gain from the traffic, substantially an interest in profitable sales; while the community at large, or the common man that goes to make up such a community, has a material interest in this traffic only as regards the services rendered and the enduring effects that follow from it. the businessman has not, or at least is commonly not influenced by, any interest in the ulterior consequences of the transactions in which he is immediately engaged. this appears to hold true in an accentuated degree in the domain of that large-scale business that draws its gains from the large-scale modern industry and is managed on the modern footing of corporation finance. this modern fashion of business organisation and management apparently has led to a substantial shortening of the term over which any given investor maintains an effective interest in any given corporate enterprise, in which his investments may be placed for the time being. with the current practice of organising industrial and mercantile enterprises on a basis of vendible securities, and with the nearly complete exemption from personal responsibility and enduring personal attachment to any one corporate enterprise which this financial expedient has brought, it has come about that in the common run of cases the investor, as well as the directorate, in any given enterprise, has an interest only for the time being. the average term over which it is (pecuniarily) incumbent on the modern businessman to take account of the working of any given enterprise has shortened so far that the old-fashioned accountability, that once was depended on to dictate a sane and considerate management with a view to permanent good-will, has in great measure become inoperative. by and large, it seems unavoidable that the pecuniary interests of the businessmen on the one hand and the material interests of the community on the other hand are diverging in a more and more pronounced degree, due to institutional circumstances over which no prompt control can be had without immediate violation of that scheme of personal rights in which the constitution of modern democratic society is grounded. the quandary in which these communities find themselves, as an outcome of their entrance upon "the simple and obvious system of natural liberty," is shown in a large and instructive way by what is called "labor trouble," and in a more recondite but no less convincing fashion by the fortunes of the individual workman under the modern system. the cost of production of a modern workman has constantly increased, with the advance of the industrial arts. the period of preparation, of education and training, necessary to turn out competent workmen, has been increasing; and the period of full workmanlike efficiency has been shortening, in those industries that employ the delicate and exacting processes of the modern technology. the shortening of this working-life of the workman is due both to a lengthening of the necessary period of preparation, and to the demand of these processes for so full a use of the workman's forces that even the beginning of senescence will count as a serious disability,--in many occupations as a fatal disability. it is also a well ascertained fact that effectual old age will be brought on at an earlier period by overwork; overwork shortens the working life-time of the workman. thorough speeding-up ("scientific management"?) will unduly shorten this working life-time, and so it may, somewhat readily, result in an uneconomical consumption of the community's man-power, by consuming the workmen at a higher rate of speed, a higher pressure, with a more rapid rate of deterioration, than would give the largest net output of product per unit of man-power available, or per unit of cost of production of such man-power. on this head the guiding incentives of the businessman and the material interest of the community at large--not to speak of the selfish interest of the individual workman--are systematically at variance. the cost of production of workmen does not fall on the business concern which employs them, at least not in such definite fashion as to make it appear that the given business concern or businessman has a material interest in the economical consumption of the man-power embodied in this given body of employees. some slight and exceptional qualification of this statement is to be noted, in those cases where the processes in use are such as to require special training, not to be had except by a working habituation to these processes in the particular industrial plant in question. so far as such special training, to be had only as employees of the given concern, is a necessary part of the workman's equipment for this particular work, so far the given employer bears a share and an interest in the cost of production of the workmen employed; and so far, therefore, the employer has also a pecuniary interest in the economical use of his employees; which usually shows itself in the way of some special precautions being taken to prevent the departure of these workmen so long as there is a clear pecuniary loss involved in replacing them with men who have not yet had the special training required. evidently this qualifying consideration covers no great proportion of the aggregate man-power consumed in industrial enterprises under business management. and apart from the instances, essentially exceptional, where such a special consideration comes in, the businessmen in charge will, quite excusably as things go, endeavour to consume the man-power of which they dispose in the persons of their employees, not at the rate that would be most economical to the community at large, in view of the cost of their replacement, nor at such a rate as would best suit the taste or the viability of the particular workman, but at such a rate as will yield the largest net pecuniary gain to the employer. there is on record an illustrative, and indeed an illustrious, instance of such cannily gainful consumption of man-power carried out systematically and with consistently profitable effect in one of the staple industries of the country. in this typical, though exceptionally thoroughgoing and lucrative enterprise, the set rule of the management was, to employ none but select workmen, in each respective line of work; to procure such select workmen and retain them by offering wages slightly over the ordinary standard; to work them at the highest pace and pressure attainable with such a picked body; and to discharge them on the first appearance of aging or of failing powers. in the rules of the management was also included the negative proviso that the concern assumed no responsibility for the subsequent fortunes of discharged workmen, in the way of pension, insurance or the like. this enterprise was highly successful and exceedingly profitable, even beyond the high average of profits among enterprises in the same line of business. out of it came one of the greater and more illustrious fortunes that have been accumulated during the past century; a fortune which has enabled one of the most impressive and most gracious of this generation's many impressive philanthropists, never weary in well-doing; but who, through this cannily gainful consumption of man-power, has been placed in the singular position of being unable, in spite of avowedly unremitting endeavour, to push his continued disbursements in the service of humanity up to the figure of his current income. the case in question is one of the most meritorious known to the records of modern business, and while it will conveniently serve to illustrate many an other, and perhaps more consequential truth come to realisation in the march of triumphant democracy, it will also serve to show the gainfulness of an unreservedly canny consumption of man-power with an eye single to one's own net gain in terms of money. * * * * * evidently this is a point in the articulation of the modern economic system where a sufficiently ruthless outside authority, not actuated by a primary regard for the pecuniary interests of the employers, might conceivably with good effect enforce a more economical consumption of the country's man-power. it is not a matter on which one prefers to dwell, but it can do no harm to take note of the fact for once in a way, that these several national establishments of the democratic order, as they are now organised and administered, do somewhat uniformly and pervasively operate with an effectual view to the advantage of a class, so far as may plausibly be done. they are controlled by and administered in behalf of those elements of the population that, for the purpose in hand, make up a single loose-knit class,--the class that lives by income rather than by work. it may be called the class of the business interests, or of capital, or of gentlemen. it all comes to much the same, for the purpose in hand. the point in speaking of this contingent whose place in the economy of human affairs it is to consume, or to own, or to pursue a margin of profit, is simply that of contrasting this composite human contingent with the common man; whose numbers account for some nine-tenths or more of the community, while his class accounts for something less than one-tenth of the invested wealth, and appreciably less than that proportion of the discretionary national establishment,--the government, national or local, courts, attorneys, civil service, diplomatic and consular, military and naval. the arrangement may be called a gentlemen's government, if one would rather have it that way; but a gentleman is necessarily one who lives on free income from invested wealth--without such a source of free, that is to say unearned, income he becomes a decayed gentleman. again, pushing the phrasing back a step farther toward the ground facts, there are those who would speak of the current establishments as "capitalistic;" but this term is out of line in that it fails to touch the human element in the case, and institutions, such as governmental establishments and their functioning, are after all nothing but the accustomed ways and means of human behaviour; so that "capitalistic" becomes a synonym for "businessmen's" government so soon as it is designated in terms of the driving incentives and the personnel. it is an organisation had with a view to the needs of business (i.e. pecuniary) enterprise, and is made up of businessmen and gentlemen, which comes to much the same, since a gentleman is only a businessman in the second or some later generation. except for the slightly odious suggestion carried by the phrase, one might aptly say that the gentleman, in this bearing, is only a businessman gone to seed. by and large, and taking the matter naively at the simple face value of the material gain or loss involved, it should seem something of an idle question to the common man whether his collective affairs are to be managed by a home-bred line of businessmen and their successive filial generations of gentlemen, with a view to accelerate the velocity and increase the volume of competitive gain and competitive spending, on the one hand, or by an alien line of officials, equally aloof from his common interests, and managing affairs with a view to the usufruct of his productive powers in furtherance of the imperial dominion. not that the good faith or the generous intentions of these governments of gentlemen is questioned or is in any degree questionable; what is here spoken of is only the practical effect of the policies which they pursue, doubtless with benevolent intentions and well-placed complacency. in effect, things being as they are today in the civilised world's industry and trade, it happens, as in some sort an unintended but all-inclusive accident, that the guidance of affairs by business principles works at cross purposes with the material interests of the common man. so ungraceful a view of the sacred core of this modern democratic organisation will need whatever evidence can be cited to keep it in countenance. therefore indulgence is desired for one further count in this distasteful recital of ineptitudes inherent in this institutional scheme of civilised life. this count comes under the head of what may be called capitalistic sabotage. "sabotage" is employed to designate a wilful retardation, interruption or obstruction of industry by peaceable, and ordinarily by legally defensible, measures. in its present application, particularly, there is no design to let the term denote or insinuate a recourse to any expedients or any line of conduct that is in any degree legally dubious, or that is even of questionable legitimacy. sabotage so understood, as not comprising recourse to force or fraud, is a necessary and staple expedient of business management, and its employment is grounded in the elementary and indefeasible rights of ownership. it is simply that the businessman, like any other owner, is vested with the right freely to use or not to use his property for any given purpose. his decision, for reasons of his own, not to employ the property at his disposal in a particular way at a particular time, is well and blamelessly within his legitimate discretion, under the rights of property as universally accepted and defended by modern nations. in the particular instance of the american nation he is protected in this right by a constitutional provision that he must not be deprived of his property without due process of law. when the property at his disposal is in the shape of industrial plant or industrial material, means of transportation or stock of goods awaiting distribution, then his decision not to employ this property, or to limit its use to something less than full capacity, in the way for which it is adapted, becomes sabotage, normally and with negligible exceptions. in so doing he hinders, retards or obstructs the working of the country's industrial forces by so much. it is a matter of course and of absolute necessity to the conduct of business, that any discretionary businessman must be free to deal or not to deal in any given case; to limit or to withhold the equipment under his control, without reservation. business discretion and business strategy, in fact, has no other means by which to work out its aims. so that, in effect, all business sagacity reduces itself in the last analysis to a judicious use of sabotage. under modern conditions of large business, particularly, the relation of the discretionary businessman to industry is that of authoritative permission and of authoritative limitation or stoppage, and on his shrewd use of this authority depends the gainfulness of his enterprise. if this authority were exercised with an eye single to the largest and most serviceable output of goods and services, or to the most economical use of the country's material resources and man-power, regardless of pecuniary consequences, the course of management so carried out would be not sabotage but industrial strategy. but business is carried on for pecuniary gain, not with an unreserved view to the largest and most serviceable output or to the economical use of resources. the volume and serviceability of the output must wait unreservedly on the very particular pecuniary question of what quantity and what degree of serviceability will yield the largest net return in terms of price. uneconomical use of equipment, labor and resources is necessarily an everyday matter under these circumstances, as in the duplication of plant and processes between rival concerns, and in the wasteful use of all resources that do not involve expenditure on the part of the given concern. it has been the traditional dogma among economists and publicists in these modern communities that free competition between the businessmen in charge will indefeasibly act to bring the productiveness of industry to the highest practicable pitch and would lead to the most unreserved and vigilant endeavour to serve the community's material needs at all points. the reasons for the failure of this genial expectation, particularly under latterday business management, might be shown in some detail, if that were needed to enforce the argument as it runs in the present connection. but a summary indication of the commoner varieties and effects of sabotage as it is systematically applied in the businesslike conduct of industry will serve the purpose as well and with less waste of words and patience. it is usual to notice, and not unusual to deplore the duplication of plant and appliances in many lines of industry, due to competitive management, as in factories engaged in the same class of manufacture, in parallel or otherwise competing railways and boat lines, in retail merchandising, and in some degree also in the wholesale trade. the result, of course, is sabotage; in the sense that this volume of appliances, materials and workmen are not employed to the best advantage for the community. one effect of the arrangement is an increased necessary cost of the goods and services supplied by these means. the reason for it is competition for gain to be got from the traffic. that all this is an untoward state of things is recognised on all hands; but no lively regret is commonly spent on the matter, since it is commonly recognised that under the circumstances there is no help for it except at the cost of a more untoward remedy. the competitive system having been tried and found good--or at least so it is assumed--it is felt that the system will have to be accepted with the defects of its qualities. its characteristic qualities are held to be good, acceptable to the tastes of modern men whose habits of thought have been standardised in its terms; and it would be only reluctantly and by tardy concession that these modern men could bring themselves to give up that scheme of "natural liberty" within the framework of which runs this competitive system of business management and its wasteful manifolding of half-idle equipment and nugatory work. the common man, at the worst, comforts himself and his neighbour with the sage reflection that "it might have been worse." the businessmen, on the other hand, have also begun to take note of this systematic waste by duplication and consequent incompetence, and have taken counsel how to intercept the waste and divert it to their own profit. the businessmen's remedy is consolidation of competing concerns, and monopoly control. to the common man, with his preconceptions on the head of "restraint of trade," the proposed remedy seems more vicious than the evil it is designed to cure. the fault of the remedy plainly is not that the mismanagement of affairs due to competitive business can not be corrected by recourse to monopoly, but only that the community, it is presumed, would still suffer all the burdens and discomforts of the régime of competition and sabotage, with, possibly, further inconveniences and impositions at the hands of the businesslike monopoly; which, men are agreed, may fairly be depended on to use its advantage unsparingly under the business principle of charging what the traffic will bear. there is also this other singular phenomenon in this modern industrial world, that something not very far short of one-half the industrial equipment systematically lies idle for something approaching one-half the time, or is worked only to one-half its capacity half the time; not because of competition between these several industrial concerns, but because business conditions will not allow its continued productive use; because the volume of product that would be turned out if the equipment were working uninterruptedly at its full capacity could not be sold at remunerative prices. from time to time one establishment and another will shut down during a period of slack times, for the same reason. this state of things is singular only as seen from the point of view of the community's material interest, not that it is in any degree unfamiliar or that any serious fault is found with the captains of industry for so shutting off the industrial process and letting the industrial equipment lie waste. as all men know, the exigencies of business will not tolerate production to supply the community's needs under these circumstances; although, as is equally notorious, these slack times, when production of goods is unadvisable on grounds of business expediency, are commonly times of wide-spread privation, "hard times," in the community at large, when the failure of the supply is keenly felt. it is not that the captains of industry are at fault in so failing, or refusing, to supply the needs of the community under these circumstances, but only that they are helpless under the exigencies of business. they can not supply the goods except for a price, indeed not except for a remunerative price, a price which will add something to the capital values which they are venturing in their various enterprises. so long as the exigencies of price and of pecuniary gain rule the case, there is manifestly no escaping this enforced idleness of the country's productive forces. it may not be out of place also to remark, by way of parenthesis, that this highly productive state of the industrial arts, which is embodied in the industrial plant and processes that so are systematically and advisedly retarded or arrested under the rule of business, is at the same time the particular pride of civilised men and the most tangible achievement of the civilised world. a conservative estimate of this one item of capitalistic sabotage could scarcely appraise it at less than a twenty-five percent reduction from the normally possible productive capacity of the community, at an average over any considerable period; and a somewhat thorough review of the pertinent facts would probably persuade any impartial observer that, one year with another, such businesslike enforced idleness of plant and personnel lowers the actual output of the country's industry by something nearer fifty percent of its ordinary capacity when fully employed. to many, such an assertion may seem extravagant, but with further reflection on the well-known facts in the case it will seem less so in proportion as the unfamiliarity of it wears off. however, the point of attention in the case is not the precise, nor the approximate, percentages of this arrest and retardation, this partial neutralisation of modern improvements in the industrial arts; it is only the notorious fact that such arrest occurs, systematically and advisedly, under the rule of business exigencies, and that there is no corrective to be found for it that will comport with those fundamental articles of the democratic faith on which the businessmen necessarily proceed. any effectual corrective would break the framework of democratic law and order, since it would have to traverse the inalienable right of men who are born free and equal, each freely to deal or not to deal in any pecuniary conjuncture that arises. but it is at the same time plain enough that this, in the larger sense untoward, discrepancy between productive capacity and current productive output can readily be corrected, in some appreciable degree at least, by any sufficient authority that shall undertake to control the country's industrial forces without regard to pecuniary profit and loss. any authority competent to take over the control and regulate the conduct of the community's industry with a view to maximum output as counted by weight and tale, rather than by net aggregate price-income over price-cost, can readily effect an appreciable increase in the effectual productive capacity; but it can be done only by violating that democratic order of things within which business enterprise runs. the several belligerent nations of europe are showing that it can be done, that the sabotage of business enterprise can be put aside by sufficiently heroic measures. and they are also showing that they are all aware, and have always been aware, that the conduct of industry on business principles is incompetent to bring the largest practicable output of goods and services; incompetent to such a degree, indeed, as not to be tolerable in a season of desperate need, when the nation requires the full use of its productive forces, equipment and man-power, regardless of the pecuniary claims of individuals. * * * * * now, the projected imperial dominion is a power of the character required to bring a sufficient corrective to bear, in case of need, on this democratic situation in which the businessmen in charge necessarily manage the country's industry at cross purposes with the community's--that is the common man's--material interest. it is an extraneous power, to whom the continued pecuniary gain of these nations' businessmen is a minor consideration, a negligible consideration in case it shall appear that the imperial usufruct of the underlying nation's productive forces is in any degree impaired by the businessmen's management of it for their own net gain. it is difficult to see on what grounds of self-interest such an imperial government could consent to tolerate the continued management of these underlying nations' industries on business principles, that is to say on the principle of the maximum pecuniary gain to the businesslike managers; and recent experience seems to teach that no excessive, that is to say no inconvenient, degree of consideration for vested rights, and the like, would long embarrass the imperial government in its administration of its usufruct. it should be a reasonable expectation that, without malice and with an unprejudiced view to its own usufruct of these underlying countries, the imperial establishment would take due care that no systematically, and in its view gratuitously, uneconomical methods should continue in the ordinary conduct of their industry. among other considerations of weight in this connection is the fact that a contented, well-fed, and not wantonly over-worked populace is a valuable asset in such a case. similarly, by contraries, as an asset in usufruct to such an alien power, a large, wealthy, spendthrift, body of gentlefolk, held in high esteem by the common people, would have but a slight value, conceivably even a negative value, in such a case. a wise administration would presumably look to their abatement, rather than otherwise. at this point the material interest of the common man would seem to coincide with that of the imperial establishment. still, his preconceived notions of the wisdom and beneficence of his gentlefolk would presumably hinder his seeing the matter in that reasonable light. under the paramount surveillance of such an alien power, guided solely by its own interest in the usufruct of the country and its population, it is to be presumed that class privileges and discrimination would be greatly abated if not altogether discontinued. the point is in some doubt, partly because this alien establishment whose dominion is in question is itself grounded in class prerogatives and discrimination, and so, not improbably, it would carry over into its supervision of the underlying nations something of a bias in favor of class privileges. and a similar order of things might also result by choice of a class-system as a convenient means of control and exploitation. the latter consideration is presumably the more cogent, since the imperial establishment in question is already, by ancient habit, familiar with the method of control by class and privilege; and, indeed, unfamiliar with any other method. such a government, which governs without effectual advice or formal consent of the governed, will almost necessarily rest its control of the country on an interested class, of sufficient strength and bound by sufficiently grave interest to abet the imperial establishment effectually in all its adventures and enterprises. but such a privileged order, that is to be counted in to share dynastic usufruct and liabilities, in good days and evil, will be of a feudalistic complexion rather than something after the fashion of a modern business community doing business by investment and pecuniary finesse. it would still be a reasonable expectation that discrimination between pecuniary classes should fall away under this projected alien tutelage; more particularly all such discrimination as is designed to benefit any given class or interest at the cost of the whole, as, e.g., protective tariffs, monopolistic concessions and immunities, engrossing of particular lines of material resources, and the like. the character of the economic policy to be pursued should not be difficult of apprehension, if only these underlying peoples are conceived as an estate in tail within the dynastic line of descent. the imperial establishment which so is prospectively to take over the surveillance of these modern peoples under this projected enterprise in dominion, may all the more readily be conceived as handling its new and larger resources somewhat unreservedly as an estate to be administered with a shrewd eye to the main chance, since such has always been its relation to the peoples and territories whose usufruct it already enjoys. it is only that the circumstances of the case will admit a freer and more sagacious application of those principles of usufruct that lie at the root of the ancient culture of the fatherland. * * * * * this excessively long, and yet incomplete, review of the presumptive material advantages to accrue to the common man under a régime of peace by unconditional surrender to an alien dynasty, brings the argument apparently to the conclusion that such an eventuality might be fortunate rather than the reverse; or at least that it has its compensations, even if it is not something to be desired. such should particularly appear to be the presumption in case one is at all inclined to make much of the cultural gains to be brought in under the new régime. and more particularly should a policy of non-resistant submission to the projected new order seem expedient in view of the exceedingly high, not to say prohibitive, cost of resistance, or even of materially retarding its fulfillment. chapter v peace and neutrality considered simply on the face of the tangible material interests involved, the choice of the common man in these premises should seem very much of a foregone conclusion, if he could persuade himself to a sane and perspicuous consideration of these statistically apparent merits of the case alone. it is at least safely to be presumed that he has nothing to lose, in a material way, and there is reason to look for some slight gain in creature comforts and in security of life and limb, consequent upon the elimination, or at least the partial disestablishment, of pecuniary necessity as the sole bond and criterion of use and wont in economic concerns. but man lives not by bread alone. in point of fact, and particularly as touches the springs of action among that common run that do not habitually formulate their aspirations and convictions in extended and grammatically defensible documentary form, and the drift of whose impulses therefore is not masked or deflected by the illusive consistencies of set speech,--as touches the common run, particularly, it will hold true with quite an unacknowledged generality that the material means of life are, after all, means only; and that when the question of what things are worth while is brought to the final test, it is not these means, nor the life conditioned on these means, that are seen to serve as the decisive criterion; but always it is some ulterior, immaterial end, in the pursuit of which these material means find their ulterior ground of valuation. neither the overt testimony nor the circumstantial evidence to this effect is unequivocal; but seen in due perspective, and regard being had chiefly to the springs of concerted action as shown in any massive movement of this common run of mankind, there is, after all, little room to question that the things which commend themselves as indefeasibly worth while are the things of the human spirit. these ideals, aspirations, aims, ends of endeavour, are by no means of a uniform or homogeneous character throughout the modern communities, still less throughout the civilised world, or throughout the checkered range of classes and conditions of men; but, with such frequency and amplitude that it must be taken as a major premise in any attempted insight into human behaviour, it will hold true that they are of a spiritual, immaterial nature. the caution may, parenthetically, not be out of place, that this characterisation of the ulterior springs of action as essentially not of the nature of creature comforts, need be taken in no wider extension than that which so is specifically given it. it will be found to apply as touches the conduct of the common run; what modification of it might be required to make it at all confidently applicable to the case of one and another of those classes into whose scheme of life creature comforts enter with more pronounced effect may be more of a delicate point. but since it is the behaviour, and the grounds of behaviour, of the common run that are here in question, the case of their betters in this respect may conveniently be left on one side. the question in hand touches the behavior of the common man, taken in the aggregate, in face of the quandary into which circumstances have led him; since the question of what these modern peoples will do is after all a question of what the common man in the aggregate will do, of his own motion or by persuasion. his betters may be in a position to guide, persuade, cajole, mislead, and victimise him; for among the many singular conceits that beset the common man is the persuasion that his betters are in some way better than he, wiser, more beneficent. but the course that may so be chosen, with or without guidance or persuasion from the superior classes, as well as the persistence and energy with which this course is pursued, is conditioned on the frame of mind of the common run. just what will be the nature and the concrete expression of these ideal aspirations that move the common run is a matter of habitual preconceptions; and habits of thought vary from one people to another according to the diversity of experience to which they have been exposed. among the western nations the national prestige has come to seem worth while as an ulterior end, perhaps beyond all else that is comprised in the secular scheme of things desirable to be had or to be achieved. and in the apprehension of such of them as have best preserved the habits of thought induced by a long experience in feudal subjection, the service of the sovereign or the dynasty still stands over as the substantial core of the cultural scheme, upon which sentiment and endeavour converge. in the past ages of the democratic peoples, as well as in the present-day use and wont among subjects of the dynastic states--as e.g., japan or germany--men are known to have resolutely risked, and lost, their life for the sake of the sovereign's renown, or even to save the sovereign's life; whereas, of course, even the slightest and most nebulous reflection would make it manifest that in point of net material utility the sovereign's decease is an idle matter as compared with the loss of an able-bodied workman. the sovereign may always be replaced, with some prospect of public advantage, or failing that, it should be remarked that a regency or inter-regnum will commonly be a season of relatively economical administration. again, religious enthusiasm, and the furtherance of religious propaganda, may come to serve the same general purpose as these secular ideals, and will perhaps serve it just as well. certain "principles," of personal liberty and of opportunity for creative self-direction and an intellectually worthy life, perhaps may also become the idols of the people, for which they will then be willing to risk their material fortune; and where this has happened, as among the democratic peoples of christendom, it is not selfishly for their own personal opportunity to live untroubled under the light of these high principles that these opinionated men are ready to contend, but rather impersonally for the human right which under these principles is the due of all mankind, and particularly of the incoming and of later generations. on these and the like intangible ends the common man is set with such inveterate predilection that he will, on provocation, stick at nothing to put the project through. for such like ends the common man will lay down his life; at least, so they say. there may always be something of rhetorical affectation in it all; but, after all, there is sufficient evidence to hand of such substance and tenacity in the common man's hold on these ideal aspirations, on these idols of his human spirit, as to warrant the assertion that he is, rather commonly, prepared to go to greater lengths in the furtherance of these immaterial gains that are to inure to someone else than for any personal end of his own, in the way of creature comforts or even of personal renown. for such ends the common man, in democratic christendom is, on provocation, willing to die; or again, the patient and perhaps more far-seeing common man of pagan china is willing to live for these idols of an inveterate fancy, through endless contumely and hard usage. the conventional chinese preconceptions, in the way of things that are worth while in their own right, appear to differ from those current in the occident in such a way that the preconceived ideal is not to be realised except by way of continued life. the common man's accountability to the cause of humanity, in china, is of so intimately personal a character that he can meet it only by tenaciously holding his place in the sequence of generations; whereas among the peoples of christendom there has arisen out of their contentious past a preconception to the effect that this human duty to mankind is of the nature of a debt, which can be cancelled by bankruptcy proceedings, so that the man who unprofitably dies fighting for the cause has thereby constructively paid the reckoning in full. evidently, if the common man of these modern nations that are prospectively to be brought under tutelage of the imperial government could be brought to the frame of mind that is habitual with his chinese counterpart, there should be a fair hope that pacific counsels would prevail and that christendom would so come in for a régime of peace by submission under this imperial tutelage. but there are always these preconceptions of self-will and insubordination to be counted with among these nations, and there is the ancient habit of a contentious national solidarity in defense of the nation's prestige, more urgent among these peoples than any sentiment of solidarity with mankind at large, or any ulterior gain in civilisation that might come of continued discipline in the virtues of patience and diligence under distasteful circumstances. the occidental conception of manhood is in some considerable measure drawn in negative terms. so much so that whenever a question of the manly virtues comes under controversy it presently appears that at least the indispensable minimum, and indeed the ordinary marginal modicum, of what is requisite to a worthy manner of life is habitually formulated in terms of what not. this appearance is doubtless misleading if taken without the universally understood postulate on the basis of which negative demands are formulated. there is a good deal of what would be called historical accident in all this. the indispensable demands of this modern manhood take the form of refusal to obey extraneous authority on compulsion; of exemption from coercive direction and subservience; of insubordination, in short. but it is always understood as a matter of course that this insubordination is a refusal to submit to irresponsible or autocratic rule. stated from the positive side it would be freedom from restraint by or obedience to any authority not constituted by express advice and consent of the governed. and as near as it may be formulated, when reduced to the irreducible minimum of concrete proviso, this is the final substance of things which neither shame nor honour will permit the modern civilised man to yield. to no arrangement for the abrogation of this minimum of free initiative and self-direction will he consent to be a party, whether it touches the conditions of life for his own people who are to come after, or as touches the fortunes of such aliens as are of a like mind on this head and are unable to make head against invasion of these human rights from outside. as has just been remarked, the negative form so often taken by these demands is something of an historical accident, due to the fact that these modern peoples came into their highly esteemed system of natural liberty out of an earlier system of positive checks on self-direction and initiative; a system, in effect, very much after the fashion of that imperial jurisdiction that still prevails in the dynastic states--as, e.g., germany or japan--whose projected dominion is now the immediate object of apprehension and repugnance. how naively the negative formulation gained acceptance, and at the same time how intrinsic to the new dispensation was the aspiration for free initiative, appears in the confident assertion of its most genial spokesman, that when these positive checks are taken away, "the simple and obvious system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord." the common man, in these modern communities, shows a brittle temper when any overt move is made against this heritage of civil liberty. he may not be altogether well advised in respect of what liberties he will defend and what he will submit to; but the fact is to be counted with in any projected peace, that there is always this refractory residue of terms not open to negotiation or compromise. now it also happens, also by historical accident, that these residual principles of civil liberty have come to blend and coalesce with a stubborn preconception of national integrity and national prestige. so that in the workday apprehension of the common man, not given to analytic excursions, any infraction of the national integrity or any abatement of the national prestige has come to figure as an insufferable infringement on his personal liberty and on those principles of humanity that make up the categorical articles of the secular creed of christendom. the fact may be patent on reflection that the common man's substantial interest in the national integrity is slight and elusive, and that in sober common sense the national prestige has something less than a neutral value to him; but this state of the substantially pertinent facts is not greatly of the essence of the case, since his preconceptions in these premises do not run to that effect, and since they are of too hard and fast a texture to suffer any serious abatement within such a space of time as can come in question here and now. * * * * * the outlook for a speedy settlement of the world's peace on a plan of unconditional surrender to the projected imperial dominion seems unpromisingly dubious, in view of the stubborn temper shown by these modern peoples wherever their preconceived ideas of right and honest living appear to be in jeopardy; and the expediency of entering into any negotiated compact of diplomatic engagements and assurances designed to serve as groundwork to an eventual enterprise of that kind must therefore also be questionable in a high degree. it is even doubtful if any allowance of time can be counted on to bring these modern peoples to a more reasonable, more worldly-wise, frame of mind; so that they would come to see their interest in such an arrangement, or would divest themselves of their present stubborn and perhaps fantastic prejudice against an autocratic régime of the kind spoken for. at least for the present any such hope of a peaceable settlement seems illusive. what may be practicable in this way in the course of time is of course still more obscure; but argument on the premises which the present affords does not point to a substantially different outcome in the calculable future. for the immediate future--say, within the life-time of the oncoming generation--the spiritual state of the peoples concerned in this international quandary is not likely to undergo so radical a change as to seriously invalidate an argument that proceeds on the present lie of the land in this respect. preconceptions are a work of habit impinging on a given temperamental bent; and where, as in these premises, the preconceptions have taken on an institutionalised form, have become conventionalised and commonly accepted, and so have been woven into the texture of popular common sense, they must needs be a work of protracted and comprehensive habituation impinging on a popular temperamental bent of so general a prevalence that it may be called congenital to the community at large. a heritable bent pervading the group within which inheritance runs, does not change, so long as the racial complexion of the group remains passably intact; a conventionalised, commonly established habit of mind will change only slowly, commonly not without the passing of at least one generation, and only by grace of a sufficiently searching and comprehensive discipline of experience. for good or ill, the current situation is to be counted on not to lose character over night or with a revolution of the seasons, so far as concerns these spiritual factors that make or mar the fortunes of nations. at the same time these spiritual assets, being of the nature of habit, are also bound to change character more or less radically, by insensible shifting of ground, but incontinently,--provided only that the conditions of life, and therefore the discipline of experience, undergo any substantial change. so the immediate interest shifts to the presumptive rate and character of those changes that are in prospect, due to the unremitting change of circumstances under which these modern peoples live and to the discipline of which they are unavoidably exposed. for the present and for the immediate future the current state of things is a sufficiently stable basis of argument; but assurance as to the sufficiency of the premises afforded by the current state of things thins out in proportion as the perspective of the argument runs out into the succeeding years. the bearing of it all is two-fold, of course. this progressive, cumulative habituation under changing circumstances affects the case both of those democratic peoples whose fortunes are in the hazard, and also of those dynastic states by whom the projected enterprise in dominion is to be carried into effect. * * * * * the case of the two formidable dynastic states whose names have been coupled together in what has already been said is perhaps the more immediately interesting in the present connection. as matters stand, and in the measure in which they continue so to stand, the case of these is in no degree equivocal. the two dynastic establishments seek dominion, and indeed they seek nothing else, except incidentally to and in furtherance of the main quest. as has been remarked before, it lies in the nature of a dynastic state to seek dominion, that being the whole of its nature in so far as it runs true to form. but a dynastic state, like any other settled, institutionalised community of men, rests on and draws its effectual driving force from the habit of mind of its underlying community, the common man in the aggregate, his preconceptions and ideals as to what things are worth while. without a suitable spiritual ground of this kind such a dynastic state passes out of the category of formidable powers and into that of precarious despotism. in both of the two states here in question the dynastic establishment and its bodyguard of officials and gentlefolk may be counted on to persevere in the faith that now animates them, until an uneasy displacement of sentiment among the underlying populace may in time induce them judiciously to shift their footing. like the ruling classes elsewhere, they are of a conservative temper and may be counted on so to continue. they are also not greatly exposed to the discipline of experience that makes for adaptive change in habits of life, and therefore in the correlated habits of thought. it is always the common man that is effectually reached by any exacting or wide-reaching change in the conditions of life. he is relatively unsheltered from any forces that make for adaptive change, as contrasted with the case of his betters; and however sluggish and reluctant may be his response to such discipline as makes for a displacement of outworn preconceptions, yet it is always out of the mass of this common humanity that those movements of disaffection and protest arise, which lead, on occasion, to any material realignment of the institutional fabric or to any substantial shift in the line of policy to be pursued under the guidance of their betters. the common mass of humanity, it may be said in parenthesis, is of course not a homogeneous body. uncommon men, in point of native gifts of intelligence, sensibility, or personal force, will occur as frequently, in proportion to the aggregate numbers, among the common mass as among their betters. since in any one of these nations of christendom, with their all-inclusive hybridisation, the range, frequency and amplitude of variations in hereditary endowment is the same throughout all classes. class differentiation is a matter of habit and convention; and in distinction from his betters the common man is common only in point of numbers and in point of the more general and more exacting conditions to which he is exposed. he is in a position to be more hardly ridden by the discipline of experience, and is at the same time held more consistently to such a body of preconceptions, and to such changes only in this body of preconceptions, as fall in with the drift of things in a larger mass of humanity. but all the while it is the discipline which impinges on the sensibilities of this common mass that shapes the spiritual attitude and temper of the community and so defines what may and what may not be undertaken by the constituted leaders. so that, in a way, these dynastic states are at the mercy of that popular sentiment whose creatures they are, and are subject to undesired changes of direction and efficiency in their endeavors, contingent on changes in the popular temper; over which they have only a partial, and on the whole a superficial control. a relatively powerful control and energetic direction of the popular temper is and has been exercised by these dynastic establishments, with a view to its utilisation in the pursuit of the dynastic enterprise; and much has visibly been accomplished in that way; chiefly, perhaps, by military discipline in subordination to personal authority, and also by an unsparing surveillance of popular education, with a view to fortify the preconceptions handed down from the passing order as well as to eliminate all subversive innovation. yet in spite of all the well-conceived and shrewdly managed endeavors of the german imperial system in this direction, e.g., there has been evidence of an obscurely growing uneasiness, not to say disaffection, among the underlying mass. so much so that hasty observers, and perhaps biased, have reached the inference that one of the immediate contributory causes that led to the present war was the need of a heroic remedy to correct this untoward drift of sentiment. for the german people the government of the present dynastic incumbent has done all that could (humanly speaking) be expected in the way of endeavoring to conserve the passing order and to hold the popular imagination to the received feudalistic ideals of loyal service. and yet the peoples of the empire are already caught in the net of that newer order which they are now endeavoring to break by force of arms. they are inextricably implicated in the cultural complex of christendom; and within this western culture those peoples to whom it fell to lead the exodus out of the egypt of feudalism have come quite naturally to set the pace in all the larger conformities of civilised life. within the confines of christendom today, for good or ill, whatever usage or customary rule of conduct falls visibly short of the precedent set by these cultural pioneers is felt to fall beneath the prescriptive commonplace level of civilisation. failure to adopt and make use of those tried institutional expedients on which these peoples of the advance guard have set their mark of authentication is today presumptively a mistake and an advantage foregone; and a people who are denied the benefit of these latterday ways and means of civic life are uneasy with a sense of grievance at the hands of their rulers. besides which, the fashion in articles of institutional equipage so set by the authentic pioneers of culture has also come to be mandatory, as a punctilio of the governmental proprieties; so that no national establishment which aspires to a decorous appearance in the eyes of the civilised world can longer afford to be seen without them. the forms at least must be observed. hence the "representative" and pseudo-representative institutions of these dynastic states. these dynastic states among the rest have partly followed the dictates of civilised fashion, partly yielded to the, more or less intelligent, solicitations of their subjects, or the spokesmen of their subjects, and have installed institutional apparatus of this modern pattern--more in point of form than of substance, perhaps. yet in time the adoption of the forms is likely to have an effect, if changing circumstances favor their taking effect. such has on the whole been the experience of those peoples who have gone before along this trail of political advance. as instance the growth of discretionary powers under the hands of parliamentary representatives in those cases where the movement has gone on longest and farthest; and these instances should not be considered idle, as intimations of what may presumptively be looked for under the imperial establishments of germany or japan. it may be true that hitherto, along with the really considerable volume of imitative gestures of discretionary deliberation delegated to these parliamentary bodies, they have as regards all graver matters brought to their notice only been charged with a (limited) power to talk. it may be true that, for the present, on critical or weighty measures the parliamentary discretion extends no farther than respectfully to say: "_ja wohl_!" but then, _ja wohl_ is also something; and there is no telling where it may all lead to in the long course of years. one has a vague apprehension that this "_ja wohl_!" may some day come to be a customarily necessary form of authentication, so that with-holding it (_behüt' es gott_!) may even come to count as an effectual veto on measures so pointedly neglected. more particularly will the formalities of representation and self-government be likely to draw the substance of such like "free institutions" into the effectual conduct of public affairs if it turns out that the workday experiences of these people takes a turn more conducive to habits of insubordination than has been the case hitherto. indications are, again, not wanting, that even in the empire the discipline of workday experience is already diverging from that line that once trained the german subjects into the most loyal and unrepining subservience to dynastic ambitions. of course, just now, under the shattering impact of warlike atrocities and patriotic clamour, the workday spirit of insubordination and critical scrutiny is gone out of sight and out of hearing. something of this inchoate insubordination has showed itself repeatedly during the present reign, sufficient to provoke many shrewd protective measures on the side of the dynastic establishment, both by way of political strategy and by arbitrary control. disregarding many minor and inconsequential divisions of opinion and counsel among the german people during this eventful reign, the political situation has been moving on the play of three, incipiently divergent, strains of interest and sentiment: (a) the dynasty (together with the agrarians, of whom in a sense the dynasty is a part); (b) the businessmen, or commercial interest (including investors); and (c) the industrial workmen. doubtless it would be easier to overstate than to indicate with any nice precision what has been the nature, and especially the degree, of this alienation of sentiment and divergence of conscious interest among these several elements. it is not that there has at any point been a perceptible faltering in respect of loyalty to the crown as such. but since the crown belongs, by origin, tradition, interest and spiritual identity, in the camp of the agrarians, the situation has been such as would inevitably take on a character of disaffection toward the dynastic establishment, in the conceivable absence of that strong surviving sentiment of dynastic loyalty that still animates all classes and conditions of men in the fatherland. it would accordingly, again, be an overstatement to say that the crown has been standing precariously at the apex of a political triangle, the other two corners of which are occupied by these two divided and potentially recalcitrant elements of the body politic, held apart by class antipathy and divergent pecuniary interest, and held in check by divided counsels; but something after that fashion is what would have resulted under similar conditions of strain in any community where the modern spirit of insubordination has taken effect in any large measure. both of these elements of incipient disturbance in the dynastic economy, the modern commercial and working classes, are creatures of the new era; and they are systematically out of line with the received dynastic tradition of fealty, both in respect of their pecuniary interests and in respect of that discipline of experience to which their workday employment subjects them. they are substantially the same two classes or groupings that came forward in the modernisation of the british community, with a gradual segregation of interest and a consequent induced solidarity of class sentiment and class animosities. but with the difference that in the british case the movement of changing circumstances was slow enough to allow a fair degree of habituation to the altered economic conditions; whereas in the german case the move into modern economic conditions has been made so precipitately as to have carried the mediaeval frame of mind over virtually intact into this era of large business and machine industry. in the fatherland the commercial and industrial classes have been called on to play their part without time to learn their lines. the case of the english-speaking peoples, who have gone over this course of experience in more consecutive fashion than any others, teaches that in the long run, if these modern economic conditions persist, one or the other or both of these creatures of the modern era must prevail, and must put the dynastic establishment out of commission; although the sequel has not yet been seen in this british case, and there is no ground afforded for inference as to which of the two will have the fortune to survive and be invested with the hegemony. meantime the opportunity of the imperial establishment to push its enterprise in dominion lies in the interval of time so required for the discipline of experience under modern conditions to work out through the growth of modern habits of thought into such modern (i.e. civilised) institutional forms and such settled principles of personal insubordination as will put any effectual dynastic establishment out of commission. the same interval of time, that must so be allowed for the decay of the dynastic spirit among the german people under the discipline of life by the methods of modern trade and industry, marks the period during which no peace compact will be practicable, except with the elimination of the imperial establishment as a possible warlike power. all this, of course, applies to the case of japan as well, with the difference that while the japanese people are farther in arrears, they are also a smaller, less formidable body, more exposed to outside forces, and their mediaevalism is of a more archaic and therefore more precarious type. what length of time will be required for this decay of the dynastic spirit among the people of the empire is, of course, impossible to say. the factors of the case are not of a character to admit anything like calculation of the rate of movement; but in the nature of the factors involved it is also contained that something of a movement in this direction is unavoidable, under providence. as a preliminary consideration, these peoples of the empire and its allies, as well as their enemies in the great war, will necessarily come out of their warlike experience in a more patriotic and more vindictive frame of mind than that in which they entered on this adventure. fighting makes for malevolence. the war is itself to be counted as a set-back. a very large proportion of those who have lived through it will necessarily carry a warlike bent through life. by that much, whatever it may count for, the decay of the dynastic spirit--or the growth of tolerance and equity in national sentiment, if one chooses to put it that way--will be retarded from beforehand. so also the imperial establishment, or whatever is left of it, may be counted on to do everything in its power to preserve the popular spirit of loyalty and national animosity, by all means at its disposal; since the imperial establishment finally rests on the effectual body of national animosity. what hindrance will come in from this agency of retardation can at least vaguely be guessed at, in the light of what has been accomplished in that way under the strenuously reactionary rule of the present reign. again, there is the chance, as there always is a chance of human folly, that the neighboring peoples will undertake, whether jointly or severally, to restrict or prohibit trade relations between the people of the empire and their enemies in the present war; thereby fomenting international animosity, as well as contributing directly to the economic readiness for war both on their own part and on that of the empire. this is also, and in an eminent degree, an unknown factor in the case, on which not even a reasonable guess can be made beforehand. these are, all and several, reactionary agencies, factors of retardation, making for continuation of the current international situation of animosity, distrust, chicane, trade rivalry, competitive armament, and eventual warlike enterprise. * * * * * to offset these agencies of conservatism there is nothing much that can be counted on but that slow, random, and essentially insidious working of habituation that tends to the obsolescence of the received preconceptions; partly by supplanting them with something new, but more effectually by their falling into disuse and decay. there is, it will have to be admitted, little of a positive character that can be done toward the installation of a régime of peace and good-will. the endeavours of the pacifists should suffice to convince any dispassionate observer of the substantial futility of creative efforts looking to such an end. much can doubtless be done in the way of precautionary measures, mostly of a negative character, in the way especially of removing sources of infection and (possibly) of so sterilising the apparatus of national life that its working shall neither maintain animosities and interests at variance with the conditions of peace nor contribute to their spread and growth. there is necessarily little hope or prospect that any national establishment will contribute materially or in any direct way to the obsolescence of warlike sentiments and ambitions; since such establishments are designed for the making of war by keeping national jealousies intact, and their accepted place in affairs is that of preparation for eventual hostilities, defensive or offensive. except for the contingency of eventual hostilities, no national establishment could be kept in countenance. they would all fall into the decay of desuetude, just as has happened to the dynastic establishments among those peoples who have (passably) lost the spirit of dynastic aggression. the modern industrial occupations, the modern technology, and that modern empirical science that runs so close to the frontiers of technology, all work at cross purposes with the received preconceptions of the nationalist order; and in a more pronounced degree they are at cross purposes with that dynastic order of preconceptions that converges on imperial dominion. the like is true, with a difference, of the ways, means and routine of business enterprise as it is conducted in the commercialised communities of today. the working of these agencies runs to this effect not by way of deliberate and destructive antagonism, but almost wholly by force of systematic, though unintended and incidental, neglect of those values, standards, verities, and grounds of discrimination and conviction that make up the working realities of the national spirit and of dynastic ambition. the working concepts of this new, essentially mechanistic, order of human interests, do not necessarily clash with those of the old order, essentially the order of personages and personalities; the two are incommensurable, and they are incompatible only in the sense and degree implied in that state of the case. the profoundest and most meritorious truths of dynastic politics can on no provocation and by no sleight of hand be brought within the logic of that system of knowledge and appraisal of values by which the mechanistic technology proceeds. within the premises of this modern mechanistic industry and science all the best values and verities of the dynastic order are simply "incompetent, irrelevant and impertinent." there is accordingly no unavoidable clash and no necessary friction between the two schemes of knowledge or the two habits of mind that characterise the two contrasted cultural eras. it is only that a given individual--call him the common man--will not be occupied with both of these incommensurable systems of logic and appreciation at the same time or bearing on the same point; and further that in proportion as his waking hours and his mental energy are fully occupied within the lines of one of these systems of knowledge, design and employment, in much the same measure he will necessarily neglect the other, and in time he will lose proficiency and interest in its pursuits and its conclusions. the man who is so held by his daily employment and his life-long attention within the range of habits of thought that are valid in the mechanistic technology, will, on an average and in the long run, lose his grip on the spiritual virtues of national prestige and dynastic primacy; "for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." not that the adepts in this modern mechanistic system of knowledge and design may not also be very good patriots and devoted servants of the dynasty. the artless and, on the whole, spontaneous riot of dynastic avidity displayed to the astonished eyes of their fellow craftsmen in the neutral countries by the most eminent scientists of the fatherland during the early months of the war should be sufficient warning that the archaic preconceptions do not hurriedly fly out of the window when the habits of thought of the mechanistic order come in at the door. but with the passage of time, pervasively, by imperceptible displacement, by the decay of habitual disuse, as well as by habitual occupation with these other and unrelated ways and means of knowledge and belief, dynastic loyalty and the like conceptions in the realm of religion and magic pass out of the field of attention and fall insensibly into the category of the lost arts. particularly will this be true of the common man, who lives, somewhat characteristically, in the mass and in the present, and whose waking hours are somewhat fully occupied with what he has to do. with the commercial interests the imperial establishment can probably make such terms as to induce their support of the dynastic enterprise, since they can apparently always be made to believe that an extension of the imperial dominion will bring correspondingly increased opportunities of trade. it is doubtless a mistake, but it is commonly believed by the interested parties, which is just as good for the purpose as if it were true. and it should be added that in this, as in other instances of the quest of larger markets, the costs are to be paid by someone else than the presumed commercial beneficiaries; which brings the matter under the dearest principle known to businessmen: that of getting something for nothing. it will not be equally easy to keep the affections of the common man loyal to the dynastic enterprise when he begins to lose his grip on the archaic faith in dynastic dominion and comes to realise that he has also--individually and in the mass--no material interest even in the defense of the fatherland, much less in the further extension of imperial rule. but the time when this process of disillusionment and decay of ideals shall have gone far enough among the common run to afford no secure footing in popular sentiment for the contemplated imperial enterprise,--this time is doubtless far in the future, as compared with the interval of preparation required for a new onset. habituation takes time, particularly such habituation as can be counted on to derange the habitual bent of a great population in respect of their dearest preconceptions. it will take a very appreciable space of time even in the case of a populace so accessible to new habits of thought as the german people are by virtue of their slight percentage of illiteracy, the very large proportion engaged in those modern industries that constantly require some intelligent insight into mechanistic facts, the density of population and the adequate means of communication, and the extent to which the whole population is caught in the web of mechanically standardised processes that condition their daily life at every turn. as regards their technological situation, and their exposure to the discipline of industrial life, no other population of nearly the same volume is placed in a position so conducive to a rapid acquirement of the spirit of the modern era. but, also, no other people comparable with the population of the fatherland has so large and well-knit a body of archaic preconceptions to unlearn. their nearest analogue, of course, is the japanese nation. in all this there is, of course, no inclination to cast a slur on the german people. in point of racial characteristics there is no difference between them and their neighbours. and there is no reason to question their good intentions. indeed, it may safely be asserted that no people is more consciously well-meaning than the children of the fatherland. it is only that, with their archaic preconceptions of what is right and meritorious, their best intentions spell malevolence when projected into the civilised world as it stands today. and by no fault of theirs. nor is it meant to be intimated that their rate of approach to the accepted occidental standard of institutional maturity will be unduly slow or unduly reluctant, so soon as the pertinent facts of modern life begin effectively to shape their habits of thought. it is only that, human nature--and human second nature--being what it always has been, the rate of approach of the german people to a passably neutral complexion in matters of international animosity and aggression must necessarily be slow enough to allow ample time for the renewed preparation of a more unsparing and redoubtable endeavour on the part of the imperial establishment. what makes this german imperial establishment redoubtable, beyond comparison, is the very simple but also very grave combination of circumstances whereby the german people have acquired the use of the modern industrial arts in the highest state of efficiency, at the same time that they have retained unabated the fanatical loyalty of feudal barbarism.[9] so long, and in so far, as this conjunction of forces holds there is no outlook for peace except on the elimination of germany as a power capable of disturbing the peace. [footnote 9: for an extended discussion of this point, see _imperial germany and the industrial revolution_, especially ch. v. and vi.] it may seem invidious to speak so recurrently of the german imperial establishment as the sole potential disturber of the peace in europe. the reason for so singling out the empire for this invidious distinction--of merit or demerit, as one may incline to take it--is that the facts run that way. there is, of course, other human material, and no small volume of it in the aggregate, that is of much the same character, and serviceable for the same purposes as the resources and man-power of the empire. but this other material can come effectually into bearing as a means of disturbance only in so far as it clusters about the imperial dynasty and marches under his banners. in so speaking of the imperial establishment as the sole enemy of a european peace, therefore, these outlying others are taken for granted, very much as one takes the nimbus for granted in speaking of one of the greater saints of god. * * * * * so the argument returns to the alternative: peace by unconditional surrender and submission, or peace by elimination of imperial germany (and japan). there is no middle course apparent. the old-fashioned--that is to say nineteenth-century--plan of competitive defensive armament and a balance of powers has been tried, and it has not proved to be a success, even so early in the twentieth century. this plan offers a substitute (_ersatz_) for peace; but even as such it has become impracticable. the modern, or rather the current late-modern, state of the industrial arts does not tolerate it. technological knowledge has thrown the advantage in military affairs definitively to the offensive, particularly to the offensive that is prepared beforehand with the suitable appliances and with men ready matured in that rigorous and protracted training by which alone they can become competent to make warlike use of these suitable appliances provided by the modern technology. at the same time, and by grace of the same advance in technology, any well-designed offensive can effectually reach any given community, in spite of distance or of other natural obstacles. the era of defensive armaments and diplomatic equilibration, as a substitute for peace, has been definitively closed by the modern state of the industrial arts. of the two alternatives spoken of above, the former--peace by submission under an alien dynasty--is presumably not a practicable solution, as has appeared in the course of the foregoing argument. the modern nations are not spiritually ripe for it. whether they have reached even that stage of national sobriety, or neutrality, that would enable them to live at peace among themselves after elimination of the imperial powers is still open to an uneasy doubt. it would be by a precarious margin that they can be counted on so to keep the peace in the absence of provocation from without the pale. their predilection for peace goes to no greater lengths than is implied in the formula: peace with honour; which assuredly does not cover a peace of non-resistance, and which, in effect, leaves the distinction between an offensive and a defensive war somewhat at loose ends. the national prestige is still a live asset in the mind of these peoples; and the limit of tolerance in respect of this patriotic animosity appears to be drawn appreciably closer than the formula cited above would necessarily presume. they will fight on provocation, and the degree of provocation required to upset the serenity of these sportsmanlike modern peoples is a point on which the shrewdest guesses may diverge. still, opinion runs more and more consistently to the effect that if these modern--say the french and the english-speaking--peoples were left to their own devices the peace might fairly be counted on to be kept between them indefinitely, barring unforeseen contingencies. experience teaches that warlike enterprise on a moderate scale and as a side interest is by no means incompatible with such a degree of neutral animus as these peoples have yet acquired,--e.g., the spanish-american war, which was made in america, or the boer war, which was made in england. but these wars, in spite of the dimensions which they presently took on, were after all of the nature of episodes,--the one chiefly an extension of sportsmanship, which engaged the best attention of only the more sportsmanlike elements, the other chiefly engineered by certain business interests with a callous view to getting something for nothing. both episodes came to be serious enough, both in their immediate incidence and in their consequences; but neither commanded the deliberate and cordial support of the community at large. there is a meretricious air over both; and there is apparent a popular inclination to condone rather than to take pride in these _faits accomplis_. the one excursion was a product of sportsmanlike bravado, fed on boyish exuberance, fomented for mercenary objects by certain business interests and place-hunting politicians, and incited by meretricious newspapers with a view to increase their circulation. the other was set afoot by interested businessmen, backed by politicians, seconded by newspapers, and borne by the community at large, in great part under misapprehension and stung by wounded pride. opinions will diverge widely as to the chances of peace in a community of nations among whom episodes of this character, and of such dimensions, have been somewhat more than tolerated in the immediate past. but the consensus of opinion in these same countries appears to be setting with fair consistency to the persuasion that the popular spirit shown in these and in analogous conjunctures in the recent past gives warrant that peace is deliberately desired and is likely to be maintained, barring unforeseen contingencies. * * * * * in the large, the measures conducive to the perpetuation of peace, and necessary to be taken, are simple and obvious; and they are largely of a negative character, exploits of omission and neglect. under modern conditions, and barring aggression from without, the peace is kept by avoiding the breaking of it. it does not break of itself,--in the absence of such national establishments as are organised with the sole ulterior view of warlike enterprise. a policy of peace is obviously a policy of avoidance,--avoidance of offense and of occasion for annoyance. what is required to insure the maintenance of peace among pacific nations is the neutralisation of all those human relations out of which international grievances are wont to arise. and what is necessary to assure a reasonable expectation of continued peace is the neutralisation of so much of these relations as the patriotic self-conceit and credulity of these peoples will permit. these two formulations are by no means identical; indeed, the disparity between what could advantageously be dispensed with in the way of national rights and pretensions, and what the common run of modern patriots could be induced to relinquish, is probably much larger than any sanguine person would like to believe. it should be plain on slight reflection that the greater part, indeed substantially the whole, of those material interests and demands that now engage the policy of the nations, and that serve on occasion to set them at variance, might be neutralised or relinquished out of hand, without detriment to any one of the peoples concerned. the greater part of these material interests over which the various national establishments keep watch and hold pretensions are, in point of historical derivation, a legacy from the princely politics of what is called the "mercantilist" period; and they are uniformly of the nature of gratuitous interference or discrimination between the citizens of the given nation and outsiders. except (doubtfully) in the english case, where mercantilist policies are commonly believed to have been adopted directly for the benefit of the commercial interest, measures of this nature are uniformly traceable to the endeavours of the crown and its officers to strengthen the finances of the prince and give him an advantage in warlike enterprise. they are kept up essentially for the same eventual end of preparation for war. so, e.g., protective tariffs, and the like discrimination in shipping, are still advocated as a means of making the nation self-supporting, self-contained, self-sufficient; with a view to readiness in the event of hostilities. a nation is in no degree better off in time of peace for being self-sufficient. in point of patent fact no nation can be industrially self-sufficient except at the cost of foregoing some of the economic advantages of that specialisation of industry which the modern state of the industrial arts enforces. in time of peace there is no benefit comes to the community at large from such restraint of trade with the outside world, or to any class or section of the community except those commercial concerns that are favored by the discrimination; and these invariably gain their special advantage at the cost of their compatriots. discrimination in trade--export, import or shipping--has no more beneficial effect when carried out publicly by the national authorities than when effected surreptitiously and illegally by a private conspiracy in restraint of trade within a group of interested business concerns. hitherto the common man has found it difficult to divest himself of an habitual delusion on this head, handed down out of the past and inculcated by interested politicians, to the effect that in some mysterious way he stands to gain by limiting his own opportunities. but the neutralisation of international trade, or the abrogation of all discrimination in trade, is the beginning of wisdom as touches the perpetuation of peace. the first effect of such a neutral policy would be wider and more intricately interlocking trade relations, coupled with a further specialisation and mutual dependence of industry between the several countries concerned; which would mean, in terms of international comity, a lessened readiness for warlike operations all around. it used to be an argument of the free-traders that the growth of international commercial relations under a free-trade policy would greatly conduce to a spirit of mutual understanding and forbearance between the nations. there may or may not be something appreciable in the contention; it has been doubted, and there is no considerable evidence to be had in support of it. but what is more to the point is the tangible fact that such specialisation of industry and consequent industrial interdependence would leave all parties to this relation less capable, materially and spiritually, to break off amicable relations. so again, in time of peace and except with a view to eventual hostilities, it would involve no loss, and presumably little pecuniary gain, to any country, locality, town or class, if all merchant shipping were registered indiscriminately under neutral colors and sailed under the neutral no-man's flag, responsible indiscriminately to the courts where they touched or where their business was transacted. neither producers, shippers, merchants nor consumers have any slightest interest in the national allegiance of the carriers of their freight, except such as may artificially be induced by discriminatory shipping regulations. in all but the name--in time of peace--the world's merchant shipping already comes near being so neutralised, and the slight further simplification required to leave it on a neutral peace footing would be little else than a neglect of such vexatious discrimination as is still in force. if no nation could claim the allegiance, and therefore the usufruct, of any given item of merchant shipping in case of eventual hostilities, on account of the domicile of the owners or the port of registry, that would create a further handicap on eventual warlike enterprise and add so much to the margin of tolerance. at the same time, in the event of hostilities, shipping sailing under the neutral no-man's flag and subject to no national allegiance would enjoy such immunities as still inure to neutral shipping. it is true, neutrality has not carried many immunities lately. cumulatively effective usage and the exigencies of a large, varied, shifting and extensive maritime trade have in the course of time brought merchant shipping to something approaching a neutral footing. for most, one might venture to say for virtually all, routine purposes of business and legal liability the merchant shipping comes under the jurisdiction of the local courts, without reservation. it is true, there still are formalities and reservations which enable questions arising out of incidents in the shipping trade to become subject of international conference and adjustment, but they are after all not such as would warrant the erection of national apparatus to take care of them in case they were not already covered by usage to that effect. the visible drift of usage toward neutralisation in merchant shipping, in maritime trade, and in international commercial transactions, together with the similarly visible feasibility of a closer approach to unreserved neutralisation of this whole range of traffic, suggests that much the same line of considerations should apply as regards the personal and pecuniary rights of citizens traveling or residing abroad. the extreme,--or, as seen from the present point of view, the ultimate--term in the relinquishment of national pretensions along this line would of course be the neutralisation of citizenship. this is not so sweeping a move as a patriotically-minded person might imagine on the first alarm, so far as touches the practical status of the ordinary citizen in his ordinary relations, and particularly among the english-speaking peoples. as an illustrative instance, citizenship has sat somewhat lightly on the denizens of the american republic, and with no evident damage to the community at large or to the inhabitants in detail. naturalisation has been easy, and has been sought with no more eagerness, on the whole, than the notably low terms of its acquirement would indicate. without loss or discomfort many law-abiding aliens have settled in this country and spent the greater part of a life-time under its laws without becoming citizens, and no one the worse or the wiser for it. not infrequently the decisive inducement to naturalisation on the part of immigrant aliens has been, and is, the desirability of divesting themselves of their rights of citizenship in the country of their origin. not that the privilege and dignity of citizenship, in this or in any other country, is to be held of little account. it is rather that under modern civilised conditions, and among a people governed by sentiments of humanity and equity, the stranger within our gates suffers no obloquy and no despiteful usage for being a stranger. it may be admitted that of late, with the fomentation of a more accentuated nationalism by politicians seeking a _raison d'être_, additional difficulties have been created in the way of naturalisation and the like incidents. still, when all is told of the average american citizen, _qua_ citizen, there is not much to tell. the like is true throughout the english-speaking peoples, with inconsequential allowance for local color. a definitive neutralisation of citizenship within the range of these english-speaking countries would scarcely ripple the surface of things as they are--in time of peace. all of which has not touched the sore and sacred spot in the received scheme of citizenship and its rights and liabilities. it is in the event of hostilities that the liabilities of the citizen at home come into the foreground, and it is as a source of patriotic grievance looking to warlike retaliation that the rights of the citizen abroad chiefly come into the case. if, as was once, almost inaudibly, hinted by a well-regarded statesman, the national establishment should refuse to jeopardise the public peace for the safeguarding of the person and property of citizens who go out _in partes infidelium_ on their own private concerns, and should so leave them under the uncurbed jurisdiction of the authorities in those countries into which they have intruded, the result might in many cases be hardship to such individuals. this would, of course, be true almost exclusively of such instances only as occur in such localities as are, temporarily or permanently, outside the pale of modern law and order. and, it may be in place to remark, instances of such hardship, with the accompanying hazard of national complications, would, no doubt, greatly diminish in frequency consequent upon the promulgation of such a disclaimer of national responsibility for the continued well-being of citizens who so expatriate themselves in the pursuit of their own advantage or amusement. meantime, let it not seem inconsiderate to recall that to the community at large the deplorable case of such expatriates under hardship involves no loss or gain in the material respect; and that, except for the fortuitous circumstance of his being a compatriot, the given individual's personal or pecuniary fortune in foreign parts has no special claim on his compatriots' sympathy or assistance; from which it follows also that with the definitive neutralisation of citizenship as touches expatriates, the sympathy which is now somewhat unintelligently confined to such cases, on what may without offense be called extraneous grounds, would somewhat more impartially and humanely extend to fellowmen in distress, regardless of nativity or naturalisation. what is mainly to the point here, however, is the fact that if citizenship were so neutralised within the range of neutral countries here contemplated, one further source of provocation to international jealousy and distrust would drop out of the situation. and it is not easy to detect any element of material loss involved in such a move. in the material respect no individual would be any the worse off, with the doubtful and dubious exception of the expatriate fortune-hunter, who aims to fish safely in troubled waters at his compatriots' expense. but the case stands otherwise as regards the balance of immaterial assets. the scaffolding of much highly-prized sentiment would collapse, and the world of poetry and pageantry--particularly that of the tawdrier and more vendible poetry and pageantry--would be poorer by so much. the man without a country would lose his pathetic appeal, or would at any rate lose much of it. it may be, of course, that in the sequel there would result no net loss even in respect of these immaterial assets of sentimental animation and patriotic self-complacency, but it is after all fairly certain that something would be lost, and it is by no means clear what if anything would come in to fill its place. an historical parallel may help to illustrate the point. in the movement out of what may be called the royal age of dynasties and chivalric service, those peoples who have moved out of that age and out of its spiritual atmosphere have lost much of the conscious magnanimity and conviction of merit that once characterised that order of things, as it still continues to characterise the prevalent habit of mind in the countries that still continue under the archaic order of dynastic mastery and service. but it is also to be noted that these peoples who so have moved out of the archaic order appear to be well content with this change of spiritual atmosphere, and they are even fairly well persuaded, in the common run, that the move has brought them some net gain in the way of human dignity and neighbourly tolerance, such as to offset any loss incurred on the heroic and invidious side of life. such is the tempering force of habit. whereas, e.g., on the other hand, the peoples of these surviving dynastic states, to which it is necessary continually to recur, who have not yet moved out of that realm of heroics, find themselves unable to see anything in such a prospective shift but net loss and headlong decay of the spirit; that modicum of forbearance and equity that is requisite to the conduct of life in a community of ungraded masterless men is seen by these stouter stomachs as a loosening of the moral fiber and a loss of nerve. * * * * * what is here tentatively projected under the phrase, "neutralization of citizenship," is only something a little more and farther along the same general line of movement which these more modern peoples have been following in all that sequence of institutional changes that has given them their present distinctive character of commonwealths, as contrasted with the dynastic states of the mediaeval order. what may be in prospect--if such a further move away from the mediaeval landmarks is to take effect--may best be seen in the light of the later moves in the same direction hitherto, more particularly as regards the moral and aesthetic merits at large of such an institutional mutation. as touches this last previous shifting of ground along this line, just spoken of, the case stands in this singular but significant posture, in respect of the spiritual values and valuations involved: these peoples who have, even in a doubtful measure, made this transition from the archaic institutional scheme, of fealty and dynastic exploit and coercion, to the newer scheme of the ungraded commonwealth, are convinced, to the point of martyrdom, that anything like a return to the old order is morally impossible as well as insufferably shameful and irksome; whereas those people, of the retarded division of the race, who have had no experience of this new order, are equally convinced that it is all quite incompatible with a worthy life. evidently, there should be no disputing about tastes. evidently, too, these retarded others will not move on into the later institutional phase, of the ungraded commonwealth, by preconceived choice; but only, if at all, by such schooling of experience as will bring them insensibly to that frame of mind out of which the ideal of the ungraded commonwealth emerges by easy generalisation of workday practice. meantime, having not yet experienced that phase of sentiment and opinion on civic rights and immunities that is now occupied by their institutionally maturer neighbours, the subjects of the imperial fatherland, e.g., in spite of the most laudable intentions and the best endeavour, are, by failure of this experience, unable to comprehend either the ground of opposition to their well-meaning projects of dominion or the futility of trying to convert these their elder brothers to their own prescriptive acceptation of what is worth while. in time, and with experience, this retarded division of christendom may come to the same perspective on matters of national usage and ideals as has been enforced on the more modern peoples by farther habituation. so, also, in time and with experience, if the drift of circumstance shall turn out to set that way, the further move away from mediaeval discriminations and constraint and into the unspectacular scheme of neutralisation may come to seem as right, good and beautiful as the democratic commonwealth now seems to the english-speaking peoples, or as the hohenzollern imperial state now seems to the subjects of the fatherland. there is, in effect, no disputing about tastes. there is little that is novel, and nothing that is to be rated as constructive innovation, in this sketch of what might not inaptly be called peace by neglect. the legal mind, which commonly takes the initiative in counsels on what to do, should scarcely be expected to look in that direction for a way out, or to see its way out in that direction in any case; so that it need occasion no surprise if the many current projects of pacification turn on ingenious and elaborate provisions of apparatus and procedure, rather than on that simpler line of expedients which the drift of circumstance, being not possessed of a legal mind, has employed in the sequence of institutional change hitherto. the legal mind that dominates in the current deliberations on peace is at home in exhaustive specifications and meticulous demarkations, and it is therefore prone to seek a remedy for the burden of supernumerary devices by recourse to further excesses of regulation. this trait of the legal mind is not a bad fault at the worst, and the quality in which this defect inheres is of the greatest moment in any project of constructive engineering on the legal and political plane. but it is less to the purpose, indeed it is at cross purposes, in such a conjuncture as the present; when the nations are held up in their quest of peace chiefly by an accumulation of institutional apparatus that has out-stayed its usefulness. it is the fortune even of good institutions to become imbecile with the change of conditioning circumstances, and it then becomes a question of their disestablishment, not of their rehabilitation. if there is anywhere a safe negative conclusion, it is that an institution grown mischievous by obsolescence need not be replaced by a substitute. instances of such mischievous institutional arrangements, obsolete or in process of obsolescence, would be, e.g., the french monarchy of the ancient régime, the spanish inquisition, the british corn laws and the "rotten boroughs," the barbary pirates, the turkish rule in armenia, the british crown, the german imperial dynasty, the european balance of powers, the monroe doctrine. in some sense, at least in the sense and degree implied in their selective survival, these various articles of institutional furniture, and many like them, have once presumably been suitable to some end, in the days of their origin and vigorous growth; and they have at least in some passable fashion met some felt want; but if they ever had a place and use in the human economy they have in time grown imbecile and mischievous by force of changing circumstances, and the question is not how to replace them with something else to the same purpose after their purpose is outworn. a man who loses a wart off the end of his nose does not apply to the _ersatz_ bureau for a convenient substitute. now, a large proportion, perhaps even substantially the whole, of the existing apparatus of international rights, pretensions, discriminations, covenants and provisos, visibly fall in that class, in so far as concerns their material serviceability to the nation at large, and particularly as regards any other than a warlike purpose, offensive or defensive. of course, the national dignity and diplomatic punctilio, and the like adjuncts and instrumentalities of the national honour, all have their prestige value; and they are not likely to be given up out of hand. in point of fact, however solicitous for a lasting peace these patriotically-minded modern peoples may be, it is doubtful if they could be persuaded to give up any appreciable share of these appurtenances of national jealousy even when their retention implies an imminent breach of the peace. yet it is plain that the peace will be secure in direct proportion to the measure in which national discrimination and prestige are allowed to pass into nothingness and be forgot. * * * * * by so much as it might amount to, such neutralisation of outstanding interests between these pacific nations should bring on a degree of coalescence of these nationalities. in effect, they are now held apart in many respects by measures of precaution against their coming to a common plan of use and wont. the degree of coalescence would scarcely be extreme; more particularly it could not well become onerous, since it would rest on convenience, inclination and the neglect of artificial discrepancies. the more intimate institutions of modern life, that govern human conduct locally and in detail, need not be affected, or not greatly affected, for better or worse. yet something appreciable in that way might also fairly be looked for in time. the nature, reach and prescriptive force of this prospective coalescence through neutralisation may perhaps best be appreciated in the light of what has already come to pass, without design or mandatory guidance, in those lines of human interest where the national frontiers interpose no bar, or at least no decisive bar, whether by force of unconcern or through impotence. fashions of dress, equipage and decorous usage, e.g., run with some uniformity throughout these modern nations, and indeed with some degree of prescriptive force. there is, of course, nothing mandatory, in the simpler sense, about all this; nor is the degree of conformity extreme or uniform throughout. but it is a ready-made generalisation that only those communities are incorporated in this cosmopolitan coalescence of usage that are moved by their own incitement, and only so far as they have an effectually felt need of conformity in these premises. it is true, a dispassionate outsider, if such there be, would perhaps be struck by the degree of such painstaking conformity to canons of conduct which it frequently must cost serious effort even to ascertain in such detail as the case calls for. doubtless, or at least presumably, conformity under the jurisdiction of the fashions, and in related provinces of decorum, is obligatory in a degree that need not be looked for throughout the scheme of use and wont at large, even under the advisedly established non-interference of the authorities. still, on a point on which the evidence hitherto is extremely scant it is the part of discretion to hold no settled opinion. a more promising line of suggestion is probably that afforded by the current degree of contact and consistency among the modern nations in respect of science and scholarship, as also in the aesthetic or the industrial arts. local color and local pride, with one thing and another in the way of special incitement or inhibition, may come in to vary the run of things, or to blur or hinder a common understanding and mutual furtherance and copartnery in these matters of taste and intellect. yet it is scarcely misleading to speak of the peoples of christendom as one community in these respects. the sciences and the arts are held as a joint stock among these peoples, in their elements, and measurably also in their working-out. it is true, these interests and achievements of the race are not cultivated with the same assiduity or with identical effect throughout; but it is equally true that no effectual bar could profitably be interposed, or would be tolerated in the long run in this field, where men have had occasion to learn that unlimited collusion is more to the purpose than a clannish discrimination. * * * * * it is, no doubt, beyond reasonable hope that these democratic peoples could be brought forthwith to concerted action on the lines of such a plan of peace by neutralisation of all outstanding national pretensions. both the french and the english-speaking peoples are too eagerly set on national aims and national prestige, to allow such a plan to come to a hearing, even if something of the kind should be spoken for by their most trusted leaders. by settled habit they are thinking in terms of nationality, and just now they are all under the handicap of an inflamed national pride. advocacy of such a plan, of course, does not enter seriously into the purpose of this inquiry; which is concerned with the conditions under which peace is sought today, with the further conditions requisite to its perpetuation, and with the probable effects of such a peace on the fortunes of these peoples in case peace is established and effectually maintained. it is a reasonable question, and one to which a provisional answer may be found, whether the drift of circumstances in the present and for the immediate future may be counted on to set in the direction of a progressive neutralisation of the character spoken of above, and therefore possibly toward a perpetuation of that peace that is to follow the present season of war. so also is it an open and interesting question whether the drift in that direction, if such is the set of it, can be counted on to prove sufficiently swift and massive, so as not to be overtaken and overborne by the push of agencies that make for dissension and warlike enterprise. anything like a categorical answer to these questions would have to be a work of vaticination or of effrontery,--possibly as much to the point the one as the other. but there are certain conditions precedent to a lasting peace as the outcome of events now in train, and there are certain definable contingencies conditioned on such current facts as the existing state of the industrial arts and the state of popular sentiment, together with the conjuncture of circumstances under which these factors will come into action. the state of the industrial arts, as it bears on the peace and its violation, has been spoken of above. it is of such a character that a judiciously prepared offensive launched by any power of the first rank at an opportune time can reach and lay waste any given country of the habitable globe. the conclusive evidence of this is at hand, and it is the major premise underlying all current proposals and projects of peace, as well as the refusal of the nations now on the defensive to enter into negotiations looking to an "inconclusive peace." this state of the case is not commonly recognised in so many words, but it is well enough understood. so that all peace projects that shall hope to find a hearing must make up their account with it, and must show cause why they should be judged competent to balk any attempted offensive. in an inarticulate or inchoate fashion, perhaps, but none the less with ever-increasing certitude and increasing apprehension, this state of the case is also coming to be an article of popular "knowledge and belief," wherever much or little thought is spent on the outlook for peace. it has already had a visible effect in diminishing the exclusiveness of nationalities and turning the attention of the pacific peoples to the question of feasible ways and means of international cooperation in case of need; but it has not hitherto visibly lessened the militant spirit among these nations, nor has it lowered the tension of their national pride, at least not yet; rather the contrary, in fact. the effect, upon the popular temper, of this inchoate realisation of the fatality that so lies in the modern state of the industrial arts, varies from one country to another, according to the varying position in which they are placed, or in which they conceive themselves to be placed. among the belligerent nations it has put the spur of fear to their need of concerted action as well as to their efforts to strengthen the national defense. but the state of opinion and sentiment abroad in the nation in time of war is no secure indication of what it will be after the return to peace. the american people, the largest and most immediately concerned of the neutral nations, should afford more significant evidence of the changes in the popular attitude likely to follow from a growing realisation of this state of the case, that the advantage has passed definitively to any well prepared and resolute offensive, and that no precautions of diplomacy and no practicable measures of defensive armament will any longer give security,--provided always that there is anywhere a national power actuated by designs of imperial dominion. it is, of course, only little by little that the american people and their spokesmen have come to realise their own case under this late-modern situation, and hitherto only in an imperfect degree. their first response to the stimulus has been a display of patriotic self-sufficiency and a move to put the national defense on a war-footing, such as would be competent to beat off all aggression. those elements of the population who least realise the gravity of the situation, and who are at the same time commercially interested in measures of armament or in military preferment, have not begun to shift forward beyond this position of magniloquence and resolution; nor is there as yet much intimation that they see beyond it, although there is an ever-recurring hint that they in a degree appreciate the practical difficulty of persuading a pacific people to make adequate preparation beforehand, in equipment and trained man-power, for such a plan of self-sufficient self-defense. but increasingly among those who are, by force of temperament or insight or by lack of the pecuniary and the placeman's interest, less confident of an appeal to the nation's prowess, there is coming forward an evident persuasion that warlike preparations--"preparedness"--alone and carried through by the republic in isolation, will scarcely serve the turn. there are at least two lines of argument, or of persuasion, running to the support of such a view; readiness for a warlike defense, by providing equipment and trained men, might prove a doubtfully effectual measure even when carried to the limit of tolerance that will always be reached presently in any democratic country; and then, too, there is hope of avoiding the necessity of such warlike preparation, at least in the same extreme degree, by means of some practicable working arrangement to be effected with other nations who are in the same case. hitherto the farthest reach of these pacific schemes for maintaining the peace, or for the common defense, has taken the shape of a projected league of neutral nations to keep the peace by enforcement of specified international police regulations or by compulsory arbitration of international disputes. it is extremely doubtful how far, if at all, popular sentiment of any effectual force falls in with this line of precautionary measures. yet it is evident that popular sentiment, and popular apprehension, has been stirred profoundly by the events of the past two years, and the resulting change that is already visible in the prevailing sentiment as regards the national defense would argue that more far-reaching changes in the same connection are fairly to be looked for within a reasonable allowance of time. in this american case the balance of effectual public opinion hitherto is to all appearance quite in doubt, but it is also quite unsettled. the first response has been a display of patriotic emotion and national self-assertion. the further, later and presumably more deliberate, expressions of opinion carry a more obvious note of apprehension and less of stubborn or unreflecting national pride. it may be too early to anticipate a material shift of base, to a more neutral, or less exclusively national footing in matters of the common defense. the national administration has been moving at an accelerated rate in the direction not of national isolation and self-reliance resting on a warlike equipment formidable enough to make or break the peace at will--such as the more truculent and irresponsible among the politicians have spoken for--but rather in the direction of moderating or curtailing all national pretensions that are not of undoubted material consequence, and of seeking a common understanding and concerted action with those nationalities whose effectual interests in the matters of peace and war coincide with the american. the administration has grown visibly more pacific in the course of its exacting experience,--more resolutely, one might even say more aggressively pacific; but the point of chief attention in all this strategy of peace has also visibly been shifting somewhat from the maintenance of a running equilibrium between belligerents and a keeping of the peace from day to day, to the ulterior and altogether different question of what is best to be done toward a conclusive peace at the close of hostilities, and the ways and means of its subsequent perpetuation. this latter is, in effect, an altogether different question from that of preserving neutrality and amicable relations in the midst of importunate belligerents, and it may even, conceivably, perhaps not unlikely, come to involve a precautionary breach of the current peace and a taking of sides in the war with an urgent view to a conclusive outcome. it would be going too far to impute to the administration, at the present stage, such an aggressive attitude in its pursuit of a lasting peace as could be called a policy of defensive offense; but it will shock no one's sensibilities to say that such a policy, involving a taking of sides and a renouncing of national isolation, is visibly less remote from the counsels of the administration today than it has been at any earlier period. in this pacific attitude, increasingly urgent and increasingly far-reaching and apprehensive, the administration appears to be speaking for the common man rather than for the special interests or the privileged classes. such would appear, on the face of the returns, to be the meaning of the late election. it is all the more significant on that account, since in the long run it is after all the common man that will have to pass on the expediency of any settled line of policy and to bear the material burden of carrying it into effect. it may seem rash to presume that a popularly accredited administration in a democratic country must approximately reflect the effectual changes of popular sentiment and desire. especially would it seem rash to anyone looking on from the point of view of an undemocratic nation, and therefore prone to see the surface fluctuations of excitement and shifting clamor. but those who are within the democratic pale will know that any administration in such a country, where official tenure and continued incumbency of the party rest on a popular vote,--any such administration is a political organisation and is guided by political expediency, in the tawdry sense of the phrase. such a political situation has the defects of its qualities, as has been well and frequently expounded by its critics, but it has also the merits of its shortcomings. in a democracy of this modern order any incumbent of high office is necessarily something of a politician, quite indispensably so; and a politician at the same time necessarily is something of a demagogue. he yields to the popular drift, or to the set of opinion and demands among the effective majority on whom he leans; and he can not even appear to lead, though he may surreptitiously lead opinion in adroitly seeming to reflect it and obey it. ostensible leadership, such as has been staged in this country from time to time, has turned out to be ostensible only. the politician must be adroit; but if he is also to be a statesman he must be something more. he is under the necessity of guessing accurately what the drift of events and opinion is going to be on the next reach ahead; and in taking coming events by the forelock he may be able to guide and shape the drift of opinion and sentiment somewhat to his own liking. but all the while he must keep within the lines of the long-term set of the current as it works out in the habits of thought of the common man. such foresight and flexibility is necessary to continued survival, but flexibility of convictions alone does not meet the requirements. indeed, it has been tried. it is only the minor politicians--the most numerous and long-lived, it is true--who can hold their place in the crevices of the party organisation, and get their livelihood from the business of party politics, without some power of vision and some hazard of forecast. it results from this state of the case that the drift of popular sentiment and the popular response to the stimulus of current events is reflected more faithfully and more promptly by the short-lived administrations of a democracy than by the stable and formally irresponsible governmental establishments of the older order. it should also be noted that these democratic administrations are in a less advantageous position for the purpose of guiding popular sentiment and shaping it to their own ends. * * * * * now, it happens that at no period within the past half-century has the course of events moved with such celerity or with so grave a bearing on the common good and the prospective contingencies of national life as during the present administration. this apparent congruity of the administration's policy with the drift of popular feeling and belief will incline anyone to put a high rating on the administration's course of conduct, in international relations as well as in national measures that have a bearing on international relations, as indicating the course taken by sentiment and second thought in the community at large,--for, in effect, whether or not in set form, the community at large reflects on any matters of such gravity and urgency as to force themselves upon the attention of the common man. two main lines of reflection have visibly been enforced on the administration by the course of events in the international field. there has been a growing apprehension, mounting in the later months to something like the rank of a settled conviction, that the republic has been marked down for reduction to a vassal state by the dynastic empire now engaged with its european adversaries. in so saying that the republic has been marked down for subjection it is not intended to intimate that deliberate counsel has been had by the imperial establishment on that prospective enterprise; still less that a resolution to such effect, with specification of ways and means, has been embodied in documentary form and deposited for future reference in the imperial archives. all that is intended, and all that is necessary to imply, is that events are in train to such effect that the subjugation of the american republic will necessarily find its place in the sequence presently, provided that the present imperial adventure is brought to a reasonably auspicious issue; though it does not follow that this particular enterprise need be counted on as the next large adventure in dominion to be undertaken when things again fall into promising shape. this latter point would, of course, depend on the conjuncture of circumstances, chief of which would have to be the exigencies of imperial dominion shaping the policy of the empire's natural and necessary ally in the far east. all this has evidently been coming more and more urgently into the workday deliberations of the american administration. of course, it is not spoken of in set terms to this effect in official utterances, perhaps not even within doors; that sort of thing is not done. but it can do no harm to use downright expressions in a scientific discussion of these phenomena, with a view to understanding the current drift of things in this field. beyond this is the similar apprehension, similarly though more slowly and reluctantly rising to the level of settled conviction, that the american commonwealth is not fit to take care of its own case single-handed. this apprehension is enforced more and more unmistakably with every month that passes on the theatre of war. and it is reenforced by the constantly more obvious reflection that the case of the american commonwealth in this matter is the same as that of the democratic countries of europe, and of the other european colonies. it is not, or at least one may believe it is not yet, that in the patriotic apprehension of the common man, or of the administration which speaks for him, the resources of the country would be inadequate to meet any contingencies of the kind that might arise, whether in respect of industrial capacity or in point of man-power, if these resources were turned to this object with the same singleness of purpose and the same drastic procedure that marks the course of a national establishment guided by no considerations short of imperial dominion. the doubt presents itself rather as an apprehension that the cost would be extravagantly high, in all respects in which cost can be counted; which is presently seconded, on very slight reflection and review of experience, by recognition of the fact that a democracy is, in point of fact, not to be persuaded to stand under arms interminably in mere readiness for a contingency, however distasteful the contingency may be. in point of fact, a democratic commonwealth is moved by other interests in the main, and the common defense is a secondary consideration, not a primary interest,--unless in the exceptional case of a commonwealth so placed under the immediate threat of invasion as to have the common defense forced into the place of paramount consequence in its workday habits of thought. the american republic is not so placed. anyone may satisfy himself by reasonable second thought that the people of this nation are not to be counted on to do their utmost in time of peace to prepare for war. they may be persuaded to do much more than has been their habit, and adventurous politicians may commit them to much more than the people at large would wish to undertake, but when all is done that can be counted on for a permanency, up to the limit of popular tolerance, it would be a bold guess that should place the result at more than one-half of what the country is capable of. particularly would the people's patience balk at the extensive military training requisite to put the country in an adequate position of defense against a sudden and well-prepared offensive. it is otherwise with a dynastic state, to the directorate of which all other interests are necessarily secondary, subsidiary, and mainly to be considered only in so far as they are contributory to the nation's readiness for warlike enterprise. america at the same time is placed in an extra-hazardous position, between the two seas beyond which to either side lie the two imperial powers whose place in the modern economy of nations it is to disturb the peace in an insatiable quest of dominion. this position is no longer defensible in isolation, under the later state of the industrial arts, and the policy of isolation that has guided the national policy hitherto is therefore falling out of date. the question is as to the manner of its renunciation, rather than the fact of it. it may end in a defensive copartnership with other nations who are placed on the defensive by the same threatening situation, or it may end in a bootless struggle for independence, but the choice scarcely extends beyond this alternative. it will be said, of course, that america is competent to take care of itself and its monroe doctrine in the future as in the past. but that view, spoken for cogently by thoughtful men and by politicians looking for party advantage, overlooks the fact that the modern technology has definitively thrown the advantage to the offensive, and that intervening seas can no longer be counted on as a decisive obstacle. on this latter head, what was reasonably true fifteen years ago is doubtful today, and it is in all reasonable expectation invalid for the situation fifteen years hence. the other peoples that are of a neutral temper may need the help of america sorely enough in their endeavours to keep the peace, but america's need of cooperation is sorer still, for the republic is coming into a more precarious place than any of the others. america is also, at least potentially, the most democratic of the greater powers, and is handicapped with all the disabilities of a democratic commonwealth in the face of war. america is also for the present, and perhaps for the calculable future, the most powerful of these greater powers, in point of conceivably available resources, though not in actually available fighting-power; and the entrance of america unreservedly into a neutral league would consequently be decisive both of the purposes of the league and of its efficiency for the purpose; particularly if the neutralisation of interests among the members of the league were carried so far as to make withdrawal and independent action disadvantageous. on the establishment of such a neutral league, with such neutralisation of national interests as would assure concerted action in time of stress, the need of armament on the part of the american republic would disappear, at least to the extent that no increase of armed force would be advisable. the strength of the republic lies in its large and varied resources and the unequalled industrial capacity of its population,--a capacity which is today seriously hampered by untoward business interests and business methods sheltered under national discrimination, but which would come more nearly to its own so soon as these national discriminations were corrected or abrogated in the neutralisation of national pretensions. the neutrally-minded countries of europe have been constrained to learn the art of modern war, as also to equip themselves with the necessary appliances, sufficient to meet all requirements for keeping the peace through such a period as can or need be taken into account,--provided the peace that is to come on the conclusion of the present war shall be placed on so "conclusive" a footing as will make it anything substantially more than a season of recuperation for that warlike power about whose enterprise in dominion the whole question turns. provided that suitably "substantial guarantees" of a reasonable quiescence on the part of this imperial power are had, there need be no increase of the american armament. any increased armament would in that case amount to nothing better than an idle duplication of plant and personnel already on hand and sufficient to meet the requirements. to meet the contingencies had in view in its formation, such a league would have to be neutralised to the point that all pertinent national pretensions would fall into virtual abeyance, so that all the necessary resources at the disposal of the federated nations would automatically come under the control of the league's appointed authorities without loss of time, whenever the need might arise. that is to say, national interests and pretensions would have to give way to a collective control sufficient to insure prompt and concerted action. in the face of such a neutral league imperial japan alone would be unable to make a really serious diversion or to entertain much hope of following up its quest of dominion. the japanese imperial establishment might even be persuaded peaceably to let its unoffending neighbours live their own life according to their own light. it is, indeed, possibly the apprehension of some such contingency that has hurried the rapacity of the island empire into the headlong indecencies of the past year or two. chapter vi elimination of the unfit it may seem early (january 1917) to offer a surmise as to what must be the manner of league into which the pacific nations are to enter and by which the peace will be kept, in case such a move is to be made. but the circumstances that are to urge such a line of action, and that will condition its carrying out in case it is entered on, have already come into bearing and should, on the whole, no longer be especially obscure to anyone who will let the facts of the case rather than his own predilections decide what he will believe. by and large, the pressure of these conditioning circumstances may be seen, and the line of least resistance under this pressure may be calculated, with due allowance of a margin of error owing to unknown contingencies of time and minor variables. time is of the essence of the case. so that what would have been dismissed as idle vapour two years ago has already become subject of grave deliberation today, and may rise to paramount urgency that far hence. time is needed to appreciate and get used to any innovation of appreciable gravity, particularly where the innovation depends in any degree on a change in public sentiment, as in this instance. the present outlook would seem to be that no excess of time is allowed in these premises; but it should also be noted that events are moving with unexampled celerity, and are impinging on the popular apprehension with unexampled force,--unexampled on such a scale. it is hoped that a recital of these circumstances that provoke to action along this line will not seem unwarrantably tedious, and that a tentative definition of the line of least resistance under pressure of these circumstances may not seem unwarrantably presumptuous. the major premise in the case is the felt need of security from aggression at the hands of imperial germany and its auxiliary powers; seconded by an increasingly uneasy apprehension as to the prospective line of conduct on the part of imperial japan, bent on a similar quest of dominion. there is also the less articulate apprehension of what, if anything, may be expected from imperial russia; an obscure and scarcely definable factor, which comes into the calculation chiefly by way of reenforcing the urgency of the situation created by the dynastic ambitions of these other two imperial states. further, the pacific nations, the leading ones among them being the french and english-speaking peoples, are coming to recognise that no one among them can provide for its own security single-handed, even at the cost of their utmost endeavour in the way of what is latterly called "preparedness;" and they are at the same time unwilling to devote their force unreservedly to warlike preparation, having nothing to gain. the solution proposed is a league of the pacific nations, commonly spoken of at the present stage as a league to enforce peace, or less ambitiously as a league to enforce arbitration. the question being left somewhat at loose ends, whether the projected league is to include the two or three imperial powers whose pacific intentions are, euphemistically, open to doubt. such is the outline of the project and its premises. an attempt to fill in this outline will, perhaps, conduce to an appreciation of what is sought and of what the conditioning circumstances will enforce in the course of its realisation. as touches the fear of aggression, it has already been indicated, perhaps with unnecessary iteration, that these two imperial powers are unable to relinquish the quest of dominion through warlike enterprise, because as dynastic states they have no other ulterior aim; as has abundantly appeared in the great volume of expository statements that have come out of the fatherland the past few years, official, semi-official, inspired, and spontaneous. "assurance of the nation's future" is not translatable into any other terms. the imperial dynasty has no other ground to stand on, and can not give up the enterprise so long as it can muster force for any formidable diversion, to get anything in the way of dominion by seizure, threat or chicane. this is coming to be informally and loosely, but none the less definitively, realised by the pacific nations; and the realisation of it is gaining in clearness and assurance as time passes. and it is backed by the conviction that, in the nature of things, no engagement on the part of such a dynastic state has any slightest binding force, beyond the material constraint that would enforce it from the outside. so the demand has been diplomatically phrased as a demand for "substantial guarantees." any gain in resources on the part of these powers is to be counted as a gain in the ways and means of disturbing the peace, without reservation. the pacific nations include among them two large items, both of which are indispensable to the success of the project, the united states and the united kingdom. the former brings in its train, virtually without exception or question, the other american republics, none of which can practicably go in or stay out except in company and collusion with the united states. the united kingdom after the same fashion, and with scarcely less assurance, may be counted on to carry the british colonies. evidently, without both of these groups the project would not even make a beginning. beyond this is to be counted in as elements of strength, though scarcely indispensable, france, belgium, the netherlands and the scandinavian countries. the other west-european nations would in all probability be found in the league, although so far as regards its work and its fortunes their adhesion would scarcely be a matter of decisive consequence; they may therefore be left somewhat on one side in any consideration of the circumstances that would shape the league, its aims and its limitations. the balkan states, in the wider acceptance, they that frequent the sign of the double cross, are similarly negligible in respect of the organisation of such a league or its resources and the mutual concessions necessary to be made between its chief members. russia is so doubtful a factor, particularly as regards its place and value in industry, culture and politics, in the near future, as to admit nothing much more than a doubt on what its relation to the situation will be. the evil intentions of the imperial-bureaucratic establishment are probably no more to be questioned than the good intentions of the underlying peoples of russia. china will have to be taken in, if for no other reason than the use to which the magnificent resources of that country would be turned by its imperial neighbour in the absence of insurmountable interference from outside. but china will come in on any terms that include neutrality and security. the question then arises as to the imperial powers whose dynastic enterprise is primarily to be hedged against by such a league. reflection will show that if the league is to effect any appreciable part of its purpose, these powers will also be included in the league, or at least in its jurisdiction. a pacific league not including these powers, or not extending its jurisdiction and surveillance to them and their conduct, would come to the same thing as a coalition of nations in two hostile groups, the one standing on the defensive against the warlike machinations of the other, and both groups bidding for the favor of those minor powers whose traditions and current aspirations run to national (dynastic) aggrandizement by way of political intrigue. it would come to a more articulate and accentuated form of that balance of power that has latterly gone bankrupt in europe, with the most corrupt and unreliable petty monarchies of eastern europe vested with a casting vote; and it would also involve a system of competitive armaments of the same general character as what has also shown itself bankrupt. it would, in other words, mean a virtual return to the _status quo ante_, but with an overt recognition of its provisional character, and with the lines of division more sharply drawn. that is to say, it would amount to reinstating the situation which the projected league is intended to avert. it is evidently contained in the premises that the projected league must be all-inclusive, at least as regards its jurisdiction and surveillance. the argument will return to this point presently. the purpose of the projected league is peace and security, commonly spoken of under patriotic preconceptions as "national" peace and security. this will have to mean a competent enforcement of peace, on such a footing of overmastering force at the disposal of the associated pacific nations as to make security a matter of ordinary routine. it is true, the more genial spokesmen of the project are given to the view that what is to come of it all is a comity of neutral nations, amicably adjusting their own relations among themselves in a spirit of peace and good-will. but this view is over-sanguine, in that it overlooks the point that into this prospective comity of nations imperial germany (and imperial japan) fit like a drunken savage with a machine gun. it also overlooks the patent fatality that these two are bound to come into a coalition at the next turn, with whatever outside and subsidiary resources they can draw on; provided only that a reasonable opening for further enterprise presents itself. the league, in other terms, must be in a position to enforce peace by overmastering force, and to anticipate any move at cross purposes with the security of the pacific nations. this end can be reached by either one of two ways. if the dynastic states are left to their own devices, it will be incumbent on the associated nations to put in the field a standing force sufficient to prevent a recourse to arms; which means competitive armament and universal military rule. or the dynastic states may be taken into partnership and placed under such surveillance and constraint as to practically disarm them; which would admit virtual disarmament of the federated nations. the former arrangement has nothing in its favour, except the possibility that no better or less irksome arrangement can be had under existing circumstances; that is to say that the pacific nations may not be able to bring these dynastic states to terms of disarmament under surveillance. they assuredly can not except by force; and this is the precise point on which the continued hostilities in europe turn today. in diplomatic parable the german imperial spokesmen say that they can accept (or as they prefer to phrase it, grant) no terms that do not fully safeguard the future of the fatherland; and in similarly diplomatic parable the spokesmen of the entente insist that prussian militarism must be permanently put out of commission; but it all means the same thing, viz. that the imperial establishment is to be (or is not to be) disabled beyond the possibility of its entering on a similar warlike enterprise again, when it has had time for recuperation. the dynastic statesmen, and the lay subjects of the imperial establishment, are strenuously set on securing a fair opportunity for recuperation and a wiser endeavour to achieve that dominion which the present adventure promises to defeat; while the entente want no recurrence, and are persuaded that a recurrence can be avoided only on the footing of a present collapse of the imperial power and a scrupulously enforced prostration of it henceforth. without the definitive collapse of the imperial power no pacific league of nations can come to anything much more than armistice. on the basis of such a collapse the league may as well administer its affairs economically by way of an all-around reduction of armaments, as by the costlier and more irksome way of "preparedness." but a sensible reduction of armaments on the part of the neutral nations implies disarmament of the dynastic states. which would involve a neutral surveillance of the affairs of these dynastic states in such detail and with such exercise of authority as would reduce their governments to the effective status of local administrative officials. out of which, in turn, would arise complications that would lead to necessary readjustments all along the line. it would involve the virtual, if not also the formal, abolition of the monarchy, since the monarchy has no other use than that of international war and intrigue; or at least it would involve the virtual abrogation of its powers, reducing it to the same status of _faineantise_ as now characterises the british crown. evidently this means a serious intermeddling in the domestic concerns and arrangements of the fatherland, such as is not admissible under the democratic principle that any people must be left free to follow their own inclinations and devices in their own concerns; at the same time that this degree of interference is imperative if the peace is to be kept on any other footing than that of eternal vigilance and superior armed force, with a people whose own inclinations and devices are of the kind now grown familiar in the german case,--all of which also applies, with accentuation, in the case of imperial japan. * * * * * some such policy of neutral surveillance in the affairs of these peoples whose pacific temper is under suspicion, is necessarily involved in a plan to enforce peace by concert of the pacific nations, and it will necessarily carry implications and farther issues, touching not only these supposedly recalcitrant peoples, but also as regards the pacific nations themselves. assuming always that the prime purpose and consistent aim of the projected league is the peace and security of those pacific nations on whose initiative it is to be achieved, then it should be reasonable to assume that the course of procedure in its organisation, administration and further adaptations and adjustments must follow the logic of necessities leading to that end. he who wills the end must make up his account with the means. the end in this case is peace and security; which means, for practical purposes, peace and good-will. ill-will is not a secure foundation of peace. even the military strategists of the imperial establishment recommend a programme of "frightfulness" only as a convenient military expedient, essentially a provisional basis of tranquility. in the long run and as a permanent peace measure it is doubtless not to the point. security is finally to be had among or between modern peoples only on the ground of a common understanding and an impartially common basis of equity, or something approaching that basis as nearly as circumstances will permit. which means that in so far as the projected peace-compact is to take effect in any enduring way, and leave the federated nations some degree of freedom from persistent apprehension and animosity, as well as from habitual insecurity of life and limb, the league must not only be all-inclusive, but it must be inclusively uniform in all its requirements and regulations. the peoples of the quondam imperial nations must come into the league on a footing of formal equality with the rest. this they can not do without the virtual abdication of their dynastic governmental establishments and a consequent shift to a democratic form of organisation, and a formal abrogation of class privileges and prerogatives. however, a virtual abdication or cancelment of the dynastic rule, such as to bring it formally into the same class with the british crown, would scarcely meet the requirements in the case of the german imperial establishment; still more patently not in the case of imperial japan. if, following the outlines of the decayed british crown, one or the other of these imperial establishments were by formal enactment reduced to a state of nominal desuetude, the effect would be very appreciably different from what happens in the british community, where the crown has lost its powers by failure of the requisite subordination on the part of the people, and not by a formal abdication of rights. in the german case, and even more in the japanese case, the strength of the imperial establishment lies in the unimpaired loyalty of the populace; which would remain nearly intact at the outset, and would thin out only by insensible degrees in the sequel; so that if only the imperial establishment were left formally standing it would command the fealty of the common run in spite of any formal abrogation of its powers, and the course of things would, in effect, run as before the break. in effect, to bring about a shift to a democratic basis the dynastic slate would have to be wiped very clean indeed. and this shift would be indispensable to the successful conduct of such a pacific league of nations, since any other than an effectually democratic national establishment is to be counted on unfailingly to intrigue for dynastic aggrandizement, through good report and evil. in a case like that of imperial germany, with its federated states and subsidiaries, where royalty and nobility still are potent preconceptions investing the popular imagination, and where loyal abnegation in the presence of authority still is the chief and staple virtue of the common man,--in all such cases virtual abdication of the dynastic initiative under constitutional forms can be had only by a formal and scrupulously complete abrogation of all those legal and customary arrangements on which this irresponsible exercise of authority has rested and through which it has taken effect. neutralisation in these instances will mean reduction to an unqualified democratic footing; which will, at least at the outset, not be acceptable to the common people, and will be wholly intolerable to the ruling classes. such a régime, therefore, while it is indispensable as a working basis for a neutral league of peace, would from the outset have to be enforced against the most desperate resistance of the ruling classes, headed by the dynastic statesmen and warlords, and backed by the stubborn loyalty of the subject populace. it would have to mean the end of things for the ruling classes and the most distasteful submission to an alien scheme of use and wont for the populace. and yet it is also an indispensable element in any scheme of pacification that aims at permanent peace and security. in time, it may well be believed, the people of the fatherland might learn to do well enough without the gratuitous domination of their ruling classes, but at the outset it would be a heartfelt privation. it follows that a league to enforce peace would have to begin its régime with enforcing peace on terms of the unconditional surrender of the formidable warlike nations; which could be accomplished only by the absolute and irretrievable defeat of these powers as they now stand. the question will, no doubt, present itself, is the end worth the cost? that question can, of course, not be answered in absolute terms, inasmuch as it resolves itself into a question of taste and prepossession. an answer to it would also not be greatly to the purpose here, since it would have no particular bearing on the course of action likely to be pursued by these pacific nations in their quest of a settled peace. it is more to the point to ask what is likely to be the practical decision of these peoples on that head when the question finally presents itself in a concrete form. again it is necessary to call to mind that any momentous innovation which rests on popular sentiment will take time; that consequently anything like a plébiscite on the question today would scarcely give a safe index of what the decision is likely to be when presently put to the test; and that as things go just now, swiftly and urgent, any time-allowance counts at something more than its ordinary workday coefficient. what can apparently be said with some degree of confidence is that just now, during these two years past, sentiment has been moving in the direction indicated, and that any growing inclination of the kind is being strongly reenforced by a growing realisation that nothing but heroic remedies will avail at this juncture. if it comes to be currently recognised that a settled peace can be had only at the cost of eradicating privilege and royalty from the warlike nations, it would seem reasonable to expect, from their present state of mind, that the pacific nations will scarcely hesitate to apply that remedy,--provided always that the fortunes of war fall out as that measure would require, and provided also that the conflict lasts long enough and severe enough to let them make up their mind to anything so drastic. * * * * * there is a certain side issue bearing on this question of the ulterior probabilities of popular sentiment and national policy as to what is to be done with the warlike nations in the event that the allied nations who fight for neutrality have the disposal of such matters. this side issue may seem remote, and it may not unlikely be overlooked among the mass of graver and more tangible considerations. it was remarked above that the united kingdom is one of the two chief pillars of the projected house of peace; and it may be added without serious fear of contradiction or annoyance that the united kingdom is also the one among these pacific nations that comes nearest being capable, in the event of such an emergency, to take care of its own case single-handed. for better or worse, british adhesion to the project is indispensable, and the british are in a position virtually to name their own terms of adhesion. the british commonwealth--a very inclusive phrase in this connection--must form the core of the pacific league, if any, and british sentiment will have a very great place in the terms of its formation and in the terms which it will be inclined to offer the imperial coalition at the settlement. now, it happens that the british community entered on this war as a democratic monarchy ruled and officered by a body of gentlemen--doubtless the most correct and admirable muster of gentlemen, of anything approaching its volume, that the modern world can show. but the war has turned out not to be a gentlemen's war. it has on the contrary been a war of technological exploits, reenforced with all the beastly devices of the heathen. it is a war in which all the specific traits of the well-bred and gently-minded man are a handicap; in which veracity, gallantry, humanity, liberality are conducive to nothing but defeat and humiliation. the death-rate among the british gentlemen-officers in the early months, and for many months, ran extravagantly high, for the most part because they were gallant gentlemen as well as officers imbued with the good, old class spirit of _noblesse oblige_, that has made half the tradition and more than half the working theory of the british officer in the field,--good, but old, hopelessly out of date. that generation of officers died, for the most part; being unfit to survive or to serve the purpose under these modern conditions of warfare, to which their enemy on the other hand had adapted themselves with easy facility from beforehand. the gentlemanly qualifications, and the material apparatus of gentility, and, it will perhaps have to be admitted, the gentlemen, have fallen into the background, or perhaps rather have measurably fallen into abeyance, among the officers of the line. there may be more doubt as to the state of things in respect of the gentility of the staff, but the best that can confidently be said is that it is a point in doubt. it is hoped that one may say without offense that in the course of time the personnel has apparently worked down to the level of vulgarity defined by the ways and means of this modern warfare; which means the level on which runs a familiar acquaintance with large and complex mechanical apparatus, railway and highway transport and power, reenforced concrete, excavations and mud, more particularly mud, concealment and ambush, and unlimited deceit and ferocity. it is not precisely that persons of pedigree and gentle breeding have ceased to enter or seek entrance to employment as officers, still less that measures have been taken to restrain their doing so or to eliminate from the service those who have come into it--though there may present itself a doubt on this point as touches the more responsible discretionary positions--but only that the stock of suitable gentlemen, uncommonly large as it is, has been overdrawn; that those who have latterly gone into service, or stayed in, have perforce divested themselves of their gentility in some appreciable measure, particularly as regards class distinction, and have fallen on their feet in the more commonplace role of common men. serviceability in this modern warfare is conditioned on much the same traits of temperament and training that make for usefulness in the modern industrial processes, where large-scale coordinations of movement and an effective familiarity with precise and far-reaching mechanical processes is an indispensable requirement,--indispensable in the same measure as the efficient conduct of this modern machine industry is indispensable. but the british gentleman, in so far as he runs true to type, is of no use to modern industry; quite the contrary, in fact. still, the british gentleman is, in point of heredity, the same thing over again as the british common man; so that, barring the misdirected training that makes him a gentleman, and which can largely be undone under urgent need and pressure, he can be made serviceable for such uses as the modern warfare requires. meantime the very large demand for officers, and the insatiable demand for capable officers, has brought the experienced and capable common man into the case and is in a fair way to discredit gentility as a necessary qualification of field officers. but the same process of discredit and elimination is also extending to the responsible officials who have the administration of things in hand. indeed, the course of vulgarisation among the responsible officials has now been under way for some appreciable time and with very perceptible effect, and the rate of displacement appears to be gathering velocity with every month that passes. here, as in the field operations, it also appears that gentlemanly methods, standards, preconceptions, and knowledge of men and things, is no longer to the purpose. here, too, it is increasingly evident that this is not a gentlemen's war. and the traditional qualifications that have sufficed in the past, at least to the extent of enabling the british management to "muddle through," as they are proudly in the habit of saying,--these qualifications are of slight account in this technological conjuncture of the nation's fortunes. it would perhaps be an under-statement to say that these gentlemanly qualifications are no longer of any account, for the purpose immediately in hand, and it would doubtless not do to say that they are wholly and unreservedly disserviceable as things run today; but captious critics might find at least a precarious footing of argument on such a proposition. through the course of the nineteenth century the british government had progressively been taking on the complexion of a "gentlemen's agreement;" a government by gentlemen, for gentlemen, and of gentlemen, too, beyond what could well be alleged in any other known instance, though never wholly so. no government could be a government of gentlemen exclusively, since there is no pecuniary profit in gentlemen as such, and therefore no object in governing them; more particularly could there never be any incentive in it for gentlemen, whose livelihood is, in the nature of the case, drawn from some one else. a gentlemen's government can escape death by inanition only in so far as it serves the material interest of its class, as contrasted with the underlying population from which the class draws its livelihood. this british arrangement of a government by prudent and humane gentlemen with a view to the conservation of that state of things that best conduced to the material well-being of their own class, has on the whole had the loyal support of the underlying populace, with an occasional floundering protest. but the protest has never taken the shape of an expressed distrust of gentlemen, considered as the staple ways and means of government; nor has the direction of affairs ever descended into the hands of any other or lower class or condition of men. on the whole, this british arrangement for the control of national affairs by a body of interested gentlemen-investors has been, and perhaps still is, just as well at home in the affectionate preconceptions of the nineteenth-century british as the corresponding german usufruct by self-appointed swaggering aristocrats has been among the underlying german population, or as the american arrangement of national control by business men for business ends. the british and the american arrangements run very much to the same substantial effect, of course, inasmuch as the british gentlemen represent, as a class, the filial generations of a business community, and their aims and standards of conduct continue to be such as are enforced by the pecuniary interests on which their gentility is conditioned. they continue to draw the ways and means of a worthy life from businesslike arrangements of a "vested" character, made and provided with a view to their nourishment and repose. their resulting usufruct of the community's productive efforts rests on a vested interest of a pecuniary sort, sanctioned by the sacred rights of property; very much as the analogous german dynastic and aristocratic usufruct rests on personal prerogative, sanctioned by the sacred rights of authentic prescription, without afterthought. the two, it will be noted are very much alike, in effect, "under the skin." the great distinguishing mark being that the german usufructuary gentlemen are, in theory at least, gentlemen-adventurers of prowess and proud words, whose place in the world's economy it is to glorify god and disturb the peace; whereas their british analogues are gentlemen-investors, of blameless propriety, whose place it is more simply to glorify god and enjoy him forever. all this arrangement of a usufruct with a view to the reputable consumption of the community's superfluous production has had the cordial support of british sentiment, perhaps fully as cordial as the german popular subservience in the corresponding german scheme; both being well embedded in the preconceptions of the common man. but the war has put it all to a rude test, and has called on the british gentlemen's executive committee to take over duties for which it was not designed. the exigencies of this war of technological exploits have been almost wholly, and very insistently, of a character not contemplated in the constitution of such an executive committee of gentlemen-investors designed to safeguard class interests and promote their pecuniary class advantage by a blamelessly inconspicuous and indirect management of national affairs. the methods are of the class known colloquially among the vulgar-spoken american politicians as "pussyfooting" and "log-rolling"; but always with such circumstance of magnitude, authenticity and well-bred deference to precedent, as to give the resulting routine of subreption, trover and conversion, an air not only of benevolent consideration but of austere morality. but the most austere courtesy and the most authentically dispassionate division of benefits will not meet the underbred exigencies of a war conducted on the mechanistic lines of the modern state of the industrial arts. so the blameless, and for the purpose imbecile, executive committee of gentlemen-investors has been insensibly losing the confidence and the countenance of the common man; who, when all is said, will always have to do what is to be done. the order of gentlemanly parleying and brokery has, therefore, with many apprehensions of calamity, been reluctantly and tardily giving ground before something that is of a visibly underbred order. increasingly underbred, and thereby insensibly approaching the character of this war situation, but accepted with visible reluctance and apprehension both by the ruling class and by the underlying population. the urgent necessity of going to such a basis, and of working out the matter in hand by an unblushing recourse to that matter-of-fact logic of mechanical efficiency, which alone can touch the difficulties of the case, but which has no respect of persons,--this necessity has been present from the outset and has been vaguely apprehended for long past, but it is only tardily and after the chastening of heavy penalties on this gentlemanly imbecility that a substantial move in that direction has been made. it has required much british resolution to overcome the night-fear of going out into the unhallowed ground of matter-of-fact, where the farthest earlier excursions of the governmental agencies had taken them no farther than such financial transactions as are incident to the accomplishment of anything whatever in a commercial nation. and then, too, there is a pecuniary interest in being interested in financial transactions. this shifting of discretionary control out of the hands of the gentlemen into those of the underbred common run, who know how to do what is necessary to be done in the face of underbred exigencies, may conceivably go far when it has once been started, and it may go forward at an accelerated rate if the pressure of necessity lasts long enough. if time be given for habituation to this manner of directorate in national affairs, so that the common man comes to realise how it is feasible to get along without gentlemen-investors holding the discretion, the outcome may conceivably be very grave. it is a point in doubt, but it is conceivable that in such a case the gentlemanly executive committee administering affairs in the light of the gentlemanly pecuniary interest, will not be fully reinstated in the discretionary control of the united kingdom for an appreciable number of years after the return of peace. possibly, even, the régime may be permanently deranged, and there is even a shadowy doubt possible to be entertained as to whether the vested pecuniary rights, on which the class of gentlemen rests, may not suffer some derangement, in case the control should pass into the hands of the underbred and unpropertied for so long a season as to let the common man get used to thinking that the vested interests and the sacred rights of gentility are so much ado about nothing. such an outcome would be extreme, but as a remote contingency it is to be taken into account. the privileged classes of the united kingdom should by this time be able to see the danger there may be for them and their vested interests, pecuniary and moral, in an excessive prolongation of the war; in such postponement of peace as would afford time for a popular realisation of their incompetence and disserviceability as touches the nation's material well-being under modern conditions. to let the nation's war experience work to such an outcome, the season of war would have to be prolonged beyond what either the hopes or the fears of the community have yet contemplated; but the point is after all worth noting, as being within the premises of the case, that there is herein a remote contingency of losing, at least for a time, that unformulated clause in the british constitution which has hitherto restricted the holding of responsible office to men of pedigree and of gentle breeding, or at least of very grave pecuniary weight; so grave as to make the incumbents virtual gentlemen, with a virtual pedigree, and with a virtual gentleman's accentuated sense of class interest. should such an eventuality overtake british popular sentiment and belief there is also the remote contingency that the rights of ownership and investment would lose a degree of sanctity. it seems necessary to note a further, and in a sense more improbable, line of disintegration among modern fixed ideas. among the best entrenched illusions of modern economic preconceptions, and in economic as well as legal theory, has been the indispensability of funds, and the hard and fast limitation of industrial operations by the supply or with-holding of funds. the war experience has hitherto gone tentatively to show that funds and financial transactions, of credit, bargain, sale and solvency, may be dispensed with under pressure of necessity; and apparently without seriously hindering that run of mechanical fact, on which interest in the present case necessarily centers, and which must be counted on to give the outcome. latterly the case is clearing up a little further, on further experience and under further pressure of technological exigencies, to the effect that financial arrangements are indispensable in this connection only because and in so far as it has been arranged to consider them indispensable; as in international trade. they are an indispensable means of intermediation only in so far as pecuniary interests are to be furthered or safeguarded in the intermediation. when, as has happened with the belligerents in the present instance, the national establishment becomes substantially insolvent, it is beginning to appear that its affairs can be taken care of with less difficulty and with better effect without the use of financial expedients. of course, it takes time to get used to doing things by the more direct method and without the accustomed circumlocution of accountancy, or the accustomed allowance for profits to go to interested parties who, under the financial régime, hold a power of discretionary permission in all matters that touch the use of the industrial arts. under these urgent material exigencies, investment comes to have much of the appearance of a gratuitous drag and drain on the processes of industry. here, again, is a sinister contingency; sinister, that is, for those vested rights of ownership by force of which the owners of "capital" are enabled to permit or withhold the use of the industrial arts by the community at large, on pain of privation in case the accustomed toll to the owners of capital is not paid. it is, of course, not intended to find fault with this arrangement; which has the sanction of "time immemorial" and of a settled persuasion that it lies at the root of all civilised life and intercourse. it is only that in case of extreme need this presumed indispensable expedient of industrial control has broken down, and that experience is proving it to be, in these premises, an item of borrowed trouble. should experience continue to run on the same lines for an appreciable period and at a high tension, it is at least conceivable that the vested right of owners to employ unlimited sabotage in the quest of profits might fall so far into disrepute as to leave them under a qualified doubt on the return of "normal" conditions. the common man, in other words, who gathers nothing but privation and anxiety from the owners' discretionary sabotage, may conceivably stand to lose his preconception that the vested rights of ownership are the cornerstone of his life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. * * * * * the considerations recited in this lengthy excursion on the war situation and its probable effects on popular habits of thought in the united kingdom go to say that when peace comes to be negotiated, with the united kingdom as the chief constituent and weightiest spokesman of the allied nations and of the league of pacific neutrals, the representatives of british aims and opinions are likely to speak in a different, chastened, and disillusioned fashion, as contrasted with what the british attitude was at the beginning of hostilities. the gentlemanly british animus of arrogant self-sufficiency will have been somewhat sobered, perhaps somewhat subdued. concession to the claims and pretensions of the other pacific nations is likely to go farther than might once have been expected, particularly in the way of concession to any demand for greater international comity and less international discrimination; essentially concession looking to a reduction of national pretensions and an incipient neutralisation of national interests. coupled with this will presumably be a less conciliatory attitude toward the members of the dynastic coalition against whom the war has been fought, owing to a more mature realisation of the impossibility of a lasting peace negotiated with a power whose substantial core is a warlike and irresponsible dynastic establishment. the peace negotiations are likely to run on a lower level of diplomatic deference to constituted authorities, and with more of a view to the interests and sentiments of the underlying population, than was evident in the futile negotiations had at the outbreak of hostilities. the gentle art of diplomacy, that engages the talents of exalted personages and well-bred statesmen, has been somewhat discredited; and if it turns out that the vulgarisation of the directorate in the united kingdom and its associated allies and neutrals will have time to go on to something like dominance and authenticity, then the deference which the spokesmen of these nations are likely to show for the prescriptive rights of dynasty, nobility, bureaucracy, or even of pecuniary aristocracy, in the countries that make up the party of the second part, may be expected to have shrunk appreciably, conceivably even to such precarious dimensions as to involve the virtual neglect or possible downright abrogation of them, in sum and substance. indeed, the chances of a successful pacific league of neutrals to come out of the current situation appear to be largely bound up with the degree of vulgarisation due to overtake the several directorates of the belligerent nations as well as the popular habits of thought in these and in the neutral countries, during the further course of the war. it is too broad a generalisation, perhaps, to say that the longer the war lasts the better are the chances of such a neutral temper in the interested nations as will make a pacific league practicable, but the contrary would appear a much less defensible proposition. it is, of course, the common man that has the least interest in warlike enterprise, if any, and it is at the same time the common man that bears the burden of such enterprise and has also the most immediate interest in keeping the peace. if, slowly and pervasively, in the course of hard experience, he learns to distrust the conduct of affairs by his betters, and learns at the same move to trust to his own class to do what is necessary and to leave undone what is not, his deference to his betters is likely to suffer a decline, such as should show itself in a somewhat unguarded recourse to democratic ways and means. in short, there is in this progressive vulgarisation of effectual use and wont and of sentiment, in the united kingdom and elsewhere, some slight ground for the hope, or the apprehension, that no peace will be made with the dynastic powers of the second part until they cease to be dynastic powers and take on the semblance of democratic commonwealths, with dynasties, royalties and privileged classes thrown in the discard. this would probably mean some prolongation of hostilities, until the dynasties and privileged classes had completely exhausted their available resources; and, by the same token, until the privileged classes in the more modern nations among the belligerents had also been displaced from direction and discretion by those underbred classes on whom it is incumbent to do what is to be done; or until a juncture were reached that comes passably near to such a situation. on the contingency of such a course of events and some such outcome appears also to hang the chance of a workable pacific league. without further experience of the futility of upper-class and pecuniary control, to discredit precedent and constituted authority, it is scarcely conceivable, e.g., that the victorious allies would go the length of coercively discarding the german imperial dynasty and the kept classes that with it constitute the imperial state, and of replacing it with a democratic organisation of the people in the shape of a modern commonwealth; and without a change of that nature, affecting that nation and such of its allies as would remain on the map, no league of pacific neutrals would be able to manage its affairs, even for a time, except on a war-footing that would involve a competitive armament against future dynastic enterprises from the same quarter. which comes to saying that a lasting peace is possible on no other terms than the disestablishment of the imperial dynasty and the abrogation of all feudalistic remnants of privilege in the fatherland and its allies, together with the reduction of those countries to the status of commonwealths made up of ungraded men. * * * * * it is easy to speculate on what the conditions precedent to such a pacific league of neutrals must of necessity be; but it is not therefore less difficult to make a shrewd guess as to the chances of these conditions being met. of these conditions precedent, the chief and foremost, without which any other favorable circumstances are comparatively idle, is a considerable degree of neutralisation, extending to virtually all national interests and pretensions, but more particularly to all material and commercial interests of the federated peoples; and, indispensably and especially, such neutralisation would have to extend to the nations from whom aggression is now apprehended, as, e.g., the german people. but such neutralisation could not conceivably reach the fatherland unless that nation were made over in the image of democracy, since the imperial state is, by force of the terms, a warlike and unneutral power. this would seem to be the ostensibly concealed meaning of the allied governments in proclaiming that their aim is to break german militarism without doing harm to the german people. as touches the neutralisation of the democratically rehabilitated fatherland, or in default of that, as touches the peace terms to be offered the imperial government, the prime article among the stipulations would seem to be abolition of all trade discrimination against germany or by germany against any other nationality. such stipulation would, of course, cover all manner of trade discrimination,--e.g., import, export and excise tariff, harbor and registry dues, subsidy, patent right, copyright, trade mark, tax exemption whether partial or exclusive, investment preferences at home and abroad,--in short it would have to establish a thoroughgoing neutralisation of trade relations in the widest acceptation of the term, and to apply in perpetuity. the like applies, of course, to all that fringe of subsidiary and outlying peoples on whom imperial germany relies for much of its resources in any warlike enterprise. such a move also disposes of the colonial question in a parenthesis, so far as regards any special bond of affiliation between the empire, or the fatherland, and any colonial possessions that are now thought desirable to be claimed. under neutralisation, colonies would cease to be "colonial possessions," being necessarily included under the general abrogation of commercial discriminations, and also necessarily exempt from special taxation or specially favorable tax rates. colonies there still would be, though it is not easy to imagine what would be the meaning of a "german colony" in such a case. colonies would be free communities, after the fashion of new zealand or australia, but with the further sterilisation of the bond between colony and mother country involved in the abolition of all appointive offices and all responsibility to the crown or the imperial government. now, there are no german colonies in this simpler british sense of the term, which implies nothing more than community of blood, institutions and language, together with that sense of solidarity between the colony and the mother country which this community of pedigree and institutions will necessarily bring; but while there are today no german colonies, in the sense of the term so given, there is no reason to presume that no such german colonies would come into bearing under the conditions of this prospective régime of neutrality installed by such a pacific league, when backed by the league's guarantee that no colony from the fatherland will be exposed to the eventual risk of coming under the discretionary tutelage of the german imperial establishment and so falling into a relation of step-childhood to the imperial dynasty. as is well known, and as has by way of superfluous commonplace been set forth by a sometime colonial secretary of the empire, the decisive reason for there being no german colonies in existence is the consistently impossible colonial policy of the german government, looking to the usufruct of the colonies by the government, and the fear of further arbitrary control and nepotic discrimination at the pleasure of the self-seeking dynastic establishment. it is only under imperial rule that no german colony, in this modern sense of the term, is possible; and only because imperial rule does not admit of a free community being formed by colonists from the fatherland; or of an ostensibly free community of that kind ever feeling secure from unsolicited interference with its affairs. the nearest approach to a german colony, as contrasted with a "colonial possession," hitherto have been the very considerable, number of escaped german subjects who have settled in english-speaking or latin-speaking countries, particularly in north and south america. and considering that the chief common trait among them is their successful evasion of the imperial government's heavy hand, they show an admirable filial piety toward the imperial establishment; though troubled with no slightest regret at having escaped from the imperial surveillance and no slightest inclination to return to the shelter of the imperial tutelage. a colloquialism--"hyphenate"--has latterly grown up to meet the need of a term to designate these evasive and yet patriotic colonists. it is scarcely misleading to say that the german-american hyphenate, e.g., in so far as he runs true to form, is still a german subject with his heart, but he is an american citizen with his head. all of which goes to argue that if the fatherland were to fall into such a state of democratic tolerance that no recidivist need carry a defensive hyphen to shield him from the importunate attentions of the imperial government, german colonies would also come into bearing; although, it is true, they would have no value to the german government. in the imperial colonial policy colonies are conceived to stand to their imperial guardian or master in a relation between that of a step-child and that of an indentured servant; to be dealt with summarily and at discretion and to be made use of without scruple. the like attitude toward colonies was once familiar matter-of-course with the british and spanish statesmen. the british found the plan unprofitable, and also unworkable, and have given it up. the spanish, having no political outlook but the dynastic one, could of course not see their way to relinquish the only purpose of their colonial enterprise, except in relinquishing their colonial possessions. the german (imperial) colonial policy is and will be necessarily after the spanish pattern, and necessarily, too, with the spanish results. under the projected neutral scheme there would be no colonial policy, and of course, no inducement to the acquisition of colonies, since there would be no profit to be derived, or to be fancied, in the case. but while no country, as a commonwealth, has any material interest in the acquisition or maintenance of colonies, it is otherwise as regards the dynastic interests of an imperial government; and it is also otherwise, at least in the belief of the interested parties, as regards special businessmen or business concerns who are in a position to gain something by help of national discrimination in their favor. as regards the pecuniary interests of favored businessmen or business concerns, and of investors favored by national discrimination in colonial relations, the case falls under the general caption of trade discrimination, and does not differ at all materially from such expedients as a protective tariff, a ship subsidy, or a bounty on exports. but as regards the warlike, that is to say dynastic, interest of an imperial government the case stands somewhat different. colonial possessions in such a case yield no material benefit to the country at large, but their possession is a serviceable plea for warlike preparations with which to retain possession of the colonies in the face of eventualities, and it is also a serviceable means of stirring the national pride and keeping alive a suitable spirit of patriotic animosity. the material service actually to be derived from such possessions in the event of war is a point in doubt, with the probabilities apparently running against their being of any eventual net use. but there need be no question that such possessions, under the hand of any national establishment infected with imperial ambitions, are a fruitful source of diplomatic complications, excuses for armament, international grievances, and eventual aggression. a pacific league of neutrals can evidently not tolerate the retention of colonial possessions by any dynastic state that may be drawn into the league or under its jurisdiction, as, e.g., the german empire in case it should be left on an imperial footing. whereas, in case the german peoples are thrown back on a democratic status, as neutralised commonwealths without a crown or a military establishment, the question of their colonial possessions evidently falls vacant. as to the neutralisation of trade relations apart from the question of colonies, and as bears on the case of germany under the projected jurisdiction of a pacific league of neutrals, the considerations to be taken account of are of much the same nature. as it would have to take effect, e.g., in the abolition of commercial and industrial discriminations between germany and the pacific nations, such neutralisation would doubtless confer a lasting material benefit on the german people at large; and it is not easy to detect any loss or detriment to be derived from such a move so long as peace prevails. protective, that is to say discriminating, export, import, or excise duties, harbor and registry dues, subsidies, tax exemptions and trade preferences, and all the like devices of interference with trade and industry, are unavoidably a hindrance to the material interests of any people on whom they are imposed or who impose these disabilities on themselves. so that exemption from these things by a comprehensive neutralisation of trade relations would immediately benefit all the nations concerned, in respect of their material well-being in times of peace. there is no exception and no abatement to be taken account of under this general statement, as is well known to all men who are conversant with these matters. but it is otherwise as regards the dynastic interest in the case, and as regards any national interest in warlike enterprise. it is doubtless true that all restraint of trade between nations, and between classes or localities within the national frontiers, unavoidably acts to weaken and impoverish the people on whose economic activities this restraint is laid; and to the extent to which this effect is had it will also be true that the country which so is hindered in its work will have a less aggregate of resources to place at the disposal of its enterprising statesmen for imperialist ends. but these restraints may yet be useful for dynastic, that is to say warlike, ends by making the country more nearly a "self-contained economic whole." a country becomes a "self-contained economic whole" by mutilation, in cutting itself off from the industrial system in which industrially it belongs, but in which it is unwilling nationally to hold its place. national frontiers are industrial barriers. but as a result of such mutilation of its industrial life such a country is better able--it has been believed--to bear the shock of severing its international trade relations entirely, as is likely to happen in case of war. in a large country, such as america or russia, which comprises within its national boundaries very extensive and very varied resources and a widely distributed and diversified population, the mischief suffered from restraints of trade that hinder industrial relations with the world at large will of course be proportionately lessened. such a country comes nearer being a miniature industrial world; although none of the civilised nations, large or small, can carry on its ordinary industrial activities and its ordinary manner of life without drawing on foreign parts to some appreciable extent. but a country of small territorial extent and of somewhat narrowly restricted natural resources, as, e.g., germany or france, can even by the most drastic measures of restraint and mutilation achieve only a very mediocre degree of industrial isolation and "self-sufficiency,"--as has, e.g., appeared in the present war. but in all cases, though in varying measure, the mitigated isolation so enforced by these restraints on trade will in their degree impair the country's industrial efficiency and lower the people's material well-being; yet, if the restrictions are shrewdly applied this partial isolation and partial "self-sufficiency" will go some way toward preparing the nation for the more thorough isolation that follows on the outbreak of hostilities. the present plight of the german people under war conditions may serve to show how nearly that end may be attained, and yet how inadequate even the most unreserved measures of industrial isolation must be in face of the fact that the modern state of the industrial arts necessarily draws on the collective resources of the world at large. it may well be doubted, on an impartial view, if the mutilation of the country's industrial system by such measures of isolation does not after all rather weaken the nation even for warlike ends; but then, the discretionary authorities in the dynastic states are always, and it may be presumed necessarily, hampered with obsolete theories handed down from that cameralistic age, when the little princes of the fatherland were making dynastic history. so, e.g., the current, nineteenth and twentieth century, economic policy of the prussian-imperial statesmen is still drawn on lines within which frederick ii, called the great, would have felt well at home. like other preparation for hostilities this reduction of the country to the status of a self-contained economic organisation is costly, but like other preparation for hostilities it also puts the nation in a position of greater readiness to break off friendly relations with its neighbors. it is a war measure, commonly spoken for by its advocates as a measure of self-defense; but whatever the merits of the self-defenders' contention, this measure is a war measure. as such it can reasonably claim no hearing in the counsels of a pacific league of neutrals, whose purpose it is to make war impracticable. particularly can there be no reasonable question of admitting a policy of trade discrimination and isolation on the part of a nation which has, for purposes of warlike aggression, pursued such a policy in the past, and which it is the immediate purpose of the league to bind over to keep the peace. there has been a volume of loose talk spent on the justice and expediency of boycotting the trade of the peoples of the empire after the return of peace, as a penalty and as a preventive measure designed to retard their recovery of strength with which to enter on a further warlike enterprise. such a measure would necessarily be somewhat futile; since "business is business," after all, and the practical limitations imposed on an unprofitable boycott by the moral necessity to buy cheap and sell dear that rests on all businessmen would surreptitiously mitigate it to the point of negligibility. it is inconceivable--or it would be inconceivable in the absence of imbecile politicians and self-seeking businessmen--that measures looking to the trade isolation of any one of these countries could be entertained as a point of policy to be pursued by a league of neutrals. and it is only in so far as patriotic jealousy and vindictive sentiments are allowed to displace the aspiration for peace and security, that such measures can claim consideration. considered as a penalty to be imposed on the erring nations who set this warlike adventure afoot, it should be sufficiently plain that such a measure as a trade boycott could not touch the chief offenders, or even their responsible abettors. it would, rather, play into the hands of the militarist interests by keeping alive the spirit of national jealousy and international hatred, out of which wars arise and without which warlike enterprise might hopefully be expected to disappear out of the scheme of human intercourse. the punishment would fall, as all economic burdens and disabilities must always fall, on the common man, the underlying population. the chief relation of this common run, this underlying population of german subjects, to the inception and pursuit of this imperial warlike enterprise, is comprised in the fact that they are an underlying population of subjects, held in usufruct by the imperial establishment and employed at will. it is true, they have lent themselves unreservedly to the uses for which the dynasty has use for them, and they have entered enthusiastically into the warlike adventure set afoot by the dynastic statesmen; but that they have done so is their misfortune rather than their fault. by use and wont and indoctrination they have for long been unremittingly, and helplessly, disciplined into a spirit of dynastic loyalty, national animosity and servile abnegation; until it would be nothing better than a pathetic inversion of all the equities of the case to visit the transgressions of their masters upon the common run; whose fault lies, after all, in their being an underlying population of subjects, who have not had a chance to reach that spiritual level on which they could properly be held accountable for the uses to which they are turned. it is true, men are ordinarily punished for their misfortunes; but the warlike enterprise of the imperial dynasty has already brought what might fairly be rated as a good measure of punishment on this underlying populace, whose chief fault and chief misfortune lies in an habitual servile abnegation of those traits of initiative and discretion in man that constitute him an agent susceptible of responsibility or retribution. it would be all the more of a pathetic mockery to visit the transgressions of their masters on these victims of circumstance and dynastic mendacity, since the conventionalities of international equity will scarcely permit the high responsible parties in the case to be chastised with any penalty harsher than a well-mannered figure of speech. to serve as a deterrent, the penalty must strike the point where vests the discretion; but servile use and wont is still too well intact in these premises to let any penalty touch the guilty core of a profligate dynasty. under the wear and tear of continued war and its incident continued vulgarisation of the directorate and responsible staff among the pacific allies, the conventional respect of persons is likely to suffer appreciable dilapidation; but there need be no apprehension of such a loss of decent respect for personages as would compromise the creature comforts of that high syndicate of personages on whose initiative the fatherland entered upon this enterprise in dominion. bygone shortcomings and transgressions can have no reasonable place in the arrangements by which a pacific league of neutrals designs to keep the peace. neither can bygone prerogatives and precedents of magnificence and of mastery, except in so far as they unavoidably must come into play through the inability of men to divest themselves of their ingrained preconceptions, by virtue of which a hohenzollern or a hapsburger is something more formidable and more to be considered than a recruiting sergeant or a purveyor of light literature. the league can do its work of pacification only by elaborately forgetting differences and discrepancies of the kind that give rise to international grievances. which is the same as saying that the neutralisation of national discriminations and pretensions will have to go all the way, if it is to serve. but this implies, as broadly as need be, that the pacific nations who make the league and provisionally administer its articles of agreement and jurisdiction, can not exempt themselves from any of the leveling measures of neutralisation to which the dynastic suspects among them are to be subject. it would mean a relinquishment of all those undemocratic institutional survivals out of which international grievances are wont to arise. as a certain danish adage would have it, the neutrals of the league must all be shorn over the same comb. * * * * * what is to be shorn over this one comb of neutralisation and democracy is all those who go into the pacific league of neutrals and all who come under its jurisdiction, whether of their own choice or by the necessities of the case. it is of the substance of the case that those peoples who have been employed in the campaigns of the german-imperial coalition are to come in on terms of impartial equality with those who have held the ground against them; to come under the jurisdiction, and prospectively into the copartnery, of the league of neutrals--all on the presumption that the imperial coalition will be brought to make peace on terms of unconditional surrender. let it not seem presumptuous to venture on a recital of summary specifications intended to indicate the nature of those concrete measures which would logically be comprised in a scheme of pacification carried out with such a view to impartial equality among the peoples who are to make up the projected league. there is a significant turn of expression that recurs habitually in the formulation of terms put forth by the spokesmen of the entente belligerents, where it is insisted that hostilities are carried on not against the german people or the other peoples associated with them, but only against the imperial establishments and their culpable aids and abettors in the enterprise. so it is further insisted that there is no intention to bring pains and penalties on these peoples, who so have been made use of by their masters, but only on the culpable master class whose tools these peoples have been. and later, just now (january 1917), and from a responsible and disinterested spokesman for the pacific league, there comes the declaration that a lasting peace at the hands of such a league can be grounded only in a present "peace without victory." the mutual congruity of these two declarations need not imply collusion, but they are none the less complementary propositions and they are none the less indicative of a common trend of convictions among the men who are best able to speak for those pacific nations that are looked to as the mainstay of the prospective league. they both converge to the point that the objective to be achieved is not victory for the entente belligerents but defeat for the german-imperial coalition; that the peoples underlying the defeated governments are not to be dealt with as vanquished enemies but as fellows in undeserved misfortune brought on by their culpable masters; and that no advantage is designed to be taken of these peoples, and no gratuitous hardship to be imposed on them. their masters are evidently to be put away, not as defeated antagonists but as a public nuisance to be provided against as may seem expedient for the peace and security of those nations whom they have been molesting. taking this position as outlined, it should not be extremely difficult to forecast the general line of procedure which it would logically demand,--barring irrelevant regard for precedents and overheated resentment, and provided that the makers of these peace terms have a free hand and go to their work with an eye single to the establishment of an enduring peace. the case of germany would be typical of all the rest; and the main items of the bill in this case would seem logically to run somewhat as follows: (1) the definitive elimination of the imperial establishment, together with the monarchical establishments of the several states of the empire and the privileged classes; (2) removal or destruction of all warlike equipment, military and naval, defensive and offensive; (3) cancelment of the public debt, of the empire and of its members--creditors of the empire being accounted accessory to the culpable enterprise of the imperial government; (4) confiscation of such industrial equipment and resources as have contributed to the carrying on of the war, as being also accessory; (5) assumption by the league at large of all debts incurred, by the entente belligerents or by neutrals, for the prosecution or by reason of the war, and distribution of the obligation so assumed, impartially among the members of the league, including the peoples of the defeated nations; (6) indemnification for all injury done to civilians in the invaded territories; the means for such indemnification to be procured by confiscation of all estates in the defeated countries exceeding a certain very modest maximum, calculated on the average of property owned, say, by the poorer three-fourths of the population,--the kept classes being properly accounted accessory to the empire's culpable enterprise. the proposition to let the war debt be shared by all members of the league on a footing of impartial equality may seem novel, and perhaps extravagant. but all projects put forth for safeguarding the world's peace by a compact among the pacific nations run on the patent, though often tacit, avowal that the entente belligerents are spending their substance and pledging their credit for the common cause. among the americans, the chief of the neutral nations, this is coming to be recognised more and more overtly. so that, in this instance at least, no insurmountable reluctance to take over their due share of the common burden should fairly be looked for, particularly when it appears that the projected league, if it is organised on a footing of neutrality, will relieve the republic of virtually all outlay for their own defense. of course, there is, in all this, no temerarious intention to offer advice as to what should be done by those who have it to do, or even to sketch the necessary course which events are bound to take. as has been remarked in another passage, that would have to be a work of prophesy or of effrontery, both of which, it is hoped, lie equally beyond the horizon of this inquiry; which is occupied with the question of what conditions will logically have to be met in order to an enduring peace, not what will be the nature and outcome of negotiations entered into by astute delegates pursuing the special advantage, each of his own nation. and yet the peremptory need of reaching some practicable arrangement whereby the peace may be kept, goes to say that even the most astute negotiations will in some degree be controlled by that need, and may reasonably be expected to make some approach to the simple and obvious requirements of the situation. * * * * * therefore the argument returns to the united kingdom and the probable limit of tolerance of that people, in respect of what they are likely to insist on as a necessary measure of democratisation in the nations of the second part, and what measure of national abnegation they are likely to accommodate themselves to. the united kingdom is indispensable to the formation of a pacific league of neutrals. and the british terms of adhesion, or rather of initiation of such a league, therefore, will have to constitute the core of the structure, on which details may be adjusted and to which concessive adjustments will have to be made by all the rest. this is not saying that the projected league must or will be dominated by the united kingdom or administered in the british interest. indeed, it can not well be made to serve british particular interests in any appreciable degree, except at the cost of defeat to its main purpose; since the purposes of an enduring peace can be served only by an effectual neutralisation of national claims and interests. but it would mean that the neutralisation of national interests and discriminations to be effected would have to be drawn on lines acceptable to british taste in these matters, and would have to go approximately so far as would be dictated by the british notions of what is expedient, and not much farther. the pacific league of neutrals would have much of a british air, but "british" in this connection is to be taken as connoting the english-speaking countries rather than as applying to the united kingdom alone; since the entrance of the british into the league would involve the entrance of the british colonies, and, indeed, of the american republic as well. the temper and outlook of this british community, therefore, becomes a matter of paramount importance in any attempted analysis of the situation resulting after the war, or of any prospective course of conduct to be entered on by the pacific nations. and the question touches not so much the temper and preconceptions of the british community as known in recent history, but rather as it is likely to be modified by the war experience. so that the practicability of a neutral league comes to turn, in great measure, on the effect which this war experience is having on the habits of thought of the british people, or on that section of the british population which will make up the effectual majority when the war closes. the grave interest that attaches to this question must serve as justification for pursuing it farther, even though there can be no promise of a definite or confident answer to be found beforehand. certain general assertions may be made with some confidence. the experiences of the war, particularly among the immediate participants and among their immediate domestic connections--a large and increasing proportion of the people at large--are plainly impressing on them the uselessness and hardship of such a war. there can be no question but they are reaching a conviction that a war of this modern kind and scale is a thing to be avoided if possible. they are, no doubt, willing to go to very considerable lengths to make a repetition of it impossible, and they may reasonably be expected to go farther along that line before peace returns. but the lengths to which they are ready to go may be in the way of concessions, or in the way of contest and compulsion. there need be no doubt but a profound and vindictive resentment runs through the british community, and there is no reason to apprehend that this will be dissipated in the course of further hostilities; although it should fairly be expected to lose something of its earlier exuberant malevolence and indiscrimination, more particularly if hostilities continue for some time. it is not too much to expect, that this popular temper of resentment will demand something very tangible in the way of summary vengeance on those who have brought the hardships of war upon the nation. the manner of retribution which would meet the popular demand for "justice" to be done on the enemy is likely to be affected by the fortunes of war, as also the incidence of it. should the governmental establishment and the discretion still vest in the gentlemanly classes at the close of hostilities, the retribution is likely to take the accustomed gentlemanly shape of pecuniary burdens imposed on the people of the defeated country, together with diplomatically specified surrender of territorial and colonial possessions, and the like; such as to leave the _de facto_ enemy courteously on one side, and to yield something in the way of pecuniary benefit to the gentlemen-investors in charge, and something more in the way of new emoluments of office to the office-holding class included in the same order of gentlemen. the retribution in the case would manifestly fall on the underlying population in the defeated country, without seriously touching the responsible parties, and would leave the defeated nation with a new grievance to nourish its patriotic animosity and with a new incentive to a policy of watchful waiting for a chance of retaliation. but it is to be noted that under the stress of the war there is going forward in the british community a progressive displacement of gentlemanly standards and official procedure by standards and procedure of a visibly underbred character, a weakening of the hold of the gentlemanly classes on the control of affairs and a weakening of the hold which the sacred rights of property, investment and privilege have long had over the imagination of the british people. should hostilities continue, and should the exigencies of the war situation continue to keep the futility of these sacred rights, as well as the fatuity of their possessors, in the public eye, after the same fashion as hitherto, it would not be altogether unreasonable to expect that the discretion would pass into the hands of the underbred, or into the hands of men immediately and urgently accountable to the underbred. in such a case, and with a constantly growing popular realisation that the directorate and responsible enemy in the war is the imperial dynasty and its pedigreed aids and abettors, it is conceivable that the popular resentment would converge so effectually on these responsible instigators and directors of misfortune as to bring the incidence of the required retribution effectually to bear on them. the outcome might, not inconceivably, be the virtual erasure of the imperial dynasty, together with the pedigreed-class rule on which it rests and the apparatus of irresponsible coercion through which it works, in the fatherland and in its subsidiaries and dependencies. with a sufficiently urgent realisation of their need of peace and security, and with a realisation also that the way to avoid war is to avoid the ways and means of international jealousy and of the national discriminations out of which international jealousy grows, it is conceivable that a government which should reflect the british temper and the british hopes might go so far in insisting on a neutralisation of the peoples of the fatherland as would leave them without the dynastic apparatus with which warlike enterprise is set afoot, and so leave them also perforce in a pacific frame of mind. in time, in the absence of their dearly beloved leavings of feudalism, an enforced reliance on their own discretion and initiative, and an enforced respite from the rant and prance of warlike swagger, would reasonably be expected to grow into a popular habit. the german people are by no means less capable of tolerance and neighbourly decorum than their british or scandinavian neighbours of the same blood,--if they can only be left to their own devices, untroubled by the maggoty conceit of national domination. there is no intention herewith to express an expectation that this out-and-out neutralisation of the fatherland's international relations and of its dynastic government will come to pass on the return of peace, or that the german people will, as a precaution against recurrent imperial rabies, be organised on a democratic pattern by constraint of the pacific nations of the league. the point is only that this measure of neutralisation appears to be the necessary condition, in the absence of which no such neutral league can succeed, and that so long as the war goes on there is something of a chance that the british community may in time reach a frame of mind combining such settled determination to safeguard the peace at all costs, with such a degree of disregard for outworn conventions, that their spokesmen in the negotiations may push the neutralisation of these peoples to that length. the achievement of such an outcome would evidently take time as well as harsh experience, more time and harsher experience, perhaps, than one likes to contemplate. most men, therefore, would scarcely rate the chance of such an outcome at all high. and yet it is to be called to mind that the war has lasted long and the effect of its demands and its experience has already gone far, and that the longer it lasts the greater are the chances of its prolongation and of its continued hardships, at least to the extent that with every month of war that passes the prospect of the allied nations making peace on any terms short of unconditional surrender grows less. and unconditional surrender is the first step in the direction of an unconditional dispossession of the imperial establishment and its war prophets,--depending primarily on the state of mind of the british people at the time. and however unlikely, it is also always possible, as some contend, that in the course of further war experience the common man in the fatherland may come to reflect on the use and value of the imperial establishment, with the result of discarding and disowning it and all its works. such an expectation would doubtless underrate the force of ancient habit, and would also involve a misapprehension of the psychological incidence of a warlike experience. the german people have substantially none of those preconceptions of independence and self-direction to go on, in the absence of which an effectual revulsion against dynastic rule can not come to pass. embedded in the common sense of the british population at large is a certain large and somewhat sullen sense of fair dealing. in this they are not greatly different from their neighbours, if at all, except that the body of common sense in which this british sense of fair dealing lies embedded is a maturer fashion of common sense than that which serves to guide the workday life of many of their neighbours. and the maturity in question appears to be chiefly a matter of their having unlearned, divested themselves of, or been by force of disuse divested of, an exceptionally large proportion of that burden of untoward conceits which western europe, and more particularly middle europe, at large has carried over from the middle ages. they have had time and occasion to forget more of what the exigencies of modern life make it expedient to have forgotten. and yet they are reputed slow, conservative. but they have been well placed for losing much of what would be well lost. among other things, their preconception of national animosity is not secure, in the absence of provocation. they are now again in a position to learn to do without some of the useless legacy out of the past,--useless, that is, for life as it runs today, however it may be rated in the setting in which it was all placed in that past out of which it has come. and the question is whether now, under the pressure of exigencies that make for a disestablishment of much cumbersome inherited apparatus for doing what need not be done, they will be ruled by their sense of expediency and of fair dealing to the extent of cancelling out of their own scheme of life so much of this legacy of conventional preconceptions as has now come visibly to hinder their own material well-being, and at the same time to defeat that peace and security for which they have shown themselves willing to fight. it is, of course, a simpler matter to fight than it is to put away a preconceived, even if it is a bootless, superstition; as, e.g., the prestige of hereditary wealth, hereditary gentility, national vainglory, and perhaps especially national hatred. but if the school is hard enough and the discipline protracted enough there is no reason in the nature of things why the common run of the british people should not unlearn these futilities that once were the substance of things under an older and outworn order. they have already shown their capacity for divesting themselves of outworn institutional bonds, in discarding the main substance of dynastic rule; and when they now come to face the exigencies of this new situation it should cause no great surprise if they are able to see their way to do what further is necessary to meet these exigencies. * * * * * at the hands of this british commonwealth the new situation requires the putting away of the german imperial establishment and the military caste; the reduction of the german peoples to a footing of unreserved democracy with sufficient guarantees against national trade discriminations; surrender of all british tutelage over outlying possessions, except what may go to guarantee their local autonomy; cancelment of all extra-territorial pretensions of the several nations entering into the league; neutralisation of the several national establishments, to comprise virtual disarmament, as well as cancelment of all restrictions on trade and of all national defense of extra-territorial pecuniary claims and interests on the part of individual citizens. the naval control of the seas will best be left in british hands. no people has a graver or more immediate interest in the freedom and security of the sea-borne trade; and the united kingdom has shown that it is to be trusted in that matter. and then it may well be that neither the national pride nor the apprehensions of the british people would allow them to surrender it; whereas, if the league is to be formed it will have to be on terms to which the british people are willing to adhere. a certain provision of armed force will also be needed to keep the governments of unneutral nations in check,--and for the purpose in hand all effectively monarchical countries are to be counted as congenitally unneutral, whatever their formal professions and whether they are members of the league or not. here again it will probably appear that the people of the united kingdom, and of the english-speaking countries at large, will not consent to this armed force and its discretionary use passing out of british hands, or rather out of french-british hands; and here again the practical decision will have to wait on the choice of the british people, all the more because the british community has no longer an interest, real or fancied, in the coercive use of this force for their own particular ends. no other power is to be trusted, except france, and france is less well placed for the purpose and would assuredly also not covet so invidious an honour and so thankless an office. * * * * * the theory, i.e. the logical necessities, of such a pacific league of neutral nations is simple enough, in its elements. war is to be avoided by a policy of avoidance. which signifies that the means and the motives to warlike enterprise and warlike provocation are to be put away, so far as may be. if what may be, in this respect, does not come up to the requirements of the case, the experiment, of course, will fail. the preliminary requirement,--elimination of the one formidable dynastic state in europe,--has been spoken of. its counterpart in the far east will cease to be formidable on the decease of its natural ally in central europe, in so far as touches the case of such a projected league. the ever increasingly dubious empire of the czar would appear to fall in the same category. so that the pacific league's fortunes would seem to turn on what may be called its domestic or internal arrangements. now, the means of warlike enterprise, as well as of unadvised embroilment, is always in the last analysis the patriotic spirit of the nation. given this patriotic spirit in sufficient measure, both the material equipment and the provocation to hostilities will easily be found. it should accordingly appear to be the first care of such a pacific league to reduce the sources of patriotic incitement to the practicable minimum. this can be done, in such measure as it can be done at all, by neutralisation of national pretensions. the finished outcome in this respect, such as would assure perpetual peace among the peoples concerned, would of course be an unconditional neutralisation of citizenship, as has already been indicated before. the question which, in effect, the spokesmen for a pacific league have to face is as to how nearly that outcome can be brought to pass. the rest of what they may undertake, or may come to by way of compromise and stipulation, is relatively immaterial and of relatively transient consequence. a neutralisation of citizenship has of course been afloat in a somewhat loose way in the projects of socialistic and other "undesirable" agitators, but nothing much has come of it. nor have specific projects for its realisation been set afoot. that anything conclusive along that line could now be reached would seem extremely doubtful, in view of the ardent patriotic temper of all these peoples, heightened just now by the experience of war. still, an undesigned and unguided drift in that direction has been visible in all those nations that are accounted the vanguard among modern civilised peoples, ever since the dynastic rule among them began to be displaced by a growth of "free" institutions, that is to say institutions resting on an accepted ground of insubordination and free initiative. the patriotism of these peoples, or their national spirit, is after all and at the best an attenuated and impersonalised remnant of dynastic loyalty, and it amounts after all, in effect, to nothing much else than a residual curtailment or partial atrophy of that democratic habit of mind that embodies itself in the formula: live and let live. it is, no doubt, both an ancient and a very meritorious habit. it is easily acquired and hard to put away. the patriotic spirit and the national life (prestige) on which it centers are the subject of untiring eulogy; but hitherto its encomiasts have shown no cause and put forward no claim to believe that it all is of any slightest use for any purpose that does not take it and its paramount merit for granted. it is doubtless a very meritorious habit; at least so they all say. but under the circumstances of modern civilised life it is fruitful of no other net material result than damage and discomfort. still it is virtually ubiquitous among civilised men, and in an admirable state of repair; and for the calculable future it is doubtless to be counted in as an enduring obstacle to a conclusive peace, a constant source of anxiety and unremitting care. the motives that work out through this national spirit, by use of this patriotic ardor, fall under two heads: dynastic ambition, and business enterprise. the two categories have the common trait that neither the one nor the other comprises anything that is of the slightest material benefit to the community at large; but both have at the same time a high prestige value in the conventional esteem of modern men. the relation of dynastic ambition to warlike enterprise, and the uses of that usufruct of the nation's resources and man-power which the nation's patriotism places at the disposal of the dynastic establishment, have already been spoken of at length above, perhaps at excessive length, in the recurrent discussion of the dynastic state and its quest of dominion for dominion's sake. what measures are necessary to be taken as regards the formidable dynastic states that threaten the peace, have also been outlined, perhaps with excessive freedom. but it remains to call attention to that mitigated form of dynastic rule called a constitutional monarchy. instances of such a constitutional monarchy, designed to conserve the well-beloved abuses of dynastic rule under a cover of democratic formalities, or to bring in effectual democratic insubordination under cover of the ancient dignities of an outworn monarchical system,--the characterisation may run either way according to the fancy of the speaker, and to much the same practical effect in either case,--instances illustrative of this compromise monarchy at work today are to be had, as felicitously as anywhere, in the balkan states; perhaps the case of greece will be especially instructive. at the other, and far, end of the line will be found such other typical instances as the british, the dutch, or, in pathetic and droll miniature, the norwegian. there is, of course, a wide interval between the grotesque effrontery that wears the hellenic crown and the undeviatingly decorous self-effacement of the dutch sovereign; and yet there is something of a common complexion runs through the whole range of establishments, all the way from the quasi-dynastic to the pseudo-dynastic. for reasons unavoidable and persistent, though not inscribed in the constituent law, the governmental establishment associated with such a royal concern will be made up of persons drawn from the kept classes, the nobility or lesser gentlefolk, and will be imbued with the spirit of these "better" classes rather than that of the common run. with what may be uncanny shrewdness, or perhaps mere tropismatic response to the unreasoned stimulus of a "consciousness of kind," the british government--habitually a syndicate of gentlefolk--has uniformly insisted on the installation of a constitutional monarchy at the formation of every new national organisation in which that government has had a discretionary voice. and the many and various constitutional governments so established, commonly under british auspices in some degree, have invariably run true to form, in some appreciable degree. they may be quasi-dynastic or pseudo-dynastic, but at this nearest approach to democracy they always, and unavoidably, include at least a circumlocution office of gentlefolk, in the way of a ministry and court establishment, whose place in the economy of the nation's affairs it is to adapt the run of these affairs to the needs of the kept classes. there need be no imputation of sinister designs to these gentlefolk, who so are elected by force of circumstances to guard and guide the nation's interests. as things go, it will doubtless commonly be found that they are as well-intentioned as need be. but a well-meaning gentleman of good antecedents means well in a gentlemanly way and in the light of good antecedents. which comes unavoidably to an effectual bias in favor of those interests which honorable gentlemen of good antecedents have at heart. and among these interests are the interests of the kept classes, as contrasted with that common run of the population from which their keep is drawn. under the auspices, even if they are only the histrionic and decorative auspices, of so decorous an article of institutional furniture as royalty, it follows of logical necessity that the personnel of the effectual government must also be drawn from the better classes, whose place and station and high repute will make their association with the first gentleman of the realm not too insufferably incongruous. and then, the popular habit of looking up to this first gentleman with that deference that royalty commands, also conduces materially to the attendant habitual attitude of deference to gentility more at large. even in so democratic a country, and with so exanimate a crown as is to be found in the united kingdom, the royal establishment visibly, and doubtless very materially, conduces to the continued tenure of the effectual government by representatives of the kept classes; and it therefore counts with large effect toward the retardation of the country's further move in the direction of democratic insubordination and direct participation in the direction of affairs by the underbred, who finally pay the cost. and on the other hand, even so moderately royal an establishment as the norwegian has apparently a sensible effect in the way of gathering the reins somewhat into the hands of the better classes, under circumstances of such meagerness as might be expected to preclude anything like a "better" class, in the conventional acceptation of that term. it would appear that even the extreme of pseudo-dynastic royalty, sterilised to the last degree, is something of an effectual hindrance to democratic rule, and in so far also a hindrance to the further continued neutralisation of nationalist pretensions, as also an effectual furtherance of upper-class rule for upper-class ends. now, a government by well-meaning gentlemen-investors will, at the nearest, come no nearer representing the material needs and interests of the common run than a parable comes to representing the concrete facts which it hopes to illuminate. and as bears immediately on the point in hand, these gentlemanly administrators of the nation's affairs who so cluster about the throne, vacant though it may be of all but the bodily presence of majesty, are after all gentlemen, with a gentlemanly sense of punctilio touching the large proprieties and courtesies of political life. the national honor is a matter of punctilio, always; and out of the formal exigencies of the national honor arise grievances to be redressed; and it is grievances of this character that commonly afford the formal ground of a breach of the peace. an appeal on patriotic grounds of wounded national pride, to the common run who have no trained sense of punctilio, by the gentlemanly responsible class who have such a sense, backed by assurances that the national prestige or the national interests are at stake, will commonly bring a suitable response. it is scarcely necessary that the common run should know just what the stir is about, so long as they are informed by their trusted betters that there is a grievance to redress. in effect, it results that the democratic nation's affairs are administered by a syndicate composed of the least democratic class in the population. excepting what is to be excepted, it will commonly hold true today that these gentlemanly governments are conducted in a commendably clean and upright fashion, with a conscious rectitude and a benevolent intention. but they are after all, in effect, class governments, and they unavoidably carry the bias of their class. the gentlemanly officials and law-givers come, in the main, from the kept classes, whose living comes to them in the way of income from investments, at home or in foreign parts, or from an equivalent source of accumulated wealth or official emolument. the bias resulting from this state of the case need not be of an intolerant character in order to bring its modicum of mischief into the national policy, as regards amicable relations with other nationalities. a slight bias running on a ground of conscious right and unbroken usage may go far. so, e.g., anyone of these gentlemanly governments is within its legitimate rights, or rather within its imperative duty, in defending the foreign investments of its citizens and enforcing due payment of its citizens' claims to income or principal of such property as they may hold in foreign parts; and it is within its ordinary lines of duty in making use of the nation's resources--that is to say of the common man and his means of livelihood--in enforcing such claims held by the investing classes. the community at large has no interest in the enforcement of such claims; it is evidently a class interest, and as evidently protected by a code of rights, duties and procedure that has grown out of a class bias, at the cost of the community at large. this bias favoring the interests of invested wealth may also, and indeed it commonly does, take the aggressive form of aggressively forwarding enterprise in investment abroad, particularly in commercially backward countries abroad, by extension of the national jurisdiction and the active countenancing of concessions in foreign parts, by subventions, or by creation of offices to bring suitable emoluments to the younger sons of deserving families. the protective tariffs to which recourse is sometimes had, are of the same general nature and purpose. of course, it is in this latter, aggressive or excursive, issue of the well-to-do bias in favor of investment and invested wealth that its most pernicious effect on international relations is traceable. free income, that is to say income not dependent on personal merit or exertion of any kind, is the breath of life to the kept classes; and as a corollary of the "first law of nature," therefore, the invested wealth which gives a legally equitable claim to such income has in their eyes all the sanctity that can be given by natural right. investment--often spoken of euphemistically as "savings"--is consequently a meritorious act, conceived to be very serviceable to the community at large, and properly to be furthered by all available means. invested wealth is so much added to the aggregate means at the community's disposal, it is believed. of course, in point of fact, income from investment in the hands of these gentlefolk is a means of tracelessly consuming that much of the community's yearly product; but to the kept classes, who see the matter from the point of view of the recipient, the matter does not present itself in that light. to them it is the breath of life. like other honorable men they are faithful to their bread; and by authentic tradition the common man, in whose disciplined preconceptions the kept classes are his indispensable betters, is also imbued with the uncritical faith that the invested wealth which enables these betters tracelessly to consume a due share of the yearly product is an addition to the aggregate means in hand. the advancement of commercial and other business enterprise beyond the national frontiers is consequently one of the duties not to be neglected, and with which no trifling can be tolerated. it is so bound up with national ideals, under any gentlemanly government, that any invasion or evasion of the rights of investors in foreign parts, or of other business involved in dealings with foreign parts, immediately involves not only the material interest of the nation but the national honour as well. hence international jealousies and eventual embroilment. the constitutional monarchy that commonly covers a modern democratic community is accordingly a menace to the common peace, and any pacific league of neutrals will be laying up trouble and prospective defeat for itself in allowing such an institution to stand over in any instance. acting with a free hand, if such a thing were possible, the projected league should logically eliminate all monarchical establishments, constitutional or otherwise, from among its federated nations. it is doubtless not within reason to look for such a move in the negotiations that are to initiate the projected league of neutrals; but the point is called to mind here chiefly as indicating one of the difficult passages which are to be faced in any attempted formation of such a league, as well as one of the abiding sources of international irritation with which the league's jurisdiction will be burdened so long as a decisive measure of the kind is not taken. the logic of the whole matter is simple enough, and the necessary measures to be taken to remedy it are no less simple--barring sentimental objections which will probably prove insuperable. a monarchy, even a sufficiently inane monarchy, carries the burden of a gentlemanly governmental establishment--a government by and for the kept classes; such a government will unavoidably direct the affairs of state with a view to income on invested wealth, and will see the material interests of the country only in so far as they present themselves under the form of investment and business enterprise designed to eventuate in investment; these are the only forms of material interest that give rise to international jealousies, discriminations and misunderstanding, at the same time that they are interests of individuals only and have no material use or value to the community at large. given a monarchical establishment and the concomitant gentlemanly governmental corps, there is no avoiding this sinister prime mover of international rivalry, so long as the rights of invested wealth continue in popular apprehension to be held inviolable. quite obviously there is a certain _tu quoque_ ready to the hand of these "gentlemen of the old school" who see in the constitutional monarchy a god-given shelter from the unreserved vulgarisation of life at the hands of the unblest and unbalanced underbred and underfed. the formally democratic nations, that have not retained even a pseudo-dynastic royalty, are not much more fortunately placed in respect of national discrimination in trade and investment. the american republic will obviously come into the comparison as the type-form of economic policy in a democratic commonwealth. there is little to choose between the economic policy pursued by such republics as france or america on the one side and their nearest counterparts among the constitutional monarchies on the other. it is even to be admitted out of hand that the comparison does no credit to democratic institutions as seen at work in these republics. they are, in fact, somewhat the crudest and most singularly foolish in their economic policy of any peoples in christendom. and in view of the amazing facility with which these democratic commonwealths are always ready to delude themselves in everything that touches their national trade policies, it is obvious that any league of neutrals whose fortunes are in any degree contingent on their reasonable compliance with a call to neutralise their trade regulations for the sake of peace, will have need of all the persuasive power it can bring to bear. however, the powers of darkness have one less line of defense to shelter them and their work of malversation in these commonwealths than in the constitutional monarchies. the american national establishment, e.g., which may be taken as a fairly characteristic type-form in this bearing, is a government of businessmen for business ends; and there is no tabu of axiomatic gentility or of certified pedigree to hedge about this working syndicate of business interests. so that it is all nearer by one remove to the disintegrating touch of the common man and his commonplace circumstances. the businesslike régime of these democratic politicians is as undeviating in its advocacy and aid of enterprise in pursuit of private gain under shelter of national discrimination as the circumstances will permit; and the circumstances will permit them to do much and go far; for the limits of popular gullibility in all things that touch the admirable feats of business enterprise are very wide in these countries. there is a sentimental popular belief running to the curious effect that because the citizens of such a commonwealth are ungraded equals before the law, therefore somehow they can all and several become wealthy by trading at the expense of their neighbours. yet, the fact remains that there is only the one line of defense in these countries where the business interests have not the countenance of a time-honored order of gentlefolk, with the sanction of royalty in the background. and this fact is further enhanced by one of its immediate consequences. proceeding upon the abounding faith which these peoples have in business enterprise as a universal solvent, the unreserved venality and greed of their businessmen--unhampered by the gentleman's _noblesse oblige_--have pushed the conversion of public law to private gain farther and more openly here than elsewhere. the outcome has been divers measures in restraint of trade or in furtherance of profitable abuses, of such a crass and flagrant character that if once the popular apprehension is touched by matter-of-fact reflection on the actualities of this businesslike policy the whole structure should reasonably be expected to crumble. if the present conjuncture of circumstances should, e.g., present to the american populace a choice between exclusion from the neutral league, and a consequent probable and dubious war of self-defense, on the one hand; as against entrance into the league, and security at the cost of relinquishing their national tariff in restraint of trade, on the other hand, it is always possible that the people might be brought to look their protective tariff in the face and recognise it for a commonplace conspiracy in restraint of trade, and so decide to shuffle it out of the way as a good riddance. and the rest of the republic's businesslike policy of special favors would in such a case stand a chance of going in the discard along with the protective tariff, since the rest is of substantially the same disingenuous character. not that anyone need entertain a confident expectation of such an exploit of common sense on the part of the american voters. there is little encouragement for such a hope in their past career of gullibility on this head. but this is again a point of difficulty to be faced in negotiations looking to such a pacific league of neutrals. without a somewhat comprehensive neutralisation of national trade regulations, the outlook for lasting peace would be reduced by that much; there would be so much material for international jealousy and misunderstanding left standing over and requiring continued readjustment and compromise, always with the contingency of a breach that much nearer. the infatuation of the americans with their protective tariff and other businesslike discriminations is a sufficiently serious matter in this connection, and it is always possible that their inability to give up this superstition might lead to their not adhering to this projected neutral league. yet it is at least to be said that the longer the time that passes before active measures are taken toward the organisation of such a league--that is to say, in effect, the longer the great war lasts--the more amenable is the temper of the americans likely to be, and the more reluctantly would they see themselves excluded. should the war be protracted to some such length as appears to be promised by latterday pronunciamentos from the belligerents, or to something passably approaching such a duration; and should the imperial designs and anomalous diplomacy of japan continue to force themselves on the popular attention at the present rate; at the same time that the operations in europe continue to demonstrate the excessive cost of defense against a well devised and resolute offensive; then it should reasonably be expected that the americans might come to such a realisation of their own case as to let no minor considerations of trade discrimination stand in the way of their making common cause with the other pacific nations. it appears already to be realised in the most responsible quarter that america needs the succor of the other pacific nations, with a need that is not to be put away or put off; as it is also coming to be realised that the imperial powers are disturbers of the peace, by force of their imperial character. of course, the politicians who seek their own advantage in the nation's embarrassment are commonly unable to see the matter in that light. but it is also apparent that the popular sentiment is affected with the same apprehension, more and more as time passes and the aims and methods of the imperial powers become more patent. hitherto the spokesmen of a pacific federation of nations have spoken for a league of such an (indeterminate) constitution as to leave all the federated nations undisturbed in all their conduct of their own affairs, domestic or international; probably for want of second thought as to the complications of copartnership between them in so grave and unwonted an enterprise. they have also spoken of america's share in the project as being that of an interested outsider, whose interest in any precautionary measures of this kind is in part a regard for his own tranquility as a disinterested neighbour, but in greater part a humane solicitude for the well-being of civilised mankind at large. in this view, somewhat self-complacent it is to be admitted, america is conceived to come into the case as initiator and guide, about whom the pacific nations are to cluster as some sort of queen-bee. now, there is not a little verisimilitude in this conception of america as a sort of central office and a tower of strength in the projected federation of neutral nations, however pharisaical an appearance it may all have in the self-complacent utterances of patriotic americans. the american republic is, after all, the greatest of the pacific nations of christendom, in resources, population and industrial capacity; and it is also not to be denied that the temper of this large population is, on the whole, as pacific as that of any considerable people--outside of china. the adherence of the american republic would, in effect, double the mass and powers of the projected league, and would so place it beyond all hazard of defeat from without, or even of serious outside opposition to its aims. yet it will not hold true that america is either disinterested or indispensable. the unenviable position of the indispensable belongs to the united kingdom, and carries with it the customary suspicion of interested motives that attaches to the stronger party in a bargain. to america, on the other hand, the league is indispensable, as a refuge from otherwise inevitable dangers ahead; and it is only a question of a moderate allowance of time for the american voters to realise that without an adequate copartnership with the other pacific nations the outlook of the republic is altogether precarious. single-handed, america can not defend itself, except at a prohibitive cost; whereas in copartnership with these others the national defense becomes a virtually negligible matter. it is for america a choice between a policy of extravagant armament and aggressive diplomacy, with a doubtful issue, on the one side, and such abatement of national pretensions as would obviate bootless contention, on the other side. yet, it must be admitted, the patriotic temper of the american people is of such a susceptible kind as to leave the issue in doubt. not that the americans will not endeavor to initiate some form of compact for the keeping of the peace, when hostilities are concluded; barring unforeseen contingencies, it is virtually a foregone conclusion that the attempt will be made, and that the americans will take an active part in its promotion. but the doubt is as to their taking such a course as will lead to a compact of the kind needed to safeguard the peace of the country. the business interests have much to say in the counsels of the americans, and these business interests look to short-term gains--american business interests particularly--to be derived from the country's necessities. it is likely to appear that the business interests, through representatives in congress and elsewhere, will disapprove of any peace compact that does not involve an increase of the national armament and a prospective demand for munitions and an increased expenditure of the national funds. with or without the adherence of america, the pacific nations of europe will doubtless endeavour to form a league or alliance designed to keep the peace. if america does not come into the arrangement it may well come to nothing much more than a further continued defensive alliance of the belligerent nations now opposed to the german coalition. in any case it is still a point in doubt whether the league so projected is to be merely a compact of defensive armament against a common enemy--in which case it will necessarily be transient, perhaps ephemeral--or a more inclusive coalition of a closer character designed to avoid any breach of the peace, by disarmament and by disallowance and disclaimer of such national pretensions and punctilio as the patriotic sentiment of the contracting parties will consent to dispense with. the nature of the resulting peace, therefore, as well as its chances of duration, will in great measure be conditioned on the fashion of peace-compact on which it is to rest; which will be conditioned in good part on the degree in which the warlike coalition under german imperial control is effectually to be eliminated from the situation as a prospective disturber of the peace; which, in turn, is a question somewhat closely bound up with the further duration of the war, as has already been indicated in an earlier passage. chapter vii peace and the price system evidently the conception of peace on which its various spokesmen are proceeding is by no means the same for all of them. in the current german conception, e.g., as seen in the utterances of its many and urgent spokesmen, peace appears to be of the general nature of a truce between nations, whose god-given destiny it is, in time, to adjust a claim to precedence by wager of battle. they will sometimes speak of it, euphemistically, with a view to conciliation, as "assurance of the national future," in which the national future is taken to mean an opportunity for the extension of the national dominion at the expense of some other national establishment. in the same connection one may recall the many eloquent passages on the state and its paramount place and value in the human economy. the state is useful for disturbing the peace. this german notion may confidently be set down as the lowest of the current conceptions of peace; or perhaps rather as the notion of peace reduced to the lowest terms at which it continues to be recognisable as such. next beyond in that direction lies the notion of armistice; which differs from this conception of peace chiefly in connoting specifically a definite and relatively short interval between warlike operations. the conception of peace as being a period of preparation for war has many adherents outside the fatherland, of course. indeed, it has probably a wider vogue and a readier acceptance among men who interest themselves in questions of peace and war than any other. it goes hand in hand with that militant nationalism that is taken for granted, conventionally, as the common ground of those international relations that play a part in diplomatic intercourse. it is the diplomatist's _métier_ to talk war in parables of peace. this conception of peace as a precarious interval of preparation has come down to the present out of the feudal age and is, of course, best at home where the feudal range of preconceptions has suffered least dilapidation; and it carries the feudalistic presumption that all national establishments are competitors for dominion, after the scheme of macchiavelli. the peace which is had on this footing, within the realm, is a peace of subjection, more or less pronounced according as the given national establishment is more or less on the militant order; a warlike organisation being necessarily of a servile character, in the same measure in which it is warlike. in much the same measure and with much the same limitations as the modern democratic nations have departed from the feudal system of civil relations and from the peculiar range of conceptions which characterise that system, they have also come in for a new or revised conception of peace. instead of its being valued chiefly as a space of time in which to prepare for war, offensive or defensive, among these democratic and provisionally pacific nations it has come to stand in the common estimation as the normal and stable manner of life, good and commendable in its own right. these modern, pacific, commonwealths stand on the defensive, habitually. they are still pugnaciously national, but they have unlearned so much of the feudal preconceptions as to leave them in a defensive attitude, under the watch-word: peace with honour. their quasi-feudalistic national prestige is not to be trifled with, though it has lost so much of its fascination as ordinarily not to serve the purposes of an aggressive enterprise, at least not without some shrewd sophistication at the hands of militant politicians and their diplomatic agents. of course, an exuberant patriotism may now and again take on the ancient barbarian vehemence and lead such a provisionally pacific nation into an aggressive raid against a helpless neighbour; but it remains characteristically true, after all, that these peoples look on the country's peace as the normal and ordinary course of things, which each nation is to take care of for itself and by its own force. the ideal of the nineteenth-century statesmen was to keep the peace by a balance of power; an unstable equilibrium of rivalries, in which it was recognised that eternal vigilance was the price of peace by equilibration. since then, by force of the object-lesson of the twentieth-century wars, it has become evident that eternal vigilance will no longer keep the peace by equilibration, and the balance of power has become obsolete. at the same time things have so turned that an effective majority of the civilised nations now see their advantage in peace, without further opportunity to seek further dominion. these nations have also been falling into the shape of commonwealths, and so have lost something of their national spirit. with much reluctant hesitation and many misgivings, the statesmen of these pacific nations are accordingly busying themselves with schemes for keeping the peace on the unfamiliar footing of a stable equilibrium; the method preferred on the whole being an equilibration of make-believe, in imitation of the obsolete balance of power. there is a meticulous regard for national jealousies and discriminations, which it is thought necessary to keep intact. of course, on any one of these slightly diversified plans of keeping the peace on a stable footing of copartnery among the pacific nations, national jealousies and national integrity no longer have any substantial meaning. but statesmen think and plan in terms of precedent; which comes to thinking and planning in terms of make-believe, when altered circumstances have made the precedents obsolete. so one comes to the singular proposal of the statesmen, that the peace is to be kept in concert among these pacific nations by a provision of force with which to break it at will. the peace that is to be kept on this footing of national discriminations and national armaments will necessarily be of a precarious kind; being, in effect, a statesmanlike imitation of the peace as it was once kept even more precariously by the pacific nations in severalty. hitherto the movement toward peace has not gone beyond this conception of it, as a collusive safeguarding of national discrepancies by force of arms. such a peace is necessarily precarious, partly because armed force is useful for breaking the peace, partly because the national discrepancies, by which these current peace-makers set such store, are a constant source of embroilment. what the peace-makers might logically be expected to concern themselves about would be the elimination of these discrepancies that make for embroilment. but what they actually seem concerned about is their preservation. a peace by collusive neglect of those remnants of feudalistic make-believe that still serve to divide the pacific nations has hitherto not seriously come under advisement. evidently, hitherto, and for the calculable future, peace is a relative matter, a matter of more or less, whichever of the several working conceptions spoken of above may rule the case. evidently, too, a peace designed to strengthen the national establishment against eventual war, will count to a different effect from a collusive peace of a defensive kind among the pacific peoples, designed by its projectors to conserve those national discrepancies on which patriotic statesmen like to dwell. different from both would be the value of a peace by neglect of such useless national discriminations as now make for embroilment. a protracted season of peace should logically have a somewhat different cultural value according to the character of the public policy to be pursued under its cover. so that a safe and sane conservation of the received law and order should presumably best be effected under cover of a collusive peace of the defensive kind, which is designed to retain those national discrepancies intact that count for so much in the national life of today, both as a focus of patriotic sentiment and as an outlet for national expenditures. this plan would involve the least derangement of the received order among the democratic peoples, although the plan might itself undergo some change in the course of time. * * * * * among the singularities of the latterday situation, in this connection, and brought out by the experiences of the great war, is a close resemblance between latterday warlike operations and the ordinary processes of industry. modern warfare and modern industry alike are carried on by technological processes subject to surveillance and direction by mechanical engineers, or perhaps rather experts in engineering science of the mechanistic kind. war is not now a matter of the stout heart and strong arm. not that these attributes do not have their place and value in modern warfare; but they are no longer the chief or decisive factors in the case. the exploits that count in this warfare are technological exploits; exploits of technological science, industrial appliances, and technological training. as has been remarked before, it is no longer a gentlemen's war, and the gentleman, as such, is no better than a marplot in the game as it is played. certain consequences follow from this state of the case. technology and industrial experience, in large volume and at a high proficiency, are indispensable to the conduct of war on the modern plan, as well as a large, efficient and up-to-date industrial community and industrial plant to supply the necessary material of this warfare. at the same time the discipline of the campaign, as it impinges on the rank and file as well as on the very numerous body of officers and technicians, is not at cross purposes with the ordinary industrial employments of peace, or not in the same degree as has been the case in the past, even in the recent past. the experience of the campaign does not greatly unfit the men who survive for industrial uses; nor does it come in as a sheer interruption of their industrial training, or break the continuity of that range of habits of thought which modern industry of the technological order induces; not in the same degree as was the case under the conditions of war as carried on in the nineteenth century. the cultural, and particularly the technological, incidence of this modern warfare should evidently be appreciably different from what has been experienced in the past, and from what this past experience has induced students of these matters to look for among the psychological effects of warlike experience. it remains true that the discipline of the campaign, however impersonal it may tend to become, still inculcates personal subordination and unquestioning obedience; and yet the modern tactics and methods of fighting bear somewhat more on the individual's initiative, discretion, sagacity and self-possession than once would have been true. doubtless the men who come out of this great war, the common men, will bring home an accentuated and acrimonious patriotism, a venomous hatred of the enemies whom they have missed killing; but it may reasonably be doubted if they come away with a correspondingly heightened admiration and affection for their betters who have failed to make good as foremen in charge of this teamwork in killing. the years of the war have been trying to the reputation of officials and officers, who have had to meet uncharted exigencies with not much better chance of guessing the way through than their subalterns have had. by and large, it is perhaps not to be doubted that the populace now under arms will return from the experience of the war with some net gain in loyalty to the nation's honour and in allegiance to their masters; particularly the german subjects,--the like is scarcely true for the british; but a doubt will present itself as to the magnitude of this net gain in subordination, or this net loss in self-possession. a doubt may be permitted as to whether the common man in the countries of the imperial coalition, e.g., will, as the net outcome of this war experience, be in a perceptibly more pliable frame of mind as touches his obligations toward his betters and subservience to the irresponsible authority exercised by the various governmental agencies, than he was at the outbreak of the war. at that time, there is reason to believe, there was an ominous, though scarcely threatening, murmur of discontent beginning to be heard among the working classes of the industrial towns. it is fair to presume, however, that the servile discipline of the service and the vindictive patriotism bred of the fight should combine to render the populace of the fatherland more amenable to the irresponsible rule of the imperial dynasty and its subaltern royal establishments, in spite of any slight effect of a contrary character exercised by the training in technological methods and in self-reliance, with which this discipline of the service has been accompanied. as to the case of the british population, under arms or under compulsion of necessity at home, something has already been said in an earlier passage; and much will apparently depend, in their case, on the further duration of the war. the case of the other nationalities involved, both neutrals and belligerents, is even more obscure in this bearing, but it is also of less immediate consequence for the present argument. * * * * * the essentially feudal virtues of loyalty and bellicose patriotism would appear to have gained their great ascendency over all men's spirit within the western civilisation by force of the peculiarly consistent character of the discipline of life under feudal conditions, whether in war or peace; and to the same uniformity of these forces that shaped the workday habits of thought among the feudal nations is apparently due that profound institutionalisation of the preconceptions of patriotism and loyalty, by force of which these preconceptions still hold the modern peoples in an unbreakable web of prejudice, after the conditions favoring their acquirement have in great part ceased to operate. these preconceptions of national solidarity and international enmity have come down from the past as an integral part of the unwritten constitution underlying all these modern nations, even those which have departed most widely from the manner of life to which the peoples owe these ancient preconceptions. hitherto, or rather until recent times, the workday experience of these peoples has not seriously worked at cross purposes with the patriotic spirit and its bias of national animosity; and what discrepancy there has effectively been between the discipline of workday life and the received institutional preconceptions on this head, has hitherto been overborne by the unremitting inculcation of these virtues by interested politicians, priests and publicists, who speak habitually for the received order of things. that order of things which is known on its political and civil side as the feudal system, together with that era of the dynastic states which succeeds the feudal age technically so called, was, on its industrial or technological side, a system of trained man-power organised on a plan of subordination of man to man. on the whole, the scheme and logic of that life, whether in its political (warlike) or its industrial doings, whether in war or peace, runs on terms of personal capacity, proficiency and relations. the organisation of the forces engaged and the constraining rules according to which this organisation worked, were of the nature of personal relations, and the impersonal factors in the case were taken for granted. politics and war were a field for personal valor, force and cunning, in practical effect a field for personal force and fraud. industry was a field in which the routine of life, and its outcome, turned on "the skill, dexterity and judgment of the individual workman," in the words of adam smith. the feudal age passed, being done to death by handicraft industry, commercial traffic, gunpowder, and the state-making politicians. but the political states of the statemakers, the dynastic states as they may well be called, continued the conduct of political life on the personal plane of rivalry and jealousy between dynasties and between their states; and in spite of gunpowder and the new military engineering, warfare continued also to be, in the main and characteristically, a field in which man-power and personal qualities decided the outcome, by virtue of personal "skill, dexterity and judgment." meantime industry and its technology by insensible degrees underwent a change in the direction of impersonalisation, particularly in those countries in which state-making and its warlike enterprise had ceased, or were ceasing, to be the chief interests and the controlling preconception of the people. the logic of the new, mechanical industry which has supplanted handicraft in these countries, is a mechanistic logic, which proceeds in terms of matter-of-fact strains, masses, velocities, and the like, instead of the "skill, dexterity and judgment" of personal agents. the new industry does not dispense with the personal agencies, nor can it even be said to minimise the need of skill, dexterity and judgment in the personal agents employed, but it does take them and their attributes for granted as in some sort a foregone premise to its main argument. the logic of the handicraft system took the impersonal agencies for granted; the machine industry takes the skill, dexterity and judgment of the workmen for granted. the processes of thought, and therefore the consistent habitual discipline, of the former ran in terms of the personal agents engaged, and of the personal relations of discretion, control and subordination necessary to the work; whereas the mechanistic logic of the modern technology, more and more consistently, runs in terms of the impersonal forces engaged, and inculcates an habitual predilection for matter-of-fact statement, and an habitual preconception that the findings of material science alone are conclusive. in those nations that have made up the advance guard of western civilisation in its movement out of feudalism, the disintegrating effect of this matter-of-fact animus inculcated by the later state of the industrial arts has apparently acted effectively, in some degree, to discredit those preconceptions of personal discrimination on which dynastic rule is founded. but in no case has the discipline of this mechanistic technology yet wrought its perfect work or come to a definitive conclusion. meantime war and politics have on the whole continued on the ancient plane; it may perhaps be fair to say that politics has so continued because warlike enterprise has continued still to be a matter of such personal forces as skill, dexterity and judgment, valor and cunning, personal force and fraud. latterly, gradually, but increasingly, the technology of war, too, has been shifting to the mechanistic plane; until in the latest phases of it, somewhere about the turn of the century, it is evident that the logic of warfare too has come to be the same mechanistic logic that makes the modern state of the industrial arts. what, if anything, is due by consequence to overtake the political strategy and the political preconceptions of the new century, is a question that will obtrude itself, though with scant hope of finding a ready answer. it may even seem a rash, as well as an ungraceful, undertaking to inquire into the possible manner and degree of prospective decay to which the received political ideals and virtues would appear to be exposed by consequence of this derangement of the ancient discipline to which men have been subjected. so much, however, would seem evident, that the received virtues and ideals of patriotic animosity and national jealousy can best be guarded against untimely decay by resolutely holding to the formal observance of all outworn punctilios of national integrity and discrimination, in spite of their increasing disserviceability,--as would be done, e.g., or at least sought to be done, in the installation of a league of neutral nations to keep the peace and at the same time to safeguard those "national interests" whose only use is to divide these nations and keep them in a state of mutual envy and distrust. * * * * * those peoples who are subject to the constraining governance of this modern state of the industrial arts, as all modern peoples are in much the same measure in which they are "modern," are, therefore, exposed to a workday discipline running at cross purposes with the received law and order as it takes effect in national affairs; and to this is to be added that, with warlike enterprise also shifted to this same mechanistic-technological ground, war can no longer be counted on so confidently as before to correct all the consequent drift away from the ancient landmarks of dynastic, pseudo-dynastic, and national enterprise in dominion. as has been noted above, modern warfare not only makes use of, and indeed depends on, the modern industrial technology at every turn of the operations in the field, but it draws on the ordinary industrial resources of the countries at war in a degree and with an urgency never equalled. no nation can hope to make a stand in modern warfare, much less to make headway in warlike enterprise, without the most thoroughgoing exploitation of the modern industrial arts. which signifies for the purpose in hand that any power that harbors an imperial ambition must take measures to let its underlying population acquire the ways and means of the modern machine industry, without reservation; which in turn signifies that popular education must be taken care of to such an extent as may be serviceable in this manner of industry and in the manner of life which this industrial system necessarily imposes; which signifies, of course, that only the thoroughly trained and thoroughly educated nations have a chance of holding their place as formidable powers in this latterday phase of civilisation. what is needed is the training and education that go to make proficiency in the modern fashion of technology and in those material sciences that conduce to technological proficiency of this modern order. it is a matter of course that in these premises any appreciable illiteracy is an intolerable handicap. so is also any training which discourages habitual self-reliance and initiative, or which acts as a check on skepticism; for the skeptical frame of mind is a necessary part of the intellectual equipment that makes for advance, invention and understanding in the field of technological proficiency. but these requirements, imperatively necessary as a condition of warlike success, are at cross purposes with that unquestioning respect of persons and that spirit of abnegation that alone can hold a people to the political institutions of the old order and make them a willing instrument in the hands of the dynastic statesmen. the dynastic state is apparently caught in a dilemma. the necessary preparation for warlike enterprise on the modern plan can apparently be counted on, in the long run, to disintegrate the foundations of the dynastic state. but it is only in the long run that this effect can be counted on; and it is perhaps not securely to be counted on even in a moderately long run of things as they have run hitherto, if due precautions are taken by the interested statesmen,--as would seem to be indicated by the successful conservation of archaic traits in the german peoples during the past half century under the archaising rule of the hohenzollern. it is a matter of habituation, which takes time, and which can at the same time be neutralised in some degree by indoctrination. still, when all is told, it will probably have to be conceded that, e.g., such a nation as russia will fall under this rule of inherent disability imposed by the necessary use of the modern industrial arts. without a fairly full and free command of these modern industrial methods on the part of the russian people, together with the virtual disappearance of illiteracy, and with the facile and far-reaching system of communication which it all involves, the russian imperial establishment would not be a formidable power or a serious menace to the pacific nations; and it is not easy to imagine how the imperial establishment could retain its hold and its character under the conditions indicated. the case of japan, taken by itself, rests on somewhat similar lines as these others. in time, and in this case the time-allowance should presumably not be anything very large, the japanese people are likely to get an adequate command of the modern technology; which would, here as elsewhere, involve the virtual disappearance of the present high illiteracy, and the loss, in some passable measure, of the current superstitiously crass nationalism of that people. there are indications that something of that kind, and of quite disquieting dimensions, is already under way; though with no indication that any consequent disintegrating habits of thought have yet invaded the sacred close of japanese patriotic devotion. again, it is a question of time and habituation. with time and habituation the emperor may insensibly cease to be of divine pedigree, and the syndicate of statesmen who are doing business under his signature may consequently find their measures of imperial expansion questioned by the people who pay the bills. but so long as the imperial syndicate enjoy their present immunity from outside obstruction, and can accordingly carry on an uninterrupted campaign of cumulative predation in korea, china and manchuria, the patriotic infatuation is less likely to fall off, and by so much the decay of japanese loyalty will be retarded. yet, even if allowed anything that may seem at all probable in the way of a free hand for aggression against their hapless neighbours, the skepticism and insubordination to personal rule that seems inseparable in the long run from addiction to the modern industrial arts should be expected presently to overtake the japanese spirit of loyal servitude. and the opportunity of imperial japan lies in the interval. so also does the menace of imperial japan as a presumptive disturber of the peace at large. * * * * * at the cost of some unavoidable tedium, the argument as regards these and similar instances may be summarised. it appears, in the (possibly doubtful) light of the history of democratic institutions and of modern technology hitherto, as also from the logical character of this technology and its underlying material sciences, that consistent addiction to the peculiar habits of thought involved in its carrying on will presently induce a decay of those preconceptions in which dynastic government and national ambitions have their ground. continued addiction to this modern scheme of industrial life should in time eventuate in a decay of militant nationalism, with a consequent lapse of warlike enterprise. at the same time, popular proficiency in the modern industrial arts, with all that that implies in the way of intelligence and information, is indispensable as a means to any successful warlike enterprise on the modern plan. the menace of warlike aggression from such dynastic states, e.g., as imperial germany and imperial japan is due to their having acquired a competent use of this modern technology, while they have not yet had time to lose that spirit of dynastic loyalty which they have carried over from an archaic order of things, out of which they have emerged at a very appreciably later period (last half of the nineteenth century) than those democratic peoples whose peace they now menace. as has been said, they have taken over this modern state of the industrial arts without having yet come in for the defects of its qualities. this modern technology, with its underlying material sciences, is a novel factor in the history of human culture, in that addiction to its use conduces to the decay of militant patriotism, at the same time that its employment so greatly enhances the warlike efficiency of even a pacific people, at need, that they can not be seriously molested by any other peoples, however valorous and numerous, who have not a competent use of this technology. a peace at large among the civilised nations, by loss of the militant temper through addiction to this manner of arts of peace, therefore, carries no risk of interruption by an inroad of warlike barbarians,--always provided that those existing archaic peoples who might pass muster as barbarians are brought into line with the pacific nations on a footing of peace and equality. the disparity in point of outlook as between the resulting peace at large by neglect of bootless animosities, on the one hand, and those historic instances of a peaceable civilisation that have been overwhelmed by warlike barbarian invasions, on the other hand, should be evident. * * * * * it is always possible, indeed it would scarcely be surprising to find, that the projected league of neutrals or of nations bent on peace can not be brought to realisation at this juncture; perhaps not for a long time yet. but it should at the same time seem reasonable to expect that the drift toward a peaceable settlement of national discrepancies such as has been visible in history for some appreciable time past will, in the absence of unforeseen hindrances, work out to some such effect in the course of further experience under modern conditions. and whether the projected peace compact at its inception takes one form or another, provided it succeeds in its main purpose, the long-term drift of things under its rule should logically set toward some ulterior settlement of the general character of what has here been spoken of as a peace by neglect or by neutralisation of discrepancies. it should do so, in the absence of unforeseen contingencies; more particularly if there were no effectual factor of dissension included in the fabric of institutions within the nation. but there should also, e.g., be no difficulty in assenting to the forecast that when and if national peace and security are achieved and settled beyond recall, the discrepancy in fact between those who own the country's wealth and those who do not is presently due to come to an issue. any attempt to forecast the form which this issue is to take, or the manner, incidents, adjuncts and sequelae of its determination, would be a bolder and a more ambiguous, undertaking. hitherto attempts to bring this question to an issue have run aground on the real or fancied jeopardy to paramount national interests. how, if at all, this issue might affect national interests and international relations, would obviously depend in the first instance on the state of the given national establishment and the character of the international engagements entered into in the formation of this projected pacific league. it is always conceivable that the transactions involving so ubiquitous an issue might come to take on an international character and that they might touch the actual or fanciful interests of these diverse nations with such divergent effect as to bring on a rupture of the common understanding between them and of the peace-compact in which the common understanding is embodied. * * * * * in the beginning, that is to say in the beginnings out of which this modern era of the western civilisation has arisen, with its scheme of law and custom, there grew into the scheme of law and custom, by settled usage, a right of ownership and of contract in disposal of ownership,--which may or may not have been a salutary institutional arrangement on the whole, under the circumstances of the early days. with the later growth of handicraft and the petty trade in western europe this right of ownership and contract came to be insisted on, standardised under legal specifications, and secured against molestation by the governmental interests; more particularly and scrupulously among those peoples that have taken the lead in working out that system of free or popular institutions that marks the modern civilised nations. so it has come to be embodied in the common law of the modern world as an inviolable natural right. it has all the prescriptive force of legally authenticated immemorial custom. under the system of handicraft and petty trade this right of property and free contract served the interest of the common man, at least in much of its incidence, and acted in its degree to shelter industrious and economical persons from hardship and indignity at the hands of their betters. there seems reason to believe, as is commonly believed, that so long as that relatively direct and simple scheme of industry and trade lasted, the right of ownership and contract was a salutary custom, in its bearing on the fortunes of the common man. it appears also, on the whole, to have been favorable to the fuller development of the handicraft technology, as well as to its eventual outgrowth into the new line of technological expedients and contrivances that presently gave rise to the machine industry and the large-scale business enterprise. the standard theories of economic science have assumed the rights of property and contract as axiomatic premises and ultimate terms of analysis; and their theories are commonly drawn in such a form as would fit the circumstances of the handicraft industry and the petty trade, and such as can be extended to any other economic situation by shrewd interpretation. these theories, as they run from adam smith down through the nineteenth century and later, appear tenable, on the whole, when taken to apply to the economic situation of that earlier time, in virtually all that they have to say on questions of wages, capital, savings, and the economy and efficiency of management and production by the methods of private enterprise resting on these rights of ownership and contract and governed by the pursuit of private gain. it is when these standard theories are sought to be applied to the later situation, which has outgrown the conditions of handicraft, that they appear nugatory or meretricious. the "competitive system" which these standard theories assume as a necessary condition of their own validity, and about which they are designed to form a defensive hedge, would, under those earlier conditions of small-scale enterprise and personal contact, appear to have been both a passably valid assumption as a premise and a passably expedient scheme of economic relations and traffic. at that period of its life-history it can not be said consistently to have worked hardship to the common man; rather the reverse. and the common man in that time appears to have had no misgivings about the excellence of the scheme or of that article of natural rights that underlies it. this complexion of things, as touches the effectual bearing of the institution of property and the ancient customary rights of ownership, has changed substantially since the time of adam smith. the "competitive system," which he looked to as the economic working-out of that "simple and obvious system of natural liberty" that always engaged his best affections, has in great measure ceased to operate as a routine of natural liberty, in fact; particularly in so far as touches the fortunes of the common man, the impecunious mass of the people. _de jure_, of course, the competitive system and its inviolable rights of ownership are a citadel of natural liberty; but _de facto_ the common man is now, and has for some time been, feeling the pinch of it. it is law, and doubtless it is good law, grounded in immemorial usage and authenticated with statute and precedent. but circumstances have so changed that this good old plan has in a degree become archaic, perhaps unprofitable, or even mischievous, on the whole, and especially as touches the conditions of life for the common man. at least, so the common man in these modern democratic and commercial countries is beginning to apprehend the matter. some slight and summary characterisation of these changing circumstances that have affected the incidence of the rights of property during modern times may, therefore, not be out of place; with a view to seeing how far and why these rights may be due to come under advisement and possible revision, in case a state of settled peace should leave men's attention free to turn to these internal, as contrasted with national interests. under that order of handicraft and petty trade that led to the standardisation of these rights of ownership in the accentuated form which belongs to them in modern law and custom, the common man had a practicable chance of free initiative and self-direction in his choice and pursuit of an occupation and a livelihood, in so far as rights of ownership bore on his case. at that period the workman was the main factor in industry and, in the main and characteristically, the question of his employment was a question of what he would do. the material equipment of industry--the "plant," as it has come to be called--was subject of ownership, then as now; but it was then a secondary factor and, notoriously, subsidiary to the immaterial equipment of skill, dexterity and judgment embodied in the person of the craftsman. the body of information, or general knowledge, requisite to a workmanlike proficiency as handicraftsman was sufficiently slight and simple to fall within the ordinary reach of the working class, without special schooling; and the material equipment necessary to the work, in the way of tools and appliances, was also slight enough, ordinarily, to bring it within the reach of the common man. the stress fell on the acquirement of that special personal skill, dexterity and judgment that would constitute the workman a master of his craft. given a reasonable measure of pertinacity, the common man would be able to compass the material equipment needful to the pursuit of his craft, and so could make his way to a livelihood; and the inviolable right of ownership would then serve to secure him the product of his own industry, in provision for his own old-age and for a fair start in behalf of his children. at least in the popular conception, and presumably in some degree also in fact, the right of property so served as a guarantee of personal liberty and a basis of equality. and so its apologists still look on the institution. in a very appreciable degree this complexion of things and of popular conceptions has changed since then; although, as would be expected, the change in popular conceptions has not kept pace with the changing circumstances. in all the characteristic and controlling lines of industry the modern machine technology calls for a very considerable material equipment; so large an equipment, indeed, that this plant, as it is called, always represents a formidable amount of invested wealth; and also so large that it will, typically, employ a considerable number of workmen per unit of plant. on the transition to the machine technology the plant became the unit of operation, instead of the workman, as had previously been the case; and with the further development of this modern technology, during the past hundred and fifty years or so, the unit of operation and control has increasingly come to be not the individual or isolated plant but rather an articulated group of such plants working together as a balanced system and keeping pace in common, under a collective business management; and coincidently the individual workman has been falling into the position of an auxiliary factor, nearly into that of an article of supply, to be charged up as an item of operating expenses. under this later and current system, discretion and initiative vest not in the workman but in the owners of the plant, if anywhere. so that at this point the right of ownership has ceased to be, in fact, a guarantee of personal liberty to the common man, and has come to be, or is coming to be, a guarantee of dependence. all of which engenders a feeling of unrest and insecurity, such as to instill a doubt in the mind of the common man as to the continued expediency of this arrangement and of the prescriptive rights of property on which the arrangement rests. there is also an insidious suggestion, carrying a sinister note of discredit, that comes in from ethnological science at this point; which is adapted still further to derange the common man's faith in this received institution of ownership and its control of the material equipment of industry. to students interested in human culture it is a matter of course that this material equipment is a means of utilising the state of the industrial arts; that it is useful in industry and profitable to its owners only because and in so far as it is a creation of the current technological knowledge and enables its owner to appropriate the usufruct of the current industrial arts. it is likewise a matter of course that this technological knowledge, that so enables the material equipment to serve the purposes of production and of private gain, is a free gift of the community at large to the owners of industrial plant; and, under latterday conditions, to them exclusively. the state of the industrial arts is a joint heritage of the community at large, but where, as in the modern countries, the work to be done by this technology requires a large material equipment, the usufruct of this joint heritage passes, in effect, into the hands of the owners of this large material equipment. these owners have, ordinarily, contributed nothing to the technology, the state of the industrial arts, from which their control of the material equipment of industry enables them to derive a gain. indeed, no class or condition of men in the modern community--with the possible exception of politicians and the clergy--can conceivably contribute less to the community's store of technological knowledge than the large owners of invested wealth. by one of those singular inversions due to production being managed for private gain, it happens that these investors are not only not given to the increase and diffusion of technological knowledge, but they have a well-advised interest in retarding or defeating improvements in the industrial arts in detail. improvements, innovations that heighten productive efficiency in the general line of production in which a given investment is placed, are commonly to be counted on to bring "obsolescence by supersession" to the plant already engaged in that line; and therefore to bring a decline in its income-yielding capacity, and so in its capital or investment value. invested capital yields income because it enjoys the usufruct of the community's technological knowledge; it has an effectual monopoly of this usufruct because this machine technology requires large material appliances with which to do its work; the interest of the owners of established industrial plant will not tolerate innovations designed to supersede these appliances. the bearing of ownership on industry and on the fortunes of the common man is accordingly, in the main, the bearing which it has by virtue of its monopoly control of the industrial arts, and its consequent control of the conditions of employment and of the supply of vendible products. it takes effect chiefly by inhibition and privation; stoppage of production in case it brings no suitable profit to the investor, refusal of employment and of a livelihood to the workmen in case their product does not command a profitable price in the market. the expediency of so having the nation's industry managed on a footing of private ownership in the pursuit of private gain, by persons who can show no equitable personal claim to even the most modest livelihood, and whose habitual method of controlling industry is sabotage--refusal to let production go on except it affords them an unearned income--the expediency of all this is coming to be doubted by those who have to pay the cost of it. and it does not go far to lessen their doubts to find that the cost which they pay is commonly turned to no more urgent or useful purpose than a conspicuously wasteful consumption of superfluities by the captains of sabotage and their domestic establishments. this may not seem a veracious and adequate account of these matters; it may, in effect, fall short of the formulation: the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; nor does the question here turn on its adequacy as a statement of fact. without prejudice to the question of its veracity and adequacy, it is believed to be such an account of these matters as will increasingly come easy and seem convincing to the common man who, in an ever increasing degree, finds himself pinched with privation and insecurity by a run of facts which will consistently bear this construction, and who perforce sees these facts from the prejudiced standpoint of a loser. to such a one, there is reason to believe, the view so outlined will seem all the more convincing the more attentively the pertinent facts and their bearing on his fortunes are considered. how far the contrary prejudice of those whose interest or training inclines them the other way may lead them to a different construction of these pertinent facts, does not concern the present argument; which has to do with this run of facts only as they bear on the prospective frame of mind of that unblest mass of the population who will have opportunity to present their proposals when peace at large shall have put national interests out of their preferential place in men's regard. at the risk of what may seem an excessively wide digression, there is something further to be said of the capitalistic sabotage spoken of above. the word has by usage come to have an altogether ungraceful air of disapproval. yet it signifies nothing more vicious than a deliberate obstruction or retardation of industry, usually by legitimate means, for the sake of some personal or partisan advantage. this morally colorless meaning is all that is intended in its use here. it is extremely common in all industry that is designed to supply merchantable goods for the market. it is, in fact, the most ordinary and ubiquitous of all expedients in business enterprise that has to do with supplying the market, being always present in the businessman's necessary calculations; being not only a usual and convenient recourse but quite indispensable as an habitual measure of business sagacity. so that no personal blame can attach to its employment by any given businessman or business concern. it is only when measures of this nature are resorted to by employees, to gain some end of their own, that such conduct becomes (technically) reprehensible. any businesslike management of industry is carried on for gain, which is to be got only on condition of meeting the terms of the market. the price system under which industrial business is carried on will not tolerate production in excess of the market demand, or without due regard to the expenses of production as determined by the market on the side of the supplies required. hence any business concern must adjust its operations, by due acceleration, retardation or stoppage, to the market conditions, with a view to what the traffic will bear; that is to say, with a view to what will yield the largest obtainable net gain. so long as the price system rules, that is to say so long as industry is managed on investment for a profit, there is no escaping this necessity of adjusting the processes of industry to the requirements of a remunerative price; and this adjustment can be taken care of only by well-advised acceleration or curtailment of the processes of industry; which answers to the definition of sabotage. wise business management, and more particularly what is spoken of as safe and sane business management, therefore, reduces itself in the main to a sagacious use of sabotage; that is to say a sagacious limitation of productive processes to something less than the productive capacity of the means in hand. * * * * * to anyone who is inclined to see these matters of usage in the light of their history and to appraise them as phenomena of habituation, adaptation and supersession in the sequence of cultural proliferation, there should be no difficulty in appreciating that this institution of ownership that makes the core of the modern institutional structure is a precipitate of custom, like any other item of use and wont; and that, like any other article of institutional furniture, it is subject to the contingencies of supersession and obsolescence. if prevalent habits of thought, enforced by the prevalent exigencies of life and livelihood, come to change in such a way as to make life under the rule imposed by this institution seem irksome, or intolerable, to the mass of the population; and if at the same time things turn in such a way as to leave no other and more urgent interest or exigency to take precedence of this one and hinder its being pushed to an issue; then it should reasonably follow that contention is due to arise between the unblest mass on whose life it is a burden and the classes who live by it. but it is, of course, impossible to state beforehand what will be the precise line of cleavage or what form the division between the two parties in interest will take. yet it is contained in the premises that, barring unforeseen contingencies of a formidable magnitude, such a cleavage is due to follow as a logical sequel of an enduring peace at large. and it is also well within the possibilities of the case that this issue may work into an interruption or disruption of the peace between the nations. in this connection it may be called to mind that the existing governmental establishments in these pacific nations are, in all cases, in the hands of the beneficiary, or kept classes,--beneficiaries in the sense in which a distinction to that effect comes into the premises of the case at this point. the responsible officials and their chief administrative officers,--so much as may at all reasonably be called the "government" or the "administration,"--are quite invariably and characteristically drawn from these beneficiary classes; nobles, gentlemen, or business men, which all comes to the same thing for the purpose in hand; the point of it all being that the common man does not come within these precincts and does not share in these counsels that assume to guide the destiny of the nations. of course, sporadically and ephemerally, a man out of the impecunious and undistinguished mass may now and again find his way within the gates; and more frequently will a professed "man of the people" sit in council. but that the rule holds unbroken and inviolable is sufficiently evident in the fact that no community will let the emoluments of office for any of its responsible officials, even for those of a very scant responsibility, fall to the level of the habitual livelihood of the undistinguished populace, or indeed to fall below what is esteemed to be a seemly income for a gentleman. should such an impecunious one be thrown up into a place of discretion in the government, he will forthwith cease to be a common man and will be inducted into the rank of gentleman,--so far as that feat can be achieved by taking thought or by assigning him an income adequate to a reputably expensive manner of life. so obvious is the antagonism between a vulgar station in life and a position of official trust, that many a "selfmade man" has advisedly taken recourse to governmental position, often at some appreciable cost, from no apparent motive other than its known efficacy as a levitical corrective for a humble origin. and in point of fact, neither here nor there have the underbred majority hitherto learned to trust one of their own kind with governmental discretion; which has never yet, in the popular conviction, ceased to be a perquisite of the gently-bred and the well-to-do. let it be presumed that this state of things will continue without substantial alteration, so far as regards the complexion of the governmental establishments of these pacific nations, and with such allowance for overstatement in the above characterisation as may seem called for. these governmental establishments are, by official position and by the character of their personnel, committed more or less consistently to the maintenance of the existing law and order. and should no substantial change overtake them as an effect of the war experience, the pacific league under discussion would be entered into by and between governments of this complexion. should difficulties then arise between those who own and those who do not, in any one of these countries, it would become a nice question whether the compact to maintain the peace and national integrity of the several nations comprised in the league should be held to cover the case of internal dissensions and possible disorders partaking of the character of revolt against the established authorities or against the established provisions of law. a strike of the scope and character of the one recently threatened, and narrowly averted, on the american railroads, e.g., might easily give rise to disturbances sufficiently formidable to raise a question of the peace league's jurisdiction; particularly if such a disturbance should arise in a less orderly and less isolated country than the american republic; so as unavoidably to carry the effects of the disturbance across the national frontiers along the lines of industrial and commercial intercourse and correlation. it is always conceivable that a national government standing on a somewhat conservative maintenance of the received law and order might feel itself bound by its conception of the peace to make common cause with the keepers of established rights in neighboring states, particularly if the similar interests of their own nation were thought to be placed in jeopardy by the course of events. antecedently it seems highly probable that the received rights of ownership and disposal of property, particularly of investment, will come up for advisement and revision so soon as a settled state of peace is achieved. and there should seem to be little doubt but this revision would go toward, or at least aim at the curtailment or abrogation of these rights; very much after the fashion in which the analogous vested rights of feudalism and the dynastic monarchy have been revised and in great part curtailed or abrogated in the advanced democratic countries. not much can confidently be said as to the details of such a prospective revision of legal rights, but the analogy of that procedure by which these other vested rights have been reduced to a manageable disability, suggests that the method in the present case also would be by way of curtailment, abrogation and elimination. here again, as in analogous movements of disuse and disestablishment, there would doubtless be much conservative apprehension as to the procuring of a competent substitute for the supplanted methods of doing what is no longer desirable to be done; but here as elsewhere, in a like conjuncture, the practicable way out would presumably be found to lie along the line of simple disuse and disallowance of class prerogative. taken at its face value, without unavoidable prejudice out of the past, this question of a substitute to replace the current exploitation of the industrial arts for private gain by capitalistic sabotage is not altogether above a suspicion of drollery. yet it is not to be overlooked that private enterprise on the basis of private ownership is the familiar and accepted method of conducting industrial affairs, and that it has the sanction of immemorial usage, in the eyes of the common man, and that it is reenforced with the urgency of life and death in the apprehension of the kept classes. it should accordingly be a possible outcome of such a peace as would put away international dissension, that the division of classes would come on in a new form, between those who stand on their ancient rights of exploitation and mastery, and those who are unwilling longer to submit. and it is quite within the possibilities of the case that the division of opinion on these matters might presently shift back to the old familiar ground of international hostilities; undertaken partly to put down civil disturbances in given countries, partly by the more archaic, or conservative, peoples to safeguard the institutions of the received law and order against inroads from the side of the iconoclastic ones. * * * * * in the apprehension of those who are speaking for peace between the nations and planning for its realisation, the outlook is that of a return to, or a continuance of, the state of things before the great war came on, with peace and national security added, or with the danger of war eliminated. nothing appreciable in the way of consequent innovation, certainly nothing of a serious character, is contemplated as being among the necessary consequences of such a move into peace and security. national integrity and autonomy are to be preserved on the received lines, and international division and discrimination is to be managed as before, and with the accustomed incidents of punctilio and pecuniary equilibration. internationally speaking, there is to dawn an era of diplomacy without afterthought, whatever that might conceivably mean. there is much in the present situation that speaks for such an arrangement, particularly as an initial phase of the perpetual peace that is aimed at, whatever excursive variations might befall presently, in the course of years. the war experience in the belligerent countries and the alarm that has disturbed the neutral nations have visibly raised the pitch of patriotic solidarity in all these countries; and patriotism greatly favors the conservation of established use and wont; more particularly is it favorable to the established powers and policies of the national government. the patriotic spirit is not a spirit of innovation. the chances of survival, and indeed of stabilisation, for the accepted use and wont and for the traditional distinctions of class and prescriptive rights, should therefore seem favorable, at any rate in the first instance. presuming, therefore, as the spokesmen of such a peace-compact are singularly ready to presume, that the era of peace and good-will which they have in view is to be of a piece with the most tranquil decades of the recent past, only more of the same kind, it becomes a question of immediate interest to the common man, as well as to all students of human culture, how the common man is to fare under this régime of law and order,--the mass of the population whose place it is to do what is to be done, and thereby to carry forward the civilisation of these pacific nations. it may not be out of place to recall, by way of parenthesis, that it is here taken for granted as a matter of course that all governmental establishments are necessarily conservative in all their dealings with this heritage of culture, except so far as they may be reactionary. their office is the stabilisation of archaic institutions, the measure of archaism varying from one to another. with due stabilisation and with a sagacious administration of the established scheme of law and order, the common man should find himself working under conditions and to results of the familiar kind; but with the difference that, while legal usage and legal precedent remain unchanged, the state of the industrial arts can confidently be expected to continue its advance in the same general direction as before, while the population increases after the familiar fashion, and the investing business community pursues its accustomed quest of competitive gain and competitive spending in the familiar spirit and with cumulatively augmented means. stabilisation of the received law and order will not touch these matters; and for the present it is assumed that these matters will not derange the received law and order. the assumption may seem a violent one to the students of human culture, but it is a simple matter of course to the statesmen. to this piping time of peace the nearest analogues in history would seem to be the roman peace, say, of the days of the antonines, and passably the british peace of the victorian era. changes in the scheme of law and order supervened in both of these instances, but the changes were, after all, neither unconscionably large nor were they of a subversive nature. the scheme of law and order, indeed, appears in neither instance to have changed so far as the altered circumstances would seem to have called for. to the common man the roman peace appears to have been a peace by submission, not widely different from what the case of china has latterly brought to the appreciation of students. the victorian peace, which can be appreciated more in detail, was of a more genial character, as regards the fortunes of the common man. it started from a reasonably low level of hardship and _de facto_ iniquity, and was occupied with many prudent endeavours to improve the lot of the unblest majority; but it is to be admitted that these prudent endeavours never caught up with the march of circumstances. not that these prudent measures of amelioration were nugatory, but it is clear that they were not an altogether effectual corrective of the changes going on; they were, in effect, systematically so far in arrears as always to leave an uncovered margin of discontent with current conditions. it is a fact of history that very appreciable sections of the populace were approaching an attitude of revolt against what they considered to be intolerable conditions when that era closed. much of what kept them within bounds, that is to say within legal bounds, was their continued loyalty to the nation; which was greatly, and for the purpose needfully, reenforced by a lively fear of warlike aggression from without. now, under the projected _pax orbis terrarum_ all fear of invasion, it is hopefully believed, will be removed; and with the disappearance of this fear should also disappear the drag of national loyalty on the counsels of the underbred. if this british peace of the nineteenth century is to be taken as a significant indication of what may be looked for under a régime of peace at large, with due allowance for what is obviously necessary to be allowed for, then what is held in promise would appear to be an era of unexampled commercial prosperity, of investment and business enterprise on a scale hitherto not experienced. these developments will bring their necessary consequences affecting the life of the community, and some of the consequences it should be possible to foresee. the circumstances conditioning this prospective era of peace and prosperity will necessarily differ from the corresponding circumstances that conditioned the victorian peace, and many of these points of difference it is also possible to forecast in outline with a fair degree of confidence. it is in the main these economic factors going to condition the civilisation of the promised future that will have to be depended on to give the cue to any student interested in the prospective unfolding of events. the scheme of law and order governing all modern nations, both in the conduct of their domestic affairs and in their national policies, is in its controlling elements the scheme worked out through british (and french) experience in the eighteenth century and earlier, as revised and further accommodated in the nineteenth century. other peoples, particularly the dutch, have of course had their part in the derivation and development of this modern scheme of institutional principles, but it has after all been a minor part; so that the scheme at large would not differ very materially, if indeed it should differ sensibly, from what it is, even if the contribution of these others had not been had. the backward nations, as e.g., germany, russia, spain, etc., have of course contributed substantially nothing but retardation and maladjustment to this modern scheme of civil life; whatever may be due to students resident in those countries, in the way of scholarly formulation. this nineteenth century scheme it is proposed to carry over into the new era; and the responsible spokesmen of the projected new order appear to contemplate no provision touching this scheme of law and order, beyond the keeping of it intact in all substantial respects. when and in so far as the projected peace at large takes effect, international interests will necessarily fall somewhat into the background, as being no longer a matter of precarious equilibration, with heavy penalties in the balance; and diplomacy will consequently become even more of a make-believe than today--something after the fashion of a game of bluff played with irredeemable "chips." commercial, that is to say business, enterprise will consequently come in for a more undivided attention and be carried on under conditions of greater security and of more comprehensive trade relations. the population of the pacified world may be expected to go on increasing somewhat as in the recent past; in which connection it is to be remarked that not more than one-half, presumably something less than one-half, of the available agricultural resources have been turned to account for the civilised world hitherto. the state of the industrial arts, including means of transport and communication, may be expected to develop farther in the same general direction as before, assuming always that peace conditions continue to hold. popular intelligence, as it is called,--more properly popular education,--may be expected to suffer a further advance; necessarily so, since it is a necessary condition of any effectual advance in the industrial arts,--every appreciable technological advance presumes, as a requisite to its working-out in industry, an augmented state of information and of logical facility in the workmen under whose hands it is to take effect. of the prescriptive rights carried over into the new era, under the received law and order, the rights of ownership alone may be expected to have any material significance for the routine of workday life; the other personal rights that once seemed urgent will for everyday purposes have passed into a state of half-forgotten matter-of-course. as now, but in an accentuated degree, the rights of ownership will, in effect, coincide and coalesce with the rights of investment and business management. the market--that is to say the rule of the price-system in all matters of production and livelihood--may be expected to gain in volume and inclusiveness; so that virtually all matters of industry and livelihood will turn on questions of market price, even beyond the degree in which that proposition holds today. the progressive extension and consolidation of investments, corporate solidarity, and business management may be expected to go forward on the accustomed lines, as illustrated by the course of things during the past few decades. market conditions should accordingly, in a progressively increased degree, fall under the legitimate discretionary control of businessmen, or syndicates of businessmen, who have the disposal of large blocks of invested wealth,--"big business," as it is called, should reasonably be expected to grow bigger and to exercise an increasingly more unhampered control of market conditions, including the money market and the labor market. with such improvements in the industrial arts as may fairly be expected to come forward, and with the possible enhancement of industrial efficiency which should follow from a larger scale of organisation, a wider reach of transport and communication, and an increased population,--with these increasing advantages on the side of productive industry, the per-capita product as well as the total product should be increased in a notable degree, and the conditions of life should possibly become notably easier and more attractive, or at least more conducive to efficiency and personal comfort, for all concerned. such would be the first and unguarded inference to be drawn from the premises of the case as they offer themselves in the large; and something of that kind is apparently what floats before the prophetic vision of the advocates of a league of nations for the maintenance of peace at large. these premises, and the inferences so drawn from them, may be further fortified and amplified in the same sense on considering that certain very material economies also become practicable, and should take effect "in the absence of disturbing causes," on the establishment of such a peace at large. it will of course occur to all thoughtful persons that armaments must be reduced, perhaps to a minimum, and that the cost of these things, in point of expenditures as well as of man-power spent in the service, would consequently fall off in a corresponding measure. so also, as slight further reflection will show, would the cost of the civil service presumably fall off very appreciably; more particularly the cost of this service per unit of service rendered. some such climax of felicities might be looked for by hopeful persons, in the absence of disturbing causes. under the new dispensation the standard of living, that is to say the standard of expenditure, would reasonably be expected to advance in a very appreciable degree, at least among the wealthy and well-to-do; and by pressure of imitative necessity a like effect would doubtless also be had among the undistinguished mass. it is not a question of the standard of living considered as a matter of the subsistence minimum, or even a standard of habitually prevalent creature comfort, particularly not among the wealthy and well-to-do. these latter classes have long since left all question of material comfort behind in their accepted standards of living and in the continued advance of these standards. for these classes who are often spoken of euphemistically as being "in easy circumstances," it is altogether a question of a standard of reputable expenditure, to be observed on pain of lost self-respect and of lost reputation at large. as has been remarked in an earlier passage, wants of this kind are indefinitely extensible. so that some doubt may well be entertained as to whether the higher productive efficiency spoken of will necessarily make the way of life easier, in view of this need of a higher standard of expenditure, even when due account is taken of the many economies which the new dispensation is expected to make practicable. one of the effects to be looked for would apparently be an increased pressure on the part of aspiring men to get into some line of business enterprise; since it is only in business, as contrasted with the industrial occupations, that anyone can hope to find the relatively large income required for such an expensive manner of life as will bring any degree of content to aspirants for pecuniary good repute. so it should follow that the number of businessmen and business concerns would increase up to the limit of what the traffic could support, and that the competition between these rival, and in a sense over-numerous, concerns would push the costs of competition to the like limit. in this respect the situation would be of much the same character as what it now is, with the difference that the limit of competitive expenditures would be rather higher than at present, to answer to the greater available margin of product that could be devoted to this use; and that the competing concerns would be somewhat more numerous, or at least that the aggregate expenditure on competitive enterprise would be somewhat larger; as, e.g., costs of advertising, salesmanship, strategic litigation, procuration of legislative and municipal grants and connivance, and the like. it is always conceivable, though it may scarcely seem probable, that these incidents of increased pressure of competition in business traffic might eventually take up all the slack, and leave no net margin of product over what is available under the less favorable conditions of industry that prevail today; more particularly when this increased competition for business gains is backed by an increased pressure of competitive spending for purposes of a reputable appearance. all this applies in retail trade and in such lines of industry and public service as partakes of the nature of retail trade, in the respect that salesmanship and the costs of salesmanship enter into their case in an appreciable measure; this is an extensive field, it is true, and incontinently growing more extensive with the later changes in the customary methods of marketing products; but it is by no means anything like the whole domain of industrial business, and by no means a field in which business is carried on without interference of a higher control from outside its own immediate limits. all this generously large and highly expensive and profitable field of trade and of trade-like industry, in which the businessmen in charge deal somewhat directly with a large body of customers, is always subject to limitations imposed by the condition of the market; and the condition of the market is in part not under the control of these businessmen, but is also in part controlled by large concerns in the background; which in their turn are after all also not precisely free agents; in fact not much more so than their cousins in the retail trade, being confined in all their motions by the constraint of the price-system that dominates the whole and gathers them all in its impersonal and inexorable net. there is a colloquial saying among businessmen, that they are not doing business for their health; which being interpreted means that they are doing business for a price. it is out of a discrepancy in price, between purchase and sale, or between transactions which come to the same result as purchase and sale, that the gains of business are drawn; and it is in terms of price that these gains are rated, amassed and funded. it is necessary, for a business concern to achieve a favorable balance in terms of price; and the larger the balance in terms of price the more successful the enterprise. such a balance can not be achieved except by due regard to the conditions of the market, to the effect that dealings must not go on beyond what will yield a favorable balance in terms of price between income and outgo. as has already been remarked above, the prescriptive and indispensable recourse in all this conduct of business is sabotage, limitation of supply to bring a remunerative price result. the new dispensation offers two new factors bearing on this businesslike need of a sagacious sabotage, or rather it brings a change of coefficients in two factors already familiar in business management: a greater need, for gainful business, of resorting to such limitation of traffic; and a greater facility of ways and means for enforcing the needed restriction. so, it is confidently to be expected that in the prospective piping time of peace the advance in the industrial arts will continue at an accelerated rate; which may confidently be expected to affect the practicable increased production of merchantable goods; from which it follows that it will act to depress the prices of these goods; from which it follows that if a profitable business is to be done in the conduct of productive industry a greater degree of continence than before will have to be exercised in order not to let prices fall to an unprofitable figure; that is to say, the permissible output must be held short of the productive capacity of such industry by a wider margin than before. on the other hand, it is well known out of the experience of the past few decades that a larger coalition of invested capital, controlling a larger proportion of the output, can more effectually limit the supply to a salutary maximum, such as will afford reasonable profits. and with the new dispensation affording a freer scope for business enterprise on conditions of greater security, larger coalitions than before are due to come into bearing. so that the means will be at hand competently to meet this more urgent need of a stricter limitation of the output, in spite of any increased productive capacity conferred on the industrial community by any conceivable advance in the industrial arts. the outcome to be looked for should apparently be such an effectual recourse to capitalistic sabotage as will neutralise any added advantage that might otherwise accrue to the community from its continued improvements in technology. in spite of this singularly untoward conjuncture of circumstances to be looked for, there need be no serious apprehension that capitalistic sabotage, with a view to maintaining prices and the rate of profits, will go all the way, to the result indicated, at least not on the grounds so indicated alone. there is in the modern development of technology, and confidently to be counted on, a continued flow of new contrivances and expedients designed to supersede the old; and these are in fact successful, in greater or less measure, in finding their way into profitable use, on such terms as to displace older appliances, underbid them in the market, and render them obsolete or subject to recapitalisation on a lowered earning-capacity. so far as this unremitting flow of innovations has its effect, that is to say so far as it can not be hindered from having an effect, it acts to lower the effectual cost of products to the consumer. this effect is but a partial and somewhat uncertain one, but it is always to be counted in as a persistent factor, of uncertain magnitude, that will affect the results in the long run. as has just been spoken of above, large coalitions of invested wealth are more competent to maintain, or if need be to advance, prices than smaller coalitions acting in severalty, or even when acting in collusion. this state of the case has been well illustrated by the very successful conduct of such large business organisations during the past few decades; successful, that is, in earning large returns on the investments engaged. under the new dispensation, as has already been remarked, coalitions should reasonably be expected to grow to a larger size and achieve a greater efficiency for the same purpose. the large gains of the large corporate coalitions are commonly ascribed by their promoters, and by sympathetic theoreticians of the ancient line, to economies of production made practicable by a larger scale of production; an explanation which is disingenuous only so far as it needs be. what is more visibly true on looking into the workings of these coalitions in detail is that they are enabled to maintain prices at a profitable, indeed at a strikingly profitable, level by such a control of the output as would be called sabotage if it were put in practice by interested workmen with a view to maintain wages. the effects of this sagacious sabotage become visible in the large earnings of these investments and the large gains which, now and again, accrue to their managers. large fortunes commonly are of this derivation. in cases where no recapitalisation has been effected for a considerable series of years the yearly earnings of such businesslike coalitions have been known to approach fifty percent on the capitalised value. commonly, however, when earnings rise to a striking figure, the business will be recapitalised on the basis of its earning-capacity, by issue of a stock dividend, by reincorporation in a new combination with an increased capitalisation, and the like. such augmentation of capital not unusually has been spoken of by theoretical writers and publicists as an increase of the community's wealth, due to savings; an analysis of any given case is likely to show that its increased capital value represents an increasingly profitable procedure for securing a high price above cost, by stopping the available output short of the productive capacity of the industries involved. loosely speaking, and within the limits of what the traffic will bear, the gains in such a case are proportioned to the deficiency by which the production or supply under control falls short of productive capacity. so that the capitalisation in the case comes to bear a rough proportion to the material loss which this organisation of sabotage is enabled to inflict on the community at large; and instead of its being a capitalisation of serviceable means of production it may, now and again, come to little else than a capitalisation of chartered sabotage. under the new dispensation of peace and security at large this manner of capitalisation and business enterprise might reasonably be expected to gain something in scope and security of operation. indeed, there are few things within the range of human interest on which an opinion may more confidently be formed beforehand. if the rights of property, in their extent and amplitude, are maintained intact as they are before the law today, the hold which business enterprise on the large scale now has on the affairs and fortunes of the community at large is bound to grow firmer and to be used more unreservedly for private advantage under the new conditions contemplated. the logical result should be an accelerated rate of accumulation of the country's wealth in the hands of a relatively very small class of wealthy owners, with a relatively inconsiderable semi-dependent middle class of the well-to-do, and with the mass of the population even more nearly destitute than they are today. at the same time it is scarcely to be avoided that this wholly dependent and impecunious mass of the population must be given an appreciably better education than they have today. the argument will return to the difficulties that are liable to arise out of this conjuncture of facts, in the way of discontent and possible disturbance. * * * * * meantime, looking to the promise of the pacific future in the light of the pacific past, certain further consequences, particularly consequences of the economic order, that may reasonably be expected to follow will also merit attention. the experience of the victorian peace is almost as pointed in its suggestion on this head as if it had been an experiment made _ad hoc_; but with the reservation that the scale of economic life, after all, was small in the victorian era, and its pace was slack, compared with what the twentieth century should have to offer under suitable conditions of peace and pecuniary security. in the light of this most instructive modern instance, there should appear to be in prospect a growth of well-bred families resting on invested wealth and so living on unearned incomes; larger incomes and consequently a more imposingly well-bred body of gentlefolk, sustained and vouched for by a more munificent expenditure on superfluities, than the modern world has witnessed hitherto. doubtless the resulting growth of gentlemen and gentlewomen would be as perfect after their kind as these unexampled opportunities of gentle breeding might be expected to engender; so that even their british precursors on the trail of respectability would fall somewhat into insignificance by comparison, whether in respect of gentlemanly qualities or in point of cost per unit. the moral, and even more particularly the aesthetic, value of such a line of gentlefolk, and of the culture which they may be expected to place on view,--this cultural side of the case, of course, is what one would prefer to dwell on, and on the spiritual gains that might be expected to accrue to humanity at large from the steady contemplation of this meritorious respectability so displayed at such a cost. but the prosaic necessity of the argument turns back to the economic and civil bearing of this prospective development, this virtual bifurcation of the pacified nation into a small number of gentlemen who own the community's wealth and consume its net product in the pursuit of gentility, on the one hand, and an unblest mass of the populace who do the community's work on a meager livelihood tapering down toward the subsistence minimum, on the other hand. evidently, this prospective posture of affairs may seem "fraught with danger to the common weal," as a public spirited citizen might phrase it. or, as it would be expressed in less eloquent words, it appears to comprise elements that should make for a change. at the same time it should be recalled, and the statement will command assent on slight reflection, that there is no avoiding substantially such a posture of affairs under the promised régime of peace and security, provided only that the price-system stands over intact, and the current rights of property continue to be held inviolate. if the known principles of competitive gain and competitive spending should need enforcement to that effect by an illustrative instance, the familiar history of the victorian peace is sufficient to quiet all doubts. of course, the resulting articulation of classes in the community will not be expected to fall into such simple lines of sheer contrast as this scheme would indicate. the class of gentlefolk, the legally constituted wasters, as they would be rated from the economic point of view, can not be expected personally to take care of so large a consumption of superfluities as this posture of affairs requires at their hands. they would, as the victorian peace teaches, necessarily have the assistance of a trained corps of experts in unproductive consumption, the first and most immediate of whom would be those whom the genial phrasing of adam smith designates "menial servants." beyond these would come the purveyors of superfluities, properly speaking, and the large, indeed redundant, class of tradespeople of high and low degree,--dependent in fact but with an illusion of semi-dependence; and farther out again the legal and other professional classes of the order of stewards, whose duty it will be to administer the sources of income and receive, apportion and disburse the revenues so devoted to a traceless extinguishment. there would, in other words, be something of a "substantial middle class," dependent on the wealthy and on their expenditure of wealth, but presumably imbued with the victorian middle-class illusion that they are of some account in their own right. under the due legal forms and sanctions this, somewhat voluminous, middle-class population would engage in the traffic which is their perquisite, and would continue to believe, in some passable fashion, that they touch the substance of things at something nearer than the second remove. they would in great part appear to be people of "independent means," and more particularly would they continue in the hope of so appearing and of some time making good the appearance. hence their fancied, and therefore their sentimental, interest would fall out on the side of the established law and order; and they would accordingly be an element of stability in the commonwealth, and would throw in their weight, and their voice, to safeguard that private property and that fabric of prices and credit through which the "income stream" flows to the owners of preponderant invested wealth. judged on the state of the situation as it runs in our time, and allowing for the heightened efficiency of large-scale investment and consolidated management under the prospective conditions of added pecuniary security, it is to be expected that the middle-class population with "independent means" should come in for a somewhat meager livelihood, provided that they work faithfully at their business of managing pecuniary traffic to the advantage of their pecuniary betters,--meager, that is to say, when allowance is made for the conventionally large expenditure on reputable appearances which is necessarily to be included in their standard of living. it lies in the nature of this system of large-scale investment and enterprise that the (pecuniarily) minor agencies engaged on a footing of ostensible independence will come in for only such a share in the aggregate gains of the community as it is expedient for the greater business interests to allow them as an incentive to go on with their work as purveyors of traffic to these greater business interests. the current, and still more this prospective, case of the quasi-self-directing middle class may fairly be illustrated by the case of the american farmers, of the past and present. the american farmer rejoices to be called "the independent farmer." he once was independent, in a meager and toil-worn fashion, in the days before the price-system had brought him and all his works into the compass of the market; but that was some time ago. he now works for the market, ordinarily at something like what is called a "living wage," provided he has "independent means" enough to enable him by steady application to earn a living wage; and of course, the market being controlled by the paramount investment interests in the background, his work, in effect, inures to their benefit; except so much as it may seem necessary to allow him as incentive to go on. also of course, these paramount investment interests are in turn controlled in all their manoeuvres by the impersonal exigencies of the price-system, which permits no vagaries in violation of the rule that all traffic must show a balance of profit in terms of price. the independent farmer still continues to believe that in some occult sense he still is independent in what he will do and what not; or perhaps rather that he can by shrewd management retain or regain a tolerable measure of such independence, after the fashion of what is held to have been the posture of affairs in the days before the coming of corporation finance; or at least he believes that he ought to have, or to regain or reclaim, some appreciable measure of such independence; which ought then, by help of the "independent means" which he still treasures, to procure him an honest and assured livelihood in return for an honest year's work. latterly he, that is the common run of the farmers, has been taking note of the fact that he is, as he apprehends it, at a disadvantage in the market; and he is now taking recourse to concerted action for the purpose of what might be called "rigging the market" to his own advantage. in this he overlooks the impregnable position which the party of the second part, the great investment interests, occupy; in fact, he is counting without his host. hitherto he has not been convinced of his own helplessness. and with a fine fancy he still imagines that his own interest is on the side of the propertied and privileged classes; so that the farmer constituency is the chief pillar of conservative law and order, particularly in all that touches the inviolable rights of property and at every juncture where a division comes on between those who live by investment and those who live by work. in pecuniary effect, the ordinary american farmer, who legally owns a moderate farm of the common sort, belongs among those who work for a livelihood; such a livelihood as the investment interests find it worth while to allow him under the rule of what the traffic will bear; but in point of sentiment and class consciousness he clings to a belated stand on the side of those who draw a profit from his work. so it is also with the menial servants and the middle-class people of "independent means," who are, however, in a position to see more clearly their dependence on the owners of predominant wealth. and such, with a further accentuation of the anomaly, may reasonably be expected to be the further run of these relations under the promised régime of peace and security. the class of well-kept gentlefolk will scarcely be called on to stand alone, in case of a division between those who live by investment and those who live by work; inasmuch as, for the calculable future, it should seem a reasonable expectation that this very considerable fringe of dependents and pseudo-independents will abide by their time-tried principles of right and honest living, through good days and evil, and cast in their lot unreservedly with that reputable body to whom the control of trade and industry by investment assigns the usufruct of the community's productive powers. * * * * * something has already been said of the prospective breeding of pedigreed gentlefolk under the projected régime of peace. pedigree, for the purpose in hand, is a pecuniary attribute and is, of course, a product of funded wealth, more or less ancient. virtually ancient pedigree can be procured by well-advised expenditure on the conspicuous amenities; that is to say pedigree effectually competent as a background of current gentility. gentlefolk of such syncopated pedigree may have to walk circumspectly, of course; but their being in this manner put on their good behavior should tend to heighten their effectual serviceability as gentlefolk, by inducing a single-mindedness of gentility beyond what can fairly be expected of those who are already secure in their tenure. except conventionally, there is no hereditary difference between the standard gentlefolk and, say, their "menial servants," or the general population of the farms and the industrial towns. this is a well-established commonplace among ethnological students; which has, of course, nothing to say with respect to the conventionally distinct lines of descent of the "best families." these best families are nowise distinguishable from the common run in point of hereditary traits; the difference that makes the gentleman and the gentlewoman being wholly a matter of habituation during the individual's life-time. it is something of a distasteful necessity to call attention to this total absence of native difference between the well-born and the common, but it is a necessity of the argument in hand, and the recalling of it may, therefore, be overlooked for once in a way. there is no harm and no annoyance intended. the point of it all is that, on the premises which this state of the case affords, the body of gentlefolk created by such an accumulation of invested wealth will have no less of an effectual cultural value than they would have had if their virtually ancient pedigree had been actual. at this point, again, the experience of the victorian peace and the functioning of its gentlefolk come in to indicate what may fairly be hoped for in this way under this prospective régime of peace at large. but with the difference that the scale of things is to be larger, the pace swifter, and the volume and dispersion of this prospective leisure class somewhat wider. the work of this leisure class--and there is neither paradox nor inconsistency in the phrase--should be patterned on the lines worked out by their prototypes of the victorian time, but with some appreciable accentuation in the direction of what chiefly characterised the leisure class of that era of tranquility. the characteristic feature to which attention naturally turns at this suggestion is the tranquility that has marked that body of gentlefolk and their code of clean and honest living. another word than "tranquility" might be hit upon to designate this characteristic animus, but any other word that should at all adequately serve the turn would carry a less felicitous suggestion of those upper-class virtues that have constituted the substantial worth of the victorian gentleman. the conscious worth of these gentlefolk has been a beautifully complete achievement. it has been an achievement of "faith without works," of course; but, needless to say, that is as it should be, also of course. the place of gentlefolk in the economy of nature is tracelessly to consume the community's net product, and in doing so to set a standard of decent expenditure for the others emulatively to work up to as near as may be. it is scarcely conceivable that this could have been done in a more unobtrusively efficient manner, or with a more austerely virtuous conviction of well-doing, than by the gentlefolk bred of the victorian peace. so also, in turn, it is not to be believed that the prospective breed of gentlefolk derivable from the net product of the pacific nations under the promised régime of peace at large will prove in any degree less effective for the like ends. more will be required of them in the way of a traceless consumption of superfluities and an unexampled expensive standard of living. but this situation that so faces them may be construed as a larger opportunity, quite as well as a more difficult task. a theoretical exposition of the place and cultural value of a leisure class in modern life would scarcely be in place here; and it has also been set out in some detail elsewhere.[10] for the purpose in hand it may be sufficient to recall that the canons of taste and the standards of valuation worked out and inculcated by leisure-class life have in all ages run, with unbroken consistency, to pecuniary waste and personal futility. in its economic bearing, and particularly in its immediate bearing on the material well-being of the community at large, the leadership of the leisure class can scarcely be called by a less derogatory epithet than "untoward." but that is not the whole of the case, and the other side should be heard. the leisure-class life of tranquility, running detached as it does above the turmoil out of which the material of their sustenance is derived, enables a growth of all those virtues that mark, or make, the gentleman; and that affect the life of the underlying community throughout, pervasively, by imitation; leading to a standardisation of the everyday proprieties on a presumably, higher level of urbanity and integrity than might be expected to result in the absence of this prescriptive model. [footnote 10: cf. _the theory of the leisure class_, especially ch. v.-ix. and xiv.] _integer vitae scelerisque purus_, the gentleman of assured station turns a placid countenance to all those petty vexations of breadwinning that touch him not. serenely and with an impassive fortitude he faces those common vicissitudes of life that are impotent to make or mar his material fortunes and that can neither impair his creature comforts nor put a slur on his good repute. so that without afterthought he deals fairly in all everyday conjunctures of give and take; for they are at the most inconsequential episodes to him, although the like might spell irremediable disaster to his impecunious counterfoil among the common men who have the community's work to do. in short, he is a gentleman, in the best acceptation of the word,--unavoidably, by force of circumstance. as such his example is of invaluable consequence to the underlying community of common folk, in that it keeps before their eyes an object lesson in habitual fortitude and visible integrity such as could scarcely have been created except under such shelter from those disturbances that would go to mar habitual fortitude and integrity. there can be little doubt but the high example of the victorian gentlefolk has had much to do with stabilising the animus of the british common man on lines of integrity and fair play. what else and more in the way of habitual preconceptions he may, by competitive imitation, owe to the same high source is not immediately in question here. * * * * * recalling once more that the canon of life whereby folk are gentlefolk sums itself up in the requirements of pecuniary waste and personal futility, and that these requirements are indefinitely extensible, at the same time that the management of the community's industry by investment for a profit enables the owners of invested wealth to divert to their own use the community's net product, wherewith to meet these requirements, it follows that the community at large which provides this output of product will be allowed so much as is required by their necessary standard of living,--with an unstable margin of error in the adjustment. this margin of error should tend continually to grow narrower as the businesslike management of industry grows more efficient with experience; but it will also continually be disturbed in the contrary sense by innovations of a technological nature that require continual readjustment. this margin is probably not to be got rid of, though it may be expected to become less considerable under more settled conditions. it should also not be overlooked that the standard of living here spoken of as necessarily to be allowed the working population by no means coincides with the "physical subsistence minimum," from which in fact it always departs by something appreciable. the necessary standard of living of the working community is in fact made up of two distinguishable factors: the subsistence minimum, and the requirements of decorously wasteful consumption--the "decencies of life." these decencies are no less requisite than the physical necessaries, in point of workday urgency, and their amount is a matter of use and wont. this composite standard of living is a practical minimum, below which consumption will not fall, except by a fluctuating margin of error; the effect being the same, in point of necessary consumption, as if it were all of the nature of a physical subsistence minimum. loosely speaking, the arrangement should leave nothing appreciable over, after the requirements of genteel waste and of the workday standard of consumption have been met. from which in turn it should follow that the rest of what is comprised under the general caption of "culture" will find a place only in the interstices of leisure-class expenditure and only at the hands of aberrant members of the class of the gently-bred. the working population should have no effectual margin of time, energy or means for other pursuits than the day's work in the service of the price-system; so that aberrant individuals in this class, who might by native propensity incline, e.g., to pursue the sciences or the fine arts, should have (virtually) no chance to make good. it would be a virtual suppression of such native gifts among the common folk, not a definitive and all-inclusive suppression. the state of the case under the victorian peace may, again, be taken in illustration of the point; although under the presumably more effectual control to be looked for in the pacific future the margin might reasonably be expected to run somewhat narrower, so that this virtual suppression of cultural talent among the common men should come nearer a complete suppression. the working of that free initiative that makes the advance of civilisation, and also the greater part of its conservation, would in effect be allowed only in the erratic members of the kept classes; where at the same time it would have to work against the side-draught of conventional usage, which discountenances any pursuit that is not visibly futile according to some accepted manner of futility. now under the prospective perfect working of the price-system, bearers of the banners of civilisation could effectually be drawn only from the kept classes, the gentlefolk who alone would have the disposal of such free income as is required for work that has no pecuniary value. and numerically the gentlefolk are an inconsiderable fraction of the population. the supply of competently gifted bearers of the community's culture would accordingly be limited to such as could be drawn by self-selection from among this inconsiderable proportion of the community at large. it may be recalled that in point of heredity, and therefore in point of native fitness for the maintenance and advance of civilisation, there is no difference between the gentlefolk and the populace at large; or at least there is no difference of such a nature as to count in abatement of the proposition set down above. some slight, but after all inconsequential, difference there may be, but such difference as there is, if any, rather counts against the gentlefolk as keepers of the cultural advance. the gentlefolk are derived from business; the gentleman represents a filial generation of the businessman; and if the class typically is gifted with any peculiar hereditary traits, therefore, they should presumably be such as typically mark the successful businessman--astute, prehensile, unscrupulous. for a generation or two, perhaps to the scriptural third and fourth generation, it is possible that a diluted rapacity and cunning may continue to mark the businessman's well-born descendants; but these are not serviceable traits for the conservation and advancement of the community's cultural heritage. so that no consideration of special hereditary fitness in the well-born need be entertained in this connection. as to the limitation imposed by the price-system on the supply of candidates suited by native gift for the human work of civilisation; it would no doubt, be putting the figure extravagantly high to say that the gentlefolk, properly speaking, comprise as much as ten percent of the total population; perhaps something less than one-half of that percentage would still seem a gross overstatement. but, to cover loose ends and vagrant cases, the gentlefolk may for the purpose be credited with so high a percentage of the total population. if ten percent be allowed, as an outside figure, it follows that the community's scientists, artists, scholars, and the like individuals given over to the workday pursuits of the human spirit, are by conventional restriction to be drawn from one-tenth of the current supply of persons suited by native gift for these pursuits. or as it may also be expressed, in so far as the projected scheme takes effect it should result in the suppression of nine (or more) out of every ten persons available for the constructive work of civilisation. the cultural consequences to be looked for, therefore, should be quite markedly of the conservative order. of course, in actual effect, the retardation or repression of civilisation by this means, as calculated on these premises, should reasonably be expected to count up to something appreciably more than nine-tenths of the gains that might presumably be achieved in the conceivable absence of the price-system and the régime of investment. all work of this kind has much of the character of teamwork; so that the efforts of isolated individuals count for little, and a few working in more or less of concert and understanding will count for proportionally much less than many working in concert. the endeavours of the individuals engaged count cumulatively, to such effect that doubling their forces will more than double the aggregate efficiency; and conversely, reducing the number will reduce the effectiveness of their work by something more than the simple numerical proportion. indeed, an undue reduction of numbers in such a case may lead to the total defeat of the few that are left, and the best endeavours of a dwindling remnant may be wholly nugatory. there is needed a sense of community and solidarity, without which the assurance necessary to the work is bound to falter and dwindle out; and there is also needed a degree of popular countenance, not to be had by isolated individuals engaged in an unconventional pursuit of things that are neither to be classed as spendthrift decorum nor as merchantable goods. in this connection an isolated one does not count for one, and more than the critical minimum will count for several per capita. it is a case where the "minimal dose" is wholly inoperative. there is not a little reason to believe that consequent upon the installation of the projected régime of peace at large and secure investment the critical point in the repression of talent will very shortly be reached and passed, so that the principle of the "minimal dose" will come to apply. the point may readily be illustrated by the case of many british and american towns and neighbourhoods during the past few decades; where the dominant price-system and its commercial standards of truth and beauty have over-ruled all inclination to cultural sanity and put it definitively in abeyance. the cultural, or perhaps the conventional, residue left over in these cases where civilisation has gone stale through inefficiency of the minimal dose is not properly to be found fault with; it is of a blameless character, conventionally; nor is there any intention here to cast aspersion on the desolate. the like effects of the like causes are to be seen in the american colleges and universities, where business principles have supplanted the pursuit of learning, and where the commercialisation of aims, ideals, tastes, occupations and personnel is following much the same lines that have led so many of the country towns effectually outside the cultural pale. the american university or college is coming to be an outlier of the price-system, in point of aims, standards and personnel; hitherto the tradition of learning as a trait of civilisation, as distinct from business, has not been fully displaced, although it is now coming to face the passage of the minimal dose. the like, in a degree, is apparently true latterly for many english, and still more evidently for many german schools. in these various instances of what may be called dry-rot or local blight on the civilised world's culture the decline appears to be due not to a positive infection of a malignant sort, so much as to a failure of the active cultural ferment, which has fallen below the critical point of efficacy; perhaps through an unintended refusal of a livelihood to persons given over to cultivating the elements of civilisation; perhaps through the conventional disallowance of the pursuit of any other ends than competitive gain and competitive spending. evidently it is something much more comprehensive in this nature that is reasonably to be looked for under the prospective régime of peace, in case the price-system gains that farther impetus and warrant which it should come in for if the rights of ownership and investment stand over intact, and so come to enjoy the benefit of a further improved state of the industrial arts and a further enlarged scale of operation and enhanced rate of turnover. * * * * * to turn back to the point from which this excursion branched off. it has been presumed all the while that the technological equipment, or the state of the industrial arts, must continue to advance under the conditions offered by this régime of peace at large. but the last few paragraphs will doubtless suggest that such a single-minded addiction to competitive gain and competitive spending as the stabilised and amplified price-system would enjoin, must lead to an effectual retardation, perhaps to a decline, of those material sciences on which modern technology draws; and that the state of the industrial arts should therefore cease to advance, if only the scheme of investment and businesslike sabotage can be made sufficiently secure. that such may be the outcome is a contingency which the argument will have to meet and to allow for; but it is after all a contingency that need not be expected to derange the sequence of events, except in the way of retardation. even without further advance in technological expedients or in the relevant material sciences, there will still necessarily ensue an effectual advance in the industrial arts, in the sense that further organisation and enlargement of the material equipment and industrial processes on lines already securely known and not to be forgotten must bring an effectually enhanced efficiency of the industrial process as a whole. in illustration, it is scarcely to be assumed even as a tentative hypothesis that the system of transport and communication will not undergo extension and improvement on the lines already familiar, even in the absence of new technological contrivances. at the same time a continued increase of population is to be counted on; which has, for the purpose in hand, much the same effect as an advance in the industrial arts. human contact and mutual understanding will necessarily grow wider and closer, and will have its effect on the habits of thought prevalent in the communities that are to live under the promised régime of peace. the system of transport and communication having to handle a more voluminous and exacting traffic, in the service of a larger and more compact population, will have to be organised and administered on mechanically drawn schedules of time, place, volume, velocity, and price, of a still more exacting accuracy than hitherto. the like will necessarily apply throughout the industrial occupations that employ extensive plant or processes, or that articulate with industrial processes of that nature; which will necessarily comprise a larger proportion of the industrial process at large than hitherto. as has already been remarked more than once in the course of the argument, a population that lives and does its work, and such play as is allowed it, in and by an exactingly articulate mechanical system of this kind will necessarily be an "intelligent" people, in the colloquial sense of the word; that is to say it will necessarily be a people that uses printed matter freely and that has some familiarity with the elements of those material sciences that underlie this mechanically organised system of appliances and processes. such a population lives by and within the framework of the mechanistic logic, and is in a fair way to lose faith in any proposition that can not be stated convincingly in terms of this mechanistic logic. superstitions are liable to lapse by neglect or disuse in such a community; that is to say propositions of a non-mechanistic complexion are liable to insensible disestablishment in such a case; "superstition" in these premises coming to signify whatever is not of this mechanistic, or "materialistic" character. an exception to this broad characterisation of non-mechanistic propositions as "superstition" would be matters that are of the nature of an immediate deliverance of the senses or of the aesthetic sensibilities. by a simile it might be said that what so falls under the caption of "superstition" in such a case is subject to decay by inanition. it should not be difficult to conceive the general course of such a decay of superstitions under this unremitting discipline of mechanistic habits of life. the recent past offers an illustration, in the unemotional progress of decay that has overtaken religious beliefs in the more civilised countries, and more particularly among the intellectually trained workmen of the mechanical industries. the elimination of such non-mechanistic propositions of the faith has been visibly going on, but it has not worked out on any uniform plan, nor has it overtaken any large or compact body of people consistently or abruptly, being of the nature of obsolescence rather than of set repudiation. but in a slack and unreflecting fashion the divestment has gone on until the aggregate effect is unmistakable. a similar divestment of superstitions is reasonably to be looked for also in that domain of preconceptions that lies between the supernatural and the mechanistic. chief among these time-warped preconceptions--or superstitions--that so stand over out of the alien past among these democratic peoples is the institution of property. as is true of preconceptions touching the supernatural verities, so here too the article of use and wont in question will not bear formulation in mechanistic terms and is not congruous with that mechanistic logic that is incontinently bending the habits of thought of the common man more and more consistently to its own bent. there is, of course, the difference that while no class--apart from the servants of the church--have a material interest in the continued integrity of the articles of the supernatural faith, there is a strong and stubborn material interest bound up with the maintenance of this article of the pecuniary faith; and the class in whom this material interest vests are also, in effect, invested with the coercive powers of the law. the law, and the popular preconceptions that give the law its binding force, go to uphold the established usage and the established prerogatives on this head; and the disestablishment of the rights of property and investment therefore is not a simple matter of obsolescence through neglect. it may confidently be counted on that all the apparatus of the law and all the coercive agencies of law and order, will be brought in requisition to uphold the ancient rights of ownership, whenever any move is made toward their disallowance or restriction. but then, on the other hand, the movement to disallow or diminish the prerogatives of ownership is also not to take the innocuous shape of unstudied neglect. so soon, or rather so far, as the common man comes to realise that these rights of ownership and investment uniformly work to his material detriment, at the same time that he has lost the "will to believe" in any argument that does not run in terms of the mechanistic logic, it is reasonable to expect that he will take a stand on this matter; and it is more than likely that the stand taken will be of an uncompromising kind,--presumably something in the nature of the stand once taken by recalcitrant englishmen in protest against the irresponsible rule of the stuart sovereign. it is also not likely that the beneficiaries under these proprietary rights will yield their ground at all amicably; all the more since they are patently within their authentic rights in insisting on full discretion in the disposal of their own possessions; very much as charles i or james ii once were within their prescriptive right,--which had little to say in the outcome. even apart from "time immemorial" and the patent authenticity of the institution, there were and are many cogent arguments to be alleged in favor of the position for which the stuart sovereigns and their spokesmen contended. so there are and will be many, perhaps more, cogent reasons to be alleged for the maintenance of the established law and order in respect of the rights of ownership and investment. not least urgent, nor least real, among these arguments is the puzzling question of what to put in the place of these rights and of the methods of control based on them, very much as the analogous question puzzled the public-spirited men of the stuart times. all of which goes to argue that there may be expected to arise a conjuncture of perplexities and complications, as well as a division of interests and claims. to which should be added that the division is likely to come to a head so soon as the balance of forces between the two parties in interest becomes doubtful, so that either party comes to surmise that the success of its own aims may depend on its own efforts. and as happens where two antagonistic parties are each convinced of the justice of its cause, and in the absence of an umpire, the logical recourse is the wager of battle. granting the premises, there should be no reasonable doubt as to this eventual cleavage between those who own and those who do not; and of the premises the only item that is not already an accomplished fact is the installation of peace at large. the rest of what goes into the argument is the well-known modern state of the industrial arts, and the equally well-known price-system; which, in combination, give its character to the modern state of business enterprise. it is only an unusually broad instance of an institutional arrangement which has in the course of time and changing conditions come to work at cross purposes with that underlying ground of institutional arrangements that takes form in the commonplace aphorism, live and let live. with change setting in the direction familiar to all men today, it is only a question of limited time when the discrepancy will reach a critical pass, and the installation of peace may be counted on to hasten this course of things. that a decision will be sought by recourse to forcible measures, is also scarcely open to question; since the established law and order provides for a resort to coercion in the enforcement of these prescriptive rights, and since both parties in interest, in this as in other cases, are persuaded of the justice of their claims. a decision either way is an intolerable iniquity in the eyes of the losing side. history teaches that in such a quarrel the recourse has always been to force. history teaches also, but with an inflection of doubt, that the outworn institution in such a conjuncture faces disestablishment. at least, so men like to believe. what the experience of history does not leave in doubt is the grave damage, discomfort and shame incident to the displacement of such an institutional discrepancy by such recourse to force. what further appears to be clear in the premises, at least to the point of a strong presumption, is that in the present case the decision, or the choice, lies between two alternatives: either the price-system and its attendant business enterprise will yield and pass out; or the pacific nations will conserve their pecuniary scheme of law and order at the cost of returning to a war footing and letting their owners preserve the rights of ownership by force of arms. the reflection obviously suggests itself that this prospect of consequences to follow from the installation of peace at large might well be taken into account beforehand by those who are aiming to work out an enduring peace. it has appeared in the course of the argument that the preservation of the present pecuniary law and order, with all its incidents of ownership and investment, is incompatible with an unwarlike state of peace and security. this current scheme of investment, business, and sabotage, should have an appreciably better chance of survival in the long run if the present conditions of warlike preparation and national insecurity were maintained, or if the projected peace were left in a somewhat problematical state, sufficiently precarious to keep national animosities alert, and thereby to the neglect of domestic interests, particularly of such interests as touch the popular well-being. on the other hand, it has also appeared that the cause of peace and its perpetuation might be materially advanced if precautions were taken beforehand to put out of the way as much as may be of those discrepancies of interest and sentiment between nations and between classes which make for dissension and eventual hostilities. so, if the projectors of this peace at large are in any degree inclined to seek concessive terms on which the peace might hopefully be made enduring, it should evidently be part of their endeavours from the outset to put events in train for the present abatement and eventual abrogation of the rights of ownership and of the price-system in which these rights take effect. a hopeful beginning along this line would manifestly be the neutralisation of all pecuniary rights of citizenship, as has been indicated in an earlier passage. on the other hand, if peace is not desired at the cost of relinquishing the scheme of competitive gain and competitive spending, the promoters of peace should logically observe due precaution and move only so far in the direction of a peaceable settlement as would result in a sufficiently unstable equilibrium of mutual jealousies; such as might expeditiously be upset whenever discontent with pecuniary affairs should come to threaten this established scheme of pecuniary prerogatives. books by thorstein veblen the theory of the leisure class the theory of business enterprise the instinct of workmanship imperial germany and the industrial revolution the nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation the higher learning in america